12 Prosecution

12​ ​Prosecution

 

PROSECUTOR​ ​VS.​ ​GENERAL​ ​VANDE Before​ ​the​ ​International​ ​Criminal​ ​Court​ ​at​ ​the​ ​Hague

OCTOBER​ ​2017

T​ABLE​ ​OF​ ​C​ONTENTS INDEX​ ​OF​ ​AUTHORITIES.....................................................................................................

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STATEMENT​ ​OF​ ​FACTS........................................................................................................

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SUMMARY​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​PLEADINGS.........................................................................................

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PLEADINGS................................................................................................................................​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​4 A.​ ​PRELIMINARY​ ​MATTERS.................................................................................................

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1.​ ​STANDARD​ ​OF​ ​PROOF​............................................................................................... 4 2.​ ​NATURE​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​CONFLICT​....................................................................................

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2.1​ ​All​ ​charges​ ​against​ ​Vande​ ​took​ ​place​ ​in​ ​the context​ ​of​ ​and​ ​were​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​an​ ​noninternational​ ​armed​ ​conflict​ ​(NIAC).................................................................​ ​ ​ ​ ​4 2.1.1​ ​ ​There​ ​was​ ​an​ ​NIAC​ ​between​ ​the​ ​TAF​ ​and​ ​the​ ​FKA​........................ 4 2.1.2​ ​The​ ​minimum​ ​requirement​ ​of​ ​ ​intensity​ ​has​ ​been​ ​met​ ​..................... 4 2.1.3​ ​The​ ​FKA​ ​possessed​ ​the​ ​requisite​ ​organization​ ​................................ 5 2.2​ ​The​ ​involvement​ ​of​ ​Hakova​ ​did​ ​not​ ​internationalize the​ ​armed​ ​conflict​ ​in​ ​Kouka​ ​................................................................... 5 2.2.1​ ​Hakova​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​sovereign​ ​state​ ​........................................................ 5 2.2.2​ ​Involvement​ ​of​ ​Hakovan​ ​officers​ ​in​ ​FKA​ ​failed​ ​the

overall​ ​control​ ​test​ ​……………………………………………………..

2.2.3​ ​Nessuno​ ​documents​ ​are​ ​inadmissible​ ​as​ ​evidence​ ​.........................

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2.3​ ​There​ ​is​ ​a​ ​nexus​ ​between​ ​the​ ​3​ ​charges​ ​against Vande​ ​and​ ​the​ ​conflict​ ​in​ ​Kouka​ ​........................................................... 6 2.4​ ​Vande​ ​is​ ​aware​ ​of​ ​factual​ ​circumstances​ ​that established​ ​the​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​an​ ​NIAC​ ​.................................................... 6 B.​ ​CHARGES​ ​…………………………………………………………………………………….​ ​ ​ ​7 COUNT​ ​1:​ ​VANDE​ ​BEARS​ ​RESPONSIBILITY​ ​FOR​ ​INDUCING​ ​THE COMMISSION​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​WAR​ ​CRIME​ ​OF​ ​DIRECTING​ ​ATTACKS AGAINST​ ​THE​ ​INDIVIDUAL​ ​CIVILIANS​ ​OR​ ​THE​ ​CIVILIAN POPULATION​ ​AS​ ​SUCH​................................................................................................ 7 Page​ ​2​ ​of​ ​25

1. Vande induced​ ​the​ ​attack​ ​directed​ ​on​ ​civilians​................................................​............​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​7 2. TAF

committed​ ​the​ ​war​ ​crime​ ​of​ ​directing​ ​attacks​ ​against civilians.....................

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2.1​ ​The​ ​TAF​ ​launched​ ​the​ ​attacks​ ​................................................................................... 8 2.2​ ​The​ ​object​ ​of​ ​the​ ​attack​ ​was​ ​a​ ​civilian​ ​population​ ​or​ ​individual​ ​civilians​ ​not

taking​ ​direct​ ​part​ ​in​ ​hostilities​ ​.......................................................................................... 8 2.2.1​ ​The​ ​attack​ ​violated​ ​the​ ​Principle​ ​of​ ​Distinction​ ​........................................... 9 2.2.2​ ​The​ ​attack​ ​violated​ ​the​ ​Principle​ ​of​ ​Proportionality​ ​.................................

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2.3​ ​The​ ​attack​ ​was​ ​intended​ ​to​ ​be​ ​carried​ ​out​ ​on​ ​a​ ​non-military​ ​objective​ ​.................... 9 2.4​ ​Vande​ ​was​ ​aware​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Civilian​ ​Status​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Population​ ​or​ ​Individuals...............

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Armed​ ​Conflict​ ​.................................................................................................................

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2.5.​ ​Vande​ ​was​ ​aware​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Circumstances​ ​that​ ​Established​ ​the​ ​Existence​ ​of​ ​the COUNT​ ​2:​ ​VANDE​ ​IS​ ​RESPONSIBLE​ ​AND​ ​LIABLE​ ​ON​ ​THE​ ​BASIS​ ​OF

COMMAND​ ​RESPONSIBILITY​ ​FOR​ ​THE​ ​WAR​ ​CRIME​ ​OF​ ​RAPE​.................... 11 1.​​ ​Vande​ ​bears​ ​command​ ​responsibility​ ​for​ ​the​ ​commission​ ​of​ ​the​ ​war​ ​crime​ ​of rape​ ​by​ ​his​ ​subordinates​ ​.................................................................................................. 11 1.1​​ ​Effective​ ​Control​ ​........................................................................................................... 11 1.2​​ ​Knowledge​ ​.................................................................................................................... 11 1.3​ ​No​ ​reasonable​ ​and​ ​necessary​ ​measures​ ​taken​ ​............................................................. 12 2.​ ​The​ ​senior​ ​officers​ ​of​ ​TAF​ ​committed​ ​rape​ ​.......................................................................

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2.1​ ​Human​ ​Rights​ ​Watch​ ​and​ ​The​ ​Guardian​ ​reports​ ​are​ ​admissible​ ​and​ ​sufficient​ ​to​ ​prove

the​ ​commission​ ​of​ ​rape​ ​........................................................................................................ 12 2.2​ ​ ​The​ ​subordinates​ ​of​ ​Vande​ ​perpetrated​ ​rape​ ​............................................................... 12 2.3.​ ​The​ ​protection​ ​against​ ​rape​ ​applies​ ​to​ ​victims​ ​within​ ​the​ ​same​ ​armed​ ​forces​ ​............. 13 3.​ ​Vande​ ​knew​ ​that​ ​the​ ​rape​ ​committed​ ​by​ ​his​ ​subordinates​ ​happened​ ​in​ ​the context​ ​of​ ​a​ ​NIAC.​.............................................................................................................. 13 COUNT​ ​3:​ ​VANDE,​ ​THROUGH​ ​ANOTHER​ ​PERSON,​ ​ORDERED​ ​THE DISPLACEMENT​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​OMBRIAN​ ​RESIDENTS​ ​IN​ ​KOUKA UNDER​ ​OPERATION​ ​BLANC​....................................................................................... 14

1. Vande,​ ​through​ ​another,​ ​ordered​ ​the displacement​..................................................

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2. Vande made​ ​the​ ​order​ ​in​ ​his​ ​capacity​ ​as​ ​an​ ​individual,​ ​jointly​ ​with another​ ​or​ ​through​ ​another​ ​person,​ ​regardless​ ​of​ ​whether​ ​that​ ​other person​ ​is​ ​criminally​ ​responsible.​.................................................................................. Page​ ​3​ ​of​ ​25

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​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​3.​ ​Ombrian​ ​residents​ ​are​ ​civilians.​...................................................................................

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​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​4.​ ​Such​ ​order​ ​was​ ​not​ ​justified​ ​by​ ​the​ ​security​ ​of​ ​the​ ​civilians​ ​involved​ ​or by​ ​military​ ​necessity.​....................................................................................................

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​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​5.​ ​Vande​ ​as​ ​Chief​ ​of​ ​Defence​ ​Staff​ ​is​ ​in​ ​a​ ​position​ ​to​ ​effect​ ​displacement when​ ​he​ ​gave​ ​the​ ​order​ ​to​ ​implement​ ​Operation​ ​Blanc.​...........................................

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​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​6.​ ​Vande​ ​is​ ​aware​ ​that​ ​the​ ​displacement​ ​of​ ​civilians​ ​occurred​ ​in​ ​the​ ​context of​ ​a​ ​NIAC.​...................................................................................................................... PRAYER​ ​FOR​ ​RELIEF​ ​.........................................................................................................

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I​NDEX​ ​OF​ ​A​UTHORITIES INTERNATIONAL​ ​TREATIES​ ​AND​ ​CONVENTIONS 1933​ ​Montevideo​ ​Convention​ ​on​ ​the​ ​Rights​ ​and​ ​Duties​ ​of​ ​States Page​ ​5 International​ ​Committee​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Red​ ​Cross​ ​(ICRC),​ ​Protocol​ ​Additional​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Geneva Conventions​ ​of​ ​12​ ​August​ ​1949,​ ​and​ ​relating​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Protection​ ​of​ ​Victims​ ​of​ ​International​ ​Armed Conflicts​ ​(Protocol​ ​I),​ ​8​ ​June​ ​1977,​ ​1125​ ​UNTS​ ​3 Pages​ ​8,​ ​9,​ ​15 International​ ​Committee​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Red​ ​Cross​ ​(ICRC),​ ​Protocol​ ​Additional​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Geneva Conventions​ ​of​ ​12​ ​August​ ​1949,​ ​and​ ​relating​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Protection​ ​of​ ​Victims​ ​of​ ​Non-International Armed​ ​Conflicts​ ​(Protocol​ ​II),​ ​8​ ​June​ ​1977,​ ​1125​ ​UNTS​ ​609 Pages​ ​8,​ ​9,​ ​15 UN​ ​General​ ​Assembly,​ ​International​ ​Covenant​ ​on​ ​Civil​ ​and​ ​Political​ ​Rights,​ ​16​ ​December​ ​1966, United​ ​Nations,​ ​Treaty​ ​Series,​ ​vol.​ ​999,​ ​p.​ ​17 Page​ ​6 UN​ ​General​ ​Assembly,​ ​Rome​ ​Statute​ ​of​ ​the​ ​International​ ​Criminal​ ​Court,​ ​July​ ​17,​ ​1998​ ​ISBN No.​ ​92-9227-227-6​ ​………………….. Page​ ​6 U.N.​ ​DOCUMENTS International​ ​Criminal​ ​Court,​ ​Elements​ ​of​ ​Crime,​ ​2013,​ ​ISBN​ ​No.​ ​92-9227-232-2 Page​ ​14 UN​ ​OCHA​ ​Civil-​Military​ ​Coordination​ ​Section,​​ ​Use​ ​of​ ​Military​ ​or​ ​Armed​ ​Escorts​ ​for Humanitarian​ ​Convoys,​ ​14​ ​September​ ​2001 Page​ ​10 Page​ ​5​ ​of​ ​25

JUDICIAL​ ​AND​ ​ARBITRAL​ ​DECISIONS ICJ​ ​Report,​ ​Legality​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Threat​ ​or​ ​Use​ ​of​ ​Nuclear​ ​Weapons,​ ​ICJ​ ​Advisory​ ​Opinion,​ ​8​ ​July 1996,​ ​[1996]​ ​Rep.​ ​226,​ ​at​ ​257 Page​ ​8 M.C.​ ​v.​ ​Bulgaria,.39272/98,​ ​Council​ ​of​ ​Europe:​ ​European​ ​Court​ ​of​ ​Human​ ​Rights,​ ​(3​ ​December 2003), Page​ ​12

Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Ante​ ​Gotovina​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​T-Ch​ ​I,​ ​IT-06-90-T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(15​ ​April​ ​2011) Page​ ​14 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Bosco​ ​Ntaganda​,​ ​ ICC-01/04-02/06​ ​(9​ ​June​ ​2014) Pages​ ​14 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Bosco​ ​Ntaganda,​ ​ICC-01/04-02/06​ ​(4​ ​January​ ​2017) Page​ ​13 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Boškoski,​ ​Trial​ ​Chamber​ ​II,Trial​ ​Decision​ ​(10​ ​July​ ​2009) Pages​ ​4,​ ​5 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Callixte​ ​Mbarushimana​,​ ​Decision​ ​on​ ​the​ ​confirmation​ ​of​ ​charges, ICC-01/04-01/10,​ ​(16​ ​December​ ​2011) Pages​ ​4,​ ​8,​ ​9 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Délic,​ ​T.Ch,​ ​IT-04-83-T​ ​(15​ ​September​ ​2008) Pages​ ​11,​ ​12 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Germain​ ​Katanga,​ ​(Judgment​ ​pursuant​ ​to​ ​article​ ​74​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Statute), ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG,​​ ​Tr.​ ​Ch.​ ​II,(7​ ​March​ ​2014) Page​ ​8 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Harun​ ​and​ ​Kushayb​,​ ​PT-ChI,​ ​27April​ ​2007) Page​ ​7 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Jean-Paul​ ​Akayesu​,​ ​T.Ch​ ​1,​ ​ICTR-96-4-T​ ​(2​ ​September​ ​1998) Page​ ​12 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Jean-Pierre​ ​Bemba​ ​Gombo​,​ ​ICC-01/05-01/08,​ ​ P-T​ ​Ch​ ​II,​ ​(15​ ​June​ ​2009) Pages​ ​4,​ ​5 Page​ ​6​ ​of​ ​25

Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Katanga​ ​(Decision​ ​on​ ​Confirmation​ ​of​ ​Charges)​ ​ICC-01/04-01/07,​ ​P-T​ ​Ch​ ​I​ ​(30 September​ ​2008) Pages​ ​4,​ ​6,​ ​7 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Kenyatta,​ ​PT-Ch.​ ​II,​ ​ICC-01/09-02/11​ ​(23​ ​January​ ​2012) Page​ ​12 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Kordic​ ​and​ ​Cerkez​,​ ​T.​ ​Ch,​ ​IT-95-14/2-T​ ​(26​ ​February​ ​2001) Page​ ​11 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Oric​,​ ​Trial​ ​Chamber,​ ​ICTY-03-68-T,​ ​T​ ​Ch​ ​II​ ​(30​ ​June​ ​2006) Page​ ​11 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Radislav​ ​Krstic​,​ ​IT-98-33-T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(2Aug​ ​2001) Page​ ​7 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Stanislav​ ​Galic​ ​-​ ​Case​ ​No.​ ​IT-98-29-T Page​ ​9 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Strugar,​ ​T.Ch,​ ​IT-01-42-T​ ​(31​ ​January​ ​2005) Page​ ​11 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Thomas​ ​Lubanga​ ​Dyilo​,​ ​(Decision​ ​on​ ​the​ ​confirmation​ ​of​ ​charges),​ ​P-T​ ​Ch​ ​I​ ​(29 January​ ​2007), Page​ ​15 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Tihomir​ ​Blaskic​,​ ​IT-95-14-T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(3Mar​ ​2000) Page​ ​7 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Zdravko​ ​Tolimir​,​ ​T.Ch​ ​II,​ ​IT-05-88/2T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(12​ ​December​ ​2012) Page​ ​14 BOOKS Black's​ ​Law​ ​Dictionary,​ ​9th,​ ​ed.,​ ​2009. Page​ ​7 Dörmann, K., & Doswald-Beck, L. (2008). Elements​ ​of​ ​war​ ​crimes​ ​under​ ​the​ ​Rome​ ​Statute​ ​of the​ ​International​ ​Criminal​ ​Court:​ ​sources​ ​and​ ​commentary​.​ ​Cambridge:​ ​Cambridge​ ​University Press. Page​ ​14

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Longman,​ ​T.,​ ​&​ ​Takirambudde,​ ​P.​ ​(1998).​ ​Proxy​ ​targets:​ ​civilians​ ​in​ ​the​ ​war​ ​in​ ​Burundi​.​ ​New York:​ ​Human​ ​Rights​ ​Watch. Page​ ​15 Mettraux,​ ​G.​ ​(2008). Perspectives​ ​on​ ​the​ ​Nuremberg​ ​Trial.​ ​Oxford:​ ​Oxford​ ​University​ ​Press. Page​ ​11 Pictet,​ ​J.​ ​S.,​ ​&​ ​Uhler,​ ​O.​ ​M.​ ​(1994). Geneva​ ​convention​ ​IV:​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​the​ ​protection​ ​of​ ​civilian persons​ ​in​ ​time​ ​of​ ​war:​ ​commentary.​ ​Geneva:​ ​International​ ​committee​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Red​ ​Cross. Page​ ​16

STATEMENT​ ​OF​ ​FACTS The Federal Republic of Toukanov and Hakova has two major religions, the Ombri and Boubha.​ ​Majority​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Ombrians​ ​reside​ ​in​ ​Hakova​ ​while​ ​most​ ​Boubhans​ ​in​ ​Toukanov. Upon his election as President in 2009, Daniel Arlet declared Boubha as the state religion which led to Hakova proclaiming independence. By 2017, 138 countries recognized the Republic of​ ​Hakova​ ​which​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​United​ ​Nations​ ​member. A constitutional amendment renamed the Federal Republic as the Boubhan State of Toukanov and referred to Hakova as an autonomous region. The Federal Army was regrouped as the​ ​Toukanov​ ​Armed​ ​Forces​ ​(TAF). Kouka is a Toukanovan province mostly populated by Ombrians who felt oppressed after the government restructuring. The Ombrians publicly demanded accession to Hakova. On March 2014,​ ​martial​ ​law​ ​was​ ​declared​ ​in​ ​Kouka​ ​which​ ​led​ ​to​ ​an​ ​escalation​ ​of​ ​violence. The Free Koukan Army was formed by Ombrian veterans based in Kouka, composed of majors and colonels. They recruited members, obtained high-powered weapons and gained control​ ​over​ ​half​ ​of​ ​Kouka.

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On August 30, 2014, General Vande, the TAF’s highest-ranking military officer, publicly declared to eliminate all persons associated with the FKA. Vande never concealed his abhorrence of​ ​the​ ​Ombri​ ​religion. Lannister Enterprises, a transport company whose trucks have been the subject of repeated criminal acts in FKA-controlled areas by Ombrian civilians, sought the protection of the TAF. On November 10, 2014, a convoy of Lannister trucks, protected by a platoon of TAF forces, and two armoured vehicles, set off to Biro, the capital of Kouka. Vande instructed the task force’s leader to protect the convoy with all necessary means. As the convoy entered the FKA-controlled area, 200 Ombrian civilians stopped and attempted to rob the trucks. Following warning shots from the TAF, shots were fired from the middle of the crowd. The TAF opened fire​ ​at​ ​the​ ​civilians​ ​as​ ​they​ ​fled.​ ​110​ ​civilians​ ​died​ ​and​ ​30​ ​injured. In January 2015, there was a mutiny within the TAF. The mutiny was partly a result of the soldiers’ dissatisfaction with the large-scale sexual abuse and rape within the TAF from March 2014 until December 2015 according to similar reports by the Human Rights Watch and the Guardian.Vande promoted the mutineers and established the Boubha Guards, a unit directly reporting​ ​to​ ​him. The Boubha Guards executed Vande’s Operation Blanc, a military strategy which forced Ombrians to attend Boubhan religious classes three times a day. The 80,000 who failed to do so were​ ​imprisoned.​ ​ ​Others​ ​fled​ ​for​ ​fear​ ​of​ ​detention. On December 14, 2015, Arlet was impeached after public displeasure over human rights abuses. The new government negotiated a cease-fire agreement with the FKA on the condition that the situation in Kouka would be referred to the International Criminal Court. After investigation,​ ​Vande​ ​was​ ​surrendered​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Court.​ ​Hence,​ ​this​ ​case​ ​before​ ​the​ ​Court.

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II.​ ​SUMMARY​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​PLEADINGS All three charges are in the context of and associated with a non-international armed​ ​conflict.

The involvement of the self-proclaimed Hakovan government does not affect the nature of the conflict between TAF and KFA as a non-international armed conflict under​ ​international​ ​law.

General Vande induced the commission of the war crime of directing attacks against​ ​civilians.

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His authority over his subordinates coupled with his public speeches encouraging the elimination of Ombrians prove that he induced TAF soldiers to commit acts against Ombrian​ ​civilians​ ​that​ ​violate​ ​the​ ​principles​ ​of​ ​proportionality​ ​and​ ​distinction. General Vande is criminally liable for the war crime of rape on the basis of command​ ​responsibility. Despite being aware of the rapes committed by his subordinates, he failed to take necessary measures against them. The reports from independent organizations are sufficient to​ ​confirm​ ​the​ ​charge​ ​against​ ​General​ ​Vande. General Vande, through his Operation Blanc, indirectly and unlawfully displaced​ ​the​ ​Ombrian​ ​residents​ ​of​ ​Kouka. Operation Blanc is not justified by military necessity nor was it for the security of civilians. He implemented it simply because of his abhorrence against Ombrians and desire to​ ​eliminate​ ​them​ ​in​ ​Kouka.

III.​ ​PLEADINGS A. PRELIMINARY​ ​MATTERS 1. STANDARD​ ​OF​ ​PROOF The Prosecution will provide evidence demonstrating a clear line of reasoning underpinning its specific allegations against General Vande [“​Vande​”] in accordance with the 1

evidentiary​ ​standard​ ​of​ ​substantial​ ​proof,​ ​as​ ​provided​ ​for​ ​in​ ​Article​ ​61(7)​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Statute. 1

​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Germain​ ​Katanga​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​ICC-01/04-01/07,​ ​P-T​ ​Ch​ ​I​ ​(30​ ​September​ ​2008)​ ​¶​65

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​ ​ ​ ​2.​ ​ ​NATURE​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​CONFLICT 2.1 All charges against Vande took place in the context of and were associated with a Non-International​ ​Armed​ ​Conflict​ ​(NIAC). 2.1.1​ ​ ​There​ ​was​ ​an​ ​NIAC​ ​between​ ​the​ ​TAF​ ​and​ ​the​ ​FKA. 2

NIAC is a “protracted armed conflict...within a state.” To qualify as an NIAC, two criteria​ ​must​ ​be​ ​met:​ ​a)​ ​intensity​ ​of​ ​the​ ​armed​ ​violence​ ​and​ ​b)​ ​organization​ ​of​ ​the​ ​armed​ ​groups.

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2.1.2​ ​The​ ​minimum​ ​requirement​ ​of​ ​intensity​ ​has​ ​been​ ​met. . 4

The intensity of the armed conflict met the relevant standards . The conflict between the two parties existed from the time the TAF forces were deployed in Kouka and the FKA was 5

established, until the signing of the ceasefire agreement. During that time, the confrontations involving the use of high-powered firearms spread all throughout Kouka enabling FKA to seize 6

control​ ​of​ ​half​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Koukan​ ​province.

2.1.3​ ​The​ ​FKA​ ​possessed​ ​the​ ​requisite​ ​organization. 7

The existence of several factors substantiates FKA as an organized armed group. It was able to recruit approximately 2,000 members and took control of approximately half of the 8

Koukan province through large scale attacks. Ombrian veterans had assumed leadership

​ ​Art.​ ​8(2)(f),​ ​Rome​ ​Statute. ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Jean-Pierre​ ​Bemba​ ​Gombo​,​ ​ICC-01/05-01/08,​ ​P-T​ ​Ch​ ​II​ ​(15​ ​Jun​ ​2009)​ ​ ​¶​231;​ ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v. Callixte​ ​Mbarushimana​,​ ​ICC-01/04-01/10,​ ​P-T​ ​Ch​ ​I​ ​(16​ ​Dec​ ​2011)​ ​¶​103 4 ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Boškoski,​ ​Trial​ ​Chamber​ ​II,Trial​ ​Decision​ ​(10​ ​Jul​ ​2009)​ ​¶​177-193 5 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶​[​8]-[28] 6 ​ ​Facts​,​ ​¶​9 7​ ​ Boškoski,​footnote[4]​ ​¶​194-206 8​ ​ Facts,​ ​¶[​9]-[28] 2 3

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positions within the FKA. ​Both parties exercised their capacity to act on behalf of its members 10

in​ ​negotiations​ ​through​ ​the​ ​signing​ ​of​ ​the​ ​ceasefire​ ​agreement.

2.2​ ​The​ ​involvement​ ​of​ ​Hakova​ ​did​ ​not​ ​internationalize​ ​the​ ​armed​ ​conflict​ ​in​ ​Kouka. 2.2.1​ ​Hakova​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​sovereign​ ​state. 11

Hakova​ ​failed​ ​to​ ​fulfill​ ​all​ ​the​ ​requisites​ ​of​ ​a​ ​sovereign​ ​state​ ​under​ ​the​ ​international​ ​law. 2.2.2​ ​Involvement​ ​of​ ​Hakovan​ ​officers​ ​in​ ​FKA​ ​failed​ ​the​ ​overall​ ​control​ ​test.

The overall control test requires that the intervening party “has a role in organizing, coordinating, or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, 12

training​ ​and​ ​equipping​ ​or​ ​providing​ ​operational​ ​support​ ​to​ ​that​ ​group”.

The self-proclaimed Hakovan government merely provided the weapons and the training 13

to the FKA fighters.

The deployment of HDA tanks and men towards the border and the

repeated manoeuvres by the HDA at the Hakova-Toukanov border occurred within Hakovan 14

territory​ ​and​ ​is​ ​therefore​ ​irrelevant​ ​to​ ​the​ ​issue.

2.2.3​ ​Nessuno​ ​documents​ ​are​ ​inadmissible​ ​as​ ​evidence. Evidence obtained by means violating internationally recognized human rights are 15

inadmissible if the admission would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings. The

Facts,​ ​¶​8 Facts,​ ​¶​28 11 Art.​ ​1,​ ​1933​ ​Montevideo​ ​Convention 12 ​ ​Gombo​,​ ​footnote​ ​[3],​ ​¶​130 13 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶​11 14 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶​11 15 ​ ​Art.​ ​69(7),​ ​Rome​ ​Statute 9​ ​

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right against unlawful interference with a person’s privacy is internationally recognized. This Court was established to reaffirm the purpose of the United Nations

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in promoting and

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encouraging respect for human rights . Thus, the admission into evidence of Nessuno 19

documents ​ ​would​ ​impair​ ​the​ ​integrity​ ​of​ ​this​ ​Court. 2.3​ ​There​ ​is​ ​a​ ​nexus​ ​between​ ​the​ ​3​ ​charges​ ​against​ ​Vande​ ​and​ ​the​ ​conflict​ ​in​ ​Kouka. The following factors establish that the act in question is sufficiently related to the armed conflict: the perpetrator is a combatant; the victim is a non-combatant; the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and the crime is committed as part of or in the 20

context​ ​of​ ​the​ ​perpetrator's​ ​official​ ​duties.”

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All the charges against Vande occurred during the NIAC in Kouka and were committed either as part of or in the context of his official duties as the highest-ranking and senior-most 22

military officer in the TAF. All the victims in the charges were either civilians or those who did not​ ​directly​ ​participate​ ​in​ ​the​ ​hostilities.

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2.4​ ​Vande​ ​is​ ​aware​ ​of​ ​factual​ ​circumstances​ ​that​ ​established​ ​the​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​an​ ​NIAC. What is required is awareness of the factual circumstances to establish the existence of an armed​ ​conflict​ ​that​ ​is​ ​implicit​ ​in​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​“took​ ​place​ ​in​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of​ ​and​ ​was​ ​associated​ ​with” B.​ ​CHARGES COUNT 1: VANDE BEARS RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDUCING THE COMMISSION OF THE WAR CRIME OF DIRECTING ATTACKS AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL CIVILIANS​ ​OR​ ​THE​ ​CIVILIAN​ ​POPULATION​ ​AS​ ​SUCH ​ ​Art.​ ​17,​ ​ICCPR ​ ​Preamble,​ ​Rome​ ​Statute 18 ​ ​Article​ ​1(3),​ ​UN​ ​Charter 19​ ​ ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶​27 20 ​ ​Katanga​,​ ​footnote​ ​[1]​ ​[​¶​380]-[382]-[383] 21 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶[​16]-[18]-[21]-[22] 22 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶[​4]-[16]-[18]-[21]-[22] 23 ​ ​Facts​,​ ​¶[​16]-[18]-[21]-[22] 16 17

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1. Vande​ ​induced​ ​the​ ​attack​ ​directed​ ​on​ ​civilians. Inducement encompasses any conduct which leads another person to commit a crime, 24

including solicitation. Public speeches personally encouraging the commission of illegal acts 25

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are indicative of inducement. As Chief of the Defence Staff, Vande had position and authority 27

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to convey implicit intent for another to commit an offense as shown by his manifestations of 29

despise​ ​against​ ​Ombrians​ ​through​ ​his​ ​public​ ​speeches​ ​and​ ​personal​ ​blog . 30

Due to prior acts of violence committed by the Ombrians against Lannister trucks , 31

Vande’s order to protect the convoy by all necessary means was interpreted by the troops that any attack against the convoy are done by FKA terrorists. Vande’s knowledge that certain acts 32

may be attributed to Ombrian civilians who are not to be subjected to any attack establish the mens​ ​rea​ ​of​ ​individual​ ​criminal​ ​responsibility.

2.​ ​TAF​ ​committed​ ​the​ ​war​ ​crime​ ​of​ ​directing​ ​attacks​ ​against​ ​civilians. All​ ​five​ ​elements​ ​under​ ​Article​ ​8​ ​(2)​ ​(e)​ ​(i)​ ​are​ ​fulfilled. 2.1​ ​The​ ​TAF​ ​launched​ ​the​ ​attacks. 33

Attacks​ ​are​ ​“acts​ ​of​ ​violence​ ​against​ ​the​ ​adversary,​ ​whether​ ​in​ ​offence​ ​or​ ​in

defence.” ​ ​The​ ​civilian​ ​population,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​individual​ ​civilians,​ ​shall​ ​not​ ​be​ ​the​ ​object of ​ ​Black's​ ​Law​ ​Dictionary,​ ​9th​ ​,​ ​ed.,​ ​2009. ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Harun​ ​and​ ​Kushayb​,​ ​PT-Ch​ ​I​ ​(27April​ ​2007)​ ​¶90 26 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶​4, 27 ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Radislav​ ​Krstic​,​ ​IT-98-33-T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(2Aug​ ​2001)​ ​¶​601 28 ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Tihomir​ ​Blaskic​,​ ​IT-95-14-T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(3Mar​ ​2000)​ ¶ ​ ​281 29 ​ ​Facts,​ ​ ​¶​12,​ ​14 30 ​ ​Facts​,​ ​¶14. 31 ​ ​Facts​ ​¶15. 32 ​ ​Katanga,​ ​footnote​ ​[1],​ ​¶807 33 ​ ​API,​ ​Art.​ ​49 24 25

Page​ ​15​​ ​of​ ​25

an

34

attack .​ ​To​ ​constitute​ ​a​ ​war​ ​crime,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​sufficient​ ​to​ ​prove​ ​that​ ​the​ ​author​ ​directed

the

35

attacks​ ​toward​ ​the​ ​civilian​ ​population​ ​or​ ​individual​ ​civilians. ​ ​TAF’s​ ​attacks,​ ​as induced

by

Vande,​ ​produced​ ​110​ ​civilian​ ​deaths. 2.2 ​The object of the attack was a civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct​ ​part​ ​in​ ​hostilities.

36

Attacks on civilians are absolutely prohibited by international humanitarian law and​ ​unjustifiable​ ​by​ ​military​ ​necessity.

37

38

A civilian is anyone not a member of the State or non-State armed forces and a civilian population consists of “all civilians as opposed to members of armed forces and any other legitimate combatants”. In case of doubt, an individual must be considered a civilian.

39

40

The shots fired from the middle of the crowd did not deprive the entire Ombrian 41

population of its civilian character. Reprisals against civilian population are prohibited in all circumstances, regardless of the behaviour of the other party, since "no circumstances would legitimise an attack against civilians even if it were a response 42

proportionate​ ​to​ ​a​ ​similar​ ​violation​ ​perpetrated​ ​by​ ​the​ ​other​ ​party.” 2.2.1​ ​The​ ​attack​ ​violated​ ​the​ ​Principle​ ​of​ ​Distinction.

​ ​APII,​ ​Art​ ​13​ ​(2) ​ ​Katanga,​ ​PT​ ​Ch.​ ​I,​ ​(6​ ​Jul​ ​2007)​ ​¶37 36 ​ ​Legality​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Threat​ ​or​ ​Use​ ​of​ ​Nuclear​ ​Weapons,​ ​ICJ​ ​Advisory​ ​Opinion​,​ ​8​ ​July​ ​1996,​ ​[1996]​ ​ICJ​ ​Rep.​ ​226,​ ​at 257​ ​(¶78) 37 ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Germain​ ​Katanga,​ ​(Judgment​ ​pursuant​ ​to​ ​article​ ​74​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Statute),​ ​ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, Tr.​ ​Ch.​ ​II,(7​ ​March​ ​2014)​ ​¶​800 38 ​ ​Katanga​,​ ​footnote[37]​ ​¶​788 39 ​ ​Mbarushimana​,​ ​footnote​ ​[3]​ ​(16​ ​Dec2011)​ ​¶​148 40 ​ ​Facts​,​ ​¶16 41 ​ ​Facts,​¶16 42 ​ ​Mbarushimana​,​ ​footnote​ ​[3]​ ​¶143 34 35

Page​ ​16​​ ​of​ ​25

Indiscriminate attacks against civilians are prohibited as they enjoy protection 43

44

against dangers from military operations , unless they take a direct part in hostilities.

Indiscriminate attacks are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.

45

Hence, the TAF forces should have distinguished a

legitimate military target from a civilian after the shot was fired from the middle of the crowd.

46

2.2.2​​ ​The​ ​attack​ ​violated​ ​the​ ​Principle​ ​of​ ​Proportionality. A disproportionate attack is launched with awareness that incidental loss of life or injury to civilians will or may occur as a result. The civilian population is not the target of 47

the attack but only an incidental consequence thereof. Even if the Ombrian were not the 48

target, opening fire at fleeing Ombrian civilians is still an incidental consequence falling within​ ​the​ ​war​ ​crime​ ​of​ ​attacking​ ​civilians. Vande had reasonable use of the information available to him, thus he could have expected​ ​excessive​ ​civilian​ ​casualties​ ​to​ ​result​ ​from​ ​the​ ​attack.

49

2.3​ ​The​ ​attack​ ​was​ ​intended​ ​to​ ​be​ ​carried​ ​out​ ​on​ ​a​ ​non-military​ ​objective. Intention could be inferred from the fact that Vande wanted to exact revenge on 50

51

both civilians and the belligerent FKA. Biro was an FKA-controlled area and before

​ ​APII,​ ​Art​ ​13 ​ ​AP​ ​II​ ​Art.​ ​13​ ​(3), 45 ​ ​API​,​ ​Art.​ ​51​ ​(4) 46 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶16 47 ​ ​Mbarushimana​,​footnote[3]​ ​¶142 48 ​ ​Facts​,​ ​¶16 49 ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Stanislav​ ​Galic​ ​-​ ​Case​ ​No.​ ​IT-98-29-T 50 ​ ​Mbarushimana​,​ ​footnote​ ​[3]​ ​¶143 51 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶9 43 44

Page​ ​17​​ ​of​ ​25

the departure of the convoy for Biro, Vande gave a direct order to the task force’s leader 52

to​ ​protect​ ​the​ ​convoy​ ​using​ ​all​ ​necessary​ ​means.

The act of Lannister Enterprises is not a humanitarian relief because it failed to satisfy the principles of humanitarian action, specifically the principles of impartiality 53

and neutrality since it was only for the Boubhans living in Biro. Even if the act was a humanitarian relief, as a general rule, humanitarian convoys do not use armed or military 54

escorts.

2.4​ ​Vande​ ​was​ ​aware​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Civilian​ ​Status​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Population​ ​or​ ​Individuals. Vande’s decision to assign a military escort is predicated on the conduct of violence imputed on Ombrian civilians made on previous Lannister convoys entering 55

FKA-controlled​ ​territories.

2.5. Vande was aware of the Circumstances that Established the Existence of the Armed​ ​Conflict. Vande’s decision to assign a TAF task force to protect the Lannister convoy is predicated on his knowledge of the previous attacks, by the same group of Ombrians, on Lannister trucks upon entering FKA-controlled areas. Furthermore, he issued statements in his personal blog that all Ombrians must be removed as they constitute danger to the Boubhans.

COUNT 2: VANDE IS RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE ON THE BASIS OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY​ ​FOR​ ​THE​ ​WAR​ ​CRIME​ ​OF​ ​RAPE ​ ​Facts​,¶16 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶15 54 ​ ​UN​ ​OCHA​ ​Civil-​Military​ ​Coordination​ ​Section​,​ ​Use​ ​of​ ​Military​ ​or​ ​Armed​ ​Escorts​ ​for​ ​Humanitarian​ ​Convoys,​ ​14 September​ ​2001 55 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶9. 52 53

Page​ ​18​​ ​of​ ​25

1. ​Vande bears command responsibility for the commission of the war crime of rape by his subordinates. 1.1​​ ​Effective​ ​Control 56

Factors such as the official position of the suspect , the power to promote, replace, 57

remove or discipline any member of the forces , and the capacity to make changes in the 58

command structure indicate the existence of effective control. Vande, as the highest military official in the TAF, promoted several mutineers in March, 2015 and created a special unit 59

directly​ ​reporting​ ​to​ ​him. 1.2​​ ​Knowledge

60

The commander can be held liable for having actual knowledge of the crime. Indicia relevant for gathering knowledge can be the scope of the illegal acts, time during which they took​ ​place,​ ​the​ ​location​ ​of​ ​the​ ​commander​ ​at​ ​the​ ​time,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​availability​ ​of​ ​reports.

61

The rape and sexual abuse of the TAF soldiers happened from March, 2014 to December, 2015. Within this interval, Vande visited the camps where the large-scale sexual abuse took place. These crimes became common knowledge when they were reported by the Guardian and 62

the​ ​Human​ ​Rights​ ​Watch..

1.3​​ ​No​ ​reasonable​ ​and​ ​necessary​ ​measures​ ​taken

​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Kordic​ ​and​ ​Cerkez​,​ ​T.​ ​Ch,​ ​IT-95-14/2-T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(26Feb​ ​2001)​ ​¶438 ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Délic,​ ​T.Ch,​ ​IT-04-83-T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(15Sep​ ​2008)​ ​¶62 58 ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Strugar,​ ​T.Ch,​ ​IT-01-42-T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(31Jan​ ​2005)​ ​¶397 59 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶18. 60 ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​vs​ ​Oric​,​ ​T.Ch​ ​II,​ ​IT-03-68-T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(30Jun​ ​2006)​ ​¶321 61 ​ ​Mettraux,​ ​G.​ ​(2008). Perspectives​ ​on​ ​the​ ​Nuremberg​ ​Trial.​ ​Oxford:​ ​Oxford​ ​University​ ​Press.​¶​214 62 ​ ​Facts,​¶18 56 57

Page​ ​19​​ ​of​ ​25

63

A commander has the duty to repress the commission of crimes by his subordinates.

This duty also includes two others: a) stopping the commission of the ongoing crimes and b) 64

punishing the perpetrators after such commission. Vande failed to fulfill these duties when he did nothing to stop the large-scale sexual abuse and refused to punish the subordinates after knowledge​ ​of​ ​such.

65

2.​ ​The​ ​senior​ ​officers​ ​of​ ​TAF​ ​committed​ ​rape. 2.1 Human Rights Watch and The Guardian reports are admissible and sufficient to prove​ ​the​ ​commission​ ​of​ ​rape. The similar reports of the Human Rights Watch and the Guardian revealing rape and sexual abuse within the TAF are considered indirect evidence that should be accorded weight, for at least two pieces of indirect evidence are sufficient to prove an allegation to the standard of 66

substantial​ ​grounds​ ​to​ ​believe.

2.2​ ​ ​The​ ​subordinates​ ​of​ ​Vande​ ​perpetrated​ ​rape Rape is physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive and its central elements cannot be captured in a mechanical description of 67

objects and body parts. Coercion constitutes not only physical force or the threat thereof, but 68

may also include the exercise of organizational power.

Here, there existed a coercive

circumstance wherein the perpetrators abused their position of superior military power over the 69

victims.

​ ​Delic,​ ​footnote[57]​ ​¶69 ​ ​Kordic​ ​and​ ​Cerkez​,​ ​footnote​ ​[56],​ ​¶446 65 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶18. 66 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Kenyatta,​ ​PT-Ch.​ ​II,​ ​ICC-01/09-02/11​ ​(23Jan​ ​2012),​ ​¶[​82]-[87] 67 ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Jean-Paul​ ​Akayesu​,​ ​T-Ch​ ​I,​ ​ICTR-96-4-T​ ​(2Sept​ ​1998)​ ​¶688 68 ​ ​M.C.​ ​v.​ ​Bulgaria,.39272/98,​ ​Council​ ​of​ ​Europe:​ ​European​ ​Court​ ​of​ ​Human​ ​Rights,​ ​(3​ ​December​ ​2003),​ ​¶180 69 Facts,​ ​¶18. 63 64

Page​ ​20​​ ​of​ ​25

Investigative journalists of the Guardian reported that a large-scale and systematic sexual abuse was happening within the TAF wherein the youngest and physically weakest men and women soldiers in each regiment were being regularly raped by higher-ranking TAF officers and senior soldiers. These findings have been corroborated by the Human Rights Watch report based 70

on​ ​the​ ​interviews​ ​of​ ​wounded​ ​TAF​ ​soldiers.

2.3.​ ​The​ ​protection​ ​against​ ​rape​ ​applies​ ​to​ ​victims​ ​within​ ​the​ ​same​ ​armed​ ​forces. The prohibition of rape attained jus cogens status under international law. It will 71

therefore​ ​apply​ ​even​ ​if​ ​the​ ​victims​ ​were​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​same​ ​armed​ ​forces.

3. Vande knew that the rape committed by his subordinates happened in the context of a 72

NIAC.

Vande acknowledged the rape committed against the youngest and physically weakest 73

soldiers by high-ranking TAF officers some senior soldiers. Further, young soldiers deployed in Kouka were also picked and sexually abused based on their ranks and performance in the 74

battlefield.

COUNT

3:

VANDE,

THROUGH

ANOTHER

PERSON,

ORDERED

THE

DISPLACEMENT OF THE OMBRIAN RESIDENTS IN KOUKA UNDER OPERATION BLANC. 1. Vande,​ ​through​ ​another,​ ​ordered​ ​the​ ​displacement

​ ​Ibid. ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Bosco​ ​Ntaganda​,​ ​PT-Ch.VI,​ ​ICC-01/04-02/06​ ​(4Jan​ ​2017)​ ¶ ​ ​51-53 72 ​ ​See​ ​Preliminary​ ​Matters 73 ​ ​Facts,​ ​¶18. 74 ​ ​Ibid. 70

71

Page​ ​21​​ ​of​ ​25

The conduct of the perpetrator forcing the civilians to leave a certain area is not limited to 75

an order. Limiting element 1 of Article 8(2)(e)(viii) to an order would unduly restrict the actual 76

circumstance​ ​of​ ​civilian​ ​displacement​ ​in​ ​the​ ​course​ ​of​ ​an​ ​armed​ ​conflict.​ ​

Ombrians were required to attend religious classes and visit Boubha sanctuaries 77

three times a day. Anyone who failed to do so were imprisoned, as ordered by Vande. ​Others 78

fled for fear of detention in notorious sanitary conditions

thus amounting to the forcible

displacement​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Ombrian​ ​civilians. 79

People moved without a genuine choice.

Fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological

oppression, and other such circumstances may create an environment where there is no choice 80

but to leave, thus amounting to the forcible displacement of people. A person must give consent 81

voluntarily​ ​and​ ​by​ ​his/her​ ​free​ ​will​ ​to​ ​be​ ​lawfully​ ​displaced.

2. Vande made the order in his capacity as an individual, jointly with another or through another​ ​person,​ ​regardless​ ​of​ ​whether​ ​that​ ​other​ ​person​ ​is​ ​criminally​ ​responsible.

82

The perpetrator was in a position to effect such displacement by giving such an order. It 83

covers an individual who has effective control over a situation. It is sufficient when such order 84

is​ ​given​ ​within​ ​the​ ​chain​ ​of​ ​command.

It is sufficient that the co-perpetrators are aware of the risk of implementing the common plan, specifically directed at the achievement of a non-criminal goal that will result in the 85

86

commission of the crime, and accept such an outcome. This was evident in Operation Blanc,

​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Bosco​ ​Ntaganda​,​ ​PT-Ch.II,​ ​ICC-01/04-02/06​ ​(9Jun​ ​2014)​ ​¶64 ​ ​Ibid. 77 ​ ​Ibid. 78 ​ ​Ibid​. 79 ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Ante​ ​Gotovina​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​T.Ch​ ​I,​ ​IT-06-90-T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(15​ ​April​ ​2011)​ ​ ​¶1738 80 ​ ​Ibid.​ ​ ​¶1739 81 ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Zdravko​ ​Tolimi​r,​ ​T.Ch.​ ​II,​ ​IT-05-88/2T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(12Dec​ ​2012)​ ​ ​¶795 82 ​ ​EOC,​Article​ ​8(2)(e)(viii) 83 ​D ​ örmann, K., & Doswald-Beck, L. (2008). Elements​ ​of​ ​war​ ​crimes​ ​under​ ​the​ ​Rome​ ​Statute​ ​of​ ​the​ ​International Criminal​ ​Court:​ ​sources​ ​and​ ​commentary​.​ ​Cambridge:​ ​Cambridge​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​pg.​ ​473 84 ​ ​Ibid. 85 ​ ​Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Thomas​ ​Lubanga​ ​Dyilo​,​ ​P-T​ ​Ch​ ​I,​ ​ICC-01/04-01/06​ ​(29​ ​Jan​ ​2007),​ ​¶344 86 ​ ​Facts​,​ ​¶19 75 76

Page​ ​22​​ ​of​ ​25

87

which was spearheaded by the Boubha Guards directly under Vande who admitted that it his 88

military​ ​strategy.

3.​ ​Ombrian​ ​residents​ ​are​ ​civilians.

89

Ombrian residents of municipalities in Kouka were the subjects of Operation Blanc.

They are deemed civilians, absent of any showing that they were taking part in the hostilities in 90

the​ ​area.

4. Such order was not justified by the security of the civilians involved or by military necessity.

Displacement of a population is allowed when conducted for the security of persons 91

involved or military necessity so demands. When carried out, the civilian population must be 92

received​ ​under​ ​satisfactory​ ​conditions​ ​of​ ​shelter,​ ​hygiene,​ ​health,​ ​safety​ ​and​ ​nutrition.

Ombrian civilians not attending Boubha religious classes were imprisoned in unsanitary 93

detention centers,

a clear showing that detention itself was the goal in furtherance of a

well-organised purpose to expel Ombrians in Kouka not justified under international law. Military​ ​reasons​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​justified​ ​by​ ​political​ ​motives.

94

Military necessity exists when the presence of protected persons in an area hampers 95

military operations. Removal of civilians, in a limited sense, is allowed from an expected site of

​ ​Ibid. ​ ​Facts​,​ ​¶20 89 ​ ​Facts,​¶20 90 ​ ​API,​ ​Rule​ ​5,​ ​Customary​ ​IHL,​ ​50(1) 91 ​ ​APII​ ​Article​ ​17(1) 92 ​ ​APII​ ​Article​ ​17(2) 93 ​ ​Ibid. 94 ​ ​Longman,​ ​T.,​ ​&​ ​Takirambudde,​ ​P.​ ​(1998).​ ​Proxy​ ​targets:​ ​civilians​ ​in​ ​the​ ​war​ ​in​ ​Burundi.​ ​ ​New​ ​York:​ ​Human Rights​ ​Watch,​ ​pg.​ ​32 95 ​ ​Pictet,​ ​J.​ ​S.,​ ​&​ ​Uhler,​ ​O.​ ​M.​ ​(1994). Geneva​ ​convention​ ​IV:​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​the​ ​protection​ ​of​ ​civilian​ ​persons​ ​in​ ​time​ ​of war:​ ​commentary.​ ​Geneva:​ ​International​ ​committee​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Red​ ​Cross.,​ ​¶280. 87 88

Page​ ​23​​ ​of​ ​25

96

97

direct combat. However, it does not authorize indefinite detention of civilians, as in Operation Blanc, strategized to effectively control Ombrians. The removal of civilians cannot be invoked as an excuse to gain military advantage and holding the population hostage against their will in 98

squalid​ ​conditions.

Although forced removal for humanitarian reasons is justifiable in certain situations, it is not justified where the humanitarian crisis that caused the displacement is itself the result of the 99

perpetrator’s​ ​own​ ​unlawful​ ​activity.

5. Vande as Chief of Defence Staff is in a position to effect displacement when he gave the order​ ​to​ ​implement​ ​Operation​ ​Blanc. Vande, being the Chief of Defence Staff, is the highest-ranking and senior-most military 100

officer in the TAF.

His order of detention, which caused the displacement, was issued pursuant

to​ ​the​ ​authority​ ​vested​ ​in​ ​him​ ​by​ ​virtue​ ​of​ ​the​ ​martial​ ​law.

101

6.​ ​Vande​ ​is​ ​aware​ ​that​ ​the​ ​displacement​ ​of​ ​civilians​ ​occurred​ ​in​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of​ ​a​ ​NIAC. The detention of the Ombrian civilians were made to ensure the suppression of the Ombri religion and to free Kouka from FKA control; coercion through the threat of being imprisoned 102

for​ ​such​ ​religious​ ​belief.

PRAYER

​ ​Longman,​ ​T.,​ ​&​ ​Takirambudde,​ ​P.​ ​(1998).​ ​Proxy​ ​targets:​ ​civilians​ ​in​ ​the​ ​war​ ​in​ ​Burundi.​ ​ ​New​ ​York:​ ​Human Rights​ ​Watch,​​ ​pg.​ ​31 97 ​ ​Ibid. 98 ​ ​Ibid. 99 Prosecutor​ ​v.​ ​Radovan​ ​Karadžić,​ ​T.Ch,​ ​IT-95-5/18-T,​ ​ICTY​ ​(24Mar​ ​2016)​ ​¶492. 100 ​ ​Ibid. 101 ​ ​Facts,​¶21 102 ​ ​Facts,​¶21 96

Page​ ​24​​ ​of​ ​25

The Prosecution respectively requests this Honourable Court to adjudge and declare that Vande​ ​is​ ​criminally​ ​responsible​ ​under​ ​the​ ​Rome​ ​Statute​ ​for: War​ ​crimes​ ​under​ ​Article​ ​8(2)(e)(i),​ ​8(2)(e)(vi)​ ​and​ ​,8(2)(e)(viii). Respectfully​ ​submitted, The​ ​Prosecution

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