Constitutional Law I

Subject: Constitutional Law Topic: Constitutional Supremacy Title: Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Security Insurance System Citation: G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997 Facts: The Government Service Insurance System, respondent, in pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell 30% to 51% of its shares in Manila Hotel Corporation through public bidding wherein only bidders who qualify to the conditions set can participate. In a close bidding, there were two bidders that partaken the activity. The Manila Prince Hotel, petitioner, offered to buy 51% or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share. While the other participant, Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, offered to buy the same at P44.00 per share which is P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Manila Prince Hotel sent a letter to Government Service Insurance System matching the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad and a manager’s check as bid security, but was disregarded. Hence, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed to the Supreme Court to compel the respondent to allow the petitioner to match the bid of Renong Berhad, invoking the Filipino First Policy enunciated in Section 10, Paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “In grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.” Issue: 

Whether or not the Government Service Insurance System violated Section 10, Paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whatever, they shall be effective. Furthermore, Section 10, Paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. In regards to national patrimony, in its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. Manila Hotel has become a landmark; a living testimony of Philippine heritage as it was used as an American hotel when it first opened in 1912 and was converted by the Japanese into a military headquarters during World War II. The Supreme Court hereby directed the respondents Government Service Insurance System, Manila Hotel Corporation, Committee on Privatization and Office of the Government Counsel are directed to cease and desist from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to Renong Berhad, and to accept matching bid of petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Subject: Constitutional Law Topic: Interpretation of the Constitution Title: Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. Citation: G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993 Facts: The plaintiffs therein and now the principal petitioners, Oposa, et. al, are all minors duly represented by their respective parents. The first complaint was filed before Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court against the original defendant is the then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayer’s class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs “are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resources treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical rainforests.” The minors asseverate that they “represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn.” Consequently, they prayed for ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country, and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. Furthermore, the plaintiffs assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. The original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on the grounds that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him, and that the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the Government. The respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. Hence, plaintiffs therein and now petitioners filed an instant special civil action. The petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment. Issue: 

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

Ruling: The subject matter of the civil case, taxpayer’s class suit, is of common and general interest pertaining to all citizens of the Philippines. However, this case has a special and novel element. The petitioners, Oposa, et. al, are all minors duly represented by their respective parents, assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. The Supreme Court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. The petitioners’ personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature”. The minors’ assertion to their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The petition was granted, and the challenged order of the respondent judge is set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

Subject: Constitutional Law Topic: Interpretation of the Constitution Title: Kilos Bayan, Inc. vs. Manuel L. Morato, Citation: G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995 Facts: A contract was signed between Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) on January 25, 1995; an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipments and accessories to PCSO. On February 21, 1995, a petition was file to declare the Equipment Lease Agreement invalid on the ground that it is the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110, and is in violation of the PCSO’s charter. Issue: 

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

Ruling: The petitioners have no standing. Standing is a concept in Constitutional Law and here no Constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are real parties in interest. The petitioners invoke Sections 5, 7 and 12 of the Constitution. However, they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. They cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.

Subject: Constitutional Law Topic: Supremacy of the Constitution Title: Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. Citation: G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003 Facts: On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven Associate Justices for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” However, the House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form”, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentabella against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. Hence, a petition was filed by Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment. Issue: 

Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint which falls on a one year bar against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide with the House of the Representatives constitutional.

Ruling: The Supreme Court, in passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.” Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus, when a proposal reached the floor proposing that “a vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings,” this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the

filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Supreme Court Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

Subject: Constitutional Law Topic: Separation of Powers Title: Santiago vs. Guingona Citation: G.R. No.: 134577, November 18, 1998 Facts: On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines with Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña as presiding officer convened for the first regular session of the Eleventh Congress. The agenda for the day was the election of officers. Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan and Sen. Francisco S. Tatad were nominated for Senate President Position by Sen. Blas F. Ople and Sen. Miriam DefensorSantiago; respectively. Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Moreover, Senator Ople was also elected as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon was elected as majority leader. Sen. Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader explaining that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, being the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. However, during a discussion on who would constitute a minority, Sen. Flavier manifested that senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Sen. Santiago and Sen. Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue. On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Hence, a petition was filed before the Supreme Court by Sen. Miriam DefensorSantiago and Sen. Francisco S. Tatad, petitioners, for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. Issue: 

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition.

Ruling: The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a co-equal branch prevents the Supreme Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and

authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

Subject: Constitutional Law Topic: Separation of Powers Title: Bondoc vs. Pineda Citation: G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991 Facts: In a local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda, respondent, of the Laban ng Demokratiking Pilipino (LDP), and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc, petitioner, of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for Fourth District of the province of Pampanga which received 31,700 votes and 28,400 votes, respectively. Marciano M. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of nine members, three of whom are justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives. After reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots, it resulted that Bondoc had greater number of votes than Pineda. Congressman Camasura voted along with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc as the winner of the contest. However, on March 4, 1991, Congressman Camasura revealed to Congressman Cojuangco, LDP Secretary General, the final tally in the Bondoc case adding that he also voted for Bondoc. This revelation stirred a hornets’ nest in the LDP which went into flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal. On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, a letter was received by Congressman Camasura from Congressman Conjuangco informing him that by Resolution No. 03-91, he has been expelled together with Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for allegedly helping organize Partido Pilipino of Eduardo “Danding” Conjuangco and allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao del Sur to join the said political party. Moreover, on the day of promulgation, the Chairman of HRET received a letter from LDP informing the Tribunal to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Hence, on March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc to the Supreme Court to annul the decision of the House of Representatives to withdraw the nomination and rescind the nomination of Representative Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; to issue a writ of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of the respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; to issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as the member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and to grant such other relief as may be just and equitable. Issue:



Whether or not the decision of the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party, for the removal of a member in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to thwart the promulgation freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein, may have violated the separation of powers doctrine.

Ruling: The expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House of Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with tribunal’s disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal’s decision in favor his, the action of House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate, Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which created the House of Electoral Tribunal to be the “sole judge” of the election contest between Bondoc and Pineda. Wherefore, petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void abitio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 (“Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda”) is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity and jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision duly promulgated, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal.

Subject: Constitutional Law Topic: Separation of Powers Title: Angara vs. Electoral Commission Citation: No. 45081, July 15, 1936 Facts: On September 17, 1935, Jose Angara, Perdro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, Dionisio Mayor were the candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of Province of Tayabas. Jose Angara, the petitioner, was proclaimed member-elect for the mentioned district for having the most number of votes and thereafter took his oath of office. However, on December 8, 1935, a “Motion of Protest” was filed by Pedro Ynsua, respondent, before the Electoral Commission against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara. On December 20, 1935, the petitioner countered the motion filed by Pedro Ynsua with a “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”, alleging that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented, that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period, and that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. On January 23, 1936, the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution denying the petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss the Protest. Hence, a petition was filed for issuance of a writ of injunction by Jose Angara against the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of the petition filed by Pedro Ynsua and other respondents. Issue:  

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy; Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly

Ruling: The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied. Subject: Constitutional Law Topic: Separation of Power Title: Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the Philippines Citation: G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012 Facts: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed in 2008 before the Philippine National Police – National Capital Region against Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four other police officers. A similar charge was also filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor by a private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw. The Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission turned the cases over, while still pending, to the Office of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman upon the request of Gonzales III. On August 26, 2008, the case filed in the Office of the City Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated “by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged.” Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution dated October 17, 2008 recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case filed against the police officers for failure of the complainant to appear in three consecutive hearings despite due notice. However, upon the recommendation of the petitioner of the case turned over by the NPC, finding Rolando Mendoza and four others guilty of Grave Misconduct. On November 5, 2009, Mendoza and the other four police officers filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez on May 6, 2010, for final approval. On August 23, 2010, Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists in a desperate attempt to have him reinstated in the police service. The tragic incident ended the lives of eight Hong Kong Chinese nationals, injured seven other tourists, and the death of Mendoza. A public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee wherein petitioner Gonzales III was pointed to be one among those in whom culpability must lie. On March 31, 2011, the Office of the President rendered assailed decision finding Gonzales III guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted out the penalty of dismissal from service. Hence, a petition was filed by Gonzales III against the decision of the Office of the President. Issue: 

Whether or not the Office of the President has the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman

Ruling:

The Ombudsman’s administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. Wherein, Section 8, Paragraph 2 of the Ombudsman Act grants the President the power to remove the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor from office after due process. However, the dismissal of Gonzales III as a Deputy Ombudsman by the Office of the President must be for any of the grounds provided in the removal of the Ombudsman and therefore, the alleged ground of betrayal of public trust was not present in his case. Wherefore, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is reversed and set aside. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered reinstated with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner.

Subject: Constitutional Law Topic: Separation of Power Title: Vera vs. Avelino Citation: No. L-543, August 31, 1946 Facts: The Commission on Elections submitted, last May of 1946, to the President and the Congress of the Philippines, its reports on the national elections held. However, by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting the mentioned regions did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. On May 25, 1946, a Pendatum Resolution was approved referring to the report and ordering that, the petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, who had been included among the sixteen candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes as proclaimed by the Commission on Elections, shall not be sworn, nor seated, as the members of the chamber. Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their colleagues responsible for the resolution. Hence, a petition was filed before the Supreme Court by the petitioners praying for an order of annulling the Pendatum Resolution, and compelling the respondents to permit them to occupy their seats, and to exercise their senatorial prerogatives. Respondents traverse the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and assert the validity of the Pendatum Resolution. Issue: 

Whether or not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine the votes cast in the said provinces are valid.

Ruling: The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the case under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a contest and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and therefore not under the judicial review of the courts. The case is therefore dismissed.