20140319-dcdc_jcn_1_14_djoc-u

Joint Concept Note 1/14 Defence Joint Operating Concept Joint Concept Note 1/14 (JCN 1/14), dated March 2014, is promulgated as directed by the Joint Force Commander and Chiefs of Staffs

Director Concepts and Doctrine

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

Foreword The drawdown of UK combat forces in Afghanistan potentially marks the end of an era dominated by our involvement in enduring land campaigns. The new international security context looks to be one defined by uncertainty, instability and threats which are more diverse, less existential and less symmetric than hitherto. The development of the future role, utility, structure and organisation of the Armed Forces will be set in this context. The Defence Joint Operating Concept (DJOC) provides high-level vision and conceptual thinking to inform the debate regarding that development. This DJOC does not attempt a comprehensive revision of many of our extant operating practices, nor does it challenge the essential warfighting core of our capability. Rather, it looks at how we might meet some of the specific challenges borne of the moment. First, it shows how the UK’s Joint Expeditionary Force (UK JEF) should allow us to make a structured and accelerated return to contingency. Second, it explains how, through the operationalisation of the International Defence Engagement Strategy, we might better align Defence activity with national policy ambition and lead to the more intelligent and focused application of military power. Third, it explains the potentially beneficial synergy between forward engagement, focused response and the wider agility of the force structure. Fourth, it advocates the greater exploitation of military power outside of its traditional roles. Finally, it demonstrates how key allies might be incorporated into our force structure by design and to considerable advantage. All these concepts, once grouped together, are innovative and potentially powerful ways of ensuring the Armed Forces can contribute to the UK’s foreign and security policy more effectively.

Chief of the Defence Staff

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

Defence Joint Operating Concept The purpose of the Defence Joint Operating Concept (DJOC) is to provide the high-level vision and unifying conceptual thinking that will assist how we develop and employ our Armed Forces most effectively to support our national policy and strategy. The DJOC draws heavily on DCDC’s Global Strategic Trends IV out to 2040, the Future Character of Conflict and the Higher Level Operating Concept. Finally, we have developed many of the ideas in the How We Will Fight paper.1 It replaces the High Level Operational Conceptual Commentary and the High Level Operational Framework.

Contents Foreword Contents Executive summary Chapter 1

Analysing the operating environment The changing mosaic of conflict Threats The environments – Key deductions

Chapter 2

2-1 2-2

Employing the military instrument of power: how we will fight/operate (Ways) Whole-of-government effort – an integrated approach to achieving national objectives Understand

1

1-2 1-3 1-3

National objectives which the DJOC aspires to meet (Ends) National vision The purpose of Defence

Chapter 3

iii v 1

3-3 3-3

Commander Joint Forces Command paper discussed by the Armed Forces Committee in September 2012.

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Forward engagement Shaping through influence Shaping through deterrence, coercion and containment Focused contingent capability Structured agility Working with allies Drawing it all together Chapter 4

3-3 3-4 3-6 3-7 3-7 3-9 3-10

Designing and generating our force structure and capabilities (Means) The Committed Force The Engaged Force The Responsive Force – The Joint Expeditionary Force The Adaptive Force Jointery and integration Structured agility Critical capabilities Agility through equipment and technology Working with allies

4-1 4-2 4-3 4-5 4-6 4-10 4-11 4-14 4-15

Conclusion Afterword Lexicon

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

Executive summary

Executive summary The purpose of the Defence Joint Operating Concept 1. The Defence Joint Operating Concept (DJOC) provides the high-level vision and unifying conceptual thinking to help us develop and employ our Armed Forces effectively in support of national policy and strategy. It is designed to inform discussions about our Armed Forces’ future role, utility, structure and organisation. It is not, therefore, policy or doctrine, but it is policy aware. The DJOC recognises the enduring requirement for homeland defence and resilience, and for large scale operations at best effort. But it focuses on resetting our Armed Forces for engagement, deterrence and contingency as we emerge from two long campaigns. In the short term, it provides a conceptual framework for the International Defence Engagement Strategy and for establishing the Joint Expeditionary Force. The operating environment 2. Further detailed analysis of the operating environment confirms the Development, Concept and Doctrine Centre (DCDC)’s conclusions highlighted in their Global Strategic Trends Out to 2040 and the Future Character of Conflict. The operating environment continues to be volatile and unpredictable with a wide range of threats and opportunities. The threats highlighted in the Future Character of Conflict – terrorism, hostile states, fragile and failing states, and hybrid threats and adversaries – remain. Population growth and climate change are likely to intensify competition for resources. The proliferation of sophisticated weapons technology will add to instability and increase the risk to our people when deployed. Britain will retain a privileged position in the global political and economic system, but in relative terms, western influence will reduce as other global powers evolve. Ends 3. The National Security Strategy makes it clear that we will use all our national capabilities to build Britain’s prosperity, extend her influence and strengthen her security. We can only achieve this through being actively engaged in the world to shape and protect the stability of the rules-based international system on which we depend.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

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Executive summary

Ways 4. National integration. To compete effectively, the UK must draw together, and use, all the instruments of national power and influence – diplomacy, intelligence, development, trade and defence – to achieve maximum effect. Our structures and posture must meet our nation’s policy and strategy requirements. At times, Defence may be required to lead, but more often we will be in support of other government departments and agencies. We must be flexible and responsive when working in partnership with other government departments. 5. Forward engagement. Our starting point in DJOC is the importance of strategic understanding. This underpins our ability to focus on what is important and deliver positive outcomes within a changing world. The Armed Forces, in close coordination with other government departments, will contribute to achieving national influence, security and prosperity objectives through forward engagement overseas and complementary activity in the UK. Defence engagement encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from defence diplomacy through capacity-building and conflict prevention to conventional deterrence and coercion, but excluding combat operations. Ultimately, this activity aims to: increase understanding; Forward engagement helps us enhance UK influence; build determine the size, shape, generation and readiness of a Joint relationships; and prevent wars before Expeditionary Force they happen. Where the threat of conflict exists, it will provide the deep understanding and situational awareness that will enable rapid orientation to events. It will also help us to determine the size, shape, capabilities and readiness of a Joint Expeditionary Force, should it be required. Where necessary, and if called upon to do so,

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

Executive summary

we will therefore be able to fight intelligently and from a position of knowledge. 6. The flexible use of military force. The DJOC emphasises that our Armed Forces must retain their warfighting excellence as the foundation of their credibility and utility. But we must also be better able to contribute in peacetime to national security, prosperity and influence through actions short of war. We will do this by strengthening alliances, building the capacity of our partners to tackle emergent threats at source, and dissuading potential adversaries from pursuing undesirable courses of action.

We must strengthen alliances and build our partners capacity

Means 7. The Engaged Force. The DJOC introduces the concept of the Engaged Force to deliver the required increase in strategic understanding and the intended broader contribution to national influence, prosperity and security objectives. 8. The Joint Expeditionary Force. Joint by culture and design, and integrated routinely with force elements from pre-determined nations, the Joint Expeditionary Force will provide precise, tailored responses to the operational situation in any environment, up to, and including, high-end warfighting. Resilience will be provided from the Adaptive Force, as it is now. In many cases, the Joint Expeditionary Force will provide the UK’s contribution to combined operations within the UK/French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, or alongside the US, NATO and other allies. This must be underpinned by regular training and common doctrine. Figure S.1 illustrates this concept.

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Executive summary

National threshold (scale, complexity, political) UK strategic orientation

UK national response

International response

Adaptive Forces Standing commitments

UK JEF

Anglo-French CJEF

Core scaleable C2, ISR, Log, IO and other enablers Defence engagement

partner nations

alliances

Adaptive Forces

Legend C2 Command and control CJEF Combined Joint Expeditionary Force IO Information operations ISR Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

JEF Joint Expeditionary Force Log Logistics NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Figure S.1 – The Joint Expeditionary Force concept 9. Structured agility. The DJOC no longer envisages rigid boundaries between types of forces and their different levels of readiness. Instead, it proposes to use the whole of the force structure in a much more dynamic and agile way in line with the whole force concept. This is illustrated in Figure S.2.

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

Executive summary

From left to right: our eyes and ears will be those forces deployed on current operations or standing commitments (the Committed Force) and those forward engaged overseas to understand and shape the strategic context and the operating environment (the Engaged Force). Together, these will provide the strategic orientation which will allow us to configure the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), which will provide the core of the UK’s national military response (the Responsive Force) for the most likely threats. This approach supports greater efficiency in the size, configuration, capabilities and readiness of the deploying force elements, thus enabling risk to be taken in a calculated and properly informed manner. The JEF will therefore be better able to deploy quickly, and to operate intelligently, with a core of permanently assigned logistic, command and control, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The Adaptive Force will underpin the Committed, Engaged and Responsive Forces. We will draw from it the manpower needed to sustain or reinforce enduring deployments, or regenerate for more demanding large-scale operations. Our Adaptive Force will also be able to provide a range of specialist skills to support homeland resilience, forward engagement or overseas contingency. The UK Joint Forces Structure Committed

Engaged

Forward engagement and crisis

Standing commitments

IDES Standing military tasks

Forward presence

Legend IDES International Defence Engagement

Responsive

Contingent capability (JEF)

Adaptive Warfighting foundation Dynamic force attribution

Dynamic force application

Joint Expeditionary Force

Support to committed engaged and responsive forces

Resilience Regeneration Reinforcement

Dynamic force flow

Figure S.2 – UK joint forces structure: dynamic and adaptable

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Executive summary

10. Critical capabilities. The DJOC places a premium upon capabilities that offer a competitive edge through sophisticated understanding and intelligent precision. This includes highly trained and innovative people, effective command and control, and tailored intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, cyber, precision strike and Special Forces capabilities. Re-focusing Defence 11. The DJOC asserts a change of emphasis in the focus of our military capability. At its heart is the idea that we should retain capable and professional Armed Forces as the nation’s insurance policy, but, at the same time, we should invest more in forward engagement overseas in order to improve our strategic understanding. That way our Armed Forces will be better able to: 

shape positive outcomes by preventing or deterring conflict;



intervene in a timely, intelligent and precise way, where necessary; and



make a broader Defence contribution to advancing the UK’s security, prosperity and influence.

In short, we will move from campaigning to engagement, deterrence and contingency.

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

Analysis

Chapter 1 – Analysing the operating environment ‘No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future conflict. The key is not to be so far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is revealed.’ Professor Sir Michael Howard Chapter 1 provides a very brief overview of the future context within which our Armed Forces must contribute to national objectives. It confirms the enduring relevance of the Global Strategic Trends Out to 2040 and Future Character of Conflict analysis, and highlights a few key themes which should inform our response. 1.1. While analysing the operating environment, we have tested and validated the Global Strategic Trends Out to 2040 (GST IV) and the Future Character of Conflict (FCOC) studies. In particular, the ‘five Cs’ – congested, cluttered, contested, connected and constrained remain extant and relevant. Both publications were also based on six core assumptions which remain extant. 

The UK has significant global interests and will wish to remain a leading actor on the global stage.



Defence will remain the UK’s ultimate insurance policy.



The UK has finite financial resources that constrain Defence, while the military purchasing power of potential competitors is increasing.



Our adversaries will seek asymmetric advantage – their logic will not necessarily be our logic.



Success will often, but not exclusively, be achieved through the results of action on the ground.



The UK will act with others where shared interests and values coincide.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

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Analysis

The changing mosaic of conflict 1.2. In the past we have considered conflict as a spectrum between peace and war. This construct has been invalidated by the nature and character of conflict over the last 20 years. The world is a much more complex and dangerous place in the 21st Century. The volatility and unpredictability of conflict means that we are likely to be persistently engaged – modulating our military presence to meet the specific requirement across a mosaic of conflict where there is no clear distinction between peace and war. Paragraphs 1.3 – 1.5 describe those key themes emerging from this changing mosaic of conflict. 1.3. Persistent engagement in an uncertain competitive world. Shifts in the global balance of power could lead to new tensions, increasing the likelihood of inter-state conflict at sea, in the air, or in cyberspace and space. In the future, we will, therefore, need to be ready to participate, where our interests demand it, in a broader spectrum of conflict types. 1.4. Increasingly constrained. In future, there may be more constraints upon how the UK applies military force. These constraints will include: 

emerging economies garnering more political power, thus potentially blocking or condemning military action;



less public support for future operations if the requirement cannot be fully proven;



changes to Western defence spending priorities and focus; and



the continuing evolution of international law.

Where possible, we should emphasise pursuing our interests by means short of intervention and exercising lethal force (including through forward engagement) to understand and shape the strategic context through influence and deterrence. But credible deterrence requires an enduring ability, when necessary, to engage the enemy with the appropriate level of force.

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Analysis

1.5. Affected by the rapid advance of technology. The proliferation of increasingly sophisticated nuclear and conventional technology raises regional tensions and makes the future operating environment more dangerous. Our moral and ethical constraints may not be shared by our opponents, whether state or non-state actors, who are likely to use a mix of conventional and asymmetric tactics. Conflicts will be dynamic and we will need to be agile by culture and organisational design.

Threats 1.6. State threats. Currently, there is no identified state-led conventional military threat to the UK. Nevertheless, because of the volatility and unpredictability of the operating environment, we must be able to regenerate forces to meet any potential threat, including defence of our homeland. 1.7. Enduring threats. The specific enduring threats highlighted in the Future Character of Conflict (terrorism, hostile states, fragile and failing states and hybrid threats and adversaries) remain. This means that we must retain our expertise in counter-terrorism, stabilisation, counter-insurgency and warfighting. But, we must also adjust our approach to conventional deterrence to prevent threats from escalating. 1.8. Other threats. There are other state (and non-state) threats against the UK, including cyber attack, subversion, espionage and crime (piracy, gangs and narcotics).

The environments – Key deductions Maritime 1.9. As a maritime nation, our ability to retain influence within the global maritime environment so that we can trade and travel freely, is vital. However, increased competition for resources and influence, and the emerging new weapon types will make the environment increasingly contested. 1.10. Maritime forces remain essential to the UK’s overall security and to protecting our trade and supply routes. Therefore, maritime capability

Defence Joint Operating Concept

1-3

Analysis

(military and civil) remains critical to our ability to project significant force overseas. Maritime force protection also remains vital to maintaining our freedom of action. 1.11. Advances and proliferation in anti-access and area denial systems will add challenge and complexity to maritime operations and sea control. As global demography changes, the littoral will feature ever more prominently in future maritime and land campaigns. Land 1.12. Land forces will continue to operate within, and among, the people. Cultural understanding is imperative. 1.13. The character of the land environment is being changed by increasing urbanisation. Larger populations demand more resources from the land and a relative increase in people living in the littoral. 1.14. More important than the physical characteristics of the land environment, is the political importance of land itself. Political power will continue to be based on land. A failed or failing state, internal conflict or regional war, will only provide the physical context for conflict: they will only matter if they impact UK policy. It will not be in our interest to intervene in such scenarios where there is no British interest to preserve or protect. The only ‘good reason’ for intervention in the land environment will be to enforce, via violence if necessary, a political behaviour. Therefore, the decisive actions to influence an actor will occur on land to achieve political objectives (whether they are delivered from land, sea, air or cyber). 1.15. The littoral and urban environments will feature more prominently in future land campaigns, particularly the growth of ‘mega’ and new cities. Defence will need the capabilities to understand and influence those living in urban areas. Limitation in mass dictates that, wherever possible, this will be done asymmetrically. 1.16. The prevalence of asymmetric threats (improvised explosive devices, insiders) will be key considerations for protecting our land forces.

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

Analysis

Air 1.17. Recent operations, and those envisaged in the future, remain heavily reliant on air as well as accessing and exploiting space to maintain our combat advantage. However, the number of states (and possibly non-state actors) with advanced air and anti-air capabilities (which could include directed energy weapons) is likely to increase. They could challenge, or at least complicate, air superiority. Therefore: 

control of the air remains our strategic advantage which we should seek to retain;



our unrestricted use of the air environment is likely to be challenged by an increasing number of potential adversaries;



advanced technologies, including unmanned and lighter-than-air vehicles, will make an increasingly important contribution to air power; and



land and maritime forces will remain vulnerable without the ability to gain air control.

Space 1.18. An increasing number of nations and nonstate actors will acquire space-based and antispace-based capabilities. Space will become increasingly congested, competitive and vulnerable. Defence must understand the threats and opportunities inherent in these capabilities, the Space will become increasingly congested, agenda of those who gain competitive and vulnerable access to them, and develop methods to exploit/counter/mitigate against them. Because of the vulnerabilities of space-based systems, we should avoid complete dependency on them.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

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Analysis

Cyber 1.19. Cyberspace is a pervasive and all-encompassing operating environment. Freedom of action in it will be contested. Our networks and systems must be resilient to attack and capable of rapidly reconfiguring to maintain operational capability. While adversaries will continue to pursue cyber operations against the UK, it also offers significant opportunities for us to pursue Defence policy. Close relationships across government, with industry partners and international allies, are crucial. These relationships will enable us to understand the threats and opportunities that arise and exploit them. This is not an area for specialists only, it is part of our daily life and business. It must, therefore, also be part of Cyber is both a threat and an opportunity; it’s part of our daily life and business routine Defence activity.

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

Ends

Chapter 2 – National objectives which the DJOC aspires to meet (Ends) Chapter 2 explains the national objectives which the Defence Joint Operating Concept (DJOC) aspires to meet (‘Ends’). The ‘Ends’ are taken from the National Security Strategy. They have been captured as Defence functions that are readily mapped to the existing post-Strategic Defence and Security Review military tasks. The most difficult security challenge we face is, ‘how we can maintain stability while accommodating change?’ The ‘Ends’ are therefore about retaining an influential place in the rules-based international system. And, it is this stability which underpins our national security and prosperity.

National vision 2.1. The UK’s National Security Strategy is to ‘use all our national capabilities to build Britain’s prosperity, extend our nation’s influence in the world and strengthen our security’.1 The National Security Strategy defines two core national security objectives. 

Ensuring a secure and resilient UK. This is about protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, territory and way of life from all major risks that can affect us directly.



Shaping a stable world. This about how we act beyond our borders to reduce the likelihood of specific risks affecting the UK or our direct interests overseas.

2.2. The National Security Strategy makes it clear that we can only achieve these objectives through being actively engaged in the world. This will enable us to understand and shape the strategic context, rather than simply react to it. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES) and the Government’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) provide the framework for how this will be achieved.

1

The National Security Strategy, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty.

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Ends

The purpose of Defence2 2.3. A government’s primary role is to ensure the survival of the state. But this is not sufficient. A government must also seek to increase the state’s prosperity, and thereby, strengthen its stability. We have a role to play, not just as the guarantor of the nation’s security against threats, but also in supporting wider interests in stability and prosperity. To achieve this, our Government requires our Armed Forces to be capable of fulfilling three overarching functions: 

defence of the homeland;



forward engagement; and



projecting military power.

Each one encompasses a broad range of tasks in which we must play either a leading or a supporting role within a whole-of-government effort. Figure 2.1 illustrates this model. Understand

Forward engagement

Military power projection (Contingent capability for defence and deterrence)

(Standing commitments, orientation, conflict prevention and overseas capacity-building)

Military power

Defence of the homeland

Inform

Influence

(UK engagement and homeland resilience)

M ai

n t a i n s t e g i c i n i t i a ti r at

ve

Figure 2.1 – Functions of our Armed Forces 2

Defence’s generic purpose was originally described in Joint Doctrine Publication 2-00, Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 3rd edition, August 2011. It was then described as ‘defence of the homeland’ and the ‘projection of military force’. It has been refined and modified here to include forward engagement.

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

Ends

2.4.

Defence of the homeland. Our primary tasks include: 

defending the UK and our Overseas Territories against external attack, either from conventional military state-on-state threats or from evolving threats, including cyber attacks;



supporting the civil authorities to ensuring the internal security of the state, and contributing to the resilience of the UK and our Overseas Territories when faced with disruption or natural disaster; and



protecting UK citizens from harm, whether at home or abroad.

Our Armed Forces must be capable of defending the UK and our Overseas Territories against external attack

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Ends

2.5. Forward engagement to support our Government objectives. Our primary tasks include: 

understanding the global and regional context through persistent and modulated forward engagement in support of our standing commitments, and through support to intelligence and diplomatic priorities;



strengthening existing alliances and developing partnerships, including non-traditional partners, that support and enhance UK security and economic relationships through Defence diplomacy;



acting early to prevent conflict and tackle the root causes of instability, including helping to build partner capacity and contributing to peacekeeping operations;



assuring UK access to secure and affordable resources; and



protecting and promoting a stable, rules-based international system that supports our national security and prosperity interests.

2.6. Projecting military power to support our national interests. Our primary tasks include deterring, containing and defeating threats to the UK, its Overseas Territories, citizens and interests. A key part of this deterrence is the ability to project power using nuclear and conventional means. We also need to intervene, where necessary, to defeat or destroy threats overseas to prevent them from reaching the UK. Internationally, we may be either obliged to resolve conflicts and contribute to stability (through the UN), or do so voluntarily if it is in our national interests.

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

Ways

Chapter 3 – Employing the military instrument of power: how we will fight and operate (Ways) ‘What is required is a shift in emphasis from Defence ‘inputs’ – weapon systems, equipment and force postures – to strategic ‘outputs’ – the functions required to ensure national security and defence in a challenging and changing environment.’1 Professor Paul Cornish Chapter 3 describes how joint forces will operate and fight in the future operating environment. We explain the need to better align the military instrument of national power with the ‘ends’ described in Chapter 2. We have learned that hard power is essential, but not always enough. The operating environment demands a more nuanced range of ways in which the military instrument can be employed to build our understanding, strengthen relationships, enhance influence, support prosperity and deter, or defeat, the emerging threats to our national security. 3.1. The need to change. As we draw down after a decade of complex stabilisation operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must re-balance so that we are better configured to support a broad range of national objectives amidst the uncertainty of a rapidly changing world. As articulated in the National Security Strategy, the UK must remain engaged in the world because this is the best way to maintain our prosperity, influence and security. 3.2. Using military force – a change of emphasis. Our Armed Forces must retain their warfighting excellence, which is the foundation of their credibility and utility. Where our interests demand it, we must be able to fight and win, as well as defend our country and our Overseas Territories from external aggression. But, our Armed Forces have much wider use than warfighting alone. Therefore, we will change our emphasis to work intelligently and proactively to build our national prosperity, extend our influence and strengthen our security through influence and forward engagement. In particular, we must invest more in our strategic 1

Professor Paul Cornish, Strategy in Austerity – The Security and Defence of the United Kingdom, Chatham House Report, 2010.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

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Ways

understanding and intelligence so that we can orientate ourselves rapidly to change, and target our limited resources for maximum effect. We must exercise our influence at the global level by investing in strengthening alliances, particularly NATO, and by developing Defence relationships with new partners where they serve UK interests. Where we spot the potential for threats to emerge, we should seek first to deter or coerce, and then to contain the threat at an acceptable level. Should prevention fail, then our deep understanding of the context will allow us to intervene, alongside our allies and partners, with power and precision and to set the conditions for a rapid, but responsible, exit. While we aim to avoid fighting, we must still be prepared to commit to an enduring operation. 3.3. Re-focusing Defence. The DJOC therefore asserts a change of emphasis in the focus of our military capability. At its heart is the idea that we should retain capable and professional Armed Forces as the nation’s insurance policy, but that we should at the same time invest more in forward engagement overseas to improve our strategic understanding. In this way, our Armed Forces will be better able to: 

shape positive outcomes by preventing or deterring conflict;



intervene in a timely, intelligent and precise way where necessary; and



make a broader Defence contribution to advancing the UK’s security, prosperity and influence.

In short, we will move from campaigning to engagement, deterrence and contingency.

3-2

Defence Joint Operating Concept

Ways

Whole-of-government effort – an integrated approach to achieving national objectives 3.4. Western influence will reduce in relative terms as other powers evolve over the next 20 years.2 To compete effectively, the UK must draw together, and use, all the instruments of national power and influence (including diplomacy, intelligence, development, trade and defence) to achieve maximum effect. Our structures and posture must meet national policy and strategy requirements. At times, Defence may be required to lead, but more often, we will support others. We must also be flexible and responsive when working in partnership with other government departments, while ensuring that they understand our wider use.

Understand 3.5. The DJOC’s starting point is that we should only fight from a position of knowledge. Strategic intelligence, if gathered exclusively from remote assets, can offer information but not understanding. Such information is most valuable when it can be allied with a deep comprehension of the political, cultural and societal drivers that shape the operating environment and underpin decision-makers’ motivation. This will enable us to target our limited resources to achieve the maximum effect. This deeper understanding will only be derived through persistent forward engagement alongside those we seek to understand within a cross-government framework. Through intelligence and engagement, we will be more able to identify and orientate ourselves quickly to threats and opportunities where they emerge. We can also use that understanding to inform a timely and intelligent response.

Forward engagement 3.6. Forward engagement encompasses those forces engaged in ‘standing’ commitments (the Committed Force), and those carrying out activities supporting strategic understanding and international Defence engagement (the Engaged Force). The latter includes complementary training and education of foreign nationals in the UK. The DJOC envisages 2

DCDC, Global Strategic Trends Out to 2040, 2010.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

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Ways

greater focus, coordination and, ultimately, commitment across the entire span of Defence engagement activity. This includes Defence diplomacy and supporting: 

Defence and security exports;



regional stability;



conflict prevention;



post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation; and



security and non-combat operations.

3.7. Our efforts will require coordinating all strands of Defence engagement and influence activity at home and abroad. They must also be prioritised and coordinated with other government departments ‘into those countries which are most important to national interests and where we are most likely to achieve the desired effect’.3

Shaping through influence 3.8. The importance of networks and alliances. The UK has a unique global network of alliances and partnerships, often underpinned by common language and long-standing historical affiliations. This represents a distinct competitive advantage within a globalised world. The International Defence Engagement Strategy seeks to capitalise on this to support our national security and prosperity objectives. 3.9. Be proactive, and sustain alliances and relationships. In future, we will usually operate as part of a multinational force, relying more heavily on our allies to provide additional mass and, in some cases, capabilities that we lack. The UK will therefore need to be proactive if it is to maintain influence with our core allies, notably the US and France, encouraging them to be both willing and able to support our national security interests for mutual benefit. We must, therefore, maintain our credibility as a robust and reliable ally, while working to strengthen alliances, particularly the European aspects of NATO. 3

MOD, International Defence Engagement Strategy, February 2013.

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Ways

3.10. Non-traditional partners. Our Armed Forces must also support cross-government efforts to build and strengthen relationships with nontraditional partners, particularly the emerging powers. This will help us to: 

develop mutual understanding and respect;



enhance operational effectiveness and interoperability to broaden and strengthen future coalitions;



contribute to conflict prevention by building partner capacity to deal with emergent threats at source; and



contribute to national prosperity by supporting Defence sales activity.

Once committed to a programme of engagement, we need to be consistent and dependable.

Our Armed Forces must also support crossgovernment efforts to build and strengthen relationships with nontraditional partners

Defence Joint Operating Concept

3-5

Ways

Shaping through deterrence, coercion and containment 3.11. We will always seek to contribute to our national objectives by peaceful means. At times, however, we must be able to robustly respond to threats. Wherever possible, however, we should aim to deter a potential opponent from pursuing a course of action that runs counter to our interests. Or, we coerce them into stopping or reversing actions that they have already undertaken through actions short of war. 3.12. Deterrence and coercion. Both deterrence and coercion will depend upon the perceived credibility of the threat. This may be harder to achieve in light of shifts in the global balance of power and the proliferation of advanced technology. This may mean that we will be better placed in future to deny the benefits of aggression than to threaten punishment. Nevertheless, an essential part of our credibility rests on possessing sufficient military capability – both conventional and nuclear – and consistent messaging that, when circumstances warrant it, we are prepared to use it. We can also enhance our credibility by: 

working closely with other instruments of national power to give us more coercive options (for example, economic sanctions); and



aligning ourselves with allies and partners to achieve a multiplying effect.

Finally, we must think and act creatively, particularly when faced by an asymmetric threat from a non-traditional adversary. For example, we must improve our ability to identify and target cyber attackers. 3.13. Application. Whether deterring or coercing, success will be rooted in understanding our opponent’s motivation and behaviour. We should also be ready to consider mixing threats and incentives to shift our opponent’s decision calculus, persuading them that their interests would be better served by being compliant. Where we cannot deter or coerce, we should consider whether the threat can be contained at an acceptable level. We will usually consider intervention only when we have been unsuccessful in deterring, coercing or containing a threat.

3-6

Defence Joint Operating Concept

Ways

Focused contingent capability 3.14. There is a continuum between ‘influence operations’ and ‘contingency operations’. The former aids understanding and insight. This informs our capability requirements for intervention, and helps to shape both the strategic context and the tactical battlespace ahead of committing contingent forces, should that prove necessary. 3.15. We will retain sufficient forces at high readiness to respond to emergent terrorist or weapons of mass destruction threats. When necessary, we will be able to exploit our mature understanding of the operating environment to intervene quickly, precisely, intelligently and decisively by land, sea or air to protect the UK and its interests abroad. This will also set the conditions for a rapid, but responsible, exit. 3.16. Understanding the operating context better will also provide a framework within which calculated judgements about risk can be made. This allows a more dynamic and modulated approach to the size, capabilities, posture and readiness states of the Responsive Force. 3.17. We must retain sufficient capability within the Adaptive Force at appropriate readiness to deliver our Defence’s responsibilities for UK resilience, homeland defence and larger scale contingency.

Structured agility 3.18. Agility, in the military sense, is the physical and structural ability that allows forces to adjust rapidly and decisively, especially when operating in complex situations or in the face of new or unforeseen circumstances.4 Maximising our Armed Forces’ agility allows us to respond with precision to operational demands, while being more efficient in using finite resources. Agility cannot be assumed – it must be designed into the force. In this concept, we see this structured agility, as having four core elements.

4

Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, British Defence Doctrine, paragraph 221.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

3-7

Ways 

Force structure. We must design in, and exploit, agility in our future force structure. This calls for us to align force development, force generation, force posture and force employment more dynamically to the demands of the operating environment, as highlighted earlier.



Moral and conceptual. We must deliver high-quality training and education as well as encourage a culture of innovation. We must also sustain and maintain our values and standards that are the bedrock of our institutions, ethos, philosophy and method of operating.



Physical. Manpower, equipment and training should enhance, rather than constrain, our capability across the range of outputs we may be asked to deliver. We should prioritise those capabilities and skills which offer an effect across the related areas of understanding, engagement and contingency.



Joint forces. The DJOC proposes a new definition for ‘joint’: military activities and operations where scaleable maritime, land, air, cyber and space force elements are integrated together into a single military force or command to achieve a specific mission or missions in peace, crisis or war.5 The case for jointery has been reaffirmed after a decade of campaigns. But we should not take it for granted in a more complex and varied future operating environment. While valuing the unique skills that each of the Services can offer, we must continue to push jointery to the point that it becomes intuitive. This will ease generating bespoke force packages when required.

5

It is proposed this replaces the broader NATO definition: activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate. It places the emphasis on integration and the creation of mission-focused joint forces such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, or peacetime commands like Joint Forces Command or Permanent Joint Overseas Bases.

3-8

Defence Joint Operating Concept

Ways

Working with allies 3.19. While retaining our ability to operate nationally to defend the UK and its Overseas Territories, we will work ever more closely in alliances and partnerships to maximise our influence to achieve our desired strategic effect. NATO’s unique ability to offer collective defence and deterrence, a standing command structure and a formal Defence planning mechanism means it will remain our primary alliance.6 We must work with our key allies, particularly the US and France, to strengthen the defence capabilities of European nations through a hard-nosed focus on coherence, efficiency and interoperability. This will not be quick or easy. It will require our sustained commitment to exercising leadership within NATO, as well as the European Union. We will also work outside the institutions, exploiting our close bilateral ties. Developing the UK/French Combined Joint Expeditionary Developing the UK/French Combined Joint Force is a good example of how Expeditionary Force is a good example of how we are enhancing our we are enhancing our interoperability with a interoperability with a trusted ally. trusted ally 3.20. Consistent with the partnerships agenda inside NATO, we should also seek out new partners. We should work with them to enhance their operational effectiveness and ability to operate inside a US, French, NATO, or UK-led coalition.

6

CDS/PUS letter, D/CDS/3/1/5, NATO – At the Heart of British Defence, dated 12 July 2012.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

3-9

Ways

3.21. Finally, we must, however, better understand the risk that comes from depending on others. Many NATO allies are emphasising their reliance on each other while reducing their defence spending, thus resulting in an overall erosion of the Alliance’s capability. Additionally, in some European capitals, there are also signs of a reducing political willingness to deploy forces. We will need to engage closely with allies and partners to ensure a high level of confidence in their future reliability. At the same time, US priorities are shifting from Europe to the Asia-Pacific rim. We will need to continue to demonstrate our enduring utility as a close ally if we are to continue to enjoy the very significant material benefits we derive from our transatlantic relationship.

Drawing it all together 3.22. Exploiting the synergies between standing commitments, forward engagement and focused agility will require better strategic direction and coordination across the spectrum of activities and effects. 3.23. The joint MOD/Foreign and Commonwealth Defence Engagement Board is responsible for setting strategic priorities to inform the development of regional strategies, which are closely coordinated with ambassadors’ country business plans. Our Head Office will continue to lead on strategic engagement activity, including senior visits, staff talks, as well as directing and managing Defence Attachés. They should also develop a mechanism that considers Defence engagement priorities alongside available resources. Such a mechanism should take into account standing commitments and contingent requirements. This will also provide consolidated direction to shape operational delivery. 3.24. At the operational level, forward engagement should be viewed as an international influence campaign, with the Chief of Joint Operations and our single Service headquarters delivering effect within the strategic framework and exploiting fully the synergies with forces generated for focused contingency. The Defence Exercise Programme provides a framework which could be expanded to become, in essence, a Defence activity programme.

3-10

Defence Joint Operating Concept

Means

Chapter 4 – Designing and generating our force structure and capabilities (Means) Chapter 4 describes the ‘means’, or the force structure and capabilities we need to support delivering our national objectives within the future operating context. The Defence Joint Operating Concept (DJOC) emphasises that our contribution to such national objectives will need people and equipment that offer utility across the broad spectrum of outputs. 4.1. The fundamentals of fighting power do not change. We must continue to harness the conceptual component (the thought process), the moral component (the ability to get people to fight) and the physical component (the means to fight). Our people are our strength. We must continue to invest in them and their education, training and wider personal development. We must retain the single Service environmental ethos and expertise. For they make our joint forces an effective military capability. 4.2. The logic of the DJOC, however, drives a number of important conclusions about the force structure and capabilities we require. It introduces two new operational concepts that will enhance our future effectiveness: the Engaged Force and the Joint Expeditionary Force. It emphasises the importance of jointery and interoperability, with other government departments, and with allies and partners. It prioritises capabilities which offer broad utility, contributing to understanding and influence as well as to power projection. It also emphasises the unremitting requirement to excel at warfighting.

The Committed Force 4.3. The Committed Force will constitute those elements deployed for enduring contingent operations and standing commitments. These will provide understanding, orientation and influence in areas where permanent presence is deemed essential. Committed forces may also be called upon to support Engaged Forces and will be reinforced as required by Responsive and Adaptive Forces.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

4-1

Means

The Engaged Force 4.4. Alongside the Committed, Responsive and Adaptive Forces that were derived from the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the DJOC introduces the new key operational concept of an Engaged Force; a natural evolution from SDSR 10. The Engaged Force will be based upon the solid foundation of an enhanced Defence intelligence and Defence diplomatic footprint overseas to provide long-term consistency and predictability in relationships that are important to us. But it will also be scalable, encompassing force elements from all three Services deployed overseas supporting Defence engagement priorities. Their activities will be managed as a joint, global influence campaign. 4.5. The Engaged Force will draw upon expertise from within the Adaptive Force, working alongside other force elements, overt and covert, from the Committed and Responsive Forces deployed overseas, and in close coordination with other government departments. It will contribute to achieving national security and prosperity objectives, while developing understanding and orientation. Importantly, this will enable us to orientate rapidly to change and have a better chance of shaping events to our advantage without the need for intervention. The Engaged Force is likely to identify the indicators and warnings that would trigger deploying Joint Expeditionary Force elements. 4.6. Effective understanding and shaping of both the strategic context and the tactical battlespace through forward engagement should be viewed as an essential, non-discretionary enabler for all other activity, up to, and including, high-end warfighting. We will need to attract high-quality people who can adapt their expertise to apply it in different ways to achieve influence with a broad range of target audiences, from allies to adversaries. To achieve this, we will need to adjust our military career structure and incentives. We must also give our people the skills to excel, including necessary language and cultural skills.

4-2

Defence Joint Operating Concept

Means

The Responsive Force – The Joint Expeditionary Force 4.7. The Joint Expeditionary Force is the DJOC’s second key operational concept. Joint by design, the Joint Expeditionary Force will be the default framework for our Responsive Force and the vehicle for focused contingency. It will bridge the contingent space between forward engagement (standing commitments and Defence engagement) and multinational operations at scale, as Figure 4.1 illustrates. National threshold (scale, complexity, political) UK strategic orientation

UK national response

International response

Adaptive Forces Standing commitments

UK JEF

Anglo-French CJEF

Core scaleable C2, ISR, Log, IO and other enablers Defence engagement

partner nations

alliances

Adaptive Forces

Legend C2 Command and control CJEF Combined Joint Expeditionary Force IO Information operations ISR Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

JEF Joint Expeditionary Force Log Logistics NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Figure 4.1 – The Joint Expeditionary Force construct 4.8. The Joint Expeditionary Force will be: 

a series of scalable and integrated force elements, which are attributed through the Defence planning process, to offer a range of credible military response options;

Defence Joint Operating Concept

4-3

Means



held at high readiness; and



reinforced as required from the Adaptive Force.

As the UK’s national response capability, deploying the Joint Expeditionary Force will be designed to prevent escalating a threat and thereby avoiding larger scale operations. 4.9. The Joint Expeditionary Force will assimilate the situational awareness developed by the Committed and Engaged Forces. The force will also draw upon established relationships with allies and partners to allow it to intervene quickly, precisely and decisively. Thereby, they will set the conditions for a rapid, but responsible, exit. 4.10. Forces within the Joint Expeditionary Force will be allocated by the annual Defence planning cycle to meet the policy-defined requirements of scale, concurrency and readiness. Nevertheless, attributing the Joint Expeditionary Force’s high-readiness element will be a dynamic process. It will be intelligence-led, and varies in each planning cycle to reflect the changing operational and resource environments. 4.11. At all scales, the Joint Expeditionary Force envisages a closely integrated international dimension. As the UK Joint Expeditionary Force, it will be designed to integrate international force elements from close allies under UK command. The force will also provide our national contribution to the UK/French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force and to other alliances and coalitions. 4.12. The Joint Expeditionary Force will be enabled by an ‘attributed core’ comprising permanent, but scalable, command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, logistics and information operations elements. These will be configured to support the lowest level of operations, but able to expand in scale as appropriate.1 Early entry and lowest scale command and control will be based on the Joint Forces Headquarters, with augmentation to increase capacity. A second command and control node will be formed to handle concurrency.2 The command and control element will be 1

The Defence Authority C4ISR, with the Expeditionary Command and Inform Programme, are responsible for defining the command and control as well as the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance requirement. 2 A reserve/alternate Joint Forces Headquarters could be modified from single Service headquarters or a separate virtual construct, trained and kept at low readiness.

4-4

Defence Joint Operating Concept

Means

informed by reachback, and access to all-source, fused intelligence and information-led analysis from UK and other national sources. The information operations strand will harmonise strategic to tactical messaging requirements. This will ensure that the force is committed intelligently within a coherent influence framework.

The Adaptive Force 4.13. The Adaptive Force provides the foundation of our national warfighting capability, support to UK resilience and the basis for generating the Committed, Engaged and Responsive Forces. As there are a range of potential tasks, some Adaptive Force units will need to be at mixed readiness. 4.14. Supporting forward engagement. The Adaptive Force will provide well-trained force elements to support the Engaged Force and will need to develop regional, cultural and environmental expertise. This force will also be responsible for ensuring that their understanding is used to shape the Joint Expeditionary Forces’ actions. The force will, therefore, need to invest in language and cultural skills, as well as the ability to build capacity in advanced skill sets to buy regular access to We need to develop forces with regional, cultural foreign countries of interest. and environmental expertise 4.15. Regeneration. The Adaptive Force will provide the mass to augment and sustain the Joint Expeditionary Force to meet any emergent national contingencies. Where judgements have been made to reduce or retire capabilities, the Adaptive Force will also act as a repository of specialist skills. This will provide us, at small scale, the seed-corn for future force generation, should requirements change.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

4-5

Means

4.16. Experimentation, research and development. Through the Defence Exercise Programme, the Adaptive Force will be the engine room for developing new capabilities. They will be supported by the Joint Forces Command Joint Warfare Directorate, the single Service Warfare Centres,3 and the trials and development organisations. These organisations all use experimentation to improve the operational effectiveness of joint forces. 4.17. Resilience. The bulk of resources for resilience (for example, support to military aid to the civil authorities) and ‘public duties’ will be generated from the Adaptive Force. The command and control and force generation of joint forces in relation to resilience is yet to be determined. It should be the subject of further concept development.

Jointery and integration 4.18. The case for jointery. UK Defence is currently founded on discrete single Service expertise and capability that deliver defined outputs as a single component, but that are drawn together to routinely fight as joint forces. While this principle should remain, we are not yet intuitively joint. Generating bespoke, joint force packages as required should be second nature. Not being so hampers Our single Services must retain their unique battle-winning expertise but they our agility and reduces both our must also integrate fully in heart and spirit efficiency and effectiveness. 4.19. Reinforcing a joint culture. Joint education and training, at an earlier career stage than is done currently, will be fundamental enablers. Through these enablers we will be able to exploit to the full the complementary skill sets and capabilities of the three Services. They will also ensure that our officers have sufficient experience to make them effective in

3

Maritime Warfare Centre, Directorate Land Warfare and Air Warfare Centre.

4-6

Defence Joint Operating Concept

Means

joint posts. The most senior posts must be selected by a joint board4 and based on merit and approach. 4.20. Whole force concept. While regular Service personnel will form the largest and higher readiness component of our joint forces, reservists, contractors and civil servants will have an increasingly important role. The DJOC embraces the whole force concept, which must become an ingrained characteristic of joint forces, including in training, exercises and mission rehearsals. All elements must be involved in the early planning stages of a deployment or operation, where their different perspectives will add value. 4.21. Generating our joint forces. The role of Joint Forces Command is to institutionalise a collegiate and integrated approach to developing and delivering military capability. Joint Forces Command will set the joint capability requirements and standards, including education and training, for our joint forces. They will also own some key capabilities that enable the single Services to operate together as an effective joint force. These responsibilities will be discharged through Joint Force Command's role as the Joint User,5 Joint Training Requirements Authority6 and the manager of joint training and exercising through the Defence Exercise Programme. Individual and unit-level training will remain the preserve and full responsibility of the single Services. The underlying function of the Joint Forces Command is to foster, guide, assist and enable the single Services to think, prepare and operate as an integrated joint force. Figure 4.2 shows this process pictorially.

4

Key recommendation 12, Defence Reform 2011, page 57, 2011. The ‘joint user’ provides capability sponsors and the lead user with inter-Service and inter-environment capability integration advice, through life, for all capabilities. They also: advise on the joint aspects relevant to single-Service capabilities; act as the lead user where proponency is not clear; provide subject matter expert feedback on the joint employment of capability; and provide the joint perspective on capability priorities. 6 The Joint Training Requirements Authority sets the requirements and standards for all aspects of joint training and education. It is discharged by Directorate of Joint Warfare in Joint Forces Command. 5

Defence Joint Operating Concept

4-7

Means

Generating joint forces – The 5-step process Policy

Generation

Integration

Attribution

Operation

Step 3

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5

JEF Directive

Joint Contingency Plans

Chief of Defence Staff Directive

Refine the Responsive Force

Task and prepare a tailored Responsive Force

Employ

National Security Strategy Step 1 DSD/ Defence plan Set strategic force requirement

Train and generate the committed, responsive and adaptive FE@R

Step 2

The single Services are the experts and have proponency for their own environments. JFC has proponency for joint standards, integration, education, training and operations.

Components of joint capability Maritime FE@R

Land FE@R

Air and Space FE@R

Joint requirements and standards (including Allies and OGDs)

Constant feedback and engagement loop between single Service, JFC and MOD for policy, concept, capability and doctrine development to deliver FE@R.

Single-Service commitments

Joint force integration

Force development

Defence exercise programme

Mission specific training

JEF Tactical engagement simulation

Lessons

Joint FE@R

Legend DSD Defence Strategic Directive FE@R Force elements at readiness JFC Joint Forces Command

JEF Joint Expeditionary Force OGDs Other government departments

Figure 4.2 – Generating joint forces Although there will be some variations in command and control arrangements, generally the process is equally applicable to generating the Joint Expeditionary Force as it is to generating any other Engaged Force. The former draws upon the Responsive Force and the latter draws more heavily upon the Committed and Adaptive Forces.

4-8

Defence Joint Operating Concept

Means

1. Step 1 – Policy. Policy and strategic direction by the National Security Council is provided by the National Security Strategy. The Defence Board coordinates the military aspects of the Government’s response to crises through Defence Strategic Direction and the Defence Plan. This may also be delivered through the Defence Engagement Board. The single Service and joint owners of maritime, land, air, cyber and space and joint capability are involved through constant dialogue/feedback with the policy decision-makers. 2. Step 2 – The force development process. The MOD (as both a department of state and a strategic military headquarters) will own strategic force development and set each Services’ outputs to deliver. The single Service commands will stipulate what they need to the Defence Equipment and Support organisation for them to deliver. The Joint Forces Command will also ensure that single Service capabilities can be integrated into a coherent mission-tailored joint force and that they are interoperable. 3.

Step 3 – Force generation and joint force integration. 

Single-Service training. The single Services, and to a lesser degree, Joint Forces Command (including the Reserve, and where appropriate contractor and civilian elements) train their force elements up to unit level in both their core individual and collective skills. They also train them to give them those key competences required of components within a joint force.



Generating joint forces. A Joint Force Directive details the force elements at readiness required. The single Services and Joint Forces Command generate forces to match the requirement.



Joint force integration. The force elements generated by the single Services and the joint enablers owned by Joint Forces Command come together and complete a joint training phase.

4. Step 4 – Attribution. The designated joint force is attributed to a Joint Contingency Plan, the Defence Exercise Programme, or a distinct forward engagement task. This attribution sets the parameters for their deployment. 5. Step 5 – Operation. Forces will be deployed as required under the operational command (OPCOM) of the Permanent Joint Headquarters. Should the force deploy, its precise make-up and the most appropriate command and control architecture, will be proposed by this headquarters and promulgated in the Chief of the Defence Staff’s Directive.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

4-9

Means

Structured agility 4.22. Figure 4.3 describes how synergies designed into the future force structure will be exploited through a dynamic force flow between the Committed, Engaged, Responsive and Adaptive Forces elements. Specifically, it shows how the Engaged Force will draw upon force elements from the Adaptive Force to shape the Responsive Force reaction to an emergent threat through sharing its deep understanding of the context. It also illustrates: 

our need for flexible, responsive attribution from the Adaptive Force in, and out of, the Joint Expeditionary Force;



Adaptive Forces will provide the mass required for enduring stabilisation operations or for a ‘best effort’ intervention; and



our Committed Forces may be released to contribute to engagement. The UK Joint Forces Structure

Committed

Engaged

Forward engagement and crisis

Standing commitments

IDES Standing military tasks

Forward presence

Legend IDES International Defence Engagement Strategy

Responsive

Contingent capability (JEF) Dynamic force application

Joint Expeditionary Force

Adaptive Warfighting foundation Dynamic force attribution Support to committed engaged and responsive forces

Resilience Regeneration Reinforcement Dynamic force flow

Figure 4.3 – The UK Joint Forces dynamic and adaptable structure

4-10

Defence Joint Operating Concept

Means

4.23. Designing in agility. To achieve a flexible force structure we must design mental and physical agility into our future forces. Agility is critical in enabling us to meet the demands of the future operating environment. To achieve this, we must do three things. a. Adopt a more responsive approach to force development, force generation, force posture and force employment to match the evolving military strategic requirement. Within the new Defence Operating Model, it is envisaged that the annual Defence Plan will continue to be the vehicle that allocates our resources, but it must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate amendments through the quarterly review process. b. Invest in the Engaged Force to provide the necessary situational awareness to underpin judgements about where calculated risk can be accepted. This will allow us to more accurately determine the required scale, capabilities, posture and readiness of the Joint Expeditionary Force. c. Develop robust and well-rehearsed joint command and control processes, joint doctrine and procedures.7 We also need frequent exercises and training to support the fusion of the single Service capabilities with a tempo that few, if any, of our adversaries will be able to match.

Critical capabilities 4.24. Our people. The intellectual quality of our personnel has long been high, but we have often failed to capitalise upon it. We must improve this failing by making better use of finite resources and ensuring that we have the intellectual foundations to deal with the challenges of the future. We will need people who can acclimatise quickly to change and develop innovative and imaginative plans for advancing UK national interests amidst uncertainty by conventional and asymmetric means. The DJOC’s first capability priority

7

Where practicable, these should be NATO joint doctrine and procedures unless there is a very good reason not to.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

4-11

Means

must therefore be the recruiting, developing and retaining high-quality and adaptable personnel who can out-think our adversaries. 4.25. Interoperability. Interoperability is our second key capability requirement. This reflects the importance of jointery, as well as our need to seamlessly integrate with other government departments and, where our interests align, with allies and partners. Through interoperability, we will both add value to our partners (enhancing our influence) and be able to exploit the benefits of capability and mass derived through coalition. 4.26. Enabling capabilities. Our future force structure will be configured to give our political and military leaders the most choice. In the DJOC, we place a premium upon capabilities which can contribute to national understanding, as well as the ability to shape the strategic context. We will achieve the latter through positive engagement with allies and partners as well as the deterrence, coercion or containment of potential adversaries. As we have already stressed, if we must intervene, we should aim to do so with power and precision, and to set the conditions for a rapid, but responsible, exit. This implies a priority upon the following capabilities, each of which offers the potential for a national competitive advantage across the full range of environments. a. Understanding and influence. The Engaged Force must be linguistically and culturally equipped to carry out its functions. It must also be able to gain access through providing high-quality, in-country training and capacity-building, alongside traditional Defence diplomacy. b. Command and control. We need to adopt an approach to command and control that maximises initiative at the appropriate level. Such an approach should also allow rapid and responsive decision-making and provide a clear framework for responsibility and accountability. These will be critical enablers of future operational effectiveness. c. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance is an essential enabling capability

4-12

Defence Joint Operating Concept

Means

that, aligned with cultural understanding from the Engaged Force, will maximise the effective targeting of our finite resources. d. Information operations. We must develop capabilities that allow us to exploit our enhanced understanding and cultural awareness, as well as influence societies and decision-makers when required. We must use information operations effectively to promote our narratives as well as target and undermine those of the opposition. This is to gain strategic, operational and tactical advantage. e. Cyber. Cyber represents both an opportunity and a threat over the timeframe of the DJOC. Nationally, we are already under sustained cyber attack, although at a level which falls short of the threshold for a military response. We must, therefore, work with others across government to improve national cyber defence and deterrence. But cyber also offers real opportunities to shape both the strategic context and the tactical battlespace in advance of deploying forces. Cyber must be ‘mainstreamed’ so that commanders, as well as specialists, understand instinctively how to conduct offensive and defensive cyber at both the strategic and tactical levels. We must also be imaginative in recruiting, managing and retaining the Defence cyber cadre. f. Special Forces. The UK’s Special Forces offer broad utility and flexibility to our decision-makers across our Armed Forces spectrum of functions and outputs. g. Strategic enablers. We will require sufficient lift, both strategic and tactical, as well as logistics, so that we can out-manoeuvre our opponents. This will also enable us to intervene quickly at a time and place of our choosing. 4.27. Summary. These capabilities are broadly applicable to operations in any of the environments – land, sea or air. Each of the single Services will also offer a broad range of capabilities at different readiness levels that can be employed flexibly to pursue national security and prosperity objectives. This may range from carrier-enabled projection of air power (which can both reassure and deter) to deploying (where necessary) highly-skilled, battle-

Defence Joint Operating Concept

4-13

Means

hardened ground forces to stabilise an emerging crisis, or to defeat or destroy a threat.

Agility through equipment and technology 4.28. Optimising our equipment. The pace of technological refresh is likely to increase over the next twenty years. We must be bold in embracing new technology, including through investing in ‘high risk, high pay-off’ research and development. We should also know how to use it asymmetrically to our advantage, while being alive to the possible legal and ethical challenges that they may bring. Our equipment should be as interoperable and widely useable as possible because it is very difficult to predict where, when, with whom, or against whom, future operations will be conducted. Each programme will have different constraints, but in principle, our equipment should be: 

designed so that it can be used across environments;



readily updated or replaced through spiral acquisition and modular construction;



procured based on a balance between quantity and quality; and



procured with sufficient stocks, based on a clear calculation and understanding of rate of use/loss and speed of resupply (based on cost, demand, industrial capacity and security of the supply line).

4.29. Harnessing commercial technology. Many promising new technologies will come from the commercial sector. We need to be nimble in harnessing commercial technology, using competition to spur innovation and, when the technology is of a sensitive nature, establishing strong, but flexible, partnerships as exemplified by the complex weapons programme. As the proportion of services and support provided to Defence by the commercial sector increases, we will become ever more dependent on contractual relationships and the personnel who manage them. We will need, therefore, skilled commercial and technical staff to act as ‘intelligent customers’. 4.30. Working with others – increasing our leverage. We stand to gain a great deal by working with other partners, not just those across government,

4-14

Defence Joint Operating Concept

Means

but also more widely. We will continue to derive very significant benefits from our close relationship with the US and France. Shared procurement offers opportunities to share the risks of capability development. But we also need to bring something to the table if we are to access the benefits of international collaboration. Sustained investment in research and development will remain critical to unlocking these relationships. 4.31. Synthesis and simulation. Simulation, with the appropriate level of investment and fidelity, has the potential to: 

reduce costs and risk;



preserve our front line equipment;



facilitate experimentation; and



provide some training that cannot be conducted in the live environment.

Simulators should be linked so that joint (and, where appropriate, integrated and multinational) training can take place. This will require common processes and standards to be set and enforced.8

Working with allies 4.32. Improving our ability to operate within alliances and with partners requires re-prioritisation and extra commitment. The DJOC has already underlined the importance of interoperability, of increased investment in our Defence relationships, and exploiting the global influence we derive from the UK’s willingness to use our highly capable Armed Forces to uphold the stability of the international system. NATO remains our primary alliance and we are increasingly dependent upon our NATO allies to provide capability and mass. This highlights some additional points for attention. 

8

The UK, US and France will need to exercise leadership together to maintain and enhance European defence capabilities. We also need to put more high quality staff into NATO.

Joint Forces Command has this responsibility.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

4-15

Means

4-16



We must work to optimise the NATO planning process to enhance the coherence and efficiency of the defence capabilities of European nations.



NATO standardisation and doctrine should be our default and followed as far as practicable to enhance interoperability.



Our national command and control architecture must be capable of ‘plugging’ into NATO systems. We must also continue to contribute to the Alliance’s structures, including the NATO Response Force.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

Conclusion

Conclusion 1. So, how will we operate and fight? First and foremost, and regardless of the circumstances in which we find ourselves, we will continue to be ready and willing to fight with the same robust and stoic professional determination for which our Armed Forces are globally respected. That much will not change. But importantly, we will also structure ourselves to exploit that hardwon reputation in softer ways, by engaging with the world in a deliberate and structured way as part of a national strategic plan to further our nation’s strategic interests. This concept calls for us to potentially increase investing in a number of areas of military capability, while compensating in others. We will embrace and exploit new techniques, such as cyber, to ensure that we are not outmanoeuvred by the unexpected exploitation of new methods of engagement. And, we must not forget that past military success has most often been rooted in the quality of our people developed through robust education, doctrine and training to sharpen their innovation, adaptability and decision-making. This holistic approach will allow us to continue to structure and develop our Defence capabilities in a way that supports our national ambition – to remain significantly strategically engaged with the rest of the world. 2. This Defence Joint Operating Concept (DJOC) makes it clear that the single Services must retain their unique battle-winning expertise and distinct individual ethos. But, they must also integrate fully, in heart and spirit, as a functioning joint force. The two are not mutually exclusive, but require Service staffs to think harder about integrating with the other Services and less so about their own vested interests. Using the Joint Forces Command as a vital catalyst for balanced force development and operational effectiveness, is crucial. 3. The DJOC is not about waiting to see what happens and then finding ourselves drawn into lengthy, expensive and bloody operations, with consequences that we had neither foreseen nor understood. The DJOC is about using our Defence capability to get out into the world to influence and understand events, opinions, relationships and outcomes. It is about refining how we use the military instrument to support a broader range of national objectives. We will aim to shape events and circumstances to protect our nation’s security, enhance its prosperity and contribute to the wider stability

Defence Joint Operating Concept

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Conclusion

that best serves our national interests. The DJOC is also about working with other partners, other government departments, allies, industry, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations – because we can achieve more in partnerships than we can alone. Taken together, therefore, the DJOC is about creating a more engaged, connected and efficient Armed Forces that will deliver the most value for our nation.

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

Afterword

Afterword – A note on concepts and taxonomy Concept – A notion or statement of an idea, expressing how something might be done or accomplished, that may lead to an accepted procedure.1 NATO definition

Concepts A-1. Concepts are important. They allow us to explore ideas and develop hypotheses that provide us with a vision of the future and how things might be. But, in military terms, concepts provide not just a vision, but a framework for further work. This framework is then used in detailed concept development, which eventually leads to concepts of employment and use, capability development, and finally doctrine. Figure A.1 shows this process. Policy aware Concepts

Doctrine

Capability development

Concept development

Concept of employment and use

Policy compliant

Figure A.1 – Linking concepts and doctrine A-2. Concepts, and the concept development process, are independent of policy. They are not bounded by it, but they are policy aware as they need to 1

Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2013 edition.

Defence Joint Operating Concept

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Afterword

be cognisant of national vision and ambition (National Security Strategy, Strategic Defence and Security Review and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy). Without this awareness, concepts would be unrealistic. Nevertheless, once the concept has been developed into concepts of employment and use, capability development and doctrine, they must then comply with policy.

Defence concept hierarchy and development A-3. The Defence Joint Operating Concept (DJOC) is the capstone concept that sets the context and direction for the three environmental concepts (Future Maritime, Future Land, and Future Air and Space Operating Concepts). Figure A.2 shows these linkages.

Strategic/operational concept hierarchy Strategic guidance National Security Strategy, Strategic Defence and Security Review, Build Stability Overseas Strategy, etc.

Defence Joint Operating Concept (DJOC)

Future Maritime Operating Concept (FMOC)

Future Land Operating Concept (FLOC)

Future Air and Space Operating Concept (FASOC)

Figure A.2 – The Defence strategic/operational concept hierarchy

Afterword-2

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Afterword

A-4. Concept development. The DJOC, Future Maritime Operating Concept, Future Land Operating Concept and Future Air and Space Operating Concept set the framework for future concept development. To coordinate a coherent Defence approach to concept development, the DJOC envisages a MOD-owned Joint Concept Development Agenda (Joint CODA). This will define a workplan that explores the concept, identifies its implications, and initiates a programme for implementation subject to endorsement within policy. Work will also be conducted by each of the single Services for their own environments, although their concept development must be coordinated with the Joint Concept Development Agenda to ensure coherence. Figure A.3 diagrammatically shows this process. Defence Joint Operating Concept (DJOC) Joint Concept Development Agenda (CODA)

Joint CONEMP/USE

Joint capabilities

Future Maritime Operating Concept (FMOC)

Future Land Operating Concept (FLOC)

Future Air and Space Operating Concept (FASOC)

Maritime CODA

Land CODA

Air and Space CODA

Maritime capabilities

Maritime CONEMP/USE

Land capabilities

Land CONEMP/USE

Air and Space capabilities

Air and Space CONEMP/USE

Legend CONEMP/USE Concept of employment/use CODA Concept Development Agenda

FigureA. 3 – Proposed Defence concept development model

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Taxonomy A-5. All taxonomy used within the DJOC is based on UK or NATO conceptual and doctrinal definitions, unless a new term has been introduced and defined. a. ‘Environment’ versus ‘domain’. In our concepts and doctrine, the UK defines maritime, land, air and space, and cyber as environments, not domains.2 We do this because domain implies some form of dominion which we would only ever have fleetingly on operations (sea or air control- and these terms now have little use). Human domain, however, is an accurate description, because humans (particularly state actors) do have varying degrees of dominion over their territory and are themselves bounded by their familial, cultural and institutional structures. The US, however, uses the term domain for all environments. We use the UK definitions for this concept. b. The operating environment. The operating environment is the totality of the global environment – maritime, land, air, space, cyber and the human domain – all of which are contiguous and interlinked. c. The joint operating environment.3 In UK doctrine, the joint operating environment equates to an operational theatre. It is defined as: the overall space, conditions and surroundings within which military forces operate.4 It constitutes the physical, human, and virtual environments within which Joint Task Force Commanders exercise their authority, and the physical or conceptually adjacent areas within which influence activity can potentially determine the success or failure of an operation. In practical terms, the joint operating environment is bounded by the joint operations area (the area of intelligence responsibility and the area of intelligence interest).

2

Initially, the UK did use domain for information and cyber because we used United States concepts and doctrine to develop our own approach. Current doctrine has reverted to the cyber environment for the reasons explained. 3 DCDC, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 2-00, Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, August 2011. 4 Ibid.

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Defence Joint Operating Concept

Lexicon

Lexicon Part 1 – Abbreviations The Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations and terms/definitions relevant to the Defence Joint Operating Concept, but is not intended to be exhaustive. For reference to extant terminology see the current editions of Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions and the UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database. AAP

Allied Administrative Publication

BSOS

Building Stability Overseas Strategy

CJEF

Combined Joint Expeditionary Force

DCDC

Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

EU

European Union

FCOC

Future Character of Conflict

GST IV

Global Strategic Trends out to 2040

IDES

International Defence Engagement Strategy

JDP JEF JFC

Joint Doctrine Publication Joint Expeditionary Force Joint Forces Command

MOD

Ministry of Defence

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SDSR

Strategic Defence and Security Review

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Lexicon

Part 2 – Terms and definitions This Lexicon incorporates two types of definition. Firstly, in black, it lists those definitions which have already been endorsed by the Defence community (and the source is shown in brackets). Second, in purple is a proposed definition that will be taken forward for endorsement. end-state That state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of a campaign either to terminate or to resolve the conflict on favourable terms. The endstate should be established prior to execution. (JDP 0-01.1) The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-6) joint those activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two Services participate. (AAP-6) joint Military activities and operations where scaleable maritime, land, air, cyber and space force elements are integrated together into a single military force or command to achieve a specific mission or missions in peace, crisis or war. (DJOC) joint operations area An area of land, sea and airspace, in which a designated joint task force commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A joint operations area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JDP 0-01.1) joint operating environment the overall space, conditions and surroundings within which military forces operate. (JDP 2.00) joint task force commander The operational commander of a nominated joint force. (JDP 0-01.1)

Lexicon-2

Defence Joint Operating Concept