Constitutional Law 2

JAVIER VS. COMELEC G.R. Nos. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986

FACTS: Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

FUNA V. COA CHAIR GR No. 192791, April 24, 2012

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This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Dennis A. B. Funa challenging the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the Commission on Audit. On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed Guillermo N. Carague as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008. Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President Macapagal Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar as the third member of the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011. Following Carague’s retirement on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was appointed as COA Chairman on April 18, 2008. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Villar insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. His term of office as chairman is up to February 2, 2015 or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.

ISSUE/S: WON whether the assailed appointment of respondent Villar as COA Chairman is unconstitutional. (YES) HOLDING: Yes, the appointment of Villar as COA Chairman is unconstitutional because according to Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, “The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The appointment of Villar, from Commissioner to Chairman, was not a reappointment. Jurisprudence tells us that the word “reappointment” means a second appointment to one and the same office. Necessarily, a movement to a different position within the commission (from Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute an appointment, or a second appointment, to be precise, but not reappointment. However, the vacancy in the position of COA chairman when Carague stepped down in February 2, 2008 resulted from the expiration of his 7-year term. Therefore there in no unexpired portion of the Carague’s term. Thus the next appointed COA chairman should serve a 7-year term. However, in this case, Villar has already served four years as commissioner, serving as COA chairman for full 7-year term as COA chairman would unduly extend his term beyond the 7 years fixed by the constitution. Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the term of office of a public official, the appointing authority is without authority to specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer than what the law provides—if the vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment, the President is without discretion to extend a promotional appointment for more or for less than seven (7) years. The explicit command of the Constitution is that the “Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven years and appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.

A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman terms of office and appointments had already expired.

Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appointment of then Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose term of office as such chairman has expired, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution.