Constitutional Law 2

Constitutional Law: RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO Facts: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that “provincial governor of any province in which nonChristian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board”. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2, which says that the provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation. Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty without due process of law. Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of

the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. * The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. * DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale. FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by

default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

ISSUE:

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.

* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action * Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING: On Jurisdiction The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.

Landmark Case: Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 (Digested Case) In 1980, someone challenged an Executive Order issued by President Marcos because it imposed a penalty without giving the violator a right to be heard. He succeeded in having the law declared unconstitutional and was commended by the Supreme Court "for his spirit" in asserting his rights.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

G.R. No. 74457 20 March 1987 Ponente: Cruz, J.

How Jurisdiction is acquired

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo in January 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of E.O. No. 626 (except when the carabo is seven years old if male, and eleven years old if female). The penalty is confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef.

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person. Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against the entire world. In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries, thus denying due process. RULING: The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain so conveniently resilient for due process is not an “iron rule.” Flexibility must be the best virtue of guaranty. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question of measure is missing. Even if there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being an outright

confiscation and a supersedeas bond of Php12,000.00. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, thus denying the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated for the owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was not seen fit to assert and protect his rights. Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional, and the superseceas bond is cancelled. Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo Pacificador Due Process – impartial and competent court Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death. ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect. Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the

litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law. GACAD VS. JUDGE CLAPIS JR., AM NO. RTJ-10-2257, JULY 17, 2012. FACTS: Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint against Judge Clapis for Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices, Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and violations of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2 (Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative to a criminal case. Petitioner alleged that she met Judge Clapis at the Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City to talk about the case of her brother. The prosecutor of the said case, Graciano Arafol, informed the petitioner that the Judge will do everything for her favor but on the pretext that in return she has to give P50,000.00 to the Judge. During the meeting, the Judge,after being satisfied of the promise of the petitioner for that amount, told her "Sige, kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato nisila." (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them.)When the case was set on hearing, the Notices of Hearings were mailed to the petitioner only after the date of hearing. Judge Clapis started conducting the bail hearings without an application for bail and granting the same without affording the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. He set a preliminary conference seven months from the date it was set, patently contrary to his declaration of speedy trial for the case. However, the judge claimed that notices were made verbally because of time constraints. Nevertheless, he stressed that both sides were given the opportunity to be heard since in almost all proceedings, petitioner was in court and the orders were done in open court. He admitted that his personnel inadvertently scheduled the preliminary conference of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of the charges. HELD: YES. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection with one’s performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of wellknown rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The acts of Judge Clapis in meeting the petitioner, a litigant in a case pending before his sala and telling those words, constitute gross misconduct. Judge Clapis’ wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made overt by the circumstances on record. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability by shifting the blame to his court personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately responsible for order and efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates are not the guardians of the judge’s responsibility. The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly: Canon 2, Section 1 and 2; Canon 3, Section 2 and 4; and Canon 4, Section 1.We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting bail

hearings without a petition for bail being filed by the accused and without affording the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Here, the act of Judge Clapis is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. If judges are allowed to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process G.R. No. L-52241 – 133 SCRA 271 – Political Law – Due Process – Impartial and Competent Court Rosalinda Tecson filed a case for collection of sum of money before the Rizal RTC against Pedro Azul. The case was raffled to Judge Sarmiento. On 27 Mar 1979, Azul received the copy of the complaint. On 10 Apr 1979, Azul filed a motion for a 15 day extension to file for responsive pleading. Azul was unaware that J. Sarmiento retired and was temporarily substituted by J. Anover who granted the extension but only for 5 days starting the next day. However, Azul only received the order granting his on the 23rd of the same month way past the 5 day period granted. On the 17th of April, Tecson already filed a motion to declare Azul in default averring that Azul’s 5 day extension has already lapsed. On the 18th of the same month, J Castro, the permanent judge who replaced J Sarmiento took office and he declared Azul to be in default due to the lapse of the 5 day extension. J Castro proceeded with the reception of evidence the next day and of course without Azul’s evidence as he was still unaware of him being in default. On April 27th, J Castro ruled in favor Tecson. On May 2nd Azul, unaware that J Castro already decided the case moved for reconsideration to remove his default status. On May 7th Azul received the decision rendered by the court on Apr 27th (but on record the date of receipt was May 5th). Azul filed a motion for new trial on June 6th. The lower court denied the same on the 20th of the same month. On Aug 1st, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was denied on the 3rd but was reconsidered on the 7th hence Azul filed his record on appeal on the 21st and J Castro approved it on the 27th but upon motion of Tecson on the 30th, J Castro set aside its earlier decision on the 27th. Finally, J Castro disallowed Azul’s record on appeal on the 7th of September.

not permanently taken over the sala vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule that only a five-day extension would be allowed. And to compound Azul’s problems, the order was sent by mail and received only twelve (12) days later or after the five-day period. A court should have known that court orders requiring acts to be done in a matter of days should not be sent by mail. Further, Azul was declared in default. However, it appears that Azul was not furnished a copy of the motion from Tecson seeking for him (Azul) to be declared in default. Also, the motion was dated April 17, 1979. Judge Castro acted on and granted said motion on April 18, 1979 – the first day that Judge Castro assumed office. G.R. Nos. L-69640-45 – 136 SCRA 266 – Political Law – Due Process – Hostility Between the Judge and the Parties – Inhibition Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura inhibits himself from deciding on pending cases brought before him on the grounds that they have lost confidence in him, that he entertained tax suits against the city and had issued TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura is bias, oppressive and is abusive in his power. ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.

HELD:

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), “All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . .” The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.

Yes. The SC agreed with the Azul that he was denied due process. The constitutional provision on due process commands all who wield public authority, but most peremptorily courts of justice, to strictly maintain standards of fundamental fairness and to insure that procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial are observed at all stages of a proceeding. It may be argued that when Azul’s counsel asked for a fifteen (15) day extension from April 11, 1979 to file his answer, it was imprudent and neglectful for him to assume that said first extension would be granted. However, the records show that Atty. Camaya personally went to the session hall of the court with his motion for postponement only to be informed that J Sarmiento had just retired but that his motion would be considered “submitted for resolution.” Since the sala was vacant and pairing judges in Quezon City are literally swamped with their own heavy loads of cases, counsel may be excused for assuming that, at the very least, he had the requested fifteen (15) days to file his responsive pleading. It is likewise inexplicable why J Anover, who had

BINAY VS. DOMINGO BINAY vs DOMINGO, G.R. NO. 92389, September 11, 1991 (201 SCRA 508) Facts: The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 – assisting those who only earn less than P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, in the exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was referred to the Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the disbursement of four hundred thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by said commission of such disbursements because there cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of its inhabitants. Hence, this petition revolving around the pivotal issue on whether or not Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied due process.

Held: Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, “Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas” (use your property so as not to impair others) and “Salus populi est suprema lex” (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. BINAY VS DOMINGO FACTS: On September 27, 1988,Petitioner Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60. The resolution provided for a burial assistance program where qualified beneficiaries (to be given P500.00) are bereaved families whose gross monthly income does not exceed 2 thousand per month. It will be funded by the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. The municipal secretary certified a disbursement fund of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. When it was referred to the COA it disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners’ reconsideration as Resolution 60 has no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare of the inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a few individuals. Moreover, it is not for a public purpose. It only seeks to benefit a few individuals. The Municipal Council passed Resolution No. 243 which reaffirmed Res. No. 60. However, the program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause HELD: YES. RATIONALE: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the

municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein. "Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government

towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official gosignal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. People Vs. Pomar [46 Phil 126; G.R. No. L-22008; 3 Nov 1924] Facts: Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory. She was granted a vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced on the 16th of July 1923. According to Fajardo, during that time, she was not given the salary due her in violation of the provisions of Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on Section 13 and 15 of said Act against the manager of the tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on the other hand, claims that the facts in the complaint did not constitute an offense and further alleges that the aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act No. 3071 provides that, “Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty day vacation with pay before and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months counting from the day of her discharge.” Section 15 of the same Act provides for the penalty of any violation of section 13. The latter was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed Police Power with the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of fifty pesos and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the former decision.

Issues: (1) Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional; (2) Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid exercise of Police Power.

Held: The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional for being violative or restrictive of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for their affairs. It has been decided several times, that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. The contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy

The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. The police power may encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of

the public peace, health, and morals. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the constitution. The Police Power is subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by the latter.