Cruz Vs Enrile G.r. No. 75983, April 15, 1988

Cruz vs Enrile G.R. No. 75983, April 15, 1988

Facts: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced on October 1, 1986 to test the legality of the continued detention of some 217 so-called “political detainees arrested in the nine-year span of official martial rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. Presidential amnesty was granted to petitioner Virgilio Alejandrino, yet to this date he remains a prisoner at the Penitentiary, as to Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patano, Andres Parado and Daniel Campus, although they were acquitted of the charges against them, and Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos, who appear to have fully served the sentences imposed on them by the military commissions which convicted them. The petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the establishment of all military tribunals as well as General Order No. 8. Their plea is for the grant of a retrial of their respective cases in the civil courts, where their right to due process may be accorded respect. The writ of habeas corpus issued on July 31, 1987, two weeks after an amended petition was filed with leave of court, reiterating the arguments originally pleaded, and setting forth the additional claim that the pronouncement of this Court of the lack of jurisdiction of military tribunals to try cases of civilians even during martial rule, entitled the petitioners to be unconditionally freed from detention. Issue: Whether or not the establishment of all military tribunals as well as General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation may be declared unconstitutional Held: Yes. In Olaquer, this Court in no uncertain terms affed that a military jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned. It need only be said that these tribunals were created precisely to try and decide cases of military personnel, and the validity of General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation, although repeatedly challenged on constitutional grounds, has as many times been upheld by the Court, either expressly or impliedly. But distinction should not be set where none were clearly intended. The issue in Olaquer, as here, is the jurisdiction of courts martial over the persons of civilians, and not merely over the crimes imputed to them, regardless of which they are entitled to trial by judicial, not executive or military process. Conformably with this holding, the disposition of these cases would necessarily have, as a premise, the invalidity of any and all proceedings had before courts martial against the civilian petitioners.

Tan vs. Barrios G.R. Nos. 85481-82, 18 October 1990 Facts: Then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order 8 dated 27 September 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them." In General Order 21 dated 30 September 1972, the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with jurisdiction among others, over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security of the Republic. In General Order 12-b dated 7 November 1972, "crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions. On 17 April 1975, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan, with 12 others, were arrested and charged before the Military Commission 1, for the crimes of: (1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-possessed firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General Order 49; and (2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol with ammunition, in violation of General Orders 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree 9. President Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the military court. On 10 June 1976, a decision was promulgated by the Military Commission finding 5 of the accused guilty of murder, where each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term. A sixth accused was found guilty of both murder and illegal possession of firearm, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by electrocution. 8 of the accused were acquitted of the charges, and released on 11 June 1976. On 17 January 1981, Proclamation 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military tribunals and commissions. On 22 May 1987, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission vacating the sentence rendered on 4 December 1984 by Military Commission 34 against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and functioning as they did during the period of martial law. Issue: Whether or not the prosecution of Tan, et. al. would violate their right to protection against double jeopardy. Held: The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against Tan, et. al. and their coaccused before the Military Commission. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of Tan, et. al., the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law,

had been affirmed by the Supreme Court years before the Olaguer case arose and came before the Supreme Court. Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against Tan, et. al. would place them in double jeopardy. The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the strong arm of the State: "The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment, enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming and expense-producing for the state as well. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases the state to do so."

Que vs. Cosico G.R. No. 81861, 8 September 1989

Facts: The information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents involving the amount of P2,120,511.24 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City on 29 November 1985. In a motion for postponement dated 24 March 1986, Atty. Lorenzo E. Coloso, counsel for Bernabe Que and Amelia Que, filed a motion to postpone the arraignment and pre-trial, and prayed that the date be reset to 8 May 1986. On 31 March 1986, Gualberto Devera, Bernabe Que, Amelia Que, Warren Machado and Paz L. Martelino were arraigned while the other accused could not be arraigned because they were still at-large. The court then set a separate trial for some of the accused on 8 May 1986. On 22 July 1986, the City Fiscal submitted his proposals for admission of facts, which was duly received on the same date by the defense counsel. On the same date, the court again directed the prosecution to furnish machine copies of the 489 US treasury warrants to the accused through counsel within 15 days from the said date, after which the defense counsel shall make their counter proposal within 10 days from receipt thereof. On 10 November 1986, Judge Enrique P. Suplico issued the order dismissing the case, in light of the accused's constitutional rights to speedy trial. On 21 November 1986, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration from the order of dismissal. In the meantime, the case was re-raffled to Judge Rodrigo Cosico, as the former judge was not reappointed after the reorganization of the judiciary. Judge Cosico in an order dated 22 May 1987, granted the prosecution's motion for reconsideration and caused the case to be reopened. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the defense was denied in an order dated 27 November 1987. On 17 December 1987, Paz Martelino filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari praying that the order of Judge Cosico reinstating the case be declared null and void on the ground of double jeopardy. Meanwhile, Bernabe Que and Amelia Que filed a petition for certiorari directly with the Supreme Court seeking to declare Judge Cosico's orders dated 22 May 1987 and 27 November 1987 as null and void and to prohibit the judge from further proceeding with Criminal Case C-2152. Issue: Whether or not the reinstatement of the criminal case placed the accused in double jeopardy. Held: Criminal Case C-2152 may be reinstated as no double jeopardy has attached. The rule on double jeopardy is found in sec. 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." Thus, the requisites that must concur for legal jeopardy to attach are, to wit: 1) a valid complaint or information; 2) a court of competent jurisdiction; 3) the accused has pleaded to the charge and 4) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. The fourth requisite is lacking in the instant case. The case

was dismissed upon motion and with the express consent of the accused. For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. Moreover, as held in Bermisa v. Court of Appeals "the consent of petitioner to the dismissal constituted a waiver of the constitutional right not to be prosecuted for the same offense. where a defendant expressly consents to or moves for the dismissal of the case against him, even if the court or judge states in the order that the dismissal is definite or does not say that the dismissal is without prejudice to the filing of another information, the dismissal will not be a bar to a subsequent prosecution of the defendant for the same offense."