Constitutional Law Cases

1. THE CITY OF MANILA, REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., AND MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 112, PASAY CITY; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION AND SIGNATURE LINES, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 175723. February 4, 2014 PERALTA, J.:

been rendered by the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant to grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of the City of Manila as amended for the year 2002 x x x TOTAL: - P19,316,458.77 Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff. SO ORDERED.

FACTS: The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.

The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above Decision had already become final and executory per the Certificate of Finality issued by the same trial court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution was issued by the RTC on November 25, 2009.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed with RTC-Pasay the complaint denominated as one for “Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction” before public respondent’s sala [at Branch 112]. In the amended complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private respondents alleged that, in relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative of the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of RA 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation. They further averred that petitioner city’s Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice. In its Order dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a MR but the RTC denied it in its Order dated October 15, 2004. Petitioners then filed a SCA for certiorari with the CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC. In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the CTA, pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under RA 9282, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA. Petitioners filed a MR but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated November 29, 2006. Hence, the present petition. Without first resolving the issues, this Court finds that the instant petition should be denied for being moot and academic. Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court discovered that a Decision in the main case had already

In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the issues raised in the present petition, which merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, have already become moot and academic considering that the trial court, in its decision on the merits in the main case, has already ruled in favor of respondents and that the same decision is now final and executory. ISSUE: WON the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case RULING: YES RATIONALE: Well-entrenched is the rule that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value. In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its significance and for future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled principle that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. While it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it. The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v. COMELEC LEC, Garcia v. De Jesus, Veloria v. COMELEC, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, this Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such power. It must be observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, these rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 8249 now provides that the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over

petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.

In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the CA, Section 9 (1) of BP 129 gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.

Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter.

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total. Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. If this Court were to sustain petitioners’ contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter — precisely the split — jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it. Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process. In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent power of a court of justice. Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court’s jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. Thus, this Court has held that “while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the

enforcement of its judgments and mandates.” Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance. Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

2. LOZANO vs. NOGRALES a. G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009 ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO, Petitioners, vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives, Respondent. b. G.R. No. 187910 June 16, 2009 LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, Respondent. FACTS: The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress,” convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly to amend the 1987 Constitution. In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners contend that the House Resolution contradicts the procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution regarding the amendment or revision of the same as the separate voting of the members of each House (the Senate and the House of Representatives) is deleted and substituted with a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of Congress (i.e., ¾ of the “members of Congress” without distinction as to which institution of Congress they belong to). ISSUE: WoN RH no. 1109 can be a subject for judicial review. HELD: No. It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. The determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its “solemn and sacred obligation” under the Constitution. This Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The “case-or-controversy” requirement bans this court from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness.” In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in. In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Yet another requisite rooted in the very nature of judicial power is locus standi or standing to sue. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners’ personal stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozano’s three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis. The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only “actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.” Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of “personal injury” to the broader “transcendental importance” doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit. In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete injury. When warranted by the presence of indispensible minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty to resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it.

3. GALICTO vs. AQUINO III G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012 J. BRION FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President entitled “Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes.” EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. A Task Force was also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers, while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force information regarding their compensation. Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. EO 7 precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to their employees. Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the President and for being in breach of existing laws. The petitioner is a Filipino citizen and an employee of the PhilHealth. He is currently holding the position of Court Attorney IV and is assigned at the PhilHealth Regional Office CARAGA. The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondent on their comment pointed out the petitioner’s lack of locus standi ISSUE: WoN the certiorari is the proper remedy WoN Galicto has locus standi to file the present case. HELD: Both, No. Certiorari is not the proper remedy First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasijudicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting [to] lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasijudicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie. Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied). As such, this petition must necessar[ily] fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18 Likewise, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti Terrorism Council,19 we similarly dismissed the petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9372, otherwise known as the "Human Security Act of 2007," since the respondents therein (members of the AntiTerrorism Council) did not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. While we have recognized in the past that we can exercise the discretion and rulemaking authority we are granted under the Constitution,20 and set aside procedural considerations to permit parties to bring a suit before us at the first instance through certiorari and/or prohibition,21 this liberal policy remains to be an exception to the general rule, and thus, has its limits. In Concepcion v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC),22 we emphasized the importance of availing of the proper remedies and cautioned against the wrongful use of certiorari in order to assail the quasi-legislative acts of the COMELEC, especially by the wrong party. In ruling that liberality and the transcendental doctrine cannot trump blatant disregard of procedural rules, and considering that the petitioner had other available remedies (such as a petition for declaratory relief with the appropriate RTC under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court), as in this case, we categorically ruled: The petitioner’s unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court do not appear to us to be the result of any error in reading Rule 65, given the way the petition was crafted. Rather, it was a backdoor approach to achieve what the petitioner could not directly do in his individual capacity under Rule 65. It was, at the very least, an attempted bypass of other available, albeit lengthier, modes of review that the Rules of Court provide. While we stop short of concluding that the petitioner’s approaches constitute an abuse of process through a manipulative reading and application of the Rules of Court, we nevertheless resolve that the petition should be dismissed for its blatant violation of the Rules. The transgressions alleged in a petition, however weighty they may sound, cannot be justifications for blatantly disregarding the rules of procedure, particularly when remedial measures were available under these same rules to achieve the petitioner’s objectives. For our part, we cannot and should not – in the name of liberality and the "transcendental importance" doctrine – entertain these types of petitions. As we held in the very recent case of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles, albeit from a different perspective, our liberal approach has its limits and should not be abused

Petitioner lacks locus standi. “Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the

governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to “raise a constitutional question” when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Jurisprudence defines interest as “material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.” For this matter, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7. Finally, since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal interest in the issue in dispute, he cannot also be considered to have filed the present case as a representative of PhilHealth. In this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant failure of the petitioner to provide a Board Resolution or a Secretary’s Certificate from PhilHealth to act as its representative. CONCURRING OPINION (CORONA)

The power of judicial review is a sword that must be unsheathed with restraint. To ensure this, certain justiciability doctrines must be complied with as a prerequisite for the Court’s exercise of its awesome power to declare the act of a co-equal branch invalid for being unconstitutional. These doctrines are important as they are intertwined with the principle of separation of powers. 10 They help define the judicial role; they determine when it is appropriate for courts to review (a legal issue) and when it is necessary to defer to the other branches of government.11 Among the justiciability doctrines are standing and mootness. Petitioner failed to observe both. Courts do not decide all kinds of cases dumped on their laps and do not open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance.12 Locus standi is intended to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case. More importantly, it warrants the judiciary’s overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government. It thus goes to the very essence of representative democracies.13 Petitioner, for himself, asserts his right to question the constitutionality of EO 7 on two grounds. First, as an employee of PhilHealth, he allegedly stands to be prejudiced by EO 7

insofar as it suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grant of salary increases and other benefits to employees and officials of GOCCs and GFIs and curtails the prerogatives of the officers responsible for the fixing and determination of his compensation. Second, as a lawyer, he claims to have an interest in making sure that laws and orders by government officials are legally and validly issued and implemented. Petitioner cannot sufficiently anchor his standing to bring this action on account of his employment in PhilHealth, a GOCC covered by EO 7. He cannot reasonably expect this Court to symphatize with his lament that the law impedes or threatens to impede his right to receive future increases as well as the right of members of the board of directors of Philhealth to allowances and bonuses. The irreducible minimum condition for the exercise of judicial power is a requirement that a party "show he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury" to his rights. 14 A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute or an official act must have a direct and personal interest. He must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. He must show that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.15 For this reason, petitioner’s reliance on his status as PhilHealth employee, without more, is a frail thread that fails to sustain the burden of locus standi required of anyone who may properly invoke the Court’s power of judicial review. EO 7 simply imposes a moratorium on increases in salaries, allowances and other benefits of officials and employees of GOCCs and GFIs and directs the suspension of all allowances bonuses and incentives of GOCC and GFI officials. Moratorium is defined as an authorized postponement in the performance of an obligation or a suspension of a specific activity. 16 Section 9 of EO 7 is not a permanent prohibition on petitioner’s perceived right to receive future increases. Nor is it an absolute ban on salary increases as it ensures that, like all other officials and employees of the government, officials and employees of GOCCs and GFIs will continue to enjoy the salary increases mandated under EO 8011 dated June 17, 2009 and EO 900 dated June 23, 2010. While one’s employment is a constitutionally-protected property right, petitioner does not claim that his employment is at risk under EO 7. Petitioner is simply concerned about his entitlement to future salary increases. However, a public officer has a vested right only to salaries already earned or accrued.17 Salary increases are a mere expectancy.18 They are by nature volatile and dependent on numerous variables, including the company’s fiscal situation, the employee’s future performance on the job, or the employee’s continued stay in a position. 19 Thus, petitioner does not have a "right" to an increase in salary. There is no vested right to salary increases.20 There must be a lawful decree or order supporting an employee’s claim. 21 In this case, petitioner failed to point to any lawful decree or order supporting his entitlement to future increases in salary, as no such decree or order yet exists.

It is, however, contended that petitioner does not claim any right to any future increase. He merely seeks to remove any legal impediment to his receiving future increases.1âwphi1 It is asserted that, without the legal impediment provided under Section 9 of EO 7, any future increase in petitioner’s compensation will simply depend on the usual factors considered by the proper authorities. I fear this view is misleading and incorrect. It is misleading because, by re-working the concept of injury, it diverts the focus from the required right-centric approach to the concept of injury as an element of locus standi. Injury or threat of injury, as an element of legal standing, refers to a denial of a right or privilege. It does not include the denial of a reasonable expectation. The argument is likewise incorrect because petitioner’s reasonable expectation of any future salary increase is subject to presidential approval. Even without Section 9 of EO 7, the President may disallow any salary increase in RA 6758 22 exempt entities. Section 9 of Joint Resolution No. 4, Section 59 of the General Provisions of RA 997023and Section 56 of the General Provisions of RA 1014724 expressly confer on the President the authority to approve or disapprove "any grant of or increase in salaries, allowances, and other fringe benefits" in entities exempt from the coverage of RA 6758. The approval of the President, upon the favorable recommendation of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), is among the "usual factors" that will determine any future salary increase that may be reasonable expected to be received by petitioner. Petitioner cannot also lay claim to any direct personal injury to his right or interest arising from the suspension under Section 10 of EO 7 of allowances and bonuses enjoyed by the board of directors/trustees of GOCCs and GFIs. He is not a member of the board of directors of Philhealth. Neither can petitioner rely on his membership in the Philippine Bar to support his legal standing. Mere interest as a member of the Bar25 and an empty invocation of a duty in "making sure that laws and orders by officials of the Philippine government are legally issued and implemented" does not suffice to clothe one with standing.26 It is clear from the foregoing that petitioner failed to satisfy the irreducible minimum condition that will trigger the exercise of judicial power. Lacking a leg on which he may base his personality to bring this action, petitioner’s claim of sufficient standing should fail.

4. Moldex Realty v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, et. al. G.R. No. 149719, June 21, 2007. FACTS: Petitioner Moldex Realty is the owner-developer of Metrogate Complex Phase I in Marilao, Bulacan. Respondent HLURB issued petitioner a License to Sell 696 parcels of land within the subdivision. From then on, lot buyers and homeowners in the subdivision organized to become the Metrogate Complex Village Homeowners’ Association (MCVHA), herein private respondent. Petitioner claims that since the completion of the subdivision, it had been subsidizing payments for the delivery and maintenance of common facilities including the operation of streetlights and the payment of the corresponding electric bills. It then decided to stop paying the electricity for the streetlights and advised respondent MCVHA to assume this obligation. Respondent objected and refused to pay. Thus, Meralco discontinued its service, prompting respondent to apply for a preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction with the HLURB. HLURB issued a Resolution granting MCVHA’s application for injunction, citing provisions of Presidential Decree Nos. 957 and 1216 and HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994. HUDCC Resolution No. R-562 provides that “subdivision owners/developers shall continue to maintain street lights facilities and, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract, pay the bills for electric consumption of the subdivision street lights until the facilities in the project are turned over to the local government until after completion of development in accordance with PD 957, PD 1216 and their implementing rules and regulations.” After respondent filed a bond, HLURB issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI) ordering petitioner to assume the obligation of paying the cost of electricity of the streetlights until their turn over or donation to the Municipality of Meycauayan. Petitioner appealed to the CA. Court of Appeals: It dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner should have raised the constitutionality of HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, directly to SC. Hence, this case. ISSUE: May the Supreme Court entertain the petition without violating the hierarchy of courts? HELD: NO. It must be emphasized that this Court does not have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions assailing the constitutionality of a law or an administrative regulation. In Drilon v. Lim, it was clearly stated that the lower courts also have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality at the first instance, thus: “We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. x x x Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.” The general rule is that this Court shall exercise only appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation, except in circumstances where the Court

believes that resolving the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance is of paramount importance and immediately affects the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a question on the constitutionality of a regulation may be brought only to this Court. The instant petition does not allege issues of transcendental importance to the public requiring their prompt resolution and the brushing aside of technicalities of procedure. Neither is the SC convinced that the issues presented in this petition are of such nature that would nudge the lower courts to defer to the higher judgment of the SC. The application of the resolution mainly affects the proprietary interests of the parties and can hardly be characterized as overriding to the general well-being of the people. Ultimately, the SC is called upon to resolve the question of who bears the obligation of paying electricity cost, a question that the lower courts undoubtedly have the competence to resolve. However, it is also a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law, or an administrative regulation as in the instant case, to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may raise its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable. In other words, the Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota of the case.

5. Antonio Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services and Marlow Navigation Co. G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009. FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by Respondents under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment for 12 months as Chief Officer with a salary of US$1,400.00 per month. However, on March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. But Respondents did not deliver on their promise, hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998. Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only 2 months and 7 days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of 9 months and 23 days. Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint against Respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims. LA: The dismissal of petitioner was illegal, thus, awarding him monetary benefits based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of US $8,770.00, representing the complainant’s salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment. The LA based his computation on the salary period of three months only— rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner’s employment contract—applying the subject clause. NLRC: Petitioner appealed to NLRC arguing that OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. The NLRC corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.” CA: Petitioner appealed to the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. However, the CA affirmed the NLRC on the reduction of the applicable salary rate and it skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. Argument of Petitioner: The subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas employment contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary package. It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal. Argument of Respondents: R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998 employment contract. Having preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties. ISSUE: Does the subject clause violate equal due process, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector?

HELD: YES. Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court in the present case employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs. There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a)

b)

c)

the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest; and strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels: “First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more; Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixedperiod employment.” The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account jurisprudence that, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, illegally dismissed OFWs, no matter how long the period of their employment contracts, were entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts. The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods creating a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only. Hence, the Court holds that the subject clause violates petitioner’s right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose. The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also his right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

NOTE: 



then Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial precept that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection—such as the working class or a section thereof—the Court may recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny. Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

6. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. vs. JOY C. CABILES, G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014 FACTS: Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.5 Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan.6 Joy’s application was accepted.7 Joy was later asked to sign a oneyear employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee of ₱70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.9 Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.10 She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year.11 In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.12 Sameer Overseas Placement Agencyclaims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informedJoy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport."13 She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."14 Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila. On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint17 with the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed. 18 She asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages.19 She identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign principal. PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with the work requirements [of] her foreign [employer]."21 The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of ₱70,000.00.22 As evidence, it showedOfficial Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10, 1997, bearing the amount of ₱20,360.00.23 Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.24 Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower. Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it.26 It alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship between them.27 Therefore, the claims against it were outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. 28 Pacific Manpower argued that the employment contract should first be presented so that the employer’s contractual obligations might be identified.29 It further denied that it assumed liability for petitioner’s illegal acts. Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoal’s accreditation was validly transferred to Pacific at the time respondent filed her complaint, it should be Pacific that should now assume responsibility for Wacoal’s contractual obligations to the workers originally recruited by petitioner. LA: Dismissed the Complaint

NLRC: awarded respondent only three (3) months worth of salaryin the amount of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from her, and attorney’s fees of NT$300. CA: affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the equivalent of three months’ worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s fees. ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost ofher repatriation, and attorney’s fees despite the alleged existence of just causes of termination. (Guys, this case talks about judicial review) RULING: NO. Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion ofthe employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of1995, states thatoverseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less." Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provisions [sic] shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placementagency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation orpartnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract. Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages under this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority.

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. .... (Emphasis supplied) Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that "repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or her] personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the worker overseas." The exception is when "termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker,"80 which as we have established, is not the case. It reads: SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND. – The repatriation of the worker and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the agency concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or local agency. However, in cases where the termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.

Section 7.Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: SEC. 10. Money Claims.– Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damage. Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with the developments in the global services industry. The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to de [sic] filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.

.... The Labor Code81 also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as attorney’s feeswhen the withholding is unlawful. The Court of Appeals affirmedthe National Labor Relations Commission’s decision to award respondent NT$46,080.00 or the threemonth equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her repatriation. We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to all of these awards. The award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should, however, be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract. In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,82 this court ruled that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"83 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.84 A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all."85 We are aware that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 provides:

Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages under this section shall be paid within thirty (30) days from approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority. In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker’s salary, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if [sic] his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. In case of a final and executory judgement against a foreign employer/principal, it shall be automatically disqualified, without further proceedings, from participating in the Philippine Overseas Employment Program and from recruiting and hiring Filipino workers until and unless it fully satisfies the judgement award. Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for resolutions of case providedunder this section shall subject the responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties: (a) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within the prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies therewith; (b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or

(c) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for five (5) years. Provided, however,That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability which any such official may have incured [sic] under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph. (Emphasis supplied) Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of the clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent’s termination from work in 1997.86 Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended byRepublic Act No. 10022 governs this case. When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual case that clearly raises adversarial positions in their proper context before considering a prayer to declare it as unconstitutional. However, we are confronted with a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the exact clause already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances. This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals.At minimum, the existence of Republic Act No. 10022 may delay the execution of the judgment in this case, further frustrating remedies to assuage the wrong done to petitioner. Hence, there is a necessity to decide this constitutional issue. Moreover, this court is possessed with the constitutional duty to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights."87 When cases become mootand academic, we do not hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar in situations where the same violations are capable of repetition but will evade review. This is analogous to cases where there are millions of Filipinos working abroad who are bound to suffer from the lack of protection because of the restoration of an identical clause in a provision previously declared as unconstitutional. In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have sochanged as to warrant a reverse conclusion. We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so changed so as to cause us to reverse binding precedent. Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial efficiency and economy that attend to these cases. The new law puts our overseas workers in the same vulnerable position as

they were prior to Serrano. Failure to reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will result in the same untold economic hardships that our reading of the Constitution intended to avoid. Obviously, we cannot countenance added expenses for further litigation thatwill reduce their hardearned wages as well as add to the indignity of having been deprived of the protection of our laws simply because our precedents have not been followed. There is no constitutional doctrine that causes injustice in the face of empty procedural niceties. Constitutional interpretation is complex, but it is never unreasonable. Thus, in a resolution88 dated October 22, 2013, we ordered the parties and the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the constitutionality of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 10022. In its comment,89 petitioner argued that the clause was constitutional.90 The legislators intended a balance between the employers’ and the employees’ rights by not unduly burdening the local recruitment agency.91 Petitioner is also of the view that the clause was already declared as constitutional in Serrano.92 The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the clause was valid and constitutional.93 However, since the parties never raised the issue of the constitutionality of the clause asreinstated in Republic Act No. 10022, its contention is that it is beyond judicial review.94 On the other hand, respondentargued that the clause was unconstitutional because it infringed on workers’ right to contract.95 We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling changein the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent. We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by anillegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of "privileges conferred and liabilities enforced."97 It is a guarantee against "undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality."98 In creating laws, the legislature has the power "to make distinctions and classifications."99 In exercising such power, it has a wide discretion.100 The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power.101 A law is void on this basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily.102 There is no violation of the equal protection clause if the law applies equally to persons within the same class and if there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and those who do not fall within the class.103 A law that does not violate the equal protection clause prescribesa reasonable classification.104

A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class." 105 The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification. In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished between fixed-period overseas workers and fixedperiod local workers. 106 It also distinguished between overseas workers with employment contracts of less than one year and overseas workers with employment contracts of at least one year.107 Within the class of overseas workers with at least one-year employment contracts, there was a distinction between those with at least a year left in their contracts and those with less than a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed.108 The Congress’ classification may be subjected to judicial review. In Serrano, there is a "legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class."109 Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special protection.110 Thus, this court in Serrano, "[i]mbued with the same sense of ‘obligation to afford protection to labor,’ . . . employ[ed] the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs."111 We also noted in Serranothat before the passage of Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of illegally terminated overseas and local workers with fixed-term employment werecomputed in the same manner.112 Their money claims were computed based onthe "unexpired portions of their contracts." 113 The adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the money claims of illegally dismissed overseas workers with an unexpired term of at least a year to a cap of three months worth of their salary.114 There was no such limitation on the money claims of illegally terminated local workers with fixed-term employment.115 We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a term of less than one year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their employment contracts.116 Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with employment terms of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to three months of their salary for the unexpired portions of their contracts.117 Observing the terminologies used inthe clause, we also found that "the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the reinstated clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only." 118 We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these classifications do not rest on any real or substantial distinctions that would justify different treatments in terms of the computation of money claims resulting from illegal termination.

Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled to security of tenure, at least for the period agreed upon in their contracts. This means that they cannot be dismissed before the end of their contract terms without due process. If they were illegally dismissed, the workers’ right to security of tenure is violated. The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local worker is illegally terminated are neither greater than norless than the rights violated when a fixed-period overseas worker is illegally terminated. It is state policy to protect the rights of workers withoutqualification as to the place of employment.119 In both cases, the workers are deprived of their expected salary, which they could have earned had they not been illegally dismissed. For both workers, this deprivation translates to economic insecurity and disparity.120 The same is true for the distinctions between overseas workers with an employment contract of less than one year and overseas workers with at least one year of employment contract, and between overseas workers with at least a year left in their contracts and overseas workers with less than a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed. For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument that "[overseas workers] are contractual employeeswho can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers"121 because it already justifies differentiated treatment in terms ofthe computation of money claims.122 Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues on overseas workers’ money claims do not justify a differentiated treatment in the computation of their money claims.123 If anything, these issues justify an equal, if not greater protection and assistance to overseas workers who generally are more prone to exploitation given their physical distance from our government. We also find that the classificationsare not relevant to the purpose of the law, which is to "establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes."124 Further, we find specious the argument that reducing the liability of placement agencies "redounds to the benefit of the [overseas] workers."125 Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not increase the standard of protection afforded to them. On the other hand, foreign employers are more incentivizedby the reinstated clause to enter into contracts of at least a year because it gives them more flexibility to violate our overseas workers’ rights. Their liability for arbitrarily terminating overseas workers is decreased at the expense of the workers whose rights they violated. Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are impressed with an expectation of a stable job overseas for the longer contract period disregard other opportunities only to be terminated earlier. They are left with claims that are less than what others in the same situation would receive. The reinstated clause, therefore, creates a situation where the law meant to protect them makes violation of rights easier and simply benign to the violator. As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in Serrano: Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and measures, and in fact provides a hidden twist affecting the principal/employer’s liability. While intended as an incentive accruing to recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as worded, simply limits the OFWs’ recovery in wrongfuldismissal

situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be liable, including the principal/employer – the direct employer primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal. In this sense, Section 10 – read as a grant of incentives to recruitment/manning agencies – oversteps what it aims to do by effectively limiting what is otherwise the full liability of the foreign principals/employers. Section 10, in short, really operates to benefit the wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason, to mitigate its liability for wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden twist, the limitation ofliability under Section 10 cannot be an "appropriate" incentive, to borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to describe the incentive it envisions under its purpose clause.

profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law."129

What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive: instead of a grant that, to encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts undertaken, the law simply limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of already deployed OFWs. This is effectively a legally-imposed partial condonation of their liability to OFWs, justified solely by the law’s intent to encourage greater deployment efforts. Thus, the incentive,from a more practical and realistic view, is really part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting the market. . . .

I likewise concur with the conclusion that Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995),1 as reinstated by R.A. No. 10022,2 is unconstitutional in so far as it provides that:

The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the OFWs — the benefits accruing to the recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are takenfrom the pockets of the OFWs to whom the full salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract rightfully belong. Thus, the principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies even profit from their violation of the security of tenure that an employment contract embodies. Conversely, lesser protection is afforded the OFW, not only because of the lessened recovery afforded him or her by operation of law, but also because this same lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal easier and less onerous to undertake; the lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino will always bea consideration a foreign employer will take into account in termination of employment decisions. . . .126 Further, "[t]here can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses suchas placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed ofOFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea thatprivate business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious."127 Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose.128 Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would,in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION (Guys just in case lang na magtanong si Sir) BRION, J.: I concur with the ponencia's conclusion that respondent Joy C. Cabiles was illegally dismissed for lack of valid cause and due process.

My conclusion on the constitutionality of the above-quoted clause (subject clause) of Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, however, proceeds from a different reason and constitutional basis. I maintain the view that the subject clause should be struck down for violation of the constitutional provisions in favor of labor, under Section 3, Article XIII, and of the substantive aspect of the due process clause, under Section 1, Article III. Thus, I take exception to the ponencia's full adoption of the ruling in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al.3 to the extent that it applies the strict scrutiny standard in invoking the equal protection guarantee. To my mind, the circumstances of this case do not justify the ponencia's approach of extending and expanding the use of the strict scrutiny standard in invalidating the subject clause (as reinstated in R.A. No. 8042 by R.A. No. 10022). The conclusion that the subject clause created a "suspect" classification is simply misplaced. The approach, sadly, only unnecessarily shifted the burden to the government, to prove: (1) a compelling state interest; and (2) that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve the intended result. It also unnecessarily undermines the presumed constitutionality of statutes and of the respect that the Court accords to the acts of a co-equal branch. The differential or rational basis scrutiny, i.e., where the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest, would have undoubtedly served the purpose without bringing these unnecessary implications. As I maintain the same view and legal reasoning, and if only to emphasize my position in the present case, I quote below portions of my Concurring Opinion in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al. (Serrano Opinion)4rejecting the validity of using the strict scrutiny standard to test the validity of the subject clause under the equal protection guarantee. I invoke the same legal reasoning as basis, mutatis mutandis, of my stance in the present case. A suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the most invidious bases for classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e.,on the basis of race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation, and to a certain extent, sex and sexual orientation. With a suspect classification, the scrutiny of the classification is raised to its highest level: the ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed and government carries the burden of proving that its challenged policy is constitutional. To withstand strict scrutiny, the government must show that its policy is necessary to achieve a

compelling state interest; if this is proven, the state must then demonstrate that the legislation is narrowly tailored toachieve the intended result. In the present case, I do not see the slightest indication that Congress actually intended to classify OFWs– between and among themselves, and in relation with local workers – whenit adopted the disputed portion of Section 10. The congressional intent was to merely grant recruitment and manning agencies an incentive and thereby encourage them into greater deployment efforts, although, as discussed above, the incentive really works for the foreign principals’ benefit at the expense of the OFWs. Even assuming that a classification resulted from the law, the classification should not immediately be characterized as a suspect classification that would invite the application of the strict scrutiny standard. The disputed portion of Section 10 does not, on its face, restrict or curtail the civil and human rights of any single group of OFWs. At best, the disputed portion limits the monetary award for wrongful termination of employment – a tort situation affecting an OFW’s economic interest. This characterization and the unintended classification that unwittingly results from the incentive scheme under Section 10, to my mind, render a strict scrutiny disproportionate to the circumstancesto which it is applied. I believe, too, that we should tread lightly in further expanding the concept of suspect classification after we have done so in Central Bank, where we held that classifications that result in prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny. The use of a suspect classification label cannot depend solely on whether the Constitution has accorded special protection to a specified sector. While the Constitution specially mentions labor as a sector that needs specialprotection, the involvement of or relationship to labor, by itself, cannot automatically trigger a suspect classification and the accompanying strict scrutiny; much should depend on the circumstances of the case, on the impact of the illegal differential treatment on the sector involved, on the needed protection, and on the impact of recognizing a suspect classification on future situations. In other words, we should carefully calibrate our moves when faced with an equal protection situation so that we do not misappreciatethe essence of what a suspect classification is, and thereby lessen its jurisprudential impact and value. Reserving this approach to the worst cases of unacceptable classification and discrimination highlights the importance of striking at these types of unequal treatment and is a lesson that will not be lost on all concerned, particularly the larger public. There is the added reason, too, that the reverse onus that a strict scrutiny brings directly strikes, in the most glaring manner, atthe regularity of the performance of functions of a co-equal branch of government; inter-government harmony and courtesy demand that we reserve this type of treatment to the worst violations of the Constitution. Incidentally, I believe that we can arrive at the same conclusion and similarly strike down the disputed Section 10 by using the lowest level of scrutiny, thereby rendering the use of the strict scrutiny unnecessary.Given the OSG’s positions, the resulting differential treatment the law fosters between Philippine-based workers and OFWs in illegal dismissal situations does not reston substantial distinctions that are germane to the purpose of the law. No reasonable basis for classification exists since the distinctions the OSG pointed out do not justify the different treatment of OFWs and Philippine-based workers, specifically, why one class should be excepted from the consequences of illegal termination under the Labor Code, while the other is not.

To be sure, the difference in work locations and working conditions that the OSG pointed out are not valid grounds for distinctions that should matter in the enforcement of employment contracts. Whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, the integrity of contracts – be they labor, commercial or political – is a zealously guarded value that we in the Philippines should not demean by allowing a breach of OFW contracts easy to undertake. This istrue whatever may be the duration or character of employment; employment contracts, whatever their term and conditions may be subject only to their consistency with the law, must be respected during the whole contracted term and under the conditions agreed upon. Significantly, the OSG could not even point to any reason other than the protection of recruitment agencies and the expansion of the Philippine overseas program as justification for the limitation of liability that has effectively distinguished OFWs from locally-based workers. These reasons, unfortunately, are not on the same plane as protection to labor in our constitutional hierarchy of values. Even RA 8042 repeats that "the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and national development." Under RA 8042’s own terms, the overseas employment program exists only for OFW protection. Thus viewed, the expansion of the Philippine overseas deployment program and the need for incentives to achieve results are simply not valid reasons tojustify a classification, particularly when the incentive is in the form of oppressive and confiscatory limitation of liability detrimental to labor. No valid basis for classification thus exists to justify the differential treatment that resulted from the disputed Section 10. 5 In this regard, I likewise reiterate my reasons and explanation for striking down the subject clause on the ground that it violates the constitutional provisions in favor oflabor and the substantive aspect of the due process clause. For proper perspective, I quote below the pertinent constitutional provision that secures a special statusand treatment in favor of labor. Article XIII xxxx Section 18. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employmentopportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.

This constitutional protection afforded to labor articulates in clearer and more concrete terms the constitutional policy under Section 18, Article II that declares and affirms labor as a primary social economic force aimed at protecting the rights of workers and promoting their welfare. On the other hand, R.A. No. 8042 provides, among others: (b) The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. Towards this end, the State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers. xxxx (e) Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. In this regard, it is imperative that an effective mechanism be instituted to ensure that the rights and interests of distressed overseas Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or undocumented, are adequately protected and safeguarded. Under these terms, R.A.No. 8042 is discernibly a piece of social legislation that the State enacted in the exercise of its police power, precisely to give teeth and arms to the constitutional provisions on labor under its aim to "establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant worker, their families and of overseas Filipinos in distress." 6 Otherwise stated, it draws power and life from the constitutional provisions that it seeks to concretize and implement. As I pointed out in my Serrano Opinion, "the express policy declarations of R.A. No. 8042 show thatits purposes are reiterations of the very same policies enshrined in the Constitution x x x [They] patently characterize R.A. No. 8042 as a directimplementation of the constitutional objectives on Filipino overseas work so that it must be read and understood in terms of these policy objectives. Under this interpretative guide, any provision in R.A. No. 8042 inimical to the interest of an overseas Filipino worker (OFW) cannot have any place in the law."7 [Underscoring supplied] Note also (again, as I reflected in my Serrano Opinion) that while R.A. No. 8042 acknowledges that the State shall "promote full employment,"it likewise provides that "the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and national development. The existence of overseas employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity and fundamental human rights and freedom of Filipino citizens shall not, at any time, be compromised and violated."8 The Act, however, concludes its Declaration of Policies by stating that "[n]onetheless, the deployment of Filipino overseas workers, whether landbased or sea-based, by local service contractors and manning agencies employing them shall be encouraged.Appropriate incentives may be extended to them."9 [Underscoring supplied] Thus, the Act recognizes that to encourage greater deployment efforts, "incentives" can be given, BUT, to service contractors and manning agencies ONLY.10 Contractors’ and agencies’ principals,i.e., the foreign employers in whose behalf the contractors and agencies recruit OFWs are not among those to whom incentives can be given as they are not mentioned at all in the Act.11

Of particular importance to the present case is Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 which governs the OFWs’ money claims.12 Pursuant to its terms, the Act obviously protects the OFW as against the employer and the recruitment agency in cases of unlawful termination of service. Unfortunately, it limits the liability to the "reimbursement of the placement fee and interest, and the payment of his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less."13 This limitation is a step backward as it imposes a cap on the liability of the foreign principal/employer and the contractor/recruitment agency even as it earlier declared their liability joint and solidary.14 To be an "appropriate incentive," this limitation of liability can only be justified under the terms of the law, i.e., "the incentive must necessarily relate to the law’s purpose with reasonable expectation that it would serve this purpose; it must also accrue to its intended beneficiaries (the recruitment/placement agencies), and not to parties to whom the reason for the grant does not apply."15 Viewed in this light, the subject clause can only pass constitutional muster if it shows: (1) a lawful purpose; and (2) lawful means to achieve the lawful purpose. On the lawful purpose requirement, the policy of extending incentives to local service contractors and manning agencies to encourage greater efforts at securing work for OFWs is, undeniably, constitutionally valid. There is nothing inherently unconstitutional in providing such incentives for not only are local service contractors and manning agencies significant stakeholders in the government’s overseas employment program;16 the Constitution itself also expressly recognizes "the right of labor to its just share inthe fruits of production and the right to reasonable returns on investments, and expansion and growth."17 [Underscoring supplied] On the lawful means requirement, i.e., whether the means employed to achieve the purpose of encouraging recruitment efforts (through the incentive granted of limiting the liabilityof recruitment/manning agencies for illegal dismissals) is reasonable, the subject clause obviously fails. First, as I pointed out in my Serrano Opinion, Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 provides measures that collectively protect OFWs, i.e.,by ensuring the integrity of their contracts; by establishing the responsible parties; and by providing the mechanisms for their enforcement that imposes direct and primary liability to the foreign principal employer.18 Yet, Section 10 presents a hidden twist affecting the principal/employer’s liability. As worded, the Act "simply limits the OFWs’ recovery in wrongful dismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be liable, including the principal/employer – the direct employer primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal." 19 From this perspective, Section 10 actually limits what is otherwise the foreign principal/employer’s full liability under the Act and exceeds what the Act intended – to grant incentivesto recruitment/manning agencies.20 "Section 10, in short, really operates to benefit the wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason, to mitigate its liability for wrongful dismissals."21 [Emphasis supplied] "Because of this hidden twist, the limitation of liability under Section 10 cannot be an "appropriate" incentive."22 [Underscoring supplied] Second, the chosen mode of granting the incentive, i.e., the liability limitation for wrongful dismissals of already deployed OFWs, effectively imposed, with legal sanction, a partial condonation of the foreign

principal/employer’s liability to OFWs. 23 The incentive, therefore, "from a more practical and realistic view, is really part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargainfor purposes solely of attracting the market,"24 a scheme that sadly reduces our OFW s to mere cash cows.1âwphi1 And third, the "incentive scheme" effectively benefits the recruitment/manning agencies and foreign principal/employer at the expense of the OFWs from whom the salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract are taken and to whom these salaries rightfully belong.25 In effect, "the principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies profit from their violation of the security of tenure that an employment contract embodies."26 The OFWs, on the other hand, are afforded lesser protection because: (1) they are afforded reduced recovery by operation of law; (2) the reduced recovery renders wrongful dismissal situations more alluring, easier to facilitate and less onerous to undertake which foreign employers will most certainly consider in termination of employment decisions.27 These inimical effects obviously will remain as long as the subject clause remains in Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, this time as reinstated by R.A. No. 10022. The "inherently oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory and inimical provision [under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 should, therefore,] be struck down for its conflict with the substantive aspect of the constitutional due process guarantee.28 Thus, I vote to declare as unconstitutional the phrase "for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired terms, whichever is less" in the fifth and final paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. 8042." In sum, given these considerations and conclusions, further testing the validity of the assailed clause under the equal protection guarantee, particularly under the strict scrutiny standard that the ponencia in the present case deemed appropriate to employ, is clearly unnecessary.

7. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. G.R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009 DOCTRINE: Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent,1 for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.2 Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.3 Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.4 So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of statutes.5 This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each other’s acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed.6 Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. FACTS: The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas 8 assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, 9 each converting the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws. By Decision10 dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal protection clause. Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for reconsideration, raising, as one of the issues, the validity of the factual premises not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let alone established, which became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration. 11 By Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the motion for reconsideration. A second motion for reconsideration followed. Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, voting 6-6, disposed of the motion.

On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents’ "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009" and "Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached ‘Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon." Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court declared the May 14, 2009 motion adverted to as expunged in light of the entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, however, taking common cause with Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 2009 Resolution and to recall the entry of judgment, stated the observation, and with reason, that the entry was effected "before the Court could act on the aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day period counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration where the Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of a law or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute resolution dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated ground– –that the "basic issues have already been passed"–– suffice to hurdle the voting requirement required for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in question? RULING: It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the "majority of the Members" contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which requires that: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis added.) Webster defines "majority" as "a number greater than half of a total."13 In plain language, this means 50% plus one. In Lambino v. Commission on Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a separate opinion, expressed the view that "a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value."14 As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case involving the constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether such determination is made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion for reconsideration. This is as it should be, for, to borrow from the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco: "x x x [E]ven assuming x x x that the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the ‘majority’ was initially reached in the x x x ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for reconsideration."15 To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing that: SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. – Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on,

and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second motion for reconsideration. DISSENTING OPINION (Guys ang ganda ng dissenting Opinion, baka itanong)

A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC – x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the Court En Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the case may be, who actually took part in the deliberation of the motion. If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted provisions ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases "shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon." To repeat, the last vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution––a 6-6 deadlock.

"A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC (dated 26 January 1999): In the Matter of Clarifying the Rule in Resolving Motions for Reconsideration The Court Resolved as follows: A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION. IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED." (Emphasis supplied) xxxx

On the postulate then that first, the finality of the November 18, 2008 Decision has yet to set in, the issuance of the precipitate16 entry of judgment notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the cityhood laws, the Court is inclined to take another hard look at the underlying decision. Without belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and against the procedural dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the Court has the power to suspend its own rules when the ends of justice would be served thereby.17 In the performance of their duties, courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application must be eschewed, if they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order.18 Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules or excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.19 While perhaps not on all fours with the case, because it involved a purely business transaction, what the Court said in Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan20 is most apropos: To reiterate what the Court has said in Ginete vs. Court of Appeals and other cases, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere instruments designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules, inclusive of the one-motion rule, can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court has already declared to be final. The peculiarities of this case impel us to do so now. The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs’ motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14, 2009 motion to consider the second motion for

[T]he reason for the rule (of immutability of final judgments) is that if, on the application of one party, the court could change its judgment to the prejudice of the other, it could thereafter, on application of the latter, again change the judgment and continue this practice indefinitely. The equity of a particular case must yield to the overmastering need of certainty and unalterability of judicial pronouncements. - Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, 4 December 2009 The ponencia states that "since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, [Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the Resolution in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC] ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases ‘shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon."’ I dissent. The Rules on Tie-Vote Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court expressly governs tievotes in the en banc, thus: SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied) This provision contemplates three possible instances where the Supreme Court en banc may be equally divided in opinion or where the necessary majority1 in the votes cannot be had.

First, in actions instituted originally in the Supreme Court, if there is a tie-vote, the Court en banc shall deliberate again. After such re-deliberation and the Court remains equally divided, which means that no decision had been reached, the original action shall be dismissed. In such a case, the tie-vote results in the dismissal of the action without establishing any jurisprudential precedent.

Similarly, if the Philippine Supreme Court en banc is evenly split in its opinion on a motion for reconsideration, it is not a deadlock vote that must be resolved; it is simply not a majority vote, and the motion for reconsideration is defeated. More importantly, the tie-vote on a motion for reconsideration does not and cannot, in any instance and for any reason, supersede the prior majority vote on the main decision.

Second, in cases appealed to the Supreme Court, Section 7 of Rule 56 explicitly provides that if the Court en banc is still equally divided after re-deliberation, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed. A tie-vote in cases arising under the Court’s appellate jurisdiction translates into a summary affirmance of the lower court’s ruling.10 In short, the tie-vote in the en banc cannot amend or reverse a prior majority action of a lower court, whose decision stands affirmed.

The Tie-Vote on the Second Motion for Reconsideration

Third, on all incidental matters, which include motions for reconsideration, Section 7 of Rule 56 specifically states that if the Court en banc is evenly divided on such matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. To settle any doubt on how a tie-vote on a motion for reconsideration should be interpreted, the Court en banc issued a clarificatory Resolution on 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-109-SC, as follows: A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION. IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis supplied) The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en banc Resolution requires no further explanation. If the voting of the Court en banc results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Court’s prior majority action on the main decision stands affirmed.11 This clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases heard by the Court en banc, which includes not only cases involving the constitutionality of a law, but also, as expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, "all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc." In short, Section 4(2) requires a majority vote of the Court en banc not only in cases involving the constitutionality of a law, but also in all other cases that are heard by the Court en banc. The principle that a multi-member judicial body such as the Supreme Court cannot, based on a tie-vote, overrule a prior action is consistently applied in legislative bodies as well. 12 In the book The Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure, the author Alice Sturgis writes: A tie vote on a motion means that the same number of members has voted in the affirmative as in the negative. Since a majority vote, or more than half of the legal votes case, is required to adopt a motion, an equal or tie vote means that the motion is lost because it has failed to receive a majority vote. A tie vote on a motion is not a deadlock vote that must be resolved; it is simply not a majority vote, and the motion is lost.13 (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides: (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis supplied) Under Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, the requirement of a majority vote of the Supreme Court en banc applies not only to the constitutionality of a law, but also to the constitutionality of treaties, executive agreements, ordinances, regulations, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court shall be heard by the Court en banc. To repeat, any case which is heard by the Court en banc shall be decided by a majority vote of the Court en banc. To insure equal protection of the law, all cases required to be heard by the Court en banc under Section 4(2), Article VII of the Constitution must be governed by the same rules on voting, whether on the main decision or on the motion for reconsideration. There can be no one rule for cases involving the constitutionality of a law and another rule for all other cases. The Constitution makes no such distinction in Section 4(2) of Article VIII. Undeniably, the Constitution does not require that motions for reconsideration in cases involving the constitutionality of a law shall be treated differently from motions for reconsideration in other cases heard by the Court en banc. There is no basis for such a different treatment, and such a different treatment would violate the equal protection of the law. Where the Constitution does not distinguish, this Court must not create a forced and baseless distinction. In the present cases, the voting on the main petitions was 6-5 to declare the sixteen Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. Clearly, there was compliance with Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution since a majority of the members of the Court en banc, who actually took part in the deliberations, voted to declare unconstitutional the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In the first motion for reconsideration, a majority of 7-5 voted to deny the motion for reconsideration. Again, there was a clear majority that denied the first motion for reconsideration. The majority of the Court en banc struck down the sixteen Cityhood Laws twice, first, during the deliberations on the main petitions, and second, during the deliberations on the first motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, by deliberating on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondents, the Court in effect allowed the filing of a second motion for reconsideration, which is

generally prohibited under the Rules of Court. The Court en banc, voting 6-6, denied the second motion for reconsideration in the Resolution of 28 April 2009. The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Certainly, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, and the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision. The Court en banc need not deliberate again because in case of a tie-vote on a second motion for reconsideration, which is an incidental matter, such motion is lost. The tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, and the second motion for reconsideration must thus be denied. Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean that the present cases were left undecided because there remain the Decision of 18 November 2008 and Resolution of 31 March 2009 where majority of the Court en banc concurred in decreeing the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, which were both reached with the concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc, are not reconsidered but stand affirmed.14 These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action. Applying Section 7, Rule 56 and the clarificatory Resolution in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC to the present cases does not in any manner contravene the mandate of Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. To repeat, the Court en banc deliberated on the petitions and, by a majority vote of 6-5, granted the petitions and declared the sixteen Cityhood Laws unconstitutional in the Decision of 18 November 2008. Again, by a clear majority vote of 7-5, the Court en banc voted to deny the first motion for reconsideration. Therefore, contrary to the ponencia, the present cases were decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc when it declared the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws, pursuant to Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC applies to all cases heard by the Court en banc. Whether the case involves the constitutionality of a law, ordinance or regulation, or any civil, administrative or criminal case which under the Rules of Court must be heard en banc, the case must be decided by a majority vote of the Court en banc as expressly required by Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. Any tie-vote in the motion for reconsideration results in the denial of the motion for reconsideration pursuant to A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, which governs all cases heard by the Court en banc. Further, to treat the second motion for reconsideration not as an incidental matter would certainly render inutile the distinction set forth in Section 7, Rule 56 among original actions commenced in this Court, appeals from the judgments of lower courts, and incidental matters, such as motions. Applying Section 7, Rule 56, the Court en banc, instead of prolonging their disposition, outrightly denied the motions for reconsideration in Santiago and Cruz. No rehearings and no redeliberations were set and conducted to re-examine the motions for reconsideration. This is precisely because such proceedings are absolutely without any basis. For this reason

alone, the second motion for reconsideration in these cases must suffer the same fate as the motions for reconsideration in Santiago and Cruz -- it must be summarily denied pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56. Following the ponencia, the cases of Santiago and Cruz would be deemed unresolved. Worse, the resolutions in Santiago and Cruz denying reconsideration due to a tie-vote would be deemed a blatant disregard of the mandate of Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Final Note Any ruling of this Court that a tie-vote on a motion for reconsideration reverses a prior majority vote on the main decision would wreak havoc on well-settled jurisprudence of this Court. Such an unprecedented ruling would resurrect contentious political issues long ago settled, such as the PIRMA initiative in Santiago and the people's initiative in Lambino. Countless other decisions of this Court would come back to haunt it, long after such decisions have become final and executory following the tie-votes on the motions for reconsideration which resulted in the denial of the motions. Such a ruling would destabilize not only this Court, but also the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government. Business transactions made pursuant to final decisions of this Court would also unravel for another round of litigation, dragging along innocent third parties who had relied on such prior final decisions of this Court. This Court cannot afford to unleash such a catastrophe on the nation.

Note: Nonetheless, while the law provides for the dismissal of the case, the Court suspended its own rules. It reiterated that it should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice (especially that the case is impressed with public interest – conversion of a municipality to a city). Thus, the Court granted the motions for reconsideration filed by the petitioners and decided to rule on the substantive aspect of the case, the final resolution of which was made by the Court was in 2011 (2008 case, 2009 case, 2010 case & 2011 case)

8. RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTUES PURCHASED BY RETIRED CHIED/ASSSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT (2012) 678 SCRA 1 Per Curiam (En Banc) FACTS:  In June 8, 2010, the opinion issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), found an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles (i.e. CFAG formula instead of a COA memorandum).



Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice then filed an administrative matter. She submitted 2 memoranda which essentially asked the Court to determine the proper formula to be used in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the government properties they used during their tenure. She also recommended that the COA respect the inhouse computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997. In fact, it has previously upheld such appraisal. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. Full autonomy, among others, contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and utilization of the Judiciary s resources,

based on its own determination of what it needs.The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of the discharge of its functions. To allow the COA to substitute the Court s policy in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial prerogative. ISSUE: W/N Atty. Candelaria's contention on the ground of judicial fiscal autonomy is correct. HELD: YES. While COA has authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy under section 2(1), Art. 9-D of the Constitution, such authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court's fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters. On Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence Under the Judiciary's unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence." Decisional independence "refers to a judge's ability to render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." On the other hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of government."15 Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a body A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate. Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system of government as the sole repository of judicial power, with the power to determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the government is attended with grave abuse of discretion, no less than the Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial independence is protected and maintained. The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the security of tenure of the members of the judiciary. The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy, and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence has characterized administrative supervision as exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by prohibiting any decrease in their salary during their continuance in office, and ensures their security of tenure by providing that "Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they

reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office." With these guarantees, justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisals brought on by their judicial action. They can act inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial independence, not only by clearly stating the Court s powers, but also by providing express limits on the power of the two other branches of government to interfere with the Court's affairs. Fiscal Autonomy Article 8, Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. In Bengzon v. Drilon, we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the following manner: As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude. The Court’s declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary is more extensive than the mere automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations; real fiscal autonomy covers the grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from any outside control or interference. Application to the Present Case The Judiciary s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court En Banc s Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciary’s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the appellate courts: WHEREAS, by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs require"; WHEREAS, the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate courts of purchasing for

sentimental reasons at retirement government properties they used during their tenure has been recognized as a privilege enjoyed only by such government officials; andcralawlibrary WHEREAS, the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that respect for sentiments that a retiring Justice attaches to properties he or she officially used during his or her tenure should be in consonance with the need for restraint in the utilization and disposition of government resources. By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized. The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judiciary s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and by its own grants. Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor. In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary s own affairs. ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the Property Division, Office of `Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Let the Commission on Audit be accordingly advised of this Resolution for its guidance. SO ORDERED.

9. RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION ON SECTION 7, RULE 111 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10154 REQUIRING RETIRING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO SECURE A CLEARANCE OF PENDENCY/NON-PENDENCY OF CASELS FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2013) 706 SCRA 502 J. Perlas-Bernabe (En Banc)

WHEREFORE, the requirement of seeking a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from the Civil Service Commission embodied in Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10154 is declared INAPPLICABLE to retiring employees of the Judiciary. SO ORDERED.

FACTS:  Before the Court is a Memorandum dated September 18, 2013 from Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services of the Supreme Court, requesting guidance/clarification on the applicability to the Judiciary of Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 101541 which states: Section 7. Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from his/her employer agency, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Office of the Ombudsman, or in case of presidential appointees, from the Office of the President. ISSUE: W/N the subject provision applies to retiring employees of the judiciary. HELD: NO. Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in the Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. As such, it oversees the court personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative action against them for any violation thereof. As an adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody records pertaining to the administrative cases of retiring court personnel. In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the subject provision – which requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC – should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the pendency/nonpendency of administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154. To further clarify the matter, the same principles dictate that a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Office of the President (albeit some court personnel are presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court Justices) or the Office of the Ombudsman should not equally apply to retiring court personnel. Verily, the administrative supervision of court personnel and all affairs related thereto fall within the exclusive province of the Judiciary. XPN: It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative supervision.

10. JARDELEZA VS SERENO FACTS: The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad last May 22, 2014. Before his retirement, in accordance with its rules, the JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation for the said vacated position. JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the University of the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza, incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the names of candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews. On May 29, 2014, Jardeleza was interviewed by the JBC. Jardeleza received telephone calls from former Court of Appeals Associate Justice and incumbent JBC member, Justice Lagman, who informed him that during the meetings held on June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, Chief Justice Sereno, manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself available" before the JBC on June 30, 2014, during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity. Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition praying that the Court, in the exercise of its constitutional power of supervision over the JBC, issue an order: 1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the public record of the JBC; 2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting witnesses, if any, and the crossexamination to be conducted in public, under the same conditions that attend the public interviews held for all applicants; 3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014 to another date; and 4) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the voting on June 30,2014 or at any adjournment thereof where such vote would be taken for the nominees for the position vacated by Associate Justice Abad. During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Jardeleza, incumbent Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio appeared as a resource person to shed light on a classified legal memorandum that would clarify the objection to Jardeleza’s integrity as posed by Chief Justice Sereno. Sereno questioned Jardeleza’s ability to discharge the duties of his office as shown in a confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an international arbitration case for the government. Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court’s ante-rooms where Secretary De Lima informed him that Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice Sereno, characterized his integrity as dubious. After the briefing, Jardeleza was summoned by the JBC at around 2:00o’clock in the afternoon. Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a

sworn statement specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He requested that the same directive should also be imposed on Associate Justice Carpio. As claimed by the JBC, Representative Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested that he wanted to hear for himself Jardeleza’s explanation on the matter. Jardeleza, however, refused as he would not be lulled into waiving his rights. Jardeleza then put into record a written statement expressing his views on the situation and requested the JBC to defer its meeting considering that the Court en banc would meet the next day to act on his pending letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was excused. Later in the afternoon of the same day, and apparently denying Jardeleza’s request for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the subject shortlist of four (4) nominees which included: Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes, Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido Tan with five (5) votes, and Reynaldo B. Daway with four (4) votes. A newspaper article was later published in the online portal of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating that the Court’s Spokesman, revealed that there were actually five (5) nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee could not be included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC rules. In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted Jardeleza’s letter petition in view of the transmittal of the JBC list of nominees to the Office of the President, "without prejudice to any remedy available in law and the rules that petitioner may still wish to pursue." The said resolution was accompanied by an extensive Dissenting Opinion penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, expressing his respectful disagreement as to the position taken by the majority. Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel the JBC to include him in the list of nominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position. Notably, Jardeleza’s petition decries that despite the obvious urgency of his earlier letter-petition and its concomitant filing on June 25, 2014, the same was raffled only on July 1, 2014 or a day after the controversial JBC meeting. By the time that his letter-petition was scheduled for deliberation by the Court en banc on July 8, 2014, the disputed shortlist had already been transmitted to the Office of the President. He attributedt his belated action on his letter-petition to Chief Justice Sereno, whose action on such matters, especially those impressed with urgency, was discretionary. An in-depth perusal of Jardeleza’s petition would reveal that his resort to judicial intervention hinges on the alleged illegality of his exclusion from the shortlist due to: 1) the deprivation of his constitutional right to due process; and 2) the JBC’s erroneous application, if not direct violation, of its own rules. Suffice it to say, Jardeleza directly ascribes the supposed violation of his constitutional rights to the acts of Chief Justice Sereno in raising objections against his integrity and the manner by which the JBC

addressed this challenge to his application, resulting in his arbitrary exclusion from the list of nominees. Jardeleza’s Position A. Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardeleza’s right to due process when accusations against his integrity were made twice, ex parte, by Sereno, without informing him of the nature and cause thereof and without affording him an opportunity to be heard. In turn, the JBC violated his right to due process when he was simply ordered to make himself available on the June 30, 2014 meeting and was told that the objections to his integrity would be made known to him on the same day. Apart from mere verbal notice (by way of a telephone call) of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against his application and not on the accusations against him per se, he was deprived of an opportunity to mount a proper defense against it. Not only did the JBC fail to ventilate questions on his integrity during his public interview, he was also divested of his rights as an applicant under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 4, JBC-009, to wit: Section 3. Testimony of parties. – The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on the ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the Council may receive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence. Section 4. Anonymous Complaints. – Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not be given due course, unless there appears on its face a probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may direct a discreet investigation or require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview. His lack of knowledge as to the identity of his accusers and as to the nature of the very accusations against him caused him to suffer from the arbitrary action by the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno. The latter gravely abused her discretion when she acted as prosecutor, witness and judge, thereby violating the very essence of fair play and the Constitution itself. B. The JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza from the shortlist of nominees, in violation of its own rules. The "unanimity requirement" provided under Section 2, Rule10 of JBC-009 does not find application when a member of the JBC raises an objection to an applicant’s integrity. Here, the lone objector constituted a part of the membership of the body set to vote. The lone objector could be completely capable of taking hostage the entire voting process by the mere expediency of raising an objection. Chief Justice Sereno’s interpretation of the rule would allow a situation where all that a member has to do to veto other votes, including majority votes, would be to object to the qualification of a candidate, without need for factual basis. C. Having secured the sufficient number of votes, it was ministerial on the part of the JBC to include Jardeleza in the subject shortlist. Section 1, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides that a nomination for appointment to a judicial position requires the affirmative vote of at least a majority of all members of the JBC. The JBC cannot disregard its own rules. Considering that Jardeleza was able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion is that a majority of the members of the JBC found him to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice.

D. The unlawful exclusion of the petitioner from the subject shortlist impairs the President’s constitutional power to appoint Jardeleza’s exclusion from the shortlist has unlawfully narrowed the President’s choices. Simply put, the President would be constrained to choose from among four (4) nominees, when five (5) applicants rightfully qualified for the position. This limits the President to appoint a member of the Court from a list generated through a process tainted with patent constitutional violations and disregard for rules of justice and fair play. Until these constitutional infirmities are remedied, the petitioner has the right to prevent the appointment of an Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad. Comment of the JBC On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment contending that Jardeleza’s petition lacked procedural and substantive bases that would warrant favorable action by the Court. For the JBC, certiorari is only available against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions.The JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to recommend appointees to the Judiciary, does not exercise any of these functions. In the same vein, the remedy of mandamus is incorrect. Mandamus does not lie to compel a discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition for mandamus must, among other things, show that the petitioner has a clear legal right to the act demanded. In Jardeleza’s case, there is no legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC. Anent the substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that Jardeleza was deprived of due process. The JBC reiterated that Justice Lagman, on behalf of the JBC en banc, called Jardeleza and informed him that Chief Justice Sereno would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 due to a question on his integrity based on the way he handled a very important case for the government. Jardeleza and Justice Lagman spoke briefly about the case and his general explanation on how he handled the same. Secretary De Lima likewise informed him about the content of the impending objection against his application. On these occasions, Jardeleza agreed to explain himself. Come the June 30, 2014 meeting, however, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the allegations against him, as he chose to deliver a statement, which, in essence, requested that his accuser and her witnesses file sworn statements so that he would know of the allegations against him, that he be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses; and that the procedure be done on record and in public. In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be heard and to enlighten each member of the JBC on the issues raised against him prior to the voting process. The JBC then proceeded to defend adherence to its standing rules. As a general rule, an applicant is included in the shortlist when he or she obtains an affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC009,however, is invoked because an applicant’s integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Thus, when Chief Justice Sereno invoked the said provision, Jardeleza needed the affirmative vote of all the JBC members to be included in the shortlist. In the process, Chief Justice Sereno’s vote against

Jardeleza was not counted. Even then, he needed the votes of the five(5) remaining members. He only got four (4) affirmative votes. As a result, he was not included in the shortlist. Applicant Reynaldo B. Daway, who gotfour (4) affirmative votes, was included in the shortlist because his integrity was not challenged. As to him, the "majority rule" was considered applicable. Lastly, the JBC rued that Jardeleza sued the respondents in his capacity as Solicitor General. In effect, he sued the respondents to pursue a purely private interest while retaining the office of the Solicitor General. By suing the very parties he was tasked by law to defend, Jardeleza knowingly placed himself in a situation where his personal interests collided against his public duties, in clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Professional Ethics. Moreover, the respondents are all public officials being sued in their official capacity. By retaining his title as Solicitor General, and suing in the said capacity, Jardeleza filed a suit against his own clients, being the legal defender of the government and its officers. This runs contrary to the fiduciary relationship shared by a lawyer and his client. In opposition to Jardeleza’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the JBC called to mind the constitutional period within which a vacancy in the Court must be filled. As things now stand, the President has until August 20, 2014 to exercise his appointment power which cannot be restrained by a TRO or an injunctive suit. ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS (WITH APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER). WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST JARDELEZA BEFIT "QUESTIONS OR CHALLENGES ON INTEGRITY" AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 10 OF JBC-009. WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS AVAILABLE IN THE COURSE OF JBC PROCEEDINGS IN CASES WHERE AN OBJECTION OR OPPOSITION TO AN APPLICATION IS RAISED. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE SHORTLIST OF NOMINEES SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT. RULING: I – Procedural Issue: The Court has constitutional bases to assume jurisdiction over the case A - The Court’s Power of Supervision over the JBC Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads: Section 8. As the definition oversight, or perform their

a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides and scope of supervision. It is the power of the authority to see that subordinate officers duties.It ensures that the laws and the rules

governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardeleza’s principal allegations in his petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority. B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available. "Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. There is no question that the JBC’s duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something. C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorari on the ground that it does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. "Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasi judicial function is a term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using discretion of a judicial nature." It asserts that in the performance of its function of recommending appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not exercise judicial or quasi judicial functions. Hence, the resort to such remedy to question its actions is improper. In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of votes in the JBC, it was negated by the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity in violation of his right to due process guaranteed not only by the Constitution but by the Council’s own rules. For said reason, the Court is of the position that it can exercise the expanded judicial power of review vested upon it by the 1987 Constitution. Thus: Article VIII. Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the Court does not find passivity as an alternative. The impasse must be overcome. II – Substantial Issues Examining the Unanimity Rule of the JBC in cases where an applicant’s integrity is challenged The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical constitutional declaration that"[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence." To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified. As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. That is why proof of an applicant’s reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials and nongovernmental organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which shall be verified and checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of person’s character." The foregoing premise then begets the question: Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, in imposing the "unanimity rule," contemplate a doubt on the moral character of an applicant? Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides: SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration of his nomination. A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes "unanimous" instead of the "majority vote" required in the preceding section. Considering that JBC-009 employs the term "integrity" as an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is

of the safe conclusion that "integrity" as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the "unanimity rule" only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness. Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing questions: Does the original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a question on Jardeleza’s integrity? Does his adoption of a specific legal strategy in the handling of a case bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his moral character? Does the "unanimity rule" apply in cases where the main point of contention is the professional judgment sans charges or implications of immoral or corrupt behavior? The Court answers these questions in the negative. While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was not borne out of a mere variance of legal opinion but by an "act of disloyalty" committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact remains that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the "disagreement" in legal strategy as expressed by a group of international lawyers. The approach taken by Jardeleza in that case was opposed to that preferred by the legal team. For said reason, criticism was hurled against his "integrity." The invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity traces its roots to the exercise of his discretion as a lawyer and nothing else. No connection was established linking his choice of a legal strategy to a treacherous intent to trounce upon the country’s interests or to betray the Constitution. Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of, interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him provided that he lives up to his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect the interests of his client within the bounds of the law. Consonantly, a lawyer is not an insurer of victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles and technique by a lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a clear showing of gross neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a legal tactic acceptable to some and deplorable to others. It has no direct bearing on his moral choices. The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding international cases, given her participation in the PIATCO case and the Belgian Dredging case. Her efforts in the determination of Jardeleza’s professional background, while commendable, have not produced a patent demonstration of a connection between the act complained of and his integrity as a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation of the rule.

As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insidertrading for the first time only during the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC. As can be gleaned from the minutes of the June 30, 2014 meeting, the inclusion of these issues had its origin from newspaper reports that the Chief Justice might raise issues of "immorality" against Jardeleza. The Chief Justice then deduced that the "immorality" issue referred to by the media might have been the incidents that could have transpired when Jardeleza

was still the General Counsel of San Miguel Corporation. She stated that inasmuch as the JBC had the duty to "take every possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants," it might as well be clarified. Do these issues fall within the purview of "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009? The Court nods in assent. These are valid issues. These two issues can be properly categorized as "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of "questions on integrity." Hence, the "unanimity rule" may come into operation as the subject provision is worded. Application to Jardeleza’s Case Nearing the ultimate conclusion of this case, the Court is behooved to rule on whether Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process in the events leading up to, and during, the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014. The JBC gives great weight and substance to the fact that it gave Jardeleza the opportunity to answer the allegations against him. It underscores the fact that Jardeleza was asked to attend the June 30, 2014 meeting so that he could shed light on the issues thrown at him. During the said meeting, Chief Justice Sereno informed him that in connection with his candidacy for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the Council would like to propound questions on the following issues raised against him: 1] his actuations in handling an international arbitration case not compatible with public interest;2] reports on his extra-marital affair in SMC; and 3] alleged insider trading which led to the "show cause" order from the Philippine Stock Exchange. As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to explain his side, as he would not want to be "lulled into waiving his rights." Instead, he manifested that his statement be put on record and informed the Council of the then pendency of his letter-petition with the Court en banc. When Chief Justice Sereno informed Jardeleza that the Council would want to hear from him on the three (3) issues against him, Jardeleza reasoned out that this was precisely the issue. He found it irregular that he was not being given the opportunity to be heard per the JBC rules.He asserted that a candidate must be given the opportunity to respond to the charges against him. He urged the Chief Justice to step down from her pedestal and translate the objections in writing. Towards the end of the meeting, the Chief Justice said that both Jardeleza’s written and oral statements would be made part of the record. After Jardeleza was excused from the conference, Justice Lagman suggested that the voting be deferred, but the Chief Justice ruled that the Council had already completed the process required for the voting to proceed. After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that the application of the "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s deprivation of his right to due process. As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Even as Jardeleza was verbally informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was later asked to explain himself during the meeting, these

circumstances still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that lingers in the mind of the Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the same would be treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat, as its wording provides, any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days from the publication of the notice and a list of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more conspicuous to JBC members. Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day period is only applicable to the public, excluding the JBC members themselves, this does not discount the fact that the invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised procedural issues. To be fair, several members of the Council expressed their concern and desire to hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-010 did not form part of the agenda then. It was only during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the same day when a resource person would shed light on the matter. Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground impelled the Council to resort to oral notice instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written opposition, why did the JBC not take into account its authority to summon Jardeleza in confidence at an earlier time? Is not the Council empowered to "take every possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants?" It would not be amiss to state, at this point, that the confidential legal memorandum used in the invocation ofthe "unanimity rule" was actually addressed to Jardeleza, in his capacity as Solicitor General. Safe to assume is his knowledge of the privileged nature thereof and the consequences of its indiscriminate release to the public. Had he been privately informed of the allegations against him based on the document and had he been ordered to respond thereto in the same manner, Jardeleza’s right to be informed and to explain himself would have been satisfied. What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in which the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but toprovide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes anidle and futile exercise. Needless to state, Jardeleza’s grievance is not an imagined slight but a real rebuff of his right to be informed of the charges against him and his right to answer the same with vigorouscontention and active participation in the proceedings which would ultimately decide his aspiration to become a magistrate of this Court. Consequences To write finisto this controversy and in view of the realistic and practical fruition of the Court’s findings, the Court now declares its position on whether or not Jardeleza may be

included in the shortlist, just in time when the period to appoint a member of the Court is about to end. The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points: 1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as to Jardeleza’s legal strategy in handling a case for the government. 2. While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall within the contemplation of a "question on integrity" and would have warranted the application of the "unanimity rule," he was not afforded due process in its application. 3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for judicial posts, exercises full discretion on its power to recommend nominees to the President. The sui generis character of JBC proceedings, however, is not a blanket authority to disregard the due process under JBC-010. 4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions on his integrity nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense. With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the "unanimity rule" as it reflects the JBC’s policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process. In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.This rule may well be applied to the current situation for an opposing view submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill of Rights. To this, the Court shall not concede. As the branch of government tasked to guarantee that the protection of due process is available to an individual in proper cases, the Court finds the subject shortlist as tainted with a vice that it is assigned to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 must be deemed to have never come into operation in light of its erroneous application on the original ground against Jardeleza’s integrity. At the risk of being repetitive, the Court upholds the JBC’s discretion in the selection of nominees, but its application of the "unanimity rule" must be applied in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the shortlist submitted to the President. Need to Revisit JBC’s

Internal Rules In the Court’s study of the petition, the comments and the applicable rules of the JBC, the Court is of the view that the rules leave much to be desired and should be reviewed and revised. It appears that the provision on the "unanimity rule" is vague and unfair and, therefore, can be misused or abused resulting in the deprivation of an applicant’s right to due process. Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively a veto power over the collective will of a majority. This should be clarified. Any assertion by a member after voting seems to be unfair because it effectively gives him or her a veto power over the collective votes of the other members in view of the unanimous requirement. While an oppositor-member can recuse himself or herself, still the probability of annulling the majority vote of the Council is quite high. Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial impression is that it refers to the moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it has been, used to mean other things. Infact, the minutes of the JBC meetings n this case reflect the lack of consensus among the members as to its precise definition. Not having been defined or described, it is vague, nebulous and confusing. It must be distinctly specified and delineated. Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a candidate. Should it be invoked only by an outsider as construed by the respondent Executive Secretary or also by a member? Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is "sui generis" and need not be formal or trial type, they must meet the minimum requirements of due process. As always, an applicant should be given a reasonable opportunity and time to be heard on the charges against him or her, if there are any. At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the peculiar nature of its function. It need not be stressed that the rules to be adopted should be fair, reasonable, unambiguous and consistent with the minimum requirements of due process. One final note. The Court disclaims that Jardeleza's inclusion in the shortlist is an endorsement of his appointment as a member of the Court.1âwphi1 In deference to the Constitution and his wisdom in the exercise of his appointing power, the President remains the ultimate judge of a candidate's worthiness. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that Solicitor General Francis I-I. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the shortlist submitted to the President for consideration as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court vice Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad. The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW, and ADOPT, rules relevant to the observance of due process in its proceedings, particularly JBC-009 and JBC-010, subject to the approval of the Court. This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of the President of this Decision.

11. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR. July 17, 2012 J. MENDOZA

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5. Doctrine (both the Decision and the MR): The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature.

JBC/ Sen. Escudero/Cong.Tupas’ arguments: 1.

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Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that

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“(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”

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In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members. Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation. In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered. An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.18 It has been the situation since then. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Chaves’ arguments: 1.

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The framers of the Constitution clearly envisioned, contemplated and decided on a JBC composed of only seven (7) members. Had the framers of the Constitution intended that the JBC composed of the one member from the Senate and one member from the House of Representatives, they could have easily said so as they did in the other provisions of the Constitution. The composition of the JBC providing for three exofficio members is purposely designed for a balanced

representation of each of the three branches of the government. One of the two (2) members of the JBC from Congress has no right (not even ½ right) to sit in the said constitutional body and perform the duties and functions of a member thereof. The JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is illegal and unconstitutional

when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance. the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders. Issue: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. Held: YES. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional. One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretationAs such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the

JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.” It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council was enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

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unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship the rationale of the Court in declaring a sevenmember composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct

ISSUE 1: Whether having 2 members of the Congress- one from the Senate and one from the House of Representatives is unconstitutional HELD: YES, it is unconstitutional. The framers did not overlook the shift to bicameral system. There are provisions in the Constitution that were adjusted to take account the shift. (eg, the tie in the presidential election shall be broken “by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately, the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be confirmed “by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members) Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function―to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function. The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. Whether in the exercise of its legislative or its nonlegislative functions, the dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of government―the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.

CHAVEZ v JBC (MR) APRIL 16, 2013 J. MENDOZA This an MR of the 2012 Decision. The present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. JBC et al’s arguments: 1. allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature 2. the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from

The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity. From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. To permit or tolerate the

splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. ISSUE 2: Whether the current setup gives the President more power to appoint HELD: NO.

interpretation of two votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the appointment of judge. c. then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera:

It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC simply because all of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of members of Congress.

“the JBC is composed of seven (7) representatives coming from different sectors. From the enumeration it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only. Two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has contemplated.”

(Despite finding the JBC composition to be unconstitutional, the Court held, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid under the doctrine of operative fact)

d. Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant:

NOTES: 1. From the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos Constitution from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos Constitution 2. Under the 1973 Constitution, with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one body, the appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications 3. Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). 4. Position papers submitted to CJ Puno a. Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao: “to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution” b. then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant: “Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of politics in Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the

“The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main branches of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government”

12. UMALI vs JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL July 25, 2017 J. VELASCO, JR. Doctrine: the adoption of the rotational scheme will not in any way deprive Congress of its full participation in the JBC for such an arrangement is also in line with the constitutional mandate.

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This Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed directly with this Court by herein petitioner Rep. Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice and Ex Officio Member of the JBC, seeks to impugn the present-day practice of sixmonth rotational representation of Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for it unfairly deprives both Houses of Congress of their full participation in the said body. The aforementioned practice was adopted by the JBC in light of the ruling in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.

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As an overview, in Chavez, the constitutionality of the practice of having two representatives from both houses of Congress with one vote each in the JBC, thus, increasing its membership from seven to eight, was challenged. With that, this Court examined the constitutional provision that states the composition of the JBC, that is, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. Both Houses of Congress agreed on a six-month rotational representation in the JBC, wherein the House of Representatives will represent Congress from January to June and the Senate from July to December. This is now the current practice in the JBC. It is by reason of this arrangement that the votes cast by the petitioner for the selection of nominees for the vacancies of then retiring Supreme Court Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Perez) and Arturo Brion (Brion) were not counted by the JBC during its En Banc deliberations held last December 2 and 9, 2016. Instead, the petitioner's votes were simply placed in an envelope and sealed subject to any further disposition as this Court may direct in a proper proceeding. This is the root of the present controversy that prompted the petitioner to file the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. This Petition was primarily filed because of the non-counting of the petitioner's votes in the JBC En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016 held for the purpose of determining, who will be the possible successors of the then retiring Associate Justices of the Supreme Court Perez and Brion, whose retirements were set on December 14 and 29, 2016, respectively. The list of nominees will then be forwarded to the President as the appointing authority. With the appointments of Associate Justices Samuel R. Martires (Martires) and Noel G. Tijam (Tijam) on March 2 and 8, 2017, respectively, this Petition has now been rendered moot insofar as the petitioner's prayers to (1) reverse and set aside the JBC En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016; and (2) direct the JBC to count his votes therein as its ex officio member are concerned. OSG’s arguments: The OSG wants this Court to revisit Chavez for its alleged unexecutability arising from constitutional constraints.

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the current practice of alternate representation was only arrived at because of time constraints and difficulty in securing the agreement of both Houses of Congress. And, since the Constitution itself did not clearly state who is the Congress' representative in the JBC, the provision, therefore, regarding the latter's composition must be harmonized to give effect to the current bicameral system. Chavez's strict interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution violates the very essence of bicameralism and sets aside the inherent dichotomy between the two Houses of Congress. To note, a JBC member's votes are reflective of the position and the interest such member wants to uphold, such that when the representatives from each House of Congress vote for a certain judicial nominee, they carry the interests and views of the group they represent. Thus, when only one would represent both Houses of Congress in the JBC, the vote would not be representative of the interests embodied by the Congress as a whole. the bicameral nature of the legislature strictly adheres to the distinct and separate personality of both Houses of Congress; thus, no member of Congress can represent the entire Congress. Besides, the phrase "a representative of the Congress" in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is qualified by the phrase "ex officio members." The ex officio nature of the position derives its authority from the principal office. It, thus, follows that each house of Congress must be represented in the JBC. the constitutional intent in creating the JBC is to ensure community representation from the different sectors of society, as well as from the three branches of government, and to eliminate partisan politics in the selection of members of the judiciary. The focus, therefore, is more on proper representation rather than qualitative limitation. that while Congress' participation in the JBC may be non-legislative, still, the involvement of both Houses of Congress in its every proceeding is indispensable, as each House represents different constituencies and would necessarily bring a unique perspective to the recommendation process of the JBC.

JBC’s arguments: 1.

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5.

the present Petition be dismissed as its adopted rotational scheme and the necessary consequences thereof are not the proper subjects of a certiorari and even a mandamus petition for the same do not involve an exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions the practice and acquiescence of both Houses of Congress to such an arrangement operates as an estoppel against any member thereof to deny its validity the allegations herein are mere rehash of the arguments and dissents in Chavez, which have already been exhaustively litigated and settled therein by this Court, hence, barred by the doctrine of stare decisis it was the intent of the Framers of the Constitution for the JBC to have only seven members. The reason for that was laid down in Chavez, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in the voting even assuming that the current six-month rotational scheme in the JBC created an imbalance between the two Houses of Congress, it is not within the power of this Court or the JBC to remedy such imbalance. For

the remedy lies in the amendment of this constitutional provision ISSUE: Did the JBC abuse its discretion in adopting the sixmonth rotational arrangement and in not counting the votes of the petitioner? RULING: NO. The JBC is merely following the provisions stipulated in Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Chavez case. Moreover, said arrangement was crafted by both Houses of Congress and the JBC merely adopted the same. By no stretch of imagination can it be regarded as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the JBC. ISSUE: Whether Mandamus will lie against JBC in the counting of Rep. Umali’s vote HELD: NO The counting of votes in the selection of the nominees to the judiciary may only be considered a ministerial duty of the JBC if such votes were cast by its rightful members and not by someone, like the petitioner, who is not considered a member during the En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. For during the questioned period, the lawful representative of Congress to the JBC is a member of the Senate and not of the House of Representatives as per their agreed rotational scheme. Considering that a member of the Senate already cast his vote therein, the JBC has the full discretion not to count the votes of the petitioner for it is mandated by both the Constitution and jurisprudence to maintain that Congress will only have one representative in the JBC. As the act of the JBC involves a discretionary one, accordingly, mandamus will not lie. ISSUE: Whether the Chavez ruling is abandoned HELD: NO. Here, the facts are exactly the same as in Chavez, where this Court has already settled the issue of interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Truly, such ruling may not be unanimous, but it is undoubtedly a reflection of the wisdom of the majority of members of this Court on that matter. Chavez cannot simply be regarded as an erroneous application of the questioned constitutional provision for it merely applies the clear mandate of the law, that is, Congress is entitled to only one representative in the JBC in the same way that its co-equal branches are. (the court reiterated the decision in Chavez) While it is true that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution did not explicitly state that the JBC shall be composed of seven members, however, the same is implied in the enumeration of who will be the members thereof. And though it is unnecessary for the JBC composition to be an odd number as no tie-breaker is needed in the preparation of a shortlist since judicial nominees are not decided by a "yes" or "no" vote, still, JBC's membership cannot be increased from seven to eight for it will be a clear violation of the aforesaid constitutional provision. To add another member in the JBC or to increase the representative of Congress to the JBC, the remedy is not judicial but constitutional amendment. In sum, this Court will not overthrow Chavez for it is in accord with the constitutional mandate of giving Congress "a representative" in the JBC. In the same manner, the adoption of the rotational scheme will not in any way deprive Congress of its full participation in the

JBC for such an arrangement is also in line with that constitutional mandate.

13. FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, PETITIONER, VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 211833. April 7, 2015. REYES, J.: Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva directly came to this Court via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief under Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of Court, respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the JBC, requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the MCTC, Compostela- New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following RTCs: Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur. In a letter dated December 18, 2013, JBC’s Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC En Banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC’s long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court. In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC’s five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC’s five-year requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 104 of RA 8557 should not be merely directory and should be fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law. In compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated April 22, 2014, the JBC and the OSG separately submitted their Comments. Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the OSG, they essentially stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because the

petitioner has no clear legal right that needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection clause is not violated because the classification of lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who have served less than five years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is no violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature. ISSUE: WON the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional. RULING: YES RATIONALE: The Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court’s power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not ministerial. More so, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on the discretion of the JBC, thus: The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary does not create an entitlement or expectation that his or her name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. By submitting an application or accepting a recommendation, one submits to the authority of the JBC to subject the former to the search, screening, and selection process, and to use its discretion in deciding whether or not one should be included in the list. Indeed, assuming that if one has the legal right to be included in the list of candidates simply because he or she possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications, then the application process would then be reduced to a mere mechanical function of the JBC; and the search, screening, and selection process would not only be unnecessary, but also improper. However, this is clearly not the constitutional intent. One’s inclusion in the list of candidates is subject to the discretion of the JBC over the selection of nominees for a particular judicial post. Such candidate’s inclusion is not, therefore, a legally demandable right, but simply a privilege the conferment of which is subject to the JBC’s sound discretion.

Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment, that is, a promotion from a first-level court to a second-level court. There is no law, however, that grants him the right to a promotion to second-level courts. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC’s principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants’ qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties. JBC’s ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner’s case is necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. “To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.” Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not constitute a

violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by experience, among other factors. The difference in treatment between lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who have served less than five years, on the other hand, was rationalized by JBC as follows: Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls squarely under the purview of the JBC. No other constitutional body is bestowed with the mandate and competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the more general categories of probity, integrity and independence. The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of “proven competence.” In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications, experience and performance. Based on the JBC’s collective judgment, those who have been judges of first-level courts for five (5) years are better qualified for promotion to second-level courts. It deems length of experience as a judge as indicative of conversance with the law and court procedure. Five years is considered as a sufficient span of time for one to acquire professional skills for the next level court, declog the dockets, put in place improved procedures and an efficient case management system, adjust to the work environment, and gain extensive experience in the judicial process. A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the integrity, probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion. To merit JBC’s nomination for their promotion, they must have had a “record of, and reputation for, honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Likewise, their decisions must be reflective of the soundness of their judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of character. Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of promotion to the next level court, it would be premature or difficult to assess their merit if they have had less than one year of service on the bench. At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor that determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed by the President. Persons with this qualification are neither automatically selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The applicants are chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis. Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test. The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five-year experience and those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined

in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said policy is valid and constitutional. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established a clear legal right to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The petitioner has merely filed an application with the JBC for the position of RTC judge, and he has no clear legal right to be nominated for that office nor to be selected and included in the list to be submitted to the President which is subject to the discretion of the JBC. The JBC has the power to determine who shall be recommended to the judicial post. To be included in the list of applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective applicants, including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria. Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ is not justified. As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those judges with five years of experience was an exercise of discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however, should have been informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare for and comply with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of JBC’s powers, and will respect the initiative and independence inherent in the latter. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court, however, DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring five years of experience as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to the Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines that the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing. SO ORDERED.

14. RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PETITIONER. A.M. No. 08-2-01-0. February 11, 2010.* CORONA, J.: FACTS: The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or controlled corporations under Section 22,1 Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The said provision states: “SEC. 22. Government exempt.—The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local government corporations and governmentowned or controlled corporations with or without independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees. However, all court actions, criminal or civil, instituted at the instance of the provincial, city or municipal treasurer or assessor under Sec. 280 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall be exempt from the payment of court and sheriff’s fees.” The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997). The GSIS then avers that courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and proceedings instituted by the GSIS notwithstanding its exemption from taxes, assessments, fees, charges, or duties of all kinds under Section 39. For this reason, the GSIS urges this Court to recognize its exemption from payment of legal fees. According to the GSIS, the purpose of its exemption is to preserve and maintain the actuarial solvency of its funds and to keep the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits provided by RA 8291 as low as possible. Like the terms “taxes,” assessments,” “charges,” and “duties,” the term “fees” is used in the law in its generic and ordinary sense as any form of government imposition. The word “fees,” defined as “charge[s] fixed by law for services of public officers or for the use of a privilege under control of government,” is qualified by the phrase “of all kinds.” Hence, it includes the legal fees prescribed by this Court under Rule 141. Moreover, no distinction should be made based on the kind of fees imposed on the GSIS or the GSIS’ ability to pay because the law itself does not distinguish based on those matters. The GSIS argues that its exemption from the payment of legal fees would not mean that RA 8291 is superior to the Rules of Court. It would merely show “deference” by the Court to the legislature as a co-equal branch. This deference will recognize the “compelling and overriding” State interest in the preservation of the actuarial solvency of the GSIS for the benefit of its members. The GSIS further contends that the right of government workers to social security is an aspect of social justice. The right to social security is also guaranteed under Article 22 of the UDHR and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, including the right to social security, but the GSIS is not compelling the Court to promulgate such rules. The GSIS is merely asking the Court to recognize and allow the exercise of

the right of the GSIS “to seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment of legal fees.” Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the OSG maintains that the petition should be denied. According to the OSG, the issue of the GSIS’ exemption from legal fees has been resolved by the issuance by then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. of OCA Circular No. 93-2004: xxx SEC. 21. Government exempt.—The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees. The OSG contends that there is nothing in Section 39 of RA 8291 that exempts the GSIS from fees imposed by the Court in connection with judicial proceedings. The exemption of the GSIS from “taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds” is necessarily confined to those that do not involve pleading, practice and procedure. Rule 141 has been promulgated by the Court pursuant to its exclusive rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Thus, it may not be amended or repealed by Congress. On this Court’s order, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) posits that the GSIS could not have been exempted by Congress from the payment of legal fees. Otherwise, Congress would have encroached on the rule-making power of this Court ISSUE: WON Congress may exempt GSIS from payment of legal fees RULING: NO. RATIONALE: The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a traditional power of this Court. It necessarily includes the power to address all questions arising from or connected to the implementation of the said rules. The Rules of Court was promulgated in the exercise of the Court’s rule-making power. It is essentially procedural in nature as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Corollarily, Rule 141 is basically procedural. It does not create or take away a right but simply operates as a means to implement an existing right. In particular, it functions to regulate the procedure of exercising a right of action and enforcing a cause of action. In particular, it pertains to the procedural requirement of paying the prescribed legal fees in the filing of a pleading or any application that initiates an action or proceeding. Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Appellate docket and other lawful fees are required to be paid within the same period for taking an appeal. Payment of docket fees in full within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.

An interesting aspect of legal fees is that which relates to indigent or pauper litigants. In proper cases, courts may waive the collection of legal fees. This, the Court has allowed in Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court in recognition of the right of access to justice by the poor under Section 11, Article III of the Constitution. Mindful that the rule with respect to indigent litigants should not be ironclad as it touches on the right of access to justice by the poor, the Court acknowledged the exemption from legal fees of indigent clients of the Public Attorney’s Office under Section 16-D of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by RA 9406. This was not an abdication by the Court of its rule-making power but simply a recognition of the limits of that power. In particular, it reflected a keen awareness that, in the exercise of its rulemaking power, the Court may not dilute or defeat the right of access to justice of indigent litigants. The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in support of its petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its individual members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members. Its capacity to sue and bring actions under Section 41(g) of RA 8291, the specific power which involves the exemption that it claims in this case, pertains to it and not to its members. Indeed, even the GSIS acknowledges that, in claiming exemption from the payment of legal fees, it is not asking that rules be made to enforce the right to social security of its members but that the Court recognize the alleged right of the GSIS “to seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment of legal fees.” However, the alleged right of the GSIS does not exist. The payment of legal fees does not take away the capacity of the GSIS to sue. It simply operates as a means by which that capacity may be implemented. Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive. Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the rule-making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and development in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice: “Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides: Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan, Congress in the

exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that “x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment—a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question.” The venerable jurist further ruled: “It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.” By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to “repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court “to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x.” More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided: xxxxxxxxx Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. xxxxxxxxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides: xxxxxxxxx Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxxxxxxxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.” The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails. Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence—fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to “guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.” Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. WHEREFORE, the petition of the Government Service Insurance System for recognition of its exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court on government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units is hereby DENIED. The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to promptly issue a circular to inform all courts in the Philippines of the import of this resolution. SO ORDERED.

15. SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. Y ASUELA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 3, LEGAZPI CITY, ALBAY, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 226679. August 15, 2017.* PERALTA, J.: FACTS: Petitioner is the accused in a criminal case for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government. In its Comment or Opposition dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused." On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the RTC, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined: The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pretrial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute. Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases. The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case

manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender. Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court. While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station. Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits pleabargaining is unconstitutional RULING: YES. RATIONALE: The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and development. While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a powersharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more independent judiciary." Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions." Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for

determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor takeaway a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to

SO ORDERED.