Akhlak Menurut Alfarabi

Akhlak Menurut al-Farabi

The Philosophy of Alfarabi And

Its Influence on Medieval Thought By REV. ROBERT HAMMOND [1947]

Title Page Front matter Preface Life and Works Contents Introduction

Part I. Logical Chapter I. Logic

Part II. Theoretical Philosophy Chapter II. Metaphysics Chapter III. Psychology

Part III. Practical Philosophy Chapter IV. Ethics Chapter V. Political Society

Conclusion Bibliography Index

The Philosophy Of Alfarabi

And Its Influence On Medieval Thought By REV. ROBERT HAMMOND THE HOBSON BOOK PRESS 52 Vanderbilt Avenue New York 17, N. Y. [1947] NOTICE OF ATTRIBUTION scanned at sacred-texts.com, November 2005. Proofed and formatted by John Bruno Hare. This text is in the public domain in the United States because its copyright was not renewed in a timely fashion as required by law at the time. These files may be used for any non-commercial purpose, provided this notice of attribution is left intact in all copies.

DEDICATED TO MY ARCHBISHOP THE MOST REV. EDWIN V. BYRNE, D.D. Archbishop of Santa Fe WITH GRATITUDE AND AFFECTION p. vi

IMPRIMATUR † EDWIN V. BYRNE Archbishop of Santa Fe

PREFACE

The purpose of this book is to present, in as brief and systematic a way, the whole philosophy of Alfarabi and the influence it exerted on Medieval Thought. My efforts in this field were prompted by a sincere desire to render service to philosophy and to those who are fond of philosophy. Therefore, in outlining Alfarabi's Philosophy I shall bring out, as far as possible, the elements it has in common with Scholasticism. My efforts will have been amply rewarded if the study of this book enables the reader to find through its pages two facts: first, that Alfarabi was well acquainted with Greek philosophy; so well acquainted, in fact, that he was able, through diligent study, to perfect some of its old theories and work out new ones. Second, that the Schoolmen borrowed from him a great amount of material which hitherto has been regarded by many as a product of their speculation, while in reality it is not. In all justice to Alfarabi and other Arabian thinkers, we should candidly admit that Christian philosophy owes a great deal to them. It is good for the reader to know that in writing this book, I used the Arabic works of Alfarabi. I read them with care, and when anything attracted my attention, I tried to examine it closely. My heartfelt thanks are due to my many friends for their kind encouragement and valuable suggestions. To Father Arnold Rodriguez, O. F. M., of St. Francis Cathedral, Santa Fe, I am especially indebted for his kindness in editing and typing this manuscript. Robert Hammond Tucumcari, New Mexico August 10, 1946

LIFE AND WORKS Alfarabi, Muhammad Ben Tarkhan Abu Nasr Alfarabi, was born at Farb (now Otrar) toward the end of the ninth century of our era. Though of Turkish descent, he received his philosophical training under the tutorship of the Christian philosopher, Yuhanna Ben Hailan. Later he went to Baghdad, at that time the center of Greek philosophy. Going to Aleppo, he lived at the court of Seif-Eddaula Ali Ben Hamdan, arousing the admiration of all by his skill in dialectics. After a lengthy stay at Aleppo he went to Damascus with his patron, where he died in December of the year 950 A.D. In logic he wrote Introduction to Logic and Abridgment of Logic. In the natural sciences he wrote commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, Meteorology, De Coelo et Mundo. He also wrote an essay on The Movement of the Heavenly Spheres. In Psychology he wrote a commentary on Alexander of Aphrodisias' De Anima as well as various treatises on the Soul, the Power of the Soul, the Unity and the One, on the Intelligence and the Intelligible (i.e. on the various meanings of the word "intellect" as found in Aristotle.)

In Metaphysics he wrote essays on Substance, Time, Space and Measure, and various treatises entitled The Gems of Wisdom, A Letter in Reply to Certain Questions, The Sources of Questions, The Knowledge of the Creator. In Ethics he wrote a commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Of his original works the following are best known: Encyclopedia, in which he gives a brief account and definition of all branches of science and art. Political Regime, which is known as the Book of Principles. The reading of this book is recommended by Maimonides in these terms: "I recommend you to read no works on Logic other than those of the philosopher Abu Nasr Alfarabi, since all that he wrote, especially the Book of Principles, is as fine flour."

CONTENTS PREFACE LIFE AND WORKS

vii ix

INTRODUCTION CHARACTERS OF ALFARABI'S PHILOSOPHY xiii WHAT MUST PRECEDE THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY xiv DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY xvi PART ONE. LOGICAL CHAPTER I. LOGIC MENTAL OPERATIONS CATEGORIES CERTAIN QUESTIONS ON THE CATEGORIES

1 2 3

PART TWO. THEORETICAL CHAPTER II. METAPHYSICS ONTOLOGY Universals Description of Being Transcendental Properties of Being Division of Being into Necessary and Contingent Principles of Being, Potentiality and Actuality The First Principles

10 10 12 13 13 13 15 18

METAPHYSICAL THEOLOGY Knowability of God Proofs of God's Existence Attributes of God a) Process of Exclusion 23 Simplicity of God Infinity of God Immutability of God Unity of God b) Process of pre-Eminence God is Intelligent God Knows All Things through Knowledge of Himself

18 19 22 23 25 25 26 27 27 28

p. xii

God is Truth God is Life

28 28

METAPHYSICAL COSMOLOGY Relation of God to the World Eternity of Matter and Eternity of the World Dualism of Good and Evil

30 30 31 32

METAPHYSICAL PSYCHOLOGY The Soul Is a Being Quite Distinct from the Body Spirituality of the Human Soul Immortality of the Human Soul

34 34 34 35

CHAPTER III. PSYCHOLOGY A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE POWERS OF THE SOUL 1. Powers of Knowledge Sense-Knowledge Perceptive Knowledge Abstractive Knowledge 2. Powers of Action Sensitive Appetite Intellective Appetite PART THREE. PRACTICAL

37 38 38 40 41 45 45 46

CHAPTER IV. ETHICS ACTIONS GOOD, BAD, OR INDIFFERENT

49

CHAPTER V. POLITICAL SOCIETY DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL STATE

50

CONCLUDING CHAPTER THREE CONCLUSIONS

54

BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

57 59

INTRODUCTION CHARACTERS OF ALFARABI'S PHILOSOPHY Alfarabi is a Neo-Platonist inasmuch as his mystic tendencies are numerous in his Metaphysics, Psychology and Political thought. As a Neo-Platonist, he follows the groundwork of the NeoPlatonic doctrine made of religious Mysticism and Emanatist Monism. Thus, Alfarabi's philosophy is entirely theocentric in the sense that it holds God as the center of the universe. God is One; this One is the Absolute which transcends everything. From the One flows the plurality of things gradually coming down the scale of perfection to the existence of matter. The goal of man is to return to God. This return is to be accomplished by virtue and philosophical thought. Like the Neo-Platonists, Alfarabi holds in his treatise on The Agreement Between Plato and Aristotle, that there is no essential difference between the philosophy of Plato and that of Aristotle. 1 Therefore, the Emanatist Monism as well as the reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle may be regarded as the outstanding features which make Alfarabi's philosophy depend on p. xiv

that of Plotinus. But outside of these Neo-Platonic features, all the philosophy of Alfarabi may he said to be saturated with Aristotelism which, by its empirical method, suited better his scientific mind. WHAT MUST PRECEDE THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY Alfarabi lays down several rules for teachers honestly striving to train youth in philosophy. No youth should start the study of philosophy before he is well acquainted with the natural sciences. For, human nature requires a gradual rise from the imperfect to the perfect. Mathematics is a very important subject in training the mind of the young philosopher because it helps him pass

easily from the sensible to the intelligible, and also because it familiarizes his mind with exact demonstrations. 2 The study of Logic, as an instrument to distinguish the true from the false, is of great educational value before beginning the study of philosophy proper. 3 p. xv

The training of one's own character, instincts and tendencies must come before entering into philosophy, for unless that is done, the chances are that the student will never fully grasp the higher and more solid truths, because his mind is still clouded by sensibility. 4 Philosophy is studied primarily to obtain a knowledge of God as the Creator and Efficient Cause of all things, the One, Immovable. 5 The student of philosophy must be instructed in the sources from which the different philosophies take their names. For example, he should be told that some philosophies derive their names from the manner in which they are taught, such as the philosophy of Peripateticism, which was discussed with students while walking up and down a garden. He should be taught that other philosophies take their names from the author, such as Platonism from Plato and Aristotelism from Aristotle; and that others take their names from the goal they propose, such as Epicurism, setting pleasure as an end. 6 In teaching, two extremes must be avoided. The teacher must be neither excessively strict nor excessively lenient. For, if he is too strict he errs through excess and if he is too lenient, he errs through defect. If the teacher becomes unpopular be-cause of his severity, his excessive leniency will also tend to make him unworthy of respect. The teacher, therefore, should avoid excess as well as defect. 7 The young man must be persuaded to persevere in the study of philosophy by calling his attention now and then to the old Arabic saying, "The drop wears away the stone",--"Gutta cavat lapidem". 8 The teacher should see that his student attends only to one p. xvi

thing at a time. For, only one thing can be well mastered at a time. The reason for this rule is to have the student concentrate his attention upon the object of study and make a success of it. 9 DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY For Alfarabi, philosophy is nothing else than thought, that is, the science of concepts. The end of philosophy is to know God as the Creator of heaven and earth.

Alfarabi's philosophy can be divided into Logic, Theoretical philosophy and Practical philosophy. The Theoretical could be subdivided into Metaphysics and Psychology, while the Practical philosophy into Ethics and Politics. I LOGIC II THEORETICAL --Metaphysics --Psychology III PRACTICAL --Ethics --Politics

Footnotes xiii:1 Alfarabi, On The Agreement Between Plato and Aristotle, in Collection of various treatises. Arabic ed. Cairo 1907. Muhammad Ismail, pp. 1-39. The main theories of Plato and Aristotle that need to be reconciled are the following: a) Some thought that a world of difference existed between Plato and Aristotle, because Plato, in his Timaeus, says that the noblest substance is the nearest to the soul and intellect, and therefore the farthest from the senses. Aristotle, on the other hand, says that the noblest substance is the individual (first substance). Here the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle, in Alfarabi's mind, is not real, because both of them speak of the same thing from a different point of view. For Aristotle the individual is nobler in Logic, because in Logic he sees beings lying in the region of the senses, and from them he abstracts the universal, the rational, the intelligible. For Plato the universal is nobler in Metaphysics, because there he sees beings that cannot change and will not change. [op. cit. pp. 8-10] b) With regard to the theory of knowledge, Alfarabi interpreted the Platonic hypothesis of reminiscence in an empiric sense. He says p. xiv that Aristotle proved in Analytics that our ideas are acquired by means of the senses, and because of that, they are by no means a reminiscence. Their formation, however, occurs so rapidly and unconsciously that the soul comes to imagine it has had them all the time, so that thinking of them would seem to the soul like recollecting or remembering them. According to Alfarabi, Plato held the same opinion when he said that to think is to recollect, for the person who thinks tries to get at what experience has written on his mind, and once he finds the object of his thought, then it looks to him as if he had recollected. [op. cit. pp 23-25]

c) Alfarabi does not agree with the opinion of his contemporaries, who hold that Aristotle believed in the existence of the world ab aeterno, while Plato did not. According to him, the true teaching of Aristotle was that time is the measurement of the motion of the world, and consequently, the product of motion. That explains why he was obliged to believe that God created the world without time, and that time is the result of the motion of the world. [op. cit. pp. 26-27] xiv:2 Alfarabi, What Must Precede the Study of Philosophy, in Collection of various treatises, 1 Arabic ed., Cairo, 1907, Muhammad Ismail, n. 3, p. 61. xiv:3 Id. op. cit. n. 3, p. 62. xv:4 Id. op. cit. n. 3, p. 62. xv:5 Id. op. cit. n. 4, p. 62. xv:6 Id. op. cit. n. 1, p. 58. xv:7 Id. op. cit. n. 8, p. 63. xv:8 Id. op. cit. n. 8, p. 63 xvi:9 Id. op. cit. n. 8, p. 63

Next: Chapter I. Logic

PART I. LOGICAL Chapter I LOGIC In Logic Alfarabi follows Aristotle. He has, however, his own original views. His Logic deals with concepts, judgments and reasoning. MENTAL OPERATIONS According to Alfarabi, a concept is an idea that represents the objective essence or the essential notes of a thing. It is the object of the first mental operation, called conception. "Concepts," says Alfarabi, "are determined by definition; definition declares what a thing is. Through definition concepts are so arranged and systematized that they imply one another until we arrive at the most universal ones, which do not presuppose others, such as Being, Necessary Being, Contingent Being. Such concepts are self-evident. A man's mind may be directed to them and his soul may be cognizant of them, but they cannot be demonstrated to him. Nor can they be explained by

deriving them from what is known, since they are already clear in themselves, and that with the highest degree of certitude." 10 For Alfarabi, judgment is the combination of a particular entity with a universal idea. The synthesis of the particular with the universal is never evident of itself. That explains why we must seek a second universal with which the first universal and the particular agree. Once we find a second universal with which the two terms of the judgment agree, both of these will agree too, between themselves, according to the principle which is the supreme law of every syllogism, "Two things which are equal to the same thing, are equal to each other." Thus, for instance, the judgment, "The world is made" is not so clear as to permit the union of the particular "world" with the universal "made". There is a term of mediation for both, and this is the universal "Composed". 11 p. 2

In Alfarabi's opinion, the process of reasoning by which we start from what is known and well established and proceed to a knowledge of the unknown, is Logic strictly speaking. 12 Philosophy, therefore, is mediation, reasoning and demonstration. Is philosophy only that and nothing else? Certainly not. There is something that cannot be mediated or demonstrated, namely, the First Principles. The First Principles are those of Contradiction, Causality and of Excluded Middle. Such principles are self-evident, be-cause they have in themselves their own demonstration. THE CATEGORIES All our concepts could be classified under ten headings, called categories. For, the categories are a complete enumeration of everything that can enter into judgment, either as a subject or predicate. Alfarabi, following Aristotle, enumerates ten: Sub-stance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Action, Passion, Posture and Having. Such categories, in Alfarabi's view, have been empirically gathered by Aristotle. Observing the things which make the universe, Aristotle found that some of them exist in themselves and are basis of certain accidents or differences. The things existing in themselves he called "substances" and the differences he called "accidents." Aristotle then asked, "How many kinds of accidents are there?" He noticed that substance is divisible and therefore capable of more or less; thus he named Quantity the first accidentcategory. Realizing that substance has capacity of acquiring certain characteristics, like, "Peter is good," Paul is a philosopher," Aristotle lost no time in selecting Quality as the second accidentcategory. Because substances are inter-related in the sense that the concept of one implies the other, Aristotle lost no time in choosing p. 3

Relation as the third accident-category. The relation between time and a thing in time led him to name Time in the fourth place. Because of the relation between different objects [paragraph continues]

in space or the relation between place and the thing placed, Aristotle set aside Place as the fifth accident-category. The ability of substance to take various positions helped him select Posture as the sixth accident-category. The physical influence of substance on the production of another substance made him call Action as the seventh accident-category. Since substance is influenced by the efficient cause, he chose Passion as the eighth accident-category. Finally the relation of the thing having and the thing had made him pick Having as the ninth accident-category. 13 CERTAIN QUESTIONS ON THE CATEGORIES In treating the Categories, Alfarabi gave the answer to certain questions that had worried the Logicians of his time. First of all, he believes that not all the ten Categories are absolutely simple. Each is simple when compared with those that are below it. But only four are absolutely simple, namely, Sub-stance, Quality, Quantity and Posture. Action and Passion come from substance and quality; time and place from substance and quantity; Having occurs between two substances; Relation between two of the ten categories. 14 There are degrees in the simplicity of the Categories. For instance, Quantity and Quality depend directly on substance, so much so that to exist both need only a substance. On the contrary, Relation needs several things, perhaps two substances, or a substance and an accident, or two accidents. 15 When asked whether Action and Passion, which are found together, should be classified in the category of Relation, Alfarabi p. 4

answers in the negative. For "when we find one thing always with another," he says, "it does not follow that there is a dependence of relation between them." For example, we find respiration only with the lungs, the day only with sunrise, accident only with substance, the spoken word only with the tongue. Now all these things are not to be classified in the dependence of Relation, but rather in that of necessity. Necessity may be essential necessity, as that of the birth of the day upon the rising of the sun; and accidental necessity as that of the departure of Zeid upon the arrival of Amron. Furthermore, there is complete necessity when one thing exists by reason of the other, as father and son; while it is incomplete necessity when the dependence of relation is unilateral, as one and two, the two depends on the one, but the one does not depend on the two. 16 We ask whether the Equal and the Unequal are a property of Quantity, and the Similar and Dissimilar a property of Quality. According to Alfarabi, each of the two terms Equal and Unequal, taken separately, is a property of Quantity, while if both terms are taken together, they are descriptive of Quantity. The same is true of Similar and Dissimilar in reference to Quality. 17 In regard to the theory of Contraries, Alfarabi makes some very profound observations. "Is the contrary the absence (privation) of its contrary? Is white the absence of black?" asks Alfarabi. He answers saying, "It is not. For, white is something and not merely the absence of black. Since the absence of black is a fact in the existence of white, we are led to say that every contrary is the absence of its contrary." 18

People say that the science of the contraries is one. But Alfarabi says that a distinction must be made, for "If we deal with the science of something which happens to have a contrary, then that science is not identical with that of its contrary. The p. 5

science of the Just is not that of the Unjust, the knowledge of White is not the knowledge of Black. On the other hand, if we deal with the science of something insofar as it has a contrary, then this science is one with that of its contrary, because in this sense the two contraries are really and truly two relatives." 19 "Opposites and Contraries differ and must be distinguished one from the other," says Alfarabi. "Opposites are two things which cannot exist in the same object at the same time and in the same respect, as the quality of father and son. Opposites are a part of Relatives proper. Contraries are odd and even, affirmation and negation, sight and blindness." 20 Some ask how many things are necessary to the knowledge of the unknown. "Two things are necessary and sufficient," answers Alfarabi. "If there are more than two, this means that they are not necessary to the knowledge of the object under investigation." 21 "Is the proposition, "Man exists" a judgment with or without a predicate?" asks Alfarabi. "If man is considered from the natural and objective viewpoint," he answers, "the judgment is without a predicate because the fact of existence is one with man and cannot be distinguished from him, while the predicate denotes distinction from the thing to which it is referred. From a logical point of view, the judgment has a predicate, because it is made up of two terms which may be either true or false." 22 In Logic too Alfarabi makes some brilliant and original observations, and gives evidence of a great knowledge of the Organon and Isagoge.

Footnotes 1:10 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 1, p. 65. 1:11 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 2, p. 65. 2:12 Id. op. cit. n. 2, p. 66. 3:13 Alfarabi, A Letter in Reply to Certain Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 25, pp. 103-105. 3:14 Alfarabi, A Letter in Reply to Certain Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 19, pp. 98-99. 3:15 Id. op. cit. n. 13, p. 98.

4:16 Id. op. cit. n. 18, p. 98. 4:17 Id. op. cit. n. 24, p. 102. 4:18 Id. op. cit. n. 17, pp. 97-98. 5:19 Id. op. cit. n. 37, p. 109. 5:20 Id. op. cit. n. 38, pp. 109-110. 5:21 Id. op. cit. n. 29, pp. 106-107. 5:22 Id. op. cit. n. 16, p. 97.

Next: Chapter II. Metaphysics

Part II. Theoretical Philosophy Chapter II METAPHYSICS MEANING AND DIVISION "Particular sciences," says Alfarabi, "restrict themselves to one or several departments of being. For instance, physics is the science of being as affected by physical properties. Mathematics is the science of being which deals with quantities and numbers. Medicine is the science of being insofar as it is healthy or sick. Metaphysics, however, knows no such restrictions. Its field is all reality, namely, Being. And it is all equally extensive with the concept of Being (One, True, Good.)" 23 Metaphysics, in the opinion of Alfarabi, treats of things which are separate from matter. In this connection he distinguishes two kinds of immaterial: the first, immaterial quoad esse or immaterial beings, such as God and the human soul, which exist without matter; and the second, immaterial quoad conceptum, or concepts, such as substance, accident, cause, quality, the content of which is free from all matter. Metaphysics, insofar as it treats of immaterial concepts, of those general notions in which matter is not included, may be called General Metaphysics or Ontology, that is, the science of Being. And because it treats of immaterial beings, it may be called Special Metaphysics. It could then be divided into three parts: Metaphysical Theology, which deals with God and His attributes; Metaphysical Cosmology, which treats of the ultimate principles of the universe; and finally Metaphysical Psychology, which treats of the human soul.

Since Alfarabi holds that immaterial may be quoad esse and quoad conceptum, his whole metaphysical thought may be divided accordingly, that is, into Ontology, Metaphysical Theology, Metaphysical Cosmology and Metaphysical Psychology. p. 10

-1ONTOLOGY UNIVERSALS The mind, in all its operations, exerts the function of synthesizing the many in the one. In fact, we cannot understand the meaning of a scene presented to our senses unless we unite its parts into a perceived whole. Perception is an act of the mind which involves synthesizing. The act of imagination involves both analysis and synthesis in the sense that nothing can be imagined without synthesizing the many in the one. The act of judgment, whereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another, cannot be had except by synthesizing both terms, subject and predicate, in one act of comparison. Syllogism, too, is simply the synthesis of two judgments in a third one. Of all these operations of the mind, the concept, more than all others, represents the synthesizing function of the mind, for the concept is by definition the apprehension of the one in the many. For Alfarabi the concept means exactly that and nothing more. "The concept," he says, "has a content signifying the synthetic, the universal, the one. The universal in reference to the particular is like the genus and species in reference to individuals. The individuals, called "First Substances," precede the universal, called "Second Substances." The former alone have substantial existence, and because of that, one is led to think that First Substances are more substances than the Second Substances. On the other hand, the universal, being permanent and subsistent, has more right to the name of substance than mortal individuals." 24 "How do universals exist?" asks Alfarabi. "The universals p. 11

do not exist in act," he says, "that is, they are not things existing in themselves, but they exist only in individuals, and their existence is accidental in the sense that they are subject to the existence of individuals. That does not mean, however, that universals are accidents, but merely that their existence in act can take place only per accident." As to the definition of universals, Alfarabi says that "The universal is unum de multis et in multis (the one found in many and affirmed of many). The inference is that the universal has no existence apart from the individual (non habet esse separatum a multis)." 25 Here we must recall that Albertus Magnus quotes the Alfarabian definition of the universal, a fact which proves beyond all doubt that both he and his pupil, St. Thomas, were acquainted with the writings of our philosopher. [See Albertus Magnus, De praed. II, 5]

Some may ask, "Is the opinion of Alfarabi on the nature of universals right or wrong?" I hold that it is right, because he believes that the universal exists really in the individuals, and not in the manner in which it is abstracted from individual characteristics. All Christian philosophers in the Middle Ages maintained the same solution on the question of the universals. In fact, St. Thomas writes: "Universalia non habent esse in rerum natura ut sint universalia, sed solum secundum quod sunt individuata." (De Anima, art. 1.) In another place he says: "Universalia non sunt res subsistentes, sed habent esse solum in singularibus." (Contra Gentiles, Lib. I, cap LXV). I do not agree with Munk who thinks that all Arabian philosophers are Nominalists concerning the question of universals. Alfarabi, for example, is not a Nominalist, because he holds unequivocally that the universal is blended with the individual. That some Arabian thinkers, such as Moses Maimonides, are Nominalists, I admit: but that they all are so, I cannot grant. [See Munk, Melanges de philosophic juive et arabe, Paris, 1859, A. Franck, p. 327] p. 12

DESCRIPTION OF BEING "The most universal concept," says Alfarabi, "is Being and what is coextensive with Being itself (One, True, Good)." "Being cannot be defined," he says, "for it is self-evident, fixed in the mind, precedes all other concepts and is the simplest of all. It is the simplest, because to define a concept is to analyze its content, and Being, having the least content, resists all efforts to resolve it into simpler thought elements. To try to define it by words serves only to make our mind attentive and directed to it, and not to explain the concept which is clearer than the words by which it is defined." He goes on to say that "Just as in the demonstration of a proposition it is imperative that the judgments be coordinated in order to arrive at an ultimate judgment-principle, in like manner in the definition of a concept, it is necessary that the concept be resolved into other simpler concepts until one arrives at the simplest and most universal concept, which is Being." 26 Now, St. Thomas describes Being in much the same way. Not only does he unfold the same ideas as those of Alfarabi, but the suprising thing is that the ideas are couched in exactly the same words as those of Alfarabi. A glance at the writings of both Alfarabi and St. Thomas bears this out. Here is what St. Thomas says about Being: Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens.

27

In another place he says: Videlicet, ens, unum, verum, bonum; quae re idem sunt, sed ratione distinguuntur. Sicut enim in demonstrationibus resolvere oportet omnes propositiones usque ad principia ipsa, ad quae necesse est stare rationem, ita in apprehensione praedictorum oportet stare ad ens quod in quolibet cognito naturaliter cognoscitur, sicut et principium in omnibus propositionibus que sunt post principia. 28 p. 13

TRANSCENDENTAL PROPERTIES OF BEING

For Alfarabi ens, unum, verum et bonum convertuntur. By that he means that the concept of Being coincides with that of unity, truth and goodness, and that every being is one, true and good. 29 DIVISION OF BEING INTO NECESSARY AND CONTINGENT According to Alfarabi, Necessary Being is that which exists in itself or that which cannot but exist. Contingent Being is that which receives its being from another, and whose non-existence is possible. 30 METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF BEING POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY Potentiality is the capability to exist. Every created being, before it existed, had only a possibility to exist: it was in potentiality. Actuality is that which exists in reality. That which is in act is perfect, and that which is in potentiality is imperfect. Potentiality and actuality constitute the nature of reality, which means that reality is being in becoming. This theory of potentiality and actuality is the central point in Metaphysics, toward which substance and accident, essence and existence, matter and form converge, and upon which their own value depends. A thing, though actual at any given moment, is in potentiality in respect to future modifications. Hence, substance and accident. Substance is that which exists in itself and is the foundation of certain accidents or accidental differences. Its fundamental characteristic is to exist in itself and not in another as its subject. 31 Accident is that which needs a subject in which p. 14

and by which it may exist. For example, a coat is a substance, because it exists in itself; white or black are accidents, because they do not exist without a substance in which they may inhere. 32 In every created being there are two constituent principles, essence and existence, which are conceived as actuality and potentiality respectively. Essence is the reason why a thing is what it is. Existence is the actuality of essence. 33 To the question, "What is the nature of the distinction between essence and existence in created substances?" Alfarabi replies that "A real distinction occurs here and that existence is one thing and essence is another. If essence and existence were one thing, then we should be unable to conceive the one without conceiving the other. But, in fact, we are able to conceive essence in itself. If it is true that man has existence by essence, this would be like saying that to conceive man's essence is to imply his existence." He continues with the same idea saying that "If existence should enter into composition with the essence of man like one entering into the essence of two, this would mean that it is impossible to conceive perfectly the essence of man without his existence as a part of the essence. Just as the essence of two would be destroyed by taking away a unity from it, so would the essence of man be destroyed by taking away existence from it. But this is not true, because existence does not enter into composition with the essence of a thing, for it is possible to understand the essence of man, and not to know whether it exists in reality. On the other hand, if there was no distinction between essence and existence in created

beings, then these could be said to exist by their essence. But there is one being alone whose essence is His very existence, and that is God. 34 p. 15

The distinction between essence and existence in. all created beings is brought in by Alfarabi to differentiate these substances from God, Who is absolutely simple and pure act. It reveals the true genius of Alfarabi, from whom St. Thomas drew the following: Omnis autem essentia vel quidditas intelligere potest sine hoc, quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo facto: possum enim intelligere quid est homo, et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet, quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quidditate, nisi forte sit aliqua res, cujus quidditas sit suum esse, et haec res non potest esse nisi una et prima. 35

The finite, concrete thing is composed of two other principles, matter and form. Matter is nothing but a reality indeterminate as body. Because of its indetermination, it has only the aptitude to become, by virtue of the form, this or that body. Form is the principle that determines matter to be actually such a body. Neither matter can exist without form, nor form without matter. As long as the wood remains indifferent to being a cradle, it is a cradle in potentiality, and becomes a cradle in actuality the very moment it receives the form of a cradle. Furthermore, all finite beings are capable of receiving not only the form proper to them, but also the opposite. Matter and form are real elements or principles of being, and together they form a real and integral whole. If either were taken away, there would be no concrete thing at all. That is the reason why form is immanent in matter. 36 THE FIRST PRINCIPLES Closely related with the concept of being are the laws of p. 16

thought and reality. If the concept of being is true, likewise the first principles are true. If the concept of being is based on reality, so are the first principles, which are not only the laws of thought, but also of reality. In fact, every first principle implies the fundamental idea of being. The principle of contradiction is: It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time. The principle of excluded middle is: A thing either is or is not. The principle of causality is thus formulated by Alfarabi: "Whatever exists after having not existed, must be brought into being by a cause; nothing (not-being) cannot be the cause of being." 37 Alfarabi arrived at the principle of causality through the analysis of the idea of motion. Motion or change involves a transition from not-being into being, from potentiality into actuality. And since not-being of itself cannot rise to being, we legitimately infer a something which causes the change. Change, like limitation, implies a something beyond itself, something to which change is due. That explains precisely the axiom, "Quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur",

namely, that change implies a real and objective cause, of which Alfarabi and the Schoolmen felt very certain. It is to be noted that Alfarabi, after having formulated the principle of causality in a philosophical way, wound up in mystic tendencies. He says, In the world of created things we do not find either produced impressions or free choice unless it is the result of a cause. Man cannot do a thing without relying on external causes, which are not of his choice, and these causes rely on the order, and the order on the decree, and the decree on the judgment, and the judgment comes from the commandment. And so everything is de-creed. 38 p. 17

It should be noted, however, that apart from these mystic tendencies, Alfarabi is quite Aristotelian and deserves much credit and praise for passing on to us the following ontological truths: [paragraph continues]

Being cannot be defined. All subsequent philosophers, both Arabian and Scholastic, accepted it and made it their own. Reality is being in becoming, actuality in potentiality, unity in difference. Hence, the different concepts of substance and accident, essence and existence, matter and form, cause and effect. Concepts are not merely symbols or names, but on the contrary, they have real significance, and their primary function is to synthesize the many in the one. For him, therefore, concepts stand for the universal and the one, applicable to many and found in many (unum de multis et in multis) . Finally, every event must have a cause. This is a proposition that expresses the essential dependence of every effect on some cause. We can now see how the Ontology of Alfarabi treats of that which is, the nature of which is actuality in potentiality. p. 18

-2METAPHYSICAL THEOLOGY The Theodicy of Alfarabi, which considers God in Himself, does not differ much from the Christian both in the arguments proving God's existence, as well as in the exposition of the various attributes which constitute His nature. There are, undoubtedly, certain flaws here and there on some non-essential points, but as a whole I can say that one who reads his Theodicy gets the impression of reading an essay written by a Christian Father. In this section we shall deal at length, not only with the arguments by which Alfarabi proves God's existence, but also with each of the attributes of God as he considers them, in order to bring out the perfect similarity that exists between Christian Theodicy and the Theodicy of Alfarabi. THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD

One of the preliminary questions which confronted Alfarabi was whether or not God is knowable. On this question he could not make up his mind, and consequently, he was hesitant to give a definite answer. Perhaps his hesitancy arose from his failure to distinguish between what is simply self-evident and that which is self-evident to us. In fact, he says: It is very difficult to know what God is because of the limitation of our intellect and its union with matter. Just as light is the principle by which colors become visible, in like manner it would seem logical to say that a perfect light should produce a perfect vision. Instead, the very opposite occurs. A perfect light dazzles the vision. The same is true of God. The imperfect knowledge we have of God is due to the fact that He is infinitely perfect. That explains why His infinitely perfect being bewilders our mind. But if we could strip our nature of all that we call 'matter; then certainly our knowledge of His being would be quite perfect. 39 p. 19

In another place he says: God is knowable and unknowable, evident and hidden, and the best knowledge of Him is to know that He is something the human mind cannot thoroughly understand. 40

A glance, however, into Alfarabi's later teaching leads us to the conclusion that he must have implicitly admitted the proposition, "God is", to be self-evident in itself, because he states repeatedly that God's essence is His existence, thus identifying the predicate with the subject. But since our mind is unable to understand the selfsame thing of both these terms, the implication is that Alfarabi must have come to the tacit conclusion that this proposition, "God is", is self-evident in itself, although not to us, and what is not evident to us can be demonstrated. 41 According to him, the knowledge of God is the object of philosophy, and the duty of man is to rise, as far as is humanly possible, up to the likeness of God. 42 PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE The arguments brought forth by Alfarabi to prove that there is a God, are three. These will be placed side by side with those of St. Thomas in order to aid the reader in comparing them. He will thus see the great similarity between them. PROOFS ADDUCED BY ALFARABI

PROOFS ADDUCED BY ST. THOMAS

1. The Proof of Motion.

It is certain and evident to our senses that in the world some things are in motion. Now, what-ever is in motion is put in motion by another ... If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity. Therefore,

In this world there are things which are moved. Now, every object which is moved receives its motion from a mover. If the mover is itself moved, there must be another mover moving it, and after that still another and so on. But it is impossible to go onto infinity in the series of movers

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and things moved. Therefore, there must be an immovable mover, and this is God. 43

it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. 44

2. Proof of Efficient Cause. In contemplating the changeable world, one sees that it is composed of beings which have a cause, and this cause, in turn, is the cause of another. Now, in the series of efficient causes it is not possible to proceed to infinity. For, if A were the cause of B, B of C, C of D, and so on, here A would be the cause of it-self, which is not admissible. Therefore, outside the series of efficient causes, there must be an uncaused efficient cause, and this is God. 45

In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself ... Now, in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity Therefore, it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. 46

Another form of the same proof: Transition from not-being to being demands an actual cause. This cause either has its essence identical with its existence or not. If it does, then being is uncaused. If it does not, then existence must be from another, and that from another, and so on until we arrive at a First Cause, whose essence differs in no way from its existence. 47

3. Proof of Contingence. The third proof is based on the principle that all change must

We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to

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have a cause. To this effect Alfarabi makes a distinction between a necessary being and a contingent being. "Contingent beings," he says, "have had a beginning. Now, that which begins to exist must owe its existence to the action of a cause. This cause, in turn, either is or is not contingent. If it is contingent, it also must have received its existence by the action of another cause, and so on. But a series of contingent beings which would produce one another cannot proceed to infinity or move in a circle. Therefore, the series of causes and effects must arrive at a cause that holds its existence from itself, and this is the

be ... But it is impossible for these always to exist ... Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something, the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary being either has its necessity caused by another or not. Now, it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another. Therefore, we can-not but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God. 49

first cause (ens primum)."

48

The different arguments brought forth by Alfarabi to prove God's existence are really so many statements of one and the same argument which is commonly called the "cosmological" argument. This argument derives its validity from the principle of causality. And if the principle of causality is validly used by the scientists to explain the phenomena of physics, likewise it must be regarded as validly employed by the philosopher to explain the universe. Hence, the cosmological argument is valid because the principle of causality is valid. The proof of an immovable mover by Aristotle, which leads to the conclusion that God is a designer and not a creator, was improved and corrected by Alfarabi nearly three hundred years before St. Thomas was born. Starting out from the Aristotelian idea of change, Alfarabi was able to arrive at an Ens Primum to whom that change is due, while He Himself does not change, because He is pure act. The proofs of causality and contingence as given by St. Thomas are merely a repetition of Alfarabi's proofs. This is said, p. 22

not because of any bias against St. Thomas, but rather because this is evident to anyone after studying the works of both Alfarabi and of St. Thomas. The main idea running through all the proofs of Alfarabi is being. That which begins to exist implies a self-existent being. A finite and contingent being, that is, a being which has not given itself existence, implies a Being that holds its existence from itself. A being which begins to exist must have a cause for its existence. An analysis of the proofs adduced by Alfarabi shows how he was able to arrive at their formulation. In each of his three proofs he starts out from a fact, applies a principle, and arrives at the conclusion. The fact is change, caused being and contingence. The principle is: that which is moved, is moved by another; the effect implies a cause; the contingent implies the necessary. The conclusion is that God exists. HOW MAN ACQUIRES KNOWLEDGE OF GOD'S NATURE AND OF HIS ATTRIBUTES Since man knows only what he finds out by his own senses and intelligence, it follows that he has no other way of knowing the divine nature except by observation. And observing the visible world, he perceives certain perfections and imperfections in it. To the first class belong such perfections as being, life, intelligence, truth, goodness and so on, which of themselves con-note perfection. To the second class belong all imperfections as non-being, non-living, nonintelligence, which necessarily con-note imperfection. While it cannot be said that God is nonliving, non-intelligent, it can be said that He is infinitely good, intelligent and wise. While

imperfections are removed from God, perfections can be attributed to Him eminently, namely, whatever positive being they express belongs to God as their cause in a much higher sense and in a more excellent way than to the creatures in which they exist. Another way of saying this is: given an infinite cause and finite effects, whatever pure perfection is discovered in the effects must first exist in the cause [Via Affirmationis], and at the same time whatever imperfection p. 23

is discovered in the effects must be excluded from the cause [Via Remotions]. Alfarabi agrees with the foregoing explanation, saying that We can have some knowledge of the nature of God by means of a two-fold process: first, by exclusion [Via Remotionis], by which we remove from God whatever implies defect, as limitation, dependence, mutability; and second, by pre-eminence [Via Eminentiae], by which we attribute to God in an infinite degree all perfections, such as goodness, wisdom, etc. 50

Concerning the method to be followed in determining God's nature, St. Thomas says exactly the same thing in the following words: We have some knowledge thereof (divine essence) by knowing what it is not: and we shall approach all the nearer to the knowledge thereof according as we shall be enabled to remove by our intellect a greater number of things therefrom. 51

In another place St. Thomas says: "Quaelibet creatura potest in Deum venire tribus modis, scilicet, per causalitatem, remotionem, eminentiam." 52 The following are the attributes of God as considered by Alfarabi and St. Thomas. (A) Process of Exclusion ATTRIBUTES CONSIDERED BY ST. ATTRIBUTES CONSIDERED BY THOMAS ALFARABI SIMPLICITY OF GOD God is simple because He is free from every kind of composition, physical or metaphysical.

There is no composition in God. For, in every composite thing there must needs be act and potentiality...

p. 24

Physical composition may be either [paragraph continues] But in God there is no potentiality. substantial or accidental. It is substantial if the composite Therefore, in Him there is no composition ... Every substance consists of body and soul, of matter and form. composite is subsequent to its components. Therefore, the Now, an infinite being cannot be a substantial composite first being, namely God, has no component parts. 54 of matter and form, because this would mean that God results from the union of finite parts which would exist before Him in time, and therefore be the cause of His being. Nor can an accidental composition be attributed to the infinite, because this would imply a capacity for an increase in perfection, which the very notion of the infinite excludes. Therefore, there is not and cannot be any physical composition. 53 [paragraph continues]

Neither can there be that kind of composition known as metaphysical, which results from the union of two different concepts so referred to the same real thing that neither one by itself signifies the whole reality as meant by their union. Thus, every contingent being is a metaphysical composite of essence and existence. Essence, as such, in reference to a contingent being, implies its conceivableness or. possibility, and abstracts from actual existence; while existence, as such, must be added to essence before we can speak of the being as actual. But the composite of essence and existence in a contingent being can-not be applied to the self-existent or infinite being in whom essence and existence are one. Therefore, there is no composition of essence and existence in God. 55

Existence denotes a kind of actuality ... Now everything to which an act is becoming, and which is distinct from that act, is related thereto as potentiality to act ... Accordingly if the divine essence is distinct from its existence, it follows that His essence and existence are mutually related as potentiality and act. Now it has been proved that in God there is nothing of potentiality, and that He is pure act. Therefore God's essence is not distinct from His existence. 56

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Nor can the composition of genus and difference, implied Wherefore it is likewise evident that God cannot be in the definition of man as a rational animal, be attributed defined: since every definition is composed of genus and to Him. For, God cannot be classified or defined, as difference. 58 contingent beings can. The reason is because there is not a single aspect in which He is perfectly similar to the finite, and consequently no genus in which He can be included. 57

ALFARABI

INFINITY OF GOD ST. THOMAS

The uncaused being is infinite. For, if He were not, He would be limited, and therefore, caused, since the limit of a thing is the cause of it. But God is uncaused. Hence, it follows that the first being is infinite. 59

Being itself, considered absolutely, is infinite ... Hence if we take a thing with finite being, this being must be limited by some other thing which is in some way the cause of that being. Now there can be no cause of God's being, since He is necessary of Himself. Therefore He has infinite being, and Himself is infinite. 60

IMMUTABILITY OF GOD God as the first cause is pure act, without the admixture It is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, of any potentiality, and for this reason He is not subject to because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure any change. 61 act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. 62

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ALFARABI

UNITY OF GOD ST. THOMAS

God is only one. For, if there were two gods, they would have to be partly alike and partly different: in which case, however, the simplicity of each would be destroyed. In other words, if there were two gods, there would necessarily have to be some difference and some identity between them; the differential and the common element would constitute the parts of the essence of each one, and these parts, in turn, would be the cause of all; and then, not God, but His parts, would be the first being.

If there be two things, both of which are of necessity, they must needs agree in the intention of the necessity of being. It follows, therefore, that they must be differentiated by something added either to one or to both of them; and consequently that either one is composite, or both. Now no composite exists necessarily per se. Therefore there cannot possibly be several things each of which exists necessarily; and consequently neither can there be several gods. 64

If there was anything equal to God, then He would cease to be the fullness of being, for fullness implies impossibility of finding anything of its kind. For instance, the fullness of power means inability of finding identical power anywhere else; the fullness of beauty means inability of finding identical beauty. Likewise if the first being possesses the fullness of being, this means that it is impossible to find anyone or anything identical with Him. Therefore, there is one infinite being, only one God. 63

God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one, which did not belong to another ... So it is impossible for many gods to exist. 65 God is existence itself. Consequently He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being ... It follows therefore that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to God. 66

God is one, because He is free from all quantitative Since one is an undivided being, if anything is supremely divisions. One means undivided. He who is indivisible in one it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God. Hence it is substance is one in essence. 67 manifest that God is one in the supreme degree. 68

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ALFARABI

(B) Process of Pre-eminence GOD IS INTELLIGENT ST. THOMAS

God is intelligent. A thing is intelligent because it exists without matter. Now, God is absolutely immaterial. Therefore, He is intelligent. 69

A thing is intelligent from the fact of its being without matter. Now it was shown above that God is absolutely immaterial. Therefore He is intelligent. 70

God knows Himself perfectly. If there is anything that would keep God from knowing Himself, that would certainly be matter. But God is absolutely immaterial. Hence it follows that He knows Himself fully, because His intellect is His essence.

That which by its nature is severed from matter and from material conditions, is by its very nature intelligible. Now every intelligible is understood according as it is actually one with the intelligent; and God is Himself intelligent, as we have proved. Therefore since He is altogether immaterial, and is absolutely one with Himself, He

understands Himself most perfectly. That which by its essence is intellect in act, is, too, by its very essence intelligible in act. Now, the divine intellect is always intellect in act, because if it were not so, then it would be in potentiality with respect to its object; and this is impossible. Just exactly the opposite occurs in man. The human intellect is not al-ways in act. Man knows himself in act after knowing himself potentially. The reason for this is that man's intellect is not his essence. Hence, what he knows does not belong to him by essence. 71

A thing is actually understood through the unification of the intellect in act and the intelligible in act. Now the divine intellect is always intellect in act ... Since the divine intellect and the divine essence are one, it is evident that God understands Himself perfectly: for God is both His own intellect and His own essence. 72

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GOD KNOWS ALL THINGS THROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF HIMSELF ALFARABI

ST. THOMAS

It must not be said that God derives His knowledge of things from the things themselves, but rather it must be said that He knows things through His essence. By looking at His essence, He sees everything. Hence, knowing His essence is the cause of His knowing other things. 73

So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things, not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself. 74

GOD IS TRUTH Truth follows being, namely, truth and being coincide. But God is the supreme being. Therefore, He is the supreme truth. Truth is the conformity of the intellect and thing. But in God intellect and object of thought are one and the same. 75

Truth and being are mutually consequent upon one another; since the True is when that is said to be which is, and that not to be, which is not. Now God's being is first and most perfect. Therefore His truth is also first and supreme... Truth is in our intellect through the latter being equated to the thing understood. Now the cause of equality is unity. Since then in the divine intellect, intellect and thing understood are absolutely the same, His truth must be the first and supreme truth. 76

GOD IS LIFE Just as we call ourselves living beings, because we have a Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its nature capable of sensation or understanding, in like very nature, must have life in the most perfect degree. 78 manner God, whose intellect is His essence, must have life in the most perfect degree. 77

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The foregoing is but a summary of Alfarabi's teaching about God and His attributes. My conclusion is that his Theodicy shows a scholarly, closely reasoned work. For, he has given us a carefully worked out treatise on the question of God's existence and His attributes. On the question of God's existence, he improved the Aristotelian proof of the first mover, adding to it two other proofs, that of efficient causes and of contingence. On the other hand, the attributes of God are dealt with so perfectly from the Christian viewpoint that the whole topic seems to have been written by a Christian Father, rather than by a Mohammedan. That Alfarabi's Theodicy exerted a great influence on Medieval thinkers is evident, because, upon comparing the teachings of Alfarabi with those of St. Thomas, we see without doubt the influence of the former on the latter, but not vice versa. p. 30

-3METAPHYSICAL COSMOLOGY RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD That God exists is a proven truth; that the world was made is another truth. The most arduous question, however, which man tries to solve is this: What relation is there between God and the world, the Infinite and the finite? What connection is there between God and matter? Is there a bridge thrust from one side to the other over which God might pass to give matter a determinate form? The dualism of spirit and matter, infinite and finite, constitutes the cosmological problem of Metaphysics. In an effort to explain the action of God on matter, Alfarabi placed the intellects of the Spheres between God and the world. Thus, he made the many proceed from the One by emanation. His theory is as follows: From the First Being (the One) comes forth the first intellect called the First Caused. From the first intellect thinking of the First Being flows forth a second intellect and a sphere. From the second intellect proceeds a third intellect and a sphere. The process goes on in necessary succession down to the lowest sphere, that of the moon. From the moon flows forth a pure intellect, called active intellect. Here end the separate intellects, which are, by essence, intellects and intelligibles. Here is reached the lower end of the supersensible world (the world of ideas of Plato). These ten intellects, together with the nine spheres, constitute the second principle of Being. The active intellect, which is a bridge between heaven and earth, is the third principle. Finally matter and form appear as the fifth and sixth principles, and with these is closed the series of spiritual existences. p. 31

Only the first of these principles is unity, while the others represent plurality. The first three principles, God, the intellects of the spheres and the active intellect, remain spirit per se, namely, they are not bodies, nor are they in direct relation with bodies; neither are the last three (soul, form, matter) bodies by themselves, but they are only united to them.

There are six kinds of bodies: the celestial, the rational animal, the irrational animal, the vegetal, the mineral and the four elements (air, water, fire, earth). All of these principles and bodies taken together make up the universe. 79 The theory of separate intellects such as taught by Alfarabi and other Arabian philosophers is simply a mixture of Aristotelian theories on the motion of heavenly spheres (Met. XII, cap. 7 and 8) and of the neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation. The student of philosophy may be surprised to hear such a strange and ridiculous theory. But, should he delve into its origin, he would certainly find that the belief in the animation of stars is just a particular case of what men formerly believed, namely, the animation of nature. ETERNITY OF MATTER AND ETERNITY OF THE WORLD Alfarabi firmly believed that the world is the workmanship of an eternal, intelligent being; and thus God is the first principle or the efficient cause. He also believed that God, in order to make the world, must have had materials to work upon. From this he inferred that an eternal, uncreated matter must have been the material cause of the universe. But this matter, he believed, p. 32

had no form, though it contained many forms in potentiality. This is what he says: When people say that God created the world, they simply mean that God produced the world out of matter by clothing it with a determinate form. The world is certainly God's work, and though it comes after Him as a worldform, yet it is equal to Him in time or eternal, insofar as He could not begin to work on it in time. The reason for this is that God is to the world exactly what a cause is to its effect. Since the cause in this case is inseparable from the effect, it follows that He could not, in a given moment, start making it. For, if He could, that would simply imply imperfection on His part while He had been trying to achieve His goal. This, of course, is incompatible with the absolute perfection of God. 80

The eternity of the world and of matter as held by Alfarabi and Avicenna was rejected by Averroes and Maimonides, who taught the "creatio mundi ex nihilo." From the latter St. Thomas borrowed the proposition that the world was created from nothing. DUALISM OF GOOD AND EVIL According to neo-Platonists, the dualism of spirit and matter gives rise to the existence of two principles, the principle of good and the principle of evil. For them, evil is linked with matter. Fortunately, the neo-Platonic teaching on this problem did not have much influence on Alfarabi. For, he says: God's providence is exercised over all things. Hence, whatever happens in the world is not to be attributed to chance. Evil is under divine control and is united to corruptible things. That evil exists in the world is good accidentally, because if it did not exist, a great deal of good in the world would never come about. 81

In conclusion, it should be noted that Alfarabi's Metaphysical p. 33

Cosmology is not original at all, but rather it is a mixture of Aristotelian theories (motion of the spheres, eternity of matter) and of neo-Platonic emanation. [paragraph continues]

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-4METAPHYSICAL PSYCHOLOGY In this part Alfarabi discusses the various problems concerning the human soul. THE SOUL IS A BEING QUITE DISTINCT FROM THE BODY Alfarabi holds that the human soul is essentially distinct from the body, simply because he accepts the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the entelechy or the substantial form of the body. By this he means that the soul is the principle of life in man, a principle by which he thinks, feels and wills, and by which his body is animated. 82 This is also borne out by the fact that Man is composed of two principles, body and soul. The body is composed of parts, limited by space, measurable, divisible; while the soul is free from all bodily qualities. The former is a product of the created world, while the latter is simply the product of the last separate intellect of the supersensible world. 83

SPIRITUALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL The soul of man is not only simple and indivisible, but it is also spiritual. That is, it is in itself independent of matter and can subsist apart from the body. He says: The spirituality of the soul is demonstrated by its specific operations, which are intellection and volition. The operation of a being is according to the nature of the being itself (Actio sequitur esse). Now, intellect and will may attain to the abstract and immaterial; therefore, the soul itself must also be independent of matter. p. 35

In addition to this, he says: Omne agens agit sibi simile, which means that the effect must resemble its cause, for the soul can give to its operations only what it has itself. Therefore, the spiritual operations of the soul give us true knowledge of the nature of the soul itself. 84

IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL Alfarabi held that the human soul cannot exist before the body, as Plato had said. Nor can it migrate from one body to another, as taught by the author of Metempsychosis. 85 However, it is very doubtful whether Alfarabi believed in the immortality of the human soul. For, he wrote passages for and against immortality. Against immortality we find the following passages: The only thing that survives the dissolution of the body is the active intellect, the dator formarum which is incorruptible. 86

And in his lost commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, he is reported by Averroes to have said that The supreme good of man is in this life, and anything meant to attain it in the life to come is but folly; it is an old wives' tale.

In fact, toward the end of his treatise on the Passive Intellect and its union with the Active, Averroes quotes Alfarabi as saying in the commentary mentioned above that Man's supreme good in this life is to attain knowledge. But to say that man after death becomes a separate form is an old wives' tale; for whatever is born and dies is incapable of becoming immortal.

This statement of Alfarabi brought much reproof on him, and p. 36

for it Immanuel Ben Solomon, in his Final Judgment, consigns him to the infernal regions. 87 However, in contrast with these passages, we find one in favor of immortality. "After death," he says, "the human soul will be happy or unhappy according to its merits or demerits." 88 In the face of these statements for and against the immortality of the soul, it is difficult indeed to tell whether or not Alfarabi believed in it. Most probably he did not.

Footnotes 9:23 Alfarabi, The Scope of Aristotle In The Book of Metaphysics, in Collection, op. cit. pp. 4044. 10:24 Alfarabi, A Letter in Reply to Certain Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 14, pp. 95-96. 11:25 Id. op. cit. N. 10, p. 94. 12:26 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit., n. 1-2, p. 65. 12:27 St. Thomas, Quest. disp., De Veritate, Q. I, a. 1. 12:28 St. Thomas, Opusculum XXXIX, De Natura Generis, cap. II. 13:29 Alfarabi, The Scope of Aristotle in the Book of Metaphysics, in Collection, op. cit. p. 42. 13:30 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 3 p. 66. 13:31 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit. p. 174. 14:32 Alfarabi, A Letter in Reply to Certain Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 22, p. 101.

14:33 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit. pp. 115-125. 14:34 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit. pp. 115-125. 15:35 "But every essence or quiddity can be understood without anything being known of its existence; for, I can understand what a man is, and yet not know whether it has existence in the natural order. Therefore, it is clear that existence is a different thing from essence or quiddity, unless perchance there be something whose essence is its very existence. And this thing must needs be one and the first." St. Thomas De Ente et Essentia, c. 4, tr. from the Latin by Clare C. Riedl, Chapter IV, p. 34. 15:36 Alfarabi, Political Regime, 1 Arabic ed. p. 26. 16:37 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit. p. 164. 16:38 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit. pp. 164-165. 18:39 Alfarabi, Political Regime, 1st Arabic ed. Cairo, Nile Press, pp. 12-13. 19:40 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit. p. 173. 19:41 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit. pp. 115-125. 19:42 Alfarabi, What Must Precede the Study of Philosophy, in Collection, op. cit. n. 4, p. 62. 20:43 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 13, pp. 70-71. 20:44 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, part I, Q. 2, Art. 3. 20:45 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit. pp. 115-125. 20:46 St. Thomas, Ibid. op. cit. 20:47 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 2, p. 65. 21:48 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 3, p. 66. 21:49 St. Thomas, Ibid. op. cit. 23:50 Alfarabi, The Knowledge of God, in Traites inedits d‘anciens philosophes arabes. Published by Malouf, Edde and Cheiko, 2nd Arabic ed., Beirut, 1911, pp. 21-22. 23:51 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, first bk. Tr. by the English Dominican Fathers, chap. XIV, p. 33. 23:52 5t. Thomas, I Sent., III, quest. 1, a. 3.

24:53 Alfarabi, Political Regime. Second Arabic ed. Cairo, Nile Press, p. 2. 24:54 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles. First Bk., op. cit. Chap. XVIII, p. 39. 24:55 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit. pp. 115-125. 24:56 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, First Bk., Ch. XXII, p. 55. 25:57 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit. p. 132. 25:58 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles. First Bk., Ch. XXV, p. 61. 25:59 Alfarabi, Political Regime. Second Arabic ed. Nile Press, p. 7. 25:60 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles. First Bk., Ch. XLIII, p. 96. 25:61 Alfarabi, Political Regime, op. cit. p. 7. 25:62 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica. Part I, Q. 9, Art. 1 ad 1, pp. 91-92. 26:63 Alfarabi, Political Regime, op. cit. pp. 3-5. 26:64 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles. First Bk., Ch. XLII, p. 90. 26:65 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica. Part I, Q. 11, Art. 3, pp. 116-117. 26:66 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica. Part I, Q. 4, Art. 2, p. 48. 26:67 Alfarabi, Id. op. cit. pp. 7-8. 26:68 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica. Part I, Q. 11, Art. 4, p. 118. 27:69 Alfarabi, Id., op. cit. p. 8. 27:70 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles. First Bk., Ch. XLIV, p. 100. 27:71 Alfarabi, Political Regime, p. 8-9. 27:72 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles. First Bk., Ch. XLVII, p. 105. 28:73 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit., p. 170. 28:74 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica. Part I, Q. 14, Art. 5, p. 190. 28:75 Alfarabi, Political Regime, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

28:76 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles. First Bk., Ch. LXII, pp. 131-132. 28:77 Alfarabi, Political Regime, op. cit., p. 11. 28:78 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica. Part I, Q. 18, Art. 3, p. 255. 31:79 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 6, pp. 67-75. 32:80 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 6, pp. 67-68. See also: Alfarabi, A Letter in Reply to Certain Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. p. 93. 32:81 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions in Collection, op. cit., n. 22, p. 75. 34:82 Alfarabi, A Letter in Reply to Certain Questions, in Collection, op. cit., n. 33, p. 108. 34:83 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit., p. 145. 35:84 Alfarabi, The Gems of Wisdom, in Collection, op. cit., p. 145. 35:85 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit., n. 22, p. 75. 35:86 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit. n. 21, pp. 74-75. 36:87 Cf. Mahberot by Immanuel. Ch. XXVIII, Berlin. P. 251. 36:88 Alfarabi, The Sources of Questions, in Collection, op. cit., n. 22, p. 75.

Next: Chapter III. Psychology

Ethics in Islamic philosophy The study of Islamic ethics, whether philosophical or theological, grew out of early discussions of the questions of predetermination (qadar), obligation (taklif) and the injustices of temporal rulers, particularly the caliphs. Early writers on ethics from the Mu'tazila school were probably influenced by Greek philosophy. By the third century ah (ninth century ad) a clearly discernible current of philosophical ethics began to take shape, with strong influences from Greek ethics including Stoicism, Platonism and Aristotelianism. Al-Kindi, the first genuine philosopher of Islam, appears from his extant ethical writings to have been particularly influenced by Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic. Other classical influences can be seen in the work of Platonists such as Abu Bakr al-Razi, who followed Plato's division of the parts of the souls, and Neoplatonists such as al-Farabi, while Aristotelian influences can be seen

in al-Farabi, who also discussed the problem of evil, Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd. Ibn Sina developed a theory of the conjunction of the soul with the active intellect; with this conjunction is bound up the ultimate perfection of the soul which has attained the highest degree of wisdom and virtue. Neoplatonism again surfaces in the work of Ibn Miskawayh and his followers, to whom we owe the groundwork of a whole ethical tradition which flourished in Persia well into the twelfth century ah (eighteenth century ad) and beyond. Onto Plato's threefold division of the soul, Ibn Miskawayh grafts a threefold division of virtue into wisdom, courage and temperance. His views were elaborated upon by al-Tusi and al-Dawwani, among others. A blend of philosophical and religious ethics is characteristic of the work of some later writers such as al-Ghazali and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, in which the road to moral and spiritual perfection has mystical overtones. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Theological preludes The rise of philosophical ethics: early Socratic and Stoic trends The advent of Aristotle Ibn Miskawayh and the Persian writers on ethics Philosophical and religious ethics

1. Theological preludes The earliest ethical discussions in the seventh and eighth centuries appear to have centred on the question of qadar, which could equally mean 'capacity', as predicated of man, or 'predetermination', as predicated of God. The early so-called Qadarites of Damascus raised the question of qadar in the context of the moral responsibilities of the Umayyad caliphs, who justified their most oppressive policies on the ground that they were part of the divine decree (qada' wa qadar). Subsequently, the Mu'tazilite theologians of Basra and Baghdad refined upon the speculation of their Qadarite predecessors and attempted for the first time to give an adequate definition of right and wrong and its bearing on God's justice and his decrees in the world. This definition was expressed in essentially rationalist and deontological terms and was received with disapproval by their traditionalist and conservative rivals, who adhered to a voluntarist thesis according to which right is by definition what God commands and wrong is what he prohibits (see Ash'ariyya and Mu'tazila §5). Other instances of Mu'tazilite rationalism include the espousal of the absolute identity of God's essence and his attributes, the irreversibility of his decrees and the freedom of the will as a precondition of moral responsibility. Mu'tazilite theologians also stressed God's wisdom and goodness and exonerated him of the responsibility for evil in the world, which was 'created' by humankind. The degree to which Mu'tazilite theological ethics was influenced by Greek philosophy cannot be fully determined from our present knowledge of the early sources, since the translation of philosophical texts had not been started by the time the founder of the school, Wasil ibn 'Ata, launched this radical theological movement in the second century ah (eighth century ad). However, contact with Christian theologians, such as John of Damascus and his disciple Theodore Abu Qurrah, was definitely a factor in initiating the Qadarite theologians, the forerunners of the Mu'tazila, into the scholastic methods of discourse that Syriac-speaking Christian scholars had been applying to theological questions prior to the Arab conquest of Syria, Egypt and Iraq.

2. The rise of philosophical ethics: early Socratic and Stoic trends Al-Kindi, the first genuine philosopher of Islam, was also the first writer on philosophical ethics, and it is significant that he was in sympathy with Mu'tazilite theology during the heyday of that movement. However, unlike his Mu'tazilite contemporaries, whose starting-point was the Qur'an and the Traditions (hadith) of Muhammad, al-Kindi's starting point was Greek philosophy. He is reported by the classical bibliographers to have written a number of ethical treatises reflecting a profound interest in Socratic thought. Thus, in addition to a treatise on Ethics, he is credited with a work on Paving the Way to Virtue, as well as an extant tract, Fi al-hila li-daf' al-ahzan (On the Art of Dispelling Sorrows). Of his Socratic writings, a tract on the Excellence of Socrates, A Dialogue between Socrates and Aschines and a short collection, Alfaz Sugrat (Socratic Utterances), which has survived, are mentioned in the classical sources. It is noteworthy, however, that in the last-mentioned collection the personalities of Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic (see Diogenes of Sinope) are fused and both emerge as paragons of virtue and asceticism. However, in the more discursive Fi al-hila li-daf' al-ahzan the Stoic ideal of apatheia (freedom from passion) and the consequent indifference to the vicissitudes of fortune are set out in eloquent terms. The antidote of sorrow, which al-Kindi argues in Stoic fashion is inseparable from humanity's ephemeral condition in this world of generation and corruption, is to consider that sorrow results either from our actions or from the actions of others. In the first case, it is our duty as rational agents to refrain from doing that which is the cause of sorrow. In the second case, averting the sorrow which results from the actions of others is either in our power or it is not. If it is in our power, we ought certainly to avert it; if it is not in our power, we should not grieve at the prospect of injury in the hope that it might somehow be turned away. However, should we nevertheless be afflicted by sorrow resulting from actions over which we have no control, it is our duty as rational beings to bear this with fortitude. This view, and the exhortation to shun material possessions as temporary acquisitions of which we are mere borrowers and not real owners, reflect clearly the influences of the great second-century Stoic teacher Epictetus and appear to derive from his famous Enchiridion. However, it was Socrates and his disciple Plato who were at the centre of the moral-ascetic speculation of the early Muslim ethical philosophers. Abu Bakr al-Razi, in his ethical treatise alTibb al-ruhani (The Spiritual Physic), refers to Plato as 'the master of the Philosophers and their leader', and to his teacher Socrates as 'the ascetic and godly' sage. He speaks of the three Platonic parts of the soul as the rational or divine, the irascible or animal and the concupiscent or vegetative souls, as these parts are designated by the Alexandrian physician-philosopher Galen in a treatise on ethics (which has survived in Arabic translation only). He then proceeds to summarize Plato's teaching on the manner in which each of the parts or 'souls' should be 'managed' through reasoning and demonstration, a process which he labels 'spiritual physic' or therapy. Another Socratic-Platonic theme which recurs in al-Razi's writings is the folly of the hedonistic life which turns man into a slave or a beast. Because so many of our pleasures are either ephemeral or unattainable, we are assailed by anxiety or grief. But the true philosopher will not succumb to grief, because he understands that nothing in this world of generation and corruption is ever permanent and that whatever cannot be turned away should be ignored or disregarded,

since it is often the product of passion and not of reason: 'For reason summons us only to what is susceptible of bringing about profit sooner or later; grief does not bring any advantage.... That is why the perfectly rational man will only follow the summons of reason...and will never follow the summons of passion or allow himself to be led by it or get close to it' (Rasa'il al-Razi alfalsafiya: 69). Like Socrates and Plato, al-Razi believed that the soul on leaving the body will return to its original abode in the intelligible world, after passing through an endless cycle of purifications. That, he argues, is why the fear of death is irrational, and like al-Kindi and other moral philosophers he admonishes the truly reasonable man to resign himself to the prospect of death as a logical consequence of our being human. As al-Kindi had written: 'Since the definition of man is that he is a living, dying, rational being, then if there was no death, there would be no man' (al-Hila li-daf' al-ahzan: 45), death being an essential part of the very definition of man. However, al-Razi adds to this argument another argument which appears to derive from Epicurus, namely that death is the privation of sensation (see Epicureanism §13); in death, man is stripped of the sensations of pleasure or pain and thus is in a better condition than the living who are constantly subjected to pain, let alone the fact that pleasure sought by our concupiscent nature is really nothing but 'relief from pain' or return to the natural condition (as Plato has taught in the Philebus). Therefore, 'according to the judgment of reason the condition of death is better than the condition of life' (Rasa'il al-Razi al-falsafiya: 93).

3. The advent of Aristotle The first systematic writer on philosophical questions in Islam was al-Farabi, who had also contributed to ethical discussions. He is reported in the classical sources to have written a commentary on 'parts' of the Nicomachean Ethics, translated into Arabic by Ishaq ibn Hunayn. This commentary is lost, but judging from an extant collection of Fusul muntaza'ah (Excerpts on Ethics),which he is established as having written, he appears to have followed Aristotle's lead in dividing the virtues into moral (practical) and intellectual (see Aristotle §§22-25). The former, he says, are the virtues or perfections of the concupiscent part or faculty of the soul; they include temperance, courage, liberality and justice. The latter are the perfections of the intellectual part and include practical reasoning, good judgment, sagacity and sound understanding. In his discussion of justice, al-Farabi also follows Aristotle's lead, arguing that justice consists in the equitable distribution of 'common goods' in the city or the state. These goods include security, wealth, dignity and public office, of which every member of the city or state is entitled to a share. Another more general meaning of justice is given as 'man's exercise of virtuous actions in himself and in relation to others, whatever such a virtue might be'. An interesting feature of al-Farabi's ethics which has no Aristotelian parallel is the discussion of evil. He starts in Neoplatonic fashion by asserting that 'evil has no existence as such in anything found in these worlds; that is generally in whatever does not exist through human volition. Everything therein is good' (Fusul muntaza'a: 81). Evil, then, is a predicate of human action, not of physical occurrences. However, al-Farabi disagrees with traditional Neoplatonists who identified being with the good and not-being with evil pure and simple, on the ground that 'being

is good only when it is in conformity with justice (or merit); not-being is evil when it is not in conformity with justice' (Fusul muntaza'a: 81). This appears to reflect Heraclitus' concept of dike as chaos (see Heraclitus §3). Al-Farabi's successor and spiritual disciple Ibn Sina (Avicenna) is the author of a very short tract on ethics which follows closely the Platonic model in psychology. Ibn Sina divides the soul into the rational, irascible and concupiscent, to which correspond the virtues of wisdom, courage and temperance respectively, and with justice being the 'summation' of all three. To ensure the enforcement of justice within the state, argues Ibn Sina, the existence of the caliph, as conceived of by the Shi'ites, is necessary as the sovereign of the world and God's vicegerent on earth. More explicitly than al-Farabi, Ibn Sina develops in his psychological writings a theory of conjunction (ittisal) of the soul with the active intellect, that supermundane agency which according to the Muslim Neoplatonists governs the sublunary world (see Neoplatonism in Islamic philosophy §2). With this conjunction, he argues, is bound up the ultimate perfection of the soul which has attained the highest degree of wisdom and virtue, becoming thereby a replica or a mirror of the higher intelligible world. Therein lies man's ultimate happiness while his soul is still in the body. Ibn Rushd, the great Aristotelian philosopher and commentator, is known from the bibliographical sources to have written a paraphrase and a middle commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, which have survived only in Hebrew and Latin, together with a paraphrase of Plato's Republic which is also relevant to his ethical theory. The principal virtues, according to Ibn Rushd, correspond to the perfection of the three parts of the soul, the rational, the irascible and the concupiscent. Justice is then described along Platonic lines as the 'harmony' of the three corresponding virtues of wisdom, courage and temperance; but it has, as Aristotle stated in the Nicomachean Ethics, two subdivisions which Ibn Rushd calls common or universal, corresponding to 'perfect virtue', and particular, whose further subdivisions are distributive and rectificatory. Contrary to expectations, however, Ibn Rushd does not identify happiness with the contemplative life, as Aristotle (§26) had done, but rather with conjunction (ittisal) with the active intellect, which the Muslim Neoplatonists - with whom he was at loggerheads - had regarded as man's ultimate goal.

4. Ibn Miskawayh and the Persian writers on ethics The most important writer on ethics in Islam, however, was an eclectic who inclined to Platonism, Ahmad ibn Muhammad Ibn Miskawayh. He laid down in his Tahdhib al-akhlaq (The Cultivation of Morals) and other ethical writings the groundwork for a whole tradition of Persian ethical writing, the chief representatives of which were Nasir-i Khusraw (d. ah 467/ad 1074), Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Jalal al-Din al-Dawani, Hussain Kashifi (d. ah 910/ad 1504), Mulla Ahmad Nuraqi (d. ah 1244/ad 1828) among others. The psychological basis of Ibn Miskawayh's ethics is clearly Platonic, as was generally the case in Islamic philosophical circles. Onto Plato's threefold division of the soul (see Plato §14), as modified by Galen, he grafts a threefold division of virtue into wisdom, corresponding to the rational part of the soul; courage, corresponding to the irascible part; and temperance,

corresponding to the concupiscent part. Justice, which Ibn Miskawayh describes as a form of moderation (i'tidal) or proportion (nisba), arises when the three powers or parts of the soul are in harmony. This virtue is not part of virtue, but virtue entire, as Aristotle (§22) had argued. Its subdivisions, according to Aristotle as interpreted probably by Porphyry, are then given as three: our duties to God, to our superiors or equals, and finally to our ancestors. Ibn Miskawayh, however, refers to the genuine Aristotelian twofold subdivisions of justice into distributive and rectificatory and predicates the exercise of this supreme virtue on submission to the holy law (shari'a), which emanates from God. He then assigns to the 'just imam' or caliph the function of warding off the different forms of violating justice. Ibn Miskawayh even attributes to Aristotle, quoting an apocryphal Aristotelian source in Arabic translation, the view that justice stipulates rendering God the kind of worship due to him as our beneficent creator. However, the Neoplatonic element in Ibn Miskawayh's ethics is nowhere more pronounced than in his analysis of happiness. Its two subdivisions, according to him, are practical and theoretical. The latter consists in 'conjunction' with the active intellect, whereby man is able to join the 'higher intellectual' realm. However, Ibn Miskawayh recognizes beyond this intellectual perfection a 'divine' or supernatural condition whereby man partakes of divine perfection or achieves a condition of self-divinization which goes far beyond his worldly conditions. This 'divine condition' is also alleged to derive from an Aristotelian fragment On the Virtues of the Soul, which Ibn Miskawayh quotes in Arabic translation, but which is clearly different from the apocryphal tract of the Aristotelian corpus known as De virtutibus et vitiis. Ibn Miskawayh's two best-known Persian followers are Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, author of Akhlaq-i Nasiri (Nasirean Ethics), and Jalal al-Din al-Dawani, author of Lawami al-ishraq fi makarim alakhlaq (Flashes of Illumination on the Nobility of Character), known also as Akhlaq-i Jalali. Both al-Tusi and al-Dawani follow closely the lead of Ibn Miskawayh in the Tahdhib al-akhlaq. A fundamental difference between Ibn Miskawayh and the latter two authors is the addition of 'household management' and politics to the purely ethical part of their work by both al-Tusi and al-Dawwani. This may be viewed as a broadening, in Aristotelian fashion, of the scope of practical philosophy, which Ibn Miskawayh had tended to confine to ethical discourse only. In the political section, inspired chiefly by al-Farabi, al-Tusi argues that orderly association is an essential precondition of the good life. Of the three forms of government, the monarchical, the tyrannical and the democratic (which he attributes to Aristotle), he favours the monarchical, identified like Plato's with the 'rule of the virtuous' or aristocrats. However, the true monarch is assisted by divine inspiration but is subordinate to the imam, who according to Shi'ite doctrine is in 'temporary concealment'. This monarch acts accordingly in a vicarious or interim capacity to ensure the administration of justice in the absence of the true head of the community or 'hidden imam'. Al-Dawani's ethical treatise follows essentially al-Tusi's lead, but in genuine Shi'ite fashion he stresses more than his predecessor the position of humans as God's vicegerent (khalifa) on earth (Surah 2: 30). In mystical fashion, he then goes on to argue that people reflect in their capacity as God's vicegerent the dual character of the divine nature, the outer and the inner, the spiritual and the corporeal, and more than any other creatures, including the angels, can be described as the 'image' of God. The foremost duty of the ruler, he argues, is to preserve the ordinances of the

divine law (shari'a) and to conduct the affairs of state in accordance with universal principles and the requirements of the times. The ruler is for that reason God's 'shadow' and the vicar of the Prophet.

5. Philosophical and religious ethics A specific blend of philosophical and religious ethics is characteristic of the writings of some late authors, including al-Raghib al-Isfahani (d. ah 502/ad 1108), Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and others. Al-Ghazali is the foremost representative of this group, who in both his ethical treatise Mizan al-amal (The Balance of Action) and his religious summa, al-Ihya' 'ulum al-din (The Revival of the Religious Sciences), has developed an ethical theory in which Platonic psychology serves as the groundwork of an essentially Islamic and mystical worldview. In this theory, the table of the four cardinal virtues accords with the Platonic virtues but admits of a series of subdivisions or ramifications analogous to those of his predecessors. A good example of the combination of religious and philosophical ideas in al-Ghazali is the manner in which happiness can be achieved. Happiness, as the chief good, admits of two subdivisions, the worldly and the otherworldly. Otherworldly happiness, which is our ultimate goal, cannot be achieved without certain worldly goods. These include the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, the bodily virtues of health, strength, good fortune and a long life, the external virtues of wealth, kin, social position and noble birth, and finally the 'divine virtues' of guidance, good counsel, direction and divine support. Those virtues are referred to in the Qur'an and the hadith, al-Ghazali says, and the final virtue, 'divine support', is identified with the Holy Spirit (Surah 2: 87, 253) (see Virtues and vices). The road to moral and spiritual perfection is described as the 'quest for God'. The seekers after God must satisfy two conditions: their actions must be governed by the prescriptions or ordinances of the 'divine law' (al-shar'), and they must ensure that God is constantly present in their hearts. By this presence al-Ghazali means genuine contrition, adoration and submission, born of the seeker's awareness of the beauty and majesty of God which al-Ghazali, like other Muslim mystics or Sufis, regards as analogous to human passion or love ('ishq) (see Mystical philosophy in Islam). See also: Aristotelianism in Islamic philosophy; Ethics; al-Ghazali; Greek philosophy: impact on Islamic philosophy;Ibn Miskawayh; Logic in Islamic philosophy; Platonism in Islamic philosophy MAJID FAKHRY Copyright © 1998, Routledge.

References and further reading Alon, I. (1991) Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, Leiden: Brill; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The Hebrew University. (A reliable review of Socratic literature in Arabic.) Arkoun, M. (1970) Contribution à l'étude de l'humanisme arabe au IV/Xe siècle (Contribution to

the Study of Arab Humanism in the 4th-10th Centuries), Paris: Vrin. (A detailed account of Ibn Miskawayh's ethics and his philosophical impact.) Donaldson, D.M. (1953) Studies in Muslim Ethics, London: SPCK. (Contains useful information on Arabic and Persian ethics, but is now somewhat out of date.) Fakhry, M. (1994) Ethical Theories in Islam, Leiden: Brill, 2nd enlarged edn. (A systematic analysis of philosophical and religious ethical theories in Islam.) * al-Farabi (c.870-950) Fusul muntaza'ah (Excerpt on Ethics), ed. F. Najjar, Beirut, 1971. (AlFarabi's work on ethics, showing the influence of Aristotle.) Hourani, G. (1985) Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (An important collection of ethical studies by an eminent writer on ethical questions in Islam.) * Ibn Miskawayh (before 1030) Tahdhib al-akhlaq (The Cultivation of Morals), trans. C.K. Zurayk, The Refinement of Character, Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1966. (Reliable and annotated translation.) Khadduri, M. (1984) The Islamic Conception of Justice, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. (A discursive and informative account of this central ethical concept in Islamic thought.) al-Kindi (before 873) Rasa'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyah (Al-Kindi's Philosophical Writings), ed. A.H. Abu Rida, Cairo, 1950. (Collected philosophical writings of al-Kindi.) * al-Kindi (before 873) al-Hila fi-daf' al-ahzan (On the Art of Dispelling Sorrows), ed. H. Ritter and R. Walzer, Uno scritto morale de al-Kindi, Rome, 1938. (Contains al-Kindi's account of Stoic ideals.) Leaman, O. (1995) 'Christian Ethics in the Light of Muslim Ethics', in C. Rodd (ed.) New Occasions Teach New Duties?, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 219-31. (Comparative study of the differing roles played by ethics in Islam and Christianity.) * al-Razi (before 925) Rasa'il al-Razi al-falsafiyah (Al-Razi's Philosophical Writings), ed. P. Kraus, Cairo, 1939. (Collected philosophical writings of Abu Bakr al-Razi.) * al-Tusi (1201-74) Akhlaq-i Nasiri (The Nasirean Ethics), trans. G.M. Wickens, London: Allen & Unwin, 1964. (Translation of al-Tusi's Akhlaq-i Nasiri from Persian. Reliable on the whole.)

Al-Farabi From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search

Muslim scholar

Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Fārābī[1] The Second Teacher[2] c. 872[2] Faryāb in Khorāsān or Otrār in Central Asia c. 950[2] Damascus[3] Iranian or Turkic Islamic Golden Age

Title Born Died

Ethnicity Era Main Metaphysics, Political philosophy, Logic, Music, [2] interest(s) Science, Ethics, Mysticism, Epistemology Notable work(s)

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kitāb al-mūsīqī al-kabīr ("The Great Book Of Music"), ārā ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila ("The Virtuous City"), kitāb iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm ("On The Introduction Of Knowledge"), kitāb iḥṣāʾ alīqā'āt ("Classification Of Rhythms")[2]

Influenced by [3]  Aristotle, Plato, Porphyry, Ptolemy, Al-Kindi Influenced Avicenna, Yahya ibn Adi, Abu Sulayman Sijistani, Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi, Ibn Bajjah, Mulla Sadra,[2] Al Amiri, Averroes, Maimonides and Abū Hayyān al-Tawhīdī, Leo Strauss[4] Al-Farabi (Arabic: ً ‫ي ً ٍي‬ َٕ / Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Fārābī;[1] for other recorded variants of his name see below) known in the West as Alpharabius[5] (c. 872[2] in Fārāb[3] – between 14 December, 950 and 12 January, 951 in Damascus),[3] was a renowned scientist and philosopher of the Islamic Golden Age. He was also a cosmologist, logician, and musician. Through his commentaries and treatises, Al-Farabi became well known among medieval Muslim intellectuals as "The Second Teacher", that is, the successor to Aristotle, "The First Teacher".

Contents 

1 Biography o 1.1 Name o 1.2 Birthplace o 1.3 Origin  1.3.1 Iranian origin theory  1.3.2 Turkish origin theory

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o 1.4 Life and Education 2 Contributions o 2.1 Alchemy o 2.2 Logic o 2.3 Al Farabi, Aristotle, Maimonides o 2.4 Music o 2.5 Philosophy o 2.6 Physics o 2.7 Psychology 3 Philosophical thought 4 Works o 4.1 Metaphysics and cosmology o 4.2 Epistemology and eschatology o 4.3 Psychology, the soul and prophetic knowledge o 4.4 Practical philosophy (ethics and politics) 5 See also 6 Notes 7 Literature 8 External links

Biography The existing variations in the basic accounts of al-Farabi's origins and pedigree indicate that they were not recorded during his lifetime or soon thereafter by anyone with concrete information, but were based on hearsay or guesses (as is the case with other contemporaries of al-Farabi).[1] The sources for his life are scant which makes the reconstruction of his biography beyond a mere outline nearly impossible.[1] The earliest and more reliable sources, i.e., those composed before the 6th/12th century, that are extant today are so few as to indicate that no one among Fārābī‘s successors and their followers, or even unrelated scholars, undertook to write his full biography, a neglect that has to be taken into consideration in assessing his immediate impact.[1] The sources prior to the 6th/12th century consist of: (1) an autobiographical passage by Farabi, preserved by Ibn Abī Uṣaibiʿa. In this passage, Farabi traces the transmission of the instruction of logic and philosophy from antiquity to his days. (2) Reports by Al-Masudi, Ibn al-Nadim and Ibn Hawqal as well as by Said Al-Andalusi (d. 1070), who devoted a biography to him. When major Arabic biographers decided to write comprehensive entries on Farabi in the 6th7th/12th-13th centuries, there was very little specific information on hand; this allowed for their acceptance of invented stories about his life which range from benign extrapolation on the basis of some known details to tendentious reconstructions and legends.[1] Most modern biographies of the philosopher present various combinations of elements drawn at will from this concocted material.[1] The sources from the 6th/12th century and later consist essentially of three biographical entries, all other extant reports on Farabi being either dependent on them or even later fabrications:[1] 1) the Syrian tradition represented by Ibn Abī Uṣaibiʿa.[1] 2) The Wafayāt alaʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ az-zamān (―Deaths of Eminent Men and History of the Sons of the Epoch‖; trans. by Baron de Slane, Ibn Khallikan‘s Biographical Dictionary, 1842–74) compiled

by Ibn Khallikān.[1] 3) the scanty and legendary Eastern tradition, represented by Ẓahīr-al-Dīn Bayhaqī.[1] From incidental accounts it is known that he spent significant time in Baghdad with Christian scholars including the cleric Yuhanna ibn Haylan, Yahya ibn Adi, and Abu Ishaq Ibrahim alBaghdadi. He later spent time in Damascus, Syria and Egypt before returning to Damascus where he died in 950-1.[6][page needed]

Name His name was Abū Naṣr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Farabi, as all sources, and especially the earliest and most reliable, Al-Masudi, agree.[1] In some manuscripts of Fārābī‘s works, which must reflect the reading of their ultimate archetypes from his time, his full name appears as Abū Naṣr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ṭarḵānī, i.e., the element Ṭarḵān appears in a nisba (family surname or attributive title).[1] Moreover, if the name of Farabi‘s grandfather was not known among his contemporaries and immediately succeeding generations, it is all the more surprising to see in the later sources the appearance of yet another name from his pedigree, Awzalaḡ.[1] This appears as the name of the grandfather in Ibn Abī Uṣaibiʿa and of the great-grandfather in Ibn Khallikān. Ibn Abī Uṣaibiʿa is the first source to list this name which, as Ibn Khallikān explicitly specifies later, is so to be pronounced as Awzalaḡ.[1] In modern Turkish scholarship and some other sources, the pronunciation is given as Uzluḡ rather than Awzalaḡ, without any explanation.[1]

Birthplace His birthplace is given in the classical sources as either Fāryāb in Greater Khorasan (modern day Afghanistan)[1] or Fārāb on the Jaxartes (Syr Darya) in modern Kazakhstan.[1] The older Persian[1] Pārāb (in Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam) or Fāryāb (also Pāryāb), is a common Persian toponym meaning ―lands irrigated by diversion of river water‖.[7][8] By the 13th century, Fārāb on the Jaxartes was known as Otrār.[9]

Origin There is a difference of opinion on the ethnic background of Farabi.[1][10][11] According to Dimitri Gutas, "[...] ultimately pointless as the quest for Farabi’s ethnic origins might be, the fact remains that we do not have sufficient evidence to decide the matter [...] [1] The Cambridge companion to Arabic philosophy also states that "[...] these biographical facts are paltry in the extreme but we must resist the urge to embellish them with fanciful stories, as the medieval biographers did, or engage in idle speculation about al-Farabi’s ethnicity or religious affiliation on the basis of contrived interpretations of his works, as many modern scholars have done [...]"[12] According to the Oxford Encyclopaedia of African Thought "[...] because the origins of al-Farabi were not recorded during his lifetime or soon after his death in 950 C.E. by anyone with concrete information, accounts of his pedigree and place of birth have been based on hearsay [...]"[13] Iranian origin theory

An Iranian stamp bearing an illustration of Al-Farabi's imagined face Medieval Arab historian Ibn Abī Uṣaibiʿa (died in 1269)—al-Farabi's oldest biographer— mentions in his ʿOyūn that al-Farabi's father was of Persian descent.[1][14] Al-Shahrazūrī who lived around 1288 A.D. and has written an early biography also state that Farabi hailed from a Persian family.[15][16] Additionally, Farabi has in a number of his works references and glosses in Persian and Sogdian (and even Greek but, interestingly, no Turkish; see below).[1][17] Sogdian has also been suggested as his native language[18] and the language of the inhabitants of Fārāb.[19] Muhammad Javad Mashkoor argues for an Iranian-speaking Central Asian origin.[20] A Persian origin has been discussed by other sources as well.[21] Turkish origin theory

Al-Farabi's imagined face appeared on the currency of the Republic of Kazakhstan The oldest known reference to a possible Turkish origin is given by the medieval historian Ibn Khallikān (died in 1282), who in his work Wafayāt (completed in 669/1271) states that Farabi was born in the small village of Wasij near Fārāb (in what is today Otrar, Kazakhstan) of Turkish parents. Based on this account, some modern scholars state his origin to be Turkish.[22][23][24][25][26][27] Others, such as Dimitri Gutas, criticize this, saying that Ibn Khallikān's account is aimed at the earlier historical accounts by Ibn Abī Uṣaibiʿa, and serves the sole purpose to prove a Turkic origin for al-Farabi, for instance by inventing the additional nisba (surname) "al-Turk" (arab. "the Turk")—a nisba Farabi never had.[1] However, Abu al-Fedā', who copied Ibn Ḵhallekān, corrected this and changed al-Torkī to the descriptive statement "wakāna rajolan torkīyan", meaning "he was a Turkish man."[1] In this regard, Oxford professor C.E. Bosworth notes that "great figures [such] as al-Farabi, al-Biruni, and ibn Sina have been attached by over enthusiastic Turkish scholars to their race".[28]

Life and Education Al-Farabi spent almost his entire life in Baghdad. In the auto-biographical passage about the appearance of philosophy preserved by Ibn Abī Uṣaibiʿa, Farabi has stated that he had studied logic,medicine and sociology with Yūḥannā b. Ḥaylān up to and including Aristotle‘s Posterior Analytics, i.e., according to the order of the books studied in the curriculum, Fārābī said that he studied Porphyry‘s Eisagoge and Aristotle‘s Categories, De Interpretatione, Prior and Posterior Analytics. His teacher, Yūḥannā b. Ḥaylān, was a Christian cleric who abandoned lay interests and engaged in his ecclesiastical duties, as Fārābī reports. His studies of Aristotelian logic with Yūḥannā in all probability took place in Baghdad, where Al-Masudi tells us Yūḥannā died during the caliphate of al-Moqtader (295-320/908-32).[1] He was in Baghdad at least until the end of September 942 as we learn from notes in some manuscripts of his Mabādeʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāżela, he had started to compose the book in Baghdad at that time and then left and went to Syria.[1] He finished the book in Damascus the following year (331), i.e., by September 943).[1]

He also lived and taught for some time in Aleppo. Later on Farabi visited Egypt; and complete six sections summarizing the book Mabādeʾ in Egypt in 337/July 948-June 949.[1] He returned from Egypt to Syria. Al-Masudi writing barely five years after the fact (955-6, the date of the composition of the Tanbīh), says that he died in Damascus in Rajab 339 (between 14 December 950 and 12 January 951).[1] In Syria, he was supported and glorified by Saif ad-Daula, the Hamdanid ruler of Syria.

Contributions Farabi made contributions to the fields of logic, mathematics, music, philosophy, psychology, and education.

Alchemy Al-Farabi wrote: The Necessity of the Art of the Elixir[29]

Logic Though he was mainly an Aristotelian logician, he included a number of non-Aristotelian elements in his works. He discussed the topics of future contingents, the number and relation of the categories, the relation between logic and grammar, and non-Aristotelian forms of inference.[30] He is also credited for categorizing logic into two separate groups, the first being "idea" and the second being "proof". Al-Farabi also considered the theories of conditional syllogisms and analogical inference, which were part of the Stoic tradition of logic rather than the Aristotelian.[31] Another addition AlFarabi made to the Aristotelian tradition was his introduction of the concept of poetic syllogism in a commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.[32]

Al Farabi, Aristotle, Maimonides In the handing down of Aristotle‘s thought to the Christian west in the middle ages, Farabi played an essential part as appears in the translation of Farabi‘s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s de Interpretatione that F.W. Zimmermann published in 1981. Great is the influence of the Persian master on Maimonides, the most important Jewish thinker of the middle ages. Maimonides wrote in Arabic a Treatise on logic, the celebrated Maqala fi sina at almantiq. In a wonderfully concise way, the work treats of the essentials of Aristotelian logic in the light of comments made by the Arab philosophers: Avicenna and above all Al Farabi. To use Maimonides‘ words, if Aristotle is the First Master the second one is undoubtedly Farabi. Rémi Brague in his book devoted to the Treatise stresses the fact that Farabi is the only thinker mentioned therein.

Music

Illustration from Kitāb al-mūsīqā al-kabīr. Drawing of a musical instrument, called shahrud] Farabi wrote a book on music titled Kitab al-Musiqa (The Book of Music). According to Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Mehdi Aminrazavi:[33] the book of Kitab al-Musiqa is in reality a study of the theory of Persian music of his day although in the West it has been introduced as a book on Arab music. He presents philosophical principles about music, its cosmic qualities and its influences. Al-Farabi's treatise Meanings of the Intellect dealt with music therapy, where he discussed the therapeutic effects of music on the soul.[34]

Philosophy

Latin translation of Kitab ihsa' al-'ulum by Gerard of Cremona As a philosopher, Al-Farabi was a founder of his own school of early Islamic philosophy known as "Farabism" or "Alfarabism", though it was later overshadowed by Avicennism. Al-Farabi's school of philosophy "breaks with the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle [... and ...] moves from metaphysics to methodology, a move that anticipates modernity", and "at the level of philosophy, Alfarabi unites theory and practice [... and] in the sphere of the political he liberates practice from theory". His Neoplatonic theology is also more than just metaphysics as rhetoric. In his attempt to think through the nature of a First Cause, Alfarabi discovers the limits of human knowledge".[35] Al-Farabi had great influence on science and philosophy for several centuries[citation needed], and was widely regarded to be second only to Aristotle in knowledge (alluded to by his title of "the Second Teacher") in his time. His work, aimed at synthesis of philosophy and Sufism, paved the way for the work of Ibn Sina (Avicenna).[36] Al-Farabi also wrote a commentary on Aristotle's work, and one of his most notable works is AlMadina al-Fadila where he theorized an ideal state as in Plato's The Republic.[37] Al-Farabi represented religion as a symbolic rendering of truth, and, like Plato, saw it as the duty of the philosopher to provide guidance to the state. Al-Farabi incorporated the Platonic view, drawing a parallel from within the Islamic context, in that he regarded the ideal state to be ruled by the prophet-imam, instead of the philosopher-king envisaged by Plato. Al-Farabi argued that the ideal state was the city-state of Medina when it was governed by the prophet Muhammad as its head of state, as he was in direct communion with Allah whose law was revealed to him.

Physics Al-Farabi thought about the nature of the existence of void.[37] He may have carried out the first experiments concerning the existence of vacuum, in which he investigated handheld plungers in water.[38] He concluded that air's volume can expand to fill available space, and he suggested that the concept of perfect vacuum was incoherent.[37]

Psychology In psychology, al-Farabi's Social Psychology and Model City were the first treatises to deal with social psychology. He stated that "an isolated individual could not achieve all the perfections by himself, without the aid of other individuals." He wrote that it is the "innate disposition of every man to join another human being or other men in the labor he ought to perform." He concluded that in order to "achieve what he can of that perfection, every man needs to stay in the neighborhood of others and associate with them."[34] His On the Cause of Dreams, which appeared as chapter 24 of his Book of Opinions of the people of the Ideal City, was a treatise on dreams, in which he distinguished between dream interpretation and the nature and causes of dreams.[34]

Philosophical thought The main influence on al-Farabi's philosophy was the neo-Aristotelian tradition of Alexandria. A prolific writer, he is credited with over one hundred works.[39] Amongst these are a number of prolegomena to philosophy, commentaries on important Aristotelian works (such as the Nicomachean Ethics) as well as his own works. His ideas are marked by their coherency, despite drawing together of many different philosophical disciplines and traditions. Some other significant influences on his work were the planetary model of Ptolemy and elements of NeoPlatonism,[40] particularly metaphysics and practical (or political) philosophy (which bears more resemblance to Plato's Republic than Aristotle's Politics).[41] Al-Farabi as well as Ibn Sina and Averroes have been recognized as Peripatetics (alMashsha’iyun) or rationalists (Estedlaliun) among Muslims.[42][43][44] However he tried to gather the ideas of Plato and Aristotle in his book "The gathering of the ideas of the two philosophers".[45] According to Adamson, his work was singularly directed towards the goal of simultaneously reviving and reinventing the Alexandrian philosophical tradition, to which his Christian teacher, Yuhanna bin Haylan belonged. His success should be measured by the honorific title of "the second master" of philosophy (Aristotle being the first), by which he was known[citation needed]. Interestingly, Adamson also says that he does not make any reference to the ideas of either alKindi or his contemporary, Abu Bakr al-Razi, which clearly indicates that he did not consider their approach to Philosophy as a correct or viable one.[46]

Works Metaphysics and cosmology In contrast to al-Kindi, who considered the subject of metaphysics to be God, al-Farabi believed that it was concerned primarily with being qua being (that is, being in of itself), and this is related to God only to the extent that God is a principle of absolute being. Al-Kindi's view was, however, a common misconception regarding Greek philosophy amongst Muslim intellectuals at

the time, and it was for this reason that Avicenna remarked that he did not understand Aristotle's Metaphysics properly until he had read a prolegomenon written by al-Farabi.[47] Al-Farabi's cosmology is essentially based upon three pillars: Aristotelian metaphysics of causation, highly developed Plotinian emanational cosmology and the Ptolemaic astronomy.[48] In his model, the universe is viewed as a number of concentric circles; the outermost sphere or "first heaven", the sphere of fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury and finally, the Moon. At the centre of these concentric circles is the sub-lunar realm which contains the material world.[49] Each of these circles represent the domain of the secondary intelligences (symbolized by the celestial bodies themselves), which act as causal intermediaries between the First Cause (in this case, God) and the material world. Furthermore these are said to have emanated from God, who is both their formal and efficient cause. The process of emanation begins (metaphysically, not temporally) with the First Cause, whose principal activity is self-contemplation. And it is this intellectual activity that underlies its role in the creation of the universe. The First Cause, by thinking of itself, "overflows" and the incorporeal entity of the second intellect "emanates" from it. Like its predecessor, the second intellect also thinks about itself, and thereby brings its celestial sphere (in this case, the sphere of fixed stars) into being, but in addition to this it must also contemplate upon the First Cause, and this causes the "emanation" of the next intellect. The cascade of emanation continues until it reaches the tenth intellect, beneath which is the material world. And as each intellect must contemplate both itself and an increasing number of predecessors, each succeeding level of existence becomes more and more complex. It should be noted that this process is based upon necessity as opposed to will. In other words, God does not have a choice whether or not to create the universe, but by virtue of His own existence, He causes it to be. This view also suggests that the universe is eternal, and both of these points were criticized by al-Ghazzali in his attack on the philosophers[50][51] In his discussion of the First Cause (or God), al-Farabi relies heavily on negative theology. He says that it cannot be known by intellectual means, such as dialectical division or definition, because the terms used in these processes to define a thing constitute its substance. Therefore if one was to define the First Cause, each of the terms used would actually constitute a part of its substance and therefore behave as a cause for its existence, which is impossible as the First Cause is uncaused; it exists without being caused. Equally, he says it cannot be known according to genus and differentia, as its substance and existence are different from all others, and therefore it has no category to which it belongs. If this were the case, then it would not be the First Cause, because something would be prior in existence to it, which is also impossible. This would suggest that the more philosophically simple a thing is, the more perfect it is. And based on this observation, Adamson says it is possible to see the entire hierarchy of al-Farabi's cosmology according to classification into genus and species. Each succeeding level in this structure has as its principal qualities multiplicity and deficiency, and it is this ever-increasing complexity that typifies the material world.[52]

Epistemology and eschatology

Human beings are unique in al-Farabi's vision of the universe because they stand between two worlds: the "higher", immaterial world of the celestial intellects and universal intelligibles, and the "lower", material world of generation and decay; they inhabit a physical body, and so belong to the "lower" world, but they also have a rational capacity, which connects them to the "higher" realm. Each level of existence in al-Farabi's cosmology is characterized by its movement towards perfection, which is to become like the First Cause; a perfect intellect. Human perfection (or "happiness"), then, is equated with constant intellection and contemplation.[53] Al-Farabi divides intellect into four categories: potential, actual, acquired and the Agent. The first three are the different states of the human intellect and the fourth is the Tenth Intellect (the moon) in his emanational cosmology. The potential intellect represents the capacity to think, which is shared by all human beings, and the actual intellect is an intellect engaged in the act of thinking. By thinking, al-Farabi means abstracting universal intelligibles from the sensory forms of objects which have been apprehended and retained in the individual's imagination.[54] This motion from potentiality to actuality requires the Agent Intellect to act upon the retained sensory forms; just as the Sun illuminates the physical world to allow us to see, the Agent Intellect illuminates the world of intelligibles to allow us to think.[55] This illumination removes all accident (such as time, place, quality) and physicality from them, converting them into primary intelligibles, which are logical principles such as "the whole is greater than the part". The human intellect, by its act of intellection, passes from potentiality to actuality, and as it gradually comprehends these intelligibles, it is identified with them (as according to Aristotle, by knowing something, the intellect becomes like it).[56] Because the Agent Intellect knows all of the intelligibles, this means that when the human intellect knows all of them, it becomes associated with the Agent Intellect's perfection and is known as the acquired Intellect.[57] While this process seems mechanical, leaving little room for human choice or volition, Reisman says that al-Farabi is committed to human voluntarism.[56] This takes place when man, based on the knowledge he has acquired, decides whether to direct himself towards virtuous or unvirtuous activities, and thereby decides whether or not to seek true happiness. And it is by choosing what is ethical and contemplating about what constitutes the nature of ethics, that the actual intellect can become "like" the active intellect, thereby attaining perfection. It is only by this process that a human soul may survive death, and live on in the afterlife.[55][58] According to al-Farabi, the afterlife is not the personal experience commonly conceived of by religious traditions such as Islam and Christianity. Any individual or distinguishing features of the soul are annihilated after the death of the body; only the rational faculty survives (and then, only if it has attained perfection), which becomes one with all other rational souls within the agent intellect and enters a realm of pure intelligence.[57] Henry Corbin compares this eschatology with that of the Ismaili Neo-Platonists, for whom this process initiated the next grand cycle of the universe.[59] However, Deborah Black mentions we have cause to be skeptical as to whether this was the mature and developed view of al-Farabi, as later thinkers such as Ibn Tufayl, Averroes and Ibn Bajjah would assert that he repudiated this view in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, which has been lost to modern experts.[57]

Psychology, the soul and prophetic knowledge

In his treatment of the human soul, al-Farabi draws on a basic Aristotelian outline, which is informed by the commentaries of later Greek thinkers. He says it is composed of four faculties: The appetitive (the desire for, or aversion to an object of sense), the sensitive (the perception by the senses of corporeal substances), the imaginative (the faculty which retains images of sensible objects after they have been perceived, and then separates and combines them for a number of ends), and the rational, which is the faculty of intellection.[60] It is the last of these which is unique to human beings and distinguishes them from plants and animals. It is also the only part of the soul to survive the death of the body. Noticeably absent from these scheme are internal senses, such as common sense, which would be discussed by later philosophers such as Avicenna and Averroes.[61][62] Special attention must be given to al-Farabi's treatment of the soul's imaginative faculty, which is essential to his interpretation of prophethood and prophetic knowledge. In addition to its ability to retain and manipulate sensible images of objects, he gives the imagination the function of imitation. By this he means the capacity to represent an object with an image other than its own. In other words, to imitate "x" is to imagine "x" by associating it with sensible qualities that do not describe its own appearance. This extends the representative ability of the imagination beyond sensible forms and to include temperaments, emotions, desires and even immaterial intelligibles or abstract universals, as happens when, for example, one associates "evil" with "darkness".[63][64] The prophet, in addition to his own intellectual capacity, has a very strong imaginative faculty, which allows him to receive an overflow of intelligibles from the agent intellect (the tenth intellect in the emanational cosmology). These intelligibles are then associated with symbols and images, which allow him to communicate abstract truths in a way that can be understood by ordinary people. Therefore what makes prophetic knowledge unique is not its content, which is also accessible to philosophers through demonstration and intellection, but rather the form that it is given by the prophet's imagination.[65][66]

Practical philosophy (ethics and politics) The practical application of philosophy is a major concern expressed by al-Farabi in many of his works, and while the majority of his philosophical output has been influenced by Aristotelian thought, his practical philosophy is unmistakably based on that of Plato.[67] In a similar manner to Plato's Republic, al-Farabi emphasizes that philosophy is both a theoretical and practical discipline; labeling those philosophers who do not apply their erudition to practical pursuits as "futile philosophers". The ideal society, he says, is one directed towards the realization of "true happiness" (which can be taken to mean philosophical enlightenment) and as such, the ideal philosopher must hone all the necessary arts of rhetoric and poetics to communicate abstract truths to the ordinary people, as well as having achieved enlightenment himself.[68] Al-Farabi compares the philosopher's role in relation to society with a physician in relation to the body; the body's health is affected by the "balance of its humours" just as the city is determined by the moral habits of its people. The philosopher's duty, he says, is to establish a "virtuous" society by healing the souls of the people, establishing justice and guiding them towards "true happiness".[69] Of course, al-Farabi realizes that such a society is rare and will require a very specific set of historical circumstances in order to be realized, which means very few societies will ever be able

to attain this goal. He divides those "vicious" societies, which have fallen short of the ideal "virtuous" society, into three categories: ignorant, wicked and errant. Ignorant societies have, for whatever reason, failed to comprehend the purpose of human existence, and have supplanted the pursuit of happiness for another (inferior) goal, whether this be wealth, sensual gratification or power. It is interesting to note that democratic societies also fall into this category, as they too lack any guiding principle. Both wicked and errant societies have understood the true human end, but they have failed to follow it. The former because they have willfully abandoned it, and the latter because their leaders have deceived and misguided them. Al-Farabi also makes mention of "weeds" in the virtuous society; those people who try to undermine its progress towards the true human end.[70] Whether or not al-Farabi actually intended to outline a political programme in his writings remains a matter of dispute amongst academics. Henry Corbin, who considers al-Farabi to be a crypto-Shi'ite, says that his ideas should be understood as a "prophetic philosophy" instead of being interpreted politically.[71] On the other hand, Charles Butterworth contends that nowhere in his work does al-Farabi speak of a prophet-legislator or revelation (even the word philosophy is scarcely mentioned), and the main discussion that takes place concerns the positions of "king" and "statesmen".[72] Occupying a middle position is David Reisman, who like Corbin believes that al-Farabi did not want to expound a political doctrine (although he does not go so far to attribute it to Islamic Gnosticism either). He argues that al-Farabi was using different types of society as examples, in the context of an ethical discussion, to show what effect correct or incorrect thinking could have.[73] Lastly, Joshua Parens argues that al-Farabi was slyly asserting that a pan-Islamic society could not be made, by using reason to show how many conditions (such as moral and deliberative virtue) would have to be met, thus leading the reader to conclude that humans are not fit for such a society.[74] Some other authors like Mykhaylo Yakubovych attest that for al-Farabi religion (milla) and philosophy (falsafa) constituted the same praxeological value (i.e. basis for amal al-fadhil—"virtuous deed"), while its epistemological level (ilm—"knowledge") was different.[75]

See also   

Islamic mythology Islamic scholars List of Iranian scholars

Notes 1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad Gutas, Dimitri. "Farabi". Encyclopædia Iranica. Retrieved April 4, 2010. 2. ^ a b c d e f g Corbin, Henry; Hossein Nasr and Utman Yahya (2001). History of Islamic Philosophy. Kegan Paul. ISBN 978-0-7103-0416-2. 3. ^ a b c d Dhanani, Alnoor (2007). "Fārābī: Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Tarkhān al‐Fārābī". In Thomas Hockey et al. The Biographical Encyclopedia of Astronomers. New York: Springer. pp. 356–7. ISBN 978-0-387-31022-0. (PDF version)

4. ^ Brague, Rémi; Brague, Remi (1998). "Athens, Jerusalem, Mecca: Leo Strauss's "Muslim" Understanding of Greek Philosophy". Poetics Today 19 (2): 235–259. doi:10.2307/1773441. ISSN 0333-5372. JSTOR 1773441. 5. ^ Alternative names and translations from Arabic include: Alfarabi, Farabi, and Abunaser 6. ^ Reisman, D.(ed.)Before and After Avicenna. Princeton, NJ. 2001 7. ^ DANIEL BALLAND, "FĀRYĀB" in Encyclopedia Iranica [1]. excerpt: "Fāryāb (also Pāryāb), common Persian toponym meaning ―lands irrigated by diversion of river water" 8. ^ Dehkhoda Dictionary under "Parab" excerpt: " ‫ ) ي‬. ٔ ًّ ّ ّ ( ‫ي م ى‬. . ٕ ‫ٔ ٔ َّ ٔ ي َُ ٌ ُُ ي‬ " (translation: "Lands irrigated by diversion of river water, springs and qanats.") 9. ^ "C. E. Bosworth, "OTRĀR" in Encyclopedia Iranica". Iranicaonline.org. 2002-07-20. Retrieved 2012-09-19. 10. ^ al-Fārābī. (2010). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved February 20, 2010, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/201680/al-Farabi 11. ^ Lessons with Texts by Alfarabi. "D. Gutas, "AlFarabi" in Barthaolomew's World accessed Feb 18, 2010". Bartholomew.stanford.edu. Retrieved 2012-09-19. 12. ^ David C. Reisman, "Al-Farabi and the philosophical curriculum", in Peter Adamson, Richard C. Taylor, The Cambridge companion to Arabic philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2005. pp 53: "These biographical facts are paltry in the extreme but we must resist the urge to embellish them with fanciful stories, as the medieval biographers did, or engage in idle speculation about al-Farabi‘s ethnicity or religious affiliation on the basis of contrived interpretations of his works, as many modern scholars have done." 13. ^ F. Abiola Irele/Biodun Jeyifo, "Farabi", in The Oxford Encyclopedia of African Thought, Vol. 1, p. 379. 14. ^ Ebn Abi Osaybea, Oyun al-anba fi tabaqat at-atebba, ed. A. Müller, Cairo, 1299/1882. ُ ً ‫سي ن‬ ْٕٔ ‫ٔك ٌ ِٕ ق ئ ج يش‬ 15. ^ Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Mehdi Amin Razavi. "An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia, Vol. 1: From Zoroaster to Umar Khayyam", I.B. Tauris in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2007. Pg 134: ―Ibn Nadim in his al-Fihrist, which is the first work to mention Farabi considers him to be of Persian origin, as does Muhammad Shahrazuri in his Tarikh al-hukama and Ibn Abi Usaybi'ah in his Tabaqat al-atibba. In contrast, Ibn Khallikan in his '"Wafayat al-'ayan considers him to be of Turkish descent. In any case, he was born in Farab in Khurasan of that day around 257/870 in a climate of Persianate culture" 16. ^ Arabic: ٔ ‫ س ف ِل لس ٌو ٌ ك‬in J. Mashkur, Farab and Farabi,Tehran,1972. See also Dehkhoda Dictionary under the entry Farabi for the same exact Arabic quote. 17. ^  George Fadlo Hourani, Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, Suny press, 1975.  Kiki Kennedy-Day, Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy: The Limits of Words, Routledge, 2002, page 32. 18. ^ Joshua Parens (2006). An Islamic philosophy of virtuous religions : introducing Alfarabi. Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press. pp. 3. ISBN 0-7914-6689-2

excerpt: "He was a native speaker of Turkic [sic] dialect, Soghdian." [Note: Sogdian was an East Iranian language and not a Turkic dialect] 19. ^ Joep Lameer, "Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian syllogistics: Greek theory and Islamic practice", E.J. Brill, 1994. ISBN 90-04-09884-4 pg 22: "..Islamic world of that time, an area whose inhabitants must have spoken Soghdian or maybe a Turkish dialect..." 20. ^ 51 :(45 ُ ‫ ) س ف‬161‫ ش‬،41ِ ٔ .―‫ي‬ ٔ ― . ٕ‫ ي ً ج‬، ٕ‫ي ك‬-20- . J. Mashkur, "Farabi and Farabi" in volume 14, No. 161, pp 15-12 ,Tehran,1972. [2] English translations of the arguments used by J. Mashkur can be found in: G. Lohraspi, "Some remarks on Farabi's background"; a scholarly approach citing C.E. Bosworth, B. Lewis, R. Frye, D. Gutas, J. Mashkur and partial translation of J.Mashkur's arguments: PDF. ٔ‫يل‬ ‫كت‬ ٔ ‫ه كّ ّ ن ى س الو ت ع هق شت‬ ٕ‫ٌ َ ب‬ ّ ‫ي ي ه ٕف ت ُٓ ي ع هق‬ ّ ‫ُجٓت ّْ َ ً ُ َ ي ك‬ . ‫ي ِق ٌ ٔ ٍ ي ً ّ ٍ ي و س ي‬ ‫ك ُج گ‬ ٔ َ ‫ي ٕ ٌ َ ً ُ ي هً ٌ ي ع هق ّ ن ى َ َ يت يي‬ ٔ ‫سي‬ ٔ‫َ ُ ٔك ي ّت كي‬ . َ َٔ 21. ^  P.J. King, "One Hundred Philosophers: the life and work of the world's greatest thinkers", chapter al-Fārābi, Zebra, 2006. pp 50: "Of Persian stock, al-Farabi (Alfarabius, AbuNaser) was born in Turkestan"  Henry Thomas, Understanding the Great Philosophers, Doubleday,Published 1962  T. J. De Boer, "The History of Philosophy in Islam", Forgotten Books, 2008. Excerpt page 98: "His father is said to have been a Persian General". ISBN 160506-697-4  Sterling M. McMurrin, Religion, Reason, and Truth: Historical Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, University of Utah Press, 1982, ISBN 0-87480-203-2. page 40.  edited by Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins. (2003). From Africa to Zen : an invitation to world philosophy. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 163. ISBN 0-7425-1350-5 "al-Farabi (870-950), a Persian,"  Thomas F. Glick. (1995). From Muslim fortress to Christian castle : social and cultural change in medieval Spain. Manchester: Manchester University Press. pp. 170. ISBN 0-7190-3349-7 "It was thus that al-Farabi (c. 870-950), a Persian philosopher"  The World's Greatest Seers and Philosophers.. Gardners Books. 2005. pp. 41. ISBN 81-223-0824-4 "al-Farabi (also known as Abu al-Nasr al-Farabi) was born of Turkish parents in the small village of Wasij near Farab, Turkistan (now in Uzbekistan) in 870 AD. His parents were of Persian descent, but their ancestors had migrated to Turkistan."  Bryan Bunch with Alexander Hellemans. (2004). The history of science and technology : a browser's guide to the great discoveries, inventions, and the people who made them, from the dawn of time to today. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. pp. 108. ISBN 0-618-22123-9 "Persian scholar al-Farabi"  Olivier Roy, "The new Central Asia: the creation of nations ", I.B.Tauris, 2000. 1860642799. pg 167: "Kazakhistan also annexes for the purpose of bank notes Al Farabi (870-950), the Muslim philosopher who was born in the south of present-

day Kazakhistan but who persumably spoke Persian, particularly because in that era there were no Kazakhs in the region"  Majid Khadduri; [foreword by R. K. Ramazani]. The Islamic conception of justice. Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, c1984.. pp. 84. ISBN 08018-6974-9 "Nasr al-Farabi was born in Farab (a small town in Transoxiana) in 259/870 to a family of mixed parentage — the father, who married a Turkish woman, is said to have been of Persian and Turkish descent — but both professed the Shi'l heterodox faith. He spoke Persian and Turkish fluently and learned the Arabic language before he went to Baghdad.  Ḥannā Fākhūrī, Tārīkh al-fikr al-falsafī ʻinda al-ʻArab, al-Duqqī, al-Jīzah : alSharikah al-Miṣrīyah al-ʻĀlamīyah lil-Nashr, Lūnjmān, 2002.  ‘Ammar al-Talbi, al-Farabi, UNESCO: International Bureau of Education, vol. XXIII, no. 1/2, Paris, 1993, p. 353-372  David Deming,"Science and Technology in World History: The Ancient World and Classical Civilization", McFarland, 2010. pg 94: "Al-Farabi, known in Medieval Europe as Abunaser, was a Persian philosopher who sought to harmonize.."  Philosophers: Abu Al-Nasr Al-Farabi, Trinity College, 1995-2000 22. ^ B.G. Gafurov, Central Asia:Pre-Historic to Pre-Modern Times, (Shipra Publications, 2005), 124; "Abu Nasr Farabi hailed from around ancient Farabi which was situated on the bank of Syr Daria and was the son of a Turk military commander". 23. ^ Will Durant, The Age of Faith, (Simon and Schuster, 1950), 253. 24. ^ Nicholas Rescher, Al-Farabi's Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, University of Pittsburgh Pre, 1963, p.11, Online Edition. 25. ^ Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present, Routledge, p. 61, Online Edition 26. ^ James Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Kessinger Publishing, Vol. 10, p.757, Online Edition 27. ^ * edited by Ted Honderich. (1995). The Oxford companion to philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 269. ISBN 0-19-866132-0 "Of Turki origin, al-Farabi studied under Christian thinkers"  edited and translated by Norman Calder, Jawid Mojaddedi and Andrew Rippin. (2003). Classical Islam : a sourcebook of religious literature. New York: Routledge. pp. 170. ISBN 0-415-24032-8 "He was of Turkish origin, was born in Turkestan"  Ian Richard Netton. (1999). Al-Fārābī and his school. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. ISBN 0-7007-1064-7 "He appears to have been born into a military family of Turkish origin in the village of Wasil, Farab, in Turkestan"  edited by Henrietta Moore. (1996). The future of anthropological knowledge. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-10786-5 "al-Farabi (873-950), a scholar of Turkish origin."  Diané Collinson and Robert Wilkinson. (1994). Thirty-Five Oriental Philosophers.. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-203-02935-6 "Al-Farabi is thought to be of Turkish origin. His family name suggests that he came from the vicinity of Farab in Transoxiana."



Fernand Braudel ; translated by Richard Mayne. (1995). A history of civilizations. New York, N.Y.: Penguin. ISBN 0-14-012489-6 "Al-Farabi, born in 870, was of Turkish origin. He lived in Aleppo and died in 950 in Damascus"  Jaroslav Krejčí ; assisted by Anna Krejčová. (1990). Before the European challenge : the great civilizations of Asia and the Middle East. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 140. ISBN 0-7914-0168-5 "the Transoxanian Turk al-Farabi (d. circa 950)"  Hamid Naseem. (2001). Muslim philosophy science and mysticism. New Delhi: Sarup & Sons. pp. 78. ISBN 81-7625-230-1 "Al-Farabi, the first Turkish philosopher"  Clifford Sawhney. The World's Greatest Seers and Philosophers, 2005, p. 41  Zainal Abidin Ahmad. Negara utama (Madinatuʾl fadilah) Teori kenegaraan dari sardjana Islam al Farabi. 1964, p. 19  Haroon Khan Sherwani. Studies in Muslim Political Thought and Administration. 1945, p. 63  Ian Richard Netton. Al-Farabi and His School, 1999, p. 5 28. ^ Clifford Edmund Bosworth, "Barbarian Incursions: The Coming of the Turks into the Islamic World." In Islamic Civilization, ed. by D.S. Richards. Oxford, 1973. 29. ^ Houtsma, M. Th (1993). E. J. Brill's First Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1913-1936. ISBN 9789004097902. 30. ^ History of logic: Arabic logic, Encyclopædia Britannica. 31. ^ Feldman, Seymour (26 November 1964). "Rescher on Arabic Logic". The Journal of Philosophy (Journal of Philosophy, Inc.) 61 (22): 726. ISSN 0022-362X. JSTOR 2023632. Long, A. A.; D. N. Sedley (1987). The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol 1: Translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-27556-3. 32. ^ Ludescher, Tanyss (February 1996). "The Islamic roots of the poetic syllogism". College Literature. Archived from the original on 2008-02-17. Retrieved 2008-02-29. 33. ^ Professor Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Professor Mehdi Aminrazavi. ―An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia, Vol. 1: From Zoroaster to ‗Umar Khayyam‖, I.B. Tauris in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2007. Pg 135: ―Morever, he was a master of music theory; his Kitab al-Musiqa al-Kabir (The Great book on Music), known in the West as a book on Arabic music, is in reality a study of the theory of Persian music of his day as well as presenting certain great philosophical principle about music, its cosmic qualities, and its influence on the soul‖ 34. ^ a b c Amber Haque (2004), "Psychology from Islamic Perspective: Contributions of Early Muslim Scholars and Challenges to Contemporary Muslim Psychologists", Journal of Religion and Health 43 (4): 357-377 [363]. 35. ^ Netton, Ian Richard (2008). "Breaking with Athens: Alfarabi as Founder, Applications of Political Theory By Christopher A. Colmo". Journal of Islamic Studies (Oxford University Press) 19 (3): 397–8. doi:10.1093/jis/etn047. 36. ^ "Avicenna/Ibn Sina (CA. 980-1137)". The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 23 June 2007. Retrieved 2007-07-13. 37. ^ a b c Arabic and Islamic Natural Philosophy and Natural Science, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

38. ^ Zahoor, Akram (2000). Muslim History: 570-1950 C.E. Gaithersburg, MD: AZP (ZMD Corporation). ISBN 978-0-9702389-0-0.[self-published source?] 39. ^ Black, D. Al-Farabi in Leaman, O & Nasr, H (2001). History of Islamic Philosophy. London: Routledge. p178. 40. ^ Motahhari, Mortaza, Becoming familiar with Islamic knowledge, V1, p:162 41. ^ Reisman, D. Al-Farabi and the Philosophical Curriculum In Adamson, P & Taylor, R. (2005). The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p52 42. ^ Motahhari, Morteza, Becoming familiar with Islamic knowledge, V1, p.166 ‫ٕ ْيى‬ ‫گ‬ ًّ‫ّكه‬ ( ‫ك هًّ ) س الن‬ ‫ى ك ّ ي ف ي ي فٕٓو ٔش ه ف ي ئ يٍ ش‬ ‫ك‬ .‫ى‬ ‫ّك‬ 43. ^ "Dictionary of Islamic Philosophical Terms". Muslimphilosophy.com. Retrieved 201209-19. 44. ^ "Aristotelianism in Islamic philosophy". Muslimphilosophy.com. Retrieved 2012-0919. 45. ^ Motahhari, Mortaza, Becoming familiar with Islamic knowledge, V1, p.167 ‫ك‬ ِٔ ‫ش‬ ‫ٍ ٔ يه ٕف‬ ‫ٍ ك ي ئم ال‬ ( ٍ‫ن كيًي‬ ٍ‫ّ َ و ) نجً ي‬ ٔ ‫كٕ ك يع‬ ٕ َ ّ ّ‫ كٕشش ش ِ ك‬. ٔ ٍ‫ي‬ ‫ال ت ي ي ٌ ٍ ٔ ح ك يى‬ 46. ^ Reisman, p55 47. ^ Black, p188 48. ^ Reisman, p56 49. ^ Black, p189 50. ^ Reisman, p57 51. ^ Corbin, H. (1993). History of Islamic Philosophy. London: Keagan Paul International. p161 52. ^ Reisman, p58-59 53. ^ Reisman, p61 54. ^ page 461 55. ^ a b Reisman, p64 56. ^ a b Reisman, p63 57. ^ a b c Black, p186 58. ^ Corbin, p158 59. ^ Corbin, p165 60. ^ Black, p184 61. ^ Reisman, p60-61 62. ^ Black (2), D. Psychology: Soul and Intellect in Adamson, P and Taylor, R. (2005). The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p313 63. ^ Black (b), p313 64. ^ Black, p185 65. ^ Corbin, p164 66. ^ Black, p187 67. ^ Corbin, p162 68. ^ Black, p190 69. ^ Butterworth, p278 70. ^ Black, p191

71. ^ Corbin, p162-163 72. ^ Butterworth, C. Ethical and Political Philosophy in Adamson, P and Taylor, R. (2005). The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p276 73. ^ Reisman, p68 74. ^ Joshua Parens, An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Religions: Introducing Alfarabi (New York: State University of New York Press, 2006), 2. 75. ^ Mykhaylo Yakubovych. Al-Farabi's Book of Religion. Ukrainian translation, introduction and comments / Ukrainian Religious Studies Bulletin, 2008, Vol. 47, P. 237.

Literature   

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Corbin, Henry; Hossein Nasr and Utman Yahya (1993). History of Islamic Philosophy. Keagan Paul International. ISBN 978-0-7103-0416-2. Habib Hassan Touma (1996). The Music of the Arabs, trans. Laurie Schwartz. Portland, Oregon: Amadeus Press. ISBN 978-0-931340-88-8 Majid Fakhry, Al-Farabi, Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism: His Life, Works, and Influence, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, (2002), ISBN 1-85168-302-X. Trad. esp.: "Alfarabi y la fundación de la filosofía política islámica", trad R. Ramón Guerrero, Barcelona, Herder, 2003. Christoph Marcinkowski, "A Biographical Note on Ibn Bajjah (Avempace) and an English Translation of his Annotations to Al-Farabi's Isagoge". Iqbal Review (Lahore, Pakistan), vol. 43, no 2 (April 2002), pp 83–99. Deborah Black. Al-Farabi in Leaman, O & Nasr, H (2001). History of Islamic Philosophy. London: Routledge. David Reisman. Al-Farabi and the Philosophical Curriculum In Adamson, P & Taylor, R. (2005). The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Deborah Black. Psychology: Soul and Intellect in Adamson, P and Taylor, R. (2005). The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Charles Butterworth. Ethical and Political Philosophy in Adamson, P and Taylor, R. (2005). The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rafael Ramón Guerrero. ―Apuntes biográficos de al-Fârâbî según sus vidas árabes‖, in Anaquel de Estudios Árabes, 14 (2003) 231-238. Rémi Brague Traité de logique, trad. de Rémi Brague, Paris, Desclée De Brouwer, 1996 F.W Zimmermann, Al-Farabi 's Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle 's De Interpretatione, Oxford, 1981. Monteil Jean-François, ―La transmission d‘Aristote par les Arabes à la chrétienté occidentale: une trouvaille relative au De Interpretatione,‖ Revista Española de Filosofia Medieval 11: 181-195 (2004).

External links Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Al-Farabi

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Dhanani, Alnoor (2007). "Fārābī: Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Tarkhān al‐Fārābī". In Thomas Hockey et al. The Biographical Encyclopedia of Astronomers. New York: Springer. pp. 356–7. ISBN 978-0-387-31022-0. (PDF version) Mahdi, Muhsin (2008) [1970-80]. "Al-Fārābī, Abū Naṣr Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ṭarkhān Ibn Awzalagh". Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Encyclopedia.com. al-Farabi at Britannica Abu Nasr al-Farabi at muslimphilosophy.com al-Fārābi—brief introduction by Peter J. King The Philosophy of Alfarabi and Its Influence on Medieval Thought (1947) al-madina al-fadila (The Virtuous City). German introduction with Arabic text. Article discussing Soghdian origin for Farabi PDF version[3] ALFARABI-Trinity College ALFARABI-Unesco