Command And Staff Procedures: Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations

The protective marking of this publication has been downgraded as of 1 Jul 11 as part of a wider review of doctrine. This change is reflected throughout this electronic version. No other change was made on this date.

Army Code 71674

ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 1 COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS

PART 8 COMMAND AND STAFF PROCEDURES

2007

Issue 3.0: November 2007

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The contents provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experience and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operations and training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is proved that you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find you criminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements of health and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a person criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP could result in disciplinary action under the provisions of the Army Act. Amendment No

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CONTENTS Page CHAPTER 1 COMMAND Section 1 – Principles Section 2 – Organisation for Command Section 3 – The Position of the Commander Section 4 – Deputising Command

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CHAPTER 2 COMMAND SUPPORT Section 1 – The Functions of Command Support Section 2 – The Staff Section 3 – Specific Responsibilities Section 4 – The Command Support Process

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CHAPTER 3 PLAN AND REVIEW Section 1 – Introduction Section 2 – The Tactical Estimate Section 3 – The Combat Estimate

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CHAPTER 4 EXECUTION AND EVALUATING THE PLAN Section 1 – Background Section 2 – Situational Awareness Section 3 – Execution Section 4 – Evaluation

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CHAPTER 5 DIRECTIVES, PLANS AND ORDERS Section 1 – General Principles Section 2 – Directives and Plans Section 3 – Orders Section 4 – Dissemination of Directives, Plans and Orders

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CHAPTER 6 HEADQUARTERS Section 1 – Purpose Section 2 – Function, Design and Siting of Headquarters Section 3 – Staff Duties Section 4 – Operational Record Keeping

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CHAPTER 7 OPERATIONAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND EXPLOITATION Section 1 – Overview and Principles Section 2 – Operational Information Life Cycle Section 3 – Information Management Planning and Execution Section 4 - Information Management Roles and Responsibilities

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Page CHAPTER 8 EFFECTS, TARGETING AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS Section 1 – Effects Planning at the Tactical Level Section 2 – Fundamentals of Targeting Section 3 – Targets and Effects Section 4 – Targeting Section 5 – Information Operations

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CHAPTER 1 COMMAND SECTION 1 - PRINCIPLES GENERAL 1. The purpose of Chapter 1 is to set out principles for the exercise of command and the military arrangements for the control of command. 2. Command is the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.1 The need for command arises from, and varies with, the size and complexity of the force. The larger and more sophisticated a force becomes, the greater the difficulties in preserving its cohesion and fighting power. Thus the importance of the function '‘Command'’ is related to the level of responsibility of an individual commander. 3. Command has a legal and constitutional status, codified in Queen’s Regulations.2 For command to be exercised efficiently, and thus achieve its objectives effectively, it is important to understand what an organisation is and how it functions. At its simplest, an organisation is defined as 'two or more people working together in a coordinated manner so as to achieve group results'. In military terms, it is necessary to note that an organisation should have a clear role and purpose and this is best achieved by vesting authority in one commander. Thus, headquarters staff are organised in order to provide the commander with the ability to exercise command. In addition, all organisations have a human aspect; they therefore require some degree of discipline within a defined structure. THE COMMAND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS 4. A commander and his staff focus on recognising and anticipating battlefield activities in order to make better decisions and to act faster than the enemy. All staff organisations and procedures exist to make the organisation, analysis and presentation of potentially vast amounts of information manageable for a commander. A commander relies on his staff to turn battlefield information into battlefield Shared Situational Awareness (SSA).3 Once a decision is made, the commander depends upon his staff to communicate the decision to subordinates in a manner that quickly focuses the necessary capabilities within the command to allow the force to dominate the enemy in time and space. 5. Formal staff processes provide two types of information associated with understanding and decisions, making all other staff activities secondary. These are: 1

NATO definition, AAP-6. Queen’s Regulations (QRs) state that, at the highest level, “The government and command of each of the fighting Services is vested in Her Majesty The Queen, who has charged the Secretary of State with general responsibility for the defence of the Realm and established a Defence Council having command and administration over Her armed forces” (J1.001); and, in turn, Commanders in Chiefs who “in conjunction with their other duties are operationally responsible to the Defence Council for the command of all British Army personnel in their area” (2.002). 3 Shared situational awareness (SSA) is the understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander’s mission. SSA is a cognitive process and is based on the information available coupled with the ability and experience of the commander. 2

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a. SSA. SSA establishes a shared perspective of the situation within which decisions are taken. b. Execution Information. Execution information is that which can lead to decision making. Examples of execution information are conclusions, recommendations, guidance, intent, concept statements and orders. 6. While a particular commander may focus and reorganise the staff as necessary to conform to his personal decision making techniques or to the unique demands of a specific mission, his requirements of the staff remain the same. All staff organisations and procedures are intended to develop understanding of the commander’s problem – how to use the capabilities available to impose his will decisively over an enemy. The scope and complexity of military operations are too great for any one staff officer or branch to meet the commander’s information needs in isolation. 7. Every commander has to make decisions concerning the allocation, commitment, and engagement of troops and resources. In turn, a commander should give his staff the authority to make routine decisions, within the constraints of his intent, while conducting operations. The Command and Control (C2) system is the tool by which the commander quickly distributes his decisions to his subordinate commanders. ADP Land Operations defines C2 as: “The process through which a commander exercises command …or operational or tactical control to organise, direct and coordinate the activities of the force allocated to him4.” 8. A commander should train his staff, shaping them into a cohesive group that can work together to deliver that information he deems important; but more precisely to develop mutual trust based upon confidence in and understanding of how he plans to command the forces under his authority. Staff officers have to be able to anticipate the outcome of current operations to develop (plan) concepts for follow on missions. They should also understand and be able to apply commonly understood doctrine in carrying out the mission; and they need to be in the mind firstly of their commander and secondly of each other. PRINCIPLES 9. The British Army has evolved a system of command by which decisions made on military operations arise from “command led” and not “staff driven” processes. This leads directly to the basis for the concept of Mission Command, which is that the commander gives his staff and subordinates the ‘why’ but not the ‘how’ for the conduct of their operations. There are five fundamental principles which apply to command. These are: a. Unity of Command. A commander should be accountable to only one superior thus ensuring clarity and unity of effort, promoting timely and effective decision making, and avoiding potential conflict in orders and instructions. Unity of command is achieved through a clear chain of command, whereby command at each level is focussed on one commander. This principle applies at all levels and throughout joint operations. In multinational operations, however, absolute unity of command may not be achievable. 4

Army Defence Publication (ADP) Land Operations. AC 71819. DGD&D, May 2005.

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b. Cooperation. Cooperation, a principle of war, complements unity of command. It entails the coordination of individual and group activities to achieve an optimum combined effect for the common good. Cooperation is based on teamwork, trust and mutual understanding, and is developed through training. Three elements contribute to cooperation: a common aim (reflecting unity of effort), mutual goodwill, and a clear division of responsibilities. Responsibility for actions, however, cannot be greater (nor should it be less) than that which is implied by the amount of authority that has been delegated to a commander. Military cooperation is formalised through clearly defined states of command5. c. Balanced Structure. There is a limit to the number of subordinates (and thus subordinate organisations) a superior can command effectively. The optimum number will depend primarily on the complexity and tasks of the particular organisation. In practice, a balanced and capable overall structure is achieved by a realistic span of command, which determines the number of principal subordinate sub units, units or formations immediately under command within an organisation. It can also, inter alia, be affected by the number of influential external organisations (eg FCO or non-governmental organisations (NGO)), the activities and views of which a commander may have to take into account. d. Common and Responsive Procedures. Command procedures have to be simple, efficient and flexible in order to be responsive, and so assist the development and maintenance of timely decision making within a command. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) save time and effort and improve unity of purpose. Procedures for running headquarters are considered in Chapter 6. These also extend to decision making techniques and the formulation and dissemination of directives and orders, which are detailed in Chapter 5. e. Dynamic Organisation. The organisation of command has to be dynamic that is to say flexible, energetic and capable of swift response or change. Changed situations and new tactical or technological challenges may demand swift adjustment of structures and procedures. In the contemporary operating environment (COE) and likely future operations, brigades, and possibly battlegroups, will operate outside the normal formation hierarchy. Land formation HQs at division and brigade may be expected to act as Land Component (LC) HQ, and possibly even as a Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ. In order to perform these more varied, complex and demanding roles, the structure and organisation of the HQ demands dynamism. 10. Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). The Future Land Operational Concept (FLOC) 2003 (re-emphasised in FLOC 2007) stressed EBAO as one of its four core tenets. EBAO stems from the Comprehensive Approach6 and emphasises the use of all methods available to create the conditions for acceptance of defeat in the mind of the enemy. EBAO will normally be a higher tactical and operational level preoccupation, albeit operational effects will translate into tactical actions guided by those intended effects. The use of non kinetic means to assist in defeating the enemy requires careful selection and use of chosen capabilities to achieve effects, and evaluation of the precise intended effect on the target. At JTFHQ and LCHQ level an understanding not only of primary but of 5 6

See para 19. JDN 4/05 The Comprehensive Approach Jan 2006.

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second order (and subsequent) effects will need to be included in the intelligence targeting planning process.7 This process is detailed in Chapter 8. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMAND 11. General. The operation of the five principles of command constitutes the art of decision making. A key ingredient in this art is the skill of leadership, namely the ability to motivate individuals and forces under command so that they can impose their military will over the enemy and achieve decisive goals at the least expense in terms of casualties, unnecessary destruction and material expended. Command is vested in a single individual who then has complete responsibility for those under command. The essence of personal command is defined by the commander’s experience, competence, intuition, judgement, initiative and strength of character; and his ability to inspire, motivate and gain the trust of those whom he commands. A commander has to possess authority, to accept responsibility and to be accountable. Mission Command must not become a means of abrogating that authority or responsibility. 12. Authority. Authority involves the legal right and freedom to use the power of command and, ultimately, to enforce obedience. A commander’s authority to enforce his decisions is one of the key aspects of his position. With the right to enforce decisions, however, comes the responsibility for their consequences. To command is to direct with authority, whilst taking full responsibility for the outcome. 13. Responsibility. Responsibility is the legal and ethical obligation a commander assumes for the actions, accomplishments or failures of subordinates. He is responsible for the health, welfare, morale and discipline of personnel as well as the maintenance of equipment in his command. In combat, a commander assumes responsibility for the loss or preservation of human life and the destruction or preservation of materiel and real estate. 14. Accountability. Accountability is the requirement for the commander to answer to a superior officer and ultimately to the Crown for the effective and efficient use of delegated responsibility, authority, and resources. These conferrals ultimately affect the life of every soldier under his command. Although responsibility and accountability rest exclusively with the commander, he can delegate specific authority to staff officers to make decisions and to act within their own areas of responsibility. Each subordinate staff officer has to understand his authority, responsibility, and accountability as they relate to his relationship with the commander, other staff officers and subordinate commanders and their commands. SECTION 2 – ORGANISATION FOR COMMAND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND 15. General. The Army's command framework, in peace and war, is based on the chain of command - the hierarchical structure through which command is exercised. Through this chain all operational directives, orders and instructions are passed down and acknowledgement or progress reports passed up. For a chain of command to be effective, it has to be flexible. It needs technical resources (command support, including 7

For a more detailed explanation see Army Defence Publication (ADP) Land Operations section 2.2.

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communications and information systems (CIS)) to link the levels as required, and formalised standard operating procedures. Where this common framework does not exist, liaison, dialogue and ideally training is essential. The most important prerequisite of an effective chain of command is that each commander knows exactly where he fits into the chain, from whom he derives his command and whom he commands. The consequences of a confused chain of command have been illustrated by General Sir David Fraser in this account of the situation of 1st Armoured Division in France in May 1940: 'The chain of command to this unfortunate division was confused and inefficient. At different times (the divisional commander) received orders direct from the War Office in London, from GHQ BEF, from General Georges commanding the army groups engaged in the battle wheresoever, from General Altmayer, commanding the left wing of the French Seventh Army - the left-hand French Army on the general line of the Somme - from General Frere, commanding Seventh Army, as well as from General Weygand, Supreme Commander, himself.'8 This example epitomises the sort of circumstances where the old military aphorism of ‘order, counter order and confusion’ might prevail. The aim of sound C2 is to prevent such a situation occurring. 16. Exceptions. In all but exceptional circumstances, observance of a clear chain of command with a cascade of direction from superior to subordinate and confirmation in return will be the most efficient path for enforcing authority. This should be made more flexible and less rigid by the decentralising principles of Mission Command. Information remains the commodity that enables decisions, and thus command and observation of a strict hierarchy may have to be subordinated to this means: a. There will be times when the imperative of timely decision and action is best met by information reaching different levels of command simultaneously rather than sequentially. An example of this is the speed with which all levels of command were made aware of the Iraqi surrender at the end of Op GRANBY. b. If communications are lost between a superior and a subordinate command, the onus is on the superior to re-establish suitable links with the subordinate (eg from rear to front). Common sense dictates that both levels do their best to re-establish communications with one another whilst the subordinate continues to act purposefully in accordance with his superior's stated intent. In re-establishing communications other levels and instruments of command may have to become involved. 17. Technical Control. In addition to the formal chain of command, there is an element of technical control in the Army which reflects functional areas of interest. This exists at almost every level. For example, the officer commanding a Brigade HQ and Signal Squadron, whilst under the command of his brigade commander, may receive technical direction (frequency allocation and cryptographic instructions) direct from the CO of the divisional HQ and Signal Regiment. Within their functional areas, Combat Service Support (CSS) commanders may exercise technical control over subordinates; they do so, however, on behalf of the commander and to support his intent. On no account should technical 8

General Sir David Fraser - And We Shall Shock Them (ISBN0340270853 Hodder & Stoughton 1983.

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control be allowed to eclipse or confuse the primacy of the commander; it has to be restricted to specific and delegated areas of expertise, interest or responsibility. If it is not restricted, there is a danger that trust in command will be broken and the morale and efficiency of those commanded will suffer accordingly. STATES OF COMMAND 18. An important factor in stabilising the chain of command lies in establishing the states of command of subordinate formations and units. In particular, establishing clear C2 relationships is a fundamental requirement in all operations, and especially so in Joint, Interagency and Multinational (JIM) ones. In establishing command relationships, a commander delegates authority to subordinates commensurate with their responsibilities. A commander can determine whether and how he can employ subordinate formations or units by using the following criteria: a.

Can he use them for any purpose (can he give them a mission)?

b. If the mission (the purpose of their employment) is not within his gift, can he give them tasks within the given mission (can he direct its execution)? c.

Can he break up the formation or unit or must he retain its integrity?

d. Are there any caveats or constraints on their use (for example, for hostilities only, or for use over a specified duration or at a given place)? 19. A summary of the application of C2 states used within NATO is at Annex A. Care should be taken in the choice and agreed import of these states as they may be interpreted differently by other Services and allies (particularly the US). The criteria listed in Para 18 assist this choice. In case of doubt it may prove prudent to consult the superior commander about any restrictions he envisages on the employment of subordinate formations and units. The definitions of the C2 states are: a. Full Command (Full Comd). The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration, and exists only within national services. b. Operational Command (OPCOM). The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. c. Operational Control (OPCON). The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it include administration or logistic control. d. Tactical Command (TACOM). The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. Issue 3.0: Nov 07

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e. Tactical Control (TACON). The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. f. Under Command for Administration (UCADMIN). The authority delegated to a commander to command and control all administration for those forces assigned. When the temporary nature of the command makes it necessary to effect a complete change of administrative command, a unit or formation may be placed under administrative command less certain named matters. g. Under Command for Daily Maintenance (UCADMIN…Less9). The state of logistic/administrative command leaves the original formation or unit with full responsibility for all administration less daily maintenance. Daily maintenance would include replenishment of combat supplies, evacuation of casualties, the provision of common user supply items and the repair and recovery of equipment. 20. Once the chain of command and the states of command within it have been defined they should be regarded as extant until formally changed. Commanders have to respect the unity of command and be aware of the possibly damaging consequences of ignoring an established structure. This applies both up and down the chain. It is important, however, that states of command and the chain of command are not interpreted too narrowly when special circumstances apply. On operations, the commander on the ground may have to use his initiative and break both the chain and states of command to ensure timely and effective action in accordance with his superior's intent.10 In this eventuality he accepts command responsibility. SPAN OF COMMAND 21. Span of command refers to the number of subordinate organisations one commander commands directly (see Figure 1.1). It should be determined by the overall area of operations (AO) over which a commander disperses forces. Decreasing spans of command may well lead to additional levels of command with potentially undesirable effects on timely decision making and action. The use of technology, particularly modern communications and information handling techniques, may make it possible to widen spans of command, flatten hierarchies and extend AO. As command is essentially a human function, purely technological considerations should not be the only criteria in determining span.11

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AFM Vol 1 Pt 2 Battlegroup Tactics. A considerable part of the German success in thwarting the British armoured attack during Operation GOODWOOD in Normandy on 18 July 1944 is credited to a local German commander, Major Hans von Luck. He commandeered a battery of Luftwaffe 88mm anti-aircraft guns and directed that they should be used in the anti-tank role. In response to von Luck's orders, the Luftwaffe battery commander resisted being placed under command: 'Major, my concern is enemy planes, fighting tanks is your job. I'm Luftwaffe', to which von Luck drew his pistol and replied 'Either you're a dead man or you can earn yourself a medal.' Recounted in Hans von Luck. Panzer Commander. 11 Experience has shown that large changes in data have had little effect on the quality of decisions made: the dominant feature being the personality of the commander and the way his staff work for him. 10

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SPAN OF COMMAND

FORMATION LEVEL HQ

CORPS

DIVISION

DIVISION

BRIGADE

BRIGADE

BRIGADE

BRIGADE

BRIGADE

UNIT

UNIT

UNIT

UNIT

UNIT

CHAIN OF COMMAND

BRIGADE

BRIGADE

* Five manoeuvre SUB-UNIT

SUB-UNIT

SUB-UNIT

SUB-UNIT

formations or units should be the maximum number at any level of command

Figure 1.1 – The Chain and Span of Command 22. Regardless of the technical ability to communicate with every element within a span of command, studies have shown that a sensible maximum span of command should not, for normal operations, exceed five subordinate elements, except for brief periods. If it does, command is liable to suffer a progressive decline in efficiency.12 Furthermore, the more varied the aspects and activities of those under command are, the less that can be handled simultaneously. Experience indicates that a commander risks becoming overloaded, with a debilitating effect on decision making, if more than three are active at any one time. STRUCTURE 23. Operational Integrity. In principle, forces should be grouped together with the capability for independent action. The cohesion, and thus effectiveness, of a command for employment on operations rests on integrating its component parts to optimise its overall capability and on reducing its inertia. A balanced force should contain combat arms with common mobility and adequate levels of protection, assisted by combat support (CS) units to support manoeuvre and to give indirect firepower, together with CSS units to provide medical care, administration and sustainment. Commanders of all types of forces need the means to command and, if not integral to their commands, the ability to request fires, engineer, logistic support and the conduct of battlespace management (BM) on their behalf.

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M J Orr. An Historical View of Flexibility in Commanders. Farnborough: APRE 1982.

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24. Regrouping. Regrouping refers to the changing of the task organisation of a force element. There are penalties in terms of loss of cohesion and tempo in frequent regrouping. To mitigate this standard groupings and organisations should be used on operations. The relative rapidity and simplicity of regrouping enjoyed in Command, Control, Communications, Computing and Information (C4I) terms in the pre digital era will be lost unless thorough and detailed communications contingency plans (which include options for regrouping) are prepared in advance of an operation. If this is not feasible on initial deployment to a theatre, and ad hoc organisations are formed, the penalties in terms of inflexibility or loss of secure voice and data connectivity should be clearly recognised13. In human terms, bringing together units and personalities hitherto unknown to each other loses valuable time and effort in establishing working relations and procedures (cohesion). However, common doctrine and training will prove invaluable for rapid regrouping. Where an ad hoc organisation or unit is created in a theatre of operations to cover a specific capability gap, its command relationship to other units or formations has to be addressed and made known. Once committed on operations, troops and resources are allocated and grouped (typically once the necessary force ratios have been determined) to achieve missions; subsequent regrouping, which costs time and effort with resultant loss of tempo, should be minimised. 25. Forces for Special Tasks. In certain circumstances, the practice of using standard groupings will have to be broken when forces for special tasks are placed together under a specified commander. Forces for special tasks should be built around existing points of command (formation or unit headquarters) as far as possible, as they have the necessary command facilities. If the situation demands it, however, such forces may have to be improvised. At the tactical level, 'battle grouping' can take place round any combat, CS or CSS unit. When applied flexibly, this principle can offer economies of effort in combat forces, allowing concentration of force elsewhere. SECTION 3 – THE POSITION OF THE COMMANDER GENERAL 26. First World War operations on the Western Front illustrate a fundamental dilemma facing any commander: where best to position himself on the battlefield or theatre of operations. A tactical commander in a defensive sector could either go forward to lead and motivate part of his force in person or keep to the rear in an attempt better to coordinate the actions of his entire span of command and to remain in contact with his superior HQ, usually via a tenuous and vulnerable landline.14 This could give rise to sneers about ‘château generalship’. The introduction of reliable radio communications in the Second World War gave both tactical and operational commanders more flexibility in choosing where to position themselves while remaining in touch with other mobile points of command.15 The physical dispersion of forces in the geographically extended battlefield of

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Bowman radio systems require detailed planning to permit regrouping. This is exacerbated by the lack of interoperability between different versions of the equipment itself. It is anticipated that this situation will be resolved by detailed planning, good TTPs and subsequently delivery of technical solutions. 14 The British tendency in World War One to position divisional HQs and above far to the rear is explained in Martin van Creveld’s Command in War. However, as research into casualty lists indicates, battalion and brigade commanders and staffs were very much at the front. ADP Land Operations Ch 6.3 para 0642. 15 Sir David Fraser. Knight’s Cross.

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the future is likely to make the dilemma of where a commander should best place himself even more acute. 27. At the lowest levels of command it is likely that the commander will be in direct contact with those that he commands. At platoon and company levels, for example, a commander will often be able to see his soldiers and thus give direct oral or radio orders. At each successive higher level, commanding at a distance and the need to delegate a wide range of decisions to local subordinate commanders will increase. In an experienced unit or formation, the commander may be able to command in this way for most of the time, fully entrusting his subordinates with almost complete tactical freedom. However, the need for personal contact or intervention at the main effort will remain likely. Similarly, when a commander loses his feel for the situation, he may well need to deploy forward to reestablish a clear perception of events on the ground and should therefore possess the protected means to do so swiftly and whilst remaining in communications.16 The future design for command of the British Army is increasingly likely to use Network Enabled Capability (NEC) to offer ‘reach’. This entails the potential for dislocation of the means of command from those needed for control by the use of long range, broadband communications links to give the commander SSA. It follows that tactical and forward command can be leaner and thus more agile and that large and vulnerable main HQs can be held in areas where force protection is easier.17 28. The commander has to consider his position in relation to the forces he commands, the means of command at his disposal and his mission. The decision as to where he positions himself can have important consequences, not only for the command organisation, but also for the conduct of operations. The basic factors influencing that decision are developed from the command imperatives and are common for both the operational and tactical levels. They are: a. Access to information on which to make timely decisions, including the ability of the commander to judge the condition and morale of his forces. b. Communications to points of command. Within technical limitations, information and communications systems should be adapted to the needs of the commander, not vice versa. c.

Planning and decision making capability.

d.

Security, including physical protection.

COMMAND IN BATTLE 29. At the lower tactical levels, the commander has to lead by personal example, have access to information and physically communicate with those he has to direct. Typically, the commander will command one major close operation at a time, with the immediacy of 16

Sir David Fraser, writing of Rommel as a divisional commander in 1940, noted: '[Rommel] believed... in commanding from the front. The opportunities of battle present themselves fleetingly, and can only be seen by eye and seized by the mind of one at the critical point. But to command a large and complex formation of all arms while simultaneously placing oneself at such a critical point or points requires a well-thought-out technique.' 17 This is currently the subject of Project ROBERTS.

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the situation requiring him to be well forward. While there may be occasions where personal intervention at a precise point will override all other factors, a commander should also consider how this will affect his communications with other points of command and how it will impact on his command, were he to prejudice his safety unwisely and be killed or wounded. If a commander needs to go forward and command in person, then structures and equipment have to be organised accordingly to support him.18 HIGH COMMAND 30. At higher levels of command, including the operational level, a commander's decision about where to base himself may be less straightforward. A commander will have a wider range of responsibilities (including liaison with the host nation and commanders of national contingents in multinational operations) and his position will be influenced by a more complex operational framework. In joint operations, for example, both the Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) and LC HQ should be located together, notwithstanding the capabilities of modern communications. One of Montgomery's first acts on arrival in the Western Desert in August 1942 was to unite the Eighth Army headquarters with that of the Desert Air Force. Montgomery describes this himself with characteristic frankness: 'When I took command, Army H.Q. was right forward, and Air H.Q. Western Desert was right back near the landing-grounds. The Army was fighting its battle and the RAF its battle... Army H.Q. and Air H.Q. and the two staffs seem gradually to have drifted apart. I decided to remedy this at once and moved Army H.Q. back to Air H.Q., and brought the A.O.C. and his senior staff officers into my Mess. This was a good move, and from that moment we never looked back.’19 SUMMARY 31. The position which a commander chooses for himself has an important effect on his ability to assess progress, interact with staff and subordinate commanders, and to influence events. Forward command can assist commanders in making timely decisions and provides greater ability to grasp fleeting opportunities. If, however, a commander is too close to the action, he risks having his knowledge impaired or judgement of the overall situation clouded. This can affect his judgement and undermine the efforts of his subordinate staff and force elements elsewhere.20 Thus a commander needs to strike a careful balance between forward command and holding further back, where the communications feeds are better and SSA will undoubtedly be richer. The most suitable position for the commander is that point where he can best influence the progress of the 18

See Colonel J M Hall, ‘The Role and Position of the Commander on Today’s Battlefield’ in The British Army and the Operational Level of War, and Richard Holmes, Nuclear Warriors. 19 Extract from Montgomery’s diary notes entitled ‘Review of the Situation in Eighth Army from 12 August to 23 October 1942’, quoted by Brooks, Stephen. (Ed.) Montgomery and the Eighth Army. Montgomery’s action caused a decisive improvement in air/land cooperation which greatly contributed to the ultimate success of the campaign from El Alamein to Tunis. It also resulted in less interference by the Army commander and his staff in the detailed affairs of subordinates – a problem that had bedevilled earlier command organisation. 20 Rommel’s actions in 1940 can equally be used to illustrate the false perspective a commander can acquire by being intimately involved in battle. Rommel’s much reproduced battle map depicting the perceived situation of 7 Pz Div South of Arras 1500-1600 21 May 40 reveals the General’s misconception of five British divisions attacking from the North. The reality was two regiments (-) of mainly Mk 1 infantry tanks with three TA infantry battalions trailing some distance behind on foot. This exaggeration came about because he became intimately involved in the battle to repel the British attack.

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campaign, major operation or battle by making the most timely and informed decisions appropriate to his level of command. Nonetheless he has at times to retain a comprehensive view of the entire prevailing operational situation. SECTION 4 - DEPUTISING COMMAND 32. General. British Army field commanders of fighting formations have traditionally not been supported by deputy commanders. The concept of deputies in the form of seconds in command, however, is not alien to the Army; they exist from section to battalion level and facilitate both a degree of redundancy and manoeuvre. In addition, deputy commanders are usually appointed to brigades in counter insurgency (COIN) operations, the ARRC has a Deputy Commander and a Deputy C-in-C is established at Land Component level. In principle, the requirement for deputy commanders at formation level depends on the circumstances, including the timescale and nature of operations. Deputising of command, however, is not necessarily synonymous with appointing deputy commanders. The overriding principles are firstly that of command authority, which is paramount and concerns also the authority and trust vested in a chief of staff by his commander; secondly accountability; and thirdly the expediency and flexibility that characterises the British Army’s approach to operations. The last dictates that the span of command or the nature of operations can make the appointment of a deputy useful, if only to supervise preparations or to control elements not in contact, thus freeing the commander to do his job unfettered by unnecessary administrative preoccupations. 33. Requirements. There is a requirement for deputisation when one or more of the following conditions apply: a. When there is a need to provide short term relief for the commander; for example if he is injured or required to be absent from theatre. b. When succession in the chain of command must be provided; for example in the event that the original commander was killed seriously injured or relieved of command. Until a successor is formally appointed the declared alternate commander will assume command until relieved; this appointment is formally stated in the relevant OpO, and will normally be the next senior combat or combat support CO or commander. c. When there is a need to reduce the burden on a commander by delegating responsibilities. A discrete task may be delegated to a deputy. d. At the operational level, when deputy commanders of multinational or joint forces are required in order to promote the cohesion of such forces. 34. Reliefs. In the absence of established deputy commanders, senior arms advisers or principal general staff officers, such as chiefs of staff, can provide temporary reliefs for commanders for short periods during which no major command decisions are expected. The appointment of informal deputies within a formation headquarters is up to the local commander to determine, dependent on the seniority, training, ability, experience and other tasks of the individuals concerned. The importance of providing reliefs for commanders is illustrated by the debilitating effects of sleep deprivation on performance, including decision making ability, illustrated in Annex B. Some individuals are more susceptible to sleep

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deprivation than others; commanders have a duty to impose adequate sleep routines on themselves and on their subordinates. 35. Succession. Seconds in command provide succession at the lower tactical levels and are normally available to assume command at little or no notice if the original commander is no longer available to exercise command. On operations at formation level, procedures for alternate command rest on nominating a subordinate commander to assume command. The potential practical difficulties of adopting this procedure should be recognised when setting up the organisation of command for a particular campaign or major operation. A subordinate not only has to move to join the superior headquarters (if it still exists) - which will take time - but also has to acquaint himself fully with the situation at that level of command before he is in a position to assume command effectively. This will be achieved more quickly if he is fully conversant with his predecessor's intent. 36. Delegation. Delegating command responsibilities allows the senior commander to concentrate on particular areas or concerns, leaving a nominated assistant or deputy to concentrate on others. For example, deputy commanders may have specific, delegated powers of budgetary and financial responsibility in peacetime. Alternatively, those who deputise for the commander in peacetime may not necessarily deploy with a formation to a theatre of operations being retained at the home base to look after the residual responsibilities of deploying commanders and to train reinforcing units.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 1 COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS (1)

FULL (2)

OPCOM (2)

Assign Separate Employment of Components of Units/Fmns

X

X

2.

Assign Missions

X

X

X

3.

Assign Tasks (4)

X

X

X

X

4.

Delegate Equal Comd/Con Status

X

X (5)

X (5)

X (5)

5.

Delegate Lower Comd/Con Status

X

X

X

X

6.

Coord of Local Mov, Real Estate and Area Def

X

X

X

X

7.

CSS Responsibility

X

SER

COMD

1.

OPCON (2)

TACOM (3)

TACON

UC ADMIN

UC ADMIN LESS “...”

UCDM

X X

X

X

1. States of comd and con will always be qualified by the DTG at which they begin. The DTG at which they end should also be specified if known. 2. A comd assigned forces under FULL COMD or OPCOM may employ those forces for any purpose. Forces assigned under OPCON may only be employed within certain constraints, such as function, time or loc, imposed by the higher auth which assigns the forces. 3. A comd assigned forces under TACOM may alloc tasks to those forces but only in accordance with the msn given to him by the higher auth which assigns the forces. 4. Mission is defined in AAP-6 as: “A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose”. 5. Only with agreement of comd holding higher level of comd status. Note this is greater auth than that defined in AAP-6.

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 1

MENTAL FACTORS AND SLEEP LOSS1

1

Factor

Effect

Counter Measure

(a)

(b)

(c)

Attention

Lapses of attention increase in frequency and duration; information is often not registered.

Decision and calculations must be cross-checked.

Initiative

The ability to initiate work decreases: tasks imposed by others are less likely to be affected.

Insight

Insight is reduced; performance and abilities are over-estimated.

Motivation

Motivation is reduced.

A ‘mental lift’ or high morale can counter this.

Memory

Short term memory is impaired.

Increased reliance must be placed on written means of communication.

General

Fatigue, irritability, feelings of persecution, inability to concentrate, and periods of misinterpretation and disorientation.

In every 24 hours, 4 hours sleep is likely to maintain adequate performance over several weeks.

Prepared after consultation with DERA Centre for Human Sciences, Farnborough.

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CHAPTER 2 COMMAND SUPPORT SECTION 1 – THE FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND SUPPORT GENERAL 1. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to describe the organisation of command support arrangements in relation to those for command, and the means by which command is exercised. 2. A commander needs support if he is to exercise command effectively. At every level of command above the lowest tactical level, there are four basic support requirements: a. Personnel who assist the commander on his behalf (the staff, arms advisers and liaison officers). This is addressed in this Chapter. b.

Robust communication and information systems. This is covered in Chapter 7.

c. A secure working base for the commander and his staff (a headquarters) which includes an administrative and security organisation to protect, sustain and move the commander and his staff. This is addressed in Chapter 6. d. Standard Operating Procedures and Instructions (SOPs and SOIs), including those for decision making, which focus command and staff effort within and between headquarters. This is covered in Chapters 3, 4 and 6. 3. Command Support is the promulgation of a commander’s decisions, guidance and intent with subsequent supervision and adjustment of subordinate forces’ execution to ensure compliance with the commander’s intent. Command support may take place before, during and after operations. This may be exercised directly or indirectly by directive, plan or procedure. Information and time are critical to command support. 4.

The principles of Command Support are to: a.

Allow subordinates maximum freedom of decision and action.

b. Create, maintain, and disseminate the Common Operating Picture (COP). The COP brings together essential elements of G2, G3, G1/4 (this information can equally be J2 or N3 etc), Fires and ISTAR with the intention of presenting a layered approach to depicting SA1.

1

c.

Use common doctrinal procedures, graphics, and terms.

d.

Provide for flexibility and adaptability.

Layers of the COP are not restricted to those listed but are too numerous to detail and subject to change.

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5. The commander, with the help of his staff, uses command support to regulate forces and functions of subordinate and supporting units in military operations to ensure that a mission is accomplished. Command support provides situation information, such as mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available from all sources. A commander uses this information to adjust the resources, concept or objective of a plan or to exploit success in operations. DESIGN OF COMMAND SUPPORT 6. When designing a command support organisation, the elements should be seen as forming a cohesive whole so that resources are not wasted on duplication. There is a temptation to let the size of the staff (and hence the headquarters) grow. If unchecked, it will expand to unmanageable (and dangerous) proportions, risking its own survivability. Operations in Iraq in 2003 showed the overblown size and inefficiency of divisional and brigade HQs: “A staff officer…remarked that orders were ‘invariably’ quite thick but too late…Recent operational analysis has indicated that in a typical formation HQ 40% of the staff do nothing useful and a further 20% produce considerable nugatory output.” 2 7. The design process has also to take full account of the threats to a command system: those posed by the enemy, including Command and Control Warfare (C2W), environmental conditions and self inflicted threats illustrated in Figure 2.1. The design will always start from an estimate of the need; Annex A provides a detailed description of Command and Control Warfare and Information Operations. C2W is the deliberate targeting of the enemy’s ability to command and is a significant aspect of waging modern warfare. Aspects of defence against C2W are explained at Annex B, Operational Security (OPSEC). OPSEC describes physical and information protection measures which we can adopt to prevent the C2 initiative passing to the enemy

2

Operations in Iraq, An Analysis from the Land Perspective. Chapter 4 Para 408. CGS. Army Code 71816.

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ENVIRONMENTAL ENEMY THREATS CONDITIONS Deception, Surprise & PSYOPS

SELF INFLICTED THREATS

• • • • • •

Human Failings Information Overload Equipment Failures Computer Keyboard Anxiety Size Resource Costs

Intercept Direction Finding

Fusion

COMMAND SYSTEM Other Sensors Command Decision

Destruction/ • Air Suppression • Aviation • Artillery • Direct Action • Jamming • Computer Virus • NBC

Physical Attack Measures Electronic

Figure 2.1 – Generic Threats to a Command System SECTION 2 - THE STAFF 8. General. The staff exists to assist and support the commander. The staff of a HQ has no authority in itself; authority stems from a commander and it is exercised in his name. 9. Duties of the Staff. Regardless of the level of command, the staff has two main roles: a. Assisting the Commander. The staff has the duty to advise, assist and temper the commander in his decision making. In assisting the commander, the staff focuses on the two major functions of coordinating and monitoring. Under the function of coordinating, the staff supports the commander by gathering, processing, analysing and presenting information in a manner that helps the commander to select a particular course of action. The staff is then responsible for planning and the preparation and dissemination of control measures, normally promulgated in the form of orders. In the second and overlapping function of monitoring, the staff provides part of the dynamic feedback mechanism essential for timely decision making. Issue 3.0: Nov 07

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b. Helping Formations and Units. The staff also exists to help subordinate formations and units. Their ability to live, train and fight depends to a large extent on the actions of the staff of their superior headquarters. Montgomery wrote: 'the staff must be the servants of the troops, and a good staff officer must serve his commander and the troops but must himself be anonymous.'3 In the eyes of both superior and subordinate commanders and staffs, the mark of a proficient headquarters is its staff's capacity to work in a timely, efficient, and cooperative manner. Staff should not 'sit' on information. It is the responsibility of the staff to ensure relevant information is passed to subordinate and flanking formations and units. 10. Role of the Staff in Decision Making. A commander is not the sole decision maker. In practice, he focuses the efforts of his staff by giving guidance and making the key decisions from which a framework of action is developed. By devolving decisions and setting priorities, the commander can concentrate on his own business of making the essential decisions applicable to his level of command. In lowering the level of routine internal decision making, the commander allows his staff to act within his overall intentions and to take decisions within their own areas of responsibility. This is consistent with, and an integral part of, Mission Command. THE STAFF OFFICER 11.

Essential Features. The staff officer assists his commander by: a. Understanding his commander's future requirements and offering informed advice when called for, or if an important factor has been overlooked. b. Providing the commander with information to assist him in reaching decisions, whilst making his own decisions within his delegated areas of responsibility, thus protecting the commander from irrelevant detail. c. Developing and implementing the commander's plan by issuing and monitoring the execution of directives and orders on his behalf.

12. Qualities of a Staff Officer. The most fundamental requirement for a staff officer is to understand fully his commander’s intent. Many of the qualities required by commanders apply to staff officers.4 This is particularly so for more senior staff officers in both national and multinational appointments who may have considerable delegated powers of command or management authority and responsibility. Staff officers also work with subordinates and support personnel (such as clerks and signallers) and thus will be required to lead others. In addition to the fundamental quality of leadership, shared by all officers, the following personal qualities grouped under character, intellect and industry typify a good staff officer: a. Character. A staff officer has to be loyal, tactful, trustworthy and supportive of his commander yet at the same time retain an independence of thought and 3

Field Marshal Montgomery. Memoirs. A former Chief of the German General Staff advised: “In forming a Staff for war the qualifications required include not only a great professional knowledge and acquaintance with Service routine, but above all things character, self-denial, energy, tact and discretion” (General Bronsart von Schellendorf. The Duties of the General Staff.) (Fourth Edition, 1905).

4

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judgement. He should accept responsibility willingly and stand by his decisions; he advises, consults and cooperates with others, and should be prepared to represent other's decisions and to sacrifice self or vested interests. A wise staff officer will also cultivate a pleasant disposition. A previous similar publication SD in the Field (1962) advised 'Good manners and a sense of humour will often help a staff officer to achieve results which could not be otherwise obtained'. He needs to have the integrity to admit to error. b. Intellect. No staff officer will succeed unless he is professionally competent. This involves research and subsequent mastery of his area of responsibility or field of interest. He needs to understand and be capable of using all the command support tools at his disposal. He has to be knowledgeable, imaginative, capable of anticipating, acting and reacting in a flexible manner, thinking and working under pressure, and of communicating accurately, both verbally and on paper, with emphasis on clear, succinct, powers of expression. Above all, he should be capable of taking a broader view of his responsibilities and not allow himself to become too compartmentalised in his outlook. c. Industry. The object of most staffwork is to relieve the commander of routine and detailed work. Therefore, despite the requirements for originality and creativity, the reality of much staff work is solid hard work, where a methodical, systematic approach and eye for detail are also necessary. If a staff officer is responsible for a team, he has to be able to delegate responsibility, coordinate their work and succinctly, accurately and on time, present a solution based on team effort. 13. Implications for Self Development. All staff officers should take an interest in the activities of their superiors and of other branches of the staff and so widen their professional horizons. This not only prepares individuals for more senior positions in command or on the staff but also allows them, if the need arises, to take over from other members of the staff, adding an element of flexibility to a HQ. A commander should foster this ethos within his staff and develop it through training. 14. The British Army Staff System. The British Army does not possess a unified general staff system in the continental sense. It makes no formal distinction - either by dress, qualifications or title - between members of the staff and those serving at regimental duty and makes little distinction between members of the staff and those of a general staff. 15. Staff Nomenclature.5 The staff are organised into the “G” – denoting Land HQs and 1 to 9 structure with general responsibilities as follows: a. G1 – Personnel and Administration (maintaining differences from the NATO system)

5

b.

G2 – Intelligence and Security

c.

G3 – Operations (including integrating all the kinetic and non kinetic effects)

d.

G4 – Logistics

With effect from 1 Jan 05.

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e.

G5 – Plans (and Policy)

f.

G6 – Communications and Information Systems

g.

G7 – Doctrine and Training

h.

G8 – Resources and Finances

i.

G9 – Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

16. Staff Titles. All staff job titles have a single reference to the above structure; examples are - SO2 G1 Legal, SO3 G2 Int and Sy, SO2 G3 O&D, SO1 G4 Log/Plans, SO2 G5 Plans, SO2 G6 IM, SO3 G7 Trg, SO1 G8 Fin, SO2 G9 CIMIC. 17. Employment. The staff structures, though broadly organised, will at all times be flexibly adapted on operations to achieve the effect required by the commander. The integration of the staff in whatever groupings required brings the synergy required to act and achieve the desired effect. The basic organisation and structure will be influenced by a Command and Control Estimate and Formation SOPs.6 When acting in any routine or land based role it will retain the G1-9 structure, and only in the instance where it is required to act as a JTF HQ will it transfer to the joint nomenclature, and hence J1-9. In common with most armies, British staff officers are employed above unit level in three main ways: a. As General Staff Officers. General staff officers may be members of joint staffs, either in the Ministry of Defence Central Staffs, or at joint or multinational headquarters, and other establishments, or of single Service staffs. The majority of those employed within the Army are members of general staff branches in headquarters. General staff officers are appointed without regard to cap badge, although some posts may be annotated as more suitable for officers with particular training, Arm or Service experience. b. As Specialists. Specialist staff officers normally deal with single Arm or Service matters in combat support, command support or combat service support branches. Officers are normally appointed to specialist staff posts with regard to cap badge and Arm or Service experience. c. As Personal Staff. Personal staff officers have such roles as military assistants (MA) and aides de camp (ADC). An MA is a commander's personal staff officer whose work will largely depend on the individual commander. An ADC is particularly concerned with the personal and social requirements of his commander. At formation level, an MA is also a trained officer who has to work closely with officers from all branches of the staff and with those of superior and subordinate headquarters. SECTION 3 - SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES 18. General. The commander requires a number of key advisers to relieve him of the burden of control, and to provide timely and unfiltered advice in support of his decision making. At formation level and above, this group will normally include the heads of the 6

See AFM Vol 1 Pt 1 Formation Tactics, Chap 4 Pt 1.

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general staff branches, together with the Arms Advisers and, possibly, Heads of Service. At Corps level and above the work of the staff is coordinated by the Chief of Staff, the commander's principal general staff officer. In contrast to most NATO armies, however, the British Army also has two principal general staff officers at divisional and brigade levels.7 The COS coordinates the G2, G3, G5, G6, G7 and G9 functions, and the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) coordinates G1/G4 and normally the G8 function. 19. Role of the COS. Although the COS at formation level is not the commander’s deputy, compared to the DCOS and others of equal rank he is primus inter pares; he has to be capable of acting on behalf of his commander, including decision making in his absence, and coordinating the work of all staff branches. In this respect, the development of a close working relationship, based on mutual understanding and trust between a commander and his COS is vital. 20. Arms Advisers. A commander frequently has the services of an adviser from one or more of the main combat support arms (artillery and engineer). Arms Advisers are either part of the staff or are attached to the HQ of the formation or unit being supported. They may have the dual function of advising the commander on matters affecting their own arm and of commanding their own troops. They usually accompany the commander on his reconnaissance and should be involved in the planning stage of an operation. To enable them to carry out their work efficiently they, and their staffs, have to be kept fully informed by the formation staff. Arms Advisers have the right of direct access to the commander at all times; their staff to the COS. Arms Advisers also have the right of access to their functional superior at the next higher headquarters. However, such contact should be confined to special to arm matters so as not to circumvent the chain of command. 21. Heads of Services. In a similar way to Arms Advisers, formation commanders down to divisional level receive advice from their Heads of Services who are also commanders of combat service support arms in their own right. At divisional level, these include Commander Medical, Commander Logistic Support and Commander Equipment Support. There are also Service representatives at brigade headquarters. Heads of Services, although having the right of access to the formation commander as in the case of Arms Advisers, normally work through the formation DCOS. RELATIONSHIPS INVOLVING THE STAFF 22. Between the Commander and his Staff. The relationship between a commander and his staff should be characterised by a climate of loyalty, respect and individual initiative rather than one that is sycophantic and unquestioning; the independence of thought and timely action implicit in Mission Command is vital. 23. Between The Staff and Other Levels of Command. The relationship between the staff and subordinate and superior commanders and their staffs is important. It should be based upon mutual respect and developed through a conscientious, determined and helpful approach to problem solving; anything less will undermine confidence in the exercise of command at all levels. Friendly personal relationships between all members of a 7

The origins are historical: the COS assumed the function of the Colonel ‘GS’ at divisional level and brigade major at brigade level, whilst the DCOS assumed the role of the Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (DAA & QMG or ‘DQ’) at both levels. Previously the title COS was reserved for use at Army or Army Group level.

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headquarters and with the staff of superior and subordinate headquarters are thus essential. 24. Staff Integration and Teamwork. The creation of an effective and closely knit staff team during peacetime both within and between headquarters and units is essential. A staff cannot work efficiently without complete cooperation between all branches and services. There must be no secrets between branches and no abrogation of responsibilities. The COS and other principal general staff officers have a key role in fostering this atmosphere. This environment can be frustrated by frequent changes in personalities and infrequent opportunities to exercise under operational circumstances. Groupings and work practices are unlikely to remain static. Many of the British Army's past and present operations have been characterised by the forming of ad hoc headquarters, formations and units and the integration of additional personnel from coalition partners and the reserves. Therefore forming a well integrated staff team has to be built on operational deployment. Team building is a command skill which requires practice. 25. Access to the Commander. While it is important, at all levels, that a commander strives to maintain a two way contact with all members of his staff, this becomes increasingly impractical at each level of command. At battlegroup level, all the commander's staff will have frequent contact with him in peace and on operations. At higher levels, commanders may choose to allow a wide range of staff officers to have direct access to them in peace. During operations, however, this may become less feasible and a commander may elect to limit access. The personal relationships created in peace and so essential to the maintenance of trust can be fostered by involving a large number of staff officers in information briefings, thereby acknowledging their contribution as well as allowing them to hear the commander's deliberations. Decision briefings, however, may often have to be restricted to a smaller group who contribute to the commander's decision making process. SECTION 4 – THE COMMAND SUPPORT PROCESS 26. Mission Command, which underpins the Manoeuvrist Approach, requires a style of command which promotes freedom and speed of action and initiative. Command support processes must be structured and integrated in ways which enable rather than hinder command. Command support to the decision making process is structured around four interrelated and dependent activities - plan, review, execute and evaluate. They are referred to as PREE. The PREE activities provide an overarching structure to all command support processes conducted by tactical level HQs. 27. Throughout the PREE process runs the need to maintain orientation, both external and internal inputs and outputs. Notwithstanding the structure imposed by PREE, all staff activity must be focussed on the outputs of developing plans, issuing orders and ensuring effective execution of operations. Above all they provide a framework for the development of staff procedures which enable the commander to make informed, timely decisions. PREE ACTIVITIES 28. The processes and activities within PREE are illustrated in Figure 2.2 and described below.

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PREE

Conduct Estimate and Plan

Produce Orders

Backbrief

New Estimate

PLAN

Analysis

REVIEW Major

Change?

Confirm Orders

Issue Orders

Minor

ENACT Execute Control Command

EXECUTE

EVALUATE

V

Monitor

CONPLAN Enacted

Existing OSW Amended

Yes Coord

New OSW Created Major

Analysis

Plan Invalid

Minor Quick Estimate

Figure 2.2 – Plan Review Execute Evaluate

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29. Plan. Planning activities are the start of the command support process. Supported by his staff, the commander conducts his initial estimate and produces orders. Formal staff procedures such as the Combat and Tactical Estimates are used. This activity ends with the dissemination of orders to subordinates who then carry out their own planning and orders process. 30. Review. As a result of subordinates’ analysis, mission rehearsals and/or the receipt of Relevant Information (Rel I) there may be a requirement to review the original orders. Once issues highlighted by subordinates or the staff’s own post planning analysis are collated, the commander and his staff will review the plan. There are three COAs: a.

Do nothing and implement the plan in its original form.

b.

Make a minor change to the plan and produce confirmatory orders.

c.

As a result of a major change conduct a new planning process.

The review function is not always required. In certain circumstances, especially at the lower tactical levels or where swift action is required, subordinates will simply be required to execute the given plan. 31. The Enact Line. The enact line is a defined a point in time or space at which preparations for an operation are completed and execution begins. For example, the Enact Line is crossed when vehicles begin moving in accordance with a MovO. If the order becomes invalid by virtue of changing circumstances or is completed, a new planning process begins and the Enact Line is crossed in the reverse direction back to the Plan and Review Functions. 32. Execute. Once the orders are enacted, either after Review or directly from Plan, execution staff activity starts. Execution relies heavily upon the personal involvement of the commander and no amount of detailed planning can negate this. Command is complemented by controls which in broad terms are activities that address two fundamental questions: a.

What is the actual situation compared with the desired end state (Monitoring)?

b. Are adjustments to the orders (and plan) necessary to reconcile the situation and achieve the commander’s intent (Coordination)? The key activity for successful conduct of this activity is G3 staff analysis of the situation based on a flow of Rel I and R38. In particular, G3 staff identify and forecast if there are any changes which invalidate the original plan; and if this is the case any required change is analysed. 33. Evaluate. Evaluate activities are conducted if the staff conducting the execute function become aware of a significant variation from planning assumptions. Evaluation of operational success must be made against predetermined success factors understood by the staff. Plans staff must develop appropriate contingency actions which the commander and staff will evaluate in the light of any change in circumstances. Timely decision making 8

Requests, Reports and Returns.

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is the key to the evaluate staff activity and HQ SOIs must contain appropriate drills or procedures. Following a decision to adjust the plan there will be one of four options: a.

An existing CONPLAN is selected, amended and then issued as a FragO.

b. As a result of a minor change to the plan, existing documentation is amended eg a minor boundary amendment or a change to an element of the DSM. A FragO will then be issued to update subordinates. c. After a major change to the plan new documentation is created or existing documentation radically amended eg the addition of a new DP to the DSM, a FragO is issued to update subordinates. d. The plan is now invalid and the staff reverts to the Plan function to begin planning based on the new situation eg receipt of new orders. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (IM) 34. IM is driven by the Information Requirement (IR) processes expanded upon in Chapter 7. There is nothing new in the requirement to manage information in a HQ, but digitisation has vastly increased the quantity and quality of information available to the staff. Precision, Order and Discipline (POD) are key to ensuring that the right information is in the right place at the right time. Information and its management compose the central hub of staff operations. IM is a separate but supporting function critical to the provision of timely Rel I to enable decision making. 35. The PREE activities all depend on the provision of timely information. Information must be seen as a central activity within a HQ and not owned by specific staff cells. For example, information initially required by G5 staff during planning will subsequently be needed by the operations staff during the execution. Figure 2.3 illustrates the central nature of IM.

Plan

Review

IM

Execute

Evaluate

Figure 2.3 – The Central Role of IM Issue 3.0: Nov 07

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PLANNING AND EXECUTION TEMPO 36. The finite organic staff and command support resources within a HQ mean that the ability to conduct functions effectively on both sides of the Enact Line is directly related to the tempo of operations and availability of staff. Whilst high intensity operations may have the potential to preclude the ability to plan and review whilst executing and evaluating, lower tempo operations may allow all functions to be conducted simultaneously. Enhanced planning capability at one level of command can have a detrimental effect on those subordinate to it. During Op TELIC 1, one brigade HQ used four unestablished plans officers working around the clock to produce contingency plans; not one was executed. 37. A major consequence of excessive planning is the workload it imposes upon subordinate HQs. Being smaller they are even less able to cope. Increasing planning capability therefore has the potential to stifle information flows and delay orders, thus leaving the planning cycle way behind the execution cycle. SIMULTANEOUS AND SEQUENTIAL ACTIVITIES 38. Although Figure 2.3 depicts PREE as a sequence, staff must be aware that some activities will be conducted simultaneously. Execution is a constant activity and therefore staff must be also always be available to conduct the evaluate function. In other words execution will always be happening concurrently to the other functions. In many cases execution may be limited to force protection and administration activities. Operational tempo and staff availability, as expressed above, will determine the ability of a HQ to conduct multiple functions simultaneously. 39. The plan is, in effect, handed over to the operations staff by the plans staff; in smaller HQs plans staff will then supplement the operations staff during the execution of the plan. Whatever tempo of operation, staff must be available and ready to react to a change in the execution of a plan. Where possible, operations staff involved in execute activities should not be involved in evaluate activities.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 2 INFORMATION OPERATIONS (INFO OPS) AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W) GENERAL 1. Effective command and control is ultimately based on information; without adequate information, decision making is reduced to guesswork. The commander has to make every effort to influence (deny, degrade, destroy, deceive) an enemy’s information systems, while at the same time protecting his own systems of gathering information. Information Operations (Info Ops) have been developed to achieve this1. 2. Info Ops are defined as: “Actions taken to influence decision makers in support of political and military objectives by affecting other’s information, information based processes, C2 systems and Communication Information Systems (CIS) while exploiting and protecting one’s own information and information systems”2; and in UK Joint Doctrine is defined as “Coordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by undermining his will, cohesion and decision making ability, through affecting his information, information based processes and systems while protecting one’s own decision makers and decision making processes”3. Whilst NATO and Joint Doctrine have similar definitions and use similar tools for Info Ops, the processes and some of the nomenclature are subtly different. This publication follows NATO Doctrine but commanders and staffs should be aware of the contents of JWP 3-80. In essence, Info Ops bring together both political and military objectives and involve the orchestration of a wide range of military and non military capabilities. Info Ops are generally directed at the strategic and operational level, but the implementation of certain aspects of the overall Info Ops plan will invariably involve tactical activities. The concepts of Info Ops and EBAO are closely interwoven: the former is seen as an appropriate method for achieving the objectives of the latter. See Chapter 1 Para 10. 3. Command and Control Warfare (C2W) is the operational strategy that is complementary to Info Ops. It is defined as: “The integrated use of all military capabilities including Operations Security (OPSEC), deception, Psychological Operations4 (PSYOPS), Electronic Warfare (EW), and physical destruction supported by all source intelligence and CIS to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary’s C2 capabilities while protecting friendly C2 activities against similar actions”. C2W is applicable in any operation, especially warfighting, where there is an enemy or potential enemy. Its key constituents of offensive and defensive C2W imply a warfighting emphasis, within given rules of engagement (ROE). Its five principal elements, OPSEC5, Deception, PSYOPS, EW and physical destruction, are military capabilities in their own right and should be familiar to all commanders. It is their integration and resultant synergy that give C2W its effectiveness. The concepts and doctrine for C2W are well established. It is planned and coordinated at the operational (JFHQ) level, and is beyond the scope of this particular 1

See ADP Land Operations Chapter 2 para 0241. The definition is taken from MC422 dated 15 Dec 98 “NATO Information Operations Policy”. 3 The definition is taken from JWP 3-80. 4 The UK uses the term Information Support to cover national psychological operations outside of warfighting. 5 See AFM Vol 1 Part 4, Countersurveillance, OPSEC and Deception, Parts B and C. 2

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publication. However, implementation of some aspects of the plan will be a tactical concern. Further details are contained in JWP 0-10 and Formation SOPs. COMMAND OF C2W 4. Control of C2W strategy has to be conducted at the operational level since synergy will only be possible through full integration of all component parts of the C2W plan at that level. The enemy’s command systems need to be attacked throughout the depth and width of his area at the same time thereby overloading his ability to absorb punishment and reducing his overall cohesion. Decisions for the operational commander include: a. The degree to which the enemy is denied use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). b. The level of protection allocated to friendly use of the spectrum and the conditions and limitations imposed upon that use. 5. These decisions will be governed by the extent to which friendly and enemy forces rely upon their use of the EMS for both the acquisition of information and for command. SUMMARY 6. Commanders at the tactical level will need to be aware of the overall C2W strategy in order that their own aspects of C2W operations are integrated and coordinated with those of the higher formation. Above all, when planning and conducting operations, C2W should be seen as confirmation of the hard won knowledge that the destruction or survival of a command system is very often the key to success or failure in battle.

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 2 OPERATIONAL SECURITY (OPSEC) 1. OPSEC is not a capability but rather a vital force protection discipline that guides the employment of the tools on which Info Ops draws to protect friendly decision makers. It requires the identification, within specific operations or exercises, of those Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) which allow identified decision makers to undermine friendly decision superiority and influence friendly effects. OPSEC is based on focused intelligence that assesses the threat to EEFI, taking account of an adversary’s capabilities, intentions and opportunities to disrupt friendly activity. It then determines the use of measures to afford the appropriate protection to EEFI. The delivery of such protection may include the judicious use of force protection (FP) and wider security measures, which are closely related disciplines providing generic protection in line with standing policy. Critically, OPSEC qualifies the use of such disciplines in operational circumstances, based on specific risks to critical information. Typical measures employed are: a. Passive Measures. Passive measures are those applied to our own procedures and capability to protect EEFI. These include elements of security (particularly those within Information Security (INFOSEC)), FP, EW, force posture, profile and camouflage, concealment and deception (CCD), including counter surveillance control measures (CSCM). Protective security of systems and information includes communications security (COMMSEC) and computer security (COMPUSEC). b. Active Measures. Where passive measures are judged to be insufficient to protect EEFI, active measures will be needed. Active measures aim to reduce specific threats by denying, degrading or destroying enemy ISTAR assets and could include deception, EW, Computer Network Attack (CNA) or physical destruction. The need for such measures will be driven within Info Ops planning by OPSEC and CCD requirements. A coherent counter ISTAR capability requires development. 2. Application. OPSEC should an integral part of all planning for operations from start to finish. OPSEC is applicable at all levels of command and should address an operation in its totality, from activity in the home base through to the tactical forces in a Joint Operational Area (JOA) and the related activities of commercial partners and Other Government Departments (OGD). At each level, OPSEC should be an integral part of G3/5, consulting with specialist staff, particularly G2 and G6, to determine the EEFI and develop threat analyses to establish the risk of compromise. OPSEC staff should then decide how best to mitigate any risk. This will include an examination of what standard FP and security measures are in place and whether they are appropriate. If standard measures are inadequate or excessive, additional or special measures or waivers, and their impacts should be identified. The result should be a series of measures, coordinated with wider military activity, which preserve OPSEC without unduly restricting operations.

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CHAPTER 3 PLAN AND REVIEW SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION 1. The purpose of this Chapter is to provide guidance on the conduct of planning and the military decision making process. Section 1 is an introduction, Section 2 explains the Tactical Estimate (the Six Steps), Section 3 covers the Combat Estimate (the Seven Questions (7Q)). TERMINOLOGY 2. As the decision making process involves activity by both the commander and the staff, it could be described as a Command and Staff Estimate. For reasons of brevity it is termed the Estimate in this publication.1 Although the decision making process may be a group activity with elements occurring simultaneously, the responsibility for taking major tactical decisions lies exclusively with the commander. LEVELS OF DECISION MAKING 3.

UK military doctrine recognises two levels of decision making. a. The Operational Level. Operational level decision making is set against the strategic context of the operational problem. It uses the Operational Estimate2 process to produce a winning concept and translate it into a workable plan. The operational level is responsible for the campaign plan and it directs the activities of the environmental components.3 b. The Tactical Level. Battles and engagements are planned and executed at the tactical level in order to achieve operational objectives. The tactical level requires Military Decision Making and Planning (MDMP) processes that span both the complex long lead time planning inherent in expeditionary deployment and rapid changes of mission executed by formations to generate tempo. This dual requirement was the genesis of the Combat Estimate based on 7Q. There is now, however, recognition that land formations may conduct more complex and extended planning cycles within an operational Campaign Plan, for which 7Q might lack sufficient rigour. The Tactical Estimate fills this gap between quick planning at formation level and the more deliberate planning which occurs at Land Component (LC) level and above.

RESPONSIBILITIES 4. The Commander. In the British Army the command and staff estimate process has been traditionally led by the commander, not driven by the staff. In joint or combined 1

In accordance with NATO doctrine, the British Army has adopted the term ‘estimate’ which has replaced the ‘appreciation’ at the tactical and operational levels. The appreciation, described in JSP 101, is rarely used by the other Services and in the Ministry of Defence who now make use of the term ‘estimate’. 2 JWP 5-00 Joint Operational Planning. 3 Maritime, Land, Air, Log and SF.

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headquarters at the higher tactical or operational levels within NATO, a greater degree of responsibility has been accorded to the staff. As the commander is responsible for the direction of the decision making cycle, he must be fully involved in the estimate at its initial stage and, as he makes the decision, he has to be involved in its final stage. The extent to which the commander is involved in the detailed evaluation of the factors in between will depend on a number of considerations, including: a.

The prevailing situation (in particular, the time available to make a decision).

b.

The state of training and experience of the staff.

c.

The level of decision making required.

d.

The potential complexity of the required decision.

e.

The style and personality of the commander himself.

f. The need for the commander to work flexibly. He might be drawn away from the HQ, for recces or visits to subordinate units or higher HQ, during the development of the plan. 5.

The Staff. a. Planning Responsibilities. The staff is responsible for completing the bulk of the estimate under the direction of the commander, or his principal general staff officer. At lower tactical levels the staff is concerned with detailed evaluation of information and the conduct of staff checks on behalf of the commander. At the higher tactical levels and at the operational level (particularly in joint and combined operations), the staff will often be required to develop possible courses of action, for the commander to compare and decide upon. While the staff may present the commander with courses of action, they do not make the decision. The Estimate process requires open access to the commander for the staff to obtain clarification and advice as necessary. b. Planning Responsibilities in Digitised HQs. The principles of planning in digital and non digital HQs are the same. The focus for planning in digitised HQs therefore remains unchanged from current practice. The process may become more difficult as a result of new infrastructure and procedures and hence greater discipline is required to manage the potential friction and information management concerns.

THE ESTIMATE 6. The purpose of the Estimate is to make a decision for a course of action, appropriate to the level of command, from a body of information or picture of a campaign, major operation, battle or engagement. As the situation changes, the mission and relevant factors are reassessed logically. In this sense, the Estimate can be looked on as a continuous cycle which can be returned to when needed4. This publication concentrates on the stages concerned and sets out the sequence of factors to be considered to ensure uniformity. The 4

Chapter 4 – Execution and Evaluate covers decision making post execution.

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detailed manner in which an Estimate is conducted should be determined by the local commander and staff and should be laid down in a SOI. 7. Consistent with the prerequisites of Mission Command, the commander must specify the effects he wishes his subordinates to achieve. At the operational level, the superior commander’s intentions are expressed in a statement of the Commander’s Intent (what needs to be achieved in terms of the desired end state for a campaign or major operation), which is normally refined in a concept of operations (how the level of command will achieve the desired end state). At the tactical level, the superior commander’s concept of operations should include his intent, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort (referred to as the commander’s design for operations). At all levels, stating the commander's intent allows subordinates to exercise initiative in accordance with the commander's aim. The estimate process, of which mission analysis is only a part, helps the subordinate commander at any level to decide how he will achieve the desired effect. 8. Types of Estimates. Ideally, doctrine would have one process which has a common format and which works for both the most complex problems and the most straightforward, irrespective of the time available. But the differing situations in which commanders conduct an estimate require two complementary approaches to the estimate. These are: a.

Tactical Estimate (Six Steps) – Section 2

b.

Combat Estimate (7 Qs) – Section 3 SECTION 2 - THE TACTICAL ESTIMATE

INTRODUCTION 9. The tactical estimate provides a process that can be used by formation headquarters conducting complex planning with time available, within the context of a campaign plan, and where the campaign planning concepts have been decided at the operational level by the JFHQ. As with the joint estimate, from which the process has been developed, and the combat estimate, the tactical estimate seeks to produce a winning concept through analysis that is focused by the commander’s direction. 10. The tactical estimate consists of analysis in six linked stages, common in format, process and outputs to the operational estimate. It requires both concurrent and sequential analysis and is designed to enable the commander, supported by the staff, to understand the problem, identify the art of the possible, select a winning concept and translate it into a workable plan within the available time. It consists of the following. a. Step 1 - Review of situation (analysis of the situation in the context of the operational level). b.

Step 2 - Identify and analyse the problem. This is split into two further steps. (1)

Step 2A - Mission Analysis.

(2)

Step 2B - Initial object analysis.

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c.

Step 3 - Formulation of potential courses of action (COA) by the Commander.

d.

Step 4 - Development and Validation of COAs.

e.

Step 5 - COA evaluation.

f.

Step 6 – Commander’s decision.

11. The Three Column Format. Both the Tactical Estimate and Combat Estimate benefit from using the tried and tested ‘‘Three Column Format’ analysis technique. When applied intelligently it produces a range of useful and accurate outputs that contribute directly to the development of a winning concept and a workable plan. Analysis of a chosen factor or question is recorded in a thee column table format, with the output listed in the right-hand column. An example of a three column table format is as follows: Ser No5 (a)

Question/Factor

Consideration

(b)

(c)

Input

Process

(Fact or Question)

(So What? Analysis)

Deductions/Task/ Constraint (d) • • • • •

•

Planning guidance. Focussed questions. Tasks. Constraints. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). Clarification.

a. Factor. A factor is a broad subject area that will affect planning, eg enemy, terrain, weather, rules of engagement (ROE) or media. It is tangible and, in its simplest form, is a statement of fact or a question. Any questions posed in the left hand column should be clear and focused. b. Factor Analysis. Analysis is the drawing of a logical conclusion from a factor by mentally asking the question 'So what, how does this affect my ability to produce a solution which resolves the problem, in its operational context?' There may be a requirement for extensive analysis from one piece of information. The analysis is recorded in the centre column, Consideration. The product of this analysis is written in the third column, Task and Constraint, and can be expressed as follows. (1) Planning Guidance. Planning guidance is the conclusion of a thought process thus far, or a ‘peg in the ground’, which will guide and focus further work.

5

Serial Numbers are used to assist the concurrent work of large staffs, and keep track of the rationale behind the output produced.

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(2) Focused Questions. Focused questions are specific questions, normally posed by the commander to staff. They will invariably lead to Information Requirements.6 (3) Tasks. A task which has been identified by the process of analysis, and might be included in the plan, depending on the eventual COA selected. (4)

Constraints. A constraint is something that may limit the plan.

(5) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). Throughout the estimate the commander and the staff will have questions that must be answered to further the process. They are the CCIR. In some cases, the answer to a CCIR may be so critical that work cannot continue until it has been obtained. For the majority of cases, however, assumptions can be made and stated in order for work to progress.7 (6) Clarification. A point of clarification normally means that further explanation must be obtained from the superior headquarters. CONDUCT OF THE TACTICAL ESTIMATE Step 1 - Review of the Situation 12. Step 1 establishes the operational context for the tactical problem. It may be simple for a brigade operating within a divisional framework, or complex for a divisional headquarters acting at the Land Component level. Step 1 ensures that the tactical level commander understands the context of his operations within the overall campaign plan. This will in part be affected by the level at which the commander is conducting the estimate, but since actions at the lower tactical levels can have strategic implications in some operations, an appropriate understanding of the operational level campaign plan is essential. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)8 starts at this point in the headquarters, beginning with the Battlespace Area Evaluation (BAE).9 13. The time available for the conduct of the estimate should be calculated as early as possible. The commander generally allows himself one third of the time for planning and delivering orders, leaving two thirds for subordinates to complete their battle procedure10. 14. For the logistic planners, the assessment of the operational context is an analysis of matching ends with means that can be made available in the timeframe of the operation. Levels of access to the operational theatre will undoubtedly shape the logistic concept for expeditionary operations. 15. At the end of Step 1 the operational context and what is logistically available should be clear to the commander and the staff. Warning Order One should then be sent to the formations or units under command.

6

See Chapter 7. See Chapter 7. 8 See Annex A. 9 See page 3-A-5 of Annex A . 10 See Para 43. 7

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Step 2 - Identify and Analyse the Problem 16. Step 2 consists of two separate parts, conducted concurrently by the commander and the staff. The commander analyses the mission, and the staff the object of the mission. To ensure that this work is coherent and appropriate to the time available, the principal staff officer, normally the COS, should ensure that a plan for this key staff work is drawn up and implemented. Step 2A - Mission Analysis 17. Mission analysis is led by the commander. He will consider what has to be done and why, with IPB informing his thinking about the enemy. What has to be done? relates to the Mission, and Why? is the operational context. Mission Analysis allows a commander, without waiting for further orders, to exercise personal initiative and exploit a situation in a way that would support the achievement of his superiors’ intentions and objectives. Specifically, the commander will determine: a. The Superiors' Intent. (Noting his immediate superior's role in his own commander's plan, what is his immediate superior commander's intent and how should his own action directly support it?). The purpose here is to establish what effect a commander has to achieve in his superior's concept of operations. This requires an understanding of the superior's end state and main effort. A commander is required to understand his superiors' intent two levels up in order to place his own actions into full context. b. Specified and Implied Tasks. (What should a commander do to accomplish his mission?) Specified tasks are those stated in the directives or orders received by the subordinate from his superior commander. Implied tasks are other activities that have to be carried out in order to achieve the mission, including the requirement to support the superior commander's main effort. A logical check of the operation should reveal the implied tasks. A comparison of the specified and implied tasks with the superior commander's intent should lead to an initial deduction of the main effort required of the formation or unit. c. Constraints. Under mission command, a subordinate can assume freedom of action unless he is otherwise constrained. Specific constraints to the way a commander executes his mission may include time, space and resources, including combat service support. (What limitations are there on my freedom of action? What can I not do? When do I need to decide? (his decision point). At all levels, further limiting factors, including political restrictions (such as ROE) which prohibit the commander from undertaking specific actions, may apply. d. Changed Situation. A commander needs to determine whether the situation has changed sufficiently to warrant a review of the estimate. Using mission analysis, the commander reassesses the progress of his operation against his Mission as the situation develops. The commander can ask at any time Has the situation changed and do I need to take another decision?11 As well as No - no change, there are three possible responses: 11

During Step 2A the commander could look at likely situational changes and how he can develop a flexible Contingency Plan.

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(1)

Yes - the situation has changed but his plan is still valid.

(2) Yes - the situation has changed: my original mission is still feasible but he needs to amend his plan.12 (3) Yes - the situation has changed and his original mission is no longer valid. In this case, the commander should consult his superior but if for whatever reason he cannot, he will act on his own initiative to support his superior commander’s main effort, in keeping with that commander’s original intent. He will also keep in mind the commander’s intent two levels of command up.6 18.

Step 2A Output. The outputs from Step 2A will be: a.

Planning guidance to the staff, to keep the staff in the commander’s mind.

b. Questions to the staff to answer specific points, which may well lead to Requests for Information (RFI). c.

Tasks the commander has identified thus far.

d.

CCIRs.

e.

Requests for clarification upwards.

f.

Constraints that the commander has identified.

19. Effects Schematic. At this stage, it may be possible to produce an effects schematic to show the commander’s early thoughts.13 The discipline of identifying effects and presenting them in graphical form imposes a degree of analytical rigour that is helpful in shaping subsequent actions, tasks, purposes and effects. Step 2B - Initial Object Analysis 20. At the same time as the commander is carrying out mission analysis, the staff will consider the object, or principal focus, of the mission. In most military operations that object will be the enemy. Initial object analysis ensures that the planning process focuses upon the enemy from the outset. The staff, using IPB, must therefore assess what the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous COAs might be so that the commander’s plan can be based on a review of the enemy’s COAs at, or near the start of, the estimate process. With an understanding of what the enemy can and might do, the staff can then seek to establish the art of the possible through analysis of ‘the essence of the military problem.’ This concerns the relative capabilities of friendly and enemy forces, interacting with each other and the operational environment (in all its forms), through time and space.

12

In the case of the second and third responses, the commander and his staff then review the Estimate, updating information as required, and confirm the Mission and Decision. 13 An Example of a Commander’s Effects Schematic can be found at Annex B.

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21. In undertaking IPB, the staff considers four principal questions. What is the enemy doing? Why is it doing it? What has the enemy at his disposal? What are the enemy’s potential COAs (the most likely and the most dangerous)? The staff will assess risk and how it can be managed, and consider the enemy’s areas of risk. The staff will also react to the commander’s questions from 2A, which guide and focus their analysis. Ultimately, the chosen COA will consist of a number of specified intended effects against the enemy, represented by Target Areas of Interest (TAIs) on the Decision Support Overlay (DSO)14. Where each of these effects is best achieved will be determined through ground recce and a study of the BAE. At this stage the staff can start to identify Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) in order to confirm enemy COAs. This will lead to the determination of TAIs following Step 4, once the commander has directed the effects he wishes to achieve. Troops to task will have to be assessed to achieve the desired effect in each TAI (arty, avn, engr etc), which guides integration of ISTAR assets to confirm the enemy and to trigger action (NAIs and Decision Points (DPs)). This will in turn require a communications infrastructure so that the whole can identify, report, track and cue action.15 As the staff conducts its analysis the results can be recorded on a draft synchronisation matrix,16 which can support the formulation and development of COAs in Steps 3 and 4 of the estimate. 22. The logistic staff are integrated with planning to ensure that this is viable, that early logistic assumptions remain valid, and that the logistic effort is focused correctly. 23. Step 2B – Output. The staff’s output will be expressed as planning guidance, tasks identified (including suggestions for ISTAR tasking), a timeline to start the synchronisation matrix, suggestions for CCIRs, and any clarification upwards required. 24. Step 2 - Commander’s Initial Conclusions. The analysis of the mission and its object are conducted concurrently, and before proceeding to Step 3 it is necessary to ensure that both the commander and the staff have the same understanding in order to inform, direct and focus work. By this stage the commander will have established the operational context of what he has to do, the nature of the enemy he is to operate against, the specifics of the environment, the time imperative, the nature of the operation he is conducting, and how the effects he wishes to bring to bear can be achieved (and their implications). He can then thus concentrate his and his staff’s effort on the options that appear most feasible. At this point Warning Order Two would be issued. It should include an effects schematic, outline task org, guidance to subordinate formations or units on recce limitations and O Group details. Step 3 - Formulation of Potential COAs by the Commander 25. A number of workable COAs should be apparent to the commander by the end of Step 2. Where the situation is complicated he may examine a wider range of COAs. When time is short, the situation simple, or the options limited, command judgment needs to be exercised to restrict what is considered. This will also depend upon experience and level of training.

14

See page 3-A4-5 of Annex A. The effective conduct of ISR requires the collection of intelligence information from a wide range of sources. The creation of an ISR matrix focuses the use of these scares ISR assets to fulfil the commanders information requirements from the estimate process. 16 See paragraph 69 and Annex C .

15

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26. The commander and the staff will consider the use of deception and OPSEC17 on the enemy (processes leading to the effect of absolute or relative surprise), by assessing three questions: a.

What does the enemy expect us to do?

b.

How are his actions relevant to our COAs?

c.

How can we use this to our advantage?

27. Answers to these questions help to frame the deception plan, expressed in terms of an object, target and story, and the measures to shield our intentions from the enemy. Surprise concerns gaining or wresting the initiative from the enemy, whilst security involves maintaining the initiative and enhancing freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats. The goal should be gaining absolute surprise in order to disrupt or paralyse the enemy commander's will and decision making ability. If this is not possible, the lesser, but often more practicable, objective of relative surprise may be achieved, whereby the enemy determines too late what is likely to happen and is therefore powerless to react. 28. The direction that the commander gives in formulating potential COAs clearly states what has to be accomplished, and creates the framework within which the remainder of the estimate is conducted. At this point the ends should be clear, and possible ways and means are beginning to emerge. The staff continues to examine the relative capabilities of friendly and enemy forces interacting with each other and with the operational environment (in all its forms), through time and space. Logistic feasibility is critical and logistic planners must have been fully involved by this stage to ensure that the formulation of COAs is logistically sustainable, and within the overall resources that can be brought to bear in the timeframe of the operation. The work plan for the staff will be reviewed by the principal staff officer, normally the COS, as the estimate progresses, to ensure that the capacity of the staff is being used to best effect. Step 4 - Development and Validation of COAs 29. In Step 4 the staff’s task is to develop and validate the commander’s potential COAs in order to create detailed and workable COAs that can be tested against one another for their likelihood of success in Step 5. By this stage in the process, the complex nature of operations at the higher tactical level may dislocate the commander from his staff; the commander will continue liaison, visits and discussions, whilst the HQ staff develops the COAs through rigorous analysis. The staff continues to work within commander’s intent and thus carries significant responsibility and executive decision making power in order to ensure that the process is not slowed down. 30. The staff will synchronise activities in time and space, and consider the effect of possible enemy action on each COA. This consideration should be sufficiently detailed to take into account potential enemy actions two levels down. The staff will consider 17

Deception and OPSEC are those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. AFM Vol 1 Part 4. Also Annex B to Chapter 2.

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reserves18 and the use of echeloned forces,19 they will determine how effectiveness can be measured and will conduct a detailed risk analysis for each COA. The logistic viability of each COA needs to be scrutinised throughout this process to ensure that staff continues to focus on the art of the possible. In expeditionary operations the staff will consider whether the order of arrival meets the timeline for forces to be ready in theatre; and if sufficient logistic capacity has been generated to meet the anticipated demand and to cope with the requirements for concurrent activity. 31. The staff will use the situation overlay and event overlay, along with the BAE to develop the details of the commander’s formulated COA graphically on a draft DSO and schematic. For each area where some action is required against the enemy, a TAI will be identified on the DSO. The TAI will then be developed by determining what effect is to be achieved by the action, its impact on enemy capability and any secondary considerations. Implications for the combat arms, CS and CSS flow from this development, as will the joint ISTAR assets necessary to confirm the enemy action and to trigger the action of friendly forces, (leading to NAIs). This will in turn reveal where decisions may need to be taken which appear on the draft DSO as DPs.20 32. Step 4 Output. The output of Step 4 is a COA summary, which contains all the key points given by the commander, allocates resources, and develops the concept of operations. For each COA it will include: a.

Schematic.

b. Commander’s concept of operations, made up of the intent, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort (ME). c.

Draft DSO.21

d.

Draft Synchronisation Matrix.22

Step 5 - COA Evaluation 33. Evaluation of COAs identifies the advantages and disadvantages of each and allows the commander to make an informed judgement to select a winning concept. The developed and validated COAs are compared using a combination of textual analysis, wargaming and operational analysis. This process should determine which COA is most likely to achieve the desired effects most efficiently in order to achieve the mission as quickly as possible and at acceptable risk. The depth and scope of evaluation will be limited by time and resources. The COA may be evaluated against the Functions in Combat,23 compared against the Principles of War,24 or modelled by computer. A simple 18

Reserve. Part of a force held by a commander to counter unforeseen situations or to impact on future actions. JWP 0-01.1 Note a reserve does not have an allocated mission, but rather planning tasks and is uncommitted. At the operational level, the operational reserve must be able to be brought to bear within the timeframe of the operation at the operational level, in order to have impact upon the commander’s plans . 19 Echelon Force. In land operations, a force not committed initially, but whose committal is vital to the success of the superior commander’s mission. JWP 0-01.1 20 Not to be confused with Decisive Points (DPs) in joint campaign planning at the operational level. 21 See paragraph 59 to Chapter 3 22 See paragraph 69 to Chapter 3. 23 Command, Manoeuvre, Firepower, Protection, Information and Intelligence, Combat Service Support.

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textual analysis evaluates COAs against a potential enemy COA by asking the following questions: a.

How will the enemy respond to our COA?

b.

What are the strengths of our COA against an identified enemy COA?

c.

What are the weaknesses of our COA against an identified enemy COA?

d. How will our COA fulfil the superior commanders’ intent against an identified enemy COA? e.

What are the risks against an identified enemy COA?

34. The evaluation will consider risk and how it can be managed. Evaluation should seek to identify where friendly and enemy forces may culminate during operations,25 and determine the requirement for pauses, contingency planning, the relative logistic risk and opportunity. This comparative process will inform targeting in its broadest sense,26 and will be the mechanism the commander uses to focus not only fires and manoeuvre, but also Info Ops, PSYOPs, Media Ops and EW, all within the context of the Joint Campaign Plan. Step 6 - The Commander’s Decision and Development of The Plan 35. The commander’s decision is the logical result of the estimate. The commander decides upon one of the possible COAs, having taken into account the advantages and disadvantages of each in comparison with the likely enemy activity. His decision constitutes the basic directive for completing planning and for all future actions. The commander’s decision will explain concisely what the formation or unit is to do, when, where, how and why.27 The commander’s decision should be passed to subordinate formations or units quickly to assist concurrent activity. The Warning Order Two sent on completion of Step 2 is supplemented by a further Warning Order Three, which may include a task org, movement orders, O group details, probable missions and tasks, outline scheme of manoeuvre and a schematic. The plan is then developed, and directives or orders are produced and disseminated. SECTION 3 – THE COMBAT ESTIMATE GENERAL 36. The Combat Estimate takes as its start point a baseline understanding of the operational environment and, with less emphasis on staff process, it allows the commander 24

British Defence Doctrine lists 10 Principles of War; Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, Maintenance of Morale, Offensive Action, Security, Surprise, Concentration of Force, Economy of Effort, Flexibility, Cooperation and Sustainability. UK Doctrine also notes that the Principles of War are guides to action, and fundamental tenets forming a basis for appreciating a situation and planning , but their relevance, applicability and relative importance change with circumstances. JWP 0-01.1 25 Culminating Point. An operation reaches its culminating point when the current operation can just be maintained, but not developed to any greater advantage. JWP 0-01.1 26 The targeting cycle embodies the following stages: analyze, plan, execute and assess. 27 The commander would normally be expected to write the intent, scheme of manoeuvre, main effort and component missions.

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to use it, along with his intuition and training, to compress his decision making to produce a workable plan. Although both processes are intended to create the winning concept at their respective levels of command, the key difference is the impact the immediacy of events at the tactical level has on decision making at the lower tactical level. When the time available is short, it may be that only one course of action can be developed. The effectiveness of the Combat Estimate depends on the commander and his staff being fully aware of where the operation is in the context of both mission and situation. 37. There are seven inter-related questions to be considered. Preceding steps either drive successive steps, or provide them with greater context. The process is dynamic and sensitive to change. This means that as new information is received, the staff may have to review previous questions to ensure that planning remains valid. Implicit in the process is the need to integrate all the functional areas within the planning staff so they do not work or plan in isolation. a.

Question 1. What is the enemy doing and why?

b.

Question 2. What have I been told to do and why?

c.

Question 3. What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direction must I give to develop a plan?

d.

Question 4. Where best can I accomplish each action/effect?

e.

Question 5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?

f. Question 6. When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other? g. 38.

Question 7. What control measures do I need to impose?

There are three stages to the Combat Estimate: a. Questions 1 – 3. (IPB, mission analysis and direction). This stage provides the input to staff to enable planning. b.

Questions 4 – 7. During this stage the plan is developed.

c. Orders. This stage provides the output from the plan and is covered in detail at Chapter 5. 39. The three stages of the Combat Estimate and the associated techniques and tools are described below. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), explained in Annex A, is well suited as an aid to answering the 7 Qs and is recommended as best practice. While an understanding of the process is important, the key to success is understanding the purpose behind each question. This should prevent a slavish adherence to process and help to focus on meaningful output. 40. Planning Responsibilities in Digitised HQs. The principles of planning in digital and non digital HQs are the same. The focus for planning in digitised HQs therefore

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remains unchanged from current practice. Arguably the process becomes more difficult as a result of new infrastructure and procedures and therefore a more disciplined process is required to manage the potential friction and information management concerns.28 Digitised formations must take full advantage of planning tools and hardware during the Estimate. Suggested brigade planning responsibilities are at Annex D. Battlegroup planning responsibilities may be found in AFM Vol 1 Part 229. STAGE ONE - IPB30, MISSION ANALYSIS AND DIRECTION 41. A change of situation, for example unforeseen enemy events or receipt of orders, should initiate planning. Even at this early stage the staff should issue an initial Warning Order (WngO 1) to initiate battle procedure. In Stage 1, the first three questions are considered. The role of the commander is to direct what needs to be done in order to answer the questions satisfactorily. The role of the staff is to address the issues raised by the commander in his direction before development of the plan can begin. The purpose of IPB and mission analysis in operations is to set the conditions for development of the plan. PREPARATION FOR QUESTIONS 1 – 3 42. Receipt of Orders Brief. A Receipt of Orders (ROO) brief should be conducted prior to planning to ensure that all staff start the Combat Estimate process with a common understanding of the operational environment. The ROO brief is a warning to staff that the commander has just received or is about to receive orders from higher. It will contain whatever essential details of the orders are already known and when approximately staff will be briefed and able to commence their planning. 43. Time Analysis. Time management is crucial. The Time Manager is likely to be the COS. He will consider: a.

1/3:2/3 rule.

b.

Environmental factors; for example, hours of daylight.

c.

Enemy events.

d. Time in context of the whole operation to include all those demands on the unit or formation’s time, such as higher HQ events, preliminary moves, CS, CSS and subordinate unit activity. The time analysis can be detailed and recorded on a planning timeline matrix: Annex E gives an example showing how the one third is to be used for a battlegroup. It should be maintained and displayed where the staff can view deadlines. The overriding aim is to ensure that subordinate commanders are given sufficient time to plan and execute their part. There is an input to Question 6 from this analysis.

28

These are currently addressed in ComBAT SOPs. AFM Vol 1 Part 2 Battlegroup Tactics Chapter 4 Annex A. 30 Also referred to in some operations as Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE). 29

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44. Physical Preparation. The planning area should be ready for mission analysis, with the following prepared and available. a.

The higher commander’s operations order.

b.

The planning timeline matrix.

c.

Products from the Higher HQs, including the DSO.

d.

Reference documents.

45. Mental Preparation. Members of the planning team should read and understand as much of the received orders as possible. At the lower tactical level this will be easy; at a higher level this may mean specialists concentrating on their specific part of the orders. QUESTION 1 – WHAT IS THE ENEMY DOING AND WHY? 46. Not only must this question be considered and answered as fully as possible before proceeding with the decision making process, but it must be kept under continual review throughout an operation. The initial focus for planning is on gathering sufficient information on the problem (normally, but not exclusively, the enemy and environment) to enable the decision making process to start. The output from analysis of Question 1 may lead to direction being given to troops on the ground or to the staff to find more information, or, if timely information is not available, planning will be based on predictive analysis (planning with what is available). In effect, this question seeks to identify the potential of ground in both friendly and enemy terms (BAE), and then attempts to define the enemy’s capability and potential and probable COAs. 47.

The steps to Question 1 are: a.

BAE.

b.

Threat evaluation.

c.

Threat integration.

48. BAE. BAE is an assessment of the effects of the battle space on both enemy and friendly operations. It is undertaken by the Engineer Staff within the HQ and considers ground and weather. It seeks to identify mobility corridors, avenues of approach and military effects of ground. At the end of BAE the commander should have a clear picture of how the environment affects the enemy and his likely intent. The products of BAE might include: a.

Terrain analysis (military effects of ground).

b.

Weather analysis and its potential impact on both air and ground operations.

c.

Mobility corridors/avenues of approach.

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49. Threat Evaluation. Threat evaluation seeks to define the enemy’s capability and potential. It should outline the enemy’s ORBAT, equipment, doctrine and tactics31. The threat model is unconstrained by the effects of the battle space environment. The G2 staff should look to build their evaluation in three steps: a. Capability. Graphical depictions of ORBATs, frontages, dispositions and intent should be used to aid the commander’s visualisation. b. Description and Tactics. Here the staff attempts to describe the threats, tactics and options based on historical analysis and most current information. It should consider actions of the major enemy manoeuvre elements and activities of those critical shapers; for example, artillery, aviation and CBRN. This is normally presented using words but where appropriate graphics should be used. c. Identification of Vulnerabilities. During threat evaluation vulnerabilities are likely to be equipment based. During threat integration, vulnerabilities should be expanded to include COA or situation based vulnerabilities. 50.

The products of threat evaluation should include: a.

Operational situation.

b.

Organisational charts.

c.

Doctrinal templates.

d.

High value target lists.

51. Threat Integration. Threat integration is the process which identifies likely enemy COAs that will influence the friendly operation. Its end state identifies those areas and activities that, when observed, will confirm or deny which COA the enemy commander has chosen. This step combines the environment with the enemy capability, so identifying the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs. 52.

The products of threat integration should include the following: a.

Situational overlay (views of enemy COAs).

b.

Event overlay (confirm or deny enemy COA).

c. Priority Intelligence Requirements32 (PIRs) for the commander, thus contributing to Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) and laying the foundation of the Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP). d. Recommendations for the development of the ISTAR plan (what is it?)– PIRs (what), the Event Overlay (where) have been identified. All that remains is to identify 31

IPB remains valid for COIN. Threat integration requires intellectual effort looking for the relevant factors, for example religious, political and ethnic disposition. 32 AFM ISTAR, JWP 2-00

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which resource (who) and by when the information is required (time). This is normally coordinated during Question 5 but recommendations should be made at this stage to allow the early deployment of ISTAR assets. 53. Briefing Question 1. Engineer and G2 Staff must prepare together if the output from Question 1 is to be briefed coherently. A suggested format for the brief is as follows: a. Ground. The ground brief must tell the commander what effect terrain (including air and maritime) and environmental factors will have on his own and the enemy force (including air) and on key functions in combat. b. Intelligence. Assessments of the enemy should conform to those of superior HQ. Any marked discrepancies must be resolved before giving this brief. (1) Enemy Orbats and capabilities down to the appropriate level (two down). (2) Enemy commander’s assessed intent and objectives. schematic may be useful. (3)

An intent

Assumptions used when formulating enemy COAs.

(4) Explanation of likely enemy COAs, normally expressed as the most likely and most dangerous. Consideration of how the enemy will use the ground to achieve his objectives. (5) An assessment of enemy vulnerabilities, High Value Targets (HVT) and potential combat multipliers. (6)

Likely employment of enemy reserves.

(7)

Suggested ISTAR tasking.

(8)

An enemy intent schematic.

QUESTION 2 – WHAT HAVE I BEEN TOLD TO DO AND WHY? 54. Mission Analysis may be conducted concurrently with Q1. When this occurs, however, the commander must ensure that he receives a backbrief from Q1 to ensure that his analysis remains valid before delivering his direction. From whatever orders are received, a commander must understand his superior commander’s intentions, the mission given to him and the context of that mission. He must also understand what effect his commander seeks to achieve in a particular period of time and his own unique contribution to the accomplishment of the overall effect. In all but the most pressing of situations, or simplest of problems, commanders at all levels conduct detailed mission analysis to answer this question by analysing: a. The Superiors’ Intent. A commander is required to understand his superiors’ intent “two up” and Mission and Concept of Operations “one up” in order to understand his own part in the plan. He must establish what effect he has to achieve

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within his superior’s concept and understand his immediate superior’s Main Effort (ME) and vision of desired end state. b. Specified and Implied Tasks. Specified tasks are those given in the orders. Implied tasks are those which, though not specifically stated, have to be carried out to achieve the mission. A review of the specified and implied tasks against the superior’s intent should lead to a clear understanding of what must be done in terms of actions and effects and which action/effect will constitute the ME. The Three Column Format at Para 11 of this chapter can be useful. Where understanding is not clear, clarification should be sought from the superior HQ. c. Constraints on Freedom of Action. Total freedom of action is assumed unless constraints are specified. These may include time, space, resources, rules of engagement, control measures and tasks additional to the mission, such as allocating troops to the higher formation reserve33. d. Has the Situation Changed or How is it Likely to Change? In a changing situation, the original tasks given in the mission statement may no longer be valid to the achievement of the superior commander’s intent. If guidance is not available, or time does not allow seeking for further guidance, a subordinate may carry out tasks not previously assigned to him in order to achieve his super commander’s intent. 55. Outcome of Question Two. The outcome of Question Two is the commander being absolutely clear on what effect he must achieve and why, by identifying the keys areas on which he must concentrate. This drives the creation of CCIRs to ensure that staff effort is not wasted on peripheral concerns. He must keep his mission under review throughout the remainder of the decision making process and the operation, and continually review whether the situation varies from that which formed the basis of the plan. The following points should fall out of the process: a. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). From Mission Analysis, the commander should be able to develop his CCIRs. CCIRs are items of information directly affecting decision making and influencing the successful execution of the plan. They may be translated into Decision Points (DPs) enabling the commander to make informed decisions: (1) Priority Information Requirements (PIR). A PIR is information about the enemy that the commander has designated as a priority in decision making. G2 staffs will identify PIRs at an early stage and should subsequently link them to NAIs during construction of the Event Overlay. (2) Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR). FFIR is information the commander needs about his own and flanking forces (unit strengths, dispositions, capability and readiness).

33

Special to Arm constraints may be imposed: Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM) for OS, Restricted Operating Zones (ROZ) for aviation and emission control (EMCON) measures for certain equipment.

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b. Key Tasks and Constraints. From Mission Analysis, the commander may have identified key tasks and constraints that might preclude some COAs. This would enable him to focus the effort of his staff on to the most feasible options without wasting valuable time on unachievable COAs. c. Essential Elements of Friendly Information34 (EEFI). EEFI establish information to protect, not information to obtain. EEFI are neither IRs nor part of the CCIR, EEFI are relevant to OPSEC and deception planning. The commander may decide that he needs to know whether the EEFI have been compromised or if the enemy is collecting against a designated EEFI. In those cases, he may designate that question as one of his CCIRs. QUESTION 3 – WHAT EFFECTS DO I WANT TO HAVE ON THE ENEMY AND WHAT DIRECTION MUST I GIVE TO DEVELOP A PLAN? 56. The commander should allow himself time after Mission Analysis to absorb the refined information output before identifying the effects he wishes to apply to the enemy. If time permits he should back brief staff not involved with Q2 on the enemy COAs selected as most likely and most dangerous. The commander has to make a statement of the effects he wishes to have on the enemy, which is best expressed in an Intent Schematic (See Annex F). The effects terms (operational terminology) and their defined meanings are given in JWP 0-01.1 in full and in brief in the LCHB, Part 3 Serial 24. The less time there is available for the decision making process, the more direction is required; otherwise staff effort will be dissipated. Once clear in his own mind, the commander should gather his staff and state: a. His Intent. The commander should express his intent as his ‘battle winning idea’. It is expressed as the effects he wishes to have on the enemy by use of an Effects Schematic and by giving direction to his staff as to how he wishes the plan to be developed. He must state the purpose of each effect relative to the enemy. He must highlight which effect will be his ME and make clear his desired end state. b. His Direction. The commander should then give direction to the staff. His direction should include how the staff is to develop potential COAs, or indeed he may direct a specific COA. The direction must also include IRs,35 points for clarification from the higher HQ, and validation of CCIRs. The amount of direction required will depend on the complexity of the situation, the experience of the staff and the time available. The direction should be structured to ensure that all functional areas are covered. The commander may either address his direction by staff function or use the functions in combat. Annex F explains the use of the functions in combat to structure the commander’s direction. c. His Directions on Recce. The commander should give direction to preliminary reconnaissance operations to find information to enable him to make

34

EEFI are critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore must be protected from enemy detection. How can I (the commander) prevent the enemy force from seeing me? 35 This process is expanded upon in Chapter 7 – Operational Information Management and Exploitation.

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better informed decisions. Preliminary recce operations will be linked to answering PIRs (what) at designated NAIs (where). d. Decision Brief. The commander should confirm the time of the COA decision brief and agree the factors against which the COAs will be evaluated. e. Warning Order Two. Warning Order Two (WngO 2) should contain the commander’s guidance resulting from Q3. Whilst it should be as full as possible, the warning order should not be delayed while waiting for information. It is very helpful to include the commander’s intent and the Effects Schematic in the warning order. COMBAT ESTIMATE STAGE TWO – DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN 57. Preparation for COA Development. COAs must be developed against the context of what the enemy is doing and their purpose. In order to start COA development, the following conditions need to be met: a.

Terrain Analysis Overlays (BAE).

b. Display and brief the enemy COA(s)36 against which the friendly COA/COAs are to be developed. These will be relevant Situation Overlays. c.

Higher HQ DSO/Ops Overlay.

d. Event Overlay. The NAIs on the Event Overlay are the first step in developing the DSO. e.

Display Effects Schematic and Commander’s direction.

f.

List own resources available (TASKORG).

g.

Display output from Mission Analysis

58. COA Development. COA development is the process that helps a commander determine the optimum solution to achieve his desired overall effect. The process of COA development aims to answer, for each COA, the following questions: a.

Where best can I accomplish each action/effect? (Question 4).

b.

What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect? (Question 5).

c. When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other? (Question 6). d.

36

What control measures do I need to impose? (Question 7).

ie most likely and most dangerous.

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59. The DSO. The DSO transfers the commander’s intent onto a map. It encompasses an Overlay, a Decision Support Matrix (DSM) and Synchronisation Matrix. It identifies where, how and when best to achieve each effect. 60.

DSO Terminology. a. Tactical Area of Interest (TAI). The TAI represents areas where the commander intends to achieve an effect against the enemy. TAIs should be a focus for the siting of direct fire weapons, targeting for offensive support (OS) and siting obstacles. Each TAI must have a purpose: eg to destroy enemy recce, to turn the lead battalion, to defeat the follow on battalion or to block the lead battalion. TAIs should also be established for options for the reserve. (1) Point TAI. Point TAIs are most commonly used for targeting eg bridges, routes ambushes on defiles. (2) Area TAI. Area TAI are more appropriate to combat arms or possibly MLRS engagements. b. Decision Point (DP). DPs relate to specific TAIs, and indicate when a commander must make a decision that will gain a result on the battlefield. Several DPs may relate to a particular TAI to cover all possible approaches, and indeed a DP may relate to more than one TAI. c. Naming Conventions. Appendix 3 to Annex A contains examples of how TAIs and DPs are numbered and marked.

QUESTION 4 – WHERE CAN I BEST ACCOMPLISH EACH ACTION OR EFFECT? 61. The draft DSO for each COA is developed by transcribing the effects schematic onto the map. Using the BAE and event overlay from Q1 the staff determine the best location for each effect (starting with the ME effect) in line with the commander’s direction. Any tasks arising from the higher formation DSO also need to be captured. The COS should also refer back to the output from Mission Analysis to ensure that all specified and implied tasks have been captured on the draft DSO. 62. CONPLANs. Courses of action must be considered for contingencies and these must also be recorded as TAIs. These contingency TAIs become options for the reserve and should be fully planned where time allows, but with supervision to prevent staff effort being dissipated. The need for additional contingencies may emerge during wargaming. Further NAIs may also emerge as the planning process continues. QUESTION 5 – WHAT RESOURCES DO I NEED TO ACCOMPLISH EACH ACTION OR EFFECT? 63. Question 5 deals with resourcing the effects. Staff should approach this question with an open mind and the COS should ensure that all staff contribute. Consideration must be given to the requirement for all elements of combat power, including direct fire, offensive support, engineers, air defence and support operations (PSYOPS and Info Ops). Initially, each TAI/NAI should be adequately resourced without regard to the restrictions of the

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TASKORG. Subsequently, the staff must review the options to identify which ones best support the commander’s intent. Relative strengths (own and enemy) and the effect to be achieved (DESTROY needs more resources than DEFEAT) in each of the TAIs must be taken into account. CSS implications must not be overlooked37. The results are recorded in the DSO Matrix. 64. STAP. STAP38 begins in Question One and is driven by PIRs and the Event Overlay. Staff must consider what enemy they are likely to see in the particular NAI and what ISTAR assets and combat power he has available to him. The ISTAR commander should consider the following criteria when tasking ISTAR assets: a.

Availability – what do we own? Who can help us?

b.

Capability – who best (day/night, equipment, reach)?

c.

Vulnerability – risk v reward.

d. Cueing framework – deep through to close (division of responsibilities and handover line). e.

Redundancy – budget for failure and contingency plan.

f.

Mix – plan for complementary coverage.

65. NAIs are resourced in the same manner as TAIs. Completion of Q5 allows the draft TASKORG to be completed. QUESTION 6 – WHEN AND WHERE DO THE ACTIONS TAKE PLACE IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER? 66. The key product of Question 6 is the Synchronisation Matrix, the timeline for which will have been started in conjunction with the planning timeline. Enemy timings should be entered on completion of Q1 and other synchronisation aspects will occur during the planning process. The draft synchronisation matrix is a living document. 67. Synchronisation is arranging activities in time, space and purpose to mass maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. Without synchronisation there is no massing of effect. Through synchronisation commanders range their assets to mass the effects of their combat power at the chosen place and time to overwhelm an enemy action. Synchronisation often requires explicit coordination and rehearsals. 68. Once all the TAIs and NAIs have been resourced, a scheme of manoeuvre should be identified: this shapes the synchronisation of the plan, which can be refined during wargaming.

37 38

See Annex G. See Annex H.

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69.

The Synchronisation Matrix. The synchronisation matrix provides: a. A clear method for ensuring that planners address all elements within a formation when developing a COA, by ensuring that all the resources on the task org have been used in the most effective manner. b. A means of showing the relationship between activities (both enemy and friendly), supporting functions and key events. c. A visual tool which can support the staff in the adjusting or modifying activities in relation to the commander’s direction or enemy action.

70. Construction. The matrix below shows one method of using this technique to coordinate activities. The first entry in the table is the enemy activity as determined by G2. The next stage is to relate friendly forces to the likely enemy action. A time relationship between these activities will be relevant regardless of the actual time of the occurrence of the events. The matrix can now be used to coordinate decision points determined in the decision support matrix. An example of a brigade synchronisation matrix is at Appendix 1 to Annex C. TIME ENEMY ACTION OWN DECISIONS OS (Arty & Avn) QRL QRH 1 RW 3 YORKS AD ENGR CSS COMD

180

150

120

90

60

30

H

30

60

90

120

En Recce 1st Ech neutralised Battle (Bn)

QUESTION 7 – WHAT CONTROL MEASURES DO I NEED TO IMPOSE? 71. Control measures are the means by which the commander and his staff coordinate and control what is going on in the battlespace. Answering this question will continue throughout the planning, but needs to have been addressed in sufficient detail before the wargame and then refined during it. The graphics on the op overlay constitute a major source of control measures. They might include: a.

Report lines/phase lines/nicknumbers.

b.

Routes, contact and coord points.

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c.

Assembly and engagement areas, objectives and limits of exploitation (LoE).

d. FSCM including Fire Support Safety Lines (FSSL), Fire Support Coordination Lines (FSCL), Restricted Fire Areas (RFA) and No Fire Areas (NFA). e.

Bdrys, NAIs, TAIs and DPs/DLs.

f.

Others include: (1)

ROE.

(2)

OPSEC.

(3)

CBRN measures.

(4)

EMCON and COMMSEC measures.

(5)

Battlespace management and battlespace spectrum management.

72. Reducing Risk of Fratricide.39 Combat Identification (CID) measures are crucial to minimise the risk of fratricide and they need very careful consideration. While some will be specific to the organic HQ, others will need coordination at superior HQ. COMMANDER’S DECISION 73. A commander may decide to adopt a specific COA at any time during COA development (Questions 4-7) depending on the situation confronting him. The most important factor is time. He may decide on a directed single COA at Question 3 (more likely when time is limited), or he may choose to have COAs presented to him on the completion of Question 5 based on the DSO/DSM with or without a scheme of manoeuvre, or he can make a decision after Question 6 based on COAs with a Synchronisation Matrix. Finally, he can use the results of wargaming as the basis for his decision (likely when time constraints are less pressing and more likely at formation level). Once a commander has taken a decision on which COA to adopt the staff may disseminate a further Warning Order (Wng O 3). 74. At whatever stage the commander makes his decision on which COA to develop, the staff must present him with the options in a clear and concise manner. This is best done graphically supported by products that support their findings. Options must be directly linked to assessment criteria (which may include functions in combat, principles of the operation or indeed criteria the commander has identified). 75. Risk. Risk analysis and risk management are part of the military decision making process and it is accepted that risks may be taken. When risk is taken, it must be monitored during the operation and, if required, reinforced by the reserve. If appropriate, the superior commander should be briefed that risk is being taken in certain areas of the plan that may require support from his reserve.

39

See also Formation SOPs.

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THE DECISION SUPPORT MATRIX (DSM) 76. General. The commander and staff develop the DSM throughout the planning process, providing the commander and his staff with the criteria which need satisfying before taking a planning decision (eg What enemy target? Where? What friendly forces are involved?). The DSM is a vital planning tool. The example below shows the criteria, action and support to each decision displayed in the matrix. SER NAI TAI DP 1

AA

2

BB

CC

3

LOC GRID GR SQ 23 75

DESCRIPTION TASK

PRIMARY SECONDARY WHAT

DEFILE

ID EN DIR/STR

BDE ASSETS

RECCE TP

E 25-7 N 66-8

VALLEY

ID EN DIR/STR

RECCE TP

A SQN

E20-21 N68-72

FLOOD PLAIN

ENGAGE MAIN AXIS

FOO D12

MFC/ RECCE

DD GR ROAD JNCT 187645

4

TRIGGER Z COY B SQN 2 RRF

RECCE

VANGUARD COY 7xT80 4xBMP VANGUARD COY 7xT80 4xBMP MAIN GUARD BN 30xT80, AVLB ARTY GP 6 x 2S19

77. DSM and CCIR. The DSM links CCIR to key decisions helping the commander to move to his decision point by improving his situational awareness and thereby to coordinate actions leading to a timely and effective decision. The DSM helps to identify when a decision is required and what action is most appropriate in the given circumstances. WARGAMING 78. The wargame is a step by step process of action, reaction and counter action for visualising the execution of each friendly COA in relation to enemy COAs. A fuller explanation is at Annex I. A wargame explores contingencies and extensions to the primary plan, resulting in a refined plan. It tests DPs for crucial actions. The side with the initiative should lead, hence in defence this will be the enemy. The lead G2 Staff Officer, representing the enemy, should be robust and adversarial in order to test the plan. The benefits are: a.

The staff can visualise sequentially the likely enemy they are facing.

b. Different COAs and the likely enemy reaction can be evaluated, exposing potential gaps. c.

The DSO, DSM, synchronisation matrix and control measures are confirmed.

d. When time is short the wargaming process can be used to determine the products at c.

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79. Wargaming can assist the commander in reaching a decision in choosing a COA. If time is short, only the chosen COA is wargamed. The aims of the wargame are to discover any weaknesses in the COA, to refine the detail and to identify further contingencies. It confirms staff planning, it ensures that all principal members of the planning group are informed of the overall concept and it helps to coordinate additional detail into the plan. SUMMARY 80. The foundation stones of the military decision making process are the Estimate and Combat Estimate. The methods used for answering the questions remain a matter for the commander and his staff. The techniques and tools which can guide and assist in answering the questions are available, as required, to assist in situations where there is time and the need for more detailed analysis. Annexes: A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I.

The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. Example Commander’s Effects Schematic. Synchronisation/Integration. Suggested Brigade Planning Responsibilities Matrix. Example Battlegroup Planning Timeline Matrix. Commander's Direction by Functions in Combat. Integrating CSS into the Decision Making Process. The Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan. Wargaming.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 3 THE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE (IPB) SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION GENERAL 1. IPB is a tool to assist the commander and his staff in planning, decision making and the execution of a plan. The products of IPB record graphically the results of the analysis of the ground, the enemy likely/worst case courses of action (from analysis of his doctrine, objectives and capabilities applied to the ground on which he is operating). These products are then used to develop courses of action indicating where the enemy will be targeted by direct fire, indirect fire and engineers to deny him his purpose and, ultimately, to defeat him. The IPB process is a dynamic and continuous process and the products will be adjusted as enemy actions are either confirmed or identified, and as the plan is adjusted to meet the changing situation. 2. In preparing the plan, the products of the IPB process are an aid to developing the reconnaissance plan, the surveillance and target acquisition plan (STAP), the intelligence collection plan (ICP), the operations security (OPSEC) plan and counter surveillance control measures, the deception plan and others appropriate to the operation. 3. The integrated G2/G3 nature of the IPB has to be emphasised and reinforced. The products from IPB are required to inform the remainder of the planning process, but it is important that they are viewed as dynamic and reviewed and revised as necessary in order to support the developing plan. AIM 4. This Chapter aims to explain the techniques used to produce the overlays, resulting from the IPB process. Examples of the products are included as appendices and the text will explain how these products can be used for assisting in the conduct of planning, the development and the execution of the plan. INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY 5. General. In order to understand IPB fully, a brief explanation of the meaning of a number of intelligence terms associated with IPB is required. The explanation of these terms1 and the relationship between them is as follows: a. Information. Unprocessed or raw data which may either be used simply to inform about some matter or, which can be subjected to an analytical process in order to assess a capability or predict the outcome of an event. b. Intelligence. The prediction or assessment which results from the analytical processing of information. 1

Based on the definitions contained in AAP-6.

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6. The Intelligence Cycle. This is the process by which information is turned into intelligence. It consists of four stages which although cyclical in nature, may also take place concurrently. They may be summarised as follows: a.

Direction. The commander produces his intelligence requirements.

b. Collection. Sources and agencies are tasked with specific questions by the G2 staff and information and intelligence is collected in response to them. c. Processing. Information is collated, evaluated, analysed, integrated and interpreted. The product of this processing is intelligence. d. Dissemination. Information and intelligence are passed or presented to those who need it, when they need it. 7. Sources and Agencies. There is a distinction between sources and agencies. A source produces information only, while an agency produces information or intelligence, or a mixture of the two. The definitions of the terms are as follows: a. A source is a person from whom, or a thing from which, information can be obtained. (AAP-6). b. An agency is an organisation or individual engaged in collecting and processing information. (AAP-6). 8. The Collection Plan. The Collection Plan, developed by the G2 and G3 staffs, on the direction of a commander, sets out how the information and intelligence needed to meet the commander’s PIRs is to be collected. The conversion of intelligence requirements into collection requirements2, and the specific questions put to sources and agencies, are achieved through the collection management process. This management of the whole Collection Plan, which is constantly revised and updated, is achieved through a procedure known as Collection Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM). SECTION 2 - THE TECHNIQUES OF IPB INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 9. The initial stages of the IPB process record the results of an Intelligence Estimate graphically, with notes where appropriate. In this format, IPB overcomes many of the shortcomings of the formal written Intelligence Estimate in that: a. A large quantity of information and intelligence can be presented quickly and easily. b. The effects on the intelligence picture of changes in various factors can be shown, as they occur, by making simple alterations to overlays.

2

From the AAP-6 definition of “Collection management”.

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c. Graphics are easy to update and amend and can be easily assimilated by those under pressure. d. The concept of displaying information graphically is readily supported by Information Technology (IT). THE STEPS OF IPB 10. Having identified the area of intelligence interest relevant to the operation there are four steps in the IPB process: a. Step 1 – Battlespace Area Evaluation. Normally the evaluation is in the form of an overlay which highlights the effects the ground and the environment will have on operations for both friendly and opposing forces. The overlay can be used to identify both threat and friendly forces mobility corridors and avenues of approach. In peace support operations (PSO), environmental factors can be highlighted. For example, inter ethnic boundaries and the ethnic balance of areas and towns can be highlighted. b. Step 2 – Threat Evaluation. Threat evaluation is the identification of the exact nature of the threat. An assessment of an enemy’s capacity to conduct operations and, from consideration of the enemy’s doctrine, the tactics which are likely to be used in operations to achieve his assessed objectives lead to the development of overlays showing how an enemy might deploy to achieve his objectives. The threat model is unconstrained by the effects of the battle space environment. c. Step 3 – Threat Integration. Applying the constraints imposed by the battlespace environment to the range of likely enemy tactics leads to the development of overlays for enemy deployments. In addition, an overlay can be produced which shows what events can be expected as the enemy plan unfolds in time and space. These overlays represent the COAs open to the enemy, his most likely and most dangerous COA, identify critical points and decision points in his plan and exploitable weaknesses. This is the procedural tool the G3 staff use to develop COAs. d. Step 4 – The Decision Support Overlay (DSO). The DSO is an overlay which reflects where the enemy should be targeted by direct fire, indirect fire, air, aviation and/or engineer assets in order to achieve a specified effect. It will show how the enemy’s course of action will be confirmed or identified. It identifies, in time and space, when the commander might need to take a decision based on own and enemy time lines. Decision points can be related to time phase lines on the DSO or specified criteria as explained in the DSO matrix. This overlay is the graphical display of the plan based on the assessed threat COAs. It should be supported by a matrix showing the purpose of each of its elements, and who is responsible for them. At formation level a DSO might be produced for each assessed threat COA.

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WHO CONDUCTS IPB? 11. IPB, in some form, is carried out at all levels in the chain of command. The products of IPB must be cascaded downwards in the same way as orders. The comprehensiveness of the products will vary depending upon the availability of IT, time available and the environment in which the products have been produced. At formation level, the Geo Section will be able to produce a series of different BAE products as required by a commander. At battlegroup level, the BAE overlay can be produced by the ISTAR Officer. Equally, situation and event overlays may be very detailed if information on the enemy is readily available. At the battlegroup level, the overlays produced may well be much simpler. 12. In order to produce a plan which aims to deny the enemy the initiative, it is necessary to make the plan based on an assessment of the enemy plan. A graphical overlay, however simple, provides a focus for planning how to deny the enemy his purpose by targeting him. The end product of IPB, the DSO, must show where ISTAR assets will be gathering information on the enemy to confirm or identify his COA, and where he will be targeted to deny him his intent and to defeat him. Drills need to be established in HQs detailing responsibilities for producing the overlays and how they should be used to assist in the decision making process. 13. IPB is simply a way of recording deductions from an analysis of the following questions: a. What is the enemy doing and why? integration.

BAE, threat evaluation and threat

b. What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direction must I give to develop a plan? The product from this question is the commander’s Intent Schematic. c. Where best can I accomplish each action/effect? Deduced from recce and BAE. Output are the NAIs, TAIs and DPs. d. What control measures do I need to impose? eg boundaries, RFLs and report lines. WHEN IS IPB USED? 14. IPB's utility extends throughout the complete spectrum of conflict encompassing not only warfighting but pre and post conflict operations. The methodology involved in the IPB process is valid for any operation wherever it may be conducted. An understanding of the theory and practice of the IPB process, by those involved in decision making at all levels, will enhance the chance of a successful outcome. IPB is a command led process involving both G2 and G3 staff. Its teaching should therefore not be confined solely to intelligence staff, but be included as part of the curriculum for a wide range of individual and collective training. It should be noted that in some situations, the term IPB has been altered to IPE (Intelligence Preparation of the Environment).

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SECTION 3 - IMPLEMENTING THE TECHNIQUES - THE IPB PROCESS STEP 1 - BATTLESPACE AREA EVALUATION (BAE) 15. Introduction. The basis of successful BAE is the establishment of a database of the battlespace environment which is kept continuously updated from the outset of planning for operations. This database is interrogated whenever the effect of the battlefield environment on the threat or on friendly forces is being considered. Maintenance of the database, a process which runs in parallel with the commander's estimate, involves the consideration of all the factors which may affect the battlespace environment and thus the ability of both the friendly force and the enemy to operate within the AO. The assessment process will enable a map overlay to be produced which will indicate likely manoeuvre corridors, and avenues of approach. a. Mobility Corridors. A mobility corridor is an open area through which a unit, deployed in accordance with its tactical doctrine, can manoeuvre. It should lie, where possible, through areas of good going. It should bypass severely restricted terrain and may occasionally need to use restricted terrain. b. Avenues of Approach. A viable avenue of approach for a formation contains two or more adjacent mobility corridors, running in the same direction and suitable for a formation or unit at the next lower level of command. 16. The Factors. A wide range of factors, which will vary from operation to operation, will affect the battlespace environment. The main ones are: a. Terrain. The main effect of terrain will be to impose constraints on the ability to move around the battlefield (the “going”). Features such as forests, stretches of water, marshes, mountain ranges and built up areas will physically restrict the ability of all sides to manoeuvre. Assessment of the effect of terrain on the enemy’s ability to move must always be made using the capabilities of his equipment as the yard stick. Definitions of types of going are shown in Appendix 1. b. Infrastructure. There may be particular aspects of the infrastructure in the AO (eg nuclear power plants or commercial chemical installations) which, if damaged, would pose hazards to friendly forces or to the civilian population. There may also be elements of the communications network (ports and harbours, bridges and rail links) which must be preserved in order to support subsequent stages of a campaign. These limitations on damage to infrastructure will affect aspects of operations (movement, the risk of collateral damage and the application of fire support to certain areas of the battlespace). c. Climate. The impact of climate (which includes meteorology), on the battlespace environment may be to exacerbate the restrictions imposed by the terrain on movement. Rain will cause rivers and streams to become impassable, and turn tracks and fields to mud, worsening the going. Snow and ice can hinder the ability of wheeled vehicles to manoeuvre freely. Conversely, sudden unexpected good weather can improve the going and reduce movement problems. Climate will also affect atmospheric conditions; mist and cloud can inhibit sensors and sights, degrading the quantity and quality of Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and weapon

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performance; bad weather will affect air and aviation operations. Heat can bring dust and a resultant movement signature; heat shimmer will affect optical sights. Rain can degrade the detection capability of radar and thunderstorms may affect some communications systems. d. Socio-Economic Issues. In certain operations, there will be a need to limit damage to components of the socio-economic infrastructure such as housing, key public utilities, industrial complexes and transport infrastructure. This will be necessary in order to achieve a particular political or economic end state after hostilities and may inhibit operations over the whole or part of the battlefield. Similarly, the need to avoid casualties amongst civilians will also constrain operations in major centres of population. 17.

Conduct of the Evaluation. This is a straightforward process carried out as follows: a. Information and Intelligence. This covers the effect of the principal factors on the battlefield environment derived from: (1) Strategic sources (satellites, OGDs, national intelligence data bases and SIGINT collected outside the AO). (2) Intelligence databases maintained both within the formation and in neighbouring and higher formations. (3)

The G2 staff at flanking and higher formations.

(4)

Climatic records and weather forecasts.

(5)

Maps and IMINT.

(6) Tactical SIGINT and EW collected by maritime, air and ground-based sensors in, or close to, the AO. (7) Tactical ISTAR3 assets such as manned recce, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or airborne radar systems such as ASTOR. They may be organic to the formation, or belong to another formation or service. They are tasked through the Collection Plan. (8) Human Intelligence (HUMINT) obtained from prisoners of war, troops belonging to friendly forces, refugees and the local population. b. Displaying the Result of the Evaluation. The information and intelligence derived from these sources and agencies may be represented on a series of individual map overlays or combined into one overlay displaying the consolidated effects of all the factors. Applying these overlays to the map of the battlefield area will indicate possible manoeuvre areas, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors

3

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance.

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and will highlight areas where the battlefield environment constrains operations4. An explanation of the symbols and colours in marking overlays of BAE is at Appendix 2. c. Using the Evaluation. The information and overlays resulting from the Battlespace Area Evaluation may be used in two ways: (1) To display how ground, environment and weather effect enemy operations to inform threat integration. (2) To display how ground, environment and weather affect own operations to inform decisions on where effects on the enemy might take place. STEP 2 - THREAT EVALUATION 18. The second step of the IPB process consists of a series of separate actions aimed at identifying the enemy's overall capability based on his doctrine. These are: a. What do I know about the enemy? What do I not know about the enemy? Record as information requirements. b.

What are his objectives in my AO and beyond?

c.

What are his strengths within my AO to inform relative strengths?

d. What doctrine and tactics might the enemy use for the assessed operation (doctrinal overlay)? STEP 3 - THREAT INTEGRATION 19. In the third step of the IPB process BAE results are combined with the doctrinal COAs derived from the threat evaluation. Threat integration seeks to identify how doctrine will be shaped by the battlefield environment and turned into practice. The threat integration procedure should be directed by the commander at the end of his mission analysis. He should also state the overlays he requires from his G2 cell in order to facilitate his planning. Overlays which can be produced are: a. Situation Overlays. A situation overlay shows graphically how the enemy will be deployed, usually two down, at a particular stage in a COA. It sets out the doctrinal model in the context of the battlefield environment (ie situating the doctrinal model in time and space). An overlay could be produced to show how the enemy will be formed up as he enters a brigade AO, displaying the likely locations of enemy companies. A second overlay could display how he would be formed up to conduct a deliberate attack. Overlays showing forces in motion through manoeuvre areas will be annotated with time lines. These may be further refined into phase lines (PL) indicating points in time and space where the momentum of the threat’s operation 4

Consideration must be given to whether the scenario is symmetrical or asymmetrical in nature. This should not change the nature of the BAE process because the requirement is to identify the enemy’s intentions. If it is asymmetrical there may be a requirement to produce separate overlays reflecting the perspectives of the battlefield environment, as seen from the different view points of the threat and of the friendly forces.

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may be lost and where friendly forces may be able to seize the initiative. The production of situation overlays is intended to identify the opportunities and constraints the battlefield environment offers to enemy and friendly forces. b. Event Overlays. An event overlay sets out graphically when and where key tactical events might be expected to take place. The event overlay should identify NAIs and DPs that will confirm the COA an enemy may be adopting or provide a trigger for friendly force action. Time lines will show when key events can be expected. Event overlays provide the basis from which DPs may be developed and will provide the information required for the Enemy Action column of the Synchronisation Matrix. 20. Examples of situation and event overlays are at Appendix 4. These overlays will inform COA development. Time may only permit one very simple overlay to be produced. Equally, if information is limited on an enemy COA, the commander may have to direct his G2 staff to make some assumptions on the enemy’s actions. As more information becomes available, then these assumptions may be confirmed or altered. STEP 4 – THE DECISION SUPPORT OVERLAY (DSO) 21. are:

The final product of the IPB process is the DSO. The constituent parts of the DSO a. Named Areas of Interest (NAI). A point or area along a particular avenue of approach through which enemy activity is expected to occur. Activity or lack of activity within an NAI will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action. These are points and areas in the AO where the recognition of particular events and activities associated with the threat will confirm or deny the enemy’s intentions to pursue a specific COA. Once an NAI has been identified, the event or activity that will focus attention on it should be clearly defined and recorded. NAIs should be covered by ISTAR assets or form a serial in the ICP for action by higher formation. b. Target Areas of Interest (TAI). The geographical area or point along a mobility corridor the successful interdiction of which will cause an enemy either to abandon a particular course of action, or require him to use specialised engineer support to continue to where he can be acquired and engaged. Not all TAIs will form part of the friendly COA; only TAIs associated with higher payoff targets (HPTs) are of interest to the staff. These are identified during staff planning and wargaming. TAIs differ from engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of all available weapons; TAIs might be engaged by a single weapon. TAIs are points and areas in the AO where the commander intends to target the threat in order to achieve a specified effect. They are identified during COA development and form the focus for the integration of resources to achieve the desired effect. c. Decision Points (DP)/Decision Lines (DL). An event, area, line, or point on the battlefield where tactical decisions are required resulting from the wargaming process or the operations order. Decision points do not dictate commander’s decisions. They only indicate that a decision is required, and when/where the decision should be made in order to have the maximum effect on friendly or enemy courses of action. These are points in time and space at which the commander has

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to make a decision to trigger an action in a particular TAI. There will be TAIs for contingencies which may not need to be triggered. Surveillance over DPs should be made in order to queue the decision. DPs which cannot be covered by ISTAR assets within the AO should be tasked through the ICP. d. DSO Matrix. The DSO is supported by a DSO matrix indicating the number allocated to each NAI, DP or TAI and its purpose. It also shows who is responsible for surveillance or action. An example of the products leading to a DSO and a draft DSO with its matrix is at Appendix 4. 22. In summary, the DSO is a graphical representation of the plan to find the enemy and to defeat him. It helps the commander to make his decision. During the execution of the plan it assists the commander and his staff to manage the plan. SECTION 4 – OTHER FACTORS IN THE IPB PROCESS 23. The IPB process acts as a focus for the allocation of resources. Once a TAI is established, it becomes the focus for planning the resources required to achieve the effect based on the strength of the enemy in the TAI and the effect to be achieved. This will trigger the allocation of direct fire, OS, air, aviation and engineers. The NAIs, TAIs and DPs established during the process will be the focus for the allocation of ISTAR assets. The commander may well have to set priorities for these ISTAR assets and decide on the level of redundancy required to meet all environmental conditions. While threat integration highlights where and when the threat may be vulnerable, development of the DSO is the tool which helps to focus planning on targeting enemy weak points and setting the conditions for that targeting to be successful. It provides the basis for integrating resources to achieve the desired effects upon the enemy and thus is an aid to achieving synergy and coordination within the overall plan. SECTION 5 - SUMMARY 24. There is nothing complicated or difficult about IPB. The structured nature of the process leads the user logically from one step to the next until the Decision Support Overlay is eventually reached by the commander. The fullest implementation of the IPB concept at the higher formation and divisional level will require a trained and practised G2/G3 staff, time in which to carry out the process and access to a wide range of information and intelligence. The process can be tailored to meet a wide range of circumstances and can be used at all levels of command. 25. IPB is a valuable staff tool which can be used across the spectrum of conflict and is as relevant to PSO as it is to operations generally. Although this Annex has concentrated on the use of IPB in warfighting, the process has been used to good effect in other operations. IPB will enable a commander to select a COA which takes into account the most likely actions and reactions of the enemy and the constraints imposed by the battlefield environment and provides the raw material for the targeting process. The use of IPB speeds up the decision making process, increases the likelihood of the identification of the threat COA and enhances the selection of the best COA for the friendly force providing the commander with an improved prospect of achieving operational success.

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26. IPB, although not dependent on IT, would greatly benefit from the digitisation programme. The combination of digital mapping with a database of doctrinal models and a suitable graphics package stored on headquarters’ IT systems will speed up the process and allow even more benefit to be gained from IPB. In a simplified form at the lower tactical levels it is the most effective tool to assist in developing a plan designed to deny the enemy his intent and to use the freedom gained to defeat him. Appendices: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Battlespace Area Evaluation – Definitions of Types of Going. Battlespace Area Evaluation – Overlay Conventions. Definitions and Conventions Used in Threat Integration. Overlays (Doctrinal Enemy Overlay, Situation Overlay, Event Overlay and Decision Support Overlay (DSO) and Draft Plan).

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 3 BATTLESPACE AREA EVALUATION – DEFINITION OF TYPES OF ‘GOING’1 GENERAL MOVEMENT Type of Terrain Area of Operations

SEVERELY RESTRICTED 2 Ground over which manoeuvre by the type of force being considered is impracticable.

RESTRICTED Ground over which manoeuvre is only possible at reduced speed, is likely to be canalised or will only be possible with the deployment of additional assets.

UNRESTRICTED Ground which is open.

ARMOURED MOVEMENT Type of Terrain Built Up Areas Water Obstacles

SEVERELY RESTRICTED for Armour

RESTRICTED for Armour

Areas more than 500m in depth or which cannot be by-passed. Water obstacles which cannot be bridged by an AVLB3. Vertical banks higher than 1.2m. Water deeper than 1.2m. Current stronger than 2.5m/s.

Areas less than 500m in depth which cannot be by passed. Water obstacles with currents, depths and bank heights less than those classified as NO GO. Must possess several possible crossing sites. Uphill gradients of between 30% and 50%. Trees with diameter in excess of 5 cm spaced at less than 5 m.

Slopes

Uphill gradients in excess of 50%.

Woods

Trees with diameter in excess of 20 cm spaced at less than 5 m. Minefields, tank ditches, or any other artificial obstacle4.

Obstacles

UNRESTRICTED for Armour Areas which can be by passed. Water obstacles less than 1.5m wide, less than 0.6m deep and fordable almost anywhere. Uphill gradients of less than 30%. Trees with diameter of less than 5 cm or spaced at more than 5 m. No obstacles.

1

Based principally on a European setting. In other theatres, Engineer advice should be sought. Classification of terrain as SEVERELY RESTRICTED does not mean that all movement through an area is impossible but merely that forces cannot manoeuvre. 3 Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridge. 4 The effect of these obstacles may be directional. 2

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 3 BATTLESPACE AREA EVALUATION OVERLAY CONVENTIONS Serial

Marking

Colour1

Monochrome

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

1.

SEVERELY RESTRICTED Terrain

BROWN cross hatching or shading.

BLACK cross hatching.

2.

RESTRICTED Terrain

BROWN diagonal

BLACK diagonal

3.

Built Up Areas over 500m square

BLACK outline and cross hatching.

BLACK outline and cross hatching.

4.

All weather water obstacle2

BLUE cross hatching or shading.

BLACK cross hatching or shading.

5.

Wet weather water obstacle3

BLUE outline containing written detail.

BLACK outline containing written detail.

6.

SEVERELY RESTRICTED Non Military Man Made Obstacle

BLACK outline and cross hatching.

BLACK outline and cross hatching.

7.

RESTRICTED Non Military Man Made Obstacle

BLACK diagonal lines.

BLACK diagonal lines.

8.

Military Man Made Obstacle.

Standard markings as set out in APP-6.

9.

Avenue of Approach

RED or BLUE

Double lines for threat AA.

10.

Mobility Corridor

RED or BLUE

Double lines for threat MC.

11.

Objective

Standard markings as set out in APP-6 A.

1

Some display and reproduction systems do not show colours accurately. If in doubt, use monochrome. Specific criteria for armoured vehicle movement are at Appendix 1. 3 Ibid. 2

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 3 DEFINITIONS AND CONVENTIONS USED IN THREAT INTEGRATION 1. Numbering Convention. NAIs, TAIs and DPs are all to be numbered, though some units now like to allocate code letters or names. The numbers are to consist of two parts derived from: a. A numerical identifier unique to the formation to which the NAI, TAI or DP relates. In the case of a brigade, division or corps, this is to be the number contained in the formation title eg “7” for 7 Armd Bde or “3” for 3 Armd Div. For a BG the name of that unit should be used. Linked to b. A sequential or ‘roll up’ number generated by the formation identifying the NAI, TAI or DP. 2. Numbering Example. Using the numbering convention, the 3rd TAI designed by 7 Armd Bde would be designated TAI 7/3. 3. Naming of NAIs, TAIs and DPs. At BG level it can be helpful to give NAIs and TAIs nicknames, which are easy to refer to on the radio during the execution of the battle. 4. Named Areas of Interest (NAI). NAIs are of two types, Point and Area NAIs which are shown in the following manner: a.

Point NAI.

b.

Area NAI.

7/5 NAI 4/2

5. Target Areas of Interest (TAI). TAIs are of two types: Point and Area TAIs. These are shown in the following manner. a.

Point TAI.

b.

Area TAI.

24/3

TAI 3/12

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It can be useful to colour TAIs and NAIs to illustrate their status: GREEN: Strike/ISTAR assets allocated and in place. AMBER: Strike/ISTAR assets allocated but not in place. RED: Strike/ISTAR assets neither allocated nor in place. 6.

Decision Points (DP). DPs are marked as follows:

5/3 7.

Decision Lines (DL). DLs are marked as follows:

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 3 OVERLAYS 1. Examples of overlays that can be used to assist the IPB process and how they contribute to the plan are as follows: a.

Example Doctrinal Enemy Overlay.

b.

Example Situation Overlay.

c.

Example Event Overlay.

d.

Example Draft Decision Support Overlay with Matrix.

e.

Example Draft Plan.

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EXAMPLE DOCTRINAL ENEMY OVERLAY

En COA 1 - Bn in Column

800 - 1,000m

800 - 1,000m

800 - 1,000m

En COA 2 - Two Up, Two Back

800 - 1,000m

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500 - 1,500m

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EXAMPLE SITUATION OVERLAY

Immed Obj

Bn Obj Immed Obj

H -2

H -1

H Hr

H +2

H +4 3 - A4 - 3

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EXAMPLE EVENT OVERLAY Situation Overlay – COA 1

4A 4M 5A Situation Overlay – COA 2

5A 4M 4A

These become potential NAIs on the draft DSO

Event Overlay

Consolidated Situation Overlay COAs 1&3

NAI 1

COAs 2&3 Situation Overlay – COA 3

4M

COAs 2&3

NAI 3 COA 1

5A 4A

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I NA

2

I NA

4

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EXAMPLE DRAFT DECISION SUPPORT OVERLAY (DSO)

4 NAI 1

1

TAI 2 TAI 5 NAI 3

NAI 5

2 NAI 2

TAI 1

NAI 01

DP 1

02

2

TAI

03 04 05 01 02 03 04 05

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TAI 3

PURPOSE Is Tk or MR Coy on this AA in 1st and 2nd ech. Trigger attk into TAI 2 Is Tk or MR Coy on this AA in 1st and 2nd ech. Trigger attk into TAI 1 Has 2nd ech been forced on south AA Potential river xing – is en attempting to use this altn rte to bypass our posn Is en going N, S or E Disrupt en’s freedom of action Block to channel en on S AA Deny to threaten en’s security Block and defeat to prevent en securing defile Block and defeat to prevent en securing defile

TAI 4

TPS TO TASK Recce Pl Recce Pl Recce Pl C Coy B Coy B Coy C Coy C Coy A Coy C Coy

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EXAMPLE DRAFT PLAN

4 NAI 1

C

1

A C NAI 3

B

2

NAI 5

NAI 2

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 3

EXAMPLE COMMANDER’S EFFECTS SCHEMATIC

Find Block to channel en south

Deny to threaten en’s security

Find

Disrupt

MAIN EFFORT Defeat to prevent en securing the defile

to deny en’s freedom of action

Deny to threaten en’s security

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ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 3 SYNCHRONISATION/INTEGRATION 1. In order to ensure that the most effective use is made of all assets at every stage of an operation, it is necessary to think through the operation stage by stage by wargaming and to check what part each element is playing in support of the critical activity at each stage, assigning responsibilities as appropriate. 2. The brigade synchronisation/integration matrix and DSO will make clear what action each battlegroup in the brigade is expected to be carrying out against the enemy in terms of time and space. It is critical to the success of any action against the enemy to ensure that the required combat power is integrated to achieve the desired effect upon the enemy. It is also important to ensure that all elements of the command not involved in the specific activity against the enemy are still acting in support of the commander’s overall intent. 3. It is therefore recommended that during the planning for an operation, a synchronisation/integration matrix is developed and confirmed during wargaming. An example of a brigade synchronisation/integration matrix is at Appendix 1. The first page is useful to commanders if no written order is produced. The second page is useful to assist HQs and commanders during the conduct of the operation. At the very least the second page should be produced in rough during planning for use as a check list when producing coordinating instructions for orders and confirming that the plan is synchronised and integrated to support the commander’s intent. 4. The synchronisation part of the matrix is time driven and the integration part is event driven. Appendix: 1.

Example of Brigade Synchronisation/Integration Matrix.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 3 EXAMPLE OF BRIGADE SYNCHRONISATION/INTEGRATION MATRIX

Msn 1 Mech Bde is to defeat the en’s attempt to estb a MDA in OA ALLENBY in order to protect the western flank of 132 (IT) Ariete Bde

WHITE BAIT

Intent Secure LD for deception attack into OA GORDON by defeating en in OA BADGER. Launch bde attack against en coys in OAs WAVELL, MARLBOROUGH and ALLENBY to destroy en north of Line SALMON LEAP. Endstate: en north of Line SALMON LEAP destroyed and flank of 132 (IT) Ariete Bde on Axis GARIBALDI secured

3 SCOTS

I %

SCHEMATIC

1 PWRR

]

1 KRH

A

OA BADGER LD SHARK FIN

2 RIFLES

OA WAVELL

OA MARLBOROUGH

X 132

OA GORDON OA ALLENBY

SALMON LEAP Scheme of Manoeuvre Deep ops: OS to neutralise RAG and ALR in TAI 1/03. Close ops: KRH and 1 PWRR to hold firm on Line WHITE BAIT. 2 RIFLES in rd move to assy area in EAST HAUXWELL SE 1693, secured by 1 PWRR. 3 SCOTS in rd and air move to assy area in HUNTON SE 1892, secured by 1 PWRR. 3 SCOTS to defeat en in OA BADGER and secure LD SHARK FIN for 2 RIFLESI. 2 RIFLES to attack into OA GORDON to force en northern coys to wdr into OA ALLENBY. KRH and 1 PWRR to attack within bdrys to defeat en in OAs MARLBOROUGH and WAVELL respectively, continuing adv to destroy all en north of Line SALMON LEAP in secondary posns in OA ALLENBY as reqd. KRH to assist fwd passage of lines of 132 (IT) Ariete Bde. Res: initially 2 RIFLES to sp 3 SCOTS attack, switching to 3 SCOTS with pri to sp KRH clearing ops into OAs MARLBOROUGH and ALLENBY. Rear ops: 45 Cdo relieve 3 SCOTS on RiverTEES, guarding res dmls ACID TIN and BLADE RUNNER, ensuring freedom of mov in the bde rear area. 2 PWRR to maint rear area sy. Air: pri for CAS to KRH clearing ops into OAs MARLBOROUGH and ALLENBY. Subsequent ops: bde to be prep to estb def posns on Line SALMON LEAP. ME: KRH clearing ops in OAs MARLBOROUGH and ALLENBY.

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

3 - C1 - 1

TIMINGS

H-8 hrs

Effect on en Enemy actions Bde actions KRH

En C attack Prelim move Firm on Line WHITE BAIT

1 PWRR

Move to assy area HACKFORTH

3 SCOTS

Move to assy area HUNTON then overwatch OA BADGER Mov to assy area EAST HAUXWELL

2 RIFLES

2 PWRR

OS Pri of Fire see Fire Sp Ex Matrix

H-6 hrs En defeated in OA BADGER

Secure assy areas 3SCOTS & “ RIFLES then hand over overwatch OA BADGER to 3 SCOTS KRH (4 PDFs)

Prelim op OA BADGER Relief in place within bdrys with 1 PWRR

En destroyed in OAs MARLBOROUGH and WAVELL En wdr to OA ALLENBY or C attack Attack on OAs MARLBOROUGH and WAVELL Assault OA MARLBOROUGH. Bde ME

Conduct relief in place with KRH on Line WHITE BAIT within bdrys Destroy en in OA BADGER, secure LD SHARK FIN. Bde ME Bde res. Pri sp to 3 SCOTS. Recce released to OA GORDON Rear area sy

Firm on Line WHITE BAIT

LD SHARK FIN. Attack into OA GORDON. Bde ME

Assault OA GORDON

1 BW (4 Regt rft) 2 GR7/hy ARP (3 SCOTS)

2 RIFLES (40 Regt rft) 2 GR7 (2 RIFLESI) UH1000

RDG, on orders 1 PWRR UH2005/6-2011 (KRH) UH2001-2004 (1 PWRR)

2 RIFLES ADJ (40 Regt)

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

H Hr En in OA GORDON deceived and wdr to OA ALLENBY En defend to protect flank Attack on OA GORDON

Assault OA WAVELL

En destroyed north of Line SALMON LEAP En wdr south of the IB Attack on OA ALLENBY Assault OA ALLENBY

Assault OA ALLENBY

Bde res

Hasty def and fwd passage of lines of 132 (IT) Ariete Bde Firm Line SALMON LEAP, then fwd passage of lines 132 Ariete Bde, Axis GARIBALDI Firm Line SALMON LEAP Mov to area THEAKSTON SE 3085

Clear OA GORDON

Firm OA GORDON

UH20014-2015 (KRH) UH2012-2013 (1 PWRR)

3 - C1 - 2

TIMINGS FSCM

H-8 hrs

H-6 hrs

NFL WHITE BAIT RFA BADGER I/E

Engrs C2

DP/01: LD SHARK FIN secure. 2 RIFLESmove to LD

Ech

CASEVAC

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

H Hr NFL SALMON LEAP Breach obs belt OA GORDON DP/02: brhd force firm, decision to launch KRH and 1 PWRR bde attack

DP/03: decision to launch KRH and 1 PWRR into OA ALLENBY

DP/04: bde res pri to destroy bypassed en

3 - C1 - 3

ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 3 SUGGESTED BRIGADE PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES MATRIX Appt

Receipt of WngO/Div orders

(a) Bde Comd

(b) 1 Attends Div Orders. Carries out initial Mission Analysis with COS, CO Arty and CO Engr.

COS

Draws up Bde timelines. Initiates Bde planning with a Receipt of Orders (ROO) Brief, updating the Staff on G2 and G3 aspects of Div Orders. Directs battle

Bde Planning (Combat Estimate Questions 1-3) (c) Q1. Directs which enemy COA/COAs to plan against. Q2. Conducts mission analysis – states initial CCIRs. Q3. Issues direction to staff to allow development of COA/COAs. Direction to include: Intent (incl schematic), ME effect and likely end state.

Assembles planning team (usually CO Arty, CO Engr, COS, SO3 G3 Plans, SO3 G2 and OC Sig Sqn). Member of planning team. Contributes to mission analysis. Reviews timelines and

Bde Planning (Combat Estimate Questions 4-7) (d) Conducts recce with R Gp where appropriate. Backbriefs planning team on results of recce and/or on change in Comd’s direction. Receives Decision brief on COA/COAs. Decides on COA/COAs which are to be developed further and wargamed. Backbriefs Div Comd2. Outlines Intent. Wargame. Oversees wargame and directs amendments to plan as 3 required Finalises intent, SoM and Msn statements. Heads planning team. Translates Bde Comd’s direction into COA development. Coordinates and integrates staff planning effort. Briefs Bde Comd on COA/ COAs and makes recommendations.

Bde Preliminary orders

Subsequent Activity and Bde Confirmatory orders

Execution

(e) Delivers overall introduction to operation outlining the ‘plan for battle’. Delivers Bde Msn, CONOPS (Intent, SoM, ME) and Msn statements. Sums up - ‘summary of execution’.

(f) Receives backbriefs from unit COs, specialist comds and updates from LOs (if present). Cfm Os. Confirms plan or details any change to his concept. Mission Rehearsal. Directs attendance at mission rehearsal. Conducts mission rehearsal and directs amendments to the plan if necessary. Gives further direction for CONPLAN / FRAGO production, incl timelines.

(g) Command of the battle from either MAIN or TAC and make decisions as appropriate.

Preparation and Rehearsal. Oversees production of orders and runs rehearsal. Orders. Delivers FF and Coord Instr paragraphs. Makes amendments to plan following questions and backbriefs – directs the issue of FRAGOs, as

Assembles planning team when necessary: composition depends on the nature of the operation to be planned. Heads CONPLAN process. Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os. Mission Rehearsal. Makes changes as directed.

Comds MAIN. Fights the battle. Ensures Up and Down Reps sent regularly, and that the staff are fully updated at regular intervals. Plans Future Ops as necessary.

1

Suggested party to Div HQ should comprise Comd, CO Arty, CO Engr, COS, and SO3 G2. Div SOIs will state attendance at Div Orders – remainder to liaise with Div staff. 2 The timing of backbrief to the Div Comd will depend on Div battle procedure. 3 Bde Comd may elect to run the planning process and the wargame himself.

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

3-D-1

Appt

Receipt of WngO/Div orders

(a)

(b) procedure (replens/ start states etc) in conjunction with the Bde DCOS. Checks the initial Bde WngO before distribution.

Bde Planning (Combat Estimate Questions 13) (c) planning assumptions. Confirms Comd's Intent, specified and implied tasks for input to WngO 2. Q3. Briefs staff on key deductions from mission analysis.

CO Arty

Attends Div Orders. Discusses OS plan/resources with Comd RA and DALO. Initial mission analysis with the Comd. May issue an Arty WngO. Coord of Bde Deep Strike function.

Member of planning team. As part of mission analysis extracts Bde NAI, TAI, DPs and briefs OS resources (AB545B, Air, Avn, Mors and AD). Recce with Bde Comd where appropriate.

CO Engr

Attends Div Orders. Discusses Engr plan/resources with CRE. Conducts initial mission analysis with the Comd. Gives direction to Engr IO with regard the conduct of the BAE. Issues Engr WngO1.

Member of planning team. As part of mission analysis briefs on Engr assets and resources available. Identify CAOI effects to support Comds intent schematic. Prepare input for Engr WngO 2 following Q3.

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

Bde Planning (Combat Estimate Questions 47) (d) Supervises production of draft DSO/ DSM and Synch Matrix. Refines COAs and prepares for wargame. Wargame. Acts as referee. Amends plan as a result of wargame. Oversees production of final DSO/ DSM and Synch Matrix by G3 Plans. Identifies timelines for CONPLAN / FRAGO development. Accompanies Bde Comd on Recce. Provides OS input to DSO/ DSM/ STAP. Produces HPTL. Prepares Arty input for Wargaming: AB545, AD deployment, FSCM (incl air/avn). Conduct battlefield calculus to ensure ammunition amounts and types meet commander's effects for OS. Wargame. Plays OS. Accompanies Bde Comd on Recce. Develops engr plan to support COA/COAs. Assists development of DSO/DSM. Identifies additional Engr resources required. Complete Engr task org and draft obstacle plan. Sends further WngO to BG Engr units fol COA decision.

Bde Preliminary orders

Subsequent Activity and Bde Confirmatory orders

Execution

(e) req. Completes a visualisation of the entire op form start to finish to ensure all relevant control and coord measures are included.

(f)

(g)

Preparation and Rehearsal. Finalises OS annex and AB545 . Orders. Delivers OS paragraph. Coord 'Time'.

Confirms OS contribution to STAP after recce/backbriefs. Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os. Mission Rehearsal. Makes changes as directed. Conducts Tac Gp Rehearsal.

Track Battle with Bde Comd in TAC Execute AB 545 and amend as nec. Resource and Int Management with FDC. Monitors DPs and Trigger pts. Asst BG Comd with Fwd planning. Manage FSCM (three dimensional). Ensures OS coord in sp of Bde level attacks.

Production of Engr Annex and Bde obstacle plan. Delivers Engr Ops para. Runs engr coord conf with sub unit comds and BGEs. Assists COS in making amendments to plan following questions and backbriefs.

Confirms and updates Engr Annex and bde obstacle plan.

Advise Comd as nec from MAIN or TAC. Monitor progress of obstacle emplacement. Track status of routes and lanes in Bde AO. Monitor BDA. Track asset capabilities effecting Bde mission. Support contingency planning. Issue SCATMIN warnings. Coordinate reserve/situational obstacle execution. Be prep to act as Engr rep in crossing

Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os. Mission Rehearsal. Makes changes as directed.

3-D-2

Appt

Receipt of WngO/Div orders

(a)

(b)

SO3 G2

SO3 G3 Ops

SO3 G3 Plans

Bde Planning (Combat Estimate Questions 13) (c)

Compiles all G2 related Div paperwork and overlays (Div trace/IPB products) in conjuction with RDC. Liaises with G2 staff at Div. Defines Area of Intelligence Interest (AII) and Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR). 4 Starts to refine IPB . Coordinates all activity in Ops Cell.

Member of planning team. Delivers Int brief as part of Q1. Contributes to Mission Analysis. Advises on enemy related CCIRs. Continues IPB.

Member of planning team (if not controlling 5 the current battle) Contributes to mission analysis or supervises preparation for planning. Coords Bde Recce Plan

Attends Div Orders. Produces initial Bde WngO 1 (To include: Phase of war/map folds, O Gp time, NMB time/No Recce Before Time. Regping)

Member of planning team (takes notes for COS, recording all specified and implied tasks and key coord instr and potential groupings). Contributes to mission analysis.

Bde Planning (Combat Estimate Questions 47) (d) Wargame. Plays Engr. Confirms effects of CAOI. Backbriefs CRE on Bde Engr plan. Refines IPB and HVTL to inform the targeting process. In conjunction with G3 Staff constructs DSO/DSM. Wargame. Fights Enemy Forces – primary Red Mover. Sets up wargame with enemy forces ORBAT.

Bde Preliminary orders

Subsequent Activity and Bde Confirmatory orders

(e)

(f)

Execution (g) area HQ for bde controlled obstacle crossing.

Preparation. Produces INTSUM and En Forces paragraph of main OpO. Produces Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP). Orders. Delivers En Forces paragraph. Assists G3 Plans in production of DSO.

Continues to develop IPB. Briefs significant changes in the en situation. Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os. Mission Rehearsal. Red mover.

Must liaise closely with current Ops Bird Table. Monitors radio net with reference to Bde STAP and DSO and advises Bde Comd regarding situational awareness. Completes kill charts as reports are received. Liaises with higher fmn. Updates all staff on en assessment and briefs Bde Comd on options.

Assists Bde COS. Wargame. Sets up wargame with friendly forces ORBAT, mapping and appropriate traces. Drafts and refines Synch Matrix as a product of the wargame.

Preparation. Produces the TASKORG and Synch Matrix.

Assists Bde COS. Coordinates any regrouping whilst maintaining and updating the TASKORG.

Primary controller on Bde Comd Net during current battle. Updates the G3 Ops map / Fusion Table and Comd's map. Coord/monitor input for SITREPs on Bde/Div nets. Coord, supervision and briefing of all watchkeepers Updates staff on G3 current situation

Produces WngO 3 after the Comd's decision brief. Real estate management Wargame. Fights Friendly Forces – primary Blue mover. Drafts DSO and DSM.

Preparation and Rehearsal. Coordinates production of OpO. Responsible for coord production of all supporting products and annexes. Responsible for the Coord Instr paragraph, DSO and

Follow up action from orders. Drafts Cfm Os. Assists in CONPLAN / FRAGO development. Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os. Mission Rehearsal. Makes changes as directed.

Controls and briefs all LOs. Relief staff officer in ops to enable 24-hr cover. Briefs and updates G3 Ops on future plans. Issue CONPLANs / FRAGOs as required.

4

IPB is a continuous process. G2 staff would already have completed some analysis at this stage; as more info is received IPB is further refined. Extra thought should be given to the division of responsibilities between the SO3 G3 Ops and SO3 G3 Plans if the planning is taking place at the same time as the current battle.

5

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

3-D-3

Appt (a)

SO3 ISTAR

Engr IO

G3 NBC

6

Receipt of WngO/Div orders

Bde Planning (Combat Estimate Questions 13) (c) Constructs and maintains RFI and CCIR list. Produces WngO 2 after Comd's direction.

Bde Planning (Combat Estimate Questions 47) (d) Confirms and generates CONPLANS.

Aids SO3 G2 in defining the AII and AIR. Starts to refine the IPB. Coord of organic collection assets (incl regrouping) within the Bde. Tasking of collection capability to meet initial intel requirements. Develops BAE in conjunction with SO3 G2. Produces gridded schematic for planning in conjunction with Bde GEO Sgt. Direct the preparation of GEO products for planning process. Deliver ground brief focussed on how the ground will effect operations.

Member of the planning team. Contributes to the Mission Analysis. Aids the Comd and SO3 G2 in determining CCIR. Further refines the IPB as info and intel is collected by Bde ISTAR assets.

Assits SO3 G3 Ops in drafting the DSO and DSM. Inputs IRs to SO3 G2 for inclusion in the ICP. Inputs ISTAR activity into Synch Matrix. Wargame. Arbitrates over asset allocation and refines the ISTAR plan as required.

Member of planning team and should be prep to act as the en engr expert. Support the SO3 G2 in the continued development of the IPB.

Prepares GEO products in support of bde plan to disseminate to BGEs.

Aids in the development of the initial IPB. Advises on the NBC input for

Assists in determining NBC threat and advises on dress states/NBC defence.

Wargame. NBC input to the wargame. Assesses ROTA/TIH.

(b) Monitors staff and clerical procedures within HQ.

Bde Preliminary orders (e) DSM. Distributes OpO in conjunction with RDC. Assists Bde COS in making amendments to plan following questions and backbriefs. Preparation and Rehearsal. Produces and briefs ISTAR Annex and ISTAR 6 Synch Matrix . Assits SO3 G2 in production of the ICP.

Subsequent Activity and Bde Confirmatory orders

Execution

(f)

(g)

Early tasking of collection assets to meet IRs. Refine DSO and ISTAR Synch Matrix in accordance with info received and changing operational situation. Assits in CONPLAN / FRAGO development. Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os.

Coordination and timely analysis of info and intel from Bde collection assets. Retasking and redirection of collection assets as required. Input info and BDA to FCC to assist targeting process.

Orders. Delivers ground brief.

Cfm Os. Deliver ground brief and continue to develop IPB.

Monitor bde BDA and maintain contamination map in conjunction with other staff cells. Monitor the effects of weather on terrain and develop mob maps.

Attends Orders.

Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os. Mission Rehearsal. Makes changes as directed.

Organises and controls NBC cell Plots NBC attacks and issues NBC 1/2/3/4 as required. Keeps Div informed.

Only if required in addition to Bde Synch Matrix.

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

3-D-4

Appt (a)

Receipt of WngO/Div orders (b) initial Bde WngO.

Bde Planning (Combat Estimate Questions 13) (c)

Bde Planning (Combat Estimate Questions 47) (d)

Bde Preliminary orders

Subsequent Activity and Bde Confirmatory orders

Execution

(e)

(f)

Integrates Bde CSS staff as necessary in developing CSS plan. Quantifies CSS resources reqd. Develops CSS COA/ COAs. Wargame. Plays CSS in particular CASEVAC. Confirms bids with HQ DSG. Issues further CSS WngO as necessary. Inputs the recovery and repair plan, including the siting of Rec Points (RX), Equipment Collection Points (ECCP) and Backloading Points (BLPs). Inputs into Bde CE state to G3 Ops.

Preparation and Rehearsal. Writes CSSO. Staff check of OpO. Orders. Delivers Service Support paragraph.

Briefs Bde CSS staff. Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os. Mission Rehearsal. Makes changes as directed.

(g) Future plans for clean area decontamination sites. Monitor the CSS state of the Bde. Monitor CSS R2. Anticipate requirements. Initiate post-battle replen plan and bids to DSG and configure CSS for subsequent ops.

Preparation and Reheasal. Finalises the ES TASKORG. Advises DCOS on all ES matters for inclusion on CSSO.

Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os.

Track all ES casualties throughout the current battle. Future plans for the siting of RXs, ECCPs and BLPs. Regularly update DCOS on all ES related issues. Assist G3 Ops with monitoring Bde CE

Agrees final comms plan with Bde Comd. Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os. Issues CEI. Mission Rehearsal. Makes changes as directed.

Occupy and secure initial HQ locs. Estb comms. Site Step -up and next MAIN. Con Radio States. Monitor COMSEC. Activate comms deception plan. Supervise defence and admin of all Bde HQ locs.

DCOS

Attends DSG OGp. Places initial bids with HQ DSG. Continues staff checks of Bde CSS state. Issues initial CSS WngO or inputs CSS into Bde WngO 1.

Member of planning team. As part of mission analysis briefs CSS state now, in 12 hrs, in 24 hrs etc. After Q3 may amend initial bids to HQ DSG. Issues further CSS instr on WngO 2, if necessary.

SO2 ES

Coord of all ES matters to ensure maximum equipment availablity. Identifies any critical ES issues that may affect further planning. Provides data to confirm current CE state. Assesses EMCON policy. Prepares Comd and Signals input for initial Bde WngO. Map recces for future HQ locs. Changes to CEI. Regping packs. Helps G2 integrate the air picture and en air threat through production on Air IPB. Initial planning, control and coord of all AS assets tasked in support of the Bde (in conjunction with

Provides advice to DCOS on all ES matters. Early liaison with Comd ES and all fmn assets. Compiles the TASKORG of Bde ES resources to meet msn specific requirements.

OC Sig Sqn

AD Bty Comd

BALO

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

Member of the planning team. Prepares outline comms plan.

May recce future HQ/RRB locs. Wargame. Finalises comms plan. Advises COS on all CIS issues during COA development.

Preparation and Rehearsal. Oversees prep of Orders area. Orders. Delivers Comd and Sigs annex.

Member of the planning team. Advises on the use of SH tasked in support of the Bde.

Coord all air space management.

Preparation and Rehearsal. Inputs detail for Air Coord Instr and FCO in conjuction with BADLO.

3-D-5

Appt (a)

Receipt of WngO/Div orders (b) CO Arty as part of FSCC function).

Bde Planning (Combat Estimate Questions 13) (c)

Bde Planning (Combat Estimate Questions 47) (d)

Provides additional Gives a situational information if requested awareness brief of his or if the situation parent unit on: changes. Current battle update Intelligence update Future intentions Any logistic information. Provision of clerical support throughout the planning process.

Bde Preliminary orders

Subsequent Activity and Bde Confirmatory orders

Execution

(e)

(f)

(g)

Attends Orders

LOs

LOs nominated in Div Orders.

RDC

Preparation and Book in WngO on receipt from higher Rehearsal. formation and copy Timely reproduction of all to: Comd, COS, products to support the O DCOS, CO Arty, CO Group. Engr, OC Sig Sqn, Accountability of all G3 Plans and SO3 operational paperwork G2. distributed by Bde HQ. Copy and distr Bde WngO 1. On receipt of OpO, copy and issue as per SOI (distr of annexes). Coordination of all visitors to the HQ in line with the instructions issued by the COS. Production and collation of the Operational Record.

Ch Clk G2/G3

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os. Mission Rehearsal. Updates situation if required. Monitors rehearsal.

Must be able to provide SITREPs of own forces: Location of fwd elements Locs of sub units and HQs Relevant tactical information.

Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os.

3-D-6

ANNEX E TO CHAPTER 3 EXAMPLE BATTLEGROUP PLANNING TIMELINE MATRIX (1)

TIMING TOTAL TIME STAGE OF DMP ACTIVITY

40 mins 40 mins

40 mins 1 hr 20 mins MISSION ANALYSIS Context Msn analysis Prep for X Mission Analysis

CO

20 mins 1hr 40 mins Direction Prep and deliver

60 mins 2 hr 40 mins

70 mins 30 mins 3 hr 50 mins 4 hr 20 mins DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN Prep for COA COA Decision development development brief R Gp Brief on X Recce results of recce on return Firepower X R Gp Recce Targeting Manoeuvre (Mob X Sp) Protection (CMob Sp) Comd Recce Firepower X R Gp Recce

90 mins 5 hr 50 mins Wargame

90 mins 7 hr 20 mins ORDERS Prep and delivery

Comd and arbitrate

Msn Concept of ops Msn statements

OS advice

OS concept incl air, avn, mors and AD

Engr advice

Ground and orientation Engr concept

Direct fire advice

BC

Read OS Annex of OpO

X

X

BGE

X

X

ATk Offr

Terrain and environmental analysis from en and own viewpts Read OpO

X

X

2IC

Read OpO

X

X

Comd Manoeuvre

X

X

Control

Ops Offr

Prep planning timeline matrix

Record Tasks

Comd Manoeuvre

X

X

Own plan

IO Sp Coy Comd

Prep Threat Brief Read OpO/Prep to brief DSO

X X

Prep intent schematic and prep WngO X X

Backbrief on prelim op. Prep to deliver ATk plan/concept Coord instrs, specifically STAP and synchronisation/ integration matrix Friendly forces

Info and Int Manoeuvre Firepower

X

En plan Cfm DSO/STAP

En forces DSO STAP

Adjt

Read OpO/MovO

X

X

Manoeuvre

Comms aspects

X

X

BGLogO

Read CSSO

X

X

Comd Protection CSS

Record Sync Matrix Comms advice CSS advice

Mov

RSO

X Brief on results of prelim op Mov planning Comms planning X

Notes: 1. 1/3rd – 2/3rd Rule. 2. 22 hours from the end of Brigade Orders until H Hr.

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

3.

X

Command and signal CSS

Therefore any orders must be complete within 7 hours 20 mins.

3 - E -1

ANNEX F TO CHAPTER 3 COMMANDER'S DIRECTION BY FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT 1.

Intelligence and Information. a. The commander's critical information requirements, ie what he needs to know to identify or confirm enemy courses of action. This may include direction for a preliminary operation to find more information on the enemy. b. Review the superior commander’s high payoff target list to identify which targets apply at this level. c. Preparation of threat integration. The commander should direct which enemy COAs to concentrate on, which event/situation overlays need to be produced in order to show key events (by time and space) and how the enemy will be deployed in situations where/when he can be targeted. d. Analyse relative strengths, own and enemy strengths and vulnerabilities in order to advise protection against enemy strengths and to target his vulnerabilities.

2.

Manoeuvre. a. What movement planning is required in order to get own forces into position ready for operations?

3.

b.

What mobility support is required for the operation?

c.

Does the commander have any conceptual ideas for courses of action?

Firepower. a. How can the available direct fire and offensive support be used to support the commander's intent? b. What are the commander's critical offensive support tasks? Each should be expressed by task, purpose and end state. This will be a continual process throughout COA development. c.

Which high pay off targets are likely to be in my area of operations?

d. What targets need to be attacked to achieve the commander's intent and in what priority? e.

Give direction on the use of psychological or information operations.

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

3-F-1

4.

Protection. a.

The commander should outline his engineer priorities.

b.

What counter mobility tasks are required to shape the enemy?

c. What effects are obstacles required to achieve to support the intent - disrupt, turn, fix or block? d.

OPSEC: (1) What engineer support is required for field defences, camouflage and concealment? (2)

What emission control measures should be in force?

(3) What effect is necessary on the enemy to achieve deception or surprise? (4)

Do I have a part to play in a higher level deception plan?

e.

What is the CBRN threat and what risk taking is recommended?

f.

What is the air threat and consequent air defence priority and tasks?

g. What force protection measures are necessary (eg to counter enemy deep ops). 5.

CSS. a.

What are the commander's CSS priorities?

b.

Which are the mission essential equipments and their repair priorities?

c. What critical timings exist in the three functional areas of logistic, medical and equipment support? d. Consider demand, distance, duration and destination for the operation as a whole. 6.

Command. a. Give guidance for the warning order content, including a time and place to meet subordinate commanders. b.

Where should HQs be sited?

c. What are the communications implications of the operation (need for rebros etc).

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

3-F-2

d.

Media Ops – give direction on the handling of the media for the operation.

e.

Give guidance to the R Gp for the recce, based on the intent schematic.

f.

When will the next central meeting be?

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ANNEX G TO CHAPTER 3 INTEGRATING CSS INTO THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS 1. CSS must be considered during the decision making process to ensure that the commander has the wherewithal to achieve his intent. To that end it is essential that the CSS officer (DCOS at formation and the BG Logistics Officer (BGLogO) in units) is a member of the planning staff and is present during all deliberations. His input must be considered and his advice heeded. Recent changes to unit structures have resulted in a reduction in the quantity of supplies routinely held within a unit with a resultant increased reliance on stocks drawn from elsewhere on the battlefield or even direct from the home base 1. Logistic staff must be involved early in the planning process in order that the necessary assets can be provided within realistic timelines. Logistic staff input is more critical to the G5 community than to G3. By involving them early in the planning cycle, units are able to satisfy the primary principle of logistics, Foresight2. 2. As a member of the commander's planning team, the CSS officer will be aware of own troops dispositions by location and number, their purpose, what enemy they are likely to come up against and when. By asking the four 'D' questions (demand, distance, duration, destination) for each TAI under each of the CSS functions (logistic, medical, equipment and personnel support - notably PW) the CSS officer is able to carry out a rapid but accurate estimate for each TAI. The result is a collection of CSS tasks across the AO. 3. The requirements of all TAIs often cannot be met simultaneously and priorities for each must be assessed, either from a tactical point of view or in terms of time – ie which will be in contact first. This will be a guide, eg where ambulances should be held (out of the way or close to where casualties will first occur) or which TAI is the priority for assistance with preparing defences. 4. An understanding of the overall CSS effect to be achieved will assist in determining the positioning of CSS assets. There may well be a conflict between the ideal CSS solution and the commander’s wishes, but having gone through the above process compromise solutions can be identified and their penalties briefed. By linking the CSS plan to the TAIs, any key CSS activity can easily be integrated into the decision support overlay and associated matrix on which the main tactical activity is recorded. Early engagement by CSS staff will enable them to enforce the principles of Directed Logistics whereby scarce CSS resources can be focused at the point of the commander’s main effort. A RAP may be reinforced by the provision of a Medical Section from the Brigade Medical Regiment, a fitter section may be provided and an Intimate Support Team from the ES Battalion and 2nd line logistic assets (eg fuel tankers) may reinforce the echelon. 8. Some BGLogOs have wrestled with the thorny problem of where to position CSS assets on the battlefield. This is a question beset with problems: the tactical siting never supports the functional plan and vice versa. As ever, a compromise must be reached and in reaching it the BGLogO must fight the specialists’ corner whilst supporting the commander’s plan. It is quite simple: badly position CSS assets and no matter how good the plan, it will be unsustainable. As a guide: 1 2

Contractorisation means that some technical spares are sourced direct from home base. The principles of logistics are: Foresight, Efficiency, Simplicity, Cooperation and Agility.

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a. Medical Support. Medical support must be placed where it is best able to provide support timely. Ambulances should be positioned as near to the point of wounding as possible; CAPs should be no more than a tactical bound away and qualified medical personnel should be located where they can be used to the limit and not be held in reserve. The target is to have casualties in the hands of an RMO within one hour from wounding3. b. Logistic Support. Current doctrine suggests that engagements will rarely be longer than 8 hours in duration, although recent operations in Afghanistan have included figures that are much higher. Logistic support assets have, therefore, a key part to play prior to contact in dumping combat supplies in readiness for defence, or in resupplying F echelon before it moves off in the offence. Thereafter, F echelon has several days of supply ‘in its pouches’ and this should be sufficient to survive most engagements. In manoeuvre warfare, however, an immediate reserve should be held at A1 echelon, ready to be deployed to wherever it is needed. The main logistic support effort should be directed to resupply once contact is broken and therefore assets must be keyed ready to do this. The logisticians need to be in a position to obtain the information to allow them to plan ahead and prepare to fight the next battle. c. Equipment Support. It is likely that the modern battlefield will be sufficiently inhospitable to prevent equipment support being carried out during an engagement. In addition, the damage inflicted by modern weapons on complex equipments will be such that first line repair is unlikely to be fully effective in the short term. ES assets should, therefore, be located in as stable an environment as possible to give them both the time and the infrastructure required to return fighting equipment to the contact battle. 9. Warning. Battlefield calculus must not be viewed as providing absolute answers. It gives an accurate guide from which to start. Intuition, experience, common sense and the actual situation on the ground must be brought into play.

3

Like the Log Planning 4Ds, the Medical Planners use the 4 Cs; Capability, Capacity, Convenience and

Continuity.

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ANNEX H TO CHAPTER 3 THE SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ACQUISITION PLAN (STAP) INTRODUCTION 1. The Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP) is a plan to find and acquire what is important to its creator, be it coy, BG or fmn. In building the STAP, four critical aspects must be defined. What is it we wish to find? Where are we likely to find it? What assets are available to build the plan? When is the information on these acquisitions required? 2. The process is not a meshing of sub units’ observation arcs as some have been taught to believe, but rather a focussed plan targetting key aspects of the enemy in order to confirm or deny his COA. If coordinated well it will answer some of the commander's CCIR, and allow him to remain within his opponent's decision action cycle. Without this information feed the manoeuvre plan will be largely reactive. "He who wins the information battle - wins the war" BUILDING THE STAP 3. The STAP begins in Q1 of the Combat Estimate. Here PIRs are defined (What we wish to collect information on). With the Event Overlay the NAIs (Where best to acquire the information to confirm or deny the enemy COA) are defined. From that start state, the G2 staff will begin to compile the Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP). The ICP will seek to place the most appropriate assets against specific collection criteria. It should also define when that information is required if it is to be of any use. This is sometimes referred to as the Latest Time the Information is of Value . 4. Although building the STAP is an all arms process, G2 will lead. As the STAP is built the planners must bear in mind the following factors: a. Availability. What assets are available to the unit and which can be brokered with the higher formation? Which assets can be used now? Which require some time for recovery or readjustment and when are they likely to be available? b.

Capability. Some assets are better suited to certain tasks than others.

c.

Vulnerability. Is the risk worth the potential reward?

d. Cueing. What is the battlefield framework for ISTAR assets, deep through close? Who hands over to whom and how is it coordinated? e. Redundancy. Failure will happen. What is the plan when critical assets fail or are destroyed? f. Mix. Consider placing different types of ISTAR assets at critical points of interest to provide more reliable picture. 5. Coordination. Most battlegroups will nominate the 2IC, IO or OC Fire Support Company/ HQ Sqn as STAP coordinator. The DSO will direct STAP and the production of Issue 3.0: Nov 07

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the STAP trace. Once developed, a set of orders and an operations overlay should be produced to direct those involved in executing the STAP. Although the BCIP 5 intervisibility tool will assist with the accurate production of a STAP plan and trace, it only takes account of terrain and makes no account of foliage. An example of a STAP overlay is produced below.

DP DA

Q21A. In posn 120001hrs

I

NAI NC

C13A. In posn 120400hrs

TAI TB

4 X 8

I

NAI NA

Q23A. In posn 120001hrs

TAI TA

NAI NB

C12A. In posn 120400hrs

I

I

II

DP DB

N20. In posn 120001hrs

II

STAP TRACE 6. Timeliness. In order for the STAP to be effective it has to be issued before the manoeuvre plan. This means that there will be two processes at work within the context of the Combat Estimate. If the STAP is issued at the same time as the manoeuvre plan, then recce will not get out early enough to inform and drive the manoeuvre plan. 7. Confirmation. The STAP should be confirmed by those charged with covering parts of the STAP. This will probably take the form of backbriefs and rehearsals to confirm to the STAP coordinator that the plan is understood. The STAP will be further confirmed by a process of bottom-up refinement once the observers are in position. It will be necessary in many cases to make adjustments to the plan in order to cover the reconnaissance objectives or NAIs. Final adjustments to the plan are likely to be promulgated in the form of FRAGOs.

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8. Updating and Adjustment during Execution. In order to remain useful the STAP must be sensitive to changing battlefield events. Without this sensitivity the staff will fight the plan and not the enemy. As negative and positive information flows into the HQ and as assets are lost or cannot carry out their function, adjustments to the STAP must be made. 9. Control Measures. Control measures will be required to protect the ISTAR assets (eg NFAs and FSSLs) as well as defining the battlefield framework (eg boundaries and PLs). This will help in minimising the risk of fratricide by considering the CID measures and defining who is responsible for which piece of the AO. 10. Counter Surveillance Control Measures (CSCM). CSCM are often determined by higher command authorities and are based on estimates of gain against risk. CSCMs can affect the STAP. When this is the case, or when formations or units impose their own CSCMs, attention should be paid to the resulting limitations on ISTAR assets, particularly MSTAR.

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ANNEX I TO CHAPTER 3 WARGAMING 1. If time allows each COA should be wargamed to assist the commander in reaching his decision in choosing a particular COA. If time is short, it is acceptable that only the chosen COA is wargamed. It is imperative that the chosen COA is wargamed in order to bring it to life, to discover any weaknesses, to refine the detail and to identify further contingencies. The wargame should follow the theme of ‘action, reaction and counter reaction'. a. Defensive operations - enemy action, own reaction and enemy counter reaction. b. 2.

Offensive operations - own action, enemy reaction and own counter reaction.

Staff Responsibilities. a. Commander - observes and arbitrates. Whilst commanders must be present during wargaming, they should step back from the process to allow it to develop properly and ensure that the audience is as inclusive as possible. b. COS or battlegroup 2IC - directs the wargame and controls input by the planning staff. It is vital that this officer ensures that the products of wargaming are recorded and that the wargame does not race ahead of the scribe detailed in sub para e below. c.

G3 staff or operations officer - conducts the friendly forces plan.

d.

G2 staff or intelligence officer - conducts the enemy plan.

e. G3 staff officer or adjutant - records decisions taken, amends the DSO and DSO matrix, (to ensure DPs are identified and confirmed,) completes the synchronisation/integration matrix and keeps track of attrition rates. f. 3.

Other staff - observe and provide comment as necessary.

Wargaming Methods. a. The Belt Method. Divide the AO into belts across the entire frontage (eg deep, close and rear) and wargame each belt sequentially. This method is driven by the DSO/ DSO matrix and helps to confirm and refine it. b. The Box Method. Wargame individual actions critical to the success of the operation (eg a turning action, a fixing action and a striking action as represented by TAIs). c. The Avenue Method. The wargame follows each avenue of approach in turn and throughout its depth.

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4. Tools to Assist Wargaming. following tools are useful:

For each course of action to be wargamed, the

a.

A draft course of action statement and a schematic.

b.

A draft task organisation.

c.

A draft DSO and DSO matrix.

d.

The superior DSO.

e.

A blank synchronisation/integration matrix.

5. Conduct of the Wargame. When conducting the wargame, the controller must first identify the start and finish points. How the force gets to the line of departure is usually as important as what it does thereafter. Once these have been established, the following sequence should be used: a. COS or battlegroup 2IC briefs the course of action to be wargamed, covering the mission, commander's intent and endstate, and the scheme of manoeuvre. The scheme should include how the desired effect is to be achieved against the enemy, the purpose for each subordinate element including offensive support and engineers, contingencies for the reserve and the main effort activity. b. The G2 or IO briefs the enemy COA against which the plan has been developed. The G2 or IO must ‘fight’ the enemy in a robust fashion in order that the HQ gains most from the wargaming. c. The location of enemy and friendly forces should be marked on the map using map pins or stickers. They should be moved as the wargame develops. Initial disposition should take account of any attrition before the start point. Whoever has the initiative starts. So, if the enemy has the initiative: (1)

Enemy action is presented.

(2)

Friendly reaction is presented.

(3)

Enemy counter reaction is presented.

d. This cycle continues until the desired endstate is achieved and the COS or battlegroup 2IC can call upon any member of the planning staff for input at any stage. It must be conducted with despatch and brevity but should bring out all aspects. At BG level, for example, the dialogue from the 2IC could be along the lines of “Enemy - what are you doing? Friendly forces - what is your reaction? Enemy - what do you do to counter that? Pause there - Adjutant - have you got all that? OK, engineers - what are you doing now? Guns - where is your priority at this stage? Good point - Adjutant - make sure you record that on the DSO matrix!” Note that wargaming techniques can also be used to develop TAIs during COA development and also, led by the commander, be used as a vehicle for rehearsing the plan with subordinate commanders.

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6. Endstate of the Wargame. The endstate of the wargame is the DSO and DSO matrix confirmed, contingency TAIs for the reserve identified and the synchronisation/integration matrix complete. At this stage, the staff should be in a position to produce the following supporting staff work as necessary: DSO and DSO Matrix Synchronisation/Integration Matrix Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan Anti Armour Plan Fire Plan Obstacle Plan Intelligence Collection Plan Movement Orders Task Organisation

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CHAPTER 4 EXECUTING AND EVALUATING THE PLAN SECTION 1 - BACKGROUND 1. Chapter 2 describes the PREE staff processes that take place during an operation. This chapter describes the staff procedures during the execution and subsequent evaluation of the enacted plan. 2. Operations in Iraq1 have identified the need to change the focus in training to concentrate on execution. This chapter will describe how a digitised HQ’s Operations Centre2 (Ops Cen) provides the command support the commander needs for effective execution. 3. The dissemination and understanding of Information Requirements (IRs) and Commanders’ Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) are key to the successful execution of a plan. Once a plan is executed the commander and his staff will evaluate its success, making adjustments as required in order to achieve the tasks and mission. While execution is an operations staff responsibility, once it is identified that adjustments are required the plans staff will work up the new orders. 4. The commander must have SA to command effectively. SA is primarily awareness of the environment3, friendly and enemy locations, and intent. This is bounded by the unit’s AOR, and set within the wider relevant situational context. 5. Execution is a continuous activity during an operation 4. Once an order has passed from the Plan and Review functions5 and has been enacted, its execution becomes the responsibility of the operations staff within the Ops Cen. SECTION 2 - SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 6. SA is defined as the understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander’s (or staff officer’s) mission (or task)6. The battlespace is a dynamic environment within which SA is restricted by the commander’s mental ability to process a vast and constantly changing variety of complex information. It is unlikely that commanders above sub unit level can have true SA. Most will rely upon remote sources which will impose an inherent time delay (reducing the SA’s quality). Raw information must be processed using military judgement to turn it into SA. SA itself is a wasting asset which requires constant refreshing and reprocessing. SA is therefore a continual cycle of Direction, Collection, Processing and Dissemination7.

1

AC 71816 Operations in Iraq. An Analysis From A Land Perspective. The Operations Centre or Operations Room describes the area within a UK HQ that executes operations. 3 Environment includes such physical factors as topography and weather. 4 A land HQ on operations will be continually executing operations related activities, whether they be simply administrative in nature or are large scale manoeuvres. As such the Ops Cen will always be active. 5 See Chapter 2 for a detailed description of the PREE Process. 6 JWP 0-01.1 7 DCPD is the current process description of the ISTAR Cycle, but matches the SA requirement. 2

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7. Shared SA is defined as a condition where force elements achieve a common, or at least consistent, understanding of both the operational level context and the prevailing tactical situation. Information which generates an individual’s SA can be shared, but SA itself cannot. The term ‘Team SA’ reflects this and therefore represents the team’s view or consensus of the situation based on shared information. There are three mechanisms by which team SA can be achieved. These are shown are at Figure 4.1:

TEAM SA

1.

TEAM SA

2.

SA

SA

SA

SA

Team SA is the collective understanding of all members

SA

SA

SA

3.

SA

SA

SA

Team SA

Team SA is the understanding of all team members as moderated by the commander

Team SA is the similar state of understanding of all team members

Figure 4.1 – Models for Team Situational Awareness 8. In the first mechanism the understanding of the situation is moderated by that of the commander. In the second, team SA is the collective understanding of all team members whilst in the third all team members have a similar understanding of the situation. In order to develop team SA there is a requirement to develop individual SA within the framework of the mission to be accomplished. Secondly, team members need to share their individual SA, thus requiring them to have SA of other team members to develop the team’s SA. Team SA enables the use of a wider medium of communication tools. With careful training, common doctrine and a methodology for integrating the information available, it will be possible to develop a sufficiently robust team SA within a HQ or command team. What matters in SA is not to achieve an absolute level, but the ability to make sense of that which you have and to use it to make a sound decision. Critically, SA is not a substitute for poor quality orders or transmission of intent. It must be based on how much probability of error a commander is willing to accept, ie ‘risk’. Risk taking based on information is a key attribute of the commander.

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SECTION 3 – EXECUTION 9. Execution comprises two functions - command and control. Control is further divided into two elements - monitoring and coordination. Coordination is based on the operational staff work a HQ will produce and provides the detailed direction and framework that staff will give to subordinate units. By monitoring the execution of the operation the staff will be able to compare their plans against what is actually happening. Command has three aspects - providing SA, decision making and communication of orders. Figure 4.2 illustrates execution and its sub-components.

Figure 4.2 - Components of Execution Appropriate procedures are therefore required within the HQ to enable the staff to monitor and coordinate the implementation of the commander’s plan and to make adjustments as and when required. If during the execution function it is assessed that there is a significant deviation from the commander’s plan, the issue is passed to the evaluation function for analysis and the development of appropriate COA. 10. The execution of an operation begins when committed assets physically enact their issued orders, ie when vehicles start moving as per a MovO. The control process of the execution function is carried out by the G3 and operations staff within supporting branches. In some HQs, especially at battlegroup and sub unit level, officers and NCOs may be required simultaneously to conduct both planning and operations tasks. 11. Planning Products. In order to control the operation, the operations staff require a thorough understanding of the plan and in particular the commander’s intent. They must also be fully conversant with the CCIRs and the status of any outstanding RFIs. The G3 staff must have access to the following planning tools:

8

a.

Synchronisation Matrix 8

b.

DSO

Some HQs prefer to use Mission Execution Check Lists (MECL) rather than synchronisation matrices.

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c.

DSOM

d.

DSM

e.

Op Overlay

f.

Supporting Plans and Overlays9

12. Commander’s Direction. The key to successful execution of the operation is clear direction from the commander to the staff on his intent, planning assumptions, success factors and concerns. He must make clear the acceptable level of detail required for SA and the amount of risk he is prepared to accept. The staff will employ standard Information Management (IM) procedures to answer the CCIR, which will have been identified during the Estimate process. The dynamic management of current and new CCIRs during the execution and evaluation of a plan is the responsibility of the operations staff. OPERATIONS CENTRE 13. The Ops Cen is at the centre of a digitised HQ. It is not simply a substitute for the G3 Ops function as it has a far wider remit and supports the execution of the commander’s plan by seamlessly integrating all staff branches and cells. Relevant information (Rel I) is thus managed, collated and displayed within the Ops Cen and is critical in supporting the commander in his decision making process. Underpinning the Ops Cen is the Local Operating Picture (LOP). The commander gains critical elements of his SA through the LOP and it may be expressed in any appropriate medium (pictorial, textual or verbal). Any information presented through the LOP must be Rel I. To be effective the work within the Ops Cen must be coherent and consistent with the commander’s direction. 14. Output. The Ops Cen concentrates on providing the control for the execution of an operation. It coordinates the implementation of the plan and monitors the results. By providing shared SA the Ops Cen will act as a trigger for decision making. It is the main conduit for the provision of SA through the HQ and will ultimately help the commander to gain SA. The Ops Cen must also provide SA to the staff who are not colocated. In order to prevent information saturation only Rel I should be passed to dispersed HQ elements. During the course of an operation the Ops Cen will constantly assess the execution of the operation and will address two fundamental questions: a.

What is the difference between reality and the plan (Monitoring)?

b. Are adjustments to the orders and plan necessary to reconcile the situation and achieve the commander’s intent (precursor to the Evaluation function)? The key activity for successful execution is for G3 and other staff to analyse the situation based on a flow of IRs and R3s10. The Ops Cen staff must identify and forecast if there are any changes which invalidate the original plan. If this is so, they must provide appropriate Rel I to the Evaluate Team to allow them to propose appropriate COA. During the execution process the commander will also make judgements on the implementation of predetermined decision points. 9 10

eg Counter mobility overlays, fire plan, the movement order. Requests, Reports and Returns.

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15. Composition. The composition of the Ops Cen depends upon available effective voice and data communications. Membership is not a necessarily a strictly defined single entity; it may include staff from outside the HQ including those not in the same theatre. The commander’s senior staff officer is responsible for determining the membership of the Ops Cen based on the following criteria: a. Complexity of Operation. Operations comprising a large number of differing weapon systems provided by different allies or air and maritime components will require a large number of expert staff within the Ops Cen. OGDs may also be represented. b. Stability and Reliability of Communications. Unreliable communications may result in the composition being restricted to in place HQ staff. c. Phase of Operation. Specialist staff will be required for different phases of an operation. During the contact battle phase of an operation CIMIC staff may not be required. They may become members once the post conflict phase has begun. d. Location of Forward HQ (Fwd HQ). If a Fwd HQ is deployed for a particular part of an operation, the Ops Cen may be split between Main and Fwd HQs. The task of the Fwd HQ is solely to maintain the commander’s SA. 16. Control of Ops Cen. The Ops Cen is controlled by the Ops Cen Director (OCD) who is normally the senior G3 staff officer in the HQ. The OCD is subordinate to the COS but has the authority to direct current operations staff within other branches. His responsibilities are: a.

To develop and implement the LOP Rel I Plan. See Annex A.

b. To report and monitor friendly force information (current strengths, dispositions, capabilities, readiness, holdings and critical assets). c.

To report and monitor enemy force information (provided and briefed by G2)

d. To report and monitor all aviation and air information (provided by G3 Air/Avn). e.

To update visual displays as appropriate.

f.

To brief the commander as appropriate.

g.

To support effective coordination within the HQ.

h.

To identify significant deviations from the commander’s plan.

17. Infrastructure. The size and composition of the Ops Cen will determine the level and complexity of infrastructure to support it. Where there are power and lift limitations the COS will have to balance these factors against the requirements of his Ops Cen. As a minimum the Ops Cen infrastructure must be able to facilitate briefings, command and control.

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18. Organisation of Ops Cen. The Ops Cen is functionally at the centre of the HQ and may also be physically located there. The OCD will be positioned in the vicinity of the LOP display and will coordinate the activities of the LOP controllers and the G3 Watchkeepers. The LOP display will be used to provide Comd’s Updates and be his main source of SA. Figure 4.3 illustrates the Ops Cen central role in a HQ. A graphical representation of a brigade Ops Cen is at Figure 4.4 and a battlegroup Ops Cen at Figure 4.5. Annex B provides guidance for the composition of a non-digitised HQ.

Engr

Environment (Geo and Met) G6

G8

G4

OPS CENTRE

G3

LOP

G9

G1

G2 G7

Avn

Arty

Figure 4.3 - Operations Centre

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Figure 4.4 - Bde Main HQ 19. Branch Operations Centres. Within a HQ different cells (eg engr, arty) support the commander. Depending on the complexity and size of an operation it may be necessary for branch operations centres to be established to support the Ops Cen. In order that Rel I is provided to the Ops Cen it is necessary to ensure that information is processed through the Information Life cycle11. Each cell is responsible for the coordination and control of their respective plan and for the assessment of the execution of their plan in the context of the commander’s overall plan. 20. Ops Cen Information Flows. Information flows between and within the HQ will follow functional routes, eg engr, and staff branch routes (G1-9). Information that flows through to the Ops Cen must be Rel I in order to prevent information overload and the subsequent loss of team SA. IM of Rel I within a HQ is critical, in particular to ensure that configuration control is maintained and that archiving and reversionary methods of working are available if required. Chapter 7 details the requirements for strict IM procedures. CCIRs must be disseminated throughout the HQ and to subordinate units. Responses to CCIRs must be carefully documented to ensure appropriate actions are taken. Annex C graphically

11

Acquisition, Exploitation, Dissemination, Storage, Disposal. Chapter 7.

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represents the CCIR process. Formation and unit SOIs must detail information routing structures in order to prevent information degradation.

0D

VocSig

ISTAR

CIS

RSO

0B Int WO

VocSig BG

ISTAR Plan Table LD

IO

VocSig Bde

BGE

VocSig

VocSig

Engr

Wkpr

FPC FPC SNCO

Adjt

2i/c

BG CSS

G4

VocSig

Info Sp NCO

Entrance

Sig

RSM

Figure 4.5 - Battlegroup Main HQ 21. Local Operating Picture (LOP). The LOP is the main source of the commander’s SA. It presents geospatial12, pictorial, textual and verbal information to the HQ. Once an order has been enacted its execution will be monitored through the LOP. This will be dictated by the Rel I plan and will allow the display of staff products such as the DSO, synchronisation matrix etc. In addition to conventional Rel I the LOP may present other information such as political opinion, alliance intent, NGO intent and activity. Strict IM procedures dictated by the OCD and based on the commander’s direction must be in place to ensure that only Rel I is presented and that it is the most current available.. 22. Relevant Information Ownership. Rel I provided to the LOP is owned by the relevant staff branch or cell. To ensure only authorised information is distributed and displayed, HQ SOIs must clearly state who owns and is responsible for the distribution of information. The OCD is the authority for the publication of any updates to the LOP which will be compiled by the OCD at appropriate times and distributed according to the commander’s direction. 12

Geospatial data is information about the shape and location of objects on the earth's surface which can be manipulated in desktop mapping or GIS programmes.

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23. Display. The majority of information will be displayed in a manner to ensure team SA, the quick identification of mission critical information and IRs. A map display is the primary way of displaying information: state boards and other display media will improve team SA. Automated state boards are particularly suitable for the display of numerical information: if configured appropriately they will give enhanced team SA. Whilst non digitised HQs are constrained by the location of the bird table, digitised HQs can ensure that the LOP is made available to all Ops Cen members at their place of work. It can also be sent to non collocated Ops Cen staff. Predefined formatting instructions are essential for any distributed information medium to ensure that Rel I is not corrupted by the receiving cell or deployed Ops Centre. 24.

Update. The LOP is updated with input from the following sources of information: a.

R313.

b.

Digital situation feeds (OSPR / CPR)

c.

Voice communications from subordinates, flanking and higher HQs.

d.

Data Messages and Rel I from staff branches and cells.

e.

Liaison officer reports.

f.

ISTAR feeds.

Presentation of Rel I must maintain Precision, Order and Discipline (POD) in order to ensure that the LOP does not become visually degraded, overly complicated and confusing. 25. Record Keeping. The OCD must ensure, through the Ops Cen log, that a record is kept of: a.

Receipt of all Orders.

b.

All decisions made by the commander and principal officers.

c.

All voice messages received by the Ops Cen from external sources.

d.

All Requests for Information (RFI).

All Rel I and R3 are to be recorded and filed in accordance with IM procedures at Chapter 7 and HQ SOIs. Post change of control, a copy of the Ops Cen log is to be passed to the new Ops Cen as soon as possible. The Ops Cen log will form part of the Commander’s Diary or Operational Record and must be included in any archiving plans (See Chapter 6). Detailed guidance for the maintenance of the log is at Annex D. 26. Execution Updates. The purpose of the Execution Update is to ensure the optimum SSA within the HQ. In digitised HQs, to save staff time and ensure maximum 13

. R3s may be in an electronic version, paper or verbal. Regardless of the sources medium it should be transposed into the LOP.

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participation, consideration is to be given to the use of intercom and the distribution of the LOP14 to specified User Data Terminals. In non digitised HQs updates are conducted around the ‘bird table’, which interrupts LOP operations and limits the numbers who can receive the update. It is possible to send graphical updates throughout the HQ at more frequent intervals with appropriate content depending on the type of operation. The OCD will identify and announce when Staff Updates are required. The ideal time to send SITREPS up and down the chain of command is directly after a staff update. During planning the COS can use Staff Updates in order to coordinate planning activity. 27. Commander’s Update Briefings. During high tempo operations the commander should be able to gain SA from the LOP, SITREPs from subordinates and his own observation of the battle. However, in a large HQ or during multifaceted complex low tempo operations (ie operations other than war) regular briefings are to be held to keep the commander updated on the execution of the operation. These differ from Execution Updates which are aimed at staff SA in general. Regular update briefing may be an option especially if Rel I is not readily available and detailed staff preparation is required. The OCD must ensure briefings are short and focus on the CCIRs and Exceptional Information. SECTION 4 – EVALUATION 28. Evaluation is perhaps the most important staff activity in the era of the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). It means to determine the measure of effectiveness of a given COA and is thus critical to the EBAO. During this process the commander and his staff adjust the plan in order to exploit a situation or to counter an enemy action. The identification of when to act is dependent upon the delivery of timely information and identification that the situation is about to change, followed by subsequent quick analysis and the distribution of orders. It is the responsibility of all operations staff to assist the commander to evaluate, thus ensuring the success of his plan. His staff must, therefore, take timely actions to keep him updated. At the lower tactical levels and during simple operations, the commander may be able to conduct this activity with limited support. During more complex and protracted operations the commander will be more dependent on his staff for analysis. Evaluation comprises three steps: a.

Identification of a change to the situation.

b.

Analysis of the impact of the change.

c.

Identification of action to exploit or mitigate change.

The process is shown in Figure 4.6.

14

Format of any medium must be prescribed to prevent deletion of Rel I.

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Figure 4.6 - Evaluate Function CHANGE OF SITUATION 29. In order to identify whether the situation has changed the operations staff must have a thorough understanding of respective commanders’ intent and any established success criteria. Coupled with the constant provision of Rel I to the Ops Cen this will enable the operations staff to analyse the progress of an operation and identify when a situation is potentially changing. a. Using direction such as the OpO and its associated products the operations staff will identify when decision points may be applicable and if there is indication that the plan is deviating from what was expected. The display of the synchronisation matrix, the DSO and its accompanying DSM are the operations staff’s primary means of controlling the implementation of the commander’s plan. A synchronisation matrix can be manipulated15 to ensure that changes in timings and events are displayed and can be distributed throughout the HQ. b. The operations staff will gain shared SA from the Rel I feeds provided by other operations staff and coordinated by the OCD. As the situation changes the operations staff will use their personal experience, knowledge and intuition to analyse whether change is taking place. They will draw on other operations and HQ staff, particularly G2, to enhance this analysis. They may refer to the commander and COS for advice and to brief the developing situation. 30. Decision Briefs. Once a substantial potential change in situation has been identified the staff must act quickly to ensure that the commander is aware. HQ SOIs must specify the ‘staff actions on’ when a change in situation is identified. The Ops Cen decision brief is the principal method of informing the commander. The staff involved in execution are to present exploited information, evolved through judgement and understanding, to enable the commander to make timely decisions in order to influence events. Decision briefs can take place any time the commander or staff feels there is a need for a decision. 15

This assumes use of a digital product.

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To ensure that they are short, succinct and relevant, HQ SOIs must stipulate the sequence and information to be briefed. 31. Commander’s Analysis. Using his experience, education, judgement and intuition the commander will then compare the results achieved so far with the desired effects as expressed in his plan. Recognising that a difference exists between the actual situation and the plan is the catalyst for further decision making and will result in the development or modification of the plan. Once the commander has conducted his own analysis, he can decide to: a.

Take no action.

b. Give operations staff more specific direction on areas to monitor more closely in an anticipation of a change. c.

Direct his plans staff to analyse the emerging situation.

d. Direct his plans staff to issue new orders or personally give commander’s orders himself.16 ANALYSIS 32. The analysis of change to an ongoing operation is a plans staff activity; it enables the Ops Cen staff to continue to concentrate on execution and monitoring the changing situation17. In order to analyse the situation successfully, the plans staff must be briefed on the perceived change. This must take place away from the Ops Cen so as not to hinder the ongoing execution function. Other forms of reference information may include imagery, eg aerial photographs, enemy equipment, and specialised mapping. As a member of the Principal Planning Group (PPG) the commander could be included during the Evaluate process. The Staff Analysis process is graphically represented at Figure 4.7.

Figure 4.7 - Staff Analysis Activities

16

This assumes the commander has conducted his own analysis and has identified a COA. The Planning and Evaluate functions differ in emphasis; the Plan function will address a situation which has not yet been analysed in detail whilst the Evaluate function addresses issues that have arisen through the implementation of an existing plan.

17

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33. The plans staff must have access to all Rel I and CCIRs which should be manipulated and presented in a manner which enhances decision making. A brief Combat Estimate is carried out with the commander and the Community of Interest (COI) who will identify the degree of change from the plan. The results are captured using formatted templates or recorded screenshots. The LOP must be available in the Evaluation / Plans area assisting in the provision of SSA. The quick estimate will identify one of four possible COA: a. CONPLAN Selection. An existing CONPLAN18 is selected; it may be amended and is issued as a FragO. CONPLANs are produced after the initial planning phase if there is spare staff capacity. b. Minor Change. A minor change to the plan requiring existing staff work to be amended, eg a minor boundary amendment. c. Major Change. A major change to the plan requiring new staff work to be created, such as a change of mission to a subordinate. d. Plan Invalid. The plan is now invalid and the staff has to begin planning again. This scenario is most likely as a result of the receipt of new orders. The results of the quick estimate are briefed to the commander if he has not been present and a decision taken. The subsequent operational staff work products produced are fused by the G5 Plans branch, using similar processes to the plans function and disseminated via a central point, normally the RDC at formation level. ACT 34. After the commander’s decision the staff must focus on distributing any new orders and associated staff work as soon as possible. The challenge lies in making sure that subordinates and operations staff are able to conduct the new actions without disrupting the existing plan and battle activities. In a fast moving operation the potential for confusion and counter order is high. Plans staff must carefully consider how to disseminate any new orders and instructions. IM staff must ensure all recipients of an order acknowledge it. 35. The authority of changed products is provided by a covering FragO; this process enables the commander to authorise a change. Verbal instructions must be recorded in the Ops Cen log. The control of such material is critical; in a fast moving battle subordinates must be in no doubt as to what is required by any changes. 36. The operations staff must also be briefed on the new orders and products as quickly as possible. Given the dynamic nature of an operation, the operations staff must anticipate the impact of the changes to existing activities. The new instructions may lead to a subsequent change in situation and the cycle will start again. A schematic of this process is at Figure 4.8.

18

CONPLAN - A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning. ADP6a.

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Evaluation COI Findings

id al v In

New Plan

Ratified by the Commander Major

M in or

Amended OSW

New OSW

Execute LOP

Figure 4.8 - Evaluation Consequences 37. Structure. After consulting the commander the COS will decide the composition of the plans staff. It should reflect the type of operation the unit/formation is executing. For offensive operations the staff may consist of the more traditional combat, CS and CSS elements, whilst during a stability operation OGD and supporting civilian agencies may also be included. 38. Infrastructure. In order to display Rel I and reference information the Evaluate / Plans Area must be equipped with appropriate visual displays, preferably with the ability to generate products which can be distributed easily throughout the HQ and beyond. Concurrently with the display of Rel I / RI a constantly updating LOP should be displayed. During the execution phase of an operation there will be a constant collection of Rel I / RI, which requires analysis, processing and manipulation into an appropriate form; this is the main focus for the G5 Plans Branch, which must be supported by the entire staff as required.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 4 RELEVANT INFORMATION PLAN CONTENT GUIDANCE 1. Local Operating Picture (LOP). The detail shown will depend on the situation and command level. In a battlegroup this may show: a.

Own troop locations, HQs and boundaries.

b.

Enemy locations, significant capabilities.

c. FEBA, objectives, report lines, tactical bounds, centre lines and all relevant control measures for Battlespace Management (BM) d.

Obstacles, fixed defences, defensive fire (DF) tasks and heavy weapons.

e.

Installations (where these are relevant to operations and movement planning).

f. Routes, bridges and ferries for tracked and wheeled vehicles, showing bridge classifications. g.

Locations, times and yields of own and enemy nuclear strikes.

h. Areas of radiological fallout, chemical contamination and toxic industrial hazard. i.

Air defence (AD) coverage. Provided by targeting staff.

j. Targeting information – both kinetic and non-kinetic, incl objectives, targets and fire positions for AH. k.

Vital topographical information not otherwise shown.

l. The time at which the LOP was brought up to date or the timing of the situation it portrays. m.

Patrol Information (Routes, locations, timings)

2. Master Intelligence Picture. The master intelligence map showing comprehensive information about enemy locations, identifications etc, is kept by the intelligence staff. Dissemination of enemy information should be clearly prescribed in order to ensure that all branches are working off a common source and version. 3. Commander’s LOP. The commander’s LOP enables the commander to maintain SSA when he is away from the Ops Cen. It usually mirrors the LOP but may be reduced if there are bandwidth constraints. 4. CSS Battle Picture. The CSS battle picture is maintained by G1/G4 staffs; it shows only such operational detail as is required for information and CSS purposes; for example:

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5.

a.

Approximate FLOT, and unit dispositions.

b.

Boundaries and BM control measures.

c.

Location of HQs, unit echelons and logistics units.

d.

Logistic installations.

e.

Traffic routes, diversions and bridge classifications.

f.

Additional topographical information.

Other Information. a.

Commander’s intent.

b.

Stateboards (composition).

c.

LOP distribution list.

d.

Effects desired.

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 4 NON-DIGITISED HQ GUIDANCE 1. Information. The following key information should be immediately available within an Ops Cen: a.

Radio net diagrams and call signs (one for each net).

b.

Communication states.

c.

Telephone directory.

d.

Task organisation and locations.

e.

Notice to move details.

f.

AFV state.

g.

COMBATREP format.

h.

Officers’ locations and duty roster.

i.

Action outstanding board.

2. Documents and Forms. The following documents and forms should be available within an Ops Cen: a.

BATCO and VOCAB cards, SOCs, SCAN Lists or CEI, etc.

b.

Log sheet (AF B58), plus cardboard backing.

c.

Message forms (F Sigs 266).

d.

Printed or duplicated proforma for reports and returns.

e.

SOPs.

3. Equipment. Although by no means exhaustive the following equipment would be useful in an Ops Cen: a.

Pencils.

b.

Chinagraph pencils and/or felt pens.

c.

Pencil sharpeners.

d.

Cleaning fluid and rags.

e.

Stencil of military symbols or map marking ‘stickies’.

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f.

Rulers.

g.

Staplers.

h.

Rubbers.

i.

Torches.

j.

Tracing paper.

k.

Spare talc overlays.

l.

Carbon paper.

m.

Rubbish sacks (separate for classified).

n.

Clock.

o.

CBRN Report Formats

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ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 4 COMMANDER’S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

CCIR CCIR

2

PIR

FFIR

IRs

Baseline

IRs

Event

IRs

Baseline

NIR

IRs

Event

IRs

Baseline

IRs

Event

FFIR – Friendly Forces Information Requirements PIR – Priority Information Requirements NIR – Neutral Information Requirement

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ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 4 LOG KEEPING 1. The log is a record of all activities, all information received and all decisions taken by the HQ. This detail is recorded on a log sheet (AF B58), a completed example of which is at Appendix 1. All operational messages must be logged and acknowledged by a watchkeeper and the information passed to those concerned, both inside and outside the HQ. Watchkeepers themselves must understand the commander’s intent and be able to analyse, interpret and act on information received. 2. The importance of accurate and comprehensive log-keeping cannot be overstressed; logs may be required for after action analysis and could be particularly relevant in other operations. The detail on the operations log should be circulated within the HQ at formation level and above. The need for a hard copy of the log to be passed around a HQ will be reduced as more information is stored digitally. 3.

The following items should be included in the log: a. The gist of all radio and telephone conversations, with exact local time and date group. b. All written messages and reports (hard copy only), both in and out of the HQ. A long message may be paraphrased or referred to by file reference and subject. c.

Reports from LOs and visitors and any other relevant information received.

d. The time of issue of operations and service support orders, and the times of dispersal of conferences and orders groups. e.

The movements of the commander and senior staff officers.

f. Own or enemy action. Items to be included in SITREPs and the commander’s diary to be written up effectively from the log. g.

Any other significant action such as those of non-military agencies.

4. The bare facts of events recorded in the log can be obscure to a reader unless he is in close touch with the situation. Time and mental effort can be saved by recording ‘comment’ in the action column of the log to underline the significance of a particular item and by marking up items which are likely to be included in the compilation of OWNSITREPs or COMBATREPs.

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Reporting Information 5.

Information. This is to be logged and recorded in the following manner: Order

Example

a.

Time (When?)

Contact at 1403 hrs

b.

Place (Where?)

Grid 020803

c.

Activity (What?)

Anti-tank gun knocked out one of my tanks

d.

Action taken.

K10 (Guns) engaging and we are by-passing

6. Methodology. Every watchkeeper will develop his method for processing information. Acting on information, eg informing others both inside and outside the HQ or passing on orders, is the most important but most frequently neglected part of the watchkeeper’s task. The log is necessary as a record and the following method is recommended. a.

Note down the key detail in the log.

b.

Mark the information on the map.

c.

Take any action necessary.

d.

If necessary complete the entry in the log, including the action taken.

7. Aids. In the heat of activity watchkeepers are always pressed to process information. The following hints may help: a. Use a shorthand that is standard through the HQ (eg ‘1 GREN GDS battlegroup’ may be ‘1GG’). b. Although units/HQ titles have to be written in the log (ie not just their callsigns), the shorthand for own HQ may be known as ‘+’. c. Condense the information as far as possible. Staff duties are not important as long as the result is intelligible. The message ‘Contact at 1436 hours in small wood south of Chipstable. Callsign Y23 reports that he can see what appears to be 2 enemy tanks. They are camouflaged and do not seem to be moving’, might appear on the log as ‘1436 hrs. Wood, SU 709385, 2 en tks static’.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 4 EXAMPLE OF COMPLETED AF B 58 – LOG SHEET SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Army Form B 58 LOG SHEET Formation/Unit HQ 20 ARMD BDE

Date 13 JAN 07

Log Keeper(s) Capt A STUDENT

Sheet No 3

Ser

DTG

To

From

Event

Action

Sign

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

24

1505

+

1 RRF

Wood at 049201 clear.

Arty ops info’d

25

1507

+

SCOTS DG

En ATGW at 020280 destroyed 2 tks. My B Sqn engaging. Am bypassing.

1 PWO warned that they will have to deal with this en posn.

26

1509

+

1 RRF

En minefd in area 054220. SCIMITAR damaged on atk mine.

(1) Ordered to find out how far minefd extends. (2) Engr Ops info’d.

27.

1510

SCOTS DG

+

Comd will visit at 1600 to brief on new task. Send RV.

(1) RV 024475. (2) Comd info’d.

28.

1516

+

QDG

Crater in rd at 074261. Cannot bypass but am laying AVLB. Verges mined.

(1) Engr Ops info’d. (2) 1 PWO warned of mines and told to stay on rd.

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CHAPTER 5 DIRECTIVES, PLANS AND ORDERS SECTION 1 – GENERAL PRINCIPLES GENERAL 1. The purpose of this Chapter is to describe the principles for the composition and dissemination of directives, plans and orders. 2. The final stage of the planning process is communicating the plan. Directives and orders provide the principal means by which a commander’s intentions are conveyed to his subordinates. They form a critical link in the chain of command. Plans and orders are thus indispensable tools of command without which no armed force can function effectively. 3. The function of directives, plans and orders should always be considered within the context of the exercise of command. Directives, plans and orders are used in the command of military operations. They also serve a wide variety of other purposes including the initiation or direction of training and of logistic preparations. They have to be acted on expeditiously. The production and subsequent dissemination of directives, plans and orders should not be allowed to become ends in themselves. The test of any directive or order is whether the commander (or the staff on behalf of a commander) has translated his intentions into a form which can be easily understood, and acted on, by subordinates or members of his staff. This test reinforces the need for common doctrine and training. TERMINOLOGY 4. General. The terms ‘directive’, ‘plan’ and ‘order’ may appear to be close in meaning but have distinct definitions in military use: a. Directives. A directive is used at the higher levels of command to initiate activity and to give both general and specific guidance to subordinate commanders. It will be less formal, rigid and prescriptive than an order. It may include missions to subordinates but need not necessarily do so.1 b. Plans. Plans are mainly issued for contingency planning purposes and have no executive authority until activated by an order. They are also the term used to describe the output from the planning process prior to being converted into directives and orders by the commander. c. Orders. Orders are defined as 'a communication, written, oral or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate2'. Orders are used in all spheres of military activity and at all levels of command. They include sufficiently detailed direction to subordinates (in the form of missions and/or tasks) so that they

1

See JWP 0-10 Chapter 5 for guidance on Joint National Directives and AJP-01(A) Chapter 4 Section IV concerning Allied Directives and Orders. 2 ADP Land Operations Vol 1.

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can achieve specific activities, such as the deployment and employment of troops.3 Types of orders are covered later in the Chapter. 5. Instruction. An instruction is used to regulate military activity. Standing Instructions are issued typically to set out organisational responsibilities and to govern routine administrative procedures and actions.4 Periodic instructions cater for any specific actions required of a non routine nature. In general, formal instructions carry authority equivalent to that of directives or orders. While instructions may complement directives or orders, they are not discussed further in this publication. APPLICATION 6. General. The considerations which affect the choice to use a directive, a plan or an order depend to a large extent on the level of command and the stage of a particular campaign, major operation, battle or engagement. In general, directives are used at the military strategic and operational levels and may apply for a longer duration than orders. A commander may also choose to issue a directive in preference to orders when he wishes to devolve greater latitude in execution to his subordinates. Orders can be used at all levels of command. 7. Approach. The composition of directives, plans and orders demands the adherence to certain rules to aid understanding and to promote uniformity of procedure. Within these constraints it is important that commanders are free to bring their intentions to life - the production of directives and orders should be regarded as a creative act. As the circumstances of peace, conflict other than war and war evolve, originality and freshness in approach, tempered by practical constraints, is required. Further, as no situation demanding military action is likely to repeat itself, a template solution to the content of directives and orders for such action is unlikely to be successful, and is incompatible with the principles of Mission Command. Where the execution of standard drills is required in orders, the drills should be referred to for ease of understanding. 8. Timeliness. Commanders and staffs must be aware of the appropriate decision point to allow timely preparation and dissemination of directives, plans and orders. The time required for dissemination is easily under estimated. Late directives or orders risk becoming inappropriate before they can be carried out; ultimately their execution may prove impossible. A number of methods for dissemination may be required in order to guarantee timeliness. There are times when orders will be issued at very short notice and commanders and staffs should be appropriately prepared in training. 9.

Composition. Directives, plans and orders should be: a. Concise. Aim to convey no more than is necessary for a subordinate to act and to achieve his mission. They should contain nothing that a subordinate can and should arrange for himself. A commander should not attempt to prescribe to a subordinate at a distance anything that he, with a fuller knowledge of the local conditions, should be better able to decide on the spot. Otherwise he runs the risk of

3

For example, orders governing the day-to-day life of a unit or formation are published at frequent intervals in routine orders. This Chapter, however, concentrates on directives and orders used on operations. 4 Such as Army General and Administrative Instructions (AGAIs),Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Standing Operational Instructions.(SOIs).

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cramping his subordinate's initiative. Although the amount of detail required in directives, plans or orders will depend on the situation, those that are too detailed will invariably take longer to produce, disseminate and assimilate; the essential sense may become obscured. b. Clear. There should be no scope for ambiguity in the interpretation of directives, plans and orders. Above all, the intentions of the commander must be clear. On operations where only national formations are involved, orders should be written in operational staff duties format.5 In multinational operations, NATO staff duties should be used. Obscure national or single service military vernacular is to be avoided. In all cases, clarity must take precedence over conciseness and slavish adherence to convention.6 c. Accurate. Care has to be taken to validate all information such as timings, grid references and other critical details such as ROE. Therefore, if time permits, all written directives, plans and orders should be double checked before dissemination. 10. Change of Mission in Exceptional Situations. In exceptional circumstances, for instance where he has not received a clear and succinct mission from his superior (in a multinational environment, subordinates may be given a simple list of tasks, with no unifying purpose), or where mission analysis, and particularly the consideration of the higher commander’s intent, reveals other inadequacies, the commander may need to develop an alternative wording of his own mission. The mission should only be adjusted without permission where the superior commander cannot be contacted, and must in any event be in line with his intent. If the revised mission is more than a simple adjustment of language, it must be communicated to other flanking formations and units, who will be in the process of conducting their own estimates on the basis of their understanding of the mission as originally articulated. SECTION 2 – DIRECTIVES AND PLANS DIRECTIVES 11. The Link to Campaign Planning. The formulation and dissemination of operational directives is an essential feature of war and campaign planning. At the military strategic and operational levels of war, directives provide the principal means by which higher commanders pass on their intentions for the conduct of the campaign to subordinates, including maritime, land, air, SF and logistic component commanders. Subordinate commanders then base their own planning on such directives. It has to be recognised that the operational environment - on which planning assumptions were based - may change significantly during a campaign. For example, after General MacArthur's successful landings at Inchon in Korea in 1951 and subsequent swift advance into Northern Korea, the entry into hostilities of the Chinese Red Army led to a significant change in the operational situation and caused a two year stalemate before the cessation of hostilities. Further directives may have to be developed for the continuation and conclusion of the campaign on favourable terms. The same applies to logistic planning. Although a Sustainability 5

Operational staff duties are set out in the Land Component Handbook (LCHB). Staff Duties in the Field’s (1962) direction still holds: ‘The criteria to be applied to the use of all points of minor staff duties are ‘Do they make the document more intelligible? Do they save time?’ If so their use is justified. Pedantic insistence on functionless trivialities merely creates difficulties where none really exist.’

6

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Statement will have been issued to define the level of sustainability to be achieved during the campaign, the statement will be regularly reviewed in the light of current and future operations. PLANS 12. The detailed content of plans will vary according to the prevailing circumstances. In the case of campaign planning, for example, direction on the conduct of the campaign is likely to evolve during the planning and preparation stages and therefore more than one plan may be required (for example, an Initiating Directive may be followed by a more detailed Campaign Plan. Plans should contain sufficient information (including the allocation of resources) and guidance to allow subordinates to plan effectively, while only specifying the minimum of control and coordination measures necessary to ensure unity of purpose and effort across a force. Only in this way can the activities of subordinate commanders be focused without undue constraints on their initiative. As a general rule, plans should include as a minimum: a. The Situation, including the higher commander's intent and any planning assumptions. b.

The Mission.

c.

The Commander's Intent and his Concept of Operations.

d.

The allocation of resources to subordinates.

e. Any limitations on subordinates' freedom of action, including time constraints, ROE and command and control arrangements. 13. If missions to subordinates can be stated, they should be included in a campaign plan. While this may not be possible at the planning and deployment stage of a campaign or major operation, the earliest guidance on probable missions (or follow on missions once operations are underway) is essential to logistic planning and preparations. TYPES AND USE 14. Table 5.1 lists the main types of directives and plans normally associated with the operational level of command.

Directive Strategic Directive

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Typical Initiator

Typical Recipient

Brief Description

The Military Strategic Authority – for most UK operations this would be the Chief of Defence Staff, who, in conjunction with the appointed Joint Commander (Jt

The Operational Commander – who may become the in theatre Joint Force Commander (JFC).

a. Contains military strategic goals, the desired end-state of the campaign, allocates forces and should include any political constraints or resource limitations.

5-4

Directive

Typical Initiator

Typical Recipient

Comd), together exercise the military strategic function.

Brief Description b. The Strategic Directive will be normally supplemented by a Sustainability Statement (see Annex B to Chapter 2 of AFM Vol 1 Part 6, CSS).

Planning Directives

Operational and Tactical Commanders.

Subordinate Formation and Unit Commanders; could also include Functional Commanders.

Operational or tactical planning directives can be used by a commander to set out how he sees the forthcoming major operation or battle being fought. They may provide greater detail, including planning assumptions, than a concept of operations found in a specific Campaign Directive or Operation Order.

Training and Logistic Directives

Operational and Tactical Commanders.

As for planning directives.

A commander may give direction on training or logistics in separate documents or combine it into a planning directive. Training and logistic requirements in a theatre of operations may require refinement once the commander’s intent and concept of operations are confirmed.

Initiating Campaign Plan

The Operational Commander.

a. Subordinate Air, Land and Maritime Component Commanders.

a. Sets the scene and framework for planning, states the main effort, allocates resources, indicates freedoms and constraints and may give guidance on special training, likely C2 arrangements (including states of command) and ORBAT.

b. Special Forces and Higher Tactical Commanders.

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Directive

Typical Initiator

Typical Recipient

Brief Description b. It should also contain a Statement of Commander’s Intent for the forthcoming campaign if not previously issued.

Campaign Plan

The Operational Commander.

As for the Initiating Campaign Directive.

Contains a confirmed Statement of Intent and a Concept of Joint Operations, assigns missions or broad options to subordinates.

Table 5.1 – Directives and Plans FORMAT AND FORMULATION 15. Format. The nature and variety of directives and plans is such that their format is not standardised throughout NATO. Their content and layout, for example, will vary according to theatre, campaign objectives and force structure.7 The production of directives and plans requires both originality and creativity in content and often in format. 16. Formulation. The commander and his staff normally share the task of formulating directives and plans. Whereas much of the detailed drafting can be delegated - particularly at the higher levels of command - the operational commander himself should have a close hand in the formulation of key elements such as Statements of Commander's Intent and Concepts of Joint Operations. FM Slim advised, '...I have had published under my name a good many operational orders and a good many directives... but there is one paragraph in the order that I have always written myself... the intention paragraph'.8 SECTION 3 - ORDERS PURPOSE 17. Orders are the formal and primary means by which a commander communicates his intentions to, and imposes his will on, his subordinates. They provide a unified basis for action. Once issued, orders are never to be the basis of discussion. However, if a subordinate is unclear as to his superior's intentions, clarification may be necessary. In the confusion, stress and uncertainties of war, only orders give certainty of purpose and resolve to subordinates on the battlefield. In this way, they provide a firm reference point and foundation for effective action. Orders are thus crucial to the exercise of command. Once a decision has been made, the production and subsequent dissemination of orders, of whatever type, must take top priority in the functioning of a command system.

7 8

AJP-1 Operations. Lecture to the Staff College, Nov 67.

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18. Different types of orders (including Warning Orders) may refer to Operation Plans that are likely to be adopted.9 In all cases, a clear distinction between a plan issued for information and an order which is issued for execution needs to be maintained. An Operation Plan may be put into effect at a described time, or following receipt of a specific order or codeword which converts the plan into an Operation Order (OpO). TYPES AND USE 19. Orders are of two main types: OpO and Administrative/Combat Service Support Orders. Both types may be preceded by Warning Orders. In rapidly changing circumstances commanders may not have time to issue a full OpO. Instead a FRAGO (an abbreviated form of an OpO) may be issued. Movement Orders can be issued as annexes to either Operation or Service Support Orders, or may be issued as separate documents in their own right. Overlay Orders are a form of order in which graphics replace text as far as possible. To ease understanding, graphical and tabular methods of presentation are used in most types of order. Table 5.2 lists the principal types of orders and their use. Type Warning Orders (WngOs)

Purpose

Format

Remarks

To enable subordinate commanders to start preparing for a new operation.

Format is not fixed. See LCHB for an example, including the incorporation of graphical techniques.

a. The amount of detail depends on the time and communications available and the information required to initiate essential action. b. The wording of a Wng O must show clearly those parts which are executive, and other parts which constitute only a warning, such as probable tasks. c. Any number of WngOs can be written to enable timely planning and preparation.

Operation Order (OpO)

To give subordinate commanders the essential information and direction required to plan and execute an operation.

Standard format: 1. SITUATION. 2. MISSION. 3. EXECUTION. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

9

a. Should only include such detail required for subordinate commanders to issue their own orders and to ensure coordination. b. May be written, oral or graphical, or a combination of these forms.

For example, OPLAN and FRAGPLAN.

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Type

Purpose

Format 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

Fragment ary Order (FRAGO)

Combat Service Support Order (CSSO)

To be used in rapidly changing situations where commanders may need to amend a portion of the original OpO but will not have time to issue a full OpO.

1. SITUATION.

May often supplement an OpO by giving the commander’s concept for CSS operations, in which case it:

Standard format:

- informs subordinate formations/units of the CSS concept.

2. MISSION. 3. EXECUTION. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

1. SITUATION. 2. MISSION. 3. GENERAL. 4. MATERIEL & SERVICES. 5. MEDICAL.

- Allots missions to CSS units.

6. PERSONNEL. 7. CIVIL-MILITARY. 8. MISCELLANEOUS. 9. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

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Remarks c. Further details are at Annex B. d. A variation of an OpO is a Movement Order, which may either be an annex of an OpO or a stand alone document. For each heading record the change or ‘NO CHANGE’. FRAGOs usually follow a full OpO but may precede them in particular circumstances when time is short. A FRAGO can be used to activate a Plan.

a. A CSSO may be issued separately from, but in conjunction with, an OpO; it then takes the place of the Service Support Annex of the OpO. In these circumstances a separate CSSO is referred to under the heading of SERVICE SUPPORT of the OpO. b. When it is known that a CSSO will not be published at the same time as OpO, the OpO (or WngO) should contain any vital CSS matters that subordinate commanders need to know immediately.

5-8

Type

Purpose

Format

Remarks c. A CSSO will normally be preceded by a Svc Sp WngO and amended by a Svc Sp FRAGO.

Table 5.2 - Orders Composition 20. Operation Orders should be composed to enable subordinates to understand the situation, their commander’s mission and intentions, and their own mission. They provide unity of effort and give cohesion to a force. Operation Orders must include a summary of the prevailing situation from the perspective of the initiating level of command and state the following: a.

The superior commander's intent.

b.

The commander's own mission.

c. His concept of operations, which includes his intent statement, scheme of manoeuvre, if required,10 and main effort. d. A mission statement to each subordinate which includes a task and its purpose. Where a number of separate tasks are required, they should be linked within the overall commander's intent. e. The allocation of sufficient resources to subordinates to enable them to fulfil their missions. f.

Details of essential command, control and coordination measures.

21. Under the tenets of Mission Command orders describe not merely the actions required of a subordinate, but also an understanding of their context and purpose without unduly restricting his freedom to achieve his mission. This provides a framework of direction within which subordinate commanders have the appropriate freedom to act. While clear direction is essential to the success of the mission, a careful balance has to be struck between such direction and over control. Control measures will invariably need to be applied in order to maintain unity of effort, minimise ammunition wastage and prevent fratricide. However these measures have to be in the context of the task or mission so as not to constrain unnecessarily the freedom of action that could and should be taken by subordinates when appropriate. 22. Commanders should endeavour to promote a state of mind which encourages control by exception. A subordinate who takes action first within his commander's intent and reports later will often achieve far more than one who delays action to confirm to his superior that he knows what to do.

10

See Chapter 3, paragraph 32.

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FORMAT 23. The sequence and format of operation orders have been standardised to conform with STANAG 2014, thus easing cooperation within NATO, enhancing clarity and ensuring that nothing is left out. The paragraphs and sub paragraphs below marked with an asterisk (*) are mandatory; others are highly likely to be used. Within this framework considerable flexibility is permitted to allow orders to reflect the commander’s plan. The standard format is: Preliminaries (ground, weather state etc). Task organisation. 1.

Situation * a.

Enemy Forces. *

b.

Friendly Forces. *

c.

Attachments and Detachments. *

2.

Mission *

3.

Execution * a.

Concept of Operations. *

b.

Missions/Tasks to Subordinates. *

c.

Combat Support Missions, Tasks, Priorities.

d.

Coordinating Instructions.

4.

Service Support*

5.

Command and Signal

*

An example of Div Op Overlay orders is at Annex A. Complete orders templates can be found in the LCHB, Section 3 Op Staff Duties. EXTRACTION PROCESS 24. The detail contained in any set of orders will be drawn from two distinct sources. The first is the superior commander’s orders and the second is the commander’s own plan. Although extraction of the relevant detail from the superior commander’s orders is relatively simple, it is important that the relationship between this extraction and mission analysis is clearly understood and appreciated. In order to carry out mission analysis a commander needs to know the intentions of his superior commanders two up, his own mission and any constraints imposed on him.

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OVERLAY ORDERS 25. Overlay OpOs are the combination of written and graphic instructions on one trace containing enough information for a commander to carry out his specified tasks. When producing an overlay OpO the maximum amount of information should be represented graphically. The recipient of an order should be able to transpose the trace onto his map and then ‘fight’ from it. Resist the temptation to produce too much information in order to guard against all untoward possibilities. The following only represents guidelines as production of an overlay OpOs ultimately entails subjective judgement by the author. Overlays may be produced as a trace ‘clears’, with or without a map background (‘taciprint’) or on paper. The general rules are: a. The author should be free to put on an overlay what he deems necessary. The overlay should show the situation as the commander intends/expects it to be when the operation is carried out rather than the current situation. The difference between actual and projected dispositions must be made clear. b.

The order may be issued by any suitable method.

c. The written part of an order follows the same sequence as written orders and can be produced in manuscript. It must include as a minimum the commanders intent, missions and tasks. d. Urgency normally dictates that overlays are handwritten and in only one colour. With increased use of CIS, a combination of typewritten text and handwritten or computer-generated graphics may prove a useful alternative, provided speed is not sacrificed. e. A logical way to proceed is to complete graphical overlay first. It is then easy to see what must be included, in addition to mandatory sections, in the written portion of the order either because it has proved difficult to portray or it will cause too much clutter on the overlay. FURTHER GUIDANCE 26. Detailed advice on the formulation of orders and associated detailed annexes is given in LCHB. While firmly based on STANAG 2014, LCHB gives the recommended practice for the British Army, which may differ in minor detail from the STANAG to take recent doctrinal developments into account. Guidance on the content of a tactical level OpO, including direction on the drafting of concepts of operations and missions, is given at Annex B. For other operations, some adaptation of this format may be required. SECTION 4 - DISSEMINATION OF DIRECTIVES, PLANS AND ORDERS MEANS OF DISSEMINATION 27.

At the tactical level the means of disseminating orders are: a. Oral Orders. Oral dissemination of orders will usually involve a formal O group. Orders may also be passed over combat net radio, by liaison officers or staff

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officers representing the commander, or by briefings by the commander himself during visits to subordinates. Notes on the preparation for, and conduct of, an oral orders group are at Annex C. Allocation of responsibilities within an ‘O’ group is shown at Annex D. b. Data and Written Orders. The use of written orders is more likely at formation level where time and resources allow the preparation and dissemination of such orders. Orders at unit level and below may also include some written elements, for example the artillery fire plan and confirmatory notes. Written orders can be disseminated by ComBAT or LO. Where possible graphics, rather than text, should be used; the Op overlay order is an example. At battlegroup and below Grid Line Traces are a helpful aid to producing timely written orders, when IT is not always available. Some notes on possible uses of Grid Line Traces are given in the LCHB. Written orders can be greatly enhanced if they are used as a reference document in support of oral orders. c. Quick Verbal or Radio Orders. Although a variation of oral orders, quick 11 verbal or radio orders provide an important option for disseminating orders. They should be as concise and brief as possible and include only essential material. Bowman ComBAT R3 and data messaging can be used in conjunction with voice. Such orders are intended to: (1)

Speed up the implementation of decisions or plans.

(2)

Instil urgency.

(3)

Allow the commander to use his personality to influence operations.

d. Coordinating Conferences. The Coordinating Conference is a type of back brief which normally follows a set of orders. At formation level, the orders will have been either an OpO or an Overlay OpO. The purpose of the Coordinating Conference is to coordinate the commander’s plan and to increase mutual understanding. It is not a set of orders and is very much a two way process; the commander and his subordinates conducting a series of briefings. It allows the commander to confirm that his subordinates understand his intent. There is no set format for a Coordinating Conference; it very much depends on the commander’s personal style. It can vary from a formal process to a chat at the front of a Land Rover. e. Issue. The issue of orders should not be delayed until all information and detail is complete. Detail should be drip fed to subordinates as it becomes available to allow the tempo of an operation to be maintained or to allow preparation for a future operation to start; the use of a FRAGO will often be appropriate. The ability of Bowman ComBAT to disseminate orders in data form across a LAN will increase the speed and integrity of replication and distribution of orders in the field.

11

Quick Battle Orders (QBO).

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FACTORS AFFECTING DISSEMINATION 28. Time Available. The fundamental factor affecting the dissemination of both directives and orders is the time available between the commander receiving his orders and the requirement to allow subordinates to begin their military decision making planning process. Convention suggests that 1/3 of this time should be used for planning and orders; with the remaining 2/3 used for subordinates’ planning and preparation. In multinational operations this ratio may need to be 1/4 : 3/4. Before operations begin, there is usually sufficient time to conduct face to face oral orders and briefings. During fast moving operations, radio, data or telephone orders are more appropriate. 29. Content. The decision to deliver the content of directives and orders verbally (such as in the case of oral orders), or to send them in written, graphical or electronic form, or a combination of these methods, is important. Where critical aspects of directives and orders are conceptual, such as commander's intent, they are often best expressed by use of the spoken word amplified, where appropriate, by the written word and graphics. The conceptual elements will often require close understanding and therefore the undivided attention of the recipients. Some factual information, such as ROE or task organisations, for example, will be needed to support this understanding. 30. Planning Yardsticks. Planning yardsticks for the dissemination of orders by non verbal means (including facsimile and electronic mail) should be produced locally, as the time required will depend largely on the equipment available. In practice, the time taken to complete and transmit orders will vary considerably. 31. Multiple Means of Communication and Redundancy. Orders can be transmitted by multiple means of communication to provide redundancy in dissemination. Verbal orders (either face to face or at a distance) can be preceded or followed by other types of order. Written orders sent by facsimile, for example, can be duplicated in the form of electronic mail; the written part of an operation order can be sent by one or more methods whilst some types of graphics may be delivered by courier or liaison officer. To avoid possible confusion in the stress of operations, duplicate orders should be clearly annotated as such. 32. Need for Confirmation. Directives and orders should be acknowledged on receipt. The need for confirmation - which implies understanding of orders - will depend on the situation. Following the issue of orders before a major operation, mutual understanding can be confirmed through subsequent back briefs from subordinates to commanders. On operations the introduction of JOCS, ComBAT and DII F(D) will automate confirmation of receipt of orders and other vital information. In protracted operations, when fatigue begins to impair mental performance and comprehension of verbal orders, confirmatory written orders may be required at all but the lowest tactical level. The availability of formatted message templates on ComBAT will facilitate this and make it a far less onerous requirement. 33. Degree of Mutual Understanding. The degree of mutual understanding may also determine the degree of detail required and hence the size of documents. Whilst the requirement for detail will depend primarily on the situation, it will also rest on levels of mutual understanding of doctrine and competence, based on force composition and training standards.

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34. Security. The need to maintain operations security (OPSEC) may also limit the dissemination of directives and orders. The risk involved will rest on the nature of the enemy threat, proximity to the battle and the timespan affected by the directives and orders concerned. The introduction of secure speech and data combat net radio has assisted with security at the tactical level, but it has not mitigated the problem completely. Units and formations will still be required to adhere rigorously to OPSEC SOIs. 35. Regrouping. Regrouping is a major factor to be considered. Sometimes it is not necessary: on other occasions it may result in significant upheaval and change. It should be noted that proper regrouping and coordination across the unit or formation will take considerable time, and this has increased with the introduction of Bowman. If it is not done properly regrouping could prejudice the conduct of the intended operations and lead rapidly to lack of cohesion and effectiveness. SUMMARY 36.

When producing any type of order a commander and his staff must ensure that: a. The order is received in time for all concerned to act on it particularly, if regrouping is necessary. It is a means to an end and not an end in itself. b.

The detail in the order is accurate.

c. The order accurately reflects the situation, the intent of the superior commanders and their mission and concept of operations. d.

Recipients fully understand: (1)

What they must do, and why.

(2)

When they must do it.

(3)

What resources are available to them.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 5

DIV OP OVERLAY ORDERS - EXAMPLE

4.

CLASSIFICATION OPO 5/07

1.

SITUATION a. En Forces: Addl to Ref C. b. Friendly Forces. (1) COMLANDNW. No change to Ref B. (2) ARRC: No change to Ref B except 1 (UK) Armd Div now to secure south flank prior to commitment of 2 (UK) Armd Div. ME is destruction of en in Obj HAPPY DAY. (3) Neighbouring Fmns: (4) Air. Air parity throughout. Ten CAS sorties aval for op.

5.

2.

MISSION

Distr: Copy No:

Copy No 26 of 28 copies Total pages 1 Main HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div WORPLESDON NC 971535 Feb 07 Ops 13

Refs: A. Map M726, Sheet 186, Edition 3-GSGS 1:50,000. B. 1 (UK) Armd Div and Div OpO 4/07. C. 1 (UK) Armd Div INTSUM 16/07. Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU. Task Org: (eff 140100)

1 (UK) Armd Div is to destroy en within sector and estb blocking posns facing south in order to prevent en interference from south with 2 (UK) Armd Div op. 3.

X

1

X

2

X

DIV TPS

3

OPCOM

OPCOM

OPCOM

OPCON

LD

(-) (-)

155 QRL

SPEC TASKS

4

QDG

DIV RES OPCOM

4, 26, 40

x 3 to Bdes

9 (-)

155 SCOTS DG

QRH

2 RTR

26 (-)

105 1SCOTS

W

OPCON

2YORKS

W

OPCON

1LANCS

W

OPCON

40

TACOM MLRS

4

CS 35

101

E

CS 32

40

E

E

CS 21

26

105

100

CLASSIFICATION

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SERVICE SUPPORT a. CSS in fragO issued by 131000 b. Replen to be complete by 140200 COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Locs: Div Tac HQ initially move behind 3 Armd Bde on Route CROWN. b. Altn Comd. Comd 1 Armd Bde (Brig I CHRISTIE)/Div Altn HQ. c. Liaison. 1 Armd Bde LO to HQ 2 Armd Bde by 140200. d. Surv/C Surv. SOP 602 measures A-1, B-2, C-1, D-1, E-1 F-2. Lifted on orders COMARRC.

EXECUTION A. Concept of Ops: Intent is to destroy the en in a sequential div attk culminating in def between COLD NIGHT and GIN FIZZ. 2 and 3 Armd Bdes destroy en in Objs ZULU CRY and LONG JOHN respectively. 3 Armd Bde cont and destroy en in Obj TARTAR HORDE to secure north flank of 2 and 3 Armd Bdes while 1 Armd Bde pass through 2 Armd Bde and destroy en in Obj DEVIL’S CAULDRON. 1 and 2 Armd Bdes then estb blocking posns facing south in areas DEVIL’S CAULDRON and ZULU CRY respectively. 3 Armd Bde become Div res. ME is destruction of en iin Obj DEVIL’S CAULDRON. b. 1 Armd Bde Msn: (1) Carry out fwd passage of lines through 2 Armd Bde. (2) Destroy en in Obj DEVIL’S CAULDRON. (3) Estb blocking posn in area DEVIL’S CAULDRON facing south in order to prevent en from south interfering with 2 (UK) Armd Div op. c. 2 Armd Bde Msn: (1) Destroy en in Obj ZULU CRY. (2) Estb blocking posn in area ZULU CRY facing south in order to prevent en from south interfering with 2 (UK) Armd Div op. d. 3 Armd Bde Msn: Destroy en in Objs LONG JOHN and TARTAR HORDE in order to secure north flank of 2 and 3 Armd Bdes. Then Div res. e. Arty: (1) Gen Sp. Prosecute deep battle. Pris: (a) CB. (b) Fix en in western objs. (2) CS. Initial Gun Gp rft: 2 and 3 Regts RA to 2 Armd Bde, 4 Regt RA to 3 Armd Bde. (3) AD. Pris: (a) Routes. (b) HQs. f. Engrs: Pris: (1) Mob sp to bdes. (2) C mob tasks to provide flank protection to south. (3) Route maint. g. Avn: Div res throughout. Planning options in pri: (1) Sp destruction of en in Obj DEVIL’S CAULDRON. (2) Sp destruction of en in Obj ZULU CRY. h. Air. Bdes for CAS sorties to this HQ. i. Coord Instrs. (1) Timings: (2) Fireplan. To fol. (3) Bypassing Policy. Bdes may bypass en posns below pl str.

External: Action: HQ 1 Armd Bde

1-2

HQ 2 Armd Bde HQ 3 Armd Bde

3-4 5-6

Info: Main HQ ARRC Main HQ 2 (UK) Armd Div Main HQ 3 (UK) Armd Div

7 8 9

Internal: Action: Step up HQ Arty Engr Comms Avn Tpt Med Sup ES Pro G1/G4 G2/G3 SO2 G3 (Air)

10 11-12 13-14 15-16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Info: Comd File Comd’s Diary

26 27 28

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 5

40

XX ?

92/7

Not before 141230

Obj HAPPY D AY

89

2

GIN FIZZ FLOT

2 XX 3 ARMD BDE

LD

COLD NIGHT BALL RACE X 3

Obj TAR TAR HORDE by 141230

?

ROUTE

CROWN

XX

Obj LONG JOHN

92/7

?

OPENS 140300

92/7

220

92 MR

1

3 X 2

0/7

3 X 2

BAG ?

X

3 X 1 MAIN

AT 140400

ASSY AREA

? ?

Obj ZULU CR Y

2 X 1 2

X 1

?

X

99 MR

Obj DEVIL’S CAULDRON by 141230

?

2 ARMD BDE XX 3

99/7

92/7

FLOT

45

LD

89 COLD NIGHT

GIN FIZZ 40

BALL RACE 72

?

92/7

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 5 CONTENT OF AN OPO GENERAL 1. An Operation Order (OpO) should include only such detail as is necessary for the commanders of subordinate formations/units to act purposefully, to issue their own orders and to ensure coordination. Mission Command orders concentrate on imparting an understanding of the context of the operation and what needs to be done, rather than how it is to be achieved in detail. 2. OpOs may be written, oral or graphical (using an overlay), or a combination of these forms. The standard STANAG five paragraph format applies to all types of OpOs and, modified as appropriate, to Operation Plans and Directives. In oral orders particularly, Paragraphs 1-5 can be prefaced by 'Preliminaries' which typically includes a description of the ground. 3. Details of the staff duties and conventions required for OpOs, CSSOs and FRAGOs are contained in the LCHB. SITUATION 4. General. The Situation paragraph gives subordinate commanders a common understanding of the current and projected situation and thus provides the operational context - including the higher commanders' intent - of the orders that follow in Orders Paragraphs 2-5. Before an operation commences, the commander determines the necessary level of detail required, taking into account the principles for dissemination of orders. Once operations are underway, Paragraph 1 of subsequent orders may be restricted to 'Changes To' the original OpO. Annexes may be used to supplement the information given in Sub-Paragraphs 1a, 1b and 1c. Alternatively, much of the detail of Sub-Paragraph 1a can be contained in an INTSUM. 5. Enemy Forces. The Enemy Forces sub paragraph establishes a common insight into the enemy's organisation, capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions. The detail included in this sub paragraph should draw heavily on the deductions derived from the consideration of the enemy and environment (ground and weather) in the IPB (Question 1 of the Combat Estimate). The assessment of the enemy's intentions should look outside the formation or unit's area of operations and should include a prediction of his future actions and their possible effect on own operations. In order to have a good understanding of the perceived threat it is helpful for the recipient to know who made the assessment. In Other Operations, 'enemy forces' may embrace a number of belligerent factions, some of which cannot be defined with precision. 6. Friendly Forces. The primary purpose of the Friendly Forces sub paragraph is to set the context for the commander's mission. At the least, this should include the intent of the commander two levels up in order to establish the concept within which the immediate superior commander is operating. The mission and concept of operations (including the Intent and Main Effort) of the commander's immediate superior should then be given in the

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detail necessary to explain the purpose and underlying intention of the commander's mission, expressed in the terms of the effect he is expected to achieve on the enemy. This allows the commander's subordinates to think and understand two levels up. In addition, the current dispositions and intended actions of neighbouring formations, including those to the front and in depth, which may impinge on subordinates' areas of interest and operations, should be described. The general air situation (supremacy, superiority, local parity, or inferiority) must be included, together with an outline of maritime support and the friendly air campaign, if appropriate. Details of air support to land operations (in terms of sorties) are included under 'Air' in Coordinating Instructions. 7. Attachments and Detachments. Where a Task Organisation is not included separately, which is the norm, the Attachments and Detachments sub paragraph is used to describe the composition and state of command of the commander's formation or unit. In joint and multinational operations it may be necessary to describe capabilities which are not normally integral to the formation or unit. CSS dependency is normally considered in the Service Support paragraph or in a separate Combat Service Support Order (CSSO). MISSION 8. The mission stated by the commander in his orders is that given to him from his superior. Having subjected his mission to analysis, he may have derived further, implied tasks, in addition to those specified in the mission. Although implied tasks are not listed in Paragraph 2 of an OpO, they should become apparent in subordinates' mission statements or in other parts of the OpO. 9. In certain circumstances (normally above formation level) a commander may, in the interests of clarity and understanding, deduce his own mission. This situation may apply when the commander has not received a clear and succinct mission from his superior, or when his mission analysis reveals a critical task crucial to the success of his mission, and which, in his judgement, must be emphasised. It is unlikely that the purpose of the mission will change and any ‘new’ mission should support the superior’s intent. Wherever possible, however, this mission should be confirmed with his superior before being used as a basis of orders to subordinates. 10. To achieve consistency in approach and to avoid misunderstanding In formulating missions, maximum use should be made of defined doctrinal terms. This particularly applies in joint or multinational operations. For example, when appropriate, the mission of combat formations and units should include the verb ‘to ATTACK, DEFEND or DELAY’ so as to reflect the relevant operation of war1. 11. The purpose within a mission should be quite clear and consistent with the Concept of Operations. When the mission is enemy-oriented, for example, purposes such as ‘to defeat’ or ‘to destroy’ are often appropriate; when the mission is terrain or own forcesoriented, the purpose can be expressed in terms of ‘to protect...’ or ‘to secure ...’. Where transitional phases are involved, the terms ‘to relieve’ or ‘to link up’ can be used either in the formulation of the task or the purpose.

1

The accepted norm is that the mission verb will be capitalised.

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12. In all cases, however, the final choice of wording must depend on the context of the mission and the need for clarity. Thus the general term ‘to defend’ may need to be qualified, for example, by more specific wording such as ‘to prevent enemy penetration of ...’; ‘to prevent enemy capture of ...’; or ‘to defeat the enemy in Area A ...’ Missions to combat support and combat service support units will often use wording such as ‘to support’ or ‘to sustain’. EXECUTION 13. General. The Execution paragraph specifies the conduct of a formation or unit's operations in sufficient detail to allow subordinates to act within a framework of Mission Command. The degree of detail required will depend on the situation and will reflect the commander's judgement of several factors including the complexity of the operation, his subordinates' understanding and the state of training, morale and fatigue within his command. Whilst the format of this paragraph can be modified to suit particular requirements, the Concept of Operations (Orders Sub Paragraph 3a), and Missions/Tasks to subordinates (Orders Sub Paragraph 3b onwards) are mandatory. Coordinating Instructions are listed in the last Sub Paragraph in Paragraph 3. The key to subordinates understanding an OpO is the clarity of the Concept of Operations and their Missions. 14. Concept of Operations. Under Mission Command, the Concept of Operations represents the most important element of orders after the Mission. In it, the commander expresses his Intent (what is to be achieved and why), his Scheme of Manoeuvre (where, when and with whom he intends to conduct his selected course of action in order to accomplish his mission) and the main effort. To do this successfully, the commander has to strike a careful balance between planning too far ahead in detail and providing subordinates with a vision of how the operation should develop. Specifically, within the Concept of Operations, the commander must: a. State his intent, as a short summary of the effects he intends to achieve over the enemy and the environment, related in time and space.2 b. If not obvious from the intent statement, include a succinct summary of his scheme of manoeuvre: what, where and when his subordinates will achieve its purpose in relation to the enemy, so that they understand what role they have to play in the operation and what outcome they are to achieve. c. State his Main Effort. Main Effort is an activity, action or effect, and while it may lie with a particular unit it is not the unit but the activity which is the ME. 15. Timings. The commander may also include key timings (for example, 'On Orders' or references to H-Hr), the intended area of operations, priorities for fire and other combat support3, and an outline of any supporting plans he deems critical to his Concept of Operations (such as reserve options or deception). 16. Phases. A commander's Concept of Operations should include no reference to phases until he has described his plan as a single overall operation. At the operational 2

STANAG 2014 states that Commander’s Intent should be included in an un-numbered sub paragraph before the Concept of Operations: UK usage is to include the intent within the Concept of Operations sub paragraph. 3 In US usage, fire support (from artillery, air and aviation) is described in terms of ‘fires’.

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level, phases are often required to give substance to the sequencing of joint or multinational operations in a campaign plan (for example, when operational pauses are required). At the tactical level, however, phases can impose unwanted breaks in the tempo and continuity of an operation, contrary to the aims of British war fighting doctrine. Thus phases should be used with care. If, however, they are required in certain situations to synchronise the actions of the whole formation/unit they then represent a legitimate control measure which allows force (including combat and combat service support) to be concentrated at the correct time and place. The test for phasing is: 'Does the phase concern the whole formation/unit?' In many cases, when phases would only involve some subordinates, the designation of Main Effort (and shifting of it) and the synchronisation of deep, close and rear operations will have the same effect without imposing the breaks imposed by phasing. 17. Missions to Subordinates. In an OpO, a commander must assign a mission to the commanders of each of his subordinate manoeuvre formations or units.4 The mission is defined as 'a clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.'5 There are three broad types of mission statement: single task, multiple task (both types including the purpose); and a list of tasks with the purpose contained in the concept of operations, usually used for reserves. a. Single Task Mission. A superior commander should strive to give a minimum of tasks to each subordinate. Therefore the simplest type of mission, and that usually most applicable at lower levels of command, contains only one task. This type of mission can also be used at higher levels, as shown in 1 (UK) Armd Div's initial mission from VII (US) Corps during the Gulf War: 'To ATTACK through 1 ID (M) [1st Infantry Division (Mechanised)] to defeat en tac res in order to protect the right flank of VII (US) Corps.'6 b. Multiple Task Mission. Where a number of tasks are required, the tasks must be linked by a singular, unifying purpose related to the higher commander's intent. The unifying purpose ensures that the recipient does not have any conflict of priorities which would make him divide his force between tasks with different purposes. Only those tasks vital to the completion of his mission should be given to a subordinate; others can be included in Coordinating Instructions. The unifying purpose of the mission should have been identified from the estimate. If a commander is still unable to determine a unifying purpose for a subordinate, he should revisit his estimate. The clearest place to state purpose is in the mission statement to each subordinate (Sub Paragraph 3b onwards). It is important that the purpose is specific to the outcome the unit is to achieve. If a subordinate has to achieve two outcomes separated by time or space then it may be necessary to give him two missions. c. Use of Tasks. In a more complex mission involving a number of tasks, it may be better for clarity and brevity to give the unifying purposes of subordinates' missions in the Concept of Operations (Sub Paragraph 3a). For example, this is 4

In this context, armoured reconnaissance and aviation formations/units and units grouped together for offensive support tasks should be treated as manoeuvre formations/units in their own right and given missions. 5 APP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms. 6 1 Armd Div OPO 4/91 of 180800CFEB91 – OP DESERT SABRE.

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often the most convenient way to give a mission to reserves. In each case, the purpose of each mission has to be quite clear and unambiguous to its recipient. In more straightforward operations it is easier to explain the outcome (intent) as a whole. The subordinate commander can then place his tasks in context. The commander then gives out tasks to subordinates in Sub-Paragraph 3b onwards. This method is more likely to be used at the lower tactical levels. 18. Missions for Reserves.7 Missions for reserves may sometimes cause difficulty. A commander should seek to distinguish between true reserves (retained for the unforeseen) and echelon forces (those already committed or held ready for committal as part of the plan). Formations or units held in echelon should not lightly be given a reserve role because, if they are used in a reactive fashion, the commander risks losing the initiative. A commander who combines these two roles in a single formation or unit has to accept the risk of compromising his mission. The distinction which should be clear from the commander's estimate is illustrated below: a. A formation or unit held wholly in reserve to exploit unexpected success or unforeseen setback will be given planning tasks (options) rather than a mission, for example: 'Be prepared to ... conduct A, B and C.' The unifying purpose of the reserve will be implicit in the Concept of Operations. Before it is committed, such a reserve should be given a specific mission. b. Formations or units held in echelon whose committal is vital to the success of their commander's mission should receive a mission. For example: 'On completion of 20 Armd Bde's break-in, ATTACK [on orders] the remaining enemy up to Line CRIMSON in order to complete the defeat of 21st Mech Div.' 19. Missions and Priorities to Combat Support Formations/Units. Wherever possible, missions should be given to commanders of combat support formations/units. However, it may prove inappropriate to give missions to combat support commanders when their role will be to continue to support the entire formation or unit throughout the operation.8 In these circumstances the unifying purpose is to provide the required support. Thus it will normally be necessary to establish priorities - qualified as necessary by time, resources and space - for combat support formations/units. The setting of priorities is not only for the benefit of the combat support commanders' own planning, but also allows commanders of manoeuvre formations/units to gauge the level of combat support they will receive and, as the situation develops and the Main Effort is shifted, to determine what combat support is likely to be available to them. 20. Coordinating Instructions. The purpose of Coordinating Instructions is to set out tools necessary for the execution of the mission. Mission Command requires a minimum of control measures to be applied. Therefore maximum use of standing operating procedures (SOPs) and drills should be made in a determined effort to reduce the amount of detail included under this heading. Coordinating Instructions should include timings, Rules of Engagement (ROE), battlefield identification friend/foe instructions (if not contained in unit 7

Commanders of multinational formations should note, however, that the distinction between ‘true reserves’ and ‘second echelon forces’ made by the British Army is not necessarily followed by armies of other NATO nations. 8 A commander may also be restrained in giving missions by the command state of the combat support unit involved.

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or formation SOIs) and other specific instructions for fratricide prevention. If appropriate, additional coordinating instructions may be required for C2, CSS, the media, host nation support, prisoners of war and CBRN measures. Coordinating instructions can be related to the Functions in Combat as follows: a. Manoeuvre. Deconfliction is achieved by the management of real estate, establishment of liaison (detailed in the Command and Signal paragraph), setting of barrier free zones, movement control and the allocation of areas of operations (defined in terms of boundaries). Objectives that are force-oriented will often be identified with tasks within a mission; it will therefore be repetitious to list them in Coordinating Instructions. Where they are terrain-oriented, they are best depicted graphically. A restrictive bypassing policy will similarly be inappropriate to a force oriented mission and, furthermore, it can unduly limit a subordinate's initiative. b. Firepower. Deconfliction is likely to be imposed in terms of linear procedural measures such as FSCL, NFL, RFL. The monitoring of demolitions is subject to unique and strict control measures. c. Information and Intelligence. Priorities for reconnaissance and targeting are a coordinating instruction and not a control measure and are listed. d. Protection. It is necessary to deconflict air and air defence, achieved through BM. The ability to use the electro-magnetic spectrum may require deconfliction measures to be imposed on emitters and offensive systems. These measures (and STAP) are detailed concurrently in the Command and Signal paragraph. SERVICE SUPPORT 21. The purpose of the Service Support paragraph is to provide subordinate commanders with sufficient detail of the service support plan to permit further planning. As a minimum, the paragraph will normally contain brief details of the combat service support concept, details of the commander's combat priorities and the allocation of key resources. If lengthy, and particularly at the beginning of a major operation, it will be normal for a separate Combat Service Support Order to be issued in support of the main OpO. The CSSO, as well as informing subordinate commanders of the concept, also directs formations/units to provide the support. COMMAND AND SIGNAL 22. The purpose of the Command and Signal paragraph is to explain how the exercise of command is to be maintained. The key consideration is the measures required to make ones own command system robust, and to frustrate enemy attempts to disrupt it. To ensure robustness, the locations of headquarters are listed, an alternate commander is nominated and liaison arrangements are specified. To frustrate the enemy, EMCON and counter surveillance measures will be listed. This paragraph is an appropriate place in which to specify OPSEC measures - if not included under the Protection sub-paragraph of Coordinating Instructions. A CEI will normally be issued separately.

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ANNEXES 23. The main purpose of using annexes is to keep the main text of an order short. It also allows addressees to be given additional copies of certain information, for example movement tables. Annexes provide amplifying information or direction not appropriate in the main order, or information which amplifies a specific Function in Combat (or type of combat support/combat service support/command support), not pertinent to all addressees of an order. 24. Further guidance on the content and layout of annexes is given in STANAG 2014 and LCHB. USE OF GRAPHICS 25. The use of graphics, both within the main text of an OpO and in annexes, is encouraged to aid comprehension. Where used, however, care must be taken that the required tactical notation is used accurately. LCHB includes examples of how graphics are incorporated into orders.

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ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 5 NOTES ON PREPARATING FOR AND CONDUCTING AN ORAL ORDERS GROUP GENERAL 1. Commanders will usually prefer to issue orders in person so that they can emphasise key points and impose their will and personality on their subordinates. Most commanders will do this by conducting an oral Orders Group (O Gp) during which the content of the operation order is disseminated verbally. 2. Preparing and conducting an O Gp requires considerable thought if it is to be as effective as the commander would wish. Its organisation and conduct will involve most, if not all, of the staff of the headquarters and will require detailed coordination. The detail included in this Annex gives guidance on how an oral O Gp could be prepared and conducted. The final decision lies with the commander. PREPARATION 3. Procedures. The procedures for assembling and conducting an O Gp must be well understood and practised by those involved. Individuals must know what they have to do and how they fit into the overall picture. A commander is likely to be under pressure with his own planning and will leave the organisation of the O Gp to his staff. 4. Rehearsals. An orders group is a stage managed affair. Therefore a rehearsal is desirable if not always practical. If a rehearsal is not held the individual responsible for organising the O Gp should ensure that the content and delivery of the orders are coordinated. 5. Selection of Site. On the assumption that physical security is assured the first decision required is where the O Gp is to be held. Commanders will prefer to use their own headquarters as the necessary support is easily available. Once the general location for the O Gp has been selected consideration should be given to the detailed siting. The following points should be considered: a.

Room available.

b.

Visibility of the model of map.

c. Likelihood of interruption from background noise and activity (radios, vehicle movement etc). d.

Protection from the elements.

If the site does not provide these conditions naturally, consideration should be given to controlling activity in the area for the duration of the O Gp.

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6. Warning Order. A decision on the location of the O Gp needs to be timely so that it can be included in the Wng O. SOIs should be used to identify those required to attend the O Gp. 7. Reception Arrangements. The bigger the headquarters the more important the reception arrangements for those attending the O Gp. In particular consider: a. Arrangements for arrivals from outside the headquarters, including guidance on where to park and how to get to the O Gp. b.

Reception arrangements at the O Gp site. For example: (1)

When those attending will be allowed access to the site.

(2)

Arrangements to meet early arrivals.

(3) A location for copying of traces and marking maps, and for subordinates to read written orders prior to receipt of oral orders. 8. Requirements of Those Attending. Consider the requirements of those attending the O Gp. In particular: a. Where personal equipment can be stowed during their time at the headquarters. b.

Drinks and meals.

c.

Communication facilities.

9. Seating Plan. Although the commander may have his own views on where specific individuals are to sit, the general principle is for the main subordinate commanders to sit centrally at the front while other individuals, including the staff, sit at the sides. Consideration should be given to:

10.

a.

The availability, number and marking of seats.

b.

Displaying a seating plan.

Aids. The aids used at an O Gp will vary. Consider: a.

The requirement for a marked map, model or diagram.

b.

How and when marked maps are to be copied by those attending.

c. The need for documents, including confirmatory notes, task organisations and AB 545s. 11. Unexpected Interruptions During the O Gp. unexpected interruptions to the O Gp, in particular:

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a.

Late arrivals.

b.

Unexpected, but important visitors.

c.

Queries on operational matters.

12. Local Security. The level of security required will depend upon the circumstances but will normally include a security guard and control of access to the O Gp site. At large headquarters a list of those attending will be useful to the guard. CONDUCT 13.

Tasks Prior to O Gp. There are four main tasks. These are: a. Map Marking. The marking of maps can take some time. Therefore adequate time must be allocated to allow those attending the O Gp to mark their own maps. This process should be complete before the O Gp begins. b. Issues of Documents. Any documents to be issued should be distributed before the O Gp starts. If documents are to be issued at the end of the O Gp, those attending should be informed before it begins. Documents which might be issued include: (1)

Confirmatory notes.

(2)

Task organisation.

(3)

AB 545.

c. Check Attendance. At the appointed time a staff officer should check that everyone is present, noting the details of those who have not yet arrived. d. Report to Commander. Having checked the attendance, the staff officer should report to the commander informing him of any absentees. 14.

Preliminaries. a. Introductions. Individuals attending the O Gp for the first time should be introduced to the other members. b.

Map Folds. Map folds required for the operation should be confirmed.

c. Task Organisation. The task organisation should also be highlighted. Particular reference could be made to any unusual or important groupings. d. Description of Ground. Before most O Gps begin in earnest there is usually a brief description of the ground relevant to the forthcoming operation. It is usually carried out by the BGE at battlegroup level, the Engr operations officer at formation level and by G2 at formation level. It normally involves the use of a model or marked map and includes locations or features to which reference will be made during the

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orders. Do not allow this description of the ground to become the enemy and friendly forces paragraphs of the orders; carefully select the detail to be included. e. Weather. The O Gp should be given details on the weather conditions relevant to the operation. The only non variables will be the time of first light, last light and thermal cross over. Details might include: (1) Forecast. The forecast should include: visibility, precipitation, cloud cover, light levels, wind strength and direction, and temperatures. (2)

First and last light.

(3)

Moon state.

(4)

Visibility.

15. Allocation of Responsibilities. The final decision on which individual delivers which part of the orders is very much a decision for the commander. A possible allocation of responsibilities at battle group and brigade level is at Annex D. The following points should also be noted: a. Regardless of what else he does the commander must deliver his own mission, concept of operations and missions/tasks for his subordinates. b. Although different speakers will cover particular aspects of the orders, the number of individuals should be kept to a minimum, thus reducing the number of changeovers and allowing the orders to flow. 16. Questions and Synchronisation of Watches. Before the O Gp breaks up the commander, or his staff, should answer any questions raised as a result of the orders. To ensure this opportunity is used sensibly, those attending must be given time to study their notes and consider the implications. Finally, watches should be synchronised by GPS. CONFIRMATORY NOTES 17. At battle group level and above, oral orders may be accompanied by the issue of confirmatory notes. These notes provide an aide memoire for those attending the O Gp as well as valuable information for those not present. 18. If confirmatory notes are used, they should be issued before the O Gp and individuals should be allowed time to study them before the O Gp begins. If this is not possible those at the O Gp should be told they will be issued later. 19. Confirmatory notes are not a substitute for oral or written orders. There is no fixed content for confirmatory notes but the sequence for operation orders should be followed as far as possible. The amount of detail will vary with the commander’s wishes but the emphasis is on brevity, with only the salient points of the plan being included. A possible priority for inclusion is:

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a.

Commander’s mission and concept.

b.

Subordinates’ missions.

c.

Key coordinating instructions; timings, locations and STAP.

d.

Key service support and command and signal detail.

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ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 5 ALLOCATION OF ORAL ORDERS RESPONSIBILITIES AT BATTLEGROUP AND BRIGADE LEVEL Prelims

BG 2IC/ Ops Offr

Task

Bde COS or SO3 G3 Ops COS

SITUATION Ground

BGEngr

Engr

Enemy Forces

IO

G2

Friendly Forces

Ops Offr

COS

HNS/Local Forces/Civs/ Refugees/ Evacuees

Ops Offr

G5

MISSION

CO

Comd

Concept of Ops

CO1

Comd

Subordinates’ Msns

CO

Comd

Coordinating Instrs

Ops Offr2

COS

SERVICE SUPPORT

BG Log Offr

DCOS

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

RSO

COS3

SUMMARY (If nec)

CO

Comd

EXECUTION

1

AFM Vol 1 Pt 2 Battlegroup Tactics advocates that this section also includes offensive spt concept (BC) and Engr Concept (BGEngr), although there is some flexibility in this area. 2 Spt Plans, eg. STAP, may be covered by spec offrs. 3 The emphasis is on comd and therefore COS speaks (not OC Sig Sqn).

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CHAPTER 6 HEADQUARTERS SECTION 1 – PURPOSE THE FUNCTION OF HEADQUARTERS 1. General. The word ‘headquarters’ is often used as a generic term for the grouping of a command element, a staff, associated CIS and an infrastructructure which provides a staff working environment. The term is used to imply the collocated assets as the recognised centre of military authority. Digitisation and the ability to work collaboratively, but remotely, means that physical proximity to the commander is no longer as essential, but is still an important feature. Principles for the design of formation headquarters from corps level downwards are described in terms of organisation and function. 2. Requirements. Headquarters at all levels must be rapidly responsive to change and able to survive in the battlespace. Whilst the detailed organisation of headquarters should reflect the level and nature of the command and the type of the campaign or operation which is to be conducted, common requirements determine organisation. These are: a. Deployment. A field headquarters has to be structured so that it can be deployed easily to, or within, a theatre of operations. This ease of deployment is in turn dependent on the size of the headquarters and the mobility of its component parts, including its communications support. b. Continuity of Command. When operational a headquarters must be able to sustain the exercise of command. This requirement is met primarily by maintaining external communications. Continuity of command further depends on the 24 hour manning of headquarters, the provision of alternate or step-up facilities (see Annex A) to allow headquarters and staff to move whilst maintaining control, and the survivability of headquarters and CIS in the face of threats from all dimensions. Thus a degree of redundancy must be built into a headquarters and its supporting CIS. c. Fusion of Command and Staff Effort. Within a headquarters, command and staff effort should be carefully coordinated, or 'fused' to provide coherence. The staff exists to provide C2 on behalf of, and decision support to, its commander. Layout, organisation, CIS infrastructure and staff procedures influence the effectiveness of this support. 3. Design of Headquarters. The role of different types of headquarters varies with the level of command and thus detailed functions will vary also. Operational level headquarters are likely to be joint and multinational and they may increasingly host representatives of other government agencies. The operational scenario will also directly influence the design of a headquarters; those designed for mobile warfighting would probably not be appropriate for a more static Peace Support Operation (PSO). Section 2 contains a summary of the principal types of headquarters in use at the tactical level, together with associated design criteria common to all field headquarters. Detailed organisations of headquarters, however, are subject to change. Descriptions of current UK formation headquarters are contained in Issue 3.0: Nov 07

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the Land Component Handbook. Project ROBERTS is currently examining the design and nature of operational land headquarters, the implications of componency and technical ‘reach’ at the brigade and divisional levels of command. OPERATION OF HEADQUARTERS 4. All staff cells within a headquarters are concerned with the two functions of coordination and monitoring in support of the commander's intent and the declared mission. While all cells should have clearly defined responsibilities, few, if any, will be able to operate effectively in isolation. Coordination between them will be crucial. The interaction between staff cells should be identified early in the process of structuring the headquarters. Arrangements should be made to ensure that they are all equipped and manned to work seamlessly, not only with other cells within the headquarters but also with similar functional cells in other headquarters. 5. The principal staff officer in a HQ (typically the COS or perhaps his deputy, depending on level and role) provides the human focus for activity within a headquarters. Regular briefings (both for himself and the commander) aid the flow of information and hence the integration of staff effort. In a digitised headquarters the ability to work collaboratively in disparate locations and to view a distributed version of the recognised land picture (RLP) will change the emphasis on a centralised ‘bird table’ or map board. Centrally delivered verbal briefs are still necessary and it will be prudent to maintain an analogue map marked up from digital feeds as a reversionary method of maintaining SA. As digital data systems replace analogue methods of working, and as confidence in the digital systems builds, there will be a fundamental change in ways of working within a headquarters. The COS will remain the principal staff officer, but he will have to adapt his role to get the most from a digital headquarters. 6. During high intensity operations physical coordination forward, rear and to the flanks may become difficult. A digitised formation should be more effective at maintaining command and control. The means of communication will be voice, text or pictorial - using combat net radio, the trunk communication conference call or sole user facility. The control of information (data) and subsequent distribution of written or graphical orders will be especially important as staffs and commanders become progressively more tired. Efficient and timely Information Management (IM) and Exploitation (IX) will thus become core skills in future command support. SUMMARY 7. The keys to the efficiency, responsiveness and the survival of tactical level headquarters lie in restricting their footprint and signature. Well rehearsed drills for movement, concealment, defence and working routines must be maintained. If allowed to grow too big, or to become too dependent on complicated CIS or staff procedures, the effectiveness and survivability of headquarters will be impaired (See Chapter 2 Section 1 Para 7). The organisation of the headquarters must therefore be carefully balanced to fulfil the core role of timely and effective command support whilst permitting agility.

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SECTION 2 – FUNCTION, DESIGN AND SITING OF HEADQUARTERS FUNCTION 8.

The functions of the six types of HQ are described below: a. Main HQ. Main HQ is the central controlling headquarters (at any level) where all the staff functions of that headquarters are coordinated and where the control of all subordinate units is concentrated. The HQ itself is normally directed by the COS who decides on its composition, organisation, siting and tactical deployment. Under proposals put forward by Project ROBERTS and endorsed by Commander Field Army (CFA), Main HQ is increasingly likely to set up outside the area of immediate physical risk and use its CIS to achieve reach. Whilst it should be mobile in response to administrative need or threat, times to set up or tear down are not predicated on tactical agility. Mobility for a future divisional HQ in the Land Component Command (LCC) role might entail relocation taking 48-72 hours. b. Forward HQ. Fwd HQ is usually an advance or detached element of the HQ (that may sometimes be deployed early into theatre) with a more limited communications infrastructure and protection. To permit a degree of agility, there may in future be twinned Fwd HQs within the manoeuvre battlespace. These may fuse together if required to constitute a Step Up HQ whilst Main HQ moves. Fwd HQ(s) typically lack the resources to support full C2 in battle, but it can provide the commander with sufficient situational awareness and a better geographical location to exercise the leadership aspect of command and to evolve first hand knowledge. c. Tactical HQ. Tac HQ now refers to a minimal HQ optimised to confer agility and protection on a commander during the forward battle or intensive tactical operations. It will generally be hardened and manoeuvrable (eg AFV mounted in war).3 Tac HQ is characterised by the bare minimum of organic staff support. If a commander needs to go forward to visit subordinates, he should either fly or move in a small group of vehicles, depending on the threat. If he needs to command forward for any duration, he should consider moving Fwd HQ to a suitable location. Tac HQ thus refers to a very small HQ (Comd and principal arms advisers as appropriate) with sufficient mobility, protection and communications to direct the battle for limited periods away from Main or Fwd HQs. The risk entailed is that it may not have access to the full situational awareness entailed in the fused COP, nor the staff support required to achieve decision superiority. d. Alternate HQ. Alt HQ provides continuity of command when a HQ either needs to be moved or is put out of action. There are a number of ways to achieve this, but the price of added flexibility is additional resources. HQs can seldom be duplicated in entirety to allow control to be passed easily from one HQ to another prior to the first moving. Prioritisation and risk assessment will be needed during the estimate process.

3

The term ‘Tac HQ’ is largely historical, and reflects the fact in the Second World War part of an army or army group headquarters was split off to conduct tactical operations. Corps and divisional headquarters became too large to move easily in an adverse air situation and the tendency grew to detach part of them, mainly to achieve dispersion and for ease of movement. (See FM Montgomery. Memoirs and Higher Formation Training 1951).

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e. Step Up HQ. If fewer vehicles, manpower and CIS are available, a Step Up HQ may replicate only key functions and be capable of holding control for only limited periods while a Main HQ moves and while men and vehicles are transferred from the previous Main HQ location. f. Rear HQ. The principal location for the designated commander of any rear operations including combat service support activity. Rear operations are planned and carried out from this HQ and all other operations monitored. DESIGN 9. Size. The size of a HQ affects it deployability and survivability. In broad terms, a larger HQ may provide greater endurance, but often at the expense of security and mobility. A smaller HQ may limit support to the commander. Added redundancy in the numbers or size of HQ gives greater flexibility but at the cost of greater resource investment in terms of manpower, vehicles and CIS equipment, and reduced deployability. The key is to strike the right balance thus producing a responsive and agile organisation. Active measures have to be taken to identify those elements that are absolutely necessary and banish those that are not.4 The ability to achieve reachback may lessen the need for an element of HQ to be positioned forward. It may also deliver command support to austere tactical headquarters. 10. Hardness. Hardness refers to the degree of physical and electronic protection a headquarters has. Hardening extends beyond providing armoured staff vehicles, as protection may involve a combination of active and passive measures. Small size and hardness together contribute towards survivability, as will frequent movement. In many cases geographical dispersion of command facilities will help to diffuse a headquarters’ signatures (visual, thermal, radar and electronic). 11. Core, Modules and Augmentation. Peacetime establishment will not support all the possible elements of a HQ deployed to conduct joint and combined operations. The core HQ 5 should therefore deploy together with predetermined modules which combine to give an agile command system and allow extra elements to be added or withdrawn according to the type of the operation. Modules are functional cells ‘plugged in’ as a whole entity in order to bring specific functionality to the core HQ. Modules do not necessarily have to be established during peacetime in a parent unit. Types of modules available to a commander and their roles can be found in Formation SOPs. Individual augmentees can be used to reinforce either the core HQ or modules. 12. Manning Structure. At brigade level and above there is a need for an organisational division between current operations and future plans; in this way a smooth transition between major operations and tactical engagements may be achieved. The division between current operations and future plans, although imperative for G3, is also required in most situations for other staff branches.

4

To quote a former US Army divisional commander: ‘Good intentions fall victim to a variety of contrary pressures such as comfort, visitors’ accommodations, a desire for briefing facilities and the conviction of staff officers that prestige is inversely proportional to the distance from the flagpole’. Major General Prillaman. Command and Control in the 2nd Armored Division, Military Review, Jul 82. 5 Core HQ. The essential manning and resources of the HQ in time of peace, enabling it to carry out its basic roles as a non deployed organisation.

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13. Administration. Administrative life support requirements have to be met: the physiological needs of the headquarters personnel - shelter, rest, food and water; the provision of internal communications, light and power; and collective and individual mobility appropriate to the formation. Whether these administrative needs can be met in the field will also depend on the siting of HQs. SITING 14. General. Chapter 1 covers factors which are considered when choosing from where a commander intends to command. The critical consideration for the commander is where can he best influence events. In turn the critical consideration for siting a HQ is where the HQ can best support the commander. Reliable communications, together with the administration and security of the commander, his staff and the other supporting elements are vital to the continuity and effectiveness of command. The vital commodity with which the HQ must service the commander is SA. Commanders may gain local SA by deploying in Tac HQ to gain a personal feel for events, but the HQ has to be capable of providing richer and broader SA than can a man on the ground. In the 21st century this means digital communications. 15. Further developing the factors which influence siting it becomes apparent there are four determiners; communication is the critical one and a HQ cannot remain in a location from which it is unable to communicate. a. Communications. Not only is the site to offer good communications to subordinate and other headquarters, it should also if possible be screened from enemy EW. Access to civil communication and information systems may also be important. b. Concealment. Woods or built up areas offer the best cover from view; the use of barns, large sheds or factory complexes, helps counter thermal imagery (TI) surveillance and provides some basic protection against chemical attack. c. Security. Headquarters have to provide a secure working environment for the commander and his staff. Security is achieved through physical and electronic concealment and protection, and CBRN defence measures. There may also be a need to assign forces for the physical security of the headquarters and its associated communications. d. Accessibility. The site should be easily accessible but not liable to accidental discovery by roving enemy land or aerial reconnaissance. Therefore the use of tac signs, a useful peacetime expedient, should be controlled carefully on operations and included in orders, SOPs and other operational briefings. 16. Land Component HQ. In principle, the siting of a land component headquarters follows the same considerations as other land headquarters but additional factors apply. Communications to the host nation and to the home base are essential, as they are to other Services and joint force components; political considerations may also be important. Infrastructure requirements and access to ports or fixed wing airfields may also determine siting.

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17. Administration. This aspect of the organisation of a headquarters is usually given the least attention – in the sense that tactical considerations are paramount and the working arrangements and routine of a headquarters are secondary. A good COS has to ensure that the staff are sufficiently catered for in their routine and basic administration to allow them to work effectively and in coordination with others. Visitors to the headquarters will quickly notice the effect of a well run, efficient and harmonious organisation. A well-run HQ allows more time for staff to do their tasks properly. SECTION 3 - STAFF DUTIES GENERAL 18. The purpose of staff duties (SD) is to establish ways of working which enable coherent communication and common understanding across the breadth of command. This had not changed with digitisation; indeed digitisation was introduced in order to increase the speed, efficiency and coherency of staff duties. It is a means to end and not an end in itself. While the rule remains not to become too pedantic in their application, the electronic age will require greater adherence to staff duties than was required in the past. For example, naming conventions in a digital context must be strictly applied otherwise information will be lost or corrupted. The guiding principle is the provision of timely and accurate information to the appropriate user. 19. SD has a long and mixed history in the Army. The greater use of joint and multinational groupings in military operations shows that the exclusive use of Army operational SD is at an end, and that terminology and SD agreed by NATO will become more widespread within many armed forces. There are commanders and staff who use SD to such an extent that the rules appear to become the basis for military operations. Others ignore SD and could leave in their wake a trail of misunderstanding, delay and frustration. The wise commander should insist that his staff make use of SD without becoming too pedantic. Experience has shown that general adherence to the SD protocols will save time – particularly in tight situations. Above all commanders and staff should speak and write plain English. THE UK POLICY FOR OP STAFF DUTIES 20. UK operational SD has only been included at the expense of NATO operational SD for the following reasons: a. There is now a significant amount of military operational activity taking place outside the NATO context. b. The differences between the UK and NATO versions are slight and hence there is no need to have both recorded here. c. NATO Staff Duties only take account of warfighting, are not flexible enough to cover some operations, and are based primarily at the operational level. At any event, changes to the NATO STANAG covering Staff Duties (STANAG 2014) can be long winded and require national ratification which would complicate the process of using operational SD.

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21. When working in a NATO context and where NATO operational SD would be required: a. STANAG 2014, ARRC TACSOPs and TACSOIs should be used as the basis for NATO SD. b.

NATO approved abbreviations only should be used.

c. If in doubt about NATO terminology, abbreviations, acronyms etc, the word or term should be spelled out in full. 22. It should be noted that JSP 101 (Defence Writing Guide) does not cover operational staff writing at all. This publication represents the UK approved means of writing operation orders and instructions in the field for all occasions other than in a NATO context. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL STAFF DUTIES 23. General Points. The main rule is that in operational writing the maximum use is made of abbreviations and the text is to be written in note form to save time and space, while maintaining clear meaning. Paragraph headings can form part of the opening of a sentence, eg ‘Ammo. Issued 1300 hrs’. 24.

Minor Rules. The following minor rules apply: a. Exercise Protective Markings. In exercise protective markings the word ‘EXERCISE’ is always to be abbreviated to ‘EX’, eg ‘EX SECRET’. b. Proper Nouns. Proper nouns are written in capital letters, eg ‘CAMBERLEY’, ‘River TONE’. c. Composite Nouns. Any composite noun, or one containing a prefix or suffix is to be abbreviated by abbreviating that part of it for which there is an authorised abbreviation, eg ‘’mob’ (mobilisation), ‘demob’ (demobilisation). d. Abbreviations. Only those recognised abbreviations included may be used without an introduction. Where unofficial abbreviations are to be used they are to be introduced into the order correctly. Some abbreviations indicate both the singular and plural. If the addition of an ‘s’ is necessary it is always placed at the end of the abbreviation eg ‘CinCs’ (Commanders in Chief). An ‘s’ may be added only to the abbreviation of a noun; it is never to be added to the abbreviation of a verb, ie ‘follows’ should be abbreviated to ‘fol’. e. Times. Times are to be expressed using the 24 hour clock and the time zone suffix, unless an expedient such as: ‘Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: BRAVO’ f. Description of Attachments/Detachments. Units which have elements detached are to be described using the convention illustrated below. The quantity of units/sub units is always written in full eg:

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2 Inf Bde (less two bns) 1 R IRISH (less one coy) g. Reported Speech. Reported speech is written as spoken without abbreviations and indented in single inverted commas. For example: We captured 3 offrs and 2 NCOs. They revealed en morale to be very poor. One of the NCOs said: ‘We have had no food supplied since 3 o’clock on Thursday of last week and we were promised that large stocks would be captured on the objective.’ 25.

Ground Location, Areas and Boundaries. The following points should be noted: a. Cardinal Points. The four cardinal points of the compass are written in full, eg south. For intermediate points the letters N, S, E and W are used, eg NE, SSW. Points of the compass should always be considered in clockwise order from north. b. Names of Places and Features. The names of places and features are spelt exactly as on the map in use, except that the word ‘River’, written in full, is to precede the names of all rivers regardless of the language in which this word appears on the map. The grid reference is to be given the first time the name of the place or feature occurs. It should be shown as a bigram map code followed by the grid reference number, eg: ‘CN 493246’. c. Roads, Tracks and Railways. Roads, tracks and railways are described by the names of places located on them. The word ‘road’, ‘track’ or ‘railway’ is to precede the place names, eg ‘railway WINCHESTER-BASINGSTOKE’. d. River Banks. River banks are described as right or left from the point of view of an observer facing downstream or, if this cannot be done, by using cardinal points. ‘Near’ and ‘far’ may be used with reference to friendly forces involved in river crossing operations. e. Canals. The name of a canal, or names of places on it, are used to describe a canal. The banks are usually described by means of the cardinal points, eg ‘the north bank of the KIEL Canal’. f. Routes. When movement is involved, a route is described by a sequence of points on the route named, in the direction of movement. When no movement is involved, the sequence of points named is to be from left to right or rear to front, assuming that the person designating the route is facing the enemy. Cardinal points may be added if required. g. Areas. An area is described by taking the northernmost point first and giving the remaining points in clockwise order. h. Ground/Positions. Ground and positions are described from left to right and front to rear facing the enemy. To avoid confusion, cardinal points may be used to describe flanks, rather than ‘left’ or ‘right’.

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i. Boundaries. Boundaries are designated by easily distinguishable features on the ground in the sequence in which they occur. They are to be described from rear to front during an advance and from front to rear in defence and withdrawal. If generally parallel to the front, eg rear boundaries, they are to be described from left to right facing the enemy. Cardinal points may be added if required. When describing boundaries between units and formations, the words ‘inclusive’ or ‘exclusive’ are used before the place to which they refer. The description of a boundary must state specifically to which unit or formation an area or a point is inclusive or exclusive. j.

Directions. A direction may be indicated in one of three ways: (1) By use of two locations or places, eg ‘direction HANNOVERDORTMUND’. (2)

As a point of the compass, eg ‘north’, ‘SE’.

(3)

Using a compass bearing, eg ‘5600 mils’.

26. Time. Time is specified using the 24 hour clock. The first pair of digits define the hour and the second pair the minutes past the hour, eg 1147 is 47 minutes past 11 o’clock in the morning. The following rules should be noted: a. Quoting the Time. The time can be followed by a time zone suffix or the word ‘hours’ if confusion with other figures is possible eg: 1432 or 1432 hrs. b. Midnight. The word midnight is not to be used. The time 0000 hours defines the time and the date defines the day. It is common practice to use either 2359 hours or 0001 hours to avoid confusion. The term ‘2400 hrs’ is never to be used as a time of day. c. Date Time Groups. Date time groups are a method of showing in signal messages or operation orders. An example: 031404AJUL97 3 July 1997, 1404 hours, Time Zone ALPHA. 27. Phonetic Alphabet. The time zone suffix letter is not an abbreviation. Where there is a possibility of error or ambiguity, or where the rules require it, the time zone suffix is to be spelt out using the spellings of the phonetic alphabet. 28. Commonality. Digitisation brings with it a need for greater commonality across the Land Environment than is currently evident. Greater commonality can be achieved through the enforcement of endorsed SOPs. Formation HQs can then develop their own SOI that is related to the relevant SOP. The definitions of SOPs and SOIs are as follows: a. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). A Land or Field Army Directive covering those features of operations which require a standard procedure to

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generate optimum capability. Digitisation requires strict adherence to SOPs in order to allow any interoperability. The purpose of SOPs is to enable: Implementation of best practice Network stability and efficiency Modularity Augmentation Joint, Coalition and Alliance interoperability. Simplified education and training b. Standard Operating Instructions (SOIs). SOIs are detailed instructions produced at formation and unit level and are developed from SOPs. SOIs should take in to account variations in the operational environment (equipment, roles, mission, environment, command style). SOIs may amplify but not contradict SOPs. 29. Publications. The British Army produces the Electronic Battle Box (BAeBB)1 annually. It contains the most significant doctrinal publications as well as special to arms publications. The more import of them are listed at Annex A. In addition the most contemporary doctrinal publications are listed at http://www.land.army.r.mil.uk/lwc/pages/msnspgp/TacDocTeam/doctrine.htm SECTION 4 – OPERATIONAL RECORD KEEPING 30. The aim of the Operational Record (OR) is to produce as comprehensive a record as practicable of combat and other operations. The information captured will inform future improvements in Army training, doctrine, equipment and organisation. It also assists with a wide range of Ministry of Defence activity from the validation of war pension claims, protection of units and commanders against litigation to the compilation of official histories. The intention of the OR is to provide the structured archiving and storage, of all important documents and information produced as part of the normal routine staff process during operations. 31. At the formation level the COS is responsible for the OR. At unit level the OR is the responsibility of the Second in Command. To be of genuine value the contents must be accurate, honest and objective. Authors must avoid the temptation to exclude unpalatable facts. 32.

33.

1 2

The OR is to consist of: a.

AF C2118.

b.

Completed cover (AF C2119) signed by the commander.

c.

Annexes, compulsory and additional (listed on AF C2119).

Current instructions for the compilation of the OR are contained in Formation SOPs2.

Distr via Army Publications Coordinator. Land Handbook (Formation SOPs) Army Code 71473. SOP 410.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 6 STAFF DUTIES – AVAILABLE PUBLICATIONS THE LAND HANDBOOK (LH) SERIES 1. The LH is a key document for many international standardisation agreements particularly STANAGs and QSTAGs. In many areas the contents are therefore mandatory. The LCH has been written to be consistent with Joint NATO and UN doctrine and terminology. The use of operational writing and abbreviations has been deliberately minimised to increase utility. 2. The LH is the generic title for all procedural and reference material of use to formations and units on operations. The series includes: a. Formation SOPs. This document contains procedural and descriptive material to provide a common baseline for the production of theatre and formation SOIs. b. Unit SOPs. This document contains procedural and descriptive material to provide a common baseline for the production of Theatre and Unit SOIs. c. Reports and Returns. This handbook contains a comprehensive range of Reports and Returns. It includes all the messages from APP-9 (The compendium of Allied Land Forces Messages), together with some additional messages required by UK Formations. Note that Special to Arm messages, especially where these have no relevance outside that specialist area, have not necessarily been included. d. Voice Communications Procedures. This revised publication supersedes its 1998 predecessor and brings into effect several small and incidental changes to voice procedure and updates the procedure covering SOCs substantially. This publication will be superseded by the Bowman Tactical Communications Procedures handbook (sub para j below). e. Radio Telegraph Procedures. The procedures in this publication are designed for use on insecure RATT nets or point to point circuits that also have the facility to work in the voice mode. f. Staff Officers’ Handbook (SOHB). Supports staff procedures at formation and unit level and is divided into 3 parts: (1)

Part 1 – Organisations (Major Unit and some Minor Units).

(2) Part 2 - Roles and Functions (Sect 1 Arms and Services, Sect 2 Bde, Sect 3 Div, Sect 4 Corps) (3) Staff Work (Sect 1 Equipment capabilities, Sect 2 Staff Planning. Sect 3 Operational Staff Duties)

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g. Doctrinal Notes. This section allows for the inclusion of all items of doctrinal interest and not just tactical items. Hence as concepts and emerging doctrine are being developed, a Doctrinal Note can be prepared which will inform the Army at large of the latest thinking on that topic before it is formally endorsed and placed in an appropriate publication. h. Acronyms, Abbreviations, Glossary of Terms and Symbology. This handbook places under one cover the detailed minutiae of staff work for commanders and staff officers when planning or conducting operations in a national or Alliance (NATO) context. It includes material from the SOHB and APP-6(A) Military Map Symbology. i. Terrain-Situation Analysis. This handbook provides a checklist of factors to be taken into account when considering the suitability of terrain for various military tasks. j. BOWMAN Tactical Communications Procedures. This publication explains the voice and data communication procedures for BOWMAN. Its distribution is limited to those organisations and units involved in BOWMAN conversion. It will be revised annually and will eventually replace completely the Voice Communications Procedures handbook. k. ComBAT Formation and Unit SOPs. These documents contain procedural and descriptive material to provide a common baseline for the production of Formation and Unit SOIs. Their distribution is limited to those organisations and units involved in BOWMAN conversion. They will be revised annually and will eventually completely replace Formation and Unit SOPs. ALL ARMS TACTICAL AIDE MEMOIRE 3. The purpose of the All Arms Tactical Aide Memoire (AATAM) is to provide a consolidated set of Aide Memoires and some Reports and Returns for use at sub unit level and below. Each Arm and Service also has a Pocket Book which complements the AATAM. OTHER RELEVANT OPERATIONAL PUBLICATIONS 4. These are other publications that would assist the staff officer in his operational staff duties. The most relevant of these are: a.

Joint Service Glossary of Terms (JWP 0-01.1).

b. NATO STANAGs and Publications (AAP-4 provides a complete list of STANAGS and Allied Publications and is revised annually). c.

A Soldier’s Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict (AC 71330).

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CHAPTER 7 OPERATIONAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND EXPLOITATION SECTION 1 – OVERVIEW AND PRINCIPLES INTRODUCTION 1. This Chapter of the AFM provides the overarching policy for Operational Information Management (OIM). The focus will be on operational information systems, and will be coherent with the policy for in barracks Defence systems such as DII, and with other sources of doctrine and policy for non deployable information systems. For more conceptual and technical detail on the issues discussed in this Chapter, readers are referred to the documents and publications listed in Annex A. 2. It is anticipated that this Chapter will be updated annually in order to match the pace of development of Command and Control Information Systems (CCIS) and the evolution of the tactics, techniques and procedures that emerge to exploit them. As OIM is still an unfamiliar concept within the Field Army, this Chapter will provide guidance on its planning and execution in order to ensure that the wider staff has a common understanding of the function and concepts of OIM. 3. The content of this Chapter will also provide the overarching doctrinal framework for Unit and Formation IM SOIs and for system and application specific SOPs such as the Recognised Land Picture and the BCIP1 Command Support SOPs. AIM AND SCOPE 4. Aim. To provide the context, doctrine and direction for the conduct of OIM and Information Exploitation (IX) within Land Environment Formations and units. 5. Scope. OIM doctrine is not information system specific and, in principle, is equally applicable to entirely paper-based operations. Consequently, the principles and practices detailed here are applicable to all systems in use within the operational Land Environment2. 6.

1 2

Structure of Chapter. This Chapter is structured as follows: a.

Section 1 – Policy, definitions and principles of OIM.

b.

Section 2 - The Operational Information Life Cycle.

c.

Section 3 – OIM planning and execution.

d.

Section 4 – OIM roles and responsibilities.

e.

Annex A – Reference Documents.

BOWMAN/ ComBAT, Infrastructure and Platform BISA SOPs. Current systems in use include JOCS, I-NET, BOWMAN ComBAT, and ATACS.

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POLICY 7. General. Information Policy within Defence is issued by DG Info and distributed and applied through the chain of command. This top down policy approach is essential in order to ensure coherence between the Services and within the Army. Defence policy seeks to provide Defence wide consistency whilst allowing local flexibility to meet particular needs. Within the Land Environment, Operational Information Policy for the Field Army is the responsibility of HQ Land and is developed on its behalf by the Land Warfare Centre. 8.

HQ Land Information Vision. The HQ Land Vision is to develop: “An information environment3 in which trained personnel use a robust network of systems to provide efficiently the right information, in the right format, to the right people, at the right time in order to exploit it to achieve success.”4

All personnel are to have access to the information they require and in the required format to perform their duties effectively both in barracks and when deployed. 9. Duty to Share Information. Information gains value as it is re-used. Therefore, there is a basic presumption that a Defence user should be able to access any piece of information held on any UK defence organisational system. This presumption is of necessity tempered by security and legal obligations and constraints, as well as by technical and operational practicality. This policy helps drive forward cooperative and collaborative working and break down information stovepipes. There is a culture shift from a general policy of “need to know” to one where there is a presumption of a “duty to share” information. 10. Convergence of In Barracks and Deployed Policies. It is the intent to converge in barracks and deployed information practices as far as possible. Any differences that exist between the in and out of barracks domains should only be the result of current technical limitations or the application of particular security policies. DEFINITIONS 11. General. This section will define the key terms and explain the concepts used within this chapter For more in depth discussion of the concepts supporting Information Management and Exploitation, see JDN 04/06 Information Management and D/CBM Information Management Handbook and Commander’s Precis. 12. Data, Information and Knowledge. Data, information and knowledge are interrelated manifestations of fact, or perceived fact, that have varying degrees of utility for commanders and staff5. a. Data. Data is the basic building blocks of information and comprises basic facts and statistics that can be manipulated by individuals and machines.

3

The Information Environment is anywhere that information is acquired, stored, manipulated or communicated. 4 HQ Land CBM/2015/1/0 Land Forces Information Strategy. Dated 31 Aug 06. 5 These definitions are derived from JDN 04/06.

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b. Information. Information is the meaning that an individual associates with data presented in context. c. Knowledge. Information combined with experience, interpretation and reflection generates knowledge and hence supports decision making. 13. Cognitive Hierarchy. The cognitive hierarchy diagram at Figure 7.1 provides a model to help understand the relationships between data, information and knowledge, and provides a way of mapping command and staff functions and processes to these concepts. The diagram also shows that the dependency of the higher order command functions (knowledge, insight and wisdom) are dependant upon the foundation provided by data and information.

Figure 7.1 - The Cognitive Hierarchy 14. Metadata. Metadata is defined as “information about information”. The metadata of a piece of information describes its characteristics, such as date created, originator, subject matter, and the document reference. 15. Information and Intelligence. In the military context intelligence describes information and knowledge on adversaries or potential areas of operation. The management of intelligence is no different in essence to that of any other type of information and the policies, practices and procedures described in this chapter are applicable to intelligence information. 16.

Information Administration (IAdmin). IAdmin is defined as: “The structuring and handling of information to enable it to be stored, archived, located and retrieved efficiently while maintaining its integrity.”6

6

JDN 04/06 Information Management.

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17. In broad terms IAdmin covers the clerical aspects of routing, labelling, filing and sorting electronic information. Within each unit and HQ there will be personnel dedicated to perform the IAdmin function in support of the staff and to deal with the routine administration of information in accordance with stated policy and processes. Compliance with IAdmin is the responsibility of all staff to ensure both information availability and accuracy, as well as order and discipline in information handling. 18.

Information Management (IM). IM is defined as: “The Integrated Management Processes and services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format to maximise freedom of action.”7

19. IM is an enabling activity that provides for the unit and HQ a set of rules techniques and procedures to make the best use of the systems available in order to meet operational objectives. 20.

Information Exploitation (IX). IX is defined as: “The use of information to gain advantage and improve situational awareness to ensure effective planning decision making and coordination of those activities required to realise effects.”8

21. IX encompasses the activities that commanders and staffs follow in using the available information to support decision making and achieve operational effect. Effective IX is achieved where the staff processes followed make best use of the available information. 22.

Information Assurance. Information assurance is defined as: “The protection of information and information systems against attack, failure and compromise.”9

23. Information assurance covers the processes for protecting, backing up, restoring archiving and retrieving information. The aim is to ensure that the information necessary to conduct operations is trusted, protected and available. There are 6 main elements to information assurance as listed below: a. Authentication. Users must have confidence both in the quality and integrity of the information and in the certainty that only authorised users have access. Processes and procedures are to ensure the necessary level of protection is applied to information resources, whilst ensuring that users can easily access the information they require. b. Non-Repudiation. Non-repudiation of origin describes the requirement to ensure that the recipient has confidence that the information has originated from a particular individual or organisation. Non-repudiation of receipt is the measure of assurance to the sender that a piece of information has reached the intended recipients. 7

JDN 04/06 Information Management. JDN 04/06 Information Management. 9 JDN 04/06 Information Management. 8

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c. Availability. Information must be accessible to be of use and therefore planning must take place to ensure the availability of the host information services. Availability is provided through two approaches. Firstly, by minimising the risk of system failure through provision of adequate physical conditions (such as power supply and air conditioning) and by ensuring that essential maintenance and support activities are carried out. Secondly by the provision of redundancy, achieved through having duplicate systems (such as step-ups) and through employing reversionary modes of operation. d. Confidentiality. Confidentiality is a measure of the effect of unauthorised disclosure of information. It provides the justification for the application of technical and procedural protective measures to information systems. e. Integrity. Integrity is a measure of the system’s ability to protect information against unauthorised modification of information or through the corruption of information caused by systems failure. f. Physical Protection. Information and its supporting systems must be physically protected against environmental hazards (such as rain) accidental hazards (such as fire) and operational hazards (such as indirect fire). 24. System Management. System Management describes the processes involved in ensuring that users have the required level of service from the available information systems. The providers of the information systems in use must have a clear understanding of the commander’s priorities for delivering information. Commanders must also have an appreciation of the capabilities and constraints of the available systems and tailor their information requirements accordingly. These requirements should be defined as an “Operational Level of Service” (OLS) which describes the availability and performance required from the systems in use in order to meet operational requirements. Furthermore such an OLS will provide the yardsticks for the time taken for system deployment, activation, maintenance, movement and recovery in the event of failure. Such yardsticks are essential for the planning of headquarters moves. Effective System Management is delivered most easily through a close relationship between the IM and G6 staff. PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION 25. Information Principles. In the same way that there are enduring principles of war, experience has shown that there are principles of information, which provide guidance on good practice for individuals and organisations to follow. Although technical and security constraints will influence the detail of how information is managed and used, the information principles should be regarded as applicable in all circumstances. The 12 Information Principles are as follows: a. Operational Needs Drive Information Objectives. The operational requirement drives the collection and maintenance of information. The information collected should relate to an operational effect that needs to be achieved. b. Information is a Corporate Asset. Information belongs to the organisation as a whole rather than any particular individual or section. There is a cost in resource and time to capture and manage information. Therefore information must be managed with the same degree of rigour as any other battle winning resource

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such as ammunition or fuel and with the appropriate allocations of priorities and identification of “Main Effort”. c. Information Ownership. All information and its constituent data will have an owner (although the identity may be masked from the end user). The originator is responsible for maintaining or updating his information as necessary. Ownership is distinct from access and information may be accessed by many users. d. Create Once, Use Many Times. Information should be created once and reused many times rather than being recreated. Data is to be captured (normally in digital form) as close to its source as practicable. Data and information should be subsequently reused as often as necessary by those who need it. The cost of recapturing information already held will always be greater than that of sharing information already captured. e. Enforce Standardisation. Information is normally held in a framework such as a table, document spreadsheet or database. Imposing standard document templates, formats and structures will reduce the time spent by users building their own frameworks. Standardisation also eases the exchange of information between users and systems. f. Responsibility. IM provides the policies for the effective handling of information. These policies are central to the effective functioning of the HQ and formation. They need to be set by the COS or equivalent officer (in consultation with the commander) and enacted by the supporting staff. Responsibility for the implementation of OIM policy comes down through the chain of command. All personnel are responsible for the effective management of the information they use. g. Information to be Widely Available. The information available within an organisation should be easily available to the personnel within and externally who require it, subject to appropriate protective measures. h. Current Information Easily Accessible. The most current information should be easily accessible, clearly presented and differentiated from older and archived information. i. Exploitation. Exploitation of information is enhanced through collaboration across organisational and other boundaries. j. Comply With Legal Obligations. Information is to be managed in accordance with legal requirements as defined in such acts as the Public Records Act and the Freedom of Information Act. k. Labelling. Information must be correctly labelled with relevant metadata in order to support the correct distribution, storage and subsequent retrieval. Information unlabelled is information lost. l. Archiving. Information used as part of decision making is to be correctly archived as part of the mandatory Operational Record Keeping requirement. (See Chapter 6).

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26. Information Practices. In addition to the Information Principles detailed above, there are three further information best practices that support effective OIM. a. Information Presentation. Information is to be presented in the form most suitable to the user. Choice of presentation will depend upon user requirements, technical constraints and the source data available. Where possible information should prepared in a way that allows it to be viewed in different ways, and allow source data to be examined if required. b. Balance Cost Versus Accuracy. In general there is a relationship between the cost (in time and resource expended) and the accuracy of information. The greater the detailed required, the greater the cost in resource expended to capture and manage it. Those specifying information needs must clearly state the accuracy, currency and timeliness of the information demanded. Timeliness may be more important than precision, as information which arrives too late to be useful to its recipient is of no value. When commanders and staff issue requests for data and information collection they should consider: (1)

The time needed to collect the data.

(2)

The time to prepare the information products derived from the data.

(3)

Distribution time.

(4)

Recipients’ assimilation time.

c. Plan for Operational Continuity. Information must be held in ways that allow its exploitation to continue in all circumstances. This aim requires close attention to both technical and staff procedures. This will include: (1) Plan Changes of Command. Changes or moves of command from in barracks to a deployed environment or between headquarters in the field must be undertaken as controlled activities. The aim is to minimise disruption to the flow of information and to ensure that the required information moves from one headquarters to another. (2) Plan For and Build in System Resilience. The stability and reliability of information systems generally depends on external factors such as power supply, environmental conditions and regular system maintenance. Deployment planning must take into account these issues to ensure that information systems are reliable and sustainable in the field. It is easier to build in resilience from the beginning, than attempt to add resilience to an already deployed system. (3) Plan for System Degradation and Failure. Operational planning and training must include processes for dealing with incidents of system degradation or failure. Staff procedures must incorporate alternate modes of operation to be followed in the event of partial or total systems failure.

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CATEGORISING INFORMATION 27. There are many ways of categorising information. It may be categorised by protective marking (eg Restricted or Secret), by subject matter, by importance or priority. In the current and future operational environment, there will be large quantities of information produced and available. This poses the risk of commanders and staff suffering information overload where data and information created overwhelms the communications channels, storage facilities and the capacity for individuals to assimilate it. To address this risk, operational information is categorised by its value in supporting the commander’s ability to complete his mission. In the operational context, information therefore is categorised into four groups, Mission Critical Information, Mission Support Information, Reference Information and Environmental Information. Furthermore much information created to support operations will in time become Archival Records for permanent retention. This categorisation provides the basic command and management tool to assign priorities to information distribution and management. 28. Mission Critical Information (MCI). Mission Critical Information (MCI) is that information the commander needs to have in order to achieve his mission. Commanders must identify their essential information needs in order that Information Managers and G6 staffs apply the relevant distribution and storage priorities. MCI is normally “pushed” to its recipients and located in storage systems where it may be most easily found. In essence the MCI is an expression of the commander’s information Main Effort. Examples of MCI include current situational awareness information, and Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). a. Local and Common Operating Picture. The Common Operating Picture (COP) is made up from Local Operational Pictures (LOP) held by subordinates. At Land Component Level the COP is known as the Recognised Land Picture and is sent to JTFHQ for inclusion in the Joint Operational Picture. b. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. CCIR are used by the commander to reduce information gaps he may have concerning his own force, the threat and the environment. They define the information he needs to enhance his understanding of the battlespace, identify risks and to make sound, timely decisions. While CCIR is a global term used for general information requirements, there are three specific categories of IR: (1) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). PIR are intelligence requirements for which the commander has anticipated and stated a priority. (2) Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR). FFIRs are information the commander and staff need to know about own forces for the mission (dispositions, capabilities, readiness and support). (3) Environmental Information Requirements (EIR). EIRs are information requirements which will inform commanders and staffs about the prevailing state of the ground and weather for the forthcoming operation. 29. Mission Support Information (MSI). Mission Support Information is that information that assists the commander and staff in the planning and execution of the

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mission. Examples of MSI will include current operational staff work, ORBAT and Task Org information, the combat supplies and equipment availability status of units and ROE details. 30. Reference Information (RI). Reference Information describes that information that needs to be on hand for reference or archival purposes, but is not changing on a frequent basis. Examples of RI include enemy equipment data, gazetteer information and superseded operational staff work. 31. Environmental Information (EI). Environmental Information is the underlying basic data describing the operational environment. In the Land Environment, EI predominantly relates to geospatial information, other types of EI such as meteorological data will also be significant. 32. Archival Records. Archival Records describe documents and other material (such as imagery and database records) that are retained as permanent evidence of the activities of the organisation. 33. Application of Information Categories. The categorisation of information as MCI, MSI and RI is a dynamic process. The category within which information is placed will depend upon the type and phase of the operation, and the particular needs of the commander. Information will move from one category to another throughout its life. For example, during the early phases of an operation the Shipping Plan may form part of a commander’s MCI. Once the force is deployed it, the Shipping Plan becomes RI. 34. Role of Commanders. It is the duty of commanders at all levels to express clearly their MCI in order that IM and G6 staff can ensure that commanders have access to the information that they need. 35. Role of IM and G6 Staff. The function of the IM and G6 staffs is to ensure that information is effectively distributed and accessible to commanders and staff. In accordance with the philosophy of Mission Command, IM and G6 staffs should actively manage and makes changes to information priorities as the situation demands and in accordance with the commander’s intent. Therefore it is essential that IM and G6 staffs are located in the heart of the headquarters in order that they are aware of the current situation and can quickly tailor the available information priorities, sources and channels to meet operational requirements. 36. Distribution Channels. The status of information as MCI or MSI will determine the priority, means and time of the dispatch of the product through available communications channels. In each case, common sense and flexibility must be applied when selecting the method of distribution.10 COMMAND, COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 37. The available Command, Communications and Information Systems (CCIS) provide the environment for the application of OIM. CCIS are in a constant state of development and it is incumbent upon IM and G6 staffs continually to review and refine procedures. As 10

For example, a 10 MB electronic document may require distribution to 15 users as MCI. If sent over an electronic link it would take two hours and consume all available bandwidth as a fresh electronic copy will be sent to each addressee (ie a total of 150 MB). All addressees are within 30 minutes drive so a more effective method of distribution would be to request addressees to collect a copy of the document burnt onto CDRom.

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well as ongoing refining of OIM procedures, there must be continual refining of OIM planning products and individual and collective training. 38. Information Exchange Requirements (IER). Defining Information Exchange Requirements (IER) is the method used to capture the information and communications requirement to support a particular operation. The IER development process is undertaken both top down through identifying the information requirements of a formation or unit, and from bottom up which determines the CIS infrastructure requirements from the staff. It is essential that this process is conducted jointly between the IM and G6 Staffs, so that the G6 community can identify capacity and capability constraints and the IM staff can identify priorities for the delivery of services. The IER process should be a dynamic activity undertaken throughout an operation in order that the best use is made of the available CIS resources. 39. Training and Experience. Commanders and staff must be trained and confident with the CIS systems that they are expected to use. Users will only gain confidence in the use of their CIS through regular use during in-barracks CPX and FTX training. Training must extend beyond the basic use of an application but include the practical use of the available applications to achieve operational ends. Formation and Unit SOIs must reflect the capabilities of the systems in use, and the procedures detailed with in them incorporate best practice in the use and exploitation of the available facilities. SECTION 2 – OPERATIONAL INFORMATION LIFE CYCLE 40. This section describes and details the Operational Information Life Cycle Management model (OILM). The OILM provides a conceptual model to help understand the flow and management of information through an organisation. This model should be used to guide the development of IM Standard Operating Instructions (SOIs) within formations and units. 41. Description of OILM Model. The OILM model is depicted in Figure 7-2 below. The model simplifies the complex information processes at work. It must be remembered that in a real organisation all phases of the cycle are running concurrently as well as sequentially. The links and circle in the centre of Figure 7-2 demonstrate the central unifying element of the process played by the IAdmin and IM functions. The various stages in the model are discussed in greater detail below.

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Figure 7.2 - The Operational Information Life Cycle Management (OILM) Model ACQUISITION 42. Overview. All HQs generate and acquire information. Data and information will be sent to the HQ from external sources. The HQ will also request information from external sources and task its own assets to capture and pass back information. Finally the HQ will also have its own information resources available to be used and in turn generate new information. 43. Receipt of Information. There will be a need for control over the flow of all information coming into and going out of the HQ. This will be done primarily in the Operations Cell and RDC/iHub11. This passage and exchange of information should be specified in SOIs and in the information directive12. Some information will be actively passed to some users (pushed) but not to others. Other information will be accessed by users when required who will draw it from available information stores (pulled). All users have a role to play in making such information available to those who need it through compliance with IM practice. 44. Information Sources. A HQ will need to balance its information needs against the information sources available. Alternate sources of information may have to be identified in the event of an expected information source becoming unavailable, or processes will require modification to mitigate the information gap. Conversely the availability of an 11

In a large organisations, with the iHub may be distributed with a central iHub supported by peripheral iHubs in the various functional branches. 12 Usually the Information Directive will be an Annex to the OpO.

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unforeseen or new information source will often require revision of the information acquisition, exploitation and decision making activities within the HQ in order to take advantage of the new capability. EXPLOITATION 45. The exploitation phase includes data fusion, transformation, assessment, analysis and manipulation of information carried out by the staff. IX activity supports situational awareness, planning, decision making and the coordination of desired effects. Staff must be confident in the level of accuracy of information and this level of confidence must be passed on to those who use the information for decision making. Conflicting information must be identified and reconciled to achieve a common understanding. 46. Presentation. A key staff function is information presentation. Providing too much or too little information should be avoided. Generally the end state of a particular IX activity is where a product is presented to inform decision making. When specifying the format for data collection, it is important to consider its final use and how it will be presented. It is far more efficient to collect the data in a format that will be easily transformed from data to information then to knowledge. For example, numerical data is best collected in to a spreadsheet from the moment of collection, as this format supports data analysis and subsequent presentation. Maintaining consistent formats for products reduces the need for nugatory re-keying of data from one format to another. More complex information may require several products in various formats. For example the COP will include operational overlays, mapping, snap shot pictures, imagery, graphics and textual information. IM and staff process SOIs should specify the formats required for data collection and subsequent analysis and presentation. 47. Commander’s Decision Making. A commander’s decision making process is both the end point of the IX process and the initiator for further information acquisition and exploitation activities. It is essential that part of the output from the decision making process is a clear expression of the commander’s MCI. DISSEMINATION 48. Command decisions, based on exploited information, situational awareness information and other mission critical and mission support information, together with updated reference and environmental information must be promulgated promptly to subordinates and internally throughout the organisation. 49. Means of Distribution. Information can be distributed in a number of ways: electronically, verbally or in hard copy. CIS will provide the primary mechanism for distribution of information externally, subject to the availability of appropriate communications. In deciding the best manner to distribute information, the process must be considered as a whole, including the recipients’ ability to exploit it in the form used. This may include the extraction from a database, transmission through a communications system and input into a target database. It may be more efficient to communicate only the changes to information, rather than its entirety. 50. Distribution Management. Formal tracking and acknowledgement of receipt is often part of the distribution process. The more important the information being distributed, the greater the need to ensure that dispatch, delivery and acknowledgement are tracked

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and recorded. Products needing such management will be specified in formation and unit SOIs. STORAGE 51. The majority of information within a HQ will be held on electronic storage devices. Storage capacity will always be at a premium on operational deployments and information will quickly accumulate on storage devices. It is essential that firm management and control are applied to the storage in use from the beginning of the operation in order that storage capacity does not become congested and system performance compromised. 52. Storage Management. Effective storage management has three elements. First the IAdmin function must create and manage the application of standard folder structures and consistent filing procedures across the available CIS. Second the System Management function must apply the necessary maintenance functions such as volume defragmentation, and load sharing across devices. Finally the IM function should manage the migration of archival records and redundant information from system storage. DISPOSAL 53. When information is of no further current value to the staff, it must either be either deleted or archived. Disposal of information must be a controlled process in order to ensure that information that should be retained for record keeping and other purposes is not lost. 54. Operational Record Keeping. At routine intervals it will be necessary to make an archive copy of specific information that has been created, sent or received within the unit HQ both to meet the requirements of the Army Operational Record13 and to support further analysis of the operation. 55. Information Deletion. The decision to dispose of information, rather than archiving it, should not be taken lightly. There is an essential information skill required by all staff responsible for deciding whether to dispose of information. The deletion policies in force must be known to all relevant staff. The underlying principles are: a. Information should be retained unless there is reasonable certainty that it has no current or future value. If in doubt archive, do not delete! b. Every piece of information should have a nominated officer who is permitted to dispose of it. c. The I Mgr should conduct a third party review of important information prior to disposal. d. All folders should have a review date, time and an owner who is responsible for housekeeping.

13

Chapter 6 Section 4.

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UNIFYING ACTIVITIES 56. It is possible that a HQ can execute the various phases in the OILM independently. However common and standardised techniques and procedures for handling information within a HQ will help the information lifecycle run more effectively and allow a greater proportion of staff resource to be dedicated to exploiting rather than administering information. IAdmin, and IM are the unifying activities that help the OILM operate more effectively. 57. IAdmin. The IAdmin policies in place within the HQ provide the common rules and processes that need to be followed by staff in order that the flow of information 58. IM. The IM function has two main tasks within the OILM: Firstly to impose, monitor and supervise the implementation of IAdmin and IM policy and procedures in force within the organisation. Secondly, the IM function must continually seek to refine the processes to take advantage of new capabilities, support emerging requirements and ensure that the process can adapt to the changes within the operational environment. SECTION 3 – INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PLANNING AND EXECUTION 59. The effective implementation of Information Management within a HQ consists of two elements. Firstly, the foundation of effective IM is a set of formation and unit SOIs that incorporate good IM practice within normal staff activity. This ensures that HQ staffs are familiar and experienced with the IM processes in force. Secondly when standing up a formation or unit for operations, it is essential that a thorough Information Needs Analysis (INA) is undertaken to help to ensure that the HQ’s information needs are met and managed through the operation. Consequently IM planning must run alongside the main planning process from the beginning. This section will outline the planning and execution of Operational Information Management planning. 60. Planning. The start point for a formation’s and unit’s IM planning process is their existing SOIs. Where effective IM practice is embedded within a HQ’s existing working practices, and familiar to staff, less time will be taken in preparing and less detail is required in the IM staff products produced during the planning process. Furthermore good internal practices will allow staffing effort to focus on identifying the information issues relating to the specific operation. The contents and detail of the Information Needs Analysis, Information Directive and any related staff products will depend upon the duration and complexity of the operation together with the systems in use and the level of Joint and Coalition involvement. 61. The Information Needs Analysis (INA). The INA is used as a framework to analyse the formation’s or unit’s information requirements for a particular operation. The analysis must be developed in conjunction with the wider operational estimate process being conducted and the CIS estimate conducted by G6 staffs. The INA process should also be used by IM staff throughout the operation as information requirements evolve. In essence INA consists of three elements which seek to answer the following questions: what is the operational context - “what are we doing?”, what is the information requirement “what information do we need to achieve the mission?”, and the infrastructure available “what infrastructure do we need to deliver it?”. a. Operational Context. The aim of the operational context element of the INA is to ensure that the IM staffs have a thorough understanding of the operational

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context and the priorities of the commander. IM staffs need to actively engage with planning staffs in order to identify the information needs for the operation. Typical areas that will need to be addressed will be: (1)

The objective, type, phasing and duration of operation.

(2)

The prevalent environmental conditions.

(3) Timelines for pre deployment training, deployment, RSOI and operations. (4) The requirement for reach-back reconnaissance and liaison teams.

from

early-entry

forces,

(5)

The formation or unit’s role in the operation.

(6)

The level of interaction required with other UK services.

(7)

The level of interaction required with other coalition and allied forces.

(8) The level of interaction required with governmental and non governmental agencies. b. Information Requirements. The aim of the information issues element of the INA is to identify the information requirements of the HQ, the likely sources of information available, and those within the HQ who will be responsible for collecting and meeting these requirements. Furthermore an analysis will need to be undertaken to identify the detail of information exchange requirements with external agencies. (1) Internal Information Issues. Listed below are representative questions that need to be answered as part of the analysis relating to the internal information needs of the HQ. The function of the IM staff is not to answer all the questions listed below, rather it should act as a prompt to the relevant elements or staff branches within the HQ to analyse and express their own information needs. Collating these needs across the HQ will identify areas or duplication and overlap and also allow a clear division of responsibility for the ownership of information. (a)

Mission Critical Information. i. What are the commander’s and staff’s Mission Critical Information (MCI)?

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ii.

Who is responsible for meeting the MCI requirement?

iii.

How will MCI evolve during the phases of the operation?

iv.

What formats will MCI be required to be produced in?

v.

Who needs access to the available MCI?

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(b)

Mission Support Information. i. What are the commander’s and staff’s Mission Support Information (MSI) requirements? ii.

Who are responsible for meeting the MSI requirement?

iii. How will MSI requirements evolve during the phases of the operation? iv. (c)

(d)

What formats will MSI be required to be produced in?

Reference Information Requirements. i.

What are the HQ’s RI requirements for the operation?

ii.

Who is responsible for meeting the RI requirement?

Environmental Information Requirements. i. What are the EI geospatial requirements for the operation? ii. What are the required meteorological and hydrological and other environmental information required for the operation?

(e)

Collaborative Working Requirements. i.

What staff processes require collaborative working?

ii. What staff products need to be produced in a collaborative way? iii. Which elements within the organisation collaborate in the creation of staff products?

need

to

iv. What requirement exists for collaborative working with external organisations? (2) External Information Issues. All HQs and units will need to exchange information efficiently and effectively throughout an operation. It is essential to understand external information requirements in order to direct and manage internal information processes. (a)

Information Exchange Requirements. i. What are the requirements for reporting with subordinate and superior HQs, including:

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(i)

Routine reporting?

(ii)

Non routine reporting?

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ii. What are the requirements for exchanging documentation with subordinate and superior HQs? iii. What are the requirements for collaborative working with subordinate and superior HQs? iv. What are the requirements for exchanging information between main, forward, tactical and rear HQs? v. What are the requirements for exchanging information with the Home Base? (b)

Request for Information Management. i. What is the process for managing Requests for Information (RFI) from subordinate organisations? ii.

What is the process of escalating RFI to superior HQs?

iii.

What is the process for managing RFI within the HQ?

c. Infrastructure Context. The aim of the infrastructure issues element of the estimate is to identify the communications and information systems infrastructure available, to meet the information requirements identified earlier in the analysis. This analysis must take place in conjunction with G6 staffs, however, it must take into account more than communications systems. It should include the requirements for information display, data storage, archiving backup and recovery mechanisms, systems resilience and the exchange of information between systems including between systems running at differing security levels. (1) Organic Information Services. Normally a HQ or unit will deploy with its own organic command and information systems. Questions to be answered are: (a) What organic information systems will be available and deployed within the organisation? (b) How will organic information systems interface with external systems? (c) What capability gaps exist that may hamper or prevent the organisation being able to deliver its required information needs? (2) Force Information Services. It is likely that a HQ or unit will deploy into an operational theatre and need to assimilate new or unfamiliar systems. These may be of UK origin or may form part of a shared coalition system. In either case the INA must answer the following questions: (a) What strategic and tactical information systems are available across the force and what are their capabilities and limitations?

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(b) What are the communications and information exchange pathways that exist? (3) Threat. Threats to the availability and integrity of information need to be identified in order that they can be mitigated. This threat analysis will need to take advice from G2 Security and G6 staffs. In particular the following questions need to be addressed: (a) What operational threats (such as electromagnetic weapons, and espionage) exist?

physical

attack,

(b) What environmental threats, (such as temperature, humidity and altitude) against available information systems exist? (4) Training Requirements. Individual and collective training requirements for the CIS to be used and the procedures to be followed need to be identified. In particular the following questions should be addressed: (a) What technical and procedural training will be required to take advantage of the systems available? (b) What systems will be available and what individual and collective training will be required in order to take advantage of these resources? (c) What technical and procedural training of augmentees will be required? (5) Non-UK Force Elements. The presence of non-UK personnel within HQ HQs and units can be expected during operations, and there is likely to be a requirement to exchange information between UK and non-UK systems. The following questions will need to be addressed: (a) What information support to non-UK liaison parties or embedded personnel will be required? (b) What security restrictions apply to non-UK personnel being provided access to UK information and systems? (c) What constraints apply to the exchange of information between UK and non-UK systems? (d) What non-UK systems will be deployed within the organisation to support information exchange with non-UK Forces? 62. The Information Directive. The Information Directive provides the IM staff input into the Operational Directive. The Information Directive is derived from the superior formation’s Information Directive, and the outcome of the HQ’s own INA. The directive forms an annex to the operation plan. The IM Directive should be written to be enduring through the duration of the campaign and amended as necessary through appropriate elements within OpOs and FRAGOs.

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63. Information Management Tools. A number of tools will assist in the presentation of the IM Directive. a. Information Policy Table. The Information Policy table lists the policies in force linked to the relevant SOIs. b. Hardware and Application Scaling Table. This provides a list of facilities distributed within the organisation. For example, in a formation HQ it will list the hardware and software available to each staff user. Within a battlegroup, it will list the information capabilities available within each command element. c. Information Services Requirements Table. This is similar to the Hardware and Application Scaling Table and lists the systems required in the HQ and the status of these requirements. It will include gateway facilities to other systems such as Multilateral Interoperability Programme (MIP) gateways and the Joint Messaging Interoperability Gateway (JMIG). d. Information Battle Rhythm. This will set out the procedures for back up, both of individual terminals and central storage facilities. It needs to be meshed into other key events of the HQ daily rhythm so as not to interfere with normal working. Of paramount importance is the need to coordinate the execution of scheduled activities, such as automated backups. These cannot be allowed to constrain operational functions. e. External and Internal Distribution Lists. This listing will describe to whom products are to be distributed; how they are to be distributed; actions to be taken in the event that the primary distribution mechanism or addressee is unavailable; and actions on failure to deliver a product to its destination within a specified time. This tool will be used primarily by the iHub. f. User Information Exchange Requirement Matrix. This lists the information to be exchanged externally, when and by which medium14. This supports the allocation of bandwidth and services. EXECUTION 64. IM activities need to take place throughout the conduct of an operation. It is both easier and far more effective to apply good practice from the very beginning than attempt to apply good IM practice in a mature operation. 65. Pre Deployment. Pre deployment activities are intended to create the OIM framework for use during the operation and to support the pre deployment staff planning processes. In particular there will be a need to capture information used in supporting decision making, provide essential reference information. IM activities during the pre deployment phase will include the following: a.

Conduct of INA.

b.

Establishment of IAdmin structures (folders etc) on systems to be deployed.

14

Voice (radio & face to face), Formatted messages (voice & data), Physical media – CD/DVD/Floppy/EMD, application generated, paper.

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c.

Creation of IM infrastructure such as operational websites, databases and application configuration.

d.

Identification, preparation and loading of Reference and Environmental Information.

e.

Conduct integration of augmentees and collective staff training.

f.

Provide skills training for Application Specialists on theatre or operationspecific applications.

66. Deployment. The deployment phase includes the movement of information into theatre and it’s subsequent activation for use by the HQ. Deployment activities may involve a relief in place and the requirement to take-over existing information from organisations already in theatre. This will require a formal handover to ensure that all information assets are accounted for and are accessible to the in-coming HQ. Deployment activities will include the following: a. Collating and packaging for deployment the information captured and generated during the pre deployment planning and preparation. b.

Controlled activation of HQ information assets within theatre.

c.

Establishment of information between the HQ and external organisations.

d.

Take over of existing information assets.

67. Operations. During the operations phase the IM function is concerned in ensuring that the information needs of the HQ are meet. The following activities will take place during operations: a.

Ongoing monitoring and enforcement of IM policy.

b. Ongoing refinement and development of procedures to support the organisation during operations. c. Identification and exploitation of new sources of information or new capabilities. d. Identification of capability gaps and input into lessons identified and force development process. 68. De-mobilisation. On the completion of the operation and subsequent to the return to the Home Base, the following activities will need to take place. a.

Collation of final operational records and other historical material.

b.

Collation of lessons identified.

c.

Declassification of material to support later training and planning activities.

d.

Destruction of redundant information.

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e.

Clean up of system storage devices and applications.

SECTION 4 - INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 69. All personnel within a HQ have a role to play in effective IM. However certain personnel have specific responsibilities in defining and implementing information policy and practices. This section will identify the general and specific IM responsibilities within HQs. 70. Command Responsibilities. The commander provides the direction to his staff on his critical information requirements and must clearly express his information priorities. 71. Branch Responsibilities. Certain branches or roles within a HQ will have specific responsibilities for delivering effective OIM: a. G3 Operations. Operational Information policy is command led and thus lies within the G3 branch. The lead IM staff officer is normally part of the G3 branch, together with any Application Specialist personnel (who form the Digitisation Support Team) within the HQ. b. Staff Support. The AGC Staff Support function has the lead for the application of IAdmin activities within a unit. Within a formation the Staff Support personnel run the central iHub, as well as provide embedded clerical support within branches. c. G6. The G6 branch is responsible for delivering and maintaining the CIS infrastructure. 72. Appointment Responsibilities. Certain appointments within HQs have explicit IM roles. Generic role responsibilities are mapped against those appointments in various HQs who direct responsibility for implementing good information practices in Table 7-3 below: Ser (a)

Role

Div HQ

Bde HQ

1 2

(b) Senior Information Officer (SIO) Information Manager (IMgr)

(c) COS SO2 G3 IM

(d) COS SO3 G3 IM

3

Cell Information Manager (CIMgr)

1 x Offr per cell

1 x Offr/WO per cell

4

Information Support Officer (ISO)

Superintending Clerk

Superintending Clerk

BG HQ/Unit (e) BG 2IC/COS Adjt 1 x Offr/WO per cell Chief Clerk

Figure 7. 3 - IM Roles and Appointments a. Senior Information Officer (SIO). The Senior Information Officer (SIO) is responsible for the ensuring that the HQ conforms and applies Defence, Land and other IM policies. The SIO approves HQ IM policies which are issued on his behalf. (1)

Directing and approving the daily battle rhythm.

(2)

Approving the Information SOPs and Directive.

(3) Directing the processes and procedures to satisfy Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).

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(4)

Prioritising Information Requirements.

b. Information Manager (IMgr). The Information Manager (IMgr) oversees the implementation of organisation IM policy on a day to day basis and reports to the SIO. The IMgr cannot on his own conduct IM for the whole organisation. The role is to act as an enabler through providing effective SOIs, briefing and advising support staff and users to conduct effective IM and IX an providing direction to the Digitisation Support Team. The IMgr is responsible for the following: (1)

Conducting the daily OIM battle rhythm.

(2)

Drafting and maintaining IM SOIs.

(3)

Drafting the IM Directive and related operational staff work.

(4)

Directing and tasking the Digitisation Support Team.

(5)

Providing IM and IX advice to staff.

(6)

Communicating IM and IX requirements to the G6 staff.

(7) Ensuring the archiving of key information such as the Operational Record. (8) Act.

Ensuring the HQ is compliant with the Freedom of Information (FOI)

(9)

Drafting the reversionary procedures, ensuring in place and rehearsed.

(10)

Providing advice and support to the RFI Manager.15

c. Cell Information Manager (CIMgr). The Cell Information Manager (CIMgr) is responsible for the application of IM within a staff cell, branch or subunit. This role may be filled by the branch Chief Clerk, or in larger or more complex branches a suitably trained Officer or Warrant Officer. The CIMgr role mirrors on a smaller scale that of the IMgr. d. Information Support Officer (ISO). The Information Support Officer oversees the application of IAdmin within the organisation under the direction of the IMgr. The ISO is responsible for the following activities: (1) Enforcing IAdmin policies and practices across the organisation such as naming conventions and document filing. (2) Policing shared folder and information storage areas to ensure compliance with establish policies. (3)

Policing the import and export of information from operational systems.

15

The RFI Manager is a role that needs to be given to one of the staff. This should be detailed in Formation and Unit SOIs.

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(4)

Enforcing document management and security policies.

(5)

Supervising the operation of the RDC/iHub.

(6)

Implementing reversionary methods of working when required.

73. Digitisation Support Team (DST). Formation HQs are established for Application Specialists (App Specs)16 who form the Digitisation Support Team (DST)17. Normally the DST reports to and is tasked by the IMgr. The App Specs are trained to be subject matter experts in the various command and control applications available within the HQ. They provide the immediate technical support to users. In addition the DST ensures that operational applications are used in accordance with IM SOPs and directive. Consequently, the members of the DST must not only be technically adept with the applications in use, but also clearly understand the organisation’s IM policy and practices and how they apply within the working HQ. 74. Organisation of IM. Figure 7.4 below illustrates a typical IM organisation for a formation HQ.

COS (SIO) SO2 G3 IM (IMgr)

Digitization Support Team

SO2 G6 CIS

Supt Clerk (ISO)

RDC/iHUB

Branch Clerks (CIMgr)

Figure 7.4 - Representative IM Organisation 16

App Specs are also established for units. Divisional HQ DSTs are established for 7 App Specs and Brigade HQ DST for 6. The DST is often known as the IM Team. 17

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 7 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES REFERENCES 1.

Defence Level Publications. a.

D CBM/J6. Information Management Handbook. Dated 2006.

b. D CBM/J6. Information Management Handbook Commanders Précis. Dated 2006. 2.

Joint Publications. a.

3.

DCDC. Joint Doctrine Note 04/06 Information Management. Dated 2006.

Army Publications. a. HQ Land Command. Dated 31 August 2006.

Land Forces Information Strategy.

CBM/2015/1/0.

b. Command and Battlespace (Land) Publication. Volume 1. Command Procedures. Version 2.0. AC 71828. Dated May 2006. c. Command and Battlespace (Land) Publication. Volume 3. Bowman BCIP 04F User Handbook. Dated May 2006. d. Command and Control Development Centre. Recognised Land Picture SOPs Version 7.0. Dated June 2005.

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CHAPTER 8 EFFECTS, TARGETING AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS INTRODUCTION AIM The aim of Chapter 8 is to describe the tactical processes associated with effects planning, targeting and information operations. More specifically it is:

1.

a.

A guide for commanders and staff in training and in the conduct of operations.

b.

A basis for instruction by training establishments.

c.

A basis for the development of formation SOIs and unit SOPs.

SCOPE 2. This Chapter provides guidance for the commander and staff of divisional, brigade and battlegroup HQs when subordinated to a Land Component Headquarters (LC HQ). It provides the guidance that enables an understanding of the process that links actions with effects throughout the Area of Operations (AO). 3. It does not provide guidance to the Land Component Commander (LCC) or the staff in his HQ, who should refer to operational level doctrine and JFOPs1 for this guidance. AJP3.9, Joint Targeting and AJP-3.9.2, Land Targeting are two publications under development that will provide additional guidance. The UK policies for Joint Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)2 and Joint Effects Based Targeting3 have been articulated by DTIO and form additional sources of information for formation targeting staff. 4. Chapter 8 is split into five sections which discuss the kinetic and non kinetic contributions to achieving a commander’s intent and explain the process of managing execution. The sections are: a. Section 1 – Effects planning at the tactical level. This section should be read after Chapter 2 Section 4 (PREE). It describes how a commander and his staff Plan, Review, Execute and Evaluate and introduces the notion that regular evaluation is necessary to ensure progress is being made towards achieving the commander’s intent. b. Section 2 – Fundamentals of targeting. c. Section 3 – Targets and Effects. d. Section 4 – Targeting.

1

JFOP 3/06 describes the Joint Effects process applicable at the operational/tactical interface. UK Joint Targeting and BDA Policy Paper dated 30 Sep 05 distributed 4 Oct 05 by DTIO. 3 UK Joint Effects Based Targeting Policy Paper (DRAFT) dated May 06 distributed by DTIO. 2

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e.

Section 5 – Information Operations.

Adaptive and Responsive Approach to Effects 5. Developments in the areas of Joint Engagement, Effects Based Planning, Information Operations and Joint Accelerated Targeting are likely to result in the production of UK policy documents which will detail further developments in tactical doctrine. Similarly, the introduction into service of targeting planning and execution tools such as JETTS4, JADOCS5 and FC BISA6 will require changes in procedures. Changes in policy and procedures will be incorporated into the AFM and issued either as a doctrine note, an amendment or as a revised AFM. SECTION 1 - EFFECTS PLANNING AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL INTRODUCTION 6. This section describes the Tactical Effects Planning (TEP) process. The methodology is derived from the combat estimate so it should be familiar to all. Equally, it encompasses the established targeting cycle7, the intelligence cycle8, the Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP) as well as the more contemporary functions such as CIMIC, Information Operations, Media, POLAD, Legal and input from OGDs. Therefore, the essential factor is that TEP is comprehensive and considers kinetic and non-kinetic processes with equal weighting. OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE 7. Orders from the operational level HQ are likely to task tactical commanders with delivering a series of activities9 that need to be undertaken at the tactical level to contribute towards achieving operational effects. The Effects Based Approach10 supports this view, in that effects are achieved at the operational level and activities are conducted at the tactical level. It has become increasingly common for tactical formation headquarters to work on the operational/tactical interface and as such it is appropriate that these HQs undertake effects based planning, which is wholly in line with the principal tactical level decision making tool: the combat estimate. Guidance from Operational HQs may be in the form of: a. Operational Sequencing Road Map (OSRM). The OSRM plots the intended course of the engagement and provides a logical sequence of activity against defined effects. These effects are plotted against lines of operation identified in the estimate process. An example of an OSRM is at Annex A. b. Synchronisation Matrix. The Synchronisation Matrix maps the supporting effects against operational lines of development and the activities that support those supporting effects. Depending on the nature of the operation, the graphic can be expanded to include a timeline. 4

Joint Effects Tactical Targeting System. Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System. 6 Fire Control Battlefield Information System Application. 7 Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess. 8 Direct, Collect, Process, Disseminate. 9 This is how JTFHQ will pass missions to components. 10 JDN 07/06 Incorporating and Extending the UK Military Effects Based Approach. 5

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c. Operational End State. The Operational End State is the desired situation within a Joint Ops Area (JOA) which delivers selected military objectives within a given campaign plan. This operational end state will mark the transition of the character and nature of UK military engagement, and will be a step towards the delivery of the National Strategic Aim. d. Decisive Condition (DC). The DC is the necessary state of affairs, brought about by the consequences of a range of influences that contributes to the desired end state. e. Supporting Effects (SE). SE are specific influences on a Decisive Condition that are generated by linking a range of activities in time, space and/or purpose. f.

Activities. Activities are military actions that contribute to achieving the SE.

PLANNING 8. Introduction. Chapter 2 describes the PREE process, which underpins tactical effects based planning. During the Plan and Review stages it may be necessary for smaller HQs to reach back to larger HQs or the UK for additional information, perhaps seeking ISTAR feeds not normally organic to the organisation. Execution at the tactical level will be initiated by orders and then commanded and controlled by the appropriate commander and his headquarters. The management of execution will be undertaken through Evaluation, which will inform the commander on progress being made. During an enduring operation it may take longer to achieve the commander’s desired effects than during war fighting. Therefore the management of execution through a regular evaluation process will be necessary. 9. The Estimate. At the start of an operation, and periodically during it, the commander and his staff will conduct an estimate. Depending on the complexity of the problem and the time available the commander may undertake a Tactical Estimate or a Combat Estimate. The Tactical Effects Process (TEP) process sits comfortably with the Combat Estimate. Provided that the Estimate process has been comprehensive it will produce the necessary direction to inform the TEP. 10. Detailed Understanding of the Environment. In order to plan for those effects that will enable mission success, all participants need to have a detailed understanding of the operating environment within which they are planning. During the early stages of an operation large gaps in information will be addressed in the intelligence collection plan. The requisite detailed understanding is achieved through an exhaustive analysis of the operating environment, which can be broken down into the following areas: a.

Physical.

b.

Political.

c.

Economic.

d.

Human.

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e.

Military.

f.

Information.

11. To achieve this level of understanding a knowledge base needs to be built, from and into which multiple sources (intelligence, political and academia) can contribute. It is therefore vital that during the early stages of planning, personnel with this level of knowledge are engaged in the process. Once the detailed planning of the operation has been conducted it is equally important that suitable representation from these bodies is present for the effect guidance process, and also have input into the military decision making process. Without this level of engagement there is a danger that planned effects will have a negative outcome or will become incoherent. REVIEW 12. As detailed in Chapter 2 there may be a requirement to review a set of orders or a plan before promulgation. Tools available for review include: a. Wargaming. Traditional war gaming techniques remain extant but in more contemporary operations “Red Teaming” provides an alternative method. Red Teaming not only provides the view of a defined enemy, but should also include the stand point of neutrals, aligned and non aligned actors. b. Commander’s Back Brief. This is an opportunity for those subordinate commanders to talk through how they have interpreted the orders. It provides an opportunity for further direction or clarification. c. Wider HQ Participation. In a contemporary environment when HQs are likely to have been augmented to deliver functions not normally organic to the force, steps must be taken to involve all functional areas to ensure that effort is coherent. d. Coordination Conference. The coord conference provides an opportunity to review matters in detail (coordination measures, control measures and BM). Following the coord conference the plan can be adjusted to ensure events are correctly sequenced. e. Mission Rehearsal. An opportunity for those involved to run through the mission ensuring complete understanding of what is to be achieved, allowing for further direction and clarification. EXECUTION 13. Managing Execution. Once orders are issued each formation and unit will have its own battle rhythm and develop SOIs that dictate how progress in reported. TEP requires a regular review of the situation and environment to assess what progress has been made and what differences exist between reality and the commander’s plan. The tempo of operations will dictate how often these reviews take place. Regular reviews will provide updates on the activities being undertaken (CIMIC, IO, Media, targeting, intelligence, STAR etc) to achieve the effects. This evaluation process will decide if adequate progress is being made and, if not, coordinate additional tasks as necessary. If as a result of these reviews it is felt that the

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situation has changed sufficiently the commander will provide further guidance or direct that another estimate is conducted and new orders given. The relationship between the Combat Estimate, the review process and the subordinate functional cycles is shown in Figure 8.1. THE COMBAT ESTIMATE- PLAN & REVIEW EVALUATION PROCESS

1. What is the en doing and why?

EXECUTE

OBSERVE the environment

2. What have I been told to do and why? 3. What effect do I wish to have and what direction? 4. Where can I best achieve the effect? 5. What resources are needed to achieve the effect? 6. When and where do the actions take place?

OUTPUT: EFFECTS SCHEMATIC

What progress has been made? Consider MOE Is progress satisfactory? What else needs to be done? Coordinate additional measures.

DEVELOP COA: All staff branches input to how they can contribute to achieving each effect and meet intent.

NAI & TAIs Kinetic and non kinetic (IO, CIMIC, Media, OGD, NGO etc)

ORIENTATE to the environment

Cbt Estimate

Another estimate?

DECIDE what else needs to be done

Output: Synch Matrix/DSO/STAP DIRECTION

7. What control measures do I need to impose

OpO/Frago

ACT: give direction

TARGETING CYCLE

INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

DECIDE

ASSESS

DELIVER

DIRECTION

DETECT

DISSEMINATE

TRACK

COLLECTION

PROCESSING

OTHER SUPPORTING STAFF FUNCTIONS/CYCLES: CIMIC, IO, OGD, POLAD, LEGAL etc

Figure 8.1 - Execution Management: The Combat Estimate, Evaluation and Subordinate Functions 14. Supporting Processes. As a result of direction given in the orders and stemming from the evaluation process, staff branches will take the lead on designated effects and activities. To deliver many of the effects there will be a need for collaborative working practices and sub working groups, established to deliver a complex or long term effect.

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Some of these groups may already exist, eg intelligence and targeting, but others may have to be formed to manage a specific mission. Some supporting functions are described below: a. Targeting. The process of targeting is explained in detail in Section 4. Traditionally the targeting cycle has had a kinetic focus. Providing non kinetic staff functions are involved in the process the targeting cycle easily accommodates both kinetic and non kinetic means of engaging targets. b. Intelligence. The intelligence staffs provide the targeting organisation with a detailed understanding of the environment against which the various planned effects are to be implemented. They also maintain the knowledge base necessary for planning. Information requirements developed during IPB and the intelligence estimate will have already generated a collection matrix from which are generated the Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and Priority Information Requirements (PIR). Subsequent evaluation meetings will provide direction on collection for Collection Coordination and Information Requirements Management (CCIRM). Detailed explanation of the ISTAR process is contained in AFM Vol 1 Part 3. c. Information, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR). ISTAR assets are provided with their tasking from the CCIRM process and are responsible for the acquisition and tracking of targets in order to maintain SA and cue engagement. A full explanation of capabilities and processes is contained in AFM Vol 1 Part 3 ISTAR. d. Info Ops. The Info Ops staff’s primary responsibility is to assist the commander in planning, coordinating and directing the implementation of Info Ops activities, and to ensure capability is delivered against specified targets. They must work closely with the Intelligence staff to plan, execute and assess the effectiveness of Info Ops activity. IPB is expanded for supporting Info Ops to include analysis of human factors (including culture, religion and languages), decision making infrastructure, processes and network vulnerabilities. This expanded IPB forms the basis of the Info Ops estimate. Info Ops planning must start early, particularly where shaping perceptions is key to success. e. Media. Media Ops encompass activities to provide public information and implement public relations policy with the aim of promoting widespread understanding and support for military operations. They have an important relationship to Info Ops in their presentation of information and communication of understanding and intent. Media Ops must remain clearly separate from Info Ops, in order to avoid charges of manipulation or mendacity from the media. f. Legal. Commanders and targeting staff must consider the legal implications of effects targeting to ensure that any military action is legal within the Law Of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and Rules of Engagement (ROE). Legal considerations and the LOAC as it applies to targeting are described in greater detail in Annex B to this Section.

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EVALUATION 15. Evaluating the execution of the commander’s plan is essential to EBAO. The commander must provide direction and guidance on the priorities for evaluation, and rigorously assess the analysis presented by the staff. The Evaluation process should consist of Measures of Effectiveness (MoE), Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and Staff Analysis. 16. Establish Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) Criteria. The commander must decide what constitutes achievement of the desired effect and establish criteria that enable the results of actions to be measured. These criteria (MOE) must then be compared against any assessed change to indicate what effect has been achieved. This is more than assessing whether the planned activity was delivered accurately to the target and the implication is that the desired effect must be measurable. Failure to achieve the required level of effect indicates the need for further action. The resources required to measure the effectiveness of an activity and to identify and establish suitable MOE is best considered during ISTAR resource planning. It will probably need the support of operational analysts. Establishing MOE for non-kinetic activity may require the identification of the indirect effects resulting from those activities. The identification of MOE criteria and the measuring of the results of kinetic and non-kinetic activity requires detailed understanding, both of the environment and the effects that were intended and may best be conducted by specialist operational analysis staff. 17. Plan Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Collection. BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either kinetic or non-kinetic. BDA can be difficult to interpret accurately and collection systems can be easily deceived. Observable battle damage does not, by itself, indicate that the desired effect has been achieved. BDA is not the same as MOE but may, in some cases, contribute to it. BDA can help inform subsequent decisions as to whether the target should be attacked again and with which weapon or system. The purpose and measurement of BDA is covered in greater detail in Section 4 -Targeting. 18. Staff Analysis. The analysis conducted by the staff must focus on providing the commander with the best possible understanding of the complex and evolving environment. The staff will use the outputs from MOE and BDA and will then apply subjective analysis to present a picture to the commander. Military judgement leads the process, supported by operational analysis metrics. This assessment must scrutinise the assumptions, expose where situations are changing and guide decision making. SECTION 2 - FUNDAMENTALS OF TARGETING INTRODUCTION This section introduces tactical targeting as an activity, the purpose of that activity, the process by which it is planned, executed and assessed and the key role the commander has in providing guidance to his staff and subordinate HQs involved in targeting. Tactical targeting takes place within the context of Joint targeting. Joint targeting and the responsibilities and requirements associated with it are set out in the UK Joint Targeting and 19.

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Battle Damage Assessment Policy Paper11 and the UK Joint Effects-Based Targeting Policy Paper12, which are essential reading for formation targeting staffs. TARGETING 20. Targeting is an effects-based activity which focuses on identifying, coordinating and delivering the kinetic and non kinetic measures and actions in order to achieve an effect on a target. The effect on that target, which can be enemy, neutral or friendly, cognitive or physical, is to enable the commander to achieve his objectives in accordance with the overall aim of the operation. 21. The Targeting Process. Targeting is defined as the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and The Manoeuvrist Approach14 aims to target the conceptual and moral capabilities.13 components (rather than focusing on the physical component) of the enemy with a combination of kinetic and non kinetic activities in order to shape his understanding, undermine his will and shatter his cohesion. The targeting process supports commanders and their staffs when planning, executing and assessing targeting activity and is the mechanism for coordinating, ISTAR, Joint Fires15 and Info Ops. 22. Role of the Commander. Management of effects is a command responsibility that requires the personal time, energy and attention of the commander and it is therefore important that he understands, and becomes involved in, the targeting process. For planned targeting activities the commander will provide guidance to his targeting staff during the coordination meetings within the HQ’s battle rhythm. At battlegroup level planned targeting activities will generally support the planned formation targeting effort. Targeting activity that supports the close battle will be more dynamic, with rapid changes requiring agile and responsive decisions. On these occasions the commander’s targeting guidance will be based on his instinct, experience and feel for the close battle based on shared situational understanding. Achieving an effect using non kinetic methods may require a longer term view and require the acceptance of set-backs. In these situations, the commander’s guidance is essential to ensure that the non kinetic activities are orchestrated in pursuit of the desired effects, objectives and end-state. 23. The Purpose of Targeting. The purpose of targeting is to enable the commander to have such an effect on the adversary that he has neither the will nor the capability to pose a significant risk to the success of the commander’s mission. To achieve this effect, Info Ops and Joint Fires need to be closely integrated. 24. Analysis of an adversary’s capability and method of operation will identify those military resources he can least afford to lose or that provide him with the greatest advantage. Further analysis will allow identification of a subset of these resources that must be denied to the enemy for particular friendly courses of action to be successful. At the tactical level, 11

DTIO, Policy/Conventional Policy/UK Jt & BDA Policy Paper dated 30 Sep 05. DTIO/PCS/02/09/06/DRAFT UK Joint Effects-Based Targeting Policy Paper dated May 06. 13 AAP-6 (2005). 14 Described in ADP Land Operations. 15 The application of targeted weapons throughout commonly referenced geo-spatial dimensions of land, maritime, and aerospace environments, the electro-magnetic spectrum, computer generated space and time. (Joint HLOC 2004). At the tactical level this definition can be understood to mean the application of kinetic and non-kinetic effects throughout the battlespace. 12

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denial can be achieved by destroying or damaging the enemy resource so that it is unable to operate or deliver its associated capability. This effect may also be achieved by non kinetic actions, for example by conducting an information operation that convinces an adversary that failure would result from pursuit of a particular course of action. PRINCIPLES OF TARGETING 25. The principles of targeting apply to targeting operations across the continuum of operations. The effects that the commander is trying to deliver to enable him to achieve his objectives may differ significantly from one operation or moment to another, but the principles themselves remain constant. Adherence to the principles throughout the targeting process contribute to ensuring desired effects are achieved while limiting undesired or unintended ones, but commanders and staff must be aware that second and subsequent order effects will occur. Sensitive targeting dictates these should be considered and mitigated or used as early as possible. 26.

The principles of targeting are as follows: a. Focused. The targeting process is focused on achieving the effects required to achieve the commander’s objectives. It is the function of targeting effectively to achieve those objectives within the parameters set by the operational plan, the rules of engagement, and the law of armed conflict. Every target affected should in some way contribute to attaining the commander’s objectives. b. Effects Based. In achieving the commander’s objectives, targeting is concerned with producing specific desired effects. Targeting seeks to achieve these effects with the least risk and expenditure of resources in a timely manner by ensuring that the appropriate actions take place at the right time in the right place and against the right target. c. Interdisciplinary. Effective targeting relies upon cooperation between a number of staff cells within a HQ, most notably current operations, plans, intelligence, ISTAR16, Fires, Info Ops17, legal and POLAD. Other Government Departments (OGD) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) may also be represented. In operations other than main combat operations the military’s role may be to support other lines of operation: therefore targeting guidance may emanate from OGDs. d. Systematic. The targeting process is systematic and iterative. It seeks to enable the delivery of effects in a systematic manner. The effects coordination process is used to guide the commander and his staff through that targeting process. SECTION 3 - TARGETS AND EFFECTS

INTRODUCTION 27. Considerable confusion can be created at the tactical level by the incorrect use of the word effect as it means different things to different staffs. This Section explains a number of terms which incorporate use of the words target and effect in a targeting context. 16 17

Including EW. Including CIMIC and PSY OPS.

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TARGETS 28. A target is an area, structure, object, person, organisation, thought process, attitude or behavioural pattern which can be suitably and effectively influenced by a capability.18 An engagement process may be any means, physical, cognitive or electronic, by which an effect can be realised. 29.

Military targets fall in to three categories: a. Strategic Targets. Strategic targets are those that affect an opponent’s long term capacity and will to sustain hostilities or targets which might otherwise have implications for the civilian population.19 b. Operational Targets. Operational targets are those that affect an opponent’s military capability or directly support an opponent’s ability to sustain hostilities.20 c. Tactical Targets. Tactical targets are those within an opponent’s military force, which have the potential to influence the tactical commander’s battle space.21 These targets are likely to have the capability adversely to affect the tactical commander’s ability to achieve his mission. They do not have to be military but are likely to be adversarial in nature.

30. All three categories may be found in a divisional, brigade or even a battlegroup AO. Targets, and the actions that can be taken against them, differ greatly during and between operations; they may be civilian, criminal, terrorist or military; and the actions that can be taken against one set of targets may be inappropriate or illegal when taken against another. EFFECTS 31. The commander will consider many factors including environment, terrain, relative strengths, threats, missions and desired end state before deciding upon the effects he wishes to achieve. The effects the commander wishes to have on an adversary will be captured on an intent schematic. The commander is responsible for ensuring that his targeting intent is understood along with the meaning of any effects terms used. There are a number of contexts in which the word ‘effect’ can be used in relation to targeting. ADP Land Operations defines Effects as “The consequences of actions22”. AJP 3.9.2 describes an effect as “the physical, functional, psychological outcome, event or consequence that results from specific military or non military action”23. Effects cannot be ‘delivered’; they are achieved through activity and are subject to the actions and reactions of an enemy or other parties, and the influence of the environment. A glossary of effects terms is at Annex C.

18

AJP-3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting, 3rd Study Draft. AJP-3.9.2 Ratification Draft. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 ADP Land Operations. AC 71819, May 2005. 23 AJP-3.9.2, Land Targeting, Ratification Draft Oct 2004. 19

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32. EBAO. An Effects Based Approach to Operations involves the integration of all military and non-military agencies (the Comprehensive Approach) to create effects in pursuit of desired objectives. 24 33. The tactical commander is given Missions and Tasks, conducts effects based planning, conducts operations to achieve effects and analyses actions to ascertain whether the correct effect has been achieved. At the operational level the goal is for the military, by adopting an EBAO, “to identify how it may best support and be supported by, the other instruments of power.”25 34. Effects Based Planning. A tactical commander conducts effects based planning when he focuses on the effects he desires to have on an adversary. The Combat Estimate26 and Tactical Estimate27 help the commander to focus on the effects he wishes to achieve and how those effects can be achieved. The effects schematic enables the commander’s intent and concept of operations to be described in effects terms. The effect a commander wishes a particular element to achieve is commonly articulated in the unifying purpose (the “in order to”) within his mission statement. SECTION 4 - TARGETING 35. This Section explains the Land Targeting methodology and explains the legal considerations, targeting process and the products that support it. Examples of some targeting products are provided for guidance purposes and the suggested formats are not prescriptive. 36. The Land Targeting Cycle is based on a cycle of functions; DECIDE, DETECT, TRACK, DELIVER and ASSESS which is harmonised with the intelligence cycle. This methodology provides a systematic approach to enable the right target to be affected with the appropriate system at the right time. The process provides an effective method for matching friendly capabilities against the most important targets in order to achieve the commanders’ desired effects. It is a dynamic process that allows those involved in the targeting process to keep up with rapidly changing situations. THE DECIDE FUNCTION 37. General. The estimate and Effects Guidance Matrix (EGM) drive the need for the targeting cycle. It is by reference to the EGM that the Decide function is initiated, which may also generate further intelligence collection requirements. 38. Function Components. This function is divided into six parts, based upon directed lines of operations: a. 1 - Identify Target Areas. This stage considers the Area of Operations (AO) via Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and identifies Named Areas of Interest (NAI) and Target Areas of Interest (TAI). 24

ADP Land Operations. Ibid. 26 Described in Chapter 3. 27 Described in Chapter 3. 25

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b. 2 - Identify Target Types. Target types and categories depend on the nature of the operation and the range of effects available. Targets are developed into target lists and further refined through intelligence collection and CCIRM. c. 3 - Establish Target Accuracy. The capabilities of available ISTAR and effects systems will dictate the technical and procedural limits to set. It is important to match appropriate ISTAR and effects systems in order to engage targets precisely. d. 4 - Input to Intelligence Collection Plan. Targeting input to the intelligence collection mechanism aims to provide a focus for the management of ISTAR assets. Input will identify priority targets, how they might be detected and whether target tracking is required. e. 5 - Establish Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Criteria. Decisions must be made early in the process as to what can be defined as a successful (or unsuccessful) attack. There should also be decisions concerning the direction of ISTAR assets to obtain BDA. Only effective BDA can ensure that the effects desired by the commander are being produced. f. 6 - Develop Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM). The AGM provides a consolidated, tabulated support for operational targeting decisions and is the culmination of the DECIDE phase of the cycle. The matrix is intended to act, as far as practical, as an executive document allowing rapid engagement decisions to be made during current operations, once cleared by the commander or properly authorised staff. 39. Target Attacks by Higher Formations. Targets and missions beyond the capability of the formation are passed to the next higher formation HQ for action. Staff need to know when the requests must be submitted for consideration within the target planning cycle of the higher formation. 40. DECIDE Function Products. The result of the DECIDE function should be a focused targeting effort and a series of supporting products. Some products are listed below: a. High Value Target List (HVTL). The HVTL is derived from consideration of the mission, enemy intentions and vulnerabilities, together with direction provided by the commander arising from the formation estimate process. HVTs are those assets, the loss of which would significantly damage the enemy's capability to achieve his intentions. There will be several categories of war fighting target and, probably, nonwar fighting targets. Some possible categories are included in Annex D. b. High Payoff Target List (HPTL). The HPTL identifies those HVTs the loss of which would contribute to the greatest effect on the enemy and which can be affected, given the ISTAR and systems available. The HPTL should change according to the phase and nature of operations and may be used to focus the intelligence collection effort. An example HPTL is at Annex E. c. Target Selection Standards (TSS). TSS are criteria applied to possible future targets to determine what degree of accuracy and timeliness is required from ISTAR

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systems and to enable the selected attack weapon system to achieve a successful attack. d. Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM). The AGM details specific HPTs, when and how they should be attacked and any attack restrictions. It allocates assets to targets and, in so doing, facilitates future tactical and logistic planning. The AGM may also identify target tracking requirements. e. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from attack. It results in an estimate of the target's residual combat effectiveness to determine if further attacks are necessary. BDA is discussed in more detail in the ASSESS function. f. Combined HPT/TSS/AGM. It may be useful to combine decision products an example is at Annex F. Individual products should still be developed and maintained to provide a decision audit. 41. These products should be briefed to the commander or, if time and circumstances dictate, to the person nominated by the commander to control and coordinate the targeting effort. Targeting group composition is covered in detail at Annex G. An example of staff responsibilities is given at Annexes H-J. THE DETECT FUNCTION 42. General. During DETECTION the intelligence staff coordinate assets to collect information which can be processed into targeting intelligence. Some systems produce actual targets, others supporting information that can be analysed in order to produce targets. Not all the information produced will benefit the targeting effort, but it may help in developing the overall situation. The targeting priorities developed during the DECIDE function are used to advance the processing of target information. The information collected and processed is used to update and amend the HPTL and AGM as necessary. 43. Use of ISTAR. Because of their scarcity, high priority and latency ISTAR assets should be coordinated at the highest level. Duplication of effort should be avoided unless it is required to confirm high priority target information. At the same time, there should be no gaps in the intelligence collection effort and fidelity of the G2 picture may well depend upon multi source fusion. THE TRACK FUNCTION 44. General. Target tracking supplements the detect function but is distinct from it since target tracking requires dynamic management decisions. Tracking decisions should have been agreed during the DECIDE phase and will be articulated in the AGM. Once detected, HPTs that cannot be immediately attacked, or which require validation, must be tracked to ensure that they are not lost. Targeting staff must bear in mind that systems used for tracking will generally be unavailable for further target detection.

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45. ISTAR. There is a requirement to manage sensor handoff in order to track targets. As more sensors become available to the ISTAR coordination function, so the challenges of managing accurate and reliable sensor handoff increase. 46. Target Reporting. As the intelligence collection effort is executed and target information is received, it is forwarded to the targeting group and, where appropriate, to target analysts for evaluation. THE DELIVER FUNCTION 47. General. The primary activity during the deliver phase of the targeting process is the application of effect to target. In executing the delivery phase, targeting staff should bear in mind the tactical and technical considerations set out below. 48.

Tactical Considerations. a. Planned Targets. Targets identified in the AGM have an attack planned, but some targets will not appear as anticipated. Attack takes place only when the forecast enemy activity occurs in the projected time and/or place. The detection, tracking and activity of targets become the trigger for the attack. Once the designated activity is detected, the targeting group may conduct a series of staff checks as follows: (1) Verify the enemy activity is the target intended for attack. This is achieved by monitoring the intelligence collection process associated with HPTs. (2) Check the legitimacy and legality of the target in terms of ROE and LOAC. (3) Coordinate with higher, lower and flanking units and formations and with other agencies, allies and the host nation as required. This is particularly important in order to avoid the risk of fratricide or civilian casualties. (4)

Staff issue orders to the appropriate unit(s).

b. Opportunity Targets. Important targets may appear outside the scope of the DECIDE function. These opportunity targets are processed in the same manner as planned HPTs. Opportunity targets are first evaluated to determine when and if they should be targeted. The decision to engage is based on a number of factors which include the activity of the target, the dwell time of the target and the pay-off compared to other targets being processed. 49. The final tactical decision is to confirm the selection of an appropriate effects system for each target in line with the AGM. For planned targets, this decision will have been made during the DECIDE stage of the targeting process. Nevertheless, a check has to be made to ensure that the selected effects system is available and can conduct the attack as planned. If not, the targeting group must determine the best available system for the attack. In some cases more than one system, or type of system, may be used to engage the same target.

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50. Once all tactical decisions have been made the appropriate staff issue orders for the designated system(s). The commander determines whether or not his system can meet the requirements and, if so, carries out the attack. If, for any reason, his system cannot meet the requirements he should notify the staff so that further analysis and checks can be carried out and/or another system can be ordered to carry out the engagement. THE ASSESS FUNCTION 51. General. Assessment is the concluding function of the targeting process: it determines the effectiveness of the attack. Assessment is a dynamic process and a constant feature of staff effort. 52. BDA. BDA is the timely and accurate assessment of damage resulting from the application of lethal or non-lethal military force against a target. The need for BDA for specific HPTs is determined during the DECIDE function of the targeting process and the requirements for it are recorded on the AGM and in the intelligence collection process. The production of BDA is normally an Intelligence staff responsibility. Commanders and their staffs should always be aware that ISTAR resources committed to BDA are not available for further target acquisition and development. BDA results are received and processed to determine whether or not the desired effects have been achieved. The results are disseminated to the targeting group. Effective BDA accomplishes the following purposes: a. At the tactical level BDA allows commanders to get a series of snapshots of the effects current operations are having against the enemy. It provides commanders with an estimate of the enemy's combat effectiveness, residual capabilities and intentions. b. As part of the targeting process, BDA helps to determine if further strikes on selected targets are necessary. Commanders use this information to allocate, or redirect, attack systems to make best use of available combat power. 53. Weapon Effect Analysis (WEA). WEA is an assessment of the effectiveness of the selected strike system and is generally an operations staff function. 54. Summary. The combination of BDA and WEA will provide staff with the information required to make recommendations to the commander. The effectiveness, or not, of a particular attack may require different attack options to be considered or for the commander to alter aspects of the plan in order to meet the prevailing situation. SECTION 5 - INFORMATION OPERATIONS INTRODUCTION 55.

The purpose of this section is to provide an introduction to Info Ops.

56. Information Operations. Info Ops seek to provide commander, protect and defend friendly information and adversary decision makers in addition to targeting adversary They can encompass both discrete activities instigated purely 28

information superiority to the have an adverse effect on information and info systems. for Info Ops28 and the shaping

For example, a PSYOPS plan or the jamming of an adversary communication system using EW assets.

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of ongoing military activity29; the key is that all activities are integrated and coordinated in support of specific objectives. Potential targets include not just adversaries and potential adversaries, but also uncommitted local and regional actors and even allies, recognising that Info Ops can achieve effect on any relevant decision maker. Consequently, the range of effects sought is no longer limited to undermining will and capability; Info Ops are applicable in supporting allies or shaping the will of uncommitted decision makers. 57. Info Ops are defined30 as; “Coordinated military activity undertaken to affect decision makers in support of political and military objectives by influencing their will, attacking their decision making processes and shaping their understanding, while protecting our own.” 58. Core Component Activities. The definition of Info Ops identifies three core components, into which all supporting activities fall: a. Influence Activities (IA). Activities to influence will. Influence activities aim primarily to achieve effect against the will of decision makers, altering their intended course of action by affecting, directly or indirectly, their available information or perception of it. Influence activities are of particular importance before and after conflict, when the use of kinetic options may be limited, but they have utility across the continuum of operations. IA seek to predispose, persuade, convince, deter, disrupt, compel or coerce approved audiences to adopt or reinforce a particular COA (or inaction) or to assist, encourage and reassure those that are following a desired COA, rebuilding confidence where necessary. IA can capitalise on, increase the effectiveness of, or in some cases may remove the need for, attacks on capability as part of broader military activity and hence the need for Info Ops and IA to be fully incorporated into the targeting process. IA also generates actions, ranging from a show of force to the dropping of leaflets, specifically intended to promote themes and thus influence will. b. Counter Command Activities. Counter command activities attack the capability of a decision maker to exercise effective command by altering his ability to acquire, process and transmit information, thereby affecting his understanding and influencing his will. They can also affect the dissemination of decision makers’ decisions thereby affecting the application of capability. They sit between IA and broader military activity, contributing to both, and are concentrated on undermining the adversary’s ability to develop, disseminate and execute sound decisions. They focus on those capabilities that assist an adversary to understand and make a decision and then translate that decision into action. Key decision making and communications nodes, linkages and their associated critical vulnerabilities are identified and engaged using the most appropriate means. Counter command activities seek, within ROE, to disrupt, degrade, deny, deceive or destroy an adversary’s information, command and associated systems, processes and networks. Post conflict they seek to deny, disrupt and degrade the capability of those attempting

29

For example, changes to posture or profile of forces undertaking an unrelated activity to influence local decision makers; or changes to kinetic targeting as part of a deception plan. 30 Info Ops were previously defined as “Coordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by undermining his will, cohesion and decision making ability, through affecting his information, information based processes and systems while protecting one’s own decision makers and decision making processes.”

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to undermine political agreements whilst assisting to regenerate the capability of those disposed to support post conflict recovery. c. Operational Security (OPSEC) Activities. OPSEC activities are those undertaken to affect understanding and protect one’s own force will and decision making processes. OPSEC is used to identify and protect information critical to the success of the operation, defined as Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI). They aim to deny the identified EEFI to the adversary decision maker, thereby affecting his understanding. In conjunction with IA and counter command activities, OPSEC will ensure that the adversary decision makers will not have the necessary information to enable them to make or implement decisions contrary to friendly intentions. Adversarial and friendly will and capability will be targeted to maintain the security of EEFI, using a combination of passive and active techniques. Passive techniques are those which are applied to our own equipment and procedures to prevent the egress of EEFI. Active measures will seek to prevent the EEFI being extracted or deduced by denying, degrading or destroying adversarial intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities or influencing or deceiving an adversary’s decision maker as to the true information. This counter ISTAR function includes the technical and non technical elements of an adversary’s information gathering capability and may include preventing a third party from receiving or relaying EEFI. d. Tools and Techniques. The three core activities of Info Ops can draw on a variety of tools and techniques to achieve their intended effect. They are PSYOPS, EW, Computer Network Operations (CNO), Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP), Physical Destruction, Deception and Information Security. Many of these tools have a wider application than Info Ops, but can be drawn upon for Info Ops activities; others are wholly directed by Info Ops. e. Framework and Context. The overall framework of Info Ops is shown in Figure 8.2 which outlines the core components and the key tools and techniques upon which they draw to coordinate the desired effect against will, capability and understanding. Although shown as a one way process, it is important in conducting Info Ops to oppose activity directed against friendly force will, capability and understanding.

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UNDERSTANDING

WILL

CAPABILITY UNDERSTANDING

TARGETS

EFFECTS INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

COUNTER COMMAND ACTIVITIES

OPSEC

CORE COMPONENT ACTIVITIES

PSYOPS

CNO

Deception

EW

Physical Destruction

Presence, Posture & Profile

Information Security

TOOLS & TECHNIQUES

Figure 8.2 - Framework for Info Ops INFORMATION OPERATIONS TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 59. Electronic Warfare (EW). Although EW has far wider application than Info Ops, it is a key tool upon which Info Ops can draw. EW can achieve effect as a counter command activity, for instance by preventing an adversary’s use of the electro magnetic spectrum, and as an OPSEC activity by protecting friendly use. It also has a role to play in countering an adversary’s CCA. It can support or enable the effect of other Info Ops tools and techniques such as CNO, PPP, deception and information security. EW consists of Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Defence (ED) and Electronic Surveillance (ES) of which ES is purely an ISR activity 60. Deception. Deception, in the context of Info Ops, is primarily an OPSEC activity aimed at denying an adversary EEFI. Deception is a discipline that draws heavily on a combination of other Info Ops tools; PPP, EW, PSYOPS, CNO and Physical Destruction. 61. PSYOPS. PSYOPS is one of the principal influence tools and must be a key element of Info Ops planning. All PSYOPS activity must support Info Ops, or wider Information Strategy objectives. Currently the UK PSYOPS capability includes print, radio and video products. Doctrinally, all UK PSYOPS activity is truthful. However, PSYOPS can still support deception by emphasising particular truths and drawing attention away from other information that could compromise the deception plan. 62. CNO. CNO consists of Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) and Computer Network Defence (CND). CND as a discipline contributes to information assurance as part of Info Sy and, as such, is important to, but not distinctly part of, Info Ops. Due to its sensitivity and reliance on other agencies CNO activity remains at the strategic level. The desired outcomes of operations may, however, be in support of operational and tactical activity.

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63. Physical Destruction. Physical destruction is a tool which primarily lies outside the boundaries of Info Ops. It becomes a tool of Info Ops, however, when used with the primary objective of influencing will or attacking decision making capability. It can be used as an influence activity31 eg firepower demonstration, an OPSEC activity eg degradation of adversary ISTAR capability to prevent their acquisition of EEFI and a CCA activity eg destruction of command posts. 64. Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP). While the PPP of a force will be affected by any activity, its use only becomes Info Ops when actions are taken to alter PPP explicitly to affect decision makers. Info Ops coordination of PPP can be an activity designed to influence decision makers with which the force may have contact, or may be an OPSEC activity as part of a tactical or, potentially, strategic deception plan. In the latter role, EW can provide support by emphasising or minimising PPP. Annexes: A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J.

Operational Sequencing Road Map Law of Armed Conflict and Legal Considerations Effects Terms High Value Target (HVT) list High Pay-Off Target (HPTL) List Effects Guidance Matrix Targeting Group Composition Divisional Targeting Responsibilities Brigade Targeting Responsibilities Battle Group Targeting Responsibilities

31

When targeting adversary personnel or materiel, such activity must be within legal constraints requiring the use of minimum force.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 8

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 8

LOAC AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 1. The commander and staff must consider whether an engagement is legal according to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) when conducting targeting activity. While targeting decisions may restrict the engagement methods that can be used against targets, the authorised action and the target must be lawful and permissible under the LOAC. Legal advisors play a key role in vetting targets to ensure they are compliant with the LOAC and should be involved as early as possible in the planning process in order to ensure that all relevant issues are taken into account. Commanders and their targeting staff should use the principles of the LOAC to guide their target planning and decision making process regardless of whether kinetic or non kinetic engagement methods are being employed. The principles are summarised in the paragraphs below. 2. Distinction. The primary principle of the LOAC is that of distinction. Distinction imposes an obligation on all decision makers to distinguish between civilian objects and persons and military objectives when conducting kinetic targeting in order that the civilian status of objects and persons can be respected and protected. Although Info Ops, including influence activities, may specifically target civilian audiences, the principle of distinction applies. Info Ops must distinguish between the target audience and the audience that the operation is not designed to effect. In addition, the planned activity must be legal, conform to the ROE and, although not specifically required by the LOAC, be ethical. In terms of the LOAC, military objectives are objects “which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers the attacker a definite military advantage.”1 Certain military targets will almost always be military objectives, for example, soldiers, armoured vehicles and ammunition depots. Some installations, facilities and objects have both military and civilian uses (known as dual use facilities) and are more difficult to identify as definite legitimate military targets. Examples of possible dual use facilities include bridges, electrical systems, fuel and communication facilities. Before engagement, these dual use facilities must be carefully analysed based upon the current situation to determine if they are legitimate military objectives. 3. Whenever an engagement is under consideration, commanders must be satisfied that they have done everything feasible to establish that the target is legitimate and distinct from those objects or people that should not be targeted. When kinetic action is considered and there is doubt as to whether a person is a civilian or a combatant, that person should be considered to be a civilian. Similarly, where there is doubt as to whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a house or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it should be presumed to be a civilian object. Civilians who take a direct part in hostilities may be targeted as can places of worship if they are used by combatants and their engagement offers a definite military advantage, is militarily necessary and the force used is proportional to the military advantage gained. 4. Discrimination. Engagements must be discriminate, that is to say they must be directed at specific objectives and employ a method or means of engagement, the effects of 1

Article 52(2) of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I.

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which can be limited and directed at that objective. Where kinetic action is taken, the application of force is justified to that extent which will ensure the submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment, with the least possible cost and using methods of engagement that are not banned by international law. Commanders and targeting staff must consider carefully the method of engagement to ensure that the effect delivered does not breach this principle. 5. Proportionality. Having determined that the target is either a military objective or, in the case of Info Ops, a legitimate and legal civilian audience, and there is a risk to objects or people that do not form part of the legitimate target, it is necessary to consider whether an attack will be proportionate. 6. An engagement will be proportionate, and legal, if the direct military advantage anticipated is not disproportionate to the effects caused on objects or persons that do not form part of the legitimate target. For kinetic targeting specific considerations include the expected loss of civilian life, injury caused to civilians and damage caused to civilian objects. The military advantage anticipated refers to the advantage to be gained from the engagement considered as a whole, and not from isolated or particular individual actions. Generally, military advantage is not restricted to tactical gains, but is linked to wider strategic goals. 7. Commanders must take all feasible precautions in the choice and methods of engagement with a view to avoiding and minimising casualties, damage and effects to anything other than the legitimate target. It should be noted that an attack that is not proportionate is deemed to be indiscriminate and, if the expected consequences are clearly excessive, will be a crime. Where estimates show that expected Collateral Damage (CD) will be out of proportion to the military advantage gained the engagement must not take place. It should be noted that the application of this rule is judged not on the actual CD or the actual military advantage of the engagement, but upon the CD expected and the military advantage anticipated. The Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) and considerations are therefore essential activities when considering engagement methods for specific targets and should be performed whenever the tactical situation allows. 8. Necessity. The military status of an object or person makes it a legitimate target for engagement. The situation is less clear when the specific targeting of civilian audiences for Info Ops is considered. In this case the target does not have military status but the engagement may still be deemed necessary. Legal advice must be made available to the commander in such circumstances. In addition, no more force should be applied than is necessary to achieve the desired effect. If there is a choice of targets that offer a similar military advantage, the target that offers least risk to combatants, civilians, and objects should be engaged. 9. Humanity. The principle of humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes. 10. Summary for Commanders and Targeting Staff. While all reasonable and feasible care must be taken at each stage of the targeting process, targeting decisions and actions are not legally judged based on perfection or hindsight. Those involved need only take all those precautions that were reasonably feasible at the time of their decision or actions and in the circumstances prevailing at that time. However, this objective standard

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also means that recklessness, negligence and wilful blindness provide no excuse for unlawful targeting. Attention should be brought to the fact that inappropriate actions taken at the tactical level may have negative effects at the operational and strategic level and a single unintended event may have a global impact. 11. In reaching a conclusion as to the legality of an engagement, the following questions should be considered: a. Is the target valid? b. Does the target enjoy special protection? c. Is the target distinct? d. Is the engagement discriminate? e. Is the engagement proportional? f.

Is the engagement necessary?

If the answer to these questions is “yes”, then the engagement can be deemed to be legal. 12. National Legal Obligations Concerning the Clearance of Explosive Remnants of War. The UK has ratified Protocol V of the Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention. Protocol V requires the UK to conduct certain post conflict clearance tasks for Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)2 and provide information to other clearance organisations. 13. National Obligations. In any future operation to which the UK is party there must be an effective mechanism in place to assess the humanitarian impact of ERW and to mark or clear it as far and as quickly as practical. Either uniformed or civilian (commercial or voluntary/ charitable) personnel or a mix of both may do this. In addition, UK must collect, store, collate and disseminate information on munitions of all types within its AOR. However UK cannot pass on information on allies’ munitions unless specifically authorised. Under the conditions of the protocol the UK is obliged to carry out the following activity: a. Marking and clearance of ERW. ERW in territory under UK control after a conflict should be marked and cleared. ERW that poses the greatest humanitarian hazard should be given the highest priority for clearance. b. Cooperation with Other Forces and Agencies. Where appropriate, UK forces and agencies will be required to cooperate with other combatants and noncombatants in order to assist with the identification and clearance of UK-delivered munitions that have become ERW in territory not controlled by UK (eg description of the munitions and how to destroy them). This assistance can be provided directly to the party in control or through a third party such as the UN.

2

ERW means unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance.

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c. Measures to Protect Civilians. All feasible precautions to protect civilians from the effects of ERW must be taken (eg marking hazardous areas and risk education programmes). d. Data Capture and Sharing. Information on all explosive ordnance used by UK forces should be recorded. As far as practical after the end of hostilities, this information should be shared with other parties to the conflict and clearance organisations subject to our legitimate security interests. e. Socio-Economic Activity. In addition to the obligations placed upon the parties to a conflict, all States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the marking and clearance of ERW, risk education, and assistance for the care, rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration of ERW victims. 14. Data Capture Requirement. compliance with legal obligations:

The following information is required to ensure

a. Details of all use of air and artillery delivered cluster munitions. These must include: number and type of rounds; target area; any follow up information (eg confirmed quantity of ERW). b. Details of artillery (tube and rocket) rounds fired, including number of rounds and target areas. c.

Number and location of air-dropped weapons, including duds where known.

d.

Full details of all minefields (pattern and scatterable).

e.

Number and type of mortar rounds fired and target areas.

f.

Details of captured or abandoned enemy munitions and stockpiles.

In all cases as much information as possible should be included, for example post operations reports detailing number and type of duds. 15. Data Sharing. As soon as practicable after hostilities have ceased, the UK must be prepared to disseminate information on ERW to the UN or any other legitimate organisation that may be involved in marking, clearing or risk education. Each conflict will be different and the chosen method will vary but the principle should be for a single point of contact in Theatre, the UK or elsewhere as appropriate, able to disseminate detailed, timely information as required. Selection of an appropriate body to perform this task will be fundamental to managing successfully our legally binding treaty obligations.

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ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 8 EFFECTS TERMS 1. The reference for the effects terms is Joint Warfare Publication 0-01.1 (JWP 0-01.1): United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions. Commanders have a responsibility to ensure that subordinates understand what is meant when an effect term is used.

Block. Deny enemy access to a given area or to prevent his advance in a particular direction. Capture/Seize. To gain possession of a position or terrain, with or without the use of force. Contain. Stop, hold or surround enemy forces or to cause the enemy to centre his activity on a given front and to prevent his withdrawing any part of his forces for use elsewhere. Deceive. Mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. Defeat. To diminish the effectiveness of the enemy to the extent that he is unable to participate further in the battle or at least cannot fulfil his intention. Defend. To defeat or deter a threat to provide circumstances for offensive action. Depending on what size of formation/unit is defending, defend can include delay, hold, deny and attack. Delay. Operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting max damage, without in principle, becoming decisively engaged. Demonstrate. Demonstrate a capability or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. To distract the enemy’s attention without seeking contact. Deny. To prevent access by blocking, disruption, dislocation and / or fire. Ground can be denied either by holding it or covering the area by direct or indirect fire. To deny without holding requires surveillance. Destroy. To kill or so damage an enemy force that it is rendered useless. Deter. Convince a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. Disrupt. Break apart an enemy formation and its tempo; to rupture the integrity of an enemy’s capability.

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Divert. Draw the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation. Fix. To deny the enemy his goals, to distract him and thus deprive him of freedom of action in order to gain own forces freedom of action. Harass. Fire designed to disturb the rest of enemy troops, limit movement and, by threat of losses, lower morale. Hold. To maintain or retain possession by force, of a position or area. In an attack, to exert pressure to prevent movement or re-disposition of enemy forces. Interdict. Divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces; or fire placed in an area or point to prevent the enemy using it. Mask. Fire to obscure enemy observation. Neutralise. Fire which is delivered to hamper and interrupt movement and the firing of weapons. Seize/Capture. To gain possession of a position or terrain with or without force. Strike. Inflict damage on, seize or destroy an objective. Suppress. Fire to inhibit the enemy’s ability to acquire and attack friendly targets. Commanders may find a number of additional predominantly non kinetic effects terms useful when conducting operations. These terms are not endorsed doctrine. The list of non kinetic effects terms should increase as understanding of the EBA develops. Coerce. To compel by threats or use of force. Convince. To make an audience feel certain that something is true. Frighten. To force or drive somebody or something away through fear. Induce. To persuade or cause an audience to believe as true. Inform. To communicate information to an audience. Prevent. To cause something not to happen. Reassure. To reduce anxiety or worry among an audience. Withdraw. To disengage or retire from a position.

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ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 8 HIGH VALUE TARGET (HVT) LIST - EXAMPLE Target Category (Note 1)

Value (Note 2)

(a) C3 C3 Fire Sp

(b)

C3 Illegal Trade

Target Classification (Note 3) (c) HQ Comms Twd Arty

Target Equipment/Capability

Remarks

(d) 3 Bde HQ Trunk Node D-30

(e)

Examples of HVTs in Stability Operations. Insurgent Group (Name of Leader and Faction) Leadership Fuel smuggling Road Tankers and Containers

Notes: 1.

Target categories will differ according to the operational environment. Some target categories are as follows:1 C3 EW ISTAR Fire Support POL Air Defence Eqpt Support Lift (transport) NBC Population groups (religious, criminal, ethnic etc)

Manoeuvre Engineer Ammunition

Lines of Communication (LOC) Media (Newspaper, TV, radio, internet)

1

The categories relevant to Stability Operations may differ from those shown here.

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2. The five boxes can be shaded or marked to indicate the level of value associated with the target. The boxes are shaded or marked from the left and the greater the number of boxes shaded the greater the assessed value of the target to the enemy. 3. Target Classification indicates the subset of the target category. Self-propelled arty, towed arty, mortars and MRL are examples of target classification of the Fire Spt Target category. A specific leader, sub group, militia, criminal cell are examples of target classification within the Population Group category.

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ANNEX E TO CHAPTER 8 HIGH PAY-OFF TARGET LIST - EXAMPLE Priority (Note 1)

Target Category (Note 2)

Target Classification (Note 3)

Target Equipment/Capability

Remarks (Note 4)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

1

ISTAR

UAV

(UAV Type)

2

AD

SAM

SA-6

2

C2

HQ Loc

21 Bde HQ

3

Fire Sp

MRL

BM-21

Notes: 1. This column is used to denote the priority given to a target and will guide the order that targets have effects delivered against them. The assessment will be based on the importance of denying the use of the target equipment or capability to the enemy thereby allowing the commander to achieve his objectives. Highest priority targets are listed first. 2.

Target categories will differ according to the operational environment. Some target categories are as follows:2 C3 EW ISTAR Fire Support POL Air Defence Eqpt Support Lift (transport) NBC Population groups (religious, criminal, ethnic etc)

Manoeuvre Engineer Ammunition

Lines of Communication (LOC) Media (Newspaper, TV, radio, internet)

3. Target Classification indicates the subset of the target category, eg Self propelled arty, towed arty, mortars, MRL are examples of target classification of the Fire Sp Target category. A specific leader, sub group, militia, criminal cell are examples of target classification within the Population Group category. 4.

This column can be used for any purpose, eg detailing ammunition restrictions or desired effect on the target.

2

The categories relevant to Stability Operations may differ from those shown here.

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USE ACROSS THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS The HPTL can be utilised across the continuum of operations. An example of a completed HPTL to support an Information Operation is shown below. Non-Military Targets Priority

Target Category

1 1 2 3

Popular Support Popular Support Popular Support Prevent Violence

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Target Description Politicians Civil Leaders Corrupt Police Factions

Target Capability

Remarks

(Named Politician) (Named Civil Leader) (Named Police Unit/Police Chief) (Named Faction)

8-E-2

ANNEX F TO CHAPTER 8 EFFECTS GUIDANCE MATRIX (EGM) - EXAMPLE DECIDE Tgt Ref Tgt Tgt Cat Pri Tgt Sub Cat (Note 1) (Note 2) (a) (b) 1 US11005 C3 HQ 12 Bde

DETECT & TRACK NAI Detect Track Asset Asset (c) 7/01

(d) EW

(e) EW

2

Manoeuvre Armd Sqn

7/03

OP

UAV

2

Faction leader (Name)

7/05

HUMINT

HUMINT

TSS (Note 3) (f) 1. 200m 2. Bde HQ 3. Static 4. 2 hours 1. 100m 2. Tp 3. Static 4. 30mins

DELIVER TAI Effect Required (Note 4)

Effect Delivery Asset

Effect When (Note 5)

ASSESS BDA MOE Asset Criteria

(g) N

(h) 7/03

(i) MLRS

(j) I

(k) EW

D

7/04

AS90

A

UAV

Arrest

7/07

QRF

I

(l) 50% reduction in comms output 30%

Remarks (Note 6) (m)

3 Notes: 1.

Priority. This column is used to denote the priority given to a target and will guide the order in which targets are engaged. The assessment will be based on the importance of denying the use of the target equipment or capability to the enemy thereby allowing the commander to achieve his objectives.

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2. Target Reference may be a name of more commonly a target number. Target categories will differ according to the operational environment. Some target categories are as follows:1 C3 EW ISTAR Fire Support POL Air Defence Eqpt Support Lift (transport) NBC Population groups (religious, criminal, ethnic etc)

Manoeuvre Engineer Ammunition

Lines of Communication (LOC) Media (Newspaper, TV, radio, internet)

3. Further information can be detailed in the target description to aid the targeteer with engagement method to target matching. Target Classification indicates the subset of the target category, eg Self propelled arty, towed arty, mortars, MRL are examples of target classification of the Fire Spt Target category. A specific leader, sub group, militia, criminal cell are examples of target classification within the Population Group category. There is no defined target classification list therefore the classification of targets is largely a matter of experience within the targeting group. 4. Target Selection Standards determine the degree of accuracy and timeliness required from ISTAR systems to enable a selected system to achieve a successful engagement. TSS: 1 = Required Target Location Error (TLE) is the accuracy with which the target location must be established to permit the nominated strike system to engage it successfully. This has implications for the choice of the most suitable STA system. 2 = Minimum Target Size details the minimum size of target that warrants action to be taken against it to achieve the desired effect. 3 = Static or Moving. 4 = Acquisition Time is the estimated dwell time of the target and details the time from acquisition of the target to the weapon effect being delivered to the target. It is the time that the target location information is considered valid. The weapon system selected to act against the target must be able to do so within the time remaining from acquisition of the target. Selection standards for non kinetic and non lethal effects may also be developed. 5. This column refers to the desired effect on the target. For kinetic effects the term used relates to the percentage of casualties assessed as being required to achieve the effect. D=Destroy (implies 30% casualties) N=Neutralise (implies 15% casualties) 1

The categories relevant to stability operations may differ from those shown here.

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S=Suppress E=Exploit EW=EW Jamming (Other effects can be detailed as required. Effects terminology must be understood throughout the chain of command to ensure the appropriate actions are carried out to achieve the effect required.) 6. Not all targets can be engaged as soon as they are acquired. This column uses four abbreviations to indicate how quickly targets should be engaged: I (Immediate). Immediate engagements take priority over all others and must be conducted even if assets have to be diverted from lower priority engagements already underway. P (Planned). Planned targets should not be engaged until it is planned to do so. Planned targets should be tracked for future engagement. A (Acquired). Acquired targets are engaged in accordance with the priority allocated in the HPTL. TOT (Time On Target). Targets should not be engaged until a specific TOT. 7.

This column can be used for restrictions such as time constraints, ammunition constraints, coordination requirements or other remarks.

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ANNEX G TO CHAPTER 8 TARGETING GROUP COMPOSITION Functional area Representation

Division

Commander Joint Fires Coordinator Targeting Coordinator

GOC/COS CRA SO1 Targets

Int Info Ops LEGAD POLAD CIMIC ISTAR BM Arty Ops Current Operations Plans Air

SO1 Int SO1 Info Ops LEGAD POLAD SO2 G9 CIMIC SO1 ISTAR SO1 BM SO2 G3 Arty Ops/BMRA SO2 G3 Ops SO1 G5 SO2 Air/ DALO/ASOC SO2 Avn CO CS Engr Regt EW LO SF LO Coalition LOs Flanking formation Los Other agency LOs SO2 Targets WO1 ACS

Avn Engr EW Liaison

Targeting Staff CIS Others

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Brigade Bde Comd/COS CO CS Arty Regt BC HQ Bty (Ops Offr) CS Arty Regt or BC of affiliated MLRS Bty SO3 G2 SO2/SO3 Info Ops LEGAD (if aval) POLAD (if aval) CIMIC LO SO2 ISTAR BC or AD Rep Ops Offr RA CS Regt SO2 G3 Ops SO2 G5 BALO & Avn LO/GLO (if aval)

BG BG Comd BC CS Bty BG Int Offr BG Int Offr LEGAD (if aval) POLAD (if aval) CIMIC LO FPC SNCO BC CS Bty Ops Offr Ops Offr OC TACP

SO2 Engr Bde EW Offr LOs as available/required

BGE RSO LOs as available/required

SO2 ISTAR OC Sig Sqn

BC CS Bty/ Mor Offr RSO

8-G-1

ANNEX H TO CHAPTER 8 TARGETING RESPONSIBILITIES Divisional Staff Post Commander

CRA or COS (or other suitable staff) SO1 Targets

Targeting Responsibilities • Provides guidance on CONOPS for decisive, shaping and sustaining operations for current and future operations. • Provides guidance as to targeting effects required, including guidance for Info Ops and other non-kinetic effects. • Defines mission, intent, objectives and main effort. • Assigns missions and tasks. • Supervises the targeting process. • Plans and synchronises use of targeting systems. • Prepares the OS portion of the operational plan and orders. • Provides status of targeting resources. • Plans use of targeting systems. • Finalises the Effects guidance (formulated by the Comd and CRA). • Coordinates the actions and functions of the targeting group. • Recommends target priorities for acquisition and engagement (on the basis of TVA and war gaming). • Recommends methods of affecting targets. • Coordinates development and review of HPTL, EGM and BDA requirements. • Develops tieliness and accuracy guidelines for the TSS (with G2). • Develops targets for electronic engagement (with EW LO). • Synchronises timings for delivery of effects with G3 and subordinate units. • Coordinates support for subordinate formations/units engagement requirements. • Reviews BDA reports (with G2 and G3) and recommends re-engagement where necessary. • Coordinates battlespace deconfliction of targeting systems. • Applies ROE and assesses collateral damage risks.

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Chief ISTAR

SO2 G2.

• Collocates and works closely with G2 staff. • Provides technical advice on suitability and capabilities of ISTAR systems. • Tasks ISTAR assets in accordance with the targeting scheme of manoeuvre; supports the detect, track, deliver and assess stages of the targeting cycle. • Coordinates higher level STA systems tasked with supporting the division. • Tasks ISTAR assets as required. • Establishes sensor to shooter linkages as required. • Supports requests for ISTAR sp to subordinate formations and units. • Liaises with BM for deconfliction of ISTAR assets. • Prepares ICP and maintains information on the current enemy situation. • Provides assessments of probable enemy COAs. • Analyses and identifies targets (on the basis of the Commander's guidance). • Maintains targets database. • Recommends NAIs and TAIs to support targeting. • Develops and monitors the enemy situation. • Develops and provides IPB products. • Provides the HVTL. • Passes HPTs and suspected HPTs to SO1 Targets. • Contributes to development of HPTL, EGM and BDA requirements. • Distributes ICP to Collection Managers. • Provides input to the OS cell on TSS. • Reassesses HPTL, EGM and BDA requirements (with Chief Targeting and G2 plans). • Assesses effectiveness of engagements.

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

8-H-2

SO2 G3 Arty/ BMRA

SO2 G3 Air

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

Oversees and coordinates the work of HQ RA and HQ OSG. Conducts and coordinates OS planning (including future ops). Develops targets and potential targets from available intelligence. Works with the Corps G2 and SO2 Targeting to integrate artillery targeting requirements with the overall corps collection plans. Determines artillery targeting information requirements. Develop and perform TVA (with G2). Assists in TSS development. Assists in EGM products development. Assists in maintaining and updating HPTL. Plans move of Divisional Artillery Group (DAG) regiments. Produces divisional fire plans. Allocates artillery assets to tasks. Produces OS Annexes for divisional OpOs. Advises the commander and his staff on the employment of air support. Receives, coordinates, plans, prioritises, and synchronises planned CAS requests. Monitors the execution of the ATO. Coordinates redistribution of CAS resources. Coordinates approval of requests for immediate CAS. Provides air input to analysis and plans. Receives, processes, exploits, and disseminates air intelligence. Provides intelligence support to electronic combat. Provides Air Force PIR to intelligence collection managers. Advises on the availability, employment and capability of air assets. Coordinates activity with the DADC. Participates in developing targets. Helps evaluate targets. Advises the commander on the suitability of targets for engagement. Advises the commander on the best aircraft ordnance to attack the target. Coordinates SEAD with other OS cell.

8-H-3

SO2 G3 Aviation.

SO2 G3 Operations.

SO1 BM

SO2 G3 Engineers

SO2 Info Ops

• • • • • • • • • • • • •

Coordinates air activities with the AGM. Assists with the coordination of airspace management. Coordinates the integration of tactical airlift. Advises on capabilities and employment of assigned aviation/AH assets. Identifies likely aviation/AH operations in planning process. Coordinates aviation/AH operations with other staff branches. Recommends ACMs for AH operations. Advises on the employment and integration of SH. Ensures plans reflect the commander’s concept of operations. Confirms the OS mission. Deconflicts operations. Assists with IPB. Assists with development of HPTL, EGM, and BDA requirements.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Coordinates management of battle space within the divisional area of operations, on behalf of the G3 staff. Advises the commander and staff on the AD plan. Allocates AD resources. Plans AD for future operations. Requests, maintains, and disseminates ACMs and restrictions. Synchronises friendly airspace usage with AD assets. Provides AD PIR to intelligence collection managers. Advises on the obstacle and/or barrier plan. Advises on the attack of targets with scatterable mines. Templates potential HVTs and/or HPTs (mechanical breaching, minelayers etc). Helps develop the DSO and describes the effects of terrain on manoeuvre. Synchronises the effects of artillery delivered scatterable mines. Contributes to development of HPTL, EGM, and BDA requirements. Recommends HPTs, NAIs, and TAIs to support the employment of artillery scatterable mines. Psyops OPSEC

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

8-H-4

SO2 AD SO2 Avn

EW LO

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

LEGAD

• •

POLAD

•

OA Formation and Unit Liaison officers

• • •

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

Conducts airspace control. Requests, maintains and disseminates ACM. Advises on capabilities and availabilities of Avn. Coordinates avaiation operations. Recommends ACM for Avn. Conducts EW IPB and produces the EW overlay. Assesses the enemy and friendly EW vulnerabilities and capabilities. Advises on EW equipment capabilities. Assists Chief Targets to determine EW HPTs. Prepares EW estimates and annexes. Develops the ECM and ESM tasking. Recommends ESM and ECM requirements to support the commander's intent. Recommends EW methods of target engagement. Recommends EW actions to support friendly C4I strategy. Liaises with allied and national agencies and accesses collateral from other SIGINT assets when compiling the estimate. Coordinates the air space requirements for airborne EW assets. Coordinates EW support for SEAD Plans and coordinates EW movement, siting, taskings and requests needed to satisfy ESM and ECM requirements in accordance with the collection plan. Assesses the effectiveness of EW operations. LEGAD advises the commander to ensure that the targeting activities are conducted in accordance with: o LOAC. o ROE. o Extant CD authorisation. POLAD provides the commander with guidance to ensure that targeting activity is conducted in accordance with UK policy. Conducts analysis to ascertain MOE of kinetic and non-kinetic action. Submit and explain the significance of target nominations for attack and operations to support their formation/unit operations. Provide feedback to their commanders on which targets are added to the HPTL and how they are synchronised with the collection plan and AGM. 8-H-5

Other Personnel G9 CIMIC

SO2 Targets

Divisional Targets Staff

SO2 Engr

• Inform their organisation of higher level targets that fall in their AO and the tasking and coordination measures involved. • During certain operations other agencies or capabilities that support the targeting process may be represented which may include the following: o SF o Naval Fires. • Advises on the effects of friendly operations on the civilian population. • Provides input to the restricted target list. • Coordinates civil affairs support to the IPB and targeting processes. • Advises on local leaders and decision makers. • Passes targeting information to OS systems. • Monitors the enemy situation and keeps SO1 Targets informed. • Recommends changes to targeting priorities and engagement systems. • Completes TSS and provides input to EGM as required. • Ensures essential target information is compared to TSS prior to passing a target to the OS cell. • Runs the targets branch. • Develop the enemy artillery situation. • Provide artillery intelligence to G2. • Liaise with higher, lower and flanking formation artillery targets staff. • Maintain deep operations and target records. • CIMIC advisor

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

8-H-6

ANNEX I TO CHAPTER 8 TARGETING RESPONSIBILITIES Brigade Staff Post Commander

Chief of Staff

CIMIC

•

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

Targeting Responsibilities Directs the targeting effort. Gives guidance on: o Critical enemy vulnerabilities to be targeted. o Effects required on targets (physical effects using primarily kinetic action and cognitive effects using primarily non kinetic action) o Priorities for engagement with Info Ops and Jt Fires. o Engagement criteria. o BDA and MOE requirements. o Main effort. Provides current and future operations focus. Supervises IPB. Interprets the commander’s concept of operations. Interprets commander’s targeting guidance. Prioritises the HPTL. Specifies the effect required on targets. Develops the DSO. Coordinates targeting activity with higher formation. Includes HPTL/EGM/STAP in the OpO. Applies ROE and assesses collateral damage risk. Advise on the effects of friendly operations on the civilian population. Provides input to the restricted target list (RTL). Coordinates civil affairs support to the IPB and targeting processes. Advises on local leaders and decision makers.

8-I-1

LEGAD

•

POLAD

•

OA CO CS Artillery Regiment.

• • • • • • • •

CS Arty Regt Ops Offr

SO2 ISTAR

• • • • • • • • • • • •

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

LEGAD advises the commander to ensure that the targeting activities are conducted in accordance with: o LOAC. o ROE. o Extant CD authorisation. POLAD provides the commander with guidance to ensure that targeting activity is conducted in accordance with UK policy. Conducts analysis to ascertain MOE of kinetic and non-kinetic action. Primary targeting advisor to the commander. Develops FSCM in support of kinetic targeting effort. Supervises and coordinates the targeting group. Ensures that the targeting group focus on the commander's intent and considers Info Ops and non kinetic targeting Allocates troops to task. Plans, coordinates and supervises the use of all ISTAR and targeting assets supporting the targeting effort. Ensures that all NAIs, TAIs and DPs are covered by observers and/or ISTAR sensors (including HUMINT and Joint assets). Prioritise targets for delivery of kinetic and non kinetic effects. Develops HPTL. Develops the STAP with SO2 ISTAR Prepares EGM and OS OpO. Informs controllers of targeting systems of HPTs requiring rapid engagement. Executes the OS plan. Coordinates the delivery of effects against HPTs (including the coordination of multiple weapon systems to deliver effects simultaneously when appropriate) according to the EGM. Integrates and synchronises all OS assets. Coordinates and synchronises TACP efforts. Collocates and works closely with G2 staff. Provides technical advice on suitability and capabilities of ISTAR systems. Tasks ISTAR assets in accordance with the targeting scheme of manoeuvre; supports the detect, track, deliver and assess stages of the targeting cycle.

8-I-2

ALO

AD Cell

SO2 G2

EW Officer

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

Coordinates higher level STA systems tasked with supporting the brigade. Tasks and controls all Bde ISTAR assets. Establishes sensor to engagement method links as required. Supports and coordinates requests for ISTAR sp from subordinate units. Liaises with BM for deconfliction of ISTAR assets. Provides advice on the capabilities, limitations and employment of air operations. Liaises with the aviation LO and BADC to ensure that the ACM procedures are followed. Plans and organises OAS. Receives, processes, exploits and disseminates air intelligence. Coordinates the use of TACPs. Develops air IPB. Coordinates air space requirements as required for the engagement of HPTs by aviation and OAS. Advises on BM requirements and coordinates Battlespace with Ops Offr of CS Arty Regt Leads IPB process. Provides updates on target arrays, enemy capabilities and courses of action. Submits RFIs. Identifies HVTs. Helps to develop the STAP. Plans and executes the ICP. Collects and distributes targeting information. Liaises and coordinates with G2 at the Division headquarters. Advises on BDA/MOE capabilities and requirements. Prompts re-evaluation of HPTL as result of major changes in tactical situation. Coordinates EW input to C2W and operations plans. Advises on EW capabilities. Coordinates EW tasking in accordance with the collection plan. Passes targeting information to G2. Coordinates ACM for airborne EW assets. Coordinates ECM activities.

8-I-3

BALO

• •

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

Advises on all aspects of air operations and OAS. Deconflicts movement of OAS through Bde battlespace with Ops Offr of CS Arty Regt.

8-I-4

ANNEX J TO CHAPTER 8 TARGETING RESPONSIBILITIES Battlegroup Staff Post CO

•

Ops Offr

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Int Offr

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

Targeting Responsibilities Directs the targeting effort. Gives guidance on: o Critical enemy vulnerabilities to be targeted. o Effects required on targets (including physical effects using primarily kinetic action and cognitive effects using primarily non-kinetic action) o Priorities for engagement with Info Ops and Jt Fires. o Engagement criteria. o BDA and MOE requirements. o Main effort. Provides current and future operations focus. Supervises IPB. Interprets the commander’s concept of operations. Interprets commander’s targeting guidance. Develops the DSO. Prioritises the HPTL. Coordinates targeting activities with higher formation. Synchronises targeting activities with manoeuvre. Includes HPTL/EGM/STAP in the OpO. Applies ROE and assesses risk of CD. Leads IPB process. Keeps the targeting group informed of target arrays, enemy capabilities and courses of action. Identifies HVTs. Plans and executes the ICP. Liaises and coordinates with G2 at Bde HQ.

8-J-1

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Identifies targets for proposal to Bde HQ that are outside the capabilities of the BG. Advises on BDA/MOE requirements and capabilities. Assists in STAP development. Primary targeting advisor to the commander. Supervises and coordinates the targeting group. Ensures that the targeting group focuses on the commander's intent. Allocates troops to task in support of targeting effort. Plans, coordinates and supervises the use of all ISTAR and targeting assets supporting the targeting effort (including EW and Info Ops). Develops FSCM in support of kinetic targeting effort. Propose targets beyond the effects delivery capabilities of the BG to Bde HQ for consideration. Ensures that all NAIs, TAIs and DPs are covered by ISTAR resources (including HUMINT). Develops HPTL , EGM and ESM. Coordinates delivery of effects onto HPTs. Integrates and synchronises all targeting assets. Coordinates and synchronises TACP (FAC) activities. Advises on all aspects of air operations and OAS. Deconflicts movement of OAS through BG battlespace with BC. Assists with IPB. Provides Engineer advice to commander’s plan. Advises on obstacle integration to achieve effects. CIMIC advisor (where specialist CIMIC advisor not available).

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

8-J-2

BC CS Regt

Fire Planning Cell

TACP BGE

ABBREVIATIONS 7Q

The Seven Questions

AA

Avenue of Approach

AFM

Army Field Manual

AGM

Attack Guidance Matrix

AJP

Allied Joint Publication

AO

Area of Operations

BAE

Battlespace Area Evaluation

BDA

Battle Damage Assessment

BG

Battlegroup

BM

Battlespace Management

C2

Command & Control

C2W

Command & Control Warfare

C3

Command Control & Communications

C4I

Command, Control, Communications, Computer & Information

CBRN

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

CCIR

Commander’s Critical Information Requirement

CCD

Camouflage, Concealment & Deception

CD

Collateral Damage

CDE

Collateral Damage Estimate

CID

Combat Identification

CIMgr

Cell Information Manager

CIS

Communications Information Systems

CNA

Computer Network Attack

CND

Computer Network Defence

CNE

Computer Network Exploitation

CNO

Computer Network Operations

COA

Course of Action

COE

Contemporary Operating Environment

COI

Community of Interest

COMMSEC

Communications Security

CONOPS

Concept of Operations

CONPLAN

Contingency Plan

COP

Common Operating Picture

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

ABBREVIATIONS - 1

CPR

Consolidated Position Report

CSCM

Counter Surveillance Security Measures

DC

Decisive Condition

DL

Decision Line

DP

Decision Point

DSM

Decision Support Matrix

DSO

Decision Support Overlay

DST

Digitisation Support Team

DTIO

Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations

EA

Electronic Attack

EBAO

Effects Based Approach to Operations

ED

Electronic Defence

EEFI

Essential Elements of Friendly Information

EI

Environmental Information

EIR

Environmental Information Requirements

ES

Electronic Surveillance

ERW

Explosive Remnants of War

EW

Electronic Warfare

FFIR

Friendly Force Information Requirements

FLOC

Future Land Operational Concept

FP

Force Protection

FSCM

Fire Support Coordination Line

HPTL

High Payoff Target List

HVTL

High Value Target List

IA

Influence Activities

ICP

Intelligence Collection Plan

IER

Information Exchange Requirements

IM

Information Management

IMgr

Information Manager

IMINT

Imagery Intelligence

INA

Information Needs Analysis

INFOSEC

Information Security

IPB

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

IR

Information Requirements

ISTAR

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition & Reconnaissance

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

ABBREVIATIONS - 2

ISO

Information Support Officer

JADOCS

Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System

JETTS

Joint Effects Tactical Targeting System

JFAC

Joint Force Air Component

JFHQ

Joint Force Headquarters

JIM

Joint, Interagency & Multinational

JMIG

Joint Messaging Interoperability Gateway

JOA

Joint Operational Area

JTF

Joint Task Force

LC

Land Component

LCC

Land Component Commander

LCHQ

Land Component HQ

LEGAD

Legal Advisor

LOAC

Law of Armed Conflict

LOP

Local Operating Picture

MC

Mobility Corridor

MCI

Mission Critical Information

ME

Main Effort

MDMP

Military Decision Making & Planning

MIP

Multilateral Interoperability Program

MSI

Mission Support Information

MOE

Measure of Effectiveness

NAI

Named Area of Interest

NEC

Network Enabled Capability

NFA

No Fire Areas

NGO

Non Governmental Organisation

OCD

Operations Centre Director

OGD

Other Government Department

OILM

Operational Information Life Cycle

OIM

Operational Information Management

OLS

Operational Level of Service

OPSEC

Operational Security

ORBAT

Order of Battle

OSPR

Own Situation Position Reporting

OSRM

Operational Sequencing Road Map

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

ABBREVIATIONS - 3

PG

Planning Guidance

PIR

Priority Information Requirements

POLAD

Political Advisor

PPG

Principal Planning Group

PPP

Presence, Posture and Profile

PREE

Plan, Review, Execute, Evaluate

PSYOPS

Psychological Operations

R3

Requests, Reports & Returns

Rel I

Relevant Information

RFA

Restricted Fire Area

RFI

Request for Information

RFL

Restricted Fire Line

RI

Reference Information

ROE

Rules of Engagement

SA

Situational Awareness

SIGINT

Signals Intelligence

SIO

Senior Information Officer

SOI

Standard Operating Instructions

SOP

Standard Operating Procedures

SSA

Shared Situational Awareness

STAP

Surveillance & Target Acquisition Plan

TAI

Target Area of Interest

TEP

Tactical Effects Planning

TSS

Target Selection Standards

Issue 3.0: Nov 07

ABBREVIATIONS - 4