Cases In Constitutional Law

Tio v Videogram Industry Facts: This petition assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. Petitioner’s attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the ground among others that Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof. 

The petitioner’s ground for assailing its constitutionality is that the imposition of tax is a rider and, is harsh and confiscatory oppressive and or unlawful restraint of trade. It also alleged that the imposition of taxes is invalid since the title of the bill said only for the creation of Video gram Regulatory Board. It does not in any way provide for the imposition of taxes. Therefore, it violates the one subject one title rule.

Issue: Is Sec 10 of PD No 1987 a RIDER? Held: NO. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. Such is the case here. Taxation is sufficiently related to the regulation of the video industry. The provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonable necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The Supreme Court thus provided the following standards whether or not a provision is embraced in the title: (1) Title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. (2) If all parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter expressed in the title. (3) So long as they are not inconsistent or foreign to the general subject to the title.

(4) Regardless of how diverse it is so long as it maybe considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object. (5) Should not be construed as to cripple legislative power. (6) Given PRACTICAL rather that a technical construction. Lidasan v Commission on Elections Facts June 18, 1966 Chief executive signed into law HB 1247 known as republic act 4790 “ An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao Del Sur” It includes 21 barrios, 9 of which are from Lanao del Sur, and the other 12 are from Cotabato. (From Lanao: Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,Dagowan,Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung and From Cotabato: Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,Tangabao,Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamawakan). The Comelec, prompted by the coming election adopted the resolution which provides for the barrios that will be included in Lanao del Sur. Apprised by this happening, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to the Comelec that the said resolution be suspended until clarified by the correcting legislation. But the Comelec stood by its own interpretation, and declared that the RA 4790 should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. This events triggered the original action for certiorari and prohibition filed by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. Affected by the implementation of RA 4790, Lidasan now questions the constitutionality of the said Act. ISSUE: Is Republic Act 4790 valid considering that such Act creates a Municipality which includes barrios from another province.

HELD: RA 4790 declared as Null and Void 

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Constitutional requirement that ‘ no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill” Constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power: 1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. 2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject It violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title It did not inform the Congress the full impact of the Law. Moreover, It did not inform the citizens of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and municipalities and that such will be added to the Province of Lamao del Sur The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. Hence, it makes the title misleading and deceptive Even upon removing the barrios of Cotabato included in the municipality of Dianaton, it is still unconstitutional because the valid part is not independent of the invalid portion. Thus, it is indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.

Note: ( Detailed ) YES. RA 4790 is null and void 1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the

entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated. 2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators. 3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. 4. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" — projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a twopronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur. 5.

Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.

Dela Cruz v. Paras Facts: 1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. 3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact

wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. 4.

Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs. 2.

In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. 4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

Tobias vs Abalos Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following: (1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. (2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.

(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. (4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section Issue: WON the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional. Ruling: The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law." As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit. Note: Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a

liberal construction of the “one-title-one-subject” rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec). Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional.

Demetria vs Alba Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:

“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.” Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional. HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

Guingona vs Caraque FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.” The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.” ISSUE: Is the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget violative of Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution? Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education. Held:

No. There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be “made by law,” such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

Belgica v. Executive Secretary FACTS: In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations. The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR. Over the years, “pork” funds have increased tremendously. In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks. In 2004, several citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 General Appropriations Act for being

unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – “JLN” standing for Janet Lim Napoles – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. As for the “Presidential Pork Barrel”, whistle-blowers alleged that “[a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO].” * ISSUES: A. Procedural Issues 1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy 2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review 3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue 4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel” WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on…

1.) …separation of powers 2.) …non-delegability of legislative power 3.) …checks and balances 4.) …accountability 5.) …political dynasties 6.) …local autonomy C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel” WON the phrases: (a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional legislative power

insofar

as

they

constitute undue

delegations

of

* HELD AND RATIO: A. Procedural Issues No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds. As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy. ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved: This is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved – the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to

be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistleblowers, and the government’s own recognition that reforms are needed “to address the reported abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionallymandated audit arm of the government. if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient. iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public: This is applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles. iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review. 2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of

judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution). 3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases. Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of controls” amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. 4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.

On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of postenactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle. In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would not apply. B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel” 1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded postenactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded postenactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5

under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).

Provision

4,

Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. 2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of nondelegability since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,

undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. 3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lumpsum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto. The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.”

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of postenactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis. Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment. 5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue. In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties. 6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator

represents. As a result, a district representative of a highlyurbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel” YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general

phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.” However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains legally effective and subsisting. Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.” The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

Note : Focus on Issue #1.

Tolentino v Sec. of Finance -

Facts: House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these Purposes…) Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different from that of the House Bill Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2nd and 3rd reading of the Bill on the same day Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and become enrolled bill which eventually became the EVAT law. Procedural Issue: WoN RA 7716 originated exclusively from the House of Rep. in accordance with sec 24, art 6 of Consti WoN the Senate bill violated the “three readings on separate days” requirement of the Consti WoN RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject, one title rule. NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT Law, they were exempt from taxes. After the passage of EVAT, they were already included. PAL contended that neither the House or Senate bill provided for the removal of the exemption from taxes of PAL and that it was inly made after the meeting of the Conference Committee w/c was not expressed in the title of RA 7166

Held: YES! Court said that it is not the law which should originate from the House of Rep, but the revenue bill which was required to originate from the House of Rep. The inititiative must ocme from the Lower House because they are elected in the district level – meaning they are expected to be more sensitive to the needs of the locality. Also, a bill originating from the Lower House may undergo extensive changes while in the Senate. Senate can introduce a separate and distinct bill other than the one the Lower House proposed. The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the House bill, so long as action by Senate is withheld pending the receipt of the House bill. (2) NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was urgent. Presidential certification dispensed the requirement not only of printing but also reading the bill in 3 separate days. In fact, the Senate accepted the Pres. certification (1)

(3)

No. Court said that the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. It is also in the power of Congress to amend, alter, repeal grant of franchises for operation of public utility when the common good so requires. One subject rule is intended to prevent surprise upon Congress members and inform people of pending legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not know of their situation not because of any defect in title but because they might have not noticed its publication until some event calls attention to its existence. Additional read: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weightof legislative practice.

Lung Center vs Quezon City FACTS: Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from real property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital building. Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The request was denied, and a petition hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and the decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160. 2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes. RULING: 1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was created was to render medical services to the public in general including those who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under PD 1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government.

2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.

Tan v. Del Rosario Facts: 1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law. 2.

Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following provisions of the Constitution: -Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. - Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. - Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the SelfEmployed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually reads, 'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The SelfEmployed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession,

Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process. 5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents. 6. The Court has given due course to both petitions. ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due process NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident in herein case. 1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not violate classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class. 2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. The Court does not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate. ISSUE 2: Whether or not public authority in promulgating the RR

respondents

exceeded

their

No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through a general professional partnership.

Garcia v Executive Secretary In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

John Hay PAC v Lim