Command: Army Field Manual (afm)

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Army Field Manual (AFM)

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Command

Land Warfare Development Centre

Army Code 72062

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HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS & Conditions of Release COPYRIGHT This publication is British Ministry of Defence Crown copyright. Material and information contained in this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system and transmitted for MOD use only, except where authority for use by other organisations or individuals has been authorised by a Patent Officer of the Defence Intellectual Property Rights whose details appear below. Crown copyright and Merchandise Licensing, Defence Intellectual Property rights, Central Legal Services, MOD Abbeywood South, Poplar 2 #2214, Bristol BS34 8JH, Email: [email protected]

SECURITY This OFFICIAL document is issued for the information of such persons who need to know its contents in the course of their duties. Any person finding this document should hand it to a British Forces unit or to a police station for its safe return to the Ministry of Defence, Def Sy, Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON SW1A 2HB with particulars of how it was found. This information is released by the United Kingdom Government to international organisations and national governments for defence purposes only. The information must be afforded the same degree of protection as that afforded to information of an equivalent classification originated by the recipient organisation or nation, or as required by the recipient organisation or nation’s security regulations. The information may only be disclosed within the Defence Departments of the recipient organisation or nation, except as otherwise authorised by the UK MOD. This information may be subject to privately owned rights. This document is to be handled (stored, transmitted and destroyed) stored in accordance with its classification, details of which can be found in JSP 440 Part 4 Section 1. Any queries on the policy should, in the first instance, be directed to your local security staff, or to the Army PSyA team.

STATUS This publication has been produced under the direction and authority of the Chief of the General Staff by ACOS Warfare branch in his capacity as sponsor of Army Doctrine. It is the individual’s responsibility to ensure that he or she is using the latest version of this publication. If in doubt the individual should contact the Warfare Branch of HQ Field Army (details below). The contents constitute mandatory regulations or an MOD Approved Code of Practice (ACOP) and provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experience and best practice available for commanders and troops to use for operations and training. To avoid criminal liability and prosecution for a breach of health and safety law, you must follow the relevant provisions of the ACOP. Breaches or omissions could result in disciplinary action under the provisions of the Armed Forces Act.

DISTRIBUTION As directed by ACOS Warfare.

CONTACT DETAILS Suggestions for change or queries are welcomed and should be sent to Warfare Branch Editor, Headquarters Field Army, Land Warfare Development Centre, Imber Road, Warminster BA12 0DJ, Telephone +44(0)1985 848764.

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS Summary of Change

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Foreword CFA Foreword to Command

Thoroughly understood and properly implemented doctrine is the most effective force multiplier known to man: it creates mutual understanding and enables decentralisation, pursuit of the initiative and generates tempo. So it is only right that we have spent significant time and effort on revising the Army’s doctrine for command. The freedoms inherent in our philosophy of Mission Command, are enabled by the implementation of effective and commonly understood planning and execution systems; they are the basic staff skills on which everything else is built. AFM Command describes the articles of faith which deliver Mission Command and the processes that underpin them. It sets out: the philosophies through which we command; the framework to enable commanders to assess situations and plan and execute the integration of capabilities; and how and why we structure staffs and command posts. It also introduces dispersed and distributed command. Given the importance of multinational operations AFM Command emphasises the need for interoperability between components and nations and sets out the practical application of that process. It recognises the steps that we must take to build the most effective partnerships, offering insights into partners’ approaches to planning to allow us to better prepare for and understand how they think. As such, it sets out a genuinely multinational and cross-agency approach to the coordination of operations in the modern world. AFM Command will be followed by two new publications: The Planning and Execution Handbook will offer a practical to allow staffs to really get to grips with the estimate process in all its forms; the new-look Staff Officers’ Handbook will refocus on providing the data and information which staff need to deliver effective execution of plans. AFM Command will remain the core document, providing everything we need to deliver the direction and control of operations. The ideas and procedures set out in AFM Command provide the common basis for the exercise of command in UK land forces; we must all read, understand and practise the approaches it lays out. I commend it to you.

Commander Field Army May 2017

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Preface Army Field Manual (AFM) Command, 2017 is the primary source of practices and procedures for the Command and Control of UK land operations. It replaces AFM Command and Staff Procedures, 2007 and is essential reading for all commanders and headquarters staff in the land environment. AFM Command supports and complements the Army’s capstone doctrine – ADP Land Operations, 2017, particularly Chapter 9 – Commanding Operations. ADP Land Operations, 2017 provides essential context for all its supporting AFMs and must therefore have been read by users of AFM Command. AFM Command re-establishes ownership of the enduring command doctrine that has resided in Part C of the Staff Officers’ Handbook since 2014. The forthcoming edition of the SOHB, 2017 will therefore focus on data and aides memoire rather than authoritative doctrine. AFM Command is increasingly aligned with tactical North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Defence doctrine. The key change to previous UK command doctrine is the adoption of NATO’s Operations Process (Assess, Plan, Prepare, Execute) as a replacement for the PREE process (Plan, Refine, Execute, Evaluate). AFM Command’s sister NATO publication, which it draws on heavily in Part B – Exercising Command and Control, is Allied Tactical Publication 3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. AFM Command is broken into three parts: Part A - Command and Control. Part A describes the UK’s Command and Control doctrine in relation to commanders, their staff and the Command Posts from which they operate. Chapter 1 - Command. Chapter 1 describes the nature of command and its corresponding principles, philosophy and characteristics. Chapter 2 - Command Support. Chapter 2 describes the people, places, systems and processes that support the commander. Chapter 3 - Command Posts. Chapter 3 describes the functions and structures of Command Posts. Part B - Exercising Command and Control. Part B describes the processes and procedures involved in exercising Command and Control using the Operations Process as a framework. Chapter 4 - Introduction to the Operations Process. Chapter 4 gives a brief overview of the Operations Process. Chapter 5 - Assess. Chapter 5 describes the process of assessment. Chapter 6 - Plan. Chapter 6 describes the UK’s tactical planning process and a range of supporting planning tools. Chapter 7 - Prepare. Chapter 7 describes the spread of preparatory activities that take place prior to execution with a focus on those undertaken by a headquarters staff. Chapter 8 - Execute. Chapter 8 describes the processes involved in the execution of operations.

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Part C - Command and Control in a Combined, Joint, Inter-agency, Inter-governmental and Multinational (CJIIM) Environment. Part C provides considerations and doctrine for commanders and staff working in a CJIIM environment. Chapter 9 - Multinational Interoperability. Chapter 9 describes the definitions, dimensions and considerations involved in multinational interoperability. Chapter 10 - NATO and Allied Planning Processes. Chapter 10 gives an overview of the planning processes of our principal allies. Chapter 11 - UK Resilience Operations. Chapter 11 gives an overview of UK Resilience Command and Control doctrine as well as a range of considerations for supporting land commanders. This manual continues the evolution of land forces’ doctrine using ADP Land Operations, 2017 as the framework. Where possible it complements NATO and joint doctrine and, whilst not exhaustive, the key command-orientated doctrine publications are shown overleaf in the Command and Control Doctrine Hierarchy schematic.

Joint

D e f e n c e

U

JDP - Joint Doctrine Publication JDN - Joint Doctrine Note JSP- Joint Service Publication * Expected publication late 2017

Staff Officers’ Handbook

AJP 5 Planning for Operations

DN OPSEC and Counter surveillance

Army Leadership Doctrine

JDP 04 Understanding

AAP 6 Glossary of Terms

Supporting

JSP 900 UK Targeting Policy

APP 6 Joint Symbology

Allied Comd Ops COPD Ver 2

ATP - Allied Tactical Publication AAP - Allied Administrative Publication APP- Allied Procedural Publication AJP- Allied Joint Publication

Planning & Execution Handbook*

JDP 3-70 Battlespace Management

AFM Command

ADP Land Operations

JDP 3-00 Campaign Execution

Command and Control of Allied Land Forces

ATP 3.2.2

AJP 3.2

Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations

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Legend: ADP - Army Doctrine Publication AFM - Army Field Manual DN - Doctrine Note

DN Fires

t h e

O p s :

K

0 2 ii.

i.JDP 2-00 J

AJP 3

Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations

Understanding & D Intelligence support P Operations to Joint

AFM Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance

UK Ops: the Defence contribution to Resilience & Sy

JDP 02

AJP 01 Allied Joint Doctrine

NATO Allied

LAND

JOINT

Tactical

NATO

Command and Control Doctrine Hierarchy

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UK Land and Joint Doctrine

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Contents Foreword I Preface ii Contents v

PART A - COMMAND AND CONTROL Chapter 1 - Command

PA-1 1-1

Introduction 1-1 Nature of Command

1-2

Principles of Command

1-4

Application of Mission Command

1-4

Additional Command Considerations

1-6

Command in a CJIIM Environment

1-7

Command in the Land Component

1-8

The Commander

1-10

Deputising Command

1-15

Span of Command

1-17

Command States

1-17

Control 1-21 Chapter 2 – Command Support

2-1

Introduction 2-1 The Staff

2-2

The Staff Officer

2-3

Relationships involving the Staff

2-5

Organisation of the Staff

2-6

Communication and Information Systems

2-7

Liaison 2-8 Procedures and Instructions

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Annex A - Use of Information

2A-1

Annex B - How to be a Staff Officer in a Brigade Headquarters

2B-1

Annex C - Functional Application Services

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Chapter 3 – Command Posts

3-1

Introduction 3-1 Purpose

3-1

Common Requirements

3-2

Organisation 3-2 Distributed and Dispersed Command

3-5

Application of the Tactical Functions within a Command Post

3-6

Functional and Integrating Cells

3-7

Speciality Cells

3-8

The Operation of Command Posts

3-12

Command Post Siting

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PART B - EXERCISING COMMAND AND CONTROL

PB-1

Chapter 4 - Introduction to the Operations Process

4-1

Introduction 4-1 Interrelationship of activities within the Operations Process

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Delineation within Activities

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Setting and maintaining the Operation’s Direction

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Chapter 5 - Assess

5-1

Introduction 5-1 Seizing the Initiative

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Process 5-1 Measures of Effectiveness and Performance

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Information Requirements

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Commanders Critical Information Requirements

5-5

Recognising Variances

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Chapter 6 - Plan Section 1 Overview of the Operational and Tactical Planning Processes Decision Making in General

6-1 6-1 6-2

Estimates 6-2 Assessment During Planning

6-3

Planning Overview

6-3

British Army Estimates

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Choice of Tactical Estimate

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Sequences within the UK Estimates

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Staff Groupings

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Section 2 Operational Level Planning Process

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Overview 6-13 Section 3 The Tactical Estimate

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Introduction 6-17 Stage 1 – Analysis of the Environment and Mission

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Step 1 – Understanding the Situation

6-18

Step 2 – Understand the Problem

6-19

Stage 2 – Development of the Plan

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Step 3 – Formulate COAs

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Step 4 – Develop and Validate COAs

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Step 5 – COA Evaluation

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Step 6 – Commander’s Decision and Development of the Plan

6-21

Tactical Estimate Summary

6-22

Section 4 The Combat Estimate

6-23

Introduction

6-23

Stage 1 – Analysis of the Environment and Mission

6-24

Q0 – Baseline Preparation and Understanding

6-24

Q1 – What is the situation and how does it affect me?

6-24

Q2 – What have I been told to do and why?

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Q3 – What effects do I need to achieve and what direction must I give in order to develop a plan? 6-26 Stage 2 – Developing the Plan

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Q4 – Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?

6-27

Q5 – What resources do I need to accomplish each action or effect?

6-28

Q6 – When and where do the actions and effects take place in relation to each other? 6-28 Q7 – What control measures do I need?

6-29

The COA Decision Brief

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Section 5 Common Planning Processes

6-31

Section 5.1 Analysing the Environment and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

6-32

Introduction

6-32

Intelligence Preparation of the Environment

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IPE Stage 1 – Operational Area Evaluation

6-34

IPE Stage 2 – Threat Evaluation

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IPE Stage 3 – Situation Integration

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Section 5.2 Mission Analysis

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Section 5.3 The Effects Schematic and CONOPS Development

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The Effects Schematic

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CONOPS Development

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Section 5.4 Wargaming

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Introduction

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COA Wargaming

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Section 5.5 Red Teaming

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Section 6 Risk Management

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Introduction 6-52 Risk Management

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The Risk Management Tool

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Consequence Management

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Dispensation and Waivers

6-58

Section 7 Control of Operations

6-59

Section 8 Control of Operations

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Directives, Plans and Orders

6-61

OSW Formats

6-63

Orders Groups

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Chapter 7 - Prepare

7-1

General 7-1 Assessment during Preparation

7-1

Activities during Preparation

7-1

Chapter 8 - Execute

8-1

Introduction 8-1 Command and Control during Execution

8-2

Assessment during Execution

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Decision Making in Execution

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Directing Action

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Rapid Decision Making and Synchronisation Process The Operations Centre

8-9 8-15

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PART C - COMMAND AND CONTROL IN A COMBINED, JOINT, INTRAGOVERNMENTAL INTER-AGENCY AND MULTINATIONAL ENVIRONMENT pC-1 Chapter 9 - Multinational Interoperability

9-1

Introduction 9-1 Dimensions 9-1 Considerations on Multinational Operations Liaison Officers Chapter 10 - NATO and Allied Planning Processes

9-4 9-10 10-1

Introduction 10-1 Allied Planning Process Comparison

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NATO Planning Overview

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Allied Planning Processes – NATO OLPP

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Allied Planning Processes – US Model

10-8

Allied Planning Processes – FR Model

10-11

Allied Planning Processes – GE Model

10-15

Chapter 11 - UK Resilience Operations

11-1

Introduction 11-1 Context Civil Primacy and Direction

11-1

Military Support to Resilience Operations

11-2

Planning and Execution of Resilience Operations

11-4

Summary 11-8

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PART A Command and Control Part A of AFM Command covers commanding within the British Army. It addresses the skills and qualities needed in a successful commander, as well as describing the roles of a commander, both in barracks and in combat. The British Army’s philosophy of Mission Command and its application is also reviewed. Part A, Chapter 2 discusses the organisational support to the commander provided by the staff. This chapter reviews the duties of the staff, the interaction of the staff and how a staff is functionally organised to assist the commander in the Operations Process. It also describes the duties for staffs in brigade, division and corps headquarters. Finally, in Chapter 3, the NATO term Command Post is introduced. This chapter describes how commanders and staff perform their duties in a Command Post. The chapter also examines Command Post organisation and deployment, as well as reviewing different command and control methods.

Part A – Command and Control  Command  Command Support  Command Posts Part B – Exercising Command and Control • Introduction to the Operations Process • Assess • Plan • Prepare • Execute Part C – Command in the CJIIM Environment • Multinational Interoperability • NATO and Allied Planning Processes • UK Resilience Operations

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Chapter 1 Command ‘On command …..acquire the best information, sift and assess it, turn it over in your mind and judge when to make a decision knowing full well you have not all the information…..that to my mind is the essence of command’. Field Marshal The Lord Carver

Introduction

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Introduction Mission Command Nature of Command Command Authority Functions of Command Principles of Command Application of Mission Command Additional Command Considerations Command in a CJIIM Environment Command in the Land Component The Commander Deputising Command Span of Command Command States Control

1-01. Mission Command. Mission Command is the British Army’s command philosophy. This is an approach which empowers subordinate commanders and promotes initiative as well as freedom and speed of action. Critically, it focuses on achievement of the higher intent through mission-type orders. It empowers leaders at every level and is intended to generate agility and tempo. This enables us to overcome an enemy in the most chaotic and demanding circumstances and unlocks everyone’s potential to seize winning opportunities.1 See Chapter 6 of ADP Land Operations (para 0607) for additional discussion on Mission Command.

1-02. Mission Command: An Approach. Mission Command applies equally to the commander as to the team. Through its exercise, Mission Command bridges organisations and capabilities to deliver outcome. This chapter address the nature of Command, its principles and functions that apply to an individual – the commander. It also discusses how the commander applies Mission Command across the team to win. 1-03. Command. Command is the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. It includes the processes by which commanders, supported by their staff, make decisions, convey intent, and impress their will in order to accomplish missions. Command is a blend of subjective art and objective science. It is founded on an understanding of the desired outcome; an appreciation of concepts, missions and priorities; and the allocation of resources. Its subjective components include: assessment of factors such as the impact of surprise, politics and morale; decision making where there is little or no information; and anticipating the enemy. It also requires objective analysis to control the operation and to resolve issues relating to the mechanics of movement, logistics, and Communication and Information Systems (CIS). Control, as a function of command, is the oversight, direction and coordination of assigned forces in accordance with the commander’s plan and intent.2 1 ADP Land Operations, 2017, para 0607 2 ADP Land Operations, 2017 para 0902.

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Nature of Command

Command Authority

1-04. Command Authority. Command authority is vested „„ Authority in an individual for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. It has a legal and constitutional „„ Responsibility status, codified for the Army in Queen’s Regulations, „„ Accountability and is vested in a commander by a higher authority that gives direction and assigns forces to accomplish a mission. The exercise of command is the process by which a commander makes decisions, impresses their will on and transmits intentions to subordinates. It entails authority, responsibility and accountability. Delegation3 is closely linked with Command Authority. A commander needs to have all four in balance to command effectively. This requirement is derived from the Military Covenant.4 With the right to enforce decisions, however, comes the responsibility for the consequences. To command is to direct with authority, whilst taking full responsibility for outcomes. a. Authority. Authority is the power and right to give orders and enforce obedience. It is necessarily accompanied by an equal responsibility for what one does and fails to do. A commander can delegate specific authority to subordinates to decide and to act within their own areas of delegated responsibility, but the commander retains overall responsibility. b. Responsibility. Responsibility is the ability and obligation to act independently and make decisions. Responsibility is also the legal and ethical obligation that a commander assumes for their actions, accomplishments, or failures and those of the subordinates. The commander is responsible for the readiness of the force including training, health, welfare, morale and discipline of personnel, as well as the maintenance of equipment in their command. In combat, a commander assumes responsibility for the loss or preservation of human life and the destruction or preservation of materiel and real estate. Commanders can only be held responsible if they have been given sufficient authority to complete the required tasks. c. Accountability. Accountability is the requirement and expectation to justify actions and decisions. Accountability links authority and responsibility, ensuring that authority is applied appropriately and that responsibilities are fulfilled. It requires, therefore, that responsibility and authority are aligned. Additionally, specific to the military, it requires commanders to answer to a superior officer and ultimately to the Crown for the effective and efficient use of force. This ultimately affects the life of every soldier under their command. The concepts of individual and command accountability are enshrined in law. Individual members of the armed forces are accountable for their own actions on operations, for example by not giving or obeying orders to commit war crimes. Commanders have additional accountability in that they can be held criminally accountable if they knew, or ought to have known, that crimes were being committed, or were about to be committed and failed to take all necessary and reasonable action to prevent or investigate them. d. Delegation. A commander can delegate specific authority to subordinates and staff officers to make decisions and to act within their own areas of responsibility. Subordinate staff officers must understand their authority, responsibility and accountability as they relate to their relationships with the commander, other 3 4

ADP Land Operations, 2017, para 0604. ADP Land Operations, 2017, para 0329.

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staff officers and subordinate commanders. As part of the philosophy of Mission Command a commander can delegate specific authority to subordinates to decide and to act within their own areas of delegated responsibility. The commander retains responsibility and accountability even when authority is delegated. 1-05. Functions of Command. In British Army Doctrine, there are three functions of command: decision making, leadership, and control.

Functions of Command

„„ Decision Making a. Decision making. Decision making is critical to „„ Leadership commanding, leading and Mission Command. A defining characteristic of great military leaders is the „„ Control ability to make the right decision at the right time, under immense pressure and in the worst conditions. Decision making and its constituent parts are described in detail in Part B. b. Leadership. Leadership is exercised at all levels within the Army and is not the sole domain of command. At the individual soldier level, leadership is displayed by making the right choice in difficult situations, often when isolated. It is included in paragraph 1-23a as a skill and quality required by a commander. c. Control. Control is the primary tool commanders use to achieve mission success. Control is almost always coupled with Command. Control is explained at paragraph 1-45 and in Part B.

1-06. Command Support. At all but the very lowest tactical levels, Command is enabled through Command Support, which is described in detail in Chapter 2.

Leadership

Functions of Command

Decision Making

Control

Elements of Command Support

CI

Provision of a HQ s S; P rocesses & Procedur e

Figure 1.1. – The Command Model

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Principles of Command 1-07. Principles of Command. Joint Doctrine describes Principles of Command.5 Use of these principles is critical in Army, joint and multinational operations. These principles will be addressed in various sections of the manual. a. Unity of Command. Unity of Command provides the necessary cohesion for planning and executing operations. Commanders achieve this authority by establishing command relationships when a force is established. b. Continuity of Command. Continuity of Command describes the ability for command authority to be exercised continually, over time, in a given area of operations. It depends on appropriately trained, structured and resourced command support, as well as establishing measures of deputising that are widely understood. c. Chain of Command. A chain of command describes the succession of commanders, from a superior to a subordinate, through whom command is exercised. It is a hierarchical structure that links points of command and defines their relationships. A clear chain of command, understood by all, strengthens integration between formations and units, enhancing Unity of Command. Subordinates must be in no doubt as to the command state within which they are operating, to whom they are responsible and for what. On multinational operations absolute clarity must be established over national responsibilities and those of the coalition or alliance. d. Integration of Command. The command structure should ensure that the capabilities of the force are integrated to achieve the commander’s objectives in the most effective way. The specific task organisation will reflect the higher commander’s requirements. e. Mission Command. Described in more detail below.

Application of Mission Command 1-08. Principles of Mission Command. Mission Command comprises one guiding principle and five further principles. The fundamental guiding principle of Mission Command is the absolute responsibility to act to achieve the superior commander’s intent. In order to successfully achieve the guiding principle, commanders rely on the additional principles of Mission Command, which are as follows: a. Unity of Effort. Unity of Effort is the coordination and cooperation among all forces to achieve a common objective. Understanding the commander’s intent two levels up, coupled with coherent subordinate planning, assists in establishing Unity of Effort. It requires common and accepted processes and procedures. Incorporated is a common military language which includes terminology, symbology, orders formats, reports and returns, SOIs and SOPs. Unity of Effort starts during IPE, continues through actions on the objective through to reconstitution and is necessary in all military activities from combat to peace keeping. When Unity of Effort is not achieved mission failure becomes a tangible risk. b. Freedom of Action. Freedom of Action is the default condition of mission command. It assumes that subordinates have the freedom to achieve the commander’s intent though commanders should specify necessary constraints to subordinates. These constraints should be kept to the bare minimum. Freedom of Action enables 5

JDP 01 UK Joint Operations Doctrine, Nov 14

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initiative, which allows subordinates to adjust their actions after the commencement of an operation or mission. Within Mission Command, Freedom of Action is best executed through decentralised execution. c. Trust. Trust is a vital component in the relationship between commanders and subordinates and goes both ways. Although trust is built through time and experience, it should be the start point of a command relationship. As commanders see the strength of subordinates through training and execution, trust in their ability should increase. Likewise, subordinates build trust in their leaders. Subordinates will develop and achieve the skills needed to win in combat if they are allowed, by wise commanders, to discover and correct their weaknesses through honest mistakes in training. d. Mutual Understanding. The basis for mutual understanding rests in working to a common doctrine. Understanding, like trust, builds on shared experiences. Mutual understanding is easiest achieved at the unit level and below, but becomes increasingly difficult as the span and complexity of command increases. Mutual understanding requires immense effort to achieve and maintain in multinational operations. It is critical that commanders work through the barriers that prevent, degrade, or erode mutual understanding. e. Timely and Effective Decision Making. Commanders and leaders make decisions. During the initial planning process, commanders have more time to understand the situation through a comprehensive gathering of information. To succeed on operations, reduce risk and maximise effectiveness, commanders should analyse and exploit information and knowledge that is already held. However, there will always be gaps preventing a complete understanding of the situation. During the execution phase, commanders will have less time and information on which to make critical decisions. Good judgement is required so that decisions can be made at the right time in order to influence the decision cycle. Commanders should use analytical tools, as well as the staff, to assist in decision making as much as possible. Timely decisions will influence tempo and behaviour resulting in favourable change in the rational calculation of all stakeholders (or actors).

Application of Mission Command „„ Commanders ensure that their subordinates understand the intent, their own contributions and the context within which they are to act. „„ Commanders exercise minimum control over their subordinates, consistent with the context and nature of the mission and the experience and ability of subordinates, while retaining responsibility for their actions. „„ Subordinates are told the outcome that they are contributing to, the effect that they are to realise and why. „„ Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions. „„ Subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their superior’s intent. „„ Subordinates must communicate their plan to the commander to ensure situational awareness.

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Additional Command Considerations 1-09. Legal and Ethical Considerations. a. Commanders are morally and legally responsible for their soldiers, even when exercising Mission Command where there is often a minimum of direct supervision and a maximum of delegated authority to subordinates. Creating a culture of respect for the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) within their commands will improve morale and discipline, demonstrate legitimacy of purpose and reduce the incidence of violations. b. The UK is legally bound to investigate potential violations of the LOAC6 and, if substantiated, prosecute those concerned. While individual members of the armed forces are accountable for their own actions on operations, commanders have an additional accountability under the doctrine of command responsibility. c. In preparation for operations, the commander must take account of the LOAC when establishing procedures or conducting training. In the planning and conduct of operations during an armed conflict, the commander must consider the LOAC when issuing all orders and instructions. Commanders must also take steps to prevent violations of the law, report violations if they occur and, if necessary, institute disciplinary action. d. The legal framework for command responsibility states that a commander has an obligation to be aware of the attitudes and actions of those under their command. Accordingly, commanders may be held criminally liable: (1) If they participate7 in conducting a war crime, particularly by ordering its commission; or (2) For failing to act, if they know, or should have known, that war crimes were being committed, or about to be committed, by forces under their command and fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent their commission, or to submit the matter to the relevant competent authority for investigation and prosecution.8 e. Legal advice. Commanders are at the heart of a potentially complex international legal framework during operations. Their own actions must be compliant with the applicable law and must also fulfil their wider command responsibilities, including their central role in both the service disciplinary justice system, laid down by the AFA 06 and the Army administrative system.9 To assist them in incorporating legal considerations into their decision making, the commander must have access to a legal advisor.10

6 7

8 9 10

The Hague Convention (HC) IV Art 3; Geneva Convention (GC) 1 Art 49, GC II Art 129, GC IV Arts 29 & 146, Additional protocol (AP) 1 Art 91 and the Armed Forces Act 2006 (AFA 06) sections 113 to 115. All individuals are responsible for violations if: they commit the crime on their own or jointly with others, order, solicit or induce a crime which is committed or attempted, aid, abet or otherwise assist in the commission of the crime, including providing the means for its commission, or contribute to the commission or attempted commission of the crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. International Criminal Court Statute, 1998 (Rome Statute), Article 25. The UK has enacted this Statute and brought this into domestic law via the International Criminal Court Act 2001. AP I Article 86(2) Rome Statute, Article 28, International Criminal Court Act 2001 Section 65(2) & (3). Army General Administrative Instruction, Volume 2, Chapter 67 (AGAI 67). AP I Article 82.

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‘For Western societies that are increasingly sceptical about the use of military force in interventions of choice, perceived to have only a tenuous link to national interests, the ethical and legal justification underpinning these operations is vital ground, before and during the operation. This is most acute because ethics and morality have become weapons used by non-state players against states. The everpresent spectre of the ‘propaganda of the deed’ ensures that any armed conflict is conducted in several theatres simultaneously. Therefore, while a particular incident in a campaign may have little operational effect on the ground, it could generate strategic effect within public opinion of the country concerned and consequently on the world stage. The ethical narrative used in the justification to deploy military forces must therefore be sustained by the ethical component within that operation both in the actions and behaviour of military personnel but also in the manner in which the operation is conducted by commanders at all levels’. AGILE WARRIOR Report 2014/2015, page 70, June 2015

1-10. Flexibility. Commanders and their headquarters must be flexible, energetic and capable of swift change when required. Headquarters are scalable by design so that they can configure themselves (possibly with augmentation) to adapt and undertake a number of different roles and tasks. The size and shape of the force under command, the range of actors with whom the headquarters must interact, as well as the tasks allocated, will determine how a headquarters should be configured. See Chapter 3.

Command in a Combined, Joint, Intra-Governmental, Inter-Agency Multinational Environment (CJIIM) The art of coalition command - whether it is here in Afghanistan, whether it was in Iraq or in Bosnia or in Haiti - is to take the resources you are provided with, understand what the strengths and weaknesses are and to employ them to the best overall effect. General David Petraeus

1-11. Land forces operate in a Combined, Joint, Intra-Governmental, Inter-Agency Multinational (CJIIM) environment which is characterised by the requirement to work with forces from other components, governmental and non-governmental organisations, as well as agencies (police, intelligence etc) from the UK and other countries, coalition partners and host-nation forces. In addition, UK forces are likely to have force elements from other countries under command. Different CJIIM actors will have different objectives and may be guided by different principles and motivation. Command in a CJIIM environment may require a modified approach. 1-12. Each CJIIM element is likely to have its own bespoke authority, accountability and command procedures. The differences between multinational elements, between civilian and military, or between deployed forces and the host government, may be acute, with serious implications for decision making and operational tempo. Understanding these differences, including where decisions can be informed and shaped, is key to the collective effort.

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1-13. The headquarters is likely to provide a point of coordination, alignment and integration. Early integration is vital and where possible should be included in pre-deployment training and in the Reception, Staging and Onward Integration (RSOI)11 process. 1-14. Interoperability requirements will depend on the level of integration deemed appropriate between the CJIIM actors. In some cases, an awareness of a particular activity, including how it contributes to the mission and can be exploited, combined with suitable deconfliction, may suffice. In other circumstances, such as a multinational force, interoperability will lie at the heart of success. Challenges may range from differing doctrine to different law, through language, to critical variations in techniques, tactics, procedures and sustainment. Interoperability risks must be understood in detail and actively managed. See Part C. 1-15. Coalition Command. The commander will create and manage the bespoke formation. This requires an understanding of the political, strategic and national issues associated with each troop-contributing nation and those of the lead nation, should it not be the UK. The commander must also understand the respective national interpretations of international law and domestic law that will often combine with policy to result, for example, in differing national Rules of Engagement (ROE). There may be times when a coalition is imposed upon the commander for reasons that relate to the greater strategic good, thus creating interoperability frictions at the tactical level that will require a great deal of patience and pragmatism to overcome. Effective communication between the commander and contributing nations can mitigate this friction. 1-16. Inter-Agency Integration. The commander will be at the heart of the effort to integrate and command joint, contractor-provided, inter-agency and multinational capabilities. The commander will need to devote time and effort to the establishment of key interagency relationships, the integration of working practices and procedures and the fusion of objectives and goals. Essentially this is leadership by persuasion. In particular the commander will focus on improving unity of effort and organisational agility. Personal involvement by the commander is crucial.

Command in the Land Component 1-17. Land Component Command (LCC). Usually a separate LCC is designated to sit above tactical formations. During major combat, this should be assumed as essential, unless the formation HQ has been specifically structured and trained for this task. Occasionally an HQ may be required to act as an LCC as well as a formation HQ, which this is the most demanding case. There is inherent tension between the tactical responsibilities of a formation commander and the operational aspects of component command. This increases with the degree to which the commander has to focus, simultaneously, on tactical decision making, while supporting the development of the campaign plan. The diagram at Figure 1.2 shows how the LCC interfaces between the Operational and Tactical levels of conflict. 1-18. The Land Component Commander is responsible for planning and executing tacticallevel operations. The commander does this by using allocated land forces and capabilities temporarily allocated from other components. Operational-level objectives are translated into tactical-level plans through the operations planning process by the Joint Force Commander and the component commanders.12 11 NATO uses RSOM&I. 12 AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Section 5, Edition A Version 1, March 2016.

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Strategic

Military strategic

Alliance Strategic plans Strategic end-state Strategic on employment Military strategy General direction and guidance Limitations on employment

Campa gic) ign end state (based on strate

Tactical

Cam ons erati paign objectives and plan and major op

Land Component Command

Operational

Battles, engagements, activities Figure 1.2. – Land Component Command and the levels of conflict

1-19. Items that a Land Component Command handles that a formation command does not, include: a. Time and Space. A component command plans for the entire campaign and not for any specific period ahead of the current battle. It normally considers necessary actions and desired effects within the entirety of a nominated Joint Operations Area (JOA). b. Level. Component commanders and their staff contribute to operationa-level planning in close conjunction with the operational-level HQ. However, component command is the highest level at which tactical activity is conducted, including joint tactical activity. The Land Component Commander and staff should have a deep understanding of operational art and the role of the Land Component at the operational level, which require additional training and education above that required by a tactical HQ. c. Resources. Component commanders should be prepared and resourced to plan at all levels, in conjunction with other components, including subordinate tactical levels if necessary for a particular joint objective. d. Staff Functions. At the Land Component-level there are specialist staff functions that may not be represented in a tactical formation-level HQ. These include: political and legal advice, campaign planning, targeting, information operations, media operations and community relations activities, military police activities, civil-military relations and national intelligence cell activities. e. Liaison. There is a significant requirement for liaison at the component level, particularly with the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) and other components, subordinate formations and national contingents, with the host nation, civilian agencies and organisations. Most of this liaison will be on a reciprocal basis.

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1-20. Responsibilities of the Land Component Commander. When acting as a Land Component Commander, the additional responsibilities of a commander include: a. Contributing to the campaign planning process and advising the Joint Force Commander (JFC) on the employment of all land forces under command. b. Planning, directing and coordinating operations in support of the JFC’s intent and concept of operations. c. Executing elements of the campaign plan and coordinating operations with other component commanders. d. Contributing to the joint coordination of the campaign. e. Providing direction and guidance on the requirements for CIS to subordinate commanders and any other communications supporting elements. For operations with technologically incompatible multinational land force systems, the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) may have to validate additional communications support requirements to the JFC for adjudication. 1-21. Selection of the Land Component Commander. The key factors in the selection of a Land Component Commander include the requirement for a commander of the appropriate rank and authority to influence the operational employment of land forces, as well as the requirement to interact and liaise with the CJTF commander. A tactical formation commander’s first duty is the command of their formation. If the additional requirements pertaining to the role of Land Component Commander would significantly detract from their ability to command, another officer should be appointed as the Land Component Commander. That officer might be of the same rank, but would normally be senior and have greater authority assigned. In some circumstances it might be appropriate to appoint a deputy to the formation commander, with responsibility for operational-level aspects of command.

The Commander When times are bad...there will come a sudden pause when your men stop and look at you. No one will speak: they will just look at you and expect leadership. Their courage is ebbing: you must force it to flow back and it is not easy Field Marshall Slim

1-22. The Role of the Commander. The role of a commander at any level is to make decisions regarding the actions of forces under command, to lead those forces and to control them. The commander must do so at a pace that contributes to the generation and maintenance of tempo and in a way that achieves success. A commander exists to make things happen and does this in two primary ways: through leadership and through decision making. In order to do this, commanders require a number of skills and qualities.

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‘Be an example to your men, in your duty and in private life. Never spare yourself and let your troops see that you don’t in your endurance of fatigue and privation. Always be tactful and well-mannered. Avoid excessive sharpness or harshness of voice, which usually indicates the man who has shortcomings of his own to hide.’ Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

1-23. Skills & Qualities. There is no unique formula for the right combination of command skills and qualities. Clausewitz described two indispensable qualities of command: ‘First, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to the truth and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may go’.13 Churchill’s view was that ‘there is required for the composition of a great commander not only massive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination, but also an element of legerdemain,14 an original, queer and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten’.15 The list of skills and qualities below is not exhaustive, but deficiencies in any one of these will compromise the ability of a commander to lead, make decisions and control: a. Leadership. Military leadership is characterised by the projection of personality and purpose onto people and situations in order to prevail in the most demanding circumstances.16 Commanders lead through a combination of example, persuasion, and compulsion. While providing leadership is a commander’s primary responsibility, it is also a responsibility of every military superior, including officers and non-commissioned officers. Leaders (and thus commanders) need to be the cutting edge of the force, leading by example, innovating and shaping values and behaviours to ensure that the force performs well and without moral blemish.17

‘I would like you to be quite clear under the conditions in which you will have to exercise leadership. You will be frequently tired. You may also be cold and wet and hungry and thirsty. You may be dripping with sweat, or may be freezing with cold. You won’t know precisely what is going on, you won’t know exactly where the enemy is, you certainly won’t know what he is going to do or what his capabilities are of doing anything. You may not know where your own people are or what they are going to do. To put it briefly, you have got to exercise leadership in conditions of fatigue and fear, uncertainty and ignorance and often in isolation. That is what makes it extremely difficult and that is why leadership on the battlefield calls, in my view, for the very highest qualities’ Field Marshal The Lord Harding of Petherton, addressing the Senior Division when C.I.G.S., July 1953, taken from Serve To Lead.

Karl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), page 102. 14 Legerdemain is a French word meaning ‘sleight of hand’, a display of skill or cleverness for deceitful purposes. 15 Winston S Churchill, The World Crisis Vol II, 1915, (London, 1923) page 21. 16 Developing Leaders: A British Army Guide. 17 Ibid. 13

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b. Understanding. Understanding the nature of the operation about to be embarked is central to fighting effectively and understanding continues throughout and, importantly, after the operation has ended. Exploiting existing knowledge is essential for effective mission command as it enables units to learn and adapt faster than their adversaries to improve mission performance. However, developing understanding across the force cannot occur unless effective command and control arrangements are in place. These are mutually supporting activities. Understanding is command led. Commanders ask the questions that drive the process and the activities that inform the force. Supported and informed by staff, commanders are enabled to make better decisions.

Skills and Qualities „„ Leadership „„ Understanding „„ Decision Making „„ Vision and Intellect „„ Initiative „„ Judgement „„ Building Relationships „„ The Ability to Communicate „„ Learning from Experience

c. Decision Making. The ability to make difficult decisions in complex situations is central to the exercise of command and requires a balance between analysis and intuition. In the pursuit of the timely decision-making required by Mission Command, a commander should have confidence in their own judgement. A commander should maintain the chosen course of action until they are aware that there is, or will be, a sufficiently significant change in the situation to require a new decision. It will be a conscious choice to delay or refrain from making a decision at that specific time. Good commanders anticipate decisions (deciding when to decide) and can make conscious choices to abstain from making decisions (deciding not to decide). A commander requires the moral courage to adopt a new course of action and the mental flexibility to act purposefully when the opportunity of unexpected success presents itself. While decision making is one of the three functions of command, authority to make routine decisions can be delegated to the staff, although responsibility remains with the commander. This is not to say that decisions are made by the commander in isolation. A commander will require detail from the staff and specialist advisors in order to increase understanding in the decision-making process. d. Vision and Intellect. Understanding a complex problem and deciding what to do require vision and intellect. Vision is the ability for a commander to describe the outcomes sought. Without vision, the command would be unable to develop a plan or express intent. Intellect embraces clarity of thought (including the ability to seek and identify the essentials), originality (based on imagination), judgement and initiative. e. Initiative. Initiative is the ability to seek, recognise and grasp opportunities. It requires flexibility of thought and action. A command climate of freedom, trust, confidence and encouragement is essential in allowing initiative to flourish. For example, to make reasonable mistakes in training is allowing and encouraging initiative. Subordinates must be encouraged to take the initiative rather than fear the consequences of failure, as this will unlock their good ideas and promote development. It will also encourage subordinates to act to achieve the commander’s intent, without deference to higher authority. This requires a culture that promotes calculated risk-taking, daring to be right rather than being afraid to be wrong. Initiative does, however, need to be tempered by good judgement.

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Nothing ventured, nothing gained. Old English saying

f. Judgement. Judgement is a matter of common sense, informed by experience. As responsibility increases, broader and deeper judgement is required of commanders. To succeed, a commander must be able to read a wide range of situations and interpret them correctly and quickly, sometimes with little information. This depends on a refined combination of experience, knowledge, intellect and intuition. However, a commander seldom has a complete picture of the situation, as many of the factors affecting decision making cannot be subject to precise calculation. To weigh up the imponderables in a confusing situation, a commander needs a clear mind, exercising sound judgement to distinguish the essentials from a mass of detail and to identify practical solutions. g. Building Relationships. Commanders build relationships on many levels. As well as the traditional relationships associated within a chain of command, commanders need to create, build and maintain effective relationships with inter-agency, multinational and joint actors. These relationships are often less defined, if at all, than those of military groups. While robust leadership may be required, commanders must be empathic and patient, prepared to collaborate and compromise through persuasion and negotiation. Finally, commanders need to build and maintain their relationship with the staff, some of whom will be augmentees and may not know, or be known by, the commander. h. Communicating. The ability to communicate effectively is an important aspect of command. A commander’s powers of analysis and decision making may be exceptional, but they will be of little use if the commander cannot express intentions clearly in orders that others can act upon. Orders and directives are described in Chapter 6 section 8. i. Learning. Commanders must strive to continually improve themselves professionally. Two aspects of improvement are the need to learn from experience (their own and the experiences of others) and the need to learn from history. For the former, this includes the need to have the humility to admit when they have made mistakes and then have the courage to learn and recover from these mistakes. All commanders, however experienced, make mistakes, though a successful commander will never make the same mistake again. It is best to learn from the mistakes of others and from history.

‘The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience (or by your men’s experience), ie the hard way. By reading, you learn through others’ experiences, generally a better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final for young men. Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation, never at a loss for how any problem has been addressed (successfully or unsuccessfully) before. It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead.’

General James ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis USMC

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1-24. Creating and Fostering the Command Climate. A commander, by the nature of their personality, command style and general behaviour, has a considerable influence on the morale, sense of direction and performance of the command organisation. It is the commander’s responsibility to craft and sustain a climate of mutual respect and trust. This climate is fundamental for the team to be a learning organisation; improving over time and with experience. Successful Mission Command thrives in a command climate that encourages subordinate commanders at all levels to think independently, to take the initiative and to be uninhibited in telling superiors accurate and, at times, unwelcome information. It is chiefly the commander’s responsibility to build, foster, and maintain such a climate. A great commander sets the conditions for the team to contribute. 1-25. Understanding and Managing Risk. Commanders at all levels must understand the risk inherent in the operations they are commanding but not be constrained by it. This includes understanding the higher commander’s appetite for risk and then setting the risk appetite across the command without hindering the ability to make tactical decisions. This requires dialogue, trust, transparency, understanding and anticipation. A poor risk culture will constrain initiative, degrade the force, or hamper it with needless process. An effective risk culture will protect the force, its legitimacy, exploit opportunity and play to the strengths of mission command. Risk is examined further in Chapter 6. 1-26. The Position of the Commander. Commanders must decide where they can best understand and influence events and outcomes. They must identify the best position to observe, assess, and lead.18 In doing so, the commander must consider the position in relation to the force, the means of command at their disposal and the mission. The commander must understand where and when they can add value and achieve influence, both in a physical and mental sense, and position accordingly. The enduring moral requirement to ‘lead from the front’ will influence this decision, particularly at the tactical level. However, when positioned forward, there is always a real risk of being distracted by the immediate dangers and losing the ability to command. The following factors shape this decision: a. The ability to assess the situation, including judging the condition and morale of the force and being able to impose will upon it. b. Access to other information which is important to the mission, such as assessments that relate to the condition of the enemy. c. Secure and reliable communications to the various points of command. d. Access to staff support for planning and decision making in order to maintain continuity. e. Security, including physical and electronic protection, taking into account the size and signature of a Command Post and its constituent parts. Siting of a Command Post is found in Chapter 3. 1-27. The principal role of the commander is that of commanding the battle, assigning missions, tasks and resources, understanding enemy intentions and taking key decisions to achieve objectives. The commander should decide where to be best placed so that they can influence the decisive action. Often, through interaction 18 ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.

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with host-nation actors and key inter-agency partners, the commander will take on the additional functions of contributing significantly to the understanding generated in the HQ and furthering key campaign goals through direct influence. The commander must understand where and when they can add value and achieve influence. The commander’s personal involvement is likely to carry significant weight.

The position of the commander is where he can get the best information, then after making a decision have it known to all so action can be taken. He may well be up front or back at main. Field Marshall The Lord Carver 1978

Deputising Command 1-28. Requirements. A deputy, in the form of a second in command, exists from section up to battlegroup level, but this has not traditionally been the case at formation levels of command. This has changed at the divisional and brigade levels, however the deputising of command is not necessarily synonymous with appointing deputy commanders and seconds in command. There is a requirement for a deputy when one or more of the following conditions apply: a. When there is a need to provide short-term relief for the commander. For example, when they rest or are absent from their place of command, either on or off duty. b. When succession in the chain of command must be provided (for example, in the event that the original commander is killed or wounded in action or, for whatever reason, relieved of command). c. When there is a need to reduce the burden on a commander by delegating responsibilities. d. At both the tactical and operational levels, when deputy commanders of multinational or joint forces are required, in order to promote the cohesion of such forces. 1-29. Authority, Responsibility, Accountability. The authority, responsibility and accountability of the commander remain unchanged. 1-30. Span of Command. The span of command, or the nature of operations, can make the appointment of a deputy expedient, if only to supervise preparations or to control discrete force elements not in contact. This enables the commander to perform their command role unfettered from having to be concerned about the detail of tasks that are not so critical or immediate. 1-31. Reliefs. In the absence of established deputy commanders, senior arms advisors or principal general staff officers, such as chiefs of staff, can provide reliefs for commanders for short periods. Lack of sleep can have a significant effect on the physical and cognitive performance of a commander. Attention lapses and reduced insight, leading to reduced understanding and an over-estimation of one’s own abilities, are some of the common symptoms. Commanders have a duty to impose adequate sleep routines on themselves and on their subordinates.

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1-32. Succession. A second in command provides succession at the lower tactical levels and is normally available to assume command at little or no notice if the original commander is no longer available to exercise command. On operations at formation level, procedures for alternate command rest on nominating a subordinate commander to assume command. The potential practical difficulties of adopting this procedure should be recognised when setting up the command organisation for a particular campaign or major operation. A subordinate not only has to move to join the superior headquarters (if it still exists), which will take time, but must also acquaint themselves fully with the situation at that level of command before they are in a position to assume command effectively. This will be achieved more quickly if they are fully conversant with the predecessor’s intent. 1-33. Delegation. Delegating command responsibilities allows the senior commander to concentrate on particular areas or concerns, leaving a nominated deputy to concentrate on others. For example, deputy commanders may have specific, delegated powers of budgetary and financial responsibility in peacetime. On operations, if the commander were to fall in action or be otherwise incapacitated, the nominated deputy commander would be available to take their place. Alternatively, those who deputise for the commander in peacetime may not necessarily deploy with a formation and may be retained at the home base to look after the residual responsibilities of deployed commander and to train reinforcing units. 1-34. Deputies of Multinational or Joint Forces. Deputy commanders of multinational forces may be appointed to help strengthen the collective command of an alliance, or to bond coalition forces together, giving a visible expression of national representation in the higher levels of command. 1-35. Deputy Commanders. The scale and complexity of operations, particularly at the divisional level, mean that command cannot be exercised without the support of a deputy commander (DComd19) who exercises command when the commander is absent from the HQ. The DComd may also be used to control a particular phase or geographical area of the operation which requires forward command: a. The relationship between the deputy and the staff is unique. Staff members do not work for the deputy commander unless the commander directs this relationship. Each commander describes the deputy commander’s roles, duties and relationships with the COS, the staff and the commanders of subordinate units. Normally, the commander assigns specific fields of interest and responsibilities to deputies, to decentralise decision making while maintaining overall command.20 b. Deputy Commanders normally do not have a dedicated staff. When they have specific responsibilities, the HQ staff assists them as the commander prescribes. Deputy Commanders give orders to the COS (or direct to the staff) within the commander’s limits and may go to the COS at any time for staff assistance. If a deputy commander needs a staff, the commander may detail officers from the HQ or subordinate units to help, or make a subordinate unit’s HQ available.

19 NATO abbreviation for Deputy Commander is DCOM. 20 ATP-3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied land Forces.

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Span of Command 1-36. There is a limit to the number of subordinate organisations that a commander can effectively command. This number will depend upon several factors including the complexity of the task, geographical spread and nature of the organisation. If the span of command is too great it will impact upon the ability of the commander to maintain understanding and make timely decisions. The task organisation of a unit or formation must take this into account. The number of external organisations including agencies, allies, coalition members and host-nation force elements with which a commander has to interact should also be considered. The Army’s experience suggests that for complex manoeuvre operations in contact with the enemy, a span of command should not exceed five subordinate manoeuvre groupings. This rule is not absolute, but is a good principle for organising brigades, battlegroups and sub units. The fewer the points of command, the more rapid the tempo. 1-37. For ground-holding or framework security operations, the span of command may be exceeded as a static headquarters has greater capacity for complex communications and information systems, with the commander and staff being less concerned with the requirement to manoeuvre. In a static headquarters, tempo is generated by managing and processing large amounts of information while generating multiple plans and executing missions concurrently.

In 1976 as part of saving money it was decided have all divisions in Germany command without any intermediate brigade headquarters direct to battle groups. This span meant commanding ten battle groups in contact over a 30km frontage. This was too big and by 1980 the brigade level of command was formally returned. From Craftsmen of the Army by JM Keene Vol 2 page 186

Command States 1-38. A common understanding of the degrees of authority is a prerequisite for effective cooperation. Command arrangements must always be qualified by the DTG at which they begin. They should also specify the DTG at which they are likely to end and must accommodate the situation prior to and after transfer of authority (TOA). Note that when working in a multinational environment, the authority granted through command states must be clarified with the issuing commander. 1-39. Command States explain the status of formations, units and commanders, relative to each other. States of command are concerned primarily with the ability to assign an independent mission, to reorganise a unit to suit its task, or to direct specific tasks within an agreed mission. They exist in order to: a. Allow a higher headquarters to prioritise resources and effort. b. Protect the integrity of force structures and where appropriate to protect the independence of non-organic forces. c. Assist with force packaging when working with limited resources.

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In general, the command state should be set at the highest level possible, whereas control should be held at the lowest level possible. Control at too high a level can result in a loss of flexibility and tempo. Conversely, command at too low a level can result in the inability to concentrate resources and will hamper the ability to rapidly switch priorities. 1-40. Full Command (FULLCOM). FULLCOM is the military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national Services. The term ‘command’, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has FULLCOM over the assigned forces of other nations. Only OPCOM or OPCON (see below) can be delegated across national lines. 1-41. Operational and Tactical Command States: a. Operational Command (OPCOM). OPCOM is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units and to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be necessary. It includes the authority to assign separate employment to components of the units concerned. It does not include responsibility for administration or logistics (see ADCON, below). b. Operational Control (OPCON). OPCON is the authority delegated to a commander to direct assigned forces so that they may accomplish their specific missions or tasks, usually limited by function, time, or location, to deploy units concerned and to retain or assign tactical control to those units. OPCON allows a commander to issue missions and tasks to subordinates, within the scope of the mission issued by higher authority.21 It does not include the authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Nor does it include administrative or logistic control. c. Tactical Command (TACOM). TACOM is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. d. Tactical Control (TACON). TACON is the detailed local direction and control of movement, or manoeuvre which is necessary to accomplish missions or assigned tasks.

21

Note that this is the authority to issue Missions and Tasks to OPCON subordinates is a UK interpretation reflecting the likelihood of the definition being revised by NATO in the near future.

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OPCON (2)

TACOM

TACON (7)

Authority

FULLCOM

OPCOM

Task organise the assigned element (1)

X

X

Assign missions to the assigned element (3)

X

X

X(4)

Assign tasks to the assigned element for the purpose of which it has been assigned.

X

X

X

X (5)

OPCOM OPCON TACOM TACON

OPCOM OPCON TACOM TACON

OPCON TACOM TACON

TACOM TACON

TACON

Coordinate movement, local defence, and force protection.

X

X

X

X

X

Planning and coordination

X

X

X

X

X

Administrative and logistic responsibility

X

May further delegate command authority (6)

FULLCOM full command OPCON operational control TACON tactical control OPCOM operational command TACOM tactical command Notes: (1) The gaining commander may task organise the assigned unit and thus assign separate missions to it and its component parts. This is limited to FULLCOM and OPCOM. A commander assigned forces under FULLCOM or OPCOM may employ those forces for any purpose. (2) For forces allocated under OPCON the gaining commander may not break up the organisational integrity of the force for separate employment. Under OPCON forces assigned may only be employed within certain constraints such as function, time or location imposed by the higher authority. For example, the forces may only be assigned for a single phase of a particular operation. This may be done for national purposes in the case of a multinational context, where it is in a participating nation’s interest to constrain in some fashion the employment of the contributed force. In other cases the assigning commander may require the force for other purposes later in the operation. (3) A mission is defined as: A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose (AAP-06). (4) Under OPCON the gaining commander may assign a mission to the assigned element that is distinct from, but related to, the gaining commander’s overall mission. OPCON is normally applied to assigned manoeuvre elements such as infantry and armour forces. (5) Under TACOM the gaining commander may only allocate to the assigned force a specific task consistent for the accomplishment of the mission and purpose assigned by the higher commander, that is, within the parameters of the current mission given by the higher authority. TACOM is used where the superior commander recognizes the need for additional resources for a task but requires the resources intact for a later role. Under TACOM the assigned force is allocated for specific tasks and is allocated normally for a limited period of time. This prevents the gaining commander from employing the assigned force in a role or manner not intended by the higher commander. When the task is complete or the specific time frame expires, the TACOM relationship with the gaining force ends. TACOM is usually applied to specific situations and to combat support elements that have unique capabilities. Example of forces and situations in which TACOM would likely be used is: an engineer subunit assigned to an infantry unit to assist in building field fortifications for a specific period of time. (6) With the exception of FULLCOM, a gaining commander may further delegate the same or a lesser command authority over the allocated force to a subordinate commander, but within the same constraints initially given. (7) TACON is generally used to indicate those units that will be located within another unit or formation’s assigned geographical boundaries, and by so assigning, the gaining unit becomes responsible for coordination aspects within the shared area of operations. The gaining commander has authority to coordinate local defence, force protection and terrain allocation. Table 1.1. - Summary of Command State Authorities

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1-42. Control and Coordination Terms. The following terms may be ascribed independently to operational and tactical command states to delegate elements of authority: a. Administrative Control (ADCON). ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect of administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other issues not included in the operational mission of the subordinate or other organisations. Therefore, ADCON is assigned separately to a given command state. b. Logistic Control (LOGCON). LOGCON is the authority to execute logistics functions and activities within the agreed limits of logistic control in accordance with the Transfer of Authority.22 c. Coordinating Authority (CA). CA is the authority granted to a commander, or an individual that assigns responsibility to them for the coordination of specific functions, or activities, involving forces of two or more countries, or commands, or two or more services, or two or more forces of the same service. The CA has authority to request consultation between the organisations involved or their representatives, but not to compel agreement. In the event of irreconcilable disagreement, the CA shall refer the matter to the appropriate higher authority. d. DIRLAUTH. DIRLAUTH is most commonly used by UK and some allied forces (US) to mean direct liaison authorised.23 However, there is the potential for confusion with this term when operating with multinational partners. AJP-3(B) uses the term DIRLAUTH as Direct Liaison Authority, which is a synonym for CA. AAP-624 does not recognise the term DIRLAUTH. 1-43. Understanding C2 Authority. The following examples explain the status of assigned forces: Can I break up force elements and direct the separate employment of their component parts? 

Only OPCOM authorises the commander to split force elements and use component parts separately.

Can I use force elements for any purpose (give them missions)?

Only OPCOM authorises the commander to assign missions to force elements. OPCON authorises the commander to assign missions or tasks for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

Can I give force elements tasks in accordance with their mission?

TACOM allows tasks to be issued to subordinates within the mission given to them by their OPCOM or OPCON commander.

Can I delegate control to other force elements (is the relationship OP or TAC)?

Only OP command states (OPCOM and OPCON) can authorise delegation of control to another force element. Table 1.2. - Status of Assigned Forces

Notes: (1) AAP-6 defines a mission as a ‘clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose’. (2) AAP-6 does not define a task. Within the context of command states, tasks are undertaken within (and are subordinate to) the subordinate force element’s mission. Tasks are usually limited by function, time or location.

22 ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces, Annex C. 23 AAP-15. NATO Glossary of Abbreviations used in NATO Documents and Publications, 2016. 24 AAP-06. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2015.

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1-44. Example Employment of Assigned Force Elements: Ser

Command State

Example

(a)

(b)

(c)

1

FULLCOM

2

OPCOM

Authority (d)

A BG Comd issues orders to organic sub-units.

The commander has the authority to employ forces for any purpose. FULLCOM only applies to national force elements.

A BG Comd is assigned an Armd Sqn OPCOM. 

The commander has the authority to give the Sqn a mission or he can break it up and give a separate mission to each Tp.

3

OPCON

A BG Comd is assigned an Armd Sqn OPCON. The BG’s mission is to ‘Defend Warminster iot Protect key infrastructure’.

The BG Comd cannot give the Sqn a mission that varies from that which was issued by higher authority. The BG Comd can issue a mission to the Sqn in order that the BG can accomplish its mission to Defend Warminster. For example, a mission to ‘Secure the railhead’ or ‘Delay the enemy for three hours between Line TIGER and Line DOG iot enable preparation of the MDA’, would be appropriate.

4

TACOM

A BG Comd is assigned a Heavy PM Inf Pl TACOM. The Pl’s mission is to escort CPERS from the Unit Holding Area to the Bde Collecting Point. 

As this Pl is TACOM, the BG Comd can assign tasks to it, (VCP on Rte SALAMANCA), as long as it is part of the Pl’s mission.

TACON

A BG Comd is assigned an AD Det TACON. The AD Det’s mission is to defend A1 Ech and the CPERS Handling Facility against air attack.

The BG Comd can direct the location of the Det’s position and can control their movement in the battlespace. The BG Comd cannot give them additional tasks (VCP on Rte SALAMANCA), or defend BG Main against air attack.

5

Table 1.3. – Employment of Assigned Force Elements

Control 1-45. Control is the detailed direction, coordination and regulation of the activities of subordinate units and formations, enabled by processes and systems and by the staff. At the lowest tactical levels, command and control are often vested in a single individual. At higher levels, it is delegated by a commander and exercised on their behalf by the operations staff.25 It includes the responsibility for ensuring that the commander’s orders and directives are implemented and that the decisions and actions of subordinates conform to the intent expressed by the commander. 1-46. Control can enable decentralised execution by apportioning battlespace within which subordinates are given the freedom to act. However, control measures will be used by a higher headquarters to enable the activities of subordinates to be deconflicted. Commanders should, wherever possible, increase the freedom of action of subordinates through decentralisation and delegation, controlling only when absolutely necessary, perhaps because of limits on resources or the complexity of the task. However, a commander is unlikely to be successful if they are not supported by a well-organised, well-trained and efficient headquarters, which is practised in exercising the right degrees 25

This includes branches such as Arty Ops, Engr Ops, CSS Ops and the like.

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of control in the most demanding conditions. These conditions include those encountered during manoeuvre in contact with an enemy, while coordinating combined arms actions. The deduction is that formation and battlegroup headquarters should be as proficient at exercising control from mobile platforms, with sufficient protection (e.g. under armour), as they would be in a staff training environment. 1-47. Control has two elements, procedural control and positive control:26 a. Procedural Control. Procedural control relies on the implementation of commonly understood procedures across a force for the regulation of activity within and between force elements. One example is Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Procedural control can, for example, be used to allocate a volume of battlespace to individual force elements for a period of time. Although sometimes perceived as an air-control technique, procedural control should be applied across all environments. In the land environment, such control also includes measures to coordinate land, air and maritime fires. While procedural control is simple, it is also less flexible than other forms of control and can curtail a commander’s ability to exploit developing opportunities. b. Positive Control. Instead of using general, procedural means, a commander may wish to direct the control of discrete force elements in a particular place for specific periods of time. Positive control allows for the control of activities in real time, using automated means. However, even when resolution of the position of friendly forces is good, that of the enemy, adversaries and the population is seldom neither timely nor accurate enough to support positive control as the sole means of battlespace management. 1-48. Communication and Information Systems (CIS). CIS is a key enabler of control. The use of battle management systems enable control measures to be specified with a high degree of accuracy. They allow for changes to be rapidly disseminated across the command and they provide near real-time feedback on the progress of operations to a commander and the staff. CIS capabilities and limitations, such as range, bandwidth, interoperability, latency and security must be factored in to all plans by the functional staff working to the integrating cells. CIS is further discussed in Chapter 2. 1-49. Control is discussed in Part B.

26 ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.

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AFMTitle Pub Command

Chapter Chapter2?

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Chapter Title? Command Support

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Chapter 2 Command Support Introduction 2-01. Command support consists of the people, places, systems and processes that assist the commander in exercising command and control. The commander uses command support to regulate the force elements and functions of subordinate and supporting units, to ensure that a mission is accomplished. At every level of command above the lowest tactical level, there are four basic elements to Command Support as listed below. These are also represented in the Command Model at Figure 2.1. a. The Staff. The staff comprises the personnel who assist the commander in the exercise of command and control. The role of the staff and the individual requirements of staff officers are explained in this chapter.

• • • • • •

Introduction The Staff The Staff Officer Relationships involving the Staff Organisation of the Staff Communication and Information Systems • Liaison • Procedures and Instructions Annex A • Use of Information Annex B • Gen Irwin’s ‘How to be a Brigade Staff Officer’ Annex C • Functional Application Services

b. Provision of an HQ. The HQ is a secure base for the commander and the staff, which includes the Command Post (CP) and the administrative and security organisations that protect, sustain and move the commander and the staff. HQs and CPs are described in Chapter 3. c. Communication and Information Systems (CIS). CIS is an assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary, key personnel organised to accomplish information transfer and processing functions.27 CIS is described both within the main body of this chapter and in Annex A – Use of Information. d. Processes and Procedures. Standard procedures, including those for decision making and the dissemination of orders, focus command and staff effort within and between headquarters.

27

AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2015.

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Leadership

Functions of Command

Decision Making

Control

Elements of Command Support

CI

Provision of a HQ s S; P rocesses & Procedur e

Figure 2.1. – The Command Model

2-02. Effective use of information is a critical seam which runs through the entirety of the Command Model. Annex A – Use of Information provides further detail for both the commander and staff on this essential function, especially with regards to Information Management.

The Staff 2-03. The staff, as an organisation, has no authority by itself. It derives authority from the commander and exercises that authority in their name. Thus, all staff activities are undertaken on behalf of a commander. 2-04. Duties of the Staff. Regardless of the level of command, the staff has three main roles: to support the commander; to support subordinate formations and units; and informing other HQs. The commander’s intuition (the art) should be balanced by the staff’s rigorous analysis (the science), with the two being complementary and not antagonistic. a. Supporting the Commander. The staff has the duty to support, advise and caution the commander. The staff supports by focusing on the functions of control: oversight, directing and coordinating. Under the function of coordinating, the staff supports the commander by gathering, processing, analysing and presenting information in a manner that helps the commander to select a particular course of action. The staff is then responsible for planning, as well as the preparation and dissemination of procedural control measures, normally promulgated in the form of orders. The staff provides part of the feedback mechanism essential for subsequent, timely decision making. The staff must also provide advice which takes many forms including technical and special to arm. This advice will at times be cautionary. This is not the application of a handbrake, rather it is the considered advice given to a commander to alert them to any omissions and conflicts within their intent/plan.

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b. Supporting Subordinate Formations and Units. The staff also exists to support subordinate formations and units, whose ability to live, train and fight depends to a large extent on the actions of the staff within their superior headquarters. In the eyes of both superior and subordinate commanders and staffs, the hallmark of a proficient headquarters is the capacity of the staff to work in a timely, efficient and cooperative manner. It is the responsibility of the staff to ensure that all relevant information is passed to subordinate formations and units as well as flanking force elements. Staff must not sit on information. The staff must have a two-down mindset. It is the responsibility of the staff at all levels to put subordinate forces into action at their best advantage.

‘The staff must be the servants of the troops and that a good staff officer must serve his commander and the troops but must himself be anonymous’. Field Marshal Montgomery

c. Informing other HQs. The third role of the staff is to inform the wider force, in particular the higher, flanking, agency, allied and partner headquarters. This will help deliver unity of effort and understanding across the force. 2-05. Decision Making by the Staff. As explained in Chapter 1, the commander is not the sole decision maker in any organisation/hierarchy. The commander always retains the responsibility for decision making but may delegate the authority to subordinates and members of the staff. This allows the commander to concentrate on the essential decisions applicable to the command. Giving the staff and subordinates the authority to make routine decisions is an important element of Mission Command.

The Staff Officer 2-06. The staff officer assists the commander by: a. Understanding the commander’s future requirements and offering informed advice when called for, or if an important factor has been overlooked. b. Providing the commander with information to assist in reaching decisions, while making routine decisions within the staff officers’ delegated areas of responsibility, thus protecting the commander from irrelevant detail.

Read Annex B This subsection is supported by Lieutenant General Irwin’s timeless guidance for brigade staff officers at Annex B. The notes are applicable to almost any situation a staff officer will face in any headquarters or CP.

c. Developing and implementing the commander’s plan by issuing and monitoring the execution of directives and orders on the commander’s behalf.

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2-07. Qualities of a Staff Officer. Many of the qualities required by commanders also apply to staff officers. This is particularly so for senior staff officers in both national and multinational appointments, who may have considerable delegated powers of command and responsibility. Staff officers also work with subordinates and support personnel (such as clerks and signallers) and will be required to lead others. In addition to the fundamental quality of leadership, shared by all officers, the following personal qualities typify a good staff officer:

Qualities of a Staff Officer „„ Character „„ Intellect „„ Hard work „„ Technical competence „„ Wider awareness

a. Character. A staff officer must be loyal, tactful, trustworthy and supportive of the commander, yet at the same time retain an independence of thought and judgement. The staff officer must accept responsibility willingly and stand by their decisions. The staff officer must advise, consult and cooperate with others, as well as be prepared to represent the decisions of others, sacrificing self or vested interests. A wise staff officer will also cultivate a pleasant disposition. As Staff Duties in the Field, 1962, advised ‘Good manners and a sense of humour will often help a staff officer to achieve results which could not be otherwise obtained’. Fifty years later this is still true. b. Intellect. The better a staff officer’s knowledge and intellect the more capable they will be. Their duties include research and subsequent mastery of their areas of responsibility. The staff officer must be knowledgeable, imaginative, capable of anticipating, acting and reacting in a flexible manner, thinking and working under pressure and must communicate accurately, both verbally and on paper, with emphasis on clear, succinct, powers of expression. Above all, the staff officer must be capable of taking a broader view of their responsibilities and not become too compartmentalised in their outlook. c. Hard Work. The object of most staff work is to relieve the commander of routine and detailed work. Therefore, despite the requirements for originality and creativity, the reality of much staff activity is solid hard work. This requires a methodical, systematic approach and an eye for detail. If a staff officer is responsible for a team, they must be able to delegate responsibility to subordinates, coordinate their work and present solutions, based on team effort, succinctly, accurately and on time. d. Technical Competence. As CIS and associated systems proliferate, a staff officer must achieve and maintain the technical skills required to operate and exploit both these systems, services and the information that they enable. This is a particular challenge when a CP requires a high number of augmentees. e. Wider Awareness. The staff and the operation that they are supporting do not sit in isolation of the UK nor of the deployed location. A staff officer must have a high level of cross-cultural awareness and political sensitivity. Cross-cultural awareness accepts and creates an environment which allows each culture to contribute its values, perspectives and behaviours in constructive ways, to enhance outcomes. 2-08. Functions of a Staff Officer. There are three functions of a staff officer: thinking and deciding, communicating and organising. These functions are not discrete activities, but are cognitive processes that serve as a framework within which each is mutually supported by the others.

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a. Thinking and Deciding. Excellent staff work requires intelligence, experience and thought. Staff officers who can deliver this level of excellence take time to reflect on their work, understanding that quality is not related to hours spent at their desk, but rather to the quality of thought that underpins their work. Understanding how thinking can be exploited in order to address different types of issue is important. Analysis is the detailed examination of the elements or structure of an issue. To get to quality analysis, a staff officer must know the context in which the issue lies. Thinking leads to understanding and once there is an adequate level of understanding, effective decisions can be made. Excellent staff work is not judged by the speed of decision making, it is judged by the quality and timeliness of the decisions made. b. Communicating. Communicating is the most visible skill of the staff officer. The best thought-out plans and the most sensible decisions will matter little if they are not effectively communicated to all who need to know. The contemporary battlespace is connected. There are more lines of communication open than ever before. Managing coherent, mutually supporting messages across a wide range of media is as important as the content of the messages themselves. Excellent staff work, either written or verbal, considers the requirements of the audience and the task/issue in order to effectively deliver the right message. c. Organising. Organising is the third function and is the crucial enabling activity that binds the other functions together. Organising is the process of arranging resources such that they are in the best position to enable exploitation, which means the skilled management of information and people.

Relationships involving the Staff 2-09. Between Commander and the Staff. While opportunities for access to, and the development of close relationships with, the commander will depend on the size and level of headquarters, the fundamentals of the relationship between commander and staff endure. It should be characterised by a climate of loyalty, respect and individual initiative, rather than one that is sycophantic and unquestioning. The independence of thought and timely action implicit in Mission Command is vital. 2-10. Between Staff and other Levels of Command. How the staff interact with subordinate, flanking and superior headquarters is critical. Staff must be careful not to presume or to hide behind the rank of the commander, while at the same time working to deliver the commander’s intent. They must develop open and positive relationships with other staffs based upon mutual respect developed through a conscientious, determined and helpful approach to problem solving. Anything less will undermine confidence in the exercise of command at all levels. 2-11. Staff Integration and Teamwork. The creation of an effective and closely knit staff team within the HQ and between the HQ and subordinate force elements is essential. A staff cannot work efficiently without complete cooperation between all branches and services. There must be no secrets between branches and no abrogation of responsibilities. The COS and other principal general staff officers have a key role in fostering this atmosphere. This environment can be frustrated by frequent changes in personalities and infrequent opportunities to exercise under operational circumstances. Groupings and work practices are unlikely to remain static. Many of the British

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Army’s past and present operations have been characterised by the forming of ad hoc headquarters, formations and units, with the integration of additional personnel from coalition partners and the reserves. Team building is a command skill which requires effort and practice. 2-12. Access to the Commander. While it is important that a commander strives to maintain two-way communications with all members of the staff, this becomes increasingly impractical at higher levels of command. At battlegroup level, the staff will have frequent contact with the commander in training and on operations. At higher levels, commanders may choose to allow a wide range of staff officers to have direct access to them in barracks. However, during operations this may become less feasible and a commander may elect to limit access. The personal relationships created in barracks, which are so essential to the maintenance of trust, can be fostered by involving a large number of staff officers during information briefings. This will acknowledge their contribution, as well as allowing them to hear the commander’s deliberations. However, decision briefings may often have to be restricted to that smaller group who have contributed to the decision making process.

Organisation of the Staff 2-13. Staff Branches. Traditionally, the staff is organised into branches using the G1-9 structure, with general responsibilities shown in the table below. Staff structures will at all times be flexibly adapted on operations to achieve the effects required by the commander. The integration of the staff, in whatever groupings required, will bring the necessary synergy to act and achieve those desired effects. The basic organisation and structure will be influenced by the operational situation, the level of command and the mission. When acting in any routine or land-based role, the G1-9 structure is used, but if an HQ is required to act as a JTF HQ, it will transfer to the joint nomenclature (J1-9). The differences in name (and to a lesser extent function) between Army, Joint and NATO staff branches are shown in the table below:

UK Military Functional Staff Branch

Joint (From JDP 3-00)

NATO

G1

Personnel & Administration

J1 Personnel & Administration

Personnel & Administration

G2

Intelligence & Security

J2 Intelligence

Intelligence

G3

Operations

J3 Operations

Operations

G4

Combat Service Support

J4 Logistics

Logistics

G5

Future Plans

J5 Plans

Plans & Policy

G6

CIS

J6 CIS

CIS

G7

Doctrine & Training

J7 Doctrine & Training

Doctrine & Training

G8

Finance

J8 Finance

Budget, Finance & Contracting

G9

Policy, Legal & Presentation

J9 Civil Secretariat

CMI/CIMIC

Table 2.2. – Summary of Staff Branches

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2-14. Principal Staff Officer – The Chief of Staff (COS). As the senior staff officer, the COS ensures that the commander’s intent is turned into workable plans, which are communicated to subordinate formations and units, as well as the HQs of superior and flanking formations. Although the COS at formation level is not the commander’s deputy, compared to the DCOS and others of equal rank, the COS is ‘primus inter pares’. The COS must be capable of acting on behalf of the commander, including decision making in the commander’s absence and coordinating the work of all staff branches. In this respect, the development of a close working relationship, based on mutual understanding and trust between the commander and the COS is vital.

Communications and Information Systems 2-15. Introduction. CIS is an essential part of military operations and provides commanders with the means to exercise command and control and to disseminate information. Employed effectively, CIS enable a commander and staff to exercise significant advantage in information sharing, situational awareness and the execution of command and control. CIS is an assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary, key personnel, organised to accomplish information transfer and processing functions.28 The flow of information between organisations should be seamless, within the constraints of system and protective markings. Commanders establish the climate and approve the policies that enable effective communication through the available CIS. Thorough training on CIS is critical. Commanders should use simulations and command post exercises to gain and maintain proficiency on these staff tools and services. 2-16. CIS Strengths and Weaknesses. The strengths and weaknesses of these systems will directly affect how command is enacted across the force. CIS is often optimised for particular types of operations, but may be used in a much broader range of circumstances. They also have finite reach and capacity. These characteristics require commanders to direct their priorities for command in terms of time, space and the information required in order to enable the staff to configure CIS in the most appropriate ways to support the operation. Formations and units should give consideration for redundancy and procedures to operate in a contested Electro-magnetic Environment (EME). It is a false assumption that CIS will unconditionally work in a contested environment. 2-17. Operational CIS (OpCIS). The divisional level operates upwards (and sometimes sideways) using OpCIS and reach-back services, as well as operating downwards to its subordinates on Tactical CIS (TacCIS). This requires the divisional staff to be proficient on two systems that operate with different services and applications. Thus, additional burdens may be placed on the staff in terms of transferring information from OpCIS to TacCIS. OpCIS is designed to operate in a more static environment, though it does allow for a degree of information flow from the strategic level down to the operational and higher tactical commands, via gateways. Applications are likely to be constrained or limited between CJIIM actors and between different security classifications. 2-18. Tactical CIS (TacCIS). Brigades and below operate on a common TacCIS, which provides voice communications, data (for passage of OSW), shared situational awareness, planning tools and functional applications (eg fire control). TacCIS is fully deployed from sub-unit level to division level. TacCIS must be rugged enough to allow for almost continuous mobility and must be able to operate in a contested electronic battlefield. 28

AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2015.

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2-19. Applications and Services. Specialist applications29 are provided to enable the commander and staff to exercise effective command and control and information dissemination. They enable functional activity and provide planning and execution tools.

Liaison 2-20. Liaison is defined as ‘that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces, to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action’.30 Liaison may be a continuous, informal process, normally achieved through consultations between the respective commanders or their staffs, either by face to face contact or electronically. Liaison is a standing requirement, especially in multinational operations and must not become an after-thought on deployment. Liaison must be reciprocal when: a. A force is placed under the command or control of an HQ of a different nationality. This is described further in Part C. b. Brigade-sized and higher formations of different nationalities are adjacent. 2-21. When liaison is not reciprocal, responsibility for its establishment is governed by the following principles: a. From left to right. b. From rear to front for units of the same echelon. c. From higher to lower echelon. d. From supporting to supported unit. e. From the incoming force to the outgoing force during the relief of combat troops. 2-22. The selection of Liaison Officers (LOs) is critically important. The contribution of one high-grade and well-motivated LO to the cooperation and mutual understanding between headquarters can be out of all proportion to the individual’s rank and appointment. As they represent their commander, LOs should know them, understand their plans and be able to express their views cogently to the commander and headquarters to which they are attached. It is the responsibility of the despatching headquarters to select, train and exercise their LOs, brief them on the current situation before their deployment and keep them informed of developments. The receiving headquarters must provide access to commanders, briefings and any information relevant to their liaison duties. Liaison detachments must provide 24-hour cover and maintain the necessary communications. 2-23. There will be occasions when the exchange of liaison officers or liaison detachments will be insufficient to ensure adequate understanding and cooperation between formations. This is most likely to be the case in joint or multinational operations. Integration of staff into each other’s headquarters provides a solution.

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e.g. fires, targeting, logistics, planning, intelligence, geographic etc. AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2015.

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2-24. When electronic communication is impossible, unreliable or not interoperable, it is imperative that formations or units which are operating closely together exchange LOs. This may be done for a specific purpose and for a limited period of time, such as providing a LO at a reserve demolition to report when their force elements are clear. Liaison may have to be conducted over a more protracted period when, for example, the activities of a number of formations or units have to be tightly coordinated. This is especially important if they are from different nations, or if they have not trained together for the activity they are about to undertake. In this case, LOs should be exchanged between headquarters and, if they need to be effective for a significant period, they may have to be built up into a liaison detachment. 2-25. LOs can play an important role in ensuring that mismatches in assumptions, values, language or expectations are identified and bridged. Cultural differences in cognition are also important when assessing potential enemy courses of action. Commanders must understand that an allied partner’s thinking, wholly rational as it is to them, can be very different to their own.31

Procedures and Instructions 2-26. In order to standardise activity across the Field Army and within subordinate formations and units, prescribed procedures and instructions are used. 2-27. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).32 SOPs are Field Army-wide directives that cover those features of operations that require a standard procedure in order to generate optimum capability. SOPs are designed to: a. Standardise procedures for the conduct of operations. b. Prevent repetition in orders. c. Give a clear understanding of individual responsibilities. d. Promulgate and follow agreed joint, coalition and NATO procedures. e. Implement best practice. f. Enable the efficient use of CIS. g. Enable efficient augmentation and regrouping. h. Ensure unity of command, effort, and purpose (see Chapter 1). i. Simplify education and training. 2-28. Standard Operating Instructions (SOIs). SOIs are detailed instructions produced at formation and unit level and are developed from SOPs. SOIs should take into account variations in the operational environment (threat, equipment, roles, mission, environment, chain of command). SOIs may amplify but must not contradict SOPs.

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JDP 04 Understanding, 2010. Formation SOPs Pt 1, 2010.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 2

Use of Information for Command Support Introduction

Use of Information

2A-01. Commanders and staff must be adept • Introduction at using information to command and • Information Superiority control effectively. This requires an • Information Management understanding of what information is • Roles of Commanders and Staff relevant, as well as the employment of effective Communications and Information Systems (CIS). The chance of making the right decision is increased with the fidelity and accuracy of the information on which that decision will be based. Information must therefore be accurate, unambiguous, concise, clear, consistent and timely. The origins (provenance) and status (such as historic or current, draft or final) of the information must be known and it should be in a form which is accessible and usable, as well as stored and passed in a way that ensures it is protected. 2A-02. As an aiming mark, commanders and staff should strive to have Information Superiority over the enemy. Whilst it is an inherently difficult measure, Information Superiority is defined as ‘possessing a greater degree of information about the battlespace, being able to exploit the information more rapidly and preventing the adversary from obtaining or exploiting information which could give combat advantage’. In broad terms, Information Superiority requires getting the right information to the right people, at the right time and in the right format. To do this, commanders and their staff must have, at the core of everything they do, a deep understanding of how they use information. Use of information is broken down into three key areas: a. Information Management (IM). IM is the continuous provision of relevant information to the right person, at the right time and in a usable form to facilitate situational awareness and decision making. It uses procedures and systems to collect, process, store, display and disseminate information. It provides structure through which to communicate and transform information as part of decision making and puts decisions into action. IM is essential in determining critical information, routing information rapidly and accurately, transforming information and disseminating information in a timely manner. b. Information Exploitation (IX). IX is defined as the use of information to gain advantage and improve situational awareness, to enable effective planning, decision making and the coordination of those activities required to realise effects. IX enables understanding.

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c. Information Assurance (IA). IA is defined as the confidence that the information within the Defence Community is maintained reliably, accurately, securely and is available when required. IA protects and defends information by ensuring its availability, confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. IA is vital for ensuring that a high degree of confidence is maintained. This includes the provision of protection for, and the restoration of, CIS. 2A-03. The remainder of this annex will briefly discuss the concept of Information Superiority before going into further detail on the core area of IM. This annex does not consider IX and IA in detail. The IM subsection is broken down into a contextual view of information, corresponding management activities and CIS. The annex then considers the key information-related roles and responsibilities within a headquarters.

Information Superiority 2A-04. Striving to achieve Information Superiority over an enemy or adversary is a critical goal. However, measuring attainment of it is transitory, subjective, largely intangible and highly contextual and personality dependent. In addition, expending effort attempting to know the unattainable can distract valuable resources. Commanders must therefore be prepared to proceed with a limited picture, accepting that the situation may become clearer in time. A valid tactic to break an impasse is to take action that triggers a revealing response from other actors. Given the fluid nature of opportunities and threats, there will always be a degree of interpretation and improvisation required by those involved and therefore a degree of risk. To wait for certainty is not an option for field commanders and staff. Instead, commanders must apply their judgement and experience to manage risk and exploit opportunity. 2A-05. It is easier to know when you do not have Information Superiority than when you do. When commanders struggle to obtain sufficient information to make timely decisions, it is likely that they do not have Information Superiority. 2A-06. Information Superiority is relative. Any advantage generated can be relative to other actors, relative to our ability to meet the demands of a situation and affected by the degree to which actors are able to assess these relative advantages. 2A-07. It is almost impossible to prevent our adversaries from accessing information. Commanders may therefore wish to do the opposite and provide an enemy, or an adversary, with information to persuade them of the futility of their position, deceive them, or to make them dependent on its availability. Deception is beyond the scope of this AFM, but is described in more detail in AFM Protection.

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Information Management 2A-08. General. a. Commanders and their staffs assess the effectiveness of IM by considering how information contributes to reducing uncertainty. IM narrows the gap between the information the commander requires and the information he has. All information must be relevant and the staff must ensure it is also accurate, timely, usable, complete, and precise. Tactical operations produce large amounts of information. Commanders and staffs can avoid potential information overload by establishing criteria for what information to present to the commander. Guidance on these criteria must come from the commander.

A commander should consider basing their IM guidance on: „„ Their willingness to cope with uncertainty. „„ Number and types of decisions they expect to make personally. „„ Gaps in relevant information for specific decisions. „„ The ability to obtain relevant information.

b. Effective IM facilitates the rapid flow of information „„ The degree of control in all directions. Improvements in technology they wish to have over for distributing information allow users to subordinate actions. identify relevant information among the totality of information flowing across CIS. Effective IM „„ Their use of LOs facilitates communications vertically (within the chain and informal of command) and horizontally (among adjacent, communications supporting and supported units). Redundancy in networks. transmission paths safeguards against disruption and battle damage. However, the transmission paths along which information flows is less important than whether it reaches the right destination, at the right time and in a usable format. 2A-09. Information. This subsection discusses the cognitive hierarchy of information, examples of how to categorise information and, finally, what constitutes relevant information. a. Cognitive Hierarchy. As described in Annex 8A of ADP Land Operations, 2017, a cognitive hierarchy consists of four different levels of information. A principal task of IM and its subsequent exploitation is to collect and then transform this information by adding progressively greater meaning at each level, raising it from the lowest data level, to understanding at the highest level. With understanding, the commander can make better decisions and can regulate actions by the forces more effectively. See Figure 2A.1 on the next page.

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Understanding

Judgement

Information requirements

Knowledge

Cognition Internal Education Experience

External Information

Regulated Unregulated

Processing Data

Figure 2A.1. - Cognitive Hierarchy

b. Categorising Information. NATO doctrine provides frameworks to categorise information – Operational and Mission Variables. Both are now used within the UK military and are fundamental to developing a comprehensive understanding of an operational environment and mission. Operational Variables describe an operational environment in terms of six inter-related variables: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure (PMESII). Additionally, the PMESII model can extend to include the Physical Environment and Time (PMESII-PT), if necessary. Mission Variables include the following six factors: Mission, Enemy Forces, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available (friendly forces), Time Available and Civil Considerations (METT TC). c. Relevant Information. Relevant information is important to the commander and staff in the exercise of command and control. Relevant information is the foundation for the Common Operating Picture (COP). Relevant information answers questions the commander and staff deem necessary to exercising effective command. These questions, or requirements, are categorised as Information Requirements (IR) and corresponding Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 - Assess. Large amounts of relevant information are collected routinely in operations and are provided by standard reports and ISR activities. Other relevant information is mission specific and assets must be specifically tasked to

Commanders and staff should know: „„ Incomplete or imprecise information is better than no information at all. „„ Untimely or unusable information is the same as no information at all. „„ Irrelevant or inaccurate information is worse than no information at all.

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collect it. CCIRs and IRs are used to prioritise the tasking of these collection assets. Information becomes relevant if it supports a mission and if it is accurate, timely, usable, complete and precise. Relevant information provides the basis for creating and maintaining the COP and is the basis for achieving Situational Awareness (SA). In the context of this publication, SA is the understanding of an operational environment in the context of the commander’s mission.

Requirements

Information

Analysis

CCIR

Produce reconnaissance and surveillance tasking

COP Situational Awareness

IR

Decisions (Questions)

Modified IR

(Answers)

Analysis CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirement COP Common Operational Picture IR Information Requirement Figure 2A.2. – Illustration of the IR to CCIR to decision development cycle. The process is likely to begin with IRs considered critical to the success of the mission.

2A-10. Information Management Activities. IM consists of five activities: collecting, processing, storing, displaying and disseminating. In practice, the different activities overlap and complement one another. CIS is critical to the effective functioning of information management activities: a. Collecting. Collecting is the continuous acquisition of relevant information about the operational environment and specific mission, by any means. This can include direct observation, other organic ISR assets, or official, unofficial, or public sources from the information environment. The commander establishes the collection priorities through IRs and CCIRs and continuously revises these during the operations process as the situation changes. Collection takes two basic forms - information push and information pull:

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(1) An information-push system collects information by pushing it from the source to the user, either as the information becomes available or according to a schedule. This system is best for managing routine reports, which include information that is not time sensitive. A properly designed information-push system alleviates the problem of distracting subordinate units from their operations with excessive requests for information. An information-push system does not work well in obtaining information to meet unforeseen information needs. The difficulty of fully anticipating the commander’s needs in an information-push system can lead to information overload by attempting to deliver all possible information. (2) In an information-pull system, the user generates IRs and the source provides information in response. A common database can serve this system by allowing authorised users to interrogate the database for information and retrieve it in their requested format. An information-pull system can help focus scarce resources on critical tasks. It can deliver information specifically tailored to the commander’s information needs and only produce information the commander requests. An information-pull system provides exceptional information and commanders should reserve their use of information-pull collection for such exceptional cases. b. Processing. Processing involves raising the meaning of information from data to understanding. It is similar in definition to Information Exploitation (see para 2A2b). Processing adds meaning to relevant information by applying progressively more complex cognitive processes that produces a COP. It includes lower-level mechanical and mechanistic methods such as organising, collating, plotting and arranging data and information. However, effective processing requires analysis and evaluation (higher-level cognitive methods) for it to become knowledge and to support SA. Processing depends primarily on well-trained and adaptive analysts to provide insight. Decision makers apply judgment to knowledge, in order to achieve understanding. Understanding enables informed decision making with less than perfect data and thus generates action. c. Storing. Storing retains relevant information in any form, usually for orderly, timely retrieval and documentation, until it is needed for exercising C2. Information is stored because not all information collected or processed can be displayed at the same time, nor is it all relevant all of the time. Common databases provide powerful tools for transforming data into the information and knowledge required for military decision making. The database provides a bridge, allowing different systems, with different purposes, to interoperate in support of military decision making. d. Displaying. Displaying involves representing relevant information in a usable, easily understood audio or visual form, tailored to the needs of the user that conveys the COP for decision making and exercising C2 functions. Displays should be meaningful images rather than simply masses of data. A good display should allow a commander to look across the area of interest in space and time and rapidly focus on decisive points, identifying opportunities, threats or gaps in information. Good displays should also allow the commander to communicate with subordinates in a manner that facilitates understanding of the desired outcome. There are three ways to present information: written reports, verbal narrative reports and graphic displays.

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Standard formats ensure that all relevant information is included and assist the user in finding information. Displays do not require lengthy instructions and should be intuitive, thereby shortening communications. Properly executed displays use doctrinal terms, graphical conventions and presentational formats that enable the rapid understanding of complex concepts. e. Disseminating. Disseminating involves communicating relevant information of any kind, from one person or place to another, in a usable form, by any means, to improve understanding, to initiate or govern action. It takes two basic forms: broadcast, or point-to-point dissemination. IM activities should consist of an appropriately balanced combination of broadcast and point-to-point forms of dissemination. (1) Broadcast. Senders may broadcast information simultaneously to anyone with access to the information network. A broadcast gets information to the widest audience in the shortest amount of time, however the information cannot be tailored to any specific commander’s needs. Undisciplined use of this method can quickly lead to information overload. (2) Point-to-Point. In point-to-point dissemination, information goes to a specific user or group of users. Information then passes sequentially from one user to the next. CIS can tailor information to meet the specific needs of each recipient. Point-to-point dissemination has built-in control mechanisms that broadcast transmission lacks. Information reaches a broad audience slowly and the chances of distortion increase through each node of dissemination.

Common Operational Picture (COP) The COP is an operational picture tailored to the user’s requirements, based on common data and information shared by more than one command. CIS can now provide all levels of commanders with near real-time information on the current situation as a COP. The COP is derived from data, information and knowledge common to all echelons. The commander and staff tailor its display for resolution and content appropriate to their echelon of command and the mission. Reports and returns generally convey information to inform the COP.

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 2

How to be a Staff Officer in a Brigade Headquarters The following guidance was compiled by the then Brigadier A S H Irwin when serving as Commander 39 Infantry Brigade in 1993. The notes are applicable to almost any situation a staff officer will face. The guidance is pitched at brigade level but is also suitable for higher formations.

Introduction 2B-01. It strikes me that not enough is made of the skills and requirements associated with the business of the staff officer relating to his commander and to others with whom he must deal. 2B-02. This brief note is intended to give some guidance on this subject. It is of course a personal view; others may not agree with what follows. It assumes that the commander for whom you work is possessed of at least a small dose of humanity! For those working for the few whose behaviour is malignantly dictatorial there can be no guidance other than never to make a mistake and to keep the helmet on!

Relationships 2B-03. With the Commander. Nothing is more important than the relationship between the commander and his principal staff officers. This is the goal: a. In age there is probably 12 years between the two. In that 12 years the commander will have acquired, by whatever devious means, higher rank and more experience than his staff. But otherwise there is no difference between the two. It follows that the staff officer must, by convention, observe protocol and must pay due consideration to the wisdom that experience should have conferred on the commander. b. But it also follows that in every other way there should be a free interplay of ideas between the two. This interplay can only take place in a relaxed and informal atmosphere. The knocking at doors, parade ground drill and the excessive use of the word ‘sir’ all tend to interfere with the interactions of minds. It is of importance to note that others judge the competence and standing of the staff officer at least in part by the self-confident way in which he relates with his chief. c. Between the two there should develop a profound sense of trust. This cannot be manufactured but can be helped by following some of the tenets suggested below. d. There should be few secrets between the two; the commander is allowed to keep more than the staff officer!

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e. And best of all, the two should be friends. But if this is not possible (and why should it always be so?) there must at least be no antagonism. If there is, guess who goes! 2B-04. With the Staff. There is no doubt at all that the very best headquarters are not only professionally competent but also happy. There is equally no doubt that if there has to be a choice between the two, professional competence must come first. Principal staff officers must insist on the highest standards, while recognising that SO3s generally have to learn their staff techniques on the job. For this they need advice and help. This advice and help is much better received if people are cheerful. If the commander is an ogre, the principal staff officer has to work hard to brighten the horizon for the junior staff: if the commander is a jolly old card, the principal staff officer may have to work equally hard to ensure that the general air of levity does not deteriorate into inefficiency. 2B-05. With Others. The staff officer must also develop good working relationships outside the brigade: a. With Brigade Units. If one remembers that the job of a brigade headquarters is not only to command but also to serve, the nature of the relationship between the principal staff officer and commanding officers, seconds-in-command, adjutants and quartermasters becomes clear. Units must not feel reluctant to speak to brigade headquarters; they must never feel that it is useless to do so. If principal staff officers are any good they will be used by commanding officers to sound out ideas, to test the water; this is greatly to be encouraged, provided that the staff officer knows his commander’s mind. b. With Higher Formation. Higher formation is almost always an ass. But it does have its uses and it is a good plan to cooperate. Higher headquarters tend to be less asinine towards those brigades that produce timely and accurate information. Brigade staff officers should get to know their counterparts upstairs at an early date. Charm them with smiles and expressions of undying admiration; stroke the ass’s ear. c. With Civilians. When dealing with civilians, whether or not associated with the MOD, pay them the common courtesy of speaking and writing to them in English. The military language is intimidating and incomprehensible to the average mortal. Even we soldiers can be defeated by this language, particularly the MOD dialect that is especially associated with budgets. Stop the rot.

The Skills 2B-06. The ideal staff officer will never make a mistake but that is impossible. But he should strive to achieve the following: a. Professional Competence. Perhaps it goes without saying, but the staff officer must know what he is doing. Sometimes he will be appointed to a job for which he has no previous experience. In this case he will have to spend much time and effort finding out about it. Do not be arrogant; you do not know all the answers. b. A Good Memory. Some are blessed with an amazing ability to remember detail with instant recall. Most are less lucky and must rely on the taking of notes (see below). Either way the staff officer must be able to focus quickly onto the subject raised; otherwise he will waste a lot of his own and other people’s time while he searches for the relevant detail.

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c. Accuracy and Honesty. It is terribly important that the information and written work given to the commander is completely accurate. You should feel bad all day if your commander returns work to you with minor [Staff Duty] (SD) corrections. If you do not know the answer never guess; always declare your hand and find out the accurate answer as soon as you can. The phrases “I imagine”, “I suspect”, “I think”, are unacceptable. “I don’t think so but I will check” is fine. There will be times when you discover that despite your best efforts the answer you have given is incorrect. Always own up at the earliest opportunity. This is where honesty comes in. It will be a very silly commander indeed who discourages you from taking this line; he will be ill-served and will make the wrong decision based on incorrect information. But the distress that you will cause to the commander if he discovers that you are both imprecise and less than honest will be hard to imagine. In short, do not bluff your commander. d. Good Filtering. This is one of the most difficult skills for the staff officer to acquire. “What do I tell the commander?” “What does he need to see/read?” “Can I make a decision without reference to him?” Only experience will provide answers to these questions. To begin with it will be better to refer more to the commander than less. Get him to say whether or not it is an appropriate subject for him. But the aim is to protect the commander from unnecessary detail. The briefing process should include the aim of reducing the amount of reading that the commander has to do. It saves his ageing eyes and allows him more time to do what he should be doing. e. Firmness. Almost all staff work can be done by friendly persuasion. But there will be times when a difficult decision has to be forced through. The staff officer must not flinch from this and should particularly avoid blaming a decision on his commander, implying that he himself does not agree with it. f. Laughter. He should be dissatisfied with himself if he does not make his commander laugh at least once a day. Remember that the commander, great being though he might be, has but limited reserves of cheeriness. This he passes onto the men in the brigade with selfless extravagance. His reserve must be topped up. Often those he is visiting will cheer him up more than he does them; but he may need priming before he goes out and this is the job of the staff officer. The obverse of the coin is also true; try very hard not to be boring, particularly when briefing. It is quite extraordinary how much less important a vital subject appears to be if it is described in a manner and tone so dull that even Nigel Mansell seems hilarious.

Methods and Techniques 2A-07. The following spring to mind: a. Visits. The staff officer cannot do his job unless he gets out and about. His should be a familiar face in all the units of the brigade. [I once served in a brigade where the commander forbade his COS from visiting – ludicrous!] The visits should have the aim of finding out and of helping. b. Briefing the Commander. Develop the technique of storing up subjects for the commander. Do not go into him immediately a new matter arises for his attention unless it is genuinely urgent; even commanders sometimes have work to do and continuous interruption is not good for the blood pressure! It is important as well to avoid the temptation to demonstrate your undoubtedly detailed grip on a problem

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by reciting at length the entire history of the case. State the situation now and only expand on the past in response to a question. Do not waste time telling the commander things he knows already. c. Reacting to the Commander’s Instructions. Sometimes you will receive instructions that need to be passed on immediately as orders. At other times you will be given instructions that require staff action. You will quickly learn which is which. But in the latter case always take some time to think through what has to be done and how to achieve the required result. It is usually a mistake to rush bull-nosed into a problem; never force a lock! d. Feedback. Ensure that you always report back to the commander any results of work that he has asked you to do. If you have reached no conclusion give him a progress report. Regard it as a failure if he has to ask how things are getting on. e. Follow-up Action. Do not assume that a written or verbal instruction from you to the units in the brigade constitutes an end to the matter. Most of the time the relevant action will be taken. But earn yourself a reputation for checking and then the relevant action will always be taken. f. Value-Added Staff Work. Much of your work will originate in your own headquarters. But a great deal will also filter down from above. Never make the mistake of merely acting as a post office. Always add value to the material received by passing it down in précis or extracted form, or by adding helpful explanation, perhaps drawing units’ attention to particular parts of a lengthy document. g. Dealing with the Commander’s Bright Ideas. Nowadays you are unlikely to find a commander who is content to leave things as they are. You may not want to believe it but he will have too much brain-power to be content with a dormant existence. All the ideas put forward by commanders are of course brilliant but some are more brilliant than others. As a staff officer it is your duty to point out the pitfalls of the less good ideas. But for the good ones, and the less good ones that the commander insists on seeing through, there is an overridingly important requirement; you must tackle the job wholeheartedly as if the idea were your own. It is never good enough to parade a succession of reasons why something cannot be done. A positive and enthusiastic approach is required. The best defence against a stream of brigadorial notions is to go active yourself; match the commander idea for idea and earn yourself a reputation as a dynamic thinker, a mover, a forger of events. h. Note Taking. Everyone has his own method, but method there must be. Any will do provided that it does not rely on loose bits of paper; this never seems to work. It gives the commander enormous confidence if he sees his staff officers consulting well-ordered note books. i. Relax!

Conclusion 2B-08. Whatever appointment comes your way after your staff training, you face the prospect of a rewarding and thoroughly enjoyable tour. You will certainly make good friends; you will be privileged to have the chance to influence significantly the way that things are done and with luck you will form a bond with your commander that will long outlast your time in the Army. In any event you will learn much and you will be a better person for the experience.

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ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 2

Functional Application Services 2C-01. Currently the British Army can use the top ten NATO Applications without any additional cost as the UK contributes to the development of these applications. The use of these applications on British systems is not restricted to NATO operations. The British Army can use these applications on bilateral or even unilateral operations. Below are the ten applications available to the British Army: a. JChat – XMPP Chat. b. NIRIS – Network Interoperable Real-Time Information Services. c. ICC – Integrated Command and Control (COP Viewer). d. JTS – Joint Targeting System. e. NITB – NATO Intelligence Toolbox. f. JOIIS – Joint Operations Intelligence Information System. g. JOCWATCH – JOCWatch event log. h. LogFAS – Logistics. i. TopFAS – Tools for Operations Planning. j. iGeoSIT – Interim Geographical Spatial Intelligence Tool. 2C-02. The following provides a brief description of the NATO application listed above: a. JChat. Is centred on time-critical operations in order to prevent casualties and to minimize reaction time. NATO troop-contributing nations maintain multiple chat rooms which are used in a federated network. This makes it possible for users, who are typically connected to a local server, to join chat rooms on local and remote servers. It also allows user accounts to be manually managed by each source (NATO, nation or organisation) within their individual context and at their respective security classification levels. The NATO C2 suite includes the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)-based JChat capability. b. NIRIS. Provides a real-time C2 picture for air, land and maritime operations. c. ICC. Provides capabilities for integrated planning, tasking, intelligence, targeting and operations, information management and decision support to operational and tactical-level operations, during peacetime, exercise, crisis and conflict. ICC is capable of displaying a Joint Common Operational Picture (JCOP), fully supports the joint targeting cycle (through JTS) and also has interfaces to gain access to ISR data from Coalition Shared Databases (CSD - MAJIIC), as well as display friendly force tracking information.

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d. Joint Targeting System (JTS). Provides a network-enabled capability for integrated joint objective and effects−based targeting, target development, target list management, target folder preparation, target imagery management and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). e. NITB. Is an integrated software capability that provides a collection of intelligence tools within a single application, allowing the user to remain in the same environment while working with different types of information. The NITB data can be easily searched based on numerous criteria and the results can be overlaid on a map or previewed in a browser. f. JOIIS. Is a NATO-wide Situational Awareness (SA) tool that supports management and analysis of the Battle Space Objects (BSOs) that are relevant to local commanders. g. JOCWatch. Is a web-based incident/event logging and monitoring tool for the Joint Operations Centre. Incident/event information can be updated over time, correlated and exported in various formats. JOCWatch maintains the ‘legal log’ for the commander. h. Logistic Functional Area Services (LOGFAS). Is NATO’s suite of software that supports logistical planning, execution, tracking and reporting, using an integrated series of computer programmes. i. Tools for Operations Planning Functional Services (TOPFAS). Is a NATO tool suite and designed to provide an integrated set of tools to support systems analysis, planning, execution and assessment of operational campaigns. Information objects created in any one of the tools are available in all others, providing seamless transition of products between various functions of the operations planning group. j. iGeoSIT. Provides situational awareness through the network-centric sharing of geospatial data and operational overlays. It is an interim web map server provider for other FAS. It will be replaced by Core GIS.

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Contents 1

AFMTitle Pub Command

Chapter Chapter3?

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Contents 1

Chapter Title? Command Posts

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Chapter 3 Command Posts Introduction

• Introduction

3-01. This chapter describes the different • Purpose types of Command Posts found at the • Common Requirements various command levels, as well as the • Organisation functions conducted within them. It covers • Distributed and Dispersed Command considerations regarding the organisation • The Application of Tactical Functions of a Command Post (CP) and the factors within a CP that determine its location. The way • Functional and Integrated Cells in which command is conducted on a • Specialist Cells traditional conventional battlefield, through • Operation of CPs to command in a rapid, expeditionary • CP Siting environment is also described. Two additional • Operational Level CP Command and Control (C2) doctrinal • Land Component CP concepts are introduced - Distributed and Dispersed Command. The command and control of a Land Component CP can be found at the end of this chapter. 3-02. A CP is a location from which command is exercised. It consists of a physical structure, the staff and its associated Communication and Information Systems (CIS). The CP supports the commander by analysing and presenting relevant information, by providing the means of control and by providing the communications through which orders are passed and information is exchanged. Principles for the design of formation CPs, from corps level downwards, are generally described in terms of their organisation and function. The UK has traditionally used the term HQ to describe what NATO calls the CP. An HQ is typically the command and control node in barracks. An HQ in the field may have several CPs. The UK is now aligned with NATO doctrine and all deployed HQs will be referred to as CPs.

Purpose 3-03. CPs perform the role of a deployed HQ for a unit or formation. They are where the commander and staff conduct their activities. The CP provides a facility for exercising C2 and should be flexibly organised to meet changing situations, as well as the requirements of a specific operation or action. They enable operations by assisting the Commander in the Operations Process (assess, plan, prepare and execute). This is explained in detail in Part B. The primary function of the CP is to provide information for the commander to gain Situational Awareness (SA), from which the commander and staff are then able to conduct oversight, give direction and coordinate actions.

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Common Requirements 3-04. All CPs have a number of common requirements. a. Deployability. A CP must be structured so that it can be deployed easily to, or within, a theatre of operations. This ease of deployment is dependent on the size and the mobility of its component parts, including CIS, power generation and staff sustainment. b. Continuity of Command. When operational, a CP must be able to enable the exercise of command. This requirement is met primarily by maintaining external communications. Continuity of command further depends on the manning of the CP to maintain constant coverage. Continuity of command requires the survivability of CP infrastructure, including CIS, from ground, air, cyber and electronic magnetic environment (EME) threats. Thus there is a requirement for a degree of redundancy. This redundancy may require reversionary procedures. c. Fusion of Command and Staff Effort. The staff exists to provide command and decision support to the commander and to provide control of subordinates. Within a CP, the command and staff efforts must be fully integrated. Layout, organisation, CIS and staff processes are the key factors that help enable this integration.

Organisation 3-05. Design of CPs. The detailed design and organisation of a CP must reflect the level and nature of the command and the type of campaign, or operation which is to be conducted. In simple terms, form must follow function, tempered by the needs of standardisation. 3-06. Permanent HQ. The home location of the HQ is known as the Permanent HQ. At corps level and potentially at divisional level, it has the ability to host the Main CP from the Permanent HQ’s Operations Centre which enables distributed and/or dispersed command. See paragraph 3.9. 3-07. Types of CPs. There are four principal categories of operational CPs, each providing differing levels of command support to the commander. The four CP types do not apply at all levels of command.

Types of CPs „„ Main CP

„„ Forward CP a. Main CP. The Main CP is the central controlling CP at all levels. It is where all staff and tactical „„ Tactical CP functions are coordinated and where control of „„ Alternate CP subordinates is concentrated. The location of the Main CP will depend on the operational situation, as well as the location of higher and subordinate CPs and the location of other key interlocutors. Additionally, at corps and divisional level, the Main is where the fundamentals of Integrated Action are orchestrated and synchronised.

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(1) Corps Main CP. The corps Main CP controls current operations, performs detailed analysis and plans future operations. Execution is devolved where possible to subordinate divisions. The corps Main CP is moveable, but it is not tactically mobile. A moveable CP implies that it is more static in location and that considerable time and transportation resources are needed to relocate it. If the corps Main CP relocates, an Alternate CP will need to be established at a new location. The corps Main CP can operate from the Permanent HQ in conjunction with a Forward or Advanced CP (for example during a deployment). Typically a Corps HQ will maintain a separate Tactical CP. During longer, campaign-type operations, the Tactical CP can integrate with the Main CP. (2) Divisional Main CP. The primary functions of the divisional Main CP are planning, preparing and executing, while continually assessing. Execution is devolved where possible to subordinate formations under divisional control. The division’s primary role is shaping the environment to enable freedom of action for subordinate formations. The divisional Main CP is moveable, but it is not always tactically mobile. A tactically mobile CP means that it can conduct its C2 mission with minimal external support for its mobility and minimal time for set up. The divisional Main CP can operate from the Permanent HQ location, in conjunction with a Forward CP (for example during a deployment), or with an Advanced CP. (3) Brigade Main CP. The brigade Main CP’s primary purpose is to control the current battle. It is designed so that it can execute one tactical action whilst concurrently planning another. The brigade Main CP is tactically mobile. (4) Battlegroup (BG) Main CP. In their standard configuration, Battlegroup CPs are designed to plan and coordinate execution, but not concurrently. Assessment during the execution phase and making necessary adjustments is not dedicated planning. Within a BG, the Main CP is where the majority of planning and coordination takes place. The battalion Main CP is tactically mobile. b. Forward (Fwd) CP. A Fwd CP is designed to allow a commander to exercise C2 near the forward edge of the battlefield, or near a decisive point where leadership can best be applied to shape a favourable outcome. It may also be deployed early into a theatre or area of operations, as a base for planning, or be used by the commander in specific operations of limited duration. In order to achieve its role, it must be small and mobile. As a result the Forward CP’s capabilities are limited in time and scope. A Fwd CP is resourced at the divisional and brigade levels but not at BG, or below. At the divisional and brigade the DComd may move forward and make decisions with authority delegated by the commander.

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XX

Obj RED

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TAC XX

TAC

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X X

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Figure 3.1. – Geographical Representation of CP Locations

c. Tactical (Tac) CP. The TAC CP is the smallest-sized CP at any level of command. A TAC CP allows a commander to bring personal presence to bear, as the tactical situation dictates. In order to do this it should have protection, mobility and CIS. The TAC CP offers limited functionality, endurance and connectivity. A TAC CP may be under poncho; in a soft skin vehicle; under armour; or on an aircraft, rotary or fixed wing. The mission, time and resources available will influence the best platform for a TAC CP. d. Alternate (Alt) CP. An Alt CP provides continuity of command when a CP either needs to be moved, or is put out of action due to the enemy, equipment failure, or poor siting. There are a number of ways to achieve this, but the price of added flexibility is the need for additional resources. A CP may be duplicated in its entirety to allow control to be passed from one CP to another, prior to the first moving. A technique may be to split the Main CP into two like Alt CPs to exercise Distributed Command (see paragraph 3.9). 3-08. Functions of Command Posts. The operational requirements dictate the functions of the four types of CPs described. The primary purpose of a Fwd, Tac or Alt CP is to provide the commander with an advanced, or step up C2 capability. a. Advanced (Adv) CP. The Adv CP is based on the standard Forward CP concept. It is an agile CP that has the capacity to assess and execute. It does so by combining a limited number of forward-deployed staff with the ability to reach back to the balance of the Main CP. The Main CP may be in theatre, or may remain at the formation’s Permanent HQ. This reach-back enables the Adv CP to exploit the ability of the Main CP to reach out to wider UK Defence capability (PJHQ, Army HQ, national agencies and other formations). In this manner, the Adv CP is able to exert significant early influence in the land environment through a relatively light deployment scale.

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b. Step-up CP. Step-up describes that element of the CP that moves prior to a Change of Control (ChoC). At divisional level, Step-up CP is in the form of a Fwd CP, although a Step-up CP can also be provided by a Tac CP, or an element of the Main CP.

Distributed and Dispersed Command 3-09. Advances in technology, constraints on sustainment, political requirements to minimise the force structure and the need for agility, are changing how C2 is applied. Two emerging doctrinal concepts provide additional ways to exercise Command and Control. These two command approaches are Distributed and Dispersed Command. a. Distributed Command. Distributed Command is the ability to exercise effective C2 leveraging cross-governmental, defence-wide expertise, while deploying forward bespoke functionality as required. The ability to use technology to reach back and to reach forward is crucial to the successful implementation of Distributed Command. Some functions, such as intelligence and planning, may stay within a non-deployed Main CP at the Permanent HQ’s Operations Centre, while current operations, forward CIS elements and sustainment functions deploy to a Fwd CP in the area of operations. Some of the required cross-government capability and non-governmental organisations can only be leveraged in the UK. These assets must therefore be incorporated within the non-deployed CP, either physically with an LO or remotely by CIS. There are five considerations for Distributed Command: (1) Modular and scalable command infrastructure. (2) Common Operating Picture (COP) that is near real time. (3) Collaborative Planning within a well-trained and self-disciplined staff. (4) Robust network technology that allows over the horizon connectivity. (5) Flexible C2 nodes that are adaptable and scalable. b. Impacts of Distributed Command. The employment of Distributed Command can optimise staff where they can be most efficient and effective, which may not necessarily be collocated. It can also reduce the forward footprint of the command element showing a smaller physical and EM signature. By having a significant CP presence at home station, it may increase access and use of UK whole-government capability. However, by splitting the staff, the commander loses immediate access to the entire team. This may result in plans or actions taking longer to complete. There is also a danger that a staff function like the Future Plans cell may become marginalised due to their physical distance from the commander. The CIS requirements to effectively implement Distributed Command are significant. It also requires a greater flow of information to compensate for the lack of personal interaction among staff members; replacing face to face exchanges. Information must be accessible in a timely manner to positively influence decision making. Distributed Command is extremely challenging. It is executed at the operational or at times, higher tactical levels. It is best suited for smaller scale, limited, short period operations. c. Dispersed Command. Dispersed Command sees the staff and the application of selected tactical functions deployed forward, but not centrally located. For an agile, expeditionary force, the functions of command may best be applied from various

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locations and nodes and not necessarily collocated. In effect, it is massing the command capability without massing the staff support. Dispersed Command may also provide redundancy in degraded conditions and ensure some level of continuity. d. Impacts of Dispersed Command. Dispersed Command can reduce the physical and EM signatures of the CP. This will increase survivability of C2 ability against an enemy with near peer or peer capabilities. The smaller C2 nodes will blend in physically and electronically with other force element nodes. On rapid-tempo, long-range, expeditionary operations, Dispersed Command could enable flexible manoeuvre by eliminating a large, static and cumbersome Main CP. It could also allow the placement of bespoke C2 activities across the area of operations, i.e. sustainment or C2 functions at the point where it is best coordinated. However, this agility and flexibility comes with a cost. Decision making is more difficult due to the physical separation of the CP. The COP will never be completely accurate which may impact the ability to make bold shifts or adjustments during execution. More so than Distributed Command, Dispersed Command requires a robust CIS architecture and additional power generation to execute. The ability to successfully utilise this approach must be well resourced and trained. 3-10. CP Size. The size of a CP affects its deployability and survivability. In broad terms, a larger CP may provide greater endurance, but often at the expense of tactical security and mobility, while a smaller CP may limit support to the commander. Added redundancy in the numbers, or size of the CP, gives greater flexibility, but at the cost of greater resource requirements in manpower, vehicles and CIS, as well as reduced deployability. Moreover, work usually expands to fill capacity, reducing agility and tempo. The key is to strike the right balance, producing a responsive and agile organisation. Active measures must be taken to identify those elements that are absolutely necessary and exclude those that are not of value. 3-11. CP Augmentation. Standard CPs and their staff structures are not necessarily manned and configured for all possible C2 scenarios within Combined, Joint, Inter-Governmental, Inter-Agency, Multinational (CJIIM) operations. The core CP structure should be capable of absorbing additional elements and personnel, as well as withdrawing them, according to the type of operation being conducted.

The Application of Tactical Functions within a CP 3-12. The Tactical Functions represent the full breadth of land forces activities when conducting operations. They provide a checklist which describes the actions that land forces take prior to, during and after operations.33 They describe actions and activities, but leave the commander to determine how these should be ordered, sequenced and applied to achieve desired effects. Land operations should be conducted with an understanding of the situation (enabled by appropriate points of command), the synchronisation and application of fires, manoeuvre, information activities and capacity building, as well as ensuring that our own freedom of action is protected and sustained. Divisional and brigade CPs should organise themselves so that each of the tactical functions is represented in each of the Functional Cells. 33 ADP Land Operations, Chapter 8.

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Functional and Integrating Cells 3-13. Functional Cells. The staff branches outlined in Chapter 2 should be organised into Functional Cells based upon the Tactical Functions. A staff section may have representation in more than one Tactical Function cell within a CP. During the course of an operation, a staff member may move from one cell to another. This requirement is directed by the COS to optimise the staff. 3-14. Integrating Cells. Each of the Functional Cells provides staff to the Integrating Cells during the Operations Process (Plan, Prepare, Execute and Assess). Future Plans (FPlans) focuses on the Plan function. Future Operations (FOps) aligns with Prepare and Current Operations (CUops) is central to Execute. The Assess function is continuous throughout. As a result of this amalgamation, the outputs from the CP’s planning and executing activities are fully coordinated. Command

Manoeuvre Fires Information Activites Capacity Building Protection

External Integration

Intelligence

Vertical Integration Staff Braches cross Tactical Functions

Plan

Prepare

Execute

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Future

Current

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Sustainment Horizontal Integration Figure 3.2. – The Integrating and Functional Cell Structure

3-15. CP considerations for the Integrating Cells. A CP should be organised into integrated cells. The integration is based on the traditional G staff as well as specialist capabilities. Vertical integration is primarily composed from the G staff. A G staff element may sit in more than one functional cell. Horizontal integration is based on the Operations Process: Assess, Plan, Prepare, and Execute. By populating the functional cells horizontally and vertically, expertise is better placed to meet the commander’s requirements. The COS should ensure that functional cells are integrated into the Operations Process (Assess, Plan, Prepare, and Execute) and not remain stovepiped. a. Plan. At the corps and divisional levels, plans are initiated in the FPlans integrating cell. These plans are developed using one of the planning processes described in Part B. The FPlans cell contains representatives from the functional cells, which deliver the necessary expertise appropriate to all the Tactical Functions. Future Plans at brigade and above is conducted and led by the G5 staff. Once a plan is completed, it is transferred to FOps. At battlegroup, planning is conducted by the G3.

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b. Prepare. At corps, division and brigade levels, FOps is where the plan enters the Prepare Phase of the Operations Process and is distributed to subordinate formations, units and supporting force elements. During this phase, rehearsals are conducted and refinements to the plan are made. At a corps and divisional CP, the FOps function is conducted by the G35 staff, while at brigade and battalion it is conducted by the G5 staff. At brigade level, the FOps cell does not have the full range of functional staff representatives, although such teams can be formed for bespoke planning activity. Once the operation is about to commence, responsibility for its execution is transferred to COps. At battlegroup, prepare is also conducted by the G3. c. Execute. The COps team is at the centre of a CP. It is not simply a substitute for the traditional G3 Ops function as it has a far wider remit and supports the execution of the commander’s plan by seamlessly coordinating all staff branches and functional cells. COps guides and controls subordinate formations and units. Relevant information is managed, collated and displayed within the Operations Centre (described below under Operation of CPs), which is a critical element of the CP that supports the commander in the decision-making process. At the heart of the Operations Centre is the Common Operating Picture (COP). The commander gains critical elements of SA and thus understanding through the COP, with information being expressed in any appropriate medium (pictorial, textual or verbal). The COP brings together essential elements of the G2, G3, G1/4 staff branches, Fires, ISR and any other element deemed critical at the time. COps is typically centred around the G3 staff.

Speciality Cells 3-16. CP Augmentation. While the majority of the CP is manned by members of the permanent headquarters staff, there is augmentation that supplements capabilities needed during an operation. Higher level CPs typically require more augmentation from speciality or niche capabilities. The augmentation may come in the form of a cell from a functional unit or by an individual specialist. While at division and below, augmentation from specialist cells is on an ad hoc basis, at corps this specialist capability is more habitual. It is critical that specialist cells and individuals are well integrated into the CP. There is danger that these cells could become stovepiped if not incorporated into the plan by the COS resulting in poor planning and unsynchronised execution. 3-17. Air Land Integration. The coordination of air operations is conducted through the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), sitting within the Air Component; this is a theatre-level organisation. The Air Component and the CAOC plans, refines and executes all air operations in its assigned areas in support of the Joint Force Commander. Its orders are delivered in the form of an Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Airspace Control Order (ACO). Air Command and Control is delegated to subordinate units such as Control and Reporting Centres (CRCs), Air Support Operating Centres (ASOCs), and Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft. 3-18. Liaison. Effective liaison between components is essential, with senior officers liaising directly between their respective component commanders. They are responsible for presenting component perspectives during the planning and execution of joint operations and assist with the integration of their component’s participation in joint operations. In addition, specialist staff provide component planning and tasking expertise as follows: a. Liaison. Liaison is established by the Air Component within the Joint Task Force headquarters and at various levels within the Land Component. Liaison includes:

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(1) Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE). The ACCE is the Air Component Commander’s senior air liaison team within the Joint Task Force HQ. The ACCE is headed by a senior airman and team members will usually include representation from across the Air Component HQ. This allows the Air Component Commander to be appropriately represented at the various joint boards and working groups that inform the Joint Task Force Commander’s decision-making process. (2) Air Liaison Elements (ALE). ALE are the Air Component Commander’s joint air and space subject matter experts established within component HQs. They are experienced in joint air planning and execution, the four air power roles, space and airspace management. ALE assist in planning the Air Component Commander’s supporting and supported requirements, exchange current intelligence and operational data and coordinate the integration of Airspace Control Means (ACMs) and Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs). (3) Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land). The AOCC(L) is an ALE, functionally subordinate to the CAOC and integrated at corps level. The AOCC(L) provides a socket which is augmented by liaison elements from the Air Component and provides advice on the capabilities and limitations of air power. (4) Air Support Operations Centre (ASOC). Located across corps, division and brigade, the ASOC is the primary command and control agency responsible for the execution of all air support allocated to the Land Component (CAS, ISTAR, Air Interdiction), as well as the processing of immediate requests submitted by ground manoeuvre forces. When the CAOC has granted the ASOC the authority over missions assigned to it on the ATO, the ASOC can directly task on-call missions, or divert scheduled missions to satisfy approved immediate requests. The ASOC may also distribute Air Staff Officers (ASOs) to augment the embedded divisional ASOs in their Plan and Refine role (an SO1 Air is positioned in the divisional JFC, while SO2s are placed in FPlans and FOps). In addition, the ASOC will task its subordinate TACPs within its assigned area of control. (5) Brigade Level. ASOs are also distributed to brigade level where they provide subject matter expertise and coordinate directly with the brigade JFC to integrate and synchronise air operations in support of land forces. The ASOC may also provide a Dynamic Procedural Controller (DPC) to assist the brigade TACP with the execution of air operations. (6) Battlegroup Level. At battlegroup level, the main ALE is the TACP. The primary task of the TACP is to support the FAC during the terminal control of CAS. b. Land Liaison Elements. Land liaison elements are placed within the air component and include: (1) Battlefield Coordination Detachment (Army) (BCD(A)). The land component establishes the BCD(A), collocated with the CAOC, to act as the interface between the land and air components. The BCD(A) processes ground force requests for air support, monitors and interprets the ground battle and provides the necessary interface for the exchange of information. (2) Ground Liaison Officers (GLO). GLOs serve with fixed wing and rotary wing squadrons where they perform the liaison function through the BCD(A).

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JTF HQ

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XXX

XX ASOC & Air Staff Officers X TACP ACCE: CAOC: BCD(A): GLOs: AOCC(L): ASOC: TACP:

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Air Component Coordination Element Combined Air Operations Centre Battlefield Coordination Detachment (Army) Ground Liaison Officers Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land) Air Support Operations Centre Tactical Air Control Party Table 3.3. – Liaison structures between the Air and Land Components

3-19. ISR Cell. At all levels of command an ISR commander will be present, supported by specialist staff. The ISR commander is the principal intelligence officer within the integrated Intelligence Functional Cell, coordinating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities. The ISR commander provides the overall assessment of the operating environment and is also the conduit through which the formation prioritises IR collection efforts and resources. Additionally the ISR commander advises the manoeuvre commander on the employment of ISR capabilities and is responsible for developing the collection plan and its integration into the overall manoeuvre plan, normally through an Intelligence Annex. The ISR commander coordinates all ISR capability on behalf of the supported manoeuvre commander. 3-20. Deployed Scientific Support (DSS) Cell. DSS has two elements: Operational Analysis (OA) and Scientific Advisors (SCIAD).

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a. Operational Analysis (OA). OA provides objective, robust, timely analytical advice to the deployed commander and staff in order to inform the planning, execution and assessment of military operations by supporting decision making. The advice given by OA staff is independent and evidence based. Operational Analysts should be located near the commander and be able to be called upon by all staff branches and functional cells. Examples of their work include the assessment of local variations from standard planning data (movement rates, equipment failure rates, ammunition and fuel use) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE). b. SCIAD. SCIADs provide scientific and technical advice to the commander and the staff in timescales commensurate with the operational need. This advice is provided by deployed SCIADs with reach-back to the MOD’s wider Science & Technology network.34 SCIADs also support the delivery of enhanced capability into theatre and provide user feedback to the wider S&T network. SCIADs require access to reach-back communications systems and their advice and reports must be fully integrated into IM systems (see Chapter 10). 3-21. Speciality cells are provided to the CP based on operational requirements. This publication does not provide a list of all the various specialist cells. 3-22. Individual Specialist. Although most speciality personnel will augment higher tactical CPs, depending on the nature of the operation, augmentation can take place as low as battlegroup level. At corps level, many of these specialists are organic to the staff. Below is a list of some speciality skills which may augment a CP to assist the commander and staff. a. Cultural Advisors (CULADs). CULADs advise the commander and staff on cultural norms and practices of the partner nation and assist the staff in understanding the environment in which they are operating. They are key members of the planning team and can be used as a Red Team player offering contrary views from the partner nation aspect. b. Policy Advisors (POLADs). While normally held at brigade, divisional or corps level, POLADs may be task organised with a battlegroup for specific missions or activities. They are responsible for advising on aspects of UK defence policy and practices that affect decision making. c. Legal Advisors (LEGADs). LEGADs are usually military lawyers, held at brigade, divisional or corps level but may be task organised with a battlegroup for specific missions or activities. They are responsible for offering legal advice to the deployed force. They have a wide range of duties, covered in detail in JDP 3-46. d. Stabilisation Advisors (STABADs). STABADs are deployed civilian experts from the Stabilisation Unit. They are responsible for advising the commander and integrating cross-government stabilisation strategies and programmes into planning. They are key members of the planning staff.

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This includes Dstl, DE&S, Industry and Academia.

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The Operation of CPs 3-23. The principal staff officer (typically the COS depending on the level and function of the CP – see Chapter 2) provides the human focus for activity within the CP. Regular briefings (for the COS and the commander) aid the flow of information and hence the integration of staff effort. There will also be a need for a physical focus within the CP where all staff cells have access, which will provide a display of the most up to date information. Ideally, this should be centred around the map on which the current battle is being tracked 3-24. All the cells within a CP are concerned with overseeing, directing and coordinating, in order to support the execution of the commander’s intent and mission. While all cells should have clearly defined responsibilities, no cell will be able to operate effectively in isolation; therefore coordination between them will be important. The interaction between cells must be identified early in the process of structuring the CP and arrangements should be made to ensure they are equipped and manned to work, not only with other cells within the CP, but also with similar functional cells in other CPs. 3-25. Understanding and Information. An effective CP should be adept at using information, rather than becoming swamped or driven by it, particularly during times of high tempo. It is vital to have robust, consistent and well-understood methods. A CP requires proficiency in Information Management (IM - integrated processes and services to provide exploitable information, such as RFI handling), Information Exploitation (IX – the use of information to gain advantage), Information Assurance (IAssurance - the confidence that information is reliable, accurate and secure) and Information Superiority (ISup - possessing better information relative to the enemy or an adversary). Effective methods in these areas also help to capture lessons and support disclosure when required. This is considered in more detail in Chapter 2 Annex A. 3-26. Endurance. The ability of a CP to plan and/or execute on an enduring basis must be balanced against the need to operate continuously. Working the staff hard in the early stages of an operation or campaign will result in a high level of initial output, but this rate of activity will not be sustainable over time. Options to mitigate the impact include having day/night-shift COps staff, dedicated rest time (primarily for the FPlans cell as they are unlikely to be split into day/night shifts), or the rotation of staff between different cells (which could have the added benefit of wider understanding and increased capability).

CP Siting 3-27. General. Reliable communications, together with the administration and security of the commander, staff and the other supporting elements, are vital to the continuity and effectiveness of command. CPs and the CIS that support them are indispensable in the exercise of C2 and are therefore high-value targets for enemies and adversaries. Thus, the siting of a CP is as critical as its design. The grouping and responsibilities of those responsible for selecting CP locations are described in detail in divisional, brigade and BG SOIs.

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3-28. Tactical Level CP. The tactical considerations affecting the siting of a CP are:35 a. Communications. The site must offer good communications to subordinate and other CPs. If possible, the CP siting should be screened to prevent enemy EW detection. Access to civil communication and information systems may also be important. Although electromagnetic signatures can assist the enemy in locating a CP, proper siting and electromagnetic discipline can reduce the possibility of detection.

Tactical Considerations for a CP „„ Communications „„ Concealment „„ Protection „„ Accessibility „„ OPSEC

b. Protection. Woods or built-up areas offer the best concealment from view, while the use of barns, large sheds, or factory complexes helps counter Thermal Imagery surveillance and provides some basic protection against chemical attack. Good fieldcraft is essential in maximising concealment - siting is not enough. c. Security. CPs must provide a secure working environment for the commander and the staff. Security is achieved through physical and electronic concealment and protection, as well as CBRN defence measures. There may also be a need to assign forces to protect the CP and its associated communications. In order to balance the needs for robust communications, concealment and security, CPs should remote their antennae as far away as possible. d. Accessibility. The site should be easily accessible but not liable to accidental discovery by enemy ground, or aerial reconnaissance. The use of tac-signing, a useful peacetime expedient, should be controlled carefully on operations. e. OPSEC. In addition to the physical security mentioned above, OPSEC must also be employed. This is increasingly critical in the modern battlespace. An OPSEC Plan is normally developed in the Protection Cell. The OPSEC plan will normally consist of a number of force-wide measures, together with specific measures (often imposed for a limited period only) for individual units, equipment, installations or areas. The measures selected will be governed by the specific requirements of each CP element and whether it needs to be protected or controlled.36 f. Additional Considerations. Consideration should also be given to the needs of the commander and elements of the staff to meet with CJIIM agencies and local interlocutors. This will often be best achieved at a location other than the Main CP. This may require the use of Fwd or Tac CPs. 3-29. Operational Level CP. In principle, the siting of an operational-level CP follows the same considerations for a tactical CP, but additional factors apply. In addition to communications with subordinate forces, the operational-level CP must have communications to the host nation and to the home base or Land Component HQ. Infrastructure requirements and access to ports, or fixed-wing airfields may also determine siting.

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Additional security and protection doctrine will be published in AFM Warfighting Tactics and AFM Protection. Further detail can be found in Doctrine Note 16/3 OPSEC and Counter Surveillance.

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3-30. Land Component CP. In principle, the siting of a Land Component CP follows the same considerations for other land CPs, but additional factors apply. Communications to the JFC, host nation and to the home base are essential. The Land Component CP may also host allied members or LOs as well as host-nation military and political personnel. Political considerations may also be important. Infrastructure requirements and access to ports or fixed-wing airfields may also determine siting. Typically, Land Component CPs are static. Since no two operations will ever be identical, the requirements for staff and command posts will vary with every operation. However, a number of broad principles apply: a. An LCC should conduct an estimate of the requirement for staff and CPs as soon as it is warned for an operation. To assist such an estimate, contingency planning for a wide range of potential scenarios should allow a set of base assumptions that will influence the options for HQ design. b. Most staff functions within an LCC are largely independent of the scale and anticipated duration of an operation, although the staff numbers required to fulfil those functions may vary considerably. Such functions depend more on the nature of the operation than its scale. c. Timely deployment of the LCC HQ will contribute to campaign success. A potential LCC HQ should be designed and structured for rapid deployment, with staffs held on appropriately high readiness levels. Typically, forward liaison and planning teams should be held at the highest readiness, followed by elements of a Fwd CP. d. Training as an LCC HQ is essential to achieving operational readiness. Integrated training programmes, incorporating joint force and other component headquarters, are required. It is usually beyond the resources of a service or formation command to train itself to serve as an LCC, therefore it should be trained by a superior headquarters.

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PART B Exercising Command and Control Overview Part B switches focus to the exercising of Command and Control (C2) described in Part A. It does so using the Operations Process of Assess, Plan, Prepare and Execute as its structure.37 Of these four activities, assessing is continuous and is therefore discussed in general and again within the sections on planning, preparing and executing. Part B does not go into absolute detail on the procedures involved in these activities, but provides the definitions, purpose and method behind each.38 The operational processes used by our principal allies, especially in the planning domain, are included in Part C.

Part A – Command and Control • Command • Command Support • Command Posts Part B – Exercising Command and Control  Introduction to the Operations Process  Assess  Plan  Prepare  Execute Part C – Command in the CJIIM Environment • Multinational Interoperability • NATO and Allied Planning Processes • UK Resilience Operations

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ADP Land Operations, 2017 adopted the NATO Operations Process of Assess, Plan, Prepare and Execute as a replacement for the UK PREE Process (Plan, Prepare, Execute and Evaluate). At the time of writing, Warfare Branch intends to capture the detailed mechanics of how commanders and their staffs plan and execute in the Planning and Execution Handbook, due for publication by the end of 2017. Further detail on the Combat Estimate can be found in Doctrine Note 15/06, The Combat Estimate.

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Chapter 4 Introduction to the Operations Process Introduction

Introduction to the Operations

Process 4-01. Exercising Command and Control (C2) takes place dynamically throughout the • Introduction Operations Process of Assessing, • Interrelationships of activities within Planning, Preparing and Executing. As the Operations Process Figure 4.1 shows, the commander is central • Delineation within activities to the process. While the activities are cyclical • Setting and maintaining the and continuous, they do not necessarily operation’s direction occur sequentially. It is important to note that planning, preparing and executing do not always have distinct start and end points. Planning is a continuous activity within the process. While preparing for one operation, or during its execution, formations or units will be refining the current plan, or planning for future operations. Preparation is also a continuous activity, even when a formation or unit is not executing an operation. Preparation always overlaps with planning and continues throughout execution for some subordinate units. The task of Assessing surrounds and permeates the other three activities. Finally, staff must understand that subordinate formations, or units within the same command, may be in different stages of the Operations Process at any given time.

PLA N

ss sse

A RE PA RE

Ass es s

P

Commander

EXECUTE A ssess Figure 4.1. – The Operations Process

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Interrelationship of Activities within the Operations Process 4-02. Figure 4.2 below shows how emphasis on each of the four activities within the Operations Process fluctuates throughout a hypothetical operation. While only a theoretical example, Figure 4.2 underlines the points that assessment remains relatively constant and that the other activities, though continuous, are not sequential.

Figure 4.2. – Interrelationship between Operations Process Activities

Delineation within Activities 4-03. Table 4.3 over the page shows the tasks that fall within each of the four activities of the Operations Process. This is not an all-encompassing breakdown and this delineation is used as the framework for Part B.

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Plan

Prepare

Execute

Estimates Planning tools and processes Operational Staff Work Orders

ISR activity Refinement of the plan Commander’s Back Brief Coordination and liaison Task Organisation and Integration Rehearsals CP pre-execution checks

Decision making Execution activity Adjustment activity Directing action

Assessment During Planning Monitor the situation Evaluate courses of action

Assessment During Preparation Monitor preparations Evaluate preparations

Assessment During Execution Monitor operations Evaluate progress

Continuous Assessment Situational Awareness Monitoring – situation, operations, MOP, MOE and variances Evaluating – forecasting, seize, retain and exploit the initiative Table 4.3. – Exercising Command and Control

Setting and Maintaining the Operation’s Direction 4-04. The Tactical Functions39 represent the full breadth of land force activities when conducting operations. However, those that are predominantly focussed internally, setting and maintaining the direction for the operation or action, are Command and Intelligence.40 Figure 4.4, taken from ADP Land Operations, 2017 also underlines the importance of a secure network of information services to underpin the effectiveness of all Tactical Functions. These Tactical Functions, coupled with information services, provide the context for the Operations Process and are considered below: a. Command. Command in the tactical land environment is described in detail in Part A. However, in relation to the Operations Process, the centrality of the commander is fundamental. Commanders must lead the process. b. Intelligence. Intelligence is the product of information that has had judgment applied to it and is critical to effective C2 throughout the Operations Process. To maintain the initiative, the commander must seek to make decisions with a tempo that is superior to that of the enemy. This requires an ability to assess an operational environment, assess the enemy’s decision-making cycle, identify opportunities for exploitation and disseminate critical information. Intelligence directly supports the commander by producing assessments and reports that support decision making regarding probable Courses of Action (COA). Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) staff synchronise and integrate the output of collection capabilities by processing, exploiting and disseminating the resulting information in direct support of planning, preparation, and execution.

39 ADP Land Operations, 2017: Command, Intelligence, Manoeuvre, Fires, Information Activities, Capacity Building, Protection and Sustainment. 40 ADP Land Operations, 2017.

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c. Information Services.41 Modern warfare relies more than ever on the capability to collect, process, display, store and disseminate information and orders in a way that is faster and better than what the enemy can achieve. This capability requires complex C2 system technologies and well-trained staff. These requirements also constitute vulnerabilities that the enemy can attack. During conflict, a commander will seek to degrade the enemy’s ability to make correct, timely decisions and disseminate information, while simultaneously protecting friendly C2 systems from enemy action.

Intelligence

Command

Fires, Manoeuvre Capacity Building Information Activities

Information Services

Protection and Sustainment Figure 4.4. – Interrelationship between the Tactical Functions

41 ADP Land Operations, 2017.

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Introduction42

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5-01. Assessment within the context of the Assess Operations Process is the monitoring and evaluation of the Current Operational Picture • Introduction (COP).43 It is continuous throughout planning, • Seizing the Initiative preparation and execution and is dependent • Process on good Situational Awareness (SA), to which • MOEs and MOPs it also contributes. Critically, assessment is • Information Requirements guided by Information Requirements and • Commander’s Critical Information provides the basis for the decision making of Requirements commanders and staff. It is also an essential • Recognising Variances supporting activity in the constant fight for understanding – one of the fundamentals of Integrated Action. Within a Command Post (CP), the commander and staff therefore strive for accurate SA to evaluate progress, forecast opportunities or threats and identify variances from the plan, in order to seize and exploit the initiative. These tasks also provide the essential feedback for the C2 of the Operations Process.

Seizing the Initiative 5-02. Initiative is the ability to dictate the course of events, to decide and act before our opponents do and thus gain advantage. Seizing and holding the initiative is one of the tools of the Manoeuvrist Approach and is dependent on effective and timely assessment to generate quicker decision making in relation to the enemy. This generation of tempo and momentum provides opportunities for exploitation and pre-emption, all of which enable commanders and staff to gain, regain and exploit the initiative.

Process 5-03. Assessing consists of two distinct tasks: monitoring the current situation and the progress of the operation, as well as evaluating the operation against Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs). Monitoring and evaluation take different forms during planning, preparing, and executing. Together, they allow commanders to assess the situation in terms of their expectations and the actual progress of the operation. As AFM Command is the first UK AFM to describe the Operations Process, much of this chapter is drawn from NATO’s ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. Whilst assessment has always been a fundamental and integral part of the UK’s procedures during planning and execution, it has not previously been defined as a distinct step until ADP Land Operations, 2017 introduced the Operations Process. 43 ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. 42

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a. Monitoring: (1) Definition. Monitoring is the continuous observation of the COP and therefore produces SA. The commander and staff will typically focus on Priority Information Requirements (PIRs). These can include confirmation of current understanding and planning assumptions, to ensure they remain valid, as well as identifying new information and assumptions that will affect subsequent planning. In addition, monitoring should identify indicators that relate to opportunities, threats to the force and gaps in information. Information requirements are described further at paragraph 5-05. (2) Relationship to Situational Awareness (SA). Monitoring informs SA. SA is the perception of a particular area of interest, problem, or situation, bounded by time and space, in the context of a mission or task. SA provides the ability to identify what has happened and what is happening, but not necessarily why it has happened. Assessment of SA provides greater comprehension of an issue. Applying judgement to this comprehension provides understanding. (3) Considerations. Often, reports and returns are adequate for monitoring at the lower tactical levels. However, as the complexity of the battlefield increases, CIS enable more timely and accurate representation of the COP. As a guiding principle, the best monitoring mechanisms are those that are least intrusive to a force element or event. b. Evaluating: (1) Definition. Evaluating compares relevant information on a situation or operation against criteria to determine success or progress. Evaluating uses relevant information from the COP to measure, analyse and report the performance of friendly forces and broader-actor activity against MOEs and MOPs, to identify variances from the plan, or its assumptions and to forecast trends. For example, functional cells within a CP may generate assessments, often directed by the commander, on factors such as timelines, distances, loss rates, consumption rates, unit effectiveness, enemy actions and facts and assumptions. They incorporate such evaluations into their staff estimates which, in turn, present recommendations to the commander. The commander considers these assessments or recommendations, makes decisions and directs action. (2) Considerations. The commander and the staff continuously evaluate the current and projected situation to determine if changes are necessary to accomplish the mission, achieve the commander’s intent more effectively, or protect the force. One aid to evaluation is the use of targeted information requirements, often in the form of questions. By evaluating the answers to these questions against the MOEs and MOPs, the commander and staff can determine variances from current understanding or assumptions made during planning, or from expected progress during execution.

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Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs) 5-04. MOEs and MOPs are fundamental to evaluation of all military operations. They are criteria developed during the Operations Process to measure mission accomplishment, but do not represent the assessment itself. A MOE helps to determine if a task is achieving its intended results. A MOP helps to determine whether a task is completed as directed, to a standard and are also commonly used to evaluate training and help determine whether activities are being conducted correctly; they simply measure the performance of a task. There is no direct hierarchical relationship between a MOP and a MOE. MOPs do not feed MOEs, or combine in any way to produce MOEs. The staff develops MOEs and MOPs in planning and they are normally expressed either as an explicit evaluation of the present situation, or a forecast of the degree of mission accomplishment. They take different forms during planning, preparing and execution. For example, the commander’s directed assessment criteria for COA comparison can be described as a form of MOE and MOP; note, they often differ from the MOE and MOP used to evaluate the progress of operations against the expectations of the plan. In addition, MOEs and MOPs can, and should, change during execution. Finally, MOE and MOP require relevant information44 to evaluate in the form of indicators. a. Measure of Effectiveness. A MOE is a criterion45 used to assess changes in system behaviour, capability, or operational environment, linked to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of a desired effect. MOEs help measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative. It is important to note that the term measurement of effect46 is subtly different and relates solely to the measurement of the consequences (positive or negative) of actions taken. MOEs help to answer questions regarding whether a force is conducting the right actions. Examples of a MOE for the objective to provide a safe and secure environment may include: (1) Decrease in insurgent activity. (2) Increase in population trust of host nation security forces. b. Measure of Performance. A MOP is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs help determine whether a specific action was taken, or whether it was completed to the required standard. MOPs are commonly found and tracked at all echelons in synchronisation matrices.47 Evaluating task accomplishment in line with the synchronisation matrix is relatively straightforward and often results in yes or no answers. Examples include: (1) Route X cleared. (2) Hill 785 secured. (3) Generators delivered, are operational and are secured at villages A, B and C.

44 45 46 47

Relevant information is defined as ‘all information of importance to the commander and staff in the exercise of command and control.’ ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. The singular form is criterion and the plural form is criteria. It is a common mistake to use criteria as if it were singular, as in a further criteria needs to be considered. ADP Land Operations, 2017 - an effect is a change (or not) created in a particular object as the consequences of actions taken. Often referred to as Execution Matrices in NATO doctrine.

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c. Indicators.48 In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of information that provides insight into a MOE or MOP. Indicators take the form of reports from subordinates, surveys and polls, as well as responses to information requirements. Indicators provide guidance as to the current status of a MOE or MOP. A single indicator can inform multiple MOPs and MOEs. CIS can support assessment activities by the automated monitoring of critical indicators of success, identification of variances from expectations and forecasting the magnitude of change. Example Indicators for the MOE decrease in insurgent activity are: (1) Number of hostile actions per area, each week. (2) Number of munitions caches found per area, per week. (3) Number of reports of insurgent activity by the population per area, per week.

Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)

Measure of Performance (MOP)

Indicator

Used to measure task accomplishment.

Used to provide insight into an MOE or MOP.

Answers the question: Are we doing the right things?

Answers the question: Are we doing things right?

Answers the question: What is the status of this MOE or MOP?

Measures why (unifying purpose) in the mission statement.

Measures what (completion of tasks specified) in the mission.

Information used to make measuring what or why possible.

No direct hierarchical relationship to MOP.

No direct hierarchical relationship to MOE.

Subordinate to MOE and MOP.

Often tracked in formal assessment plans.

Often formally tracked using the Synchronization Matrix.

Often formally tracked in formal assessment plans.

Typically challenging to choose the appropriate criteria.

Typically simple to choose the appropriate criteria.

Typically as challenging to select appropriately as the supported MOE or MOP.

Used to measure attainment of an end state condition, achievement of an objective, or creation of a desired effect.

Table 5.1. – Summary of MOE, MOP and Indicators

Information Requirements (IRs)49 5-05. IRs50 represent the full spread of information that must be collected in order to meet the requirements of the commander and staff for the successful execution of operations. In that context, commanders and staff must focus, prioritise and manage IR in order to ensure that mission-focussed information is with the right person at the right time. IRs are therefore sub-divided into five categories:

48 The term Indicator is an adopted NATO term that has previously been referred to as a measure in UK doctrine. 49 ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. 50 Information regarding an adversary or potentially hostile actors and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. APP-6. NATO Joint Military Symbology.

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a. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). An IR that relates to the enemy and its operating environment is categorised as PIR. They are essential to the planning and conduct of operations and consist of specific questions aimed in a focussed manner. Their identification and drafting initiates and drives the intelligence process. PIR can be further subdivided into Specific Intelligence Requirements (SIR), which are specific questions aimed in a focussed manner for input to the Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP). b. Neutral Information Requirements (NIRs). NIRs relate to information regarding the environment or human terrain. These IRs are likely to be collected by a range of Non-Traditional ISR methods (NTISRs), such as defence engagement teams, human terrain recce patrols, as well as by conventional ISR capabilities. NIRs are not currently recognised in NATO doctrine. c. Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs). An IR that relates to friendly forces, or local indigenous forces, are categorised as FFIRs; ‘how we see ourselves’. They are not the responsibility of ISR staff to answer directly and are more usually answered by the commander or staff. d. Essential Elements of Information (EEI). An IR can be broken down into more detailed questions known as EEI. They add the details to the SIR and allow the production of a collection task list as part of an ICP. EEI could be related to several IRs and should provide enough guidance to allow analysts to produce a complete and satisfying answer to each requirement. EEI are the basis for creating collection requirements and for establishing the relevant tasking and coordination with organic sources, or relevant agencies. e. Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI). EEFI are not IR in the traditional sense, but are those elements of information regarding friendly forces that must be protected from compromise. EEFI will inform OPSEC and deception planning. As with FFIRs, they are not the responsibility of the ISR staff to answer directly.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) 5-06. Information concerning areas that are either critical to the success of the mission, or represent a critical threat are expressed as CCIRs. They are set by the commander (though the staff may recommend CCIRs) to inform staff and subordinates regarding what information is necessary for their decision making and to focus resources on collecting that information. CCIRs are not static. The commander adjusts and updates them throughout the progress of an operation to reflect changing information needs. The fewer the CCIRs, the better the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources. CCIRs can range across all five of the IR categories. The relationship between IRs and CCIRs is shown in Figure 5-2.

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CCIR are: „„ Specified by the commander for each mission or operation. „„ Related to planned decisions. „„ Applicable only to the commander who specifies them. „„ Situation dependent - directly linked to present and future missions. „„ Time sensitive. Answers to CCIRs must be immediately reported to the commander by any communications system available.

Increasing OPSEC

Increasing importance

„„ Always included in operational staff work (OSW).

CCIR IR

PIR

EEI

EEI

NIR

EEI

EEI

FFIR EEI

EEFI

EEI

Figure 5.2. – Information Requirements

Recognising Variances 5-07. Variances are the differences between the actual situation at a given point during an operation and the forecast of the situation at that time. CIS can display relevant information in the COP that highlights the existence of variances. In such instances, the staff will use objective and subjective criteria to assess the COP, to determine the existence of a variance, its significance and how it will affect the plan. If necessary, the staff will update its estimates and recommend COAs to the commander. The commander will direct any necessary subsequent action to exploit opportunities, or counter threats to the mission. If the evaluation reveals no substantial variance, the commander may direct minimal corrective action to ensure that operational progress conforms to the plan.

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5-08. There are two forms of variance. The first is an unexpected threat to mission accomplishment, or to the force. When a threat is recognised, the commander must adjust the plan to counter the enemy advantage and restore the initiative. The second form of variance is the presence of an unexpected opportunity that will enable the more effective accomplishment of the mission, or will lead to unexpected success against the enemy. When recognised, the commander should alter the plan51 to exploit the opportunity, if such an amendment can be made without compromising the plan, or incurring unacceptable risk. The philosophy of Mission Command empowers the commander to exploit opportunity, or seize the initiative within their commander’s intent52. In evaluating variances, assessment must identify opportunities and threats quickly in order to react effectively.

51 52

Although the concept may, and the intent will usually, remain the same. The classical decision-action cycle – sometimes referred to as the OODA loop (Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act).

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Ass es PLA s N Commander

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Overview 6-01. The UK uses three formal processes to assist a commander with decision making – the Operational Level Planning Process (OLPP),53 the Tactical Estimate (TE) and the Combat Estimate (CE). This chapter will describe these processes, but will primarily focus on the tactical level (TE and CE). As the problem-solving tools and processes within each estimate are not exclusive to it, this chapter will first describe the respective estimate sequences before going into further detail on the planning tools and supporting procedures common to all. Part C gives an overview of those planning processes used by our principal allies, including the OLPP/NATO Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD). Of note, due to the necessary procedural focus of this chapter, it has a unique style within the publication that encompasses a number of sections and subsections.

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Plan • Overview of the Operational and Tactical Planning Processes • Operational Level Planning Process • Tactical Estimate • Combat Estimate • Common Planning Tools • Intelligence Preparation of the Environment • Mission Analysis • Effects Schematic and CONOPS Development • Wargaming • Red Teaming • Risk Management • Control of Operations • Operational Staff Work

SOHB, 2014 describes the Army’s approach to operational planning as the Operational Estimate. With the UKs increasing alignment to NATO, the SHAPE endorsed NATO Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD) is now recognised as the authoritative source for Operational Level Planning Process direction.

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 1 Overview of the Operational and Tactical Planning Processes Decision Making in General 6-02. Individuals and formalised groups are tasked with making decisions every day. These can vary from very simple, almost unconscious decisions, to extremely complex ones. However, common throughout this spectrum is the generic process that people go through to make a decision. This process, at its simplest, can be reduced to four key steps: a. Define the problem. b. Gather and consider information. c. Identify possible solutions. d. Select the best solution 6-03. This simple problem-solving model establishes the base logic for the formalised estimate processes used by the Army and by nations within NATO.54

Estimates 6-04. Against the backdrop of this generic framework, The estimate is a logical military estimates have been developed as a formal process of reasoning by process to consider problems and construct Courses which the commander, of Action (COAs). Estimates are planning tools faced with an ill structured that enable military commanders to make timely problem, arrives at a and appropriate decisions and to generate plans decision for a course of and orders. Decision making in the military context action to be taken in order is unique in that poor decisions, or inefficient to achieve their mission. process have the potential to increase the risk to friendly forces, leading to loss of life. The formal definition of an estimate is: ‘a logical process of reasoning by which the commander, faced with an ill-structured problem, arrives at a decision for a course of action to be taken in order to achieve the mission.55 6-05. Military estimates range in complexity from the extensive analysis and briefings that take place in headquarters or Command Posts (CPs), where there is a full staff and plenty of time, down to the rapid assessment and decisions made in contact by commanders at subunit level and below.

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The classical decision-action cycle - sometimes referred to as the OODA (Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act) loop. AJP-5. Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Level Planning, 2013.

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6-06. As the situation changes, the mission and relevant elements of a plan should be reassessed. Therefore, where a situational change requires an amendment to the plan, estimates should be revisited. They must be looked at as a continuous cycle rather than a linear and inflexible planning tool. 6-07. When conducting an estimate, individuals and staff branches are responsible for discrete elements of it. The commander is responsible for ensuring that coherence is maintained, but it is the responsibility of the whole staff to know how their element of the analysis links to the work being conducted by others. The commander is responsible for mission analysis, as well as identifying the unit or formation’s role in supporting the higher commander’s intent and for identifying potential COAs for the staff to develop into a plan.

Assessment During Planning 6-08. Assessment is procedurally engrained within UK estimates, especially within Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE), Mission Analysis and COA evaluation. As the plan develops within the estimate process, it is tested against a constantly changing situation in order to refine the decisions made, as well as identify and mitigate risks. Such refinement, drawing on the tools of red-teaming, wargaming and Operational Analysis (OA), precedes the issuing of orders. Planning is typically the stage in the operations process where the staff creates the initial COP from which to achieve shared Situational Awareness (SA) and identify opportunities, threats and information requirements. Assessment during planning also identifies measure of effectiveness (MOE) and measure of performance (MOP) that are used for subsequent assessment during preparation and execution.

Planning Overview 6-09. The Commander. In British doctrine, estimate processes have traditionally been led by the commander and not driven by the staff. However, the autonomy afforded to the staff is not absolutely fixed. In joint headquarters, at the higher tactical and operational levels within NATO, a greater degree of responsibility may be accorded to the staff. As the commander is responsible for the direction of the decision-making cycle, they must be fully involved in the estimate at its initial stage and, as they make the decision on a COA, they have to be involved in the final stage. The extent to which the commander is involved in the detailed evaluation of the factors and COA development, in between, will depend on a number of considerations including: a. The time available to make a decision. b. The state of training and experience of the staff. c. The level of decision making required. d. The complexity of the required decision. e. The style and personality of the commander. f. The availability of the commander - there will always be a requirement for reconnaissance, visits and briefs during a planning process.

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6-10. A good commander also knows that: a. To achieve tempo, a plan that is 80% complete but delivered on time is preferable to one that is 100% complete but late. b. To enable Mission Command, commanders must provide clear and timely direction, particularly regarding their intent. They must direct one down, but always think and resource two down. c. The estimate is a means to an end. The actual decision the commander makes is more important than the decision-making process. However, elements of that process, particularly the IPE to develop understanding, are important components to help inform their decision making. 6-11. The Staff. The staff is responsible for completing the bulk of the estimate under the direction of the commander or the principal staff officer, usually the Chief of Staff (COS). The COS provides the essential bridge between the commander and the staff advising, managing and coordinating the work of the staff. At lower tactical levels the staff is mainly concerned with detailed evaluation of information and the conduct of staff checks on behalf of the commander. At the operational (particularly in joint and multinational operations) and higher tactical levels, the staff will often be required to develop possible COAs for the commander to compare and decide upon. The UK’s estimate processes require that the staff has open access to the commander in order to obtain clarification and advice as necessary. 6-12. Planning Guidelines. At the operational level, AJP-5: Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Level Planning articulates the principles of planning.56 At the tactical level, planning is not allocated specific planning principles, noting that the Principles of War and the requirements of the Manoeuvrist Approach offer sufficient considerations for a commander. There are however, regardless of the method of estimate being used, a number of guidelines that should be referred to: a. Commander’s Intent. In line with Mission Command, commanders at every level must act to achieve or support their higher commander’s intent. This has a direct correlation to the requirement to constantly focus on the intent and mission during planning. Plans and orders must be consistent with the higher commander’s intent and clearly articulate what that intent is. Subordinates have a duty to ensure that they understand the intent, while commanders must ensure that subordinates understand it. b. Information and Intelligence. The estimate should be command led, but information and intelligence-driven. Not only will information and intelligence requirements come to light during the estimate, it is also incumbent on intelligence staffs to anticipate requirements and to be proactive in meeting them. Commanders must have clarity in their own minds as to what they are planning against. c. Agility Based on Preparation. Mental agility underpinned by sound preparation is essential to the estimate process. It will likely be conducted with incomplete information, in changing circumstances, to achieve sometimes ambiguous objectives and against challenging timelines. Clear direction, delegation, proven standard operating procedures and concurrent activity at all levels will mitigate the frictions. 56

Definition of Objectives, Unity of Purpose, Sustainment, Concentration of Force, Economy of Effort, Flexibility, Initiative, Maintenance of Morale, Surprise, Security, Simplicity in Plans and Orders and Multinationality.

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d. Practise. A well-practised team will be capable of working through complex problems and meeting tight timelines. A disciplined working environment should be created, which needs to be as tidy, as uncluttered and as free of as many internal frictions as possible. However, it should not be assumed that this work can always be done in secure and sterile spaces with plenty of workable information technology. Headquarters should be comfortable with conducting estimates in more austere field conditions, perhaps on the move, perhaps in contact with an adversary or in a chaotic situation. The problem faced is likely to be difficult to solve and probably ill-structured, therefore the best estimate teams place a premium on rigour, time-keeping, concurrent activity and cooperation. e. Enabling mindset. Within the application of Mission Command, it is the duty of the staff in higher headquarters to create the freedom for their subordinates to operate. To do this requires staff to think two-down and to use their access to greater resources to reduce the burden on subordinates. This is particularly important when facilitating enabling actions. f. Use of Time. Effective planning requires a sensitive awareness of and an efficient use of time in order to maximise the subordinate commanders’ time for battle procedure. For staffing, the commonly accepted 1/3 – 2/3 rule is applied to allocate sufficient time to subordinates to conduct their own planning and battle procedure. This allocation can be supported by the prompt issuing of warning orders to generate concurrent activity. As a guide, the staff should give 2/3 of the time available to subordinate levels of command and use the remaining time as follows: 30% to understand the situation and the problem, 50% to develop and validate COAs and 20% to produce and issue formal direction. 6-13. Integrated Action. Integrated Action is the application of the full range of lethal and non-lethal capabilities to change and maintain the understanding and behaviour of audiences to achieve a successful outcome.57 This doctrine, formalised in ADP Land Operations, 2017 has therefore created a slight shift in the Army’s approach to planning, rather than any change in the estimate processes themselves. At its simplest, it ensures that commanders and their staffs consider the full range of lethal and nonlethal means (capabilities and actions) available. It ensures that the use of force is a means to an end, rather than simply the default main activity. Where appropriate, plans should therefore be expressed in terms that integrate the full range of relevant actions available to the force. To that end, the application of Integrated Action in a planning cycle is most relevant at the divisional level and above, as it is here that all the tactical functions can be resourced effectively and where the full spread of Combined, Joint, Intra-Governmental, Inter-Agency and Multinational (CJIIM) actors are likely to be represented and available. However, as a mindset, it remains as applicable at the lower tactical level. The purpose of Integrated Action is to achieve fully integrated, interdependent actions, leading to more appropriate effects and outcomes.

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6-14. Manoeuvrist Approach. The Manoeuvrist Approach is the Army’s fighting doctrine for the tactical level and determines how we fight enemies across the spectrum of operations. An in-depth understanding of this approach is important for commanders and staff conducting tactical planning. Commanders must always make time to consider how manoeuvrist their direction and plans are to avoid conducting predictable, slow and unimaginative tactical actions. A non-exhaustive list of planning considerations drawn from the Manoeuvrist Approach is shown in the adjacent text box. 6-15. Mission Command. In line with Mission Command the commander must specify the desired outcome. At the operational level, the superior commander’s intentions are expressed in a statement of the commander’s intent. At the tactical level, the superior commander’s concept of operations should include their intent, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort. A well-framed commander’s intent allows subordinates to exercise initiative in accordance with their commander’s vision. All UK estimate processes are designed to give a subordinate commander the freedom of action to decide how they will achieve desired effects, within their superior’s overarching intent. 6-16. Planning is Continuous. Planning is a dynamic process of interrelated activities rather than a single linear process. Commanders and staff must have the agility to adjust a plan based on new information and changing circumstances. Thus, simple plans will likely deliver the necessary flexibility and tempo. Commanders and staff must also be aware that refinements to a plan that has already been communicated will add another layer of considerations onto time-constrained subordinate battle procedure. Refinement therefore requires efficient staff procedures driven by sharp situational awareness. Refinement is covered in further detail in Chapter 7.

Manoeuvrist Approach Considerations „„ Is there an emphasis on understanding (constant assessment)? „„ Is the plan innovative and original - are we doing the unexpected? „„ Is the full range of capabilities in the TASKORG synchronised to deliver effect? „„ Effect is more important than method (consequence over action). „„ Manoeuvre the mind - are behaviours and perceptions being influenced? „„ Is risk managed appropriately to generate opportunity? „„ Are weaknesses (vulnerabilities) struck in strength? „„ Will we act before the enemy? „„ Understand the maximum capacities of the capabilities at your disposal. „„ Is there a relentless determination to succeed?

6-17. Planning Horizons. Planning involves an appreciation of planning horizons. Because the future is always uncertain, planning should not specify future actions with precision. Rather, future plans must remain flexible and adaptable, allowing the opportunity to pursue a variety of options. As plans extend further into the future, they become less a matter of trying to direct events and more a matter of identifying options and possibilities. Critical to this is the ability to

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determine future enemy actions, therefore assumptions on which to plan against must be made and continually validated. If unable to predict enemy actions with reasonable certainty, the plan must keep options open until intelligence builds a clearer picture. 6-18. Outcome, Objectives, Effects, Actions (OOEAs). Within British doctrine, an understanding of the relationship between Outcomes, Objectives, Effects and Actions is crucial to successful planning, especially during a commander’s Mission Analysis. It not only helps a commander to understand where they sit in the higher commander’s CONOPS, but also aids the analysis of specified and implied tasks. When considering OOEAs within planning, it is essential that staff understand that actions might not necessarily result in desired effects and they must therefore build the necessary simplicity and flexibility into plans58. In addition, while establishing cause and effect can sometimes be difficult, especially with regard to human behaviour, it is critical to effective assessment. Appropriate MOEs and MOPs must therefore be established during planning. The ‘layered’ relationship between Outcomes – Objectives – Effects – Actions, with definitions, is depicted in Figure 6.1.1. The OOEAs interrelationship expressed succinctly is Actions create Effects; Effects achieve Objectives, and numerous Objectives deliver the desired Outcome. In the context of UK planning, tasks are defined as something a formation or unit is required to do – they can include actions and effects, as well as a range of other direction.

Outcome

Favourable or enduring situation

Objective

Objective A clearly defined and achievable goal Effect

Effect

A change which is the consequence of an Action Physical capability

Action

Will and cohesion

Effect

Effect

Action

Action

Action

Action

Action

Action

A task to create an effect taken by the force. integrated with those not under direct control

Understanding

Changed or maintained understanding and behaviour Figure 6.1.1. – Outcome, Objectives, Effects and Actions (OOEA)

6-19. Analytical Tools. The three-column format (3CF) is a basic but highly effective analytical tool used at all stages of the estimate, though it is particularly applicable during Mission Analysis, Table 6.1.2 refers. It is a mechanism that helps a commander and staff to interrogate the factors within a problem and to record the analysis as deductions with a series of outputs. It therefore provides an audit trail of the logic upon which a plan is 58

Note: The OOEA relationship is not intended to be mathematically precise.

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based. This enables a commander and staff to revisit the logic flow and, where necessary, test and adjust the deductions when either the situation changes or the plan fails. The output from the 3CF is a series of staff tasks or constraints, using a commonly understood Staff Planning Lexicon, as detailed in other handbooks. During the estimate, this drives the staff to comprehensively examine a problem through a Planning Guidance Matrix (PGM). Factor

Analysis

Output

Input

Process

Planning Guidance Matrix

Question or Factor raised during the estimate

So What? What are the key deductions from the factor/question

Use Staff Planning Lexicon

Table 6.1.2. – 3CF Template

6-20. Audiences, Actors, Adversaries and Enemies. Integrated Action doctrine defines and describes the people who observe, perceive or are the targets of, our operational activity as audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies, see Figure 6.1.4. The Audience is all those relevant to the attainment of our outcomes. Some of the audience outside the area of operations could exert influence on the operation itself (an example is the UK population, the media or politicians). Those individuals or groups in the audience who take action or directly exert influence are defined as Actors. The actors most relevant to land forces are those who have effects on the operation. They may be friendly, neutral (even-handed) or hostile to us and will usually be in the theatre of operations. Adversaries are those individuals or groups that seek to prevent us from achieving our objectives such that the use of force against them may be considered. An Enemy is a particular type of adversary who seeks to oppose us through armed, lethal means. Consideration should be given to the regular reassessment of people’s classification (audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies) as the classifications are not fixed and will likely alter in response to FF or enemy action or inaction. Additionally, the criticality is not simply to label the people within the classification but to assess how to apply Integrated Action against them appropriately.

Audiences

Actors

Adversaries

Enemies

Audience. All the groups and individual people whose perception and interpretation of events and subsequent behaviour contribute to the success or otherwise of military action Actors. A group or person that takes action or directly exerts influence Adversary. A group or person that seeks to prevent us from achieving our objectives Enemy. A group or person that seeks to defeat us through armed lethal means

Figure 6.1.4. – Audiences, Actors, Adversaries and Enemies

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British Army Estimates 6-21. Ideally, the Army would have one process with a common format and which works for both the most complex problems and the most straightforward, irrespective of the level of understanding and time available. However, the differing situations in which commanders and staff conduct an estimate means that the Army uses three different estimates, all of which are command led: a. Operational Level Planning Process (OLPP). At the operational level, the commander and their staff use the OLPP to produce a campaign or operational plan, usually at the Joint Force Command (JFC) level. The OLPP incorporates Planning Concepts (often referred to as Campaign Planning Concepts) which support the detail of the campaign plan. The OLPP is referred to in Section 6.2 for completeness, recognising it as a planning process; the detail of the OLPP is addressed in Chapter 10 NATO and Allied Planning Processes. b. Tactical Estimate (TE). The TE, also known as the Six Step Estimate, can be used by corps59, division, brigade and battlegroup HQs. It is designed for circumstances where military problems are complex and plans may be longer term, involving significant sequencing. The TE is suitable where there is an emphasis on detailed planning and understanding, rather than on high-tempo decision making. The TE can incorporate Planning Concepts, which have utility in framing longer-term, more complex tactical planning. The TE is further explained in Section 6.3. c. Combat Estimate (CE). The CE is derived from the TE but presents the analysis, plan creation and decision making in a sequence of seven questions. This is intended to enable the rapid understanding of a problem and to allow swift decision making, as part of an accelerated battle procedure. The CE is designed to generate plans for single, urgent tactical problems, yet can be adapted for more complex, deliberate actions. It assumes that the operating environment and general tactical situation are already well understood. It is used at the divisional and brigade levels for problems that require quick execution (as a guide, within 72 hours) and it is always the tool that is used at battlegroup level and below. Consequently, the CE can be used by an individual commander or with a supporting headquarters staff. The CE is further explained in Section 6.4. (1) Individual. The Individual/Hasty CE is conducted by a commander on their own where there is either no staff, or there is no time to use them60. It is always used at subunit level and below and often by battlegroup commanders, see Figure 6.1.5; its use is not described further in this publication.

59

60

If the OLPP is the process utilised by the JFC at the operational level, then Corps (as the highest tactical headquarters) should either use the TE, or a hybrid process that blends OLPP with the TE, to ensure the Corps remains tactical in function but aware of the operational level. All Arms Tactical Aide Memoire, 30 May 2016.

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7Q REMINDER

Baseline prep and understanding

1. What is the situation and how does it affect me?

HASTY ESTIMATE

Regain initiative Create space to think

Suppressive fire, drills, get clear of killing area, fix with indirect fire etc. Need to get situation stable enough to think

Regain initiative Create space to think

Talk through what is going on out loud - e.g. en position with a machine gun on the high ground. Distinguish between the important and unimportant

Q1

A very simple assessment on the en MLCOA. May identify what is not immediately evident - potential depth a ‘come on’, a show of force

What is the enemy up to?

2. What have I been told to do and why? 3. What effects do I need to achieve & what direction must I give? 4. Where can I best accomplish each action or effect? 5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action of effect?

What does my comd want me to do?

Q2

What do I need to do?

Q3

Where do I need to do it?

Q4

What do I need to do it with?

Q5

When?

Q6

Timings related to fire support

Q7

Visualise the plan to identify where things are going to go wrong. Use of Reference Pts and FSCM crucial. Synchronise fire. Hazard to locals considered here?

6. When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other? 7. What control measures do I need to impose?

Focus on the Mission and identify the options that support your comd’s intent

How can I stop things going wrong?

A quick plan. What do you need to do, where should you do it from and who is best placed/equipped to do it? What else do i need to ask for? Think to the finish.

Figure 6.1.5. – The Individual/Hasty Estimate

(2) Staff. The Staff CE is command led, with the commander giving direction to the staff regarding the key points on which to focus. The staff contribution is a collaborative team effort. The staff must therefore be well trained to be able to work through the questions quickly and efficiently, generating Operational Staff Work (OSW) as they go, without becoming fixed by process. d. Bespoke Estimates. A number of bespoke estimates exist to support specialised force elements such as UKSF, CIS and CSS. These are often framed around the TE or CE and are not included in this AFM. 6-22. Allied Planning Processes. The majority of NATO nations use their own tactical planning processes; US, German and French estimates are outlined in Part C. NATO uses the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), which is best suited to problems at the strategic and operational levels.

Choice of Tactical Estimate 6-23. Key Differences. As described, at the operational level the UK uses the OLPP. This enables a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC)61 to frame a problem and then, through a flexible and adaptive process designed to address ill-structured problems, establish suitable courses of action to achieve campaign success. However, at the tactical level, formation commanders need to decide whether to use the TE or CE.62 At divisional level, the decision is typically straightforward, due to increased planning horizons and welldefined Future Plans and Future Operations planning responsibilities.63 At battlegroup level and below, the CE will be the default. This therefore leaves the brigade as the formation most regularly having to make a decision as to which estimate to use. Table 6.1.6 highlights the principal differences that should govern the choice between using either the TE or the CE. 61 62 63

For example, a Corps Commander (ARRC). In the recent past, the CE was the default estimate at formation level due, in large part, to a lack of staff training on the TE. The Army is addressing this shortfall. ICSC(L) will teach the TE from 2017. Divisional Future Plans typically use the TE and Future Operations will almost always use the CE.

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Planning Criteria

TE

CE

The challenge

Complex problem requiring detailed analysis and sequenced mission delivery over time.

Broadly understood tactical challenge, normally focussed on enemy and ground.

Detailed contextual analysis required. Step 1 likely to be iterative as understanding develops and its implications to the plan are considered.

Context broadly understood

Level of Understanding

Significant planning time required and available, not less than 24hrs and usually more.

Time-constrained tactical problem.

Time available

Table 6.1.6. – Criteria for appropriate estimate selection

Sequences within the Uk Estimates 6-24. Table 6.1.7 shows the separate stages of each of the UK’s three estimate processes. The first column is designed to highlight the commonality between each estimate. Experience has shown that staff can initially be intimidated by the prospect of learning another estimate, once they have established a solid understanding of the CE. However, it has also been shown that the similar flow of the estimates enables a logical transition from one to another, noting that all are supported by the same group of problem-solving tools and processes. These common tools and processes are described at Section 6.5. Common to all

OLPP

TE

CE

Step 1. Initiation of Planning.

Step 1. Understand the situation.

Q1. What is the situation and how does it affect me?

Step 2. Problem and Mission Analysis.

Step 2. Understand the problem. (2A Mission Analysis, 2B Evaluation of Factors, 2C Commander’s Guidance)

Q2. What have I been told to do and why?

Consider and Develop COAs

Step 3. COA Development. Step 4. COA analysis. Step 5. COA Validation and Comparison.

Step 3. Formulate and consider COAs. Step 4. Develop and validate COAs. Step 5. COA evaluation.

Q4. Where can I best accomplish each action/effect? Q5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect? Q6. When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other? Q7. What control measures do I need to impose?

Make a Decision / Communicate

Step 6. Commander’s Decision.

Step 6. Commander’s decision.

Commander’s decision

Execute and Assess

Step 7. Operational level CONOPS and Plan Development. Step 8. Campaign Assessment and Plan Review/ Revision.

Understand the Situation/Problem

Q3. What effects do I need to achieve and what direction must I give in order to develop a plan?

Table 6.1.7. – Stages of UK Estimate Process64

64

Note: Steps 7 and 8 of the OLPP equate to OSW production and execution assessment respectively in both the TE and CE. Whilst not defined stages of the TE and CE they are obviously part of the Operations Process.

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Staff Groupings 6-25. Command and Staff Groupings during the TE and CE. SOIs should specify who is in which group, reflecting the experience, manning and ability of the staff. Groupings will change as staff take leave, are employed on other tasks, or become casualties. The COS must rehearse the groupings to ensure that all planning tasks are covered. Typically the staff are organised into a Command Group (CG) supported by staff branches. Further groups, such as the Principal Planning Group (PPG) and the Staff Planning Group (SPG) also exist for the planning cycle - roles for these planning groups should be defined in SOPs. Additional functional groupings may be created for specific tasks.

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 2 Operational-Level Planning Process Overview 6-26. Overview. The operational level is described as: the level of operations at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained, to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations65. The operational level provides the vital link between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. This publication is concerned with Tactical Doctrine; the Operation-Level Planning Process (OLPP) sits above the tactical level and is therefore only referred to in Chapter 6 Planning for completeness to recognise where OLPP sits relative to the TE and CE. The detail of OLPP and NATO COPD is contained with Chapter 10 NATO and Allied Planning Processes. 6-27. Operational Level. The operational level is described as: the level of operations at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained, to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations66. The operational level provides the vital link between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. Without this link, it is unlikely that tactical actions would lead to the achievement of a strategic end-state. Tactical actions must be linked by the operational level such that they conform to the aims of the overall strategy. The strategy should also be linked through the operational level in order to achieve an understanding of what is tactically realistic. The operational commander must clearly understand how activities mesh within other strategic lines of operation.67 6-28. Operational Art68. Operational art is defined as the employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. It is the orchestration of a series of tactical actions, if necessary along multiple tactical lines of activity. Operational art is often regarded as an aspect of command at the operational (joint) level. It is described here because although its understanding and application is implicit to land force commanders with operational-level responsibilities, tactical commanders also need to understand it. It informs the design of the campaign or operation to which they contribute, and is therefore the source of their higher commander’s intent. It is also relevant as a tool at the tactical level, when sequencing multiple tactical activities to achieve objectives, which in turn contribute to operational-level outcomes. This is often relevant in the case of a unit with long-term responsibilities for an area of operations. 6-29. Planning Concepts at the Operational Level. Operational Plans are designed and managed using Operational-Level Planning Concepts. These focus effort, assist a commander to visualise how their operation or campaign may unfold, provide a common lexicon for disseminating ideas and instructions and assist in mission execution.

65 66 67 68

Within NATO the operational level is often referred to as the joint level. Within NATO the operational level is often referred to as the joint level. AJP-01: Allied Joint Doctrine, Dec 2010. Extract from ADP Land Operations, 2017 para: 8-11.

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The planning concepts are normally displayed at first in an operational framework and will become the operational design once the commander takes ownership and applies their commander’s initial intent (see Figure 6.2.1). Tactical level HQs (component HQs and high-level Land formation HQs) will deliver military activities and supporting effects that underpin campaign success. Planning Concepts, which have utility at both the operational and higher tactical levels, are shown below in Table 6.2.2.

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Current Situation

Favourable Situation Phase 1 Shape

Line of Operation 1 (Maritime)

Phase 2 Attack

DC 3

Campaign End-State

Campaign Objective A

Line of Operation 2 (Land) Line of Operation 3 (Air)

Phase 3 Transition

Opponent Operational CoG

DC 4

DC 1

DC 6

Campaign Objective B

DC 2

DC 5

4a - Governance DC 9

Line of Operation 4 (Civil-Mil)

DC 7

4b - Infrastructure

DC 10

Campaign Objective D

The Withdrawal of Country ‘X’ Invading Force from Island ‘Y’ and the reestablishment of ‘Y’ host nation authority

DC 8

Campaign Objective C

Campaign End-State The Withdrawal of Country ‘X’ Invading Force from Island ‘Y’ and the Re-Establishment of ‘Y’ Host Nation Authority Campaign Objective A Defeat ‘X’ Conventional Forces DC1 ‘X’ C2 Neutralised DC2 Air Superiority Gained DC3 Seas Denied DC4 ‘X’ Land Forces Defeated

Campaign Objective B Secure ‘x’ Withdrawal

Campaign Objective C Restore Essential Services

DC5 Air Control Established DC6 ‘X’ Land Forces Repatriated

DC7 Potable Water Provided DC8 Electric Power Restored

Campaign End-State

Centre of Gravity (CoG)

Campaign End-State Brief Narrative

Centre of Gravity

Equates to the sum of the campaign objectives Campaign Objective

Contingency Plan

DC (number)

Line/Grouping of Operation

Phase

Line

SE descriptor expressed as a noun or verb in its completed from

Decisive Condition (DC)

DC descriptor expressed as a noun or verb in its completed from

DC

SE (number)

DC9 ‘Y’ Armed Forces and Police Re-Asserted DC10 ‘Y’ Governing Authority Re-Instated

Description

DC

Support Effect (SE)

Campaign Objective D Re-Establish HN (‘Y) Authority

Line Line / Grouping

Line / Grouping

Grouping

Operational Pause

Culminating Point

Figure 6.2.1. – Operational Schematic using Planning Concepts69

69 JDP 5-00, 2nd Edition.

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Planning Concepts Operational End-State or the Outcome

Centre of Gravity (CoG)

Transition and Termination

Objectives

Decisive Conditions (DC) (Supporting) Effects

Definition Provides the focal point to achieve the National Strategic Aim. Although the outcome is singular and synonymous with the end-state, a series of outcomes can exist at each level of warfare. Characteristic, capability or influence from which a nation, alliance, military force, civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, its strength, cohesion or will to fight. Political or Strategic CoG can often be a moral entity, such as ‘the ruling elite’ or a strong willed population. CoGs representing physical strength and power exist in principle at each level of command. These are vital considerations in the design of an operation. Will include the resolution of a conflict as well as mutual acceptance of terms and conditions. Commanders and staff must clearly understand exit criteria. A goal which contributes to the desired outcome. Objectives can sit at the strategic through to the tactical level noting that, at the tactical level, they should be clearly defined and attainable. A decisive combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign or operational objective. The intended consequences of actions. When these effects are realised, decisive conditions are realised.

Lines of Operation (LOO)

In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive conditions or points in time and space on the path to the Centre of Gravity. Lines may be functional, thematic or environmental.

Sequencing and Synchronising

Sequencing is the logical arrangement of effects and activities based on their interdependencies. Synchronisation applies time and space considerations to sequences and thus establishes their feasibility.

Phases

Contingency Plans (Branches and Sequels)

These represent distinct stages in the progress of a campaign leading to decisive conditions to reach the outcome. A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. Branches provide alternative ways to achieve DCs within a phase. Sequels provide an alternative option for the next phase, based on the outcome of the current phase.

Culminating Point

A culminating point is reached when the current situation can be maintained, but not developed to any greater advantage. To attempt to do so, without a pause or reinforcement, would risk over-extension and the vulnerability this may cause.

Operational Pause

An operational pause can be imposed on an operation or campaign out of necessity or through choice. Although a pause tends to reduce tempo in the short-term, it may increase it later on. Pauses are used to avoid culmination. They should be exploited to regain or strengthen a hold on the initiative and increase momentum.

Fulcrum*

The point during a campaign when an approximate, albeit fluctuating, equilibrium between opposing forces is disrupted significantly. One side starts winning and the other losing, potentially irreversibly. The very act of attempting to define it and its distinctive criteria, however, can help to identify opportunities and create the requisite conditions for success.

* Tipping Point is also used; note that neither Fulcrum nor Tipping Point are accepted NATO terminology. Table 6.2.2. – Planning Concepts for the Operational and Higher Tactical Levels70

70 SOHB.

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 3 The Tactical Estimate (TE) Introduction 6-30. Overview. As described in Section 6.1, the Tactical Estimate (TE), also known as the 6-Step process, is used when the tactical problem is complex and plans may be longer term and involve significant sequencing. There must therefore be sufficient time71 to complete a thorough assessment of the situation and the resultant plan may well link a number of tactical actions, through time and across the battlespace. Although it is typically the preserve of the higher tactical level (corps or division), a brigade HQ should use the TE when planning a deliberate, complex, multinational operation, and the CE for subsequent tactical actions. The TE will typically be used within the context of an operational or campaign plan and where the planning concepts (see section 6.2) have been decided at the operational level by the JTFHQ. As with the OLPP and the CE, the TE seeks to produce plan that is focussed by the commander’s direction. 6-31. Process. The TE consists of analysis in six linked stages, common in format, processes and outputs to the OLPP. It requires both concurrent and sequential analysis and is designed to enable the commander, supported by the staff, to understand the problem, identify the art of the possible, select a winning concept and translate it into a workable plan within the available time. It consists of the following steps, each of which is described in further detail in the latter stages of this section. Each step has a clear purpose, product and outcome. As with the CE, the TE is split into two stages; a subsequent third stage relates to the communication of the plan, Table 6.3.1. Stage 1 - Analysis of the Environment and the Mission Step 1

Understand the situation

Step 2

Identify and analyse the problem. This step is split into three further sub steps: 2A

Mission Analysis

2B

Evaluate Objects and Factors (includes Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE))

2C

Commander’s Analysis and Guidance Stage 2 - Development of the Plan

Step 3

Formulate and consider Courses of Action (COAs)

Step 4

Develop and Validate COAs

Step 5

COA Evaluation

Step 6

Commander’s Decision

Stage 3 - Communication of the Plan Delivery of OSW and orders. In the subsequent Preparation activity, subordinate back-briefs and a Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill ensure clarity of understanding across the Chain of Command. Table 6.3.1. – The Stages and Steps in the Tactical Estimate

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6-32. Operating within the context of an Operational or Campaign Plan. At the higher tactical level the TE will typically be used to produce a tactical plan in support of an overarching campaign/operational plan. This will often be depicted by an operational schematic. Component and higher-level tactical HQs therefore have to deliver military activities and supporting effects that underpin the campaign. They may therefore decide to use planning concepts which, derived from the operational level, assist in breaking down, ordering and visualising complex tactical military plans.72 6-33. Planning Concepts at the Tactical Level. The planning concepts methodology, explained at Section 6.2, has wider utility beyond the operational level. Some planning concepts such as Centre of Gravity and Phases, are a useful method to bring order to higher-level tactical plans where they are complex, sequenced or managed over significant periods of time. For example, a brigade conducting a complex stabilisation operation that spans years may find a planning concept such as a Line of Operation (LOO) of use. The HQ may also choose to display its tactical plan using a schematic based on planning concepts. The use of planning concepts at the higher tactical level is about exploiting a useful methodology; it is not about campaign planning at the tactical level, nor is it a mandatory part of tactical planning. Planning concepts may be self-generated in the tactical planning process or may derive from an analysis of a higher HQ’s planning concepts. HQs should restrict themselves to examining 1 and 2-up plans only and should not search higher and higher in the hope of discovering planning concepts relevant to their activity.

STAGE 1 – Analysis of the Environment and Mission STEP 1 – Understanding the Situation 6-34. Overview. The purpose of Step 1 is to develop a thorough understanding of the character and nature of the operating environment and its corresponding challenges in order to allow the commander to frame the problem within its operational context. Step 1, which initiates the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) and the Intelligence Estimate (IE), is critical because it establishes the baseline for the remainder of the estimate. As with the other steps, it is likely to be iterative and may be refined at any stage of the estimate. WngO 1 will be sent during Step 1.

Step 1 – Understanding the Situation Purpose: To develop a broad but thorough understanding of the character and nature of the operating environment in order to allow the commander to frame the problem within its operational context. Product: A Receipt of Orders Brief (ROOB) and an Operational Environment Brief followed by WngO 1. Outcome: An understanding of the operational context in which the tactical problem sits.

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When planning concepts are used at the higher tactical level UK doctrine has previously referred to them as Tactical Planning Concepts.

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STEP 2 - Understand the Problem 6-35. Overview. ‘Understanding the problem’ is the process by which the commander narrows their focus on the complexities of the problem – what are the key factors and why, what is their theory of change from the current conditions to the future desired conditions, and what risks and opportunities exist? The commander should also envisage how the problem might change over time as a result of events both in and out of their control.

Step 2 – Understand the problem Purpose: Allows the commander to narrow their focus on the complexities of the problem – what are the key factors and why, what is their theory of change from the current conditions to the future desired conditions, and what risks and opportunities exist? Product:  • 2A – Mission Analysis. Planning Guidance, deductions in relation to Planning Concepts (i.e. FF CoG, Decisive Act and Decisive Conditions), IRs, tasks, assumptions, constraints and areas of risk to the plan. Effects Schematic and Intent. • 2B – Object and Factor Analysis. ML and MD En COA, ICP, Draft DSO/DSOM and analysis of specific factors – typically related to CCIRs. • 2C – Commander’s Confirmation. Output of MA, Intent Schematic and further Planning Guidance for remainder of estimate. • WngO 2. Outcome: A full understanding of the operational environment, the outcome to be achieved in the context of the overall design for operations (higher intent and SoM), the objectives and tasks necessary to fulfil the mission, what constraints apply and what further decisions are required as the operation progresses.

STAGE 2 – Development of the Plan STEP 3 – Formulate COAs 6-36. Overview. Formulation of COAs is the stage in which the staff take the commander’s direction from Step 2 and generate outline COAs. The commander should have already generated a number of workable COAs in their own mind at this point and they must now focus staff effort on providing sufficient detail for each of these. Step 3 does not follow a set procedure - its purpose is to create credible and feasible COAs using balanced planning teams that can then be further developed in Step 4. Where the situation is complicated the commander may examine a wider range of COAs or task bespoke planning teams to scope the feasibility of certain contingency plans. When time is short, the situation simple, or options limited, command judgement needs to be applied to limit what is considered. In sum, it is a relatively quick transitory step which allows the commander to rule out options and select the most credible COAs to take forward.

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Step 3 – Formulate COAs Purpose: Creation of credible and feasible outline COAs that can be further developed in Step 4. Products: • COA summary sheet for each COA. • COA back brief to commander. Outcome: Commander has selected COAs for further development in the remainder of the estimate.

STEP 4 – Develop and Validate COAs 6-37. Overview. Development and validation of the COAs is the step in which the staff work up the detail of the selected COAs to ensure that credible and feasible COAs can then be tested against one another in the next step. Of note, by this stage in the process the complex nature of operations at the higher tactical level may dislocate the commander from the HQ so staff must work diligently within the commander’s intent to ensure that the process does not lose tempo.

Step 4 – Develop and Validate COAs Purpose: Development and validation of detailed COAs in order to create mature options that can be tested against each other in Step 5. Products: • DSO/DSOM, SoM, TASKORG and Synch Matrix for each COA. • Commander’s Step 4 Outbrief. Outcome: Commander gives further direction on the development of the plan.

STEP 5 – COA Evaluation 6-38. Overview. COA evaluation is the step where alternative COAs are evaluated against the likelihood of achieving the operational or tactical outcome and the associated objectives. At a minimum each COA should therefore have a fully developed CONOPS and Ops Trace with any additional product specified in formation SOIs. Although there is an opportunity for further refinement of the CONOPS, Step 5 is primarily designed to assist the commander in making a COA decision noting that they should have previously set the criteria for evaluation. Step 5 consists of four stages and the results are briefed to the commander.

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Step 5 – COA Evaluation Purpose: Step 5 is primarily designed to assist the commander in making a COA decision; alternative COAs are evaluated against the likelihood of achieving the operational or tactical outcome and the associated objectives. Products: • Captured results of the COA evaluation. • Refined COAs. • Commander’s Step 5 Outbrief. Outcome: COAs refined and evaluated sufficiently to allow the commander to select a COA for development into a detailed plan.

STEP 6 – Commander’s Decision and Development of the Plan 6-39. Overview. In this step the commander decides which of the COAs the staff will develop into the plan. They must explain precisely what the COA will involve in the form of a Commander’s Decision Brief to the staff or, if time is constrained, to the PPG for it to brief to the remainder of the staff subsequently. WngO 3 is produced following the Commander’s Decision Brief.

Step 6 – Commander’s decision and development of the plan Purpose: Commander selects their chosen COA for development into the plan. Products: • Commanders Decision Brief to the staff. • WngO 3. • The Plan – full OSW and supporting product. (Golden Thread product includes: Ops Schematic, TASKORG, Synch Matrix and DSO/DSOM.) Outcome: A finalised plan.

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TE Summary Stage 1 - Analysis of Env & Msn

Tactical Estimate – The 6-Step Process

1

2

Commander & Staff Receipt of Orders Brief (ROOB) Understand the Operating Environment Operating Environment Brief WngO 1

Understand the Problem

Staff

Commander

Commander

Step 2B: Evaluate Objects and Factors

Step 2A: MA

3

Stage 2 - Developing the Plan

Understand the Situation

Formulate & Consider COAs

Step 2C: Comd’s Analysis & Guidance

Commander & Staff Operational Schematic Effects Schematic Risk Set Evaluation Criteria Commander Comd’s Guidance for COA Development

4

5

6

Develop & Validate COAs

Staff Develop COAs Validate with FACES Wargame

COA Evaluation

Commander & / or Staff Evaluate against Comd’s criteria Wargame/Red Team/OA

Commander’s Decision

Figure 6.3.2. – Overview of the Tactical Estimate

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 4 The Combat Estimate (CE) Introduction 6-40. Overview. The CE was initially produced for commanders planning at subunit level and below, but it is also suitable for commanders and staff in battlegroup, brigade or divisional headquarters. It is designed to generate plans for tactical problems that typically need resolving urgently. The CE assumes that the commander and staff of a unit or formation has a good base understanding of the situation and there is therefore no need (and no time) to analyse the broader issues arising from tools such as ASCOPE (Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organisation, People, Events) or PMESIIPT (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical, Time).73 The requirement to generate tempo is foremost. 6-41. Process. The manner in which the CE is used depends on the problem to which the estimate is being applied and the amount of time available. A summary of the process and outputs is at Figure 6.4.3. It is a process, not a template, with each question having a clear purpose, product and outcome. The CE format is a guide that requires the individual or staff conducting the estimate to identify the factors most relevant to the problem, and to analyse them under the most appropriate question. This section deliberately focuses on the conduct of a staff-supported CE. When conducting the CE as an individual the purpose and outcome of each question is identical but the level of product will obviously be limited. Of note, planning concepts (see Section 6.2) are not used in the CE though the staff should clearly be aware of the tactical level plan/schematic that they are supporting. The CE is split into two stages, while a third stage relates to the communication of the plan. Table 6.4.1 refers. Stage 1 - Analysis of the Environment and the Mission Question 0

Baseline Preparation and Understanding.

Question 1

What is the situation and how does it affect me?

Question 2

What have I been told to do and why?

Question 3

What effects do I need to achieve and what direction must I give to develop the plan?

Question 4

Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?

Question 5

What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?

Question 6

Where and when do the actions/effects take place in relation to each other?

Question 7

What control measures do I need to impose?

Stage 2 - Development of the Plan

Stage 3 - Communication of the Plan Delivery of OSW and orders. In the subsequent Preparation activity subordinate backbriefs and a Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill ensure clarity of understanding across the Chain of Command. Table 6.4.1. – The Two Stages of the CE 73

ASCOPE (Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organisation, People, Events) and PMESIIPT (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical, Time) are described further at Section 6.5.

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STAGE 1 – Analysis of the Environment and the Mission (Q0 – 3) Q0 – Baseline Preparation and Understanding 6-42. Overview. ‘Baseline Preparation and Understanding’ is the first stage in the CE. The aim of this stage is for the commander and staff to frame the problem that faces them and to focus the staff on the key issues that must be considered during the estimate. It follows the same logic as Step 1 of the TE, though unlike the TE it assumes that everyone has a broad understanding of the context within which the tactical problem sits.

Q0 – Baseline Preparation and Understanding Purpose: To frame the problem and focus the staff on the key issues to be considered during the estimate. Product: Receipt of Orders Brief (ROOB) followed by WngO 1. Outcome: The context of the tactical problem understood and the staff aware of the key issues to be considered.

QUESTION 1 – What is the Situation and How does it affect Me? 6-43. Overview. Q1 is the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE).74 It is the analysis of the environment (physical and human) and the enemy to identify what the enemy is most likely to do and how the environment will affect the operation, summarised at Figure 6.4.2.

Q1 – What is the situation and how does it affect me? • Purpose: To analyse the physical environment, human terrain and enemy focussing on the object and factors that the force will have to overcome to achieve its mission. Products: • The Q1 Back Brief. • Draft ICP. • Draft Decision Support Overlay (DSO). • En focussed Event Overlay. • En most dangerous (MD)/most likely (ML) COAs. Outcome: The context of the tactical problem understood and the staff aware of the key issues to be considered.

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Sometimes referred to as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace/Battlefield (Annex 7c to AJP-2). NATO use the term Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE).

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Operational Area Evaluation Terrain Analysis

Human Terrain Analysis1

Met Analysis

Threat Evaluation Doctrine

Impact of the Environment on the enemy

Strength

Likely Tactics

Situation Integration

Impact of the Environment on friendly forces

Note 1 – Human Terrain Analysis may be omitted if it is clear that the population has no bearing on the operation. Urban areas are covered in the Terrain Analysis.

Enemy MLCOA

Fig 6.4.2. – CE IPE Summary75

QUESTION 2 – What have I been told to do and Why? 2C-44. Overview. MA is an analytical process to allow the commander to understand the superior’s intent, the mission and the context in which it is set. More specifically, it allows the commander to develop an understanding of the role in achieving the higher commander’s desired end state, identify specified and implied tasks and the factors that constrain decision making. Q1 and Q2 are best conducted sequentially to reduce the risk of flawed assumptions. To make best use of limited time, conducting Q1 and Q2 concurrently has merit; Table 6.4.3 over the page shows a recommended ‘blended’ compromise. The key Q2 outcome is that the commander and staff must be absolutely clear on what situation is being planned against.

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Note: Human Terrain Analysis may be omitted if it is clear that the population has no bearing on the operation. Urban areas are covered in the Terrain Analysis.

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Q2 – What have I been told to do and why? Purpose: An analysis of the orders to identify/confirm the intent and tasks that must be completed and the freedoms and constraints imposed. Product: Planning guidance incorporating the identification of: • Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), Priority Information Requirements (PIRs), Requests for Information (RFIs). • Tasks, assumptions, constraints. • Risk Register (Areas of risk for the plan). • Planning Guidance Matrix. Outcome: A full understanding of the outcome to be achieved in the context of the overall design for operations (higher intent and SoM), the objectives and tasks necessary to fulfil the mission, what constraints apply and what further decisions are required as the operation progresses.

Q1

What is the situation and how does it affect me? (70%)

Initial Q1 Brief

Q1 Final analysis (30%)

Q2

What have I been told to do and why? (Individual)

Comds Guidance

Q2 Continued (PPG)

Q1 Final Brief

Q2 Brief

Table 6.4.3. – Example format for concurrent Q1 and Q2

QUESTION 3 – What Effects do I need to Achieve and what Direction must I give In order to Develop a Plan? 6-45. Overview. Q3 allows the commander to consolidate their analysis into the key effects they need to achieve and to construct their corresponding intent and planning guidance. To do this the commander must review and refine their CCIRs, assumptions and constraints before confirming the effects to be imposed on the enemy, the broader spread of actors and any terrain or capabilities (friendly or enemy). Once the commander has identified the effects they need to achieve, the Intent and Main Effort can be written. Q3 is complete when the commander has briefed the staff on the desired effects, the intent and given their planning guidance. This must be disseminated to subordinates in WngO 2. Development of the Effects Schematic and Intent is described in further detail in Section 6.5.3. After Q3, the commander might choose to deploy with his Recce Gp to see the ground, leaving the COS and staff to develop COAs in Qs 4-6. It is therefore essential that the COS and staff fully understand the commander’s direction and guidance; the COS or COA team leads must read back the direction and guidance to the commander to demonstrate complete comprehension.

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Q3 - What Effects do I need to achieve and what direction must I give in order to develop a plan? Purpose: To review and refine tasks, CCIRs, assumptions and constraints in relation to the outcome and objectives; in order to enable the identification of the effects that must be achieved and the drafting of a commander’s intent. Products: • Comd’s Intent Statement. • Effects Schematic. • Comd’s Guidance • WngO 2. Outcome: An understanding of the effects that need to be imposed.

STAGE 2 – Developing the Plan (Questions 4 – 7) 6-46. Overview. Stage 2 is the development of the plan, taking the commander’s Effects Schematic, relating it to the ground, then resourcing each effect and synchronising and deconflicting activity. Qs 4 - 6 need to be conducted sequentially. If the commander outlined more than one COA for development, additional teams are used to develop each COA. The chosen COA should then be wargamed76, refined and Q7 applied. Note, once a CP is ‘worked up’ and mature in its use of the CE process, the option of conducting Qs 4 – 6 concurrently becomes viable as it offers the possibility to reduce planning time with a streamlined process. 6-47. Risk Register. The Risk Register will have been generated by the Principal Planning Group (PPG) during Q2 and the commander will have specified CONPLANS for development at Q3. In addition, throughout Stage 2, the COA Team(s) should continue to capture risks. The risks and corresponding mitigation measures are presented to the commander at the COA back-brief.

QUESTION 4 – Where can I best Accomplish each Action or Effect? 6-48. Overview. The purpose of Q4 is for selected staff, most commonly in COA teams, to place the effects and related actions on the enemy and physical and human terrain where they will best achieve their purpose. The teams should also stipulate what and where to observe in order to confirm the situation and enemy COA.

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Wargaming is described in further detail in Section 6.5.4.

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Q4 – Where can I best accomplish each Action or Effect? Purpose: To identify where the commander’s desired effects on enemy or adversary will and cohesion, physical capability and understanding should take place. Products: • DSO. • Developed Decision Support Overlay Matrix (DSOM). Outcome: An understanding of where to allocate resources in order to achieve the identified effects and supporting actions. The identification of where to look, where to act and where to decide.

QUESTION 5 – What Resources do I need to Accomplish each Action or Effect? 6-49. Overview. The purpose of Q5 is to decide on the necessary resources and grouping to enable each effect or action; it is the resourcing of the DSO. This process should not be constrained to the combat power under command of the formation or unit and may therefore prompt a bid for additional resource or the sequencing of activity.

Q5 – What Resources do I need to accomplish each Action or Effect? Purpose: To identify the resources required for each action. Products: • DSOM. • TASKORG. • Ops Schematic. • Updated Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP). • Initiation of the Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP). Outcome: An understanding of what resources are required to achieve each action and effect and how they should be grouped and allocated.

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QUESTION 6 – When and where do the Actions and Effects take place in relation to each other? 6-50. Overview. Detailed synchronisation follows on naturally from the resourcing of activity. Q6 aims to synchronise the actions, effects and resources in relation to time and space. COA Team(s) must refine when and where to look (NAIs), where to act (TAIs) and where to decide (DP/DLs), while ensuring there is synergy in the plan by bringing together the full spectrum of activities across the staff branches. The key output from Q6 is the SoM which is supported by the Synch Matrix; COA teams must also: confirm the TASKORG, missions and tasks, record key events in draft coordinating instructions and continue to develop CONPLANs against the MDCOA and the Risk Register. At the end of Q6, the staff will have the information required to be able to brief the commander on the COAs. In addition, any final developments made during Q6 must be reflected in the updated DSO, DSOM, TASKORG, Ops Trace, SoM, ICP and Risk Register. Staff will have a clearer understanding of the operational timings at this stage and should cue any prelim or early moves where appropriate.

Q6 – When and Where do the Actions and Effects take place in relation to each other? Purpose: To synchronise the effects and their supporting actions by resource, time and space. Products: • Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM), supported by Synch Matrix. • Refined TASKORG. • Missions and Tasks. Outcome: The identification of the sequence in which the effects and actions should be conducted and the identification of likely missions and tasks.

QUESTION 7 – What Control Measures do I Need? 6-51. Overview. Q7 considers what control measures are required to support the plan. Control measures, such as boundaries, are the means by which Battlespace Management (BM) is conducted; they are the glue that holds a plan together. Owned by G3, BM is the adaptive method that enables the dynamic synchronisation, prioritisation and deconfliction of activity across all dimensions within the operational area.

Contents 1 6-30  |  Army Field Manual I Command

Q7 – What Control Measures do I need? Purpose: To identify the measures required to effectively coordinate and control activity. Product: No single product is produced but information from Q7 is required to complete: • Ops Trace. • Coordinating instructions. Outcome: The required deconfliction (including fire support coordination measures), C2 relationships, protection and sustainment coordination measures identified to support the coordination of the effects and their supporting actions.

The COA Decision Brief 6-52. Overview. A COA decision brief is the formal presentation of COAs to the commander to allow their decision on a single COA to develop into a detailed plan. A commander may elect to receive this brief and decide on a COA at any time during Stage 2 of the CE depending on the situation. The most important factor governing when the commander makes a decision is the time available for planning, combined with the availability of information to make a decision. For example, the commander may decide on a single COA at Q3 (more likely when time is limited), or may choose to have COAs presented on the completion of Q5 based on the DSO/DSOM with or without a SoM. The commander can also make a decision after Q6 based on COAs with a Synch Matrix. Finally, the results of the wargame can be used for the basis of a decision though this is more likely at formation level or when time constraints are less pressing. Following the commander’s decision, Q4–7 for the selected COA are typically revisited in detail in order to refine the plan and to capture any further planning guidance from the commander.

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Refine choosen COA

DSO - Where to look (NAI), act (TAI) and decide (DP/DL) - Pull through ‘golden thread’ product from Q1 - match Event Overlay to DSO

DSOM - Location, purpose and force elements allocated to each action/effect Draft TASKORG - Groups capabilities together for each task, refined in Q6 Draft Ops trace and SoM (to feed Q6) Initiate STAP

RESOURCE

TARGET

QUESTION 5

What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?

BSM/Control Measures - Deconfliction - Integration - C2 - Enhance Protection - Enable Sustainment Ops Trace/Co-ord instructions

CONTROL

QUESTION 7

Fig 6.4.3. – CE Summary

COA Decision Brief Options

SoM and Missions and Tasks

Synch Matrix - Sequences adversary activity, manoeuvre, fires and IA in time and space Refined TASKORG

SYNCHRONISE

When and where do the actions/ effects take place in relation to each other?

QUESTION 6

WARGAME

ROC Drill

Subordinate Back Briefs

OGp

OGp Rehearsal

O&W Prep

STAGE 3 COMMUNICATION OF THE PLAN

WngO 2

3.1 Review and Refine key output from Q1 and 2 - Review and refine tasks, CCIRs, IRs, assumptions and constraints - confirm key effects 3.2 Comd’s Effects Schematic and Intent - Link effects to objectives and purposes - ID ME - Write intent 3.3 Comd’s Guidance/Direction - COAs, planning guidance (against criteria), key risks. En COA to plan against, CONPLANS - COA team leaders to read back comd’s guidance/direction

REVIEW/INTENT/DIRECT

What effects do I need to achieve and what direction must I give in order to develop a plan?

QUESTION 3

What control measures do I need to impose?

2.1 What is the Higher Comd’s intent? - Sketch 1 UP CONOPs - Identify your role, desired outcome, Comd’s ME. Task Org changes, supporting/ supported, any likely Tasks/Objectives. 2.2 What are the specified & implied tasks? - Tasks (Actors and effects), Planning Guidance, Assumptions, Constraints, RFIs, IRs 2.3 What are the freedoms and contraints? - Time, space and resources. 2.4 Has the situation changed? How might the situation change and how might it affect me? - Amend plan? - ID key areas to Risk, Risk Register

MISSION ANALYSIS

STAGE 2 - DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN (COA Development)

OAE: - Meterological Effects Trace - Terrain Overlays - Infrastructure Overlays - Human Terrain Analysis - MC and AA Overlay - Key Terrain and Vital Ground Threat Evaluation - Enemy Doctrinal Overlays - Force Ratios and Capabilities - SWOT Analysis - Enemy Intent Schematics - Draft HVTL - Draft HPTL Situation Integration - Situation Overlays - MLCOA and MDCOA (Including timetable) - Event Overlays - Draft ICP - Draft DSO Q1 Brief

IPE

What have I been told to do and why?

QUESTION 2

STAGE 1 - ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND MISSION What is the situation and how does it affect me?

Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?

QUESTION 4

WngO 1

CIS ESTIMATE

CSS ESTIMATE

INITIATE

Staff Planning Time Line Operational Time Line ROOB Direction for WngO 1

Baseline preparation and understanding

QUESTION 0

QUESTION 1

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 5 Common Planning Processes 6-53. Overview. This section describes the definitions and broad methodology for the key planning processes common to both the TE and the CE. It does not go into the detailed mechanics of how to conduct each process as this information can be found in supporting handbooks. In Table 6.5, the similarities between the two tactical level estimates are highlighted, with the progression from the CE to the TE being more logical than may first appear.

Common Planning Processes • Intelligence Preparation of the Environment • Mission Analysis • Effects Schematic and CONOPS Development • Wargaming • Red Teaming

Process Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) Mission Analysis (MA) Effects Schematic and CONOPS Development Wargaming Red Teaming

TE Step 1 and 2B

CE Q1 (continual)

Step 2A

Q2

Step 2A/C Step 2 - 3

Q3

Step 5

Most commonly after selected COA fully developed

Optional

Optional

Table 6.5. – The Key Planning Processes Common to both the TE and CE

Contents 1 6-34  |  Army Field Manual I Command

Chapter 6 - SECTION 5.1 Analysing the Environment and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Introduction 6-54. Analysing the Environment in the Tactical Estimate (TE) and Combat Estimate (CE) is the overarching definition given to the understanding the character of the conflict and the human dimension within it. It is continual throughout the Operations Process and is essential to the provision of a unified staff effort. The key is that analysing the environment is not an end in itself; the purpose is to inform the commander’s decision making and planning. At the tactical level, Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) will often be fed by Joint IPE,77 and at every subsequent level, G2-led analysis will draw on the intelligence analysis of the higher HQ. 6-55. Types of Intelligence. IPE and the Intelligence Estimate (IE) are able to draw on numerous sources of information and intelligence during planning and execution. While these may not be available during the prosecution of all military activities, commanders and staff need to be aware of the range of capabilities so that formal requests for a capability can be submitted to the higher HQ. Figure 6.5.1.1 depicts the intelligence collection disciplines.

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Joint IPE is explained in JDP 2-00 – Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

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Electronic Warfare (EW)4 & Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

Agent Handling & CASCON

Debriefing

Human Intelligence HUMINT

Communications Intelligence (COMINT)5 Electronic Support Measures (ESM) Comms & Non Comms

Surveillance

Measurement & Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

All-Source Fusion Forensics & Biometrics Intelligence (FABINT)

Document Exploitation (DOCEX)

Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)

Interrogation & Tactical Questioning (TQ)1

Seized Media Analysis (SMA)

Foreign Instrumentation & Signals Intelligence (FISINT)

Intelligence Collection Disciplines

Strategic HUMINT

Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT)

Synthetic Apeture Radar (SAR)6

Material & Personnel Exploitation (MPE)

Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)2

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)

Internet

Media

Infra Red (IR)7

Electro-Optical (EO)7 Limited Distribution Material

Sources 1. AFM ISTAR Part A Chapter 3 Annex A. 2. JDP 2-00 Chapter 2 Section V.

Notes on All-Source Fusion: 1. Interrogation and TQ are HUMINT disciplines but are integrated with MPE disciplines operationally. 2. TECHINT incorporates Wpns Int and CHEMEX. 3. Depending upon the task, all-source fusion and further processing produces intelligence in support of operations (OPINT), including specific functions such as targeting, or it produces Security Intelligence (SI) which informs Counter-Intelligence activities and security measures. This function is supported by a number of specialist processing disciplines including Intelligence Applications Management and Intelligence Requirements Management and Collection Management. 4. EW also includes ECM and EPM. 5. COMINT includes Cyber Exploitation Activities. 6. SAR may be classed as IMINT or MASINT. 7. Both IR and EO IMINT may be produced from imagery or FMV.

Figure 6.5.1.1. – Intelligence Collection Disciplines

Intelligence Preparation of the Environment 6-56. Overview. IPE,78 occasionally still referred to as the IPB, is a set of analytical procedures to assist the commander and his staff in planning and mission execution. The IPE process has application across all military activities and improves a force’s understanding across all environments. It analyses the Physical Environment, the Human Terrain, the Information Environment, and the enemy/adversary, leading to the creation of the Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP), the draft Decision Support Overlay (DSO), and the draft Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP). The commander and staff conduct IPE during Steps 1 and 2B of the TE, and Q1 of the CE. An IE is also conducted by the G2 staff, particularly during the TE. 78

Intelligence Preparation of the Environment/Battlespace is explained at Annex 7C to AJP-2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security, 2016.

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6-57. Purpose. The purpose of IPE is to: a. Define the total operating environment and its effects on the operation. b. Determine, describe and evaluate the enemy/adversary or intended target. This involves identifying possible threats to the operation and identifying areas where intelligence collection assets must be used in order to monitor or detect threats or to determine if actions and effects are having the intended results. c. Identify places where friendly forces can influence events or opinions through physical or cognitive means (potential TAIs). This includes identifying DPs at which the commander must decide on a COA and areas in which Indicators and Warnings will confirm what the target’s COA is (NAIs). 6-58. 3-Stage Process. IPE consists of three stages which lead to the production of a draft DSO. A staff proceeding through each stage has the option of producing a number of overlays and matrices which are designed to help improve the understanding; the depth of analysis depends on the time available. Some products can be prepared in advance of planning.

IPE STAGE 1 – Operational Area Evaluation 6-59. Analyse the Physical Environment. a. Define the Area of Intelligence Interest (AII) and the Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR). The AII is the area in which a commander requires intelligence on those factors likely to affect the outcome of his current and future operations. The AIR is the area in which a commander is responsible for the provision of intelligence within the means at his disposal. All formations, units and subunits are allocated their respective AII and AIR by their next higher level of command. The AIR given to a commander will usually mirror their AOO. b. Methods for Terrain Analysis. The best terrain analysis, which includes weather analysis, is based on a recce of the ground, supplemented by further analysis conducted by the Engineer staff in the HQ. It is vital that the key deductions from this analysis are at hand throughout the estimate, particularly during wargaming. For example, identifying that low cloud has an adverse effect on the ability of ISTAR assets to observe NAIs, DPs and TAIs should be raised at the Step 2B / Q1 back-brief and played out during wargaming. Useful handrails for terrain analysis include OCOKA79 and ROBOT80. Deductions must be related to the mission i.e. ‘The northern route will take 30mins longer than the southern route, but it affords cover from view and fire which the northern route does not’. c. Infrastructure Analysis. In many cases it will be necessary to analyse the Infrastructure as well as the ground. The mnemonic SWEAR-MSO is useful: Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academic (locations only), Refuge, Medical, Security (locations only) and Other.

79 80

OCOKA (offensive focus): Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Key Terrain, Avenues of Approach. ROBOT (defensive focus): Routes, Obstacles, Boundaries, Observation, Terrain.

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6-60. Analyse the Human Terrain (HT). People cannot be separated from the ground, either symbolically or physically. It is extremely difficult to envisage the consequences of actions without understanding the HT. HT is defined as the social, political and economic environment, belief systems and forms of interaction of the people among whom soldiers will operate. It encompasses every facet of social anthropology. Analytical tools include: a. Human Terrain Analysis (HTA). This is the process by which an understanding of the HT is developed and analysed. This can include a wide range of military and opensource inputs. While it is tempting to disseminate more information than not, the staff must focus on the key themes and trends, corroborating information across several sources where possible. Depending on the time available and the depth and breadth of analysis required, the G2 Staff may choose to use the following frameworks: (1) PEST / PESTLEI. – Political, Economic, Social and Technological (Legal, Environmental and Information). (2) PMESII-PT. – Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical and Time. This is a widely used and effective US model for COIN operations. (3) STEMPLES. – Social, Technological, Environmental, Military, Political, Legal, Economic and Security. (4) ASCOPE. – Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organisation, People, Events. (5) Combinations. A particularly useful tool is to combine PMESII-PT and ASCOPE into a single matrix, which can then provide a basis for collection planning and further analysis. b. HT Mapping (HTM). This is the process of using a geographic map to display those comparatively static demographic features e.g. population density, demographics, income distribution, social features (e.g. tribe, ethnicity, religion) or the location of physical items of social importance. There may be specific ROE within the LOAC which prohibit the use of certain institutional buildings, such as mosques and churches, museums and power stations. The staff may capture these on a Prohibited Target List (PTL). These rules may not apply to the enemy. Human Terrain Mapping can usefully form the basis of a ‘Human Terrain DSO’ on which the commander may wish to plot his Human Effects and Actions. c. Link Analysis. Link Analysis aims to map the linkages between various actors in the operating environment. It is particularly good for showing hierarchies and leaders. The linkage between actors can be shown as an information path to show how that interaction happens. And those linkages may provide opportunities for targeting as well as the actors themselves. d. Audiences, Actors, Adversaries and Enemies. It is essential to examine the interaction between these grouping (defined in Section 6.1). For example: relationships, political affiliations, political objectives, power brokers, funding lines and depth of ideology. Biometric Data Analysis assists the force in gaining information on a wide range of the population.

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e. Shade Shift. The Shade-Shift81 approach encourages the indirect approach to shaping the HT; the system generates clear options for the commander using the simple model. In practical terms, Shade Shift presents the commander with an enhanced understanding of the HT. From this, the commander is better able to identify areas of risk (consequence) and potential exploitation in the planning of operations. Subsequently, this detailed understanding allows the commander to identify how best to mitigate and exploit the consequences of actions within the HT during the execution of operations. 6-61. Analyse the Information Environment. The third component of OAE is the Information Environment. This is where humans and automated systems observe, orientate, decide and act upon information, and is therefore the principal environment for decision making. Relevant actors include leaders, stakeholders and organisations. The centrality of influence in shaping perceptions depends on commanders and their staffs understanding and utilising this environment. At the operational and tactical levels this involves Information Activities: a. Information Activities. These are actions designed to affect or manipulate information, or perceptions of information and information systems. They include protective measures. Examples include Info Ops, Media Ops and OPSEC. b. Informational Systems Analysis (ISA). ISA provides a clear understanding of the opposition’s means of executing their communications and influence strategy. This knowledge will provide the foundations to proactively track and refute or interdict and disrupt their communications strategy messages and in doing so counter a significant element of their influence campaign. c. Electromagnetic Environment (EME). The EME is contested space which presents opportunities (to exploit other actors’ use of the spectrum), constraints (ability to C2) and threats (to our information and C2) to the mission. EME needs to be considered early during planning process and continually during the mission in order to maintain freedom of manoeuvre and information superiority. EME analysis and understanding needs to consider own-force requirements, and the use of the EME by coalition partners, HN, NGO and hostile actors.

IPE STAGE 2 – Threat Evaluation 6-62. Introduction. Threat Evaluation is the identification, evaluation and analysis of adversaries and enemies; it is unconstrained by the environment. It involves an assessment of an enemy capacity to conduct operations and, from considering their doctrine or modus operandi (MO), the tactics which are likely to be used in operations against friendly forces.82 It assesses the enemy’s likely objectives within the AO. The result of the Threat Evaluation is a series of overlays showing deployment and tactics for each doctrinal COA. Any gaps in our knowledge will subsequently become IRs. Typically, it is conducted in three stages.

81 82

Further detail at: Land Influence Handbook, Army Code 71951, dated March 2011. Whilst irregular adversaries may not conform to any ‘doctrine’, they will have established TTPs. LIFC(A) produce a range of theatre-specific reference work that will assist in identifying these.

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a. Analysis of Adversary Capabilities (ORBATs, Frontages, Eqpt capabilities, Wpn ranges, dispositions, Intent). b. Analysis of Adversary Doctrine and Tactics (Doctrine, TTPs, Historical Precedents). c. Identification of Adversary Vulnerabilities (HPTL, HVTL, SWOT, CoG). SWOT Analysis and CoG Analysis, discussed below, are tools that are available for use when an enemy is particularly complex, and weaknesses are not immediately evident. 6-63. Centre of Gravity (CoG) Analysis. CoG Analysis83 is a tool that is utilised during the TE or OLPP, but can have applicability wherever a CoG can be identified. The key output of CoG Analysis is the identification of vulnerabilities which may then be exploited (enemy) or protected (friendly) or both (civilian). Figure 6.5.2 refers. Centre of gravity analysis Assessed aim and desired outcome The actor’s main goal and desired conditions 2) Critical capabilities The Actor’s primary means to enable the COG.

1) Centre of gravity The actor’s Primary element of power.

3) Critical requirements Those key system elements and essential conditions required to generate and sustain the COG’s critical capabilities

4) Critical vulnerabilities Weakness, gaps or deficiencies through which the COG may be influenced or neutralised

Conclusions The actor’s weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies which could be exploited to change the behaviour of an actor and improve conditions in the operational environment. Figure 6.5.1.2. – Centre of Gravity Analysis

6-64. SWOT Analysis. SWOT Analysis is a method of identifying a group’s Strengths and Weaknesses, and the Opportunities and Threats which are available. As with COG analysis, it is a useful way of breaking down an organisation’s characteristics such that they can be exploited or mitigated against. Table 6.5.1.3 refers. Strengths (internal) „„ ID the capabilities that give an advantage. „„ ID the characteristics that give an advantage. „„ ID how the object might exploit those advantages.

Weaknesses (internal) „„ ID the capabilities that give a disadvantage. „„ ID the characteristics that give a disadvantage. „„ ID how they might be exploited.

Opportunities (external) „„ ID the external conditions available and helpful to the object. „„ ID how opportunities may be enhanced or denied.

Threats (external) „„ ID the external conditions that could damage the object. „„ ID how those threats may be enhanced or reduced.

Table 6.5.1.3. – SWOT Analysis

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COG Analysis is further discussed in Annex 8B of ADP Land Operations 2017.

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IPE STAGE 3 – Situation Integration 6-65. Introduction. Step 3 of the IPE fuses the results of the OAE and Threat Evaluation from Steps 1 and 2 respectively. It aims to identify how the operating environment will shape enemy or adversary capability, doctrine and tactics and effectively turn it into practice, identifying potential COAs (including most likely (ML) and most dangerous MD)) and/or the civilian population’s COA. The key outputs are the draft DSO and deductions, which then constrain or provide opportunities to the commander’s plan. 6-66. DSO, DSOM and DSM. The DSO is an overlay which reflects where the activities of a specific actor should be targeted by Fires, Manoeuvre, Information Activities84 and Capacity Building. It will show how the enemy or adversary COA will be confirmed or identified. It identifies, in time and space, when the commander might need to take a decision based on own and adversary time lines. DPs can be related to time, such as Time Phase Lines (TPLs), or space as Decision Lines (DLs) on the DSO or as specified criteria as explained in the DSOM. It is the graphical display of the commander’s plan. The DSO must be supported by a DSOM, a table that lists all elements of the DSO and the action that is to take place and who is responsible for that action. Likewise a DSOM should be supported by a DSM, a table that summarises all the DPs, related CCIRs and indicators (see Chapter 5) and the conditions for subsequent/linked actions. At formation level a full DSO might be produced for each assessed COA. The DSO is the precursor to the STAP, which is simply a DSO that has been resourced with ISTAR assets.

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To note, Information Activities can only be targeted if a physical delivery method can be identified; they cannot be targeted if delivered via cyber or electronic means.

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 5.2 Mission Analysis 6-67. Mission Analysis (MA). MA is conducted in both the Tactical Estimate (TE) (Step 2A) and the Combat Estimate (CE) (Q2) and asks the commander and the Principal Planning Group (PPG) an identical set of four questions. A useful mechanism for both estimates is for the COS to state 2-up’s intent and the CONOPs of 1-up before the commander questions his force’s role and contribution. This must include an appreciation of what critical activity the superior commander intends to implement, and when he is likely to make decisions. The three-column format described in Section 6.1 is the principal analytical tool used to conduct MA and is assisted by a clear understanding of OOEA (see Section 6.1). 6-68. Q1 – What is the Higher Commander’s Intent? A force’s role in the operation can be identified and subsequently analysed from the Intent of the commander 2-up and the CONOPS of the commander 1-up. This sub-question seeks to allow the commander to understand their commander’s Outcome, Objectives and Main Effort, the context in which they will be operating and the nature of the problem to be solved. The ‘Intent’ of other key Combined, Joint, Intra-Governmental, Inter-Agency and Multinational (CJIIM) actors should also be analysed. This is the same for both estimates although the scale and subsequent assessment differ, especially as the TE involves the formal consideration of Tactical Planning Concepts (TPCs) and the higher commander’s narrative. The CE, which is not designed for longer-term operational planning, does not consider TPCs. 6-69. Q2 – What are the Specified and Implied Tasks? During MA, the commander and PPG must confirm the specified and implied tasks. These are extracted directly from the higher HQ’s Operation Order (OpO), Operation Plan (OPLAN) (if they have not been updated in a specific Fragmentary Order (FRAGO)) and supporting operational staff work (OSW). Specified Tasks are given in orders as something you must do, either as an Effect or Action, in order to achieve an Objective and an Outcome. Implied Tasks are those unstated tasks, either as Effects or Actions, which have to be carried out to achieve the specified tasks, the mission, or to support the Main Effort (ME)85. Implied tasks may be best discovered by asking the following six questions: a. What must I do on the ‘objective’? b. What must I do before? c. What must I do concurrently? d. What must I do after? e. What must I do to support others? f. What do I need others to do for me?

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The relationship between: Outcomes – Objectives – Effects – Actions is discussed in Section 6.1.

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6-70. Q3 – What are the Freedoms and Constraints? Mission Command is the British Army’s command philosophy. This is an approach which empowers subordinate commanders and promotes initiative as well as freedom and speed of action. Critically, it focuses on achievement of higher intent through mission-type orders. It empowers leaders at every level and is intended to generate agility and tempo. This enables us to overcome an enemy in the most chaotic and demanding circumstances and unlocks everyone’s potential to seize winning opportunities, however fleeting86. Freedoms should be identified to allow the staff to develop COAs later in the estimate and should be exploited; freedoms in relation to enemy weaknesses may become the ‘Battle-Winning Idea’. Constraints are those things that must be done, or a restraint, something that must not be or cannot be done. Some constraints will be imposed from above and some are simply ‘life’. Examples of freedoms and constraints include; time, space, legal, C2, ‘physics’, resources, OPSEC, media and restrictions. Imposed constraints may be challenged in order to allow greater freedoms. 6-71. Q4 – Has the Situation Changed and How Might it Affect Me? A commander needs to determine whether the situation has changed sufficiently to warrant a review of the estimate. Using MA, the commander reassesses the progress of their operation against the mission as the situation develops. The commander can ask at any time ‘has the situation changed – and do I need to make another decision?’ As well as ‘No – no change’, there are three possible responses: a. “Yes – the situation has changed but my plan is still valid.” b. “Yes – the situation has changed. My original mission is still feasible but I need to amend my plan.” c. “Yes – the situation has changed and the original mission is no longer valid.” In this case the commander should consult the superior but if, for whatever reason this is not an option, own initiative will have to be used to support the superior commander’s ME, in keeping with the original Intent. This will have to be balanced against implications for the commander’s Intent two levels of command up. 6-72. During initial planning a commander should also ask ‘How might the situation change?’ As part of MA Q2.4, a commander also examines the risks to the operation, and the opportunities they might present. This requires formal Risk Analysis and Management noting that, at the lower tactical level, it is very important to ensure that risk management is simple and based on sound military principles and common sense; not a laborious process conducted for its own sake. At the tactical level, the basic tools are judgement, experience, intuition and understanding – understanding the full span of the higher commander’s intent, the force’s capability, the likely consequences of actions, and likely and dangerous enemy COAs. Risks must be identified and mitigated, but complicated tables and spread sheets often do not contribute much to this sort of basic risk assessment. Risk Analysis must then continue throughout the estimate. Risk Analysis and Management are further explained in Section 6.6.

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Further detail on Mission Command is at page 6-4 in ADP Land Operations, 2017.

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 5.3 The Effects Schematic and Conops Development The Effects Schematic87 6-73. Overview. The Effects Schematic is common to both estimates.88 When combined with the commander’s intent and planning guidance it is known as a Combined Effects Schematic. Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for each effect must be identified during planning in order that assessment of the over or under delivery of the plan can occur. A Note on Effects Schematics. Actions and Effects will be combined with output from the IPE to create the commander’s Effects Schematic. This should be aligned to his Intent Statement.

Mission Effect Objective Purpose List all effects and their related objectives and purpose

Fix

Draw a schematic of intended effects

Block

Add any additional Effects and their purpose not already identified

Draft an Intent Statement using Outcomes, Objectives and Effects that the Comd wishes to have on the adversary/people

Intent

Main Effort

State Main Effort

Assessment is explained in Chapter 5. Figure 6.5.3.1. – The Effects Schematic

6-74. Commander’s Guidance. It is essential that commanders backbrief their staff following Mission Analysis in particular, but also at other times during the estimate process, to ensure that they are ‘in his/her mind’.89 The direction and guidance will come from two key sources; the Planning Guidance Matrix (created as a product of the 3CF), and the Effects Schematic. It should include planning guidance against the Tactical Functions or other doctrinal principles, direction on which COAs the commander wants their staff to develop, the criteria against which they will judge them and a draft an intent. In terms of process, this guidance is often summarised on an Effects Schematic, Figure 6.5.3.1 refers. 87 88 89

In nomenclature terms, the Effects Schematic has replaced the Intent Schematic. Effects – Objective – Purpose – terminology has replaced Task and Effect. (Note this is a change from SOHB, 2014). In the TE, the commander may have sufficient information to produce an Effects Schematic at the end of Step 2A, but will deliver it to the SPG in Step 2C. In the CE, the commander produces an Effects Schematic as part of Q3. A Commander will do this formally at Step 2C in the TE and Q3.3 in the CE.

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CONOPS Development 6-75. Formulating Concepts of Operations (CONOPS).90 The commander needs to select what will be decisive to their mission and how to achieve it. At the tactical level, what a commander is to achieve is given in the mission, which should be described in terms of tasks, written as Actions or Effects, with a unifying purpose. Since an understanding of what is to be achieved is determined in Q2.1, how the commander intends to achieve it is at the core of the remainder of the estimate. It requires the commander to select an action that would be decisive, together with the remaining actions necessary to achieve the intended effect and outcome. Whilst the Intent will be generated after Mission Analysis, the Scheme of Manoeuvre will necessarily follow later in the estimate once COAs have been analysed and the commander has selected the preferred COA. The use of Outcome, Objectives, Effects and Actions91 as described in Section 6.1 will bring clarity to the CONOPS. 6-76. CONOPS. COAs should include one decisive action92 and a number of supporting shaping or sustaining actions, each leading to an intended effect. The commander must then decide on the COA to be taken forward in planning terms. Where possible, the selected COA may be cleared with the superior commander via a confirmatory back brief and thereafter, the CONOPS is written comprising three elements: a. Intent Statement. The Effects Schematic leads to the Intent statement. Written by the commander, the Intent statement is, at its simplest, a statement of the outcome that the commander wishes to accomplish. But it may be clearer to express Intent using objectives, effects, and desired outcome. It represents what the commander wants to achieve and why – the change required in a given situation to be delivered by the operation, that binds the force together and sets the tone for what is to follow. Intent must be written in language the recipients will understand, noting that they may be from other nations, or not be military. The best Intent paragraphs are clear to subordinates without the requirement for additional amplifying detail. A typical sequence for writing an Intent is: (1) Describe the overall purpose of what is trying to be achieved (the outcome). (2) Describe the Objectives and the Effects using time or space to group them. (3) Summarise what success looks like and indicate what follows next. But, most importantly, an intent is personal to a commander. An intent should therefore be creative and allow the commander to inject their own personality. Ultimately, the Intent is what subordinates will refer too for guidance when the situation changes. b. Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM). The SoM expands the Intent to describe how the commander sees the operation unfolding – the method to achieve the change identified in the Intent. It explains where, when, how and with what, in relation to each other, the force is to achieve its purpose, so that subordinates can understand their roles in the plan and the effects and actions that they and others are to realise. Because it is related to time, a SoM can only be completed once the Sync Matrix has been confirmed. A clear intent should minimise the length of the SoM. A SoM may 90 ADP Land Operations, 2017, Chapter 9. 91 Effects and Action terms are defined in the SOHB. 92 The Main Effort (ME).

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helpfully use the conceptual frameworks93 to provide clarity. In turn, the conceptual frameworks may be preceded by a ‘preliminary activity’ statement and followed by an ‘enduring’ statement. Phases should be used with caution as they can serve to stilt subordinate action. c. Main Effort (ME). The ME is that activity that the commander considers critical to the success of the mission. To give it substance sufficient resources must be allocated to the unit assigned to deliver it. Illuminating the ME ensures that when the situation becomes more chaotic that activity will be remembered and it will provide the rallying point for effort. The ME may change throughout an operation in accordance with the situation. It should be expressed as an action, together with the primary force responsible for its delivery. 6-77. Missions. A mission statement is a clear and direct order to a subordinate and consists of action/task verbs and a unifying purpose (effect), traditionally preceded by the words ‘in order to’. There are three types of mission: a single statement with a unifying purpose; a series of tasks with a unifying purpose; and for reserves, a series of ‘be prepared to’ tasks, without a unifying purpose. Missions should be listed in a logical order of activity, reflecting the SoM, rather than in Army precedence as this will enhance the visualisation of the operation. Tasks contained within mission statements should be substantive. Lesser tasks, such as conducting prelim moves or establishing liaison should be omitted from the mission, and are better located within Coordinating Instructions. Mission statements will often be written personally by the commander.

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Conceptual frameworks include: deep, close and rear (with these terms relating to effect, time and space, geography) or shape, sustain, protect and enable decisive operations.

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 5.4 Wargaming Introduction 6-78. COA Wargaming, Red-Teaming, Rehearsal of Concept Drills. Course of Action (COA) Wargaming, Red-Teaming and Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drills are closely related, but discrete tools that support different elements of decision making. The distinctions between them are outlined in Figure 6.5.4.1. Red-Teaming is further described in Section 3.5.5 and ROC Drills are discussed in supporting handbooks. Tool

What

COA Wargaming

A systematic method of analysing a plan to visualise the ebb and flow of an operation or campaign. An adversarial ‘stress test’

RedTeaming (further detail at Section 6.5.5)

ROC Drill

Why

Who (illustrative)

When

To identify risks and areas of weakness in a forming plan

Chief Controller (e.g. COS, BG 2ic) Blue Team Red Cell Staff branches SMEs (OA)* (Commander)** (Red Team)***

During any or all of: 1. COA development 2. COA evaluation 3. COA refinement

The provision of honest, constructive and objective criticism to improve a commander’s decision-making

To challenge assumptions and fully explore alternative outcomes to reduce threats and increase opportunities

An independently constituted group of SMEs with appropriate skills for the project under consideration

Throughout the estimate

A visual, sequenced rehearsal of a plan

To enhance understanding of a formed plan

Comd Chief Controller Staff branches Unit/sub-unit commanders SMEs

After orders have been delivered and therefore sits within ‘preparation’ activity of the Operations Process

* If available. ** If desirable. *** If formed. Table 6.5.4.1. - COA Wargaming, Red-Teaming and ROC Drill distinctions

6-79. Common Misconceptions: a. ‘Wargaming’ and ‘COA Wargaming’ are not synonymous terms. COA Wargaming is but one of many wargaming techniques; in UK doctrine it generally takes place towards the end of the planning process. Other forms of wargaming can usefully be undertaken earlier in the decision-making process and elsewhere in Defence.94 b. ROC Drills might look and sometimes feel like a COA Wargame but they are not the same; they are a separate technique used at a different point in the military decisionmaking process and with separate aims. 94

Other forms of wargaming are detailed in the DCDC A Guide to Wargaming, 2013. This explains that COA Wargaming is but one wargaming technique in the decision-support ‘golf bag’. Other opportunities exist to wargame, particularly in the early stages of the estimate. Techniques and methods by which this can be achieved are contained in the DCDC guide.

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c. A Red Team is not synonymous with a Red Cell. A Red Team challenges assumptions and explores alternative outcomes; a Red Cell plays enemy/adversary actions in a given situation. d. ‘Simulation’ is not synonymous with ‘wargame’. A simulation (computer or manual) might be used to support a wargame, but it is not the wargame.

COA Wargaming 6-80. Introduction. COA Wargaming is a systematic method of analysing a plan in a conscious attempt to visualise the ebb and flow of an operation or campaign. Adversarial by nature, COA Wargaming superimposes friendly, neutral and hostile elements together to identify risks and shortcomings in potential or selected COAs. It pitches planners against each other in a deliberate attempt to spark debate and generate insights into a plan. By COA Wargaming, commanders and staffs attempt to foresee the dynamics of action, reaction and possible counteraction of battle. COA Wargaming is an essential part of the planning process. 6-81. Purpose. The purpose of a COA Wargame is to: identify risks (opportunities and threats) and areas of weakness in a forming plan; provide a thorough understanding of the interactions of various actors to the plan; highlight additional tasks which may have been overlooked in planning and; refine the synchronisation, resourcing, activity, prioritisation and coordination of a COA(s). COA Wargaming can apply to multiple COAs for comparative reasons or in a single selected COA to refine it and add robustness; to ‘bullet proof’ it. Hence a COA Wargame must rigorously test the plan. 6-82. Participants. The HQ personnel listed below are typically involved in COA Wargaming. a. Chief Controller (e.g. COS). The Chief Controller directs and controls the COA Wargame. b. Blue Team/Friendly Forces (G3 and/or G3/5 staff). The Blue Team, who has developed the plan, and that should include key G5 and G3/5 planners, controls Friendly Forces during the COA Wargame. It might include, as appropriate, G1/G4, G6, G3 staff, coalition partners, Consequence Management staff and other Integrated Action ‘lever’ SMEs. c. Red/Adversary Cell. Generally a G2 staff officer, who controls the adversary during the COA Wargame. d. Red Team95. If the HQ has established a Red Team it can be used during the COA Wargame to: (1) Allow G2 staff to play Red Cell, while the Red Team stands back and takes an independent view of the game, offering advice to the commander as appropriate, based on its broad perspective of the overall plan. (2) Play a free-thinking adversary who reacts to the Blue plan. (3) Inject situational and contextual changes and any ‘friction’ factors.

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Further detail on Red Teaming in Section 6.5.5.

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e. SMEs and CJIIM Actors. Available SMEs and CJIIM Actors should support COA Wargaming, sharing their time between the Blue and Red Teams where necessary. f. Operational Analysis (OA) Personnel. OA delivers quantitative rigour and objectivity to operational planning and decision making. OA, when available, should be engaged as early as possible (well in advance of the COA Wargame) to give analysts time to conduct meaningful analysis to feed into the COA Wargame, as appropriate. g. The Commander. Typically, a commander would wish to attend a COA Wargame to add greater insights based on their experience. These benefits, however, should be balanced against other effects that may be realised by their presence. Staff may be uneasy about criticising those elements of their plan they assess as unsatisfactory, resulting in the plan not being robustly tested. h. Subordinate Commanders. Subordinate Commanders may be invited to observe a wargame – when time is short, it can act as a pictorial warning order. The commander must weigh up the benefit of doing so against the likelihood that the subordinate will take away a snap shot which, by nature of the purpose of a wargame, may change. 6-83. When to COA Wargame. There are three occasions when a COA Wargame is appropriate, as shown in Figure 6.5.4.2.

Develop COA

COA Development

Evaluate COA

COA Evaluation

Comd’s Decision

Orders

Plan Refinement

COA Wargaming Opportunities

Rehearse Operation

ROC Drill (Mission Rehearseal)

Execute Operation

Figure 6.5.4.2. - Opportunities to COA Wargame

a. COA Development. COA Wargaming can help to visualise an embryonic COA, indicating the art of the possible and enabling impractical COAs to be discarded at an early stage. Early wargaming should yield a better understanding of a proposed COA. Finally it also helps to ensure that COAs are truly distinct and not merely a variant on the same scheme of manoeuvre. b. COA Evaluation. COA Wargaming can be used to compare each friendly COA with appropriate opponent COAs and any other relevant factors to determine the likelihood of success. Wargaming at this stage provides information on the relative strengths and weaknesses of each individual COA for evaluation against a commander’s COA selection criteria. c. Plan Refinement. Once the commander has selected their COA, wargaming can contribute significantly to its refinement, including identifying risks, areas of weakness and further CCIRs. In addition, wargaming assists in the production of coordinating instructions, indicates specific requirements for battlespace management and highlights potential tasks and associated readiness for reserves.

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6-84. Wargame Methodology. A COA Wargame requires three phases to deliver: plan; prepare; and execute. a. Plan. (1) Select the Event(s) to be COA Wargamed. The first task is to identify the event(s) to be COA Wargamed, based on what the commander wishes to achieve in the time available. The event(s) should be those the commander believes to hold most risk, either due to vulnerability to opponent action or perhaps the complexity of coordination required. (2) Determine the Time Available. COA Wargaming is time pressured; there is rarely sufficient time to COA Wargame all desired aspects of a plan. Hence the time available will dictate the number of critical events that can be COA Wargamed and the time dedicated to each, which becomes the length of the relevant ‘turn’. (3) Select the Method. The COA Wargame method96 selected will depend on the events to be COA Wargamed. The scope of the Wargame will be bounded by time, space and resource. Thus the COA Wargame could focus on the activity of a single sub-unit, or of the entire unit. It could focus only on activity on the objective, or solely on preliminary moves. Or it could look at activity from a point in time to another. It is tempting to wargame the whole plan, but time for wargaming will always be limited and it is therefore best to restrict the Wargame to those areas likely to induce the most friction and where the plan needs testing most. (4) Select the Adversary COA. In the unlikely event that the commander has not specified which enemy COA he is planning against, the Red Team and/or G2 cell should advise the commander/Chief Controller on which adversary COA to wargame. The choice is usually between the adversary’s Most Likely (ML) or Most Dangerous (MD) COA. Because COA Wargaming is an adversarial activity consideration should be given to selecting the adversary MD/WC COA as a default; the Blue plan will only be fully tested if Red is doing everything it can to win. (5) Select the Recording Method. The output of the COA Wargame should be captured either as a narrative, a work sheet or as a Joint Action Synchronisation Matrix as a consolidated stand-alone product. In addition, any amendments required to be made to other staff products by individual branches should be documented. b. Prepare. Despite the increasingly digital nature of command and control there is an argument for considering manual forms of SA to enable COA Wargaming. Digital media such as BOWMAN/ComBAT and PowerPoint have their advantages, but so do manual media such as a bird-table, map(s) and ‘stickies’ or counters. Whatever media are used, visual aids need to be prepared. Relevant OSW is also required97. In a particularly complicated or large COA Wargame, rehearsals are recommended. 96 97

There are three recommended techniques - the Belt, the Avenue-in-Depth, and the Box; further detail can be located in Annex D to ATP 3.2.2 and supporting handbooks. DSO, DSOM, Synch Matrix, TASKORG, CCIRs and other products in accordance with Unit SOPs.

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c. Execute. COA Wargaming is turn-based. Each turn covers one or more area or event of the plan being developed or refined. The basic mechanism for each turn is: Action - Reaction - Counteraction - Consolidation. Traditionally the side with the initiative takes the first action. However, consideration should be given to Blue always having the first action irrespective of the initiative holder as the Blue plan is the one that requires rigorous testing and therefore there is merit in Blue consistently getting the counteraction phase. That said, whichever side goes first, the process remains the same. SME input should be injected as appropriate and accurate recording of findings is vital. 6-85. Outputs. COA Wargaming will result in a number of observations which will be required to refine the plan and subsequently enable the OSW and planning products to be updated.

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 5.5 Red Teaming Introduction 6-86. A Red Team is a team that is formed, under a nominated red team leader, with the singular objective of subjecting an organisation’s plans, programmes, ideas and assumptions to rigorous challenge. Red teaming is the work performed by the red team in identifying and assessing, inter alia, assumptions, alternative options, vulnerabilities, limitations and risks for that organisation. Red teaming is a tool set, the use of which will provide the end user (commander or decision maker) with a more robust baseline for decision making. 6-87. Benefits. The specific benefits of red teaming include: a. Broader understanding of the Operational Environment. b. Filling gaps in understanding. c. Identifying vulnerabilities, opportunities, risks and threats. d. Identifying bias, group-think, flawed assumptions and the tendency to jump to conclusions. e. Revealing how external influences, adversaries or competitors could affect plans, concepts and capabilities. f. Identifying second and third-order effects and unforeseen consequences. g. Identifying further or improved measures of effectiveness. h. Identifying the need for contingency plans. i. More focussed intelligence collection and improved information requirements. 6-88. Composition. A red team should be tailored appropriately for the project under consideration. Critical and creative thinkers will form the core of the team; the wider team may comprise a diverse mix of skills and experience or may be focussed in one particular area, depending upon the issue being addressed. There is a need to include experts, but there must also be room for people who are able, and unafraid, to ask naïve questions. Members of the team should be selected for their critical and creative thinking skills, their subject matter expertise, or their analytical ability. Where the team is to employ an alternative perspective, cultural advisers who are able to provide an understanding of the different perspectives will be required. The size of the team is important and can constitute as few as two to over 25, dependent upon the task. However the optimum number for a red team is generally considered to be between five and nine. The reasons for this are twofold; when a team exceeds nine, facilitation becomes unwieldy, and, when a team is less than five creativity starts to decline. 6-89. Characteristics and Skills of a Red Team. The characteristics and skills of a Red team are articulated in table 6.5.5.1 over the page:

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Characteristics „„ Intellect and imagination. „„ Critical and creative thinking skills. „„ The ability to see things from alternative perspectives. „„ The confidence to challenge traditional thinking. „„ The ability to think strategically (able to connect the dots). „„ Attention to detail and analytical skills. „„ The ability to ask questions that stimulate .thought without creating conflict. „„ Communication skills. „„ Self-awareness.

Additional Task Dependent Skills „„ Familiarity with different cultural perspectives, cultural appreciation and empathy. „„ Expertise in specific operational analysis techniques. „„ Understanding of the aims and objectives of other relevant parties (eg partners and neutrals). „„ Knowledge of the relevant organisational philosophy, theory and doctrine. „„ Knowledge of the relevant capabilities and developments. „„ Understanding of the wider context.

Whatever their background, in addition to the attributes above, red teamers must bring an open and agile mind to the problem. Table 6.5.5.1. – Characteristics and Skills of a Red Team

6-90. Red Cell. Care should be taken, in a planning situation, not to conflate the role of the red team with that of the red cell. The role of the red team is to challenge the perceived norms and assumptions of the Commander and their staff in order to improve the validity and quality of the final plan. The red cell is a G2 or J2-led98 entity which focuses on the activities of potential adversaries and threats. A red cell may also play the adversarial role(s) in any wargaming or debate undertaken to assist decisionmaking during the planning process. 6-91. Guidelines for Good Red Teaming. The art of good red teaming is founded on the following guidelines being applied by the end user: a. Plan red teaming from the outset. It cannot work as an afterthought. b. Create the right conditions. Red teaming needs an open, learning culture, accepting of challenge and criticism. c. Support the red team. Its contribution should be valued and used to inform decisions and improve outcomes. d. Provide clear objectives. e. Fit the tool to the task. Select an appropriate team leader and follow their advice in the selection and employment of the red team. f. Promote a constructive approach which works towards overall success. g. Poorly conducted red teaming is pointless; do it well, do it properly 6-92. The Golden Rules of Red Teaming. There are many factors which can influence the success and impact of the red team. However, red teaming is critically dependent on a realistic time frame, the quality of the product and results being presented to key decision makers in time to be acted upon. Therefore effective red teaming is founded upon: a. Timeliness: The product must be delivered in time to be useful to the end user. b. Quality: The work of the red team must be of high quality to retain the credibility of the team and the usefulness of the product. 98 JDP 2-00 Understanding and Intelligence Support to Operations.

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c. Access: The red team’s findings must be presented at the correct level within the end user’s team if it is to influence the decision maker. 6-93. Failure to meet any of these criteria means that success in red teaming is unlikely. 6-94. When can Red Teaming be Used? The red team can participate in any stage of TE or the CE; its involvement will usually depend on the complexity of the problem and the time available. Hence the concept has more utility for the TE than the CE. In either case, the Red Team should be present at all briefings and cross-briefings in order to build their own SA, but also to enable them to spot occasions where the planning team’s thinking and decision making might be distorted by human and organisational fallibility99 and to allow them to challenge accepted wisdom, scrutinise planning assumptions and discover potential weaknesses in the plan, thereby improving the validity and quality of the final campaign plan. Time will often be limited, but the Red Team must have the opportunity to brief their conclusions, even though their deductions may be uncomfortable for the planners. JDP 5-00100 offers a fuller explanation of the application of red teaming as applied to the campaign planning process. 6-95. How Red Teaming is Conducted. There are three key phases of Red Team activity: a. The Diagnostic Phase. Is the information accurate, well-evidenced, logical, and underpinned by valid assumptions? b. The Creative Phase. Is the problem artificially constrained; have all possible options been considered; have the consequences been thought through? c. The Challenge Phase. Are the options offered robust; are they resilient to shock, disruption or outright challenge; which of the options is the strongest; what are the chances of a successful outcome? 6-96. But, the process is not linear, nor the activities within it discrete – the process is iterative and incremental. Within this framework, a Red Team leader will choose the most appropriate techniques for the task in hand. On the completion of each phase, the red team should check back to ensure that any new findings or information have been subjected to the same diagnostic scrutiny as the initial information provided. This iterative application of red teaming ensures that the final product has been comprehensively examined.

99 JDP 4 Understanding and Decision Making (Second Edition). 100 JDP 5 (Second edition) Campaign Planning Annex I.

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 6 Risk Management Introduction 6-97. Prior to any discussion of Risk Management, commanders and staff must have a clear understanding the Army’s capstone doctrine on risk as described in Annex 9A of ADP Land Operations 2017. Its key introductory paragraph on risk, with definitions highlighted, is quoted below.

Land operations require commanders at all levels to identify and seize opportunities. But they also necessarily involve significant and often fatal risks. Understanding risk is therefore essential. Military organisations broadly understand risk as: potentially damaging; made up of cause, effect and consequence; explained in terms of likelihood or probability and impact; and something that has to be accepted on the route to success. Distinction is also made between operational and operating risks. Clarity of communication within the land force and with NATO allies is imperative and so this doctrine uses the term risk as it is commonly understood and defined by the Concise Oxford English Dictionary: “the possibility that something unpleasant may happen”. Risks, therefore, are described as potential negative outcomes in relation to the force or the mission. The events or conditions that lead to those negative outcomes are causes. The interplay between cause and effect is inherently uncertain and requires commanders and staff to manage risk. Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors, and making informed decisions that balance risk with mission benefits. ADP Land Operations, 2017 Annex 9A

6-98. In addition, ADP Land Operations emphasises: a. To achieve success commanders have to understand, judge and accept risk. b. Taking risk involves seeking opportunities and then vigorously seizing and exploiting them within the superior commander’s intent. c. Risk has different implications at different levels of operations with actions taken at one level potentially incurring risk at another. d. At the tactical level, to judge what is appropriate, commanders need to understand the risk appetite at the higher levels of command. e. Operational Risk. Which is the focus of this section, involves two areas which are not mutually exclusive: (1) Risk to Force. Which comprises loss of elements of the force or damage to its fighting power.

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(2) Risk to the Mission, which on its own is the risk that the mission will not succeed. Obviously Risk to Force, if realised may contribute to mission failure. f. The causes of Military Risk fall into three broad and non-exclusive groups: (1) Enemy or adversary actions (i.e. attrition of friendly forces our will and capabilities). (2) Environmental factors (weather, disease, darkness etc). (3) Own actions (errors of judgement, poor co-ordination, limited assessment, inaction etc). g. Operating Risk. Relates to the potential negative outcomes born out of operating technical military capabilities. Such risks can only be fully understood by qualified and experienced specialists and are not the focus of this Risk Management Section. 6-99. Opportunities.101 It is important to note that anticipated opportunities are considered within and throughout the tactical planning process rather than by using any bespoke opportunity analysis mechanism or tool. Indeed the Manoeuvrist Approach places significant emphasis on identifying enemy weaknesses (a potential opportunity) and then exploiting them. As risk analysis regularly highlights potential opportunities there are references to both risk and opportunity within this section. Both risk and opportunities must be considered and planned for accordingly.

Risk Management 6-100. Risk in Planning. Ultimately the commander of any force, supported where applicable by the staff, is responsible for judging and accepting risk. Superior headquarters will support this task by communicating their risk analysis and any corresponding management plans in OSW. Direction on risk will therefore be considered in subordinate commanders’ Mission Analysis. In addition, commanders will identify additional risks during their own Mission Analysis; particularly at step 2.4 when they consider ‘how might the situation change’. The commander and staff will also identify and consider risks during the rest of the estimate. This should involve understanding potential causes, likelihood and impact in the context of the operation. At the tactical level when time is at a premium, the key is then to focus on the potentially ‘game changing’ risks, mitigate the causes where possible, knowingly accept the residual risk, and where possible prepare contingency plans. The following considerations are of particular relevance during planning: a. At formation level, risk management tools, supported by operational analysis, can provide a useful, objective measure of risk.

Lower Tactical Level Risk Management At the lower tactical levels, certainly at unit level and below, risk management is usually straightforward. Units usually operate in a formation context, so much of the risk management is done for them. In that context, units and sub-units identify and plan mitigation by using the Combat Estimate process, including wargaming and rehearsals. This allows concurrent considerations of risks and opportunities.

101 The Oxford English Dictionary defines an opportunity as ‘a favourable time or set of circumstances for doing something’.

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b. Superior commands must articulate their risk appetite and management plans. Therefore, units operating in a formation context should have a reduced Risk Management burden. c. At lower tactical level, Risk Management should be relatively straightforward. Units and subunits identify and plan risk mitigation using the Combat Estimate process, including wargaming and rehearsals. This allows concurrent considerations of risks and opportunities. d. Appropriate application of Mission Command during planning (i.e. minimum control measures imposed) provides the freedom of action for subordinates to react to unidentified risks (within their commander’s intent) during execution. e. Likewise, the Manoeuvrist Approach emphasises offensive action to seize and retain the initiative, compelling enemies and adversaries to respond to our actions. Remain active rather than passive. f. There is a tendency for risks only to be examined in terms of their proximity when in fact, the greater impact may lie further downstream. Commanders and staff should think through second and third-order effects. 6-101. Risk in Execution. Risk will expose itself during execution as well as during planning. Ideally the risk will already have been identified and planned for during the estimate process but there will inevitably be risks which have not been anticipated. Where these represent a significant risk to the mission or force they will be managed through reactive planning or direction. When a risk is realised it represents a change to the situation and is considered accordingly through execution procedures. In addition, the second and thirdorder consequences of actions can often represent a risk and the continual assessment cycle must be alive to such dynamics. Execution is described in further detail in Chapter 8.

The Risk Management Tool 6-102. Introduction. As described at para 6.6-4, risk is managed effectively within the UK’s tactical-level planning estimates (Tactical Estimate (TE) and Combat Estimate (CE)) and their corresponding operational staff work (OSW). Risks, once identified during the appropriate estimate process, can then be further analysed and managed using the Risk Management Tool (a complementary process to the estimate process) which allows commanders and staff to further analyse and manage risks, once they have been identified. It is most appropriately used at formation level where planning staff have more time and resources. The process is described in the following model at Figure 6.6.1.

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Risk Analysis

Risk Management

Identify Assess • Risks (Activitys and Events) • Likelihood • Impacts • Owners/Those at Risk

Plan Manage • Terminate • Treat • Tolerate • Transfer • Take

• Responsibility • Indicators & Warnings • Reassessment

Figure 6.6.1. – The Risk Management Tool

6-103. Risk Analysis. Risk analysis identifies those activities and events that may lead to risk and assesses the likelihood and potential impact of that event occurring as well as the risk ownership. It is conducted twice, once to identify and analyse the inherent risk; and secondly, once a plan has been devised to identify and assess the residual risk. a. Risk Identification. The basis for risk analysis is the identification of risks. Risks comprise three elements: the cause, the event that precipitates the risk and the consequence of the event. In the context of planning in the Land Environment, this will typically relate to Operational Risk. Analysis of risk can regularly highlight potential opportunities which must then be considered and planned for accordingly. b. Risk Assessment. Having identified risks, assessment seeks to understand the likelihood of the event occurring, the potential severity of the outcome (its impact), and who owns the risk. While risks have to be analysed individually, the compound effect of multiple and linked risks and their consequences at different levels, also require consideration. There are a number of techniques and methods, using subjective and objective data, to assess the likelihood and impact of every risk. It is the combination of the impact and the likelihood which is important as it will give the overall significance of that activity or event occurring. It should be noted that the impact of a risk occurring is a subjective judgement which will change as the context and perceptions change. Commanders may then articulate their risk tolerance level. Attributing weighting/importance to each risk assists the prioritisation of mitigation/ reduction measures and aids the development of CONPLANS. A method of displaying risk graphically is shown at Figure 6.6.2.

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Impact Very High

High

Med

Low

Very Low

Very High

L i

High

k e l

• Mission, objective or outcome

Med

• Resources and Capability (manpower, time, space, csups)

i

• Relationships (HN, LN, Coalition/alliance, National, Regional, International)

h o

Low

• Reputation

o d

Impact Criteria The impact of a risk occurring is a subjective judgement. Commanders will need to make their judgement of the impact against the context in which they are operating. Commanders must consider the 2nd and 3rd-order effects of risk as well as the immediate impact and also consider the compound, cumulative effect of multiple risks occurring. The realisation of risk will normally impact upon:

Context will be informed by experience and knowledge and shaped by understanding the superior’s approach to, and appetite for risk.

Very Low

Notes on the Risk Assessment Matrix Example Likelihood Criteria Very High

>80% chance of risk occurring

Regular occurrence, circumstances frequently encountered

High

51-80% chance of risk occurring

Occurs occasionally and may happen again in the near future

Med

21-50% chance of risk occurring

Has occurred before but not often and may have been in a limited way

Low

6-20% chance of risk occurring

Seldom happens or incident happens in a limited way

Very Low

<5% chance of risk occurring

Has rarely / never happened before

The Risk Assessment Matrix allows risks to be plotted on a graph and allows a comparison of Likelihood and Impact of that risk occurring. The boxes may then be shaded to display those risks which are acceptable (green); those risks which are tolerable (yellow); those risks which require treatment (red) (though noting that once treated, the risk should fall into the yellow or green bands); and those which are unacceptable and must therefore be terminated or transferred, or indeed taken if an opportunity rather than a threat. A commander’s risk tolerance line is the boundary between red and yellow segments. Scoring provides an alternative method of displaying and helping to judge risk. Risks are given a numerical value - usually 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). The overall score is a multiplication of Impact x Likelihood. Thus a Very High Impact risk which is Very Highly likely to occur would be given an overall score of 25.

Figure 6.6.2. – Graphical Display of Risk and an Example of a Risk Tolerance Line

6-104. Risk Management. Risk management creates plans and directs activity to reduce the possibility of negative events occurring; to mitigate their consequences as they occur or; to exploit the opportunities they may present. a. Plan to deal with risk. Having identified and assessed likely risks, and a commander’s appetite for them, commanders and staff should develop measures to reduce their likelihood, and mitigate unfavourable outcomes. A commander may decide to deal with risks in a variety of ways, some resulting in requests for dispensations/waivers. There are five options to deal with risk: (1) Terminate. Termination removes the risk entirely by changing the plan so the risk is eliminated, or terminating that aspect of the plan which is affected by the risk. (2) Treat. Treating a risk to reduce its likelihood, or mitigate likely adverse outcomes to reduce impact, is the most common response. Commanders should consider how activity might be conducted differently in order to reduce the threat. Residual risk after treatment should be reassessed. (3) Tolerate. Provided that a risk falls below the tolerance line, a commander may decide to tolerate the risk without attempting treatment. Where the reward is sufficiently great, a commander may choose to tolerate the threat. Risk appetite may also be increased to accommodate a specific threat.

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(4) Transfer. Where a risk cannot be treated, and a commander is unwilling to tolerate it, the option to transfer the risk elsewhere may be sought, usually up the chain of command for the higher HQ to ‘own’ the risk and then create plans to mitigate or exploit it. (5) Take. Where an opportunity exists, the philosophy of Mission Command empowers commanders to seize it by operating within their superior commander’s intent and attitude to risk. Taking risk is a key way to seize the initiative. To achieve success, commanders have to judge and accept risks. Taking risk is inherent in effective military operations, in which commanders at all levels achieve their intent by seeking opportunities then vigorously seizing and exploiting them. The nature of conflict means that military activity is seldom, if ever, risk-free102. b. Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). CONPLANs are the pre-considered actions to mitigate risks or exploit potential opportunities should they occur. Indicators required to trigger them must be linked clearly to CCIRs and corresponding Decision Points. The depth of planning to support a CONPLAN will vary according to the impact and likelihood of the risk occurring and the time available to plan. 6-105. Risk Registers. At formation level, once a COA has been selected for development into a plan, risk mitigation options are further refined to the point where they can be managed effectively during the operation. Each risk should be clearly articulated in the operational staff work. It is essential that ownership, potential impacts, assessed likelihood, indicators and warnings and plans for risk mitigation are clearly understood by subordinates. Risks will vary during the course of an operation and need to be revisited regularly. Simple risk registers that list risks and outline any mitigating actions, may assist in the long-term management of risk. 6-106. Reserves. Some risks will occur which are unforeseen. Operationally, a commander will always keep a reserve, traditionally not less than 1/9th of their force, to mitigate risks or exploit opportunities. They may also warn a reserve to mitigate or exploit risks or opportunities using ‘be prepared to’ tasks in the reserve’s mission.

Consequence Management (CM) 6-107. Overview. CM is activity undertaken to exploit or militate against a situation which has occurred in order to preserve or improve the planned outcome. It is a form of CONPLANing and occurs most frequently to militate against negative, unintended effects on White, Green and Blue. These can appear in multiple forms, most commonly collateral damage (CD), including civilian casualties, damage to property, including dwelling and crops and damage to infrastructure. Whilst the generic risk may have been identified in the estimate, CM generally occurs once the detail of the event is understood. The origins of the incident will usually be in Blue action and the management of the consequences usually aims to mitigate the impact on reputation and legitimacy, though there may be circumstances which allow exploitation of an opportunity to enhance reputation and legitimacy. It is more usual for CM to be applied during less intense and more enduring operations.

102 ADP Land Operations, 2017, para 9A-02.

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6-108. Aims. The aims of CM are: a. Mitigate against/plan to exploit events through anticipation. b. Manage the negative impact of events. c. Exploit the positive impact of events. d. Control the flow of information relating to an event. e. Learn from the event to encourage or prevent recurrence. Although CM is executed reactively, it can nevertheless be prepared for in advance.

Dispensations and Waivers 6-109. TTPs direct the way in which activity is conducted and Safety Cases direct how equipment is used such that threats, usually to personnel safety, are reduced to an acceptable level. Both are usually generic. In certain, usually more mature, theatres, commanders may need to request clearance to change the way in which they conduct operations or how they use equipment to better match the operational need. The dispensation and waiver process exists to allow commanders to assess and manage risks associated with operating outside of approved TTPs or equipment operating guidelines. The process is not designed to prevent a commander from making immediate decisions should the tactical situation require it. If the commander identifies that the requirement is likely to continue, a dispensation or waiver will allow them to do so with the associated risks acknowledged by the chain of command.

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 7 Control of Operations 6-110. Control. Control involves the oversight, direction and coordination of assigned forces in accordance with the commander’s plan and intent. At the lowest tactical levels, C2 is often vested in a single individual. At higher levels, it is a key function of the staff to exercise control over certain aspects of operations in accordance with the principle of Mission Command. 6-111. Mission Command. Mission Command provides staff and subordinates with the opportunity to accomplish the commander’s intent by using their initiative. Normally this approach takes place through decentralised execution, where commanders increase the freedom of action of subordinates, controlling only when absolutely necessary. However, there are times when more centralised execution and tighter levels of control are required, for example during complex operations that involve more than one subordinate operating in close proximity to each other, such as during withdrawals, reliefs of troops, and obstacle crossings. In such cases, commanders need to impose and exercise greater levels of control to ensure the tempo of the operation is sustained and that the possibility of fratricide is minimised. Mission Command is still exercised during these operations but the control of individual elements is more coordinated. Control has two basic forms which are not mutually exclusive and can be used simultaneously. a. Procedural control. Relies on the implementation of commonly understood procedures across a force for the regulation of activity within and between force elements. Examples are standard operating procedures, boundaries and NATO standardised procedures. Procedural control can, for example, be used to allocate a volume of battlespace to individual elements for a period of time. Although sometimes perceived as an air-control technique, procedural control is applied across all environments. For successful Mission Command, the commander always uses only the minimum essential procedural control measures. b. Positive control. Allows for active control of activities in real time. It is used when a commander wishes to direct control in a particular place or on specific elements, for specific periods of time. However, even where resolution of the position of friendly forces is good, that of adversaries and the population is seldom sufficiently timely nor accurate enough to support positive control as the sole means of battlespace management. 6-112. Land Environment. Land operations necessarily demand degrees of control over the activities of many different groups, on the ground and in the air, within a given geographical area. Those aspects of an area of operations that require active management are described as the battlespace, and battlespace management103 (BM) refers to the adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronisation of activity. Applying BM provides the control mechanisms for effective and efficient 103 Further detail regarding BM is contained within JDP 3-70.

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execution of Integrated Action, synchronising, integrating and coordinating battlespace activities with respect to time, forces and capabilities. The key challenge for commanders and staff is enabling maximum freedom of action for subordinates while maintaining control consistent with the context and nature of the mission. Of note, tighter measures are typically required as the density and complexity of the battlefield increases. At the tactical level, the spectrum of BM tools include commonly understood symbology used to identify units, locations and functions, to fire support control measures, and information exchange procedures and processes on CIS and targeting systems. 6-113. Procedures. C2 procedures must be simple, efficient and flexible to enable timely and effective decision making. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) (which are set by a higher authority or formation to its subordinates) and Standard Operating Instructions (SOIs) (how SOPs are implemented in a given context) must be clearly written, understood, rehearsed and used. 6-114. Information. Headquarters must be adept at using information to exercise control effectively. This requires appropriate procedures and communications systems; further detail is at Chapter 2 Annex A. a. At times of high tempo, it is vital to have robust, consistent and well-understood methods. A headquarters requires proficiency in Information Management (integrated processes and services to provide exploitable information); Information Exploitation (use of information to gain advantage); Information Assurance (the confidence that information is reliable, accurate and secure); and Information Superiority (possessing better information and able to exploit it faster relative to an adversary). b. These procedures all in turn depend on CIS. These enable control measures to be specified with a high degree of accuracy, allow for changes to be rapidly disseminated across the command, and provide near real-time feedback on the progress of operations to commanders and their staff. CIS capabilities and limitations, such as range, bandwidth and security are factors of all plans. 6-115. Directives, Plans and Orders. Directives, plans and orders provide the principal means by which a commander’s intentions are conveyed to subordinates as well as the control framework for the operation. Directives, plans and orders must be concise, clear, accurate and timely. Further detail on Operational Staff Work is in Section 6.8.

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Chapter 6 - SECTION 8 Control of Operations 6-116. OSW is produced to deliver an understanding of the situation, to enable control of activity, and to ensure effective communication between subordinates, flanking, and higher headquarters. Excellent staff work finds the right balance between detail and clarity, simplicity and complexity, and giving context and making decisions.

Directives, Plans and Orders 6-117. Introduction. Directives and orders provide the principal means by which a commander’s intentions are conveyed to his subordinates. Commanders and staffs must be aware of the appropriate decision point to allow timely preparation and dissemination of directives, plans and orders. The time required for dissemination is easily under estimated. Late directives or orders risk becoming inappropriate before they can be carried out; ultimately their execution may prove impossible. Directives, Plans and Orders must be Concise, Clear and Accurate. 6-118. Terminology. The terms ‘directive’, ‘plan’ and ‘order’ may appear to be close in meaning but have distinct definitions in military use: a. Directives. A directive is used at the higher levels of command to initiate activity and to give both general and specific guidance to subordinate commanders. It will be less formal, rigid and prescriptive than an order. It may include missions to subordinates but need not necessarily do so. b. Plans. Plans are mainly issued for contingency planning purposes and have no executive authority until activated by an order. They are also the term used to describe the output from the planning process prior to being converted into directives and orders by the commander. c. Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). CONPLANs are a plan which is developed for possible operations where planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as the basis for subsequent planning104. d. Orders. Orders are defined as ‘a communication, written, oral or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate’. Orders are used in all spheres of military activity and at all levels of command. They include sufficiently detailed direction to subordinates (in the form of missions and/or tasks) so that they can achieve specific activities, such as the deployment and employment of troops. (1) Warning Order (WngO). WngOs are also issued immediately after the receipt of a WngO from a superior HQ, and may be issued at any other time it is judged to be useful to subordinates. A WngO is delivered on three occasions during the Tactical Estimate (TE) and Combat Estimate (CE):

104 JDP 5 definition.

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(i) On completion of the ROOB. (ii) Once the commander has drawn the Effects Schematic as part of MA. (iii) Once the COA has been decided. At all times, maximum information should be included to facilitate subordinates’ planning processes. (2) Operation Order (OpO). To give subordinate commanders the essential information and direction required to plan and execute an operation. (3) Fragmentary Order (FRAGO). FRAGOs are an abbreviated form of OpO. They may be used in three ways: (i) To issue timely changes to existing orders. This is the most commonly used form of a FRAGO. (ii) To issue key sections of an order before the complete order has been produced. (iii) To provide specific instructions to commanders who do not require the complete order. (4) Combat Service Support Order (CSSO). A CSSO may be produced in support of the main OpO to deliver the CSS plan. Details of the operational plan should be included in the CSSO to inform those CSS units which do not receive the main OpO. 6-119. Dissemination. At the tactical level the means of disseminating orders are: a. Oral Orders. Oral dissemination of orders will usually involve a formal O Group. Orders may also be passed over TacCIS, by liaison officers or staff officers representing the commander, or by briefings by the commander himself during visits to subordinates. b. Written Orders. Written Orders are more likely when time is available to produce them. They are particularly useful for conveying complexity where detail may be lost if delivered verbally. Staffs should be particularly aware of the ability of those they are ordering to print orders and traces if disseminating the written order by data means. It is usual for attendees at verbal O Groups to receive printed OSW and traces from the Higher HQ, but the process of reproduction should not be underestimated. The requirement for written orders will increase as fatigue begins to impair mental performance and comprehension of verbal orders. A useful addition is the ‘2-pager’, a summary105 of the orders to enable subordinates to have the key information in an easily accessible format – the 2-pager should only be provided in addition to a full set of orders and is never to be considered a substitute. Note that much of the detail of written orders can be inserted during the planning process. It is inefficient, and frequently impossible, to leave the writing until the end of the estimate. Clarity, accuracy and brevity are essential. There are two principal types of written order:

105 Products to be considered: Intent, Pictorial SoM, Msns and Tasks, Key Timings, Sync Matrix, DSM, Extracts from CSSO (AXPs, ECPs etc).

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(1) MS Word. An order may be written in MS Word, usually using a two-column format on a landscape A4 page. The structure remains that of an order, but the commander can insert as much detail as is relevant by increasing the number of sub-paras used. This method allows detailed and complex plans to be recorded fully; the risk is that staff loses proficiency with ComBAT. (2) ComBAT. The ComBAT OSW tools are particularly useful at the tactical level. They allow for collaborative working and easy disseminated by data. It links to the stand-alone tools which will have been used during the estimate. c. Quick Verbal or Radio Orders. Although a variation on oral orders, quick verbal, or radio orders provide an important option for disseminating orders. Common formats such as Standard Orders Cards (SOCs) should be used in order to improve comprehension. 6-120. The need for confirmation. Receipt of OSW must be acknowledged by the subordinate HQ to the Issuing HQ. Comprehension may also be confirmed through the use of back briefs and ROC Drills.

OSW Formats 6-121. OSW Formats. While staff work is about the intelligent application of thought to enable activity, there is a vital difference between OSW and that which is non-operational. For the latter it is said that slavish adherence to templates and structures at the expense of common sense and expediency undermines command intent rather than reinforcing it. In many ways this is also true for OSW but because OSW is produced and disseminated on OpCIS and TacCIS, the formats and templates that these systems provide must be used. 6-122. Orders Generic Format. It is widely acknowledged that the formats for OpOs, WngOs, FRAGOs and CSSOs are essentially the same with varying degrees of detail. A generic format is shown below in Table 6.8.1.

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OpO / WngO / FRAGO Prelims

CSSO Prelims

TASKORG

TASKORG Situation

Ground White (LN and Govt) Green (Indigenous Armed Forces) Red (En Forces) Situation

Black (Criminal Elms) Fr Forces

2 Up – Intent and ME 1 Up – Mission and CONOPS Flanking Fmns CS Air / Avn

Mission

Mission* CONOPS

Execution

Intent

CONOPS

Scheme of Manoeuvre

Scheme of Manoeuvre

Main Effort

Main Effort

End State

End State**

Subordinate Missions

Subordinate Tasks

CS Missions / Tasks / Priorities

Materiel and Services Medical Personnel Civil – Military Miscellaneous

Coord Instrs

Timings Locations Con Measures Fireplan Deception and Sy Movement Key information from annexes

Concept

Contained in Execution

Log Service Support

ES Med Pro

Command and Signal

Command and Signal



* Note that there is only one mission for elements organic to the formation – that in the Main Body. Sub-units assigned to the formation TACOM will have missions issued by their OPCOM Commander. Tasks may be issued by the formation commander.



** Note that end states are not normally used at the tactical level. Table 6.8.1. – Generic Orders Format

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6-123. Annexes. OpO annexes should follow the taxonomy below. If annexes are not used then the words ’not issued’ should be annotated alongside that letter. A. TASKORG.

L. EOD & Search.

B. Situation.

M. Information Activities.

C. Ops Trace & Effects Schematic.

N. Legal.

D. DSO / DSOM.

O. ROE / use of force.

E. Outline SoM.

P. Lessons.

F. Air and Avn.

Q. Civ / mil coord and assessment.

G. BM.

R. CIS.

H. ISTAR.

S. Pro.

I. Jt Fires and Tgting.

T. MovO.

J. Engrs.

U. Indigenous Forces Dev / Partnering.

K. CSS.

V. Media.

Orders Groups (O Gps) 6-124. Introduction. Commanders will usually prefer to issue orders in person so that they can impose their will and personality on their subordinates, emphasise key points and allow subordinates to ask any questions immediately. 6-125. Rehearsals. An orders group is a stage-managed affair. Therefore a rehearsal is essential, if not always practical. If a rehearsal is not held the individual responsible for organising the O Gp should ensure that the content and delivery of the orders are coordinated and coherent. 6-126. Timings. Subordinate commanders will often have to travel some distance to get to an O Gp. If possible ComBAT orders should be transmitted to subordinate commanders as soon as possible. This may allow them to be at least partially read in prior to arrival at the O Gp. It is a significant decision to delay an O Gp. To do so will invariably reduce subordinates’ own battle procedure and administrative time, which may have consequences. Note that the production of OSW takes time – COSs should consider producing the OSW early and issuing pencil amendments at the start of the O Gp, rather than delaying an O Gp because the OSW is still being printed. 6-127. Post O Gp. After the O Gp staff cells may use the opportunity to amplify areas of the orders with subordinate specialists who may have attended the O Gp with their commander. For example, at BG level, the BC will often wish to gather the subunit FST commanders together to expand on the Fireplan. Staff should be careful not to use up the subordinates’ ‘2/3’ of planning time in doing so. Once subordinates have had sufficient time to plan, it is usual for them to back-brief the commander on their plan and for the commander to host a ROC drill.

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6-128. Briefing responsibilities. The decision on who briefs which paragraph at O Gps rests with the commander but the suggested breakdown is shown below in Table 6.8.2. Heading

Detail Security

Responsible COS / G3/5

Introductions Map Folds Prelims

Briefing Products Confirmation of Issued OSW and any pencil changes to it TaskOrg Ground

Engr / Met Offr

Weather Visibility (incl light levels) Situation

White

G2 / CULAD / STABAD

Red

G2

Black

G2

Friendly (incl Indigenous Forces)

COS / G3/5

CONOPS Intent Scheme of Manoeuvre Main Effort (End State)*

Comd

Subordinate Missions

Comd

Coordinating Instructions

COS / G3/5

Mission

Execution

Comd

Combat Service Support



DCOS / G4

Command and Signal

COS (Comd) G6 (Signal)

Summary

Comd

* Note that End States are not usually used at the tactical level. Table 6.8.2. – Responsibilities within O Gps

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7-01. Preparation, within the context of the Prepare Operations Process, includes the activities • General conducted by a formation or unit prior to • Assessment during Preparation execution in order to improve its ability to • Activities during Preparation 106 conduct the operation. These activities include, but are not limited to, plan refinement, rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, checks and movement. Preparation generally occurs any time a formation or unit is not executing a specific mission; it starts with receipt of a warning order and ends when execution begins. Preparation requires staff, unit, subunit and individual action noting that this publication, by its nature, places more emphasis on the activities of the commander and their staff at this stage in the process.

Assessment During Preparation 7-02. Assessment during preparation assists in plan refinement and oversight of formation and unit readiness to conduct the operation. Not only must commanders have the ability to adjust the plan based on new information and changing circumstances but they must have a firm grasp of the readiness and combat effectiveness of subordinate units. The latter should be linked to MOPs established in the planning process.

Activities During Preparation 7-03. Preparation consists of many activities which involve work at staff, unit, and soldier level. The most common activities which have a direct impact on the commander and staff within a CP are listed below and then described in further detail in subsequent paragraphs. Of note, NATO doctrine highlights a broader range of subordinate unit tactical activity which can take place during preparation. These additional activities are detailed at paragraph 7-11. a. Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) activity. b. Refinement of the plan. c. Commander’s Back Brief. d. Coordination and liaison. e. Task Organisation and Integration. f. Rehearsals. g. CP pre-execution checks. 106 This chapter focuses on preparation within the context of the Operations Process (once committed to a specific operation) rather than the cycle of generic preparation that deployable formations and units are locked into: the Formation Operational Readiness Mechanism (FORM).

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7-04. ISR Activity: a. ISR activity is regularly the most important part of the preparation phase. It is focussed on answering the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) and those of the higher formation. In turn, these will inform decision making. Of note, commanders often deploy ISR assets early in the planning phase in order to inform subsequent planning and refinement. ISR feed will also be coming into the HQ from both higher and subordinate HQs throughout the preparation period. Where appropriate commanders and staff should continue to request ISR resources from higher formations. b. ISR activity must be managed dynamically by the commander and the staff following the assessment of new information. The updated collection plan will focus on the most important remaining unknowns, emphasising established or revised CCIRs. ISR feed will directly inform any refinement of the plan, which is discussed below. 7-05. Refinement of the plan: a. Planning is a continuous process; commanders must have the agility to adjust the plan based on new information and changing circumstances. For example, the enemy may do the unexpected, unforeseen opportunities may arise, assumptions on which the plan is based may be proven true or false and friendly forces’ status may change. In any of these cases the change must be assessed against the plan and the commander must decide if the new information: (1) Validities the plan with no further changes. (2) Requires minor adjustments to the plan. (3) Requires major adjustments to the plan. (4) Means the mission is no longer valid and direction from higher is required. b. The Operations Process therefore places significant emphasis on the requirement to continually assess and refine a plan, even after orders have been delivered. Staff must also note that refinements to a communicated plan will add another layer of considerations onto time-constrained subordinate battle procedure; the process therefore requires agile staff procedures driven by sharp situational awareness if it is to deliver mission success. c. Refinement of a plan will involve revisiting some or all of the stages of the respective estimate process. This level of refinement will depend on the current battle picture, the maturity of the plan and the time and staff resources that can be allocated to the task. At divisional and corps levels, there may be a significant time gap between the initial preparation of a plan and its execution. This therefore demands a dedicated staff and formalised process to refine the plan after orders have been delivered in order to reflect evolving understanding of the context and requirement. At brigade level and below in combat operations, planning may flow immediately into execution and any deliberate refinement of a plan will typically take place within the estimate process itself. For example, as the result of a wargame, BGHQ staff could be tasked to develop a CONPLAN or to revisit battlespace management. d. Formation level Process and Outputs. Within formation headquarters, planning staff (FPlans) will typically handover the plan to operations staff (FOps or COps) once the allocated 1/3 of planning of time has been used. The operations staff, then responsible for the plan, have three key outputs as described below:

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(1) Refinement of the Plan. Further detailed refinement of the plan can be initiated by the commander at any stage but is likely to be triggered by the following deliberate procedures/factors: (i) Receipt of the Plan. Following the handover of the plan from Plans to Operations staff, the fresh eyes of another layer of SMEs may identify critical areas of weakness or incoherence for refinement. (ii) Commander’s Back Brief. Subordinate commanders deliver Commander’s Back Briefs to the commander following their own mission analysis. This invaluable step in the planning process will regularly identify areas for refinement, especially with regard to BM. Commander’s Back Briefs are described in further detail at paragraph 7.6 below. (iii) ROC Drill. By the time of the ROC Drill, subordinates should have completed their planning and issued their own orders. Any changes to the plan must be captured in a sweep up FragO. (iv) Impact of the Current Battle. Staff must continue to routinely reassess the plan against the current battle. This must include a deliberate staff check of assumptions. (v) Operations Updates/Resource Availability. Many of the bids for critical resources (such as air and aviation) will not have been confirmed on takeover of the plan. Staff must track availability and refine where appropriate. (2) CONPLAN Development. Contingency planning can be initiated as a result of risk identification at any stage of the planning process. On an operational schematic using Planning Concepts (see Section 6.2) they will typically fall into two categories: Branches or Sequels. CONPLANS that cannot be developed by the plans staff may be prioritised and handed over to operations staff. The typical format for the communication of CONPLANS developed after delivery of orders will be a FragO containing a series of ‘be prepared to’ tasks, the criteria for enactment of the CONPLAN and any assumptions. (3) Reactive Planning. The current battle picture may dictate that, while the mission is still valid, major amendments are required to the plan. In this instance staff must revisit key stages of the estimate. The level of tactical understanding and the planning horizons will drive whether the Tactical Estimate, Combat Estimate or rapid commander’s direction is used. e. Planning Considerations for Teams Responsible for Plan Refinement: (1) Continuity within Planning Teams. Within any headquarters where a plan is handed over from one team to another, thought must be given to creating a level of staff continuity within each team. This level will be driven by the complexity of the plan and the time available for subsequent refinement. However, due consideration should be given to embedding some operations staff in the initial planning cell so that they can move with the plan on handover and operations staff attendance at key planning back briefs. In some cases (most likely for complex plans requiring input from an SME pool of limited depth) it may be necessary to maintain an Operational Planning Team (OPT) in its entirety throughout both the plan and refinement.

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(2) Handover Procedure. To mitigate the risk of information being lost during handover from Plans to Operations and to maximise the benefits of a fresh set of eyes looking at the plan, a very deliberate and detailed handover from one team to the other is essential. Typically, this handover will be tied to a key stage of the planning process such as the wargame, delivery of orders or the ROC Drill and must be outlined in detail in formation SOIs to ensure that the appropriate versions of OSW are transferred efficiently. Efficient IM is critical. 7-06. Commander’s Back Brief. The Commander’s Back Brief is delivered to the commander or senior officer by a subordinate to demonstrate understanding and compliance with the direction received. The format for the briefing should be articulated in SOIs. It differs from a Confirmation Brief - typically a short-notice read back of direction in that subordinate leaders should have been given time to formulate a plan, or at least a draft CONOPS. As a minimum, it should therefore be conducted once a subordinate commander has completed their Mission Analysis and should focus on confirmation of the mission, the CONOPS, key coordinating instructions, Requests for Information (RFIs), headline risks and areas of concern. 7-07. Coordination and Liaison: a. NATO doctrine describes coordination as the actions taken to maintain synchronisation and prevent confusion and problems.107 When these actions are not covered in SOPs or SOIs they should be identified in planning and specified in the ‘Coordinating Instructions’ paragraph. The majority of this coordinating activity should take place during preparation noting that formations and units must coordinate with higher, lower, adjacent, supporting and supported units. Coordination should, of course, continue throughout execution where it enables effective synchronisation of activity and dynamic resource management. It should include human, procedural and technical considerations and is driven by effective relationships as well as staff process. The effective use of Liaison Officers (LO) and/or teams is therefore of particular importance. b. Effective coordination supports a broad range of the fundamentals of UK doctrine. For example, it supports effective integration of the full spread of CJIIM actors, ensures the commander’s intent gets to the right people at the right time, avoids duplication of effort and increases tempo. c. Internal coordination occurs within the unit HQ. It initiates activities among the staff and ensures that it remains fully informed of relevant information affecting their areas of responsibility. Internal coordination also resolves problems, conflicts, and resourceallocation challenges in support of subordinate unit preparations. d. External coordination involves communication with higher, lower, adjacent, supporting and supported units as well as other agencies or organisations. The external coordination challenge is magnified in multinational operations or between forces in non-contiguous areas of operation. Staff should also note that coordination lines or points between units or formations represent a potential weakness ‘or seams’ that the enemy may choose to exploit.

107 ATP-3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.

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e. Establishing and maintaining liaison is one of the most important means of external coordination. Liaison may commence with planning and continue through preparing and executing, or it may commence as late as execution, depending on resources and the need for direct contact between sending and receiving HQs. The earlier liaison can be established, the more effective the coordination. 7-08. Task Organisation and Integration. Task organisation involves organising available resources and establishing command and support relationships according to the plan. During this process the commander and staff ensure that personnel and units are assimilated into the force in a posture that allows them to contribute effectively. They must also prepare new units and personnel for the upcoming operation. a. As a handrail, the key tasks involved during integration involve: (1) Receiving and introducing new units and military personnel to the force and environment. (2) Familiarisation to places or work, roles in the force and operation. (3) Establishing C2, sustainment, and communications for and with them, within the force. (4) Exchange of LOs. b. Additional multinational considerations include defining when and where transfer of authority takes place; clarifying command states; understanding any national reservations or caveats (red card issues) and clarification of ROE. 7-09. Rehearsals. Rehearsals are defined in NATO doctrine as the practice of actions designed to improve performance during execution. All rehearsals for the operation occur during preparation. The extent of rehearsals depends on the time available. Rehearsals allow participants in an operation to become familiar with and to translate the plan into a visual impression that orients them to their environment and other units during execution. They also imprint a mental picture of the sequence of key actions in the operation and provide a forum for subordinate and supporting leaders and units to coordinate. While rehearsals are designed to enhance the understanding and execution of a mature plan or activity, they may reveal unknown coordination or synchronisation problems. In such instances solutions should be addressed in a sweep-up FRAGO. Where time is constrained, rehearsals should focus on the key areas of the operation as directed by the commander. As an example, this could include the most complex enabling operations and/or the Main Effort. NATO doctrine108 lists a full range of specific rehearsal techniques. 7-10. Command Post Pre-Execution Checks. A full range of preparatory checks need to take place within the CP prior to execution. These will vary depending on the size and complexity of the CP, but must be covered in detail in SOIs. Critical to all, however, is the requirement to ensure that ‘Golden Thread’ planning output has been handed over by the Planning staff and is understood by the Operations staff. This includes the Operations Trace, Synchronisation Matrix, Decision Support Overlay and supporting Decision Support Overlay Matrix, CCIRs and any outstanding RFIs and any other supporting plans and overlays. Examples of

108 ATP 3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied Land Forces (Annex F).

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other activities include CIS configuration/preparation109 and functionality checks, joint and interagency staff integration and confirmation of battle rhythm. 7-11. Broader Preparation Activity. NATO doctrine captures a broader range of tactical activity that can take place during preparation. For reference, elements of this nonexhaustive list are shown below.

1. Security. Security is always a critical operational consideration but is of particular importance as the main body of a force is orientated towards preparation rather than execution. Therefore security operations including local security, operations security (OPSEC) and counterintelligence are all designed to prevent the enemy from discovering the friendly force’s plan and to protect the force from unforeseen enemy actions. Security operations should also be focussed on preventing the enemy from gathering Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI). As with reconnaissance, security is a dynamic effort that anticipates and thwarts enemy intelligence-collecting efforts (friendly counter-ISTAR). When successful, security operations should provide the main body of the force with adequate time and manoeuvre space to react to enemy initiatives. To accomplish this, the security plan must be synchronised and meshed at every level of command as well as with any local unit or host nation security. 2. Force Protection. Force protection employs a combination of active and passive measures to deter, defeat, or mitigate hostile actions against friendly forces. Force protection is not a discrete mission assigned to a single unit, but a continuous process executed by all commanders regardless of their mission, location, or threat. It conserves the fighting potential of a deployed force, preserving its integrity and capability by countering the wider threat to all its elements from the enemy, natural and environmental hazards, and fratricide. It consists of a broad set of unit-specific, coordinated actions executed to protect the entire force across the range of military operations. The commander and staff develop and initiate actions for force protection during planning, but conduct them mainly during preparing and execution. Commanders, at all levels, have the responsibility to set force protection measures, estimating risks and vulnerabilities in conducting operational and tactical activities, including adequate self-defence measures. 3. Logistics Preparation. Resupplying, maintaining, and issuing special supplies or equipment takes place during the preparation phase, as does any repositioning of critical logistic assets. As with preparatory movement, OPSEC must remain a fundamental consideration when coordinating logistical preparation so as not to reveal friendly intentions.

109 To include: the input of logistical and medical data into applications such as Log FAS; air and maritime integration; the migration of information from in barracks to deployed systems (including profiles); and the preparation of integrated electronic communication plans for the whole force.

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4. Training. Training prepares forces and individuals to execute actions in accordance with doctrinal philosophy and principles as well as Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). While formations and units deployed on operations are likely to have conducted significant pre-deployment training as well as a reception, staging and onward integration (RSOI) package, there may well be a requirement for further Mission Specific Training (MST) during preparation. This requirement is especially pertinent to multinational formations that have been dynamically task organised in theatre. In such circumstances lead nation tactics, techniques and procedures should provide the backbone of the training requirement. 5. Pre-Operations Checks and Inspections. Preparation includes completing pre-operations checks and inspections to ensure that formations, units, personnel and systems are ready to execute as time and resources permit. 6. Movement. All movement allowed or required to preposition units for execution takes place during preparation. The commander must integrate movement with OPSEC measures to ensure that it does not reveal any intentions to the enemy. As an example, such movement could include advance party reconnaissance of assembly areas or route reconnaissance to support a march.

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8-01. Execution involves the application of combat Execute power110 to accomplish a mission as well • Introduction as assessment of operational progress • Command and Control during in order to inform decision making. It Execution begins when committed assets physically • Assessment during Execution enact their issued orders. Decision making • Decision making in Execution involves both deciding when to execute • Directing Action planned actions - execution decisions, as • Rapid Decision Making and well as deciding whether to amend the Synchronisation Process plan based on changes in the situation • The Operations Centre - adjustment decisions. Command is exercised throughout execution by the commander who will typically focus on directing the application of combat power and significant adjustment decisions. Control delegated to the operations staff involves the oversight, direction and coordination of the operation within established parameters; on which the staff must be absolutely clear. Assessment, which informs and contributes to situation awareness, is of particular importance to C2 during execution; commanders and staff must decide and act at a higher tempo than the enemy. 8-02. Execution is therefore more than just putting the plan into action and can be broken down into a continuous cycle of three broad activities: a. Assessing. The current state of the operation and forecasting its progress. b. Making execution and adjustment decisions to account for unforeseen enemy actions and to exploit opportunities. c. Directing. Actions that apply combat power to accomplish the mission. 8-03. The ability of a CP to plan and execute concurrently will be driven by the tempo of operations and the manning available to do so. For example, BGs are not established to plan and execute concurrently, but may be able to do so for limited periods or during less intense operations – for example during stabilisation. 8-04. This chapter will first describe the relationship of C2 during execution before going into further detail on execution’s three key activities: assessment, decision making and directing action. The Rapid Decision Making and Synchronisation Process is articulated and the chapter concludes with a section on the CP’s Operations Centre (Ops Cen).

110 APP 2015 – Combat Power is the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.

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Command and Control During Execution 8-05. Command. The fundamentals of command involve leadership, decision making and control.111 A commander, supported by their staff, will exercise all three of these during execution to overcome friction, maintain tempo and to enable Mission Command. The key to successful command during execution is clear direction from the commander to the staff on their intent, planning assumptions, remaining CCIRs, success factors and concerns. The commander must make clear the acceptable level of detail required for their Situational Awareness (SA)112 and decision making, which decisions they anticipate making and when and which decisions they are content for others to make. They must also specify the amount of risk they are prepared to accept. 8-06. Control. As a function of command, control is the oversight, direction and coordination of assigned forces in accordance with the commander’s plan and intent. Above subunit, a defined level of control may be delegated to the staff. This empowers them, through standardised processes and procedures, to coordinate actions in line with the commander’s intent.113 To that end staff must have a thorough understanding of the CONOPS and supporting OSW. Within all CPs this is driven by an efficient handover of the plan from plans to operations staff as well as access to and understanding of the ‘golden thread’ planning output shown in the text box below. Oversight of execution requires constant reference to the COP in order provide the SA for effective and appropriate coordination. As a guiding principle, staff controlling the execution of operations should maintain an enabling mindset focussed on provision of appropriate resources and freedom of action to subordinates – using control measures only when necessary.

Golden Thread Planning Product used to Fight the Battle • Synchronisation Matrix. • DSO and DSOM. • Op Overlay and Control Measures trace. • CCIRs and any outstanding RFIs. • Any other supporting plans and overlays (e.g. Fireplan, MovO, obstacle trace).

111 ADP Land Operations, 2017. 112 SA is defined as the perception of a particular area of interest, problem or situation bounded by time and space in the context of a mission or task. 113 ADP 1, 2017.

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Assessment During Execution 8-07. General. As already discussed in Chapter 5, In Sum assessment consists of monitoring and evaluating. During execution, assessing the operation is a Commanders and staff assess deliberate comparison of forecast outcomes to current progress, the probable actual events. Established MOE and MOP should outcome of the mission be used to judge operational success at any point and likely impact on future during an operation. The assessment should identify operations. the magnitude and significance of variances in performance from expectations and determine the need for adjustments. Commanders and staffs should also assess the probable outcome of an ongoing operation to determine whether alterations are required to accomplish the mission, react to possible threats or take advantage of opportunity. They also assess the impact of the current situation and expected progress with regards to its impact on likely future operations in order to shape their early development. In sum, commanders and staff assess current progress, the probable outcome of the mission and likely impact on future operations. Figure 8.1 refers.

Assess

Direct

Situational awareness

Modifies information requirements

Execution Progress

Update reconnaissance and surveillance tasking

CCIR

Decide Evaluate Criteria of success

Monitor

Yes No

Apply combat power

Adjustment

Changes

Chan

ges Creates new reality start process again

CCIR commander’s critical informantion requirement

Figure 8.1. – Assessment during Execution

8-08. Monitoring an Operation. Monitoring the operation informs the SA of the commander and staff. In turn, they determine if the operation is progressing according to the plan (including FRAGO initiated modifications). More specifically, the staff monitors known facts and planning assumptions to ensure they remain valid and to seek new information and assumptions that will affect current and future operations. This output should be reflected in the CP’s dynamic management of its IRs and any corresponding MOEs and MOPs. During execution, staff monitoring the COP must have the ability to filter and present relevant information to the commander to give a clear picture of the current operation. They must also be clear on what constitutes a critical event or piece of information that must be passed to the commander, or appropriate staff sections, immediately.

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NATO Evaluation Questions • Is the enemy acting as anticipated? If not, do enemy actions invalidate the current plan? • Is the friendly force accomplishing the mission at an acceptable cost? If not, what changes are required to put the plan back on track? • Is the progress of the operation leading to a disposition of friendly forces that can transition effectively to anticipated future operations? • Has the situation changed so that friendly forces can exploit unanticipated opportunities to attain the end state more effectively than what is called for in the original plan?

8-09. Evaluating an Operation. Evaluation during execution considers the monitored unfolding situation against that which was planned for and allows adjustments to be made to mitigate or exploit the identified change, or variance. At the lower tactical levels and during simple operations, the commander may be able to conduct the evaluation function with limited support. During more complex operations, the commander will rely more heavily on the staff to assess the situation and inform decision making. Evaluation also improves tempo by anticipating future operations and identifying links to current operations. a. Process. Evaluation compares relevant information on the situation or operation against criteria to determine success or progress. The outcome of the comparison represents assessment. During execution the commander and staff continuously use MOEs and MOPs, including forecasted performance, to determine variances and their significance. Variances may occur for a variety reasons noting that friendly, enemy, neutral and environmental activity will all have an impact and cause an under or over delivery of the plan. In all such cases, the commander and empowered staff make decisions based on the assessment. In addition, staff cells continuously update functional estimates based on their assessments which should feed back into centralised decision making. b. Conclusions. During an operation the commander and staff continually ask the question: Has the situation changed and how might it affect me?114 This broad question should focus on friendly, neutral, enemy and environmental factors which impact on the progress of an operation in relation to the desired outcome. Of note, NATO uses a set of questions to prompt such conclusions as shown in shown in the above quote box. Assessing progress can result in two conclusions: (1) First, that the operation is progressing satisfactorily and that observed variances between the expectations and current (or forecast) performance are within acceptable tolerance levels. In this case progress continues to meet the commander’s intent and the concept of operations remains relevant to the situation. This evaluation results in allowing the operation to proceed according to plan. It leads to execution decisions foreseen by the plan.

114 Q4 of Mission Analysis.

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(2) Secondly, that the operation as a whole, or one or more of its major activities, is not proceeding according to expectations (either better or worse than expected). In either case, the commander should make an adjustment decision to take advantage of the opportunity or to counter the threat.

Decision Making in Execution 8-10. The commander should not hesitate to modify the plan or discard it altogether if it is necessary to accomplish the mission (and save the force) or to achieve greater success. Commanders at all levels must consider whether the benefits of modifications outweigh the costs of disrupting the current plan, particularly its synchronisation. If modifications are required they are initiated by two forms of decisions: a. Execution Decisions. If the progress of the operation is meeting expectations, what needs to be done next according to the plan? b. Adjustment Decisions. What must be done to exploit opportunity or restore mission accomplishment? 8-11. The difference between execution and adjustment decisions lies in whether the plan anticipates the situation requiring a decision. In execution decisions, the variances in MOEs and MOPs are within limits for planned actions such as coordination of manoeuvre or the initiating of a CONPLAN. For adjustment decisions, the variances are greater than expected in the MOE and MOP. Table 8.2 refers. Type of Decision

Execution

Execution

Situation Minor Variances from the Plan. Plan working well. Variances in MOE and MOP are within acceptable limits.

Anticipated Situation linked to established Decision Point. Variances within limits for CONPLAN initiation.

Execute CONPLAN Commander or staff review CONPLAN (branch or sequel) if prepared; commander receives assessments and recommendations for modifications to plan and issues guidance or decision for further actions. Participation by commander and refinement of CONPLAN determined by situation and time available. Staff completes follow-up actions. FRAGO issued if modifications to CONPLAN are complex.

Unanticipated Situation Friendly Success Significant unanticipated positive variances are to the friendly forces’ advantage for mission accomplishment. Adjustment

Action Execute Planned Actions Commander or responsible staff member decides which planned actions best meet situation and directs or confirms their execution. Staff complete follow-up actions. Decision may simply be permissive; FRAGO not normally issued.

Or Unanticipated Situation Enemy Threat Significant, unanticipated negative variances are not to the friendly forces’ advantage for mission accomplishment.

Commander recognises threats or opportunities and determines time available for decision making. Selects estimate method. If no time for full estimate, outlines decision on single COA for staff to refine or directs actions by subordinates to counter threats or exploit opportunities and exercise initiative in accordance with higher commander’s intent. Normally will not attempt to restore plan. Verbal WngO or FRAGO issued to subordinate commanders. Staff resynchronise the operation, modify MOE and MOP, and commence operations assessment in accordance with new decisions.

Table 8.2. – Summary of Decision/Action relationships during Execution

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8-12. Execution Decisions. An execution decision selects what needs to be done next according to the plan if the progress of the operation is meeting expectations. They are informed by the ‘golden thread’ planning product used to execute operations: the Decision Support Overlay, Decision Support Overlay Matrix (including Decision Points and their criteria/indicators) and the Synchronisation Matrix. Therefore the most basic form of an execution decision results in the application of resources or conduct of tactical actions as outlined within the plan, or within minor tolerances of the plan. The critical ongoing functions during execution, discussed below, are also execution decisions when they support planned activities. Of note, the initiation of a developed CONPLAN represents an execution decision. a. Facilitating planned actions. One form of execution decision is permissive - to allow planned actions to take place. This usually requires the commander or staff to recognise that a particular directed action has met preconditions for execution and then directing execution of a pre-planned activity. Taking planned actions includes modifying them to fit the circumstances at the time of execution. b. CONPLAN. A CONPLAN, also known as a Branch or a Sequel in operational-level planning, is a planned action. The criteria (MOE and MOP) used to evaluate progress of an operation help identify events that trigger them. c. Critical routine tasks. Formations and units must accomplish routine tasks during execution, even if the plan is progressing satisfactorily. Failure to consider these routine tasks can waste precious resources, squander opportunities, or even lead to failure. Many of these critical tasks help to keep minor variances from becoming threats to mission accomplishment. d. Resource the Main Effort. Typically, the majority of the force is supporting the Main Effort. During execution, situations may render some supporting operations irrelevant or result in supporting assets being out of position. The commander and staff must continuously survey all assets and ensure that, where appropriate, they are in position and tasked to support the Main Effort, or that they are moving to a position where they can provide that support. e. Conduct Continuous ISR and Counter Intelligence Activity. ISR activity is continuous. The commander should rarely keep IR assets in reserve; they should always be looking for weaknesses in the enemy disposition. For example, when the main body directly engages the enemy, ISR assets should be observing the flanks, looking beyond the area of close combat and seeking opportunities for the commander to exploit. The commander and ISR staff should phase or sequence the use of ISR assets to ensure continual availability. f. Continue Security Operations. Security forces have specific missions for many operations. As a generalisation, these tasks may be completed or handed over to an alternate force prior to mission success. Therefore, the commander and staff should always look beyond initial security tasks and continually assess the 360 degree threat throughout an operation. g. Adjust Information Requirements. The commander and staff continuously review the full spread of Information Requirements during execution, particularly CCIRs. For example, as CCIRs are answered or the situation changes, the commander develops and disseminates new CCIRs. The staff must allocate resources accordingly.

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h. Adjust Control Measures. A combined arms operation often requires the dynamic modification of control measures during execution. As a guiding principle, the commander or staff should enable freedom of action by using control measures sparingly and only for the minimum amount of time necessary. Manoeuvre forces should be given appropriate space in which to operate. i. Perform Battle Tracking. Battle tracking is defined as monitoring elements of the COP that are tied to MOEs and MOPs. Battle tracking requires special attention on the part of all staff officers but is of particular relevance to Battle Captains and Watchkeepers in the Ops Cen. j. Employ Airspace Control Means (ACM). Closely allied to graphic control measures and battle tracking, but separate for discussion, are ACM. Airspace control is a joint responsibility normally assigned to an Airspace Control Authority (ACA), usually the Air Component Commander (ACC). All commanders, units and staff officers must remain aware of current ACM, their integration with and implications for ground operations. They must also consider the same for ground operations on airspace control and adjust as necessary. k. Continue Liaison and Coordination. These essential ongoing functions of the commander, staff and specific LOs enable the synchronisation of execution and adjustment decisions, both internally and externally. SOIs must establish procedural controls to ensure that communications across the chain of command continue to function effectively. l. Conduct Targeting. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them while taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. The process is integral to Integrated Action and underpins the lethal and non-lethal actions that must be directed at specific targets in order to realise the commanders’ intended effects in the physical, virtual and cognitive domains. It is either pre-planned (deliberate) or dynamic. Therefore, the decision to initiate pre-planned targeting in line with established criteria (MOEs or MOPs) is defined as an execution decision. Targeting is further detailed in AFM Fires. m. Manage Sustainment. Concentration of force at the decisive point and time requires manoeuvring, not only combat, but also the full range of CS and CSS assets. Commanders and staffs must deliberately and dynamically coordinate and direct supporting and sustaining operations in order to deliver mission success. During execution, experience has shown it is possible for staffs to lose sight of, or underestimate, the sustainment challenge. This is particularly relevant during combined arms manoeuvre. The first principle of sustainment states ‘it is the collective responsibility of all elements of the force to share logistic information, capabilities and resources to support the force’. Sustainment is further detailed in AFM Sustainment. 8-13. Adjustment Decisions. Adjustment decisions initiate a course of action that requires a modification to the plan as a result of unanticipated opportunities or threats. When the commander makes an adjustment decision they choose a decision-making approach appropriate to the situation. This can be one that relies heavily on intuition, or a more deliberate approach that requires parts or all of the estimate to be revisited. It is often a blend of both as combining approaches provides a holistic perspective on the many factors that affect decisions. When deliberate planning is involved, it is usually conducted

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by plans staff allowing those in the Ops Cen to focus on controlling the ongoing operation. During this pressurised process staff fight to maintain SA in the broader headquarters and functional cells focus on assessing the impact of the commander’s decision in their areas of responsibility. The commander pays particular attention to the implications of adjustment decisions on targeting and gives sufficient guidance to initiate and support the targeting process. Adjustments may take one of three basic forms: a. Minor Change. An example of a minor change would be making a boundary change or reallocating resources. The latter usually provides additional assets to the Decisive Actions or Main Effort; however, it may also require reinforcing a shaping or sustaining operation. Of note, commanders do not reinforce a failing effort without a clear indication that additional resources will result in success. On the other hand, they reinforce success if this creates opportunities for more success within their superior commander’s intent. Minor changes require OSW to be reissued as a FRAGO. b. Major Change. Major changes involve a significant change to the plan requiring new OSW issued as an OpO or a FRAGO. Examples could include switching the Main Effort as a result of unexpected threats or opportunities, tasking the reserve on an unforeseen mission or even changing the CONOPS – providing it still accomplishes the 1-up Intent. c. Plan invalid. If the plan becomes invalid, commander and staff begin planning again within the superior commander’s intent. However, such a significant adjustment will typically be supported by new orders from the higher HQ. 8-14. Decision Briefs. For adjustment decisions and significant execution decisions (often related to key Decision Points), a Decision Brief is the principal method for generating a commander’s decision. Staff act quickly once the unexpected change or appropriate criteria have been identified noting that well-practised SOIs enhance tempo. The Decision Brief presents relevant information and provides options for action from which the commander directs additional analysis or makes a decision. Decision briefs must be short, succinct and relevant.

Directing Action 8-15. Implementation of a decision requires communication of the decision and corresponding orders for the application of combat power. Therefore after a commander’s decision the staff must distribute any new orders and associated OSW as soon as possible. The challenge lies in making sure that subordinates and Operations Centre staff are able to conduct the new actions without disrupting those elements of the existing plan and broader activities which remain extant. In a fast-moving operation, the potential for confusion is significant. Plans staff must consider carefully how best to disseminate the new orders. For example, it will rarely be possible to reconvene an OGp, therefore staff must exercise efficient IM/IX procedures founded on established SOIs. 8-16. The authority for changed OSW products is provided by a covering FRAGO. Verbal instructions must be recorded in the Operations Centre log. Version control is essential and subordinates must be in no doubt which version of OSW products are to be used. 8-17. The operations staff must also be briefed on the new orders and products as quickly as possible. Given the dynamic nature of an operation, the operations staff must anticipate the impact of the changes to existing activity. The new instructions may lead to a subsequent change in situation and the cycle will start afresh.

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8-18. Table 8.3 below summarises the range of possible actions with respect to decisions made during execution.

Rapid Decision Making and Synchronisation Process115 8-19. The rapid decision-making and synchronisation process is a technique that a commander and staff can use during execution. While identified here with a specific name and method, the approach is not new. Commanders and staffs should develop this capability through training and practice. When using the technique, the following considerations apply: a. Speed is more important than process. b. Much of it may be mental rather than written. c. It should become a battle drill for the operations staff. 8-20. While the military three estimates seek an optimal solution (see chapter 6), the rapid decision-making and synchronisation process seeks a timely and effective solution within the commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. Using the rapid decision-making and synchronisation process lets commanders avoid the timeconsuming requirements of developing decision criteria and comparing courses of action (COAs). Operational and mission variables continually change during execution. This often invalidates or weakens COAs and decision criteria before a commander can make a decision. Under the rapid decision-making and synchronisation process, a commander combines their experience and intuition to quickly reach situational understanding. Based on this, workable COAs are developed and refined. 8-21. The rapid decision-making and synchronisation process facilitates continuously integrating and synchronising the warfighting functions to address ever-changing situations. It meets the following criteria for making effective decisions during execution: a. It is comprehensive, integrating all warfighting functions. It is not limited to any one warfighting function. b. It ensures all actions support the decisive operation by relating them to the commander’s intent and concept of operations. c. It allows rapid changes to the order or mission. d. It is continuous, allowing a commander to react immediately to opportunities and threats. The rapid decision-making and synchronisation process is based on an existing order and a commander’s priorities as detailed in the orders. The most vital elements are the commander’s intent, concept of operations, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). The rapid decision-making and synchronisation process includes five steps. The first two may be performed in any order, including concurrently. The last three are performed iteratively until the commander identifies an acceptable COA, Figure 8.3 refers.

115 FM 6-0 Commander and Staff Organisation and Operations, dated May 2015.

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Performed concurrently or sequentially.

„„ Compare the current situation to the order. „„ Determine that a decision, and what type, is required.

If the action is unacceptable, develop a new course of action.

„„ Develop a course of action. „„ Refine and validate the course of action. „„ Implement.

Figure 8.3. – Rapid Decision Making and Synchronisation Process

8-22. Step 1. Compare the Current Situation to the Order. A commander and staff will identify likely variances during planning and identify options that will be present and actions that will be available when each variance occurs. During execution, a commander and staff will monitor the situation to identify changes in conditions. Then they ask if these changes affect the overall conduct of the operation or their part in them and if the changes are significant. Finally, they identify if the changed conditions represent variances from the order, especially opportunities and risks. Staff should look for indicators of variances that affect their areas of expertise; Table 8.4 refers for examples of indicators. 8-23. Staff will be focussed on seeking answers to CCIRs that support anticipated decisions. Furthermore, staff will also seek exceptional information, that which would have answered one of the CCIRs if the requirement for it had been foreseen and stated as one of the CCIRs. Exceptional information usually reveals a need for an adjustment decision. When performing the rapid decision-making and synchronisation process, the current operations staff first compares the current situation to the one envisioned in the order. They may require assistance from the assessment branch or the red team for this analysis. If the situation requires greater analysis, the COS may task plans to conduct the analysis. At BG level, this task will be completed by either plans or operations staff. Types

Command

Intelligence

Indicators „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„

Answer to a CCIR. Change in mission. Change in organisation of unit. Change in command of unit. Change in capabilities of subordinate unit. Impending changes in key military command. Receipt of a FRAGO or WngO from higher headquarters. Effective adversary information efforts on civilians. Loss of contact with a CP or commander. Jamming or interference.

„„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„

Identification of enemy main effort. Identification of enemy reserves or counterattack. Indications of unexpected enemy action or preparation. Increase in enemy solicitation of civilians for intelligence operations. Identification of an IR. Insertion of manned surveillance teams. Disruption of education systems. Unexplained disappearance of key members of intelligence community. Use of enemy electronic attack. Identification of high-value targets. Unmanned aircraft system launch. Answer to a PIR. Enemy Air or Avn (incl UAV) use. Identification of threats from within the population.

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Manoeuvre

Fires

Information Activities

Capacity Building

Protection

Sustainment

„„ Success or failure in breaching or gap crossing operations. „„ Capture of significant numbers of enemy PoW, enemy CP, Logistic elements or artillery units. „„ Establishment of road blocks along major traffic routes. „„ Success or failure of a sub-unit task. „„ Modification of an airspace control measure (ACM). „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„

Receipt of an air tasking order (ATO). Battle damage assessment (BDA) results. Unplanned repositioning of artillery units. Identification of high-payoff targets. Identification of an IR. Execution of planned fires. Modification of a Fire Support Coordination Measure (FSCM). Effective enemy counter-fire.

„„ Identification of an IR. „„ Climate changes or natural disasters impacting on the population, agriculture, or industry. „„ Interference with freedom of the press or news media. „„ Indicators of illicit economic activity. „„ Increased unemployment within the population. „„ Interference with freedom of religious worship. „„ Loss of civilian communications nodes. „„ Negative effects of fires on civilians. „„ Destruction of any place of worship by friendly fire. „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„

Signing or implementation of peace treaty or other key political arrangement. Change in role of host-nation military force. Upcoming local election. Changes in key civilian leadership. Unexplained displacement of neighbourhoods within a given sector. Numbers of dislocated civilians sufficient to affect friendly operations. Damage to civilian infrastructure affecting friendly mobility. Loss of one or more critical transportation systems.

„„ Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) report or other indicators of enemy CBRN use. Report or other indicators of enemy improvised explosive device (IED) use. Indicators of coordinated enemy actions against civilians or friendly forces. Increased criminal activity in a given sector. Increase in organised protests or riots. Identification of threats to communications or computer systems. Reports of enemy targeting critical host-nation infrastructure. Identification of threat to base or sustainment facilities. Escalation of force incidents. Loss of border security.

„„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„

Significant loss of capability in any class of supply. Opening or closing of civilian businesses within a given area. Identification of significant incidences of disease and non-battle injury (DNBI) casualties. Closing of major financial institutions. Mass casualties (MASCAL). Receipt of significant resupply. Disruption of one or more essential civil services (water or electricity etc). Enemy contact on a supply route. Answer to a FFIR. Mass detainees. Degradations to essential civilian infrastructure by threat actions. Civilian MASCAL event beyond capability of host-nation resources. Identification of significant shortage in any class of supply. Outbreak of epidemic or famine within the civilian population. Medical evacuation launch. Dislocated civilian event beyond capability of host-nation resources. Disruption of key logistics lines of communication. Changes in availability of host-nation support. Table 8.4. – Examples of change indicators

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8-24. Step 2. Determine the type of decision required. When a variance is identified, the commander directs action while the COS leads the staff who are conducting the quick comparison of the current situation to the expected situation. This assessment accomplishes the following: a. Describes the variance. b. Determines if the variance provides a significant opportunity or threat and examines the potential of either. c. Determines if a decision is needed by identifying if the variance: (1) Indicates an opportunity that can be exploited to accomplish the mission faster or with fewer resources. (2) Directly threatens the success of the main effort. (3) Threatens a shaping operation such that it may threaten the main effort. (4) Can be addressed within the commander’s intent and concept of operations, and therefore determine what execution decision is required. (5) Requires changing the CONOPs substantially and therefore determine what adjustment decision or new approach will best suit the circumstances. 8-25. For minor variances, the COS works with the staff to determine whether changes to control measures are required. If so, they determine how those changes affect other warfighting functions and changes, within authority (execution decisions), are directed to affected CPs and staff elements. A commander should intervene directly in cases that affect the overall direction of the unit - they should describe the situation, direct their subordinates to provide any additional information required, and order either implementation of planned responses or development of an order to redirect the force. 8-26. Step 3. Develop a COA. If the variance requires an adjustment decision, the staff and affected CP recommend the implementation of a COA or obtain commander’s guidance for developing one. The following conditions to screen possible COAs should be used: a. Mission. b. Commander’s intent. c. Current dispositions and freedom of action. d. CCIRs. e. Limiting factors, such as supply constraints, boundaries, and combat power. 8-27. The new options must conform to the commander’s intent. Possible COAs may alter the CONOPS and CCIRs, if they remain within the commander’s intent. The commander must approve any changes to the CCIRs. Staff identify areas potentially affected within their areas of expertise by proposed changes to the order or mission. COA considerations include, but are not limited to, those shown in Table 8.5. 8-28. The commander is as likely as anyone else to detect the need for change and to sketch out the options. Whether the commander or COS detects the need, Plans or Ops will be directed to further develop the concept and draft the order. The commander, or COS, will have the decision-making authority, depending on the commander’s delegation of authority. Commanders may delegate authority for execution decisions to their deputies, COSs or operations officer. A commander must retain personal responsibility for all

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decisions and will normally retain the authority for approving adjustment decisions. When reallocating resources or priorities, commanders assign only minimum essential force elements to shaping operations. All other force elements should be prioritised to the decisive operation. 8-29. A commander should direct the ops staff to prepare a FRAGO, setting conditions for the execution of the new COA. If a lack of time precludes a full estimate, or if a quick action is desirable, commanders should make an immediate adjustment decision, using intuitive decision making, in the form of a focussed COA. Developing the focussed COA often follows mental wargaming by a commander until an acceptable COA is determined. If time is available, a commander may direct the plans staff to develop a new COA using the relevant estimate process and the considerations for COA planning, Table 8.5 refers. Types

Indicators

Command

„„ „„ „„ „„ „„

Move communications nodes. Move CPs. Loss of C2 nodes capability. Adjust themes and messages to support the new decision. Revise recommended protected targets.

Intelligence

„„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„

Modify PIR and other IRs. Update NAIs & TAIs. Update the Intelligence Estimate. Update the enemy situation template. Modify the ICP. Confirm or deny enemy MD / ML COA.

Manoeuvre

„„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„

Assign new objectives. Assign new tasks to sub-units. Adjust BM. Use of obscurants. Modify ACM. Make boundary changes. Emplace obstacles. Clear obstacles. Establish and enforce movement priority.

Fires

„„ „„ „„ „„ „„

Deliver fires against targets or target sets. Modify the HPTL and the attack guidance matrix. Modify radar zones. Modify the priority of fires. Modify FSCM.

Information Activities

„„ Modify information priorities for employing information as combat power.

Capacity Building

„„ Adjust measures for minimizing civilian interference with operations. „„ Recommend modifications of stability tasks, including employment of civil affairs operations and other units, to perform civil affairs operations tasks. „„ Inform HN authorities. „„ Coordinate HN SF to secure routes.

Protection

„„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„

Move AD weapons systems. Establish decontamination sites. Conduct CBRN recce. Establish movement corridors on critical lines of communications. Change AD weapons control status. Enhance survivability through engineer support. Revise and update personnel recovery coordination. Reassign or reposition reserve force elements.

Sustainment

„„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„

Prioritise MEDEVAC assets. Reposition logistic assets. Position and prioritise detainee assets. Reposition and prioritise engineer assets. Modify priorities. Modify distribution. Table 8.5. – COA Considerations

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8-30. Step 4. Refine and Validate the COA. Once a commander has articulated the new COA, the ops staff conduct an analysis to validate its feasibility, suitability, and acceptability. If acceptable, the COA is refined to resynchronise the warfighting functions to generate and apply the required combat power. The detail should be captured in a FRAGO and the commander, or COS, may direct an ‘on-call’ operations synchronisation meeting to perform this task to enable rapid resynchronisation. 8-31. Validation and refinement should be achieved quickly. Typically, the commander and staff conduct a mental wargame of the new COA. Potential enemy reactions, the unit’s counteractions, and potential consequences that might affect the force’s synchronisation should be considered. The following checklist should be addressed at this stage: a. Is the new COA feasible in terms of my area of expertise? b. How will this action affect my area of expertise? c. Does it require changing my IRs? (1) Should any of the IRs be nominated as a CCIR? (2) What actions within my area of expertise does this change require? (3) Will this COA require changing objectives or targets? d. What other CP branches or cells does this action affect? e. What are potential enemy reactions? f. What are the possible friendly counteractions? (1) Does this counteraction affect my area of expertise? (2) Will it require changing my IRs? (3) Are any of my IR potential CCIRs? (4) What actions within my area of expertise does this counteraction require? (5) Will it require changing objectives or targets? (6) What other CP branches or cells does this counteraction affect? 8-32. The validation and refinement will determine if the COA will solve the problem adequately. If it does not, the COS will direct modifications via additional analysis, or a new COA will be developed. The COS will then inform the commander of any changes made to the COA. 8-33. Step 5. Implement. When the COA is accepted, the COS recommends implementation to the commander or implements it directly, in accordance with delegated authority. Implementation normally requires a FRAGO; in exceptional circumstances, it may require a new OPO. That order changes the CONOPS (in adjustment decisions), resynchronises the Tactical Functions, and disseminates changes to control measures. Staff should use a WngO to alert subordinates to a pending change and will also establish sufficient time for the unit to implement the change without losing integration or being exposed to unnecessary tactical risk.

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8-34. A commander will most likely issue orders to subordinates verbally in situations requiring a quick reaction. At BG and higher levels, a written FRAGO be utilised to confirm verbal orders, and to ensure synchronisation, integration, and notification to all force elements. If time permits, commanders may verify that subordinates understand the critical tasks via a back brief. 8-35. After the analysis is complete, ops staff will update decision support templates and synchronisation matrixes. When time is available, the ops staff should continue analysis out to the end of the operation. Staff should then begin the synchronisation required to implement the decision. The synchronisation involves collaboration with other Command Post (CP) branches/cells and subordinate staff. The staff will determine how actions in their areas of expertise affect others; these must be coordinated to eliminate undesired effects that might cause friction. Results of the synchronisation should then inform the COP.

The Operations Centre 8-36. Introduction. The Operations Centre (Ops Cen) within a CP is at the heart of assessing, deciding and directing activities that have already been discussed in this chapter. As well as monitoring and evaluating, empowered operations staff control execution through execution decisions and staff activities in support of the commander’s adjustment decisions. Operations staff must also package and pass relevant information to branches, subordinates, flanks, higher HQs and the commander to generate and maintain SA. 8-37. Composition. The composition of the Ops Cen depends upon the availability and effectiveness of voice and data communications, SA feeds, space, the level at which the HQ is operating and the type of operation being conducted. Membership is not necessarily a strictly defined single entity. It will frequently include staff from outside the core HQ. Composition may change during an operation. The COS will usually be responsible for the design and manning of the Ops Cen and will do so based on the following criteria: a. Complexity of the Operation. Operations comprising a large number of differing capabilities provided by different organisations, and even different nations, will require a large number of expert staff in the Ops Cen. This will be particularly evident when working in the CJIIM environment. See Part C for further CJIIM detail. b. Stability and Reliability of Communications. Although the Ops Cen will be sited as part of the CP, and that siting will usually have the requirement to communicate at its core, there may be occasions when specialist communication users are required to be detached to operate from different locations. c. Phase of Operation. Specialist staff will be required for different phases of the operation. A particularly complex resupply operation will require logistic staff to be present in the Ops Cen but they may not be permanent members. The COS or Ops Cen Director (Dir) will set the conditions for appropriate manning in accordance with the mission. d. Location of Other HQs. Where a Forward CP is deployed, the Ops Cen may split. The Forward Ops Cen will restrict its activity to providing SA for the commander. When CPs are moving, the Ops Cen will also split so that control can be exercised from both. e. Example Manning. Manning will be dictated by tempo, activity and availability. Note that manning may need to allow for a shift system to provide continuous coverage.

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8-38. Infrastructure. The size and composition of the Ops Cen will determine the level and complexity of the infrastructure required to support it. Where power and lift limitations exist, the COS will have to balance these factors against the requirements of the Operations Centre. Default layouts for CPs should be contained in formation and unit SOIs. 8-39. Functional Cell’s Ops Cens. Within a CP, different cells support the commander as well as the main Ops Cen. Depending on the complexity and size of an operation and the concomitant size of the cell staffs, it may be necessary for Functional Cell Ops Cens to be established to support the main Ops Cen. The greater the number of Cell Ops Cens, the greater the potential of decreased SA in the Main Ops Cen. It is critical that defined relevant information is passed from Cell Ops Cens to the Main Ops Cen. 8-40. Control of the Ops Cen. The Ops Cen is controlled by the Ops Cen Dir, usually the senior G3 officer in the CP. At BG and Bde level, this role is usually fulfilled by a Battle Captain. The Dir/Battle Captain’s responsibilities include those listed below and key questions for the Ops Cen in Table 8.3: a. To fight the battle. b. To report and monitor friendly force information (strengths, dispositions, capabilities, readiness, holdings, activity and critical assets). c. To report and monitor enemy force information (usually provided by G2). d. To report and monitor flank and higher activity (including air, aviation, maritime, SF, NGO and OGD activity as required). e. To maintain visual displays and a COP. f. To brief the commander and staff as required. g. To monitor and report on CCIRs. h. To identify and predict deviations from the plan in accordance with MOEs and MOPs. i. To initiate and cue decisions within the authority granted by the commander.

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Key Questions in the Ops Cen Anticipate

Decide / Operate

„„ What could change? „„ What next? „„ What / where is the risk – is it an opportunity or a threat? „„ Where is the reserve; what is its NTM? Inform „„ When was the last SITREP – up and down? „„ Am I in a position to give an accurate SITREP? „„ Who else needs to know? „„ Is what I am telling them fact or assumption? „„ Can we communicate with all elements of the Force? „„ Do we need to move? „„ Is this a CCIR?

„„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„

What is the priority? What else should I be doing? Whose decision is it and when does it need to be taken? Is this what we expected? What is the impact? Am I integrating, synchronising, easing and facilitating activity? What is happening on the flanks? Are we being calm and disciplined? How can I add value? Is the force balanced? What is our Combat Effectiveness?

Table 8.3. – Key Questions for the Ops Cen

8-41. Log Keeping. Relevant Information and decisions are recorded in the Log, usually by the Watchkeeper. Log Keeping is an essential element of Operational Record Keeping (ORK). 8-42. The Common Operating Picture (COP).116 The detail shown on the COP will vary depending on the situation and command level. The COP may be digitised or be a bird table, or a combination. It presents geospatial, textual, pictorial and verbal information to the CP staff. Once an order has been enacted, its execution will be monitored through the COP and the display enables a commander’s SA. The accuracy of the COP is critical and must be controlled by the Ops Cen Dir. Of note, the commander may also have a COP from which to monitor the situation when away from the Ops Cen. It will usually be a mirror image of the Main Ops Cen, but may be reduced if there are bandwidth constraints. Typical content of the COP and other information displays are shown in Table 8.4.

116 British Doctrine has adopted the term COP for what was previously called Local Operations Picture (LOP).

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Geospatial information

Ops Trace

Detail

Remarks

Other detail Net diagram Comms States c/s matrix TASKORG NTM details Key staff locs Own Combat Effectiveness Key Battle Rhythm events Effects Schematic Comd’s Intent

FF locations FSCMs Routes Obstacles Report Lines Objectives AD coverage DFs Key weapon range Installations Key CSS locs

DSO Sync Matrix Physical Terrain Trace

Route class Bridge Class Going

May not be permanently displayed

Met Trace

EF

May not be permanently displayed

Locations Weapon effect (particularly CBRN) Table 8.4. – Content of the COP

Remarks Note that much of this information can be displayed electronically, but doing so detracts from the space available to display map-based information

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Contents 1 8-20  |  Army Field Manual I Command

AFMTitle Pub Command

PART Chapter C ?

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PART C Command in the Combined, Joint, Intra-Governmental, Inter-Agency and Multinational (Cjiim) Environment Overview

Part A – Command and Control

Part C of AFM Command covers the aspects of Interoperability117 that should be considered by a commander operating in a CJIIM environment. It describes the definitions, dimensions and some considerations relevant to operating within a multinational arena, or context, including the vital roles and requirements for effective Liaison Officer (LO) cooperation. It further outlines the decisionmaking and planning processes of NATO and our key strategic partners118, as well as those within the UK MOD, UK National Resilience Operations.

• Command • Command Support • Command Posts Part B – Exercising Command and Control • Introduction to the Operations Process • Assess • Plan • Prepare • Execute Part C – Command in the CJIIM Environment

 Multinational Interoperability  NATO and Allied Planning Processes  UK Resilience Operations

Figure 3.1. – The Interoperability Model 117 ADP Land Operations, 2017, Chapter 7 describes ‘Interoperability’ as a national inter and intra service, as well as an interagency and multinational, enabling activity – see Figure 3.1. 118 US, France and Germany.

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Chapter Title? Interoperability Multinational

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Chapter 9 Multinational Interoperability Introduction

Mulitnational Interoperability

9-01. Coalition, combined or multinational • Introduction operations are not new. In the future • Dimensions it is almost inconceivable that UK Land • Considerations on Multinational Forces will operate without allies, or other Operations agencies. However, interoperability still • Liaison Officers remains a critical gap at the strategic, operational and tactical level. The better the understanding of the challenges, dynamics and complexity of combined operations, the better able commands will be to deliver. In its broadest sense, interoperability is a requirement even within units, arms and services within the British Army. However, for the purposes of this Chapter, the focus will be on multinational interoperability. 9-02. NATO defines interoperability119 which is reflected in UK doctrine,120 as ‘the ability for Allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives’.121 As with ‘jointery’, ‘interoperability’ is not an end in itself, but a means by which we are better able to improve our joint, multinational and inter-agency capacity to assess, plan, prepare and execute operations. Interoperability should be considered in three dimensions: a. Levels of Ambition of Interoperability. b. Breadth of Interoperability. c. Depth of Interoperability.

Dimensions 9-03. Dimensions. Interoperability requires nations to spend money, take risk and cede sovereignty in order to increase legitimacy, cohesion, mass and agility. The level of ambition for each relationship will depend on the cost/benefit, risk appetite and likelihood of use. During the course of a combined operation, involving a number of multinational contributions, UK force elements (FEs) may find themselves alongside Partner Nations (PNs) with whom they can only operate at deconflicted levels. However they may find themselves concurrently operating at an integrated level with other forces. It should be noted that forces may wish to operate together at a lower level of interoperability than can be mutually achieved, dependent on the discrete requirements of that particular operation. 119 AAP-06. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. 120 The UK doctrinal definition (AAP-06) is similar: ‘Interoperability describes the ability of UK Forces and, when appropriate, forces of partner and other nations to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.’ 121 AAP-42 Edition B Version 1, NATO Glossary of Standardization Terms and Definitions, 2011.

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a. Levels of Ambition: (1) Level 1 - Integrated. Forces that are integrated are able to merge seamlessly and are interchangeable. This high level of interoperability has only been achieved within coalition headquarters and niche areas, such as the Regional Command (South West) Coalition Targeting Cell in Afghanistan. It is difficult to achieve between units at the tactical level. (2) Level 2 - Compatible. Forces that are compatible are able to interact with each other in the same geographical battlespace in pursuit of a common goal. This level of interoperability was achieved in RC(SW) in the final years of Op HERRICK. This is the area where the majority of bilateral interoperability development lies. (3) Level 3 - Deconflicted. Forces that are deconflicted. This is where two nations’ forces work together towards a common goal, but need to divide the battlespace into nationally-led areas of responsibility. This was the level of interoperability exercised on Op GRANBY and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This is the base level of interoperability provided by NATO procedures.

Integrated ve an stm e d lik nt el (B o ih oo I) / r d of isk us / c om e

pr

om

is

e

Forces able to merge seamlessly and are interchangeable

Compatible Forces able to interact in the same geographical Battlespace

of ce la n Ba

Forces can co-exist but not interact. Base-level

In

Deconflicted

Figure 9.1. – Levels of Ambition

b. Breadth. Interoperability in its breadth spans the human, the procedural and the technical domains, with the human being by far the more critical: (1) Human Interoperability. Time and effort developing and strengthening multinational relationships on operations and in training will create and improve trust and mutual understanding. Nations will always retain authority for such areas as national control of caveats and have to work to overcome the challenges of synchronising technological differences. Therefore human interoperability is the vital ground, because the mutual trust generated through shared experience drives solutions on the ground and strengthens the moral component of fighting power.

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(2) Procedural Interoperability. This generates synergy and efficiency through common policy, doctrine and procedures. (3) Technical Interoperability. Technical interoperability should enable systems and equipment to communicate with each other through the exchange, display and exploitation of each other’s information. Technical interoperability must be designed into our systems and equipment from the outset in conjunction with Partner Nations (PNs). Until this is achieved nations must work together to establish workable solutions to current technical interoperability challenges.

Human

Technical

Vital for success on operations, takes time to develop / fades rapidly

Not designed effectively into current force

• Understanding

• Secure Voice

• Relationship building

• Data sharing (Mission Network)

• Goals & Objectives

Procedural The OIL that lubricates the interoperability cogs

• Standard Operating Procedures • Rules of Engagement Doctrine

• Mutual trust

• Shared Battlespace Management

• Tactics Training & Procedures

• Practice - frequent training opportunities

• Digital Fires

• National Policy & Caveats

• Progress meetings

• Shared Intelligence • Theatre Entry, Integrated Log, Commodity sharing, Med, Air Maritine & Aviation, Mobility / Counter Mobility, Training & Sim, Cyber Sy, Combat ID, Science & Tech EMS

• Pairing Arrangements • LEGAD / POLAD CIMIC & Intro Ops

Figure 9.2. – Breadth of Interoperability

c. Depth. Interoperability takes time to develop and is more effective and affordable if it is designed into capability development from the initial concept. Armies will simultaneously be developing, refining and maintaining interoperability in the near, mid and far-terms. In the far-term (10 years +) nations collaborate in conceptual development and science and technology (S&T) research to share the cost and ensure the relevance and effectiveness of their conceptual force. In the mid-term (5-10 years) nations develop common standards and doctrine, and align procurement requirements in order to maximise the employability/versatility and effect of their future force. This may include experimentation and the harmonisation of national policies. In the near-term (0-5 years) nations will re-engineer in-service equipment, mitigate national policy obstacles, validate standards and train the current force in order to generate interoperability at readiness. Interoperability is perishable and therefore must be maintained to avoid a cycle of relearning the same lessons.

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Human Interop

Mutual trust & understanding

Procedural Interop Policy, caveats, ROE, TTPs

Breadth of Interoperability

Near

Mid

Solutions Future Force

Far

Designed-in Conceptual Force

Comms, data sharing, COP

1

Readiness, Exercises & Visits Depth of Interoperability

Fight Tonight Mitigation Current Force

Technical Interop

Experimentation Liaison & Exchange

3 Leveles of Ambition for Interoperability Integrated:

Forces are able to merge seamlessly and are interchangeable

Compatible:

Staff Talks & Engagement

Forces are able to interact with each other in the same geographical battlespace in pursuit of a common goal

Acquisition 2 Concepts, War Games and S&T Collaboration

Deconflicted:

Forces are geographically deconflicted: they can co-exist but not interact with each other

Interoperability Definition (NATO): ‘The ability for Allies to act together coherently, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives’. Figure 9.3. – Dimensions of Interoperability

High levels of interoperability take time and resources to develop and maintain. Therefore the level of interoperability to be achieved will often be directed by the political level of ambition.

Considerations on Multinational Operations 9-04. Although there may be varying degrees of similarity, no two armies are the same and ill-informed assumptions will lead to operational misunderstandings, mistakes and ultimately frictions which in turn have the potential to damage reputations, relationships and trust. Complete homogeneity is unlikely to be achieved between two separate national land force elements (and is probably not always desirable – as each will come with different, and ideally compensating, strengths and capabilities). Superficial similarities can often mask a myriad of differences from military culture, experience, backgrounds, ethos, histories, training and deployment standards and regimes as well as respective appointments’ roles and responsibilities. Therefore it is to be expected that each Partner Nation may think, react and respond to circumstances differently, to each other, and to that that might be expected within UK land forces. There are a number of ways to mitigate these challenges but the importance of developing mutual understanding through engagement, combined training and the exchange of empowered and respected LOs, should be emphasised. These issues described below are a nonexhaustive list of considerations that need to be mutually agreed and understood: a. Mutual Trust and Common Understanding. The key element to effective interoperability is mutual trust and common understanding. Within a military context, understanding is defined as the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision making122. The deeper the reciprocal comprehension, the better the ability to harness 122 JDP-04.

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and employ respective coalition partners’ strengths. This will also prevent, or minimise any errors or miscalculations. This is best achieved by developing strong links with likely partners prior to, and ideally well before, any operational deployment. For example, through a broad range of liaison visits, unit and individual exchanges, combined/joint exercises and course attendances, etc. It should also be recognised that interoperability is a perishable commodity; effort, time and resources must be provided in order to ensure it is maintained. Mutual trust and common understanding will be ‘Key Terrain’ that enables partners to overcome the many other procedural and technical challenges that they will face. In developing mutual understanding, prior to any multinational deployment it is a sound investment to understand a contributing PN’s Ends, Ways and Means: (1) Ends. – What ends are the PN seeking by contributing to this particular operation? (2) Ways. – What ways may be limited to a PN during the execution of this operation? (3) Means. – What priority of direction and orders will the PN unit need to follow (who owns the means and dictates, and directs, your ways)?

Multinational Considerations „„ Mutual trust and common understanding „„ Developing understanding „„ The implications of understanding for Commanders and Staff „„ Language and culture „„ Leadership „„ Multinational command „„ National Contingent Commanders „„ Operational Staff Work and Operational Record Keeping „„ Liaison Officers „„ Command and Control Relationships. „„ Communications „„ National Caveats (Red Cards) „„ National Agendas „„ Operational Standardisation „„ Operational security „„ Medical „„ Media and visits „„ Finance and sustaining „„ Risk

‘A key point of confusion for the foreigner lies in the apparent contradiction between the British culture of modesty and understatement which is at odds with the underlying success driven value system in the culture. Critical to understanding the British is being able to ‘read between the lines’. What is said is not always what is meant.’ Professor Geert Hofstede - Culture’s Consequences.

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b. Developing Understanding123. Understanding flows from developing the most inclusive perspective of an actor, group, environment or situation. Building understanding takes time. Developing understanding is based on: (1) Clear articulation of the requirement by commanders. (2) The development of networks and systems. (3) A detailed knowledge of the human domain. (4) Situational awareness derived from a COP of the operational environment. (5) The coherent integration of: (i) Information management, exploitation and assurance. (ii) Communications and information technology. (6) Education and training. c. The Implications of Understanding for Commanders and Staff. Understanding is as much an attitude of mind as an activity; the burden of responsibility to understand works both ways in any partnership. This has implications: (1) A change of ethos and philosophy; a duty to share proactively. (2) There is a greater requirement to understand our allies and equally for our allies to understand ourselves. (3) A change in how we produce our vision and intent, our thought and planning processes and in the way we make decisions. (4) We must be comfortable working with complex and ambiguous problems. (5) We must monitor and evaluate the effects and consequences of our decisions in order to learn, adapt and make better decisions in the future. d. Language and Culture. Language and culture have a significant impact on how situations and communications are perceived. Commanders and staff must ensure that both written and verbal communications use plain and simple English in order to mitigate the risk of differing perceptions developing among Partner Nations. Although a coalition formation, or individual, may display excellent command of the English language, do not automatically assume that everything that is implied, nuanced, or expressed is fully understood. Deliberate effort should be made to ensure that mutual comprehension is confirmed, prior to any decisions being agreed. The use of national, formation or unit vernacular and abbreviations, should be avoided as they can very easily lead to confusion or mistakes. Much of this is mitigated through the use of NATO-approved terminology124 and the confirmation of understanding by the proper application of the formal planning and orders process, including the use of: (1) Commanders’ Back Briefs after the receipt of orders. (2) Wargaming. (3) Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drills. 123 JDP-2.00. 124 AAP-06. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

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‘The HQ staff of the DANBAT on HERRICK 15, when reading staff work sent from HQ Task Force Helmand, with a paragraph heading BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front) understood it to actually mean it was a ‘bluff’ or a deception strategy, thus distorting the whole meaning, and their understanding, of the rest of the document.’ DComd DANBAT H15, Post Operational Interview

e. Leadership. The leadership theory, styles and principles exercised by our multinational allies can, and do, vary markedly from those employed within the British Army.125 This can range from the leadership exercised within the field unit chain of command, where leadership styles may be more firmly transformational as opposed transactional; and to headquarters modus operandi where the staffing processes can be ‘staff driven’ as opposed to ‘command led’. The key will be for commanders and staffs to identify and understand the different leadership methods and attitudes employed by whichever PNs they might be operating with. f. Multinational Command. Operating multinationally, either as part of a formal alliance or as an ad hoc coalition, introduces many challenges for both the multinational force commander and for contributing contingent commanders. A multinational force commander will be required to exercise a degree of political judgement, patience and tact. Routine engagement by the commander (or the nominated deputy) with Senior National Representatives (SNR) from each PN in the command is an effective way to identify and resolve many of the issues and challenges that develop in combined operations. The role of the SNR is to represent and help resolve their national contingent interests. Depending on the level, or echelon of the command, the SNR may also be the designated National Contingent Commander. g. National Contingent126 Commanders. On deploying forces as part of a combined operation most, if not all, contributing nations will deploy a national contingent commander (in UK terms, often referred to as COMBRITFOR) who may be separate to the operational contingent commander, dealing with rear-link issues back to national capitals and HQs. With the exception of the lead nation, each country contributing forces to a multinational operation can be expected to deploy a national contingent commander who will exercise national command and represent national interests at the operational level.127 Where PNs have forces under UK command, the interactive role, location and communication requirements of their Contingent Commander may have to be considered. h. Operational Staff Work (OSW) and Operational Record Keeping (ORK). PNs within a multinational operation will have different approaches to OSW and ORK. This is to be expected, but the essential role that ORK plays in post-operations activities (including lessons, and Parliamentary and legal enquiries) is considerable. It is recommended that the UK CoC issues clear policy and assures itself that it is confident that any subordinated multinational units are compliant with the UK ORK procedures and requirements.

125 Army Leadership Doctrine, Edition 1, 2016. 126 Note that AAP-06 uses the term ‘Component’ instead of ‘Contingent’. 127 JDP 0-01.1.

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i. Liaison Officers (LOs). The correct selection, preparation and exchange of LOs will be key to mitigating many of the potential areas of confusion and confliction that might arise during the course of an operation. ATP-3.2.2 specifies the circumstances when reciprocal liaison must be established in a multinational environment. Further details on the duties and responsibilities of an LO are contained in para 5. j. Command and Control (C2) Relationships. C2 relationships should be mutually understood and agreed prior to any deployment, or retasking, of multinational contingents. Notwithstanding what may be articulated by the various Command States within NATO doctrine128 and reflected in the UK’s, in a multinational environment it is vitally important that both, or all, partners agree to a common understanding of the actual definitions129 and any ‘Supported and Supporting’ relationships are settled. In order to reach a common understanding and a Common Operating Picture (COP) it might require that the agreed C2 relationships are articulated, and confirmed, inperson at every level. k. Communications. In multinational operations, especially where the participating forces are not operationally ‘integrated’, there will always be a varying degree of human and technical challenges e.g. secure comms, data transmission and COP. However, many of these can be at least mitigated to a degree with the passage of mutually understandable, accurate and timely communications over a robust and wellpractised network. l. National Caveats (Red Cards). In multinational operations, each nation contributing forces will have national caveats and certain areas which for them might mean a potential national caveat (‘Red Card’) issue. It is imperative that national caveats (or even the ‘professed’ lack of them)130 are fully explored and agreed. Additionally it is important to understand where the Red Card issues might fall, and who, and at what level has the authority to exercise them. It should also be recognised that these national caveats may evolve, and change, during the course of the operation as it develops. So commanders may sometimes need to exercise tactical patience in order to protect and preserve strategic coalitions. m. National Agendas. It is important during combined operations, especially where the UK has multinational units under command, that the PNs’ motivation for participation on particular operations are understood, and factored within the planning processes. This might include such areas as strategic communications messaging to both national and international audiences (especially to senior partners). During any operation, including NATO Article 5, as with the UK, partner nations will almost certainly have national agendas and objectives, especially with the more discretionary operations. These may, or may not, be the same as the UK’s and ideally have been mutually considered in order to allow for some equity, especially for junior partners. Ideally these will have been discussed, clarified and agreed by each nation’s senior operational headquarters (in the case of the UK, this will most probably be PJHQ) prior to deployment. If these have not been articulated in advance, guidance should be sought, up through the chain of command. Where partner nations wish to influence and 128 AJP-3(B). Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, 2011. 129 As an example, US command states are different to NATO’s. 130 This may often occur when some partner nations find themselves exposed to situations and challenges that they had not previously experienced, or envisaged prior to deployment.

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contribute to the operations conducted by their participating forces, from J3-5. This must ideally be negotiated prior to deployment, or retasking and correct procedures agreed (see Ends, Ways and Means para 4.b). n. Operational Standardisation. Although NATO should be the framework for operational standardisation, the current tempo of technical change often outstrips the ability for NATO (and some allies) to keep pace. It would therefore be naïve not to continue to develop doctrinal initiatives and national Tactics Technics and Procedures while NATO standardisation catches up. Early opportunities for mutual training activities and ideally some form of joint Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSOI), ideally with an in-theatre training package, will do much to aid standardisation within a multinational force. o. Operational Security (OPSEC). PNs will have different approaches to OPSEC and any critical areas should be identified at the earliest opportunity and clear policy guidance should be issued and confirmation of understanding may be required. The areas that may need to be considered range from the operational security and passage of information (including Emission Control EMCON) to the use of mobile phones and personal electronic devices (PEDs). p. Medical. Medical standards vary from nation to nation. UK commanders assuming command of multinational FEs should ideally understand the medical condition of these forces in order that it does not incur an unexpected heavy usage of UK apportioned medical support. q. Media and Visits. A multinational force commander should expect a number of media and senior representative visits from the contributing nations during the course of a deployment. While maintaining any OPSEC requirements, these visits need to be supported and positively and sensitively handled as they will be important in maintaining PNs’ political, and national, willingness and support. r. Finance and Sustaining. During multinational operations the financial and sustainment issue may also have to be considered, especially where PNs are dependent on a lead nation for enablers and logistical support. Additionally, consideration may also have to be given to the different approaches PNs may have to Host-Nation (HN) support. s. Risk. Operating as part of a multinational force will normally always engender a greater degree of risk than would be experienced in a purely national context. Commanders at whatever level should identify what the risks might be, who holds the risk, and what possible mitigation strategies might be available.

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Liaison Officers 9-05. Multinational Operations131. Mutual confidence is the key to making liaison successful. Liaison activities require the explicit coordination of doctrine and techniques, patience and tact during personal interaction, and a thorough understanding of the strategic, operational, and tactical aims supporting any international military effort. Cultural differences and sensitivities may require special communications and liaison arrangements to ensure explicit understanding across the alliance or coalition partners. In addition, significant technological differences may exist because of each force’s differing degrees of development, which will require sensitive and careful liaison to overcome. Further, the LO may need to deploy with additional communications support and equipment. 9-06. Selection and Preparation. The correct selection and preparation of LOs132 will be a crucial element to the success of combined operations. The roles and responsibilities of a liaison officer are detailed in NATO STANAGs,133 but in essence an LO is an officer who is exchanged between two forces and is empowered to represent and make appropriate recommendations on behalf of their commander. The LO must be prepared to be able to amplify the commander’s intent and points of detail when appropriate. Moreover, a liaison officer shall assist their own commander through the timely exchange of information, intentions and situational awareness. 9-07. Functional Requirements. The following factors are required for the LO to function effectively and efficiently: a. Accreditation. The LO must hold the appropriate accreditation for security, authority and delegation. b. Continuity. Ideally, the rotation of the LO team staff should be limited to ensure continuity. c. Credibility. Understanding the cultural norms of the receiving unit and appointing the appropriate individuals should be considered (rank, service component, gender, religious beliefs, professionalism, trust of the commander) in order to enable LOs to conduct their duties effectively. d. Command. There should be a clearly defined C2 relationship between the receiving and sending units. e. Flexibility. While deployed within a Div/Bde HQ, the LO needs to have a multidisciplinary understanding in order to be effective across the breadth of staff functions. f. Mobility. LOs should deploy with organic transportation to allow freedom of movement compatible with the receiving unit mobility. g. Protection. LOs should be equipped to operate at the appropriate level of force protection. h. Security. LOs may be required to transport classified material between organisations and commensurate protection will be required.

131 ATP-3.2.2 132 The term Liaison Officer also refers to Liaison Team, and could include, but is not limited to an Officer, Senior NCO and signaller. 133 ATP 3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces, Annex E.

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i. Communications. Secure communications will be required between sending and receiving organisation. j. Administration. Clearly understood arrangements should exist for supporting LOs to minimise any logistic burden on the receiving unit. 9-08. Typical Role and Tasks. NATO STANAG 2199 (also known as ATP 3.2.2) is the authority for LOs. However, a useful guide to training and preparing LOs is contained in the ABCANZ Standard No 2069,134 describing the minimum performance, conditions and standards for conducting LO duties:

Ser

Performance

Standards

1

Sound understanding of the sending unit commander’s intent, concept of operations, ROEs

Able to clearly articulate the sending unit commander’s plan

2

Understanding of receiving unit’s doctrine, capabilities and procedures

Received appropriate military familiarisation training of the receiving unit’s doctrine, capabilities and procedures

3

Be able to understand and communicate the receiving unit’s intent, concept of operations, ROEs

Able to clearly articulate the receiving unit commander’s plan to the sending unit commander

4

Knowledge of own doctrine, capabilities and procedures

Qualified to the appropriate level in staff and tactics, and capabilities of the sending unit

5

Relevant military experience and expertise for the environment

Commensurate to the complexity of the operation and sending unit’s mission/role in the operation

6

Understanding the relevant operational environment

Received intelligence briefs, country overview, campaign plan, national/strategic issues commensurate to the operational context

7

Trained to operate equipment provided to meet functional requirements of the LO (mobility, protection, CIS etc)

Proficient with own equipment

8

Understand the duties of an LO

IAW STANAG 2199, within Coalition HQ

9

Have the personality traits required of an LO (such as proactivity, discretion, maturity, flexibility, reliability, integrity, dynamism, moral courage, confidence)

No standard provided, subjective measure by sending unit commander

10

Sound interpersonal communications skills

Includes negotiation, communication with non-mil organisations

11

Staff skills

Qualified to operate within a staff environment at a level appropriate for the receiving unit HQ

12

Language capabilities or use of an interpreter

Understand, or communicate through an interpreter, the receiving unit’s primary language. Language ability (of the LO or interpreter) to be fluent and comfortable with military terminology relevant to the environment

13

Cultural knowledge relevant to the environment

Received appropriate cultural awareness training for the receiving unit and environment

14

Ability to work within an LO team

Team has conducted pre-deployment collective training

Table 9.4. – Requirements of an LO

134 ABCANZ (American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand) Standard Number 2069 Amendment 1, Liaison Officer Training.

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Vignette of A British LO on Attachment to the 3/6 Bn USMC in Helmand Province in 2010 The role of a Liaison Officer (LO) at Battalion level is to be a link man between two Commanding Officers. Therefore, it is absolutely key that the LO has a clear understanding of the intent of the respective commanders. To achieve this for the parent unit is straightforward. To achieve this within the USMC requires the LO to spend as much time with the Commanding Officer and his staff as possible. As such, the LO should be part of all key meetings and discussions in the Battalion Combat Operations Center (COC). An LO is a guest of the USMC and should behave accordingly. The USMC is susceptible to inherent British politeness, charm and good humour, all of which should be brought to the table. An LO represents not only their regiment but also the British Army and thus every effort must be made to maintain the highest standards of professionalism. The USMC are fastidious about orders of dress and personal grooming, and whilst the LO does not necessarily need to adopt a Marine crew cut, he should ensure his kit and equipment are beyond reproach – think RMAS standards and stick to them. LO to the 3/6 Bn USMC in Helmand Province, 2010

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NATO and Chapter Title? Allied Planning Processes

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Chapter 10 NATO and Allied Planning Processes Introduction

• Introduction • Allied Planning Processes Comparison

10-01. All of our allies’ military planning • NATO Planning Overview processes are similar. First, they seek to • Allied Planning Processes – NATO OLPP understand the situation. Second, they • Allied Planning Processes – US Model develop Courses of Action (COAs) to • Allied Planning Processes – FR Model address the problem/situation. Third, they • Allied Planning Processes – GE Model compare the COAs against a common filter; this is often called wargaming. Fourth, after the commander selects a COA as the basis for a plan it is communicated through an Orders/Operational Staff Work process. Within this context Chapter 10 provides an overview of the planning processes used by NATO and our principal allies.

10-02. Although not exhaustive, the list of multinational partners UK land forces could expect to be operating alongside includes the US, FR and GE. However they may also include Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) partners, NATO and coalitions allies (possible ABCANZ/5 EYES, and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)) as well as national and international civilian agencies. Consistent with all of these potential multinational partners, as well as those on UN operations, is the likelihood that the majority will work to NATO standards and procedures. 10-03. Commanders and staff with a good understanding of their own national planning processes will naturally have a grasp of the fundamentals of planning. In addition, experienced commanders and staff will have the ability to flex and adapt planning doctrine depending on the situation and their experience. The process is just a means to an end. This agility is particularly critical in a CJIIM environment and will allow them to adapt quickly to the processes of partner nations.

Allied Planning Processes Comparison 10-04. Within combined operations each of the participating nations’ land force may well bring with them a slightly different approach to the decision-making and planning process, even when standard recognised coalition processes are used. Table 10-1 provides a comparison of the various estimate processes used with NATO, as well as those used nationally by the US, French and German armies, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This table is not intended to provide a solution to integrate and combine national processes seamlessly; rather it should be used to recognise that there are subtle differences between each stage and each process. Notwithstanding, common themes to each process exist, which should enable commanders and staff to understand how each of the processes is used; these themes are shown in Table 10-1:

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a. Understand the situation/problem (in blue). b. Consider and develop the COAs (in orange). c. Communicate (in green). d. Execute and assess (in white). When operating in a combined environment, the decision-making and planning process of the lead nation will be used.

Level

Strategic to Operational

Operational

Operational to Tactical

Operational to Tactical

Operational to Tactical

Higher Tactical

Process

NATO COPD Phases

NATO OLPP

US MDMP

FR MEDO

GE MDMP

UK Tactical Estimate (6 Step)

Understand the situation/ Problem

Phase 1- Initial Assessment Phase 2 Operational Appreciation of Strategic Environment

1. Initiation of Planning

1. Receipt of Mission

1. Initiation

1. Situation Assessment

1. Understand the Situation

Phase 3a Mission Analysis

2. Problem and Mission Analysis

2. Mission Analysis

2. Orientation (Mission Analysis)

2. Mission Analysis

2. Understand the Problem

Phase 3b COA Development

3. COA Development

3. COA Development

3. Concept Development (COA Dev & Assessment)

Orientation

3. Formulate & Consider COAs

4. COA Analysis

Consider and develop COAs

Phase 4a CONOP Development

4. COA Analysis (Wargame)

5. COA Validation & Comparison

5. COA Comparison

6. Comd COA Decision

6. COA Approval

Estimate of the Situation Friendly COA Development COA Decision

4. Develop & Validate COAs 5. COA Evaluation 6. Commander’s Decision

Communicate

Execute and Assess

Phase 4b OPLAN Development

7. CONOP & CONPLAN Development

Phase 5 Execution

8. Campaign Assessment & Plan Review/ Revision

Phase 6 Transition

7. Orders Production

4. Plan Development

3. Planning 4. Issuing of Orders

5. Plan Review

Table 10.1. – Estimate Model Comparisons

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NATO Planning Overview 10-05. Introduction. The primary role of NATO military forces is to promote peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. Alliance forces should therefore be configured to deter and if necessary defeat adversaries, either to defend or restore the territorial integrity of Alliance nations or to enable security and stabilisation operations. NATO recognises that the military alone cannot resolve a crisis or conflict. A comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.135 Planning within a multidimensional environment will be conducted always as an integrated civilian-military approach. Strategic, operational and tactical are the three levels utilised by NATO to categorise echelons of command and operations activities. The NATO strategic commander for operations is Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The commander at the operational level is normally the commander of the Joint Forces Command (JFC) at one of NATO’s standing joint force headquarters. Further detail on land component command can be found in Chapter 1. 10-06. NATO Command Models. The NATO military structure allows for three command models. Each model offers a C2 option that may be appropriate to specific operations: a. Fully Integrated. This model integrates forces on the basis of ‘proportional shares’. This may result in a binational or multinational construct for operational and component level headquarters. The working language and procedures are agreed by the contributing nations. Commanders of such multinational formations are usually appointed on a rotational basis. b. Lead Nation. This model sees one nation assume responsibility for the planning and execution of an operation. The commander, staff, C2 capability, information and communications capacity, doctrine and logistic coordination of the force is provided by one nation (the lead nation). Other nations can assign contributions to this force, and fill staff positions within the lead nation headquarters. c. Framework Nation. This model sees one nation provide the C2 framework. The key elements of the staff and the headquarters support come from the framework nation. The working language and procedures however are based on Alliance standards. 10-07. NATO Planning Categories. To prepare for its roles and mission the Alliance has two main operations planning categories: Advance Planning and Crisis Response Planning. Both planning categories can incorporate Article 5 and Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations: a. Advance Planning. Advance planning is conducted with a view to preparing the Alliance to deal with possible future security risks. Advance planning calls for three distinct types of plans: a Standing Defence Plan (SDP), a Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) and a generic CONPLAN.136 Additionally, a fourth type – the Graduated Response Plan (GRP) – has been introduced.

135 Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD Interim V2.0) dated 04 October 2013. Available at http://defenceintranet.diif.r.mil.uk/libraries/8/Docs1/20140621.10/20131104-shape_aco_copd.pdf. 136 AJP5 – Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Level Planning.

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b. Crisis Response Planning. Crisis response planning is conducted in response to an actual or developing crisis and calls for the development of an OPLAN. If a crisis is foreseen, the OPLAN might be developed from an appropriate CONPLAN or generic CONPLAN. If the crisis is not foreseen the OPLAN must be developed in response to the prevailing circumstances. An OPLAN is a detailed and comprehensive plan capable of execution as soon as forces are assigned in accordance with the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). Because of the rapid manner in which crises can develop, it is essential that procedures are in place throughout the NATO command structure to allow for the timely and efficient development of OPLANs. In circumstances where multiple operations are conducted concurrently within a single region, it may be deemed necessary to develop a single, theatre-wide OPLAN/campaign plan to ensure proper coordination, unity of purpose and economy of effort of all military activities involved in the execution of, and support for, these operations. 10-08. NATO Planning Processes. The purpose of NATO planning is to produce an operational plan (OPLAN), based on strategic guidance that can be quickly given to tactical units in order to produce an operations order (OPORD). The goal is to use a collaborative process to allow tactical commanders to employ mission-command fundamentals to quickly win or resolve the problem. The basic reference document for planning staffs within the military command structure is the Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD).137 It shapes the OPP at the strategic military and the operational-level planning process (OLPP) at the joint level. It addresses all aspects of an OPLAN and provides guidance on the conduct and methods of planning as well as the factors to be taken into consideration during the development of a plan. It also specifies the standard structure and content of OPLANs. As such, it can be a reference for planning at tactical levels, especially for HQs operating at the high end of the tactical level. a. Strategic. At the strategic level, the strategic-level operations planning process (OPP) is used. This process is carried out by SHAPE as guided by SACEURs direction and guidance. The strategic level OPP comprises six phases that are aligned with the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP) to harmonise the interface between SHAPE and NATO HQ. The phases of the strategic level OPP and the interface are depicted in Figure 10.1. These phases are specifically designed to develop strategic assessments, planning products and directives and orders in support of the NCMP, required by the political military and operational levels. b. Operational. Within NATO, operational planning is military planning at the operational level to design, conduct and sustain campaigns and major operations in order to accomplish strategic objectives within given theatres or areas of operations.138 The OLPP (see below) is designed to support a Joint Force Commander and the staff in conducting operational level planning. The steps can be arranged and/or phased by the commander to fit the planning circumstances, such as complexity or time constraints.139 The phases are shown in Figure 10.1. They should be read in conjunction with COPD Chapter 4. It is also increasingly used as reference at the tactical level.

137 Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD Interim V2.0) dated 04 October 2013. Available at http://defenceintranet.diif.r.mil.uk/libraries/8/Docs1/20140621.10/20131104-shape_aco_copd.pdf. 138 AJP 5, para 0116. 139 AJP-5 para 0301.

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c. Tactical. At the tactical level, NATO FEs use a decision-making process. In practice, one of several planning estimates may be used; this is largely dependent on the nationality of the unit designated. In many NATO operations, there will likely be a combination of national forces in corps and below formations. Conceptually, a corps may use a different planning process than a subordinate division. Subordinate brigades within a division may all use distinct planning processes. It is important to understand how allied partners conduct their planning.

Allied Planning Processes – NATO OLPP 10-09. Operational-Level Planning. Operational-level planning leads to the production of an Operation or Campaign Plan, defined as: a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.140 It demands a way of thinking and specific processes that enable the effective use of military capability, usually as part of a comprehensive response,141 to achieve favourable outcomes. A Joint Force Commander (JFC) plans and executes the campaign, in concert with other actors, on the basis of allocated campaign objectives and set in the context of an overall desired outcome. Campaigns evolve from the relationship between Operational Design and Operational Management.142 Detailed guidance on joint planning and joint operations is articulated in NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, dated Oct 13 and in AJP-5: Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Level Planning, dated Jun 13. 10-10. Operational-Level Planning Process (OLPP) Overview. The OLPP is designed to support a JFC and staff in the conduct of operational-level planning, an overview of the NATO COPD Crisis Response Planning is at Figure 10.2. a. The eight steps of the process can be rearranged and phased by the commander to fit the planning circumstances. The steps can also be arranged to align planning at the operational level with the operations planning process at other levels and the NATO crisis management process. This is a task which may be fulfilled through the Allied Command Operations (ACO) Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD).143 b. The eight steps of the OLPP enable a JFC and staff to develop the Operations Plan (OPLAN), including the conduct of the operational estimate process. The OLPP also includes an assessment step, which enables revision of the plan as necessary, during execution. The OLPP steps are:

140 AJP-01: Allied Joint Doctrine, Dec 2010 141 Use of the full spread of CJIIM actors. 142 Operational Design develops and refines a commander’s operational ideas to provide detailed, executable plans. It is underpinned by a clear understanding of the political and strategic context together with an effective framing of the problem. Operational Management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress. Both Operational Design and Operational Management are interrelated – one continually informs the other. 143 COPD describes operations planning at the strategic level, and the connectivity between planning activities at the political level (North Atlantic Council), the military strategic level (SHAPE), and the operational level (Allied Joint Force Commands). The Allied Joint Publication 5 (AJP-5) is aimed at operational–level planning, specifically commanders and staffs employed in joint force command headquarters and component command headquarters. AJP-5 describes the fundamental aspects of planning joint operations at the operational level. In sum, the COPD directs connectivity between planning activities and AJP-5 is an Op level planning activity guide.

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(1) Initiation of the OLPP. (2) Problem and Mission Analysis. (3) Course of action (COA) development. (4) COA analysis. (5) COA validation and comparison. (6) Commander’s COA decision. (7) Operational-level Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and plan development. (8) Campaign assessment and plan review/revision. c. The results of the OLPP steps are designed to respond to the requirements of the operational-level planning at the strategic and the high-end tactical planning levels. For the strategic level, the OLPP will deliver the operational-level products that will inform or reflect the initial strategic assessment, strategic design, plan development and operations assessment. For the tactical operations planning the OLPP will produce direction through its products, mainly the operational planning directive, operationallevel CONOPS and OPLAN, including Wng Os and activation orders (ACTORDs).

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NAC

MC

SHAPE

JHQ

Phase 1 Initial Situational Awareness of Potential/Actual Crisis

Information Sharing

Phase 1 Initial Situational Awareness of Potential/Actual Crisis

Information Sharing

Phase 1 Indications and Warnings of Potential/Actual Crisis

PME

Phase 3 Military Response Options

Phase 3a Mission Analysis

Phase 3b COA Development

NAC Approved Strategic CONOPS with MC Guidance

FAD with MC Guidance

Strategic OPLAN SORs ROE REQ

Draft Op OPLAN SORs ROE REQ

Strategic Op OPLAN OPLAN Approval

Phase 4a Operational CONOPS Development

Phase 4b Operational OPLAN Development

Phase 4 Operational Plan Development

Draft Op Strategic Op CONOPS, CONOPS CONOPS llustrative SORs Approval

SPMP

Phase 5 Execution

Request or Endorsed NAC Execution Task NMA’s Mission for PMR Progress Directive Report

Phase 5 Execution

ACTORD ROE IMP

Figure 10.2. – NATO Crisis Response Planning Overview

Phase 5 Execution

Operations Assessment

Phase 5 Execution

Strategic Planning Directive

Phase 6 Transition

Disengagement Planning

Phase 6 Transition

Approved NAC DS for NAC Strategic Transitions Transition Execution planning with OPLAN Directive MC Guidance with MC with Guidance Strategic MC Transition Guidance OPLAN

Phase 6 Transition

NAC Decision Endorsed Sheet for Transition Transition OPLAN NAC Planning Execution Endorsed Directive Transition OPLAN

Phase 6 Transition

Strategic Political - Military Review

NAC NAC Tasker for SACEUR’s Approved SPMP Execution Periodic Mission Strategic Directive Mission Progress OPLAN, with MC Review Report ROE REQ, Guidance TCSOR with MC Guidance

Phase 4b Strategic OPLAN Development (Force Generation)

Phase 4 Strategic Plan Development

Strategic CONOPS with llustrative CJSOR and TCSOR

Phase 4a Strategic CONOPS Development

Phase 3 Operational Estimate

Strategic Planning Directive

NID with MC Guidance

Phase 4 Planning

Endorsed Approved Force Endorsed Approved Strategic Strategic Activation Strategic Strategic CONOPS CONOPS Directive OPLAN, OPLAN, with (FAD) SORs ROE REQ, Ilustrative CJSOR ROE REQ TCSOR and TCSOR

Phase 4 Planning

Strategic Political - Military Plan (SPMP) Development

Notes: 1. Following FAD receipt, SACEUR will release provisional CUSOR with ACTWARN to commence formal Force Generation 2. As part of the collaborative planning process documents submitted to the MC will also be passed to subordinate Cdrs

Phase 2 Operational Appreciation of the Strategic Environment

Strategic SACEUR’s Draft MROs Warning Strategic Order Assessment Operational Advice

Phase 2 Strategic Assessment

Military Response Options (MRO)

Phase 3 Development of Response Options

SMA and MROs

Tasker for MRO

SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment (SSA)

Phase 2 Assessment of the Crisis

SMA and SSA

NID

Phase 3 Development of Response Options

Request or Task the NMAs for MROs

Phase 2 Assessment of the Crisis

Tasker for SSA

Request or Task the NMA’s Information for SMA Sharing

Phase 1 Indications and Warnings of Potential/Actual Crisis

NATO Crisis Response Planning

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Allied Planning Processes – United States Army Model 10-11. The United States Army uses three methodologies for planning. Commanders and staffs determine the appropriate mix of these methodologies based on the scope and familiarity of the problem and the time and staff availability. The three methods are described in more detail below:

• US Army Design Methodology. • Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). • Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs). 10-12. US Army Design Methodology. a. The US Army Design Methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualise, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. It is an iterative process of understanding and problem framing that uses elements of operational art to conceive and construct an operational approach to solve identified problems. Commanders and their staffs use US Army Design Methodology to assist them with the conceptual aspects of planning. It is typically used at Corps level and above. b. US Army Design Methodology entails framing the operational environment, framing the problem, and developing an operational approach to solve the problem. US Army design methodology results in an improved understanding of the operational environment, a problem statement, an initial commander’s intent, and an operational approach that serves as the link between conceptual and detailed planning. Based on their understanding and learning gained during design methodology, commanders issue planning guidance, to include an operational approach, to guide more detailed planning.

Frame an operational environment

Current state

Desired end state

What is going on?

What should the environment look like?

Understand the current conditions of the operational environment.

Visualize desired conditions of the operational environment.

Frame the problem What are the obstacles impeding progress toward the desired end state?

Develop an operational approach What broad general actions will resolve the problem?

Develop the plan Using the military desicion-making process.

Continuous assessment and reframing as required Figure 10.3. – The US Army Design Methodology Continuous Assessment 10.13

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10-13. Military Decision-Making Process. The Military Decision-Making Process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. It is used at battalion level and up for both operational and tactical levels of warfare and consists of seven steps. It is designed for a time-constrained problem, so is similar to the British Army’s Tactical Estimate (6-step). The MDMP combines the conceptual and detailed aspects of planning and integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners throughout the planning process. The MDMP helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. The MDMP results in an improved understanding of the situation and a plan or order that guides the force through preparation and execution (ADP 5-0). Joint Force Headquarters use the Joint Operation Planning Process (known as JOPP), which is similar to the Army’s MDMP. US Marine Corps headquarters use the Marine Corps Planning Process, which is similar to both the MDMP and the Joint Operation Planning Process. a. The MDMP facilitates collaborative and parallel planning as the higher headquarters solicits input and continually shares information concerning future operations with subordinate and adjacent units, supporting and supported units, and unified action partners through planning meetings, warning orders, and other means. Commanders encourage active collaboration among all organisations affected by the pending operations to build shared understanding, participate in course of action development and decision making, and resolve conflicts before publication of the plan or order. b. The MDMP consists of a series of steps that have various inputs and outputs. The outputs lead to an increased understanding of the situation facilitating the next step of the MDMP. Commanders and staffs generally perform these steps sequentially; however, they may revisit several steps in an iterative fashion, as they learn more about the situation before producing the plan or order. These are summarised in Figure 10.4. The MDMP is very similar to the UK Tactical Estimate (6-step). There are subtle differences when compared with the UK Combat Estimate (7 Qs); these are highlighted over the page.

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Macro Difference I: Comd gives guidance rather than own direction (at Q3) Difference 1: “Q1” subsumed within Step 2

Key Inputs

Steps

• Higher headquarters’ plan or order or a new mission anticipated by the commander

Key Outputs

Step 1: Receipt of Mission

• Commander’s initial guidance • Initial allocation of time

Step 2: Mission Analysis

• Mission statement • Initial commander’s intent, planning guidance, CCIRs and EEFIs. • Updated IPB and running estimates • Assumptions

Step 3: Course of Action (COA) Development

Difference 5: The COA comparison and approval briefs are entire “steps”.

• Updated running estimates • Refined COAs • Evaluation criteria • War-game results • Updated assumptions • Updated running estimates • Evaluated COAs • Recommended COA • Updated assumptions

• Mission statement • Initial commander’s intent • Initial planning guidance • Initial CCIRs and EEF’s • Updated IPB and running estimates • Assumptions

Difference 2: Specified, implied and “essential” tasks.

• COA statements and sketches - Tentative task organization - Broad concept of organizations • Revised planning guidance • Updated assumptions

Step 4: COA Analysis (War Game)

• Refined COAs • Potential decision points • War-game results • Initial assessment measures • Updated assumptions

Step 5: COA Comparison

• Evaluated COAs • Recommended COAs • Updated running estimates • Updated assumptions

Difference 4: Step 4 uses wargaming early for COA Analysis.Can be very ‘formal’.

• Commander-selected COA and any modifications. • Refined commander’s intent, CCIRs and EEFIs. • Updated assumptions

Step 6: COA Approval

Warning order • Commander-selected COA with any modifications • Refined commander’s intent, CCIRs and EEFIs • Updated assumptions CCIR COA

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Warning order

• Higher headquarters’ plan or order • Higher headquarters’ knowledge and intelligence products • Knowledge products from other organisations • Design concept (if developed)

• Updated running estimates • Revised planning guidance • COA statements and sketches • Updated assumptions

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Macro Difference II: Beware Staff stovepipes and superficial PPT analysis

Warning order

Difference 3: Step 3 COA Dev contains Qs 4-7

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Step 7: Orders Production

commander’s critical information requirement course of action

• Approved operation plan or order

EEFI essential element of friendly information IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield

Figure 10.4. – The US MDMP Steps

10-14. Troop Leading Procedures. Troop Leading Procedures extend the MDMP to all small unit level. The MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical. It is used at company level and below. a. Step 1 - Receive the Mission. The leader may receive the mission in a warning order, an operation order (OPORD), or a fragmentary order (FRAGO). Analysis begins immediately using the factors of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time and Civil Considerations (METT-TC). b. Step 2 - Issue a Warning Order (WARNORD). The leader provides initial instructions in a warning order. The warning order contains enough information to begin preparation as soon as possible. c. Step 3 - Make a Tentative Plan. The leader develops an estimate of the situation to use as the basis for the tentative plan. The leader updates the estimate continuously and refines the plan accordingly. This plan is used as the start point for coordination, reconnaissance, task organisation (if required), and movement instructions. This problem-solving sequence is worked through in as much detail as time available allows. As the basis of the estimate, the leader considers the factors of METT-TC.

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d. Step 4 - Start Necessary Movement. The unit may need to begin movement while the leader is still planning or forward reconnoitring. The Platoon Sergeant or a Squad Leader144 may bring the platoon forward, usually under the control of the Company Executive Officer or First Sergeant. This is where subordinate leaders prepare men, weapons and equipment for the coming mission. e. Step 5 - Reconnoitre. If time allows, the leader makes a personal reconnaissance to verify the terrain analysis, adjust the plan, confirm the usability of routes, and time any critical movements. When time does not allow, the leader must make a map reconnaissance. The leader must consider the inherent risk in conducting reconnaissance forward of friendly lines. Sometimes the leader must rely on others (e.g. scouts) to conduct the reconnaissance if the risk of contact with the enemy is high. f. Step 6 - Complete the Plan. The leader completes the plan based on the reconnaissance and any changes in the situation. The mission is reviewed (as received from the commander) to ensure that the plan meets the requirements of the mission and stays within the framework of the commander’s intent. g. Step 7 - Issue the Order. Platoon and Squad Leaders normally issue oral operations orders. To aid subordinates in understanding the concept for the mission, leaders should issue the order within sight of the objective or on the defensive terrain. When this is not possible, they should use a terrain model or sketch. Leaders must ensure that subordinates understand the mission, the commander’s intent, the concept of the operation, and their assigned tasks. h. Step 8 - Supervise. The leader supervises the unit’s preparation for combat by conducting rehearsals and inspections.

Allied Planning Processes – French Army Model 10-15. At the strategic and operational levels the French military currently use the Operational Level Planning Process (OLPP). Most of the time, Divisional HQs use the COPD for planning issues when they are deployed as the operational land level of command (e.g. as a LCC). Where the problem is of a more tactical nature (e.g. to develop a specific FRAGO), a Divisional HQ may use their Methode D’Elaboration D’Une Decision Operationnelle (MEDO). The MEDO is a planning tool that is used primarily at the tactical level from brigade and below. British units supporting a French-led Combined Operation should expect to use the MEDO. 10-16. The MEDO has two main steps, and is initiated by a preliminary phase of situation analysis. Figures 10.5 and 10.6 refer. The commander formally intervenes three times during the process to make decisions: a. Preliminary Phase – Framework of action; context of the mission. A preliminary phase of situational analysis [corresponding broadly to Q0 / Q1 of the Combat Estimate (7 Qs)]. This phase ends with a formal orientation of the commander (Orientation initial?). b. Phase 1 – Analysis & Synthesis. Phase 1 is the analysis of the situation, and concludes with the mission analysis brief (Réunion de synthèse) when the commander decides what ‘Effet Majeur’ will be adopted. The ‘Effet Majeur’ is the way the battle-winning idea is expressed, and is how the commander intends to seize and maintain the initiative. 144 Equates to a UK Section Commander.

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c. Phase 2 – Development of Manoeuvre. Phase 2 is the construction of manoeuvre through the elaboration and comparison of COAs (friendly and enemy), leading to the commander’s selection of the COA at the decision brief (Réunion de décision). 10-17. In the written order, the Effet Majeur is expressed succinctly in the commander’s intent in a format such at that shown in below. The intent is then developed into the concept of operations.

• In order to….(remind of higher commander’s intent) • I want to ….Effet majeur (e.g.: to destroy that enemy unit, at that place, before that time) • To do so ….description of the manoeuvre (The film of the action, = phase 1, 2 ,3…bpt…) PHASE PREALABLE

PHASE 1

ETAPE 1 ETAPE 2 ETAPE 4 ETAPE 3

AVEC QUI, QUOI? Forces amies Adaptation de mes unités aux conditions de la mission? Quelles unités peuvent exécuter quelies táches?

BALANCE DES POTENTIELS Quantitatifs? Qualitatifs? Dans l’espace? Dans le temps. Désequlibres.

COMMENT? Développement modes d’action enemis Face á mon action, dans le but de remplir sa mission. L’eni pourrait soit......, soit......

OU? Analyse du terrain physique et humain

CONTRE QUI, QUOI? Forces adverses Quel est mon enemi? Quels sont sa mission, son objectif immédiate et Quel devrait étre son depositif de départ?

WNG01

2

Réunion de synthèse? EFFET MAJEUR Je veux

Conclusions partielles - Evolution des RAPFOR quantitatifs et qualitatifs - Centre de gravité ennemi - Centre de gravité ami - Capacités, besoins & vulnérabilitiés critiques

WNG02

ELABORATION DE LA MANOEUVRE COMMENT? Développement modes d’action amis/articulation A cet effet...

ETAPE 4

CE - Q5/Q6/Q7

SYNTHESE

ETAPE 6 conclusions générates

Conclusions partielles - Terrain/Délais - rythme & tempo, elangations - Front/Profondeur etc - Conditions d’exécution - Terrain & moment * ciés* - Liberté d’action

ETAPE 2

PHASE 2

Orientation initiale?

Conclusions partielles - But á atteindre - Impératifs - Limitations - Reformulation mission - Demandes

CONFRONTATION DES MA & ME risques & opportunités

ETAPE 3

CE - Q1

QUAND? Analyse des délals d’execution de la mission

ETAPE 5

CE - Q5

1

POURQUOI? L’esprit de la mission Quelle place prend ma misson la manoeuvre de chef? Quel est l’effet majeur du chef? Que font mes voisins? Afin de QUOI? La lettre de la mission Quele effects dois-je réaliser? Quelles sont les compassantes de la mission (- táches)? Quelles sont les limitations?

ETAPE 1

CE - Q4/Q6

Orientation initiale?

ANALYSE ET SYNTHESE ANALYSE

CE - Q2/Q3

1

COMPARAISON DES MA (critéres avantages & inconvénients

Confrontation approfondie

ETAPE 6

3 Ebouche plan de manoeuvre

MODE D’ACTION RETENU

ETAPE 5

CE - Q0/Q1

CADRE DE’ACTION - CONTEXTE DE LA MISSION

DE QUOI S’AGIT-IL? Contex le général Cadre politique, juridique etc. Contraintes? Impératifs nuveau sup? Quel est le style général de mon action? Les facteurs essentiels immédiatement perceptiblies (mission, contraintes, terrain, délais, RAPFOR)? En quoi cela sort-it evidemment de la norme? Présuppositiens?

ANALYSE FONCTIONNELLE DES MA avantages, inconvénients, problémes

Réunion de décision? INTENTION Effet majeur & idée de manoeuvre

Plan d’opération ou ordre d’opération ou FRAGO

WNG03

Figure 10.5. – The French MEDO Tactical Planning Estimate. Note translation in Para 10-18

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FRENCH MEDO / GENERAL OVERVIEW TF Comd Phase 1: Analysis MISSION ANALYSIS

Phase 2: Manoeuvre

What?

Assigned-implied tasks / constraints - imperatives

Why?

Cdr’s intent Lines of ops OPFOR - fdly COG

Comd initial intent Context

When? General Commitment overview

Where? SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW OPFOR Friendly forces

Historical - political economic - legal factors / people Overall timeframe Operation tempo

ANALYSIS

R.O.E

ECOAs Blue COAs

Decisive points at 1st approach

own forces COAs comparison

KEY EFFECT proposal

Margin for initiative

Terrain analysis weather

Key area / points

ENY forces Hostile parties

Strengths Weaknesses

Own forces

Capabilities limitations Key timings and points for action

Strength ratio

How? COA development

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSIONS

Comd decision

War gaming

selection: Key Effect Lines of ops OPFOR - fdly COG Decisive points

selected own forces COA

COA decision brief

requirements

SYNTHESIS WINGO

CONOPS OPLAN / OPORD

Figure 10.6. – The French MEDO Tactical Planning Estimate

10-18. A comparison of the UK Tactical Estimate (6-step) and Combat Estimate (7Qs) with the French MEDO-T is set out in Table 10.7. The table includes observations to contextualise the links and differences between each of the processes.

UK TE (6-step) 1. Understand the situation Staff Preparation Understand the Operating Environment Initial Tactical Planning Concept Analysis Receipt of Orders Brief (ROOB)

FRENCH MEDO-T Preliminary phase - What is it all about? • What will the general features of my mission be (NEO, combat, …)? • Essential and immediately perceptible factors (mission, limitations, terrain, time, ratio of force)? • How is it out of the norm? • Initial orientation

UK CE (7Qs) Q0 - Baseline Preparation and Understanding.

Observations Q0 - Baseline Preparation and Understanding.

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UK TE (6-step) 2. Understand the problem Commander : Step 2A: MA Staff : Step 2B: Evaluate Objects and Factors Commander : Step 2C: Comd’s Analysis & Guidance

FRENCH MEDO-T Phase 1.1 - Analysis. • Etape 1. a. What for? The “spirit” or purpose of the mission. How my mission will affect the senior commander’s manoeuvre? What is my senior commander’s “major effect” (≅ main effort. b. What? The words of the mission. Which effects should I achieve? What are the “components” (tasks)? Which limitations? • Etape 2. a. When? Time available to execute the mission , possible steps, phases, etc b. Where? Terrain analysis (physical and human terrain) • Etape 3. With what? Friendly forces adaptation to the conditions of the mission? Troop to tasks analysis? • Etape 4. Against what? Adverse Forces. Who/ what is my enemy? His mission, effects to be achieved, initial and final objectives? What should or could be his initial lay out? • Etape 5. Balance of potentials. Quantitative, qualitative ; in time, in space, inbalances. Phase 1.2 - Synthesis. • Partial conclusions (keys to success, mission statement, major effect “at first sight”) • Partial conclusions on terrain vs time frame, rhythm & tempo, distances, front/depth, key terrain, conditions of execution. • Partial conclusions, ratio of force in time & space (quantitative & qualitative), centres of gravity, critical capacities, requirements & vulnerabilities • Etape 6. General Conclusions. • Mission analysis brief : Commander selects the Effet Majeur

UK CE (7Qs) Q1 What is the situation and how does it affect me? Q2 What have I been told to do and why? Q3 What effects do I need to achieve and what direction must I give to develop the plan? Q4 Where can I best accomplish each action/ effect? Q6 Where and when do the actions/effects take place in relation to each other? Q5 What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?

Observations Whereas the 6 STEP utilises the Commander early on to present the understanding, the MEDO-T allows both Staff and Comd to work independently. Staff present; Comd gives his thoughts; a much less formal approach. Much of the work is conducted in the margins, with staff cells holding independent briefs to collate understanding. The French use an operational information system (collaborative working system (SICF)) enabling staff to work independently whilst accessing different cells working areas.

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UK TE (6-step)

FRENCH MEDO-T

UK CE (7Qs)

Observations

3. Formulate and consider COA’s Operational Schematic Effects Schematic Risk Set Evaluation Criteria

Phase 2. Development • Etape 1. How? Enemy COAs development; facing my action, in order to fulfil his supposed mission • Etape 2. How? Development and selection of friendly COAs

Q5 What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect? Q6 Where and when do the actions/effects take place in relation to each other? Q7 What control measures do I need to impose?

Schematics not used, everything is conducted on PowerPoint using the map. Risk is not conducted as a formal independent staffing area, unlike the UK process.

4. Develop and Validate COA’s

No parity here as this is not developed using COA teams as in the UK. Plans draws up the plan, with questions posed to cell branches when needed.

Develop COAs Validate with FACES Wargame 5. COA evaluation Evaluate Textual Analysis

6. Commander’s decision

• Etape 3. COAs Comparison (advantages and disadvantages) • Etape 4. Wargaming (risks & opportunities) • Etape 5. COA functional analysis

Much less formal than the COA backbriefs/evaluation done with the 6 steps.

• Etape 6. Decision brief : approved COA and Comd’s Intent (major effect & scheme of manoeuvre) • Plan or order. Table 10.7. – Comparison of UK and French Tactical Planning Processes

10-19. While both UK and French processes provide a mechanism to enable decision making and the development of a plan, the way each is conducted is very different. The UK Tactical Estimate is much more process driven, where the MEDO-T is more fluid; application of the MEDO-T tends to be personality driven. More emphasis is placed on the ‘understand’ part of the planning.145

Allied Planning Processes – German Army Model 10-20. The German Model. The German Army employs two methods for military planning. At the Operational Level, the Germany Army uses the NATO OLPP. This process is shown in the NATO section of this chapter. At the tactical level the German Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is used. a. Operational Command. The Operations Planning Process (OPP) is the planning process for the military-strategic and operational levels of command of NATO and the EU. It is designed for the systematic estimate of the situation, the development of military courses of action and the definition of national force contributions. Usually, it is also applied by the component commanders at the highest tactical level of command in support of operational planning. 145 Expect 70% of the process to be on phases 1.1 and 1.2: the more the problem is understood, the less time is needed to understand how to tackle the problem (COA dev).

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b. If the superior level applies the Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), headquarters at tactical levels may be required to contribute to the planning efforts within the scope of parallel/collaborative planning. In this case, however, they will not be required to work in accordance with the COPD, too. The purpose of this contribution to the superior level’s planning effort is: (1) To have the results of their own planning effort controlled by the superior headquarters. (2) To coordinate their own planning effort with that of the superior headquarters. (3) To ensure coordination with other headquarters of the same level of command via the superior headquarters. c. For this purpose, the headquarters concerned is expected to submit the following work results: (1) Concept of Operations (CONOPS). (2) If required, Status of Requirements (SOR). (3) Operation Plan (OPLAN). d. As a matter of principle, contributions can be prepared based on the tactical decisionmaking process. e. Tactical Command. The German land forces’ decision-making process to exercise tactical command and control of land forces is based on the supreme leadership principle of German armed forces, mission command. The freedom of action afforded to subordinate commanders in executing their orders is reflected in an unmistakably defined concept of operations and in a mission with clear and realistic objectives. To this end, they are provided with the necessary assets and given the time required for planning and implementation. f. The German land forces’ decision-making process provides for both the planning of future and the conduct of ongoing operations. It can be used to prepare and make appropriate decisions in a complex and dynamic operational environment, even in rapidly changing situations and under pressure of time. It is fundamentally applied to exercise command and control over German land forces at all tactical levels, at all levels of intensity and in any missions. It is suitable for the implementation of an effects-oriented approach also in cooperation with civilian actors. The decision-making process provides the basis for staff work of all German headquarters. The question of which procedure will be pursued specifically, however, it will depend on the situation, the mission, and further parameters. g. The core element of the decision-making process is the decision-making stage. The methodology applied to do the groundwork for making a decision structures the established thought and action processes required for this. Thus, the German land force decision making-process primarily provides a framework for thought. It helps to get all commanders to think and act along the same lines and therefore also provides for better understanding between the levels of command.

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h. The German land forces’ decision-making process is initiated by a new mission, a fundamental change in the situation, or a development of the situation in an ongoing operation which requires action. It takes place in a continuous cycle of the following stages: (1) Situation assessment and control. (2) Decision-making stage. (3) Planning stage. (4) Issuance of orders, and again. (5) Situation assessment and control.

Permanent exchange by: • Warning orders and orientations • Reports, requests and input • Mutual exchange of information

Higher level of command

ses trol/As sment Con the Situation of

Subordinate level of command

in g St a g e

Permanent exchange by: • Warning orders and orientations • Reports, requests and input • Mutual exchange of information

Figure 10.8. – The German Continuous Estimate Process

ion-Making S

Plan n

ta Estimate cis De lysis the Situatioofn ge De Ana cis ion ion iss

ce of Orders Sta uan ge Iss

M

Own level of command

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i. In case of a new mission, the entire staff is involved in the command and control process. In case of situation changes in an ongoing mission, though, the decision is prepared and implemented in the operations centre, supported by contributions from the other cells and centres. In case of a fundamentally changed situation, the chiefs of staff will decide on further courses of action. j. Within the scope of continuous situation assessment and control, all cells and centres verify whether the course of the operation and the ordered measures still comply with planning or should be adapted to it. For this purpose, all information relevant for the situation assessment is retrieved and represented at the operations centre and the information from their special functional areas above all in the other cells and centres. New Mission/ need for Action

Situation Assessment and Control Decision-Making-Stage Mission Analysis

Warning Order, if applicable

Staff Work Plan

Information Briefing to Initiate the Estimate of the Situation

Warning Order

Estimate of the Situation Part 1 Interim Meeting(s)

Orientation

(Staff Backbriefs as required)

Warning Orders

Identify Friendly Courses of Action Estimate of the Situation Part 2 Decision Briefing

Warning Order

Decision

Planning

Develop and prepare operation plan

Issuing of Orders Prepare Operation Order Issue Operation Order

Figure 10.9. – The German Estimate Stages

Issue Orders

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Contents 1

AFMTitle Pub Command

Chapter Chapter11 ?

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Chapter UK Resilience Title? Operations

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Chapter 11 UK Resilience Operations Introduction

• Introduction

11-01. The National Security Strategy/Strategic • Context and Civil Primacy and Defence and Security Review of November Direction 2015 identified eight Defence Tasks (DTs). • Military Support to Resilience The first - DT1 - is to ‘defend and contribute Operations to the security and resilience of the UK and • Planning and Execution of Resilience Overseas Territories. This includes deterring Operations attacks; defending our airspace, territorial • Summary waters and cyber space; countering terrorism at home and abroad; supporting the UK civil authorities in strengthening resilience; and protecting our people overseas’. Defence doctrine for UK Resilience is set out in JDP-02.146

Context and Civil Primacy and Direction 11-02. The UK government has developed and significantly improved the nation’s civil response capability after a series of challenging resilience events during the early 21st century. This was achieved primarily through the passing of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA04) which placed legal duties upon a range of organisations to plan for, and respond to, disruptive challenges in the UK; CCA04 promotes the concept of ‘civil primacy’. In addition, devolved administrations have been assigned specific responsibilities, including in a number of elements of resilience. Under Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA)147, Defence plays a supporting role providing support (niche or generalist) when the civil authorities’ capacity/capability is overwhelmed by an incident. This can happen when directed, or when preparing for major national events. MACA activity is frequent, and occurs across the UK. 11-03. Civil authorities and emergency services are required to provide the first response when reacting to crises, emergencies and/or major incidents within the UK. Notwithstanding this, other government departments (OGD) or civil authorities are able to request military assistance from the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Routinely, such requests will require ministerial authorisation, although where there is imminent threat to life, a need to alleviate distress or to protect significant property, local military commanders are authorised to provide immediate assistance recourse to higher authority.148

146 UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience and Security. JDP 02 (3rd Edition) dated Feb 2017. 147 MACA is often referred to as ‘UK Operations’, although there is no recognised military or civilian definition of the latter term. 148 The procedures for this are set out in JDP 02, Chapter 2. Intentionally the term ‘local military commanders’ is not defined in terms of rank, thus allowing any commander to authorise such activity.

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11-04. The British Army will be required to contribute to DT1 through operations conducted under the principles of MACA. CCA04 provides the broad framework for civil protection. It describes how organisations, particularly local responders, prepare and respond to emergencies in the UK. In essence a civilian-led government department is always in the lead and Defence is invariably in a supporting capacity. With a few defined exceptions, Defence ministerial authority must be sought for any request for military resources under MACA. Under the government’s integrated emergency management principles our Armed Forces can now expect to be involved in planning and preparation, responding to emergencies, and recovery tasks. The Defence contribution to resilience is usually provided by the Armed Services through spare capacity, and MACA is provided usually in accordance with four criteria when: a. There is a definite need to act and the tasks the Armed Forces are being asked to perform are clear. b. Other options, including mutual aid and commercial alternatives, have been discounted. c. The civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one. d. The civil authority has all or some capability, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from MOD. 11-05. MACA. The range of tasks that Defence might undertake under the principles of MACA is considerable. The National Risk Register of 2015 (NRR15)149 sets out a wider range of disruptive challenges that are grouped into ‘Threats’ (largely malicious in nature), and ‘Hazards’ (a term used to describe other events). However, Defence should be prepared for the unexpected. a. Hazards and Threats. NRR15 describes three types of hazard and threat: (1) Natural hazards – human disease, animal disease, severe weather and flooding. (2) Major accidents – major industrial accidents, major transport accidents, widespread electricity failure, disruptive industrial action and widespread public disorder. (3) Terrorist and other malicious attacks – terrorist attacks on crowded places, infrastructure, transport systems, unconventional terrorist attacks and cyber security. Lead government departments (LGDs) are responsible for managing risks assigned to their respective portfolios and for conducting the associated contingency planning and preparation.

Military Support to Resilience Operations 11-06. In response to requests for military assistance, Defence may contribute in five main roles, or functions, as follows: a. Role 1 - Command and Control. 149 Available at www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/419549/20150331_2015-NRRWA_Final.pdf. Note that a successor document – National Risk Register 2017 – is due for publication in May 17.

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b. Role 2 - Liaison. c. Role 3 - Specialist advice and capability. d. Role 4 - General and non-specialist support. e. Role 5 - Education, training and mentoring. Further detail on these roles can be found in JDP 02, Chapter 3. 11-07. Command and Control of Resilience Operations in the UK. CCA04 promotes the LGD principle, whilst NRR15 and associated documentation proposes an LGD for each risk identified; the MOD does not have any resilience-related LGD responsibilities. For events where no LGD has been assigned, the Cabinet Office will assign lead responsibilities when required. At all levels of command, control and coordination, Defence will engage with, and support, the civil authorities as required. At the 3 levels of command150 this comprises: a. Strategic. At the strategic level of command, the MOD Operations Directorate (MOD Ops Dir) is the focus for all resilience operations in the UK. It leads on liaison with LGDs (including devolved government if required) during periods of routine, and represents Defence as part of the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) mechanism during crises. Certain limited MACA activity may be authorised by senior staffs within the Ops Dir, but the default setting is that the Ops Dir will seek the authority of a Defence Minister for most MACA tasks. b. Operational. Operational command of assets across Defence will be exercised by the MOD’s Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom) (SJC(UK)). Commander Home Command is the SJC(UK)151 and, while he is based in Aldershot, his HQ, comprising 23 joint service staff, is collocated with, but not part of, the Army Directorate for Operations and Contingencies in Andover.152 c. Tactical. Tactical-level command of Defence capability will be exercised by the Army’s Regional Points of Command (RPoC) HQs.153 RPoCs have a small core staff which can be reinforced by reservists from the Resilience Support Teams154 during an emergency. Additionally, RPoC HQs are established with at least one full-time reservist lieutenant colonel Joint Regional Liaison Officer who is the primary focus for integration of Defence activity with the civil authorities within the formation area. The number of forces assigned under command of RPoCs ranges considerably, with some having very few indeed. d. Coordinating authority. The HQ SJC(UK) will execute the role of coordinating authority over the activities of Defence agencies within boundaries. Specifically, it oversees the deployment, management and recovery of any assets generated from Defence agencies. 150 Within Defence, the three levels of command are: strategic, operational and tactical. However, it should be noted that civil authorities in the UK run with strategic, tactical and operational. 151 GOC Regional Command is the Deputy SJC (UK), although he assumes this role only in the absence of the SJC (UK) and not on a routine basis. 152 The collocation of the operational-level HQ with the force generator of the majority of personnel for Resilience operations allows for the rapid delivery of effect. 153 These comprise: HQ LONDIST, HQs 4 Inf, 7 Inf, 11 Inf, 11 Sig, 38 (Irish), 51 Inf and 160 Inf Bdes, as well as the OF-5 commanded HQs NW and SW. 154 These teams were known until recently as District or Brigade Reinforcement Teams (DRTs/BRTs)

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11-08. The United Kingdom Standby Battalion (UKSB). Since 2011 the Army has fielded a UKSB, the primary purpose of which is to provide a large number of disciplined personnel at a very high state of readiness to provide generalist support to the civil authorities when required. Since 2016 the number of UKSBs has increased from one to three, each assigned notionally to a specific geographic area although, in practice, they may be employed anywhere in the UK should the need arise.

Planning and Execution of Resilience Operations 11-09. Civil Authority Planning Considerations. Within single agencies (police, fire, ambulance etc) civil authorities and emergency services recognise and employ the concepts of command and control. However, in a multi-agency environment, which is the more likely scenario in which Defence effect will be delivered, the coordination [rather than command] of effect is more likely. Defence will provide support to, and presence at, the required levels of coordination through its network of regional liaison officers (JRLOs, Royal Navy RLOs and Royal Air Force RLOs). For larger events it is possible that the RPoC commander may be present. This coordination is delivered at three broad levels: a. Strategic Coordinating Group. At the strategic level, a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG)155 will be convened with multi-agency participation to provide the strategic-level lead and oversight for an event. This level of coordination will always see a Defence presence if Defence support has been provided. SCGs are chaired usually, although not exclusively, by senior police officers; and are held usually, although not exclusively, at the HQs of a police or fire service. b. Tactical Coordinating Group. At the (civil authority) tactical level a Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG)156 will be convened with multi-agency participation to provide the tactical-level lead and oversight for an event. This level of coordination will always see a Defence presence if Defence support has been provided. SCGs are chaired usually, although not exclusively, by senior or middle-ranking police officers and are held usually, although not exclusively, at a regional or local HQs of a police or fire service. c. Responder Agencies. At the (civil authority) operational level responder agencies157 will be established to direct the multi and single-agency response to an event. They will usually be ‘on the ground’, and it is unlikely that a Defence presence will be provided at this level. 11-10. Terminology. Commanders need to be aware that the three tiers of coordination may often still be referred to as Gold, Silver and Bronze. These terms are obsolete at the joint level because of the risk of confusion: ‘Silver’ for one emergency responder may be ‘Gold’ for another. 11-11. The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP).158 The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) have been introduced recently in order to enhance police, fire and rescue service, and ambulance service interoperability in 155 The equivalent in Scotland is Regional Resilience Partnership (RRP). 156 The equivalent in Scotland is Local Resilience Partnership (LRP). 157 In a few areas, such as Cumbria, Operational Co-ordinating Groups (OCGs) may be established. However, in most areas, civil authorities have chosen to use the single-Service term ‘Bronze’ to describe this level. 158 JESIP Joint Doctrine – The Interoperability Framework, Edition 2 (Jul 2016) available at www.jesip.org.uk

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the early stages of, and during, a response to a major or complex incident. Its purpose is to provide emergency services’ commanders with a framework to enable them to respond together as effectively as possible. JESIP is nationally recognised with support from emergency service chief officers and the Home Office, Cabinet Office and the Department of Health. JESIP doctrine focuses on the interoperability of the three emergency services while also acknowledging that emergency response is a multi-agency activity and the resolution of an emergency will usually involve collaboration with other Category 1 and 2 responders159 and partner organisations. JESIP doctrine is not a prescriptive set of rules, rather it aims to guide, explain and inform. Specifically, it provides guidance: a. On how responders should train and operate, by applying common terminology, principles and ways of working. b. On responders’ actions in a multi-agency working environment, to achieve the degree of interoperability that ensures a successful joint response. c. For commanders, at the scene and elsewhere, on the actions they should undertake when responding to major and complex incidents. d. On the Joint Decision Model (JDM) as shown at Figure 11.1.

Gather information & intelligence

Take action & review what happened

Identify options &

Working Together Saving Lives Reducing Harm

contingencies

Assess Risks & develop a working strategy

Consider powers, policies & procedures

Figure 11.1. – The JESIP Joint Decision Model

11-12. The Joint Decision Model (JDM). JESIP has developed the JDM Model, effectively a planning tool. Defence liaison officers and commanders must be aware of the JDM as it will be used by civil authority commanders as their primary tool to help them bring together the available information, reconcile objectives and make effective decisions - together. Like most decision models, the JDM centres around three primary considerations:

159 CCA04 divides responders into one of two categories: Category 1 and Category 2, and places specific duties upon them depending upon their categorisation.

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Situation

Direction

What is happening?

What do you want/need to achieve in the first hour (the desired outcomes)?

What are the impacts?

Action What do you need to do to resolve the situation and achieve your desired outcomes?

What are the aims and objectives of the emergency response?

What are the risks? What might happen and what is being done about it?

What overarching values and priorities will inform and guide this?

Table 11.2. – The JDM Primary Considerations

a. Along with a commander’s personal experience and knowledge of any given situation, the JDM is designed to help commanders make effective decisions together. b. The overarching aim or purpose for using the JDM is common to all those involved in emergency response. They are the words in the centre of the JDM – Working Together – saving lives, reducing harm. All commander and responder staff should remind themselves of the importance of this purpose when responding to a multi-agency incident and applying JESIP. 11-13. JESIP Planning Principles. The need for interoperability between emergency services extends to other agencies that may be expected to operate with them, including our Armed Forces. Any contribution by military responders should be seen in a supporting role to the civil responders, who will have primacy throughout. Military responders must be aware of the JESIP and will be expected to adhere to the procedures wherever possible, specifically the five core principles: a. Collocation. Collocation of commanders is essential and allows those commanders to perform the functions of command, control and coordination, face-to-face at a single and easily identifiable location known as the forward command post. Defence personnel operating with civil authorities at all levels must be aware of both the use of the JDM and the civil authorities’ approach to operational record keeping and decision logging. Responders should identify who is in charge from the other services; this is made easier by the use of tabards. Defence commanders should make themselves aware of the tabard identification scheme applicable to the operation that they are supporting. b. Communication. The JESIP doctrine does not provide guidance on the technical solutions that are available to the emergency services.160 The sharing of information, free of acronyms, across service boundaries is essential to operational success. The understanding of any information shared ensures the achievement of shared situational awareness which underpins the best possible outcomes of an incident. During incidents with a multi-agency response, civil commanders will use emergency services interoperability talk-groups, especially when collocation proves challenging. To enable shared understanding, military responders need to be incorporated onto the network. The mnemonic METHANE will be used by civil authorities over communications 160 A technical solution already exists – Airwave – and is in widespread use by the emergency services and other responders. The replacement of Airwave is subject to a separate, cross-governmental and emergency service programme.

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networks; military units and personnel will be expected to use this format as required when dealing with the civil authorities. METHANE is: M - Major incident declared. E - Exact location. T - Type of incident. H - Hazards present or suspected. A - Access – routes that are safe to use. N - Number of casualties. E - Emergency services present and those required. c. Coordination. Depending on the nature of the incident one of the emergency services will generally take the lead role at an incident to ensure an effective response. Any military contribution will be in a supporting role. It is the duty of the commander of the military unit to identify themselves at the forward command post and establish effective coordination with the lead civil responder to ensure tasking is appropriate. d. Joint Understanding of Risk. Commanders of civil emergency services will ensure the safety of responders by conducting a joint assessment of risk. This will include any military assets that are under the control of the civilian agencies. However, this does not absolve military commanders from their own assessment of the risks and, where necessary, military commanders must decide for themselves that the risks their personnel are exposed to are tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable. In the event of disagreement between the military commander and the civilian commander on a risk related matter, the military commander must inform the military chain of command at the first opportunity. e. Shared Situational Awareness. Critical to success is a common understanding of the circumstances and immediate consequences of an emergency, together with an appreciation of available resources and capabilities of all response agencies. To achieve this emergency services employ the IIMARCH briefing format.161 IIMARCH is: I – Information. I – Intent. M – Method. A – Administration. R - Risk assessment. C – Communications. H - Humanitarian issues.

161 The IIMARCH briefing template is available at: http://www.jesip.org.uk/IIMARCH-template.

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Summary 11-14. The frequency and scale of Defence support to the civil authorities has increased in recent years. Whilst the CCA04 sets out clear civilian-led processes and structures for responding to a disruptive challenge, should Defence support be required it will be done so under the provisions of MACA, and in accordance with a number of standing criteria. A clear Defence chain of command for resilience operations has been defined, and at each level strong links are maintained with civil authority equivalents so that the transition to crisis management is seamless. Defence staffs operating in support and/or with the civil authorities must be aware of JESIP as it is the relatively new process that seeks to ensure that emergency services work together more effectively than might have been the case in the past.

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Contents 1

© Crown Copyright The sponsor of this publication is: Warfare Branch Editor, Headquarters Field Army, Waterloo Lines, Land Warfare Development Centre, Imber Road, Warminster, Wiltshire, BA12 ODJ Civ 01985 84 8764 Mil 94381 8764 DII FdArmy-Warfare-Editor-C1 Email [email protected] BAeBB http://akxportal.landforces.r.mil.uk/sites/baebb

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