Acknowledgement: Presumptions Of Interpretation

PRESUMPTIONS OF INTERPRETATION SUBMITTED TO: DR ALI MOHAMMAD FACULTY OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUES. SUBMITTED BY:

BBA LLB.(HONS.)

March , 2018

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, PATNA

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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Writing a project is one of the most significant academic challenges I have ever faced. Though this project has been presented by me but there are many people who remained in veil, who gave their all support and helped me to complete this project. First of all I am very grateful to my subject teacher DR ALI MOHAMMAD without the kind support and help of whom the completion of the project was a herculean task for me. She donated her valuable time from her busy schedule to help me to complete this project and suggested me from where and how to collect information and data. I am very thankful to the librarian who provided me several books on this topic which proved beneficial in completing this project. I acknowledge my friends who gave their valuable and meticulous advice which was very useful and could not be ignored in writing the project. I want to convey a most sincere thanks to my parents for helping me throughout the project. SHUBHI MISHRA ROLL NO. 1439 7th SEMESTER

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Objectives of the Study: To study what is interpretation and how presumption of interpretation takes place.

Hypothesis: The general view of the researcher is to find that whether there is no difference between interpretation and assumption.

Research Methodology: The researcher has used doctrinal method in her research, that is, extensive use of literary sources and materials. The researcher mainly uses secondary sources to provide substance to the research analysis. In some cases, the researcher shall be bound to extract materials directly from the literary work of certain authors which the researcher intend to adequately cite and notify in due course of time.

Sources of Data: The researcher will collect the data from the following sources: Secondary Sources: Books Websites Articles

Limitations of the Study: Though this is an immense project and pages can be written over the topic due to time, finance, and territorial constraints the researcher has been compelled to deal with a limited number of concepts only.

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Contents Objectives of the Study: .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Hypothesis: ............................................................................................................................................................................. 3

Research Methodology: .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Sources of Data: ...................................................................................................................................................................... 3

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................... 5 CHAPTER 1 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 9 MEANING OF PRESUMPTION. ........................................................................................................................................ 9

CHAPTER 2 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 12 RULES OF PRESUMPTION.............................................................................................................................................. 12

CHAPTER 3 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 14 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION. ............................................................................................................... 14

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Introduction The Delegated Legislation is one of the main topics in Law, it means making the law by some person or body other than parliament but with the authority of the parliament. So, it is necessary to have a good back ground about it as it has an important role in a court. The language of act: The language of act is the source to which parliament must have intended the citizen to refer. Languages of act are the words which parliament has itself approved as accurately expressing its intentions. In addition, if the meaning of these words is clear and does not lead to a result that is manifestly unreasonable, it would be a confidence trick by parliament and destructive of all legal certainty if he private citizen not rely upon that meaning but was required to search through the course of the legislative process in order to see whether there was anything to be found from which it could be inferred that parliaments real intention had not been accurately expressed by the actual words that parliament had adopted to communicate it those affected by the legislation. Language is not a precise tool as words often take their meaning from context, their meaning can even change over time and of course draftsmen cannot foresee and guess everything. Here's an uncomplicated example to show you the affects of the words changing meanings: "Every person willfully, openly, lewdly and obscenely exposing his person with intent to insult any female". The word "person" is used twice but giving two different meanings. There are three basic rules that the courts will employ to determine the intention of parliament: 1-The literal rule: it is the first rule of the statutory interpretation. This type of rule concentrate in what the parliament has said. It is a very simple rule. It means that words should be given their ordinary meaning without trying to guess what parliament actually meant when the act was pulled. (A court will always access and update the common and general meaning of a provision. Therefore, the definition of a provision in the dictionary would be the clearer). Even though 5

following the exact meaning without considering the changes of language sometimes might lead to an unforgiving outcome, you still must follow the act if the words in that act are clear. For example, in the Fisher v Bell (1960) act a shopkeeper displayed a knife in his window. While the restriction of offences weapons act 1959 made it an offence to sell such a knife. However, he succeeded in arguing that a display in a shop is not an offer for sale. Under the contract law it is an invitation to treat with any offer made by customers. The role of judges in this rule is to apply the law not to make it but the can have difficulty in deciding parliament's intention. The advantages of this rule are its simplicity and that you just give the normal meaning of the words. On the other hand sometimes it might lead to bad out comings. 2-The golden rule: golden rule is the second rule that will seek to apply a reasonable and rational result. Therefore, it is used when the words of the statute are ambiguous and it is very hard to see which meaning is appropriate and also when words have only one meaning but to give them that meaning would be wholly unacceptable. However, there have been few occasions where statutory interpretation may have resulted in a bad outcome but for the redeeming affect of the golden rule. Applying this golden rule gives effects to the clear words used by parliament, but will stop short of arriving at a ridiculous decision. As a result it is acceptable for a court to modify the language of the statute or even vary the language to the purpose of avoiding such inconvenience. Furthermore here is a simple example, in this particular case of illustration Re Sigsworth (1953). Here's an example of R v Allen (1872), Allen was accused of bigamy under s.57 of the offences against the person act (1861) which made it an offence to 'marry' while the original spouse was still alive; and not divorce. The word marry had two meanings so, if the word marry was given the first meaning nobody who was already married could be guilty of offence of bigamy because at the time it was legal to marry a second time, it would be impossible for them to do that. The court held that this was silly and said that the word marry must mean go through a formal ceremony of marriage. The main advantage of this rule that it has more safety out comes than the literal rulein contrast one of its disadvantages is that judges don’t like telling the parliament they are being absurd. 3-The mischief rule: (There is time where the court will consider the law prior to the enactment of legislation although legislation is reactive and proactive). Finally, the mischief rule is the third rule of the statutory interpretation that it's aspiring is to look at the intention of the statute. 6

A more recent example of statutory interpretation under the mischief rule is Smith V Hughes (1960).This case consider the fundamental purpose of the street offences act 1959, in preventing the soliciting sex on the street by prostitute. It was argued that these strippers weren’t actually present on the streets but they were attracting the attention of individuals by tapping on the windows of their properties. So if we conceder this issue by looking at the literal rule of the statutory interpretation, they would fall outside of the scope of the act and avoid liability. On the other hand if we look at this issue by considering the mischief rule the court will state that the intention of the act was to deter prostitution so the action of the prostitutes should be including when interpreting the statute. Some of the advantages of the mischief rule are finding the meaning that seems to be what parliament intended and it can be extent to the reason of fitting new situations. Other than that, it might sometimes lead to some recompense such as the waste of time and cases might be more costly. * The literal and golden rules determine what parliament have said, unlike the mischief rule. The three general approaches: 1- The literal approach: also known as "the constructionist approach". This rule uses cannons and rule of interpretation to establish the meaning of words or the intention of parliament. 2- The mischief approach: also known as "the purposive approach" .It is typical of the way EU law it needs to be interpreted. 3- The integrated approach: also known as "the unified or contextual approach". Lately courts have integrated the traditional approaches. This approach means that the courts respects the actual words used but rather than stick religiously to them, they interpret them in the context in which they appear, and the underlying purpose of act. These approaches are not always clearly defined, least of all by judges who often interpret a statute without saying which approach they are using. Why is statutory interpretation necessary Nowadays, statutory interpretation is very necessary because the problems of language have increased and languages are changing over time. Also, it is important because of the uncertainty, ambiguity, broad terms, hurried drafting and unforeseeable development. Presumptions: they are made by certain assumptions made by the courts. They are used only as a starting point. Such as, a presumption that the crown is not bound by any statute unless it 7

expressly says so, a presumption that legislation does not apply retrospectively, a presumption against a change in the common law and finally a presumption that is required in criminal cases. An intrinsic aid is one that is from outside the act of parliament which makes it easier to interpret. These are the long/short title, preamble, headings and punctuations. Whereas the extrinsic aids are previous act on the same topic, historical settings, earlier case law and dictionaries at the line. In consideration of this overview, statutory interpretation is an extremely dynamic and demanding process. When reading a statute, it is worth pitting yourself in the shoes of a parliamentary draftsman to understand the real intention and effect of their work. It is expected that mistakes will be made and clarity will be required. These factors make statutory interpretation an essential skill of judgment.

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CHAPTER 1 MEANING OF PRESUMPTION. Enacted laws, especially the modern acts and rules, are drafted by legal experts and it could be expected that the language used will leave little room for interpretation or construction. But the experience of all those who have to bear and share the task of application of the law has been different. Interpretation means the art of finding out the true sense of an enactment by giving the words of the enactment their natural and ordinary meaning. It is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute. The Court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily and therefore there have been certain principles which have evolved out of the continuous exercise by the Courts. These principles are sometimes called ‘rules of interpretation’. The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. As stated by SALMOND, “by interpretation or construction is meant, the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.” Elaborate rules of interpretation were evolved even at a very early stage of Hindu civilization and culture. The rules given by ‘Jaimini’, the author of Mimamsat Sutras, originally meant for srutis were employed for the interpretation of Smritis also. In the process of interpretation, several aids are used. They may be statutory or nonstatutory. Statutory aids may be illustrated by the General Clauses Act, 1897 and by specific definitions contained in individuals Acts whereas non-statutory aids are illustrated 9

by common law rules of interpretation (including certain presumptions relating to interpretation) and also by case-laws relating to the interpretation of statutes.

According to Salmond interpretation or construction is the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.” It has been said that there is a distinction between the two expressions. As explained by Cooley: “Interpretation differs from construction in the sense that the former is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; i.e. the sense that their author intended to convey. Construction on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting the subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text. This distinction has been widely criticized. Interpretation of statute is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute. When the language of the statute is clear, there is no need for the rules of interpretation. But, in certain cases, more than one meaning may be derived from the same word or sentence. It is, therefore, necessary to interpret the statute to find out the real intention of the statute. Legislative Language – Legislative language may be complicated for a layman, and hence may require interpretation; and Legislative Intent – The intention of the legislature or Legislative intent assimilates two aspects: a. the concept of ‘meaning’, i.e., what the word means; and b. the concept of ‘purpose’ and ‘object’ or the ‘reason’ or ‘spirit’ pervading through the statute. Some Important points to be taken care of in the context of interpreting Statutes: Intention of the legislature. Statute must be read as a whole in its Context. Statute should be Construed so as to make it Effective and Workable – if statutory provision is ambiguous and capable of various constructions, then that construction must be adopted which will give meaning and effect to the other provisions of the enactment rather than that which will give none. If meaning is plain, effect must be given to it irrespective of consequences. The process of construction combines both the literal and purposive approaches. The purposive construction rule highlights that you should shift from literal construction when it leads to absurdity. Nature and Scope Necessity of interpretation would arise only where the language of a statutory provision is ambiguous, not clear or where two views are possible or where the provision gives a different meaning defeating the object of the statute. 10

If the language is clear and unambiguous, no need of interpretation would arise. In this regard, a Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court in R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay, has held: “… If the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self-defeating.” Again Supreme Court in Grasim Industries Ltd. v Collector of Customs, Bombay , has followed the same principle and observed: “Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for court to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions.” The purpose of Interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention of the Legislature – not to control that intention or to confine it within the limits, which the Judge may deem reasonable or expedient.1 The correct is one that best harmonises the words with the object of the statute. As stated by Iyer J. “to be literal in meaning is to see the skin and miss the soul. The judicial key of construction is the composite perception of the deha and the dehi of the provision.” According to Blackstone the fairest and rational method for interpreting a statute is by exploring the intention of the Legislature through the most natural and probable signs which are ‘either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law’.

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Law Commission of India, 60th Report, Chapter 2, para 2.2

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CHAPTER 2 RULES OF PRESUMPTION. PRESUMPTION A fact assumed to be true under the law is called a presumption. For example, a criminal defendant is presumed to be innocent until the prosecuting attorney proves beyond a reasonable doubt that she is guilty. Presumptions are used to relieve a party from having to actually prove the truth of the fact being presumed. Once a presumption is relied on by one party, however, the other party is normally allowed to offer evidence to disprove (rebut) the presumption. The presumption is known as a rebuttable presumption. In essence, then, what a presumption really does is place the obligation of presenting evidence concerning a particular fact on a particular party. An inference as to the existence of one fact, from the existence of some other fact, founded on a previous experience of their connexion. Or it, is an opinion, which circumstances, give rise to, relative to a matter of fact, which they are supposed to attend. To constitute such a presumption, a previous experience of the connection between the known and inferred facts is essential, of such a nature that as soon as the existence of the one is established, admitted or assumed, an inference as to the existence of the other arises, independently of any reasoning upon the subject. It follows that an inference may be certain or not certain, but merely, probable, and therefore capable of being rebutted by contrary proof.In general a presumption is more or less strong according as the fact presumed is a necessary, usual or infrequent consequence of the fact or facts seen, known, or proven. When the fact inferred is the necessary consequence of the fact or facts known, the presumption amounts to a proof when it is the usual, but not invariable consequence, the presumption is weak; but when it is sometimes, although rarely,the consequence of the fact or facts known, the presumption is of no weight. Presumptions are either legal and artificial, or natural. 2 Legal or artificial presumptions are such as derive from the law a technical or artificial, operation and effect, beyond their mere natural. tendency to produce belief, and operate uniformly, without applying the process of reasoning on which they are founded, to the circumstances of the particular case. For instance, at the expiration of twenty years, without 2

Salmond, Jurisprudence, 11th Edition, p. 152

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payment of interest on a bond, or other acknowledgment of its existence, satisfaction is to be presumed; but if a single day less than twenty years has elapsed, the presumption of satisfaction from mere lapse of time, does not arise; this is evidently an artificial and arbitrary distinction. An example of another nature is given under this head by the civilians. If a mother and her infant at the breast perish in the same conflagration, the law presumes that the mother survived, and that the infant perished first, on account of its weakness, and on this ground the succession belongs to the heirs of the mother. Legal presumptions are of two kinds: first, such as are made by the law itself, or presumptions of mere law; secondly, such as are to be made by a jury, or presumptions of law and fact. Presumptions of mere law, are either absolute and conclusive; as, for instance, the presumption of law that a bond or other specialty was executed upon a good consideration, cannot be rebutted by evidence, so long as the instrument is not impeached for fraud or they are not absolute, and may be rebutted evidence; for example, the law presumes that a bill of exchange was accepted on a good consideration, but that presumption may be rebutted by proof to the contrary. Presumptions of law and fact are such artificial presumptions as are recognized aud warranted by the law as the pro er inferences to be made by juries under particular circumstances; for instance, au unqualified refusal to deliver up the goods on demand made by the owner, does not fall within any definition of a conversion, but inasmuch as the detention is attended with all the evils of a conversion to the owner, the law makes it, in its effects and consequences, equivalent to a conversion, by directing or advising the jury to infer a conversion from the facts of demand and refusal. Natural presumptions depend upon their own form and efficacy in generating belief or conviction on the mind, as derived from these connexions which are pointed out by experience; they are wholly independent of any artificial connexions and relations, and differ from mere presumptions of law in this essential respect, that those depend, or rather are a branch of the particular system of jurisprudence to which they belong; but mere natural presumptions are derived wholly by means of the common experience of mankind, from the course of nature and the ordinary habits of society.

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CHAPTER 3 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION : At the outset, it must be clarified that, it is only when the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute is not clear, that the Court in interpreting it will have any need for the rules of interpretation of statutes. It may also be pointed out here that since our legal system is, by and large, modelled on Common Law system, our rules of interpretation are also same as that of the system. It is further to be noted, that the so called rules of interpretation are really guidelines. (i) Primary Rules (a) The Primary Rule : Literal Construction According to this rule, the words, phrases and sentences of a statute are ordinarily to be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular and grammatical meaning unless such a construction leads to an absurdity or the content or object of the statute suggests a different meaning. The objectives ‘natural’, ‘ordinary’ and ‘popular’ are used interchangeably. Interpretation should not be given which would make other provisions redundant (Nand Prakash Vohra v. State of H.P., AIR 2000 HP 65). If there is nothing to modify, alter or qualify the language which the statute contains, it must be construed according to the ordinary and natural meaning of the words. “The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive, if possible, at their meaning without, in the first instance, reference to cases.”3 “Whenever you have to construe a statute or document you do not construe it according to the mere ordinary general meaning of the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the subject matter with regard to which they are used”. (Brett M.R.) It is trite that construction of a statute should be done in a manner which would give effect to all its provisions [Sarbajit Rick Singh v. Union of India, (2008) 2 SCC 417]. It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express. 3

Justice GP Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Lexis Nexis, 14th Edition, 2016, p. 21

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A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected. Thus, where an Act plainly gave an appeal from one quarter sessions of another, it was observed that such a provision, though extraordinary and perhaps an oversight, could not be eliminated. Similarly, the main part of the section must not be construed in such a way as to render a proviso to the section redundant. Some of the other basic principles of literal construction are: (i) Every word in the law should be given meaning as no word is unnecessarily used. (ii) One should not presume any omissions and if a word is not there in the Statute, it shall not be given any meaning. (b) The Mischief Rule or Heydon’s Rule In Heydon’s Case, in 1584, it was resolved by the Barons of the Exchequer “that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the Common Law) four things are to be discerned and considered: (1) What was the Common Law before the making of the Act; (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the Common Law did not provide; (3) What remedy the parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth; and (4) The true reason of the remedy. Although judges are unlikely to propound formally in their judgements the four questions in Heydon’s Case, consideration of the “mischief” or “object” of the enactment is common and will often provide the solution to a problem of interpretation. Therefore, when the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions, the most firmly established rule for construction of such words is the rule laid down in Heydon’s case which has “now attained the status of a classic”. The rule directs that the Courts must adopt that construction which “shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”. But this does not mean that a construction should be adopted which ignores the plain natural meaning of the words or disregard the context and the collection in which they occur. (See Umed Singh v. Raj Singh, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 43) The Supreme Court in Sodra Devi’s case, AIR 1957 S.C. 832 has expressed the view that the rule in Heydon’s case is applicable only when the words in question are ambiguous and are reasonably capable of more than one meaning. The correct principle is that after the words have been construed in their context and it is found that the language is capable of bearing only one construction, the rule in Heydon’s case ceases to be controlling and gives way to the plain meaning rule. (c) Rule of Reasonable Construction i.e. Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pareat Normally, the words used in a statute have to be construed in their ordinary meaning, but in many cases, judicial approach finds that the simple device of adopting the ordinary 15

meaning of words, does not meet the ends as a fair and a reasonable construction. Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of words’ may not necessarily assist a proper construction of the statutory provision in which the words occur. Often enough interpreting the provision, it becomes necessary to have regard to the subject matter of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve. According to this rule, the words of a statute must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pareat, so as to give a sensible meaning to them. A provision of law cannot be so interpreted as to divorce it entirely from common sense; every word or expression used in an Act should receive a natural and fair meaning. It is the duty of a Court in constructing a statute to give effect to the intention of the legislature. If, therefore, giving of literal meaning to a word used by the draftsman particularly in penal statute would defeat the object of the legislature, which is to suppress a mischief, the Court can depart from the dictionary meaning which will advance the remedy and suppress the mischief. It is only when the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship of injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence (Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 830). Courts can depart from dictionary meaning of a word and give it a meaning which will advance the remedy and suppress the mischief provided the Court does not have to conjecture or surmise. A construction will be adopted in accordance with the policy and object of the statute (Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 S.C. 871). To make the discovered intention fit the words used in the statute, actual expression used in it may be modified (Newman Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Marrables, (1931) 2 KB 297, Williams v. Ellis, 1880 49 L.J.M.C.). If the Court considers that the litera legis is not clear, it, must interpret according to the purpose, policy or spirit of the statute (ratio-legis). It is, thus, evident that no invariable rule can be established for literal interpretation. In RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424. the Supreme Court stated. If a statute is looked at in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute makers provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clauses each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act.(See also Chairman Indira Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemicals Ltd., AIR 2007 SC 2458). (d) Rule of Harmonious Construction 16

A statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid “a head on clash” between two sections of the same Act and, “whenever it is possible to do so, to construct provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise” (Raj Krishna v. Pinod Kanungo, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 202 at 203). Where in an enactment, there are two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect may be given to both. This is what is known as the “rule of harmonius construction”. The Supreme Court applied this rule in resolving a conflict between Articles 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the Constitution and it was held that the right of every religious denomination or any section thereof to manage its own affairs in matters of religion [Article 26(b)] is subject to a law made by a State providing for social welfare and reform or throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus [Article 25(2)(b)]. See Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 255. (e) Rule of Ejusdem Generis Ejusdem Generis, literally means “of the same kind or species”. The rule can be stated thus: (a) In an enumeration of different subjects in an Act, general words following specific words may be construednwith reference to the antecedent matters, and the construction may be narrowed down by treating them as applying to things of the same kind as those previously mentioned, unless of course, there is something to show that a wide sense was intended; (b) If the particular words exhaust the whole genus, then the general words are construed as embracing a larger genus. In other words, the ejusdem generis rule is that, where there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words following particular and specific words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified, unless there is a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose. It is merely a rule of construction to aid the Courts to find out the true intention of the Legislature (Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1033). To apply the rule the following conditions must exist: (1) The statute contains an enumeration by specific words, (2) The members of the enumeration constitute a class, (3) The class is not exhausted by the enumeration, (4) A general term follows the enumeration, (5) There is a distinct genus which comprises more than one species, and (6) There is no clearly manifested intent that the general term be given a broader meaning that the doctrine requires. (See Thakura Singh v. Revenue Minister, AIR 1965 J & K 102) 17

The rule of ejusdem generis must be applied with great caution because, it implies a departure from the natural meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning or supposed intention of the legislature. The rule must be controlled by the fundamental rule that statutes must be construed so as to carry out the object sought to be accomplished. The rule requires that specific words are all of one genus, in which case, the general words may be presumed to be restricted to that genus. Whether the rule of ejusdem generis should be applied or not to a particular provision depends upon the purpose and object of the provision which is intended to be achieved. (ii) Other Rules of Interpretation (a) Expressio Unis Est Exclusio Alterius The rule means that express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. At the same time, general words in a statute must receive a general construction, unless there is in the statute some ground for limiting and restraining their meaning by reasonable construction; because many things are put into a statute ex abundanti cautela, and it is not to be assumed that anything not specifically included is for that reason alone excluded from the protection of the statute. The method of construction according to this maxim must be carefully watched. The failure to make the ‘expressio’ complete may arise from accident. Similarly, the ‘exclusio’ is often the result of inadvertence or accident because it never struck the draftsman that the thing supposed to be excluded requires specific mention. The maxim ought not to be applied when its application leads to inconsistency or injustice. Similarly, it cannot be applied when the language of the Statute is plain with clear meaning (Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society ltd v Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1960 SC 801) (b) Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima in Lege The maxim means that the best way to give the meaning to a document or proposition of a law is to read it as it would have read when it was made.Where the words used in a statute have undergone alteration in meaning in course of time, the words will be construed to bear the same meaning as they had when the statute was passed on the principle expressed in the maxim. In simple words, old statutes should be interpreted as they would have been at the date when they were passed and prior usage and interpretation by those who have an interest or duty in enforcing the Act, and the legal profession of the time, are presumptive evidence of their meaning when the meaning is doubtful. But if the statute appears to be capable of only interpretation, the fact that a wrong meaning had been attached to it for many years, will be immaterial and the correct meaning will be given by the Courts except when title to property may be affected or when every day transactions have been entered into on such wrong interpretation. (c) Noscitur a Sociis 18

The ‘Noscitur a Sociis’ i.e. “It is known by its associates”. In other words, meaning of a word should be known from its accompanying or associating words. It is not a sound principle in interpretation of statutes, to lay emphasis on one word disjuncted from its preceding and succeeding words. A word in a statutory provision is to be read in collocation with its companion words. The pristine principle based on the maxim ‘noscitur a socitis’ has much relevance in understanding the import of words in a statutory provision (K. Bhagirathi G. Shenoy v. K.P. Ballakuraya, AIR 1999 SC 2143). The rule states that where two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood in their cognate sense. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance, is doubtful that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied. The same words bear the same meaning in the same statute. It is a matter of common sense that a particular word should be attributed with same meaning throughout a Statute. But this rule will not apply: (i) when the context excluded that principle. (ii) if sufficient reason can be assigned, it is proper to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of the Act. (iii) where it would cause injustice or absurdity. (iv) where different circumstances are being dealt with. (v) where the words are used in a different context. Many do not distinguish between the rule and the ejusdem generis doctrine. But there is a subtle distinction as pointed out in the case of State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, (1960) 2 SCR 866. (d) Strict and Liberal Construction In Wiberforce on Statute Law, it is said that what is meant by ‘strict construction’ is that “Acts, are not to be regarded as including anything which is not within their letter as well as their spirit, which is not clearly and intelligibly described in the very words of the statute, as well as manifestly intended”, while by ‘liberal construction’ is meant that “everything is to be done in advancement of the remedy that can be done consistently with any construction of the statute”. Generally criminal laws are given strict interpretation and unless the accused is found guilty strictly as per the provisions of the law, he cannot be punished. For instance, when an Act provided for punishment for causing wound by cutting or stabbing and the accused caused wound by biting, it was not covered under that provision as cutting or stabbing implied using an external instrument while biting and causing wound does not involve any external instrument. Labour and welfare laws, on the other hand are given Labour and welfare laws, on the other hand are given. 19

CONCLUSION Lately courts have integrated the traditional approaches. This approach means that the courts respects the actual words used but rather than stick religiously to them, they interpret them in the context in which they appear, and the underlying purpose of act. These approaches are not always clearly defined, least of all by judges who often interpret a statute without saying which approach they are using. Why is statutory interpretation necessary? Nowadays, statutory interpretation is very necessary because the problems of language have increased and languages are changing over time. Also, it is important because of the uncertainty, ambiguity, broad terms, hurried drafting and unforeseeable development. Presumptions: they are made by certain assumptions made by the courts. They are used only as a starting point. Such as, a presumption that the crown is not bound by any statute unless it expressly says so, a presumption that legislation does not apply retrospectively, a presumption against a change in the common law and finally a presumption that is required in criminal cases. An intrinsic aid is one that is from outside the act of parliament which makes it easier to interpret. These are the long/short title, preamble, headings and punctuations. Whereas the extrinsic aids are previous act on the same topic, historical settings, earlier case law and dictionaries at the line. In consideration of this overview, statutory interpretation is an extremely dynamic and demanding process. When reading a statute, it is worth pitting yourself in the shoes of a parliamentary draftsman to understand the real intention and effect of their work. It is expected that mistakes will be made and clarity will be required. These factors make statutory interpretation an essential skill of judgment.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT. AIR 1965 SC 1636, p. 1644 Law Commission of India, 60th Report, Chapter 2, para 2.2 Salmond, Jurisprudence, 11th Edition, p. 152 Cooley, Constitutional limitations, Vol. 1, p. 97 AIR 1984 SC 684 2002)4 SCC 297 Justice GP Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Lexis Nexis, 14th Edition, 2016, p. 21 State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963SC 1604, p. 160

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