Buku Perjanjian Penanaman Modal Dalam Hukum Perdagangan Internasional Wto

1

Perjanjian Penanaman Modal dalam Hukum Perdagangan Internasional (WTO)

Huala Adolf

2

DAFTAR ISI BAB 1

PENGANTAR

BAB 2

LATAR BELAKANG NEGOSIASI TRIMs Addendum: Canada Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Report of the Panel, 7 February 1984.

BAB 3

NEGOSIASI TRIMs DALAM PUTARAN URUGUAY (URUGUAY ROUND)

BAB 4

PERJANJIAN WTO MENGENAI TRIMS Addendum: Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures

BAB 5

ARTI PENTING PERJANJIAN TRIMs

BAB 6

PERKEMBANGAN PERJANJIAN TRIMs DALAM KONPERENSI TINGKAT TINGGI WTO

BAB 7

SENGKETA PENANAMAN MODAL DI WTO: SENGKETA MOBIL NASIONAL RI Addendum: Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, Report of the Panel, 2 July 1998.

3 KATA PENGANTAR Buku

berjudul

'Perjanjian

Penanaman

Modal

dalam

Hukum

Perdagangan Internasional (WTO)' ini merupakan buku sejenis Cases and Materials. Buku ini memuat bacaan awal atau dasar mengenai perjanjian penanaman modal dalam WTO, yani Perjanjian TRIMs (Trade-Related Investment Measures), muatan isi perjajian TRIMs, dan perkembangan negosiasi Perjanjian TRIMs dalam WTO. Penulis menyusun naskah ini karena sangat kurangnya bukubuku mengenai hukum perdagangan internasional (WTO) di tanah air. Sedangkan

kebutuhan

akan

tulisan

atau

buku

seperti

ini

masih

langka. Buku ini memuat perjanjian dan sengketa-sengketa GATT dan WTO

yang

terkait

dengan

penanaman

modal.

Dalam

buku

ini

dua

sengketa yang secara khusus terkait mengenai TRIMs, yaitu sengketa the FIRA (Foreign Review Investment Act) Case, yaitu sengketa yang terjadi dalam kerangka GATT. Sengketa kedua adalah sengketa Mobil Nasional RI (Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry), yaitu sengketa pertama dan terkenal sehubungan dengan pembahasan mengenai TRIMs dalam WTO. Buku ini semata-mata buku pengantar untuk memahami TRIMs lebih lanjut. Kepada penerbit PT Rajagrafindo Persada yang telah bersedia

menerbitkan

naskah-naskah

penulis

sebelumnya,

penulis

ucapkan terima kasih. Mudah-mudahan buku ini dapat memberi setitik sumbangan bagi perkembangan ilmu hukum yang kita cintai. Kritik dan saran perbaikan atas buku ini akan penulis hargai dan ucapkan terima kasih.

Bandung, Mei 2004.

Huala Adolf SH LLM PhD

1

BAB I PENGANTAR A. Pendahuluan Penanaman modal asing1 berperan penting baik di negara maju maupun negara sedang berkembang. Di dalam suatu laporannya yang diterbitkan pada tahun 1996, WTO menunjukkan bahwa telah terjadi suatu perkembangan yang cukup mendasar di bidang penanaman modal, khususnya

sejak

tahun

1980-an.

Aliran

penanaman

modal

secara

global hanyalah sekitar 60 miliar dollar AS pada tahun 1985. Namun angka ini mengalami peningkatan yang cepat dalam kurun waktu 10 tahun kemudian (pada tahun 1995), yaitu sebesar 315 miliar dollar AS.2 Demikian pula aliran penanaman modal asing ke negara-negara sedang berkembang mengalami perkembangan yang berarti dalam jangka waktu 15 tahun terakhir. Aliran penanaman modal asing ke negaranegara ini telah mengalami peningkatan yang berarti, yaitu dari 1

Prof. M. Sornarajah mendefinisikan penanaman modal sebagai 'the transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one country to another for the purpose of use in that country to generate wealth under the total or partial control of the owner of the assets.' (M. Sornarajah, The Law on Foreign Investment, (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1994), hlm. 4. Cf., Untuk definisi lainnya, lihat: Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1997), hlm. xix,xx. Untuk kajian hukum internasional secara umum mengenai penanaman modal lihat, antara lain, G. Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and International Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1969); Cynthia D. Wallace, (ed.), Foreign Direct Investment in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment: The World Bank Guidelines (Dordrecht, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993); Richard B. Lilich, The Protection of Foreign Investment (Syracuse, New York: Sijthoff, 1965); Zouhair A. Kronfol, Protection of Foreign Investment (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1972). Untuk kajian mengenai praktek (hukum) penanaman modal asing, lihat P.T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995). 2 WTO, Annual Report 1996, (Geneva: WTO, 1996), hlm. 44; Lihat pula: UNCTAD, World Investment Report: 1996 (New York: United Nations, 1996).

2

sekitar hanya 5 persen di tahun 1983 hingga 1987, menjadi 15 persen

pada

tahun

Meskipun

1995,

adanya

yaitu

sekitar

peningkatan,

200

namun

miliar

tidak

dollar

ada

AS.3

penjelasan

resmi mengenai sebab-sebab terjadinya peningkatan angka penanaman modal tersebut. Namun demikian sebuah penelitian menunjukkan bahwa adanya liberalisasi hukum penanaman modal asing baik di negara maju

maupun

negara

berkembang

menjadi

faktor

penyebab

utama

meningkatnya angka penanaman modal asing tersebut.4 Yang menjadi permasalahan cukup mendasar adalah bahwa hukum internasional yang mengatur bidang ini ternyata berkembang agak lambat guna mengimbangi perkembangan ini. Salah satu pendapat yang berkembang

mengungkapkan

internasional kurangnya

di

upaya

bahwa

dalam

mengatur

koordinasi

lambatnya masalah

masyarakat

perkembangan ini

hukum

adalah

karena

internasional

untuk

merumuskan aturan-aturan hukum di bidang ini. Pendapat

lainnya

menyatakan

bahwa

lemahnya

aturan

hukum

internasional mengatur bidang ini disebabkan karena tidak adanya keinginan Geist

yang

sungguh

mengungkapkan

dari

bahwa

masyarakat

tidak

adanya

internasional. niat

yang

Michael

serius

dari

berbagai negara untuk mengatur bidang ini merupakan kendala bagi perkembangan hukum di bidang investasi.5 Ada pula yang berpendirian bahwa alasan utama dari lambatnya hukum internasional di dalam mengatur masalah ini adalah karena 3

WTO, Annual Report 1996 (Geneva: WTO, 1996), hlm. 46. Untuk kajian umum mengenai hal ini, lihat: Renato Ruggiero, 'Whither The Trade System Next?' dalam: Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch, (eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond. (Berlin, New York: Springer, 1998), khususnya hlm. 126 et.seq.

4

3

tidak

adanya

lembaga

khusus

yang

memformulasikan

hukum

internasional di bidang penanaman modal asing.6 Pada prinsipnya terdapat 4 (empat) bidang utama dari hukum internasional yang mengatur penanaman modal ini. (1) Hukum

internasional

yang

mengatur

perlindungan

terhadap

investor dan harta miliknya. (2) Hukum

internasional

yang

mengatur

hubungan

atau

transaksi

bilateral antara dua negara (yang disebut juga sebagai BIT atau

bilateral

investment

treaty).

Perjanjian

seperti

ini

banyak dibuat baik negara maju maupun berkembang. (3) Hukum internasional yang mengatur upaya-upaya penanaman modal di suatu wilayah (region) tertentu. Upaya ini timbul sebagai reaksi

ketidakpuasan

terhadap

hukum

internasional

yang

melindungi investor dan harta miliknya. Termasuk dalam hal ini adalah prinsip pembayaran ganti rugi manakalah terjadi nasionalisasi penanaman modal asing. (4) Berkembangnya aturan hukum internasional baru yang mengatur upaya-upaya penanaman modal yang terkait dengan perdagangan internasional

(the

trade-related

investment

measures

atau

TRIMs dalam kerangka WTO).7 Bidang keempat pengaturan hukum penanaman modal ini timbul sebagai

reaksi

terhadap

semakin meningkatnya kekhawatiran para

investor asing dan negara-negara maju terhadap semakin banyaknya 5

Michael A Geist, 'Toward a General Agreement on the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment,' 26 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 673 (1995). 6 M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 15,16.

4

kebijakan-kebijakan

penanaman

modal

khususnya di negara sedang

berkembang. Mereka menganggap upaya-upaya atau kebijakan penanaman modal

tersebut

telah

mempengaruhi

atau

berdampak

terhadap

perdagangan internasional. Fenomena dirasakan

yang

seiring

berkembang dengan

akhir-akhir

semakin

ini

telah

berkembangnya

semakin kesadaran

masyarakat internasional. Fenomena tersebut sekarang ini digembargemborkan sebagai liberalisasi atau globalisasi ekonomi. Termasuk di dalamnya adalah dijunjung tingginya kebebasan aliran penanaman modal. Bidang keempat dari hukum internasional ini sekarang telah menjadi hukum internasional positif setelah dirampungkannya hasilhasil

perundingan

Uruguay

yakni

dengan

disahkannya

perjanjian

mengenai TRIMs. Buku ini mengkaji secara ringkas bidang hukum internasional mengenai penanaman modal yang keempat. Kajian menunjukkan bahwa lambatnya di dalam mengembangkan hukum intenasional di bidang ini semata-mata disebabkan karena sulitnya upaya untuk mencakup dan mengatur seluruh aspek mengenai hukum penanaman modal asing. Besarnya perbedaan pandangan antara negara maju dan negara berkembang ternyata sulit sekali untuk mencapai titik temu. Negara maju menekankan pentingnya keterbukaan dan dihilangkannya semua upaya

atau

kebijakan

penanaman

modal

yang

terkait

dengan

perdagangan atau rintangan-rintangan penanaman modal. Sebaliknya, preventif. 7

Mereka

negara

sedang

acapkali

berkembang

menyandarkan

diri

menganut

sikap

kepada

alasan

Untuk kajian mengenai sejarah atau latar belakang mengenai TRIMs, lihat: Paul B. Christy III, 'Negotiating Investment in the GATT: A Call

5

kedaulatan dan menekankan kepada kebutuhan penanaman modal yang dikaitkan dengan aspek pembangunan. Kajian ini juga menyimpulkan bahwa: Pertama, WTO, bukan Bank Dunia,

PBB

upaya-upaya

atau OECD, adalah forum yang tepat untuk mengatur penanaman

modal

yang

merintangi

perdagangan

internasional (TRIMs). Kedua, dalam

hukum

kebijakan-kebijakan nasional

penanaman

masing-masing

negara

modal

yang

sedikit

termuat

banyak

akan

mempengaruhi posisi atau pendirian negara-negara tersebut di dalam proses negosiasi pembentukan aturan-aturan penanaman modal. B. Upaya-upaya Penanaman Modal yang terkait dengan Perdagangan (Trade Related Investment Measures). Dewasa

ini,

negara-negara

penerima

penanaman

modal

asing

tidak lagi menganggap masuknya modal asing sebagai suatu ancaman. Mereka tidak lagi memandangnya dengan kecurigaan. Pendirian ini berbeda di waktu awal tahun 1960-an hingga tahun 1970-an. Pada waktu itu negara-negara sedang berkembang masih kental menganggap bahwa

masuknya

modal

asing

adalah

suatu

ancaman

penjajahan

(ekonomi) baru dari bekas negara kolonial-nya (asing). Karena itu, setiap bentuk modal asing akan dipandang sebagai sesuatu yang patut dicurigai. Dewasa ini pandangan tersebut berubah. Modal asing tidak lagi dipandang sebagai suatu, istilah Sir Leon Brittan, ‘Trojan

for Functionalism,' 12 Mich. J. Int'l.L 743 (1991).

6

Horses’ (‘Kuda-kuda bangsa Troja’).8 Sekarang negara berkembang berpendapat

bahwa

mendatangkan

modal

keahlian

asing

dapat

manajerial,

memberi

ilmu

modal

kerja

dan

pengetahuan,

modal

dan

koneksi pasar.9 Penanaman modal asing dapat pula berperan dalam meningkatkan pendapatan

mata

perusahaan

uang

multinasional

asing

melalui

(Multinational

aktivitas

ekspor

Enterprise

atau

oleh MNE).10

Yang juga penting, penanaman modal asing (PMA) tidak melahirkan utang baru. Selain itu negara penerima tidak perlu merisaukan atau menghadapi

risiko

manakala

suatu

PMA

yang

masuk

ke

negerinya

ternyata tidak mendapatkan untung dari modal yang ditanamnya.11 Meskipun adanya aspek-aspek positif dari PMA dalam membantu upaya-upaya penerima,

PMA

pembangunan ternyata

kepada dapat

pula

perekonomian berdampak

negara-negara

negatif

terhadap

perekonomian negara penerima. Namun demikian sudah lama diakui bahwa PMA dapat melahirkan sengketa dengan negara penerima atau dengan penduduk asli setempat, khususnya di negara-negara sedang berkembang.

8

Sir Leon Brittan, 'Building on the Singapore Ministerial: Trade, Investment and Competition,' dalam: Jagdisch Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch, supra, note 4, hlm. 272. 9 William A. Fennel and Joseph W. Tyler, Trade and International Investment from the GATT to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (1995), hlm. 2003. 10 Lihat Eric M. Burt, 'Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization,' 12:6 Am. U.J.Int'l.L & Pol'y 1022 (1997); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, 'Factors Influencing the Flow of Foreign Investment and the Relevance of a Multilateral Guarantee Scheme,' 21 Int'l. Law 671, 675 (1987). 11 William A. Fennel, supra, note 9, hlm. 23.

7

Dampak lainnya adalah bahwa PMA oleh MNE dapat mengontrol atau mendominasi perusahaan-perusahaan lokal.12 Sebagai akibatnya, mereka dapat mempengaruhi kebijakan-kebijakan ekonomi atau bahkan kebijakan-kebijakan politis dari negara penerima. Di samping itu pula, MNE banyak dikecam telah mengembalikan keuntungan-keuntungan dari kegiatan bisnisnya ke negara di mana perusahaan induknya berada. Praktek seperti ini sedikitnya telah mengurangi cadangan persediaan mata uang asing (foreign exchange reserves) dari negara penerima. Yang lebih banyak dikecam pula adalah adanya tuduhan-tuduhan terhadap

MNE

yang

kegiatan

usahanya

ternyata

telah

merusak

lingkungan di sekitar lokasi usahanya, terutama di negara-negara sedang berkembang. Pasalnya adalah, MNE ini telah menggunakan zatzat yang membahayakan lingkungan atau menerapkan teknologi yang tidak atau kurang memperhatikan kelestarian lingkungan.13 Dampak

negatif

lainnya

adalah

bahwa

MNE

dikritik

telah

merusak aspek-aspek positif dari penanaman modal itu sendiri di negara-negara sedang berkembang. Misalnya, adanya praktek MNE yang acapkali

menerapkan

kegiatan-kegiatan

usahanya

yang

bersifat

restriktif (restrictive business practices).14

12

Sir Leon Brittan, supra, note 8, hlm. 271 (berpendapat bahwa banyak negara maju, khususnya di Eropa dan sekutunya menganggap penanaman modal sebagai saingan yang potensial terhadap perusahaan di dalam negeri). 13 Misalnya saja, perusakan lingkungan di Papua (Irian Jaya) sebagai akibat dari pengoperasian proyek tembaga dan mas oleh PT Freeport Indonesia (suatu anak perusahaan Amerika Serikat, the Freeport-McMoran Company), atau kasus bocornya reaktor nuklir di India yang terkenal dengan kasus the Bhopal case. 14 Eric M. Burt, supra, note 10, hlm. 1023.

8

C. TRIMS di Negara Sedang Berkembang. Dengan

mengingat

dampak-dampak

negatif

PMA,

dewasa

ini

negara-negara berkembang umumnya berpendapat bahwa akivitas atau ruang

lingkup

usaha

perusahaan-perusahaan

besar

ini

perlu

dibatasi. Mereka tidak boleh dengan bebas menanamkan modalnya di segala sektor. Negara-negara ini memandang bahwa PMA harus diawasi guna mencegah timbulnya aspek-aspek negatif tersebut tadi.15 Negara-negara

berkembang

umumnya,16

menerapkan

pengawasan

modal yang tertuang dalam bentuk berbagai upaya penanaman modal dan

persyaratan-persyaratan

penanaman

modal.

Persyaratan-

persyaratan demikian sekarang dikenal dengan istilah TRIMs atau trade-related investment measures terhadap perusahaan-perusahaan asing yang hendak menanamkan modalnya. Tujuan utama dari pengenaan upaya-upaya atau persyaratan-persyaratan ini oleh negara penerima adalah untuk mengatur dan mengontrol aliran PMA sedemikian rupa sehingga dapat memenuhi tujuan pembangunannya.17

15

Pendekatan ini yang diperkenalkan oleh Prof. M. Sornarajah, yang dikenal pula sebagai teori jalan tengah ('middle path theory'). Teori ini berupaya mendamaikan adanya polarisasi dari dua teori yang saling bersilangan, yaitu teori klasik ('classical theory') yang berpendapat bahwa semua PMA adalah baik sifatnya dan teori kedua yaitu teori ketergantungan ('dependency theory') yang beranggapan bahwa semua PMA sifatnya adalah membahayakan. (Lihat, M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 45 et.seqq). 16 Suatu survei yang dilakukan pada tahun 1982 oleh pemerintah Amerika Serikat menunjukkan bahwa negara-negara sedang berkembang telah menerapkan sekitar 28 per sen TRIMS dibandingkan dengan negara-negara maju yang hanya menerapkan 7,5 %. (David Greenaway, 'Why Are We Negotiating on TRIMs?', dalam: David Greenaway, et.al., Global Protectionism (Macmillan, Hampshire, 1991), hlm. 152. 17 Mina Mashayekhi and Murray Gibbs, 'Lessons from the Uruguay Round Negotiations on Investment,' 33:6 JWT 1 (1999) (menyatakan antara lain bahwa negara-negara sedang berkembang lebih menyukai kombinasi antara insentif penanaman modal dan persyaratan pelaksanaan (performance requirements) guna memenuhi tujuan pembangunannya); United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Impact of Trade Related Investment Measures on

9

Pada prinsipnya TRIMs ini merupakan unsur yang penting bagi kebijakan-kebijakan

negara

tuan

rumah,

terutama

negara

sedang

berkembang. Beberapa negara sedang berkembang bahkan ada pula yang menganggap

TRIMs

sebagai

pembangunannya.18

sarana

Negara

berkembang lainnya menggunakan TRIMS ini untuk meminimalkan dampak dari

PMA.

Negara-negara

ini

telah

pula

menjadikan

upaya-upaya

tersebut sebagai bagian dari pembangunan ekonominya untuk mencapai tingkat pertumbuhan pembangunan negaranya.19 Tujuan lainnya dari negara tuan rumah di dalam menerapkan TRIMS ini adalah mencegah perusahaan PMA untuk membuat putusan atau kebijakan yang sifatnya lintas batas. Putusan atau kebijakan seperti

ini

perekonomian penerapan kebijakan

biasanya

mempengaruhi

tuan

rumahnya.20

dipandang

semata-mata

negara

TRIMS

dapat

setiap

negara

yang

Di

samping

sebagai

merdeka

kebijakan

suatu untuk

itu hak

atau pula, atau

mengatur

Trade and Development (UN Doc.ST/CTC/120, U.N. Sales No. E.91.II,A.19 (1991). 18 Lihat misalnya pernyataan yang dibuat oleh Delegasi ASEAN pada Joint ASEAN Statement on the Uruguay Round at the APEC Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 30 July 1990, para. 14. 19 Ralph H. Folsom & Michael W. Gordon, International Business Transactions, vol. 2 (St. Paul Minn.,: West Publishing Co., 1995), hlm. 137 (menyatakan bahwa negara-negara sedang berkembang berpendirian bahwa TRIMS adalah sarana untuk mendorong tujuan-tujuan pemerintah di dalam memajukan pembangunan ekonomi dan memastikan perdagangan yang berimbang); Rachel McCulloch, 'Investment Policies in the GATT,' 13 World Economy 541, 545 (1990), (mengungkapkan berbagai bentuk kebijakan nasional di bidang penanaman modal), Edmund M.A. Kwan, 'Trade Related Investment Measures in the Uruguay Round: Towards a GATT for Investment,' 16 N.C.J.Int'l.L.& Com.Reg. 309, 309, 319 (1991). 20 Lars Oxelheim, 'Foreign Direct Investment and the Liberalization of Capital Movements,' dalam Lars Oxelheim (ed)., The Global Race for Foreign Direct Investment, (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1993), hlm. 14. Cf., Puri dan Bondap berpendapat bahwa TRIMS tidak semata-mata mengatur FDI untuk memenuhi kebijakan negara tuan ruman tetapi juga untuk mengundang investor datang ke negaranya. (Puri and Bondad, 'TRIMS, Development Aspects and the General Agreement,' dalam Uruguay Round: Further Papers on Selected Issues, (New York: United Nations, 1990), hlm. 57.

10

perekonomiannya termasuk PMA di dalamnya (guna mencegah dampak buruk dari PMA).21 Kebijakan seperti ini sudah barang tentu suatu langkah yang lebih

menguntungkan

berkembang)

negara

daripada

penerima

negara-negara

(khususnya

maju

negara

(pengimpor

sedang

modal

dan

negara di mana perusahaan-perusahaan besar berdomisili).22 Para

investor

asing

sebaliknya

berpendapat

lain.

Mereka

beranggapan, TRIMS merupakan rintangan terhadap perdagangan dunia dan aliran penanaman modal serta telah menghalangi mereka dalam menerapkan

strategi

kompetitif

global

yang

terpadu.23

Suatu

penelitian yang dilakukan pada tahun 1977 dan 1982, misalnya, menunjukkan

bahwa

45

hingga

60

persen

perusahaan-perusahaan

Amerika Serikat terkena pengaruh dari adanya TRIMS ini.24

21

P.T Muchlinski, supra, note 1, hlm. 172. Untuk kajian secara umum tentang TRIMS, khususnya mengenai sifat dan perkembangannya, lihat: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Impact of Trade Related Investment Measures on Trade and Development (UN Doc.ST/CTC/120, U.N. Sales No. E.91.II,A.19 (1991). 22 Cf., sewaktu Tokyo Round (1979) berlangsung, mantan duta besar Kanada untuk GATT menyatakan bahwa kebijakan negara-negara sedang berkembang yang mengenakan syarat-syarat terhadap penanaman modal asing langsung merupakan praktek yang telah lama berlangsung dan diakui. Beliau berpendapat bahwa secara umum para investor asing pun dapat menerima adanya persyaratan-persyaratan tersebut sebagai harga yang harus dibayar atas kesempatan untuk membuat keuntungan yang besar di dalam pasar negara-negara sedang berkembang. (Rodney de C. Grey, " '1992' TRIMS and Selected Issues (New York: United Nations, 1990), hlm. 238). 23 UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment (New York: UN, 1997), hlm. 135. 24 Low and Subramanian, 'TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An Unfinished Business,' dalam: Robert M. Stern, (ed.), Multilateral Trading System (Ann Arbor: the University of Michigan Press, 1993), hlm. 418. Cf., suatu pandangan yang berbeda dikemukakan oleh sarjana Hong Kong yang menyatakan tidak ada bukti yang jelas dan dapat diterima bahwa TRIMS benar-benar merintangi perdagangan dan aliran penanaman modal. Suatu kajian dari sudut pandang ekonomi mengungkapkan bahwa TRIMS sesungguhnya dapat digunakan secara efisien sebagai penyangkal atas akibat buruk dari akibat negatif dari perdagangan dan penanaman modal. (Lihat lebih lanjut: Eden S.H. Yu and Chi-Chun Chao, 'On Investment Measures and Trade,' 21 World Economy 4 (1998), hlm. 549 dan khususnya hlm. 559.

11

Pada umumnya, persyaratan penanaman modal dapat digolongkan ke

dalam

bentuk.25

dua

requirement)

dan

requirement).

Pertama,

kedua,

persyaratan

persyaratan

Kebijakan

negara-negara

masuk

operasional

(entry

(operational

menunjukkan

bahwa

pada

umumnya negara-negara menerapkan kedua bentuk persyaratan tersebut sebagai syarat untuk masuknya modal asing ke negaranya.26 Pada

tahap

pertama,

yaitu

persyaratan

masuk

(entry

requirement), biasanya badan penanaman modal dari negara penerima memeriksa apakah usulan atau proposal penanaman modal asing sesuai atau

cocok

dengan

Pertimbangan

tujuan-tujuan

lainnya,

apakah

pembangunan

proposal

negaranya.

tersebut

memberikan

keuntungan kepada negara penerima.27 Karena itu, manakala negara penerima setelah memeriksa suatu proposal PMA beranggapan bahwa proposal

tersebut

tidak

memenuhi

persyaratan

masuk

atau

persyaratan kebijakan penanaman modal nasionalnya, maka pemerintah tersebut dapat menolak permohonan penanaman modal. Sebaliknya, manakala pemerintah negara penerima beranggapan bahwa suatu usulan PMA memenuhi persyaratan untuk masuknya suatu penanaman modal, maka negara yang bersangkutan akan menerapkan persyaratan

yang

persyaratan requirements).

25

kedua,

yaitu

pelaksanaan Ruang

lingkup

persyaratan

(operational

operasional atau

persyaratan-persyaratan

atau

performance ini

cukup

Lihat juga Muchlinski, supra, note 1, hlm. 172 et.seq. Fennel berpendapat bahwa ada juga TRIMS yang tidak secara eksplisit merupakan bagian dari kebijakan perdagangan, yaitu rintangan-rintangan birokrasi di berbagai negara sedang berkembang yang dapat menjadi rintangan bagi penanaman modal. (Lihat: William A. Fennel and Joseph W. Tyler, supra, note 9, hlm. 2034). 27 M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 100-102. 26

12

luas,

bergantung

kepada

tujuan

atau

kebijakan

masing-masing

negara. Namun adalah

demikian

persyaratan

requirements), balancing

persyaratan menggunakan

persyaratan

requirements)

requirements), persyaratan

kandungan

perdagangan

persyaratan

pembatasan

mata

pelaksanaan

uang

impor

asing

dan

yang

local yang

ekspor

paling

(local

content

berimbang

(export

(limitation pengiriman

(trade

performance

on mata

umum

imports), uang

asing

(foreign exchange and remittance requirements), persyaratan modal minimum

(minimum

teknologi

local

(technology

equity transfer

requirements),

persyaratan

requirements),

dan

alih

persyaratan

lisensi produk (product licensing requirements).28 Dengan

diterapkannya

persyaratan-persyaratan

ini,

negara

tuan rumah akan memastikan bahwa PMA akan memberikan keuntungan maksimum kepada pembangunan ekonominya. Dalam hal ini, PMA akan digunakan

sebaik-baiknya

untuk

membangun

atau

untuk

memenuhi

rencana pembangunan atau rencana perekonomian negaranya. Semua persyaratan ini lebih banyak dan lazim dipraktekkan oleh

negara

tuan

rumah.

Legalitas

upaya

ini

disandarkan

pada

alasan untuk memelihara kedaulatan atau pengawasan negara terhadap PMA.29 Setiap usulan penanaman modal yang tidak memenuhi tujuan dari

28

negara

tuan

rumah

atau

usulan

PMA

yang

diduga

akan

Eric M. Burt, supra, note 10, hlm. 1025. Maskus and Eby, 'Developing New Rules and Disciplines on Trade-Related Investment Measures,' in Robert M. Stern (ed.), supra, note 24, hlm. 451.

29

13

membahayakan tujuan pembangunan negaranya, maka negara tersebut akan menolak masuknya PMA.30 Semua

upaya

atau

kebijakan

tersebut

adalah

sah.

Pada

prinsipnya hukum internasional memberikan kekuasaan, jurisdiksi atau hak-hak berdaulat kepada suatu negara untuk mengatur setiap kegiatan. Termasuk di dalamnya adalah kegiatan perdagangan atau ekonomi di wilayahnya. Perlu ditekankan di sini bahwa jangka waktu penanaman modal MNEs

di

negara

tuan

rumah

biasanya

cukup

lama.

Karena

itu,

pertimbangan waktu inilah yang juga menjadi latar belakang mengapa negara tuan rumah mengatur ruang lingkup PMA. Langkah ini perlu guna mengantisipasi akibat-akibat yang mungkin timbul di kemudian hari dari PMA melalui berbagai kebijakan atau persyaratan.31 Kewenangan negara tuan rumah untuk mengatur masuknya PMA hanya tunduk kepada perjanjian-perjanjian internasional (di bidang PMA)

yang

Pengakuan

ditandatangani atas

hak

ini

oleh

negara

yang

bersangkutan.32

sangat

penting

untuk

negara-negara,

khususnya negara sedang berkembang. Hak tersebut diperlukan untuk mengatur dan mengawasi masuknya PMA ke dalam wilayahnya.33 Prof. M. Sornarajah menjelaskan hak ini sebagai berikut:34 'The right of a state to control entry of foreign investment is unlimited, as it is a right that flows from sovereignty. Entry of any foreign investment can be excluded by a state. Once an alien enters a state, both he and his property are 30

M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 100. Eric M. Burt, supra, note 10, hlm. 1027. 32 Muchlinski, supra, note 1, hlm. 173. 33 Dapat dikemukakan di sini bahwa adanya pengakuan untuk mengatur dan mengontrol ini telah mencerminkan pendirian negara-negara sedang berkembang di Uruguay Round mengenai TRIMS. 34 M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 83. 31

14

subject to the law of the host state. This result flows from the fact that the foreign investor had voluntarily subjected himself to the regime of the host state by making entry into it. The absoluteness of the right to exclude the alien prior to entry becomes somewhat modified after entry as the alien then comes to enjoy a status, which is protected by international law.'

Tampak bahwa hukum internasional berperan penting di dalam penanaman

modal.

berperan

penting

Peranan di

hukum

dalam

ini

juga

menyelesaikan

cukup

luas.

sengketa

Ia

yang

juga

timbul

antara dua negara, yakni antara negara penerima dengan negara dari para investor.35 Uraian

di

atas

menunjukkan

hukum

internasional

telah

mengakui hak negara-negara untuk mengontrol orang asing (investor asing atau MNE). Ironisnya perkembangan hukum internasional di bidang ini (khususnya PMA) masih diwarnai oleh berbagai debat di antara para ahli hukum internasional.36 Latar belakang dari keadaan ini adalah masih adanya sengketa atau polarisasi pandangan antara (sarjana-sarjana) negara maju dan negara sedang berkembang. Pada prinsipnya sarjana dari negara maju berpandangan

perlunya

suatu

rejim

hukum

internasional

yang

liberal, yaitu rejim yang tidak boleh menghalangi aliran penanaman modal ke mana pun juga. Sedangkan

sarjana

dari

negara

berkembang

acapkali

masih

bersandar pada prinsip kedaulatan negara. Mereka berpendapat bahwa 35

M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 7-8. Secara umum, peranan yang dimainkan oleh hukum internasional antara lain adalah bahwa hukum ini meletakkan beberapa prinsip tentang penyelesaian sengketa, misalnya saja, prinsip penyelesaian sengketa melalui cara-cara damai, atau larangan menggunakan kekerasan di dalam menyelesaikan sengketa.

15

adalah hak berdaulat setiap negara untuk mengontrol setiap PMA, dari manapun asalnya, yang masuk ke dalamnya.37 Pandangan negara-negara maju terhadap adanya TRIMS adalah bahwa TRIMS tersebut telah memaksa mereka untuk mempertimbangkan faktor-faktor

non-ekonomis

di

dalam

rencana

penanaman

modal

mereka. Dalam pandangan mereka, TRIMS tidaklah kondusif dan telah menjadi rintangan bagi perdagangan. Karena itu, mereka bertekad untuk mengurangi atau bahkan menghapus adanya upaya-upaya TRIMS tersebut. D. TRIMS di Negara Maju Meskipun adanya pandangan-pandangan di atas, beberapa negara maju

sebenarnya

perdagangan beberapa

terhadap

negara

semata-mata

telah

menerapkan

penanaman

telah

sebagai

juga

modal.

berubah

Hal

rintangan-rintangan ini

kedudukannya,

pengekspor

modal,

terjadi

yaitu

tetapi

ketika

bukan

juga

lagi

sebagai

pengimpor atau penerima modal asing.38 Adalah benar bahwa negara-negara ini telah mengurangi atau berupaya

menghapus

rintangan-rintangan

penanaman

modal.

Namun

rintangan tersebut tidak seluruhnya hilang. Ada beberapa rintangan yang masih ada. Ada dua alasan mendasar mengapa beberapa rintangan masih

36

dipertahankan.

Pertama,

negara

maju

kadang-kadang

pula

Prof. M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 1 (menyatakan bahwa hukum penanaman modal telah menjadi bahan debat yang cukup sengit di antara para sarjana hukum internasional pada pertengahan abad ke dua-puluh). 37 M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 85. 38 Robert H. Edwards Jr and Simon N. Lester, 'Towards a More Comprehensive World Trade Organization on Trade-Related Investment Measures,' 33 Stan.J. Int'l.L. 169 (1997), khususnya hlm. 184-186 (memberikan contoh-contoh praktek Amerika Serikat dan Kanada di dalam menerapkan TRIMS terhadap penanaman modal asing).

16

menyandarkan pendekatannya kepada rasa nasionalisme yang tinggi. Kedua, terdapat rasa kekhawatiran pada sebagian negara maju bahwa modal

asing

akan

mengambil

alih

aset-aset

produktif

di

negaranya.39 Selain itu, beberapa negara maju telah pula menutup atau melarang

beberapa

sektor

untuk

PMA.

Atau,

kalaupun

akhirnya

sektor-sektor tersebut diliberalisasi, tingkat keikutsertaan PMA di

sektor

tersebut

dibatasi.40

sangat

PMA

tidak

diperkenankan

untuk ikut serta di dalam permodalan di dalam privatisasi asetaset

milik

negara.

Atau,

PMA

ini

akan

dikaji

dan

hanya

diperbolehkan manakala mereka telah memenuhi beberapa persyaratan tertentu.41 Negara-negara maju utama, seperti Eropa, Kanada, Australia dan

bahkan

Amerika

penanaman

modal

kebijakan

tersebut

Serikat

seperti

mempraktekkan

ini.

kepada

Mereka

kebijakan-kebijakan

menyandarkan

standar-standar

mereka

kebijakanyang

pada

hakekaktnya merupakan hambatan terhadap masuknya PMA ke negaranegara tersebut. Dalam laporan pada tahun 1988, PBB mengungkapkan bahwa Amerika Serikat telah membatasi kepemilikan atas sektorsektor oleh PMA yang dapat mempengaruhi atau mengancam keselamatan dan kepentingan vital, seperti pengangkutan laut (maritim) dan pengangkutan udara.42

39

Lars Oxelheim, supra, note 20, hlm. 27. Stephen J. Canner, 'Trade and International Investment: from GATT to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,' dalam: Joseph F. Dennin, (ed)., Law and Practice of the World Trade Organization (New York: Oceana Publ., 1995), hlm. 12. 41 Stephen J. Canner, Ibid, hlm. 12. 42 William A. Fennel and Joseph W. Tyler, supra, note 9, hlm. 2037, (mengutip U.N. Center on Transnational Corps., 7 National Legislation 40

17

Guna Serikat

mengantisipasi

mengundangkan

masuknya

suatu

PMA

ke

negaranya,

Amerika

Undang-Undang yang disebut Defense

Production Act. Tujuan utama dari UU ini adalah mengawasi dan melindungi produk-produk yang sifatnya strategis bagi pertahanan Amerika Serikat. Di tahun 1975, Amerika Serikat mendirikan suatu badan antar departemen

yang

disebut

the

Interagency

Committee

on

Foreign

Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS). Badan baru ini bertugas mengawasi aliran masuk PMA di bidang perminyakan. Setahun

kemudian

di

tahun

1976,

Amerika

Serikat

mengundangkan the International Investment and Trade in Service Survey Act (IITSSA) guna memonitor aliran penanaman modal Amerika Serikat ke luar negeri dan PMA yang masuk ke dalam wilayah Amerika Serikat. The IITSSA mewajibakan para investor untuk memberikan laporan secara periodik mengenai kegiatan penanaman modalnya.43 Pada tahun 1988, pemerintah Amerika Serikat mengundangkan the Exxon-Florio Act. Undang-undang ini memberi kewenangan kepada presiden untuk mengkaji ulang setiap penanaman modal asing. Kajian ini dipandang perlu dilakukan untuk mengetahui apakah penanaman modal

tersebut

akan

mempengaruhi

atau

membahayakan

keamanan

nasional Amerika Serikat. Undang-Undang ini juga memberi wewenang kepada presiden untuk menunda atau melarang PMA yang ternyata

and Regulation Relating to Transnational Corporations 289, ST/CTC/31, U.N. Sales No. E. 89. II. A.9 [1989]). 43 Robert H. Edwards Jr and Simon N. Lester, supra, note 38, hlm. 184186.

18

mempengaruhi

atau

membahayakan

keamanan

nasional

Amerika

Serikat.44

44

William A. Fennel and Joseph W. Tyler, supra, note 9, hlm. 2037; M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 85.

1

BAB II LATAR BELAKANG NEGOSIASI TRIMs Hingga

dewasa

ini

belum

ada

aturan

hukum

internasional

komprehensif yang mengatur PMA. Sedangkan lembaga internasional yang mengatur dan mengawasi liberalisasi PMA baru terbentuk pada tahun 1995. Alasan utama dari keadaan ini adalah karena upayaupaya masyarakat internasional terhadap masalah ini masih sangat sektoral sifatnya.1 Dalam

perkembangan

awalnya,

penanaman

modal

asing

secara

langsung mulai tampak di masa penjajahan (kolonialisme). Penanaman modal pada waktu itu berlangsung dalam bentuk pergerakan manusia (investor) bersama modalnya dari Eropa ke negara-negara di Asia, Afrika dan Amerika selatan. Umumnya modal yang ditanamkan tersebut ditujukan untuk mengeksploitasi kekayaan melimpah di negara-negara tersebut. Pemerintah penjajah biasanya membuat suatu kebijakan yang menarik

bagi

para

investor

asing.

Mereka

juga

memberikan

perlindungan dan jaminan bahwa para investor dan harta bendanya dapat tunduk kepada jurisdiksi pengadilan negara penerima di mana para investor tersebut berdomisili atau menginvestasikan modalnya.

1

Cf., Pandangan yang berbeda dapat terlihat dalam: Lee E. Preston and Duane Windsor, (eds)., The Rules of the Game in the Global Economy: Policy Regime for International Business, (Boston-Dordrecht-London: Kluwer, 2nd.ed., 1977), hlm.137 (yang berpendapat bahwa peranan penaman modal asing akan memainkan perannya pasca perang tata ekonomi internasional tidak diantisipasi manakala fondasi dari hukum perdagangan dan pembayaran tidak ada).

2

Atau, mereka diperkenankan pula untuk tunduk kepada jurisdiksi nasional negara para investor tersebut.2 Sebenarnya merupakan

perlindungan

masalah

yang

investasi

penting.

pada

waktu

Umumnya

itu

para

tidak

penguasa

(pemerintahan penjajahan) telah menjadikan masalah perlindungan ini sebagai salah satu bagian dari kebijakannya di wilayah negara jajahannya. Karena itu kebutuhan investor akan perlindungan hukum internasional tidaklah begitu penting. Setelah

berakhirnya

Perang

Dunia

II

yang

diikuti

oleh

lahirnya negara-negara baru di Asia, Afrika dan Amerika Selatan yang

memerdekakan

perhatiannya tersebut.

dirinya,

kepada

Mereka

para

pembangunan

berupaya

pula

investor

mulai

mengfokuskan

kembali

negara-negara

baru

mencari

syarat-syarat

yang

menguntungkan di dalam usaha penanaman modalnya.3 Dalam masa ini terjadi suatu masa baru di mana para investor dan pemerintah negara-negara baru tersebut membuat kesepakatankesepakatan mengenai penanaman modal yang tertuang di dalam suatu perjanjian. Dalam hal ini, para investor asing mulai berupaya mencari

aturan-aturan

yang

mengatur

penanaman

modal

asing

di

tingkat bilateral, regional atau internasional. Upaya petama di dalam menetapkan aturan hukum intenasional bagi penanaman modal asing terjadi sebelum Perang Dunia II. Pada masa itu, Amerika Serikat dan beberapa negara Eropa menetapkan

2

Nico Schrijver, 'Developments in International Investment Law', in: Ronald St. John Macdonald, (ed)., Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), hlm. 704. 3 Preston and Windsor, supra, note 1, hlm. 136.

3

standar-standar internasional untuk perlindungan penanaman modal asing. Standar-standar

bagi

perlindungan

penanaman

modal

ini

sesungguhnya pula dibuat untuk menampung kebutuhan negara-negara (maju) dan para investornya. Fokus utama dari standar tersebut adalah terhadap

mengenai

status

berbagai

perlindungan

orang

aspek

modalnya.4

asing.

hukum

Termasuk

Standar

mengenai di

ini

penanaman

dalamnya

adalah

diterapkan modal

dan

pengaturan

mengenai perlindungan hak-hak milik penanaman modal asing (the regulations of foreign investment protection of property rights), penyelesian

sengketa,

hak

asasi

manusia

dan

orang

asing,

dan

perlindungan dalam hal terjadinya pemberontakan atau kekacauan.5 Negara-negara

maju

tersebut

berpendapat

bahwa

pengaturan-

pengaturan seperti ini harus ditaati oleh semua negara. Mereka menyebut pengaturan-pengaturan tersebut sebagai standar minimum yang harus diterapkan secara internasional (international minimum standard).6 Standar-standar perlakuan tersebut juga dimasukkan di dalam perjanjian-perjanjian di bidang perdagangan. Untuk memastikan agar standar-standar

4

tersebut

mengikat,

negara-negara

maju

berupaya

Untuk analsis lebih lanjut mengenai hal ini lihat: M. Sornarajah, 'Power & Justice in International Law,' 1 SJICL 28 (1997), (berpendapat bahwa hukum internasional 'has been an extension of power play of states and curtailment of such use of power by normative principles involved in notions of justice'). (hlm.49) 5 Nico Schrijver, 'Developments in International Investment Law', supra., note 2, hlm. 706. 6 Untuk pembahasan lebih lanjut mengenai standar minimum internasional ini, lihat: G. Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1969).

4

memaksakan

standar-standar

tersebut

melalui

tekanan-tekanan

politik atau bahkan kadang kala melalui intervensi militer.7 Perlakuan yang cenderung lebih menguntungkan investor asing ditentang keras oleh beberapa negara Amerika Latin. Salah seorang sarjana yang menentang standar internasional ini adalah Carlos Calvo,

seorang

ahli

hukum

dan menteri luar negeri Argentina.8

Menurut Calvo, seorang asing yang menetap di negera lain (untuk berusaha dan lain-lain) tunduk kepada hak-hak perlindungan yang sama dengan warga negara di negara tersebut. Menurut Calvo pula, orang asing tidak dapat menuntut hak perlindungan yang lebih besar.9 Pendapat ini menjadi standar yang digunakan berkembang

dan

diterapkan

dalam

upaya

oleh

mereka

sebagian mengatur

besar

penanaman

negara

sedang

modal

asing.

Mereka berpendapat bahwa penanaman modal asing di suatu negara tunduk kepada hukum di negara tersebut, termasuk perlindungannya

7

UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment (New York: UN, 1997), hlm. 135. 8 Untuk pengkajian mengenai status Calvo Doctrine dewasa ini dalam hubungannya dengan prinsip nasional di dalam hukum internasional mengenai penanaman modal, lihat: Denise Manning-Cabrol, 'The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of the Calvo Principle: Equality of Foreign and National Investors,' 26 Law & Pol'y Int'l. Bus. 1169 (1995) at 1199. 9 'M. Sornarajah, The Law on Foreign Investment, (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1994), hlm. 11. Perlu dikemukakan di sini, sebagaimana diungkapkan oleh Prof. M. Sornarajah, bahwa ‘hukum yang mengatur penanaman modal asing selama adanya konflik pandangan antara Amerika Serikat dan negaranegara Amerika Latin tidak terkait dengan pengambil-alihan harta milik orang asing. Masalah utamanya adalah kasus-kasus mengenai penyerangan oleh penduduk atau balas dendam politis yang dilakukan untuk memberi keuntungan kepada pemerintah Junta yang sedang berkuasa. Beliau pun menyatakan bahwa 'the law on foreign investment in this nature should be kept in mind since the early scholars tended to apply the uniform principles between the investment cases in Latin American mentioned above and the cases of the taking of foreign investment resulting from economic reforms in later period both in Latin America and other part of the world'). (M. Sornarajah, supra, note 8, hlm. 11).

5

dan

ganti

ruginya

manakala

negara

penerima

menasionalisasi

penanaman modal asing. Begitu pula manakala suatu sengketa timbul dari adanya suatu perjanjian penanaman modal asing. Dalam keadaan tersebut sengketa harus

diselesaikan

menurut

hukum

nasional

negara

penerima

investasi. Pengadilan yang mengadili sengketa itu pun haruslah pengadilan nasional dari negara tuan rumah (penerima PMA). Standar nasional ini diikuti, antara lain, oleh Indonesia selama tahun 1960-an di dalam sengketa nasionalisasi perusahaanperusahaan perkebunan Belanda di Sumatera. Dalam sengketa ini, pemerintah

Indonesia

menyandarkan

pada hukum nasionalnya untuk

membayar ganti rugi kepada pemerintah Belanda.10 Konflik antara dua standar tersebut di atas juga mendapat perhatian Liga Bngsa-Bangsa (LBB). Dalam berbagai konperensi badan dunia

ini,

negara-negara

gagal

mencapai

kesepakatan

mengenai

perbedaan standar yang harus diterapkan antara kewajiban-kewajiban negara tuan rumah dengan hak-hak investor asing.11 Upaya yang lebih serius dari masyarakat internasional untuk merumuskan pengaturan mengenai PMA terjadi setelah Perang Dunia II usai.

Dalam

suatu

Ketenagakerjaan

(the

konperensi United

PBB

Nations

mengenai

Perdagangan

Conference

on

Trade

dan and

Employment) di tahun 1947-1948, negara-negara juga telah menaruh perhatiannya kepada masalah penanaman modal ini. Namun pada waktu 10

Lihat Sudargo Gautama, Segi-segi Hukum Internasional mengenai Nasionalisasi di Indonesia (Djakarta: Universitas, 1969); Martin Domke, 'Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign Courts,' 54 Am.J.Int'l.L 305 (1960); Huala Adolf, Aspek-aspek Negara dalam Hukum Internasional, Jakarta: Rjagrafindo Persada, cet. 3, 2002, khususnya Bab V tentang Tanggung Jawab Negara.

6

itu, isu penanaman modal bukan merupakan suatu agenda khusus. Ia semata-mata masih bagian dari suatu agenda yang membahas persoalan praktek bisnis yang restriktif (restrictive business practices).12 Isu penanaman modal mendapat suatu tempat khusus dan serius dalam

aganda

suatu

konperensi

internasional

terjadi

ketika

masyarakat internasional menandatanani the Final Act of the Havana Charter for International Trade Organization.13 Final Act (Piagam Havana) ini mengatur di dalamnya upaya penggalakan aliran modal intenasional untuk penanaman modal yang produktif di antara tujuan dari the International Trade Organization (ITO) (Article 1 : 2). Bab

III

dari

Final

Act

tersebut

yang

berjudul

"International

Investment for Economic Development and Reconstructions" antara lain menyatakan bahwa: “1. The Members recognize that: (a) international investment, both public and private, can be of great value in promoting economic development and reconstruction and consequent social progress. ... (c) without prejudice to existing international agreements to which Members are parties, a Member has the right: (i) to take any appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure that foreign investment is not used as a basis for interference in internal affairs or national policies; (ii) to determine whether and to what extent and upon what terms it will allow future foreign investment... .”14

11

UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm. 136. UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm. 136. 13 Untuk teks the Havana Charter, lihat: United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, ECONF. 2/78. Teks tersebut juga termuat dalam buku klasik mengentai ITO: Clair Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (New York: Macmillan, 1949), hlm. 227-319. The Havana Charter tidak pernah berlaku karena adanya kondisi-kondisi pada waktu itu. Pasal 103 Charter, tidak terpenuhi dalam jangka waktu yang ditetapkan. Keengganan Amerika Serikat untuk meratifikasi the Charter merupakan penyebab utama kegagalannya. 14 Article 12:1 Havana Charter. Analisis lebih lanjut dan latar belakang sejarah Bab III dan pasal-pasal mengenai penanaman modal dalam Charter, lihat: Clair Wilcox, supra note 13, hlm. 140-148. 12

7

Piagam Havana tidak meletakkan persyaratan terhadap negaranegara anggotanya untuk mempraktekkan perlakuan non-diskriminatif atau perlakuan nasional terhadap PMA.15 Di samping itu, Piagam juga tidak mengatur isu-isu penting lainnya, seperti penggunaan insentif penanaman modal atau persyaratan-persyaratan pelaksanaan oleh

negara

sengketa

penerima.

untuk

Piagam

menyelesaikan

juga

tidak

mengatur

sengketa-sengketa

penyelesaian

penanaman

modal

antara negara tuan rumah dan investor asing.16 Beberapa

sarjana

berpendapat

bahwa

salah

satu

alasan

gagalnya ITO adalah karena adanya ketentuan mengenai penanaman modal

sebagaimana

pendapat

diatur

menyatakan

dalam

bahwa

Pasal

pasal

12

tersebut.

tersebut

Salah

terlalu

satu

memberi

perlindungan kepada negara berkembang. Dalam hal ini, Sylvia Ostry menyatakan sebagai berikut: “The ITO did include investment as well as trade but the provisions were heavily circumscribed, reflecting the fears of many developing countries strong pro-investment rules would lead to foreign control over natural resources and 'strategic' industries.”17 GATT yang semula direncanakan sebagai suatu dokumen yang dilampirkan kepada Piagam ITO tidak menyebut suatu ketentuan apa pun mengenai penanaman modal. Dapat dimaklumi, GATT sejak semula hanya direncanakan untuk mengatur tarif dan perdagangan. 15

Edward M. Graham, 'Should There Be Rules on Foreign Direct Investment,' dalam: John H. Dunning, (ed)., Governments, Globalization, and International Business (New York: Oxford U.P., 1997), hlm. 484. 16 Edward M. Graham, Ibid., hlm. 484. 17 Sylvia Ostry, A New Regime for Foreign Direct Investment (Washington DC: Group of Thirty, 1997), hlm. 3. Cf., Eric M. Burt, 'Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization,' 12:6 Am. U.J.Int'l.L & Pol'y 1028 (1997) (mengupas keinginan negara sedang berkembang bahwa pasal-pasal mengenai penanaman modal di dalam ITO atau Havana Charter lebih menguntungkan negara sedang berkembang).

8

Namun memberi

demikian,

the

perhatiannya

CONTRACTING

kepada

PARTIES

penanaman

GATT

modal

telah

pula

internasional.

Sayangnya perhatian tersebut tidaklah terlalu serius. Dalam salah satu resolusinya mengenai 'International Investment for Economic Development,' pada tanggal 4 Maret 1955, the CONTRCTING PARTIES antara lain menyatakan: “Recommended that the contracting parties who are in a position to provide capital for international investment and the contracting parties who desire to obtain such capital use their best endeavours to create conditions calculated to stimulate the international flow of capital having regard in particular, to the importance for this purpose of providing by appropriate methods for security for existing and future investment, the avoidance of double taxation, and facilities for the transfer of earning upon foreign investment, and urge that contracting parties upon the request of any contracting party enter into consultation or participate in negotiations directed to the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreement relating to these matters.”18 Dalam waktu

suatu

tahun-tahun

sebenarnya

belum

pengamatannya, permulaan siap

untuk

UNCTAD

Perang

berpendapat

Dunia

mengadopsi

II,

bahwa

pada

negara-negara

aturan-aturan

hukum

internasional untuk mengatur kebijakan penanaman modalnya. Karena itu pula negara-negara, terutama negara maju, mengambil kebijakan untuk mengadakan perjanjian bilateral dengan negara lainnya di bidang penanaman modal ini. Waktu

itu

perjanjian

demikian

dikenal

sebagai

the

Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties.19 Perjanjian seperti ini biasanya mengatur hal-hal yang cukup luas. Termasuk di dalamnya adalah hak warga negara dari masing-masing negara dan perlindungan harta miliknya di luar negeri. Prinsip lainnya yang

18 19

3S/49,50, GATT, Guide to GATT Law and Practice, updated 6th.ed. (1995). UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm. 136.

9

terkait adalah perlakuan nasional dan perlakuan MFN, pelayaran dan masalah jurisdiksi masing-masing negara. Ketentuan yang luas ini sebagaimana termuat dalam perjanjian FCN ternyata tidak memuaskan para investor dan negara penerima. Mereka berpendapat bahwa perlu adanya peraturan yang khusus untuk mengatur masalah penanaman modal. Pandangan seperti ini kemudian melahirkan suatu bentuk perjanjian baru yang khusus di bidang penanaman modal yaitu perjanjian penanaman modal bilateral (the bilateral investment treaty atau BIT).20 Dalam

perkembangannya

kemudian,

negara-negara

telah

menggunakan perjanjian seperti BIT ini sebagai salah satu upaya untuk

mengadakan

professor

perjanjian

Sornarajah,

suatu

dengan

negara

pengkajian

lainnya. terhadap

Menurut BIT

ini

menunjukkan bahwa terdapat sekitar 2000 BIT yang dibuat sejak tahun 1990.21

20

Nico Schrijver, 'Developments', supra, note 2, hlm. 713. Cf., untuk kajian mengenai peralihan dari FCN ke BIT ini, lihat: Jeswald Salacuse, 'BIT by BIT: The Growth of BITs and Their Impact on Foreign Investment Treaties and the Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries,' 24 Int'l. Law 657 (1990). Lihat juga: Todd S Shenkin, 'Trade Related Investment Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties and The GATT: Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty,' 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 548 (1994); Huala Adolf, Hukum Ekonomi Internasional, Jakarta: Rajagrafindo Persada, cet. 3, 2002, khususnya Bab I.. 21 Kumpulan perjanjian penanaman modal bilateral dapat dilihat pada: ICSID, Investment Laws of the World (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1972 ), Lihat pula website ICSID di: ; Paul Peters, 'Exhaustion of Local Remedies: Ignorance in Most Bilateral Investment Treaties,' XLIV NILR 233 (1997), hlm. 244. Kajian pengantar (awal) untuk BIT ini lihat: Margrete Stevens & Ruvan de Alwis, 'References on Bilateral Investment Treaties,' 7 ICSID Rev. FILJ (1992), hlm. 229-283. Kajian lengkap mengenai BIT, lihat: Dolzer & M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995). Dan untuk kajian agak kontroversial mengenai status BIT ini sebagai hukum kebiasaan internasional, lihat: M. Sornarajah, The Pursuit of Nationalized Property (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), hlm. 40; Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law, (London: Stevens and Sons, 1969), hlm. 8-9.

10

Tujuan utama dari perjanjian bilateral seperti itu adalah untuk

memastikan

diambil

alih

bahwa

tanpa

harta

adanya

milik

ganti

para

rugi

investor

yang

tidak

sifatnya

akan

Prompt,

Adequate and Effective. Perjanjian seperti ini juga mengandung ketentuan mengenai perlakuan non-diskriminatif, peralihan dana, dan

prosedur

penyelesaian

sengketanya manakala sengketa timbul

antara investor dengan negara tuan rumah. Pembahasan

mengenai

penanaman

modal

internasional

pada

tingkat multilateral dimulai kembali di PBB khususnya pada tahun 1960-an dan 1970-an. Dengan semakin banyak lahirnya negara-negara baru

di

Asia

dan

Afrika,

peran

negara-negara

ini

di

dalam

menyuarakan kepentingan dan keprihatinan mereka mengenai penanaman modal cukup penting. Negara-negara ini mengemukakan pendapatnya dengan

mengedepankan

berpendapat

standar

aspek

kedaulatan

internasional

di

secara bidang

kental.

Mereka

penanaman

modal

sebagaimana diperkenalkan negara-negara maju selama abad ke – 19 tidaklah sesuai dengan aspirasi negara-negara ini. Upaya negara sedang berkembang untuk merumuskan kepentingan dan kebutuhan mereka untuk meningkatkan pembangunannya melalui PMA dilakukan antara lain melalui PBB. Hasil yang cukup penting dari upaya ini adalah dikeluarkannya resolusi Majelis Umum PBB mengenai the

Permanent

1962.22

Sovereignty

Resolusi

penting

over

lainnya

Natural adalah

Resources resolusi

pada

tahun

mengenai

the

Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States pada tahun 1974.

22

Lihat lebih lanjut: Nico Schrijver, 'Permanent Sovereignty over natural resources versus the common heritage of mankind; complementary or contradictory principles of international economic law' in: de Waart, Peters and Denters, (eds.), International Law and Development

11

Resolusi mengakui

hak

pertama

(the

setiap

Permanent

negara

untuk

Sovereignty

secara

Resolution)

bebas

memanfaatkan

kekayaan alamnya sesuai dengan kepentingan nasionalnya. Resolusi ini

juga

menegaskan

dilakukan

oleh

bahwa

perjanjian

negara-negara

penanaman

berdaulat

modal

secara

yang

bebas

harus

dihormati dengan itikad baik.23 Piagam Charter

of

Hak-Hak Economic

dan

Kewajiban

Rights

and

Ekonomi

Duties

of

Negara-negara States)

(the

mengandung

pengaturan yang lebih banyak mengenai penanaman modal asing. Pasal 2

Piagam

mengatur

melaksanakan

hak-hak

jurisdiksinya

setiap atas

negara

penanaman

untuk modal

mengatur sesuai

dan

dengan

hukum dan perundangannya serta sejalan dengan tujuan-tujuan dan prioritas-prioritas internasionalnya. Pasal ini juga menyatakan dengan

tegas

bahwa

negara-negara

tidak

dapat

dipaksakan

untuk

memberikan perlakuan yang menguntungkan kepada sesuatu PMA.24 The United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations juga sudah mengeluarkan the Draft Code of Conduct in Transnational Corporation

(Rancangan

Perjanjian

Aturan

Tingkah

Laku

Bagi

(Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1988), also Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources; Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1997), khususnya pada bab 2 dan 3 23 Paragraph 8. CERDS dikritik keras oleh negara-negara maju. Sewaktu pengesahannya, CERDS mendapat 104 suara, 16 menolak dan 6 abstein. Suara penolakan datang dari negara maju. Alasan utama penolakan adalah keberatan negara maju atas pasal atau ketentuan mengenai nasionalisasi yang mensyaratkan bahwa kompensasi atau pembayaran ganti rugi harus dilakukan sesuai dengan ‘hukum atau perundangan yang relevan dan dengan memperhatikan keadaan-keadaan yang relevan ... ' (Article 2 paragraph 2 (2)). Kajian menarik mengenai CERDS lihat: S.K. Chatterjee, 'The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States; An evaluation after 15 years,' (1991) 40 Int'l.&Comp.L.Q. 669; Milan Bulagic, Principle of Development of International Law (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1986); E.U. Petersmann, 'Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,' in R. Bernhardt (ed)., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Installment 5 (1985).

12

Transnasional).25

Perusahaan

Rancangan

Perjanjian

ini

juga

mengatur beberapa aspek mengenai penanaman modal asing. Rancangan perjanjian ini mengatur berbagai hal yang terkait dengan kegiatan perusahaan

transnasional,

restriktif,

transfer

seperti

pricing,

praktek-praktek

perlakuan

bisnis

terhadap

yang

perusahaan

transnasional, nasionalisasi, apropriasi, ganti rugi, dll.26 Negara-negara maju menentang keras aturan-aturan tersebut di atas.

Mereka

kekuatan

berpendapat

hukum.27

penanaman

modal

aturan-aturan tersebut tidak memiliki

Mereka

memandang

sebagaimana

ketentuan-ketentuan

termuat

dalam

mengenai

resolusi-resolusi

Majelis Umum PBB di atas sifatnya adalah hukum internasional yang tidak mengikat ('soft' international law).28 Sejarah

pembentukan

perjanjian-perjanjian

internasional

penting dalam hukum internasional. Hal tersebut menunjukkan bahwa tanpa adanya dukungan dari negara-negara maju, maka perjanjianperjanjian

tersebut

akan

sangat

sulit

untuk

dapat

berlaku.

Misalnya saja, tidak adanya ratifikasi Amerika Serikat terhadap Piagam ITO telah menyebabkan Piagam ini tidak dapat berlaku.29 Karena

itu

pula

tampak

bahwa

upaya-upaya

PBB

untuk

merumuskan dan mengatur penanaman modal gagal karena tidak adanya 24

UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm.136. Draft, UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (UN Doc.5/1988/39/- add.1.) 26 UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm.136. 27 Pembahasan lebih lanjut dan evaluasi terhadap beberapa pendapat sarjana mengenai masalah ini, lihat: Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law (Dordrecht, Boston, London; Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2nd.ed., 1992), khususnya hlm. 37-42. 28 UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm. 137. 29 Contoh lainnya adalah penolakan negara-negara maju untuk menaati ketentuan-ketentuan dalam Bab XI dari Konvensi Hukum Laut 1982 (United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea of 1982). 25

13

dukugan dari negara maju. Sejalan dengan itu pula, keengganan negara-negara sedang berkembang secara umum untuk mengatur masalah ini berdasarkan GATT merupakan alasan lainnya mengapa pengaturan penanaman modal khususnya TRIMS juga lambat untuk berkembang. Tahun 1970 Goldberg and Kindleberger dalam suatu tulisannya berjudul

'Towards

a

GATT

for

Investment:

A

Proposal

for

Supervision of the International Corporation,'30 mengusulkan suatu pengaturan internasional komprehensif mengenai penanaman modal. Mereka berhasil mengemukakan berbagai hal yang menjadi penghalang bagi penanaman modal, termasuk di dalamnya adalah kontrol neraca pembayaran,

kontrol

ekspor

dan

pengaturan

mengenai

jaminan

(securities regulation) terhadap perusahaan transnasional. Goldberg penting

dan

berkaitan

perlunya

membentuk

Kindleberger dengan suatu

juga

penanaman ‘General

mengemukakan modal

ini,

Agreement

for

dua

yaitu

usulan pertama

International

Corporation’ (‘the Agreement’). Kedua, perlunya membentuk suatu badan

khusus

yang

bertugas

untuk

melaksanakan

dalam

mengembangkan

the

Agreement

tersebut.31 Peranan internasional 30

Bank

Dunia

mengenai

di

penanaman

modal

juga

aturan-aturan cukup

besar.

Paul M. Goldberg and Charles P. Kindleberger, 'Towards A GATT for Investment: A Proposal for Supervision of the International Corporation,' 2 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 295-325 (1970). 31 Goldberg and Kindleberger, ibid, hlm. 323. Upaya lain yang juga penting untuk dikemukakan di sini adalah upaya Bank Dunia yang berupaya mempersiapkan suatu ketentuan internasional mengenai penanaman modal asing. Karya komprehensif yang membahsa hal ini adalah Ibrahim F.I. Shihata yang berhasil merampungkan dan menerbitkan 'Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct investment.' Namun demikian karya penting tersebut tetap hanyalah sebagai pedoman semata ('guideline'). Ia tidak memiliki kekuatan hukum yang mengikat negara-negara. (Lihat: World Bank, Legal Framework for the Treatment of Foreign Investment, Vol.: 1; Survey

14

Khususnya,

Bank

Dunia

membantu

penyelesaian

sengketa

mengenai

penanaman modal dan di dalam memberikan jaminan bagi penanaman modal. Perjanjian multilateral pertama yang berhasil dibuat adalah the Convention on the Establishment of an International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID). Konvensi ini berlaku pada tanggal 14 Oktober

1966.

ICSID

mengatur

prosedur

penyelesaian

sengketa

penanaman modal. ICSID juga memiliki suatu daftar nama-nama orang yang berkualitas sebagai konsiliator atau arbitrator yang dapat dipilih oleh para pihak yang bersengketa.32 Perjanjian multilateral kedua yang dibuat oleh Bank Dunia adalah

the

Convention

Establishing the Multilateral Investment

Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Konvensi ini berlaku pada tanggal 12 April

1988.

Tujuan

utama

dari

lembaga

MIGA

ini

adalah

untuk

memberikan jaminan kepada investor terhadap risiko non ekonomis khususnya

di

negara

sedang

berkembang.

Di

samping

itu,

MIGA

berperan dalam menggalakkan aliran penanaman modal untuk tujuantujuan produktif ke negara-negara sedang berkembang.33 Pada pokoknya Konvensi MIGA tidak mengatur hal-hal pokok mengenai standar perlakuan dari suatu PMA. Ia hanya menyatakan di dalam

menjamin

penanaman

modal,

MIGA

harus

berkeyakinan

bahwa

of Existing Instruments, Progress Report and Background Studies (Washington D.C.: the World Bank Group, 1992). 32 Diskusi lebih lanjut mengenai ICSID, lihat: Aron Broches, Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID and Other Subjects of Public and Private International Law (Dordrecht, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), khususnya Part III; Antonio Parra, 'Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instrument on Investment,' 12 ICSID Rev.- FILJ 287 (1977). 33 Jurgen Voss, 'The MIGA: Status, Mandate, Concept, Features and Implications, 4 J.W.T. (1987), hlm. 1-23; Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Multi

15

kondisi-kondisi

penanaman

modal

di

negara

tuan

rumah

telah

tersedia, termasuk tersedianya perlakuan yang fair dan equitable serta perlindungan hukum bagi penanaman modal.34 Beberapa negara di region-region tertentu telah pula membuat ketentuan saja,

atau

perjanjian

Perjanjian

Roma

penanaman modalnya sendiri. Misalnya

(the

Treaty

of

Rome)

pada

1957

yang

mendirikan MEE. Perjanjian ini memberi kebebasan bagi setiap orang untuk melakukan usaha di bidang jasa dan modal. Pasal 52 hingga 58 Perjanjian mengenai hak untuk mendirikan perusahaan menyatakan, antara lain, bahwa kebebasan untuk mendirikan perusahaan (freedom of establishment) termasuk di dalamnya adalah hak untuk melakukan kegiatan-kegiatan

sebagai

orang

perorangan

(self-employed

persons). Tercakup di dalamnya adalah hak untuk mendirikan dan melaksanakan

usahanya,

khususnya

perusahaan

atau

firma,

berdasarkan prinsip perlakuan nasional (national treatment).35 Perjanjian lainnya yang terkait dengan penanaman modal yang dibuat di region Amerika Utara adalah the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) yang mulai berlaku pada 1994.36 Bab 11 Perjanjian NAFTA memuat pengaturan komprehensif mengenai PMA.37

Investment Guarantee Agency and Foreign Investment (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988). 34 Article 12 : 2 MIGA Convention. Bahasan lebih lanjut mengenai peran MIGA dan ICSID, lihat: Malcolm D. Rowat, 'Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment Climate of Developing Countries: the Cases of ICSID and MIGA,' 33 Harv.Int'l.L.J. 103 (1992). 35 Pembahasan lebih lanjut mengenai Pasal-pasal 52 hingga 58 Perjanjian Roma, lihat: John Temple, The Common Market and Common Law (Chicago, London: the University of Chicago Press, 1966), khususnya Bab 5 (Freedom of Establishment). 36 The North American Free Trade Agreement mengatur prinsip-prinsip seperti national treatment, MFN, non-discriminatory treatment, dan minimum standards of treatment sesuai dengan hukum internasional (untuk investor dan modal dari negara lainnya. Perjanjian ini juga melarang

16

The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) juga telah menyepakati suatu perjanjian guna memajukan dan melindungi penanaman

modal

pada

tahun

1987.38

Tujuan

dari

perjanjian

ini

adalah untuk menggalakkan dan memajukan aliran alih teknologi dan penanaman modal di antara negara-negara anggotanya. Pengaturan (APEC)

telah

mengenai

termuat

penanaman

dalam

modal

suatu

di

Asia

pengaturan

dan

khusus

Pasifik mengenai

penanaman modal. APEC telah menyepakati suatu prinsip yang tidak mengikat

(non-binding

principles)

sebagai

suatu

pedoman

untuk

menghapus secara progresif rintangan-rintangan penanaman modal di antara anggotanya dan perlindungannya.39 Upaya lainnya yang mendapat sorotan kuat adalah usulan dari the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Lembaga

negara-negara

perjanjian

maju

multilateral

ini

mengusulkan

mengenai

pembentukan

penanaman

modal

atau

suatu the

Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).40 OECD

secara

resmi

mengusulkan

MAI

pada

the

Ministerial

Meeting OECD pada bulan Mei 1995. Prinsip utama yang diemban MAI adalah

prinsip

non-diskriminasi

dengan

menekankan

aspek-aspek

sebagai berikut:

penerapan pensyaratan pelaksanaan (performance requirement). (Lihat: UNCTAD, supra, note 7, p.137). 37 The NAFTA diterbitkan dalam 32 ILM 289 (1993); lihat juga: . 38 Teks perjanjian ASEAN untuk Penggalakan dan perlindungan Penanaman Modal tanggal 15 Desember 1987 diterbitkan pula di dalam 27 ILM 612 (1988), lihat juga website: . 39 Lihat: M. Sornarajah, 'Protection of Foreign Investment in the AsiaPacific Economic Co-operation Region,' 29 J.W.T. 2 (1995), hlm. 105 129. Lihat pula website: .

17

1) prinsip

perlakuan

mensyaratkan

nasional

(national

perusahaan-perusahaan

asing

treatment) dan

yang

domestik

dan

penanaman modal untuk diperlakukan secara sama (adil); 2) Prinsip transparansi yang mensyaratkan para anggotanya untuk menerapkan

prinsip

perundangannya

transparansi

(beserta

di

implikasinya)

dalam

peraturan

terhadap

anggota

lainnya; dan 3) prinsip pengaturan konsiliasi dan penyelesaian sengketa yang spesifik.41 Dinyatakan pula bahwa manakala MAI ini kelak disahkan, maka instrumen ini akan mengikat secara hukum. MAI akan pula berlaku tidak saja kepada negara anggota OECD, tetapi juga terhadap semua negara

yang

mau

tunduk

kepadanya,

termasuk

negara

sedang

berkembang.42 Sebagaimana telah direncanakan, MAI akan dipandang sebagai perjanjian asing

multilateral

secara

umum

di

pertama samping

yang

mengatur

pengaturan

yang

penanaman telah

modal

ada

yang

sifatnya sektoral. Misalnya, pengaturan penyelesaian sengketa di bidang

penanaman

modal

asing

seperti

ICSID

atau

pengaturan

mengenai penjaminan penanaman modal (misalnya investment guarantee dalam MIGA). Namun instrumen

40

demikian, ini

perkembangan

sangatlah

sulit.

mengenai

Adanya

perundingan

pendekatan

yang

dari tidak

William H. Witherel, 'The OECD Multilateral Agreement Investment,'4:2 Transnational Corporation 1-14 (1995); Preston Windsor, supra, note 1, hlm. 140. 41 Preston and Windsor, supra, note 1, hlm. 140. 42 Preston and Windsor, supra, note 1, hlm. 140.

on and

18

konsisten dari para juru runding MAI telah menuai banyak kritik para sarjana.43 Pembahasan

lebih

lanjut

mengenai

peraturan

multilateral

mengenai penanaman modal dilakukan kembali setelah dirampungkannya putaran

(perundingan)

Tokyo

tahun

1979.

Beberapa

negara

maju

mencoba untuk memasukkan masalah penanaman modal asing ini di dalam

GATT.

Mereka

berupaya

keras

untuk

membatasi

persyaratan

pelaksanaan (perfomance requirement) oleh negara tuan rumah dalam hubungannya dengan persyaratan penggunaan kandungan lokal hingga persyaratan ekspor (local content - export performance). Upaya-upaya di atas juga telah gagal. Sebagian besar negara sedang berkembang enggan merundingkan masalah ini dalam kerangka GATT. Mereka tetap berpendirian, GATT tidak mengurus penanaman modal. Kemajuan penting mengenai upaya pengaturan penanaman modal di dalam kerangka GATT terjadi di tahun 1982. Waktu itu timbul sengketa antara Amerika Serikat dan Kanada mengenai keabsahan UU PMA Kanada yang terkenal bernama the Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA).44

43

M. Sornarajah, A Developing Country Perspective on International Economic Law in the Context of Dispute Settlement, (Manuscript, 2001, hlm. 17). Lihat pula upaya yang dilakukan oleh the Friends of Earth, suatu LSM yang bergerak di bidang perlindungan lingkungan. LSM ini mengkritik dengan tajam dan menentang dibentuknya MAI, dengan alasan bahwa MAI akan membiarkan investor asing merusak lingkungan. (Lihat: website: ; David Henderson, The MAI Affair: A Story and Its Lessons (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999). 44 Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) (Panel Report) (GATT B.I.S.D 30s/140 (disahkan pada tanggal 7 Februari), Pierre Pescatore, William J.Davey & Andreas F.Lowenfeld, eds., Handbook of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement (Vol I, 1997), Cs 54/1; GATT Analytical Index, pp 165 et.segg. [Lihat addendum bab ini].

19

Sebelum UU ini disahkan, Amerika Serikat menikmati kebebasan berusaha

dalam

bentuk

penanaman

modal

di

Kanada

tanpa

adanya

syarat-syarat yang membebaninya.45 Namun, di tahun 1973, Kanada mengundangkan FIRA yang mensyaratkan para investor asing untuk membeli

barang-barang

atau

produk

Kanada

dibandingkan

dengan

produk impor dari negara lain. Amerika Serikat yang terkena banyak dampak oleh UU ini, menganggap bahwa FIRA melanggar pasal III:4, III:5, XI and XVI:1 (c) GATT. Sebelum

GATT

menangani

kasus

ini,

negara-negara

sedang

berkembang yang diwakili oleh Argentina sempat mempermasalahkan jurisdiksi atau kewenangan GATT untuk mengadili sengketa penanaman modal. Negara sedang berkembang berpendapat GATT tidak memiliki jurisdiksi untuk menangani sengketa mengenai perundangan PMA. Meskipun ada keberatan, Dewan GATT (GATT Council) ternyata memberi

lampu

hijau

kepada

panel

GATT

untuk

memeriksa

kasus

tersebut. Dewan GATT juga menyatakan, kewenangan GATT di dalam menangani kasus ini hanya dibatasi semata-mata kepada kewajiban perdagangan negara anggota GATT.46 Panel GATT memutuskan, upaya atau persyaratan untuk membeli produk-produk asli Kanada dibandingkan dengan produk impor dari negara lain secara jelas menunjukkan bahwa Kanada telah memberikan

45

Rodney de C. Grey, '1992, TRIM and the Uruguay Round,' dalam: Uruguay Round: Further Papers on Selected Issues, UNCTAD, (New York: United Nations, 1990), hlm. 239. 46 Penting dikemukakan di sini bahwa dengan memperhatikan kepentingan negara sedang berkembang, Panel GATT telah memutuskan untuk tidak menguji aturan-aturan khusus yang berlaku terhadap penanaman modal di negara sedang berkembang, seperti misalnya pasal XVIII:c (Lihat: Pierre Pescatore, William J. Davey, Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Handbook of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement (Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1997).

20

perlakuan yang lebih ‘favourable’ (menguntungkan) daripada yang diberikan kepada produk-proudk sejenis dari negara lainnya. Panel

juga

menyatakan

bahwa

kebijakan

PMA

Kanada

yang

termuat dalam FIRA adalah bertentangan dengan Pasal III:4 GATT. Pasal III:4 menyatakan bahwa produk-produk impor harus diberikan perlakuan

yang

tidak

diberikan

kepada

boleh

produk

kurang

yang

sama

daripada dalam

perlakuan

hubungannya

yang dengan

persyaratan-persyaratan yang mempengaruhi jual beli, penawaran, pembelian,

pengangkutan,

distribusi

atau

penggunaannya

secara

lintas batas (internasional).47 Panel

berpendapat,

upaya-upaya

yang

mensyaratkan

agar

membeli produk Kanada tidak mencegah masuknya produk-produk impor dan

karenanya

tidaklah

bertentangan

dengan

pasal

XI:1

GATT

mengenai larangan resktiktif kuantitatif. Panel juga menyimpulkan, persyaratan-persyaratan yang dikenakan oleh Kanada bahwa investor harus membuat pernyataan secara tertulis dan bahwa mereka akan mengekspor produksinya dalam jumlah tertentu tidaklah bertentangan dengan pasal XVI:1.48 Panel

dalam

sengketa

ini

telah

hati-hati

untuk

tidak

menerapkan prinsip non-diskriminasi di dalam pasal III GATT di

47

Dalam kesimpulannya, Panel memutus sebagai berikut: 'The Panel sympathized with the desire of the Canadian authorities to ensure that Canadian goods and suppliers would be given a fair chance to compete with imported goods. However, the Panel holds the view that the purchase requirements under examination do not stop short of this objective but tend to tip the balance in favour of Canadian products, thus coming into conflict with Article III:4.... '…Purchase requirement supplied to foreign investors in Canada which are inconsistent with article III:4 can affect the trade interest of all contracting parties, and impinge upon their rights.' (Huruf miring oleh kami). 48 UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm. 138.

21

dalam kasus penanaman modal ini. Di samping itu, Panel dengan tegas

menyatakan

bahwa

ia

tidak

memiliki

kewenangan

untuk

mengadili apakah para investor asing telah terpengaruh oleh adanya persyaratan untuk membeli (purchase requirements).49 Kasus ini merupakan kasus yang penting di dalam penyelesaian sengketa

GATT.

Putusan

Dewan

GATT

yang

merestui

panel

untuk

melanjutkan penyelidikannya dalam menangani kasus ini merupakan terobosan hukum dan langkah inovatif Panel. Namun demikian, persetujuan Dewan GATT tersebut tampaknya agak berlebihan. Pokok sengketa dalam kasus ini bukanlah masalah perdagangan atau sengketa mengenai tarif, suatu wilayah jurisdiksi GATT.

Jelas

tampak

bahwa

sebenarnya

pokok

sengketanya

adalah

penanaman modal. Maka sebagai

dari

itu

suatu

perdagangan

sangatlah

organisasi

dan

tarif

sulit

untuk

internasional

harus

menangani

diterima

yang

bahwa

mengatur

masalah

atau

GATT

masalah sengketa

penanaman modal. Kasus ini memberi preseden ‘buruk’, bahwa setiap sengketa

atau

perdagangan,

pokok maka

perkara

sengketa

yang

ternyata

tersebut

(baik

dapat

mempengaruhi

berupa

perburuhan,

lingkungan, hak asasi manusia, dll) yang dapat dikatakan sebagai terkait dengan perdagangan maka dapat ditafsirkan pula sebagai sengketa yang terkait dengan perdagangan (trade related). 49

GATT BISD, 30th supp. art 167 (1984). Kanada menerima putusan Panel. Namun negara-negara sedang berkembang berpendapat, putusan tersebut tidak berlaku untuk mereka sehubungan dengan seringnya negara-negara ini mensyaratkan penggunaan kandungan lokal sebagai kebijakan penanaman modal mereka berdasarkan pasal XVIII.c GATT. Lihat: Edward M. Graham, supra, (should there be) note 15, hlm.48. Cf., Sarjana lain yang mendukung posisi Kanada: lihat: R.ST.J Macdonald, 'Trade Related Performance Requirement and the GATT', dalam: Jerzy Makarczyk, (ed.),

22

Sengketa FIRA ini dan adanya fakta bahwa terdapat banyak negara yang mempraktekkan TRIMS yang memiliki pengaruh langsung dengan perdagangan telah menjadi pendorong penting bagi Amerika Serikat

untuk

memasukkan

masalah

TRIMS

ini

ke

dalam

agenda

perundingan GATT di Uruguay Round. Kehendak

Amerika

Serikat

untuk

memasukkan

isu

ini

telah

dimulai di tahun 1981 tatkala Amerika Serikat mengeluarkan suatu kebijakan Paper.'

perdagangannya Dokumen

ini

yang

tertuang

menyatakan

di

keinginan

dalam

'1981

pemerintah

White

Amerika

Serikat untuk memasukkan isu penanaman modal ke dalam perundingan perdagangan.50 Amerika Serikat menghendaki masuknya TRIMS ini yang akan mencakup antara lain: a. pengaturan

mengenai

upaya-upaya

yang

mengganggu

aliran

perdagangan dan penanaman modal dengan merugikan negara anggota lainnya; b. hak untuk melakukan penanaman modal; c. pemberlakuan prinsip national treatment dan MFN untuk penanaman modal yang baru.51 Uraian di atas menunjukkan, upaya hukum intenasional untuk mengatur penanaman modal asing tampaknya masih sangat sulit. Hukum di bidang ini yang telah berkembang pada awal abad ke 20, ternyata belum

dapat

berkembang

secara

memuaskan.

Meskipun

telah

cukup

Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), hlm. 717 et.seqq. 50 David Greenaway, 'Why Are We Negotiating on TRIMs,' dalam: David Greenaway, et.al., (eds.), Global Protectionism, (London: Macmillan, 1991), hlm. 145. 51 Stephen J. Canner, 'Trade and International Investment: From GATT to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,' dalam: Joseph F. Dennin, (ed)., Law and Practice of the World Trade Organization (New York: Oceana Publ., 1995), hlm. 3.

23

banyak kajian dilakukan oleh para sarjana dan berbagai organisasi internasional, namun tidak ada satu aturan pun yang dapat mencakup semua aspek dari bidang penanaman modal ini. Luasnya ruang lingkup penanaman modal telah membuat upaya pembentukan hukum komprensif tersebut gagal. Misalnya saja, di dalam proses penanaman modal, para calon investor akan segera menghadapi

hukum

administrasi

(proses

'screening'),

hukum

perusahaan (pendirian badan usaha asing), alih teknologi dan hak atas kekayaan intelektual. Bidang hukum lainnya adalah hukum mengenai praktek bisnis restriktif

(restrictive

business

practices),

hukum

persaingan,

hukum lingkungan, perburuhan dan hak asasi manusia, hukum keuangan (perpajakan, pengembalian keuntungan, dan masalah-masalah keuangan lainnya,

hukum

perdagangan

internasional

dalam

GATT,

serta

penyelesaian sengketa di dalam GATT. Yang juga penting adalah masalah-masalah sensitif seperti politik yang dapat mempengaruhi kebijakan negara tuan rumah. Dalam hal ini yang terutama adalah adanya ketakutan bahwa masuknya penanaman modal asing tersebut akan mempengaruhi kebijakan politik negara tuan rumah. Di

samping

multilateral

di

itu,

tampak

bidang

ini

bahwa

masih

pembentukan

jauh

dari

aturan-aturan

kenyataan.

Alasan

utamanya, pertama, adanya pendangan yang berbeda antara negara maju dan sedang berkembang sehubungan dengan tetap adanya dua kepentingan yang berbeda mengenai penanaman modal. Negara sedang berkembang nasionalnya.

menyandarkan Sebaliknya

kepada investor

tujuan asing

pembangunan

ekonomi

berupaya

mendapat

24

keuntungan yang besarnya dari modal yang ditanamnya. Dua kubu kepentingan yang berbeda ini sulit didamaikan. Kedua,

terdapatnya

berbagai

organisasi

regional

dengan

berbagai bentuk perjanjian regional di bidang penanaman modal. Organisasi-organisasi

ini

berupaya

membentuk

suatu

hukum

perjanjian di bidang ini. Upaya-upaya tersebut menyebabkan dan menunjukkan sulitnya di dalam merumuskan aturan hukum internasional di bidang ini. Hal ini juga dipersulit oleh adanya perbedaan pandangan yang cukup tajam, perbedaan tingkat pertumbuhan ekonomi dan keadaan-keadaan khusus di setiap negara. Ketiga,

adanya

fakta

seperti

tesebut

di

atas

bahwa

organisasi internasional multilateral hingga saat ini hanya dapat merumuskan aturan-aturan penanaman modal yang sifatnya sektoral atau sebagian kecil saja dari penanaman modal. Hal ini mempertegas sekaligus

memperlihatkan

sulitnya

merumuskan

aturan

hukum

internasional di bidang ini. Keempat,

adanya

upaya

yang

‘terbatas’

yang

gagal

untuk

mencakup semua sektor akan mengakibatkan gagalnya upaya tersebut. Upaya terbatas yang bersifat tanggung ini tampak misalnya dalam hal pembahasan mengenai MAI.

25 ADDENDUM CANADA - ADMINISTRATION OF THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT Report of the Panel adopted on 7 February 1984 (L/5504 - 30S/140) 1.

Introduction

1.1 In a communication dated 5 January 1982, the United States requested the government of Canada to consult under Article XXII:1 on the administration of the Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act. Among the issues which the United States wished to raise in the consultation was the practice of the government of Canada to enter into agreements with foreign investors according to which these are to give preference to the purchase of Canadian goods over imported goods and to meet certain export performance requirements. The communication was circulated to the contracting parties on 7 January 1982 (L/5280). Since the consultation did not lead to a solution, the United States, in a communication dated 19 March 1982, referred the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES in accordance with Article XXIII:2 (L/5308). 1.2 At its meeting on 31 March 1982 the Council agreed to establish a Panel and authorized its Chairman, in consultation with the two parties concerned and with other interested contracting parties, to decide on appropriate terms of reference and, in consultation with the two parties concerned, to designate the Chairman and the members of the Panel. 1.3 At the meeting of the Council on 2 November 1982 the Chairman of the Council informed the Council that these consultations had been held and that the following composition and terms of reference had been agreed: Composition Chairman:

Mr. T.C. O'Brien

Members:

Mr. J.N. Feij Mr. M. Ikeda

Terms of Reference "To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States concerning the administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act of Canada with respect to the purchase of goods in Canada and/or export of goods from Canada by certain firms subject to that Act; and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or rulings provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XXIII." 1.4 At the Council meeting, a number of delegations expressed doubts whether the dispute between the United States and Canada was one for which the GATT had competence since it involved investment legislation, a subject not covered by the GATT. They therefore reserved their position on the terms of reference (C/M/162, pages 25-26). The representative of the United States said that his government was not calling into question the Canadian investment legislation as such but was complaining about the two specific trade-related issues mentioned in the terms of reference. The representative of Canada said that, in the view of his government, the terms of reference

26 ensured that the examination would touch only on trade matters within the purview of GATT. The Chairman suggested, and the Council so decided, that the terms of reference remain as they stood, that the reservations and statements made be placed on the record and that it be presumed that the Panel would be limited in its activities and findings to within the four corners of GATT. 1.5 The representatives of the contracting parties which had spoken on the matter in the Council were asked by the Chairman of the Panel, in letters dated 20 December 1982, whether they wished to have an opportunity to be heard by the Panel as provided in paragraph 15 of the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance (BISD 26S/213). Argentina asked to be given this opportunity and was heard by the Panel on 25 January 1983. (The views of Argentina are summarized below in paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2). 2.

Factual Aspects

2.1 The following description of the factual aspects, particularly in paragraphs 2.3, 2.5, 2.7 and 2.12, contains much information about the Foreign Investment Review Act which is not directly at issue in this dispute but is useful in placing the dispute in its general context. 2.2 The Foreign Investment Review Act. In December 1973 the Parliament of Canada enacted the Foreign Investment Review Act. According to Section 2(1) of this Act, the Parliament adopted the law "in recognition that the extent to which control of Canadian industry, trade and commerce has become acquired by persons other than Canadians and the effect thereof on the ability of Canadians to maintain effective control over their economic environment is a matter of national concern" and that it was therefore expedient to ensure that acquisitions of control of a Canadian business or establishments of a new business by persons other than Canadians be reviewed and assessed and only be allowed to proceed if the government had determined that they were, or were likely to be, of "significant benefit to Canada". 2.3 Section 2(2) lists five factors to be taken into account in assessing whether a proposed investment is or is likely to be of significant benefit to Canada. These are: (a) The effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and nature of economic activity in Canada, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the effect on employment, on resource processing, on the utilization of parts, components and services produced in Canada, and on exports from Canada; (b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the business enterprise or new business and in any industry or industries in Canada of which the business enterprise or new business forms or would form a part; (c)the effect of the acquisition or establishment on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological development, product innovation and product variety in Canada; (d) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on competition within any industry or industries in Canada; and (e) the compatibility of the acquisition or establishment with national industrial and economic policies, taking into consideration industrial and economic policy objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of any province likely to be significantly affected by the acquisition or establishment. 2.4 Written undertakings given by investors. The Act provides that investors may submit written undertakings on the conduct of the business they are proposing to acquire or establish, conditional on approval by the Canadian government of the proposed acquisition or establishment. The submission

27 of undertakings is not required under the Act but, as the administration of the Act evolved, they are now routinely submitted in support of nearly all larger investment proposals. Many undertakings are the result of negotiations between the investor and the Canadian government. Undertakings given by investors may deal with any aspect of the conduct of a business, including employment, investment, research and development, participation of Canadian shareholders and managers, productivity improvements as well as practices with respect to purchasing, manufacturing and exports. There are no pre-set formulas or prescriptions for the undertakings. 2.5 Purchase undertakings. Undertakings with respect to the purchase of goods have been given in a variety of forms: -

Some involve best efforts to seek Canadian sources of supply;

-

some specify a percentage or amount of purchases of Canadian products;

some envisage replacement of imports with Canadian-made goods in a specific dollar amount; -

some refer to the purchase of Canadian products, others only to the purchase from Canadian suppliers (whether of domestic or imported goods);

-

some involve a commitment to set up a purchasing division in the Canadian Subsidiary; and

-

some involve a commitment to consult with federal or provincial industry specialists in drawing up tender lists.

Undertakings on purchases are often but not always conditional on goods being "available", "reasonably available" or "competitively available" in Canada with respect to price, quality, and delivery or other factors specified by the investor. 2.6 Manufacturing undertakings. Some firms have given undertakings to manufacture in Canada products or components of a product used or sold by the firm. 2.7 Export undertakings. The undertakings involving the export of goods have been given in a variety of forms: -

Some involving development of natural resources are predicated on the development of offshore markets;

-

some involve a specific export target, expressed as a percentage of output or sales, often to be achieved within a specified time frame;

-

some involve assigning to the Canadian business exclusive rights to export either all its products to certain countries or specified products on a world basis;

-

some involve a commitment by the investor to assist the Canadian subsidiary in selling its products in foreign markets; and

-

some involve commitments that the Canadian business will not be restricted from seeking out and taking advantage of any export opportunities.

2.8 Statistics on the undertakings. The Act came into force on 9 April 1974 with respect to acquisitions and on 15 October 1975 with respect to new businesses. From April 1974 to

28 September 1982, the Government of Canada has rendered decisions on 4,103 investment proposals, of which 2,448 were from the United States. Approximately 90 per cent of the reviewable investment proposals on which the government has taken a decision have been judged to be of significant benefit to Canada and have, therefore, been allowed. The Panel asked questions about the frequency with which the various types of undertakings have been given. In order to answer these questions the Canadian government reviewed a sample of 181 investments allowed in the month of November in the years 1980, 1981 and 1982. (November was the latest month for which data were available). In this sample, 55 of the investors or 30 per cent of the total gave no undertakings relating to sourcing. The remaining 126 investors gave a total of 178 sourcing undertakings. (Some investors gave more than one sourcing undertaking). Of those 178 sourcing undertakings, 65 per cent referred to the purchase of goods and services from Canadian suppliers or words to that effect, 15 per cent referred to purchase of Canadian produced goods. The remaining 20 per cent were sourcing commitments of other kinds, e.g. to set up a Canadian purchasing division, or to consult with a government body to identify potential Canadian suppliers. This latter 20 per cent also includes undertakings relating solely to the purchase of services. 71 per cent of the undertakings to purchase in Canada or to purchase Canadian produced goods carried a qualification with respect to the availability of goods on competitive terms. 2.9 With respect to export undertakings in the same sample of 181 investments, 97 investors or 54 per cent of the total gave no export undertakings of any kind. The remaining 84 investors gave 96 export undertakings. (Again some investors gave more than one undertaking relating to exports). Of the 96 export undertakings, 32 per cent referred to a quantifiable level of exports, e.g. target value of exports or a percentage of output. The remaining 68 per cent were export undertakings of other kinds, such as an undertaking not to restrict the export activities of the Canadian business, or to actively pursue export opportunities. 2.10 Enforcement of the undertakings. Written undertakings given by firms are legally binding on the investor if the investment is allowed. According to Section 21 of the Act the Minister responsible for the administration of the Act may apply to the courts for a remedial order in the event an investor fails to implement undertakings he has given. The Minister responsible for the Act made the following statement in the Canadian Parliament in 1973 on the enforcement of undertakings: "In normal circumstances the inability to fulfil undertakings will lead to discussions with the Minister and perhaps to the negotiation of new undertakings. Like any contract, an undertaking can be modified with the consent of both parties. If, however, the failure to comply with an undertaking is clearly the result of changed market conditions - for example, the undertaking to export frisbees is followed by the collapse of the frisbee market - the person would not be held accountable. It should be remembered, however, that some undertakings may be tailored to a range of market expectations." 2.11 All investments that are allowed subject to the Act are monitored by the government of Canada. If the investment involves specific undertakings the investor is asked at regular intervals for a progress report on the implementation of his undertakings. All undertakings are monitored at least once before the file is closed, normally after the fifth anniversary of the date on which the permission to invest was granted. If the investor's progress report reveals a variation from the undertakings, or non-fulfilment of them, the investor is asked to provide a more detailed explanation. Depending on the circumstances, performance of unfulfilled undertakings has so far always been either postponed or waived, or the undertakings have been replaced by revised undertakings. To date, the Minister responsible for the administration of the Act has not applied to the courts to enforce an investor's written undertaking.

29 2.12 Recent changes in the administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act. During the second half of 1982 some changes were introduced in the administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, without entailing modifications in the Act itself. Among the most important changes was the decision to raise the threshold for the review of new investments or direct acquisitions under the small business procedures from Can$ 2 million and 100 employees to Can$ 5 million and 200 employees. The small business procedures do not require a full review, except under special circumstances. Approximately, 85 per cent of all proposals fall within the small business procedure. 3.

Main Arguments

3.1 The United States requested the Panel to find that the written undertakings obtained by the Government of Canada under the Foreign Investment Review Act which oblige foreign investors subject to the Act (a) to purchase goods of Canadian origin in preference to imported goods or in specified amounts or proportions, or to purchase goods from Canadian sources; (b) to manufacture in Canada goods which would be imported otherwise are inconsistent with Articles III:4, III:5, XI and XVII:1(c) of the General Agreement, and that the undertakings which oblige foreign investors (c) to export specified quantities or proportions of their production are inconsistent with Article XVII:1(c) of the General Agreement, and that any such undertakings therefore constitute a prima facie case of nullification and impairment under Article XXIII of the General Agreement. The United States further requested the Panel to suggest that the CONTRACTING PARTIES recommend that Canada (a) make clear that it will not regard as binding, or seek to enforce in the context of the Foreign Investment Review Act, any undertaking of the kind found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement, and (b) that it cease eliciting and accepting such undertakings as part of investment proposals. 3.2 Canada requested the Panel to find that the purchase undertakings (paragraph 3.l(a)) given by foreign investors are not inconsistent with the provisions of Articles III:4, III:5, XI or XVII:1(c) of the General Agreement, that the export undertakings (paragraph 3.1(c) ) are not inconsistent with the provisions of Article XVII:1(c) and that, were the purchase and/or export undertakings to fall within the provisions of one or more of these Articles, they, would constitute measures within the provisions of Article XX(d). As to the manufacturing undertakings (paragraph 3.1(b)), Canada asked the Panel to find that these do not fall under the Panel's terms of reference. 3.3 Both parties agreed that the issue before the Panel was not the Foreign Investment Review Act itself or Canada's right to regulate the entry and expansion of foreign direct investments, but rather the consistency with the General Agreement of the purchase and export undertakings given by investors subject to the Foreign Investment Review Act. (a)

Undertakings to purchase goods of Canadian origin in preference to imported goods or in specified amounts or proportions, or to purchase goods from Canadian sources

3.4 Article III:4. The United States contended that the written undertakings which oblige investors to purchase goods of Canadian origin in preference to imported goods or in specified amounts or proportions, or to purchase goods from Canadian sources (henceforth referred to as "purchase undertakings") violated Article III:4 because they constituted requirements giving less favourable treatment to imported products than to like products of national origin.

30

3.5 In the view of the United States even those undertakings that obliged a firm to purchase goods in Canada whenever "available", "reasonably available", or "competitively available" had the effect of according less favourable treatment to imported goods. Such undertakings prevented the investor from choosing freely between imported and domestic goods since they obliged him to opt in favour of domestic products whenever the availability condition was fulfilled. The provisos "reasonably available" or "competitively available" were vague and involved value judgements regarding quality, reliability of supply and the like. A firm subject to an undertaking with such a proviso was therefore likely to purchase Canadian goods even when they were less attractive than imported goods in order to avoid possible conflict with Canadian officials monitoring compliance who have a different perspective and apply different value judgements on these matters. Undertakings to purchase from Canadian sources or suppliers (whether the products purchased were domestic or imported) would also result in less favourable treatment to imports than that given to Canadian products because in cases where a product was produced in both Canada and other countries such undertakings would oblige the investor to purchase imports from a Canadian "middleman" (the importer/distributor/retailer), thus forcing the investor to incur additional costs in the form of the middleman's profit if he decided to import, but leaving him free to purchase directly from a Canadian manufacturer, thereby avoiding the additional cost of the "middleman". Even more discrimination against imported products would result in instances in which Canadian sources and suppliers did not stock or distribute imported products sought by the investor. 3.6 Canada held that the purchase undertakings did not constitute laws, regulations or requirements within the meaning of Article III:4. There was no provision in the Foreign Investment Review Act, its regulations or any other Canadian act or regulation which stipulated that any undertaking shall be given by a firm as a condition of investment. While there was an overall requirement under the Act that a foreign investor demonstrate that his proposal, as an overall package, was, or was likely to be, of significant benefit to Canada, it was entirely up to him to choose the means to do this. Frequently, investors chose to offer purchase undertakings in support of their proposals. Canada further stated that the investment screening procedures were not intended nor applied so as to provide protection to Canadian manufacturers or to oblige companies to depart from commercially sound practices. Investors, having decided on their plans for conducting business in Canada, generally had no hesitation in giving undertakings which reflected these plans. Since both the investor and the Canadian government had to act in the context of markets in which the investor's competitors were not subject to undertakings, it was highly unlikely that purchase undertakings would either be offered or sought that departed significantly from the purchasing practices the investor would follow in the absence of the undertaking. Where undertakings were given, they reflected a decision by the investor about how he intended to conduct his business in Canada. Undertakings would only represent a cost to the investor if they did not reflect his business intentions. When investors gave purchase undertakings without any qualification as to the competitive availability of goods in Canada, it was usually because either the investor had already identified his sources of supply, or, given the nature of his business, purchases were ordinarily made locally. A review of the circumstances of the investment proposals specifically cited by the United States in their submission did not support the claim that the undertakings given in these proposals had to be regarded as requirements. 3.7 The United States replied that it was true that the Act itself did not require investors to offer undertakings, but, once given, the undertakings had to be regarded as requirements in the light of the circumstances in which they were offered and accepted and of their legally binding character. No private business would bind its future purchasing practices unless the achievement of some benefit or the avoidance of some penalty was made contingent upon that binding. The investors only offered undertakings in order to obtain the Canadian government's approval of their investment proposals. Moreover, there were many cases in which purchase undertakings were the result of negotiations in which Canada sought new or "improved" undertakings. The government of Canada itself had

31 indicated that most of the work performed by the Foreign Investment Review Agency established under the Foreign Investment Review Act centred on the effort to define and to improve the terms of 52 the original investment proposals. Once the investment proposal had been approved, the undertaking became legally binding on the investor, who was then no longer free to modify his purchase undertaking without the permission of the government of Canada, regardless of changed circumstances. In the current economy it was difficult to imagine that a company would not alter plans it had made more than a year before unless the alteration of those plans entailed a greater penalty than adherence to them. The threat of legal action and the potential effect of non-compliance on future requests for permission to invest was not lost on enterprises that had given undertakings. Canada replied that, although undertakings were not required, where an investment was allowed which contained undertakings it was both reasonable and necessary for the Canadian government to have a means by which remedial action could be taken in the event an investment was implemented in a manner inconsistent with the authority granted. Enforceability under the law simply held the investor, after he had given the undertaking, to doing what he said he would do. Enforceability served to discourage the presentation of grandiose or inflated statements by the investor of his intentions so as to secure approval of his proposal. 3.8 Canada, citing the panel reports in BISD 7S/60 and 25S/49 as precedents, stated that the word "requirements" in Article III had to be interpreted in conjunction with the terms "laws and regulations" and in this context it should be defined as a mandatory rule of general application applying across-the-board to a particular product or range of products. The undertakings, however, were private contractual obligations of a particular foreign investor. They applied to a specific investment and not to trade in goods generally. The United States replied that the exercise of many governmental functions, and the grant of many benefits within a government's power, could be viewed, or recast to appear, as "private contracts" between firms and the government. To find that such "private contracts" were not requirements within the meaning of Article III would be to invite contracting parties to do by "private contract" what the General Agreement did not permit to be done by laws of general application. There was no basis in the General Agreement or in previous panel reports for asserting that only across-the-board measures applying to purchases of all products of a certain category were subject to GATT obligations. 3.9 Canada stated that the word "requirements" in Article III:4 of the General Agreement should be interpreted in the light of Article 12 of the Havana Charter, which reads in part: "The Members recognize that ..., without prejudice to existing international agreements to which Members are parties, a Member has the right... to determine whether and to what extent and upon what terms it will allow future foreign investments, to prescribe and give effect on just terms to requirements as to the ownership of existing and future investments and to prescribe and give effect to other reasonable requirements with respect to existing and future investments". The drafting history of the General Agreement revealed that it was the intention of the drafters of the General Agreement that the extent of the rights and obligations under the General Agreement were to be consistent with, and defined within the broader context of, the Havana Charter. The draftsmen were working within a conceptual framework that encompassed both trade and investment, and rights and obligations with respect to both. GATT Article III was amended in 1948 to incorporate the text of the Havana Charter on national treatment. Canada was not arguing that the Havana Charter was in force but rather that one could not read into the General Agreement obligations which the drafters of the General Agreement had not intended it to contain. Given that it was agreed that the provisions of the Havana Charter were to be interpreted as a consistent whole, it was reasonable to conclude that the meaning of the word "requirements" in the Charter's national treatment provision corresponding to Article III of the General Agreement did not encompass "requirements as to ownership" or "other reasonable requirements" 52

1

Proceedings of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs of 26 May 1981.

32 allowed under the Charter's investment provisions. Although the Chapter of the Charter dealing with investment was not incorporated into the General Agreement, it was one of the Chapters the general principles of which the contracting parties, in Article XXIX of the General Agreement, agreed to observe to the fullest extent of their executive authority pending the ratification of the Charter. It was therefore reasonable to assume that it had not been the intention of the drafters of the a General Agreement to include within the meaning of the words "requirements" in Article III of the General Agreement those "requirements" provided for under Article 12 of the Havana Charter. Thus, if the Panel were tending towards an interpretation that undertakings were requirements, which in Canada's view they were not, they would be requirements within the meaning of Article 12 of the Havana Charter. 3.10 The United States replied that Canada was asking the Panel to decide that a provision in a draft agreement which never entered into force be interpreted to override specific obligations of the GATT. The Havana Charter provisions on investment, had they entered into force, would most likely not have been interpreted to override the Charter's national treatment obligation. A broad range of requirements - for instance those relating to the employment of nationals, to management, etc. could be imposed without conflict with the obligation to grant to imported products no less favourable treatment than to products of domestic origin. As a matter of common sense and normal interpretation of an international agreement, the requirements that were contrary to another specific obligation of the Charter would not have been interpreted to be a "reasonable" requirement within the meaning of the Charter's investment provisions. 3.11 The United States pointed out that, after the Charter had been abandoned, Article III had been amended but not to exempt trade-related requirements affecting foreign investors. Canada replied that Article III was last amended in 1948 whereas Article XXIX went into force in 1952. 3.12 Article III:5. The United States contended that purchase undertakings which obliged the investor to purchase in Canada a specified amount or a proportion of his requirements constituted internal quantitative regulations relating to the investor's processing and use of products and that they were therefore contrary to Article III:5. Canada stated that the Foreign Investment Review Act did not establish any internal quantitative regulations. In the relatively few cases in which investors had given purchase undertakings that referred to specific amounts or proportions of the investors requirements, the figures mentioned reflected the investor's expectations. Regulations were, in the view of Canada, subsidiary rules of general application promulgated by the executive pursuant to an existing legislative enactment. The word "regulations" in Article III:5 involved a rule of general application as was the case in the previous Panel reports which involved Article III:5 (BISD 11S/95 and 25S/49). The purchase undertakings were firm-specific and did not relate generally to the international trade of the goods in question; they could therefore not be regarded as "regulations" within the meaning of Article III:5. The United States replied that each undertaking obviously did not, by itself, have the same degree of effect as a general regulation applicable to an entire industry. But the effect of such undertakings was to restrict the internal market for various imported products by requiring individual firms to use specified amounts or proportions of Canadian products. 3.13 Article XI. The United States claimed that the purchase undertakings operated as restrictions on the importation of products into Canada and were therefore contrary to Article XI. In the view of Canada there was a fundamental distinction in the General Agreement between measures affecting the importation of products and measures affecting imported products. The former were regulated by Article XI which clearly spoke of "importation" and the latter by Article III which referred to "imported products". If Article XI were interpreted to cover also internal measures affecting imported products Article III would have no function. The United States said that, though Article XI was primarily aimed at traditional import quota systems, the language of the Article was broad enough to cover also other, similarly restrictive non-tariff barriers not implemented or enforced at the border. In the United States'

33 view the purpose of the undertakings was to limit imports and reserve a portion of the internal market for Canadian products, which Article XI was intended to prohibit. 3.14 Article XVII:1(c). The United States asserted that the purchase undertakings prevented the investors from acting solely in accordance with commercial considerations and that they therefore violated Canada's obligations under Article XVII:1(c). Canada replied that Article XVII:1 only extended to state-trading and other enterprises the most-favoured-nation principle, and whether or not the investor was prevented from acting in accordance with commercial considerations was therefore irrelevant given the meaning of this Article. A careful research which Canada had undertaken into the drafting history had revealed no reference to national treatment in the discussions leading to the adoption of Article XVII:1. Under Article 26 of the United States "Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization of the United Nations", which served as a basis for the London Conference in October-November 1946, state-trading enterprises were to accord "non-discriminatory treatment, as compared with the treatment accorded to the commerce of any country other than that in which the enterprise is located." At the London Conference the non-discrimination obligation was reformulated to read: "... the commerce of other Members shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the commerce of any country, other than that in which the enterprise is located... ". The formulation of the non-discrimination obligation contained in Article XVII went back to a draft adopted at the 1947 Geneva Conference. If the drafting changes introduced then had been intended to include the national treatment obligation in the provisions on state-trading, this fundamental change would have been referred to in the extensive records of the drafting sessions. One reference to the Article on state-trading in the records of the Geneva Conference (E/PC/T/A/SR/10, page 34) confirmed in the view of Canada that this Article was understood to establish only a most-favoured-nation obligation: a delegate had said in a discussion on government procurement that the Article on state-trading referred only "to most-favoured-nation treatment and not to national treatment" and had then proposed that, in drafting rules on government procurement, "you have got to stick to most-favoured-nation treatment as you have in state-trading." 3.15 The United States stated that it disagreed with the Canadian interpretation for two reasons. First, paragraph 1(a) spoke of principles of non-discriminatory treatment. Were the most-favoured-nation principle the only principle intended to be covered, the word principle would not have been used in the plural. Second, paragraph 2 of Article XVII would be unnecessary if the most-favoured-nation principle of non-discriminatory treatment were the only principle covered by paragraph 1(a). Paragraph 2 permitted contracting parties to give less favourable treatment to imports in comparison to domestic products when purchasing for the consumption of the government. This exception from the national treatment obligation would be superfluous if the term "principles of non-discriminatory treatment" only covered the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment. 3.16 Canada said that Article XVII:1(b), and the principles of "commercial considerations" and "adequate opportunity to compete" it contained, were intended to define the most-favoured-nation treatment principle with respect to state-trading, contained in Article XVII:1(a). This was made clear by the opening clause of paragraph (b) which read: "The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to require...". The reference to "commercial considerations" in this context permitted a derogation from the most-favoured-nation principle; it did not impose an additional obligation of broad import, as the United States suggested. The obligation in Article XVII:1(c) was that a contracting party shall not prevent any enterprise from acting in accordance with the principles of XVII:1(a) and 1(b). The word principle was used in the plural because the most-favoured-nation obligation in the General Agreement involved a number of principles such as those set out in Article I, Article IV on screen quotas for films, and Article XIII concerning import quotas. In response to the argument that paragraph 2 of Article XVII would be unnecessary if the most-favoured-nation principle of non-discriminatory treatment were the only principle covered by paragraph l(a), Canada stated that a reference in the Geneva Conference to the Article on state-trading (E/PC/T/A/SR/37, page 7) established that paragraph 2 of Article XVII did not involve the national treatment principle. Further evidence of the most-favoured-nation character of

34 Article XVII was demonstrated by the fact that Article XVII:1(a) dealt with the purchases or sales of state enterprises involving either imports or exports. The terms "imports" and "exports" described the process of a product crossing a border and clearing customs. Once the product had entered or left the country, it was an "imported" or "exported" product. (Thus Article III spoke of "imported" products.) The scope of Article XVII was therefore limited to purchases or sales abroad by the state enterprise. It was not concerned with the treatment by the state-trading enterprise of imported or domestic products in its domestic market.

(b)

Undertakings to manufacture in Canada goods which would be imported otherwise

3.17 The United States stated that undertakings which required a firm to manufacture goods in Canada with the purpose of substituting a domestically produced good for one that would be imported in the absence of the undertaking (henceforth referred to as manufacturing undertakings) violated Article III:4. Such undertakings reserved a portion of the internal market for products of domestic origin, to the exclusion of imported products. Undertakings obliging the investor to manufacture in Canada specified parts or components of a particular product were also inconsistent with Article III:5 because they constituted internal quantitative regulations relating to the mixture, processing or use of products which required that a specified amount or proportion of a product be supplied from domestic sources. 3.18 Canada stated that Article III:4 did not deal with the manufacture or production of goods and therefore did not apply to manufacturing undertakings. The undertakings to manufacture parts or components of particular products in Canada reflected the individual investor's intention and were firm-specific. They were therefore not "regulations" within the meaning of Article III:5. In the view of both parties, their arguments on the applicability or non-applicability of Articles XI and XVII:1(c) to purchase undertakings also applied to manufacturing undertakings (see paragraphs 3.4 - 3.16 above). 3.19 In the view of Canada the manufacturing undertakings were not only fully in conformity with its obligations under GATT but also outside the Panel's terms of reference. It therefore requested the Panel not to examine these undertakings. (c)

Undertakings to export specific amounts or proportions of production

3.20 The United States stated that Article XVII:1(c), which prohibited government interference with the operation of commercial considerations, was also applicable to undertakings to export specified amounts or proportions of production. The export levels of companies subject to such undertakings could not be assumed to be the result of a decision-making process based on commercial considerations. No enterprise would bind itself voluntarily to export fixed amounts or proportions of its production given the uncertainty of markets and conditions of competition. Once the undertakings were accepted, the investor could not adjust its export sales in accordance with commercial considerations, but was dependent on the consent of the Canadian government to make a change in the undertaking. He might therefore be forced to dump products abroad to meet his obligations. 3.21 Canada reiterated that Article XVII:1 only contained a most-favoured-nation obligation and could therefore not be applied to export undertakings, none of which made distinctions among contracting parties. Canada also rejected the contention that an investor might dump goods in order to fulfil an undertaking. This argument lacked credibility because export undertakings were given by the investors on the basis of their expectations of future export market prospects and in the knowledge of the flexible manner in which Canada monitored compliance with the undertakings.

35 (d)

Article XX(d)

3.22 Canada contended that, in the event that the Panel were to consider the undertakings to be inconsistent with Articles III, XI or XVII, then they would fall within the exception provided for in Article XX(d) of the General Agreement. Within the meaning of Article XX(d), the Foreign Investment Review Act constituted a law which was not inconsistent with the provisions of the General Agreement and the administrative practices under that Act with respect to undertakings fell well within the scope of the types of measures envisaged under this Article as being necessary to secure compliance with this law. Under any scheme under which a state granted authority to a foreign investor to invest in its territory, there had to be some means of ascertaining the nature of the investment for which authority was being granted and that the investment was implemented in a manner consistent with the authority granted. The written undertakings describing the intentions of investors served both these purposes. They were the means by which the investment for which authority was being granted was defined with some precision and, together with the monitoring procedures of the government, buttressed by Sections 19 to 22 of the Act, they were also the means by which the government ensured that investments were implemented within the terms of the authority granted. 3.23 If the government did not have the possibility to enforce undertakings the only recourse it would have in a case of non-implementation of the terms of the authority granted to invest would be to render the investment nugatory. This could entail economic hardship and loss of employment. The enforceability of undertakings and their flexible application provided a reasonable recourse for the government in cases of non-implementation of the proposal as allowed. Moreover, undertakings provided the government with a means of assessing, with confidence, that a proposed investment is, or is likely to be, of significant benefit. Undertakings may be provided with respect to any aspect of the proposed investment as set out in the criteria listed in the Act to be taken into account in assessing significant benefit. An investor's plans with respect to the use of Canadian goods and to exports may properly be considered in assessing the effect of a proposed investment. Many investors submitting proposals, including those involving services and distributorships, may have no other means than through purchase or export undertakings to demonstrate significant benefit. If purchase and export undertakings were not permitted, many potential investors would be denied an equitable opportunity to demonstrate significant benefit. 3.24 The measures the Canadian government took to secure compliance with the Foreign Investment Review Act were, insofar as they related to the purchase or sale of goods, identical in all respects to the measures pertaining to any other aspects of investments allowed under the law. The Canadian practices in this regard were therefore not disguised restrictions on trade within the meaning of the opening sentence of Article XX. The detailed explanation given on the need for undertakings also showed that the undertakings and related administrative practices were not disguised restrictions on trade. 3.25 The United States stated that the undertakings at issue were not necessary to implement the Foreign Investment Review Act and that they constituted disguised restrictions on foreign trade. Two of the conditions of the Article XX(d) exception were therefore not met. The Foreign Investment Review Act itself did not require any undertakings, not to mention undertakings requiring preference for purchase or use of Canadian products or adherence to export performance targets. The Act itself required only that investment proposals be submitted for review to determine whether the proposal was, or was likely to be, of significant benefit to Canada. The effect of the investment on the use of Canadian parts and components and on exports was only one of many factors to be taken into account by the government of Canada in assessing whether a proposal was, or was likely to be, of significant benefit to Canada. Eliciting or accepting binding undertakings to give preference to Canadian products or to meet export targets was therefore an exercise of administrative authority under the Act, rather than a measure necessary to secure compliance with the Act. The undertakings at issue also operated as disguised restrictions on international trade. A preference requiring

36 purchase or use of domestically produced goods obviously restricted trade. Export performance requirements restricted trade by creating artificial export targets for products with which the industries of other contracting parties had to compete. The undertakings at issue, moreover, went far beyond what was necessary to address the concerns that had led to the enactment of the Foreign Investment Review Act. 4.

Position of Argentina

4.1 Argentina was heard by the Panel in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance (see paragraph 1.5 above). Argentina said that a distinction should be made between the purchase and export undertakings and their compatibility with the General Agreement on the one hand, and Canada's investment legislation as such on the other. While the former subject could be considered as falling within the competence of GATT, the latter clearly fell outside the purview of the General Agreement. In this connection Argentina recalled that it had been decided not to include the question of investments in the Ministerial declaration in November 1982. The question of GATT competence would need to be taken into consideration by the Panel in interpreting its terms of reference. 4.2 Argentina further said the dispute before the Panel involved two developed contracting parties. The provisions and arguments invoked against Canada were not necessarily those which could legitimately be invoked against developing countries, considering the protection which those countries had the right to grant under the General Agreement to their developing industries. Argentina asked the Panel to take this into account in its deliberations. 5.

Findings

(a)

General

5.1 In view of the fact that the General Agreement does not prevent Canada from exercising its sovereign right to regulate foreign direct investments, the Panel examined the purchase and export undertakings by investors subject to the Foreign Investment Review Act of Canada solely in the light of Canada's trade obligations under the General Agreement. This approach is in accordance with the Chairman of the Council's conclusions at the close of the discussion of this question at the Council meeting of 2 November 1982. 5.2 In its statement before the Panel, Argentina also pointed out that the provisions and arguments invoked against Canada in this case were not necessarily those which could be legitimately invoked against less-developed contracting parties, given rights to protect national industries which these contracting parties enjoyed under the General Agreement. The Panel recognizes that in disputes involving less-developed contracting parties full account should be taken of the special provisions in the General Agreement relating to these countries (such as Article XVIII:C). The Panel did not examine the issues before it in the light of these provisions since the dispute only involved developed contracting parties. 5.3 The Panel considered that the examination of undertakings to manufacture goods which would be imported otherwise, as requested by the United States (paragraphs 3.1(b), and 3.17 to 3.19 above), was not covered by its terms of reference which only refer to "the purchase of goods in Canada and/or the export of goods from Canada". Accordingly the Panel did not examine this question. (b)

Undertakings to purchase goods of Canadian origin in preference to imported goods or in specified amounts or proportions, or to purchase goods from Canadian sources

37 5.4 Article III:4. The Panel first examined whether the purchase undertakings are to be considered "laws, regulations or requirements" within the meaning of Article III:4. As both parties had agreed that the Foreign Investment Review Act and the Foreign Investment Review Regulations whilst providing for the possibility of written undertakings - did not make their submission obligatory, the question remained whether the undertakings given in individual cases are to be considered "requirements" within the meaning of Article III:4. In this respect the Panel noted that Section 9(c) of the Act refers to "any written undertakings ... relating to the proposed or actual investment given by any party thereto conditional upon the allowance of the investment" and that Section 21 of the Act states that "where a person who has given a written undertaking ... fails or refuses to comply with such undertaking" a court order may be made "directing that person to comply with the undertaking". The Panel further noted that written purchase undertakings - leaving aside the manner in which they may have been arrived at (voluntary submission, encouragement, negotiation, etc.) - once they were accepted, became part of the conditions under which the investment proposals were approved, in which case compliance could be legally enforced. The Panel therefore found that the word "requirements" as used in Article III:4 could be considered a proper description of existing undertakings. 5.5 The Panel could not subscribe to the Canadian view that the word "requirements" in Article III:4 should be interpreted as "mandatory rules applying across-the-board" because this latter concept was already more aptly covered by the term "regulations" and the authors of this provision must have had something different in mind when adding the word "requirements". The mere fact that the few disputes that have so far been brought before the CONTRACTING PARTIES regarding the application of Article III:4 have only concerned laws and regulations does not in the view of the Panel justify an assimilation of "requirements" with "regulations". The Panel also considered that, in judging whether a measure is contrary to obligations under Article III:4, it is not relevant whether it applies across-the-board or only in isolated cases. Any interpretation which would exclude case-by-case action would, in the view of the Panel, defeat the purposes of Article III:4. 5.6 The Panel carefully examined the Canadian view that the purchase undertakings should be considered as private contractual obligations of particular foreign investors vis-à-vis the Canadian government. The Panel recognized that investors might have an economic advantage in assuming purchase undertakings, taking into account the other conditions under which the investment was permitted. The Panel felt, however, that even if this was so, private contractual obligations entered into by investors should not adversely affect the rights which contracting parties, including contracting parties not involved in the dispute, possess under Article III:4 of the General Agreement and which they can exercise on behalf of their exporters. This applies in particular to the rights deriving from the national treatment principle, which - as stated in Article III:1 - is aimed at preventing the use of internal measures "so as to afford protection to domestic production". 5.7 The Panel then examined the question whether less favourable treatment was accorded to imported products than that accorded to like products of Canadian origin in respect of requirements affecting their purchase. For this purpose the Panel distinguished between undertakings to purchase goods of Canadian origin and undertakings to use Canadian sources or suppliers (irrespective of the origin of the goods), and for both types of undertakings took into account the qualifications "available", "reasonably available", or "competitively available". 5.8 The Panel found that undertakings to purchase goods of Canadian origin without any qualification exclude the possibility of purchasing available imported products so that the latter are clearly treated less favourably than domestic products and that such requirements are therefore not consistent with Article III:4. This finding is not modified in cases where undertakings to purchase goods of Canadian origin are subject to the qualification that such goods be "available". It is obvious that if Canadian goods are not available, the question of less favourable treatment of imported goods does not arise.

38 5.9 When these undertakings are conditional on goods being "competitively available" (as in the majority of cases) the choice between Canadian or imported products may frequently coincide with normal commercial considerations and the latter will not be adversely affected whenever one or the other offer is more competitive. However, it is the Panel's understanding that the qualification "competitively available" is intended to deal with situations where there are Canadian goods available on competitive terms. The Panel considered that in those cases where the imported and domestic product are offered on equivalent terms, adherence to the undertaking would entail giving preference to the domestic product. Whether or not the foreign investor chooses to buy Canadian goods in given practical situations, is not at issue. The purpose of Article III:4 is not to protect the interests of the foreign investor but to ensure that goods originating in any other contracting party benefit from treatment no less favourable than domestic (Canadian) goods, in respect of the requirements that affect their purchase (in Canada). On the basis of these considerations, the Panel found that a requirement to purchase goods of Canadian origin, also when subject to "competitive availability", is contrary to Article III:4. The Panel considered that the alternative qualification "reasonably available" which is used in some cases, is a fortiori inconsistent with Article III:4, since the undertaking in these cases implies that preference has to be given to Canadian goods also when these are not available on entirely competitive terms. 5.10 The Panel then turned to the undertakings to buy from Canadian suppliers. The Panel did not consider the situation where domestic products are not available, since such a situation is not covered by Article III:4. The Panel understood the choice under this type of requirement to apply on the one hand to imported goods if bought through a Canadian agent or importer and on the other hand to Canadian goods which can be purchased either from a Canadian "middleman" or directly from the Canadian producer. The Panel recognized that these requirements might in a number of cases have little or no effect on the choice between imported or domestic products. However, the possibility of purchasing imported products directly from the foreign producer would be excluded and as the conditions of purchasing imported products through a Canadian agent or importer would normally be less advantageous, the imported product would therefore have more difficulty in competing with Canadian products (which are not subject to similar requirements affecting their sale) and be treated less favourably. For this reason, the Panel found that the requirements to buy from Canadian suppliers are inconsistent with Article III:4. 5.11 In case undertakings to purchase from Canadian suppliers are subject to a "competitive availability" qualification, as is frequent, the handicap for the imported product is alleviated as it can be obtained directly from the foreign producer if offered under more competitive conditions than via Canadian sources. In those cases in which Canadian sources and a foreign manufacturer offer a product on equivalent terms, adherence to the undertaking would entail giving preference to Canadian sources, which in practice would tend to result in the purchase being made directly from the Canadian producer, thereby excluding the foreign product. The Panel therefore found that requirements to purchase from Canadian suppliers, also when subject to competitive availability, are contrary to Article III:4. As before (paragraph 5.9), the Panel considered that the qualification "reasonably available" is a fortiori inconsistent with Article III:4. 5.12 The Panel considered the Canadian view expressed in paragraph 3.9 above that the word "requirements" in Article III:4 of the General Agreement should be interpreted in the light of Article 12 of the Havana Charter, the general principles of which the contracting parties, in Article XXIX of the General Agreement, agreed to observe to the fullest extent of their executive authority. The Panel noted that the deletion of Article XXIX of the General Agreement was proposed in 1955 and accepted 1 by all but one contracting party , and that - although this Article is technically still in force - it refers to an instrument which itself has never been implemented and the acceptance of which is no longer pending as is assumed in Article XXIX. This leaves considerable doubt as to the manner in which its provisions would have been interpreted if they had entered into force. The Panel further noted that

39 paragraph l(c) of Article 12 of the Charter was to apply "without prejudice to existing international agreements to which Members are parties", and that paragraph 1(a), (b) and (d) as well as paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article tended to encourage international investments (including international co-operation in this field). It is therefore doubtful whether paragraph l(c) which reserved the rights of Members to prescribe "reasonable requirements" should by itself be considered as a "general principle" in the sense of Article XXIX:1 of the General Agreement. The wording of this latter provision suggests that it was not the intention of its drafters that contracting parties should "undertake to observe to the fullest extent of their executive authority" what they would in any case judge to be in their own interest, nor that they should invoke the Charter to detract from their obligations under the General Agreement, but rather that they should observe general principles which reinforced or added to these obligations. _______________ 1 Protocol Amending Part I and Articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the Ninth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, published 10 March 1955. This protocol did not enter into force (see Status of Legal Instruments, page 2-7.1). In the light of the foregoing facts and considerations the Panel could not subscribe to the assumption that the drafters of Article III had intended the term "requirements" to exclude requirements connected with the regulation of international investments and did not find anything in the negotiating history, the wording, the objectives and the subsequent application of Article III which would support such an interpretation. 5.13 Article III:5. The Panel then considered the United States contention that purchase undertakings which obliged the investor to purchase in Canada a specified amount or proportion of his requirements were also contrary to Article III:5. The Panel noted that these cases had been characterized by both parties as purchase undertakings (paragraph 2.5) and had also been presented as such by the United States (paragraphs 3.l(a) and 3.12). In this regard the Panel noted that in paragraph 5 of Article III the conditions of purchase are not at issue but rather the existence of internal quantitative regulations relating to the mixture, processing or use of products (irrespective of whether these are purchased or obtained by other means). On the basis of the presentations made, the Panel (which was unable to go into a detailed examination of individual cases where purchase undertakings referred to percentages or specific amounts) therefore did not find sufficient grounds to consider the undertakings in question in the light of Article III:5, but came to the conclusion that they fell under the purchase requirements that had been found inconsistent with Article III:4. 5.14 Article XI. The United States further asked the Panel to find that the purchase undertakings operate as restrictions on the importation of products into Canada and are therefore contrary to Article XI:1. The Panel shares the view of Canada that the General Agreement distinguishes between measures affecting the "importation" of products, which are regulated in Article XI:1, and those affecting "imported products", which are dealt with in Article III. If Article XI:1 were interpreted broadly to cover also internal requirements, Article III would be partly superfluous. Moreover, the exceptions to Article XI:1, in particular those contained in Article XI:2, would also apply to internal requirements restricting imports, which would be contrary to the basic aim of Article III. The Panel did not find, either in the drafting history of the General Agreement or in previous cases examined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, any evidence justifying such an interpretation of Article XI. For these reasons, the Panel, noting that purchase undertakings do not prevent the importation of goods as such, reached the conclusion that they are not inconsistent with Article XI:1. 5.15 Article XVII:1(c). The United States requested the Panel to find that the purchase undertakings obliging investors to give less favourable treatment to imported products than to domestic products prevent the investors from acting solely in accordance with commercial considerations and that they therefore violate Canada's obligations under Article XVII:1(c).

40 5.16 The Panel takes the view that, through its reference to sub-paragraph (a), paragraph l(c) of Article XVII of the General Agreement imposes on contracting parties the obligation to act in their relations with state-trading and other enterprises "in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders". This obligation is defined in sub-paragraph (b), which declares, inter alia, that these principles are understood to require the enterprises to make their purchases and sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations. The fact that sub-paragraph (b) does not establish a separate general obligation to allow enterprises to act in accordance with commercial considerations, but merely defines the obligations set out in the preceding sub-paragraph, is made clear through the introductory words "The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of the paragraph shall be understood to require ...". For these reasons, the Panel considers that the commercial considerations criterion becomes relevant only after it has been determined that the governmental action at issue falls within the scope of the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed by the General Agreement. The Panel saw great force in Canada's argument that only the most-favoured-nation and not the national treatment obligations fall within the scope of the general principles referred to in Article XVII:1(a). However, the Panel did not consider it necessary to decide in this particular case whether the general reference to the principles of non-discriminatory treatment referred to in Article XVII:1 also comprises the national treatment principle since it had already found the purchase undertakings at issue to be inconsistent with Article III:4 which implements the national treatment principle specifically in respect of purchase requirements. (c)

Undertakings to export specified quantities or proportions

5.17 The United States requested the Panel to find that the undertakings which oblige investors to export specified quantities or proportions of their production are inconsistent with Article XVII:1(c) because the export levels of companies subject to such undertakings cannot be assumed to be the result of a decision-making process based on commercial considerations. 5.18 As explained in paragraph 5.16 above, Article XVII:1(b) does not establish a separate obligation to allow enterprises to act in accordance with commercial considerations but merely defines the obligation of the enterprises, set out in sub-paragraph (a) of Article XVII:1, to "act in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment" prescribed in the General Agreement. Hence, before applying the commercial considerations criterion to the export undertakings, the Panel first had to determine whether Canada, in accepting investment proposals on the condition that the investor export a certain quantity or proportion of his production, acts inconsistently with any of the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in the General Agreement. The Panel found that there is no provision in the General Agreement which forbids requirements to sell goods in foreign markets in preference to the domestic market. In particular, the General Agreement does not impose on contracting parties the obligation to prevent enterprises from dumping. Therefore, when allowing foreign investments on the condition that the investors export a certain amount or proportion of their production, Canada does not, in the view of the Panel, act inconsistently with any of the principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed by the General Agreement for governmental measures affecting exports by private traders. Article XVII:1(c) is for these reasons not applicable to the export undertakings at issue. (e)

Article XX(d)

5.19 Canada contended that, in the event that the Panel were to consider the purchase undertakings to be inconsistent with Article III:4, these would fall within the exception provided for in Article XX(d) of the General Agreement because, within the meaning of that provision, the Foreign Investment Review Act constitutes "a law which is not inconsistent with the provisions of the General Agreement" and the purchase undertakings are "measures necessary to secure compliance" with that law.

41 5.20 Since Article XX(d) is an exception to the General Agreement it is up to Canada, as the party invoking the exception, to demonstrate that the purchase undertakings are necessary to secure compliance with the Foreign Investment Review Act. On the basis of the explanations given by Canada the Panel could not, however, conclude that the purchase undertakings that were found to be inconsistent with Article III:4 are necessary for the effective administration of the Act. The Panel is in particular not convinced that, in order to achieve the aims of the Act, investors submitting applications under the Act had to be bound to purchasing practices having the effect of giving preference to domestic products. It was not clear to the Panel why a detailed review of investment proposals without purchasing requirements would not be sufficient to enable the Canadian government to determine whether the proposed investments were or were likely to be of significant benefit to Canada within the meaning of Section 2 of the Foreign Investment Review Act.

(f)

Other undertakings

5.21 To avoid any misunderstanding the Panel wishes to underline that some of the undertakings mentioned in paragraph 2.5 above, such as undertakings to set up a purchasing division in the Canadian subsidiary or to consult with Canadian industry specialists in drawing up tender lists, although related to the purchase of goods in Canada - have not been the subject of United States contention in the Panel proceedings and were therefore not examined. The Panel also wishes to stress that the considerations relating to the purchase undertakings examined in paragraphs 5.1 to 5.20 remain strictly without prejudice to the status of other undertakings agreed upon in the context of the Foreign Investment Review Act and referred to in paragraph 2.4 but pertaining to employment, investment, research and development and other subjects which clearly fall outside the scope of the General Agreement. 6.

Conclusions

6.1 In the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 5.4 to 5.12, the Panel concluded that the practice of Canada to allow certain investments subject to the Foreign Investment Review Act conditional upon written undertakings by the investors to purchase goods of Canadian origin, or goods from Canadian sources, is inconsistent with Article III:4 of the General Agreement according to which contracting parties shall accord to imported products treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all internal requirements affecting their purchase. The Panel further concluded that in relation to Article III:5, there were insufficient grounds to consider the purchase undertakings which refer to specific amounts or proportions under its provisions (paragraph 5.13). Noting that purchase undertakings do not prevent the importation of goods as such, the Panel reached the conclusion that they are not inconsistent with Article XI:1 (paragraph 5.14). Further, having reached a decision on purchase requirements in relation to Article III:4, the Panel did not consider it necessary to make a specific finding on the interpretation of Article XVII:1(c) in the context of this case, and therefore did not reach a separate conclusion regarding the consistency of purchase requirements with this provision (paragraphs 5.15 and 5.16). On the basis of the evidence before it, the Panel could not conclude that the purchase undertakings that were found to be inconsistent with Article III:4 are necessary within the meaning of Article XX(d) for the effective administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (paragraphs 5.19 to 5.20). 6.2 For the reasons set out in paragraphs 5.17 and 5.18, the Panel found that Canada does not act inconsistently with Article XVII:1(c) of the General Agreement when allowing certain investments subject to the Foreign Investment Review Act conditional upon undertakings by investors to export a specified amount or proportion of their production. Finally, the Panel considered that the examination of undertakings to manufacture goods which would be imported otherwise was not covered by its terms of reference (paragraph 5.3).

42 6.3 The Panel is aware that inconsistency with Article III:4 was not intended by the Foreign Investment Review Act, which does not require the submission of undertakings, but that this practice developed as the administration of the Act evolved, to the point that "they are now routinely submitted in support of nearly all larger investment proposals" (paragraph 2.4 above). This evolution may partly reflect the need for foreign investors to demonstrate, by this and other means, to the Canadian administration that their proposed investment would be of significant benefit to Canada. The Panel sympathizes with the desire of the Canadian authorities to ensure that Canadian goods and suppliers would be given a fair chance to compete with imported products. However, the Panel holds the view that the purchase requirements under examination do not stop short of this objective but tend to tip the balance in favour of Canadian products, thus coming into conflict with Article III:4. 6.4 The Panel recognizes that purchase requirements may reflect plans which the investors would have carried out also in the absence of the undertakings; that undertakings with such provisos as "competitive availability" have an adverse impact on imported products only in those cases in which imported and Canadian goods are offered on equivalent terms; and that the undertakings are enforced flexibly. Many of the undertakings, though technically in violation with the General Agreement, therefore possibly do not nullify or impair benefits accruing to the United States under the General Agreement. However, understanding GATT practice, a breach of a rule is presumed to have an adverse impact on other contracting parties (BISD 26S/216), and the Panel also proceeded on this assumption. 6.5 As to the extent to which purchase requirements reflect plans of the investors, the Panel does not consider it relevant nor does it feel competent to judge how the foreign investors are affected by the purchase requirements, as the national treatment obligations of Article III of the General Agreement do not apply to foreign persons or firms but to imported products and serve to protect the interests of producers and exporters established on the territory of any contracting party. Purchase requirements applied to foreign investors in Canada which are inconsistent with Article III:4 can affect the trade interests of all contracting parties, and impinge upon their rights. 6.6 The Panel carefully considered the effects of the purchase requirements on trade. The Panel concluded that an evaluation of these effects would entail scrutiny and analysis of the implementation of several thousands of often differently worded undertakings as well as speculation on what the purchasing behaviour of foreign investors would have been in their absence. The Panel could not undertake such an evaluation and it is therefore not in a position to judge how frequently the purchase requirements cause investors to act differently than they would have acted in the absence of the undertakings and how frequently they therefore adversely affect the trade interests of other contracting parties. The Panel, however, believes that an evaluation of the trade effects was not directly relevant to its findings because a breach of a GATT rule is presumed to have an adverse impact on other contracting parties (see paragraph 6.4 above). 6.7 Taking into account all the above considerations, the Panel considered what scope might exist for modifications of administrative practices under the Foreign Investment Review Act so as to bring them into conformity with Canada's obligations under the General Agreement. In this connection, the Panel considered the following Canadian submission contained in paragraph 3.6 of particular relevance: "Since both the investor and the Canadian government had to act in the context of markets in which the investor's competitors were not subject to undertakings, it was highly unlikely that purchase undertakings would either be offered or sought that departed significantly from the purchasing practices the investor would follow in the absence of the undertaking."

43

On the face of it, this statement and the above-mentioned considerations seem to suggest that there may be scope for adapting the administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act in such a way as to remove the implication that imported products are treated less favourably than domestic products. The Panel notes that in a previous case another Panel had been confronted with a somewhat similar 1 situation and had suggested a solution along these lines. In the case at issue, the Panel considers that the Canadian authorities might resolve the problem by ensuring that any future purchase undertakings will not provide more favourable treatment to Canadian products in relation to imported products. The Panel's findings also apply to existing purchase undertakings. However, the Panel recognizes that an immediate application of its findings to these undertakings might cause difficulties in the administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act. Consequently, the Panel suggests that the CONTRACTING PARTIES recommend that Canada bring the existing purchase undertakings as soon as possible into conformity with its obligations under the General Agreement, and invite Canada to report on the steps taken to that effect before the end of 1985.

_______________ 1 BISD 7S/66-67: "The Panel considered, furthermore, that if the considered view of the Italian Government was that these credit facilities had not influenced the terms of competition on the Italian market, there would not seem to be a serious problem in amending the operation of the Law so as to avoid any discrimination as regards these credit facilities between the domestic and imported tractors and agricultural machinery."

1 BAB III NEGOSIASI TRIMs DALAM PUTARAN URUGUAY (URUGUAY ROUND) Negosiasi mengenai TRIMs merupakan salah satu agenda penting selama putaran Uruguay. Agenda ini menarik perhatian cukup serius dari para perunding, khususnya para perunding dari negara maju dan negara sedang berkembang. Namun demikian dalam perundingan agenda TRIMs

ini

mereka

tidak

mempunyai

pengalaman

atau

pengetahuan

memadai mengenai apa yang dimaksud dengan TRIMs. Karena itu pula, dapatlah

dimengerti

apabila

negosiasi

di

bidang

ini

merupakan

salah satu perundingan yang paling sulit selama putaran Uruguay.1 Upaya lama Amerika Serikat untuk menempatkan isu atau agenda penanaman

modal

dalam

GATT

cukup

berhasil

ketika

perundingan

putaran Uruguay diluncurkan.2 Namun demikian konflik antara negara maju

dan

negara

sedang

berkembang

kembali

berlangsung

selama

perundingan GATT (Uruguay) mengenai masalah TRIMs ini. Konflik utama yang terjadi adalah adanya perbedaan pandangan di antara dua kelompok negara ini mengenai sifat TRIMs. Beberapa negara 1

maju

(industri)

beranggapan,

TRIMS

bertentangan

dengan

John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 1995), hlm. 138. Referensi utama untuk masalah ini lihat: Terence P. Stewart, (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), vol. II: Commentary (The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993), hlm. 1997 - 2240; Paul Bryan Christy III, 'Negotiating Investment in the GATT: A Call for Functionalism,' 12 Mich. J. Int'l.L 743 - 798 (1991). 2 Penggunaan organisasi (ekonomi) internasional merupakan kebijakan ekonomi Amerika Serikat. (Lihat: T. L. Brewer and S. Young, The Multilateral Investment System and Multinational Enterprises (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1998), hlm. 122). Laporan ekonomi presiden AS tahun 1998 menyatakan: 'The primary thrust of the U.S. trade policy is to use multilateral discussions and fora such as GATT and the Organization for Economic and Development to promote free, rules-based trade.' (W.A.

2 berbagai

aturan

atau

pasal

GATT.3

Sedangkan

negara

sedang

berkembang pada umumnya berpendapat, upaya-upaya penanaman modal (investment measures atau TRIMs) bukan atau tidak dibuat untuk merintangi

perdagangan.

ditujukan

untuk

berkembang),

Upaya

memenuhi

termasuk

penanaman

tujuan untuk

modal

ini

pembangunan tujuan

semata-mata

negara

(sedang

industrialisasi

dan

pembangunan.4 Ada

juga

pandangan

yang

menyatakan

bahwa

cukup

banyak

pemerintah di dunia yang telah menerapkan upaya penanaman modal ini.5 Pandangan ini menyatakan, dalam merundingkan aturan-aturan mengenai

TRIMs,

maka

kajian

terhadap

pasal-pasal

GATT

perlu

dilakukan untuk memberi perlindungan yang cukup terhadap hak-hak dari para peserta perundingan.6 Pandangan lain yang juga berbeda adalah mengenai tujuan dari perundingan

di

bidang

ini.

Sedangkan

sarjana

baru

lainnya

Fennel and J. W. Tyler, Trade and International Investment from the GATT to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (1995), hlm. 2036). 3 Upaya-upaya yang terkait dengan penanaman modal yang sering dibahas adalah: local content, yaitu manakala investor disyaratkan untuk membeli bahan-bahan setempat untuk maksud-maksud produksi; export performance, yaitu manakala investor disyaratkan untuk mengekspor produknya dalam suatu jumlah tertentu; product mandating, yaitu manakala terdapat suatu kewajiban bagi investor untuk mengekspor kepada suatu negara tertentu atau wilayah tertentu; trade balancing, yaitu manakala investor disyaratkan untuk menggunakan keuntungannya untuk membayar produk atau bahan impor; domestic sales, yaitu manakala investor disyaratkan untuk memberikan produknya kepada pasar dalam negeri; dan exchange restrictions, yaitu mankala akses investor terhdap mata uang asing atau kemampuannya untuk mengimpor dibatasi. (GATT, GATT Activities 1990, hlm. 46). 4 GATT, GATT Activities 1987, hlm. 43; GATT, GATT Activities 1989, hlm. 66. 5 GATT, GATT Activities 1987, hlm. 43; lihat juga: Robert H. Edwards Jr., and Simon N. Lester, 'Towards a More Comprehensive World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures,' 33 Stan. J. Int'l.L 145 (1997).

3 berkeinginan untuk membuat aturan-aturan yang baru dan lebih luas mengenai TRIMs. Sebaliknya, negara

sedang berkembang menentang

upaya ini. Negara-negara ini berpendapat, negosiasi harus dibatasi hanya untuk menguraikan aturan-aturan atau pasal-pasal GATT yang ada yang mungkin dapat diterapkan terhadap TRIMs. Negara-negara ini juga meminta agar negosiasi harus memberikan kesempatan yang lebih luas dan kebebasan kepada negara sedang berkembang untuk mempertimbangkan tujuan pembangunannya.7 Sejak semula negara maju semangat untuk membahas masalah TRIMs

dalam

kerangka

aturan

GATT.

Tetapi

semangat

ini

kurang

mendapat dukungan GATT. Mandat Putaran uruguay sebagaimana termuat dalam the Punta Del Este Declaration (Deklarasi Punta Del Este) tidaklah seluas yang negara maju harapkan. Terdapat tiga alasan mengapa Deklarasi Punta Del Este memuat mandat yang tidak terlalu ambisius. Pertama, di antara negara maju sendiri negosiasi dipimpin

masih yang oleh

terdapat akan

tujuan

yang

dikeluarkan.

Amerika

Serikat

berbeda

Beberapa berupaya

mengenai

negara agar

hasil

maju

yang

tujuan

dari

perundingan akan menghasilkan suatu aturan yang luas muatannya. Menurut negara ini, keluaran perjanjian harus mencakup aturan yang memuat insentif dan pengawasan terhadap penanaman modal asing. Sedangkan negara lainnya ternyata hanya menghendaki agar aturan di

6

GATT, GATT Activities 1987, hlm. 43. Paul Bryan Christy III, supra, note 1, hlm. 783; Terence P. Stewart (ed.), supra, note 1, hlm. 2073; Sidney Golt, The GATT Negotiations 1986-1990: Origin, Issues and Prospects (London: British-North American Institute, 1990), hlm. 43.

7

4 bidang TRIMs hanya akan mengatur pengawasan upaya-upaya penanaman modal yang terkait dengan perdagangan.8 Kedua,

isu

atau

agenda

perundingan

lainya

di

dalam

GATT

ternyata juga menarik perhatian sebagian besar para perunding, khususnya perundingan mengenai GATS dan TRIPS. Ketiga, negara sedang berkembang pada umumnya dengan keras menentang adanya setiap upaya pembahasan agenda mengenai TRIMs.9 The

Punta

del

Este

Declaration

mengenai

penanaman

modal

menyatakan sebagai berikut:10 “Following an examination of the operation of GATT articles related to the trade restrictive and distorting effects of investment measures, negotiations should elaborate, as appropriate, further provisions that may be necessary to avoid such adverse effects on trade.” Deklarasi

di

atas

mengungkapkan

bahwa

negosiasi

mengenai

agenda penanaman modal memuat hal-hal berikut: (1) Negosiasi dibatasi hanya kepada upaya-upaya penanaman modal yang mempengaruhi perdagangan (TRIMs). (2) Deklarasi mengakui pasal-pasal GATT dapat diterapkan terhadap TRIMs. (3) Perundingan diperlukan guna membentuk pengaturan di masa depan yang

mengatur

TRIMs

guna

mencegah

dampak

yang

merugikan

terhadap perdagangan.11

8

John Croome, supra, note 1, hlm. 138. Stephen J. Canner, 'Trade and International Investment: from GATT to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,' dalam: Joseph F. Dennin, (ed)., Law and Practice of the World Trade Organization (New York: Oceana Publ., 1995), hlm. 3. 10 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Uruguay Round: Papers on Selected Issues (UNCTAD/ITP/10), 1989, Annex I, hlm. 376. 9

5 Pada

awal

difokuskan

perundingan,

terhadap

upaya

ternyata

pemahaman

perhatian

yang

lebih

lebih baik

banyak mengenai

pengeritan TRIMs itu sendiri. Selain itu, para perunding juga berupaya merumuskan pasal-pasal GATT yang dapat diterakan terhadap upaya-upaya penanaman modal yang dapat mempengaruhi perdagangan internasional.12 Perundingan sejak awal berjalan lambat. Hal ini memang dapat dipahami mengingat pada waktu itu belum pernah ada pembahasan mengenai

hal

didahului

ini.

oleh

TRIMs

adanya

seolah-olah

studi

atau

lahir

kajian

begitu yang

saja

mendalam

tanpa yang

dilakukan atau disponsori oleh GATT. Dalam perundingan pun negaranegara peserta ternyata juga membahas dampak-dampak perdagangan terhadap TRIMs. Selain itu, mereka mengkaitkannya dengan akibat atau

dampak

perdagangan

mereka

dikaitkan

dengan

perundingan,

pandangan

bahwa

perdagangan

masih

pasal-pasal

GATT.13 Selama diciptakan

proses untuk

mengganggu

TRIMs

tidak

mendominasi

perundingan. Para perunding percaya, TRIMs dibuat sebagai suatu kebijakan yang sah guna memenuhi pembangunan suatu negara seperti industrialisasi atau pembangunan.

11

Lihat Maskus and Eby, 'Developing New Rules and Disciplines on TradeRelated Investment Measures,' dalam: Robert M. Stern (ed.), Multilateral Trading System (Ann Arbor: the University of Michigan Press, 1993), note 109, hlm. 458. Mandat yang singkat untuk negosiasi TRIMs ini kelak melahirkan beberapa penafsiran dan keterlambatan prosedural di dalam negosiasi. (Lihat: John Croome, supra, note 1, hlm. 1). 12 GATT Focus 52 (1987/88) 5; GATT Focus 54 (1988) 6; GATT Focus 58 (1988) 7. 13 GATT Focus 56 (1988) 5; GATT, GATT Activities 1987, hlm. 42.

6 Negara-negara

sedang

berkembang

mendukung

pandangan

ini

bahwa negosiasi harus berfokus pada perumusan masalah secara kasus per

kasus.

Para

peserta

perundingan

juga

telah

sepakat

bahwa

negosiasi hanya akan membahas dampak yang merugikan dari upayaupaya (kebijakan) penanaman modal dari suatu negara.14 Suatu komisi khusus yang dibentuk untuk mengkaji masalah penanaman modal ini bertemu di Montreal pada bulan Desember 1988. Pertemuan ini telah berhasil merumuskan tujuan dari perundingan TRIMs, yakni sebagai berikut: (a) Mengidentifikasi lebih lanjut dampak-dampak dari perdagangan yang

restriktif

dan

mengganggu

upaya-upaya

penanaman

modal

yang dapat tercakup dalam pasal-pasal GATT; (b) Mengidentifikasi restriktif modal

dan

yang

dampak dampak

baik

dari

perdagangan

merugikan

tercakup

dari

dalam

yang

bersifat

upaya-upaya

penanaman

aturan-aturan

GATT

namun

relevan dengan mandat sebagaimana tercantum dalam the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration. (c) Mengkaji

kemungkinan

pemberlakuan

aspek-aspek

pembangunan

dalam aturan-aturan penanaman modal (TRIMs Agreement); (d) Upaya-upaya merugikan

untuk

termasuk,

aturan-aturan

14

mencegah

baru

adanya

apabila apabila

dampak

perdagangan

memungkinkan,

pasal-pasal

GATT

yang

dirumuskannya tidak

dapat

GATT, GATT Activities 1987, hlm. 42. GATT, GATT Activities 1989, hlm. 66.

7 mengatur

upaya-upaya

penanaman

modal

yang

terkait

dengan

perdagangan.15 (e) Masalah-masalah lainnya seperti bentuk-bentuk penanaman modal dan implementasinya. Dari uraian di atas dan dari tujuan dari negosiasi mengenai TRIMs,

tampak

bahwa

sebenarnya

negara-negara

para

peserta

perundingan tidak memiliki satu kesepahaman pengertian mengenai apa yang dimaksud dengan TRIMs. Mereka ternyata masih dalam tahap mengidentifikasi bentuk atau upaya-upaya apa yang dimaksud dengan TRIMs

yang

memiliki

internasional,

dampak

hubungan

TRIMs

merugikan dengan

terhadap

pasal-pasal

perdagangan GATT,

serta

dampak dari upaya-upaya penanaman modal terhadap pembangunan.16 Pada tahun 1988, beberapa negara anggota GATT mengemukakan proposalnya. beberapa

Amerika

prinsip

Serikat,

aturan

GATT,

misalnya seperti

saja,

mengusulkan

misalnya

prinsip

agar non-

diskriminasi, prinsip transparasi dan penyelesaian sengketa dapat diterapkan terhadap TRIMs. Amerika Serikat mengusulkan perlunya tambahan aturan-aturan GATT supaya

upaya-upaya penanaman modal

TRIMs yang dapat merugikan perdagangan dapat dicegah.17 Negara sedang berkembang menentang usulan di atas. Mereka berpendapat bahwa negosiasi harus dibatasi hanya kepada TRIMs. Negara ini juga dengan tepat menyatakan bahwa aturan mengenai

15

GATT Focus 61 (1989) hlm. 8-9; GATT, GATT Activities 1989, hlm. 67; UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment (New York: UN, 1997), hlm. 138-139. 16 UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 139. 17 GATT, GATT Activities 1988, hlm. 52.

8 perlakuan yang lebih menguntungkan dan berbeda (bagi negara sedang berkembang) perlu dicantumkan.18 Selama

pembahasan

di

sepanjang

tahun

1989,

usulan-usulan

kembali diserahkan oleh berbagai negara peserta. Swiss dan Jepang misalnya

mengusulkan

beberapa

prinsip

yang

mempertimbangkan

dampak-dampak dari perdagangan yang restriktif terhadap upayaupaya penanaman modal. Prinsip-prinsip ini adalah larangan upaya perdagangan yang restriktif dan komitmen umum untuk menerapkan semua upaya secara transparan dan non-diskriminatif.19 Amerika

Serikat,

didorong

oleh

kepentingan

ekonomi

dan

kebijakan pasar terbuka, mengemukakan kembali perlu dimasukkannya perjanjian komprehensif mengenai penanaman modal dalam konteks GATT.20 Amerika Serikat dalam hal ini mengusulkan suatu aturan hukum baru yang akan mengatur TRIMs. Aturan tersebut mencakup penghapusan

atau

pengurangan

dampak

dari

perdagangan

yang

merugikan.21 Amerika

Serikat

juga

mengusulkan

pembentukan

suatu

Illustrative List dari TRIMs yang akan diuraikan baik pada kedua kategori tersebut atau pada masing-masing kategori. Usulan penting lainnya

yang

Negotiating 18

dikemukakan Group

adalah

oleh

Amerika

perlunya

Serikat pengaturan

kepada

the

mengenai

UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 141. GATT Focus 64 (989) hlm. 3; GATT, GATT Activities 1989, hlm. 67; Terence P. Stewart, (ed.), supra, note 1, hlm. 2093. 20 GATT Focus 64 (989) hlm. 3; Kebijakan Amerika Serikat untuk merundingkan dengan rekan dagangnya didasarkan kepada UU Amerika Serikat the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act, Sect. 1101 (b) (11), 102 Stat. 1107. (Lihat lebih lanjut: William A. Fennel and Joseph W. Tyler, supra, note 2, hlm. 2036). 19

9 transparansi, penegakan dan penyelesaian sengketa serta aturanaturan transisi untuk memberlakukan perjanjian TRIMs.22 Dalam usulan awalnya, Amerika Serikat mengemukakan 3 (tiga) bentuk kategori dan mengidentifikasi pasal serta prinsip-prinsip GATT yang relevan dengan TRIMs, yakni:23 1). Upaya-upaya yang membatasi penjualan, pembelian dan penggunaan (produk-produk) impor di dalam negara penerima (Pasal III, XI, XIII, dan XV GATT); 2). Upaya-upaya

yang

membatasi

kemampuan

negara

ketiga

untuk

mengekspor (Pasal XI dan XIII GATT), dan 3). Upaya-upaya yang memaksa peningkatan ekspor dari negara tuan rumah atau yang dapat mengganggu aliran perdagangan di pasar dunia (Pasal XVI dan XVII). Keseluruhannya Negotiating

Group

diperkenankan.24

jumlah adalah

Amerika

usulan 8

Serikat

Amerika bentuk

Serikat upaya

mengemukakan

kepada yang

the

tidak

upaya-upaya

ini

untuk dimasukkan ke dalam agenda perundingan GATT. Kemudian

Amerika

Serikat

mengemukakan

usulan

lainnya

mengenai sampai berapa jauh pasal-pasal GATT dapat diberlakukan dan mengatur dampak-dampak yang timbul dari adanya TRIMs. Dalam 21

GATT Focus 64 (1989) hlm. 3. GATT Focus 64 (1989) hlm. 3. 23 Stephen J. Canner, supra, note 9, hlm. 5. 24 Pesyaratan tersebut mencakup: (i) local content requirements; (ii) export performance requirements; (iii) local manufacturing requirements; (iv) trade balancing requirements; (v) production mandates; (vi) foreign exchange restrictions; (vii) mandatory technology transfer; and (viii) limits on equity participation and on remittances (lihat juga: Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman, 'Trade-Related Investment Measures,' dalam: 22

10 hal ini Amerika Serikat membuat tiga kategori berupa dampak-dampak merugikan yang dapat timbul terhadap perdagangan:25 1) pengurangan impor (Pasal III dan XI GATT); 2) pengurangan

atau

peningkatan

ekspor

(Pasal

I,

VI

dan

XVI

GATT); 3) pengurangan ekspor (Pasal XI GATT tidak cukup untuk memberi aturan atau landasan hukum). Masyarakat

Eropa

(EC)

dan

negara-negara

Skandinavia

beranggapan, perundingan (negosiasi) selayaknya tidak menyinggung hal-hal

yang

mengganggu

kebijakan

penanaman

modal

nasional.

Negara-negara ini mengusulkan, setiap aturan baru harus berasaskan pada aturan-aturan dan prinsip-prinsip GATT.26 Usulan

yang

dikemukakan

oleh

Komisi

EC

(The

European

Commission) sangat lebih selektif dan berkaitan dengan upaya-upaya TRIMs yang secara tegas atau diam-diam mengganggu perdagangan dan aturan-aturan GATT. EC memisahkan masalah penanaman modal langsung (foreign

direct

investment)

dan

masalah

mengenai

upaya-upaya

penanaman modal yang terkait dengan perdagangan. EC juga menentang dimasukkannya

'the

right

of

establishment'

dan

'alih

kekayaan

('transfer of resources') di dalam perundingan. Di samping itu, EC juga berpendapat bahwa pemisahan tersebut harus

ditarik

di

antara

upaya-upaya

penanaman

modal

yang

Jeffrey J. Schott (ed.), Completing the Uruguay Round (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990), hlm. 152. 25 Stephen J. Canner, supra, note 9, hlm. 5. 26 GATT, GATT Activities 1989, hlm. 67; Lihat juga: UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment, Chapter VI, supra, note 15, hlm. 141.

11 berpengaruh terhadap perdagangan baik yang secara langsung maupuan tidak

langsung.

Dampak

perdagangan

langsung,

menurut

EC,

disebabkan oleh TRIMs - berkaitan dengan persyaratan licensing local

equity

remittances pembatasan

dan

persyaratan

(pengiriman atau

restriksi

insentif-insentif

alih

keuntungan tukar

penanaman

teknologi,

ke

menukar

modal.27

negara mata

persyaratan asalnya)

uang

Sedangkan

asing) TRIMs

dan dan yang

mempunyai dampak yang secara tidak langsung berdampak terhadap perdagangan akan tunduk pada prosedur konsultasi dan penyelesaian sengketa.28 EC

mengemukakan

8

TRIMs

yang

memenuhi

krtieria

yang

ditujukan kepada ekspor dan impor dari suatu perusahaan yang dapat mempengaruhi perdagangan. Persyaratan-persyaratan tersebut adalah: persyaratan penggunaan produk lokal (local content), persyaratan untuk membuat suatu produk tertentu (manufacturing), pelaksanaan ekspor tertentu (export performance), kewajiban membuat produk tertentu (product mandatory), persyaratan untuk menyimbangi neraca perdagangan (trade balancing), pembatasan nilai tukar mata uang (exchange restrictions), persyaratan penjualan di

dalam negeri

(domestic sales), dan pembatasan pembuatan suatu barang mengenai komponen

dari

suatu

produk

final

(manufacturing

limitations

concerning components of the final product).29

27

UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 140. UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 140. 29 UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 140. ME juga percaya bahwa negosiasi mengenai masalah pengecualian seperti halnya untuk negara sedang berkembamg hanya akan relevan manakala TRIMs dan aturan-aturan GATT yang relevan telah dapat diidentifikasi. 28

12 Negara sedang berkembang agak segan untuk menetapkan tujuan perundingan di bidang TRIMs ini. Negara-negara ini berpendapat, perundingan di bidang TRIMs seyogyanya memfokuskan kepada dampakdampak

dari

TRIMs

yang

merugikan,

bukan

kepada

upaya-upaya

penanaman modalnya.30 Usulan dari negara sedang berkembang tidak menekankan kepada upaya-upaya penanaman modal atau membentuk suatu sistem baru dalam GATT

untuk

mengatur

upaya-upaya

penanaman

modal

yang

terkait

dengan perdagangan. Negara-negara ini yang dipelopori oleh India dan

Brazil

berpendapat,

tujuan

dari

negosiasi

adalah

mengklarifikasi pasal-pasal GATT dan membuat aturan pasal baru apabila memang diperlukan.31 Negara-negara berkembang juga menekankan perlunya perlakuan yang

berbeda

dan

lebih

menguntungkan

mereka.32

kepada

India

berpendapat, dimensi atau unsur pembangunan jauh lebih bermanfaat daripada membahas dampak-dampak terhadap perdagangan. Upaya-upaya ini

diperlukan

dampak

dari

oleh

negara

praktek

sedang

bisnis

berkembang

restriktif

untuk

(restrictive

mengurangi business

practices) dari perusahaan-perusahaan multinasional.33 India juga mengusulkan kepada the Negotiating Group untuk memfokuskan

kepada

upaya-upaya

penanaman

modal

yang

mempunyai

akibat terhadap perdagangan yang sifatnya langsung dan signifikan. India berpendirian, larangan upaya-upaya penanaman modal tertentu 30 31 32 33

Stephen J. Canner, supra, note 9, hlm. 4. UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 141. UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 141. GATT Focus 66 (1989) hlm. 6; GATT, GATT Activities 1989, hlm. 67.

13 adalah sesuatu hal yang baru dalam GATT. India berpendapat, upayaupaya penanaman modal yang memiliki pengaruh terhadap perdagangan adalah: a. persyaratan ekspor (export performance requirements), b. penggunaan

bahan

lokal

(local

content

requirement)

dan

persyaratan manufaktur (manufacturing requirements) dan c. persyaratan neraca perdagangan (trade balancing requirements), dan lain-lain.34 Negara penanaman

sedang

modal

berkembang

internasional

juga yang

berpendapat, membatasi

aturan-aturan atau

melarang

penggunaan TRIMs sebagaimana diusulkan oleh beberapa negara maju merupakan

pelanggaran

terhadap

kedaulatan

negaranya.

Hal

ini

menurut India akan melahirkan kolonialisme baru oleh perusahaan multinasional. Selain berpendapat

itu bahwa

beberapa posisi

negara

sedang

beberapa

berkembang

negara

mempertimbangkan faktor pembangunan di dalam

maju

juga tidak

membahas TRIMs.35

Negara sedang berkembang berpendapat bahwa negosiasi TRIMS tidak boleh terlepas dari aturan-aturan atau pasal-pasal GATT. Negara-negara perjanjian

34 35

berkembang

multilateral

juga

mengenai

GATT Focus 66 (1989) hlm. 5,6. GATT Focus 64 (1989) hlm. 3.

berpendapat TRIMS

bahwa

membatasi

suatu hak-hak

14 prerogatif

pemerintah

dari

suatu

negara

untuk

mengatur

dan

menetapkan kebijakan perdagangannya.36 Selama

perundingan

di

tahun

1990,

the

Negotiating

Group

melanjutkan kajiannya mengenai aspek pembangunan dari TRIMS dan hubungannya

dengan

pasal-pasal

GATT.

Dalam

hal

ini,

beberapa

negara sedang berkembang (seperti Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba,

India,

Zimbabwe)

Kenya,

mengajukan

Nigeria, suatu

Pakistan,

Mesir,

rancangan

Peru,

deklarasi.

Tanzania, Deklarasi

menekankan perlunya the Negotiating Group untuk membahas dampakdampak

dari

upaya

penanaman

modal

terhadap

perdagangan

(bukan

kepada upaya-upaya penanaman modalnya), aspek pembangunan dari upaya penanaman modal, dan hubungannya dengan pasal-pasal GATT yang mempunyai dampak terhadap perdagangan. Negara-negara berkembang juga menekankan perlunya pengakuan bahwa upaya-upaya penanaman modal adalah instrumen hukum yang sah. Upaya ini digunakan oleh para negara untuk memajukan tujuan-tujuan pembangunan.37

Rancangan

deklarasi

tersebut,

antara

lain

menyatakan bahwa hasil dari perundingan harus mendorong aliran penanaman modal melintasi batas-batas negara, khususnya dengan maksud untuk membantu aspirasi atau keinginan pembangunan dari negara-negara sedang berkembang.38

36

William A. Fennell and Joseph W. Tyler, supra, note 2, hlm. 2003. Lihat juga Maskus and Eby, supra, note 11, hlm. 452. Selama negosiasi, Singapura, yang mendukung posisi negara sedang berkembang, berpendapat bahwa TRIMs tidak boleh dipandang sebagai hal yang membatasi atau melanggar perdagangan manakala tidak ada kerugian terhadap pihak lainnya ditemukan. (GATT Focus 64 (1989), hlm. 3). 37 GATT Focus 73 (1990), hlm. 10. 38 GATT, GATT Activities 1990, hlm. 47.

15 Negara-negara maju menanggapi pendapat atau seruan negara berkembang

di

menyatakan

atas

bahwa

menghindari

dengan

perlu

adanya

positif.

dibuat

Namun

aturan-aturan

dampak-dampak

yang

mereka lebih

kemudian

lanjut

merugikan

guna

terhadap

perdagangan.39 The

Negotiating

Group

tidak

mampu

menjembatani

silang

pendapat ini. Hal-hal yang masih belum dapat dipecahkan adalah: a) ruang lingkup TRIMs; b) apakah beberapa TRIMs tertentu harus dilarang di dalam aturan baru; dan c) apakah suatu perjanjian mengenai TRIMs harus pula mengatur di dalamnya

ketentuan

mengenai

praktek

bisnis

restriktif

dari

perusahaan swasta (restrictive business practices of private enterprises).40 Usulan negara-negara sedang berkembang di atas pada pokoknya menggambarkan

pendekatan

methodological

untuk

menentukan

ada

tidaknya dampak merugikan dari TRIMs. TRIMs yang dimaksud adalah: (1) Tidak

ada

prasangka

bahwa

upaya-upaya

penanaman

modal

merupakan resktriksi perdagangan atau menghalangi perdagangan. (2) Apabila atas dasar kasus per kasus beberapa upaya penanaman modal

ternyata

perdagangan,

dalam

mempunyai hal

ini

dampak harus

merugikan

dapat

terhadap

dibuktikan

bahwa

terdapat kaitan erat antara upaya penanman modal dengan akibat merugikan terhadap perdagangan. 39 40

GATT, GATT Activities 1990, hlm. 47. GATT, GATT Activities 1990, hlm. 47.

16 (3) Apabila

terdapat

kaitan

tersebut,

maka

sifat

dari

dampak

terhadap kepentingan dari pihak yang berpengaruh harus dapat dinilai. (4) Harus dapat ditemukan cara-cara untuk menangani dampak-dampak dari

perdagangan

(selain

daripada

upaya-upaya

penanaman

modalnya).41 Selama perundingan di tahun 1991, ketua kelompok perunding mengadakan

serangkaian

konsultasi.

Konsultasi-konsultasi

berhasil merumuskan suatu teks perjanjian

ini

TRIMs (yang kelak akan

berperan penting dan menjadi sumbangan kepada Direktur Jenderal Arthur Dunkel dalam merumuskan rancangan akhir perjanjian TRIMs.42 Rancangan penanaman

perjanjian

modal

perdagangan.

Draft

tertentu

menetapkan dapat

perjanjian

juga

bahwa

merintangi menyatakan,

beberapa atau

upaya

mengganggu

negara

anggota

tidak boleh menerapkan TRIMs yang tidak sesuai dengan GATT. Untuk 41

Lihat: UNCTAD, supra, note 16, hlm. 141; Stephen J. Canner, supra, note 9, hlm.7. Pada awal tahun 1990, Amerika Serikat sebenarnya telah pula menyerahkan rancangan perjanjian TRIMs. Rancangan perjanjian tersebut memuat larangan mengenai upaya penanaman modal yang merintangi perdagangan dan memuat komitmen umum yang berlaku atas dasar nondiskriminasi (Pasal 1 and 2). Draft perjanjian memuat pula jangka waktu transisi untuk negara sedang berkembang untuk menghapus TRIMs yang dilarang (Pasal 3), persyaratan transparansi (Pasal 4) dan pembentukan Dewan Tetap TRIMs atau Standing TRIMs Committee (Pasal 5). Draft Perjanjian memuat pula ketentuan mengenai pemberlakuan pasal-pasal GATT mengenai penyelesaian sengketa (Pasal 6), dan perlunya untuk meninjau aturan-aturan perjanjian TRIMs secara tetap atau periodik (Pasal 7) (Lihat: Terence P. Stewart, (ed.), supra, note 1, hlm. 2108-9). Namun sayangnya beberapa delegasi tidak memberi lampu hijau terhadap usulan rancangan perjanjian ini. Mereka menganggap usulan rancangan perjanjian tersebut sifatnya terburu-buru. Mereka menyatakan bahwa prinsip-prinsip atau konsep dasar mengenai TRIMs harus terlebih dahulu disepakati. Di samping itu, usulan Amerika Serikat untuk melarang beberapa bentuk dari TRIMs telah dipandang tidak dapat diterima. Bahkan beberapa negara anggota beranggapan bahwa usulan tersebut tidak mencantumkan ketentuan mengenai pertimbangan atau aspek pembangunan (GATT Focus 69 (1990), hlm. 4).

17 menetapkan upaya-upaya penanaman modal apa saja yang tidak sesuai dengan TRIMS, Perjanjian TRIMs melampirkan suatu Daftar Ilustrasi (Illustrative List).43 Rancangan

perjanjian

juga

mensyaratkan

pemberitahuan

mengikat (memaksa) dari semua upaya yang tidak sesuai dengan TRIMs dan penghapusannya dalam jangka waktu 2 tahun untuk negara maju dan 7 tahun untuk negara sedang berkembang. Rancangan perjanjian juga memuat aturan pembentukan suatu Komisi TRIMs (Committee on TRIMs)

yang

tugasnya,

antara

lain,

memonitor

pelaksanaan

perjanjian TRIMs.44 Perbedaan pandangan antara negara maju dan negara sedang berkembang selama perundingan sulit dipertemukan. Hal ini antara lain karena para pihak masih menganggap masalah ini masih baru. Perundingan-perundingan sebelumnya dan pengaturan yang ada pada umumnya menyangkut masalah perlindungan investasi, prinsip ganti rugi yang timbul dari nasionalisasi dan ekspropriasi perusahaan asing. Sedangkan masalah atau agenda yang dirundingkan sekarang ini masih

merupakan

isu

baru

dan

sangat

'sensitif'

terutama

bagi

negara sedang berkembang. Hal ini juga karena masalah penanaman modal

terkait

dengan

aspek

kedaulatan

negara-negara

ini

untuk

mengatur dan mengontrol masuknya penanaman modal. Di samping itu, untuk negara sedang berkembang pada umumnya, masalah yang dibahas

42 43 44

GATT, GATT Activities 1991, hlm. 31. GATT, GATT Activities 1991, hlm. 31. GATT, GATT Activities 1991, hlm. 31-32.

18 sekarang

ini

sangat

berpengaruh

terhadap

tujuan

pembangunan

ekonomi mereka.45 Selain itu, Deklarasi Punta del Este yang menjadi dasar bagi negosiasi mengenakan tugas yang terbatas bagi negara anggota GATT untuk menegosiasikan masalah ini. Beberapa pengarang berpendapat, negosiasi di bidang TRIMs tidaklah mudah karena tidak ada insentif yang diberikan kepada para pihak untuk dapat mencapai kesepakatan di bidang ini.46 Meskipun terdapat pandangan yang berbeda antara negara maju dan sedang berkembang, terdapat sedikitnya padangan yang sama. Kedua kelompok negara sepakat bahwa terdapat dua bentuk TRIMs, yaitu persyaratan kandungan lokal (local content requirement) dan persyaratan

45

pelaksanan

(performance

requirement),47

yang

Cf., Amerika Serikat khawatir mengenai masalah kedaulatan ini khususnya ketika Kongres Amerika Serikat hendak memutuskan untuk meratifikasi Piagam ITO. Ketika Kongres pada tahun 1994 membahas kemungkinan meratifikasi Perjanjian WTO, isu atau masalah kedaulatan terangkat kembali ke permukaan dan pembahasan mengenai isu kedaulatan ini, oleh Professor John Jackson disebut sebagai 'the Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate.' (See: John H. Jackson, 'The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results,' 36 Colum. J. Transn'l L. 157- 188 (1997). 46 Lihat: Steven Wong and J. Brady Lum, 'TRIMs at the Elevenths Hour: Prospects and Possibilities for Multilateral Solutions,' dalam: N. Sopiee and J. B. Lum, (eds.), Towards the Closing of the Uruguay Round and Beyond, (Malaysia: the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1990), hlm. 53. 47 Sebagaimana dinyatakan di atas, persyaratan kandungan lokal (local content requirements) mensyaratkan bahwa suatu produk tertentu harus menggunakan material atau komponen yang berasal dari dalam negeri (domestic market). Persyaratan ekspor (Export performance requirements) mensyaratkan bahwa beberapa jumlah tertentu dari suatu produk harus dijual ke luar negeri (diekspor). (John Croome, supra, note 1, hlm. 139).

19 mempengaruhi perdagangan dan kedua bentuk TRIMs ini layak untuk dibahas lebih lanjut ('legitimate subjects for discussion').48 Mengingat terdapat perbedaan kepentingan yang tajam antara negara

maju

dan

negara

sedang

berkembang

serta

tugas

dari

perundingan ini yang cukup sulit, hasil dari perundingan Uruguay, sebagaimana

tercantum

dalam

perjanjian

Agreement), masih jauh dari komprehensif.

48

John Croome, supra, note 1, hlm. 139.

TRIMs

(the

TRIMs

1 BAB IV PERJANJIAN WTO MENGENAI TRIMS Perundingan mengenai TRIMs, sebagaimana digambarkan di atas, tidak

berjalan

mulus.

Kepentingan

dan

perhatian

dari

para

perunding (negosiator) pada saat berakhirnya perundingan sangat sedikit. Namun demikian, inisiatif Direktur Jenderal GATT, Arthur Dunkel sangat berarti. Beliau membuat rancangan perjanjian yang merupakan hasil dari perundingan mengenai TRIMs. Perjanjian TRIMs ('Perjanjian')

pada

prinsipnya

tidak

lain

adalah

hasil-hasil

kompromistis antara negara maju dan negara sedang berkembang.1 Teks

perjanjian

TRIMs

memuat

upaya-upaya

penanaman

modal

yang dilarang, jangka waktu transisi untuk negara-negara anggota untuk

menghapus

praktek-praktek

yang

dilarang.2

Perjanjian

tersebut juga mengakomodasi kepentingan negara sedang berkembang. Perjanjian membolehkan negara berkembang untuk tidak menerapkan ketentuan-ketentuan Perjanjian untuk sementara waktu. Perjanjian juga

memuat

suatu

ketentuan

untuk

meninjau

kembali

muatan

Perjanjian TRIMs.3 Ketentuan mengenai TRIMs sebagaimana termuat dalam Rancangan Perjanjian kemudian berhasil disahkan menjadi Perjanjian TRIMs

1

Penting untuk dicatat di sini bahwa Rancangan Arthur Dunkel bukanlah suatu hasil dari suatu perundingan selama 6 tahun mengenai Perjanjian TRIMs. Rancangan Arthur Dunkel tidak lain adalah ketentuan yang berupaya mengakomodasi atau berupa kompromi yang diciptakan oleh Arthur Dunkel (Terence P. Stewart (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. II: Commentary (The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993), hlm. 2127). 2 Terence P. Stewart, supra, note 1, hlm. 2127. 3 Thomas L. Brewer and Stephen Young, The Multilateral Investment System and Multinational Enterprises, (Oxford: Oxford U.P.,1998), hlm. 124.

2 tanpa mengalami perubahan yang berarti. Patut diperhatikan pula bahwa Amerika Serikat yang semula menentang keras dimasukkannya ketentuan

substantif

TRIMs

secara

luas

pada

akhirnya

mengakui

hasil-hasil perundingan mengenai TRIMs. Perubahan sikap ini antara lain adalah karena perundingan Uruguay Round telah sepakat untuk memasukkan agenda HaKI dan perdagangan di bidang jasa ke dalam perundingan Uruguay.4 Perjanjian komprehensif.

TRIMs

seperti

Perjanjian

ini

dikemuakkan

termuat

dalam

di

atas,

Annex

1

tidaklah dari

Teks

Uruguay Round Agreement.5 Namun demikian perjanjian ini merupakan perjanjian

yang

tersingkat

dibandingkan

dengan

perjanjian-

perjanjian lainnya. Perjanjian hanya memuat 9 (sembilan) pasal ditambah daftar ilustrasi TRIMs. 4

Low and Subramanian, 'TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An Unfinished Business', dalam: Robert M. Stern (ed)., Multilateral Trading System, (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan U.P., 1993), hlm. 416. Sylvia Ostry juga menyatakan bahwa di samping sedikitnya perhatian Amerika Serikat pada masalah ini, negara-negara anggota ME lainnya juga tidak begitu semangat untuk membatasi penggunaan persyaratan penananam modal (investment performance requirements) (khususnya dalam upaya mereka untuk meningkatkan kompetisi industri mereka). (Sylvia Ostry, A New Regime for Foreign Direct Investment (Washington DC: Group of Thirty, 1997), hlm. 6-7). 5 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation, Marrakesh, 15 April 1994. Perlu diingat bahwa ketentuan-ketentuan mengenai penanaman modal tidaklah tercakup dalam Perjanjian TRIMs, tetapi juga dalam Perjanjian WTO lainnya. Ketentuan mengenai penanaman modal terdapat pula dalam Perjanjian Perdagangan yang terkait dengan Jasa (GATS), Perjanjian mengenai Hak Atas Kekayaan Intelektual (TRIPs Agreement), dan bahkan dalam aturan mengenai Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagang (the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes). Namun demikian, perjanjianperjanjian lainnya ini tidak secara langsung mengatur penanaman modal. Analisis lebih lanjut mengenai hal ini, lihat, misalnya, Sir Leon Brittan, 'Building on the Singapore Ministerial: Trade, Investment and Competition,' dalam: J. Bhagwati and M. Hirsch, (eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond (Verlag: Springer, 1998), hlm. 275; Thomas L. Brewer and Stephen Young, The Multilateral Investment System and Multinational Enterprises (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1998), hlm. 126-130; WTO, Trade and

3 Preambul

Perjanjian

TRIMs

memuat

dan

menegaskan

putusan

mandat Deklarasi Punta Del Este bahwa beberapa upaya penanaman modal

tertentu

"can

cause

trade-restrictive

and

distorting

effects" (' dapat menyebabkan rintangan terhadap perdagangan dan berakibat yang merugikan'). Pasal 1 Perjanjian menyatakan bahwa perjanjian hanya terkait dengan perdagangan di bidang barang (yang terkait dengan penanaman modal). Pasal ini dengan jelas menyatakan keinginan negara sedang berkembang yang menginginkan agar pengaturan di bidang penanaman ini tidak memuat aturan baru atau tambahan.6 Pada penegasan

pokoknya kembali

hasil

dari

perjanjian

prinsip-prinsip

TRIMS

pokok,

yaitu

ini the

merupakan National

Treatment (Pasal III) (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation) dan larangan penggunaan restriksi kuantitatif (kuota) Pasal XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) Pasal 3 menyatakan bahwa semua pengecualian yang termuat dalam

GATT

(GATT

1994)

akan

tetap

berlaku

terhadap

ketentuan

pasal-pasal Perjanjian TRIMs, seperti misalnya moral masyarakat, perlindungan lingkungan, keamanan nasional, dll. Pasal 4 secara khusus untuk negara sedang berkembang. Pasal ini

membolehkan

negara-negara

ini

untuk

menyimpangi

untuk

Foreign Direct Investment, New Report by the WTO (PRESS 55/57, 9 October 1996), hlm. 46-51. 6 UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment (New York: UN, 1997), hlm. 142 (menyatakan bahwa negara sedang berkembang telah berhasil di dalam mencegah perluasan kewajiban perdagangan ke dalam bidang penanaman modal. Negara-negara ini telah juga berhasil dalam mencegah dimasukkannya prinsip-prinsip seperti 'right of

4 sementara waktu ketentuan pasal 2, sepanjang dan sesuai dengan ketentuan pasal III dan XI GATT dapat disimpangi sesuai dengan Pasal

XVIII

Payments

GATT

of

Perdagangan

1994,

GATT

the

1994

yang

diambil

Understanding

dan

Deklarasi

guna

tujuan

on

the

Balance-of-

mengenai

Upaya-upaya

penyeimbangan

neraca

perdagangan (Declaration on Trade Measures taken for Balance-ofPayment Purposes of 28 November 1979). Pasal

5

mensyaratkan

negara

anggota

untuk

menotifikasi

kepada Dewan Perdagangan Barang (the Trade in Goods Council) dalam jangka waktu 90 hari setelah berlakunya Perjanjian WTO semua TRIMs yang tidak sesuai yang negara-negara anggota terapkan (ayat 1).7 Pasal 5 ayat 2 juga mensyaratkan negara-negara anggotanya untuk menghapuskan semua TRIMs dalam jangka waktu 2 (dua) tahun untuk negara maju, 5 (lima) tahun untuk negara sedang berkembang dan

7

(tujuh)

tahun

untuk

negara

miskin

(least

developed

countries). Negara waktu

sedang

transisi

berkembang

apabila

dapat

mereka

pula

memohon

menghadapi

perpanjangan

masalah

dalam

establishment' atau 'national treatment' terhadap investor ke dalam Perjanjian TRIMs). 7 Hingga 30 Juni 1999, dua puluh enam negara telah menotifikasi the Trade in Goods Council mengenai upaya-upaya yang tidak sesuai dengan TRIMs yang dipraktekkannya. Negara-negara ini adalah: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Mexico, Malaysia, Mesir, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Polandia, Romania, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela and South Africa (WTO, Annual Report 1999 [Geneva: WTO, 1999], hlm. 66).

5 mengimplementasikan perjanjian TRIMs (ayat 3).8 Pasal 5 ayat 4 menyatakan bahwa: “a Member shall not modify the terms of any TRIMs which it notified under paragraph 1 from those prevailing at the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement so as to increase the degree of inconsistency with the provisions of Article 2.” Pasal

ini

memuat

pula

suatu

ketentuan

khusus

yang

membolehkan penerapan TRIMs terhadap perusahaan-perusahaan (baru) selama jangka waktu transisi apabila hal ini dipandang perlu agar tidak

merugikan

perusahaan

yang

telah

ada

yang

tunduk

kepada

ketentuan Perjanjian TRIMs (Ayat 5).9 Pasal 6 memuat kewajiban transparansi di dalam menerapan perjanjian

TRIMs.

Pasal

ini

mensyaraktan

kewajiban

notifikasi

kepada Sekretariat WTO mengenai publikasi adanya TRIMs, termasuk TRIMs yang diterapkan oleh pemerintah daerah dan atau pejabatpejabat yang memiliki kewengan di bidang kebijakan penanaman modal di dalam wilayah kekuasaannya.10 Pasal 7 memuat pembentukan badan baru, yaitu the Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures (the "Committee") (Ayat 1).

8

Belum ada negara yang memanfaatkan pasal ini (WTO, Annual Report 1999 (Geneva: WTO, 1999), hlm. 66. 9 Low and Subramanian, supra, note 4, hlm. 416. 10 Untuk melaksanakan ketentuan ini, pada bulan September 1996, the Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures mengesahkan suatu prosedur notifikasi TRIMs dalam ruang lingkup pasal 6. Hingga tanggal 30 Juni 1999, berikut adalah negara-negara yang telah menyerahkan informasi mengenai prosedur notifikasi TRIMs: Argentina, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Chad, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, the European Community, Fiji, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. (WTO, Annual Report 1999 (Geneva: WTO, 1999), hlm. 66.

6 The

Committee

bertugas

memonitor

pelaksanaan

komitmen-komitmen

negara anggota berdasarkan Perjanjian TRIMs ini dan melaporkannya setiap tahun kepada the Council for Trade in Goods (Ayat 3). Pasal 8 terkait dengan penyelesaian sengketa TRIMs. Pasal ini

memberlakukan

pasal

XXII-XXIII

GATT

1994.

Ketentuan

penyelesaian sengketa ini kemudian mengacu pula kepada Annex 2 mengenai the Dispute Settlement Understanding.11 Pasal 9 menyatakan bahwa the Council for Trade in Goods akan meninjau berlakunya

Perjanjian

TRIMs

Perjanjian.

dalam

Tujuan

jangka

dari

waktu

tinjauan

5

ini

tahun

sejak

adalah

untuk

mengusulkan amandemen terhadap muatan atau isi daftar ilustrasi dan mempertimbangkan ketentuan mengenai kebijakan investasi (the scope

of

complimentary

provisions

on

investment

policy)

dan

kebijakan persaingan (competition policy).12 Lampiran Perjanjian memuat daftar ilustasi TRIMs yang tidak sesuai dengan Pasal III (4) dan Pasal XI (1) GATT 1994. Lampiran ini

sifatnya

memaksa

dan

mengikat

baik

berdasarkan

hukum

(substantif GATT) atau aturan-aturan administratif. Berikut adalah daftar ilustrasi yang dilarang berdasarkan Perjanjian TRIMs:13

11

Ketentuan pasal ini mensyaratkan Perjanjian TRIMs untuk tunduk pada prosedur Penyelesaian Sengketa WTO. Hal ini juga menunjukkan pentingnya WTO sebagai forum penyelesaian sengketa dagang di antara negara anggotanya. 12 P. Sauvé, 'A First Look at Investment in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round,' 29 J.W.T. 5 (1995), hlm. 8. 13 Upaya-upaya di atas, khususnya local content requirement dan trade balancing requirement merupakan upaya-upaya yang umum diterapkan khususnya di negara sedang berkembang dan praktek negara menunjukkan bahwa upaya-upaya ini telah menjadi sumber sengketa di antara negara.

7 (i)

berdasarkan

perlakuan

nasional

yang

dikeluarkan

untuk

memperoleh suatu keuntungan dalam hal penerapan: (a) persyaratan menggunakan

untuk

membeli

produk-produk

atau

lokal

oleh

kewajiban

untuk

perusahaan

(local

content requirement); atau (b) pembelian

atau

penggunaan

suatu

produk

impor

yang

dikaitkan dengan jumlah atau nilai dari produk lokal yang diekspor (trade balancing requirement); (ii) TRIMs yang tidak sesuai dengan kewajiban Pasal XI ayat 1, yakni: (a) import

produk

dengan

jumlah

hingga atau

jumlah

nilai

tertentu

produk

yang

yang

dikaitkan

diekspor

(trade

perusahaan

kepada

balancing); (b) impor

produk

dengan

membatasi

akses

nilai mata uang asing hingga sejumlah masuknya jumlah mata

uang

ke

perusahaan

tersebut

(foreign

exchange

restrictions); atau (c) ekspor suatu produk yang dikaitkan dengan nilai produk lokal (domestic sales requirement). Dari daftar tersebut di atas, tampak bahwa TRIMs lainnya tidak

masuk

dalam

daftar.14

Hal

ini

berarti

bahwa

upaya-upaya

(John H,. Jackson, The World Trading System (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 2nd ed., 1997), hlm.317. 14 Upaya penanaman modal tidak tercakup oleh Perjanjian TRIMs, termasuk persyaratan mengenai kepemilikan saham, alih teknologi dan lisensi, persyaratan produksi untuk kebutuhan lokal, dan persyaratan ekspor, pembatasan tenaga kerja dan pembatasan pemulangan keuntungan ke negara atau perusahaan asal (induk) (local equity, technology transfer and licensing, local manufacturing, local employment, and export performance requirements, personnel entry restrictions, remittance restrictions).

8 lainnya

masih

dimungkinkan

berdasarkan

TRIMs.15

Perjanjian

Ketentuan ini tampaknya berupaya mengakomodasi kepentingan negara sedang berkembang yang acapkali masih menerapkan atau membebankan persyaratan ini terhadap investor asing. Di samping itu, ketentuan ini di banyak negara berkembang biasanya bersifat mengikat.16 Dalam laporannya tahun 1988, Kelompok Kerja WTO mengenai Hubungan Perdagangan dan Penanaman Modal (the WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment) menyatakan bahwa beberapa

bentuk

requirements),

dari

persyaratan

seperti

halnya

pelaksanaan

persyaratan

alih

(performance teknologi

dan

promosi untuk penelitian dan pembangunan telah terbukti sebagai suatu cara penting untuk memenuhi tujuan pembangunan.17 Namun ada beberapa pembatasan dari Perjanjian TRIMs ini. Pertama, perjanjian tidak memberi batasan atau test objectif guna mengidentifikasi suatu upaya yang tergolong ke dalam TRIMs. Karena itu

untuk

negara

(anggota)

penotifikasi

sajalah

yang

akan

menentukan sendiri bentuk-bentuk upaya TRIMs mana sajakah yang ia anggap tidak sah berdasarkan Perjanjian TRIMs.18 Kedua, kemunduran

Perjanjian di

dalam

TRIMs

hal

dapat

penegakan

dianggap hukum.

sebagai

Menurut

Low

suatu dan

Subramanian, dengan memberikan jangka waktu transisi kepada negara anggota untuk menghilangkan TRIMs, Perjanjian TRIMs telah seolah15

UNCTAD, supra, note 6, hlm. 143. UNCTAD, supra, note 6, hlm. 143. 17 WTO, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment to the General Council, WT/WGTI/2. 8 December 1998, paragraph 68. (Selanjutnya disebut sebagai Report [1998]). 18 UNCTAD, supra, note 6, hlm. 143. 16

9 olah

mengabaikan

fakta

bahwa,

sebagaimana

dinyatakan

dalam

Sengketa the FIRA, suatu TRIMs yang mengganggu perdagangan telah dinyatakan atau telah ditentukan sebelumnya.19 Ketiga,

kekurangan

lainnya

dari

hasil

Putaran

Uruguay

mengenai TRIMs ini adalah bahwa Perjanjian ini telah gagal untuk memasukkan yang

ketentuan-ketentuan

restriktif.

negara

sedang

penting

Ketentuan-ketentuan

berkembang

manakala

mengenai ini

praktek

cukup

mereka

penting

berhubungan

bisnis untuk dengan

investor asing yang memiliki posisi dominan dan daya saing yang kuat.20 Keempat, meskipun Perjanjian TRIMs mengakomodasi kepentingan negara sedang berkembang, namun perjanjian ini telah gagal untuk memberikan berkembang.

perlakuan Pasal

khusus

yang

dan

secara

non-resiprositas khusus

diberikan

untuk

negara

untuk

negara

berkembang adalah Pasal 4 (yang menyatakan bahwa negara berkembang bebas untuk menyimpangi prinsip national treatment dan restriksi kuantitatif untuk sementara waktu). Di samping itu, pasal 5 ayat 2 membolehkan negara sedang berkembang

untuk

memperpanjang

jangka

waktu

transisi

untuk

melaksankaan Perjanjian. Namun demikian, untuk dapat memperoleh 19

Low and Subramanian, supra, note 4, hlm. 418. Dari hasil keseluruhannya, Perjanjian TRIMs, sebagaimana dinyatakan oleh Brewer and Young, 'is something perceived to be tangible evidence of the failure of the Uruguay Round to make significant progress on FDI manufacturing, since its core provisions were already embodied in the previous GATT agreements concerning trade in goods.' (Brewer and Young, supra, note 3, hlm. 124). 20 Untuk analisis lebih lanjut mengenai hal ini, lihat: Report (1998), supra, note 17, paragraph 28, hlm. 101-119 (menyatakan bahwa kehadiran suatu kebijakan persaingan yang efektif merupakan suatu persyaratan yang

10 perpanjangan waktu transisi ini tidaklah mudah. Pasal 5 ayat 2 menentukan 2 persyaratan: (1) Perjanjian mensyaratkan negara sedang berkembang bersangkutan untuk menunjukkan bahwa negara tersebut menghadapi kesulitan di dalam melaksanakan Perjanjian TRIMs. (2) Permohonan

perpanjangan

waktu

transisi

tersebut

tidak

diberikan secara otomatis. Permohonan tersebut tunduk pada persetujuan dari the Council for Trade in Goods setelah badan ini mempertimbangkan kebutuhan-kebutuhan tertentu dari negara yang bersangkutan.21

perlu untuk memberi keuntungan dari adanya liberalisasi penanaman modal asing langsung). 21 Report (1998), supra, note 17, juga menyatakan bahwa Perjanjian TRIMs tidak mengatur ketentuan mengenai Perlindungan Penanaman Modal (paragraph 125).

11

ADDENDUM

AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES Members, Considering that ministers in the Punta del Este Declaration that "Following an examination of the operation of GATT Articles related to the trade restrictive and distorting effects of investment measures, negotiations should elaborate, as appropriate, further provisions that may be necessary to avoid such adverse effects on trade"; Desiring to promote the expansion and progressive liberalisation of world trade and to facilitate investment across international frontiers so as to increase the economic growth of all trading partners, particularly developing country Members, while ensuring free competition; Taking into account the particular trade, development and financial needs of developing country Members, particular these of least developed country Members; Recognizing that certain investment measures can cause trade restrictive and distorting effects; Hereby agree as follow: Article 1 Coverage This Agreement applies to investment measures related to trade in goods only (referred to in Agreement as "TRIMS"). Article 2 National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions 1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Members shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994. 2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 and the

12

obligation of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement. Article 3 Exceptions All exceptions under GATT 1994 shall apply, as appropriate, to the provisions of this Agreement. Article 4 Developing Country Members A developing country members shall be free to deviate temporarily from the provisions of Article 2 to the extent and in such a manner as Article XVIII of GATT 1994, the Understanding on the Balance of Payments Provisions of GATT 1994, and the Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance of Payments Purposes adopted on 28 November 1979 (BISD 26S/205-209) permit the Member to deviate from the provisions of Articles III and XI of GATT 1994. Article 5 Notification and Transitional Arrangements 1. Members, within 90 days of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, shall notify the Council for Trade in Goods of all TRIMS they are applying that are not in conformity within the provisions of this Agreement. Such TRIMS of general or specific application shall be notified, along with their principal features. 2. Each Member shall eliminate all TRIMS which are notified under paragraph 1 within two years of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement in the case of a developed country Member, within five years in the case of a developing country Member, and within seven years in the case of a least developed country Member. 3. On request, the Council for Trade in Goods may extend the transition period for the elimination of TRIMS notified under paragraph 1 for a developing country Member, including a least developed country Member, which demonstrates particular difficulties in implementing the provisions of this Agreement. In considering such a request, the Council for Trade in Goods shall take into account the individual development, financial and trade needs of the Member in question.

13

4. During the transition period, a Member shall not modify the terms of any TRIM which it notifies under paragraph 1 from those prevailing at the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement so as to increase the degree of inconsistency with the provisions of Article 2. TRIMS introduced less than 180 days before the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall not benefit from the transitional arrangements provided in paragraph 2. 5. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2, a Member, in order not to disadvantage established enterprise which are subject to a TRIM notified under paragraph 1, may apply during the transition period the same TRIM to a new investment (i) where the products of such investment are like products to those of the established enterprises, and (ii) where necessary to avoid distorting the conditions of competitions between the new investment and the established enterprises. Any TRIM so applied to a new investment shall be notified to the Council for Trade in Goods. The terms of such a TRIM shall be equivalent in their competitive effect to those applicable to the established enterprises, and it shall be terminated at the same time. Article 6 Transparency 1. Members reaffirm, with respect to TRIMS, their commitment to obligation on transparency and notification in Article X of GATT 1994, in the undertaking on "Notification" contained in the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance adopted on 28 November 1979 and in the Ministerial Decision on Notification Procedures adopted on 15 April 1994. 2. Each Member shall notify the Secretariat of the publication in which TRIMS may be found, including those applied by regional and local governments and authorities within their territories. 3. Each Member shall accord sympathetic consideration to request for information, and afford adequate opportunity for consultation, on any matter arising from this Agreement raised by another Member. In conformity with Article X of GATT 1994 no Member is required to disclose information the disclosure of which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be country to the public

14

interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interest of particular enterprises, public or private. Article 7 Committee on Trade Related Investment Measures 1. A Committee on Trade Related Investment Measures (referred to in this Agreement as the "Committee") is hereby established, and shall be open to all Members. The Committee shall elect its own Chairman and Vice Chairman, and shall meet not less than once a year and otherwise at the request of any Member. 2. The Committee shall carry out responsibilities assigned to it by Council for Trade in Goods and shall afford Members the opportunity to consult on any matters relating to the operation and implementation of this Agreement. 3. The Committee shall monitor the operation and implementation of this Agreement and shall report thereon annually to the Council for Trade in Goods. Article 8 Consultation and Dispute Settlement The provisions of Articles XXII and XXVIII of GATT 1994, as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding, shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement. Article 9 Review by the Council for Trade in Goods Not later than five years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the Council for Trade in Goods shall review the operation of this Agreement and, as appropriate, propose to the Ministerial Conference amendments to its text. In the course of this review, the Council for Trade in Goods shall consider whether the Agreement should be complemented with provisions on investment policy and competition policy.

ANNEX ILLUSTRATIVE LIST

15

1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require: (a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products. in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production ; or (b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to the volume or value of local products that it exports. 2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict : (a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production, generally or to an amount related to the volume or value of local production that it exports; (b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by restricting its access to foreign exchange to an amount related to the foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or (c) the exportation or sale for export by an enterprise of products, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production.

1 BAB V ARTI PENTING PERJANJIAN TRIMs A. Arti Penting Hasil dari negosiasi Putaran (Perundingan) Uruguay, memiliki arti yang cukup penting. Alasannya: (1) Dimasukkannya penanaman modal dalam Perjanjian WTO merupakan hasil yang mendasar. Belum pernah ada aturan atau perjanjian yang

sebelumnya

memuat

penanaman

modal

dikaitkan

dengan

perdagangan.1 Perjanjian Penanaman Modal (TRIMs) juga suatu aturan

baru

yang

mengikat

mayoritas

negara

di

dunia.

Berlakunya perjanjian ini untuk pertama kalinya memperkuat asumsi dan kenyataan bahwa terdapat hubungan yang erat antara perdagangan dan penanaman modal.2 (2) Berhasilnya perundingan mengenai penanaman modal dalam Putaran Uruguay ini telah menciptakan suatu lembaga baru, yaitu WTO dengan badan khususnya 'Committee on TRIMs'. Badan khusus ini bertugas mengawasi dan menjamin liberalisasi penanaman modal asing secara langsung (foreign direct investment atau FDI). Hal ini merupakan sumbangan penting bagi perkembangan hukum internasional di bidang penanaman modal. Seperti diketahui, 1

Sir Leon Brittan, 'Building on the Singapore Ministerial: Trade, Investment and Competition,' dalam: J. Bhagwati and M. Hirsch, (eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond (Verlag: Springer, 1998), hlm. 275 (menyatakan bahwa Perjanjian TRIMs 'incorporates specific investment disciplines in the multilateral system for the first time'). 2 Hal penting yang perlu diperhatikan adalah bahwa ketentuan WTO yang memiliki dampak tidak langsung pada penanaman modal dapat tidak tak terbatas. Menurut Piere Sauvè, semua bidang kebijakan perdagangan dapat saja terkait dengan penanaman modal dari perusahaan multinasional

2 sebelum

tahun

1995,

belum

ada

lembaga

internasional

yang

menangani secara khusus masalah TRIMs. Selain itu pula, peran WTO

mengenai

masalah

ini

memiliki

prosedur

penyelesaian

sengketanya yang akan menangani sengketa-sengketa di antara negara

anggota

apabila

salah

satu

anggotanya

melanggar

Perjanjian TRIMs atau komitmen di bidang penanaman modalnya. Sebelumnya, terdapat beberapa argumen mengenai tidak adanya lembaga internasional yang menangani masalah FDI. Ada yang berpendapat,

WTO

bukanlah

lembaga

yang

tepat

menangani

masalah penanaman modal multilateral. Alasannya adalah karena terdapatnya pandangan yang berbeda mengenai muatan standarstandar substantif yang akan diatur dalam Perjanjian TRIMs.3 Argumentasi

tersebut

Seperti

telah

ada

sejarah

benarnya,

tetapi

tunjukkan,

argumennya

eksistensi

lemah.

lembaga

atau

forum akan sangat berperan dalam menangani masalah-masalah perbedaan pendapat dan aturan standar substantif di antara negara anggotanya.4 Karena itu, pembentukan dan keberadaan WTO tidak

saja

akan

menangani

masalah

aturan

penanaman

modal

(Lihat: Piere Sauvè, 'A First Look at Investment in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round,' 29 J.W.T. 6 (1995). 3 Misalnya saja, Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman, 'Trade-Related Investment Measures,' dalam: Jeffrey J. Schott (ed.), Completing the Uruguay Round (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990), hlm. 150.. 4 Misalnya, selama negosiasi sempat muncul masalah mengenai sampai berapa jauh ketentuan khusus untuk negara sedang berkembang harus juga diterapkan terhadap TRIMs; masalah dumping; GATS dan TRIPs, hanyalah beberapa contoh saja. Dalam bidang hukum internasional lainnya, misalnya, perdebatan mengenai Bab XI dari Konvensi Hukum Laut, atau masalah perbedaan pandangan antara negara maju dan negara sedang berkembang mengenai kekuatan mengikat prinsip-prinsip hukum internasional yang termuat dalam Piagam PBB mengenai Hak Dan Kewajiban Negara tahun 1974.

3 tetapi

juga

dalam

jangka

panjang

akan

memastikan

bahwa

kesepakatan-kesepakatan yang telah disepakati akan dihormati dan ditegakkan. (3)

Perjanjian

TRIMs

pembangunan

hukum

penanaman

modal.

memberikan

sumbangan

internasional Karena

itu

di

masa

Perjanjian

penting depan

terhadap di

TRIMs,

bidang

meskipun

aturannya singkat dan sederhana, namun perjanjian tersebut sebenarnya membuka jalan lebih lanjut untuk pembahasan aturan substantif yang lebih komprehensif di masa depan.5 (4)

Perjanjian

TRIMs

membantu

negara

anggotanya

untuk

lebih

transparansi dalam kebijakan hukum penanaman modalnya. Hal ini akan membentuk suatu kondisi yang lebih terbuka dan dapat diduga

serta

kepastian

hukum

bagi

investor

asing

untuk

melakukan usahanya di negara anggota WTO lainnya. (5) Perjanjian TRIMs memberi ketentuan yang berimbang di antara kepentingan

negara

maju

dan

sedang

berkembang

(dalam

hal

kebijakan penanaman modalnya). Perjanjian ini, dipandang dari sudut

kepentingan

keleluasaan melaksanakan

kepada

negara

sedang

negara

Perjanjian.

berkembang,

sedang

Perjanjian

memberi

berkembang

mensyaratkan

5

untuk (lima)

tahun dan 7 (tujuh) tahun bagi negara sedang berkembang dan negara 5

miskin

untuk

dapat

melaksanakan

perjanjian

secara

Lihat Pasal 9 Perjanjian TRIMs; Cf., DeAnne Julius dalam salah satu tulisannya menyatakan bahwa 'creation of the WTO encompassing the GATT as well as the new agreements provides a strong skeleton on which to build sectoral codes that expand from and integrate new areas of traderelated investment.' (DeAnne Julius, 'International Direct Investment: Strengthening the Policy Regime,' dalam: Peter B. Kennen, (ed.),

4 penuh. Perjanjian yang memberikan jangka waktu transisi ini menunjukkan

bahwa

WTO

mempertimbangkan

kedudukan

negara

berkembang dan miskin di dalam pelaksanaan Perjanjian TRIMs. (6) Dimasukkanya prosedur penyelesaian sengketa dalam perjanjian TRIMs

merupakan

perdagangan penting,

suatu

internasional.

karena

masyarakat

Hal

sepanjang

internasional

penyelesaian arbitrase

perkembangan

sengketa

nasional

selama

di

merupakan

menyangkut

secara

dan

ini

baru

modal,

menggunakan

tradisional,

hukum

perkembangan

penanaman

ini

internasional

dalam

antara

(misalnya

cara lain,

arbitrase

berdasarkan Konvensi ICSID). B. Implikasi Perjanjian TRIMs pada Negara Sedang Berkembang. Karena

hasil

dari

negosiasi

Putaran

Uruguay

mengenai

penanaman modal relatif singkat, namun implikasi dari perjanjian ini pun tampaknya kecil dan tidak terlalu membebani negara-negara anggotanya secara signifikan.6 Selain itu, perjanjian tidak secara signifikan menghambat kemampuan negara anggota khususnya negara berkembang

untuk

mengatur

penanaman

modal

asing

di

dalam

wilayahnya.7

Managing The World Economy: Fifty Years after the Bretton Woods (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economic, 1994), hlm. 284. 6 UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment (New York: UN, 1997), hlm. 144. 7 Penting pula untuk dinyatakan di sini, sebagaimana dinyatakan oleh Kirmani bahwa praktek menunjukkan bahwa penerapan TRIMs oleh negaranegara pada umumnya sifatnya tidak memaksa tetapi suatu keleluasaan dari negara masing-masing (discretionary). (Naheed Kirmani, et.al., International Trade Policies: The Uruguay Round and Beyond, vol. II: Background Papers (Washington: IMF, 1994), hlm. 13.

5 Namun demikian, larangan persyaratan kandungan lokal (local content requirement) dan persyaratan neraca perdagangan (trade balancing untuk

requirement)

secara

bertahap

telah

memaksa

negara

memberhentikan

sedang

pencantuman

berkembang persyaratan

terhadap penanaman modal asing untuk menggunakan kandungan atau komponen lokal. Hal ini merupakan implikasi negatif karena negaranegara ini acapkali menerapkan persyaratan-persyaratan ini untuk memajukan industri dalam negeri dan pembangunan ekonominya.8 Implikasi

lainnya

dari

Perjanjian

TRIMs

adalah

bahwa

perjanjian tersebut membatasi kewenangan atau kontrol negara tuan rumah

terhadap

sebenarnya

penanaman

merupakan

modal

tantangan

secara

cukup

besar

langsung.9

Hal

terhadap

ini

kebijakan

penanaman modal dari negara sedang berkembang. Negara berkembang pada umumnya memang kerapkali berupaya mengontrol penanaman modal asing. Di samping itu, kewajiban notifikasi dan transparansi untuk negara sedang berkembang sehubungan dengan TRIMs tidaklah mudah bagi

negara-negara

ini.

Suatu

studi

baru-baru

ini

menunjukkan

bahwa banyak kesulitan dalam menaati kewajiban notifikasi dari

8

Lihat: John H. Jackson, The World Trading System (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 2nd ed., 1997), hlm.317; Trade Policy Review Mechanism GATT pada tahun 1991-1994 menunjukkan bahwa beberapa negara sedang berkembang ternyata menerapkan persyaratan kandungan lokal (local content requirements), khususnya di dalam sektor otomotif. Negara-negara ini adalah Bangladesh, Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, Mesir, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippina, Senegal, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay). (Naheed Kirmani, et.al., supra, note 7, hlm. 13. 9 Eric M. Burt, 'Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization,' 12:6 Am. U.J.Int'l.L & Pol'y 1027 (1997).

6 upaya-upaya

yang

tidak

sesuai

dengan

TRIMs

kepada

Sekretariat

WTO.10 Untuk mencegah atau meminimalisasi implikasi negatif untuk perundingan di masa depan di bidang penanaman modal bagi negara sedang berkembang, Mashayekhi dan Gibbs mengemukakan pendapatnya sebagai berikut: 'If developing countries are to maintain influence over the future international trade agenda in the area of investment, consistent with their growing importance as import markets, they will have to exert considerable efforts to prepare technically sound initiatives reflecting the realities of globalization and liberalization for action in their favour, i.e. 'positive agenda', and to form solid alliances and to counter proposals emanating from developed country ...' 11 Pendapat

dua

sarjana

tesebut

di

atas

secara

singkat

merekomendasikan negara sedang berkembang untuk: (1) berupaya lebih keras untuk memasukkan atau memberi pengaruh dan

inisiatif

negara-negara

secara sedang

teknis

tentang

berkemang

ke

keinginan dalam

dan

usulan

agenda-agenda

perundingan mengenai TRIMs; (2) negara-negara sedang berkembang untuk semakin giat membentuk blok-blok atau aliansi di antara mereka; dan

10

Thomas L. Brewer and Stephen Young, The Multilateral Investment System and Multinational Enterprises, (Oxford: Oxford U.P.,1998), hlm. 143. 11 Mina Mashayekhi and Murray Gibbs, 'Lessons from the Uruguay Round Negotiations on Investment,' 33:6 J.W.T. 12 (1999). Pendekatan aliansi negara-negara sedang berkembang ini oleh beberapa sarjana dipandang sebagai dapat dipraktekkan hanya terhadap negara-negara yang memiliki kesadaran lebih baik mengenai aturan-aturan dan masalah-masalah yang sedang dinegosiasikan. Di samping itu, forum di mana sesuatu masalah dibicarakan juga mempunyai saham yang cukup besar. Masalah yang sangat penting untuk segera dibahas adalah bahwa semua negara, khususnya negara maju, perlu menyadari dan mempertimbangkan isu tujuan pembangunan (development objectives) dan kondisi-kondisi khusus negara sedang berkembang.

7 (3) mendesak

negara

berkembang

untuk

lebih

proaktif

dalam

hal

memberi proposal atau usulan tandingan terhadap proposal atau usulan negara maju. Pendapat

Mashayekhi

dan

Gibbs

tersebut

patut

disambut

positif. Pendapat tersebut juga penting mengingat dilihat dari kenyataannya dewasa ini, posisi negara sedang berkembang memang sangat lemah.

1

BAB VI PERKEMBANGAN PERJANJIAN TRIMs DALAM KONPERENSI TINGKAT TINGGI WTO Sejak Putaran Uruguay, WTO telah melangsungkan serangkaian pertemuan

tingkat

tinggi

para

anggota

WTO

(WTO

Ministerial

(Singapore

Ministerial

(Geneva

Ministerial

(Seattle

Ministerial

Conference). Pertemuan tersebut adalah: 1. Pertemuan

Tingkat

Tinggi

Singapura

Conference) 9 – 13 Desember 1996 2. Pertemuan

Tingkat

Tinggi

Jenewa

Conference) 18 and 20 Mei 1998; dan 3. Pertemuan

Tingkat

Tinggi

Seattle

Conference), 30 November – 3 Desember 1999; 4. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Doha (Doha Ministerial Conference) 10 – 14 November 2001 5. Pertemuan

Tingkat

Tinggi

Cancún

(Cancún

Ministerial

Conference) 10 - 14 September 2003. 1. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Singapura, 1996 Pertemuan

Ministerial

Conference

WTO

pertama

diselenggarakan di Singapura dari tanggal 9 hingga 13 Desember 1996.

Sebanyak

Tingkat berbagai

120

Tinggi

WTO

pertemuan

negara

anggota

pertama bisnis

ini.

WTO

menghadiri

Pertemuan

multilateral

dan

ini

Pertemuan

mencakup

plurilateral

pula serta

bilateral. Berbagai pertemuan ini membahas masalah-masalah yang terkait dengan pekerjaan WTO sejak dua tahun pertama berdirinya badan ini. Masalah lainnya adalah berbagai masalah implementasi dari berbagai perjanjian di bawah kerangka Perjanjian WTO. a. Ministerial Declarations Pertemuan

Singapura

melahirkan

dua

keputusan

(Deklarasi)

in

Information

Technology

sebagai berikut: 1. Ministerial Declaration; dan 2. Ministerial

Declaration

on

Trade

Products. Pertemuan Singapura membahas pula masalah penanaman modal di dalamnya. Hasil pembahasan isu atau agenda penanaman modal

2

termuat dalam Ministerial Declaration yang disahkan pada tanggal 13 Desember 1996. Adapun keputusan menyangkut penanaman modal, dalam teks bahasa Inggrisnya, menyatakan sebagai berikut: Investment and Competition 20. Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters related to investment and competition policy and the built-in agenda in these areas, including under the TRIMs Agreement, and on the understanding that the work undertaken shall not prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in the future, we also agree to: • establish a working group to examine the relationship between trade and investment; and • establish a working group to study issues raised by Members relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-competitive practices, in order to identify any areas that may merit further consideration in the WTO framework. These groups shall draw upon each other's work if necessary and also draw upon and be without prejudice to the work in UNCTAD and other appropriate intergovernmental fora. As regards UNCTAD, we welcome the work under way as provided for in the Midrand Declaration and the contribution it can make to the understanding of issues. In the conduct of the work of the working groups, we encourage cooperation with the above organizations to make the best use of available resources and to ensure that the development dimension is taken fully into account. The General Council will keep the work of each body under review, and will determine after two years how the work of each body should proceed. It is clearly understood that future negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral disciplines in these areas, will take place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO Members regarding such negotiations. Dari teks tersebut, tersimpul 5 keputusan sebagai berikut: (1) Negara

peserta

keterkaitan kompetisi

untuk

erat

pertama

antara

(persaingan),

dua

kalinya

sepakat

penanaman bidang

modal yang

dan

dan

mengakui kebijakan

disepakati

sebagai

agenda yang menyatu untuk bahan pembahasan di masa depan. Hubungan kedua bidang ini, penanaman modal dan persaingan, dipandang sebagai 'The Singapore Issue'. (2) Negara peserta sepakat untuk membentuk dua kelompok kerja, yaitu

satu

kelompok

kerja

guna

mengkaji

hubungan

antara

perdagangan dan penanaman modal. Kelompok kerja kedua mengkaji masalah-masalah

yang

diangkat

oleh

negara-negara

anggota

3

mengenai interaksi antara perdagangan dan kebijakan kompetisi, termasuk praktek-praktek anti-kompetisi guna mengidentifikasi hal-hal yang akan dibahas di mada depan; (3) Negara anggota menyadari dan menganggap penting upaya-upaya lembaga-lembaga internasional seperti misalnya UNCTAD, yang juga

berupaya

modal.

Untuk

bekerja

merumuskan itu,

sama

aturan-aturan

negara

erat

anggota

dengan

di

bidang

sepakat

bahwa

lembaga-lembaga

penanaman WTO

perlu

tersebut

dalam

berupaya mencari rumusan yang tepat untuk mengatur perdagangan dan penanaman modal; (4) Negara-negara anggota sepakat pula bahwa di dalam pembahasan substansi aturan-aturan penanaman modal, pertimbangan faktor pembangunan

dari

negara

sedang

berkembang

perlu

mendapat

perhatian; (5) Negara-negara anggota sepakat bahwa hasil kerja dari (dua) kelompok kerja tersebut di atas diberi waktu 2 tahun yang hasilnya akan ditinjau ulang untuk menentukan tindak lanjut dari hasil kerja kedua kelompok kerja tersebut. 2. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Jenewa 1998 Pertemuan Ministerial Conference WTO Kedua diselenggarakan di Jenewa dari tanggal 18 hingga 20 Mei 1998. Dibandingkan dengan Pertemuan

Singapura,

pertemuan

kedua

ini

tidak

secara

khusus

membahas isu penanaman modal. Konperensi memuat beberapa butir kesimpulan berupa komitmen negara anggota WTO beserta beberapa rekomendasi. Pertemuan

Tingkat

Tinggi

kedua

ini

sebenarnya

tidak

menghasilkan hal-hal baru dan konkrit atau praktis seperti halnya Pertemuan Singapura 1996. Hasil pertemuan kali ini sebagian besar hanya memuat komitmen-komitmen negara anggota mengenai pentingnya dan perlunya sistem perdagangan multilateral yang terbuka. Hasil

pertemuan

yang

dihiasi

oleh

berbagai

komitmen

ini

tampaknya banyak dipengaruhi oleh keadaan perdagangan dunia yang diterpa krisis moneter yang melanda banyak negara

pada tahun

4

1997. Seperti kita maklumi, krisis di Asia menimpa Korea Selatan, kemudian menyebar cepat ke negara-negara lain di Asia Tenggara, terutama memukul telak Indonesia. Di samping krisis moneter, masalah perdagangan dan ekonomi yang melilit negara sedang berkembang dan miskin WTO terutama masalah beban utang luar negeri juga berpengaruh terhadap hasil pertemuan

Jenewa.

Hasil

komitmen

negara-negara

pertemuan anggota

secara untuk

khusus

menegaskan

menangani

masalah

marginalisasi negara miskin karena lilitan utang. Khusus untuk penanaman modal, pertemuan Jenewa tidak secara khusus menyinggungnya. Hasil pertemuan hanya menegaskan kembali komitmen negara-negara anggota untuk melaksanakan hal-hal yang telah disepakati atau dihasilkan dalam pertemuan Singapura 1996. Hasil Jenewa 2001 menegaskan pula bahwa hasil-hasil pertemuan Singapura

akan

dibahas

lebih

lanjut

dalam

Pertemuan

Tingkat

Tinggi ke-3. Adapun pernyataan dan rekomendasi dari pertemuan kedua ini menyatakan sebagai berikut: 1. This Second Session of the Ministerial Conference of the WTO is taking place at a particularly significant time for the multilateral trading system, when the fiftieth anniversary of its establishment is being commemorated. On this occasion we pay tribute to the system's important contribution over the past half-century to growth, employment and stability by promoting the liberalization and expansion of trade and providing a framework for the conduct of international trade relations, in accordance with the objectives embodied in the Preambles to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization Agreement. 2. We underline the crucial importance of the multilateral rulebased trading system. We reaffirm the commitments and assessments we made at Singapore, and we note that the work under existing agreements and decisions has resulted in significant new steps forward since we last met. In particular, we welcome the successful conclusion of the negotiations on basic telecommunications and financial services and we take note of the implementation of the Information Technology Agreement. We renew our commitment to achieve progressive liberalization of trade in goods and services. 3. The fiftieth anniversary comes at a time when the economies of a number of WTO Members are experiencing difficulties as a result of disturbances in financial markets. We take this

5

4.

5.

6.

7.

opportunity to underline that keeping all markets open must be a key element in a durable solution to these difficulties. With this in mind, we reject the use of any protectionist measures and agree to work together in the WTO as in the IMF and the World Bank to improve the coherence of international economic policy-making with a view to maximizing the contribution that an open, rule-based trading system can make to fostering stable growth for economies at all levels of development. We recognize the importance of enhancing public understanding of the benefits of the multilateral trading system in order to build support for it and agree to work towards this end. In this context we will consider how to improve the transparency of WTO operations. We shall also continue to improve our efforts towards the objectives of sustained economic growth and sustainable development. We renew our commitment to ensuring that the benefits of the multilateral trading system are extended as widely as possible. We recognize the need for the system to make its own contribution in response to the particular trade interests and development needs of developing-country Members. We welcome the work already underway in the Committee on Trade and Development for reviewing the application of special provisions in the Multilateral Trade Agreements and related Ministerial Decisions in favour of developing country Members, and in particular the least-developed among them. We agree on the need for effective implementation of these special provisions. We remain deeply concerned over the marginalization of leastdeveloped countries and certain small economies, and recognize the urgent need to address this issue which has been compounded by the chronic foreign debt problem facing many of them. In this context we welcome the initiatives taken by the WTO in cooperation with other agencies to implement in an integrated manner the Plan of Action for the least-developed countries which we agreed at Singapore, especially through the High-Level Meeting on Least-Developed Countries held in Geneva in October 1997. We also welcome the report of the DirectorGeneral on the follow-up of this initiative, to which we attach great importance. We commit ourselves to continue to improve market access conditions for products exported by the least-developed countries on as broad and liberal a basis as possible. We urge Members to implement the market-access commitments that they have undertaken at the High-Level Meeting. We welcome the WTO Members who have joined since we met in Singapore: Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mongolia, Niger and Panama. We welcome the progress made with 31 applicants currently negotiating their accession and renew our resolution to ensure that the accession processes proceed as rapidly as possible. We recall that accession to the WTO

6

requires full respect of WTO rules and disciplines as well as meaningful market access commitments on the part of acceding candidates. 8. Full and faithful implementation of the WTO Agreement and Ministerial Decisions is imperative for the credibility of the multilateral trading system and indispensable for maintaining the momentum for expanding global trade, fostering job creation and raising standards of living in all parts of the world. When we meet at the Third Session we shall further pursue our evaluation of the implementation of individual agreements and the realization of their objectives. Such evaluation would cover, inter alia, the problems encountered in implementation and the consequent impact on the trade and development prospects of Members. We reaffirm our commitment to respect the existing schedules for reviews, negotiations and other work to which we have already agreed. 9. We recall that the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization states that the WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreements in the Annexes to the Agreement, and that it may also provide a forum for further negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations, and a framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference. In the light of paragraphs 1-8 above, we decide that a process will be established under the direction of the General Council to ensure full and faithful implementation of existing agreements, and to prepare for the Third Session of the Ministerial Conference. This process shall enable the General Council to submit recommendations regarding the WTO's work programme, including further liberalization sufficiently broad-based to respond to the range of interests and concerns of all Members, within the WTO framework, that will enable us to take decisions at the Third Session of the Ministerial Conference. In this regard, the General Council will meet in special session in September 1998 and periodically thereafter to ensure full and timely completion of its work, fully respecting the principle of decision-making by consensus. The General Council's work programme shall encompass the following: (a) recommendations concerning: (i) the issues, including those brought forward by Members, relating to implementation of existing agreements and decisions; (ii) the negotiations already mandated at Marrakesh, to ensure that such negotiations begin on schedule; (iii) future work already provided for under other existing agreements and decisions taken at Marrakesh; (b) recommendations concerning other possible future work on the basis of the work programme initiated at Singapore;

7

(c) recommendations on the follow-up to the High-Level Meeting on Least-Developed Countries; (d) recommendations arising from consideration of other matters proposed and agreed to by Members concerning their multilateral trade relatons. 10. The General Council will also submit to the Third Session of the Ministerial Conference, on the basis of consensus, recommendations for decision concerning the further organization and management of the work programme arising from the above, including the scope, structure and time-frames, that will ensure that the work programme is begun and concluded expeditiously. 11. The above work programme shall be aimed at achieving overall balance of interests of all Members.

8

3. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Seattle 1999 Pertemuan tingkat tinggi WTO atau the Third WTO Ministerial Conference

diselenggarakan

di

kota

Seattle,

Washington

State,

Amerika Serikat, 30 November dan 3 Desember 1999. Dalam pertemuan ketiga ini para peserta tidak menghasilkan keputusan apa pun, termasuk

di

Penolakan

bidang

yang

internasional

keras

penanaman dari

menyebabkan

modal.

para

Pertemuan

aktivis

pertemuan

WTO

ini

khususnya kali

gagal. LSM-LSM

ini

gagal

berlangsung sesuai dengan jadwal. Umumnya LSM menggugat keberadaan WTO. Mereka mengkritik WTO sebagai badan negara maju. Keberadaan WTO tidak membantu sama sekali

kedudukan

negara

sedang

berkembang

dan

miskin.

WTO

dituding sebagai badan perdagangan dunia yang tidak demokratis, merugikan petani, merusak lingkungan, tidak pro-pekerja, dll.

9

4. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Doha, 2001 Pertemuan keempat

ini

deklarasi).

tingkat

berhasil

tinggi

(Ministerial

menghasilkan

Keseluruhan

keputusan

Conference

beberapa

keputusan

disahkan

pada

WTO)

(berupa

tanggal

14

November 2001. Salah satu hasil penting di bidang penanaman modal adalah diakuinya kembali hubungan erat antara perdagangan dan penanaman modal. Deklarasi mengenai hubungan kedua bidang ini, dalam teks bahasa Inggris, menyatakan sebagai berikut: a. Hubungan antara Perdagangan dan Penanaman Modal 20. Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term cross-border investment, particularly foreign direct investment, that will contribute to the expansion of trade, and the need for enhanced technical assistance and capacity-building in this area as referred to in paragraph 21, we agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations. 21. We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed countries for enhanced support for technical assistance and capacity building in this area, including policy analysis and development so that they may better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral cooperation for their development policies and objectives, and human and institutional development. To this end, we shall work in cooperation with other relevant intergovernmental organisations, including UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral channels, to provide strengthened and adequately resourced assistance to respond to these needs. 22. In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment will focus on the clarification of: scope and definition; transparency; non-discrimination; modalities for preestablishment commitments based on a GATS-type, positive list approach; development provisions; exceptions and balance-ofpayments safeguards; consultation and the settlement of disputes between members. Any framework should reflect in a balanced manner the interests of home and host countries, and take due account of the development policies and objectives of host governments as well as their right to regulate in the public interest. The special development, trade and financial needs of developing and least-developed countries should be taken into account as an integral part of any framework, which should enable members to undertake obligations and commitments commensurate with their individual needs and circumstances. Due regard should be paid to other relevant WTO provisions. Account should be

10

taken, as appropriate, of arrangements on investment.

existing

bilateral

and

regional

b. Penjelasan Deklarasi Doha Paragrap

20

hingga

22

di

atas

memuat

ketentuan

pokok

mengenai komitmen negara anggota WTO terhadap Perjanjian TRIMs. Ketiga paragrap tersebut mendapat penjelasan tidak resmi sebagai berikut: "The November 2001 declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, provides the mandate for negotiations on a range of subjects, and other work including issues concerning the implementation of the present agreements. The negotiations take place in the Trade Negotiations Committee and Its Subsidiaries. Other work under the work programme takes place in other WTO councils and committees. This is an unofficial explanation of what the declaration mandates. c. Hubungan antara Perdagangan dan Penanaman Modal (Paragrap 20 22) Di samping penjelasan terhadap paragrap 20 hingga 22, hasil dari kesepakatan Doha memuat penjelasan (dan penegasan) mengenai keterkaitan Deklarasi

erat

antara

menyatakan

perdagangan

bahwa

masalah

dan

hubungan

penanaman kedua

modal.

bidang

ini

sejak awal dipandang sebagai 'Singapore Issue'. Seperti telah dinyatakan di atas, untuk mengkaji masalah 'Singapore Issue' ini suatu 'working group' telah dibentuk berdasarkan Hasil Singapore Ministerial Conference tahun 1996. Dalam

pertemuan

tahun

2001

ini,

deklarasi

yang

dikeluarkannya tidak menyatakan bahwa negosiasi di bidang ini akan

segera

dilaksanakan.

Deklarasi

2001

ini

menyatakan:

“negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations [i.e. how the negotiations are to be conducted].” Dalam Conference working ruang

jangka tahun

group lingkup

waktu 2003,,

untuk dan

hingga

diselenggarakannya

Deklarasi

memfokuskan definisi

kali

ini

dirinya

mengenai

memerintahkan

guna

pokok

Ministerial the

mengklarifikasi

bahasan

(TRIMs),

11

prinsip transparansi, prinsip non-diskriminasi, cara-cara untuk mempersiapkan komitmen-komitmen dari hasil negosiasi, ketentuan mengenai pembangunan, pengecualian dan tindakan penyelamat neraca pembayaran, konsultasi dan penyelesaian sengketa. Komitmen

hasil

negosiasi

(the

negotiated

commitments)

disepakati akan mengikuti model yang digunakan dalam perjanjian GATS. Dalam perjanjian GATS, komitmen negara-negara ditetapkan dengan berdasarkan pada — “positive lists” — , tidak menerapkan pemberian

komitmen

yang

luas

dan

memuat

daftar-daftar

pengecualian. Deklarasi menyatakan pula beberapa prinsip seperti prinsip kebutuhan untuk menyeimbangkan kepentingan negara-negara (negara investor

dan

negara

penerima

modal

asing),

hak

negara

untuk

mengatur penanaman modal, prinsip pembangunan, kepentingan umum dan keadaan-keadaan khusus dari negara tertentu. Hasil-hasil pertemuan tingkat tinggi ini secara eksplisit menekankan isu pembangunan dalam keputusannya. Itulah sebabnya pertemuan

ini

disebut

juga

sebagai

'Agenda

Pembangunan

Doha'

('The Doha Development Agenda'). Deklarasi juga menekankan perlunya dukungan dan kerja sama internasional untuk negara sedang berkembang atau negara kurang mampu, dan pentingnya koordinasi dengan organisasi internasional lainnya

seperti

misalnya

the

UN

Conference

on

Trade

and

Development (UNCTAD). Hasil pekerjaan

keputusan Working

pertemuan

Group

hingga

ini

menetapkan

dilanjutkannya

diselenggarakannya

Ministerial

Conference WTO tahun 2003 di Mexico. Sedangkan negosiasi setelah tanggal tersebut Working Group akan melangsungkan pekerjaannya “on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations”. Untuk hal ini, tanggal

akhir

tanggal

1

dari

Januari

pekerjaan 2004,

oleh

sebagai

Working

bagian

Group

dari

keseluruhan bidang-bidang Perjanjian WTO lainnya.

satu

ditetapkan pekerjaan

12

5. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Cancún, 2003 Pertemuan

Tingkat

Tinggi

WTO

kelima

(the

Fifth

WTO

Ministerial Conference) diselenggarakan di kota Cancún, Mexico dari tanggal 10 hinggga 14 September 2003. Tujuan utama dari pertemuan tingkat tinggi ini adalah untuk melihat sampai berapa jauh kemajuan yang telah dicapai dalam perundingan dan pekerjaan berdasarkan

Agenda

Pembangunan

Doha

(the

Doha

Development

Agenda). Pada

akhir

pertemuan

tingkat

tinggi

ini,

konperensi

berakhir tanpa adanya konsensus. Ketika menutup pertemuan ini, ketua

pertemuan

Mr.

Luis

pertemuan masih belum ada

Ernesto

Derbez

menyatakan

bahwa

kesepakatan mengenai isu-isu Singapura

(“Singapore” issues), termasuk di dalamnya isu hubungan antara perdagangan dan penanaman modal.

1

BAB VII SENGKETA PENANAMAN MODAL DI WTO: SENGKETA MOBIL NASIONAL RI A. Pengantar Sejak Perjanjian TRIMs disahkan hingga tulisan ini disusun, Badan Penyelesaian Sengketa (Dispute Settlement Body atau DSB) WTO telah menangani 4 (empat) sengketa, yakni: (1) ME (EC), Jepang, AS lawan Indonesia dalam 'Indonesian Autos' (DS54, DS55, DS64 dan DS59); (2) ME dan AS lawan India, dalam India, Automobiles (DS146, DS175); (3) ME dan Jepang lawan Kanada dalam The US-Canada Auto Pact, Duty Free Requirements (DS142, DS 139); AS lawan Philippina dalam 'Automobiles' (DS 195). Persamaan dari keempat sengketa di atas adalah bahwa semua sengketa terkait dengan kebijakan otomotif. Dari keempat sengketa tersebut,

sengketa

yang

paling

ternama

dan

terkenal

adalah

sengketa the Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (Indonesian Autos atau Sengketa Mobil Nasional/Mobnas).1 Sengketa ini cukup banyak menjadi acuan dalam berbagai literatur yang

menyangkut

TRIMs.

Sengketa

ini

pun

sekaligus

merupakan

sengketa pertama yang secara langsung terkait dengan TRIMs.2 B. Sengketa Mobnas RI Sengketa ini menyangkut program mobil nasional (Mobnas) RI. Program diluncurkan pada tahun 1993 ketika pemerintah mengeluarkan rencana mobnasnya. Berdasarkan program ini, pemerintah memberikan keuntungan (perlakuan khusus) dalam bentuk tarif dan pajak kepada produsen mobil Indonesia. Keuntungan ini diberikan kepada produsen yang bersedia menggunakan kandungan dalam negeri untuk mobnas (the local content of the finished vehicles). Kebijakan ini dikembangkan pada tahun 1996 ketika pemerintah secara resmi meluncurkan 'Program Mobil Nasional'. Program ini diberikan kepada 1

perusahaan pionir, yaitu perusahaan Indonesia

Indonesia-Autos, Report of the Panel, 2 July 1998. Lihat: Thomas L. Brewer and Stephen Young, 'WTO Dispute and Developing Countries,' 33:5 JWT 177 (1999).

2

2

bernama PT Timor. PT Timor juga diberi hak untuk mengimpor 45,000 mobil jadi dari perusahaan Korea, the Korean Motor Corporation. Perusahaan

atau

produsen

mobil

asing

yang

berada

di

Indonesia, yaitu perusahaan dari Jepang, Masyarakat Eropa (ME) dan Amerika Serikat (AS) protes. Mereka mengklaim program Mobnas ini diskriminatif berdasarkan

dan

GATT.

melanggar Jepang,

aturan

ME

dan

perdagangan

AS

internasional

melancarkan

klaim

secara

terpisah mengenai program Mobnas Indonesia ini. Mereka mengklaim, upaya atau kebijakan pemerintah RI tersebut melanggar kewajiban Indonesia berdasarkan, antara lain, Pasal I dan III, Pasal 2 Perjanjian TRIMs, Pasal 3, 6 dan 28 Perjanjian SCM (Subsidi dan Bea Masuk Imbalan), dan Pasal 3, 203 dan 65 TRIPS.4 Mereka memohon konsultasi terpisah dengan pemerintah RI pada bulan Oktober 1996. Setelah konsultasi gagal, mereka mengajukan pembentukan panel. Tiga Panel terbentuk pada bulan Juni dan Juli 1997 untuk mengadili tuntutan 3 negara tersebut. Tetapi kemudian DSB

memutuskan

bahwa

panel

cukup

satu

saja

untuk

mengadili

sengketa ini berhubung kasus, tuduhan dan tergugatnya sama.5 Dalam kandungan dalam

putusannya, lokal

program

Perjanjian

(the Mobnas

TRIMS.6

Panel

local tahun

Panel

menyimpulkan

content 1993

juga

bahwa

requirements)

dan

setuju

1996 dengan

persyaratan yang

melanggar ME

termuat Pasal

bahwa

2

program

Mobnas telah merugikan ME sehubungan dengan pengertian Pasal 5 (c) Perjanjian SCM.7

Namun Panel menolak bahwa RI telah

melanggar

Pasal 28 para. 2 Perjanjian SCM dan Pasal 65 ayat 5 Perjanjian TRIPs yang digugat Amerika Serikat.8 Menghadapi

putusan

panel,

RI

ternyata

tidak

mengajukan

banding. Tidak ada penjelasan resmi dari pemerintah mengapa RI 3

Para. 1.4, the Indonesia-Autos (Panel Report). (Lihat addendum Bab ini mengenai ringkasan putusan (Report) Panel. 4 Para. 1.11, the Indonesia-Autos (Panel Report). 5 Para. 1.13, the Indonesia-Autos (Panel Report). 6 Para. 15.1, the Indonesia-Autos (Panel Report). 7 Para. 15.1, (d), the Indonesia-Autos (Panel Report). 8 Para. 15.1 (g), the Indonesia-Autos (Panel Report).

3

tidak mengajukan upaya ini. Dalam persidangan, Korea Selatan dan India berpihak dan membela Indonesia. Tetapi pembelaan dua negara ini tidak meyakinkan panel. Alasan

yang

hingga

kini

diterima,

pada

waktu

Panel

WTO

menyidangkan dan memutus sengketa tersebut, ekonomi dan moneter RI dalam keadaan yang sulit. Ketika Panel mengeluarkan putusannya apda tanggal 2 Juli 1998, RI masih menderita krisis moneter dan sangat membutuhkan bantuan dana dari donor-donor internasional, khususnya IMF. Terungkap bahwa sebagai bagian dari skema bantuan dana IMF, Indonesia diharuskan untuk mengakhiri program Mobnasnya. Hal ini secara otomatis memupus upaya banding atas putusan Panel.9 Lembaga South Centre menyatakan sebagai berikut: 'The broader significance of this case is illustrated by the major campaign mounted by the countries of the North against this "national car project" and the fact that its abandonment was one of the conditionalities of the IMF rescue package for Indonesia which de facto precluded Indonesia from challenging the panel ruling in WTO.'10 C. Penutup Sengketa di atas menunjukkan bahwa Panel DSB WTO, negara penuntut

tidak

ragu

lagi

melihat

Perjanjian

TRIMs

sebagai

perjanjian yang efektif. Hal ini tampaknya penting bagi eksistensi Perjanjian adalah

TRIMs.

Telah

perjanjian

yang

khususnya

perjanjian

pemahaman

tentang

dikemukakan 'gagal'

TRIPS

TRIMs

itu

atau

di

muka,

dibanding GATS.

sendiri

perjanjian

Selain

tidak

Perjanjian itu,

begitu

TRIMs lain,

kekosongan

dipersoalkan

dalam persidangan. Hal ini semua memberi dukungan positif terhadap Perjanjian TRIMs.

9

Lihat: South Centre, Issues Regarding the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, T.R.A.D.E. Working Paper, (South Centre, 2000), hlm. 34. 10 Ibid.

4

Addendum:11

WTO, INDONESIA - CERTAIN MEASURES AFFECTING THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY REPORT OF THE PANEL (WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R,WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, 2 July 1998 I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

Background

1.

Complaint of Japan

1.1 On 4 October 1996, Japan requested consultations with Indonesia pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"), Article XXII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994") and Article 8 of the Agreement on TradeRelated Investment Measures (the "TRIMs Agreement") regarding certain measures affecting the automotive industry of Indonesia (WT/DS55/1). 1.3 On 5 November and 3 December 1996, Japan and Indonesia held the consultations requested on 4 October 1996. On 3 December 1996, also in Geneva, Japan and Indonesia held the consultations requested on 29 November 1996. No mutually satisfactory solution was reached. 2.

Complaint of the European Communities

1.5 On 3 October 1996, the European Communities requested consultations with Indonesia pursuant to Article 4 of the DSU, Article XXII of GATT 1994, Article 8 of the TRIMs Agreement and Articles 7 and 30 of the SCM Agreement, with respect to certain measures affecting the automobile industry (WT/DS54/1). 1.6 The European Communities and Indonesia held consultations on 6 November 1996 and on 5 December 1996. No mutually satisfactory solution was reached. 3.

Complaint of the United States

1.9 On 8 October 1996, the United States requested consultations with Indonesia pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the DSU, Article XXII:1 of GATT 1994, Article 8 of the TRIMs Agreement (to the extent it incorporates by reference Article XXII of the GATT 1994), Articles 7 and 30 of the SCM Agreement (to the extent Article 30 incorporates by reference Article XXII of the GATT 1994), and Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement (to the extent it incorporates by reference Article XXII of the GATT 1994) regarding certain measures affecting trade and investment in the motor vehicle sector (WT/DS59/1). 1.10 The United States and Indonesia held consultations on 4 November 1996 and 4 December 1996, but failed to reach a mutually satisfactory solution.

11

Footnote dalam ringkasan putusan (Report) sengketa Mobnas ini tidak dicantumkam.

5 B.

Establishment and Composition of the Panel

1.13 At its meeting on 12 June 1997, the DSB established a panel pursuant to requests by Japan and the European Communities (WT/DS55/6-WT/DS64/4, and WT/DS54/6, respectively). At its meeting of 30 July 1997, the DSB agreed to the United States' request for establishment of a panel (WT/DS59/6), and also agreed, as provided for in Article 9 of the DSU in respect of multiple complainants, that the Panel established on 12 June 1997 to examine the complaints by Japan and the European Communities would also examine the United States' complaint. 1.14

The terms of reference of the Panel are the following: "To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by Japan in document WT/DS55/6-WT/DS64/4, by the European Communities in document WT/DS54/6, and by the United States in document WT/DS59/6, the matter referred to the DSB by Japan, the European Communities and the United States in those documents and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements".

1.15 Pursuant to a joint request by Japan and the European Communities, and as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 8 of the DSU, on 29 July 1997 the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Chairman:

Mr. Mohamed Maamoun Abdel Fattah

Members:

Mr. Ole Lundby Mr. David John Walker

1.16

India and Korea reserved their rights as third parties to the dispute.

II.

FACTUAL ASPECTS

2.1 This dispute concerns a series of measures maintained by Indonesia with respect to motor vehicles and parts and components thereof. A.

Tax and Tariff Treatment in Indonesia of Imported Completely Built-Up Motor Vehicles

2.2

Completely Built-Up motor vehicles ("CBUs") imported into Indonesia are subject to luxury tax as set forth in Table 10 below, as well as to import duties. B. Measures at Issue

2.3 The measures at issue are the measures comprising: (1) "the 1993 Incentive System", which was amended in 1995 and 1996 (referred to herein as the "1993 programme"), (2) "the National Car Programme", which encompasses the so-called "February 1996 programme" and "the June 1996 programme", and (3) a $US690 million loan to PT Timor Putra Nasional ("PT TPN" or "TPN"). All complainants raise claims with respect to the National Car Programme, and the European Communities and the United States also raise claims with respect to the 1993 programme. In addition, the United States raises claims with respect to the $US690 million loan. These measures can be summarized as follows: 1.

"1993 Programme"

2.4 In 1993, Indonesia adopted the so-called 1993 Incentive System. The 1993 Incentive System consists of: (a) import duty relief (reductions or exemptions) on imports of automotive parts and accessories based on (1) the per cent of local content of the finished motor vehicle in which the parts are used, and (2) the type of vehicle in which the parts are used.

6 (b) import duty relief on imports of “subparts” used to make automotive parts and accessories based on (1) the per cent of local content of the completed part or accessory, and (2) the type of motor vehicle in which the part or accessory is used. (c) exemption from or reduction of luxury sales tax on goods for certain categories of motor vehicles. (a)

Decree No. 114/1993

2.5 The first decree in the 1993 programme was Minister of Industry Decree No. 114/M/SK/6/1993 (June 9, 1993) (“The Determination of Local Content Levels of Domestically Made Motor Vehicles or Components”). Decree No. 114/1993 defines "local components" or "local sub components" as "parts or sub parts of Motor Vehicles which are domestically made and have Local Contents at a level of more than 40 per cent for [light commercial vehicles and passenger cars] ... ". The decree sets forth import duties dependent on specified local content rates for passenger cars, commercial vehicles, and automotive parts and components. (b)

Decree No. 645/1993

2.9 The purpose of the second decree forming part of the 1993 Programme, Minister of Finance Decree No. 645/KMK.01/1993 (June 10, 1993) (“The Relief of Import Duty on the Import of Certain Parts and Accessories of Motor Vehicles for the Purpose of Automotive Assembling and/or Manufacture”), is to authorize the incentives identified above under Decree No. 114/1993. (c)

Decree No. 647/1993

2.10 A third decree forming part of the 1993 Programme, Minister of Finance Decree No. 647/KMK.04/1993 (June 10, 1993) (“The Kinds and Types of Motor Vehicles Subject to Sales Tax on Luxury Goods”) provides reduced Indonesian sales tax on luxury goods for motor vehicles with specified local content rates. Specifically, passenger cars with cylinder capacities of 1600cc or less and jeeps are subject to a luxury tax of 20 per cent provided that their local content exceeds 60 per cent. (An exception is made for motor vehicles used for public purposes, such as police vans, ambulances, fire-engines, etc.). If the local content is not in excess of 60 per cent, the applicable luxury tax rate is 35 per cent. (d)

Decree No. 223/1995

2.12 In 1995, through Minister of Finance Decree No. 223/KMK.01/1995 (May 23, 1995) (“The Improvement of Decree of the Minister of Finance Number 645/KMK.01/1993 on the Relief of Import Duty on Parts and Accessories of Motor Vehicles for the Purpose of Automotive Assembly and/or Manufacture”), Indonesia modified the schedule of import duty rates corresponding to specified local content rates. (e)

Decree No. 36/1997

2.14 Minister of Finance Decree No. 36/KMK.01/1997 (January 21, 1997) ("The Granting of Import Duty Relief to Certain Parts and Accessories of Motor Vehicles for the Assembly and or Manufacturing of Motor Vehicles”) reissues the schedule of import duty relief set forth in Decree No. 223/1995 in light of changes in the underlying customs statutes. 2.

"The National Car Programme"

7 2.15

Two sets of measures have been identified by all parties under the 1996 National Car programme:

2.16 The first set of measures - the February 1996 Programme - provides for the grant of “pioneer” or National Car company status to Indonesian car companies that meet specified criteria as to ownership of facilities, use of trademarks, and technology. Maintenance of pioneer status is dependent on the National Cars' meeting increasing local content requirements over a three year period. The benefits provided are exemption from luxury tax on sales of National Cars, and exemption from import duties on parts and components. 2.17 The second set of measures - the June 1996 Programme - provides that National Cars manufactured in a foreign country by Indonesian nationals and which fulfil the local content requirements prescribed by the Minister of Industry and Trade, shall be treated the same as National Cars manufactured in Indonesia, i.e. exempt from import duties and luxury tax. In accordance with Decree 142/96, imported National Cars are deemed to comply with the 20 per cent local content requirement for the end of the first production year if the overseas producer manufacturing the National Cars “counter-purchases” Indonesian parts and components that account for at least 25 per cent of the C&F value of the imported cars. 2.18 The United States alleges a third element of the National Car Programme - a series of loans, totalling US$690 million with a maturity of 10 years, made on 11 August 1997, to TPN (the only pioneer company) for TPN to carry out the national car project. The loans allegedly were made by a consortium of state-owned and private banks at the direction of the Government of Indonesia, with the state-owned banks providing at least 50 per cent of the financing. (a)

"The February 1996 Programme"

2.19 The so-called February 1996 programme consists of a series of decrees and regulations published in February and March 1996. (1)

Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996

2.20 Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 (“The Development of the National Automobile Industry”) was issued on 19 February, 1996. The purpose of Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 is “to continue to strengthen the self-reliance of the nation, particularly in providing means of land transportation in the form of the production of a national car . . . ” Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 directs the Minister of Industry and Trade, the Minister of Finance, and the State Minister for the Mobilization of Investment Fund/Chairman of Capital Investment Coordinating Board to implement a series of “provisions.” 2.21 First, Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 directs these ministers collectively to implement “measures in close coordination to realize as fast as possible the development of the national car industry, which meets the following criteria: (a) the use of a brand name of its own; (b) domestically produced; (c) the use of components which are domestically produced.” 2.22 Second, Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 directs the Minister of Industry and Trade “to foster, guide and grant facilities, in accordance with the use of provisions of laws in effect such that the national car industry: (a) uses a brand name of its own; (b) uses components produced domestically as much as possible; (c) is able to export its products.” 2.23 Third, Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 directs the Minister of Finance to “grant the following facilities in the field of taxation in accordance with regulations in force: (a) import duty exemption for importation of components produced domestically as much as possible which still need to be imported; (b) the assessment of the Value Added Tax at the rate of 10 per cent upon the delivery of the produced automobiles; (c) payment of the Sales Tax on Luxury Goods which is owed upon the delivery of the produced automobiles will be borne by the Government.”

8 (2)

Decree No. 31/1996

2.24 Also on 19 February 1996, Indonesia issued Minister of Industry and Trade Decree No. 31/MPP/SK/2/1996 (“The National Motor Vehicle”). Decree No. 31/1996 identifies its purpose as “to implemen[t] Presidential Instruction No.2 of 1996 on the Development of the National Car Industry ... in the framework of promoting industry ... .” 2.25 Decree No. 31/1996 sets forth the requirements for designation as a “national motor vehicle”. Specifically, national motor vehicles are those which: (a) are made domestically at production facilities owned by national industrial enterprises or Indonesian corporations, the shares of which are wholly owned by Indonesian citizens; (b) use "a brand name of its own which has never been registered by any other party in Indonesia and which is owned by an Indonesian companies/citizen"; and (c) are "developed with technology, construction, design and engineering based on national capability applied by stages." The Decree also provides that “the motor vehicle industrial enterprise which produces national motor vehicles in accordance with the requirements set forth in Article 1 will be granted the status of ‘Pioneer enterprise'.” 2.26 Decree No. 31/1996 sets forth a schedule of local content rates to be achieved by a “national motor vehicle industrial enterprise given 'Pioneer status'”: (3)

Decree No. 82/1996

2.27 The third measure issued on February 19, 1996, was Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 82/KMK.01/1996 (“The Improvement of the Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 645/KMK.01/1993 on the Grant of Import Duty Relief to Certain Parts and Components of Motor Vehicles for the Assembly Purposes and/or Manufacture of Motor Vehicles as Previously Improved by the Decree of the Minister of No. 223/KMK.01/1995”). Decree No. 82/1996 establishes that parts and components imported by a producer/assembler of National Cars, for assembly or manufacture of National Cars fulfilling the local content rates identified above, are exempted from import duties. (4)

Government Regulation No. 20/1996

2.28 The final measure issued on February 19, 1996, was Government Regulation No. 20 (“The Amendment of Government Regulation No. 50 of 1994 Regarding the Implementation of Law No. 8 of 1983 on Value Added Tax on Goods and Services and Sales Tax on Luxury Goods as Amended by Law No. 11 of 1994”). By this regulation, National Cars fulfilling the specified requirements, including local content rates, were exempted from luxury tax. (5)

Decree of the State Minister for Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the Investment Coordinating Board No. 01/SK/1996

2.30 On 27 February 1996, Indonesia issued Decree of the State Minister for Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the Investment Coordinating Board No. 01/SK/1996 ("Investment Regulations Within the Framework of the Realization of the Establishment of the National Automobile Industry"). The decree provided that "to realise the establishment of [a] national car industry, the investment approval will be issued to the automobile industry sector with tax facilities in accordance with legal provisions enacted specifically for that purpose."

9 (6)

Ministry of Industry and Trade Decree No. 002/SK/DJ-ILMK/II/1996

2.31 On 27 February 1996, Decree No. 002/SK/DJ-ILMK/II/1996 of the Ministry of Industry and Trade was issued. This Decree designated PT Timor Putra Nasional (“TPN”) as "a pioneer national motor vehicle enterprise." On 5 March 1996, Decision No. 02/SK/1996 of the State Minister for the Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the Capital Investment Co-ordinating Board was issued. This decision designated TPN "to establish and produce a National Car." 2.32 The National Car, the "Timor", was to be based on the design and other technology of the Kia Sephia, model produced by Kia Motors of Korea. The Timor was to be produced initially in knock-down form in Korea by Kia Motors, for export to Indonesia, where it was to be assembled at TPN's facility at Karawang, Indonesia. (At the time that the February 1996 programme was announced, construction of this facility had not yet begun.) TPN was to gradually increase the level of local content of the Timor. (b) 2.33

"The June 1996 Programme"

The so-called June 1996 programme comprises a series of decrees issued in June 1996. (1)

Presidential Decree No. 42/1996

2.34 On 4 June 1996, Presidential Decree No. 42/1996 (“The Production of National Cars”) was issued. This Decree No. 42/1996 stated that: National cars which are made overseas by Indonesia workers and fulfil the local content stipulated by the Minister of Industry and Trade will be treated equally to those made in Indonesia. In other words, National Cars in fully built-up form could be imported free of duty and luxury tax, if they were made by Indonesian personnel and fulfilled the local content requirements for the National Car. 2.35 This Decree also provided that this tax and duty exemption would be granted only once for a maximum period of one year, and would involve a total number of vehicles to be stipulated by the Minister of Industry and Trade. In Minister of Industry and Trade Decree No. 1410/MPP/6/1996 (30 June 1996), TPN was authorized to import 45,000 Timors pursuant to Decree No. 42/1996. (2)

Regulation No. 36/1996

2.36 Also on 4 June 1996, Indonesia issued Government Regulation No. 36/1996 (“The Amendment of Government Regulation No. 50 of 1994 on the Implementation of Law No. 8 of 1983 on Value Added Tax on Goods and Services and Sales Tax on Luxury Goods as Amended by Law No. 11 of 1994, as Lastly Amended by Government Regulation No. 20/1996”). Regulation No. 36/1996 made further revisions to the luxury tax on motor vehicles, which, as discussed, had been most recently revised on 19 February 1996, in Regulation No. 20/1996. (3)

Decree No. 142/1996

2.38 As indicated, Presidential Decree No. 42/1996 permitted the “national motor vehicle” to be produced abroad for a period of one year and still receive the duty and tax benefits of the National Motor Vehicle programme, if the local content requirements for the National Car (20 per cent local content for the first year) were met and the car was produced by Indonesian personnel. 2.39 The Decree of the Minister of Industry and Trade No. 142/MPP/Kep/6/1996, issued 5 June 1996 (“The Production of the National Cars”) established guidelines for meeting the local content requirement referred to in Decree 42/1996. Decree No. 142/1996 provides that “the production of national cars can be

10 carried out overseas ... on the condition that Indonesian parts and components are used”, and then states further that “[t]he procurement of Indonesian-made parts and components shall be performed through the system of counter purchase of parts and components of motor vehicles by the overseas company carrying out the production and reexporting of national cars to Indonesia.” In addition, the decree states that “[t]he value of the counter purchase ... shall be fixed at the minimum of 25% (twenty-five per cent) of the import value of the national cars assembled abroad (C&F value).” 2.40 In other words, counter purchases by the overseas producer of the National Car of Indonesian motor vehicle parts and components worth at least 25 per cent of the C&F import value of the imported National Cars would satisfy the local content requirements for the National Car. (4)

Audit of TPN's performance under Decree 142/1996

2.41 Indonesia has submitted a letter to the Panel dated January 1998, containing the results of an audit of TPN's compliance with the counterpurchase requirement of Decree No. 142/1996. The letter indicates that TPN was found in the audit not to have met the counterpurchase requirement. 3.

The US$690 million loan to TPN

2.42 The United States' claims include one additional measure, which it characterizes as a further component of the National Car Programme: a loan provided on 11 August 1997. According to the United States, at the direction of the Indonesian Government a consortium of four government-owned banks and twelve private banks decided to disburse US$650 million in ten-year loans to TPN to carry out the national car project. The United States also asserts that one of the Government-owned banks involved previously had disbursed a US$40 million bridging loan to TPN, bringing the total loan amount to US$690 million. According to the United States, the loans reportedly will carry an annual interest rate of 3 per cent over the 3-6 month deposit rate, a maturity of 10 years, and a grace period of 3 years, and the four government-owned banks will provide one-half of the $650 million loan. 2.43 On 25 February 1998, Indonesia notified the Subsidies Committee that, as of 21 January 1998, it had terminated all subsidies previously granted under the National Car programme. On 2 March 1998, Indonesia notified the Panel and requested the Panel to terminate the dispute settlement proceeding, at least as it relates to the 1996 National Car programme measures. C.

Notifications by Indonesia to WTO Committees

2.44 On 23 May 1995, Indonesia made a notification with respect to the 1993 Incentive System to the TRIMs Committee under Article 5.1 of the TRIMs Agreement (G/TRIMS/N/1/IDN/1). On 28 October 1996, Indonesia notified the TRIMs Committee that it was “withdrawing” its notification related to automobiles because it considered that its programme was not a TRIM (G/TRIMS/N/1/IDN/1/Add.1); on the same day Indonesia made a notification with respect to its 1993 Incentive System and its 1996 National Car programme to the SCM Committee (G/SCM/N/16/IDN). III.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REQUESTED BY THE PARTIES A.

3.1

Japan

Japan requests the Panel to find that: (a) the luxury sales tax exemption with regard to domestically produced National Cars pertaining to the February 1996 National Car Programme measures identified is inconsistent with Article III:2 of GATT 1994, since imported automobiles are subject to luxury sales tax in excess of that applied to the like domestic products (i.e. National Cars);

11 (b) the local content requirements with regard to domestically produced National Cars pertaining to the February 1996 National Car Programme measures identified are inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT 1994, since the requirements accord to products imported from Japan treatment less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products; (c) the local content requirements and the exemption from customs tariff and luxury sales tax pertaining to the February 1996 National Car Programme measures identified are trade related investment measures as stipulated in paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List annexed to the TRIMs Agreement, and are therefore inconsistent with Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement; (d) the customs tariff exemption with regard to the import of automotive parts and components and the sales tax exemption pertaining to the February 1996 National Car Programme measures identified are inconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994, since the exemptions are not accorded to the like products originating in all other members including Japan; (e) the exemption from customs tariff and sales tax granted under the extended National Car Programme of June 1996 solely to the completed automobiles originating in the Republic of Korea is inconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994, since the exemption is not accorded to the like products originating in other Members including Japan; (f) the extended National Car Programme measures were not promptly published and have not been administered in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner, thus being inconsistent with Articles X:1 and X:3(a) of GATT 1994. 3.2 Japan requests that the Panel recommend that Indonesia bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement. B. 3.3

European Communities

The European Communities requests the Panel to find that: (a) Indonesia violates the provisions of Article III:2, first sentence, by exempting from the luxury sales tax the sales of the following categories of motor vehicles: (i)

domestically manufactured motor cycles with engines of 250 cc or less;

(ii) combines, minibuses, vans and pick-ups using gasoline as fuel which are manufactured domestically and have a local content of more than 60 per cent; (iii) combines, minibuses, vans and pick-ups using diesel oil as fuel which are manufactured domestically and have a local content of more than 60 per cent; (iv)

domestically manufactured buses;

(v) domestically manufactured sedans and stations wagons of less than 1,600 cc with a local content of more than 60 per cent; (vi)

National Cars assembled in Indonesia by pioneer companies; and

(vii)

imported National Cars.

12 (b) the following measures favour the “use” by Indonesian car manufacturers of domestic parts and components over “like” imported parts and components and are, accordingly, inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT: (i) the exemption from the luxury sales tax of locally manufactured combines, minibuses, vans and pick-ups with more than 60 per cent local content; (ii) the exemption from the luxury sales tax of locally manufactured sedans and stations wagons of less than 1,600 cc with more than 60 per cent local content; (iii) the exemption from the luxury sales tax of National Cars assembled in Indonesia by pioneer companies meeting certain local content requirements; (iv) the exemption from the luxury sales tax of National Cars assembled in Korea by “overseas producers” meeting certain counter-purchasing obligations; (v) the grant of import duty relief to parts and components used in the assembly of motor vehicles (or of other parts and components for the assembly of motor vehicles) in Indonesia based on the finished vehicles (or the parts and components) meeting certain local content requirements; (vi) the exemption from import duties for parts and components used for the assembly of National Cars in Indonesia by pioneer companies meeting certain local content obligations. (c) the following measures are inconsistent with Indonesia's obligations under Article I:1 of GATT: (i) (ii) National Cars;

the exemption from customs duties on imports of National Cars; the exemption from the sales tax on luxury goods for imported

(iii) the exemption from the sales tax on luxury goods for National Cars assembled in Indonesia; and (iv) the exemption from customs duties on imports of parts and components for the assembly of National Cars in Indonesia. (d) the measures listed in paragraph b. above are also TRIMs inconsistent with Article III of GATT and, accordingly, that by applying those measures Indonesia is in violation of its obligations under Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. (e) the following incentives granted to PT TPN under the National Car Programme constitute "specific subsidies" within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement and cause "serious prejudice" to the interests of the Community in the sense of Article 5(c) of that Agreement: (i) customs duty relief for parts and components intended for assembly into National Cars; (ii)

exemption from the luxury sales tax for National Cars;

13 (iii) C. 3.4

customs duty relief for National Cars imported from Korea.

United States

The United States requests the Panel to find that: (a) Indonesia’s system of tariff and tax incentives under the 1993 Incentive System and National Car programmes and the government-directed $690 million loan to TPN are inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT 1994 and are not covered by Article III:8 of GATT 1994; (b) Indonesia’s discriminatory application of the luxury sales tax is inconsistent with Article III:2, first sentence, of GATT 1994; (c) alternatively, Indonesia's discriminatory application of the luxury sales tax is inconsistent with Article III:2, second sentence; (d) Indonesia's exemption of CBU Kia Sephia sedans imported from Korea from import duties and the luxury sales tax violates Article I:1 of GATT 1994. (e) Indonesia’s system of tariff and tax incentives under the 1993 Incentive System and National Car programmes and the government-directed $690 million loan to TPN are inconsistent with Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement; (f) Indonesia’s grant of “national motor vehicle” benefits only to motor vehicles bearing a unique Indonesian trademark owned by Indonesian nationals discriminates against foreign-owned trademarks and their owners and is inconsistent with Articles 3, 20 and 65 of the TRIPS Agreement; (g) Indonesia has extended the scope of its tariff and tax subsidies in a manner inconsistent with Article 28.2 of the SCM Agreement. (h) Indonesia's subsidies under the National Motor Vehicle Programme have caused serious prejudice to the interests of the United States within the meaning of Articles 6 and 27 of the SCM Agreement; (i) Indonesia's subsidies under the National Motor Vehicle Programme have caused a threat of serious prejudice to the interests of the United States within the meaning of Articles 6 and 27 of the SCM Agreement.

3.5 The United States requests that the Panel recommend that Indonesia bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under GATT 1994, the TRIMs Agreement, the TRIPS Agreement, and the SCM Agreement. 3.6 The United States also requests that the Panel recommend, pursuant to Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement, that Indonesia take appropriate steps to remove the serious prejudice and the threat of serious prejudice or withdraw its subsidies. D.

Indonesia

3.7 Indonesia requests the Panel to reject the complainants' assertions and find that the 1993 incentive programme and the 1996 National Car programme are allowable subsidies under the Subsidies Agreement and do not violate any provisions of GATT 1994, the TRIMs Agreement, or the TRIPs Agreement. VI.

CLAIMS UNDER THE TRIMS AGREEMENT

14 A.

Claims Raised by Japan

6.1 Japan argues that the National Car Programme (see Section III.A) violates Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement. The following are Japan's arguments in support of this claim: 6.2 Article 2:1 of the TRIMs Agreement provides that "no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994." The issues before this panel, therefore, are twofold: (i) whether or not the National Car Programme is a "TRIM", and (ii) whether or not it violates either of the relevant GATT articles. As we have demonstrated, the exemption from the luxury tax and the import duty on the basis of local content is in violation of Article III:4. Consequently, the second of the above has been met, and the focus of the analysis here is on the first of the two issues. 1.

Indonesia's Programmes are "TRIMs" as defined in the TRIMs Agreement

6.3 There is no doubt that Indonesia's programmes constitute "investment measures related to trade". First, in the context of GATT/WTO, a "measure" is interpreted broadly. For example, in the case of GATS, it is expressly stated that "'measure' means any measure by a Member, whether in the form of law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form". In light of the usage of the term within the context of the TRIMs Agreement, the notion of a "measure" should be interpreted similarly. Government regulations requiring certain local content to obtain an exemption from a luxury tax or specifying levels of import duty thus constitute "measures" within the meaning of the TRIMs Agreement. 6.4 Second, Indonesia's programmes are all "trade-related investment measures". The National Car Programme has been established specifically "with a view to supporting the development of the automotive industry." The central aspect of the National Car Programme is to develop the domestic manufacturing capability of automobiles and automotive parts and components. The fact that the Programme includes "investment measures" is also obvious from the fact that one of its implementing regulations is entitled "Investment Provisions for Realization of the National Automobile Industry." The Programme indeed impacts on the automobile industry in Indonesia where foreign-owned manufacturers are actively participating. Furthermore, these are all "trade-related" since the Programme is conditioned on local contents requirements and thus naturally affects trade. 6.5 Indonesia has essentially confirmed this point in prior meetings of the WTO Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures. In the Minutes of the Meeting Held on 30 September and 1 November 1996, the representative of Indonesia stated: [T]he National Car Programme was intended to bring about major structural changes in the Indonesian automotive sector so that it could develop into a world standard industry ... . These policies were expected to encourage car companies to increase their local content, resulting in a rapid growth of investments in the automotive component industry. (Emphasis added) 6.6 In addition, the Illustrative List in the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement, paragraph 1, specifically includes local content requirements as TRIMs that are inconsistent with Article III:4: TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in [Article III:4] include those ...compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require: (a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin ... specified in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production .... Indonesia's measures, which are contingent on compliance with local content requirements, thus clearly constitute prohibited TRIMs as set forth in the Illustrative List.

15 6.7 Furthermore, Japan considers that any TRIMs which violate GATT Article III, including both Article III:2 and Article III:4, are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. Japan believes that the February 1996 Programme violates GATT Article III, is a "trade-related investment measure", and thus violates TRIMs Article 2.1. 2.

Even if Indonesia's measures were deemed to constitute a subsidy, it is nonetheless also a TRIM

6.8 Indonesia claims that the measure is a "subsidy" rather than a "TRIM". However, the concepts of a TRIM and subsidy are not mutually exclusive. Nothing in the text, objective or purpose of the TRIMs Agreement would support the contention that a TRIM is no longer a TRIM simply because the local administering authority prefers to call it a subsidy rather than a TRIM. 3.

Indonesia cannot enjoy the benefit of the transitional period

6.9 Nor can Indonesia enjoy the benefit of the five-year transitional period for developing countries stipulated in TRIMs Agreement, Article 5.2, in light of Indonesia's failure to comply with its notification and standstill obligations. The TRIMs Agreement, Article 5.2 requires notification for Members to benefit from the transitional period, and Article 5.4 imposes a standstill obligation during the period. Indonesia has complied with neither provision. First, there is no notification. Indonesia submitted a notification on 23 May 1995, which specifies certain automotive related measures, but the notification was withdrawn in October 1996. Second, even if the notification had not been withdrawn, its content is irrelevant to the National Car Programme. While the measures appeared in the notification may be tangentially related to the National Car Programme, the Programme itself was not specified in the notification. Moreover, the National Car Programme, which was introduced in 1996, could have never been notified in the notification, which was due within 90 days after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement (i.e., 1 January 1995) and was actually made by Indonesia in May 1995. Therefore, Indonesia cannot enjoy the benefit of the transitional period under Article 5.2. of the TRIMs Agreement. B.

Claims Raised by the European Communities

6.10 The European Communities claims that Indonesia has violated its obligations under Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, as the following measures (See Section III.B) are TRIMs inconsistent with Article III of GATT 1994: (1) the exemption from the Sales Tax on Luxury Goods of locally manufactured combines, minibuses, vans and pick-ups with more than 60 per cent local content; (2) the exemption from the Sales Tax on Luxury Goods of locally manufactured sedans and stations wagons of less than 1,600 cc with more than 60 per cent local content; (3) the exemption from the Sales Tax on Luxury Goods of National Cars assembled in Indonesia by Pioneer Companies meeting certain local content requirements; (4) the exemption from the Sales Tax on Luxury Goods of National Cars assembled in Korea by “overseas producers” meeting certain counter-purchasing obligations; (5) the grant of duty relief to parts and components used in the assembly of motor vehicles (or of other parts and components for the assembly of motor vehicles) in Indonesia based on the finished vehicles (or the parts and components) meeting certain local content requirements; and (6) the exemption of import duties for parts and components used for the assembly of National Cars in Indonesia by Pioneer Companies meeting certain local content obligations. 6.11

The following are the European Communities' arguments in support of this claim:

16 6.12

Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement provides that: Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT.

6.13 The notion of TRIM (“Trade Related Investment Measure”) is not defined in the TRIMs Agreement. Nevertheless, the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement contains what Article 2.2 of that Agreement describes as: An Illustrative List of TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 and the obligation of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI. 6.14 The above measures are “investment measures” because they are specifically designed to promote investment into the automotive sector with the purpose of achieving “full manufacturing” of motor vehicles in Indonesia. Further, the measures are “trade related” because they encourage the use of domestic parts and components over imported ones. Finally, as demonstrated above, the measures are inconsistent with Article III:4 and, in some cases, also with Article III:2, first sentence. 6.15 The above analysis is confirmed by the Illustrative List annexed to the TRIMs Agreement. Indeed, the measures at issue fall squarely within the category defined in Item 1 (a) of the Illustrative List, which reads as follows: 1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those [....] compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require: (a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source [...] in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production. 6.16 Article 5.2 of the TRIMs Agreement provides a temporary derogation from the obligation contained in Article 2 in respect of TRIMs which were in force at least 180 days before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement and which have been duly notified by the Member concerned within 90 days from the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, as required by Article 5.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. In the case of developing country Members, such as Indonesia, this temporary derogation has a duration of five years. 6.17 On 23 May 1995, Indonesia made a notification under Article 5.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. This notification, however, does not entitle Indonesia to invoke the temporary arrangement provided in Article 5.2 with respect to the measures at issue. 6.18 In the first place, Indonesia’s notification was made more than 90 days after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Accordingly, it does not constitute a valid notification under Article 5.1. 6.19 Moreover, Indonesia’s notification covered only the measures provided in Decree 645/93. The tax benefits provided in Government Regulation 36/96 and the incentives granted under the National Car Programme were introduced by Indonesia only after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. For that reason, they were not, and could not have been, notified under Article 5.1. 6.20 On 28 October 1996 (i.e. immediately before the first round of consultations with the Community took place) Indonesia withdrew formally its notification. Allegedly because, based on a further analysis of the measures concerned, it had concluded that the measures were not TRIMs. In reality, however, the obvious reason for withdrawing the notification was Indonesia’s belated realisation that the notification would not only fail to provide the expected immunity for the notified measures, but, in addition, would represent an open admission that both the notified measures and the non-notified ones are contrary to Articles III:4 of GATT and 2 of the TRIMs Agreement.

17 C.

Claims raised by the United States

6.21 The United States claims that Indonesia’s system of tariff and tax incentives and the governmentdirected $690 million loan to TPN (See Section III.C) are inconsistent with Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement. The following are the United States' arguments in support of this claim: 6.22 Indonesia’s system of tariff and tax incentives and the government-directed $690 million loan to TPN are based upon the achievement of designated local content targets and, as such, discriminate against imported automotive parts (and subparts) in favour of their domestic counterparts. In addition to violating Article III:4 of GATT 1994, these measures also violate Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement. 6.23

Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreements, in pertinent part, states the following: 1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III … of GATT 1994. 2. An illustrative list of TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 … is contained in the Annex to this Agreement.

6.24

Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List, in turn, provides as follows: 1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require: (a)

the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production ... . (emphasis added).

6.25 The tariff and tax incentives provided by Indonesia fall squarely within the example of a TRIM in paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List. The tax and tariff incentives under the 1993 Programme and the National Car Programme require, within the meaning of Article 1(a) of the Illustrative List, "the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source ...". "Compliance" with these requirements "is necessary to obtain an advantage" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Illustrative List. As such, these incentives fall squarely within the Illustrative List. Under both the 1993 programme and the National Motor Vehicle programme, in order to obtain the “advantage” of tariff or tax reductions or exemptions, an “enterprise” must “comply” with the requirement to “use . . . products of domestic origin”. Likewise, the provision of the government-directed $690 million loan to TPN was based on TPN’s status as a participant in the production of a “national motor vehicle”, a status which, in turn, was based on compliance with the requirement to satisfy the local content requirements for a “national motor vehicle”. Therefore, the tariff and tax incentives and the provision of the government-directed $690 million loan constitute TRIMs that are prohibited by Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. 6.26 With respect to the 1993 programme, Indonesia, as a developing country, could have taken advantage of the notification and transitional arrangements of Article 5 of the TRIMs Agreement. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 provide, in pertinent part: 1. Members, within 90 days of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement [i.e., by 31 March 1995], shall notify the Council for Trade in Goods of all TRIMs they are applying that are not in conformity with the provisions of this Agreement. Such TRIMs of general or specific application shall be notified, along with their principal features.

18 2. Each Member shall eliminate all TRIMs which are notified under paragraph 1 … within five years [of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement] in the case of a developing country Member ... . (footnote omitted). 6.27 Indonesia did notify, pursuant to Article 5.1, that portion of the 1993 programme providing tariff incentives. However, that notification was untimely, because it was made on 23 May 1995, well after the deadline for notifying TRIMs under Article 5.1 had closed. Moreover, the notification did not cover that portion of the 1993 programme providing tax incentives. Subsequently, Indonesia withdrew that portion of its notification pertaining to the tariff incentives for motor vehicles. As a result, Indonesia has not notified any of the TRIMs described above, and, thus, is ineligible to take advantage of the transitional arrangements in Article 5.2. D.

Response by Indonesia to Claims under the TRIMs Agreement

6.28 Indonesia argues, in response to the claims under the TRIMs Agreement, that the TRIMs Agreement interprets Article III of the GATT 1994, and adds no new obligations; thus it cannot alter the fact that Article III is not applicable. The following are Indonesia's arguments in this regard. 1.

Summary

6.29 At the start of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States, the European Communities, Japan and other developed countries had grand plans for an agreement that would broadly discipline investment measures. Throughout the negotiations, however, the developed countries' efforts were countered by virtually all developing countries. To avoid the absence of any agreement at all, the agreed-upon TRIMs text provides that the type of local content measure found to be inconsistent with Article III of the General Agreement in Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (7 February 1994), BISD 30S/140, (as well as another type of measure previously found to be inconsistent with Article XI) should also be proscribed as a TRIM. In other words, to be a TRIM, a measure must be inconsistent with GATT Articles III or XI. 6.30

Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement states: Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994. (Emphasis added.)

The TRIMs Agreement does not add any new obligations; it merely interprets Article III. This was recognized in the Report of the Panel on European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA (22 May 1997), which declares at paragraph 7.185: In considering these arguments, we first examine the relationship of the TRIMs Agreement to the provisions of GATT. We note that with the exception of its transition provisions the TRIMs Agreement essentially interprets and clarifies the provisions of Article III (and also Article XI) where trade-related investment measures are concerned. Thus the TRIMs Agreement does not add to or subtract from those GATT obligations, although it clarifies that Article III:4 may cover investment-related matters. (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) 6.31 As demonstrated (See Section V.D), Indonesia's luxury tax subsidy is not inconsistent with Article III of the General Agreement. Therefore, the TRIMs Agreement is not germane to this dispute. 2.

The TRIMs "Illustrative List" cannot alter the fact that Article III is inapplicable

6.32 Complainants seek to use the TRIMs Illustrative List as the tail to wag the Article III dog, claiming that the Indonesian measures fall within the scope of paragraph 1(a) of the List and hence are TRIMs.

19 6.33 During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States clearly indicated the subordinate nature of the Illustrative List. The official minutes of the 10-11 July 1989 meeting of the TRIMs negotiating group record the following exchange: One participant asked for clarification on the nature of and the role that would be assigned to "illustrative lists"; were they only concepts within the framework of the negotiations, would they remain illustrative rather than definitive in any final agreement and would they be open-ended so that they could be added to at a later stage? ... The representative of the United States said that the lists should be purely illustrative. Disciplines should be based on general criteria such as the inherently trade distorting nature of TRIMs and illustrative lists could then be drawn up with specific examples of TRIMs that were subject to specific disciplines. In that way any new measure that was devised could still be caught by the discipline even if it did not appear on an illustrative list. 6.34 The United States, the European Communities, Japan and other developed countries had extensive negotiating goals for the TRIMs Agreement, but at the end of the negotiation the parties could not even agree upon basic definitions such as "investment" measure and "trade-related." The only "general criteria" that survived the negotiating process and was reflected in the final text of the TRIMs Agreement was that a TRIM must be inconsistent with the obligations of either Article III or XI of the General Agreement. In sum, because the luxury tax subsidy is not inconsistent with Article III, it cannot be proscribed by the TRIMs Agreement. 3.

Subsidies are governed by the subsidies agreement and are not within the scope of the TRIMs Agreement

6.35 One of the many fundamental issues on which there were major differences of opinion among the participants in the Uruguay Round TRIMs negotiating group was whether subsidies were governed solely by the Subsidies Agreement or also could be considered to be an "incentive" or a "condition for receipt of an advantage" and thus governed by the TRIMs Agreement. The United States and Japan argued that subsidies could also be TRIMs. Argentina, Hungary, India, the Nordics, the Philippines (for ASEAN), Poland and others disagreed. So did the European Communities, which included the following in its 13 November 1989 submission to the TRIMs negotiating group: [G]overnment incentives, including subsidies, are being addressed in the Negotiating Group on Subsidies; such incentives are therefore not the subject of the current negotiations on TRIMs. 6.36 The disagreement remained throughout the life of the negotiating group. In the "Chairman's Report on the Status of Work in the Negotiating Group" (MTN.GNG/NG12/W/27), the paragraph and accompanying footnote asserting that subsidies could be TRIMs was in brackets, thereby signifying lack of agreement with the proposition. In its 1997 Report to the WTO Council for Trade in Goods, the TRIMs Committee stated: “[d]iffering views continue to be expressed on issues such as ... the relationship of the provisions of the [TRIMs] Agreement to those of other WTO agreements, including the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the Agreement on Agriculture.” Even the United States has acknowledged that "[o]ther issues that appear to require additional follow [sic] include: ... the relationship of the TRIMs Agreement with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures." 6.37 The foregoing clarifies that no consensus exists that subsidy measures also are subject to the disciplines (whatever they might be) of the TRIMs Agreement. The luxury tax reductions and exemption under the 1993 Incentive Programme and the February 1996 national car programme are not TRIMs; they are subsidies. They are governed by and subject to the disciplines of the Subsidies Agreement. 4.

Customs import duty subsidies are not within the scope of the TRIMs Agreement

20 6.38 The TRIMs Agreement merely interprets Article III of the General Agreement. It does not add new obligations. Therefore, where, as here, Article III is not applicable, the TRIMs Agreement is not applicable. The “Illustrative List,” therefore, is irrelevant. Customs duty subsidies are governed by the Subsidies Agreement and are not within the scope of the TRIMs Agreement. 5.

Indonesia has not violated the TRIMs Agreement: The TRIMs Agreement does not apply - it adds no new obligations, but merely puts a gloss on Article III of GATT 1994 (a)

The TRIMs Agreement, unlike the SCM Agreement, is not lex specialis; it neither defines “TRIM” nor sets forth special remedies

6.39 The TRIMs Agreement differs substantially from the SCM Agreement. Unlike the SCM Agreement, which is lex specialis for this dispute, the TRIMs Agreement is not lex specialis for this or, for that matter, any dispute. This is because the TRIMs Agreement: -

first, does not define “TRIM” (in fact, it does not contain even a limited definition of “TRIM”); and

-

second, does not set forth special remedies for measures found to be TRIMs (in fact, it sets forth no remedies at all).

To Indonesia’s knowledge, these facts concerning the TRIMs Agreement are not in dispute. (b)

The TRIMs Agreement does not establish a “new balance of rights and obligations”; rather, it merely elaborates on the FIRA Panel’s decision regarding the coverage of Article III of GATT

6.40 The United States asserts that the TRIMs Agreement establishes a “new balance of rights and obligations,” and that Indonesia ignores it (See Section VI.E.3). These allegations are unfounded. It should go without saying that any contract, memorandum of understanding or trade agreement establishes a “balance of rights and obligations”. The real question, however, is: what was agreed to? Indonesia has demonstrated conclusively that the developing countries successfully countered the developed states’ drive to increase the scope of what became the TRIMs Agreement. 6.41 As Indonesia has demonstrated, the TRIMs Agreement was conceived of and drafted in order to further specify the application of Article III of the GATT to trade-related investment measures. No provision of the TRIMs Agreement brings Indonesia’s subsidies within the scope of the Agreement. 6.42 In further specifying Article III, the TRIMs Agreement elaborates on the decision of the Panel in Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) (7 February 1994), BISD 30S/140. The United States, in discussing this fact, attempts to undercut Indonesia's argument by focusing on the word “essentially” in the following passage from paragraph 7.185 of Bananas III: the TRIMs Agreement essentially interprets and clarifies the provisions of Article III (and also Article XI) where trade-related investment measures are concerned. The United States asserts that “essentially” indicates that the TRIMs Agreement must cover other items (See Section VI.E.3). But the United States ignores, as it must, the very next sentence from the Panel report, which clarifies that the Panel did not use “essentially” to indicate that the phrase following it is false or incomplete: Thus the TRIMs Agreement does not add to or subtract from those GATT obligations, although it clarifies that Article III:4 may cover investment-related measures. This quotation pretty much sums it up. It is a precise statement of Indonesia’s position.

21 6.43 Thus, the United States, in its arguments, runs afoul of the very criticism it levies against Indonesia. It is complainants, not Indonesia, that come before this Panel seeking to revisit and rewrite the TRIMs Agreement by having the Panel adopt interpretations explicitly rejected during the negotiations. 6.

Japan is in Error; the Government most certainly does not view the National Car Programme as an investment programme

6.44 The two measures which make up the National Car Programme are subsidies. This has been the consistent view of Indonesia since this dispute began. When the measures initially were introduced, the Indonesian Government, on the basis of an incomplete and unsound analysis of the legal nature of the subsidies under the WTO Agreements, notified them as TRIMs. Upon a more exacting legal analysis, the Government realized its mistake, withdrew its TRIMs notification and notified the measures as subsidies. 6.45 From time to time, some Indonesian officials have referred to the measures as relating to industrial development, trade, investment, etc. These references do not and cannot alter the nature of the measures. Nor do the statements of various officials from competing bureaucracies change the Government’s position that the measures are subsidies. As demonstrated, the measures are subsidies to a domestic industry to encourage its development. Alternative descriptions or characterizations cannot alter this fact. 7.

The underlying decree, rules and regulations, and Indonesia’s statements to the Committee on TRIMs establish that the National Car Programme does not involve a TRIM

6.46 Japan claims that because one implementing decree contains the word “investment” in its title (which, according to Japan, means that it addresses the measure as an investment measure), the subsidy must be a TRIM. This is incorrect. Of the large number of regulations and decrees regarding the National Car Programme, Japan selected a single regulation on the basis of its heading. Japan then arbitrarily affixed the designation “key” to that single regulation and, finally, promoted it to the rank of evidence that the National Car Programme is an “investment measure.” 6.47 The seminal regulation for the February 1996 measure is Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 of 19 February 1996. It simply instructs two Ministers, the Minister of Industry & Trade (MIT) and the Minister of Finance (MOF), to perform detailed activities. It also charges the Minister for the Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) with the very general task of “safeguarding” the development of the national car industry. 6.48 On 19 February 1996, the same day that Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 was issued, both MIT and MOF issued their implementation decrees. MIT implemented the Presidential Instruction by issuing Decree No. 31/MPP/SK/2/1996; MOF issued implementing Decree No. 82/KMK.01/1996. 6.49 The BKPM implementing regulation appeared eight days later, on 27 February 1996. BKPM had to wait until further implementing regulations were issued by the two principal ministries before ascertaining what secondary supporting regulation was appropriate for it to promulgate. The principal implementing regulation (supplementing the two decrees cited above) was issued by MIT’s Director General for the Metal, Machinery & Chemical Industries (Decree No. 002/SK/DJ-ILMK/II/1996), appointing a Pioneer Motor Vehicle Industrial Enterprise. Only after the Director General issued this decree did BKPM issue the Investment Provisions for the Realization of the National Automobile Industry. Even then, on closer scrutiny, the “Investment Provisions” turn out to be merely a rehash of the earlier MIT Decree (No. 31/MPP/SK/2/1996). 6.50 Why did BKPM have to issue a regulation at all? It had to issue the regulation because TPN is a Domestic Capital Investment Company (a PMDN), and all PMDN companies operate under the auspices of BKPM. BKPM Decree No. 01/SK/1996 is not a “key implementing regulation.” It is merely an administrative and procedural regulation that could not be issued prior to the MIT and MOF decrees. Moreover, it simply repeats another Ministerial decree. Again, the February 1996 national car measure is a subsidy and Complainants’ misrepresentations do not bring it under the TRIMs Agreement.

22 6.51 Japan similarly misuses Indonesia’s presentation at the 30 September 1996 meeting of the Committee on TRIMs. At this meeting, Indonesia responded to questions posed by the delegation of Japan and mentioned at least seven objectives of the National Car Programme: -

to improve the competitiveness of local companies and strengthen overall industrial development;

-

to promote the competitiveness of Indonesia’s automotive production;

-

to develop the capacity of multiple-source auto parts and components;

-

to encourage the development of the automotive industry and the automotive component industry;

-

to bring about major structural changes in the Indonesian automobile industry;

-

to encourage the transfer of technology and contribute to large-scale job creation; and

-

to encourage car companies to increase their local content, resulting in a rapid growth of investment in the automobile component industry.

6.52 Like Japan’s selective use of Indonesia’s regulations to buttress its assertion that Indonesia’s national car policy is an investment measure, Japan again has acted arbitrarily here. It has chosen one of the seven objectives to carry its allegation that the February 1996 national car measure is a TRIM and, even then, its conclusion does not reflect the facts. 6.53 The single sentence used by Japan as evidence that the national car measure is a TRIM is in item 4 of page 2 of Indonesia’s response: These policies are expected to encourage car companies to increase their local content, resulting in a rapid growth of investments in the automotive component industry. But Japan’s interpretation even of this one (of seven) goals is inaccurate. The expectation and, therefore, the objective is directed toward car companies increasing their local content. The measure is a subsidy conditioned upon the increasing use of local content. The “rapid growth of investments” is not an objective of the national car measure; it is only a side product of such objective. 8.

The measures are not investment measures but subsidies granted to an automaker to use domestic parts and components

6.54 The Indonesian measures are not investment measures, but subsidies granted to an automaker to use domestic parts and components, for the following reasons: 1.

The subsidies are granted by the Minister of Finance.

2.

The regulating authority over the automaker vests with the Minister of Industry and Trade.

3.

The involvement of the Minister for the Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the Capital Investment Coordinating Board is purely administrative and is required only because the automaker happens to be a domestic capital investment company.

4.

The considerable number of regulations providing and implementing the subsidy do not once refer to "investments".

23

9.

5.

Although subsidies may at times indirectly affect investment decisions of the recipient of the subsidy or other parties, these decisions are not the object, but rather the unintended result, of the subsidy. Indeed, increased investment indirectly results from many subsidies.

6.

Moreover, even if the TRIMs Agreement did apply, the subsidies are not inconsistent with Article III of GATT 1994.

The measures are not TRIMs that violate Article III:2 of GATT 1994

6.55 The government measures are not TRIMs. Specific subsidies by definition discriminate between products benefiting from the subsidies and those that do not. If GATT Article III:2 and Article III:4 were applied every time a specific subsidy came up, virtually all actionable subsidies granted by developing countries would be undone by GATT Articles III:2 and III:4 and the TRIMs Agreement. Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement unequivocally provides that GATT actions against subsidies are to be resolved under the SCM Agreement. It is the SCM Agreement that deals with actionable subsidies under Art. 27.3, not the GATT. 10.

The TRIMs Agreement is not lex specialis to any dispute

6.56 Unlike the SCM Agreement, the TRIMs Agreement is not lex specialis to any dispute. By its very terms it cannot be. For example, Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement states that the TRIMs Agreement operates "[w]ithout prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994". 6.57 The Article continues, stating, "no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994". (This passage breathes new life into Article III of GATT 1994 which, complainants assert, Indonesia's lex specialis and conflict arguments would render moribund.) Thus the TRIMs Agreement itself states that it is naught but a general agreement that depends upon the General Agreement to have any meaning whatsoever. 6.58 Given this, other Annex 1A and 1C Agreements can apply and, more importantly, in the case of those agreements which are lex specialis, such as the SCM Agreement, control certain disputes, such as this one, to the complete exclusion of the TRIMs Agreement. E.

Arguments made in rebuttal to Indonesia's responses to the claims under the TRIMs Agreement

1.

Rebuttal arguments made by Japan

6.59 Japan makes the following arguments in rebuttal to Indonesia's responses to the claims under the TRIMs Agreement: (a)

The February 1996 Programme violates TRIMs Article 2.1

6.60 As demonstrated (See Section VI.A), the February 1996 Programme violates GATT Article III, is a "trade-related investment measure," and thus violates TRIMs Article 2.1. 6.61 Indonesia argues that the TRIMs Agreement only interprets GATT Article III and GATT Article III is not applicable to the February 1996 Programme. As discussed (See Section VI.D), GATT Article III does apply and the Programme is inconsistent with it. 6.62 Indonesia also attempts to evade its violation of the TRIMs Agreement by arguing that the Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement is "purely illustrative" and that the List cannot alter the "fact" that GATT Article III is inapplicable. Once again, however, the Government of Japan has amply demonstrated that Article III does in fact apply. It appears, moreover, that Indonesia misunderstands Japan's argument. The Government of Japan does not argue that the National Car Programme violates TRIMs Article 2 because it is

24 on the Illustrative List, but that it violates TRIMs Article 2 because it is a TRIM and it is inconsistent with GATT Article III. Thus, Indonesia's argument about the nature of the List is irrelevant. 6.63 Therefore, the February 1996 Programme is inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement and the Government of Indonesia's contrary argument lacks any merit. (b)

The SCM Agreement does not excuse indonesia's violations of the TRIMs Agreement

6.64 Indonesia seems to argue that there is a conflict between SCM Article 27.3 and TRIMs Article 2.1, such that SCM Article 27.3 excuses the violations of TRIMs Article 2.1. However, that argument also lacks any merit. These provisions do not conflict and Indonesia's assumption that the SCM Agreement would prevail in a hypothetical conflict is unfounded. 6.65 As discussed (See Section V.E.1), the Bananas III Panel found that a conflict between two WTO Agreements can only arise if the two establish "mutually exclusive" obligations or one "explicitly permits" what another prohibits. As already shown with respect to GATT Article III, however, the SCM Agreement neither creates obligations that are "mutually exclusive" with TRIMs Article 2.1 nor "explicitly permits" violations of TRIMs Article 2.1. 6.66 Rather, the TRIMs and SCM Agreements create “different or complementary obligations.” The TRIMs Agreement applies to TRIMs regardless of whether such TRIMs are also “subsidies” under the SCM Agreement and the SCM Agreement applies to “subsidies” regardless of whether such “subsidies” are also TRIMs. A WTO Member can, and therefore must, comply with the provisions of both Agreements with respect to a measure that is both a “subsidy” under the SCM Agreement and a TRIM under the TRIMs Agreement. Nothing in the text, context, object or purpose of the TRIMs Agreement supports the Indonesian contention that a TRIM is no longer a TRIM simply because the administering authority prefers to call it something else. 6.67 This conclusion is strengthened by a review of the TRIMs and SCM provisions that establish the transition periods for developing country Members. SCM Article 27.3 allows developing countries a period of time (five years for Indonesia) before they must comply with the prohibition on subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over imported products. TRIMs Article 5.1 likewise also allows developing country Members time before they must comply with the TRIMs Article 2 provisions on local content requirements which are inconsistent with GATT Article III, provided that the measure existed when the WTO Agreements entered into force (i.e., on 1 January 1995) and that the Member notified the measure within ninety days of such entry into force (i.e., by 1 April 1995). For TRIMs that are also “subsidies” under the SCM Agreement, it is clearly possible for developing country Members to receive the benefits of the transitional arrangements under both Agreements by acting in accordance with the terms of each Agreement. Moreover, if such TRIMs should be subject only to the SCM Agreement, it would render the specifically crafted notification requirement under the TRIMs Agreement, for the substantial part of its coverage, meaningless. 6.68 Finally, if a conflict may some day arise between the TRIMs and SCM Agreements, there is no reason to assume - as Indonesia apparently does - that the SCM Agreement would prevail in such a conflict. Indonesia’s faulty assumption seems to result from its mistaken equating of the GATT and the TRIMs Agreement, discussed above. The plain text of the General Interpretative Note refutes this assumption. That Note expressly provides that Annex 1A Agreements - including both the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement - prevail over the GATT to the extent of a conflict. The General Interpretative Note thus gives the TRIMs and SCM Agreements alike a hierarchical status above the GATT in the event of a conflict, but it does not establish any hierarchy between the two. Recent Appellate Body Reports also support the conclusion. For example, in Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, a WTO panel firmly rejected an argument by Canada that the scope of the GATS and the GATT were mutually exclusive, holding that: The ordinary meaning of the texts of GATT 1994 and GATS as well as Article II:2 of the WTO Agreement, taken together, indicates that obligations under GATT 1994 and GATS can co-exist and that the one does not override the other. If the consequences suggested by Canada were intended, there would have been provisions similar to Article XVI:3 of the

25 WTO Agreement or the General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A in order to establish hierarchical order between GATT 1994 and GATS. The absence of such provisions between the two instruments implies that GATT 1994 and GATS are standing on the same plain in the WTO Agreement, without any hierarchical order between the two." The WTO Appellate Body approved this aspect of the panel decision in the Periodicals case, quoting the above reasoning by the panel and noting that: "The entry into force of the GATS ... does not diminish the scope of application of GATT 1994". Since GATS is not covered by the General Interpretative Note (which gives WTO agreements in Annex 1A other than GATT precedence over GATT in the event of a conflict), GATS is on equal footing with GATT. In the same way, the TRIMs Agreement is on equal footing with the SCM Agreement. Thus, the Panel should not, without any textual basis, elevate one Annex 1A Agreement over the others. (c)

Incentive measures are covered by the TRIMs Agreement

6.69 The Government of Indonesia also contends that “no consensus exist[ed] that subsidy measures also are subject to the disciplines of the TRIMs Agreement,” that its incentives to encourage purchases of domestic goods over imports "are not TRIMs; they are subsidies", and thus “they are subject to the disciplines of the Subsidies Agreement”. (See Section VI.D). 6.70 However, Indonesia's allegation contradicts the text of the TRIMs Agreement. The text of the Agreement requires only two elements for a measure to constitute a violation of TRIMs Article 2.1: first, the measure is an "investment measure related to trade in goods"; and second, the measure is "inconsistent with the provisions of [GATT] Article III or Article XI". As described in paragraph 3.14 above, it has been firmly established that GATT Article III:4 applies not only to mandatory measures but also to measures with which a company may comply voluntarily to obtain a benefit. Therefore, it is clear that TRIMs Article 2.1 also applies to such voluntary measures, or incentive measures, as long as they fall within the concept of "TRIMs". 6.71 The Illustrative List in the Annex of the TRIMs Agreement also demonstrates that the February 1996 Programme is a TRIM. That list explicitly provides that prohibited TRIMs include any local content requirement "compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage". 6.72 Because the text of the TRIMs Agreement clearly and unambiguously establishes that it applies not only to mandatory measures but also to measures "compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage", there is no need to resort to the drafting history to understand this point. In fact, however, a review of the preparatory work of the TRIMs Agreement confirms - unsurprisingly, in view of the plain text that the negotiators decided to include so-called "incentive measures" in the TRIMs Agreement. 6.73 Although the preparatory work shows active discussion about the definition of a "TRIM" throughout the negotiations and a wide variety of views were expressed, at the final stage a consensus was created, as discussed below. 6.74 Late in the TRIMs negotiations (i.e., October 1991 through 20 December 1991), the Chairman distributed texts for the purpose of discussion. The key phrase concerning incentive measures (i.e., “TRIMs .... compliance with which is necessary to obtain advantage”) was included in the Chairman's first draft, removed in the revised text of 25 November 1991 at the behest of India and other developing countries, and revived in the Chairman’s second draft after developed countries objected to the earlier deletion. Ultimately, this phrase was finally adopted, with the developing countries accepting it in exchange for the developed countries' acceptance of the five-year transition period. Indeed, the negotiating group rejected a proposal by one Member that would have expressly limited TRIMs to mandatory measures. 6.75 It is also relevant to note that the final TRIMs Agreement did not incorporate a position advanced by some developing countries that would have provided for only the disciplines of the SCM Agreement to apply, when a "subsidy" (as defined in the SCM Agreement) was granted contingent on meeting certain requirements, such as local content requirements. That position was rejected, because most Members recognized that it would create too large a loophole in the TRIMs Agreement. This loophole was avoided by

26 leaving both the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs Agreement silent about their relationship, thereby ensuring that the disciplines of both would apply to measures that were both TRIMs and "subsidies." 6.76 Thus, it is clear that the positions advanced in the quotations from the preparatory work cited in Indonesia's First Submission were not adopted in the final text of the TRIMs Agreement. Of course, it is the text of a treaty itself that governs and any views expressed during the negotiations that do not comport with the text carry no weight. 6.77 Finally, subsequent practice under the WTO, which is relevant to its interpretation, confirms that TRIMs that fall within the SCM definition of "subsidy" have nevertheless been understood to also be subject to the TRIMs Agreement. This is demonstrated by the fact that even many developing country Members have included such measures in their notifications to the TRIMs Committee under Article 5. In fact, the Government of Indonesia itself notified the TRIMs Committee of the incentive measures in its 1993 automobile programmes, although it did so late and later withdrew the notification, apparently in connection with these proceedings. (d) Indonesia's arguments would render parts of the TRIMs Agreement virtually meaningless 6.78 Finally, it should also be noted that Indonesia's argument that incentive measures should be governed only by the SCM Agreement, not by the TRIMs Agreement, would render parts of the TRIMs Agreement virtually meaningless. 6.79 As discussed (See Section VI.A), the text of the TRIMs Agreement clearly shows that an incentive measure, or a measure "compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage", is within the coverage of the Agreement. It appears that a TRIM that is an incentive measure would very often also be a "subsidy" under the SCM Agreement. Therefore, if an interpretation were taken that a measure, which constitutes both a "TRIM" under the TRIMs Agreement and a "subsidy" under the SCM Agreement, shall be governed only by the SCM Agreement, that would negate a substantial part of the TRIMs Agreement coverage. 6.80 Accordingly, a "TRIM" under the TRIMs Agreement should not be excluded from the coverage of the TRIMs Agreement, only because it constitutes a "subsidy" under the SCM Agreement. 2.

Rebuttal arguments made by the European Communities

6.81 The following are the European Communities' rebuttal arguments to Indonesia's responses to the claims under the TRIMs Agreement: (a) The measures at issue infringe GATT Article III and are therefore contrary to Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement 6.82 Indonesia argues that the measures at issue do not infringe Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement because they are not within the scope of, and therefore cannot be “inconsistent” with, Article III. The European Communities has shown (see Sections V.A.2 and V.C.2) that the measures at issue are inconsistent with GATT Articles III:2 and/or III:4. Therefore, they are contrary also to Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. (b)

Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement lays down a legally distinct obligation

6.83 Indonesia claims that the TRIMs Agreement “interprets GATT Article III and does not add new obligations”. Indonesia relies for this proposition on the following passage of the Panel Reports on EC regime concerning the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas : with the exception of its transitional provisions, the TRIMs Agreement, essentially interprets and clarifies the provisions of Article III (and also Article XI) were trade-related investment

27 measures concerned. Thus the TRIMs Agreement does not add to or subtract from those GATT obligations, although it clarifies that Article III:4 may cover investment matters. 6.84 Properly interpreted, this passage means that, in substance, the TRIMs Agreement is limited to restate and clarify the obligations laid down GATT Article III. Formally, however, Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement lays down an obligation which is distinct from the obligation contained in GATT III. This is confirmed by the prior finding in the same Panel Report that the provisions of GATT and the TRIMs Agreement were “equally applicable” to the European Communities’s import licensing procedures. Furthermore, if Article 2.1 of the TRIMs did not provide for an additional and distinct obligation, it would have been superfluous to stipulate in Article 3 of the TRIMs Agreement that all exceptions under GATT 1994 shall apply also to the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement. Likewise, it would have been unnecessary to sate in Article 4 of the TRIMs Agreement that developing Members shall be free to deviate from Article 2 “to the extent and in such manner” as Article XVIII of GATT and other related legal instruments permit those Members to deviate from GATT Articles III and XI. (c) Even if it was found that there is a “conflict” between GATT Article III and the SCM Agreement, that conflict would not preclude a violation of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement 6.85 The General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A only applies to conflicts between GATT and the other Annex 1A Agreements. It does not apply to conflicts between the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. Accordingly, even if it was found by the Panel that there is a “conflict” between GATT Article III and the SCM Agreement, such “conflict” would not preclude a violation of the legally distinct obligation contained in Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement. In fact, the existence of a “conflict“ between the SCM Agreement and GATT Article III would not make the measures concerned “consistent” with GATT Article III but merely exclude the application of that provision. Quite to the contrary, the existence of a “conflict” between the SCM Agreement and GATT Article III would presuppose necessarily that the measures are “inconsistent” with the latter. (d)

The TRIMs Agreement may apply to subsidies

6.86 The TRIMs Agreement applies to any trade related investment measure which is inconsistent with GATT Article III. Given that GATT Article III may apply to measures which are “subsidies” within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, it follows that the TRIMs Agreement may also apply to “subsidies”. This is confirmed by the Illustrative List. In accordance with its ordinary meaning, the term “advantage” used in the Illustrative List may include also “subsidies” within the meaning of the SCM Agreement. 3.

Rebuttal Arguments made by the United States

6.+87 Noting that it agrees with the points made by Japan and the EC at the second meeting of the Panel, and, in particular, the arguments made by the European Communities (See Section VI.E.2(b)), the United States makes the following arguments in rebuttal to Indonesia's responses to the claims under the TRIMs Agreement: (a) The tariff and tax incentives under the 1993 Programme and the National Car Programme are inconsistent with Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement 6.88 With respect to Indonesia’s violations of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, Indonesia argues that the TRIMs Agreement imposes no new obligations, but is merely an interpretation of Article III of GATT 1994. Indonesia, of course, must advance this argument in light of its “conflict” argument (the flaws in which we have addressed (See Section V.E.III)), because the General interpretative headnote to Annex 1A addresses only alleged “conflicts” between the GATT 1994 and the provisions of another Annex 1A agreement, not alleged “conflicts” between two or more Annex 1A agreements other than GATT 1994. 6.89 In advancing its argument, Indonesia relies on a statement made by the panel in the Bananas III case at para. 7.185 of the report. Indonesia argues that the panel ruled that the TRIMs Agreement does not add any

28 new obligations. However, that is not what the Bananas III panel said. While the panel said that the TRIMs Agreement “essentially” interprets Article III and Article XI of GATT 1994, the panel also noted that the TRIMs Agreement clarified those obligations and granted transition provisions. Moreover, the panel’s holding simply was that in the context of that particular case, the panel did not need to make a specific ruling under the TRIMs Agreement, because it already had found the measures in question to be violative of Article III:4. That limited holding is far different from holding that the TRIMs Agreement does not, in itself, impose obligations. 6.90 Indeed, the Bananas III panel itself recognized that the TRIMs Agreement reflected a new balance of rights and obligations; namely, a trade-off between the clarification of obligations and the grant of transition periods. An additional trade-off that the panel did not mention was the addition of transparency requirements in the form of the notification provisions in Article 5. For purposes of our Autos dispute, the most important clarification was that “incentive-based” measures, such as Indonesia’s local content incentives, are covered. 6.91 As the Appellate Body stated in the Wool Shirts case, page 16, where an agreement reflects a carefully drawn balance of rights and obligations of Members, “[t]hat balance must be respected”. Rather than respecting the balance reflected in the TRIMs Agreement, Indonesia would have this Panel ignore it. 6.92 Indonesia’s other argument is that the drafting history of the TRIMs Agreement somehow demonstrates that the TRIMs Agreement was not intended to impose a new balance of rights and obligations. This argument, too, is easily disposed of. 6.93 Indonesia cites to a statement made by the United States during the TRIMs negotiations that allegedly demonstrates the subordinate nature of the TRIMs Illustrative List. However, the statement in question was made in the context of a United States proposal that was not adopted, and, thus, is of limited, if any, relevance. 6.94 Second, Indonesia refers to the fact that an issue in the negotiations was whether subsidies could be considered an “incentive” or a “condition for receipt of an advantage” and, thus, subject to the TRIMs Agreement. As discussed previously in connection with Indonesia’s “conflicts” argument, the drafting history of the TRIMs Agreement demonstrates: (1) that local content subsidies are covered by the TRIMs Agreement; and (2) that Article 27.3 of the SCM Agreement was added at the last minute to ensure that subsidies permitted by the transitional provisions of the TRIMs Agreement would not be precluded by the SCM Agreement. Indeed, the very fact that Article 27.3 was added to the SCM Agreement demonstrates that the drafters intended that local content subsidies would be covered by the TRIMs Agreement. 6.95 Third, Indonesia refers to a document, "US Paper on WTO Agenda", which states that "[o]ther issues that appear to require additional follow [sic] include: ... the relationship of the TRIMs Agreement with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures." The document was drafted for the so-called "Invisibles Committee" (senior Capital-Based Officials), which functions as an ad hoc and unofficial steering group of sorts. Other participants in the Committee had asked the United States to draft the paper as a means of "kick-starting" a collective assessment of the Singapore Ministerial and the ensuing and continuing work across the spectrum of WTO activities. Thus, the paper was a discussion paper, and was intended to provide a representative mix of Members' actual or perceived thoughts about where the WTO has been and where it ought to go. It definitely was not intended to convey US positions on particular issues. 6.96 With respect to the discussion of the TRIMs Agreement, the paper draws no conclusions about the legal relationships between the agreements cited, nor does it even suggest that there are conflicts among them. Instead, it merely expresses the commonsense and obvious point that in considering the future work of the TRIMs Committee, it might be appropriate to look at how the three agreements relate to one another given their obvious overlap. Given the views that Indonesia already had articulated in the TRIMs Committee and the SCM Committee, it is hardly surprising that this issue would be identified as one for further discussion. Also, by the time the paper was drafted, there already had been several "sleights of hand" by several Members that were making multiple notifications under the TRIMs and SCM Agreements and then later "withdrawing" some. Because a measure can be both a TRIM and a subsidy in substance, the italicized "Question for Discussion" in the paper appropriately suggests that Members should take a look at all of the notification

29 provisions to see where gaps from one could fill in for another, or where improvements are needed in order to monitor phase-out obligations across agreements. 6.97 Thus, even if this Panel should find incorrectly that Article III:4 of GATT 1994 does not apply to the Indonesian tax and tariff incentives due to an alleged “conflict” with the SCM Agreement, those measures nonetheless violate Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement. (b)

The Indonesian measures are "trade related investment measures"

6.98 Indonesia also argues that the measures in question do not violate Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement because they are not "investment" measures. In the view of the United States, if a measure described in the Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement is being applied, nothing more need be shown to establish an Article 2 violation. If any Member, in whatever context, requires the purchase by an enterprise of a domestic product in order to obtain an advantage, that requirement by definition has investment consequences for such an enterprise, putting the measure within the coverage of the TRIMs Agreement. The United States is unaware of anything in the negotiating history of the TRIMs Agreement that would warrant a different conclusion. 6.99. Moreover, even if the identification of a relationship to an investment were necessary to prove an inconsistency with the TRIMs Agreement, the Indonesian measures in question fulfil such a condition, because they necessitate an investment in Indonesia (either as a producer of motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts) to qualify for the various tax and tariff incentives. (c)

The TRIMs Agreement imposed a new obligation on Indonesia

6.100 Indonesia's argument that because the TRIMs Agreement allegedly merely restates Article III, the TRIMs Agreement does not give rise to a separate obligation, reflects a fundamental misperception of the significance of the TRIMs Agreement. It is true that, to an extent, the TRIMs Agreement codifies the GATT 1947 panel jurisprudence concerning Article III:4 arising out of such cases as Italian Tractors, EC Parts and Components, and FIRA. However, because panel decisions were not, and are still not, stare decisis, Indonesia was not bound by this jurisprudence. Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body adopted 1 November 1996, pages 14-16. By signing the WTO Agreement, Indonesia did become bound by this jurisprudence, as codified in the TRIMs Agreement. Thus, the TRIMs Agreement imposed a new obligation on Indonesia. (d) The notion of lex specialis is irrelevant in this case with respect to the relationship between Article III and the TRIMs Agreement 6.101 Insofar as the issues in this dispute are concerned, because Indonesia did not notify the measures in question pursuant to Article 5.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, there are no conflicting obligations between Article III and the TRIMs Agreement. Thus, the notion of lex specialis is irrelevant. 6.102 Having said that, however, the United States should note that in the Bananas III case, the Panel found, at para. 7.158, that in the absence of a "conflict" between GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement, both agreements applied equally. This finding would not have been necessary if the Panel had considered that the TRIMs Agreement was lex specialis in relationship to GATT 1994. 6.103. More generally, Article III:2, Article III:4, and the TRIMs Agreement each impose legally distinct obligations on Members, and a single measure may be found to be inconsistent with all three.

30 XIV.

FINDINGS

……………. 1.

Claims of the complainants

14.10 The various Indonesian measures at issue in this dispute are described in paragraphs 2.3 to 2.43 of the Descriptive Part of this report. For the purpose of these findings, we shall generally categorize and refer to the measures as those adopted pursuant to the 1993 car programme, the February 1996 car programme and the June 1996 car programme. When we refer to the “Indonesian car programmes”, especially in the discussion on the general relationship between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and Article III of GATT, we include all the measures adopted pursuant to all three car programmes. When we refer to the National Car programme we refer to the measures adopted pursuant to the February and June 1996 car programmes. Our use of these general references is not intended to preclude discussion of the WTO compatibility of more specific aspects of the various car programmes. We note, however, that Japan considers that most of Government Regulation No.20/1996 and Government Regulation No. 36/1996 are not related to the National Car Programme. We also note that Government Regulation No. 36/1996 has affected the level of benefits under the 1993 car programme. 14.11 We understand from the requests for establishment of the panel that the claims of the complainants are as follows: (i)

Local-content requirements

14.12 The European Communities and the United States claim that the local content requirements of the 1993 car programme (to which are linked tax benefits for finished motor vehicles incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic products and customs duty benefits for imported parts and components used in motor vehicles incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic products) violate the provisions of Article III:4 of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade of 1994 (hereafter, “GATT”) and Article 2 of the Agreement on Trade-Related-Investment Measures (hereafter “TRIMs Agreement”). 14.13 Japan, the European Communities and the United States claim that the local content requirements of the February 1996 car programme (to which are linked tax benefits for National Cars incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic products and customs duty benefits for imported parts and components used in National Cars) violate the provisions of Article III:4 of GATT and Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement. 2.

Indonesia’s general defence

14.27 More specifically, we understand Indonesia’s argument to be two-fold. First, in support of its defense that the only law applicable to this dispute is the SCM Agreement, Indonesia submits that: … 4.

Since Article III is not applicable, the TRIMs Agreement is not applicable.

Second, we understand that Indonesia argues that should Article III and/or the TRIMs Agreement be considered to apply to this dispute, there are specific conflicts between some of the provisions of the SCM Agreement, on the one hand, and some provisions of Article III on which the complainants base their claims, on the other hand. For Indonesia, any and all conflicts should be resolved in favour of the SCM Agreement which, according to Indonesia, permits the car programmes under examination. We shall first address Indonesia’s argument that the only law applicable to this dispute is the SCM Agreement. 5.

Is the TRIMS Agreement applicable to this dispute?

14.47 Indonesia argues that the TRIMs Agreement is not applicable to this dispute. For Indonesia, since Article III does not apply to the measures under examination, being in conflict with the SCM Agreement,

31 the TRIMs Agreement does not apply either. Indonesia also argues that its car programmes are subsidies and therefore cannot be trade-related investment measures. 14.48 We note that we have found above that the provisions of Article III are generally relevant and applicable to the present dispute. We therefore reject Indonesia's argument that the TRIMS Agreement is not applicable to the measures under examination because Article III does not apply to those measures. We must now proceed to examine whether the Indonesian car programmes under examination can be covered at the same time by the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement and those of the SCM Agreement. 14.49 In considering this issue of whether a measure covered by the SCM Agreement can also be subject to the obligations contained in the TRIMs Agreement, we need to examine whether there is a general conflict between the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs Agreement. We note first that the interpretive note to Annex IA of the WTO Agreement is not applicable to the relationship between the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs Agreement. The issue of whether there might be a general conflict between the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs Agreement would therefore need to be examined in the light of the general international law presumption against conflicts and the fact that under public international law a conflict exists in the narrow situation of mutually exclusive obligations for provisions that cover the same type of subject matter. 14.50 In this context the fact that the drafters included an express provision governing conflicts between GATT and the other Annex 1A Agreements, but did not include any such provision regarding the relationship between the other Annex 1A Agreements, at a minimum reinforces the presumption in public international law against conflicts. With respect to the nature of obligations, we consider that, with regard to local content requirements, the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs Agreement are concerned with different types of obligations and cover different subject matters. In the case of the SCM Agreement, what is prohibited is the grant of a subsidy contingent on use of domestic goods, not the requirement to use domestic goods as such. In the case of the TRIMs Agreement, what is prohibited are TRIMs in the form of local content requirements, not the grant of an advantage, such as a subsidy. 14.51 A finding of inconsistency with Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement can be remedied by removal of the subsidy, even if the local content requirement remains applicable. By contrast, a finding of inconsistency with the TRIMs Agreement can be remedied by a removal of the TRIM that is a local content requirement even if the subsidy continues to be granted. Conversely, for instance, if a Member were to apply a TRIM (in the form of local content requirement), as a condition for the receipt of a subsidy, the measure would continue to be a violation of the TRIMs Agreement if the subsidy element were replaced with some other form of incentive. By contrast, if the local content requirements were dropped, the subsidy would continue to be subject to the SCM Agreement, although the nature of the relevant discipline under the SCM Agreement might be affected. Clearly, the two agreements prohibit different measures. We note also that under the TRIMs Agreement, the advantage made conditional on meeting a local content requirement may include a wide variety of incentives and advantages, other than subsidies. There is no provision contained in the SCM Agreement that obliges a Member to violate the TRIMs Agreement, or vice versa. 14.52 We consider that the SCM and TRIMs Agreements cannot be in conflict, as they cover different subject matters and do not impose mutually exclusive obligations. The TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement may have overlapping coverage in that they may both apply to a single legislative act, but they have different foci, and they impose different types of obligations. 14.53 In support of this finding, we agree with the principles developed in the Periodicals and Bananas III cases concerning the relationship between two WTO agreements at the same level within the structure of WTO agreements. It was made clear that, while the same measure could be scrutinized both under GATT and under GATS, the specific aspects of that measure to be examined under each agreement would be different. In the present case, there are in fact two different, albeit linked, aspects of the car programmes for which the complainants have raised claims. Some claims relate to the existence of local content requirements, alleged to be in violation of the TRIMs Agreement, and the other claims relate to the existence of subsidies, alleged to cause serious prejudice within the meaning of the SCM Agreement.

32 14.54 To respond to an argument raised by Indonesia in the context of its discussion of the relationship between Article III of GATT and the SCM Agreement, we do not consider that the application of the TRIMs Agreement to this dispute would reduce the SCM Agreement, and Article 27.3 thereof, to “inutility”. On the contrary, with Article 27.3 of the SCM Agreement, those subsidy measures of developing countries that are contingent on compliance with TRIMs (in the form of local content requirement) and that are permitted during the transition period provided under Article 5 of the TRIMs Agreement, are not prohibited by Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, for the transition period specified in Article 27.3 of the SCM Agreement. 14.55 We find that there is no general conflict between the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs Agreement. Therefore, to the extent that the Indonesian car programmes are TRIMs and subsidies, both the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement are applicable to this dispute. 6.

Conclusion

14.56 In view of the above findings, we reject Indonesia’s general defense that the only applicable law to this dispute is the SCM Agreement. We consider rather that the obligations contained in the WTO Agreement are generally cumulative, can be complied with simultaneously and that different aspects and sometimes the same aspects of a legislative act can be subject to various provisions of the WTO Agreement. 14.57

We now turn to the claims of the complainants.

D.

Claims of Local Content Requirements

14.58 The European Communities and the United States claim that the 1993 car programme, by providing for local content requirements linked to tax benefits for finished cars incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic products, and to customs duty benefits for imported parts and components used in cars incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic products, violates the provisions of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, and Article III:4 of the GATT. 14.59 Japan, the European Communities and the United States also claim that the 1996 car programme, by providing for local content requirements linked to tax benefits for National Cars (which by definition incorporate a certain percentage value of domestic products), and to customs duty benefits for imported parts and components used in National Cars, violates the provisions of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement and Article III:4 of the GATT. 1.

The relationship between the TRIMS Agreement and Article III of GATT

14.60 Since the complainants have raised claims that the local content requirements of the car programmes violate both the provisions of Article III:4 of GATT and Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, we must consider which claims to examine first. For Indonesia, this issue does not arise because it argues that the TRIMs Agreement does not add anything to Article III; it merely interprets Article III, elaborates the principles developed in the FIRA panel report and applies them to trade-related investment measures. In deciding which claims to examine first, we must, initially, address the relationship between Article III of GATT and the TRIMs Agreement. 14.61 In this regard, we note first that on its face the TRIMs Agreement is a fully fledged agreement in the WTO system. The TRIMs Agreement is not an “Understanding to GATT 1994”, unlike the six Understandings which form part of the GATT 1994. The TRIMs Agreement and Article III:4 prohibit local content requirements that are TRIMs and therefore can be said to cover the same subject matter. But when the TRIMs Agreement refers to “the provisions of Article III”, it refers to the substantive aspects of Article III; that is to say, conceptually, it is the ten paragraphs of Article III that are referred to in Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, and not the application of Article III in the WTO context as such. Thus if Article III is not applicable for any reason not related to the disciplines of Article III itself, the provisions of Article III remain applicable for the purpose of the TRIMs Agreement. This view is reinforced by the fact that Article 3 of the TRIMs Agreement contains a distinct and explicit reference to the general exceptions to

33 GATT. If the purpose of the TRIMs Agreement were to refer to Article III as applied in the light of other (non Article III) GATT rules, there would be no need to refer to such general exceptions. 14.62 Moreover, it has to be recognized that the TRIMs Agreement, in addition to interpreting and clarifying the provisions of Article III where trade-related investment measures are concerned, has introduced special transitional provisions including notification requirements. This reinforces the conclusion that the TRIMs Agreement has an autonomous legal existence, independent from that of Article III. Consequently, since the TRIMs Agreement and Article III remain two legally distinct and independent sets of provisions of the WTO Agreement, we find that even if either of the two sets of provisions were not applicable the other one would remain applicable. And to the extent that complainants have raised separate and distinct claims under Article III:4 of GATT and the TRIMs Agreement, each claim must be addressed separately. 14.63 As to which claims, those under Article III:4 of GATT or Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, to examine first, we consider that we should first examine the claims under the TRIMs Agreement since the TRIMs Agreement is more specific than Article III:4 as far as the claims under consideration are concerned. A similar issue was presented in Bananas III, where the Appellate Body discussed the relationship between Article X of GATT and Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement and concluded that the Licensing Agreement being more specific it should have been applied first. This is also in line with the approach of the panel and the Appellate Body in the Hormones dispute, where the measure at issue was examined first under the SPS Agreement since the measure was alleged to be an SPS measure. 2.

The application of the TRIMS Agreement

14.64

Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement provides that “ ... no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.”

By its terms, Article 2.1 requires two elements to be shown to establish a violation thereof: first, the existence of a TRIM; second, that TRIM is inconsistent with Article III or Article XI of GATT. No claims have been raised with reference to a violation of Article XI of GATT. 14.65 Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement refers to Article III generally. It is our view that the complainants have limited their TRIMs inconsistency claims to the aspects of the Indonesian car programmes that would violate the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement which prohibit any advantage conditional on meeting local content requirements. In other words, while the complainants have claimed that some other aspects of the same car programmes also violate the provisions of Article III:2 of GATT, they have not claimed that the tax discrimination aspects of the measures per se violate the TRIMs Agreement. Therefore, we will examine under the TRIMs Agreement, only the consistency of the local content requirements made effective through the custom duty and tax benefits of these car programmes. Later, we shall examine the consistency of the tax discrimination aspects per se of these car programmes with the provisions of Article III:2 of GATT. 14.66

We note also that Article 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement provides: “2.2 An Illustrative List of TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligations of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 ... is contained in the Annex to this Agreement.

14.67 The United States and the European Communities claim that any measure that falls within the description of Item 1(a) of the Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement constitutes per se a TRIM inconsistent with Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement. For the United States, if any Member, in whatever context, requires the purchase by an enterprise of a domestic product in order to obtain an advantage, that requirement by definition has investment consequences for such an enterprise, bringing the measure within the coverage of the TRIMs Agreement and confirming its violation thereof. The United States adds that,

34 even if the identification of a relationship to investment were necessary to prove an inconsistency with the TRIMs Agreement, the Indonesian measures under examination fulfil such a condition, because the measures necessitate an investment in Indonesia (as a producer of motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts and components) to qualify for the various tax and customs duty incentives. 14.68 Japan rather argues that two elements must be shown to establish a violation of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement: first, there must be a TRIM; second, the measure in question must be inconsistent with Article III of GATT (or with Article XI of GATT). 14.69 The European Communities and Japan submit as well that the central aspect of the various measures included in the Indonesian car programmes is to develop domestic manufacturing capability of automobiles and automotive parts and components, and that they thereby qualify as “investment” measures. For these complainants, the Indonesian car programmes are “trade related” because they encourage the use of domestic over imported parts and thereby affect trade. 14.70 Indonesia argues that, while its subsidies may at times indirectly affect investment decisions of the recipient of the subsidy or other parties, these decisions are not the object, but rather the unintended result, of the subsidy. Indonesia adds that many subsidies will result indirectly in increased investment. Indonesia adds that these subsidies have not been adopted as investment regulations. Therefore, for Indonesia, the measures under examination are not trade-related investment measures. Indonesia also supports the argument put forward by India, a third party, that the TRIMs Agreement is basically designed to govern and provide a level playing field for foreign investment, and that therefore measures relating to internal taxes or subsidies cannot be construed to be trade-related investment measures. 14.71 We note that the arguments presented by the parties reflect different views on whether any requirement by an enterprise to purchase or use a domestic product in order to obtain an advantage, by definition falls within the Illustrative List or whether the TRIMs Agreement requires a separate analysis of the nature of a measure as a trade-related investment measure before proceeding to an examination of whether the measure is covered by the Illustrative List. However, if we were to consider that the measures in dispute in this case are in any event trade-related investment measures, it would not be necessary to decide this basic issue of interpretation. We note in this regard that the United States and the European Communities have also argued in the alternative that, even if it is necessary to show a relationship of a measure to investment, any such requirement would be satisfied in the case under consideration. 14.72 Therefore, we will first determine whether the Indonesian measures are TRIMs. To this end, we address initially the issue of whether the measures at issue are “investment measures”. Next, we consider whether they are “trade-related”. Finally, we shall examine whether any measure found to be a TRIM is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III and thus violates the TRIMs Agreement. (a)

Are the Indonesian measures “investment measures”?

14.73 We note that the use of the broad term "investment measures" indicates that the TRIMs Agreement is not limited to measures taken specifically in regard to foreign investment. Contrary to India’s argument, we find that nothing in the TRIMs Agreement suggests that the nationality of the ownership of enterprises subject to a particular measure is an element in deciding whether that measure is covered by the Agreement. We therefore find without textual support in the TRIMs Agreement the argument that since the TRIMs Agreement is basically designed to govern and provide a level playing field for foreign investment, measures relating to internal taxes or subsides cannot be construed to be a trade-related investment measure. We recall in this context that internal tax advantages or subsidies are only one of many types of advantages which may be tied to a local content requirement which is a principal focus of the TRIMs Agreement. The TRIMs Agreement is not concerned with subsidies and internal taxes as such but rather with local content requirements, compliance with which may be encouraged through providing any type of advantage. Nor, in any case, do we see why an internal measure would necessarily not govern the treatment of foreign investment.

35 14.74 We next consider whether the Indonesian measures are investment measures. In this regard, we consider the following extracts (emphases added) from the official Indonesian legislation relevant and instructive. 14.75

With regard to the 1993 car programme, we note: The “considerations section” of the Decree of the Ministry of Industry announcing the 1993 car programme states: “a. that within the framework of supporting and promoting the development of the automotive industry and/or the component industry in the future, it is deemed necessary to regulate the local content levels of domestically produced motor vehicles or components in connection with the grant of incentives in the imposition of import duty rates; b. that in order to further strengthen domestic industrial development by taking into account the trend of technological advance and the increase of the capability and mastering of industrial design and engineering, it is necessary to improve the relevant existing regulations already laid down;” states:

The "considerations section" of the 1995 amendment to the 1993 car programme “That in the framework of further promoting of the development of the motor vehicles industry and /or domestically produced components, it is considered necessary to amend...”

14.76

With regard to the February 1996 car programme, we note the following: The title of the Presidential Instruction for the National Car programme (No.2) is “The Development of the National Automobile Industry”. -

Paragraph a) of the “Considering” section of the Government Regulation No.20 states: “that in the effort to promote the growth of the domestic automotive industry, it is deemed necessary to enact regulations concerning the Sales Tax on Luxury Goods upon the delivery of domestically produced motor vehicles”.

In addition, the State Minister for Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the Investment Coordinating Board issued a decree entitled “Investment Regulations within the Framework of the Realisation of the Establishment of the National Automobile Industry” which emphasized that the new measures were intended to promote investment, stating in its fifth considering: “5. that it is therefore necessary to issue a decree for the regulation of investment in the national automobile industry.” Article 2 of that same Investment Regulation by the Minister of State for Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the Investment Coordinating Board provides: “In order to realise the development of the national automobile industry as meant in Article 1:

36 1. ... 2. In the endeavour to realise the development of such national car industry, the investment approval will be issued to the automobile industry sector with tax facilities in accordance with legal provisions enacted specifically for such purpose.” The Decision relating to the investment facilities regarding the Determination of PT. Timor Putra National to Establish and Produce a National Car, entitled “Decision of the State Minister for the Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the Capital Investment Coordinating Board” states: “1. That in implementing a national car industry it is deemed necessary to determine investment approval for a car industry which will build and produce a national car. 2. That in the framework of investment for the car industry, PT.Timor Putra National has submitted an application and working program to build a national car industry and has obtained domestic investment approval (PMDN) NO.607/PMDN/1995, dated 9 November 1995”. 14.77 With regard to the June 1996 car programme, we note that the “Considering” section of the Decree of the President of the Republic No. 4267 on the Extension (June) to the February 1996 car programme provides: “a. that the development of the national car is aimed at improving the nation’s self-reliance ... and to achieve this solid preparations and continuous support are necessary; b. that the preparation for domestic production of national cars require the availability of huge financing and therefore will be carried out in stages; c. that in connection with the preparations, it is considered necessary to establish a policy on the implementation stage of the production of national cars.” -

The “Considering” section of the Government Regulation No. 3667 states: “That within the framework of promoting the development of the automotive industry in the increased use of domestically produced automotive components, it is deemed necessary to grant Sales Tax on Luxury Goods facilities to the group of luxury goods upon delivery of certain motor vehicles”

-

The Elucidation to the Government Regulation No. 36 states: “Within the framework of speeding up the realisation of production of national motor vehicles using domestically made automotive components, it is necessary to promote the domestic automotive industry in order to further its growth particularly in the face of global competition. One of the endeavours which can be exerted is the provision of a tax incentive in the form of exemption from the assessment of Sales Tax on Luxury Goods on the delivery of certain motor vehicles which have achieved certain levels of local content.”

14.78 We note also that Indonesia indicates that the objectives of the National Car programme include the following:

37 -

To improve the competitiveness of local companies and strengthen overall industrial development; To develop the capacity of multiple-source auto parts and components; To encourage the development of the automotive industry and the automotive component industry; To bring about major structural changes in the Indonesian automobile industry; To encourage the transfer of technology and contribute to large-scale job creation; To encourage car companies to increase their local content, resulting in a rapid growth of investment in the automobile industry.

14.79

Indonesia has also stated that PT TPN is a “domestic capital investment company”.

14.80 On the basis of our reading of these measures applied by Indonesia under the 1993 and the 1996 car programmes, which have investment objectives and investment features and which refer to investment programmes, we find that these measures are aimed at encouraging the development of a local manufacturing capability for finished motor vehicles and parts and components in Indonesia. Inherent to this objective is that these measures necessarily have a significant impact on investment in these sectors. For this reason, we consider that these measures fall within any reasonable interpretation of the term “investment measures”. We do not intend to provide an overall definition of what constitutes an investment measure. We emphasize that our characterization of the measures as “investment measures” is based on an examination of the manner in which the measures at issue in this case relate to investment. There may be other measures which qualify as investment measures within the meaning of the TRIMs Agreement because they relate to investment in a different manner. 14.81 With respect to the arguments of Indonesia that the measures at issue are not investment measures because the Indonesian Government does not regard the programmes as investment programmes and because the measures have not been adopted by the authorities responsible for investment policy, we believe that there is nothing in the text of the TRIMs Agreement to suggest that a measure is not an investment measure simply on the grounds that a Member does not characterize the measure as such, or on the grounds that the measure is not explicitly adopted as an investment regulation. In any event, we note that some of the regulations and decisions adopted pursuant to these car programmes were adopted by investment bodies. (b)

Are the Indonesian measures “trade-related”?

14.82 We now have to determine whether these investment measures are “trade-related”. We consider that, if these measures are local content requirements, they would necessarily be “trade-related” because such requirements, by definition, always favour the use of domestic products over imported products, and therefore affect trade. (c)

Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement

14.83 An examination of whether these measures are covered by Item (1) of the Illustrative List of TRIMs annexed to the TRIMs Agreement, which refers amongst other situations to measures with local content requirements, will not only indicate whether they are trade-related but also whether they are inconsistent with Article III:4 and thus in violation of Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. 14.84

The Annex to the TRIMs Agreement reads as follows: “ANNEX ILLUSTRATIVE LIST 1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require: (a)

the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of

38 volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production;” 14.85 We note that all the various decrees and regulations implementing the Indonesian car programmes operate in the same manner. They provide for tax advantages on finished motor vehicles using a certain percentage value of local content and additional customs duty advantages on imports of parts and components to be used in finished motor vehicles using a certain percentage value of local content. We also note that under the June 1996 car programme, the local content envisaged in the February 1996 car programme could be performed through an undertaking by the foreign producer of National Cars to counterpurchase Indonesian parts and components. 14.86 For instance, the Decision to issue the Decree of the Minister of Industry Concerning The Determination of Local Content Levels of Domestically Made Motor Vehicles or Components attached to the Decree of the Ministry of Industry announcing the 1993 car programme states in its Article 2: “(1) The Automotive Industry and/or the Components Industry may obtain certain Incentives within the framework of importing needed Components, Sub-Components, basic materials and semi-Finished Goods, originating in one source as well as various sources (multi sourcing), if the production has reached/can achieve certain Local Content levels. (...) (3) The Local Content levels of domestically made Motor Vehicles and/or Components which are eligible for Incentives including their Incentive rates shall be those listed in Attachment I to this decree.” (emphasis added) The Instruction of the President of the Republic of Indonesia No.2 of 1996 of the National Car programme (dated 19 February 1998) states in its “INSTRUCT ... SECONDLY: “WITHIN the framework of establishment of the National Car Industry: 1. The Minister of Industry and Trade will foster, guide and grant facilities in accordance with provisions of laws in effect such that the national car industry: a. b.

uses a brand name of its own; uses components produced domestically as much as

possible; c. is able to export its products.” (emphasis added)

More specifically Regulation No. 20/1996 established the following sales tax structure where passenger cars of more than 1600cc and jeeps with local content of less than 60% would pay 35% tax; passenger cars of less than 1600cc, jeeps with local content of more than 60%, and light commercial vehicles (other than jeeps using gas) would pay 20% tax; and National Cars would pay 0% tax. We recall that one of the requirements for designation as a “National Car” is that the local content rate must be 20% at the end of the first year, 40% at the end of the second year and 60% at the end of the third year. 14.87 We also note with reference to the June 1996 car programme, that the Decree of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 42 of 1996 on the production of National Cars provides in Article 1: “National Cars which are made overseas by Indonesian workers and fulfil the local content stipulated by the Minister of Industry and Trade will be treated equally to those made in Indonesia.” The Decree of the Minister of Industry and Trade adopted pursuant to this Presidential Decree 42 states in Articles 1, 2 and 3: “Article 1

39 Within the framework of preparations, the production of national cars can be carried out overseas for a one-time maximum period of 1 (one) year on the condition that Indonesian made parts and components are used. Article 2 The procurement of Indonesian made parts and components shall be performed through a system of counter purchase of parts and components of motor vehicles by the overseas company carrying out the production and reexporting of national cars to Indonesia. Article 3 The value of the Counter purchase referred to in Article 2 shall be fixed at the minimum of 25% (twenty-five percent) of the import value of the national cars assembled abroad (C&F value)”. 14.88 We believe that under these measures compliance with the provisions for the purchase and use of particular products of domestic origin is necessary to obtain the tax and customs duty benefits on these car programmes, as referred to in Item 1(a) of the Illustrative List of TRIMs. 14.89 We need now to decide whether these tax and customs duty benefits are “advantages” in the meaning of the chapeau of paragraph 1 of that Illustrative List. In the context of the claims under Article III:4 of GATT, Indonesia has argued that the reduced customs duties are not internal regulations and as such cannot be covered by the wording of Article III:4. We do not consider that the matter before us in connection with Indonesia’s obligations under the TRIMs Agreement is the customs duty relief as such but rather the internal regulations, i.e. the provisions on purchase and use of domestic products, compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, which advantage here is the customs duty relief. The lower duty rates are clearly “advantages” in the meaning of the chapeau of the Illustrative List to the TRIMs Agreement and as such, we find that the Indonesian measures fall within the scope of the Item 1 of the Illustrative List of TRIMs. 14.90 Indonesia also argues that the local content requirements of its car programmes do not constitute classic local content requirements within the meaning of the FIRA panel (which involved a binding contract between the investor and the Government of Canada) because they leave companies free to decide from which source to purchase parts and components. We note that the Indonesian producers or assemblers of motor vehicles (or motor vehicle parts) must satisfy the local content targets of the relevant measures in order to take advantage of the customs duty and tax benefits offered by the Government. The wording of the Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement makes it clear that a simple advantage conditional on the use of domestic goods is considered to be a violation of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement even if the local content requirement is not binding as such. We note in addition that this argument has also been rejected in the Panel Report on Parts and Components. 14.91 We thus find that the tax and tariff benefits contingent on meeting local requirements under these car programmes constitute “advantages”. Given this and our earlier analysis of whether these local content requirements are TRIMs and covered by the Illustrative List annexed to the TRIMs Agreement, we further find that they are in violation of Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. 14.92 We note that a violation of Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement may be justified under Articles 3, 4 or 5 of the TRIMs Agreement. However, Indonesia has not invoked any of the general exceptions of GATT as referred to in Article 3 of the TRIMs Agreement, nor the provisions available to developing countries referred to in Article 4. In addition, Indonesia does not claim that the measures in dispute benefit from the transitional period under Article 5 of the TRIMs Agreement. ……. XV.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

15.1

In the light of the findings above,

(a) We conclude that the local content requirements of the 1993 and of the 1996 February car programmes to which are linked (i) sales tax benefits on finished motor vehicles incorporating a certain

40 percentage value of domestic products or on National Cars and (ii) customs duty benefits for imported parts and components used in finished motor vehicles incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic products or used in National Cars violate the provisions of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement. (b) We conclude that the sales tax discrimination aspects of the 1993 and the February and June 1996 car programmes in favour of domestic motor vehicles incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic products and National Cars violate the provisions of Article III:2 of GATT. (c) We conclude that the customs duty and sales tax benefits of the June 1996 car programme in favour of imported National Cars and the customs duty benefits of the February 1996 car programme in favour of imported parts and components to be used in National Cars assembled in Indonesia violate Article I of GATT. (d) We conclude that the European Communities have demonstrated by positive evidence that Indonesia has caused, through the use of specific subsidies provided pursuant to the National Car programme, serious prejudice to the interests of the European Communities within the meaning of Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement. (e) We conclude that the United States has not demonstrated by positive evidence that Indonesia has caused, through the use of specific subsidies provided pursuant to the National Car programme, serious prejudice to the interests of the United States within the meaning of Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement. (f)

We conclude that Indonesia has not violated Article 28.2 of the SCM Agreement.

(g) We conclude that the United States has not demonstrated that Indonesia is in breach of its obligations under Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement in respect of the acquisition of trademark rights or the maintenance of trademark rights or in respect of the use of trademarks specifically addressed in Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement nor has it demonstrated that measures have been taken that reduce the degree of consistency with the provisions of Article 20 and which would therefore be in violation of Indonesia's obligations under Article 65.5 of the TRIPS Agreement. 15.2 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment of benefits under that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that to the extent that Indonesia has acted inconsistently with the provisions of covered agreements, as described in the preceding paragraph, it has nullified or impaired the benefits accruing to the complainants under those agreements. 15.3 With respect to the conclusion of serious prejudice to the interests of the European Communities, Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement provides that, “[w]here a panel report or an Appellate Body report is adopted in which it is determined that any subsidy has resulted in adverse effects to the interests of another Member within the meaning of Article 5, the Member granting or maintaining the subsidy shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or shall withdraw the subsidy.” 15.4 The Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request Indonesia to bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the WTO Agreement. __________

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