Article 17- 19 Crim Law Compilation Case Digest

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ARTICLE 17. PRINCIPALS I.

Conspiracy

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v PANCHO PELAGIO ALFONSO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-16177 | DATE: MAY 24, 1967 TICKER: rob rob lang kay Lola DOCTRINES: Conspiracy to commit robbery is not a crime -where a person conspired to commit robbery but he did not perform any overt act, he is not liable since conspiracy alone, without the execution of its purpose is not a crime except in special instances. Same; Voluntary desistance from conspiracy. -a conspirator who desisted voluntarily from the conspiracy before the contemplated crime could actually be carried out is free from penal accountability. When the action of the felony starts and the accused, because of fear or remorse desists from its continuance, there is no attempt. If the author of the attempt, after having commenced to execute the felony by external acts, stops by a free and spontaneous feeling, on the brink of the abyss, he is saved. FACTS: Common law spouses Jose Guico and Evelyn Villanueva was at their house in Pasay City. Armando Manalang was also at the said residence when Pancho Pelagio went to see the spouses as his wife just delivered a child and that he wanted to borrow money for hospital expenses from the spouses. (March 23, 1955) It was not determinable if he was accommodated with his request but Armando, taking advantage of the said visit, informed Panch to commit a plan— which was to rob, along with Pancho, Oscar Caymo, and Arcadio Balmeo. Pancho and Armando decided to talk over the matter. (March 24, 1995) Evelyn, Pancho, Armando, Oscar, and Arcadio met again at Jose’s residence and agreed on the plan to rob the house of Jose’s former landlady, a certain Aling Nena, somewhere in Pasay City. At this meeting, Jose was absent. It was established though that after Armando sketched the intended victim’s house and its surrounding, Jose explained the location of the said house. When the meeting broke up at about 6pm that evening, Pancho, Oscar, Armando, and Arcadio set out for the execution of their plan. They all walked towards Aling Nena’s residence, although before reaching that place, Oscar told Armando to hail and hold a taxi (to which the latter complied). Arcadio and Oscar actually entered the victim’s premises, as earlier agreed upon. Pancho acted as a lookout by the gate of the said house. Oscar and Arcadio entered the house through the back kitchen door (which was open). Oscar drew his gun and sought out its occupants. Only an old woman, Mrs. Severina de Gloria was in

that time. He pointed out the gun and intimidated her into producing all the money and jewelry she could. All in all, the pair (Oscar and Arcadio) had taken about P437 in cash, 3 pieces of jewelry worth P205, and a watch worth P300. After they had taken the items, Oscar ordered Mrs. Severina to lie face downward, covered her with a blanket, and cautioned against her moving, or otherwise sounding out an alarm. The two went out but they failed to find Pancho. They found Armando instead, waiting for them in a taxi, to which they rode thereafter. As the taxi was about to leave, a jeep blocked its way as the two vehicles were thus stopped, a man alighted from the jeep and started to walk towards the taxi. When the stranger was very near the taxi already, Armando instructed Oscar to shoot the man as such man was a police officer (who was later identified as Patrolman Francisco Trinidad) of the Pasay Police Department who fell dead. After the shooting, Armando, Oscar, and Arcadio went to Armando’s sister where they changed clothes and hid death weapon and the money and jewelry they had robbed. Oscar and Arcadio met Pancho in Blumentritt whom they called out to account his absence at the gate of the robbery. Pancho explained that he had to scamper away as he saw someone slipped out of the house apparently to summon the police. The records do not disclose just how and when the appellants and their companies were apprehended by the police. On March 25, 1995, the day after the incident, Oscar was taken to the NBI, where he got positive results for paraffin test and nitrate burns in both hands. Pancho, Oscar, and Jose, stated their alibi. They were condemned to death for the crime of robbery with homicide as penalized in Art. 294 of RPC. Originally, such judgment included 6 defendants: Evelyn, Arcadio, Armando, Panco, Oscar, and Jose. Arcadio and Evelyn were discharged after agreeing to turn as state witnesses while Armando died while the case was pending. In appeal to the SC, Oscar sticked to his alibi, Pancho admitted he participated in such crime but under the circumstances, he should only be convicted for simple robbery and not for robbery with homicide. Jose argued he could not be convicted for the crime charged. The OSG urged its affirmance of the decision under review with respect to Pancho and Oscar but recommended the acquittal of Jose on reasonable doubt. CRIME CHARGED: Robbery with Homicide COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE: Pancho, Pelagio, and Jose (Death Penalty for Crime of Robbery with Homicide) ISSUE: Whether or not Jose should be granted of acquittal despite being allegedly involved as a conspirator in such crime SUPREME COURT: The SC founnd the Solicitor General's recommendation for the acquittal of appellant Jose Guico well founded. While it seemed proven that the said appellant did participate in the first of two meetings in the discussion of the plan to commit the robbery in question by answering Armando Manalang's inquiries relating to the intended house and its surrounding streets and the means of entrance thereto

and the channels of exit therefrom, the evidence is as much that, thereafter, his involvement with the conspiracy ceased. It should be recalled that the conferences on the robbery were held on March 23, and 24, 1955. At the first meeting, the participants were Jose Guico, Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo, Armando Manalang, Arcadio Balmeo and Evelyn Villanueva. At the meeting of the 24th the same group, save for appellant Jose Guico, conferred and finalized the plan and, in fact, proceeded to execute the same almost immediately after the conference adjourned. There is ample and positive evidence on record that appellant Jose Guico was absent not only from the second meeting but likewise from the robbery itself. To be sure, not even the decision under appeal determined otherwise. Consequently, even if Guico's participation in the first meeting sufficiently involved him with the conspiracy, such participation and involvement, however, would be inadequate to render him criminally liable as a conspirator. Conspiracy alone, without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, however, do not include robbery. Besides, appellant Jose Guico's absence from the second conference as well as from the robbery itself strongly points to his evident change of mind regarding his commitment the previous day to be in on the robbery. Under the circumstances and under a policy of liberal consideration for timely retreat or repentance, he may be deemed to have desisted voluntarily from the conspiracy before the contemplated crime could actually be carried out and therefore, free from penal accountability. (People v. Timbol, et al., G.R. Nos. 47473-47474, August 4, 1944 [unreported]) As Viada expounds on the rule, "when the action of the felony starts and the accused, because of fear or remorse desists from its continuance, there is no attempt. . . . If the author of the attempt, after having commenced to execute the felony by external acts, he stops by a free and spontaneous feeling on the brink of the abyss, he is saved. It is a call to repentance, to the conscience, a grace, a pardon which the law grants to voluntary repentance." (Cited and translated in Padilla Criminal Law, p. 120, 1964 Ed.)

DECISION: The SC affirmed the decision under appeal insofar it imposed death penalty for Oscar Caymo, but modifies conviction of Pancho Pelagio from robbery with homicide to simple robbery, and Jose Guico should be acquitted

PEOPLE v RODOLFO FEDERICO Y MEDIONA G.R. No. 99840 | 14 August 1995 TICKER: tricycle; bakery; DOCTRINES: Art 17. Principals 1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; FACTS: Version of the Prosecution:

Sometime in February 1990, Rogelio Fernando, a tricycle driver and Francisco Mediona, a Metro Aide, had an altercation resulting in one chasing the other. Before the incident could worsen, they settled their differences. On March 17, 1990, between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m., Rogelio Fernando, Pastor Escala, one Artemon and a certain Jun, all of whom were tricycle drivers, were in front of the bakery owned by Benedicto Escala, the father of Pastor Escala, while Marcelo Gallardo was seated as he used to in front of his house located eight (8) meters away from Escala's bakery across the street, passing the time. Marcelo Gallardo saw appellant Rodolfo Federico and the latter's cousins Francisco Mediona and Ruben Mediona emerge from an alley across the street going towards the direction of the bakery. Francisco Mediona was holding with his right hand a bladed knife similar to that used by butchers, proceeded towards the bakery where Rogelio Fernando, Pastor Escala, Artemon and Jun were still conversing; while Ruben Mediona and appellant Rodolfo Federico, who both stayed behind, pulled out from their pockets slings with darts and aimed the same towards the bakery. Francisco Mediona bought bread from the bakery then after buying he suddenly and without any warning stabbed Rogelio Fernando on the left side of the body and at the same time uttered "malas mo, pare". Rogelio Fernando instinctively fled from the scene before Francisco Mediona could finish him off, but his path was blocked by Ruben Mediona and appellant, who aimed their slings and darts at him. So he turned towards Herbosa Street, Tondo, Manila, to avoid being hit where, he met some friends who brought him to the Tondo Medical Center for medical treatment. After Francisco Mediona stabbed Rogelio Fernando, he instantly turned to Pastor Escala, held him by the hair, and stabbed him with his bladed knife. Pastor Escala fell down on his back to the pavement and again Francisco Mediona stabbed him four (4) times on different parts of the body. After stabbing Pastor Escala, Francisco Mediona defiantly hurled a challenge on anyone in the vicinity to a fight but nobody took up his challenge. Thereupon, Francisco Mediona fled with the appellant and Ruben Mediona. Pastor Escala was rushed to the Mary Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival by Dr. G. Uy, the hospital's surgeon-on-duty. Version of the Defense: At 6:00 p.m. of 17 March 1990, he was in the house of his cousin Elsa Mediona. Before 9:00 p.m. that evening, he noticed a commotion outside Elsa's house and heard someone shouting, "May saksakan, may saksakan." When he went out of the house, he heard people, say that Francisco Mediona stabbed somebody. He then returned to the house of Elsa, but shortly thereafter, two policemen arrived, handcuffed him, and pushed him outside the house. At the police headquarters, Patrolman Richard Lumbad tried to force him to admit that he killed Pastor Escala, but he refused to do so. CRIME CHARGED: Murder and Frustrated Murder RTC Manila: guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

ISSUE: WON there was conspiracy between the accused-appellant and his cousin Francisco Mediona, the person who actually stabbed Escala. SUPREME COURT: With respect to the stabbing of the victim herein, Pastor Escala, we find very tenuous and insufficient the evidence of conspiracy. Conspiracy, just like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy; for other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. In such a case, the dictum that the act of one is the act of all does not hold true anymore. No reason, motive, or intent on the part of Francisco was shown or proved why he would stab Escala. And there is no convincing evidence that the killing of Escala was part of the conspiracy to kill Rogelio Fernando. Neither is there any indication that the accused-appellant was aware that Francisco would attack Escala. Francisco stabbed Escala only after he had stabbed Rogelio Fernando and the latter ran away. Why Francisco decided to also stab Escala is beyond our ken. We could only surmise that Escala made a move which Francisco perceived as an act of aggression against him because after repeatedly stabbing Escala, Francisco even challenged those around him to a fight. We cannot and should not assume that the accused-appellant had any inkling of what Francisco was going to do at the time the latter turned against Escala. Because the conspiracy was to kill Fernando only and the accused-appellant did not conspire with Francisco in the killing of Escala, he cannot be held liable as a co-conspirator for the said killing. DECISION: WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 90-82576-SCC is AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications on the extent of the accused-appellant's criminal liability and the imposable penalty, and as modified, accusedappellant RODOLFO FEDERICO Y MEDIONA is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder only as accomplice and his penalty is hereby reduced from reclusion perpetua to an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Costs against the accused-appellant.

PEOPLE v AGULOS G.R. No. 121828 | June 27, 2003 TICKER: DOCTRINES: Conspiracy FACTS: On June 7, 1998, Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and appellant Rene Gayot Pilola were charged with the murder of Joselito Capa.

Of the three accused, Odilon Lagliba was the first to be arrested and tried, and subsequently convicted of murder. The decision of the trial court became final and executory. Accused Edmar Aguilos remains at large while accused Ronnie Diamante reportedly died a month after the incident. Meanwhile, herein appellant Rene Gayot Pilola was arrested. He was arraigned on March 9, 1994, assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial of the case ensued. Prosecution: The witness Elisa Rolan was inside their store in Mandaluyong at around 11:30PM. Joselito Capa (deceased) and Julian Azul Jr. were drinking beer when Aguilos and Odilon arrived at the store. Joselito and Julian invited them to join their drinking which they accepted. Later on, a heated argument between the two parties turned into an altercation. Elisa was able to pacify them. However, as Joselito and Julian were about to leave, Edmar and Odilar returned. Edmar and Julian got into a fist fight. Joselito tried to stop the fight however, this caused Odilon to pull out his knife and stab Joselito in the neck. Ronnie and the appellant (Rene), who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Julian was able to run away. Appellant The appellant denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. He claims he was inside his cousin’s house and was suffering from ulcer. The appellant also argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and Odilon in stabbing the victim to death. He could not have conspired with Odilon as the incident was only a chance encounter between victim, the appellant and his co-accused. In the absence of a conspiracy, the appellant cannot be held liable as a principal by direct participation CRIME CHARGED: Murder LOWER COURT RULING: HEREFORE, this Court finds RENE GAYOT PILOLA of 606 Nueve de Febrero Street, Mandaluyong City, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in finding that there was conspiracy SUPREME COURT: We are not persuaded by the ruminations of the appellant. There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative.There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders, and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or

was not in on the scheme from the beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated May 3, 1995, of Branch 164 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 73615, finding appellant Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant is hereby directed to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa the amount of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; the amount of ₱50,000 as moral damages; and the amount of ₱25,000 as exemplary damages. II.

Principals by inducement

US v INDANAN G.R. No. L-8187 | January 29, 1913 TICKER: Headman of Parang; Chinese cemetery DOCTRINES: Principal by inducement/induction- those who directly force or induce others to commit the crime. Requisites: 1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime. 2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor. FACTS: The accused, who was the headman of Parang, sent Induk to bring to his house one Sariol. Induk obeyed to this command and brought Sariol to the house. The accused ordered witnesses Akiran and Sariol to tie the victim, and the latter obeyed such order. Sariol remained there with his hands tied in his back, until the accused ordered to the witnesses to bring Sariol to the Chinese cemetery to be killed, as he received an order coming from the governor. Accused ordered Akiran to take his bolo to be used in the killing of Sariol. Kalakyan (one of the witnesses) struck the first blow while Akiran joined in and assisted the former. CRIME CHARGED: Murder LOWER COURT RULING: N/A ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be held liable as principal by inducement. SUPREME COURT:

Yes. In order that a person may be convicted of a crime by inducement, it is necessary that the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime. One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a consideration, or by any other similar act which constitutes the real and moving cause of the crime and which was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act and was sufficient for that purpose. These acts of inducement do not consist in simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or in simple words uttered at the time the act was committed. Such advice and such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have a great dominance and great influence over the person who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself. In this case, the accused falsely represented to the persons who committed the crime that he had an order from the Government requiring the death of Sariol and that they were under obligation to carry out that order. Inducement was offered by the accused directly to the persons interested with the intention of moving them to do his bidding, and that such representation was the moving cause of the fatal act. While it is true that the personal commands of the accused were entirely sufficient to produce the effects of the crime and that such commands may be considered the moving cause of the crime, still there is no doubt, that the representation that the accused had in his possession an order from the Government commanding the death of Sariol was also of material influence in effecting the death; and where two fundamental causes work together for the production of a single result and one of those causes would lead to a conviction upon one theory (personal command) and the other (false representation that accused had an order from government) upon another, a conviction is sustainable upon either theory.

DECISION:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. KIICHI OMINE, EDUARDO AUTOR, LUIS LADION, and AGAPITO CORTESANO G.R. No. L-42476 | July 24, 1935 TICKER: Hemp Plantation; Pinagtulungan na bugbugin tapos sabi patayin daw si Pulido DOCTRINES: Principal by Inducement FACTS: Defendants are found guilty of the crime of frustrated Homicide.

Defendants Autor, Ladion, and Cortesano were working on the hemp plantation of Angel Pulido under the direction of their co-defendant Kiichi Omine, who was the overseer or manager. The four defendants lived together in a house on the plantation. Kiichi Omine asked Pulido for permission to open a new road through the plantation, however, such request was denied because there was already an unfinished road. Kiichi Omine contends that Pulido actually gave him the permission requested. Plaintiff’s Contention: When Angel Pulido, with his son Hilario, and another named Saito Paton were returning home from the cockpit, they saw that a great number of hemp plants were destroyed for the purpose of opening a new road. The Pulidos went to the defendant’s house wherein they had an argument. While the offended party was talking with Omine, Autor attempted to intervene, but was prevented by Hilario Pulido. Autor attacked Hilario Pulido with a bolo, but did not wound him except on the left thumb. Ladion and Cortesano then held Angel Pulido by the arms, and when Autor approached, Omine shouted to him "pegale y matale" (“hit and kill him”), and Autor struck Angel Pulido in the breast with his bolo. Defendant’s Contention: Defendants maintain that it was Pulido and his son who were the aggressors. The first to arrive was Hilario Pulido, who after applying to Kiichi Omine an offensive epithet and asking him why he had grubbed up the hemp plants, struck him in the breast with brass knuckles. When Autor attempted to intervene, Angel Pulido and his son attacked him their fists, Hilario Pulido him on the right cheek with brass knuckles. Ladion and Cortesano ran away before Angel Pulido was wounded by Autor. Kiichi Omine never uttered the words attributed to him or urged Autor to strike Angel Pulido.

CRIME CHARGED: Frustrated Homicide LOWER COURT RULING: Guilty of frustrated homicide, with the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken of their superior strength, and sentencing each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence from six years of prision correccional to twelve years of prision mayor, to indemnify Angel Pulido jointly and severally in the sum of P540, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the corresponding costs.

ISSUE: W/N Kiichi Omine can be considered as a Principal by Inducement. SUPREME COURT:

No. In order that a person may be convicted of a crime by inducement it is necessary that the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime. Furthermore, in order that such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have great dominance and great influence over the person who acts, that it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself There was obviously no conspiracy among the defendants, but the offended party and his son and his relative, Saito, narrated the facts of the incident in such away that all the four defendants would appear to be equally responsible for the injury sustained by the offended party. If they did in fact intervene, it may have been for the purpose of preventing the offended party and his son from continuing their attack on Omine. There was no need for Ladion and Cortesano to hold Angel Pulido in order to enable Autor to strike him with his bolo, or for Kiichi Omine to induce him to do so by shouting "pegale y matale". According to the witness for the prosecution, Hilario Pulido and Eduardo Autor had already struck each other in the face with their fists, and Eduardo Autor had received a blow in the right eye, and then struck Hilario Pulido with his bolo. Angel Pulido would naturally intervene in the fight between his son and Eduardo Autor, and if he did so, Autor, who had already drawn his bolo, would strike him without the need of any inducement from Omine. Even if it were satisfactorily proved that Kiichi Omine uttered the words in question, we are of the opinion that they would not be sufficient to make him a principal by induction, because it does not appear that the words uttered by Kiichi Omine caused Eduardo Autor to strike Angel Pulido.

DECISION: We are therefore of the opinion that Eduardo Autor is guilty of lesiones graves, since the offended party was incapacitated for the performance of his usual work for a period of more than ninety days, and not of frustrated homicide. For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed as to Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano, and they are acquitted with the proportionate part of the costs de oficio. As to the appellant Eduardo Autor, the decision of the lower court is modified, and he is convicted of lesiones graves and sentenced to suffer one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P540, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the corresponding costs. In accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to be served by him is fixed at one year of prision correccional.

III.

Principals by indispensable cooperation

PEOPLE v MONTEALEGRE G.R. No. L- 67948 | May 31, 1988 TICKER: marijuna fight DOCTRINES: Art 17 par 3- Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished FACTS: Edmundo Abadilia was eating at a restaurant when he detected the smell of marijuana from a nearby table. He went outside and saw Police Officer Renato Camantigue and reported the matter. Abadilla and Camantigue went to the restaurant and Police Officer Camantigue detected the smell of Marijuana from the table of Vicente Capalad and Napoleon Montealegre. Police Officer Camantigue then approached the accused Montealegre and Capalad collared them and asked them “Nagmamarijuna kayo no?” and asked the waitress if she knew them but the waitress said no. Montealegre with his right hand and Capalad with his left hand brought out a knife. Capalad stabbed Police Officer Camantigue in the back, Police Officer Camantigue tried to pull the gun from his holster but Montealegre held Police Officer Camantigue preventing him to defend himself while Capalad continued to stab Police Officer Camantigue. When they were grappling, the three fell to the floor then Capalad rose and scampered towards the door and fled. Police Officer Camantigue fired and went outside and fired again. Police Officer abandoned the chase and asked to be brought to the hospital. Capalad and Police Officer Camantigue died the next day. The accused Montealegre escaped but was later found on March 12, 1983 on board a vehicle bound for Baclaran. He gave his name as Alegre but later on admitted to be the fugitive sought. Abadilla testified that Montealegre was the one who held Police Officer Camantigue but the accused Montealegre claimed that he escaped before the stabbing (what a liar) but his testimony consisted of denials and contradictions. CRIME CHARGED: Complex crime of murder, as qualified by treachery, with assault upon a person in authority RTC: The accused-appellant was correctly convicted of the complex crime of murder, as qualified by treachery, with assault upon a person in authority. Accordingly, he must suffer the penalty imposed upon him, to wit, reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, plus the civil indemnity, which is hereby increased to P30,000.00, and the actual, mectical and fimeral expenses in the sum of P37,380.00 as proved at the trial. ISSUE: Whether or not is Montealegre a principal to the crime? SUPREME COURT: YES. The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated with Capalad in the killing of the police officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant holding on to the victim's hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending himself. While it is true that the accused- appellant did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack against him.

The accused-appellant was a principal by indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code. As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above modified, without a ny pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

US v LIM BUANCO and LUCIANO DE LOS REYES G.R. No. 5240 | November 19, 1909 TICKER: Conspired to commit estafa sa bank DOCTRINES: Principals by indispensable cooperation FACTS: At least three and a half years prior to the commission of the crime, Luciano de los Reyes was employed in the Banco Español-Filipino, and served as bookkeeper and check registry clerk. He was in charge of certain current account-books of the bank, and it was his duty to inspect certain checks presented to the bank for payment, to examine the account of the maker of said checks, and determine whether or not the drawer of the check had a sufficient balance to his credit to justify the payment of the check. In the performance of these duties, Reyes was required to indorse upon each check, if it was entitled to payment, the words "Corriente. P. O. Luciano de los Reyes." Thereafter, it was passed to the cashier of the bank, who in reliance upon the indorsement, paid or ordered the same to be paid. The defendant Lim Buanco had an account with the bank, and drew large sums of money by means of checks signed by him, and inspected and indorsed by Reyes. During this time a conspiracy existed between the defendants Lim Buanco and Reyes for the withdrawal of funds from the bank, regardless of whether he had any funds in the bank to his credit, further, the entries in the account of Lim Buanco on the books of the bank were fraudulently and illegally manipulated by Reyes so as to make the books show an apparent credit balance, when in fact Lim Buanco was owing the bank a large amount of money. One day, Lim Buanco drew a check on the Banco Espano ̃ l-Filipino for the sum of P2,000, and this check was through the agency of another bank in which it was deposited by Lim Buanco, presented in due course of business to and paid by the Banco Espano ̃ l-Filipino. Before the check was paid, Reyes indorsed the words "Corriente. P. O. Luciano de los Reyes," although at the time when this indorsement was made Lim Buanco had no actual credit balance in the bank, and no permission had been given him by any officer or officers in authority of said bank to overdraw his account. In this manner, the defendants, secured the payment of the check, although they both knew at the time that Lim Buanco had no credit balance in the bank, but was

in fact indebted to the bank in the sum of more than 300,000 pesos, which had previously been withdrawn from the bank by means of checks drawn by Lim Buanco and fraudulently indorsed as correct by Reyes. The amount of money fraudulently obtained from the bank by means of the check, with interest, amounted to P2,273. No part of the said sum has been returned or paid back to the Banco Espano ̃ l-Filipino by Lim Buanco, or by Reyes, or by any person acting for or in his or their behalf. Counsel for defendant Reyes contended that the court committed an error in holding that the evidence shows that Reyes is guilty as principal of the crime of estafa. CRIME CHARGED: ESTAFA COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE: Both defendants are found guilty and are sentenced to two years and ten months of presidio correccional in the public cárcel of Bilibid, in the city of Manila; to jointly and separately indemnify the Banco Español-Filipino in the sum of P2,273, Philippine currency, and in the event of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment for the time and in the manner and place prescribed by law. ISSUE: Whether or not Reyes is guilty as principal of the crime of estafa SUPREME COURT: YES. Each performed the part which was necessary to enable them to accomplish the criminal purpose they had in view. Article 535 of the Penal Code says that: "The following shall incur the penalties of the preceding articles: "1. He who shall defraud others by using a fictitious name, by assuming fictititous power, influence, or attributes, or by pretending to possess imaginary property, credit, commission, enterprises, or business, or by using any other similar deceit that is not one of those mentioned in the following cases." Lim Buanco certainly by implication represented to the bank that he possessed a credit to which he was not entitled, and with the assistance of Reyes he gave that claim the color of truth, and thus deceived the bank. The fact that Reyes falsified the accounts-current of Lim Buanco, making him appear as a creditor when as a matter of fact he was a debtor of the bank, together with the fact that he acted in collusion with Lim Buanco, made him guilty of a deceit under the province of the paragraph above quoted. We cannot see that this conclusion is in the least, affected by the fact that under the by-laws of the bank it may have been the duty of the directors of the bank to ascertain the correctness of the entries made by Reyes before the payment of the check. The fraudulent conduct of Reyes cannot be deprived of its criminal character by the fact that other officers, directors, or employees of the bank may have been careless in the performance of their duties. Whatever may have been the strict duty of the other officers of the bank, the fact remains that Reyes was guilty of fraudulently manipulating the records of the bank, and he cannot escape the legal consequences thereof by showing that if others had

properly performed their duties he would not have been able to have accomplished anything by his fraudulent acts. DECISION: The judgment and sentence of the trial court should be and are therefore affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellants. So ordered.

PEOPLE v MADALI G.R. No.L-67803-04 July 30,1990 TICKER: Dj Khalid’s “another one” gone wrong, DOCTRINES: Principal by inducement FACTS: Husband and wife petitioners Ricarte Madali and Annie Mortel Madali appeal a decision of RTC of killing father and son Cipriano and Felix Gasang and seriously wounded Augustin Reloj and his daughter Merlinda. According to prosecution, the crime stemmed from the altercation between the deceased who accompanied by Augustin Reloj and son of Madali spouses Ramon. Felix was mauled with chako by the latter. The next day, Felix and Augustin was summoned by the police at the municipal building where the petitioner Ricarte is a police captain. He detained the two in twelve hours because they were very brave of assaulting his son, and said that their bodies must be sowed by bullets. Madali uttered "Kailangan sa imo lubongan bala" which means, what you need is a bullet embedded in you. Felix was released along with his mother. Around 9 o’clock evening, Felix and Augustin went home together and separate ways at Marawi bridge. Felix stopped by at a store to buy cigarettes, Augustin preceded home, 15 meters away from Madali;s house, Augustin was held by Ricarte and dragged him to his home. While Agustin feet step on a knee high fence Annie Madali clubbed him with a piece of wood striking his left shoulder then clubbed him again but she clubbed Ricarte instead so Agustin escaped from Ricarte’s grip. Ricarte then shot Agustin on the right hip thus landing on the ground. He did not get up fearing he might be shot again, then Felix arrived upon hearing the shot. Annie shouted that “here comes another”,Ricarte shot Felix and fell to the ground. Upon hearing the shooting, Cipriano preceded to Madali’s, Annie saw her with her flashlight and shouted “here comes another, here comes another, shoot him!”. Ricarte fired and Cipriano screamed in pain that he was shot, Merlinda saw his father and she was shot too but thanks to wooden fence she abled to ran away, where her mother saw her and she was helped by a Romeo Manes who accompanied her to the hospital. Desamparada (mother) saw his husband Cipriano, crawling to her, she asked to stand up but failed to do so, Cipriano said, "Ging iwagan ako ni Annie Madali cag ging baril ako ni Ricarte Madali" (Annie focused a light on me and Ricarte Madali shot me.) She then went back to her daughter and shouted for help. Defense:

Madali surrendered voluntarily to police and gave his .38 caliber service pistol. Madalis pleaded not guilty. On the same evening at 9 oclock they were both ready to sleep when someone threw a rock on their home then again threw rocks three times. Ricarte went down a saw someone crouching behind gabi plants, he could not identify it because of fog. He then came behind the kitchen when someone struck him on left shoulder, he will be stricken again but he managed to caught the club, him and the intruder fell down and then her wife came and kicked the intruder to his stomach then Ricarte shot the gun. There he saw another two men approaching, one with a club and the other with a knife. He shouted that he is a policeman. The other person preceded to strike him with club, but he was able to resist it and the man fell down, When the man with the knife was about to stab him, Madali fired his gun at him. As that man was still closing in on him, Madali shot him again. The man with the knife retreated to the gate and fell just outside of it. After firing two shots, Madali turned sideward and saw the man with the club about to strike him. So, Madali shot him. The man walked away. Madali later identified the man crouching amidst their gabi plants as Agustin Reloj.

CRIME CHARGED: Murder and Frustrated Murder RTC Romblon: Frustrated Murder on Agustin Reloj- Indeterminate Penalty of 6 yrs Prision Correcional Murder on Felix Gasang - Reclusion Perpetua Complex Crime of Murder with Frustrated Murder (Murder: Cipriano, Frustrated Murder: Merlinda)- Reclusion Perpetua with accesory penalties, indemnifying the heirs of Cipriano and fees of hospitalization of Merlinda ISSUE: 1. W or N Annie Madali is a principal by direct participation on the said crime 2. W or N Ricarte Madali acted on self-defense SUPREME COURT: 1. Annie's participation in the shooting of the victims consisted of beaming her flashlight at them and warning her husband of the presence of other persons in the vicinity. By beaming her flashlight at a victim, Annie assisted her husband in taking a good aim. However, such assistance merely facilitated the commission of the felonious acts of shooting. Considering that, according to both of the Madali spouses, "it was not so dark nor too bright that night or that "brightness and darkness were equally of the same intensity. Ricarte Madali could have nevertheless accomplished his criminal acts without Annie's cooperation and assistance.

Neither may Annie's shouts of "here comes, here comes another, shoot" be considered as having incited Ricarte to fire at the victims to make Annie a principal by inducement. There is no proof that those inciting words had great dominance and influence over Madali as to become the determining cause of the crimes. The rapidity with which Madali admittedly fired the shots eliminated the necessity of encouraging words such as those uttered by Annie. Proof of motive is unnecessary where there is a clear identification of the accused. More so in this case where the principal accused does not deny having fired the fatal shots. But the Madali spouses must have harbored a deep resentment against the Gasang family to put into action Madali's threat of "sowing bullets" on them. What makes Madali's crimes even more reprehensible is the fact that he claims to have committed them in the pursuit of his task as a peace officer. He even went to the extent of wearing his fatigue jacket and trousers to create a facade of performance of an official function. Sadly, he misused his authority and his wife, harboring an improper sense of connubial cooperation, did not even try to dissuade him.

2.

The defense is anchored on the justifying circumstance of self-defense. In order that such plea can prosper, it must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the defendant's life in danger and forced him to inflict more or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefor reasonable means to resist the said attack The defense miserably failed to pass said test. Its allegation that the Madali residence was hurled with stones before Madali confronted the Gasang group, was not credibly established. No one was able to positively identify the stone-throwers. Not even Madali and his wife, Annie. There is no proof that the stones found in the Madali yard were indeed the stones thrown at their house. It is interesting to note that even defense witness Antonio Morales, a fellow policeman of Madali, testified that he did not have personal knowledge on where the stones were discovered because he was only informed by Galang (another policeman) "who in turn was only told by Ricarte that the latter was stoned.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, except as hereinabove modified, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the appellants. ARTICLE 18. ACCOMPLICES

PEOPLE v TAMAYO G.R. No. L-18289 | November 17, 1922 TICKER: FARMERS DOCTRINES: Art. 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.chanrobles virt FACTS:

On the morning of July 17, 1921, Catalino Carrera together his brother, Francisco Carrera, and a youth of thirteen years, named Juan Gonzales, went to work at the field belonging to the deceased, in the barrio of San Felipe, municipality of Binalonan. To accomplish said work, it was necessary to turn water into the paddy from an irrigating ditch flowing nearby; and the deceased accordingly intercepted the flow of the water in this ditch by constructing a dirt dam, thereby diverting the water entirely to his own land. While the deceased was engaged in working in and around the irrigating ditch, his brother Francisco was occupied nearby in leveling the soil with a light rake, and the boy, Juan Gonzales, mounted on a carabao, was using a harrow to smoothen the surface of the field a few rods away. The five appellants herein arrived to begin work preparing another plot of land for cultivation, adjacent to or near the paddy upon which the deceased was at work. Upon arriving upon the scene of their intended labors, the five appellants found that no water was available for watering the land, since all the water in the canal was being seized by the deceased. The five approached the deceased and either Hilario or Ramon Tamayo asked him to allow the water, or some of the water, to flow on through the canal to their land, as it was dry and water was necessary. In reply the deceased told them to wait for the rain of heaven. The appellants were not content with this rejoinder, and the request for water was repeated, upon which the deceased told them that they should await his pleasure. Seeing that their request for water was disregarded, the anger of the appellants was aroused, and Hilario Tamayo advanced towards the irrigating ditch, and toward the deceased, with the intention, so Hilario states, of breaking the dam with his hands, thereby releasing the water so that it would continue its course in the ditch. This movement on the part of Hilario Tamayo was met with a demonstration of resistance on the part of the deceased, When Hilario Tamayo found himself confronted by the deceased in a threatening attitude, he at once closed in upon the deceased and, seizing him firmly by the neck, began choking him, with the result that the deceased was rendered incapable of effectual resistance. Upon this Francisco Carrera ran to his brother's assistance and taking Hilario by the belt, pulled him away, whereupon a minor altercation apparently ensued between these two and during the remainder of the affray Hilario remained separated a few meters from Catalino Carrera. As soon as Hilario had been thus drawn away from the deceased, Ramon Tamayo at once took Hilario's place and continued choking the deceased until the latter had become visibly weak; and it was at this moment that Jose Tamayo, a son of Ramon, ran up and delivered a blow with a bamboo stick on the side of the head of the deceased just above the left ear. The deceased at once gave down, but Ramon Tamayo continued to choke him for a few moments until life was extinct. Seeing what had been thus accomplished, the five accused went away, leaving the body where it had fallen. At this Basilla Orensia, the wife of the latter, had just arrived in the field, bringing food for her husband and his assistant, as the day was getting hot and the hour was approaching when agricultural laborers are accustomed to take rest and refreshment. She therefore was present at the quarrel from the beginning and is one of the two adult witnesses for the prosecution, the other being Francisco Carrera, the brother of the deceased. After life was extinct, Federico Tibunsay approached the body and removed a large bolo with which the deceased was provided, drawing it, so the witnesses for the prosecution testify, from the sheath in which it was reposing. This bolo, it may be observed, was afterwards found in the hands of Hilario, by whom it was delivered to the justice of the peace. The evident explanation of

this circumstance is that Federico. Tibunsay delivered the bolo to Hilario after the appellants had departed from the scene of homicide, with a view to the corroboration of the tale which they then concocted, to the effect that only Jose and Hilario had been present at the tragedy. CRIME CHARGED: Homicide LOWER COURT RULING: I cant find it ISSUE: Whether or not appellant Ramon Hilario can be held responsible in the character of an accomplice. SUPREME COURT:From what has been said it result that the judgment appealed from must be affirmed in so far as it finds Jose Tamayo guilty of the offense of homicide and sentences him to undergo imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion temporal, with the accessories prescribed in article 59 of the Penal Code and requires him to pay indemnity to the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P650; with proportional costs of this instance against the appellant. The judgment must bee reversed as to all the other appellants; and as to Ramon Tamayo, judgment will be entered declaring him guilty of homicide, in the character of accomplice,xxxxxx. So ordered. DECISION: In considering whether Ramon Tamayo is guilty as a principal in this homicide, the first impression must be that, if he is responsible in that character, it is because of his direct participation in the commission of the deed; but when the facts proved are carefully considered in the light of the jurisprudence relating to criminal responsibility, it will be seen that he could not properly be held responsible in the character of principal, for the reason that participation on his part in the criminal design of Jose Tamayo, the actual slayer, is not sufficiently proved. The doctrine sustained in the Spanish decisions, where the language of a decision from the supreme court of Spain was quoted with approval to the following effect: "The responsibility of the accomplice is to be determined by acts of aid and assistance, either prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the crime, rendered knowingly for the principal therein, and not by the mere fact of having been present at its execution, unless the trial court finds that the object of such presence was to encourage the delinquent or to apparently or really increase the odds against the victim, and in the absence of such an intent specifically shown, concurring with some overt act, which together form the basis of the responsibility of the indirect author of the crime, such a conclusion is erroneous and constitutes an infraction of article 15 of the Penal Code." Passing to the case of Hilario Tamayo, it is apparent in the light of the authorities above cited, that he must be absolved from all responsibility for the homicide; for at the time Jose Tamayo intervened in the affray Hilario had desisted from his own acts of aggression against the deceased; and he did nothing whatever to assist Jose in the immediate commission of the homicide. Moreover, such acts as were done by Hilario prior to the commission of the deed were evidently done without knowledge of the criminal design on the part of Jose, for that design had not then been revealed. It result that his accused is guilty only of the misdemeanor involved in his previous assault upon the deceased.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SIMPLICIO REALON AND EUTROPIO SOLIVEN G.R. No. L-30832 | DATE: August 29, 1980 TICKER: Handa…...awit!!! Bangggg DOCTRINES: Article 19. Accessories. - Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners: 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery. 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

FACTS: On April 13, 1969, at the grandstand in the Athletic Bowl located at the Burnham Park in Baguio City, a group of more than forty (40) male and female public school teachers were assembled and rehearsing a song for the inaugural ceremonies of the Benguet Division of the Bureau of Public Schools at La trinidad, Benguet. The group was arranged in four horizontal rows on four steps of the grandstand and facing the basketball court below. Those belonging to the different voice groups of soprano, alto, tenor and bass were together or placed near each other so that on the fourth or uppermost row from left to right facing the conductress, Lena Domingo, and the basketball court stood the members of the tenor group which included, Serafino Gayudan, Simplicio Realon (one of the accused), Severino Dionisio, Jose Viray, Cipriano Bayangan, and Basilio Tumpac, Jr., then Vicente Ramos (the deceased victim), Federico Pacleb, Mr. Puyasan, Mr. Balao, Andrew Sagubo, and Joseph Dampac, all members of the bass group. Between Federico Pacleb and Puyasan was a post. Earlier, Joseph Dampac, Andrew Sagubo and the accused Simplicio Realon arrived together, the latter being accompanied by the other accused Eutropio Soliven, a mason working for one Delfin Balajadia of Baguio City. During the song practice, and apparently while waiting for his coaccused Realon, Soliven seated himself somewhere higher up the steps of the grandstand behind the fourth line of the teachers, more specifically at the back of the tenor group. Because the place of the rehearsal was situated in a public park, there was a considerable number of people around. The teachers in the grandstand were holding copies of their song selection and were actually singing and blending their voices to the song "Come Where the Lilies Bloom" when accused Simplicio Realon pulled out of the formation and shortly thereafter, a loud explosion was heard.

Immediately, panic ensued. Adults and children were screaming, some were running in different directions while others were scampering to safety. Realon and Soliven left the grandstand in haste, one following the other. Near the main gate of the Athletic Bowl, both Realon and Soliven were caught and held separately, then turned over first to Patrolman Patrick Tolentino, then to Patrolman Jose Abellera, both of the Baguio City Police Department. Pat. Abellera later brought the two accused to the City Hall for investigation. Immediately after the loud explosion, Vicente Ramos, one of the teachers. fell from where he was standing in the grandstand. It turned out that he was shot at the upper portion of the nape. He died from the gunshot wound inflicted.

CRIME CHARGED: Crime of Murder CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF BAGUIO: GUILTY - Simplicio Realon and Eutropio Soliven for the crime of Murder qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. ISSUE: Whether or not Soliven is an accessory to the crime. SUPREME COURT: YES. (Please refer back to Art. 19 description) In finding Soliven guilty as an accessory, The Court have considered the following facts and circumstances as gathered from the evidence: (1) from where he was seated at the grandstand of the Athletic Bowl, Soliven must have seen Realon leave his place in the formation, approach the victim from behind and fire the gun at the latter; (2) Soliven ran with Realon when the latter fled from the scene of the crime; (3) while in flight, Realon passed the fatal weapon to Soliven who in turn dumped the gun inside a garbage barrel; and (4) upon his apprehension Soliven did not show or make any act of protestation. From the foregoing, there can be no conclusion other than that Soliven witnessed his friend Realon commit the crime and that having done so, Soliven assisted in Realon's escape by concealing the instrument used in the perpetration of the offense in an obvious effort or attempt to prevent its discovery. The additional fact that Soliven made no protest at the time of his apprehension only serves to indicate a guilty mind. That the offense was accomplished with treachery is beyond question. The sudden and unexpected attack from behind directly and specially insured the killing without risk to Realon since the victim Ramos had no chance to retaliate at all. It indubitably appears that Realon had consciously adopted and deliberately chosen a mode of attack intended to facilitate the perpetration of the crime without risk to himself arising from any defense which Ramos might have made. Indeed, the surprise assault precluded the victim from making any defense at all. Realon, therefore, committed murder qualified by alevosia

DECISION: We find the appellant Simplicio Realon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder without any modifying circumstance, and he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua. We also find the appellant Eutropio Soliven guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. Since said accused Eutropio Soliven has been in prison since 1969 up to the present, he is deemed to have served his sentence and should be released therefrom, unless detained for any other cause.

PEOPLE v LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias "ECOY," CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO alias "CONDRING," and VIRGILIO C. DOCTOLERO alias "VERGEL," G.R. No. 34386 | 7 February 1991 TICKER: bolo; DOCTRINES: Art 18. Accomplices - Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. FACTS: Version of the Prosecution: At about 6:30 in the evening on November 8, 1970, Marcial Sagun and his wife, Maria OviedoSagun and Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo (sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-Sagun) were on their way home. Upon reaching a crossing of the road they met the accused Ludovico Doctolero who, without warning and without cause or reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck Marcial Sagun with a bolo. The latter evaded that blow and wrestled with Ludovico Doctolero for possession of the bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo became frightened when Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were wrestling for the possession of the bolo of the former, so she ran away in the direction of the house in Sitio Binday. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified that she saw the accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throw stones at the house of Marcial Sagun. While throwing stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for the man in the house to come out. Paciencia SagunDiamoy told them: "Why can't you be patient and forget?" But she was asked not to interfere. At about that time, Marcelo Doctolero was going towards the house of Marcial Sagun, when he met the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told them why they can't be patient and forget, but the three accused replied "Vulva of your mother, we will also kill you." Then they struck Marcelo Doctolero several times with their bolos. And when their father Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the head. Marcelo Doctolero fell and then all the accused ran away. Maria Oviedo-Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) declared that while she was in the house of Marcelo Doctolero, she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones

at their house and called to all the men in the house to come out. She was about to go to their house to get her children but she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio going up. So she hid behind the palm tree, a few meters away from their house. While there, she heard Epifania Escosio (her adopted mother) shouting at her, saying "Enieng, your children." Then she saw the three accused coming down from the house, going towards the road where they met Marcelo Doctolero whom they also boloed several times until he fell. When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all left. Version of the Defense: On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ludovico Doctolero met at the crossing of Bo. Banana and Binday road Marcial Sagun, who was with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo and the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman who were on their way home. Ludovico noticed Antonio Oviedo holding his bolo on his waist unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward swing. He parried the bolo with his left hand, but he was hurt in the process. At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed his bolo. Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by boloing Maria Oviedo. He retreated and then run away, with Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo throwing stones at him. He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house of his cousins. As he came near his house, he saw the house of Marcial Sagun and his blood boiled. He went to Marcial's house calling him to get down. He went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told him that Marcial Sagun went towards the South. He was about to leave when the old woman hit him at the back of his neck, causing him to see darkness and (he) boloed her several times. Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He stayed a while at the trunk of the buri tree, thinking that he might be ambushed. Here, he did not notice anyone coming from the south or the east. So he tried to move, but as he did so, he noticed someone approaching him coming from the yard of Marcelo Doctolero. As it was dark he did not recognize the man and thinking that it was Marcial Sagun, he met him. It turned out however, that the man was Marcelo Doctolero. So he returned the bolo he was holding in its scabbard. He asked Marcelo Doctolero where Marcial Sagun was, but Marcelo Doctolero answered him, "because of your foolishness" and hit him on the shoulder, but in the process of evading the blow, Ludovico Doctolero was hit at the back. As Marcelo Doctolero tried to hit him for a second time he took a side step and took hold of the stick and pulled it away, causing Marcelo Doctolero to fall on his knees. He was able to get the club, but Marcelo Doctolero unsheathed his bolo. When the latter insisted on unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico Doctolero boloed him many times. CRIME CHARGED: multiple murder and unspecified physical injuries CFI PANGASINAN: Ludovico Doctolero guilty as principal, and his co-accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as accomplices, in committing the crime of Murder, and in physical injury. ISSUE: WON appellant Conrado participated as an accomplice in the commission of the crime.

SUPREME COURT: The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as an accomplice in the commission of the crimes charged. In his defense, appellant denies having participated in the commission thereof and raises the effete defense of alibi, contending that he was not at the place where the crimes were committed. Appellant's pretension, however, was not corroborated by any evidence other than the testimony of the other erstwhile appellants. While the testimony of a co-conspirator or an accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes from a polluted source and must be scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to travel suspicion. This uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive and categorical testimony of the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and between the positive declarations of the prosecution Witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence. The appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women victims to death. Indeed, there is no question that the presence of these two appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their brother Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed as he did proceed, in committing the heinous crimes against two defenseless women and a child. We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice. DECISION: WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered IMPOSING on appellant Conrado Doctolero three (3) indeterminate sentences of ten (10) years of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal each for the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and a penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor for the less serious physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. Appellant Conrado Doctolero and the estate of Virgilio Doctolero are ORDERED to indemnify, in the sum of P50,000.00 for each set or group of heirs, the respective heirs of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.

PEOPLE v WATIMAR G.R. No. | DATE TICKER: DOCTRINES: FACTS: The accused Fernando Watimar (50) raped his daughter Myra Watimar (20) at the point of a knife and with threat to kill on two separate occasions (March 26, 1992 and Nov 28, 1992). Myra slept in the same room with her brothers and sisters: Bernarndo, Marilou, Leonardo, Ariel and Lea. Myra testified that, on March 26 at around 2AM, she felt someone on top of her. She

then realized it was her father and tried to resist. However, Fernando threatened her with a knife and told her not to resist. The second incident happened on Nov 28 at 10 PM while she was cooking alone, her father suddenly kissed her and pulled her to the place where they used to sleep. The lower court found him guilty for the two cases of rape. The accused claimed that in Nov 1992 he was working as a truck helper and that he was unable to go home for a period of one month due to this work. He also claimed that the false accusations were instigated by father in law. This was because his brother in law Celestino (youngest brother of his wife) was the one who caused the pregnancy of his daughter. Accused appellant also contends that it would have been impossible to consummate the rape because they were in the room with the victim’s 5 siblings. Her resistance would have caused a commotion which would have alerted her brothers and sisters. CRIME CHARGED: Rape LOWER COURT RULING: In Crim. Case No. 5513-AF, the Court finding the accused Fernando Watimar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA In Crim. Case No. 5513-AF, the Court finding the accused Fernando Watimar guilty beyond reasonabledoubt of the crime of RAPE, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of rape SUPREME COURT: No. The possibility of rape is not negated by the presence of even the whole family of the accused inside the same room with the likelihood of being discovered. Rape may be committed even when the rapist and the victim are not alone, or while the rapist’s spouse was asleep, Rape does not necessarily have to be committed in an isolated place and can in fact be committed in places which to many would appear to be unlikely and high-risk venues for sexual advances Accused-appellant further contends that the victim did not do everything in her power to prevent the assault on her virtue. The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance, especially where there is intimidation. In fact, physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapist’s lust because of fear for her life or personal safety. Accused-appellant, lastly, faults the complainant for tarrying for three (3) long years before telling her mother about his nefarious conduct despite ‘countless’ opportunities to seek the aid of her mother and other relatives particularly her grandfather who lived a mere ten (10) meters from her house. This Court has consistently held that delay in reporting rape incidents in the face of physical violence cannot be taken against the victim. A rape victim’s action is oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than reason. It is fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator

hopes to build up a climate of extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim to silence and submissiveness. DECISION: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision appealed from, finding accused-appellant guilty beyondreasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua for each crime, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the accusedappellant is ordered to pay the victim Myra Watimar for each count of rape the amounts of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

ARTICLE 19: ACCESSORIES I. Profiting from effects of the crime MENDOZA v PEOPLE G.R. No. L-46484 | January 29, 1988 TICKER: Rice; qualified theft; aporstation DOCTRINES: Accessories FACTS: Three hundred ten bags of American rice valued at P5,908.60 belonging to the Rice and Corn Administration were unloaded from a vessel at Pier 5, South Harbor, Manila to a truck bearing plate No. TH-2296 owned by the Yellow Ball Freight Lines. The driver of the truck was Ponciano Reponte with Wilfredo Escopin as helper. The cargo was intended for delivery to RCA warehouse at Pureza Street, Manila under the accountability of Emilio Rosella. However, instead of delivering it to its proper destination, Reponte and Escopin, together with one named Frank, diverted the cargo to the grocery store of Leonardo Mendoza in Balintawak, Quezon City. Several bags of rice had already been unloaded thereat when police operatives arrived and arrested Reponte, Escopin and Mendoza. Frank eluded arrest and has not been apprehended. The Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City filed in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City, an information for qualified theft naming Reponte, Escopin and John Doe alias Frank as principals, and Leonardo Mendoza as an accessory after the fact for purchasing and receiving from the principal the said bags of rice thereby aiding the accused to profit from the effects of the crime. On appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, Mendoza asserts that his guilt as such accessory could not be sustained “in the absence of evidence that he had knowledge of the alleged commission of the crime, the finding being based solely on presumption and suspicion, in total disregard and violation of his constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. CRIME CHARGED: Qualified theft

LOWER COURT RULING: Finding Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory after the fact of the crime of qualified theft. The lower court imposed on him the indeterminate penalty of four [4] months and twenty [20] days of arresto mayor, as a minimum, to one [1] year, eight [8] months and twenty-one [21] days of prision correccional, as maximum, “without indemnity in view of the recovery of the goods stolen and to pay the costs. ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza is an accessory by aiding the accused to profit from the effects of the crime. SUPREME COURT: Under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, accessories are “those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission” in any of the three ways enumerated therein. One manner of participation which is pertinent to this case is “by profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. Mendoza an accessory to the crime committed by the asportation of RCA rice. One reason for such finding is the testimony of Reponte that there was a previous understanding among the accused to sell the stolen RCA rice to Mendoza.8 The latter’s admission that the RCA rice was brought to his store merely for deposit9 does not negate Reponte’s testimony. Neither does it exonerate him. Rather, it proves his complicity to the crime. While there is no direct proof that Mendoza knew that the rice had been stolen, the totality of circumstantial evidence points to the fact that he knew that the rice he was receiving from Frank was stolen. Circumstantial evidence may be the basis for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences may be derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. All these requirements are satisfied in this case. DECISION: WHEREFORE, Leonardo Mendoza is hereby convicted as an accessory to the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty of one [1] month and one [1] day of arresto mayor is accordingly imposed on him. No costs. SO ORDERED.

JORGE TAER v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 85204 | June 18, 1990

TICKER: Iniwan lang daw sa kanya yung mga kalabaw. DOCTRINES: Profiting from the effects of the crime FACTS: 2:00AM of December 6, 1981, accused Emilio Namocatcat and Mario Cago arrived at Jorge Taer's house with two (2) male carabaos owned by and which Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend. The said carabaos were left at Taer's place.

Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca discovered the following morning that their carabaos were missing. They were not able to find the carabaos so hey just reported the matter to the police. On December 15, a certain Felipe Reyes informed Dalde that he saw the latter's carabaos somewhere in Datag, Bohol. When they went to Datag, indeed they saw the carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket near Taer's house. When they inquired with Taer why were carabaos in his vicinity, the latter told them that that said carabaos were only brought to him by Namocatcat. The carabaos were then taken by Dalde and Palaca. Respondent’s Contention: 1. That the extent of his participation did not go beyond the participation of the original defendants Cirilo Saludes and Mario Cago. Therefore, he submits that the acquittal of these two by the trial court should also lead to his acquittal; 2. That the only evidence proving the alleged conspiracy between him and Emilio Namocatcat was the confession of his co-accused Emilio Namocatcat. However this should not be considered as admissible because the same is hearsay under the rule of res inter alios acta.

CRIME CHARGED: Theft RTC RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Emilio Namocatcat and Jorge Taer GUILTY beyond doubt of the theft of large cattle and appreciating against them the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 533 each is hereby sentenced to undergo the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE DAY TO FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY ONE (21) DAYS, together with the accessory penalties, and to pay the costs; they are entitled to credit for their preventive imprisonment. Accused Mario Cago and Cirilo Saludes are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Taer should be convicted of the crime of theft and/or conspiring with Namocatcat. SUPREME COURT: No. Taer should only be convicted as an accessory of the crime of cattle rustling (stealing of cattle or carabaos). The facts establish Taer's knowledge of the crime. And yet without having participated either as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not participate in the taking of the carabaos, he took part subsequent to the commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects. Taer is thus only an accessory after the fact. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners: 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; xxx xxx xxx Persons who received any property from another, and used it, knowing that the same property had been stolen is guilty as an accessory because he is profiting by the effects of the crime." By employing the two carabaos in his farm, Taer was profiting by the objects of the theft.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran and affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED in that the herein JORGE TAER is convicted as an accessory of the crime of cattle-rustling as defined and penalized by PD No. 533 amending Arts. 308, 309, and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and he will serve the minimum penalty within the range of arresto mayor medium, which we shall fix at 4 months imprisonment and the maximum penalty of prision correccional minimum which we shall fix at 2 years.

II.

PD1612

DIZON-PAMINTUAN v PEOPLE G.R. No. 11426 | July 11, 1994 TICKER: Stolen jewelry being sold again DOCTRINES: PD 1612- Anti Fencing Law FACTS: Teodoro Encarnation, undersecretary of DPWH arrived at his residence coming from the airport at 9:45pm leaving his driver and maid to pick up his belongings. Five masked unidentified person appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside their house and poked their guns to poked their guns to his driver and two helpers and dragged them inside his house.The men pointed a gun at Encarnation, his wife and kids and were made to lie face down on the floor. The robbers then ransacked the house and took away their jewelries and other personal properties including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter immediately to the police. Two days later, the Western Police District informed Encarnation that some of the lost items were sold in Chinatown. Encarnation and his wife later posed as buyers and were able to recognize the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall tended by Norma Dizon-Pamintuan. The pieces were: 1 earring and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000 bought from estimator Nancy Bacud, 1 set of earring diamond worth P15,000 and 1 gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000. They later invited Norma Dizon-Pamintuan to the precinct and investigated the same. Rosito Dizon-Pamintuan, (brother of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan) testified that he and Norma were infront the Carinderia along Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila waiting for a vacancy therein to eat lunch and three people arrived saying that Cpl. Ignacio Jao told Norma to get the

jewelry from inside the display window but her sister requested to wait for Fredo, the owner of the stall. But ten minutes later when said Fredo did not show up, and the display stall was hauled to a passenger jeepney and the same, together with the accused were taken to the police headquarters CRIME CHARGED: violation of the Anti-Fencing Law RTC: Norma Dizon-Pamintuan is found guilty beyond reason doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of prision mayor to NINETEEN (19) YEARS of reclusion temporal on the ground of section 5 of PD 1612 “Mere possession of any goods, articles, item object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.” CA: The petitioner then appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 11024) where she raised two issues: (1) that the judgment was based on a mere presumption, and (2) that the prosecution failed to show that the value of the jewelry recovered is P93,000.00. The CA however stated that the guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. All the elements of the crime of fencing in violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (P.D. No. 1612), to wit: 1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. A person, not a participant in said crime, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells; or in any manner deals in any article or item, object or anything of value; 3. With personal knowledge, or should be known to said person that said item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; 4. With intent to gain for himself or for another; have been established by positive and convincing evidence of the prosecution BUT there was not enough evidence to prove the value of the pieces of jewelry recovered, which is essential to the imposition of the proper penalty under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1612. It opined that the trial court erred in concluding that "the value of the recovered jewelries is P93,000.00 ISSUE: Whether or not should the accused know that the proceeds were from the crime of robbery to qualify as a violation of PD 1612 SUPREME COURT: The elements of the crime of fencing are: 1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and

sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; 3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. The first, second and fourth elements were present. As for the third element, it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law. The petitioner was not able to rebut this presumption and that the testimony of his brother alone is not sufficient (see testimony above). Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that he was a licensed dealer or supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 provides that "all stores, establishments or entitles dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store, establishment or entity is located." The SC also does not agree that there is insufficient evidence to prove the actual value of the recovered articles. In the light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the penalty imposed by the trial court and in remanding the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence to determine the actual value of the pieces of jewelry recovered from the petitioner and for the imposition of the appropriate penalty. DECISION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED by setting aside the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11024 insofar as it sets aside the penalty imposed by Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 and orders the remand of the case for the trial court to receive evidence with respect to the correct value of the properties involved. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED subject to the modification of the penalty which is hereby reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor maximum as minimum to Eighteen (18) years and Five (5) months of Reclusion Temporal maximum as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the latter.

TAN v PEOPLE G.R. No. | DATE TICKER: DOCTRINES: FACTS: Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees working for her. Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the company. Lim noticed that

some of the welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were missing. She conducted an inventory and discovered that propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00, more or less, were missing. Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the loss. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in Visayas and he admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainant’s warehouse some boat spare parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainant’s forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the amount with one another. Complainant did not file a case against Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop. On relation of Lim, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 19, an information against Ramon C. Tan charging him with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612. Ramon C. Tan pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and waived pre-trial. He denied having bought the stolen spare parts worth P48,000.00 for he never talked nor met Manuelito Mendez. That further the two (2) receipts presented by Mrs. Lim are not under her name and the other two (2) are under the name of William Tan, the husband, all in all amounting to P18,000.00. Besides, the incident was not reported to the police. Tan likewise denied having talked to Manuelito Mendez over the phone on the day of the delivery of the stolen items and could not have accepted the said items personally for everytime (sic) goods are delivered to his store, the same are being accepted by his staff. It is not possible for him to be at his office at about 7:00 to 8:00 o’clock in the morning, because he usually reported to his office at 9:00 o’clock.

CRIME CHARGED: FENCING REGIONAL TRIAL COURT: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused RAMON C. TAN is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 1612, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor and to indemnify Rosita Lim the value of the stolen merchandise purchased by him in the sum of P18,000.00. COURT OF APPEALS: Affirmed RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as against petitioner

SUPREME COURT: NO. In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential elements of the crime of fencing as follows: 1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; 3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

Consequently, “the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the existence of all the elements of the crime charged.” Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the essential elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense. In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft independently of fencing? Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of robbery or theft has been committed. There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of another’s property. True, witness Mendez admitted in an extrajudicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only against the person admitting or confessing. Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting. Here, the extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither may such extrajudicial confession be considered evidence against accused. There must be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt. Corpus delicti means the “body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed.” In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. In this case, the theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti. What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence.” Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he cannot be guilty of “fencing.” Additional Notes: Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is ‘the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.’ Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon things. The crime of theft is committed if the taking is without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things.

“The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.” Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be prosecuted as an accessory after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal. P.D. No. 1612 was enacted to “impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20059 and hereby ACQUITS petitioner of the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 92-108222 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila.

IV. Assisting the Principal to escape

PEOPLE v TALINGDAN G.R. No. L-32126 | July 6,1976 TICKER: You tell your father that we will kill him DOCTRINES: Assisting the Principal to Escape FACTS: The case is an appeal for reclusion perpetua due to violent death of Bernardo Bagabag by the accused Nemesio Talingdan, and his co accused Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, Pedro Bides, and Teresa Domogma (wife of Bernardo). The murder stemmed from an illicit relationship of Teresa and Nemesio, before that the deceased Bernardo is married with Teresa, their relationship has been strained however when Teresa abandons her family and when Nemesio Talingdan visited Teresa on two occassions when her husband at work and during these visit Teresa ordered her daughter Corazon to leave the house. Bernardo somehow wind the relationship and quarreled with Teresa regarding it, that if she is pregnant the baby was not his and he slapped Teresa several times during the quarrel. Then Nemesio came to the vicinity of Bernardo and ordered him to come down, Bernardo ignored it for Nemesio is a policeman and armed. Between 10 am to 11 am, Corazon is washing in the creek when she saw her mother, Nemesio, and his co acussed meeting in a small hut 400 m away from their home. When Teresa saw Corazon she said “You tell your father that we will kill him”. One night before dinner, Corazon saw on their “batalan”(window ng bahay kubo na may patungan) as she was cooking dinner, her mother and 4 gunmen near the avocado tree equipped with long firearms, then saw her mother proceed to their house and went upstairs. Corazon called her parents to eat, Bernardo went home as he was working on the field, when he proceeded to the batalan, the gunmen fired the shots. They climbed to batalan and as they saw Bernardo still alive, shoot again. Teresa said she will call help but one of the gunmen said, if you called help we will kill you, then immediately left the place. News on Bernardo’s death made his relatives come to Sallapadan, Abra, his mother and brother went. Corazon saw the whole thing, she did not say that her mother conspired against his father due

to fear of what her mother is going to do to her if someone finds out, but she was able to say the antecedents before it especially the conversation she heard at the small hut to her relatives Defendant’s Alibi: Nemesio Talingdan - he was accompanying the Mayor from Sallapadan to Bangued Co- accused- they were sleeping at Mrs. Bayongan house 250 m away from Bagabag’s Tersa Domogma- no affair with Nemesio, did not know that her husband will be killed.

CRIME CHARGED: MURDER CFI Abra: Reclusion Perpetua with indemnity to the heirs 12000, Teresa NOT CONVICTED to PARRICIDE because there is no proof or certificate proving it ISSUE: W or N Teresa must be acquitted SUPREME COURT: No, True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason, sue cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely shown that she masterminded it either by herself alone or together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be plain surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really includible. After all, she had been having her own unworthy ways with him for quite a long time, seemingly without any need of his complete elimination. Why go to so much trouble for something she was already enjoying, and not even very surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark Bernardo had occasion to make to Teresa one time was "If you become pregnant, the one in your womb is not my child." The worst he did to her for all her faults was just to slap her. But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed by her coaccused. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her coappellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being murder, qualified by treachery, and attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and that the offense was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the Court has no alternative under the law but to impose upon them the capital penalty. However, as to appellant Teresa, she is hereby found guilty only as an accessory to the same murder.

DECISION:WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

VINO v PEOPLE G.R. No. 84163 | October 19, 1989 TICKER: DOCTRINES: FACTS: At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house at Burgos Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They went down to meet Roberto who was crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor responded by turning on their lights and the street lights and coming down from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left. Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta took his ante-mortem statement. In the said statement which the victim signed with his own blood, Jessie Salazar was Identified as his assailant. Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the case against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed an information charging Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan. CRIME CHARGED: MURDER LOWER COURT RULING: The trial court found Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 Years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be convicted as an accessory to muder SUPREME COURT: Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible for the commission of the same offense are the accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder had been committed and that the evidence tended to show that Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner was present during its commission or must have known its commission is the only logical conclusion considering that immediately thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when they left shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory. This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, in which case the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved. 5 In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it appears that there was a mistake in charging the proper offense, and the defendant cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, in which case the defendant must not be discharged if there appears to be a good cause to detain him in custody, so that he can be charged and made to answer for the proper offense. 6 In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission of the said crime was established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the offense committed. The variance is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal. DECISION: Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as two witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the man with the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against Vino, wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape of the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.

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