Constitutional Law Case Digests

CONSTI 1 DIGESTS

Javellana vs. Executive Secretary 50 scra 33 | March 31, 1973 Ponente: Concepcion, C.J  The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.  Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the “Plebiscite” then “Ratification” Cases. FACTS: The Plebiscite Case On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Then, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973. Then Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from

implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.” The President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. He then announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.” Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. The Congress then scheduled to meet in regular session and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. The petitioners in Case G.R. No. 
L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.” Then the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents,” praying: “… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.” On the same date, the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was

delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning. The Ratification Case On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents “and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution” referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a “Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter” and as “a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated,” was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced “the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including,” and that the latter “are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution” upon the ground: “that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies”; that the same “are without power to approve the proposed Constitution …”; “that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution”; and “that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.” ISSUE/S: 1. Whether the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question? 2. Whether the Constitution has proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions? 3. Whether the aforementioned proposed Constitution has acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? (acquiesced – “permission” given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.) 4. Whether petitioners are entitled to relief? 5. Whether the aforementioned proposed Constitution is in force? HELD: 1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people’s will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with.” Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and “beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry. 2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution

proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens’ Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified.” Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification. 3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.” Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.” 88 Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.” 4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that “(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable.” 91 Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents’ motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

CO KIM CHAN v. VALDEZ TAN KEH 75 Phil 113 | September 17, 1945 Ponente: Feria, J. FACTS: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). The respondent judge of the lower court refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceeding of civil case No. 3012 of said court which was initiated under the regime of the socalled Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines. He argued that the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the courts of the said governments. He also argued that the said governments during the Japanese occupation were not de facto governments. ISSUE: Whether the governments established in the Philippines (Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines) during the Japanese military regime were de facto governments. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1 by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. The source of its authority comes from the Japanese military, it is a government imposed by the laws of war. The same is true with the Republic of the Philippines. Apparently, established and organized as a

sovereign state, independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the Japanese forces of occupation. In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government, remain good. All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true and original sovereign.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES v. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL. G.R. No. 73748 | May 22, 1986  NOTE: There is no “Full-Text” of this case. This is a Minute Resolution made by the Supreme Court. FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No. 3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.” ISSUE: Whether the government of President Corazon Aquino is legitimate. HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter, it belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the people have accepted the Aquino government, which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

ANASTACIO LAUREL v. ERIBERTO MISA 77 Phil 856 | January 30, 1947 FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic. Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason as defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino

citizens was then suspended, and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. ISSUE: Whether the absolute allegiance of a Filipino citizen to the government becomes suspended during enemy occupation. HELD: No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate government. What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of a sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military occupation. DISSENTING OPINION: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law adopted by our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec. 3] as part of law of the nation. The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading power whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of the law and order, and for the proper administration of the country.

RAMON RUFFY, ET AL. v. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY 75 Phil 875 | August 20, 1946 Ponente: Tuanson, J. FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated military camps all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro, thus, forcing petitioner and his band to move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the “Bolo area“. A certain Captain Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the “Bolo area” by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Captain Beloncio was, thus, allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was committed, which was at the time of war and Japanese occupancy. HELD: The Court ruled that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which made them even more eligible for the military court’s jurisdiction.

WILLIAM F. PERALTA v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS 75 Phil 285 | November 12, 1945 Ponente: Feria, J. FACTS: William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused. ISSUE: Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional. HELD: Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.

DALE SANDERS, ET AL. v. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, ET AL. 162 SCRA 88 | June 10, 1988 Ponente: Cruz, J. FACTS: Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services director of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Private respondents, Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers, are American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines and were employed as game room attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer’s report of the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent part-time plus back wages. Respondents allege that the letters contained libelous imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and, thus, filed for damages against petitioners. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages. HELD: It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of

the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The same can be said for Moreau. Given the official character of the above-described letters, it can be concluded that the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government. There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The private respondents must pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the Unites States of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.

MARIANO E. GARCIA v. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ET AL. 16 SCRA 120 | January 31, 1966 Ponente: Regala, J. FACTS: The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action to collect a sum of money against the above defendants. He suffered injuries while undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga. He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant General’s Office which later disallow his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff, the same Adjutant General’s Office denied the claim, alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610 which took effect January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim, plaintiff was deprived of his disability pension from July 1948 totaling no less than Php 4,000 at the rate of P20 per month and suffered moral damages and attorney’s fees the amount of Php 2,000. The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of AFP file separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court; that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Acting on the said Motion, the Court of First Instance, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that action has prescribed. Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the lower court has jurisdiction on the said matter and dismissing the complaint on ground it being the money claim against the government. HELD: The court affirmed the lower court’s decision on dismissing the complaint for the simple reason that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being a money claim against the government. If there is a money claim against the government should be filed with the Auditor General. Plus, under the doctrine of state immunity, the state cannot be sued without its consent. Moreover, it is in line with the principle that the State cannot be charged without its content as provided by the Commonwealth Act 328 Sec. 1 that in all cases involving the settlement of accounts and claims other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days.

Also, if all administrative remedies have been made and if superior administrative officers could grant relief, it is not necessary to entertain actions against the administrative officers as established by the rule.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL. v. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, ET AL. 182 SCRA 644 | February 26, 1990 Ponente: Cruz, J. FACTS: The cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. In GR No. 76607, private respondents re suing several officers of the US Air Force in connection with the bidding for barbering services in Clark Air Base. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was arrested following a buy-bust operation for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Bautista then filed a complaint for damages claiming that because of the acts of the respondents, he lost his job. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioner for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force. In GR No. 80258, complaint for damage was filed by the respondents against petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiffs. All cases invoke the doctrine of state immunity as ground to dismiss the same. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are immune from suit. HELD: It is clear that the petitioners in GR No. 80018 were acting in the exercise of their official functions. They cannot be directly impleaded for the US government has not given its consent to be sued. In GR No. 79470, petitioners are not immune for restaurants are commercial enterprises, however, claim of damages by Genove cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence presented. Barber shops are also commercial enterprises operated by private persons, thus, petitioners in GR No. 76607 cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed. In GR No. 80258, the respondent court will have to receive the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions before it can be known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.

CARMEN FESTEJO v. ISAIAS FERNANDO, 50 O.G. 1556 | March 11, 1954 Ponente: DIOKNO, J. FACTS: The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first from the CFI of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. ISSUE: Whether the is a suit against the state.

RULING: No, the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff’s land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff’s land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff’s land southeasterly of the right of way innocently for the surveys clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for the right of way. It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative, quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. He cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office and not personally. SEPARATE OPINION: To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee Isaias Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the Government. According to said pleading the defendant is “Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works.” Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged: That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, is in charge of irrigation projects and systems, and the official responsible for the construction of irrigation system in the Philippines; We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system referred to in the complaint — of which the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same pleading, is “in charge” and for which he is “responsible” as Director of the Bureau of Public Works — are established and operated with public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution, must be appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in which the construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a property of the Government.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, ET AL. 78 SCRA 470 | August 31, 1977 Ponente: FERNANDO, Acting C.J. FACTS: A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s decision is valid.

RULING: No. The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: “The State may not be sued without its consent. The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance decision: “Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law. The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to have no binding force on the government.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE v. NICOLAS CUENCA 43 SCRA 360 | February 29, 1972 FACTS: Victoria Amigable rightfully owned a lot in Cebu City which was used by the government for Mango and Gorordo Avenues without her permission and without proper negotiation of sales. Because of this, she filed a case in CFI Cebu. Defendants argue that 1) Action was premature; 2) Right of action has already been prescribed; 3) Government cannot be sued without its consent and; 4) Cebu already agreed to use the land as such. CFI rendered a decision which states that Amigable cannot restore and recover her ownership and possession of the said land and thus dismissed the complaint on grounds that state may not be sued without its consent. ISSUE: Whether petitioner Amigable may rightfully sue the government without its consent. RULING: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.

Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit. The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the taking.

ILDEFONSO SANTIAGO v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. 87 SCRA 294 | December 19, 1978 Ponente: FERNANDO, J. FACTS: Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the terms that the Bureau should construct a building and install lighting facilities on the said lot. When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot, Santiago filed a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation but the trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper without the consent of the government. ISSUE: Whether the respondent government has waived its immunity from suit. RULING: Yes. The government’s waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did not comply with such terms. Thus, the donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the court. Also, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so advances. The Court of First Instance is hereby directed to proceed with the case.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. GREGORIO PERFECTO 43 Phil. 887 | October 4, 1922 Ponente: MALCOLM, J. FACTS: Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article in the newspaper La Nacion regarding the disappearance of certain documents in the Office of Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate. Its article suggested that the difficulty in finding the perpetrators was due to an official concealment by the Senate since the missing documents constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies. This resulted to a case being filed against Mr. Perfecto for violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Perfecto filed an appeal in the Supreme Court to dismiss the case on the ground that Article 256 was not in force anymore.

ISSUE: Whether Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case at bar. HELD: No. The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted. REASONS FOR THE DECISION: Three members of the court believe that Article 256 has been abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines, rendering it inconsistent with democratic principles of government. Article 256 of the Penal Code is goes against fundamental principles of the American system of government. This article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA v. HON. ELIAS B. ASUNCION 114 SCRA 77 | May 31, 1982 Ponente: MAKASIAR, J. FACTS: petitioner, Bernadita Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of CA, with “acts unbecoming of a judge” when the latter purchased a property which was previously the subject of litigation on which he rendered decision. Respondent and his wife were also members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares and interests in said property were conveyed. According to the petitioner, respondent allegedly violated Article 1491 (5) of the New Civil Code and Article 14 (1) and (5) of Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 12 XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of Canons of Judicial Ethics. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provisions. HELD: No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the property in 1965 –2years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the property directly from any of the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who then sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon acted as a “dummy” of Asuncion. Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or that what she got were insignificant portions of the land.

The Court held that respondent Judge Asuncion’s acts did not constitute an “Act Unbecoming of a Judge” but he was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities for next time.

GREGORIO PERFECTO v. BIBIANO MEER 85 SCRA 552 | February 27, 1950 Ponente: BENGZON, J. FACTS: The Collector of Internal Revenue required plaintiff-appellee to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution thereof. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that unless and until the Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing “that salaries of judges thereafter appointed”, salaries of judges are not included in the word “income” taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable “income” did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges’ compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them.

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA v. SATURNINO DAVID 93 Phil. 696 | August 31, 1953 Ponente: MONTEMAYOR, J. FACTS: Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugo’s salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional. HELD: No, Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the power to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts

interpret them. The collection of income taxes in judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.

DAVID G. NITAFAN, et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, et al. 152 SCRA 284 | July 23, 1987 Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. FACTS: Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the judges of the judiciary – but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue once and for all. ISSUE: Whether the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax. HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other branches of the government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary. But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased? Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and such increase will immediately take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately. Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary but such will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, et al. G.R. No. 122156 | February 3, 1997 Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J. FACTS: The GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the outstanding shares. In a close bidding only two(2) bidder participated, the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel and RenongBerhad, a Malaysian firm.

First the MPH has a lower bid compare to the Malaysian firm but later matched the bid of the Malaysian firm with all the compliance of the bidding rules imposed by the GSIS on the contracts. Perhaps apprehensive the respondent GSIS has disregarded the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with RenongBerhad. The petitioner came to the court on prohibition and mandamus. The court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. The petitioner invoked Sec 10, second par. Article XII. The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 constitution. [In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipinos]. Respondent, opposing that the provision is not self-executing and requires implementing legislation, and Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony. ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Constitution are self-executing. HELD: No, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means if which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected is self-executing. Sec 10, second par. Article XII of the 1987 constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. It means thatqualified Filipino shall be preferred. And when our constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject, consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforce itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibiremedium. Whether the 51% share of Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony? No, the national patrimony that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the constitution speaks for patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark- a living testimonial of Philippines heritage. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony; for sure 51 % of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. Wherefore the respondents are directed to cease and desist from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RenongBerhad. And accept the matching bid of the manila prince hotel corporation.

BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., et al. v. HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, et al. 59 SCRA 183 | September 17, 1974 Ponente: MAKALINTAL, C.J. FACTS: Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law. ISSUE: 1. Whether Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law. 2. Whether the petitions for writ of habeas corpus should be suspended contending that the proclamation of Martial Law was unconstitutional. HELD: 1. YES. The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order. 2. YES. The petitions should be dismissed with respect to petitioners who have been released from detention but have not withdrawn their petitions because they are still subject to certain restrictions. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation: to suppress invasion, insurrection, rebellion or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof.

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION v. COMELEC 140 SCRA 455 | January 7, 1986 FACTS: Eleven petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986. for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest. ISSUE: Whether B.P Blg. 883 unconstitutional. HELD: No. There are less than 10 required votes to declare BP 833 unconstitutional. Thus, petitions are dismissed, writs are denied. The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3 (Cory declared bid for presidency), as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

IN RE: SATURNINO v. BERMUDEZ 145 SCRA 160 | October 24, 1986 FACTS: Saturnino Bermudez, as a lawyer, questioned the validity of the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows: Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. Bermudez claims that the said provision “is not clear” as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court “to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to as the “incumbent president”. ISSUE: Whether said provision is ambiguous. HELD: No. The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action. Petitioner’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and VicePresident Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their

term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

IN RE: LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO June 29, 1992 | 210 SCRA 589 Ponente: PADILLA, J. FACTS: Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated Nov. 14, 1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.” He was then appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary. A Screening Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an exercise of her legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner’s ranking changed from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno’s request. A motion for consideration was later filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment. ISSUE: Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33. HELD: The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence. A government as a result of people’s revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

ALFREDO M. DE LEON v. HON. BENHAMIN B. ESGUERRA 153 SCRA 602 | August, 31, 1987 Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain together with other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Pronice of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Barangay Election Act of 1982. Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra which provided the designation of respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of the same barangay and the other respondents as members of the barangay Council of the same barangay and municipality. Petitioners maintain that Sec 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 provides that the terms of office shall be six (6) years which shall continue until their successors shall have elected and qualified. Also, in accordance with the recent ratification of the 1987 Constitution, it seems that respondent OIC Governor no longer had the authority to replace them as well as designate successors. Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions. ISSUE: Whether the designation of successors is valid. HELD: No, memoranda has no legal effect. The Court ruled in the negative. SC declared that the Memorandum issued by respondent OIC Governor designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Councilmen of Barangay Dolores has no legal force and effect. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer in effect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were suspended. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date therefore, the provisional constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Effectivity of the Constitution is also immediately upon its ratification. When did the 1987 Constitution take effect? The Supreme Court, with only one dissent, ruled in De leon vs. Esguerra that the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987 which is the date of its ratification in the plebiscite, by virtue of its provision under Article XVIII, Section 27 that it “shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose.” (This provision was unanimously approved by thirty-five votes in favor and none against in the Con Com of 1986) The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification that is the date the people have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. The act of voting by the people is the act of ratification. It should not be on the date of the proclamation of the President since it is the act of the people. In fact, there should be no need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the President, if there is, it is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act done by the

people. The COMELEC, on the other hand, should make the official announcement that the votes show that the Constitution was ratified, but the canvass is merely a mathematical confirmation of what was done during the plebiscite.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. G.R. No. 127325 | March 19, 1997 Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J. FACTS: Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People’s Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their “memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda” within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others: 1. That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 2. That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. ISSUE: Whether RA No. 6735 is sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative. HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.” The use of the clause “proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed” denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition. TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. 41 SCRA 702 | October 16, 1971 Ponente: BARREDO, J. FACTS: The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections “from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971,” at which the proposed constitutional amendment “reducing the voting age” in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years “shall be, submitted” for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. ISSUE: Whether it is within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s. HELD: The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single “election” or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent COMELEC in that direction are null and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose “may propose amendments to this Constitution,”. The same provision also as definitely provides that “such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification,” thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many “elections” or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocally says “an election” which means only one. The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent COMELEC complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents COMELEC, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the

Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single “election” or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately but together.

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD v. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER 73 SCRA 333 | October 12, 1976 Ponente: MARTIN, J. FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a plebescite fo its ratification (original schedule was reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990. On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that the president has no power to propose amendments to the new constitution, as such, the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis. Allegations of Sanidad: (1) Unconstitutional as it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. (2) Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press because of its penal provisions in case of violation. Responses of COMELEC: (1) Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press but only a valid implementation of the power of the COMELEC to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA 6646 (2) Does not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the COMELEC space and airtime (magazine/periodical in the province)

ISSUE: Whether the president have authority to propose amendments to the Constitution. HELD: The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to perform such act is in question. The president has the authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time for deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short especially since the questions are issues of the day and the people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law. Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. TRO made permanent due to the following reasons: 1. It has no statutory basis 2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner’s freedom of expression for no justifiable reason 3. Affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, et al. v. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., et al. G.R. No. 134577 | November 18, 1998 Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J. FACTS: Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader. Senator Ople and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon were likewise elected as president and as majority leader, respectively. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.“ During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate “minority,” Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. ISSUE: Whether there is an actual violation of the Constitution.

HELD: However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court. The term “majority” simple means “the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the Senators.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al. G.R. No. G.R. No. 160261 | November 10, 2003 Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J. FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law. the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House

Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.“ ISSUE: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings. HELD: The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint. More importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. The Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The “moderating power” to “determine the proper allocation of powers” of the different branches of government and “to direct the course of government along constitutional channels” is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is “the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.” As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

CHARLES BAKER v. JOE CARR 396 US 186 FACTS: Apportionment cases had often been brought under the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section: 4 of the United States Constitution (Constitution), in which the United States guarantees to the individual states a republican form of government. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has long held that such challenges present a political question, not addressable by the courts. In the current case, Appellants challenged the state apportionment of legislatures under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. Baker filed suit against Joe Carr, the Secretary of State of Tennessee. Baker’s complaint alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn its legislative districts since 1901, in violation of the Tennessee State Constitution which required redistricting according to the federal census every 10 years. Baker, who lived in an urban part of the state, asserted that the demographics of the state had changed shifting a greater proportion of the population to the cities, thereby diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the remedy of reapportionment or at-large elections. The district court denied relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political question and would therefore not be heard by the court. ISSUE: Whether federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment. HELD: Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment. The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political question. The case did not present an issue to be decided by another branch of the government. The court noted that judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause were well developed and familiar, and it had been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an act is arbitrary and capricious and reflects no policy. When a question is enmeshed with any of the other two branches of the government, it presents a political question and the Court will not answer it without further clarification from the other branches. A district court dismissed the case upon the ground, among others, that the issue was a political one, but, after a painstaking review of the jurisprudence on the matter, the Federal Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision and held that said issue was justiciable and non-political, inasmuch as:”… (d)eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.“

WALTER NIXON v. UNITES STATES 506 US 224 | October 14, 1992 FACTS: Walter Nixon, a former Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, was sentenced to prison for lying under oath to a federal grand jury. The Petitioner refused to resign from his post and continued to draw his salary while incarcerated. In the ensuing impeachment trial, the Senate invoked Rule XI, which allowed a Senate committee to receive evidence and testimony. The committee provided full transcripts and summaries to the entire Senate and more than the necessary two-thirds voted to impeach on two of the three articles. Nixon now appeals, arguing that Rule XI violates the impeachment trial clause, Art. I Section: 3, cl. 6 of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

ISSUE: Whether the constitutionality of Senate Rule XI is non-justiciable because it involves a political question. HELD: Yes. Judgment Affirmed. A controversy is non-justiciable because of the political question doctrine for one of two reasons. First, “if there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department is present. Second, if a there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the controversy” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217. A lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen a conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment. Nixon’s claim that the word “try” required proceedings in the nature of a judicial trial was rejected by the Court. The conclusion that the use of the word “try” in the first sentence of the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate’s actions is fortified by the existence of the three very specific requirements that the Constitution does impose on the Senate when trying impeachments: The Members must be under oath, a two-thirds vote is required to convict, and the Chief Justice presides when the President is tried. These limitations are quite precise, and their nature suggests that the Framers did not intend to impose additional limitations on the form of the Senate proceedings by the use of the word “try” in the first sentence.