Constitutional-law-i-class-1-c.docx

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I MIDTERM CASE DIGESTS LAW 112 – 1C

BY: BACTOL, Carlo Jose L. BANGSILAN, Balban Jones B. TADENA, Mark Jester C. BATAY-AN, Krezza Iah Micah C. BUYUCAN, Shallymae C. PARAJAS, Jinkylyn C. OCTOBER 7, 2017 TO: ATTY. JENNIFER N. ASUNCION

Supremacy of the Constitution MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS GR. NO. 122156 267 SCRA 408 February 3, 1997 FACTS: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept. Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. 2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony. 3. Is the submission of matching bid being premature? 4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.

RULING: 1. Yes, it is a self-executing provision. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy, Ubi jus ibi remedium. 2. Yes, the Manila Hotel forms part of the national matrimony. Filipino First Policy is a rule under Article XII Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, which heavily favors Filipino businessmen over foreign investors with respect to the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the

Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. 3. No, the submission of a matching bid is not premature. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum. 4. Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the GSIS in refusing the matching bid of the Manila Prince Hotel. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an

opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Provisions of the Constitution CoTesCUP v. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION GR. NOS. 216930, 217451-52, 218045, 218098, 218123, and 218465 October 9, 2018 FACTS: On January 21, 1901, the Philippine Commission created the Department of Public Instruction4 through Act No. 74. All schools established under the auspices of the Military Government were made under the control of the officers of the Department of Public Instruction and as early as this law, the primary education established through it was considered free. Act No. 74 also made English language as the basis of all public school instruction and allowed optional religious instruction in all schools. On March 10, 1917, Act No. 2706 was passed mandating the recognition and inspection of private schools and colleges by the Secretary of Public Instruction in order to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges. The authority of the Secretary over private schools and colleges was later on expanded under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 180. The Secretary was vested with the power "to supervise, inspect and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same. The law also made compulsory the attendance and completion of elementary education, except when the child was mentally or physically incapable of attending school or when it was inconvenient to do so considering the means of transportation available or on account of economic condition of the parents the child could not afford to continue in school. The parents or guardians or those having control of children therein required to attend school without justification were liable to a fine of not less than twenty nor more than fifty pesos.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy and whether certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the laws and issuances. 2. Whether there are provisions that are self-executing and not self-executing in the K to 12 Law under the Constitution.

RULING: 1. Yes, the Court may exercise its power of judicial review and the remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. As stated under Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” That said, the Court's power is not unbridled authority to review just any claim of constitutional violation or grave abuse of discretion. The following requisites must first be complied with before the Court may exercise its power of judicial review, namely: (1) there is an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a personal and substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the act or issuance; (3) the question of constitutionality is raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case. Of these four, the most important are the first two requisites. An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute since the courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions. While legal standing refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. In the case above, the petitioners have sufficient legal interest in the outcome of the controversy. And, considering that the instant cases involve issues on education, which under the Constitution the State is mandated to promote and protect, the stringent requirement of direct and substantial interest may be dispensed with, and the mere fact that petitioners are concerned citizens asserting a public right, sufficiently clothes them with legal standing to initiate the instant petition. Therefore, the Court may exercise its power of judicial review and the remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. 2. Yes, there are provisions that are self-executing and not self-executing.

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that there can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, it was ruled that all provisions of the Constitution are presumed self-executing, because to treat them as requiring legislation would result in giving the legislature “the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.” And this could result in a cataclysm. In Tanada v. Angara, it was settled that sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executting provisions. In the cases of Basco, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, and Tondo Medical Center v. CA, the Court categorically ruled that sections 11, 12, 13, 17, and 18 of Article II, Section 13 of Article XIII, and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are non-self-executing. The very terms of these provisions show that they are not judicially enforeceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. In specific application to the present petitions, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court also ruled that section 1, Article XIV on the right of all citizens to quality education is also not self-executory. Further, Section 6, Article XIV on the use of the Filipino language as a medium of instruction is also not self-executory. Therefore, all provisions in the Constitution are presumed to be all selfexecutory, there are still provisions that are considered not self-executory.

Amendment and Revision ( Article XVII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) SANTIAGO v. COMELEC GR. NO. 127325 March 19, 1997 FACTS: Atty. Jesus Delfin, President of the People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials through Peoples’ Initiative basing on Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The COMELEC issued an Order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition; and setting the case for hearing. Senator Roco, one of the petitioner-interveners, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC. Petitioner filed the special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments: 1)The constitutional provision on people’s initiatives to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by a law to be passed by Congress; 2) RA No. 6735 provides for 3 systems of initiative (Constitution, statutes, local legislation) but it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution; 3) RA 6735 only covers laws and not constitutional amendments; 4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (1991) to govern the conduct of initiative is ultra vires (beyond legal capacity) because only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass implementing law; 5) People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution and not revision; and 6) Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiatives.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not RA No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 2. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition solely intended to obtain an order. 3. Whether or not the lifting of term limits as proposed in the Delfin Petition would constitute a revision or an amendment to the Constitution. 4. Whether or not it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. RULING: 1. Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution is not self-executing and RA 6735 cannot be the implementing legislation. Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution is not self-executing. The details for carrying out the provision are left to the legislature. The interpellations which ensued on the modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Furthermore, the modified amendment constitutes initiative to amendments to and not revision of the Constitution. However, RA 6735 does not give for the

contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution because there was no subtitle provided for it. Hence, RA 6735 is not sufficient to be the implementing legislation for Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution. 2. COMELEC has no jurisdiction over a petition solely intended to obtain an order. COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing and thus, becomes the initiatory pleading. The Delfin petition is not an initiatory pleading since it does not contain signatures of the required number of voters (under Sec 2 of Article XVII), COMELEC has no jurisdiction before its filing. 3. There is no need to discuss whether the petition presents an amendment or revision of the Constitution. The discussion on the issue of whether it is an amendment or a revision is unnecessary if not academic since COMELEC has no jurisdiction. 4. The Supreme Court can take cognizance of the present petition for prohibition. COMELEC has no jurisdiction so it must be stopped from proceeding further. Moreover, petition for prohibition is the proper remedy. In this case, the writ is necessary in view of the highly divisive consequences on the body politic of the questioned Order. This political instability and legal confusion climate calls for judicial statesmanship because only the SC can save the nation in danger and uphold the majesty of the Constitution when the system of constitutional law is threatened.

Amendment and Revision ( Article XVII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) LAMBINO v. COMELEC GR. NO. 174153 505 SCRA 160 October 25, 2006 FACTS: On 25 August 2006, Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735. These proposed changes will shift the present BicameralPresidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.”. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

RULING: No, the Lambino Group failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative under section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire

proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. The proposed constitutional changes constitute revisions and not mere amendments. An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. In revision however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the document to determine how and to what extent they should be altered.

Other territories over which the Philippines exercises sovereignty or jurisdiction

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA under Article VII of the UNCLOS PCA Case No. 2013-19 FACTS: Philippines instituted an arbitration case against the China under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea since both parties have ratified the Convention. However, China have consistently stated its view on the lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the matter. The arbitration concerns disputed between the parties regarding the legal basis of maritime rights and entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain geographic features in the South China Sea, and the lawfulness of certain actions taken by China in the South China Sea. China asserts that they own South China Sea on the grounds that they have jurisdiction and sovereignty, historical rights and nine-dash line. However, the Philippines has asked the Tribunal to resolve a dispute between the Parties concerning the source of maritime rights and entitlements in the South China Sea. It asserts South China Sea must be based on the Convention and not on any claim to historic rights. Furthermore, the nine-dash line as stated by China as marked on Chinese maps are without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the entitlements that China would be permitted by the Convention.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction over the South China Sea.

RULING: The Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction over the South China Sea. Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea addresses a wide range of issues and includes as an integral part a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes. This system is set out in Part XV of the Convention, which provides for a variety of dispute settlement procedures, including compulsory arbitration in accordance with a procedure contained in Annex VII to the Convention. It was pursuant to Part XV of, and Annex VII to, the Convention that the Philippines commenced this arbitration against China. In this case, the Tribunal concludes that, between the Philippines and China, the Convention defines the scope of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, which may not extend beyond the limits imposed. Furthermore, Between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are

contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention. The Tribunal concludes that the Convention superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein. Therefore, the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction over the South China Sea pursuant to 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The Archipelagic Doctrine

REPUBLIC v. ERMITA GR. NO. 170867 December 4, 2018 FACTS: On December 11, 1990, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic or National Government), through the Department of Energy (DoE), entered into Service Contract No. 38 with Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines, Incorporated (collectively SPEX/OXY), as Contractor, for the exclusive conduct of petroleum operations in the area known as "Camago-Malampaya" located offshore northwest of Palawan. Exploration of the area led to the drilling of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoir about 80 kilometers from the main island of Palawan and 30 kms from the platform. The quantity of natural gas contained in the Camago-Malampaya was estimated to be sufficient to justify the pursuit of gas-to-power projects having an aggregate powergenerating capacity of approximately 3,000 megawatts operating at baseload for 20 to 25 years. The Contractor was subsequently composed of the consortium of SPEX, Shell Philippines LLC, Chevron Malampaya LLC and Philippine National Oil Company-Exploration Corporation (PNOC-EC). On June 10, 1998, DoE Secretary Francisco L. Viray wrote Palawan Governor Salvador P. Socrates, requesting for the deferment of payment of 50% of Palawan's share in the project for the first seven years of operations, estimated at US$222.89 Million, which it would use to pay for the National Power Corporation's Take-or-Pay Quantity (TOPQ) obligations under the latter's Gas Sale and Purchase Agreements with SPEX/OXY. On October 16, 2001, the CamagoMalampaya natural gas project was inaugurated. The Provincial Government of Palawan asserted its claim over forty percent (40%) of the National Government's share in the proceeds of the project. It argued that since the reservoir is located within its territorial jurisdiction, it is entitled to said share under Section 290 of the Local Government Code. The National Government disputed the claim, arguing that since the gas fields were approximately 80 k.ms from Palawan's coastline, they are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the province and is within the national territory of the Philippines. Negotiations took place between the National Government and the Provincial Government of Palawan on the sharing of the proceeds from the project, with the former proposing to give Palawan 20% of said proceeds after tax. The negotiations, however, were unsuccessful. On March 14, 2003, in a letter to the Secretaries of the Department of Energy (DoE), the

Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the Department of Finance (DoF), Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes (Governor Reyes) reiterated his province's demand for the release of its 40% share. Attached to said letter was Resolution No. 5340-03 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan calling off further negotiations with the National Government and authorizing Governor Reyes to engage legal services to prosecute the province's claim. The Province of Palawan claims that the National Government failed to fulfill their commitments under the Interim Agreement and that it has not received its stipulated share since it was signed. The RTC held that it was "unthinkable" to limit Palawan's territorial jurisdiction to its landmass and municipal waters considering that the Local Government Code empowered them to protect the environment, and R.A. No. 7611 adopted a comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province. The RTC further declared that the Regalian Doctrine could not be used by the Department Secretaries as a shield to defeat the Constitutional provision giving LGUs an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of national wealth within their respective areas. The doctrine, said the RTC, is subject to this Constitutional limitation and the 40% LGU share set by the Local Government Code. On December 29, 2005, the Provincial Government of Palawan filed a motion to require the Secretaries of the DoE, DoF and DBM to render a full accounting of actual payments made by SPEX to the Bureau of Treasury from October 1, 2001 to December 2005, and to freeze and/or place Palawan's 40% share in an escrow account. On December 1, 2007, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 683 which authorized the release of funds to the implementing agencies pursuant to the PIA, without prejudice to any ongoing discussion or the final judicial resolution of Palawan's claim of territorial jurisdiction over the Camago-Malampaya area. E.O. No. 683. In the CA's Resolution dated May 29, 2008, Arigo et al.'s petition for certiorari was denied due course and dismissed. The CA held that the task of submitting relevant documents fell squarely on Arigo, et al. as petitioners invoking its jurisdiction. It added that Arigo, et al. should have submitted a certification from this Court's Third Division concerning the unavailability of the records of G.R. No. 170867 and that they could have simply secured a copy of the PIA from the Malacañang Records Office as the official repository of all documents related to the Executive's functions. On December 16, 2008, the CA issued a Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

On February 23, 2009, Arigo, et al. filed a petition for review on certiorari over the CA's May 29, 2008 and December 16, 2008 Resolutions, arguing that the case was ripe for decision and that the documents required by the CA were not necessary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the natural resources in the Camago-Malampaya reservoir belong to the State.

RULING: YES, the Camago-Malampaya reservoir belongs to the State. The archipelagic doctrine is embodied in Article I of the 1987 Constitution which provides: The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. The regalian doctrine, in turn, is found in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which states: Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. It is at once evident that the foregoing doctrines find no application in this case which involves neither a question of what comprises the Philippine territory or the ownership of all natural resources found therein. There is no debate that the natural resources in the Camago-Malampaya reservoir belong to the State. Palawan's claim is anchored not on ownership of the reservoir but on a revenue-sharing scheme, under Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 290 of the Local Government Code, that allows LGUs to share in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth provided they are found within their respective areas. To deny the LGU's

share on the basis of the State's ownership of all natural resources is to render Section 7 of Article X nugatory for in such case, it will not be possible for any LGU to benefit from the utilization of national wealth. To the states' dismay, the Court concluded that these cases remained grounded on sound constitutional principles. Whatever interest the states may have held in the sea prior to statehood, the Court held, as a matter of "purely legal principle the Constitution allotted to the federal government jurisdiction over foreign commerce, foreign affairs, and national defense and it necessarily follows, as a matter of constitutional law, that as attributes of these external sovereign powers the federal government has paramount rights in the marginal sea. In this case, there are applicable laws found in Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and in Sections 289 and 290 of the Local Government Code. They limit the LGUs' share to the utilization of national wealth located within their respective areas or territorial jurisdiction. As herein before-discussed, however, existing laws do not include the Camago-Malampaya reservoir within the area or territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan. The supposed presence of gas pipes through the northern part of Palawan cannot justify granting the province the 40% LGU share because both the Constitution and the Local Government Code refer to the LGU where the natural resource is situated. The 1986 Constitutional Commission referred to this area as "the locality, where God chose to locate his bounty," while the Senate deliberations on the proposed Local Government Code cited it as the area where the natural resource is "extracted." To hold otherwise, on the basis of equity, will run afoul of the letter and spirit of both constitutional and statutory law. It is settled that equity cannot supplant, overrule.

Straight Baseline Method MAGALLONA v. ERMITA GR. NO. 187167 August 16, 2011

FACTS: RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I. RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo. RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island. Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayers, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522. It reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

RULING: RA 9522 is constitutional. First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty—the role played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto. This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it. The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the

waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and it will weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

Doctrine of Parens Patriae SORIANO v. LAGUARDIA GR. NO. 164785 587 SCRA 79 April 29, 2009 FACTS:

In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano seeks to nullify and set aside an order and a decision of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterances he made in his television show, Ang Dating Daan. After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in... relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. The same order also set the case for preliminary investigation. The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case. Two days after,however, petitioner sought to withdraw his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive suspension order thus issued.

ISSUE: Is petitioner's preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.

RULING: Petitioner's contention is untenable. The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB's authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits... for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be... x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television." In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in which absolute permissiveness is the norm. Petitioner's flawed belief that he may simply utter

gutter profanity on television without adverse consequences, under the guise of free speech, does... not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We repeat: freedoms of speech and expression are not absolute freedoms. To say "any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows" is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or... expression is per se invalid. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and expression, and indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech.

De Jure v. De Facto Government LAWYERS LEAGUE v. AQUINO GR. NO. 73748 May 22, 1986

FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking over the government. Days later, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.” Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Aquino government is legitimate. RULING: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but a political question where the wisdom of the people would be the only judge. The people have made their judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Furthermore, the international community has already recognized the legitimacy of the present government.

Definition of Sovereignty TAÑADA v. ANGARA GR. NO. 118295 272 SCRA 18 May 2, 1997 FACTS:

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO. Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petition presents a justiciable controversy. 2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. 3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress. 4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence. 5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.

RULING: In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or

not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.” While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.” The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in. The 1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.” In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes. The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.

Definition of Sovereignty RUFFY v. CHIEF OF STAFF GR. NO. L-533 75 PHIL 875 August 20, 1946 FACTS:

Major Ruffy was the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary garrison stationed in Mindoro. However, he was relieved of his assignment as Commanding Officer, Bolo Battalion, and Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio was put in Ruffy's place where Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners. After the commission of this crime, the petitioners, it is alleged, seceded from the 6th Military District. It was this murder which gave rise to petitioner's trial, the legality of which is now being contested. As a result, Ruffy and others filed a petition for prohibition, praying that Chief of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial. Preliminary injunction having been denied by us and the General Court Martial having gone ahead with the trial, which eventually resulted in the acquittal of one of the defendants, Ramon Ruffy, the dismissal of the case as to another, Victoriano Dinglasan, and the conviction of Jose L. Garcia, Prudente M. Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus, the last-named four petitioners now seek in their memorandum to convert the petition into one for certiorari, with the prayer that the records of the proceedings before the General Court Martial be ordered certified to this court for review on the ground that petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed and they have raised an additional question of law that the 93(d)Article of War is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Article 93 is constitutional. RULING: No, Article 93d Article of War is unconstitutional. According to Article 93(d) Article of War states "that any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of was shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may direct." In this case, Article 93d Article of War violates Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines on the ground that there is no review is provided by that law to be made by the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life imprisonment or death. Therefore, Article 93d Article of War is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution. Derogation of Sovereignty TAÑADA v. ANGARA GR. NO. 118295 272 SCRA 18 May 2, 1997 FACTS:

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes (1), (2) and (3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING: No. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.” The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.

Derogation of Sovereignty BAYAN v. ZAMORA GR. NO. 138570 October 10, 2000 FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” ISSUE: Whether or not the Visiting Force Agreement is unconstitutional. RULING: NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. Derogation of Sovereignty PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GRP GR. NO. 183591 October 14, 2008 FACTS:

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government ‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the MindanaoSulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was described as ―associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.

Ruling: The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does

not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

Citizens of the Philippines MO YA LIM YAO v. COMMISSIONER OF IMIIGRATION GR. NO. L-21289 41 SCRA 292 October 4, 1971 FACTS: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her

great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

RULING: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16.

Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. There is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to nativeborn Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

Citizens of the Philippines DJUMANTAN v. DOMINGO GR. NO. 99358 January 30, 1995 FACTS:

Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker. He then embraced and was converted to Islam. He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the Philippines. Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests” of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.” As “guests,” petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”, however, subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration. Banez’ eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. They revoked the visa previously granted to her.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration status from temporary to permanent resident legal.

RULING: No. There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines. The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and “may be admitted” as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of

a Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens

Citizens of the Philippines POE v. COMELEC GR. NO. 221697 March 8, 2016 FACTS: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo on 3 September 1968. Parental care

and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relative Emiliano and his wife. Three days after, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the OCRIloilo. In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar. When Grace was five years old, celebrity spouses Fenando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces filed a petition for her adoption with MTC of San Juan City. Thereafter the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Then the OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. Grace registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office and secured her Voter' Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Also, applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by DFA and subsequently she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7 Grace married Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony. She became a naturalized American citizen and owned U.S. Passport No. 017037793. Grace filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten years and eleven months counted from 24 May 2005. She attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon. However, Senator Tadtad alledge in his petition to disqualify Grace under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, on the ground that she lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency.

ISSUE: Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a Natural -born Filipino Citizen. RULING: Yes, Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a Natural born Filipino Citizen. According to Article 15 paragraph one of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that Everyone has the right to a nationality. According to Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws which states that nationality of the country of birth which means that a child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known. A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found.

Also According to Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which states that A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State. In this case, That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. In Razon v. Tagitis, this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international law”. Therefore, Grace Poe Llamanzares is natural born citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Article 15 paragraph, and Article 2 of the 1961 United N Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws ations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.

Election of Philippine Citizenship In re: VICENTE CHING BAR MATTER NO. 914 October 1, 1999 FACTS: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at

the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union. The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Ching did elect Filipino citizenship, but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

RULING: No, Ching should not be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of CA No. 625 or fourteen years after he had reached the age of majority. The age of majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. The Supreme Court noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure

in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Doctrine of Implied Election CO v. HRET GR. NO. 92191-92 July 30, 1991 FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and

the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent alleging that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared respondent Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. 2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers.

RULING: 1. Yes, the respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. The respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen. 2. The Court declared that HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.

Natural-born Citizens BENGSON v. HRET and TEODORO CRUZ GR. NO. 142840 May 7, 2001 FACTS: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as

US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Is Cruz a natural born citizen of the Philippines?

RULING: Yes, Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. In Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

Natural-born Citizens TECSON v. COMELEC GR. NO. 161434 March 3, 2004 FACTS: FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to cancel his certificate of candidacy on

the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his COC that he is a natural born citizen on the ground that his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject. Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration and the motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc. Unsatisfied with the result, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen. RULING: FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen. According to Section 2, Paragraph 1, Article 4, of the 1987 Constitution which provides that"natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In this case, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents that FPJ is a natural born Filipino Citizen. Therefore, FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen because of the different public documents stated above. Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance MERCADO v. MANZANO GR. NO. 135083 May 26, 1999 FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for ViceMayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification

filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position. However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the Philippines.

RULING: No. The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

Naturalization REPUBLIC v. DELA ROSA GR. NO. 104654 232 SCRA 785 June 6, 1994 FACTS: Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats for the same position. Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.

However, the petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner. As a result, COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166 which provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board of canvassers on questions affecting its composition or proceedings was three days. On the other hand, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the fundamental issue of private respondent’s disqualification in the guise of technicality. Furthermore, Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondent’s name in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was as American citizen. Also, that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive because the case is still on appeal before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dela Rosa is a Filipino citizen when he runs as Governor of Sorsogon.

RULING: Dela Rosa is a not Filipino citizen when he runs as Governor of Sorsogon. Both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. In this case, Dela Rosa is not a Filipino citizen when he runs and wins being the Governor of Sorsogon which is a violation of the Constitution and LGC. Therefore, Dela Rosa is an alien when he runs and wins as Governor of Sorsogon.

Naturalization REPUBLIC v. HUANG TE FU GR. NO. 200983 March 18, 2015 FACTS: On March 19, 2004, respondent Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy – a citizen of the Republic of China (Taiwan) – filed a sworn Declaration of Intent to Become a Citizen of the Philippines with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). On April 27, 2005, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) a Petition for Naturalization, which was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. Q-05-55251 and assigned to Branch 96.

Petitioner thereafter testified that he was born on August 15, 1976 in Taiwan; that his father, Huang Ping-Hsung, and mother, Huang Wen, Chiu-Yueh are both Chinese nationals; that he is the holder of Alien Certificate of Registration No. E062035 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 259804; that he resided at Lin 4, Chienkuo Li, Panchiao City, Taipei County, Taiwan Province since his birth until he came to Manila, Philippines on August 13, 1982; that he first stayed at Santiago Street, Valenzuela City; that they transferred to Biak-na-Bato Street, San Francisco Del Monte and they later transferred to 23-C, 3rd Street, 10th Avenue, Caloocan City; that petitioner presently resides at No. 64- A Parklane Street, Barangay Sangandaan, Project 8, Quezon City; that he attended Philippine Cultural High School for his elementary and secondary education; that he attended Ateneo de Manila University where he took up Bachelor of Science in Computer Science. When petitioner graduated from College in the year 2000, he worked as General Manager of MIT Zipper, a company owned by the family of the petitioner; that as a businessman he conscientiously files Income Tax Returns; that he is presently married to Irene Chan, a Filipino citizen on October 01, 2000; that he has two children namely, Rochelle Ivy C. Huang, 3 years old, and Reynard Ivan C. Huang, 1 year old and that he and his family are presently residing at 64-A Parklane Street, Barangay Sangandaan, Project 8, Quezon City.1âwphi1 Petitioner further alleged that he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. He had conducted himself in a proper, irreproachable manner during his entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. These allegations are evinced by the clearances petitioner was able to secure from the Philippine National Police, National Bureau of Investigation, Office of the Clerk of Court – Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, and the Office of the City Prosecutor. He has mingled socially with the Filipinos, and have [sic] evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos. Petitioner further alleged that he is not a polygamist nor a believer in the practice of polygamy. He has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or any incurable or contagious disease. The nation of which he is presently a citizen or subject of, is not at war with the Philippines. He is not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments. He has all the qualifications required and none of the disqualifications under Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Moreover, petitioner’s intention to become a citizen of the Philippines is being done in good faith, and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign state, prince, potentate or sovereignty and particularly to the Chinese Government of which at this time he is a citizen and subject, and that petitioner shall reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of filing of this petition up to the time of [his] admission to the Philippine Citizenship. Based on the foregoing, the Court believes that the petitioner was able to establish by sufficient evidence, both testimonial and documentary, that he has all the qualifications and

none of the disqualifications provided for under the law which will warrant the granting of the relief being prayed for. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT HUANG TE FUHAS DULY COMPLIED WITH THE RIGID REQUISITES PRESCRIBED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW, AS TO ENTITLE HIM TO BE ADMITTED AS A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. RULING: No, In Republic v. Hong, it was held in essence that an applicant for naturalization must show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization law; otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be denied. This ponente has likewise held that "the he courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law." Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that an applicant for naturalization must be of good moral character and must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. In regard to the requirement that the applicant must have a known lucrative trade, this ponente declared: Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization." Indeed, it is even doubtful that respondent is carrying on a trade at all. He admitted during trial that he was not even listed or included in the payroll of his family’s zipper business. If this is the case, then he may not be considered an employee thereof. One of the most effective pieces of evidence to prove employment – aside from the employment contract itself and other documents such as daily time records is a worker’s inclusion in the payroll. With this admitted fact, one may not be faulted for believing that respondent’s alleged employment in his family’s zipper business was contrived for the sole purpose of complying with the legal requirements prior to obtaining Philippine citizenship. Either way, respondent’s deliberate non-inclusion in the payroll of his parents’ business can have only the most unpleasant connotations. And hisconsent to be part of such scheme

reflects negatively on his moral character. It shows a proclivity for untruthfulness and dishonesty, and an unreserved willingness and readiness to violate Philippine laws. Moreover, respondent’s admitted false declaration under oath contained in the August 2001 deed of sale that he is a Filipino citizen – which he did to secure the seamless registration of the property in the name of his wife – is further proof of respondent’s lack of good moral character. It is also a violation of the constitutional prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign individuals. His defense that he unknowingly signed the deed is unacceptable. First of all, as a foreigner living in a foreign land, he should conduct himself accordingly in this country – with care, circumspect, and respect for the laws of the host. Finally, as an educated and experienced businessman, it must be presumed that he acted with due care and signed the deed of sale with full knowledge of its import. Having decided in the foregoing manner, We must conclude the instant case and disregard the other issues and arguments of the parties; they are deemed irrelevant and will not alter the conclusion arrived at. As far as this Court is concerned, respondent has failed to satisfy the law which renders him completely undeserving of Filipino citizenship.

Loss of Citizenship MAQUILING v. COMELEC GR. NO. 195649 April 16, 2013 FACTS: We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Courts Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen can run for a local elective position?

RULING: No, dual citizens are ineligible for local public office. There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national. It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times. The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use." This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine passport. Arnado’s travel records show that he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.

By Naturalization of a Foreign Country FRIVALDO v. COMELEC GR. NO. 87193 174 SCRA 245 June 23, 1989 FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE: Is Frivaldo a Filipino citizen? RULING: No, Frivaldo is not a Filipno citizen. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

By Naturalization of a Foreign Country LABO v. COMELEC GR. NO. 86564 176 SCRA 1 August 1, 1989

FACTS: In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an

Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office. 2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified. RULING: No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress – none of this happened. Labo cannot serve public office because he is a foreigner. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen. Moreover, Lardizabal cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not

acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

By Express Renunciation or Expatriation YU v. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO GR. NO. L-83882 169 SCRA 364 January 24, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10, 1978, he was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980. The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a petition for habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en

banc. The Court en banc denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship RULING: Yes. Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

Retroactivity of Repatriation FRIVALDO v. COMELEC GR. NO. 120295 257 SCRA 727 June 28, 1996 FACTS: Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63". As a result respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of RTC, Manila. However, Frivaldo filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," for him to file his COC on time.The motion was granted wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published, nor a copy thereof posted.Six days later,

the Judge rendered a decision granting JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen.On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge. However, Quiterio H. Hermo filed "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" alleging that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects and prayed for a new trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law. After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo is naturalized Filipino Citizen RULING: Frivaldo is not a naturalized Filipino Citizen. According to Section 9 of the said Revised Naturalization Law. both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies. In this case, the petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by the provisions above. As the law requires no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation and publication requirements however Frivaldo did not comply to these provisions. Therefore, Frivaldo is not a naturalized Filipino citizen on the ground that he did not comply with the laws stated above.

Basis of Immunity LASCO v. UN REVOLVING FUND GR. NO. 109095-109107 241 SCRA 681 February 23, 1995 FACTS: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. Petitioners are the complainants for illegal dismissal and damages. Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. ISSUE: Whether or not specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity

RULING: Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that ³each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party. Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island.

Basis of Immunity ARIGO v. SWIFT GR. NO. 206510 September 16, 2014 FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles

east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing. 2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian. 3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case. RULING: 1. Yes, petitioners have legal standing. Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations. 2.Yes, US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian. The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act

or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling. During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea. In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions: Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately. Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law. Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US? According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter

of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS. Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.” The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our longtime ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features. In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31. 3. No, waiver of immunity from suit is not applicable in this case. The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately. The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for

the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.

Basis of Immunity HUDCC v. ROQUE GR. NO. 203610 October 10, 2016 FACTS: Gonzalo Roque, Jr. (Gonzalo), Manuela Almeda-Roque, Eduvigis A. Paredes, Michael A. Paredes, Purification Almeda, Jose A. Almeda, Michelle A. Almeda, Michael A. Almeda, Alberto Delura, and Theresa Almeda (respondents), owned several parcels of land with a total area of about 9,811 square meters, located in Constitution Hills, Quezon City. Gonzalo represented the respondents in the court proceedings. In 1978, the Republic, through the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), approached the respondents and asked them to sell a portion of the land at governmentdictated prices lower than the market value. The Republic was supposed to use the land for President Marcos' National Government Center (NGC) Project — his plan to bring together the

various national government offices in one venue for greater efficiency and to create additional areas for the expanding needs of the central government and the people. The register of deeds cancelled the three certificates of title and issued six new titles. The RTC decided in the respondents' favor. The CA affirmed the RTC's decision ISSUE: Whether the Republic is immune from suit. RULING: No, the Republic is not immune from suit. The Constitution provides that "the State may not be sued without its consent.” One instance when a suit is against the State is when the Republic is sued by name, as in this case. A suit against the State is allowed when the State gives its consent, either expressly or impliedly. Express consent is given through a statute while implied consent is given when the State enters into a contract or commences litigation. Although not all contracts entered into by the government operates as a waiver of its non-suability, the Court held in the two cases below that the State effectively gave its consent when it entered into contracts and committed breach. In the present case, the Republic entered into deeds of sale with the respondents to construct the NGC Project on the lots sold. To facilitate the sale, the Republic created a negotiating team to discuss the terms of the sale with the respondents. The latter agreed to the negotiated sale on these alleged conditions: (a) that they will have the right to repurchase the properties if the NGC Project does not push through; and (b) that the NGC Project will increase the market value of their remaining properties. Following Santiago and Republic, the State's failure to abide by these conditions constitutes the State's implied waiver of its immunity. We reiterate that the doctrine of state immunity from suit cannot serve to perpetrate an injustice on a citizen. If we rule otherwise, we will be tolerating unfair dealing in contract negotiation.

Basis of Immunity CITY OF BACOLOD v. PHUTURE VISIONS CO. GR. NO. 190289 January 17, 2018 FACTS: Phuture Visions Incorporated applied with the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) for an authority to operate bingo games, to which it was issued a provisional Grant of Authority (GOA). Phuture likewise applied for the renewal of its mayor’s permit with “professional services, band/entertainment services”. Upon submission of requirements, Phuture was issued a “claim slip” for it to claim the actual mayor’s permit. However, the City of Bacolod found discrepancies in the submitted requirements, wherein the application form was notarized earlier than the amendment of its Articles of Incorporation to reflect the company's primary purpose for bingo operations. Aside from this, respondent failed to pay the necessary permit fee/assessment fee under the applicable tax ordinances of the City of Bacolod. Phuture started the operation of its bingo outlet at SM Bacolod without waiting for the release of the mayor's permit. Because of this, Atty. Allan Zamora issued a Closure Order dated March 2, 2007. Phuture claimed that the closure is tainted with malice and bad faith and that City of Bacolod did not have the legal authority to shut down said bingo operations, especially since PAGCOR itself had already issued a provisional GOA in its favor. Petitioners

contend that the release of claim slip was mere oversight or human error in the City Government’s employee. Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the City of Bacolod, which Phuture appealed. Court of Appeals remanded the case to the court of origin to further investigate whether, in the manner by which the closure of the bingo operations was effected, Phuture was denied its proprietary right without due process of law, and to determine if damages should be awarded. Petitioners contend that hearing the action for damages effectively violates the City's immunity from suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Bacolod may be sued for damages. RULING: No. The City of Bacolod has not given its consent to be sued. The CA also erred in adjudging subject business permit as having been issued by respondent City Mayor in the performance of proprietary functions. The power to issue or grant licenses and business permits is not an exercise of the government's proprietary function. Instead, it is in an exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a governmental act (Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals). Waiver of Immunity – Express Consent (ACT NO. 3038) VETERANS MANPOWER and PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. v. CA GR. NO. 91359 214 SCRA 286 September 25, 1992 FACTS: Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. alleges that the provisions under Section 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law violate the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency. Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals. Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that “all private security agencies/company

security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located.” ISSUE: Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent. RULING: Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents. Waiver of Immunity – Express Consent (CA 327) GARCIA v. CHIEF OF STAFF GR. NO. L-20213 16 SCRA 120 January 31, 1966 FACTS: Garcia, filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action to collect a sum of money against the Chief of Staff and the Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board and /or the Auditor General on the ground that he suffered injuries where he was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled while undergoing the 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga. Thereafter he filed his claim under Commonwealth Act 400. He submitted some papers in support of his claim to the Adjutant General's Office upon the latter's request. As a result, he received a letter from the said Adjutant General's Office disallowing his claim on the ground that it is alleged that Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by Republic Act 610 which took effect on January 1, 1950. By that reason of the unjustified refusal by defendants of plaintiff's claim, the latter was deprived of his disability pension and suffered thereby moral damages and attorney's fees. The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction

over the subject matter of the complaint, that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court and that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. However, the court rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action has prescribed. Thereafter, Garcia appealed in CA which it decided that Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being a money claim against the government. ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia can collect the sum of money from Chief of Staff and the Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board. RULING: Garcia cannot collect the sum of money from Chief of Staff and the Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board. According to Section 1 and Section 2 Commonwealth Act 327 which states that “In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation” and “that the party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing”. In this case, Garcia filed the collection of sum of money from Chief of Staff and the Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board which it should be be filed with the Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State cannot be sued without its consent pursuant to Section 1 and Section 2 Commonwealth Act 327 Therefore, Garcia’s petition must be filed with the Auditor General pursuant to Section 1 and Section 2 Commonwealth Act 327.

Waiver of Immunity – Express Consent (PD 1807; ART. 2180, NCC) CALLADO v. IRRI GR. NO. 106483 244 SCRA 210 May 22, 1995 FACTS: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident. Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with: (1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor; (2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery, and (3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed. In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620." ISSUE: Did the IRRI waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employeremployee relationship? RULING: No, the IRRI did not waive its immunity. P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides: Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives. The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political department of Government.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction. The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity. In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part.

Waiver of Immunity – Express Consent MERRIT v. GOV’T OF THE PHILIPPINES GR. NO. L-11154 34 PHIL 311 March 21, 1916 FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same. ISSUES: 1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? 2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?

RULING: 1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. 2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable.

Waiver of Immunity – Implied Consent MINISTERIO v. CITY OF CEBU GR. NO. L-31635 40 SCRA 464 August 31, 1971 FACTS: Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu. To seek the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. It was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June 30, 1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in the alternative, either the restoration of possession or the payment of the just compensation. In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that

the suit in reality was one against the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11, 1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 647-B of the Banilad estate described in the Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters; That the National Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot No. 647-B is still in the possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as yet paid the value of the land which is being utilized for public use." The lower court dismissed the complaint on January 30, 1969 stating that the case is undoubtedly against the National Government and there is now showing that the Government has not consented to be sued in this case. The petitioners appealed by certiorari to review the decision and contended that they are entitled for just compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1 (2) of the Constitution. ISSUE: Is the decision of the CFI of Cebu to dismiss the complaint by reason Government immunity from suit correct? HELD: No, the decision of the CFI of Cebu is not correct. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot be an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely there was a failure on what the law requires and the petitioners has the right to demand from the Government what is due to them. The Supreme Court decided that the lower court’s decision of dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case is remanded to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.

Waiver of Immunity – Implied Consent REPUBLIC v. PURISIMA GR. NO. L-36084 78 SCRA 470 August 31, 1977 FACTS: On September 7, 1972, a motion to dismiss was filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s decision is valid. RULING:

No. The Constitution states that: “The State may not be sued without its consent. The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance decision: “Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law. The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to have no binding force on the government.

Test of Suability – Incorporated PNR v. IAC GR. NO. 70547 217 SCRA 401 January 22, 1993 FACTS: The passenger express train of Philippine National Railways and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit Inc. collided at the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit Bulacan at 1:30 in the afternoon of August 10, 1947 causing damage to the bus and its passengers, 18 of whom died and 53 suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleges that the collision was due to the negligence and imprudence of PNR and its engineer Honorio Cirbado in operating in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman.

ISSUE: Is PNR immune from suit?

RULING: There is no admissible evidence to show that the bus driver did not take necessary precaution in traversing the track. Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus driver for he had taken necessary precautions before passing over the railway track. The

failure of PNR, on the other hand, to put a crossbar, or signal light, flagman, or switchman or semaphores is evidence of negligence on their part. By the doctrine of implied powers, the power to sue and be sued is implicit from the faculty to transact private business. PNR is not exercising governmental powers, as such, it is not immune from suit.

Test of Suability – Unincorporated ATO v. RAMOS GR. NO. 159402 644 SCRA 36 February 23, 2011 FACTS: Spouses Ramos discovered that a portion of their land registered was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by ATO. As a consequence, Spouses Ramos agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of ₱778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands leading for the Spouses Ramos filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC. ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. Also, they asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions. As a result, the RTC denied the ATO’s motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense. After the RTC likewise denied ATO’s motion for reconsideration, ATO commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to assail the RTC’s orders. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, upon its finding that the assailed orders were not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Unsatisfied with the result, ATO ask in the Supreme Court the reversal of the Decision of RTC and CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for State’s Consent for the Spouses Ramos can sue ATO.

RULING: There is no need for State’s consent for the Spouses Ramos can sue ATO. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution which states that “the State may not be sued without its consent”. An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen.In this case, The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the ATO on the ground that it is an agency of the State engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the State’s exclusive prerogative. Therefore, there is no need for the consent of the state in order to sue a governmental agency or office if their acts do not constitute a governmental function.

Suability versus Liability PALAFOX v. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE GR. NO. L-10659 January 31, 1958 FACTS: Sabas Torralba was employed as a truck driver of the provincial government of Ilocos Norte. While driving his truck, he ran over Proceto Palafox, resulting to the latter’s death. Sabas was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence to which he pleaded guilty. The heirs of Palafox instituted a civil case against him and the Province.

ISSUE: Can the Province of Ilocos Norte be held liable for the death of Palafox? RULING: NO. The general rule is that local government units are not liable for negligent acts of its employees while they are performing governmental functions or duties. In this case, the driver was involved in the construction or maintenance of roads which was a governmental duty. Therefore, the province cannot be held liable for his negligent act. However tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary consideration. (Palafox vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, 102 Phil 1186)

Suability versus Liability UP v. DIZON GR. NO. 171182 679 SCRA 54 August 23, 2012 FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction of its buildings in its Los Baños campus. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance. On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the RTC filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City. Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution. On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UP’s petition. The denial became final and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC their motions for execution despite their previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UP’s depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds.

Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA but the CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the UP’s funds can be validly garnished? RULING: UP’s funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a “chartered institution” performing a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a “special trust fund,” the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UP’s mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. The Constitution strictly mandated that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP. The settlement of the monetary claim was still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA despite the final decision of the RTC having already validated the claim.

Suability versus Liability GSIS v. GROUP MANAGEMENT CORP. GR. NO. 167000 651 SCRA 279 June 8, 2011 FACTS: Lapu-Lapu Development & Housing Corporation (LLDHC) was the registered owner of seventy-eight (78) lots (subject lots), situated in Barrio Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City. LLDHC and the GSIS entered into a Project and Loan Agreement for the development of the subject lots. GSIS agreed to extend a Twenty-Five Million Peso-loan (P25,000,000.00) to LLDHC, and in return, LLDHC will develop, subdivide, and sell its lots to GSIS members. To secure the payment of the loan, LLDHC executed a real estate mortgage over the subject lots in favor of GSIS. For LLDHC’s failure to fulfill its obligations, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage. As the lone bidder in the public auction sale, GSIS acquired the subject lots, and eventually was able to consolidate its ownership over the subject lots with the corresponding transfer certificates of title (TCTs) issued in its name. GMC offered to purchase on installments the subject lots from GSIS for a total price of One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,100,000.00), with the aggregate area specified as 423,177 square meters. GSIS accepted the offer and on February 26, 1980, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over the subject lots. However, when GMC discovered that the total area of the subject lots was only 298,504 square meters, it wrote GSIS and proposed to proportionately reduce the purchase price to conform to the actual total area of the subject lots. GSIS approved this proposal and

an Amendment to the Deed of Conditional Sale was executed to reflect the final sales agreement between GSIS and GMC. GSIS, submitted to the court a Commission on Audit (COA) Memorandum, purportedly disallowing in audit the sale of the subject lots for “apparent inherent irregularities,” the sale price to GMC being lower than GSIS’s purchase price at the public auction. ISSUE: Whether or not LLDHC is guilty of forum shopping.

RULING: Yes, LLDHC is guilty of forum shopping. There is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion from another. In the present case, after Lapu-lapu RTC had rendered its decision in favor of private respondent, petitioner filed several petitions before this court and the CA essentially seeking the annulment. Therefore, LLDHC is is guilty of forum shopping.

Execution MAKATI v. CA GR. NO. 89898-99 190 SCRA 206 October 1, 1990 FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution. RULING: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said

amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.

Execution HAGONOY v. DUMDUM GR. NO. 168289 March 22, 2010 FACTS: The case stems from a Complaint filed by herein private respondent Emily Rose Go Ko Lim Chao against herein petitioner for the collection of a sum of money and damages. It was alleged that sometime in the middle of the year 2000, respondent, doing business as KD Surplus and as such engaged in buying and selling surplus trucks, heavy equipment, machinery, spare parts and related supplies, was contracted by petitioner Ople. Respondent had entered into an agreement with petitioner municipality through Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality. As of the filing of the complaint, the total obligation of petitioner had already totaled from P5,820,000.00 to P10,026,060.13 exclusive of penalties and damages. Thus, respondent prayed for full payment of the said amount, with interest at not less than 2% per month, plus P500,000.00 as damages for business losses, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, attorney’s fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the suit. On March 20, 2003, the trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment directing the sheriff "to attach the estate, real and personal properties" of petitioners. Petitioners also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment Already Issued, invoking immunity of the state from suit, unenforceability of the contract, and failure to substantiate the allegation of fraud. The Court However denied such Motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Writ of Preliminary Attachment must be discharged.

RULING: Yes. The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or special law such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate powers, one of them is the power to sue and be sued. Execution may not issue upon such judgment, because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction. Thus, where consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is limited only to the resultant verdict on the action before execution of the judgment.

Manifestation/Characteristics of a Republican State OPOSA v. FACTORAN GR. NO. 101083 224 SCRA 792 JuLY 30, 1993 FACTS: The principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents and the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc filed an action before RTC, Branch 66 in Makati, Metro Manila against was Factoran, Jr. and the Secretary of DENR on the ground the petitioners request to the respondents to cancel all existing agreements in the country and cease and desist from, receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving timber license agreements. Despite the petitioners’ effort to have exhaust all the administrative remedies with the defendant’s office but the defendant fails and refuses to comply with the petitioners’ request. As a result, Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion. Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss on the grounds that affirming the defendant’s claim, that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question and that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. Unsatisfied with the result, Petitioners filed an instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioners have fundamental rights that are violated in this case.

RULING: Petitioners have fundamental rights that are violated in this case.According to Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. In this case, Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. Therefore, Defendants violated the Rights of the Petitioners and the generations yet unborn granted by sections 15 and 16 of Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Manifestation/Characteristics of a Republican State VILLAVICENCIO v. LUKBAN GR. NO. L-14639 39 PHIL 778 March 25, 1919 FACTS: One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute. RULING: No, Mayor Lukban Has no right to deport women with ill repute. Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban et. al must be severely punished.

Manifestation/Characteristics of a Republican State PETITIONER ORGANIZATION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR. NO. 147036-37 669 SCRA 49 April 10, 2012 FACTS: These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain presidential decrees and executive orders of the martial law era and under the incumbency of Pres. Estrada relating to the raising and use of coco-levy funds, particularly: Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313. On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted R.A. 6260 that established a Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry through capital financing. Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer the Fund through the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) whose objective was, among others, to advance the coconut farmers interests.For this purpose, the law imposed a levy ofP0.55on the coconut farmers first domestic sale of every 100 kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt convertible into CIC shares of stock. In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 which approved the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmersto enable such bank to promptly and efficiently realize the industry's credit policy.Thus, the PCA bought 72.2% of the shares of stock of First United Bank, headed by Pedro Cojuangco.Dueto changes in its corporate identity and purpose, the banks articles of incorporation were amended in July 1975, resulting in a change in the banks name from First United Bank United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) 312, establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to provide immediate income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a sustainable local market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products.The Executive Order sought to establish aP1-billion fund by disposing of assets acquired using coco-levy funds or assets of entities supported by those funds.A committee was created to manage the fund under this program.A majority vote of its members could engage the services of a reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits. At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, which created an irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund).This aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut industry, and to other agri-

related programs.The shares of stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust Funds initial capital.These shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC.E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through its Trust Department, as the Trust Funds trustee bank.The Trust Fund Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund. The Committee would designate an external auditor to do an annual audit or as often as needed but it may also request the Commission on Audit (COA) to intervene. To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission on Good Government, the Office of the Solicitor General, and other government agencies to exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,which was then pending before the Sandiganbayan and to lift the sequestration over those shares. On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313. This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R. 147036-37 to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional.On April 24, 2001 the other sets of petitioner organizations and individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being unconstitutional. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the coco-levy funds are public funds? 2. Whether or not (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313 are unconstitutional? RULING: 1.Coco-levy funds are public funds. The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law to support a proper governmental purpose.They were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general. The COA reviewed the use of the funds.The BIR treated them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public character. The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose.Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government and for all itspublic needs. Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276.The funds were collected and managed by the PCA,an independent government corporation directly under the President.And, as the respondent public officials pointed out, thepertinent laws used the termlevy, which meansto tax, in describing the exaction.

R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not raise money to boost the governments general funds butto provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the State. The funds sought to support the coconut industry,one of the main economic backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits for the coconut farmers and farm workers. Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds. Its character as such fund was made clear by the fact that they were deposited in the PNB (then a wholly owned government bank) and not in the Philippine Treasury. 2.The Court has already passed upon this question in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic of the Philippines. It held as unconstitutional Section 2 of P.D. 755 for effectively authorizing the PCA to utilize portions of theCCS Fundto pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCS Fund levies with UCPB interest free. And as there also provided, the CCS Fund, CID Fund and like levies that PCA is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning they shall be deemed private funds. In any event, such declaration is void.There is ownership when a thing pertaining to a person is completely subjected to his will in everything that is not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another. An owner is free to exercise all attributes ofownership: the right, among others, to possess, use and enjoy, abuse or consume, and dispose or alienate the thing owned. The owner is free to waive all or some of these rights in favor of others.But in the case of the coconut farmers, they could not, individually or collectively, waive what have not been and could not be legally imparted to them. Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III,Section 5of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through taxation.And since taxes could be exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be declared private properties of individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct group of persons. These assailed provisions,which removed the coco-levy funds from the general funds of the government and declared them private properties of coconut farmers,do not appear to have a color of social justice for their purpose.The levy on copra that farmers produce appears, in the first place, to be a business tax judging by its tax base.The concept of farmersbusinessmen is incompatible with the idea that coconut farmers are victims of social injustice and so should be beneficiaries of the taxes raised from their earnings. On another point, in stating that the coco-levy fund shall not be construed or interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the

general funds of the national government,P.D.s 961 and 1468 seek to remove such fund from COA scrutiny. This is also the fault of President Estradas E.O. 312 which deals with P1 billion to be generated out of the sale of coco-fund acquired assets.E.O. 313 has a substantially identical provision governing the management and disposition of the Coconut Trust Fund capitalized with the substantial SMC shares of stock that the coco-fund acquired. But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of P.D.s755,961 and 1468 as well as those of E.O.s 312 and 313 that remove such funds and the assets acquired through them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate Article IX-D, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution.Section 2(1) vests in the COA the power and authority to examine uses of government money and property.The cited P.D.s and E.O.s also contravene Section 2 of P.D. 898 (Providing for the Restructuring of the Commission on Audit), which has the force of a statute.And there is no legitimate reason why such funds should be shielded from COA review and audit.The PCA, which implements the coco-levy laws and collects the coco-levy funds, is a governmentowned and controlled corporation subject to COA review and audit. E.O. 313 suffers from an additional infirmity.Apparently, it intends to create a trust fund out of the coco-levy funds to provide economic assistance to the coconut farmers and, ultimately, benefit the coconut industry.But on closer look, E.O. 313 strays from the special purpose for which the law raises coco-levy funds in that it permits the use of coco-levy funds for improving productivity in other food areas. Clearly, E.O.313 above runs counter to the constitutional provision which directs thatall money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.Assisting other agriculturally-related programs is way off the coco-funds objective of promoting the general interests of the coconut industry and its farmers. A final point, the E.O.s also transgress P.D. 1445,Section 84(2),the first part by the previously mentioned sections of E.O. 313 and the second part by Section 4 of E.O. 312 and Sections 6 and 7 of E.O. 313.E.O. 313 vests the power to administer, manage, and supervise the operations and disbursements of the Trust Fund it established (capitalized with SMC shares bought out of coco-levy funds) in a Coconut Trust Fund Committee. Section 4 ofE.O. 312 does essentially the same thing.It vests the management and disposition of the assistance fund generated from the sale of coco-levy fund-acquired assets into a Committee of five members. In effect, the provision transfers the power to allocate, use, and disburse coco-levy funds that P.D. 232 vested in the PCA and transferred the same, without legislative authorization and in violation of P.D. 232, to the Committees mentioned above. An executive order cannot repeal a presidential decree which has the same standing as a statute enacted by Congress.

Manifestation/Characteristics of a Republican State JAWORSKI v. PAGCOR GR. NO. 144463 January 14, 2004 FACTS: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under PD No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos. On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument denominated as “Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming,” which granted Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games. On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia LI. Reyes, and SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document. Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commended its operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets. Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, filed the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, PD No. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation of PAGCOR’s franchise, under Section 14 of PD No. 1869 which provides: “Place. – The Corporation shall conduct gambling activities or games of chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x.”

Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of PD No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the “right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.” He contends that internet gambling could not have been included within the commonly accepted definition of “gambling casinos,” “clubs” or “other recreation or amusement places” as these terms refer to a physical structure in real-space where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance authorized by law. ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to contract any of its franchise to another entity such as SAGE. RULING: No, PAGCOR is not allowed to contract any of its franchise to another entity. A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language. While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that “since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.” By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not “ride on” PAGCOR’s franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling.

Sec. 1, Art. II - Manifestation/Characteristics of a Republican State GEROCHI v. DOE GR. NO. 159796 July 17, 2007 FACTS: NPC filed with ERC a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification pursuant to Section 36 of RA 9136 and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulation. The ERC in its order and decisions grant the petitions with modification which provides that TRANSCO and Distributive Utilities are directed to collect the UC-ME. As a result, PECO charged the Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal charge as reflected in their respected bills on the basis of the decision of ERC. Hence, the Gerochi and other petitioners answered that the provisions stated above is unconstitutional on the grounds that: first that the said collection is tantamount to power to tax which it is strictly a legislative function and such delegation to executive and administrative agency is unconstitutional; second the ERC is also empowered to approved and determine where the funds collected should be used; and Lastly, the imposition of Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and the amounts to taxation without representation as the consumers were not given the chance to be heard and represented. On the other hand, PSALM through the OGCC claimed that a tax is imposed to provide income to the public purposes while the Universal Charge is levied for a specific regulatory purpose. Also, ERC merely exercises a limited authority or discretion for the implementation of RA 9136. In addition, DOE, ERC, NPC through the OSG share the same view with PSALM. Respondent further contend that the Universal charge does not possess the essential characteristic of a tax. On the part of the PECO argues that it is their duty to collect and remit the said charge under Section 34 of RA 9136 and the ERC No. 2002-94. Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under Section 46 of RA 9136 and its IRR. Petitioner pray in the Supreme Court that RA 9136 and its IRR be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or Not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of ERC.

RULING: The Supreme Court states that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC. The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within

its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. Because of the increasing complexity of modern life, there is a need to delegate to administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. In this case, RA 9136 is complete in all terms and conditions enshrined in Section 36 and as stated in Article 43 and 51 provides for adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation. Therefore, there is no undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.

Sec. 2, Art. II - Defense of a State KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO GR. NO. 118910 246 SCRA 540 November 16, 1995 FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have standing? RULING: No. Stare decisis cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. Law of the case cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. Rule on conclusiveness cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are real properties in interest.

Sec. 2, Art. II - Incorporation Clause ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMELEC GR. NO. 190582 618 SCRA 32 April 8, 2010 FACTS: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals who first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. However the application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. Thereafter, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC which they argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Again, COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds. Unsatisfied with the result, Ang Ladlad filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Resolutions of the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under RA No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. ISSUE: Whether or not International Law applies in this case. RULING: Yes, not International Law applies in this case.According to the principle of nondiscrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR which states that “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” and Article 21 of UDHR states that “ Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives” In this case, our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR. The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights

Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual orientation. Therefore, the international laws applies in this case.

Sec. 2, Art. II - Incorporation Clause MIJARES v. RANADA GR. NO. 139325 455 SCRA 397 April 12, 2005 FACTS: Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly 1.9 Billion U.S. Dollars in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying Php 410.00 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, Section 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was 472 Million Philippine pesos, which Petitioners had not paid. ISSUE: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee? RULING: Yes, the amount paid by Mijares is the proper filing fee. It is the proper amount paid but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds to the same amount required for “other actions not involving property”. The Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioner’s Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners erred in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under Batasang Pambansa 129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. Section 33 of Batasang Pambansa 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property

or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. Section 16 of Batasang Pambansa 129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is Section7(b)(3), involving “other actions not involving property.”

Sec. 2, Art. II - Incorporation Clause AGUSTIN v. EDU GR. NO. L-491112 88 SCRA 195 February 2, 1979 FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition. Petitioner was an owner of a volkswagen beetle car, model 13035 already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended, as well as the Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land Transportation Commission. Respondent Land Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.229, as amended. It required the use of early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction imposes valid measure of police power? RULING: Yes, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229, as amended as well as the implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure of police power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the United Nations Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices. It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance, between the International law and municipal law in applying the rule municipal law prevails.

Sec. 2, Art. II - Incorporation Clause SEC. OF JUSTICE v. LANTION GR. NO. 139465 January 18, 2000 FACTS: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following grounds: 1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. 2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents. 3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

RULING: No, respondent’s entitlement does not constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

Sec. 2, Art. II - Incorporation Clause BAYAN MUNA v. ROMULO GR. NO. 159618 641 SCRA 17 February 1, 2011 FACTS: In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states. Via the Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect. ISSUES: 1)

Whether or not the respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute. 2) Whether or not the agreement valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate. HELD: The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. The principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states].” the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute. There is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty under international law. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow

any provision in the treaty would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts. Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, “executive altogether.” The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.

Sec. 12, Art. II - Sanctity of Family Life

IMBONG v. OCHOA GR. NO. 204819 April 8, 2014 FACTS: Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall wellbeing of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives. The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether the RH law is against the constitutional Right to Life and The Family. RULING: Yes, RH Law is against the constitutional right to life and family. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to him, “fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous.” Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected. This theory of implantation does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object – it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To

adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution. It is the Court’s position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life.

Sec. 12, Art. II - Sanctity of Family Life TECSON v. COMELEC

GR. NO. 161434 March 3, 2004 Facts: FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his COC that he is a natural born citizen on the ground that his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject. Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration and the motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc. Unsatisfied with the result, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

Issue: Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen. Ruling: FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen. According to Section 2, Paragraph 1, Article 4, of the 1987 Constitution which provides that"natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In this case, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents that FPJ is a natural born Filipino Citizen. Therefore, FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen because of the different public documents stated above. Sec. 13, Art. II - Rearing of the Youth CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORP. V. MONTANO

GR. NO. 182836 603 SCRA 621 October 13, 2009 FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union. This, after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery which resulted to the death of their unborn child. Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. It posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. ISSUE: Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his unborn child. RULING: Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits. The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently. The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. Sec. 14, Art. II – Women PT&T CO. V. NLRC GR. NO. 118978

May 23, 1997 FACTS: This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T. Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented that she was single although she was married. When management found out, she was made to explain. However, her explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed from work. Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor Arbiter, Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally dismissed by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action. Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her concealment of the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty, which was why she was dismissed from work. ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee. RULING: No. Private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. Thus, could not be a ground to terminate her services. Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law. PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women

are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required. However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of Grace from work.

Sec. 16, Art. II – Balanced and Healthful Ecology PAJE v. CASIÑO GR. NO. 207267 February 3, 2015

FACTS: Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) expressing their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay coal-fired power plant. SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Zambales opposing the establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant at Sitio Naglatore, Brgy. Cawag, Subic, Zambales. Filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP Energy, first set of allegations deals with the actual environmental damage... second set of allegations deals with the failure to comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto. ISSUE: Can the validity of an ECC be challenged via a writ of kalikasan? RULING: The writ of kalikasan is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government, agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Provide judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries following requisites: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an... unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

Sec. 17, Art. II – Priority to Education, Science, and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports CUDIA v. PMA GR. NO. 211362 February 24, 2015

Facts: Herein petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the Philippine Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy Cadet graduate and be commissioned as an ensign of the Navy. Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for two minutes in his ENG 412 class, other cadets were also reported late for 5 minutes. The DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers and were logged and transmitted to the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation. Cudia incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per violation of the Honor Code specifically, Lying that is giving statements that perverts the truth in his written appeal stating that his 4th period class ended at 3:00 that made him late for the succeeding class. Cudia then submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC constituted a team to conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it recommended the case be formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty verdict and upon the order of the Chairman, the HC reconvened in the chambers, after, the Presiding Officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict and denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted a formal review and checking of findings. Special orders were issued placing Cudia on indefinite leave of absence and pending approval of separation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting his re-instatement. The matter was referred to Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision. Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings of the CRAB. CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding probable cause for Human Rights Violations. Issues: 1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cudia in utter disregard of his right to due process and in holding that he violated the Honor Code through lying. 2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs. Ruling: No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due process, education, and property should be placed in the context of the Honor Code. All the administrative remedies were exhausted. A student of a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interest for the proper functioning of the institution. The PMA may impose disciplinary measures and punishments as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs

of the institution. PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of the internal rules and regulations. As to the second issue, the court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery mandated by Article VIII of the Constitution. The court’s mandate (according to Section 1, Article 8) is expanded that the duty of the courts is not only to “settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. No one is above the law, including the military, especially in violations of Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Sec. 17, Art. II – Priority to Education, Science, and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports UP v. JUDGE AYSON GR. NO. 88386 176 SCRA 571 August 17, 1989 FACTS:

The UP Board of Regents issued an order abolishing the University of the Philippines College Baguio High School on the ground that such school is not serving as a laboratory or demonstration school, among others, invoking in their favor academic freedom. The UPCBHS filed a petition for injunction with preliminary preventive mandatory injunction with a prayer for the issuance a TRO in the CFI, invoking the right to quality education and free public secondary education. The CFI granted this and issued an order restraining the Board from implementing their decision to phase out the UPCBHS. ISSUE: Whether a petition for certiorari/prohibition to restrain the Board from implementing the decision of phasing out UPCBHS is proper? RULING: No. It is beyond cavil that the UP, as an institution of higher learning, enjoys academic freedom the institutional kind. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Acts of an administrative agency within their areas of competence must be casually overturned by the courts. Mandamus is not proper to compel a school to enroll a student for academic deficiencies because this involves the exercise by the school of discretion under academic freedom. UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditions, e.g., it must be selfsupporting, it can serve as a feeder for the UP at Baguio, it can serve as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective teachers, failing in which the University can order its abolition on academic grounds, specially where the purposes for which it was established was not satisfied. It is apparent that secondary education is not the mandated function of the University of the Philippines; consequently, the latter can validly phase out and/or abolish the UPCBHS especially so when the requirements for its continuance have not been met, Rep. Act No. 6655 to the contrary notwithstanding.

Sec. 17, Art. II – Priority to Education, Science, and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports PRC v. DE GUZMAN GR. NO. 144681 June 21, 2004 Facts:

The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine. PRC then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. However, the Board of Medicine observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam strangely unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination. As a result, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the NBI to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination. The NBI found that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions. As a result, Arlene V. De Guzman et al., for brevity filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the other respondents as intervenors. Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, charging respondents with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. The case was docketed as Adm. Case No. 1687 by the PRC. The RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 9366530 granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought by the respondents. It ordered the petitioners to administer the physician’s oath to Arlene V. De Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC. As a result, the PRC filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ to the CA and the court rendered a decision in favor with granting the petition of PRC. Unsatisfied with the result, Arlene V. De Guzman et al., for brevity filed a special civil action for mandamus to the SC Issue: Whether or not Arlene V. De Guzman et al., for brevity have the right to become Physician despite the alleged misconduct and dishonesty. Ruling: The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned

professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine as long as the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue.

Sec. 10, Art. II – Social Justice ONDOY v. IGNACIO GR. NO. L- 47178 69 SCRA 611 May 16, 1980 FACTS: Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio Ignacio. According to thechief engineer and oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the

workforce. He was invited byfriends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. Therefore, Estrella wasasking for compensation from the death of her son while in the respondents employ. However, thestatement given by the chief engineer and oiler was ignored by the hearing officer and thereforedismissed the claim for lack of merit. Even when a motion for reconsideration was filed, this was alsodenied by the Secretary of Labor for the same reason, that is, lack of merit. ISSUE: Is social justice applicable in this case? RULING: Yes, Social Justice is applicable. As defined in the case of Calalanf v. Williams, Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.” Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number." Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of Labor. It merely disregardedthe statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the principle of social justice applied inthis case is a matter of protection, not equality. The Court recognized the right of the petitioner to theclaim of compensation because her son was shown to have died while in the actual performance of hiswork. To strengthen the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, The Courtquoted another case as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who hasresources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter the stricter compliance.

Sec. 10, Art. II – Social Justice PRRM v. PULGAR GR. NO. 169227 623 SCRA 244 July 5, 2010 FACTS: Pulgar was the manager of PRRMs branch office in Quezon Province. When Pulgar was reassigned to PRRMs central office, PRRM conducted an investigation into alleged financial anomalies committed at the TBFO.

In her investigation report, Solis stated that part of the funds allotted to the TBFO was missing or not properly accounted for. The report also stated that some of the receipts that the TBFO submitted to liquidate the organizations financial transactions were fictitious and manufactured. PRRM maintains that while the investigation was ongoing, Pulgar went on leave. After the lapse of his last leave, Pulgar no longer reported to work, leading PRRM to believe that Pulgar had abandoned his work to evade any liability arising from the investigation. PRRM was therefore surprised to learn that Pulgar had filed an illegal dismissal case. Pulgar tells another tale. According to him, he submitted a letter to PRRM to complain that he was not given the right to confront and question Solis,but his letter went unanswered. Thereafter, he was not allowed to enter the premises of the organization. Pulgar also alleges that PRRMs representatives removed his personal properties and records from his office, placed them in boxes and kept them in storage. Believing he was constructively dismissed by PRRMs actions, Pulgar filed a complaint against PRRM for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter found in his decision that Pulgar had been illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter in its decision and dismissed Pulgars complaint, giving more weight to PRRMs allegation that Pulgar abandoned his work. CA rendered the assailed decision, granting Pulgars petition and reinstating the Labor Arbiters decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Pulgar was illegally dismiised? RULING: Yes, Pulgar was constructively dismissed from employment. The CA relied on two main factors: (a) Pulgar's claim that he was barred from entering the premises on March 31, 1997; and (b) the fact that Pulgar immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PRRM. Pulgar claims he was constructively dismissed when he was barred from the premises on March 31, 1997, he still filed his application for leave for April 1-15, 1997. The fact alone that Pulgar was able to return to the office to file his application for leave for April 1-15, 1997 raises doubt as to his purported ban from the premises. More importantly, if Pulgar truly believed that he had already been constructively dismissed on March 31, 1997, reason dictates that he would no longer bother to apply for a leave of absence from PRRM for April 1-15, 1997. The fact that he did belies his contention that he believed he had already been constructively dismissed on March 31, 1997. The fact that respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, as noted by the CA, is not by itself sufficient indicator that respondent had no intention of deserting his employment since the totality of respondent's antecedent acts palpably display the contrary. In Abad v.

Roselle Cinema, the Court ruled that: The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal should be taken into account together with the surrounding circumstances of a certain case. In Arc-Men Food Industries Inc. v. NLRC, the Court ruled that the substantial evidence proffered by the employer that it had not, in the first place, terminated the employee, should not simply be ignored on the pretext that the employee would not have filed the complaint for illegal dismissal if he had not really been dismissed. "This is clearly a non-sequitur reasoning that can never validly take the place of the evidence of both the employer and the employee." While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor .Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. We have previously ruled on the Labor Arbiters jurisdiction to rule on all money claims, including those of the employer, arising out of the employer-employee relationship. Unfortunately for PRRM, it never raised as an issue the money allegedly still in Pulgars custody in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, or even before the NLRC. As a factual matter, this issue should have been raised at the earliest opportunity before the Labor Arbiter, to allow both parties to present their evidence. The rule is wellsettled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.

Sec. 6, Art. II – Separation of the Church and State AUSTRIA v. NLRC GR. NO. 124382 312 SCRA 410 August 16, 1999 FACTS: The Seventh Day Adventists(SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were terminated.

On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications form Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very ill to be able to do the collecting. A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing: 1) Misappropriation of denominational funds; 2) Willful breach of trust; 3) Serious misconduct; 4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and 5) Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative as grounds for the termination of his services. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for reinstatement and back wages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner. SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state. RULING: No, the termination is not an ecclesiastical affair. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor Code. Sec. 6, Art. II – Separation of the Church and State UCCP v. BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC. GR. NO. 195669 674 SCRA 92 May 30, 2016 FACTS: Petitioner United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines. Respondent Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI), is likewise a religious corporation with a personality separate and distinct from UCCP. Private respondents are members of BUCCI. BUCCI belonged to the

Cebu Conference Inc. (CCI) and enjoyed a peaceful co-existence until late 1989 when BUCCI constructed a fence that encroached upon the right of way allocated by UCCP for CCI. The General Assembly attempted to settle the dispute and rendered a decision in favor of CCI. This triggered a series of events, which further increased enmity and led to the formal break-up of BUCCI from UCCP. Consequently, BUCCI filed its Amended Article of Incorporation and By-Laws, which provided for and affected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved the same. UCCP filed a complaint before SEC to reject the same but SEC dismissed UCCP’s petition. CA affirmed SEC, hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the separation of BUCCI from UCCP is valid. 2. Whether or not the amendments to the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of BUCCI made after it separated from UCCP are valid. 3. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to the use of the name Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. HELD: YES. SEC defended the right of BUCCI to disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition of its constitutional freedom to associate and disassociate. SEC also pointed out that since UCCP used the fact of BUCCI’s disaffiliation to consolidate its claim over the property subject of unlawful detainer case against BUCCI before the RTC, UCCP cannot now deny the validity of said disaffiliation. The SC ruled that the matter at hand is not purely an ecclesiastical affair. BUCCI has the power under the law to effect disaffiliation such that it should be given legal consequence and granted recognition. UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees of primary franchises, are subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC in matters that are legal and corporate. The Court owes recognition to BUCCI’s decision as it concerns its legal right as a religious corporation to disaffiliate from another religious corporation via legitimate means is a secular matter well within the civil courts purview. As to the second issue, the court ruled in affirmative. SEC also found that UCCP is not the real party in interest to question the amendments made by BUCCI to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. UCCP’s control an authority over its local churches is not full and supreme; memberships of the local churches in the UCCP is voluntary and not perpetual; local churches enjoy independence and autonomy and may maintain or continue church-life with or without UCCP. Under the law and UCCP polity, BUCCI may validly bring about its disaffiliation from UCCP through the amendment of its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. SEC approved the amendments, which approval has in its favor the presumption of regularity.

This Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, UCCP, not being a member of BUCCI, has no locus standi to question the amendments. Finally, on the last issue, the court ruled in affirmative. SEC upheld the right of BUCCI to continue using its corporate name. The CA also ruled that BUCCI’s history show that it has a better right to use its corporate name on the ground of priority of adoption. It has acquired the right to make use of its corporate name. It also held that it is not confusing or deceptively similar to UCCP as to mislead a person of ordinary care and discrimination. The SC sustained the said rulings. Wherefore, the petition is denied. The decision of the CA is hereby affirmed.

Sec. 6, Art. II – Separation of the Church and State IMBONG v. OCHOA GR. NO. 204829 April 8, 2014 FACTS: The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of

contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. ISSUE: Whether or not RH law is against Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech RULING: No, RH Law is not against Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech. It is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one’s participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom. Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s. The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas has written, “at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.

Sec. 6, Art. II – Separation of the Church and State CELDRAN v. PEOPLE GR. NO. 220127 March 21, 2018 FACTS: On September 30, 2010, a celebration of the 2nd anniversary of the May They Be One Campaign (MTBC) and the launching of the Hand Written Bible which coincided with the feast of Saint Jerome, a throng of people composed mainly of catholic church dignitaries

intermixed with those of different religions such as members of the military, police, media, non-Catholics, students, representatives of various religious organizations gathered around the Manila Cathedral in the afternoon of said date. While Brother Tirona was reading a passage from the Bible, Celdran entered the church and went to the center aisle, in front of the altar and brought out a placard with the word “DAMASO.” Commotion ensued when Celdran started shouting inside saying “Bishops, stop involving yourself in politics”, disrupting and disrespecting a solemn celebration. The defense, said the otherwise, alleging that the incident did not happen during the holy mass. MeTC found Celdran guilty of the crime of Offending Religious Feelings under Article 133 of the RPC. RTC & CA affirmed MeTC’s decision. ISSUE: Did Celdran offend the religious feelings of those present during the celebration of the MTBC is a question of fact which will not be entertained? RULING: Yes, Celdran offended the religious feelings of those present in the celebration. Under Article 133 of the RPC, provides the penalty for the crime of Offending religious feelings. Thus, SC affirms the decision of MeTC, RTC, & CA. Agreeing with CA that Celdran’s acts were meant to mock, insult, and ridicule those clergies whose beliefs and principles were diametrically opposed to his own. Therefore, as held in the case of People v. Baes: Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a questions of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is impossible that a certain act may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith.

Sec. 3, Art. II – Supremacy of Civilian Authority GUDANI v. SENGA GR. NO. 170165 498 SCRA 671 August 15, 2006 FACTS: Obedience and deference to the military chain of command and the President as commander-in-chief are the cornerstones of a professional military in the firm cusp of civilian control.

A self-righteous military invites itself as the scoundrel's activist solution to the "ills" of participatory democracy. Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the President's consent... petitioners, in their defense, invoke weighty constitutional principles that center on fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled on 28 September 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of "Joint Task Force Ranao" by the AFP Southern Command. "Joint Task Force Ranao" was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to the Superintendent of the PMA Gen. Cristolito P. Baloing (Gen. Baloing). Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing on 28 September 2005, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. PER INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. INFORM BGEN FRANCISCO F GUDANI AFP AND LTC ALEXANDER BALUTAN PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY... Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing the senator that "no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear" before the hearing scheduled on that day they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections. The office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee "in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance;" that such directive was "in keeping with the time-honored principle of the Chain of Command;" and that the two officers "disobeyed a legal order, in violation of Articles of War 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x x x" Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval OPMG recommended that petitioners be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on

willfully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the good order and military discipline violates the principle of separation of powers in government as it interferes with the investigation of the Senate Committee conducted in aid of legislation. Petitioners wish to see annulled the "gag order" that required them to secure presidential consent prior to their appearance before the Senate, claiming that it violates the constitutional right to information and transparency in matters of public concern; or if not, is tantamount at least to the criminal acts of obstruction of justice and grave coercion. The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government. ISSUES: 1. whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. 2. whether respondents could properly initiate such proceedings preparatory to a formal court-martial. 3. whether the violation of the aforementioned order of Gen. Senga, which emanated from the President, could lead to any investigation for court-martial of petitioners RULING: The solicited writs of certiorari and prohibition do not avail; the petition must be denied The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Both petitioners, Brigadier General Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Balutan (Col. Balutan), belonged to the Philippine Marines. It has to be acknowledged as a general principle that AFP personnel of whatever rank are liable under military law for violating a direct order of an officer superior in rank. Distinctions are called for, since Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 listed "generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege," as among those public officials required in Section 3 of E.O. 464 "to secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress." The Court in Senate declared both Section 2(b) and Section 3 void, and the impression may have been left following Senate that it settled as doctrine, that the President is prohibited from requiring military personnel from attending congressional hearings without having first secured prior presidential consent. That impression is wrong.

The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing before Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority the commander-in-chief powers of the President. Notably, it is not alleged that petitioners were in any way called to task for violating E.O. 464, but instead, they were charged for violating the direct order of Gen. Senga not to appear before the Senate Committee, an order that stands independent of the executive order. This point was settled against Gen. Gudani's position in Abadilla v. Ramos, where the Court declared that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. The Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and... rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered. Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of their Commander-in-Chief and Commanding General in obeisance to a paramount idea formed within their consciences, which could not be lightly ignored. Still, the Court, in turn, is guided by the superlative principle that is the Constitution, the embodiment of the national conscience. The Constitution simply does not permit the infraction which petitioners have allegedly committed, and moreover, provides for an orderly manner by which the same result could have been achieved without offending constitutional principles.

Sec. 19, Art. II – Self-Reliance and Independent National Economy ESPINA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ZAMORA GR. NO. 143855 September 21, 2010 FACTS: On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business.

R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens. A petition was raised on the following grounds: First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies. Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy. Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sarisari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment. Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release of certain loans. Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade. Respondents countered that: countered that: First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public funds. Nor can they invoke the fact that they are members of Congress since they made no claim that the law infringes on their right as legislators. Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable controversy. Petitioners of course claim that, as members of Congress, they represent the small retail vendors in their respective districts but the petition does not allege that the subject law violates the rights of those vendors. Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Indeed, they could not specify how the new law violates the constitutional provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable. Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens’ certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such

reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional. RULING: No, R.A. 8762 is constitutional. State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution... the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not selfexecuting. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise... to a cause of action in the courts. In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development. Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of industries... which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it... also recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.

Sec. 25, Art. II – Local Autonomy BETOY v. BOD GR. NO. 156556-57 October 4, 2011 FACTS: On June 8, 2001, RA 9136 (EPIRA) was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation. On February 27, 2002, pursuant to Section 77 of the EPIRA, the Secretary of the Department of Energy promulgated the IRR.

Section 63 of the EPIRA provides for separation benefits to officials and employees who would be affected by the restructuring of the electric power industry and the privatization of the assets of the NPC. Rule 33 of the IRR provided for the coverage and the guidelines for the separation benefits to be given to the employees affected. Petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were then terminated. He then filed a petition questioning his termination, and together with it the validity of the EPIRA, in particular Section 34 of EPIRA for being exorbitant display of State Power and was not premised on the welfare of the people. ISSUE: Is the universal charge under Section 34 of the EPIRA, a tax or an exaction in the exercise of the State’s police power? RULING: In Gerochi vs. Department of Energy, the Court ruled that the Universal Charge is not a tax but an exaction in the exercise of the State’s police power. The Universal Charge is imposed to ensure the viability of the country’s electric power industry. Petitioner argues that the imposition of a universal charge to address the stranded debts and contract made by the government through the NCC-IPP contracts or Power UtilityIPP contracts or simply the bilateral agreements or contracts is an added burden to the electricity-consuming public on their monthly power bills. It would mean that the electricityconsuming public will suffer in carrying this burden for the errors committed by those in power who runs the affairs of the State. This is an exorbitant display of State Power at the expense of its people. It is basic that the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves a question of fact and, thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same.

Sec. 25, Art. II – Local Autonomy JUDGE DADOLE v. COA GR. NO. 125350 December 3, 2002 FACTS: Petitioners RTC Judges Dadole et al and MTC judges Temistocles et al stationed in Mandaue City received a monthly allowance of P1,260 each pursuant to the yearly appropriation ordinance. Eventually, in 1991, it was increased to P1,500 for each judge. However, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) then issued Local Budget

Circular No. 55 which provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Acting on the said DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Thus, petitioners filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest. However, it was treated as a motion for reconsideration and was endorsed to the Commission on Audit Regional Office. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the said motion to their Head Office with recommendation that the same should be denied. Accordingly, it was denied by the COA. Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition. They argued, among others, that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges stationed therein. ISSUE: Whether or not LBC 55 is void for infringing the local autonomy of Mandaue City. HELD: Yes. The Court states that, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that: "Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. . . . " Under Section 458, of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to judges "when the finances of the city government allow." The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, the Court need not belabor the point that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures. Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(l)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution.

Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.

Sec. 25, Art. II – Local Autonomy PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL v. THE COMMISSIONERS, COA GR. NO. 182574 September 28, 2010 FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed a resolution allocating P4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the province. The Committee on Awards granted the insurance coverage to Philam Care Health System Incorporated. Petitioner Province of Negros

Occidental, and Philam Care entered into a Group Health Care Agreement. After a post-audit investigation, the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the President as provided under Administrative Order No. 103. Then President Joseph E. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the amount ofP100,000. The Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President. The COA ruled that under AO 103, no government entity, including a local government unit, is exempt from securing prior approval from the President granting additional benefits to its personnel. ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of P3,760,000 for premium paid for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by the Province of Negros Occidental. RULING: Yes, COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of ₱ 3, 760, 000 for premium paid for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by the Province of Negros Occidental. It is clear from Section 1 of AO 103 that the President authorized all agencies of the national government as well as LGUs to grant the maximum amount of P2,000 productivity incentive benefit to each employee who has rendered at least one year of service as of 31 December 1993. From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate the rule of prior approval from the President since Section 2 states that the prohibition applies only to “government offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards.” Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to LGUs. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case does not need the approval of the President to be valid.

Sec. 26, Art. II – Equal Access to opportunity for Public Service PAMATONG v. COMELEC GR. NO. 161872 April 13, 2004 Facts: Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Presidency on COMELEC but it refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy. The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Tancangco voted to include petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy. Thereafter, Pamatong moved for

reconsideration. The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired. Unsatisfied with the result, Pamantong filed in the SC a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987. Issue: Whether or not Pamantong is deprived with his right to equal access to opportunities for public service. Ruling: Pamantong is not deprived with his right to equal access to opportunities for public service. According to Section 26 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which states that “The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law”. In this case the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. Furthermore, the provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. Therefore, Pamantong is not deprived with his right to equal access to opportunities for public service enshrined in Constitution

Sec. 28, Art. II – Full disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest AQUINO-SARMIENTO v. MORATO GR. NO. 92541 November 13, 1991 FACTS: In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the

basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members. ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 10-89 is valid. RULING: The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character. it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land.

Explanation – Separation of Powers FORT BONIFACIO DEV. CORP. V. CIR GR. NO. 175707 679 SCRA 566 September 4, 2012 FACTS: Petitioner was a real estate developer that bought from the national government a parcel of land that used to be the Fort Bonifacio military reservation. At the time of the said sale there was as yet no VAT imposed so Petitioner did not pay any VAT on its purchase. Subsequently, Petitioner sold two parcels of land to Metro Pacific Corp. In reporting the said

sale for VAT purposes (because the VAT had already been imposed in the interim), Petitioner claimed transitional input VAT corresponding to its inventory of land. The BIR disallowed the claim of presumptive input VAT and thereby assessed Petitioner for deficiency VAT. ISSUE: Is Petitioner entitled to claim the transitional input VAT on its sale of real properties? RULING: Yes. Petitioner is entitled to claim transitional input VAT based on the value of not only the improvements but on the value of the entire real property and regardless of whether there was in fact actual payment on the purchase of the real property or not. The amendments to the VAT law do not show any intention to make those in the real estate business subject to a different treatment from those engaged in the sale of other goods or properties or in any other commercial trade or business. On the scope of the basis for determining the available transitional input VAT, the CIR has no power to limit the meaning and coverage of the term "goods" in Section 105 of the Tax Code without statutory authority or basis. The transitional input tax credit operates to benefit newly VAT-registered persons, whether or not they previously paid taxes in the acquisition of their beginning inventory of goods, materials and supplies.

Purposes – Separation of Powers SAGUIGUIT v. PEOPLE GR. NO. 144054 494 SCRA 128 June 30, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner was charged with eight counts of violations of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law). One of which was issued to Elmer Evangelista. The issued check was dishonored by the bank by reason of insufficient fund. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found petitioner guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC.

The decision led to petition for re-examination and modification, if not abandonment, of rulings to the effect that the mere issuance of a check which is subsequently dishonored makes the issuer liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 regardless of the intent of the parties. Petitioner respectfully submits that it was not the intention of the lawmaking body, to make the issuance of a bum check ipso facto a criminal offense already; there must be an intent to commit the prohibited act, and subject check should be issued to apply on account or for value. ISSUE: Whether the Court can delve into the policy behind or wisdom of a statute. RULING: No, the Court cannot delve into the policy behind or wisdom of a statute. Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, the Court can only interpret and apply the law and cannot, despite doubts about its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of justice have no right to encroach on the prerogatives of lawmakers, as long as it has not been shown that they have acted with grave abuse of discretion. And while the judiciary may interpret laws and evaluate them for constitutional soundness and to strike them down if they are proven to be infirm, this solemn power and duty do not include the discretion to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.

Checks and Balances DISOMANGCOP v. DATUMANONG GR. NO. 149848 444 SCRA 203 November 25, 2004 FACTS: RA 6734 was passed (Organic Act of ARMM) on Aug. 1, 1989. Four provinces voted for inclusion in ARMM, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with it, EO 426 was issued by Pres. Cory Aquino on Oct. 12, 1990. The same devolved to the ARMM the power of the DPWH. Consequently, DO 119 entitled "Creation of Marawi SubDistrict Engineering Office." was issued by DPWH Sec. Vigilar last May 20, 1999, which is in

accordance with the E.O 124. It created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur. On Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which created a new Engineering District in the first district of Lanao del Sur was passed by Pres. Estrada entitled “An act establishing an engineering district as the first district of Lanao Del Sur and appropriating funds therefor”. On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 which amended RA 6734 was passed. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join ARMM through said law. Disomangcop and Dimalotang, in their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and Engineer II respectively of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur filed a petition questioning the constitutionality and validity of DO 119 and RA 8999 on the ground that they contravene the constitution and the organic acts of the ARMM. They sought mainly the to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing D.O 119 and R.A 8999 and releasing funds for public work projects intended for Lanao Del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi SubDistrict Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH. ISSUE: Whether or not DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid and constitutionally infirm HELD: Yes, Republic Act 8999 never became operative and was repealed by Republic Act 9054. RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054 which is a later law. RA 9054, which is anchored on the 1987 Constitution advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARMM which covers among others Lanao del Sur. However, RA 8999 ventures to re-establish the National Government's jurisdiction over the infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 is inconsistent with RA 9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective of devolution of the functions of DPWH in line with the policy of the Constitution to grant LGUs meaningful and authentic regional autonomy. DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO 426 which implements the transfer of control and supervision of the DPWH to the ARMM in line with RA 6734. The office created under DO 119 having essentially the same powers with the District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur as created under EO 426, is a duplication. The DO in effect takes back powers which have been previously devolved under EO 426. RA 9054 however has repealed DO Department Order 119. Thus, R.A 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts. It contravened true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy. And, D.O were issued unconstitutional and were issued grave abuse of discretion

Distinction between Justiciable and Political Question DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. GUINGONA GR. NO. 134577 298 SCRA 756 November 18, 1998 FACTS: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue, thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. ISSUES: Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? RULING: The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President. The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.

Distinction between Justiciable and Political Question PHILJA v. PRADO GR. NO. 105371 298 SCRA 756 November 11, 1993 Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory on the ground that while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

Ruling: Section 35 of RA 7354 is unconstitutional. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. In this case, Prado counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. Therefore, Section 35 of RA 7354 violated the Constitution which is null and void.

Distinction between Justiciable and Political Question COMELEC v. CRUZ GR. NO. 186616 605 SCRA 167 November 20, 2009 FACTS: When RA 9164 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections” was passed, questions of the constitutionality were raised against Section 2 which states that “No barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position: Provided however, that the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

Before the 2007 Synchronized Barangay and SK Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the said provision as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution in as much as the barangay officials were singled out that their consecutive limit shall be counted retroactively. ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Section 2 of RA 9164 is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. RULING: The equal protection clause is under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution which provides: “Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” This is however considering equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a 3-year term and 3-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the 3-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions. Distinction between Justiciable and Political Question GONZALES v. OP GR. NO. 196231 679 SCRA 614 September 4, 2012 FACTS: In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i)... found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty of dismissal. Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary proceedings against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary proceedings. The Court affirmed the continuation of the proceedings against her... after upholding the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.

In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others, before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of the prosecution's evidence against Garcia. ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a deputy ombudsman. RULING: Yes, the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a deputy ombudsman. Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment. Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the President's power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article

XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."And so it was that Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as "protectors of the people" and constitutionally mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent provisions under Article XI prescribes a term of office of seven years without reappointment Section 11, prohibits a decrease in salaries during the term of office Section 10, provides strict qualifications for the office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and ensures the exercise of constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The cloak of independence is meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively function as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog and protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline. Tariff Powers ABAKADA v. ERMITA GR. NO. 168056 469 SCRA 1 September 1, 2005 FACTS: ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition o questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties; Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution. 2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the Constitution. 3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection of the Constitution. RULING: 1. No, there is no violation of Article VI, Section 24. The revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes. 2. No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. 3. No, there is no violation of the due process and equal protection of the Constitution. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

Emergency powers DAVID v. ARROYO GR. NO. 171396 489 SCRA 161 May 3, 2006 FACTS: President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the seven consolidated petitions for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5 implementing the former. It is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the constitution. ISSUE:

Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional. HELD: PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives”. To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws”, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty to suppress lawless violence. 93. boc employees vs teves 181704 Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335. It was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.

Delegation to the People PHIL BAR ASSN. V. COMELEC GR. NO. 72915 140 SCRA 453 December 19, 1985 FACTS: Numerous petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987.

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest. ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections RULING: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3, as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

Delegation to Local Government MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON v. MENDEZ, SR. GR. NO. 103702 239 SCRA 11 December 6, 1994 Facts: The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had

no right to exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that rightfully belonged to the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative and special defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it should be deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality;5 that because the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that, considering the petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General. Issue: Whether or not there is a valid of delegation of powers to the officials of San Andres Ruling: There is no valid of delegation of powers to the officials of San Andres. In this case, Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Therefore, there is no valid of delegation of powers to the officials of San Andres due to unconstitutionality of EO No. 353.

Delegation to Administrative Bodies GEROCHI v. DOE GR. NO. 159796 527 SCRA 696 July 17, 2007 FACTS: On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Act of 2001. Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for being an undue delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides for the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all electricity end users after a period of (1) one year after the effectively of the EPIRA Law. The universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for government debts, missionary electrification, equalization of taxes and royalties applied to renewable energy and imported energy, environmental charge and for a charge to account for all forms of cross subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The universal charge

shall be collected by the ERC on a monthly basis from all end users and will then be managed by the PSALM Corp. Through the creation of a special trust fund. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the power to tax on the part of the ERC. RULING: No, there is no undue delegation of the power of taxation on the part of the ERC. The universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an exaction of the regulatory power (police power) of the state. The universal charge under section 34 is incidental to the regulatory duties of the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not for generation of revenue and therefore it cannot be considered as tax, but an execution of the states police power thru regulation. Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by the legislative parameters provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it therefore cannot be understood as a rule solely coming from the ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized administrative agency which is tasked of executing a subordinate legislation issued by congress; which before execution must pass both the completeness test and the sufficiency of standard test. The court in appreciating Section 34 of RA 9136 in its entirety finds the said law and the assailed portions free from any constitutional defect and thus deemed complete and sufficient in form.

Delegation to Administrative Bodies CHAVEZ v. ROMULO GR. NO. 157036 431 SCRA 534 June 9, 2004 FACTS: GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of residence. Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the implementation. The request was denied. Hence the petition for prohibition and injunction against Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.

ISSUE: Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or not the banning of carrying firearms outside the residence is a valid exercise of police power? RULING: Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked. Revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege. The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.

Test of Delegation PEOPLE v. DACUYCUY GR. NO. L-45127 173 SCRA 90 May 5, 1989 FACTS: In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975, herein private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555, thereof for violation of Republic Act No. 4670. The case was set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At the arraignment, the herein private respondents, as the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The facts charged do not constitute an offense considering that Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional.

On March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein filed an opposition to the admission of the said amended petition, respondent judge denied the same in his resolution of April 20, 1976. On August 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a supplementary memorandum in answer to the amended petition. ISSUE: Does it constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government. RULING: That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unsual. The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created. An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that when the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow. Test of Delegation BOC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. TEVES GR. NO. 181704 661 SCRA 589 December 6, 2011 FACTS: Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial. Issue:

Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Held: No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected.

The District Representatives - Legislative Department ALDABA v. COMELEC GR. NO. 188078 611 SCRA 137 January 25, 2010 FACTS: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare R.A. 9591 unconstitutional, which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the Republic Act violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo, by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010. Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected. RULING: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 populations. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides: “The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.” It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010. It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.

The District Representatives - Legislative Department BAGUILAT v. ALVAREZ GR. NO. 227757 July 25, 2017 FACTS: The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on several news articles surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or anointment of President Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative minority" in the House of Representatives and even purportedly encamped himself in Davao shortly after the May 2016 Elections to get the endorsement of President Duterte and the majority partisans. The petition further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's election as the Minority Leader, the supermajority coalition in the House allegedly "lent" Rep.

Suarez some of its members to feign membership in the Minority, and thereafter, vote for him as the Minority Leader. The Elections for the Speakership were held, "with 252 Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez, eight voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one registering a no vote," thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 17th Congress. Rep. Baguilat hoped that as a "longstanding tradition" of the House - where the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader. He would be declared and recognized as the Minority Leader. However, despite numerous follow-ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never recognized as such. As a result, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus in the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not Rep. Baguilat is the minority leader of the House of Representatives. RULING: Rep. Baguilat is not the minority leader of the House of Representatives.Under Section 16(1) of Article 6 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which states that “the Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members”In this case, it concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers doctrine. Verily, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void only because it thinks that the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. Therefore, Rep. Baguilat is not the minority leader pursuant to Section 16(1) of Article 6 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The Party-List Representatives - Legislative Department ATONGPAGLAUM, INC. v. COMELEC GR. NO. 203766 April 2, 2013 FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists. RULING: No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters: Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the partylist system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisher folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the

sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the partylist system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above). Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.” Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.) The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections. If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house. As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant, fisher folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.

The Party-List Representatives - Legislative Department LICO v. COMELEC GR. NO. 205505 September 29, 2015 FACTS: Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was registered on 16 November 2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law.

On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections. On 6 March 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee. On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning partylist groups. Based on the procedure provided in BANAT Party-List v. COMELEC, Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, and thereafter assumed office. Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-year term. On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list organization RULING: Yes, COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview. The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as party-list representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case. The COMELEC justified its Resolution on the merits of the expulsion, by relying on the rule that it can decide intra-party matters as an incident of its constitutionally granted powers and functions. It cited Lokin v. COMELEC, where We held that when the resolution of an intraparty controversy is necessary or incidental to the performance of the constitutionallygranted functions of the COMELEC, the latter can step in and exercise jurisdiction over the intra-party matter. The Lokin case, however, involved nominees and not incumbent members of Congress. In the present case, the fact that petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of his expulsion from Ating Koop removes the matter from the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner. In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure.

Apportionment of Legislative Districts AQUINO v. COMELEC GR. NO. 189793 April 7, 2010 FACTS: Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district

municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. HELD: No, it is not an indispensable requirement. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

Apportionment of Legislative Districts ALDABA v. COMELEC GR. NO. 188078 January 25, 2010 FACTS: This is an action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.

RA 9591 lapsed into law on May 1, 2009, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.” Petitioners, taxpayers and registered residents of Malolos filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250k for a city to merit representation in Congress. OSG said that Congress’ use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with constitutional requirement. ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not RA 9591 “An act creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional. 2.) Whether or not the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000. RULING: RA 9591 is unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.[5] The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional. The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the immediately following election after the attainment of the 250,000 population. The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be as of the middle of every year. In addition, there is no

showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by this Court. Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides: Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Apportionment of Legislative Districts NAVARRO v. ERMITA GR. NO. 180050 February 10, 2010 FACTS: The arguments of the movants, that the province of Dinagat Islands was created in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. Article 9 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations is merely interpretative of Section 461 of the Local Government Code. The argument of the movants reiterates the same arguments in their respective Comments that aside from the undisputed compliance with the income requirement, Republic

Act (R.A.) No. 9355, creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, has also complied with the population and land area requirements. When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on 2006, it had an official population of only 106,951 based on the 2000 Census of Population which is short of the 250,000 inhabitants’ requirement ISSUE: Is the correct interpretation of Section 461 of the Local Government Code the one stated in the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura? RULING: Section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code provides: SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: (a)Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned; (b)Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; an (c)Land area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code, providing the requisites for the creation of a province, specifically states the requirement of a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers. Contrary to the contention of the movants, the evidence on record proved that R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the population or territorial requirements prescribed in Section 461 of the Local Government Code for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands; hence, the Court declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional.

Qualifications – Legislative Department JALOSLOS v. COMELEC GR. NO. 191970 April 24, 2012 Facts: Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor. He furthers assert hat long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the RTC of Cebu City. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted

probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation in an order. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the same grounds. Unsatisfied with the result, the case is appealed up to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not Jaloslos is disqualified to run as Mayor. Ruling: Jaloslos is disqualified to run as Mayor.According to Section 68 of the Omnibus Code which states that “Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws”.In this case, Jaloslos is guilty with the crime Robbery and his assertion of that he completed his probation is null and void.Therefore, Jaloslos cannot be given his COC on the ground that he have the disqualification Qualifications – Legislative Department MITRA v. COMELEC GR. NO. 191938 January 25, 2010 FACTS: We resolve the Motion for Reconsideration Filed by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Oral Arguments filed by private respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (private respondents), dated July 19, 2010 and July 20, 2010, respectively, addressing our Decision of July 2, 2010 (July 2, 2010 Decision or Decision).We annulled in this Decision the February 10, 2010 and May 4, 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC, and denied the private respondents

petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (Mitra). To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that despite our limited certiorari jurisdiction in election cases, we are not only obliged but are constitutionally bound to intervene when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion in this case, a situation where resulting errors, arising from the grave abuse committed by the COMELEC, mutated from being errors of judgment to errors of jurisdiction. Based on our evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, we found that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC. We noted, too, that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan. We also found that the COMELEC failed to critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan. On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented his Aborlan residence to deceive and mislead the people of the Province of Palawan, we found that Mitra did not. In fact, Mitra adduced positive evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents evidence failed to sufficiently controvert. Specifically, the private respondents evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident. In this regard, we took note of the incremental moves Mitra undertook to establish his new domicile in Aborlan, as evidenced by the following:(1) his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the completion of his house. Thus, we found that under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence in Aborlan. We also emphasized that the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis (as it used subjective non-legal standards in its analysis) to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC concerning his residence was indeed a misrepresentation. In sum, we concluded that the evidence in the present case, carefully reviewed, showed that Mitra indeed transferred his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law. In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2010, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, asks us to reconsider our July 2, 2010 Decision. The COMELEC argues

that we overstepped our review power over its factual findings; as a specialized constitutional body, the findings and conclusions of the COMELEC are generally respected and even given the status of finality. The COMELEC also contends that the Court erred in taking cognizance of the present petition since the issues raised therein are essentially factual in nature. It claims that it is elementary that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to correcting questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the SC erred when it reviewed the probative value of the evidence presented and substituted its own factual findings over that of the public respondent. RULING: We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and for oral arguments. We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private respondent's arguments are mere rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the same arguments addressing the issues we already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision. Thus, both the COMELEC and private respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument meriting reconsideration. The denial of the motion for oral arguments proceeds from this same reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties original submissions on issues our Decision has sufficiently covered, without more, do not merit the time, effort and attention that an oral argument shall require. Having said these, we shall still proceed to discuss the aspects of the case the motions touched upon, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of our July 2, 2010 Decision. The private respondents fail to realize that the important considerations in the present case relate to questions bearing on the cancellation of the COC that they prayed for; the main critical points are the alleged deliberate misrepresentation by Mitra and the underlying question of his residency in Aborlan, Palawan. While it is undisputed that Mitra’s domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009.As our Decision discussed and as repeated elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra did not effectively transfer, while the COMELEC

not only grossly misread the evidence but even used the wrong considerations in appreciating the submitted evidence. These issues are not new issues; we extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved them in our July 2, 2010 Decision. At this point, we only need to address some of the private respondents misleading points in order to clear the air: 1.The private respondent’s reliance on the expiration date of the lease contract, to disprove Mitra’s claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is his residence, is misplaced. This argument is flimsy since the contract did not provide that it was completely and fully timebarred and was only up to February 28, 2010; it was renewable at the option of the parties. That a lease is fixed for a one-year term is a common practice. What is important is that it is renewable at the option of the parties. In the absence of any objection from the parties, the lease contract simply continues and is deemed renewed. 2.In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto Princesa City, the private respondents submitted in their Motion for Reconsideration a colored certified true copy of Mitras alleged Puerto Princesa City Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated February 3, 2009 allegedly showing Mitras signature. To recall, we found that based on the records before us, the purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the signature of Mitra. Although the private respondents have belatedly filed this evidence, we carefully examined the recently submitted colored copy of the February 3, 2009 CTC and saw no reason to reverse our finding; the alleged signature appears to us to be a mere hazy superimposition that does not bear any resemblance at all to Mitra’s signature. We, thus, stand by our ruling that the February 3, 2009 CTC, if at all, carries very little evidentiary value. It did it not at all carry Mitra’s signature; his secretary’s positive testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without the latter’s participation and knowledge, still stands unrefuted. 3.The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certification, dated July 17, 2010, from the Municipal Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that its office does not have any record of the supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan. This late submission was made to show that Mitra has no established business interests in Aborlan. The Certification pertinently states: This is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing records/registration in our office regarding the alleged pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan. However, the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist is on the process of gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan. We cannot give any evidentiary value to this submission for two reasons. First, it was filed only on reconsideration stage and was not an evidence before us when the case was submitted for resolution. Second, even if it had not been filed late, the Certification does not

prove anything; it is, on its face, contradictory. On the one hand, it categorically states that there are no existing records of any pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it also expressly states that its records are not yet complete since it is on the process of gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan. Under what law or regulation the certifying office has the obligation to prepare a list of agricultural business interests in Aborlan has not even been alleged. At the risk of repetition, we reiterate that Mitra’s business interests in Aborlan stand undisputed in the present case. Not only was Mitra able to present photographs of his experimental pineapple plantation; his claim of ownership was also corroborated by the statements of Dr. Carme Caspe, Ricardo Temple and other witnesses.

Qualifications – Legislative Department TAGOLINO v. HRET GR. NO. 202202 March 19, 2013 FACTS: On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of College

Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Canadieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled. On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution6 granting Juntilla’s petition without any qualification. Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010.7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted the said resolution with finality “in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution.” On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to various letter-requests submitted to the COMELEC’s Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 889011 on May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the substitution of private respondent. The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009. ISSUE: Whether or not there is valid substitution. RULING: No. A distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are wellperceived. Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws.

In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3) spending in one’s election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected.

Qualifications – Legislative Department ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC GR. NO. 119976 248 SCRA 300 May 11, 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution RULING: Yes, Imelda has satisfied the requirement for residency as mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b)domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. Qualifications – Legislative Department AQUINO v. COMELEC GR. NO. 120265 248 SCRA 400 September 18, 1995 FACTS: Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy(CoC) for the position of Representative for the new 2nd Legislative District of Makati City. Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, and Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for

congressman which should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the elections Petitioner filed another CoC amending the certificate. Petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency for l year and 13 days. 2nd Division of COMELEC promulgated a Resolution which dismiss the: petition for Disqualification against respondent Agapito Aquino and declares him eligible to run for the Office of Representative in the 2nd District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's 2nd Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. COMELEC issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation. Petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he stated his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether or not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sec 17, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution. COMELEC issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the 2nd Division dated May 6, 1995. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the 2nd Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is granted. Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the 2nd District of Makati City in the elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid. HELD: Yes, COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid. Petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. His certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Thus, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City. While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati indicate that the sole purpose of transferring his physical residence is not to acquire's new residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the 2nd District of Makati City. Petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in a newly created political district lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case, the old Municipality of Makati.

Qualifications – Legislative Department COQUILA v. COMELEC GR. NO. 151914 July 31, 2002 FACTS: Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States. Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two-year residency in Oras was a material representation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen. ISSUE: Whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy. RULING: No. Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code provides: Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and. In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.

Term of Office - Legislative Department ABUNDO v. COMELEC GR. NO. 201716 January 8, 2013 Facts: For four successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. However, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres, who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. As a result, Abundo protested Torres' election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty

seat Torres lost no time in seeking the former's disqualification to run predicated on the threeconsecutive term limit rule. COMELEC issued a Resolution finding for Abundo accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-election of Viga. Vega commenced a quo warranto action to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify. Issues: Whether or not Abundo is disqualified to seat as Mayor on the ground that it violates the term of office enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Ruling: 1Abundo is not disqualified to seat as Mayor on the ground that it violates the term of office enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In this case, Abundo's three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. Therefore, Abundo can seat as mayor on the ground that he does not violates the laws stated above. Salaries – Legislative Department PHIL CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION v. GIMENEZ GR. NO. L-23326 15 SCRA 479 December 18, 1965 FACTS: Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree,

while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution. The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute “forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary. ISSUE: Whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution. RULING: Yes, Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase.” In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation “other emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term “other emoluments.” Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites. It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.

Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.

Parliamentary Immunities - Legislative Department POBRE v. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO A.C. NO. 7399 597 SCRA 1 August 25, 2009 FACTS: In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered the following remarks: x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a different environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x x Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the

impending vacancy of the CJ post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court, including Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified. Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-Santiago. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or subjected to disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech. RULING: No, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be afforded parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Although there was no express admission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed say those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as an implied admission. Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the controversy her utterances had managed to stir. Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should be noted that "[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good."

Parliamentary Immunities - Legislative Department PEOPLE v. JALOSLOS GR. NO. 132875 February 3, 2000 FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives RULING:

Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Parliamentary Immunities - Legislative Department TRILLANES IV v. JUDGE PIMENTEL GR. NO. 179817 June 27, 2008 Facts: Trillanes was charged with coup d’etat together with other junior officers of the AFP for the so-called “Oakwood incident.” While Trillanes was in detention, he ran for a seat in the Senate and won. Trillanes then filed with the RTC of Makati where his case was pending an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests,” praying that: (1) he be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate, and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings, etc.; (2) be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or the media on the important issues affecting the country and the public.

The RTC denied his motion. The argument of Trillanes was: the fact that the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him to the position of senator provides the proper legal justification to allow him to work and serve his mandate as a senator. Issue: Whether or not election to Congress is a sufficient basis to allow Trillanes liberty for him to work as a senator. Ruling: No. Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. The Rules provides that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. In this case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. The presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights. The mandate of the people in electing Trillanes to the senate yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.

Parliamentary Immunities - Legislative Department TRILLANES IV v. JUDGE CASTILLO-MARIGOMEN GR. NO. 223451 March 14, 2018 FACTS: Petitioner expressed his opinion on the media, that based on his office's review of the documents, private respondent appears to be a "front" or "nominee" or is acting as a "dummy" of the actual and beneficial owner of the estate, VP Binay. On October 22, 2014, private respondent filed a Complaint for Damages against petitioner for the latter's alleged defamatory statements before the media from October 8 to 14, 2014, specifically his repeated accusations that private respondent is a mere "dummy" of VP Binay. He averred that petitioner’s accusations were defamatory, as they dishonored and discredited him. Trillanes’ Answer with Motion to Dismiss, he raised that his statements, having been made in the course of the performance of his duties as a Senator, are covered by his parliamentary immunity under Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s statements are covered by his parliamentary immunity under Article VI, Section 11 0f the 1987 Constitution. RULING: No. Section 11 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that: Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years’ imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. Petitioner's statements in media interviews are not covered by the parliamentary speech or debate privileges. Trillanes IV admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private respondent "front" or "dummy" in response to media interviews during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee hearings in the Senate. It is evident that petitioner's remarks fall outside the privilege of speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The statements were clearly not part of any speech delivered in the Senate or any of its committees. They were also not spoken in the course of any debate in said fora. It cannot likewise be successfully contended that they were made in the official discharge or performance of petitioner's duties as a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the legislative process.

Incompatible and Forbidden Offices - Legislative Department LIBAN v. SEN. GORDON GR. NO. 175352 January 18, 2011 Facts: This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration filed by Gordon of the Decision promulgated by the SC, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by movant-intervenor Philippine National Red Cross and the latter’s Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper. In the Decision the SC held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as "the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, declared void the PNRC Charter "insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation" and consequently ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

Issue:

Whether or not the creation of Philippine National Red Cross is a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation. Ruling: Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a governmentowned or controlled corporation. Under Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that “No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected”. In this case, the elements of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers is void for being unconstitutional. Therefore, the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Inhibitions and Disqualifications - Legislative Department GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR. NO. 101273 677 SCRA 750 July 3, 1992 FACTS: Executive Order no 475 imposed an additional duty of 9% on crude oil and oil products while Executive Order 478 imposed a special duty on crude oil and oil products. Petitioners claimed that both EOs are unconstitutional because all revenue measures must originate from the House of Representatives and the Tariff and Customs Code authorized the president to increase the tariff duties only to protect local industries but not to raise additional revenue for the government. ISSUE: Whether or not the tariff rates imposed are valid? Ruling: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The assailed Executive Orders are valid. Congress may by law authorize the president to fit tariff rates and other duties within specified limits. The issuance of these EOs authorized by Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. There is nothing in the law that suggests that the authority may only be exercised to protect

local industries. Custom duties may be designated to achieve more than one policy objective the protection of local industries and to raise revenue for the government.

Quorum - Legislative Department PADILLA v. ALVAREZ GR. NO. 231671 July 25, 2017 FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands on the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution. Within forty-eight (48) hours after the proclamation, or on May 25, 2017, and while the Congress was in session, President Duterte transmitted his "Report relative to Proclamation No. 216 dated 23 May 2017" (Report) to the Senate, through Senate President Pimentel, and the House of Representatives, through House Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez. According to President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and his Report to the Congress, the declaration of a state of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao ensued from the series of armed attacks, violent acts, and atrocities directed against civilians and government authorities, institutions, and establishments perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups, in complicity with other local and foreign armed affiliates, who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

(ISIS), to sow lawless violence, terror, and political disorder over the said region for the ultimate purpose of establishing a DAESH wilayah or Islamic Province in Mindanao. On May 29, 2017, the briefing before the Senate was conducted, which lasted for about four (4) hours, by Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenza (Secretary Lorenzana), National Security Adviser and Director General of the National Security Council Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr. (Secretary Esperon), and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) General Eduardo M. Año (General Año). P.S. Resolution No. 388 was approved, after receiving seventeen (17) affirmative votes as against five (5) negative votes, and was adopted as Senate Resolution No. 49 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Not to Revoke, at this Time, Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao.' ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution

RULING: The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension. By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is only required to vote jointly to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads: Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

Discipline of Members - Legislative Department PAREDES v. SANDIGANBAYAN GR. NO. 118364 August 10, 1995 FACTS: While Congressman Paredes was still provincial governor, charges of violations of AntiGraft Law were filed against him before the Sandiganbayan. He was elected to Congress. During his second term in Congress, Sandiganbayan imposed a preventive suspension on him pursuant to the A-G law. ISSUE: Can Paredes, now a member of Congress, be suspended by order of the SB. RULING: Yes, Paredes may be suspended by an order of the Sandiganbayan. Paredes’s invocation of Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alias to “punish its members of Congress for disorderly behavior” and suspend or expel a member by a vote of 2/3 of the members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension spoken of in section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a penalty by a preliminary preventive measure presenting from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on the petitioner for.

Discipline of Members - Legislative Department DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN GR. NO. 128055 April 18, 2001 Facts: Miriam Defensor-Santiago, then Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) Commissioner, was charged with alleged Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019). In the course of the proceedings, pursuant to R.A. 3019, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended her for ninety (90) days. At that time, Santiago was already a Senator. Contention of Santiago: Only the Congress has the power to discipline its own ranks. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the authority to preventively suspend a Senator. Ruling: Yes.

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides: “SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. In the event that a convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already received such benefits, he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government.” It is a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.” In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which states that each — “ house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.” The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino

Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., the Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of Congress. The Court ruled: "Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives." The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch. Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. Journals - Legislative Department TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE GR. NO. 115455 235 SCRA 630 October 30, 1995 FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution. RULING:

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Electoral Tribunals - Legislative Department BRILLANTES v. COMELEC GR. NO. 163193 432 SCRA 269 June 15, 2004 FACTS: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines, computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. The COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization program for the 2004 elections consisting of three (3) phases, to wit: (1) PHASE I – Computerized system of registration and voters validation or the so-called "biometrics" system of registration; (2) PHASE II – Computerized voting and counting of votes; and (3) PHASE III – Electronic transmission of results. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three phases. Problems were encountered as to the enforcement of phase I and II, leaving Phase III imposable. The COMELEC issues Resolution regarding the said phase which leads to this petition. Jose Concepcion, Jr., Jose De Venecia, Edgardo J. Angara, Dr. Jaime Z. Galvez-Tan, Franklin M. Drilon, Frisco San Juan, Norberto M. Gonzales, Honesto M. Isleta and Jose A. Bernas, filed with

this Court their Motion to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention which movants-petitioners urge the Supreme Court to declare as null and void the assailed resolution and permanently enjoin the respondent COMELEC from implementing the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC action in implementing Republic Act No. 8436 is Unofficial. RULING: COMELEC action in implementing Republic Act No. 8436 is unofficial. According to Section 24 of RA No. 8436 which provides the confirmation of the constitutional undertaking of Congress as the sole body tasked to canvass the votes for the President and VicePresident.In this case, the contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is "unofficial," is puerile and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an "unofficial" canvass of said votes. Therefore, COMELEC action in implementing Republic Act No. 8436 is unofficial on the ground that it violates the Section 24 of RA No. 8436. Commission on Appointments - Legislative Department DRILON v. DE VENECIA GR. NO. 180055 594 SCRA 749 July 31, 2009 FACTS: Issues involving the deprivation of a seat in the Commission on Appointments should be lodged before the respective Houses of Congress and not with the Supreme Court. The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments (CA). In the second week of August 2007, Franklin Drilon et al. went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. However, no report or recommendation was proffered by the Legal Department, drawing Representative Tañada to request a report or recommendation on the matter within three days. Hence spawned the filing by Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), et al., alleging that the liberal party with at least twenty (20) members who signed herein, is constitutionally entitled to one (1) seat in the CA. Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-Laban wrote a letter claiming that ―the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation‖. The Senator avers that political parties PMP and KAMPI were

given more seats than they were entitled to in the CA and the political party PRP and other Independents cannot be represented in the CA. The CA, speaking through its Ex-Officio Chairman Manny Villar, advised Senator Madrigal that CA ―has neither the power nor the discretion to reject a member who is elected by either House, and that any complaints about the election of a member or members should be addressed to the body that elected them.‖ Villar further explained that instructions have been given to ―transmit the original copies of Senator Madrigal‘s letters to the Senate Secretary for their immediate inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate. Madrigal, not satisfied with the CA‘s action, filed a petition with the Supreme Court for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction against Senator Villar as Senate President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA. The Court consolidated the petitions filed by Drilon et al. and Madrigal et al. ISSUES: Whether or not the petition before the Supreme Court is proper. RULING: The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn. As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not in fact allege that she or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi. Senator Madrigal ‘s primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of Congress and not with this Court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may bring her petition to court. Senator Villar‘s invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken.

Organization - Legislative Department ARROYO v. DE VENECIA GR. NO. 127255 June 26, 1998 FACTS: RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called ”sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes were challenged by Representative Joker Arroyo. The bicameral committee after submitting its report to the House, the chairman of the committee proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech and was interpellated. Arroyo also interrupted to move to adjourn for lack of quorum. His motion was defeated and put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor proceeded and the bill was approved on its third reading. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Arroyo should have been heard for his call to adjourn for lack of quorum. 2. Whether or not the House of Reps committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240 RULING:

1.

No, it is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department of the Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when the petitioners can find their remedy in their own department.

2.

No. The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240. It is clear that what is alleged to have been violated are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. In Osmena v. Pendatun, the Court ruled that rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.