Battlespace Management: Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations

Army Code 71868

ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 1 COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS

PART 11 BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT

2007

Issue 1.0: November 2007

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The contents provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experience and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operations and training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is proved that you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find you criminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements of health and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a person criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP could result in disciplinary action under the provisions of the Army Act. Amendment No

Amendment

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Suggestions for additions/deletions and changes can be made by sending them to the author, SO1 Tac Doc Pubs, Warfare Development for consideration and incorporation in the next edition.

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PREFACE APPLICATION THROUGH LEADERSHIP Although doctrine and Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs) provide practical guidance on the conduct of operations, their publication alone will not sufficiently add to operational success. Unless soldiers understand doctrine, are well trained in TTPs and are sufficiently motivated to carry out their tasks to the best of their ability, their effectiveness on the battlefield, as individuals or as part of a team, will be limited. It is leadership which ensures that training is effective and that drills are learned and followed correctly. It is leadership which drives effective action and motivates soldiers to give their utmost to achieve the common purpose. It is leadership which turns the bald statements of fact in this publication into life saving or battle winning action. And moreover, it is strong leaders who recognise that doctrine writers do not have a monopoly on wisdom and adapt and develop this guidance to win in the Contemporary Operating Environment.

“Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction, which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen war.” Clausewitz, On War

1. The purpose of this publication is to inform commanders and staffs of the scope and nature of battlespace management. Much of what is contained here is far from new; the interaction, coordination and deconfliction of activity by the various staff branches in an HQ is just plain sense. However, the increasingly complex environment in which today’s Army must operate and fight and the increasingly diverse and capable equipments which we have at our disposal make battlespace management an issue which must be clearly articulated in order that our true capability may be effectively exploited. 2. A generation ago, the potential to create friction which drained tempo was far less. Many types of equipment simply did not have the power or range to mutually interfere and the EMS was exploited to a much lesser degree. There was little technology to facilitate deconfliction of activity in real or near real time, and so considerable risk was accepted. Contemporary attitudes to risk together with the power and pervasiveness of today’s media, quite rightly mean that ‘blue on blue’ can no longer be defended as simply an unintended consequence of warfare. The Army in the 21st Century has the ability, and indeed the duty, to manage the battlespace so that the risk to life and limb is limited to that posed by the enemy.

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CONTENTS VOLUME 1 - COMBINED OPERATIONS PART 11 - BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT Page PREFACE

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CONTENTS

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CHAPTER 1 THE FUNDAMENTALS Section 1 Section 2

The Battlespace Defining the Battlespace

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CHAPTER 2 BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4

Defining Battlespace Management Components of Battlespace Management The Principles of Battlespace Management Levels of Activity and Methods of Control

Annex A Annex B

Airspace Control Means and Measures Fire Support Coordination Measures

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CHAPTER 3 PLANNING Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5

Effects Based Approach Campaign Themes Functions in Combat The Core Functions Plan and Review

Annex A Annex B

The Tactical Estimate The Combat Estimate

3-1 3-2 3-3 3-3 3-4 3-A-1 3-B-1

CHAPTER 4 EXECUTION Section 1 Section 2 Section 3

Execute and Evaluate The Battlespace Management Meeting Situational Awareness

Annex A Annex B Annex C Annex D Annex E

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The Battlespace Management Meeting Agenda Air Interdiction Close Air Support Close Combat Attack Unmanned Air Vehicles

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Annex F Annex G Annex H Annex I Annex J Annex K Annex L Annex M Annex N Annex O

GMLRS (U) NGS, MLRS, Arty, Mors, Ground Manoeuvre SF, Recce, STA Patrols Battlefield Helicopters Electronic Warfare Weapon Locating Radar Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Combat Search and Rescue Combat Service Support

4-F-1 4-G-1 4-H-1 4-I-1 4-J-1 4-K-1 4-L-1 4-M-1 4-N-1 4-O-1

CHAPTER 5 AIR LAND INTEGRATION Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4

Counter Land Operations CAS Command and Control Recognised Air Picture Air Defence

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GLOSSARY

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ABBREVIATIONS

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CHAPTER 1 THE FUNDAMENTALS SECTION 1 - THE BATTLESPACE 1. Battlespace. The battlespace is defined as ‘all aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompasses the area of operations’. (JDP 0-01.1) 2. Dimensions of the Battlespace. The six dimensions of the battlespace are land, sea, air (and space), Electro Magnetic Spectrum (EMS), Computer Generated Space (CGS) and time. The clear allocation of controlling authority for each dimension is essential to effective coordination of any activities or effects which take place in more than one dimension. No dimension should be considered in isolation; the possible implications of an action in one dimension for one or all of the others must be considered during both planning and execution. a. Land. Land Component (LC) forces are but one element that operates in the land dimension. Maritime (including amphibious), air, Special Forces (SF) and logistic elements will all, depending on the specific situation, require terrain for deployment, action or activity. The variety of terrain types and environments into which the land component may deploy also presents differing challenges for Battlespace Management (BM). Most activities in the land dimension will affect some or all of the others. b. Sea. Maritime and amphibious forces have the ability to reach into the land dimension either physically or with effects. Operations in the littoral environment create the most complex BM environment, simply because of the number of interacting battlespace users from all components. The considerable reach of maritime assets can have significant effect on the land and air dimensions through capabilities such as long range strike assets and air defence radars. c. Air and Space. The air dimension begins at the surface and extends to the upper operating limit of conventional aircraft; beyond that limit is space. For practical purposes, the air dimension must be considered when any system which can reach more than a few metres in altitude is used. Desert Hawk, for example, has an optimum operating altitude of 60m1. Access to the air dimension is required by all components since they manoeuvre, fire and communicate through it. Military operations will often be constrained by civilian airspace control or by unexpected civilian activity in the Joint Operations Area2 (JOA) or Airspace Control Area3 (ASCArea). The all encompassing nature of the air dimension makes the effective

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On Op HERRICK. Desert Hawk has been used at 300-400ft AGL within a ROZ normally 1000ft AGL and 10km radius. 2 An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission-specific. 3 The ASC-Area is that area over which the Airspace Control Authority exercises airspace control. It should never be larger than the JOA, but for eg political, civilian/HN reasons it may be smaller.

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coordination of all aspects of its use essential in order to minimise the constraints imposed on deployed elements. d. EMS. Managing the EMS is essential as it is both limited in size and increasingly in demand. It is readily accessible and open to exploitation by friendly and enemy forces alike. All components have platforms that are increasingly reliant on EMS exploitation. Loss of control of the EMS, either through enemy action or lack of coordination, will significantly degrade the capability of any force. The EMS requires significant coordination through management of issues including allocation of frequencies and bandwidth, and avoidance of interference. Effective control or management of the EMS is particularly difficult where it is impossible to control assets entering or leaving an Area of Operation (AOO)4. To a lesser extent, control may be more challenging in multinational and coalition operations. Such loss of control introduces physical and electronic interference problems that can result in the degradation, failure or complete loss of capabilities. Control of the EMS must therefore begin at the highest level. e. CGS. CGS is the structure of computer networks. It enables technology to be exploited to increase reaction speeds through automation of processes. This exploitation is achieved through Operational Management of Communications and Information Systems (OMC) and Information Management (IM). IM and Information Exploitation (IX) are key enablers for Situational Awareness (SA) and Shared Situational Awareness (SSA). CGS promotes the efficient use of many capabilities, but also represents a significant vulnerability if not properly managed. This vulnerability could be exploited by the enemy either accessing or overloading systems if IM is poor. f. Time. The principle function of time in the BM context is to enable the management of the other dimensions. It must, however, be managed in itself to ensure uniformity. SECTION 2 – DEFINING THE BATTLESPACE 3. Defining the Battlespace. All of the components involved in an operation will have their initial battlespace conditions set by the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ). This will be promulgated in either a discrete Joint Battlespace Management Force Instruction Document5 (JBM FID) or a BM Annex to the FID. The document will define key elements of the battlespace which will be common across the components, ideally for the duration of the operation. These elements must include constraints imposed by civilian/host nation control and use of, for example, air, sea and EMS. Once the JOA is defined, authority can be delegated to components and the architecture of the battlespace further developed. These parameters must be made available to operational or strategic assets which may be required to support other operations.

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An operational area defined by a Joint Commander for Land or Maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the Joint Commander, but is sufficient in size for the Joint Force Component Commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces. AAP-6 5 See Annex A to PJHQ JFOP 2/06 JBM dated 10 Jul 06.

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4. Initial Battlespace Conditions. Each appropriate datum will be defined in the JBM FID in order to coordinate any cross component activity and ensure common terms of reference in the passage of information. Thereafter, it is likely that responsibility for control of certain volumes of battlespace will be delegated to individual components by the JTFC. a. Time. The time zones for the JOA will be specified and the time reference for the operation stated (default is ZULU). The source should also be defined, eg GPS6. b. Geographic Datum. The geographic datum will be specified, eg lat/long, WGRS, MGRS or OSGB7. This specification will also include the height reference, eg AGL or AMSL8. c. Geospatial Data. will be mandated.

Specific versions of paper maps, charts and digital data

d. Common Geographic Reference System (CGRS). CGRS is a procedural measure used to rapidly and clearly define geographical locations. The CGRS in use will be defined by specifying its point of origin. Any variations to dimensions or axis labelling must be specified. For more details see Chapter 4, paragraph 4e. e. Physical Boundaries. The JOA will be defined and an initial volume of battlespace allocated to the components, including geographical freedoms and constraints. f. Component Battlespace Responsibilities. responsibilities within the JOA will be specified.

The maritime, land and air BM

g. Battlespace Spectrum Management. The BSM authority for the use of the EMS will be defined. 5. Contemporary Operating Environment (COE)9. Use of the battlespace is not limited to military operations. Within any volume of battlespace there will be a number of other actors and agencies whose presence and activities are likely to add to the complexity of operations. Close coordination with Information Operations (Info Ops) staff will provide much of the data required to define the battlespace beyond the purely military environment. Info Ops will provide the Basic Psychological Studies (BPS), each of which consists of a basic country study and a subsequent detailed consideration of potential Info Ops Target Audiences (TA). This subsequent Target Audience Analysis (TAA) is “the systematic study of the population and environment of a TA to enhance understanding of a military psychological environment10”. Within the context of the COE this will allow the identification of additional BM issues warranting consideration. The six COE variables are physical, political, economic, human, military and information. The BM implications of these

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GPS and GMT/UTC are diverging time references: GMT/UTC is corrected for ‘leap seconds’ and GPS is not. World Geographic Reference System, Military Geographic Reference System, Ordnance Survey Great Britain. 8 Above Ground level/Above Mean Sea Level. 9 Doctrinal Note 07/01. 10 JWP 3-80.1 7

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variables should be established prior to any deployment as they will identify freedoms and constraints on actions which may be undertaken within a JOA.

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CHAPTER 2 BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT SECTION 1 – DEFINING BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT 1. Definition. BM is defined as, ‘The adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronisation of activity’11. 2. Purpose. The purpose of BM is to maximise freedom of action and to minimise constraints for all battlespace users, while managing and reducing the risk of fratricide. These three aspects are inextricably linked; increasing the freedom of action of one force element may impose significant constraints on another while increasing the risk of fratricide. BM is a G3 function that seeks to ensure the most efficient prioritisation and allocation of resources in pursuit of objectives. Effective BM is essential to the successful conduct of operations, across the spectrum of conflict and at all levels. Operations will not be confined to one point on the spectrum and as a result the tempo and intensity will vary in time and space. Authority for the detailed coordination and execution of various aspects of BM will routinely be delegated by the commander, for example to G6 or the Offensive Support Group12 (OSG), but critical coordination at potentially decisive points in time and space will remain a function of command. The BM process must ensure the timely coordination of all aspects of the physical, cognitive or electronic use of the battlespace. 3. Levels of BM. BM is conducted at all levels of operations. While the purpose and principles of BM remain consistent, the volume and complexity of activities, and thus the information requirement in terms of resolution and timeliness, vary with both level of command and specific responsibilities. However, It is essential for commanders and planners at all levels to ensure that throughout the plan/ review/execute/evaluate cycle, BM is considered in all applicable dimensions. The various levels are categorised as follows: a. Level 1. Level 1 BM requires a formation to have the structure, C4I systems and capacity to plan and liaise across components throughout the JOA. Clearly, it should also be able to plan, liaise and execute BM within its AOO. BM at this level is conducted across all six domains. Planning is conducted 48+ hours in advance of operations, although BM execution can be more dynamic if required. Typically, only a full divisional HQ or above, or a specialist or augmented brigade HQ13, has the requisite organic Subject Matter Experts (SME) and resources to be able to conduct this level of BM. b. Level 2. Level 2 BM requires a formation to be able to plan, liaise and execute BM within its AOO. Implicit in this is the requirement to have the requisite competent personnel and C4I systems to liaise with all assets that are able to have an effect within the AOO. This level also contributes to the planning process but, due to the C2 structure and limited C4I capability, inter-component liaison is 11

JDP 3 -70 Study Draft Dated 28 Jul 06. The OSG brings together the offensive support available to a division in order to ensure unity of effort and purpose in support of the Divisional Commander’s plan, and to minimise potential friction. In HQ ARRC the OSG is known as the Joint Effects Branch. 13 HQ 16 Air Asslt Bde and HQ 3 Cdo Bde are inherently capable of this level of BM when fully augmented for independent operations. 12

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conducted through a level 1 BM cell. A brigade headquarters or divisional headquarters in a low intensity warfighting configuration14, when augmented with an Air Support Operations Cell (ASOC) or elements thereof (Air Support Element (ASE)), has the necessary resources to conduct this level of BM. c. Level 3. Level 3 BM is focussed on the terminal control of effects and is typically conducted at the tactical level. Although BM is predominantly limited to the dynamic integration and execution of fires with manoeuvre (including in the air), the BM implications of tactical activity should still be considered during all stages of planning and execution. Fire Support Teams15 (FST), Forward Air Controllers (FAC), Attack Helicopter (AH) crews and Close Support Fire Planning Cells (FPC) are examples of organisations and individuals capable of this level of BM. 4. Bounding BM. Bounding BM is not straightforward at any level and there is considerable overlap between the levels described above. Within any individual HQ, BM should be regarded as an enabler. Like any other enabler, it can produce benefits, implications and unintended consequences which should be understood by all of the staff branches concerned. At no stage does the complete BM function become a separate staff function; at no stage does fighting the battle cease to be a G3 function or planning the battle a G5 function. BM identifies and avoids or reduces the frictions which would otherwise slow the tempo of operations. For example, BM includes allocation of terrain which is defined by boundaries. Defining an allocated area is not the same as allocating it: it is a G3 function to allocate a piece of terrain to a specific force element. Similarly a boundary is in itself less important in BM terms than its effect as a coordination and control measure. BM facilitates the most efficient execution of a given course of action by identifying, managing and reducing friction. 5. Battlespace Managers. BM staff officers do not carry out an all encompassing executive staff function, but they do act on behalf of the commander and with his authority. The impact and effects of BM must be considered routinely in each staff branch throughout the planning and execution of an operation. It is not the place of a BM group or of a battlespace manager to decide how to fight or what to do, but rather to support the decisions already made by the commander or G3 staff on his behalf. There will be occasions where BM is the key enabler and becomes the focus for a specific activity, such as the physical clearance of joint fires; however the commander and the G3 Staff remain responsible for the successful execution of a mission. Similarly, terminal control of fires cannot take place without BM, but BM is simply an enabler and not the primary activity. SECTION 2 – COMPONENTS OF BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT 6.

Components of BM. Joint BM may be divided as follows:

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Eg MND (SE) which does not require a full warfighting div structure for Op TELIC or an augmented mech/armd bde for Op HERRICK. 15 A FST is a tactical grouping with task organised structures, training and equipment required to execute terminal control of the fires of artillery, mortars, CAS, CCA, NGS and ensuring their coordination and deconfliction with the manoeuvre elements. Working description only.

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a. Air Battlespace Management. Routine ASM within the ASC-Area is likely to be delegated to a single Airspace Control Authority16 (ACA). The ACA function is provided through the Joint Airspace Coordination Centre (JACC) which is manned not only by air staff officers, but also representatives from the other components. b. Maritime Battlespace Management. There are four aspects of maritime BM: waterspace management, naval cooperation and guidance for shipping, and amphibious operations and maritime/land interface. c. Land Battlespace Management. Unlike the air and maritime environments, responsibility for the land environment is unlikely to be delegated to a single component. The Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) is likely to require a significant proportion of land battlespace simply to deploy his forces. However, the Joint Force Logistics Component Commander (JFLogCC) will also require a large amount of real estate and the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is likely to need land space for basing and, possibly, air defence (AD).17 The requirements of the SF element will be governed by the nature of the operation. d. Electromagnetic Spectrum. The joint battlespace manager will routinely delegate responsibility for the management of the EMS to the JTFHQ Battlespace Spectrum Manager (BSM). He will produce and implement a battlespace spectrum management plan to coordinate all spectrum usage across the JOA, allocating areas of the EMS to component commands while taking specific note of the influence and needs of host and border nations, international allocations, coalition partners and non-military participants. 7.

Land BM. Land BM is the term which describes BM within the LC. It consists of: a. Landspace Management. The four aspects of landspace management are manoeuvre, air defence, Fire Support Control Measures (FSCM), and Airspace Control (ASC). Landspace management is currently achieved by establishing spatial or temporal controls of deployed forces in order to coordinate all aspects of their activities. These controls consist of boundaries, FSCM, defined routes, terrain allocation and other restrictions to freedoms of action that reduce the risk of fratricide18, whilst enabling manoeuvre and maximising the use of terrain. Responsibility for landspace management normally rests with the Chief of Staff (COS) and is delegated to G5 Plans during planning and G3 Ops during execution. These staff officers plan and manage the activities that take place within the land environment, making decisions based on the end state and effects that are to be achieved, the commander’s guidance and the staff’s awareness of the situation, risks and battlefield activity. b. Airspace Management. The Air Component Commander (ACC) will usually remain the ACA for all airspace within the JOA or the ASC-Area, which will include

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ACA: The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in his or her designated area. 17 The JFACC in his role as ACA is also likely, to be nominated as the Air Defence Commander (ADC). 18 The accidental destruction of own, allied or friendly forces. A result of what is colloquially known as a blue on blue engagement. JWP 0-01.1

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all or most of the Land Component Commander’s (LCC) AOO. The LCC only controls volumes of airspace within its AOO when ROZ/HIDACZ19 are established. The LCC, however, controls20 air to surface operations and surface to surface fires within his AOO. Effective management of the airspace within this AOO is therefore essential as multiple CCs may be conducting any combination of independent, synchronised and integrated activities simultaneously in the same volume of battlespace. The LCC has the means for routine input to airspace control through Airspace Control Means (ACM) promulgated through the Air Tasking Order21 (ATO), Airspace Coordination Order (ACO) and Special Instructions (SPINS)22. c. Battlespace Spectrum Management (BSM). Overall BSM architecture is defined at the joint level and control of relevant areas of the EMS is delegated to components. Within the LC the electronic architecture is further defined and disseminated by using the BSM plan issued through G6 in accordance with SOP/SOI and much of it is likely to be routine in nature. The allocation of frequencies is routine, as is the identification of potential mutual interference sources from emitters such as Weapon Locating Radars (WLR) and UAV data links. Consideration of the effects of Radiation Hazard (RADHAZ) and High Intensity Radio Transmission Areas (HIRTA) are also taken into account. BSM must include the early identification and de-confliction of any Joint, Interagency and Multi-national (JIM) organisations that work within a formation AOR or the effects of whose equipments may affect the battlespace. This may include civilian and strategic assets fitted with, for example, stand-off jammers. The availability of satellites may also have an impact for specialist communications and data links. SECTION 3 – THE PRINCIPLES OF BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT 8.

Principles. The principles of BM are as follows: a. Command Led. BM is a core G3 function and should be command led throughout. Authority can be delegated in order to enable routine coordination and liaison, but responsibility remains with the commander. b. Define the Battlespace. The volume of battlespace which a commander is allocated must be clearly defined across all six dimensions of BM. The responsibilities within that allocated battlespace must also be clear. This is essential in order to establish those cross boundary or cross responsibility areas of activity which may cause friction and therefore to identify where the authority to resolve potential conflict lies. c. Shared Situational Awareness. Information Management (IM), information exchange and SSA are key to conducting effective BM. The level, timeliness and granularity of the SA which can be created and maintained will define the level of integration which can be achieved during an operation. At the lowest levels of SA,

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Restricted Operations Zone/High Density Airspace Control Zone. The word control under these circumstances denotes aircraft control procedures; it does not imply that the surface force commander has operational and tactical control of the aircraft. AP 3002. 21 The ATO is a detailed document used to task and disseminate to Components, subordinate units and C2 agencies those projected sorties, the capabilities matched to specific targets and planned missions. 22 The ATO combined with the ACO and SPINS provides operational and tactical guidance for air operations. 20

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BM will be limited to procedural methods but with the advent of near real time SSA, positive control of integrated activity will be possible. d. Identify the Level and Type of BM. Throughout both planning and execution the levels of activity at each phase of an operation must be reviewed and evaluated. This will enable the staff to anticipate the level of BM, from procedural to positive, which will be required to enable an operation. Additional resources may have to be allocated for a specific phase of an operation or the complexity of the activity reduced if BM cannot enable an appropriate level of command and control. e. Continuous Process. BM activity should be continuous. There are elements of the battlespace which, once defined, will endure and require only occasional reviews. However, there will be activity in all dimensions of the battlespace, particularly during intense periods of operations, where evaluation of current and future BM requirements must be continuous in order to avoid loss of tempo. f. Collaborative Planning. BM is a collaborative process. It is the responsibility of commanders and staffs at all levels to coordinate activity and ensure that friction is removed or reduced wherever possible. Planning and execution should routinely consider BM. g. Simplicity. Simple BM controls and procedures are easier to manage dynamically and are less prone to cause confusion or error. Complex BM is potentially inflexible, increases decision and reaction times and can increase risk. h. Resilience. BM planning should be resilient in the face of enemy action and the loss of CIS or communications. Procedural controls and procedures should be clear and robust to allow operations to continue if positive control is degraded or fails. SECTION 4 – LEVELS OF ACTIVITY AND METHODS OF CONTROL. 9. Levels of Activity. The principal function of BM is to coordinate activity in the battlespace. The closer that activity comes to real time temporal and spatial control, the more demanding and resource intensive BM will become. Coordination requires forces to act together to achieve shared objectives. It prevents fratricide and duplication, and ensures that effects complement each other. The degree of coordination required is defined by the level of activity being conducted. The levels of activity within BM are as follows: a. Independent Activity. Independent activity is coordinated by the most basic form of BM, where forces are separated in time and/or space. The deconfliction of activity in this manner avoids fratricide and duplication, but does not promote synergy. b. Synchronised Activity. Synchronised activity allows discrete elements of a force to follow specified Courses of Action (COA), enabling them to conduct a joint task without fear of unexpected interference and with a controlled level of risk. Synchronisation is the focusing of resources and activities to produce maximum

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combat power at the decisive time, but it does not take account of space. Synchronised activity requires a significant amount of staff planning and coordination and can be heavily dependent on communication systems. c. Integrated Activity. Integrated activity is at the opposite end of the range from independent activity. It requires a complete state of mutual awareness and understanding between two or more elements of a force such that they can conduct simultaneous activity with impunity in the same portion of battlespace. It typically requires faster and precise planning, with real time communications and liaison.

Synchronized Activity Independent Activity

Interdependence

Integrated Activity

Required Shared Situational Awareness Figure 2.1 – The Range of Interaction 10. Methods of Control23. Land combat can be complex, dynamic and unpredictable with a large number of force elements concentrated into a small volume of battlespace. Control of battlespace with a high density of users is essential and BM can be executed in a number of ways to achieve this. 11. Procedural Control. In its simplest form battlespace can be allocated procedurally, that is to say volumes of battlespace (electronic or physical) can be allocated by time and force elements operate within these volumes without constraint. While relatively simple, it is inflexible and most suited to a situation where all elements of a force can achieve their aims by conducting independent actions. Activity may be synchronised in time, but not in space, or vice versa. Procedural control has the advantage of being relatively immune to disruption. a. Procedural Airspace Control. The purpose of ASC is to maximise the effectiveness of military operations by promoting the ability of air, land and maritime forces to operate in an efficient, integrated and flexible manner with minimal mutual interference and without undue restraint and risk to friendly forces and neutral air. Procedural ASC relies on previously agreed and promulgated orders (ATO/ACO/SPINS) and set procedures (ACM). It is more restrictive than positive control but is less vulnerable to interference by electronic and physical attack.

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That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. JWP 0-011.

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ROZ

TMRR

COORDINATION LEVEL

HIDACZ

x SAAFR

x

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xx Figure 2.2 – Procedural Airspace Control Means b. Land Battlespace Procedural Control. Fire support coordination is used to coordinate and integrate land, air, and maritime fires to support the manoeuvre commander’s intent and operations plan. As such FSCM24 are a key part of managing the land battlespace. Landspace management using boundaries, ARA/AMAs, routes, phase/report lines, movement orders etc is another aspect of procedural control. Some aspects of BSM can be conducted procedurally, such as frequency management, EMCON and some coordination of EW assets. 12. Dynamic Procedural. To allow BM to react to the unexpected (including enemy action), procedural measures may be developed in order to enable synchronised and focussed actions which will better achieve the required effect. The dynamic procedural approach to BM still requires an established architecture based on FSCM/ACM/WCS etc but presupposes that these measures can be quickly activated and deactivated. This will enable synchronised activity within the battlespace, with the flexibility to respond quickly to changing circumstances. The volume of battlespace which this method can effectively control is finite, as the larger and busier the volume, the less responsive this method of control can be. The use of GMLRS ‘walls’ is an example of dynamic procedural control. A wall can be routinely established, but with sufficient planning time planning (1-24hrs) the trajectory can be calculated to enable aircraft to fly below it. Where a more dynamic response is required (<1hr) a simple ‘solid’ wall is established; this increases GMLRS freedom of action but can constrain the use of air. Low latency SSA is essential for the effective implementation of any such short notice control measures.

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FSCMs and definitions are at Annex B.

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PREPLANNED GMLRS ‘WALL’

IMMEDIATE GMLRS ‘WALL’

x x

x xx

Figure 2.3 – GMLRS Walls as an Example of Dynamic Procedural Control 13. Active Deconfliction. The automation of the dynamic procedural approach, through the use of JADOCS25 or JETTS26, enables active deconfliction. This allows the near real time coordination of all assets to achieve the required effects. This method may use a mixture of procedural and positive control measures, but is absolutely reliant upon speed of communication and reaction through automation in order to minimise separation of activity in both time and space. The level of SSA required to achieve active deconfliction is high. 14. Positive Control. Positive control is the real time coordination and deconfliction of activity in the battlespace to enable fully integrated action and maximum freedom of action by all elements involved. The level of SSA required is extremely high. Positive control becomes easier at lower levels of BM where the number of participants is low. An FST can already exercise positive control over manoeuvre and joint effects at the lowest tactical level, but relies on the appropriate BM being in place to control the battlespace beyond the FST’s ‘bubble’ and to coordinate and deliver resources to it. The terminal controllers manage and reduce risk in real time based on their knowledge of factors such as safety distances.

25

Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System Joint Effects Tactical Targeting System. The first delivered version of JETTS will be known as Interim JETTS – IJETTS.

26

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 2 AIRSPACE CONTROL MEANS (ACM)27 1. Coordination Level (CL)28. The CL is an advisory measure established to increase the aircrew awareness of conflicts between slow and fast moving aircraft at low level. It is a procedural method to separate slow and fast moving air traffic (normally fixed and rotary wing aircraft) by determining a height above ground level below which fast traffic normally will not fly and above which slow traffic will not normally fly. 2. High Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ). A HIDACZ is airspace of defined dimensions designated by the ACA in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons/airspace users. The HIDACZ offers a short term volume of airspace within which a surface force commander can exercise complete freedom of action for those whom he specifies eg for AH raids, CAS, air manoeuvre or deception operations. A HIDACZ may be permanently established, but not activated until specific criteria are met, or created for an operation or specific aspects of it. Activated HIDACZs will, however, impact on the operations of assets or forces that are excluded from them. 3. Restricted Operations Zone (ROZ). A ROZ is established in order to reserve airspace for specific activities in which the operations of one or more airspace users is restricted (eg refuelling orbits, terminal approach holding areas, landing/drop zones etc). The ROZ offers a short term volume of airspace, usually smaller than a HIDACZ, reserved for a single activity eg UAVs or field artillery. Nevertheless, within a ROZ the designated commander can exercise complete freedom for the specified action. A ROZ may be permanently established, but not activated until specific criteria are met, or created for an operation or specific aspects of it. Activated HIDACZs will, however, impact on the operations of assets or forces that are excluded from them. 4. Temporary Minimum Risk Route (TMRR). A TMMR is a route of defined dimensions for use by high speed fixed-wing aircraft to route them between Transit Routes (TR) or the rear of the forward area and their operations area. 5. Standard Use Army Aircraft Flight Routes (SAAFR). SAAFRs are established to route helicopter traffic in the forward area in direct support of ground operations. They are established below the CL. SAAFRs may be established by any component. These routes do not require approval of the airspace control authority. 6. Transit Route (TR). A TR is a temporary corridor of defined dimensions established in the forward area to minimise the risks to friendly aircraft (including helicopters) from friendly air defences or surface forces. TRs are bi-directional routes through areas of forward deployed friendly forces. 7. Base Defence Zone (BDZ). A BDZ is an air defence zone established around air bases to enhance the effectiveness of local ground based air defence systems. BDZs have specific entry, exit, and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) procedures established. 27 28

These ACMs are those most often encountered in the land environment. For a complete list see AJP 3.3.5. CL is the correct terminology; however this ACM is sometimes referred to as the Coordination Altitude.

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8. Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ). A WEZ is airspace of defined dimensions where the responsibility for engagement rests with a particular weapon system. Some examples of WEZs include: a. Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ). For land based AD, a FEZ is airspace of defined dimensions where the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter aircraft. b. Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ). A JEZ is airspace of specific dimensions where friendly SAMs and fighters are simultaneously employed. c. Short Range Air Defence Engagement Zone (SHORADEZ). A SHORADEZ is airspace of defined dimensions where the responsibility for engagement rests with short-range air defence weapons.

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 2 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES (FSCM) Ser

FSCM

Definition/Purpose

Estb/Dissemination/Graphical Portrayal

Remarks

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Fire Supported Coord Line (FSCL)

A line established by the appropriate ground force comd to ensure coord of fire not under his control but which may affect current tac ops. The FSCL is used to coord the fires of air, ground or sea wpn systems using any type of ammo against surface tgts. Supported elms may attack fwd of the FSCL provided that the wpns used do not produce effs on or to the rear of the line. Attacks behind the FSCL must be coord with the appropriate ground force comd, except those fires which have been cleared by other measures, such as the NFL, and require no further coord.

Estb by the ground comd in coord with the appropriate tac air comd and other supported elms.

When det forces are beyond the FSCL, appropriate fire coord measures should be estb around the det forces. Normally only one FSCL can be in eff at any one time. The FSCL should be as close to fwd elms as poss, consistent with the tac sit and its evolution. The FSCL should be easy to define on a map and easily recognised from the ground and air.

1.

Disseminated through a FSCL msg which is used to info air bases, ac carriers, arty units and fmns, NGS ships and interested units/ fmns of the current FSCL. The FSCL is shown on maps, charts and overlays with a solid black line. The abbreviation FSCL and the estb HQ are written above the line, at the ends, with the eff DTG immediately below the line.

AT THE TIME OF PUBLICATION THE 30 OCT 06 RATIFACTION DRAFT OF NATO FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL DOCTRINE - AARTYP-5 HAS DELETED FSSL AND PROPOSED THE CFL AS DETAILED BELOW 2.

3.

Fire Support Safety Line (FSSL)

PROPOSED Coordinated Fire Line (CFL). PROPOSED

A line short of which indirect fire systems do not fire except on req or approval of the comd who estb the line, but beyond which they may fire at any time without danger to friendly tps. The FSSL is used to expedite the quick attack of tgts beyond it by fire supported units (of higher levels) without the delay of unnecessary coord but also to guarantee that no tgts are attacked short of it without coord with the responsible manoeuvre comd. A line beyond which conventional, indirect, surface fire support means may fire at any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination. The CFL is used to expedite the surface-tosurface attack of targets beyond the CFL without coordination with the ground

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Normally estb by fmns although it may be estb at BG level. Disseminated through manoeuvre and fire support channels to higher, lower and adjacent manoeuvre and fire support units.

The FSSL is normally loc as close in as the estb supported comd desires and should fol, if poss, well defined terrain features. The FSSL could be a staright line in front of the force or a circular line around a force.

Shown on maps, charts and overlays with a black dashed line. The abbreviation FSSL and the estb HQ are written above the line, at the ends, with the eff DTG immediately below the line. Normally estb by div/bde comds although it may be estb by BG Comd if required. Disseminated through manoeuvre and fire support channels to higher, lower and adjacent manoeuvre and fire support units. Shown on maps, charts and overlays with a black dashed

The CFL is normally loc as close in as the estbl supported comd desires and should fol, if poss, well defined terrain features. It could be a stretched line in front of the force as well as a circular line in case the restriction of indirect fire should be imposed on a certain idea.

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commander in whose area the targets are located.

line. The abbreviation CFL and the estb HQ are written above the line, at the ends, with the eff DTG (and any code name) immediately below.

4.

Free Fire Area (FFA)

A specific des area into which any wpn system may fire without addl coord with the estb HQ. The FFA is used to expedite fires and to facilitate the jettison of CAS munitions if ac are unable to use them on tgt. Estb by a supported div or higher comd fol coord with the host nation if appropriate.

Disseminated through manoeuvre and fire supported channels to higher, lower and adjacent manoeuvre and fire supported units. The FFA is shown on maps, charts and overlays as an encircled solid line. The abbreviation “FFA” is placed within the encircled area fol by the estb HQ and the eff DTG.

The FFA is loc on identifiable terrain when poss or by grid ref if nec.

5.

No Fire Area (NFA)

An area into which no fires or the eff of fires are allowed except when the estb HQ approves fires (temporarily) within the NFA on a msn by msn basis, or when an en force within the NFA engages a friendly force, the comd may engage the en to def his force. Estb by a corps or div in concert with a host nation if applicable.

Disseminated through manoeuvre and fire supported channels to higher, lower and adjacent manoeuvre and fire supported units.

The NFA is loc on identifiable terrain where poss, or by grid ref, or as a radius in metres from a centre pt.

The NFA is shown on maps, charts and overlays as an area enclosed with a solid line. The enclosed area is shaded with diagonals. The abbreviation NFA is placed within the encircled area fol by the estb HQ and the eff DTG.

6.

Restricted Fire Area (RFA)

An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and in which fires which exceed those restrictions will not be del without coord with the estb HQ. Estb by a manoeuvre bn or larger ground force or by an independently operating coy.

Disseminated through manoeuvre and fire supported channels to higher, lower and adjacent manoeuvre and fire supported units. The RFA is shown on maps, charts and overlays as an encircled solid line. The abbreviation RFA is placed within the encircled area fol by the estb HQ and the eff DTG.

The RFA is usually loc on identifiable terrain, by grid ref, or as a radius in metres from a centre pt.

7.

Restrictive Fire Line (RFL)

A line estb between converging friendly forces (one or both may be mov) that prohibits all fire, or effs from fires, across the line without coord with the affected force. The purpose of the RFL is to prevent fratricide between converging friendly forces.

Estb by the comds of both forces. Disseminated through manoeuvre and fire supported channels to higher, lower and adjacent manoeuvre and fire supported units.

An RFL is placed on identifiable terrain - usually closer to the stationary force.

A restricted area or route specified for use by friendly ac and estb for the purpose of preventing friendly ac from being fired on by friendly forces so as to allow the safe op of hels and ac.

Estb by the FSCC ordering its adoption. The ACA is shown on maps, charts and overlays as an area enclosed by a solid line or lines. The abbreviation ACA is placed inside the area together with the estb HQ, the min and max altitudes and the eff DTG.

8.

Airspace Coord Area (ACA)

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The RFL is shown on maps, charts and overlays as a solid line. The abbreviation ‘RFL’ is placed at the line fol by the estb HQs. The eff DTG is shown above the line. The ACA will be des by timings, grid refs of a centre line, a width either side of the centre line in metres and a min and max altitude/height in feet. FSCCs must coord with AD comds.

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CHAPTER 3 PLANNING SECTION 1 - EFFECTS BASED APPROACH 1. Comprehensive Approach (CA). In complex contemporary crises, activities and effects from a wide range of participants need to be coordinated or, at least, deconflicted. The military is but one part of the CA which requires the engagement of the full range of actors. The four principles of CA are: a proactive approach, shared understanding, outcome based thinking and collaborative working. This is entirely coherent with BM at all levels. 2. Effects Based Approach (EBA). EBA is, ‘The way of thinking and specific processes that, together, enable both the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a CA and the realisation of strategic outcomes’. Effects are, ‘Changes as a result or consequence of actions, circumstances or other causes’29. BM at all levels is completely coherent with the EBA in that it manages such effects in order to minimise their impact on the tempo and effectiveness of operations. At lower tactical levels, BM focuses on the activities being undertaken to ensure they are conducted in the most efficient way. This is shown in the diagram below.

TACTICAL LEVEL BM

BM IS REQUIRED THROUGHOUT

Figure 3.1 – Illustration of the Requirement for BM from Planning Operational End State through to Tactical Activity 3. Consequences of Activity. Activities and their consequences have effects both in the cognitive and the physical domains, the impact being achieved through fires, influence 29

JDN 7/06 dated Sep 06.

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or a combination of both. The consequences of activity might be intended and desired, but might be unintended or might not materialise as predicted. EBA requires a continuous assessment of both the cognitive and physical impact of activity to exploit fleeting opportunities and to reduce the risk of unintended and undesired consequences. This precisely describes the purpose of BM. SECTION 2 –THE CAMPAIGN THEMES 4. The Campaign Themes. The campaign themes within the continuum of operations and directly related to the spectrum of conflict are: major combat, counter insurgency, peace support, limited intervention, and peacetime military engagement. For purely national operations, Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) is an additional category. BM is a key enabling function within all of these campaign themes and becomes more important as campaigns are increasingly JIM in nature. a. Major Combat. Major combat operations may be characterised as the most demanding type of operations involving frequent, widespread and intense combat. In such operations BM is essential to enable the focussed application of effects by multiple users of the battlespace. b. Counter Insurgency. COIN may be characterised as combat operations typically conducted below formation level during which levels of activity will vary significantly. BM remains a key enabler during these operations. c. Peace Support. The range of activities which can be carried out in the land environment during peace support operations is significant. There is a clear need for BM during enforcement operations, but the nature of BM will change as operations develop into stabilisation. Once there is a safe and secure environment and all other elements of the comprehensive approach are engaged, BM will become an increasingly routine function. d. Limited Intervention. Limited intervention has limited objectives such as the rescue of hostages or the security of non-combatants. Such operations can be aggressive in nature, as in, for example, a strategic raid. They are normally intended to be of short duration and specific in objective and scope. There will be a need for BM throughout intervention operations and it is likely to be focussed, intense and in a JIM environment. e. Peacetime Military Engagement (PME). PME encompasses all military activities involving other nations that are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. Combat is not envisaged, although there is always some possibility of terrorism against deployed forces. The level of BM required will depend on both the nature of the operation and the level of control of the environment which a deployed force may have. f. Military Aid to the Civil Authorities. MACA (encompassing MACC, MAGD and MACP30) will require an element of BM for routine coordination and deconfliction. A deployed force will, however, be working to civil authorities and will 30

Military Aid to the Civil Community, Military Aid to other Government Departments, Military Aid to the Civil Power.

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not control an AOR. Activity levels will be relatively low and the number of users of the environment limited compared to other operations. SECTION 3 – FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT 5. The Functions in Combat. At the land tactical level, the six functions in combat can be used to describe tactical battlefield activities. They represent the practical expression of the physical component of fighting power. a. Command. Command is the exercise of military authority by a designated commander for the planning, direction, coordination and control of a military force. Control is a supporting means by which command is exercised and regulated, and is normally the province of the staff. BM is a key aspect to the successful execution of command and control. b. Information and Intelligence. Accurate and timely intelligence is essential to the successful planning and conduct of operations. Coordination of collection assets across the six dimensions of the battlespace, including IM and IX of the product, is a function of BM. IM and IX are essential for SA, therefore directly contributing to BM. c. Firepower. In its broadest sense firepower includes conventional maritime, air and land delivered munitions, as well as offensive EW assets. Manoeuvre enhances the potential effects of firepower, and firepower in turn enables manoeuvre. To maximise the effects which can be achieved by firepower requires staff to fully understand the requirements of BM and to consider it in all stages of planning and execution. d. Manoeuvre. Land manoeuvre embraces ground and air manoeuvre, and manoeuvre support. It has both spatial and temporal dimensions allowing the generation of a tempo which is higher than that of the enemy. This denies the enemy the initiative and forces him to react, thus generating freedom of action. The coordination of such manoeuvre, particularly with firepower, is a function of BM. e. Protection. Protection preserves the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at a decisive time and place. It also reduces friendly casualties that may cause media and political pressure on the operation. Combat ID, essential to effective protection, has direct relevance to SA and BM. Further, a key role of BM is to reduce fratricide and thus it can contribute directly to the protect function. f. Combat Service Support (CSS). CSS elements will be allocated their own battlespace in which to operate, and BM is therefore a key part of the CSS planning process. Where CSS HQs are responsible for discrete portions of battlespace, their staffs must carry out BM. SECTION 4 – CORE FUNCTIONS 6. The Core Functions. Finding, fixing, striking and exploiting should be conducted concurrently, or at least achieve seamless transition from one to another. For this to be possible BM has to be considered and implemented throughout the process.

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a. Find. The find function involves a wide variety of manned and unmanned platforms and the use of numerous electromagnetic systems. It it is likely to be conducted in a JIM environment. The effective coordination and use of find assets requires careful planning to consider all six dimensions of the battlespace. Find is integral to the success of the ISTAR and targeting cycles and BM is a routine and essential enabler. b. Fix. How a target is fixed will depend on the nature of an operation but will involve either influence or fires, be they kinetic or non kinetic. However actions are brought to bear in order to fix the enemy, the effects required will only be achieved by managing the battlespace in which they are used. In contemporary operations the enemy operates in most, if not all, BM domains. Fixing effectively thus requires agility across all six domains which can only be achieved by carefully planned, timely and responsive BM. c. Strike. An effective attack on an enemy will involve the use of far more than only strike assets. At its simplest strike could be conducted with STA, a weapon platform and a BDA system. Experience has shown that tactical level strike can routinely involve operational and strategic joint and multinational systems; a clear understanding of BM is thus required by all concerned. It may be necessary to conduct SEAD31 operations simply to manoeuvre platforms and info ops should be addressed at every stage of an action. This level of coordination will only be achieved through effective planning which includes comprehensive consideration and implementation of BM throughout. d. Exploit. The exploitation of a fleeting opportunity requires audacious, timely and responsive action. Positive control will maximise a force’s ability to exploit such opportunities through integrated action. SECTION 5 – PLAN AND REVIEW 7. Plan, Review, Execute, Evaluate. Command support processes are structured around four interrelated and dependent activities. These are Plan, Review, Execute and Evaluate (PREE). It is the responsibility of each staff branch or agency to ensure that BM is considered throughout the PREE cycle. 8. Initial Planning. Planning activities are the start of the command support process, notwithstanding the need for analysis and assessment to have taken place to inform the planning itself. It is during this activity that the commander and his staff conduct their initial estimate and produce their orders. It is essential that all cells and agencies consider the implications of any actions on other force elements throughout the planning process. Sources of friction can be identified and deconflicted early or procedures identified for potential sources of friction to be managed dynamically if they occur. On occasions this may simply be the early identification of procedures, linkages and IM/IX requirements for a particularly intense or complex phase of battle so that they may be swiftly enacted at the appropriate time.

31

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences. That activity which neutralises, temporarily degrades or destroys enemy air defences by destructive and/or disruptive means. AAP-6

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9. Review. The review function is not always required. In certain circumstance, especially at the lower tactical levels or where swift action is required, subordinates will be required to simply execute the given plan. There will, however, be occasions when factors change and the BM implications should be considered. 10. Planning Activities. There are a number of activities which are integral parts of the estimate and planning process, but which happen in parallel with the core G3/5 process, both informing and being directed at various stages. These planning activities include IPB, targeting, ISTAR and CSS. Any plan which does not include these activities throughout the process will be inherently fragile. Encompassing all of these is the need to avoid or reduce friction in order to maximise freedom of action, minimise constraints and reduce the risk of fratricide. At any stage in the estimate or planning process, when an activity or effect can be identified in time and space its potential to constrain other activities must be identified. This should be a routine function within each staff cell, but BM requires visibility across the HQ to enable G3 to coordinate and enable activity. No planned operation will achieve its potential tempo if BM is not a key factor considered at every stage. The time taken to overcome or manage friction during execution, which should have been identified and dealt with during planning, will directly affect the tempo achieved and possibly the success of the mission. 11. The Tactical Estimate. BM must be considered routinely during the estimate. There may be occasions when BM constraints, such as the lack of sufficient C4I to coordinate activity, reduce the simultaneity which can be achieved in a given course of action. BM will also allow the levels of risk for some activities to be identified; if sufficient freedom of action cannot be generated, the ability to focus combat power may be reduced, adding risk to the operation. BM activity should be conducted within the tactical estimate as detailed in Annex A. 12. The Combat Estimate. The combat estimate is a tool to allow commanders and staff to deal with rapid changes of mission in order to generate tempo. It may lack the rigour of the tactical estimate, but BM must be considered throughout the process in order to ensure that unforeseen friction does not reduce tempo. BM activity should be conducted within the combat estimate as detailed in Annex B. 13. Subsequent Planning. BM requires a collaborative planning approach to succeed. However, there are occasions when individual staff cells or groups should focus on planning for and delivering their specific capabilities according to the direction given. All cells must continue to consider BM when this is so: should any element begin to plan in isolation, it is possible that they will unwittingly limit the freedom of action of other deployed elements and thereby introduce friction which will reduce tempo until solutions are found. G3, or an appointed G3 battle manager, must maintain a coordinating role to ensure that the implications and effects of a given action are considered across the deployed force, including across boundaries and agencies. It should be relatively straightforward for a planning cell to identify a potential conflict or source of friction: where the resolution of such a conflict involves multiple agencies it remains the responsibility of G3/5 to resolve it. It is essential that cells alert G3 or the appointed SO1/SO2 in order that action can be taken to manage the relevant BM dimensions as soon as possible. To enable this coordination, BM meetings should be held as part of the HQ’s routine battle rhythm, but they can be called as required and as the situation demands.

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14. Risk. Risk analysis and risk management are part of the estimate and planning process. Risk should be accepted and BM limitations may mean that risk is unavoidable if freedom of action is to be maximised. It is essential, however, that where BM identifies risk or cannot reduce risk that it is at an understood and acceptable level. At all stages where BM recommendations are made or measures implemented, the risk should be considered and briefed to the commander. Within BM risk can be taken both by enforcing and by removing control measures. A plan which is predicated upon the ability to dynamically manage the battlespace, either using dynamic procedural or active deconfliction procedures, risks failure if the CIS architecture fails or is inadequate. Equally a plan which relies entirely upon procedural control will lack flexibility and may fail to generate sufficient tempo to enable success. At all levels BM has a direct influence on a force’s ability to reduce fratricide to the absolute minimum; when planning or capability is inadequate, risk increases. 15. Summary. BM must be considered throughout the estimate and planning processes. The effective application of BM requires all cells and agencies to continuously assess the impact of their current and planned activities on other battlespace users. Throughout the planning process G5 is responsible for BM, although routine coordination of aspects of BM can of course be delegated. When a plan is handed to G3 for execution the responsibility moves with it and BM continues to be a key enabler.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 3 TACTICAL ESTIMATE ACTIVITY

OUTPUT

BM ACTIVITY

Stage 1 - Review of the Situation Establish op context of the tac problem

Warning Order.

BM must be considered from the outset.

Establish op timeframe of the tac problem

Monitor IPB activity for constraints and freedoms: terrain; weather effect on air/space; EMS; en disruptive capability

Establish availability of resources within op’s timeframe

Monitor initial targeting activity incl Info Ops Tgts

IPB starts.

Ident Component, JIM issues, connectivity, constraints, freedoms Stage 2 - Identify and Analyse the Problem 2A Mission Analysis (Conducted by the Comd)

Superior’s Intent.

Comd’s Initial Conclusions

Specified and implied tasks.

Planning Guidance to Staff for COA dev.

Constraints. Has the situation changed?

Constraints Points for Clarification CCIR development Requests for Information Focussed Questions to Staff Staff Tasks

Ident potential sources of friction in tasks ident. Consideration of constraints includes all 6 BM dimensions. Achievable effects and simultaneity may be limited by lack of BM capability eg to manage the Battlespace dynamically Ident effect of BM constraints eg on potential tempo .

Effects Schematic 2B Initial Object Analysis (Conducted by the Staff) Identified Tasks incl ISTAR

Using IPB ident en most likely/dangerous COA Examine relative capabilities to keep planning focussed on en React to Comd’s Qs fro 2A Tentative NAIs to ident en COA Log staff integrated

Timeline to begin draft synch matrix. Poss CCIRs. Clarification required.

Ident en’s capability to disrupt own BM activities ISTAR BM requirement: ACM, ESM, terrain, IM/IX, Info Ops. Ident potential friction in timeline/ drafting synch matrix. Ident X bdry issues required to service CCIRs Ensure early coord and deconfliction begins.

Stage 3 - Formulation of Potential Courses of Action

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ACTIVITY

OUTPUT

Develop own COAs.

COAs.

Deception and OPSEC.

Deception Plan to achieve surprise

What does en expect? How is en action relevant to our COAs? How can we use this to our advantage?

Ends clear – ways and means emerging. Examination of En/Fr capabilities interacting with each other across all dimensions of the Battlespace. Identify areas of risk

BM ACTIVITY BM freedoms/constraints considered for each COA. Ident which COAs can be enabled by procedural control and which require dynamic control. Is there a key BM vulnerability for the en to disrupt? Examination of En/Fr capabilities is BM.

Stage 4 - Development and validation of COAs Develop and validate COAs.

For each COA:

Synchronise activities across BM dimensions

Intent Schematic.

Risk analysis for each COA. Log supportability of each COA. DSO development informs TAI selection, implications for Cbt, Cs and CSS, ISTAR for NAI/DPs.

Effects Schematic. Comd’s concept of ops Draft DSO. Draft Synch matrix.

Ident BM potential sources of friction: ACM, ACMREQ, Jt Fires, ISTAR Manoeuvre, IM/IX, terrain, x-bdry action/effects, Info Ops. BM vulnerability to en disruption. Synch matrix is core BM business

Stage 5 - COA Evaluation Analyse COAs: textual, wargaming and OA

Ident En/Fr culmination points. Ident requirement for pauses, contingency planning etc. Mechanisms avail to focus fire and manoeuvre. Mechanisms avail to focus Info Ops, Psy Ops, Media Ops EW

Ident COAs which are BM intensive eg need for FSTs, LOs, cross bdry activity/effects, involvement of other agencies. Ident physical and electronic interfaces to enable COAs. Processes to provide CSS

Identify areas of risk Stage 6 - Commander’s Decision Commander’s Decision and Development of the Plan

Decision is logical result of estimate. Targeting and other boards as required (level dependent)

Ensure BM measures which have been considered are carried forward and included in direction and orders given.

Passage of info for Mov Os, O Gps, probable Msns and Tasks etc: Warning Order 3.

Table 3.2 – BM Activities within the Tactical Estimate

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 3 THE COMBAT ESTIMATE ACTIVITY

OUTPUT

BM ACTIVITY

Question 1 - What are the Enemy doing and why? IPB. BAE. Threat Evaluation. Threat Integration.

En COA – most likely/most dangerous

Ident en’s capability to disrupt own BM activities

PIRs (initial CCIRs/ICP)

Early coord and deconfliction begins.

Initial scope of ISTAR plan

Monitor initial ISTAR plan

Question 2 - What have I been told to do and why? Comd’s intent

Key Tasks

Specified and implied tasks

Constraints

Constraints

CCIRs

Ident potential sources of friction in key tasks. Constraints in all 6 BM Dimensions. Ident X bdry issues to service CCIRs

Has situation changed?

Question 3 - What effect do I want to have on the en and what direction must I give to develop my plan? Comd’s Intent and Direction

Intent Schematic

Consider BM constraints on each COA

Develop COA

Effects Schematic

Early coord and deconfliction begins.

Question 4 - Where can I best accomplish each action and effect? Select COA

Draft DSO

Develop CONPLANS

Achievable effects and simultaneity may be limited by lack of dynamic BM capability.

Question 5 - What resources do I need to accomplish each action and effect? Resources allocated to tasks

Develop and resource DSO

Develop ISTAR Plan

Confirm ICP

Ident potential friction in resource allocation. ISTAR BM: ACM, ESM, terrain, IM/IX.

Draft TASKORG

Consider BM integration of CSS elmns. Question 6 - When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other? Coord assets/activity across 6 BM dimensions

Synch matrix

Synch matrix is core BM business

Question 7 - What control measures do I need to Impose? Identify BM required to enable comd’s plan

TM, FSCM, ACM, COMSEC, Combat ID, AD WCS, etc

Q 7 is BM.

Table 3.3 – BM Activities within the Combat Estimate

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CHAPTER 4 EXECUTION SECTION 1 – EXECUTE AND EVALUATE 1. Execute. Once the orders are delivered either post review or directly from plan, execution staff activities start, which includes BM. Critically, G3 staff identify and forecast changes which may invalidate the original plan and necessitate changes to the conduct of the operation. In order to ensure that the tempo is not lost, the implications and potential effects of all changes in planned activity on other elements must be identified and managed. All cells and agencies should routinely consider BM throughout the execution of an operation. There will be occasions when BM is most easily addressed through a BM meeting as part of an HQ’s battle rhythm. 2. Evaluate. Evaluate activities are conducted continuously, throughout execution and might require a quick estimate to be conducted. The result may be the execution of a CONPLAN; a FragO to implement a minor or a major change to current ops; or the invalidation of the current operation and a return to the plan stage. The BM implications of any change must be considered throughout; tempo will be lost if friction is not reduced as early as possible. BM meetings provide the opportunity to conduct such evaluation. 3. The Execution of BM. While there may be a clear point where the transfer of a plan from G5 to G3 represents the beginning of its execution, the reality is that once an operation has begun PREE activities will happen continuously and simultaneously. Similarly, BM has to be continuously evaluated as an operation progresses. Some BM controls or measures can be established and will endure with little or no change, such as some routes, liaison requirements, CIS linkages or procedures for clearance of fires and joint fires. Most aspects of BM will however develop and change as a mission progresses; the tempo will determine whether changes need to be made dynamically or whether procedural methods are sufficient. Digitisation will significantly improve an HQ’s ability to execute BM through the tools provided by systems such as BCIP32, JADOCS, JETTS, DII33 and VMF34. 4. Amphibious Operations. Amphibious operations may generate additional BM complexity during execution. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) is given specific authority over all forces within the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). As such, he requires control or influence over the AOA Battlespace. If he has the necessary structures, he will fulfil the role of subordinate Airspace Control Authority (ACA), which conveys responsibility for issues such as promulgation of an Airspace Control Plan (ACP) and Airspace Control Orders (ACO). In certain operations, the JFMCC may also be the JFACC. If forces are required to transit through an AOA, CATF is responsible for coordinating their movements, though it is preferable that assets not directly involved in the AOA avoid it altogether. The task is simplified during discrete amphibious operations, compared with those that form one part of a wider action. There will an increased requirement for liaison where force interaction is planned within the AOA. At the termination of an amphibious operation, usually when a force is re-embarked or placed under the control of the JFLCC, the AOA is 32

Bowman, Combat, Infrastructure and Platform BISA. Defence Information Infrastructure 34 Variable Message Formats. 33

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disestablished. At this stage control of the battlespace, and the airspace in particular, reverts to the arrangements previously in place. For this to be accomplished seamlessly and without generating added friction it is necessary for the transfer to be carefully planned and briefed, relying heavily on established Liaison Officers (LOs). 5. BM Enablers. In order to effectively conduct BM during both the planning and execution of an operation, staff must be fully familiar with the key tools, organisations and enablers available, in order that they can change or request changes to them as BM is conducted. a. Air Operations Coordination Centre (AOCC). The AOCC is the senior tactical Air Liaison Element (ALE) of the JFACC embedded within the HQ of another component. The role of the AOCC (L)35 is to coordinate and direct air support to the land forces in order to integrate air operations with the supported land formation. The AOCC (L) consists of two parts, the Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) and the Air Support Operations Centre (ASOC)36. b. Battlefield Coordination Detachment (Air) (BCD(A)). The BCD(A) is the senior tactical land liaison element in the JFACC. Its role and function is therefore similar to that of the AOCC(L). The AOCC(L) assists with the flow of air information into the LCHQ and is responsible for requesting land support to the JFACC. Conversely, the BCD(A) assists with the flow of land information into the JFACHQ and requests air support from the JFACHQ. c. ATO/ACO/SPINS. The ATO is a document which allocates air resources to tasks; the ACO and SPINS are usually issued with the ATO and contain sufficient BM information to plan the missions. A 72-hour ATO cycle is fairly standard. Planning begins 48 hours in advance of the execution period to enable the integration of joint targeting and individual component requirements. The cycle ends after a 24-hour execution period. An ATO is therefore issued every 24 hours, having been in planning for the previous 48 hours. While the tasking of aircraft cannot be completely changed in the last few hours before the execution of an ATO, additional ACMs or FSCMs can be included in the ACO or SPINS at the latter end of the planning cycle and during execution when they are issued as changes. The mechanism for requesting, for example, a ROZ, is to submit an Airspace Control Means Request Message (ACMREQ). ACMREQs are collated by airspace managers and then passed to the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) through the extant chain of command. The ACA is usually JFAC and the POC within JFAC for LC ACMREQs is the BCD(A). Systems such as JADOCS include a digitised ACMREQ management facility. d. Recognised Air Picture (RAP). The RAP is an electronically produced 37 display delivered over Tactical Data Links (TDL). It is compiled from a variety of sources including primary and secondary radar, and ESM. It covers a three dimensional volume of interest in which all detected air contacts have been evaluated against specific threat parameters and recognition criteria and then assigned an identification category and track number. There will be only one RAP 35

AOCC (Land). There is an AOCC (M) for the Maritime Component. For greater detail see Chapter 5. 37 TDLs are the means which enable near real-time tactical data exchange from which the RAP is produced. 36

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for the JOA. The RAP is a near real time picture of air activity38. It is produced by drawing on data that is drawn from as wide a variety of sources as possible39. The RAP is an essential part of cross component SSA and enables dynamic air land integration. The RAP is not universally available at the land tactical level40 and its availability is therefore a key element in determining the level of BM which can be conducted. Information can be sent from the LC to take advantage of the SA represented by the RAP allowing dynamic BM to be executed eg to clear fires. Information can be passed through FACs, TACPs and ALOs. e. Common Geographic Reference System (CGRS). CGRS is a procedural measure used to rapidly and clearly define geographical locations for BM. It provides a common reference between components (boxes can be colour coded to indicate component ownership41), and simplifies the passage of information; it is not in itself an FSCM. The CGRS will be defined in the FID. CGRS should be flexible enough to be used for a variety of purposes, including general locations of friendly forces, land force manoeuvre boundaries, areas of intended attack, ACM boundaries, FSCM boundaries, locating the FSCL, ISTAR areas of interest, aircraft orbits, high threat areas (such as AD threat locations). It is a flexible BM tool which can be dynamically applied in changing circumstances if the appropriate interfaces are available.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Cell

9

Keypad

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Quadrant NW NE SW SE

The CGRS grid is constructed in minutes of lat/long from a point of origin unique for each operation. The size of each square therefore varies according to distance from the equator. The grid is divided into boxes with the following dimensions: CELL: 30 mins x 30 mins lat/long

9B9SW

KEYPAD: 10 mins x 10 mins lat/long QUADRANT: 5 mins x 5 mins lat/long

A B C D E F G H I J Table 4.1 – Example CGRS f. Kill Boxes. CGRS can be used to quickly define and disseminate the location of a kill box. There should be no ground forces in or near a kill box; aircraft 38

The latency of the picture will vary according to the sensors and data links available. Link 16 can deliver a 12 second latency. The future UK Land Environment Air Picture Provision (LEAPP) will allow the compilation of a Local Air Picture with a four second latency. 39 Sensors/sources such as TACC, E3D, SK ASACS, CVS, T42, LEAPP. 40 RAP Tp (Jt GBAD HQ) and AMRAP Tp (16 AA Bde) provide Link 16 connectivity at the land tactical level. ALES Det (3 Cdo Bde) provides Link 11 SA. 41 Ref JFOP 2/06 JBM. JTFC: Purple. MCC: Yellow. LCC: Green. ACC: Blue. SF: Black. JFLogC: Grey.

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can therefore attack without the need for terminal control. A kill box is a threedimensional FSCM used to facilitate the expeditious air-to-surface attack of targets, which may be augmented by or integrated with surface-to-surface indirect fires. The primary purpose of a kill box is to allow air assets to conduct interdiction against surface targets without further coordination with the establishing commander, and without terminal attack control. g. FSCM/ACM. FSCM and ACM42 are essential procedural BM tools. They are disseminated through the normal orders procedure and when linked to systems which provide situational awareness such as BCIP or rapid cross component/boundary coordination such as JADOCS and JETTS, they can become far more dynamic BM tools. It is essential that these means and measures are fully understood, as they can be restrictive as well as permissive. h. Staff Products. There are a variety of staff products which are designed to coordinate or allocate resources in time and space; they are all in effect, BM tools. During the production of a synchronisation matrix such as an AB545B or an Effects Guidance Matrix (EGM), staff branches should ensure that in addition to coordinating combat and combat support activity within the battlespace, potential sources of friction are identified and eliminated or reduced. i. Digitisation/NEC. A number of CIS systems are being delivered which directly contribute to a developing NEC43. Many of these systems include tools or functionality which directly enable dynamic and flexible BM. BCIP 5 will provide a significant information sharing capability, which with regularly updated position reports will make a direct contribution to SSA. JADOCS and JETTS provide tools such as collaborative planning capability, access to the RAP, access to the ATO and the ability to deconflict fires across components. DII (Future Deployed) (DII(FD)) will provide a common system on deployment which will significantly improve Information Management (IM) information exchange and Information Exploitation (IX). Single component systems such as RAFCCIS provide secure connectivity across the AC. The LEAPP capability will produce a Local Air Picture (LAP) which can stand alone if necessary or receive and contribute to the RAP if available. LEAPP will provide the LC with the ability to dynamically manage its own airspace or better to control it within a HIDACZ. BM execution will become far more dynamic and sophisticated as each of these systems is deployed. j. Battlespace Spectrum Management (BSM). BSM is the practical coordination and, where necessary, the deconfliction of all EMS usage within an operational environment. Spectrum management is a G6 responsibility, executed on behalf of the G3 branch, which is founded on interpretation of the commander’s intent and requires the production of an operational BSM plan, inclusive of EMCON advice, in order to ensure coherent C3I for all functions in combat. BSM must anticipate, deconflict and ensure the most efficient and operationally effective use of the EMS between all users; including EW, ECM (FP), ISTAR, CIS and weapons

42

For individual measures/means, see Annexes A and B to Chapter 2. The Joint Data Networks (JDN) Backbone programme will provide the means to connect and transfer realtime and near real-time tactical data between existing stove-piped tactical data networks from 2012, thereby being a key development towards SSA and NEC. 43

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systems. The JRFL44 process is a key element in conducting effective BSM. BSM must be executed in accordance with the commander’s priorities. BSM is a dynamic process that must be conducted across the spectrum of conflict and in all types of operation. In order to achieve this it requires a feedback process to enable the appropriate action to be taken when a conflict is identified. k. EW Coordination Cell (EWCC). The EWCC provides a capability for planning, coordinating, monitoring and directing EW operations. The EWCC is also the focus for EW liaison as part of the spectrum management process. 6. Activity Specific BM Measures. The BM measures which the commander or his staff will enact will vary in practice, if not in principle, depending on the assets and resources involved. Thus in response, for example, to a ‘Troops in Contact’ (TIC) situation aircraft can be easily routed through airspace where the hazards have already been identified and promulgated and handed off to an FAC for terminal control allowing detailed coordination with the manoeuvre element. The procedures required would be different in response to a second TIC situation where the effect required could only be delivered by GMLRS for example. In order to clear GMLRS fires a method is required to clear a trajectory up to 70km in length, to a maximum altitude of 20km+ of all air users in a matter of minutes. This has been routinely carried out during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Annex A contains a series of BM issues and considerations which are specific to activities or weapon systems. SECTION 2 – THE BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT MEETING 7. The BM Meeting. The BM management meeting is the most effective method of ensuring that the synergy and coordination which BM delivers is achievable. The meeting brings together those elements that will require access to the battlespace in order to carry out their assigned missions. Items under discussion and attendance will depend on the capabilities available. The level of the HQ will determine how far ahead the group will consider issues. The purpose of the meeting is to clarify the requirements of each capability or functional area and to identify potential sources of conflict. That done, BM priorities can be established either to deconflict or coordinate from within an HQ’s own controlled battlespace or to request access or control measures where authority lies elsewhere. The collaborative principle of BM planning requires that this meeting should identify where a formation or unit’s activity might have cross boundary or inter agency effects or implications. Such possible friction should then be passed to the appropriate agencies. Depending on the nature of the operation, the BM meeting will also identify where actions by OGD or NGO could impact upon operations, if not coordinated in advance. 8. Frequency. The frequency of meetings will be dependent upon the battle rhythm of a given HQ and the intensity and nature of an operation. The cycle must however be coherent with that of the ATO/ACO/SPINS if potential friction identified within the LC volume of airspace is to be managed successfully. Equally, details of any action which may have a potential, possibly unintended, physical or electronic effect in airspace controlled by another agency must be passed on in order to be coordinated or deconflcited. The ATO/ACO cycle is the only cycle with which all components will synchronise their planning activity in order to manage their own airspace; it is therefore an essential part of 44

Joint Restricted Frequency List

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establishing a BM battle rhythm. Effective synchronisation is more important than a rigid cycle; ACO and SPINS can be produced more frequently than once every 24 hours if the tempo of operations demands it. 9. Agenda. The standing agenda will be as per formation or unit SOI/SOPs, but as BM is a continuous and iterative process, it must inform the PREE cycle at all stages. Changes to the current plan and future intentions should be examined from the perspective of individual capabilities in order to coordinate the activities of the deployed force. The agenda should be structured around current and future operations by capability or function as this will best allow G3, or the G3 appointed battle manager, to maintain a clear overview. A suggested agenda, which can be tailored as needed, is detailed in Annex A. SECTION 3 – SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 10. Situational Awareness, Shared Situational Awareness and BM. Without SA/SSA, BM is procedural, pedestrian and inflexible. In order to manage the Battlespace dynamically enough to seize each fleeting opportunity and maximise the freedom of action of all elements, SA/SSA must be of the highest order. Procedural control relies upon friendly forces remaining in their own allocated volumes of battlespace thus avoiding the risk of fratricide and allowing the maximum freedom of action of each individual element. The risk of human error is accepted, although significantly reduced by GPS and systems such as Blue Force Tracker (BFT). However, in order to conduct the most dynamic BM (ie positive control) and allow all systems to operate with minimum constraints, the ability to reduce risk to absolute minimal levels by near-guarantee of combat ID is required. SSA is significantly improved by the use of CIS systems such as BCIP 5, JADOCS, JETTS particularly when they have data links such as Link 16 providing access to the RAP. LEAPP will also directly contribute to SSA within the LC through the provision of an AP from organic sensors and Link 16 access to the RAP. 11. Situational Awareness. SA is defined as ‘the understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander’s (or staff officer’s) mission (or task)’45. SA informs decision making. The Battlespace is an increasingly complex and dynamic environment, where the achievement of SA is challenging. SA is not a mechanical process, although the effective management and exploitation of information is essential: SA simply does not exist without military judgment to understand the picture presented. SA is easily lost and its maintenance is therefore a continuous process. 12. Shared Situational Awareness. SSA is defined as a condition where force elements achieve a common or at least consistent understanding of both the operational level context and the prevailing tactical situation46. SSA is enabled to differing levels by BCIP and JADOCS/JETTS which increase the ability of commanders and staffs to visualise activity in battlespace. Critically, this allows planned activities to be coordinated and synchronised to a very high level and promotes agile responses to changing circumstances. For BM, this allows control means and measures to be modified as rapidly as necessary, minimising the risk of fratricide and enabling consistently high tempo operations.

45 46

JWP 0-01.1. Joint HLOC referred to in JDP 3-70 Study Draft.

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13. Information Management47. IM is a command responsibility which uses the application of TTPs to effectively support the acquisition, storage, access, manipulation, dissemination, presentation and re-use of information and knowledge which leads to their effective exploitation. Effective IM is essential for effective information exploitation which in turn directly contributes to SA and therefore BM. 14. Information Exploitation48. Information exploitation includes fusion, transformation, assessment, analysis and manipulation of information by all staff. It supports SA, planning, decision making and the coordination of desired effects. This encompasses the interpretation of information by applying judgement and experience. It is the aim of the commander and staff to use the information available for decision superiority. Digitisation will significantly improve both IM and information exploitation and therefore directly contribute to BM through improved SA. 15. Combat Identification. Combat ID is the process of combining SA, target identification, specific tactics, training and procedures to increased operational effectiveness of weapon systems and reduce the incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire49. It is a key BM enabler because by increasing the speed of target identification and reducing the risk of fratricide, it increases freedom of action by removing potential friction. Additionally, it reduces reaction times in kill chains by reducing the time between detection and identification and therefore in the clearance of fires in order to deliver the desired effect. 16. Special Forces. Special Forces (SF), some recce forces and STA patrols are examples of force elements whose requirement for OPSEC can be high. Such force elements often have significant resources allocated to their operations, including specialist and/or unique equipment that impinges on the battlespace. It is thus essential to establish an effective level of SSA/visibility of SF activity in order to avoid fratricide. 17. Civilian Agencies. Civilian agencies will operate in many theatres, even when the risks are significant. Such agencies include OGD, UN, NGOs, HN and private military companies. Agencies working wholly within a formation’s AOR should, if possible, be integrated into the battlespace to minimise their risk. It is, however, important that OPSEC is not prejudiced. Coordination considerations required include ground and air movement, current and future locations, operations (eg aid distribution) and communications equipment (compatibility and interference). The level of risk which is acceptable if such agencies are reluctant to integrate their activities should be determined. G3/5 should submit RFIs to ensure advanced warning of the entry of a new organisation to the battlespace. 18. Terminal Control. SA is key to successful terminal control, although the volume of battlespace in which that SA applies to can be limited. Terminal control is an essential part of BM; the preferred method of control is real time positive control. It consists of the control of fires, or other assets such as UAVs, by tactical parties usually deployed with the manoeuvre elements. It is activity conducted with the specific intention of supporting the manoeuvre elements on the ground. Communications are the key to exercising effective terminal control particularly where there are multiple assets allocated to an action. Without communications, positive control is impossible and operations are of necessity planned, procedural in nature and thus lacking in flexibility. 47

See AFM Vol 1 Part 8 Ch 3. Ibid. 49 JWP 0-01.1 48

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19. Summary. BM is a core function. It is the commander at each level who retains responsibility for the battlespace allocated to his unit or formation. The COS at each level is the designated battlespace manager. The execution of BM is routinely delegated50 and when this happens, it must be made clear that the BM function operates on behalf of the commander and with his authority. Experience shows that without such authority the BM function is less effective in resolving conflicting issues and does not therefore enhance synergy and operational tempo. BM remains the responsibility of all staff branches within a HQ, regardless of the level. During the execution of an operation BM should identify and remove sources of friction which could reduce tempo; periods of intense activity across the BM domains must be identified during plan and review in order that BM functions and levels of effort are easily and quickly put in place in order to maintain momentum.

50

BM is routinely delegated to the organic Close Air Defence (CAD) Tac Gps embedded within formation HQs.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 4 BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT MEETING AGENDA Ser

Cell/Tac Gp

Content

(a)

(b)

(c)

1

COS (or delegated to SO1/ SO2)

-

Intro. Scope of meeting in time and phase of operation. Identify stages/phases of current/future ops which will require greatest coord or dynamic control.

2

G3 Ops

-

Changes to current plan and future intentions and coord implications. Identify periods of highest activity levels next 24/48/72 hrs and acceptable risk (Combat ID) to manoeuvre elms to estab BM pris. Determine phases which need HIDACZ/ROZ for AOR. Boundaries, ACM, FSCM issues. Prohibited/Restricted target lists. Landspace Management issues. Pris, higher HQ Tps OGD/NGO/HN. Identified IM/IX/LO requirements next 24/48/72 hrs. OGD/NGO/HN constraints/freedoms. Media constraints/freedoms. UOR equipment coord and spectrum supportability requirements. BSM.

3

G2

-

Update/Assessment of en ability to disrupt BM.

4

Arty Ops (incl Deep)

-

Review FSCL. ARAs/AMAs. Current & planned. Landspace Management and ASM implications. Hazard areas for manoeuvre elmns. Fire Planning. (Key Tgt areas –ROZ?). Trajectory issues? Harassing fire? FSCM requests/requirements. Mechanisms to exercise dynamic control and revert to procedural. TST BM issues incl possible Joint Accelerated Targeting. Identify periods of highest activity levels next 24/48/72 hrs incl fires, WLR, UAV and Battlespace affected, risk to other force elmns.

5

ASM Air Ops ASOC

-

-

ATO. Air scheme of manoeuvre. Allocation of CAS/AI. Identify periods of max activity including overflights and flanks next 24/48/72 hrs. ACMs next 24/48/72hrs and potential affect on land ops. Possible limitations of ARA/AMA ROZs, TST/JAT dynamic control procedures. ACMREQ 24/48/72hrs. Cfm ATO/ACO/SPINS timelines. Issues affecting air C3I/RAP issues eg lack of Link 16 capable ac, availability of AWACS, AOCC(L) etc CSAR. Possible coord required or acceptable risks? Possible SF constraints on ops. BSM requirements eg signatures of UOR radars. OGD/NGO/HN issues.

-

6

Avn AMPT AAPT

-

ACMs in place next 24/48/72hrs to sp ops. ACMREQ 24/48/72hrs to enable ops. Identify periods of max planned activity and possible coord issues. Safe routing drills in event of lost comms. Possible SF constraints on ops. Landspace Management requirements.

7

Engr

-

Barrier Free/Restricted Areas UXO / hazardous waste Restricted Areas IED threat areas Routes / Mobility Corridors/Obstacles and xing points.

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Ser

Cell/Tac Gp

Content

(a)

(b)

(c)

8

ISTAR

-

Host Nation Infrastructure Restricted Target Areas Engr Log issues

-

Non Organic. Planned missions, types of platform and potential products (freedoms) or friction (BSM? Resource allocation?). Potential interference from classified platforms. UORs. Freedoms and constraints.

9

STA

-

UAVs. ACMs, Timings, ARAs: Air/grd hazard. Coord with manoeuvre. BSM. WLR. BSM hazard area. EMS profile for ac DAS. ASP real estate, base line vulnerability/maintainability STA Ptls, insertion, location, extraction, OPSEC and acceptance of risk.

10

CIS

-

EMS Management. EW, HN, multinational, flanking fmn ‘leakage’ of electronic effects. Real estate. UORs.

11

AD

-

ADA requests. WCS changes. Multination issues: SIFF/Combat ID. New ac types in theatre.

12

CSS

-

Real estate. Combat ID. OGD/NGO freedoms constraints.

13

CBRN

-

Extant hazard areas for ground and air (ASM, TM, effect of Met). HN infrastructure risks – Restricted/Prohibited Tgt recommendations

14

OGD

-

Constraints implied by Comprehensive Approach. Movement by OGD/NGO agencies (ASM, TM) Comms requirements. UOR equivalents

15

LEGAD

-

Update on UK ROE – constraint or freedom? Multi national constraints. Use of forces. Different ROE

16

COS (or delegated to SO1/ SO2 BM)

-

Summarise frictions identified and confirm BM priorities to resolve. Identify dynamic control requirements and limitations on ops if not achieved. Procedural concerns/deconfliction required. External Requests required including OGD/NGO/HN/SF.

17

AOB

18

COS (or SO1/ SO2)

BM direction for next 24/48/72 hrs.

Table 4.1 – Generic BM Meeting Agenda.

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS AIR INTERDICTION Description Action to destroy, disrupt, divert or delay the en’s surface potential before it can be used effectively against fr forces, or otherwise achieve its objs and carried out at such distance from Fr forces that detailed integration of each air msn with the fire and mov of fr forces is not required Request/Tasking/Control AI conducted short of the FSCL would probably not happen below div level (bde if it is the highest echelon). Request through DALO/BALO to ASOC (part of AOCC(L)) or Air Planning Team. Tasked on ATO (Likely to be retasked CAS). AOCC(L) will route ac through ACMs. BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air

Ensure existing ASM promulgated through the ACO will enable the ac to reach the tgt area – if not amend. RAP. Kill Box using CGRS activated within LC airspace: authorised by LC actioned through AOCC(L). Tgt info passed to ac through AOCC(L).

Land

Msn is AI not CAS because there are no manoeuvre elements near tgt. Coord with SF LO. Terminal control is by pilot. Activity is independent. AD WCS. Possible unknown OGD/NGO/HN activity in target area will rely on pilot and ROE for deconflcition.

Sea

Coord through MCC to CATF. If operating in the Littoral, requires NGS deconfliction. AD radars. AD WCS.

EMS

Jammers, AD radar, WLR signatures.

CGS

JETTS, JADOCS, LEAPP, RAP

Time

Pre-planned is procedural. Deconfliction is in space.

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ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT Description Action by FW/RW vs tgts, requiring detailed integration with actions of fr forces to avoid fratricide and allow targeting guidance. Type 1 - High risk of fratricide: FAC is required visually to acquire ac and tgt prior to and during wpn release. FAC considers aircraft nose position and geometry. FAC clears each attack/ tgt. Type 2 - Reduced risk of fratricide, but FAC controls each individual attack. Type 3 - Low risk of fratricide. FACs grant wpn release clearance to the aircrew attacking a tgt iaw restrictions set by the FAC. Request/Tasking/Control PRE PLANNED Requests through the CofC to AOCC (L). Tasked through ATO. Either scheduled so ac is in the tgt area at a TOT or On Call with assets on ground/deck or airborne alert. IMMED CAS Request which diverts ac from another task or airborne alert, or scrambles them from a ground-alert posture. Requested as a result of a developing situation where the need for pre-planned CAS had not been anticipated/allocated. Requests are sent via the Tactical Air Request Net (TARN) to the AOCC or to the Air Liaison Officer (ALO). E CAS CAS without qualified controller. Aircrew have wpn release auth and decide attack profile. Initiator unlikely to have comms to speak direct to ac or have the codes for authentication. May talk to the FAC via the Manoeuvre net, the MFC/FOO/ BC, or with FAC on Tactical Air Request Net (TARN). BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

Ensure existing ASM promulgated through the ACO will enable the ac to reach the tgt area – if not amend. ASOC coord the airspace requirements and liaises with the TACP(ALO) to ensure CAS missions deconflicted with other airspace users and ground manoeuvre. If a ROZ/HIDACZ is estab covering tgt area, the ac will not enter it until contact is estab with FAC. If executed within CGRS addl ACM/FSCM may be required.

Land

Type 1 must have qual FAC. Untrained obs act as eyes for FAC for Type 2 or 3. OSG/Fire Sp HQ cells must ensure ac safe in relation to arty etc. In terminal area controller (FAC/FOO) is responsible for BM separation of ac and arty/mors/small arms etc. ECAS STOP, STOP, STOP

Sea

If operating in the Littoral, requires NGS deconfliction. AD radars. AD WCS.

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EMS

Coloured Smoke, Fluorescent Marker Panels, Signal Mirror, Lights/IR/Laser. Freqs/call signs for non-FACs for the passage of E-CAS requests must be distributed during the orders process along with any chain of command that is to be followed when submitting an E-CAS request.

CGS

JETTS, JADOCS, LEAPP, RAP, BCIP

Time

With FST deconfliction is real time positive control

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ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK Description CCA is fire support provided by Battlefield Helicopters (BH) in close proximity to friendly forces. It is mainly executed by Attack Helicopters (AH) and is tasked through the LC chain of command. Request/Tasking/Control TYPE A CCA is where the air to ground effects and fire and movement of AH is controlled by the supported tactical commander on the ground, in his AO. The qualified (ground) observer is responsible for selecting the target, preventing fratricide, and ensuring that the effects requested are within the ROE. TYPE B CCA takes place within the AO of a ground tactical commander but within an area, which has been temporarily allocated as an Aviation Free Fire Area (FFA) and in which no friendly forces are positioned. Aviation then has freedom to fire and manoeuvre and deliver effects against targets within the allocated area. The aircrew are responsible for target identification and all aspects of weapons delivery. The CCA call for fire through FPC, FDC, or FSCC or be rebro through LO. Secure Voice Rebroadcast (SVR) required for comms between BOWMAN and AH radios. The SVR is provided to ground units who require direct comms with AH. Key planner and controllers are JEC, OSG, AAPT and AMPT. BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

Avn Manoeuvre Area (AVMA). Grid box system. Segment system. Concentric circles.

Land

Terrain may be required for FOB FARP etc. this will be alloc by TM at appropriate level. Type B is procedural control conducting independent activity in a defined volume of battlespace, usually an AVMA. CGRS.

Sea

CCA may be by MC assets. Coord through MCC/CATF. AH could operate from Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) or Landing Platform Dock (LPD).

EMS

Lights/IR/laser.

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CGS

JETTS, JADOCS, LEAPP, RAP

Time

Type A positive control by obs.

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ANNEX E TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES Description BM is vital for multiple platforms to be flying at the same time, at different heights/altitudes, in different parts of the battlespace and repeatedly transitioning between flight levels, this will add a greater level of complication to airspace management and coordination. Request/Tasking/Control UAVs will usually be grouped to the G2 Branch (or the OSG) but capability tasked iaw comd’s pri. Capability will be commanded at the highest level and controlled at the lowest. UAVs may be grouped down to BG/Coy level. Tasking is through tac gp which is also responsible for BM. BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

ACM – ACMREQs submitted if sufficient time available though airspace manger to AOC; short notice tasks will require more dynamic control. ROZ launch/rcy UAV may have exclusive air routes. ‘Racetrack’/loiter pattern required to observe NAI Operating alts vary: Px 2000m AGL, WKPR 15000ft AMSL, DH 150m AGL. A UAV ROZ can be estab above the CL to avoid conflict with RW. Planned activity on ATO/ACO. Small size and low RCS make UAVs a potential hazard for fast jets.

Land

Terrain require for launch and recovery – ARAs, AD given an appropriate, restrictive WCS. For mini UAVs coord with manoeuvre elmns in area. CGRS

Sea

UAVs (including TUAV) may be launched from LPH/CVS.

EMS

EW or poor BSM can significantly affect the comms and data links and/or navigation systems that provide the ability to control the AV, provide the sensor downlink or comms with manoeuvre arm or other airspace users. JTDS data links. Lost comms drills must be identified.

CGS

JETTS, JADOCS, LEAPP, RAP

Time

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ANNEX F TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS GMLRS (UNITARY) Description GMLRS (U) (Unitary) is a blast/fragmenting unitary warhead triggered by PD or delay fuze. Onboard GPS/INS (Inertial Navigation System) will provide approx 2 m CEP at ranges from 15 to 70 km. Fired from MLRS M270 B1 (12 rockets) and in future LIMAWS (R) (6 rockets). Both platforms can fire single or multiple rockets. Max vertex height 22 km AGL. Request/Tasking/Control JEC, OSG CoC, fire sp BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

ROZ may be established around firing and target areas. AOC responsible for establishing ACM such as trajectory ‘wall’ which will be enforced by AOCC(L). <1hr solid ACM min 1km wide, length GT, height up to 20km+. Pre-planned (1 -24hrs) ‘gate’ under trajectory may be planned. Pre-planned 24+hrs ATO. CAS may be restricted to ground forces below traj

Land

Real estate – ARAs/AMAs. If ROZ used, avoid establishing on whole ARA/AMA. CGRS

Sea

In extremis GMLRS could be fired form LPH/LPD.

EMS

Missile guidance is GPS/INS - no in flight link to launcher.

CGS

JETTS, JADOCS, LEAPP, RAP

Time

Control is dynamic procedural – linkages must be established in advance. ACM in place for min possible time.

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ANNEX G TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT, MLRS, ARTILLERY, MORTARS Description LC organic fire support. MLRS M77 (Bomblet) 11.5 to 32 km, AT2 (SCATMIN) 11.5 to 39 km, max alt 13km AGL. ‘Fired in ripples’ of up to 12 rkts. 155mm L20 ERBS max rge 29.2Km, max alt High Angle -18,589m AGL, max alt Low Angle - 12,718m AGL. 155mm L15 HE max rge 24.9 Km, max alt High Angle 15,171m AGL, max alt Low Angle 9,078m AGL. 105mm range 17.2km max alt 7500m AGL . 81mm mors range 5.6km max alt 11000ft AGL. All systems 6400mil shooting. MC. NGS. Various wpns eg max rg 27000m. Request/Tasking/Control Requested through fire sp CoC: MFC, FOO,FST, NGFO, BC, FPC, FSCC. Clearance of fires at FSCC (bde) or delegated to observer. Clearance cross component may require JADOCS/JETTS. Coord/deconfliction with manoeuvre arm is terminal control. NGLOs may be used for liaison. BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

ROZ possible over firing position out to max range above max alt. May constrain use of CAS. If aval, FST responsible for coordination of assets/tac groups.

Land

Coord with manoeuvre elements. TST/JAT procedures will have BM implications. RW coord. LO requirement. CGRS

Sea

Coord of fire with CATF or LC. LO requirement.

EMS

Cross component comms

CGS

JETTS, JADOCS, LEAPP, RAP

Time

FST, NGFO, MFC, FOO, BC exercise real time positive control.

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ANNEX H TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS GROUND MANOEUVRE Description Primarily BGs, but for BM all elements must be considered as ground manoeuvre requiring coord/deconfliction. Manoeuvre is the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect of the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. Exercising effective and flexible control over fast-moving elements enables better concentration of effort and synchronisation of combat power should follow. Request/Tasking/Control Through deployed CoC. BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

ACM take deployment into account. Jt fires in sp of manoeuvre elmns must be coord/deconflicted.

Land

Deconflict with other ground forces using boundaries (terrain allocation), time slots (moves). Integration/coordination with RW/FW. Engr tasks/planning/Int: UXO, obs, IED threat, barrier restricted areas. Coord moves/activity of CSS elmns lacking comms/BFT etc.

Sea

Littoral manoeuvre is likely to involve both avn and surface movement in concert with fires.

EMS

Use/allocation of freqs. IM/IX.

CGS

Blue Force Tracker

Time

High tempo will require responsive BM system able to impose/lift BM measures dynamically.

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ANNEX I TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS SF/RECCE/STA PTLS Description Light forces can conduct direct attacks, collect intelligence and provide terminal guidance and attack control for attacks. They are particularly useful against concealed valuable enemy targets or those hidden close to no-strike targets. Request/Tasking/Control

BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

There should be no friendly ground forces within or manoeuvring into established kill boxes; however, should circumstances require otherwise (eg long-range reconnaissance patrols, SF teams, etc), then NFAs must be established to cover those forces, or the kill box must be closed. Beyond FSCL CGRS boxes (colours for CCs) may be used to protect mobile or sensitive ops: may be reduced to NFAs once troops static. Sy may require acceptance of risk to deployed elms to enable strike.

Land

Sy may require acceptance of risk to deployed elms to enable strike.

Sea

3 Cdo Bde Recce Force may have elmns deployed in or near NAI/TAIs. Liaison with CATF is essential.

EMS

Specialist comms may require specific EMS access.

CGS Time

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ANNEX J TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS BATTLEFIELD HELICOPTERS Description BH have cross-component utility can operate under a variety of C2 arrangements. In high intensity war fighting operations, elements can be task organised within land or amphibious force formations, in order to provide organic manoeuvre and support. However, for lower intensity enduring operations, experience has shown that more effective and efficient helicopter provision may be facilitated when all BH are task organised within a Joint Helicopter Force (JHF) structure. The endorsed roles for Attack Helicopter (AH), Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter (BRH) and Support Helicopter (SH) are shown below: Offensive action, control and direction of firepower, command support, ISTAR, tactical mobility (including Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) and Forward Aeromedical Evacuation (FAME)).

Request/Tasking/Control Command of BH will normally be held at component level. In order to remain flexible and reactive to short notice tasking for a 24hr period, BH aircraft are often held on strip alert within the ATO rather than given specific mission numbers. BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

Helos will normally operate below the CL but additional ASM will normally be required. Routing. Lost comms drills.

Land

Deconflict with fires. Routine traffic routes

Sea

Commando Helicopter Force (CHF) is an independent unit within the JHC. Liaison required through MCC/CATF.

EMS

For ac with DAS, jammers, AD radar, WLR signatures.

CGS

BFT/Helicopter Asset Tracking System (HeATS)

Time

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ANNEX K TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS ELECTRONIC WARFARE Description Electronic Warfare (EW) is a military discipline whose aim is to provide military action that exploits EM energy to provide situational awareness, deliver offensive and defensive effects and dominate the EMS. It is broken down in to the following three subdivisions. Electronic attack: use of EM energy for offensive purposes. Electronic defence: use of EM energy to provide force, area or platform protection and to ensure effective friendly use of the EMS. Electronic surveillance: use of EM energy to provide situational awareness and intelligence. EW is achieved by use of the following measures or procedures. Electronic Warfare Support measures (ESM): “EW actions taken to search for, intercept and identify EM emissions and locate their sources for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Electronic Counter Measures (ECM): “EW actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the EMS, through the use of EM energy”. Electronic Protection Measures (EPM): “EW actions taken to ensure effective friendly use of the EMS despite the adversary’s use of EM energy”. Request/Tasking/Control Assets coord through an EWCC located within J/G3 at fmn level. Some capabilities eg Local EW Team (LEWT) may be task organised to BG for specific ops BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

Use of strategic assets with own EW capability eg B52, Nimrod, Rivet Joint.

Land

Coord with Fires/IO/G2/influence/counter command activity/G6 for JRFL. Coord with radars WLR/AD/Surveillance and UAVs Protect STA capability through ESM and avoidance of electronic fratricide.

Sea

In littoral ops LC and MC must coord assets. Y Sqn (EW) is generally available in a Lit M op and its activity should be coord through CATF.

EMS

EW CC link to SIGINT (COMINT and ELINT). BSM. Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) (potentially to incl coalition and OGD frequencies of interest). LEWT secure all-informed EW net with air EW assets, for maximum position fixing capability / TST opportunities.

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CGS

Protect IM/information exchange/information exploitation

Time

Deconflict activity by time if necessary ie accept risk at decisive points only. Ensure coord LAND Y / L Hrs and ATO fixed timings.

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ANNEX L TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS WEAPON LOCATING RADARS Description COBRA. G band wpn loc (WL) radar capable of loc guns, mors and rkts. A mobile, solid state, phased array radar mtd on a DROPS veh. Scanned arc is 4800 mils. Secondary roles are adjustment of guns and mors, detection of jammers and radar registration. MAMBA. G band WL radar capable of loc guns, mors and rkts. A mobile, solid state, phased array radar mtd on a Haglund Bv 206. Scanned arc is 1600 mils. Secondary roles are adjustment of guns and mors, detection of jammers. Request/Tasking/Control WL btys will usually be grouped to OSG. Task/control though OSG. BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

Radar signatures included in DAS software. Can be incl as fixed ground locs in RAP – Link 16/11 ac will be able to ident. HIRTA.

Land

Terrain allocation: potential HVT to en. ARAs. May need multiple areas depending on EW threat.

Sea EMS

Coord with EW effort. Frequency alloc coord with HN. Frequency alloc coord with UAVs. WLR/UAV mutual interference. HIRTA.

CGS Time

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ANNEX M TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS CBRN Description Difference in effectiveness/hazards of CBRN weapons (fully engineered) and CBRN devices (ad hoc construction). CBRN threats/hazards may be military, industrial, deliberate and accidental. Persistent and non-persistent. Immediate and long term effects. Some hazards are subject to effects of met eg wind and therefore move with minimal predictability. Potential to contaminate water and food sources. Request/Tasking/Control CBRN cells in HQ across components. CA may require SCIAD or addl reach back assistance. BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

Use off ACM for hazard areas eg ROZ –must be monitored for changing met conditions. Changes to ACMs for routing. Limits to CAS provision. CA – allocation of ac for medical/humanitarian ops

Land

Whilst it is likely that BH will not be placed in a dirty environment, CHF maintains the ability to continue to operate in such an environment until a natural pause allows decontamination to take place. Helicopters and their crews are especially sensitive to the effects of CBRN attacks. Define acceptable risk of fighting dirty. Decontamination of terrain and vehs/eqpt. Ident and marking hazard areas will require coord with other ops. Los of tempo. Info Ops - Impact of long term risks. CA – allocation and coord of resources for medical/humanitarian ops.

Sea

Use of ACM for hazard area. CA – allocation and coord of resources medical/humanitarian ops.

EMS

Possible EO/IR/TI interference. EMP effects on Comms/CIS and SSA.

CGS

CIS to disseminate changing threat. Info ops.

Time

Potentially unpredictable real time moving hazard; real time BM controls required.

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ANNEX N TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE Description CSAR is the recovery of isolated personnel in distress, from an environment in which a threat is posed by hostile interference, who are trained and equipped for CSAR. CSAR is amongst the most time sensitive of operations. After four hours on the ground the chance of recovering a survivor in combat is historically less than 20%.

Request/Tasking/Control Location and authentication of personnel required before CSAR committed. SPINS contain CSAR tasking/authorisation procedures. BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

Tasked on ATO, but ensure SPINS incl CSAR annex effective ACMs or implement dynamic control where possible.

Land

Rapid response is critical; coord with fires essential. Risk may be accepted. Sy of HLS.

Sea

CSAR may be MC.

EMS

Comms in flight.

CGS

LAP. RAP.

Time

Considerable risk may be accepted as time is critical.

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ANNEX O TO CHAPTER 4 ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Description CSS encompasses medical support, provost support, personnel support, logistic support, equipment support, logistic engineering support and the civilian resources provided to formations. Delivery of this capability represents significant activity throughout the battlespace by units and organisations controlled by a variety of agencies and HQs. SA of the CSS environment is difficult, with the lack of a BFT, although this will in part be offset by BOWMAN. Contractor delivered CSS (to the deployed force or as part of the comprehensive approach) adds an additional SA complexity. Request/Tasking/Control Log bde HQ, CSS HQ (normally based on RLC tpt regt), HQ BSG. G1 – Provost support, personnel support. G4 – Log sp, ES, med sp, infrastructure engineering. BM CONSIDERATIONS Air

Combat ID, routes, ACM, FSCM, ROE.

Land

Combat ID, routes, ACM, FSCM, ROE. SA where CSS crosses bdys must be addressed.

Sea EMS

Limited comms, SA, use of BFT.

CGS

Constraints on the deployability of J1/J4 IOS bearer system requires IS specialist be involved in BM real estate allocation, especially in BSG and FSG.

Time

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CHAPTER 5 AIR LAND INTEGRATION SECTION 1 – COUNTER LAND OPERATIONS 1. Counter Land Operations. Counter land operations are conducted by air forces and their purpose is to gain and maintain a desired degree of control of the battlefield by targeting fielded enemy ground forces and the infrastructure directly supporting them1. In order to achieve decisive effects, the use of air and ground forces must be fully coordinated. Such coordination represents the most frequently exercised aspect of BM. There are three basic elements to counter land operations: a. Air Interdiction (AI). AI is action to destroy, disrupt, divert or delay the enemy’s surface potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or otherwise achieve its objectives and carried out at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. AI is usually conducted beyond the FSCL and the implications for BM at the land tactical level are limited. It is, however, possible to conduct AI short of the FSCL in which case BM tools such as CGRS and kill boxes2 may be used. b. Close Air Support (CAS). CAS is action by fixed and rotary wing aircraft against hostile targets which requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces for fratricide avoidance and targeting guidance. CAS takes place in the land battlespace. It requires routine BM activity often of a procedural nature in planning, and real time dynamic BM during execution. c. Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR). SCAR involves an attack/tactical recce aircraft operating deep, well away from friendly forces and possibly within a kill box, searching an area for targets and then coordinating attacks by other aircraft. SCAR is conducted beyond the FSCL and therefore implications for BM at the land tactical level are unlikely. 2. CAS. CAS is air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces3. CAS provides ground or amphibious forces with firepower in offensive and defensive operations, by day and night, to destroy, suppress, neutralise, disrupt, fix or delay enemy forces in close proximity to friendly ground forces. Reliable and interoperable communications with the supported force are essential features in the CAS environment. 3. CAS Employment Methods. CAS can be pre-planned, immediate or emergency. Each of these requires BM to be carried out at various levels. While CAS is being conducted there may still be a requirement to clear fires. An FST can do this in his own target area, but other fires may also require clearance. CAS should be fully understood by BM practitioners. 1

AP 3002 Air Warfare dated Apr 06. For greater detail on CGRS and Kill Boxes, see Ch 4. 3 JWP 0-01.1. 2

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a. Pre-Planned CAS. Pre-planned CAS occurs when the ground commander anticipates the need for and requests CAS for specific operations. Requests for preplanned CAS are submitted through the chain of command to the AOCC. The BCD(A) is key to this process as the land element in the JFAC. Where the request is given sufficiently high priority, air assets will be tasked to provide CAS. Pre-planned CAS requests must be submitted with sufficient lead time (normally no less than 24 hours prior to the Time Over Target) to allow the mission to be planned and for the publication of appropriate details in the relevant ATO. Pre-planned CAS can be scheduled or on call. (1) Scheduled. Scheduled CAS puts the CAS assets over the area of the battlefield where they are needed most at a pre-planned Time on Target (TOT) and where the need for CAS has been established in advance. (2) On Call. On call CAS involves putting CAS assets on ground/deck or airborne alert during a period where the need for immediate CAS is foreseen. b. Immediate CAS. Immediate CAS is any request which diverts aircraft from another task or airborne alert, or scrambles them from a ground-alert posture. Immediate CAS may be requested as a result of a developing situation where the need for pre-planned CAS had not been anticipated or allocated. All immediate CAS requests are sent via the Tactical Air Request Net (TARN) to the AOCC or to the ALO who has been allocated CAS aircraft available for tasking. If the request is accepted, the ASOC or ALO will either divert pre-planned CAS or forward the request to the Air Operations Centre (AOC). If required the ACC may need to redirect other air missions to cover the higher priority CAS needs. c. Emergency CAS (E-CAS). E-CAS is the use of CAS without a qualified controller where the aircrew have the weapon release authority and decide on the attack profile. E-CAS is executed by military personnel who are not FAC trained but find themselves in an emergency situation where CAS is required and where no FAC is available to take responsibility for the control and coordination of the mission. The manoeuvre force commander will be required to authorise personnel to conduct ECAS and will need to consider this during his planning and force preparation. 4. Close Combat Attack (CCA). CCA is fire support provided by Battlefield Helicopters (BH) in close proximity to friendly forces. It is mainly executed by Attack Helicopters (AH), and tasked through the land component chain of command. a. Type A CCA. In Type A CCA, the air to ground effects and fire and movement of AH is controlled by the supported tactical commander on the ground, in his AOO. The qualified (ground) observer is responsible for selecting the target, preventing fratricide, and ensuring that the effects requested are within the ROE. b. Type B CCA. Type B CCA takes place within the AOO of a ground tactical commander but within an area which has been temporarily allocated as an Aviation Free Fire Area (FFA) and in which no friendly forces are positioned. Aviation then has freedom to fire and manoeuvre and deliver effects against targets within the allocated area. The aircrew are responsible for target identification and all aspects

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of weapons delivery (including ROE, fratricide prevention and collateral damage limitation). SECTION 2 – CAS COMMAND AND CONTROL 5. Joint Force Commander (JFC). The JFC will apportion available air assets to Component Commanders according to their assessed needs and targeting priorities. The JFC usually tasks the ACC with allocating air assets on his behalf. 6. Air Component Commander (ACC). accomplish specific missions, including CAS.

The ACC allocates air assets to the AOC to

7. Air Operations Centre. The AOC is responsible to the ACC for the planning, tasking and execution of specific missions, including CAS. Planning activity focuses on the development and production of the ATO. Execution activity consists of executing the ATO and managing any dynamic changes to tasking as a result of immediate requests for support. In Coalition and Alliance operations the AOC is called the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC). The AOC also caries out the following tasks: a. The AOC tasks flying units to conduct specific missions, some of which will involve providing CAS, through the ATO. SPINS complement the ATO by providing the strategy, operational constraints, tactical procedures and ROE to be followed during the execution of the mission. b The AOC coordinates the execution of its mission with its liaison elements, known as the Tactical Air Ground System (TAGS), located throughout the Land Component Commander’s (LCC) chain of command. 8.

Tactical Air Ground System. The TAGS consists of the following: a. Air Operations Coordination Centres (AOCC)4. The AOCC is the senior tactical Air Liaison Element (ALE) of the JFACC embedded within the HQ of another Component5. The UK AOCC(L) consists of two parts, the Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) and the Air Support Operations Centre (ASOC), each of which has a specific role: (1)

ACCE. The ACCE represents the JFACC in the JFLCHQ.

(2) ASOC. The Air Support Operations Centre (ASOC) is the primary agency responsible for the coordination of Close Air Support (CAS) and other air users (helicopters, UAVs etc) in direct support of the JFLC and is in effect the Current Operations Cell within the AOCC. A scaled down version of the ASOC can be deployed to tactical level HQs depending on the circumstances – this smaller ASOC is called an Air Support Element (ASE).

4

The USAF, RAAF, and NoAF still use the term ASOC in place of the AOCC. The UK’s ASOC is part of the AOCC(L). 5 There is a AOCC(Land) for the Land Component and a AOCC (Maritime) for the Maritime Component.

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b. Air Liaison Officers (ALO). ALOs are permanently assigned to, and located at, division and brigade HQs. The Divisional Air Cell6 consists of personnel whose duties include acting as the ground commander’s primary advisor on all aspects air power, and planning and executing CAS in accordance with his guidance and intent. They also provide ASM input to the BM solution, control and coordination of TACP (FAC)s, A2 input, advice on, and coordination with, AT/SH/Air ISTAR. The BALO performs a similar function at brigade level, with assistance from a TACP (FAC) and the Divisional Air Cell. c. Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). A TACP7 is an operational element of the TAGS. It provides air liaison and advice to ground forces and the capability to control aircraft. TACPs can operate at division, brigade and battalion/battlegroup levels; they are either TACP (FAC) or TACP (MAOT8). (1) TACP (FAC). The TACP (FAC) is a team of four personnel commanded by a qualified FAC, which provides advice to commanders on the capabilities and limitations of fixed-wing aircraft, AH (in the absence of an Aviation LO or AMPT9), and air delivered weapons. The TACP (FAC) assists in the planning and detailed integration of CAS with ground manoeuvre and, when required, provides the primary terminal attack control for CAS through its two integral FACs. TACP (FAC)s are established within every regular bde and formation recce regt. (2) TACP (MAOT). The TACP (MAOT) is a team that consists of personnel trained in helicopter handling. The MAOT advises surface commanders on the employment of Support Helicopters (SH). It can be deployed to conduct command and control of SH operations. MAOT personnel are not qualified to control CAS aircraft. d. FAC. An FAC is a qualified individual who, from a forward position on the ground or in the air, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support of land forces. An FAC operating from the air is known as an Airborne FAC (AbFAC)10. A number of combat and combat support units are established for FACs in addition to the TACP (FAC)s already mentioned. Selected personnel such as FOOs, Observation Post Assistants (OPA), formation reconnaissance personnel, Army Air Corps (AAC) pilots and some specialist infantry and reconnaissance personnel are trained to perform the duties of an FAC in addition to their primary role. These personnel are known as secondary or other FACs.

6

Shortly to be renamed the Divisional Air Staff. The term TACP has become associated in the army with the TACP(FAC) to differentiate an FAC in the primary role (a TACP(FAC)) from a secondary FAC who has other primary responsibilities but who is also FAC qualified. 8 Mobile Air Operations Team. 9 Air Manoeuvre Planning Team. See AFM Vol 1 Part 12 – Air Manoeuvre. 10 The US uses the term FAC Airborne (FAC-A) for fixed wing combat aircraft in the FAC role (A10/F16/F18 ETC). 7

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SECTION 3 – RECOGNISED AIR PICTURE 9. Recognised Air Picture. The RAP is generated by the ASACS organisation. Data from a variety of sensors is compiled to produce a track based AP. In order to produce a RAP, all tracks must be recognised. Data from identification systems (such as Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)) and non-sensor information (ATO/ACO) is collected, processed and associated with tracks in order to determine their identity, and the RAP is then disseminated. 10. Air Surveillance and Control System (ASACS). ASACS organisations have the capability to enable 24-hour air surveillance coverage and weapons control within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). They also provide Tac Air C2 defined11 as, “the ability to conduct real-time tactical control of the airspace that includes sensor fusion of surface and air platforms, provision of integrated surveillance, ASM and weapons control. Tactical command functions associated with Tactical Battle Management Functions12 (TBMFs) can be conducted after delegation from higher authority”. In order to execute Tactical Air Battle Management within its AOR, an ASACS unit needs to produce a RAP within its AOR and conduct tactical control of assigned weapons. 11. Land Environment AP Capabilities. The current land environment AP provision is via Link-1613 / Link-11A14. Link-16 as a system provides access to the air, surface and theatre missile tactical pictures to inform the planning and execution capabilities of formation headquarters15. It provides a source of information to enhance Situational Awareness (SA), allow for dynamic reaction to air activity and assist with combat ID between air and ground systems. It provides commanders with a high degree of decision support in a fast changing environment, allowing exploitation of any tactical advantage as presented, whilst anticipating enemy activity through the observation of real time movement. Link-16 provides the ability to contribute to time sensitive targeting through the employment of digital information exchange to reduce sensor-to-shooter delay. The three deployable organisations within the current ORBAT are: a. Recognised Air Picture Troop (RAP Tp). The RAP Tp provides a Link-16 capability in order to receive and input16 information to the RAP. The RAP Tp system comprises two major elements: the Joint Tactical Information and Distribution System (JTIDS) Link Vehicle (JLV), and the Distributed Situational Awareness Picture (DSAP) equipment which allows the RAP to be viewed. b. Air Manoeuvre RAP Flight (AMRAP Flt). AMRAP Flt provides a rapid, digital exchange of tactical information between 16 AA Bde and other Link-16 fitted

11

Air Warfare Centre definition. JWP 3-63. TBMFs give the AD commander the tool by which to allocate/resume these tasks to/from subordinates. The general principle is that TBMFs should be delegated early enough to that level from which they can be executed most effectively to guarantee the fastest reaction time and highest efficiency. Where necessary, TBMFs may be restricted by unit, area or by time. Delegated functions may be reassessed or reassumed by higher authority at any time. 13 Provided by the RAP Tp (OPCON Jt GBAD HQ) or AMRAP Flt (OPCON 16 Air Assault Bde). 14 Provided by the ALES Det (OPCON 3 Cdo Bde). 15 “The RAP capability will be a significant enhancement to the ability of Headquarters to manage the Battlespace.” Op TELIC – RAP Tp POR, 7 AD Bde/4920 dated 11 Jul 03. 16 The input is limited. 12

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platforms within a network. The AMRAP system comprises two major elements: the JTIDS Links Crates (JLC) and the DSAP. AMRAP comprises one JLC and 3 DSAPs. c. Autonomous Link Eleven Detachment (ALES Det). ALES provides 3 Cdo Bde with a receive-only Link-11A capability. The ALES Det is manned by four other ranks and consists of two Link-11 systems, a main and step up, each mounted in a BV206. It is deployed within the Air Defence Coordination Cell (ADCC) element of HQ 3 Cdo Bde and is capable of receiving RAP/LAP from numerous sensors including all RN FF/DD, LPD, CVS, AWACS, Merlin Mk1 and both the Type 45 Air Defence Destroyer (T45) and Carrier Vessel Future (CVF) on entry to service. SECTION 4 – AIR DEFENCE 12. Joint Air Defence. Because AD has tasks across all components and operates in all of the dimensions of the battlespace there are significant BM implications. AD and air operations should be as fully integrated as possible from the outset since maximising the freedom of action of one automatically constrains the other. The AD Plan (ADP) is produced at the joint level and designs an integrated and layered defence using the AD systems (less VSHORAD) of all components. The ADP contains elements of BM through Tactical Battle Management Functions (TBMF) which deal with issues such as ID authority, engagement authority, WCS, and emission control. TBMFs can delegate BM authority to AD systems in the LC. 13. Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD). BM issues are very clear when conducting planning for the integration of GBAD with air operations. Maximising the freedom of action of aircraft necessarily constrains GBAD in order to avoid fratricide. GBAD units should, however, be free to engage enemy air assets to be fully effective. ACM should therefore assist with the identification of friendly or neutral aircraft and should not overly constrain GBAD operations or make the systems vulnerable to attack. GBAD operation should not unnecessarily delay air operations by creating lengthy route structures or complex combat ID procedures. Access to the RAP is currently provided to the GBAD BCP/FCC by the RAP Tp; from 2010 this will be done by LEAPP. The RAP is not available at each GBAD platform, but such access to the RAP is essential to maximise the utility of the system through early warning, identification and the ability dynamically to change WCS. 14. Maritime Air Defence. Aircraft carriers and Type 42 Destroyers provide an AD C2 capability which should be included in BM planning when operating in the littoral environment or where there is a maritime/land interface. This AD C2 capability includes AD/AAW17 coordination facilities and specialist personnel, long range air warning radars with supporting EW suites, aircraft control facilities including fighter controllers and comprehensive CIS and data link facilities for IM/IX with other AD ships, AWACS and the land based ASACS. 15. Summary. Effective air land Integration is essential for the conduct of joint operations and BM is a fundamental part of achieving this. BM in this area spans all levels from joint planning to terminal control. There are cross component CIS issues such as access to the RAP, although this will improve with capabilities such as JADOCS, JETTS, LEAPP and DII(FD). Aspects of air land integration such as CAS and AD will be seriously constrained if BM is not considered throughout the PREE cycle. 17

AD in the maritime environment is referred to as Anti Air Warfare.

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GLOSSARY The source for the terms and their definitions used in this Glossary is indicated in parentheses. Agency A distinct non military body which has objectives that are broadly consistent with those of the campaign. (JDP 0-01.1) Air Interdiction Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralise, or delay the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (AAP-6) Air Manoeuvre Those operations primarily within the land scheme of manoeuvre, seeking decisive advantage by the exploitation of the third dimension by combined-arms forces centred around rotary-winged aircraft, within a joint framework. (JDP 0-01.1) Airspace Control Authority The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in his or her designated area. (AAP-6) Amphibious Objective Area A geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of command and control within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious task force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task force’s mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air and land operations. (AAP-6) Amphibious Operation A military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships or craft, with the principal purpose of projecting the landing force ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile. (AAP-6) Area of Operations 1. At the operational level, the geographical area defined by the operational level commander within his JOA in which a commander designated by him (usually a component commander) is delegated authority to conduct operations. 2. At the tactical level, a geographical area, defined by lateral and rear boundaries, which is assigned to a commander by a higher commander. Within these boundaries the commander has the authority to conduct operations in order to execute his mission. (JDP 001.1) Augmentation The temporary increase in unit establishments, either by redistribution of existing manpower (regular or civilian) or by call out of selected Reservists to meet Directed Operational Military tasks and specified other activities that cannot be achieved within peacetime establishments. (JDP 0-01.1)

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Barrier Restricted Area An area declared by an authorised commander where manoeuvre of friendly forces must not be hindered by barriers. Restrictions imposed may include a complete ban on the emplacement of obstacles in certain areas for specified periods. AAP-6 Battlegroup A battlegroup is a tactical grouping, usually with armour and infantry under command, based on the HQ of an armoured regiment or infantry battalion, normally armoured or mechanised, or possibly on an armoured reconnaissance or aviation regiment. (JDP 001.1) Battlespace All aspects of air, surface, sub-surface, land, space and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompasses the area of operations. (JDP 0-01.1) Battlespace Management The adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronisation of activity. (JDP 3-70) Close Air Support Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (AAP-6) Combat Identification The process of combining situational awareness, target identification, specific tactics, training and procedures to increase operational effectiveness of weapon systems and reduce the incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire. (JDP 0-01.1) Command 1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces. 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit, group of units, organisation or area under the authority of a single individual. 4. To dominate an area or situation. 5. To exercise command. (AAP-6) Component Commander 1. A single service or functional component commander at the third level of the NATO military command structure. 2. A designated commander responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land, air, special or other operation as part of a joint force. (AAP-6) Components Force elements grouped under one or more component commanders subordinate to the operational level commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

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Composite Air Operations Air operations interrelated and/or limited in both timescale and space where units differing in type and/or role are put under a single package commander to achieve a common, specific objective. (JDP 0-01.1) Control 1. That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. 2. In mapping, charting and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or objects on the earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations, or both, have been or will be determined. (AAP-6) Course of Action In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. (AAP-6) Datum Any numerical or geometrical quantity or set of such quantities which may serve as reference or base for other quantities. Where the concept is geometric, the plural form is ‘datums’ in contrast to the normal plural ‘data’. (AAP-6) Doctrine Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (AAP-6) End state The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-6) Environment The surroundings in which an organisation operates, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna, humans, and their interrelation. (AAP-6) Expeditionary Operation The projection of military power over extended lines of communications into a distant operational area to accomplish a specific objective. (AAP-6) Fire Support Coordination Line Within an assigned area of operations, a line established by a land or amphibious force commander to denote coordination requirements for fires by other force elements which may affect the commander’s current and planned operations. The fire support coordination line applies to fires of air, ground or sea weapons using any type of ammunition against surface or ground targets. The establishment of the fire support coordination line must be coordinated with the appropriate commanders and supporting elements. Attacks against surface or ground targets short of the fire support coordination line must be conducted under the positive control or procedural clearance of the associated land or amphibious force commander. Unless in exceptional circumstances, commanders of forces attacking targets beyond the fire support coordination line must coordinate with all affected

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commanders in order to avoid fratricide and to harmonise joint objectives. Note: in the context of this definition the term ‘surface targets’ applies to those in littoral or inland waters within the designated area of operations. (AAP-6) Fratricide The accidental death or injury which occurs when friendly forces engage their own forces believing either them, or their location, to be an enemy target. (JDP 0-01.1) High Density Airspace Control Zone Airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the airspace control authority, in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons/airspace users. (AAP-6) Host Nation A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b. allows materiel and/or NATO organisations to be located on its territory; and/or c. provides support for these purposes. (AAP-6) Host-nation Support Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organisations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation’s territory. (AAP-6) Humanitarian Disaster Relief Operation Operations where the primary mission of a deployed force is to relieve human suffering. HDR operations are conducted in an entirely benign posture (except for essential force protection) and are normally conducted in support of the coordinating humanitarian agency. (AAP-6) Information Management Integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action. (JDP 3-70) Insurgency An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JDP 0-01.1) Joint Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate. (AAP-6) Joint Airspace Control Cell A joint cell with appropriate representation from the components and, if applicable, host and coalition nations, to provide the Airspace Control Authority with the capability to plan, coordinate, integrate and regulate airspace control within the Joint Operations Area. (JDP 0-01.1)

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Joint Airspace Coordination Centre (JACC). The agency coordinating the use of the ASC-Area through ACM to be published in an ACO. (AJP 3.3.5) Joint Enablers Operational activities that do not have an end unto themselves and are unlikely to be discrete lines of operation in achieving the end state. Their principle purpose is to enable other activity to take place. (JDP 3-70) Joint Fires Joint Fires is defined as kinetic attack coordinated or directed at the operational level by the JTFC/NCC. (JDP 0-01.1) Joint Force A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational command or control. (JDP 0-01.1) Joint Operations Area An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission-specific. (JDP 0-01.1) Joint Operations Picture The total set of shared information on a particular operation, or Joint Operations Area, available through a secure information environment on CIS networks to support situational awareness and decision making by UK commanders, and to facilitate information sharing with allies and partners. (JDP 0-01.1) Joint Task Force Commander The operational commander of a nominated joint force. (JDP 0-01.1) Joint Task Force Headquarters A purely national deployable joint headquarters of variable size commanded at the operational level by a Joint Task Force Commander. (JDP 0-01.1) Liaison That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (AAP-6) Main Effort A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision. (JDP 0-01.1) Mission Analysis A logical process for extracting and deducing from a superior’s orders the tasks necessary to fulfil a mission. (JDP 0-01.1)

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Mission Command A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about the intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with the maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources. (JDP 0-01.1) Multinational Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organisations, etc in which forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. (AAP6) Non-combatant Evacuation Operation An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. (AAP-6) Operational Art The orchestration of all military activities involved in converting strategic objectives into tactical actions with a view to seeking a decisive result. (JDP 0-01.1) Operations Security The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-6) Operations Support Activities Operational activities that, being capabilities or techniques likely to be essential to achievement of the end state, have an end unto themselves. They will usually, but not always, form specific lines of operation and are underpinned by Joint Enablers. (JDP 3-70) Peace Support Operations An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations. (AAP-6) Positive Control In air traffic control within NATO, a method of regulation of all identified air traffic within a designated airspace, conducted with electronic means by an air traffic control agency having the authority and responsibility therein. (AAP-6) Procedural Control A method of airspace control which relies on a combination of previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures. (AAP-6) Recognised Air Picture An electronically produced display from primary and secondary radar, and ESM sources covering a three dimensional volume of interest in which all detected air and surface contacts have been evaluated against specific threat parameters and then assigned a recognition category and track number. (JDP 0-01.1)

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Recognised Land Picture The fullest achievable agreed level of identification and tracking of all land surface contacts in the area of interest. The Recognised Land Picture is normally associated with the Recognised Air Picture of the same area. (JDP 0-01.1) Recognised Maritime Picture The fullest achievable agreed level of identification and tracking of all surface and subsurface contacts in the area of interest. The Recognised Maritime Picture is normally associated with the Recognised Air Picture of the same area. (JDP 0-01.1) Situational Awareness The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander’s (or staff officer’s) mission (or task). (JDP 0-01.1) Special Forces Troops who are selected, trained and organised to special levels and are usually employed in pursuit of strategic objectives. (JDP 0-01.1) Standard Operating Procedure A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardised procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. (AAP-6) Time Sensitive Targets Time sensitive targets (TST) are those targets requiring immediate response because they represent a serious and imminent threat to friendly forces or are high payoff, fleeting targets of opportunity. In practice, TSTs are specific target sets designated by the JTFC. (JDP 001.1) Waterspace Management In naval warfare, a system of procedures for the control of antisubmarine weapons to prevent inadvertent engagement of friendly submarines. (AAP-6)

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ABBREVIATIONS A ABFAC ACA ACMREQ ACA

Airborne Forward Air Controller Airspace Coord Area Airspace Control Means Request Airspace Control Authority

ACC ACM ACO AD

Air Component Commander Airspace Control Means Airspace Coordination Order Air Defence

ADA ADP AGL AH AI ALE ALES Det

Air Defence Area/Air Defended Area Air Defence Plan Above Ground Level Attack Helicopter Air Interdiction Air Liaison Element Autonomous Link Eleven Detachment

BC BCD (A)

Battery Commander Battlefield Coordination Detachment (Air) Bowman, Combat, Infrastructure and Platform BISA Battle Damage Assessment

ALO AMA AMPT AMRAP Flt AMSL AOO AOCC AOCC (L) AP ARA ASACS ASC-Area ASOC ASP ATO AWACS

Air Liaison Officer Artillery Manoeuvre Area Air Manoeuvre Planning Team Air Manoeuvre Recognised Air Picture Flight Above Mean Sea Level Area of Operations Air Operations Coordination Centre Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land) Air Picture Artillery Reserved Area Air Surveillance and Control System Airspace Control Area Air Support Operations Centre Advanced Sound-ranging Programme Air Tasking Order Airborne Warning and Control System

BDZ BGT

Base Defence Zone Blus Force Tracker

BH

Battlefield Helicopter

BSM

Battlespace Spectrum Management

COA COIN Combat ID CSAR

Course of Action Counter insurgency. Combat Identification

CSS

Combat Service Support

DSAP

Distributed Situational Awareness Picture

EGM EMS

Effects Guidance Matrix Electro Magnetic Spectrum

FSCL FSCM FSSL FST

Fire Sp Coord Line Fire Support Safety Line Fire Support Coordination Measures Fire Support Team

GBAD

Ground Based Air Defence

HIMEZ HN

High Altitude Missile Engagement Zone Host Nation

B

BCIP BDA

C CA CAS CBRN CCIR CGS CGRS

Comprehensive Approach Close Air Support Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Commander’s Critical Information Requirements/Requests Computer Generated Space Common Geographic Reference System

Combat Search and Rescue

D DII(FD)

Defence Information Infrastructure (Forward Deployed)

EBA E-CAS

Effects Based Approach Emergency CAS

FAC FEZ FID FFA FPC

Forward Air Controllers Fighter Engagement Zone Force Instruction Document Free Fire Area Fire Planning Cell

GMLRS

Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System

E F

G H HeATS HIDACZ

Helicopter Asset Tracking System High Density Airspace Control Zone

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IM IFF JACC JADOCS JBMFID JETTS JEZ JFCIS

Information Management Identification Friend or Foe Joint Airspace Control Centre (Cell) Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System Joint Battlespace Management Force Instruction Document Joint Effects Tactical Targeting System Joint Engagement Zone Joint Force Communications and Information Systems

LAP LEAPP

Local Air Picture Land Environment Air Picture Provision

MACA

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities

MACC MACP

Military Aid to the Civil Community Military Aid to the Civil Power

NFA NGO

No Fire Area Non Governmental Organisation

OGD OMC

Other Government Department Operational Management of Communications and Information Systems

PME

Peacetime Military Engagement

RAP RAP Tp RFA

Recognised Air Picture Recognised Air Picture Troop Restricted Fire Area

SA SAAFR

Situational Awareness Standard Use Army Aircraft Flight Route Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance Suppression of Enemy Air Defences

SCAR SEAD TACP TACPMAOT TAGS TARN TBMF

Tactical Air Control Party Mobile Air Operations Team Tactical Air Ground System. Tactical Air Request Net Tactical Battle Management Functions

UAV

Unmanned Air vehicle

WCS WEZ

Weapon Control Status Weapons Engagement Zone

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I IX IPB J JIM JLC

Information Exploitation Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace/Battlefield Joint, Interagency, Multinational JTIDS Link Crates

JLV

JTIDS Link Vehicle

JOA

Joint Operations Area

JTFHQ JTIDS

Joint Task Force Headquarters Joint Tactical Information and Distribution System

L LLTR LOMEZ M MAGD MGRS MRR N NGFO O OSG OSGB P PREE R RFI RFL ROZ S SH SHORADEZ SPINS SSA T TIC TM TMRR TOT U UOR W WGRS WLR

Low Level Transit Route Low Altitude Missile Engagement Zone Military Aid to Government Departments Military Geographic Reference System Minimum-Risk Route Naval Gunfire Forward Observer Offensive Support Group Ordnance Survey Great Britain

Plan Review Execute Evaluate Request for INformation Restrictive Fire Line Restricted Operations Zone Support Helicopters Short Range Air Defence Engagement Zone Special Instructions Shared Situational Awareness Troops in Contact’ Terrain Management Temporary Minimum Risk Route Time on Target Urgent Operational Requirement World Geographic Reference System Weapon Locating Radar

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