Elec Finals Digests Mateo

VII. Party-list Representatives VIII. Automated Elections 1.

Roque vs COMELEC

Facts: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436 authorizing the adoption of an automated election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards. The 1998, 2001, and 2004 national and local polls, however, came and went but purely manual elections were still the order of the day. On January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA 9369 [4] was passed authorizing anew the Comelec to use an AES. Of particular relevance are Sections 6 and 10 of RA 9369originally Secs. 5 and 8, respectively of RA 8436, as amendedeach defining Comelecs specific mandates insofar as automated elections are concerned. The AES was not utilized in the May 10, 2000 elections, as funds were not appropriated for that purpose by Congress and due to time constraints. RA 9369 calls for the creation of the Comelec Advisory Council [5] (CAC). CAC is to recommend, among other functions, the most appropriate, applicable and cost-effective technology to be applied to the AES. [6] To be created by Comelec too is the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC)[7] which is tasked to certify, through an established international certification committee, not later than three months before the elections, by categorically stating that the AES, inclusive of its hardware and software components, is operating properly and accurately based on defined and documented standards. After declaring TIM-Smartmatic as the best complying bidder, the SBAC then directed the joint venture to undertake postqualification screening, and its PCOS prototype machinesthe Smarmatic Auditable Electronic System (SAES) 1800to undergo end-toend[30] testing to determine compliance with the pre-set criteria. Then, Comelec and Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as provider, executed a contract[34] for the lease of goods and services under the contract for the contract amount of PhP 7,191,484,739.48, payable as the Goods and Services are delivered and/or progress is made in accordance [with pre-set] Schedule of Payments. [35] On the same date, a Notice to Proceed[36] was sent to, and received by, Smartmatic TIM Corporation. Petitioners interposed the instant recourse which, for all intents and purposes, impugns the validity and seeks to nullify the July 10, 2009 Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract adverted to. Among others, petitioners pray that respondents be permanently enjoined from implementing the automation project on the submission that: PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMELEC AND COMELEC-SBAC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AWARDING THE 2010 ELECTIONS AUTOMATION PROJECT TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TIM AND SMARTMATIC FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1. COMELEC DID NOT CONDUCT ANY PILOT TESTING OF THE x x x PCOS MACHINES OFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM, IN VIOLATION OF [RA] 8436 (AS AMENDED BY [RA] 9369) 2. THE [PCOS] MACHINES [THUS] OFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS x x x DO NOT SATISFY THE MINIMUM SYSTEM CAPABILITIES SET BY [RA] NO. 8436 (AS AMENDED BY [RA] 9369). 3. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS x x x DID NOT SUBMIT THE REQUIRED DOCUMENTS DURING THE BIDDING PROCESS THAT SHOULD ESTABLISH THE DUE EXISTENCE, COMPOSITION, AND SCOPE OF THEIR JOINT VENTURE, IN VIOLATION OF THE SUPREME COURTS HOLDING IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 159139, Jan. 13, 2004). 4. THERE WAS NO VALID JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT [JVA] BETWEEN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM DURING THE BIDDING, IN VIOLATION OF THE SUPREME COURTS HOLDING IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC x x x WHICH REQUIRES A JOINT VENTURE TO INCLUDE A COPY OF ITS [JVA] DURING THE BIDDING. 5. THE ALLEGED JOINT VENTURE COMPOSED OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM, DOES NOT SATISFY THE SUPREME COURTS DEFINITION OF A JOINT VENTURE IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC x x x WHICH REQUIRES A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER.

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Issue/s: (1) WON the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) of Smartmatic and TIM is valid; (2) WON the PCOS machines to be used satisfy the minimum capabilities requires by law Held: 1.

2.

Yes. Petitioners beef against the TIM-Smartmatic JVA is untenable. First off, the Comelec knows the very entities whom they are dealing with, which it can hold solidary liable under the automation contract, should there be contract violation. Secondly, there is no requirement under either RA 8436, as amended, or the RFP, that all the suppliers, manufacturers or distributors involved in the transaction should be part of the joint venture. On the contrary, the Instruction to Biddersas petitioners themselves admit [60]allows the bidder to subcontract portions of the goods or services under the automation project.[61 Yes. A. Pilot Testing

To argue that pilot testing is a condition precedent to a full automation in 2010 would doubtless undermine the purpose of RA 9369. For, as aptly observed during the oral arguments, if there was no political exercise in May 2007, the country would theoretically be barred forever from having full automation. The provision clearly conveys that the [AES] to be used in the 2010 elections need not have been used in the 2007 elections, and that the demonstration of its capability need not be in a previous Philippine election. Demonstration of the success and capability of the PCOS may be in an electoral exercise in a foreign jurisdiction. [66] As determined by the Comelec, the PCOS system had been successfully deployed in previous electoral exercises in foreign countries, such as Ontario, Canada; and New York, USA,[67] albeit Smartmatic was not necessarily the system provider. But then, RA 9369 does not call for the winning bidder of the 2010 automation project and the deploying entity/provider in the foreign electoral exercise to be one and the same entity. Neither does the law incidentally require that the system be first used in an archipelagic country or with a topography or a voting population similar to or approximating that of the Philippines. AES is not synonymous to and ought not to be confused with the PCOS. Sec. 2(a) of RA 8436, as amended, defines an AES as a system using appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing and transmission of election results, and other electoral processes. On the other hand, PCOS refers to a technology wherein an optical ballot scanner, into which optical scan paper ballots marked by hand by the voter are inserted to be counted. [65] What may reasonably be deduced from these definitions is that PCOS is merely one of several automated voting, counting or canvassing technologies coming within the term AES, implying in turn that the automated election system or technology that the Comelec shall adopt in future elections need not, as a matter of mandatory arrangement, be piloted in the adverted two highly urbanized cities and provinces. In perspective, what may be taken as mandatory prerequisite for the full automation of the 2010 regular national/ local elections is that the system to be procured for that exercise be a technology tested either here or abroad.

B. Minimum System Capabilities

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Given the foregoing and absent empirical evidence to the contrary, the Court, presuming regularity in the performance of regular duties, takes the demo-testing thus conducted by SBAC-TWG as a reflection of the capability of the PCOS machines, although the tests, as Comelec admits,[80] were done literally in the Palacio del Governador building, where a room therein simulated a town, the adjoining room a city, etc. Perusing the RFP, however, the real worth of the PCOS system and the machines will of course come after they shall have been subjected to the gamut of acceptance tests expressly specified in the RFP, namely, the lab test, field test, mock election test, transmission test and, lastly, the final test and sealing procedure of all PCOS and CCS units using the actual Election Day machine configuration.[81] Apropos the counting-accuracy feature of the PCOS machines, petitioners no less impliedly admit that the web page they appended to their petition, showing a 2% to 10% failing rate, is no longer current. [82] And if they bothered to examine the current website of Smartmatic specifically dealing with its SAES 1800, the PCOS system it offered, they would have readily seen that the advertised accuracy rating is over 99.99999%.[83] Moreover, a careful scrutiny of the old webpage of Smarmatic reveals that the 2% to 10% failure rate applied to optical scanners and not to SAES. Yet the same page discloses that the SAES has 100% accuracy. Clearly, the alleged 2% to 10% failing rate is now irrelevant and the Court need not belabor this and the equally irrelevant estoppel principle petitioners impose on us. 2.

Capalla vs COMELEC

Facts: On July 10, 2009, the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections,(AES Contract). The contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM was one of “lease of the AES with option to purchase (OTP) the goods listed in the contract.” In said contract, the Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the option. In September 2010, the Comelec partially exercised its OTP 920 units of PCOS machines with corresponding canvassing/consolidation system (CCS) for the special elections in certain areas in the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan. In a letter dated December 18, 2010, Smartmatic-TIM, through its Chairman Flores, proposed a temporary extension of the option period on the remaining PCOS machines until March 31, 2011, waiving the storage costs and covering the maintenance costs. The Comelec did not exercise the option within the extended period. Several extensions were given for the Comelec to exercise the OTP until its final extension on March 31, 2012. On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued a Resolution resolving to accept Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until March 31, 2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for and on behalf of the Comelec the Agreement on the Extension of the OTP Under the AES Contract (Extension Agreement). Comelec again issued a Resolution resolving to approve the Deed of Sale between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter’s PCOS machines to be used in the upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the Comelec. The Deed of Sale was forthwith executed. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Comelec Resolutions on the grounds that the option period provided for in the AES contract had already lapsed; that the extension of the option period and the exercise of the option without competitive public bidding contravene the provisions of RA 9184; and that the Comelec purchased the machines in contravention of the standards laid down in RA 9369. On the other hand, respondents argue on the validity of the subject transaction based on the grounds that there is no prohibition either in the contract or provision of law for it to extend the option period; that the OTP is not an independent contract in itself, but is a provision contained in the valid and existing AES contract that had already satisfied the public bidding requirements of RA 9184; and that exercising the option was the most advantageous option of the Comelec. Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Comelec in issuing the assailed Resolutions and in executing the assailed Extension Agreement and Deed.

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Held: No. A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the parties are given the right to amend the contract which may include the period within which to exercise the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective. The Comelec still retains P50M of the amount due Smartmatic-TIM as performance security, which indicates that the AES contract is still effective and not yet terminated. Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the contract, the provisions thereof may still be amended by mutual agreement of the parties provided said amendment is in writing and signed by the parties. Considering, however, that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a government agency, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed not only by the Civil Code but also by RA 9184. A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions of the contract bidded upon. However, such changes must not constitute substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms. The conclusions held by the Court in Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) v. Pozzolanic Philippines Incorporated and Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., (PIATCO) cannot be applied in the present case. First, Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was not previously available to the other bidders. The bidders were apprised that aside from the lease of goods and purchase of services, their proposals should include an OTP the subject goods. Second, the amendment of the AES contract is not substantial. The approved budget for the contract was P11,223,618,400.00 charged against the supplemental appropriations for election modernization. Bids were, therefore, accepted provided that they did not exceed said amount. The competitive public bidding conducted for the AES contract was sufficient. A new public bidding would be a superfluity. Lastly, the amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous to the Comelec and the public because the P7,191,484,739.48 rentals paid for the lease of goods and purchase of services under the AES contract was considered part of the purchase price. For the Comelec to own the subject goods, it was required to pay only P2,130,635,048.15. If the Comelec did not exercise the option, the rentals already paid would just be one of the government expenses for the past election and would be of no use to future elections. IX. Recall 1.

Garcia vs Comelec

Facts: Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the May 11, 1992 elections. In 1993, some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province met at the National Power Corporation compound in Bagac, Bataan where they constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. The mayor of Mariveles, Honorable Oscar, de los Reyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila Payumo, were chosen as Presiding Officer and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively. Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben Roque, was recognized and he moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of the petitioner on the ground of "loss of confidence." On July 7, 1993, petitioners filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition to deny due course to said Resolution No. 1 and alleged that the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160; respondent COMELEC dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall elections for the position of Governor of Bataan on October 11 , 1993. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the said Resolution of the respondent COMELEC on various grounds. They urged that section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings, and (2) it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of law. They also argued that the proceedings followed by the PRAC in passing Resolution No. I suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly. Issue/s: 1. 2.

WON the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings WON failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly will invalidate the recall

Held:

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1.

No. The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. 19 Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The power given was to select which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate. Congress was not straightjacketed to one particular mechanism of initiating recall elections. What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people.

2.

Yes, notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place. It also requires that the recall resolution by the said majority must be adopted during its session called for the purpose. The underscored words carry distinct legal meanings and purvey some of the parameters limiting the power of the members of a preparatory recall assembly to initiate recall proceedings. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.

2.

Claudio vs Comelec

Facts: Jovito O. Claudio, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998. Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. Thereafter, on May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999. As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor. Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case,[2] filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10 were actually double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction. In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions against it. Hence, these petitions. Issue/s: WON the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period Held: No. it is not the holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall resolutions that produces a judgment on the performance of the official concerned; it is the vote of the electorate in the Election that does. Therefore, as long as the recall election is not held before the official concerned has completed one year in office, he will not be judged on his performance prematurely. Since the voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period provided and because the purpose of the first limitation is to provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election. 3.

Goh v Bayron

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Facts: Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition against Mayor Bayron due to loss of trust and confidence brought about by "gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other related gross inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and emotional immaturity as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City." On 1 April 2014, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9864. Resolution No. 9864 found the recall petition sufficient in form and substance, but. suspended the funding of any and all recall elections until the resolution of the funding issue. Hence, Goh filed the present Petition. He prayed for (a) the PARTIAL ANNULMENT and REVERSAL of Resolution No. 9864, insofar as the same directed the suspension of further action on the instant Recall Petition, and (b) the ANNULMENT AND REVERSAL of Resolution No. 9882, on the ground that in their issuance, the respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to rule that: I. THE 2014 GAA PROVIDES FOR AN APPROPRIATION OR LINE ITEM BUDGET TO SERVE AS A CONTINGENCY FUND FOR THE CONDUCT OF RECALL ELECTIONS. II. THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION MAY LAWFULLY AUGMENT ANY SUPPOSED INSUFFICIENCY IN FUNDING FOR THE CONDUCT OF RECALL ELECTIONS BY UTILIZING ITS SAVINGS. III. THE PROPER, ORDERLY AND LAWFUL EXERCISE OF THE PROCESS OF RECALL IS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION. IV. THE FACTUAL BACKDROP OF THIS CASE DOES NOT WARRANT NOR JUSTIFY THE DEFERMENT OF ALL PROCEEDINGS ON RECALL PETITJONS. Issue/s: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882 (re: Suspension of Recall Elections because fo the lack of funding) Held: Yes. the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882.1âwphi1 The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014. The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power to "[e]nforce and administer alE laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." 26 The 1987 Constitution not only guaranteed the COMELEC's fiscal autonomy,27 but also granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its savings.28 The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to the COMELEC Chairman Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the conduct of recall elections in the 2014 GAA, we see no reason why the COMELEC is unable to perform its constitutional mandate to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of x x x recall."45 Should the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed insufficient, then the COMELEC Chairman may exercise his authority to augment such line item appropriation from the COMELEC's existing savings, as this augmentation is expressly authorized ]n the 2014 GAA. X. Failure of Elections, Postponement of Elections, Special Elections 1. Sison vs COMELEC | Romero, J. Facts:

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Joseph Peter S. Sison filed a Petition to Suspend the Canvassing of Votes and/or Proclamation in Quezon City and to Declare a Failure of Elections. Issue/s: Held: NOTE!!! Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvas thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. (Underscoringsupplied) petitioner's petition before the COMELEC had nothing therein that could support an action for declaration of failure of elections. He never alleged at all that elections were either not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of failure to elect stood as a bare conclusion bereft of any substantive support to describe just exactly how the failure to elect came about. 2. AMPATUAN VS COMELEC | PARDO, J. Facts: Petitioners[4] and respondents[5] were candidates for the provincial elective positions in the province of Maguindanao in the May 14, 2001election. Petitioner Ampatuan and respondent Candao contended for the position of governor. The slate of Ampatuan emerged as winners as per election returns. On May 23, 2001, respondents filed a petition with the Comelec for the annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections[6] in several municipalities[7] in the province of Maguindanao. They claimed that the elections were completely sham and farcical. The ballots were filled-up en masse by a few persons the night before election day, and in some precincts, the ballot boxes, official ballots and other election paraphernalia were not delivered at all.[8] On May 25, 2001, the Comelec issued an order suspending the proclamation of the winning candidates for congressman of the second district, governor, vice-governor and board members of Maguindanao.[9] On May 30, 2001, petitioners filed with the Comelec a motion to lift the suspension of proclamation.[10] On June 14, 2001, the Comelecissued an order lifting the suspension of proclamation of the winning candidates for governor, vice-governor and board members of the first and second districts.[11] Consequently, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioners winners.[12] On June 16, 2001, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition to set aside the Comelec order dated June 14, 2001, and preliminary injunction to suspend the effects of the proclamation of the petitioners.[13] Meantime, petitioners assumed their respective offices on June 30, 2001. On July 17, 2001, the Court resolved to deny respondents petition.[14] Issue/s: whether the Commission on Elections was divested of its jurisdiction to hear and decide respondents petition for declaration of failure of elections after petitioners had been proclaimed. Held: No. Thus, the Comelec, in the case of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters signatures and thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean.[27] The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive the Comelec of its authority to annul any canvass and illegal proclamation.[28] In the case at bar, we cannot assume that petitioners proclamation and assumption into office on June 30, 2001, was legal precisely because the conduct by which the elections were held was put in issue by respondents in their petition for annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections.

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Respondents allegation of massive fraud and terrorism that attended the May 14, 2001 election in the affected municipalities cannot be taken lightly as to warrant the dismissal of their petition by the Comelec on the simple pretext that petitioners had been proclaimed winners. Note: two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and second, the votes cast would affect the result of the election. XI. Election Offenses 1.

PEOPLE VS FERRER

Facts: before the elections on November 10, 1953, the said accused, Andres G. Ferrer, delivered a speech during a political rally of the Liberal Party in Barrio Caloocan Norte, Binmaley, Pangasinan, inducing the electors to vote for the candidates of the Liberal Party but more particularly for President Quirino and Speaker Perez; that during said political meeting the said accused caused to be distributed to the people who attended said meeting cigarettes and pamphlets concerning the Liberal Party; and (2) that the said accused, Andres G. Ferrer, sometime prior to the last elections campaigned in the Barrio of Caloocan Norte, of the said municipality of Binmaley, going from house to house and induced the electors to whom he distributed sample ballots of the Liberal Party to vote for the candidates of said Party.||| Issues:

Held: 2.

MAPPALA VS NUNEZ

Facts: An administrative complaint is filed by Jacinto Mappala against Judge Crispulo A. Nuñez for the acquittal of the accused against Alejandro Angoluan and Honorato Angoluan for Violation of the Omnibus election Code. In his decision, respondent found that Alejandro shot complainant herein inside Precinct No. 2 located at the elementary school building in Santo Tomas, Isabela, during the barangay elections on March 28, 1989. Respondent also found that Alejandro was the one who surrendered the gun. To respondent, the surrender of the weapon was an implied admission that it was the one used by Alejandro in shooting complainant. Inspite of all these findings, respondent acquitted Alejandro of illegally carrying a deadly weapon inside a precinct on the theory that the gun was not seized from him while he was the precinct. According to respondent: . . . With respect to the other accused Alejandro Angoluan, although there is evidence to prove that he shot the complainant Jacinto Mappala, the gun which he allegedly used was surrendered by him two (2) days after the incident and he was not apprehended in possession of the gun within 100 meters radius of the precinct. This Court believes that he should not be prosecuted (sic) in violation of Article 22, Section 261, Subsection (p) of the Omnibus Election Code (Rollo, p. 45; Emphasis supplied).

Issue: WON accused should be acquitted Held: No. To support a conviction under Section 261(p) of the Omnibus election Code, it is not necessary that the deadly weapon should have been seized from the accused while he was in the precinct or within a radius of 100 meters therefrom. It is enough that the accused carried the deadly weapon "in the polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof" during any of the specified days and hours. After respondent himself had found that the prosecution had established these facts, it is difficult to understand why he acquitted Alejandro of the charge of violation of Section 261(p) of the Omnibus election Code. 3.

PEOPLE VS BAYONA

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Facts: "At about eleven o'clock the day June 5, 1934, while general elections are held in the precinct number 4 located in the neighborhood of Aranguel the Municipality of Pilar, Province of Capiz, the accused was surprised by Jose E. Desiderio, who was then the representative of the Department of the Interior to inspect the general elections in the province of Capiz, and the commander of the Constabulary FB Agdamag who was on that occasion with said Jose E. Desiderio, carrying in his Colt revolver inside the fence surrounding the building intended for the said polling station number 4, and a distance of 22 meters from the polling station concerned. Jose E. Desiderio immediately seized the revolver in question. "The defense, through the testimony of Jose D. Benliro and Dioscoro Buenvenida, try to establish that the defendant stop here on the street facing opposite the at the invitation of the Jose D. Benliro and in order to entreat the said defendant to take home to voters of said Jose D. Benliro who had already finished voting, and that when they arrived Jose E. Desiderio and FB Agdamag commander, the accused here was in the street. at school election to the site where, according to those witnesses, the defendant was when he took off the revolver, there is a distance of 27 meters. the defendant could not leave his revolver in his automobile without the risk of losing it because he was alone, it is sufficient to say that under the circumstances it was not necessary for the defendant to leave his automobile merely because somebody standing near the polling place had called him, nor does the record show that it was necessary for the defendant to carry arms on that occasion.||| Solicitor-General argues that in the case at bar there is no evidence that the defendant went to the election precinct either to vote or to work for the candidacy of anyone, but no the other hand the evidence shows that the defendant had no intention to go to the electoral precinct; that he was merely passing along the road in front of the building where the election was being held when a friend of his called him; that while in the strict, narrow interpretation of the law the defendant is guilty, it would be inhuman and unreasonable to convict him.||| Issue: WON intent is material in violating an election law Held: No. We cannot accept the reasons advanced by the Solicitor-General for the acquittal of the defendant. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended to intimidate the voters. The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. . . . 4.

LOZANO V YORAC

Facts: petitioner and Bernadette Agcorpa, a registered voter of Makati, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against then candidate for mayor Jejomar C. Binay on the ground that respondent Binay used P9.9 million of municipal funds to enhance his candidacy and his entire ticket under the Lakas ng Bansa. 2. The disqualification case was assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC composed of Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac, as presiding officer, and Commissioners Andres R. Flores and Magdara B. Dimaampao, as members. 3. The Second Division, through its Presiding Commissioner, referred the case to the Law Department of respondent commission for preliminary investigation of the criminal aspect. On February 4, 1988, Binay filed his counter-affidavit with said department.

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4. On June 21, 1988, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the inhibition and/or disqualification of Commissioners Yorac and Africa. This was the first of several motions for inhibition filed by petitioner before respondent commission. Petitioner also prayed that the disqualification petition be referred for consideration en banc. CommissionerYorac denied the motion for inhibition. On August 10, 1988, the COMELEC en banc denied the prayer that the case be hearden banc, ruling that "no substantial reason exists why this case should be taken en banc; and considering finally that the case is set for hearing by the Second Division. " 5. On October 26, 1988, petitioner Lozano himself filed a motion to disqualify Commissioner Yorac because she postponed motu proprio a hearing set on the ground that she will study the issue of jurisdiction. Said motion was denied. 6. On November 3, 1988, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2050 which provides that petitions for disqualification filed prior to the January 18, 1988 local elections based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code but not resolved before the elections shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department which shall submit its report to the Commission en banc. Pursuant to said resolution, the Second Division on even date referred back the disqualification case against respondent Binay to the Law Department "before taking any action thereon." 7. On November 8, 1988, petitioner filed another motion praying that the disqualification case be heard and decided en banc invoking therein COMELEC Resolution No. 2050. Instead of issuing a formal resolution, respondent COMELEC authorized then Chairman Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a member of this Court) to reply to petitioner's counsel. prLL 8. On May 23, 1990, the Law Department submitted its investigation report 5 recommending that criminal charges be filed against respondent Binay for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, ||| Issue: WON commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amount to lack of jurisdiction in not finding Binay guilty of votebuying, contrary to the evidence presented by petitioner Held: NO. petitioner's postulation that she should have inhibited herself from hearing the main case, for allegedly having prejudged the case when she advanced the opinion that respondent Binay could only be disqualified after conviction by the regional trial court, is of exiguous validity. In the first place, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 1, Rule 4 thereof, prohibits a member from, among others, sitting in a case in which he has publicly expressed prejudgment as may be shown by convincing proof. There is no showing that the memorandum wherein Commissioner Yorac rendered her opinion was ever made public either by publication or dissemination of the same to the public. Furthermore, the opinion of CommissionerYorac was based on prior cases for disqualification filed with the COMELEC wherein prior conviction of the respondent was considered a condition sine qua non for the filing of the disqualification case. 10 We accordingly find no compelling reason to inhibit Commissioner Yorac from participating in the hearing and decision of the case 5.

ONG VS MARTINEZ

Facts: Ong, who was a defeated candidate of the Liberal Party in the Third District of Manila, on the strength of an indorsement by the Treasurer of the said party in the district which was allegedly supported by 80% of the ward leaders of the party of the same district as embodied in their resolution, was appointed on February 9, 1989 as member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod (City Council) by the Secretary of Local Government to fill the vacancy created by the late Councilor Saturnino Herrera. On the same date, petitioner took his oath of office as such councilor after which the Secretary of Local Government informed Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. and ViceMayor and Presiding Officer Danilo Lacuna of the appointment of petitioner. Likewise, in his lst Indorsement of March 13, 1989, the Undersecretary of Local Government forwarded petitioner's appointment to Presiding Officer of the City Council Danilo Lacuna.

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In the regular session of the City Council held on March 9, 1989, said Council, acting on the letter of the Secretary of Local Government dated February 9, 1989 informing them of the four appointments including that of petitioner, moved to exclude petitioner and the other appointees from the session hall. In the subsequent session of the Council on March 14, 1989, petitioner and his coappointees were formally excluded from the session hall with sixteen (16) councilors voting for such exclusion and none against it, with the rest of the Council members abstaining. The records show that respondent Martinez went through the legal formalities or standard procedure prior to her appointment to the vacated position subject of this controversy. Respondent thus assumed and performed her duties as Councilor for the Third District of Manila until the restraining order of the Court issued on April 20, 1989 was received by respondent. This petition now seeks to annul the appointment of respondent Martinez and to declare petitioner to be the holder of the position of Councilor in place of deceased Saturnino Herrera. One of the grounds: The Secretary of the Department of Local Government, in appointing respondent Martinez on March 17, 1989, violated the election ban on appointments under Res. No. 2054 of the Comelec dated December 7, 1988 since her appointment was not cleared for exemption from the election ban and, therefore, the same was made beyond and in excess of the Secretary's authority and by reason of which, the appointment is null and void. Issue: WON the secretary of the DILG violated the election ban on appointments Held: NO. Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code provides thus: (g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. During the period of forty- five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee whether provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election. As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this provision shall be null and void. Case at bar, the aforequoted provision does not apply to both assailed appointments because of the following reason: The permanent vacancy for councilor exists and its filling up is governed by the Local Government Code while the appointment referred to in the election ban provision is covered by the Civil Service Law. 6.

REGALADO VS COMELEC

Facts: complainant Editha Barba was appointed nursing attendant in the Rural Health Office of Tanjay, Negros Oriental by then Officer-InCharge Mayor Rodolfo Navarro.[3] Although she was detailed at, and received her salary from, the Office of the Mayor, she reported for work at the Puriculture Center, Poblacion, Tanjay. As Navarro decided to run for mayor of Tanjay in the January 18, 1988 elections, petitioner Dominador Regalado, Jr. was appointed substitute OIC-Mayor. His brother, Arturo S. Regalado, was also a mayoralty candidate. Petitioners brother won in the elections. Four days later, on January 22, 1988, petitioner, still sitting as OIC-Mayor, issued a memorandum to Barba informing her that effective January 25, 1988, she would be reassigned from Poblacion, Tanjay to Barangay Sto. Nio,[4] about 25 kilometers from Poblacion.[5] The transfer was made without the prior approval of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Barba continued to report at the Puriculture Center, Poblacion, Tanjay, however. Hence, on February 18, 1988, petitioner issued another memorandum to Barba directing her to explain, within 72 hours, why she refuses to comply with the memorandum of January 22, 1988.[6]Spp-edjo In response, Barba, on February 21, 1988, sent a letter to petitioner protesting her transfer which she contended was illegal. [7] She then filed, on February 16, 1988, a complaint[8] against petitioner for violation of 261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, and

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after preliminary investigation, the Provincial Election Officer of Negros Oriental, Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, charged petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Negros Oriental. RTC held Regalado guilty of violating 261(h) of the OEC. Petitioner admits that he issued the January 22, 1988 memorandum within the election period set in Resolution No. 1937 without the prior approval of the COMELEC. He contends, however, that he did not violate 261(h) because he merely effected a "re-assignment" and not a "transfer" of personnel by moving Barba from one unit or place of designation (Poblacion, Tanjay) to another (Sto. Nio, Tanjay) of the same office, namely, the Rural Health Office of Tanjay, Negros Oriental Issue: WON petitioner violated 261(h) of OEC Held: Yes. First. The two elements of the offense prescribed under 261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, are: (1) a public officer or employee is transferred or detailed within the election period as fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules and regulations 261(h) of B.P. No. 881, as amended, provides that it is an election offense for Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission. (Emphasis added) As the Solicitor General notes, "the word transfer or detail, as used [above], is modified by the word whatever. This indicates that anymovement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency, during the election is covered by the prohibition. In this case, the memorandum itself issued by petitioner to Barba on January 22, 1988 stated that the latter was being "transferred," thus:[17]Man-ikan Effective Monday, January 25, 1988, your assignment as Nursing Attendant will be transferred from RHU I Tanjay Poblacion to Barangay Sto. Nio, this Municipality. You are hereby directed to perform the duties and functions as such immediately in that area. For strict compliance.(Emphasis added) He also contends that his order to transfer Barba to Barangay Sto. Nio was prompted by the lack of health service personnel therein and that this, in effect, constitutes sufficient justification for his non-compliance with 261(h) . It may well be that Barangay Sto. Nio in January 1988 was in need of health service personnel. Nonetheless, this fact will not excuse the failure of petitioner to obtain prior approval from the COMELEC for the movement of personnel in his office. Indeed, appointing authorities can transfer or detail personnel as the exigencies of public service require. [19] However, during election period, as such personnel movement could be used for electioneering or even to harass subordinates who are of different political persuasion, 261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, prohibits the same unless approved by the COMELEC. 7.

AQUINO VS COMELEC

Facts: On January 8, 2010, Aquino, as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), issued PhilHealth Special Order No. 16, Series of 2010 (reassignment order)5 directing the reassignment of several PHIC officers and employees. On January 11, 2010, Aquino issued an Advisory implementing the reassignment order. The Advisory directed these officers to, among others, "report to their new regional assignments; or to the central office; or to other areas, as the case may be, not later than five (5) working days from the date of issuance of the reassignment order or January 15, 2010 for officers transferred, reassigned or

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designated to various posts located in the central office; and/or ten (10) working days from the ADVISORY or January 22, 2010, in the case of those reassigned or transferred from a regional office to another or from the central office to a regional office and vice versa." In view of the reassignment order and its directive, Dean Rudyard A. Avila III, consultant to the Chairman of the Board of PHIC and former Secretary of the PHIC Board of Directors, filed before the COMELEC on January 18, 2010, a complaint against Aquino and Melinda C. Mercado, PHIC Officer-in-Charge, Executive VP and Chief Operating Officer, for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. The case was docketed as E.O. Case No. 10-003. Issue: WON Aquino violated 261(h) of the OEC Held: No. Under Section 261(h) of BP 881, a person commits the election offense of violation of the election transfer ban when he makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any official or employee of the government during the election period absent prior approval of the COMELEG. By its terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the elements of the offense and its exceptions. The elements are: (1) the making or causing of a government official or employee's transfer or detail whatever, (2) the making or causing of the transfer or detail whatever was made during the election period; and (3) these acts were made without the required prior COMELEC approval. As this provision operates, the making or causing of the movement of personnel during the election period but without the required COMELEC approval is covered by the prohibition and renders the responsible person liable for the offense. Conversely, the making or causing (of the movement of personnel) before or after the election period even without the required COMELEC approval, or during the election period but with the required COMELEC approval are not covered by the prohibition and do not render the responsible person liable for this election offense. During the making or causing phase of the entire transfer or reassignment process - from drafting the order, to its signing, up to its release - the issuing official plays a very real and active role. Once the transfer or reassignment order is issued, the active role is shifted to the addressee of the order who should now carry out the purpose of the order. At this level - the implementation phase - the issuing official's only role is to see to it that the concerned officer or employee complies with the order. The issuing official may only exert discipline upon the addressee who refuses to comply with the order. Case at bar, Aquino completed the act of making or causing the reassignment of the affected PHIC officers and employees before the start of the election period. In this sense, the evils sought to be addressed by Section 261(h) of BP 881 is kept intact by the timely exercise of his management prerogative in rearranging or reassigning PHIC personnel within its various offices necessary for the PHIC's efficient and smooth operation. As Aquino's acts of issuing the order fell outside the coverage of the transfer prohibition, he cannot be held liable for violation of Section 261(h). 8.

COMELEC VS TAGLE

Facts: In connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, candidate for Mayor Florentino A. Bautista filed a complaint against Mayor Federico Poblete et al. for vote –buying in violation of Sec 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Subsequently, a complaint for vote-selling in violation of Sec 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code was filed with the Prosecutor’s Office as witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 and the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite filed separate Informations for vote-selling against said witnesses. On appeal, the COMELEC en banc declared that the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 were exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to 4th paragraph of Sec 28, RA No. 6646, otherwise known as “The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987” which grants immunity from criminal prosecution to persons who voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling. The Law Department of the COMELEC moved to dismiss the Informations against the said witnesses but the RTC in Imus, Cavite denied the motion to dismiss.

Held: 1. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was bought. Sec 28 of RA No. 6646 concludes with the following

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paragraph: The giver, offeror, the promissory as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, that any person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to which his information and testimony were given: Provided, further, that nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony. 2. To avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers, especially by the latter’s opponents, Congress saw it fit to warn “vote-sellers” who denounce the vote-buying that they could be liable for perjury or false testimony should they not tell the truth. 3. The prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the proviso in the last paragraph of Section 28, RA 6646. At the time when the complaint for vote-selling was filed with the office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents had already executed sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-buying. It cannot then be denied that they had already voluntarily given information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly testified in Crim. Case No. 7034-99. 4. The COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same. The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or their respective assistants are, however, given continuing authority, as deputies of the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses and to prosecute the same. This authority may be revoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever, in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the common good, or when it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC. When the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, it in effect withdrew the deputation granted by the COMELEC.

9.

TAPISPISAN VS COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Tapispisan is a public school teacher and has been occupying the position of Teacher III since September 1, 1992. She has been teaching for the last thirty (30) years and is currently assigned at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City. On May 30, 1995, respondent Atty. Ricardo T. Sibug (Schools Division Superintendent, Pasay City) issued Division Memorandum No. 33 designating respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School and respondent Teves as OICPrincipal of Don Carlos Elementary School, both schools are in Pasay City. Feeling that she had been unduly by-passed, petitioner Tapispisan filed with respondent Sibug a protest contesting such designation. The latter, however, denied the protest. In the present petition, she alleged among others that Respondent Court of Appeals committed serious error when it did not rule that the Transfer/Designation of respondents R[u]mbaoa and Teves made pursuant to the May 30, 199[5] Division Memorandum No. 33 were violative of COMELEC Resolution No. 2731 which expressly bans the transfer of officers and employees in the civil service during the election period designated from January 8, 1995 to June 7, 1995. Issue: WON the Transfer/Designation of respondents R[u]mbaoa and Teves made pursuant to the May 30, 199[5] Division Memorandum No. 33 were violative of COMELEC Resolution No. 2731 which expressly bans the transfer of officers and employees in the civil service during the election period designated from January 8, 1995 to June 7, 1995.[9] Held: No. Such designation did not violate Resolution No. 2731 dated December 5, 1994 of the Commission on Elections, which declared as a prohibited act the transfer of officers and employees in the civil service during the election period from January 8, 1995 up to June 7, 1995. Transfer is defined as a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment. [21] The designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves did not involve a movement from one position to another. Neither did it involve the issuance of any appointment to the said positions in their favor. In fact, respondents Rumbaoa and Teves retained their incumbent positions at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School. As such, their designation could not be considered as a transfer within the meaning of a prohibited act during the election period .

10. CAUSING VS COMELEC **

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The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 are transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as “any personnel movement from one government agency to another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or without the issuance of an appointment”; while detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment. Facts: Elsie Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010 (Office Order No. 12), commanding for the detailing of Causing at the Office of the Municipal Mayor. Causing filed the complaint claiming that issuance made by Mayor Biron ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the election period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and it violated of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737. Mayor Biron countered that the purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to closely supervise the performance of her functions after complaints regarding her negative behavior in dealing with her coemployees and with the public transacting business in her office. The Provincial Election Supervisor recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and recommendation. ISSUE: Is the relocation of Causing by Mayor Biron during the election period from her office as the Municipal Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor constitute a prohibited act under the Omnibus Election Code and the relevant Resolution of the COMELEC? HELD: No. Reassignment was not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code there was no probable cause to criminally charge Mayor Biron with the violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only physically transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor. Causing is not stripped of her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar. She was merely required to physically report to the Mayor’s Office and perform her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar therein. Definitely, she is still the MCR, albeit doing her work physically outside of her usual work station. She is also not deprived of her supervisory function over the staff as she continues to review their work and signs documents they prepared. While she may encounter difficulty in performing her duties as a supervisor as she is not physically near her staff, that by itself, however, does not mean that she has lost supervision over them. Moreover, Causing’s too literal understanding of transfer should not hold sway because the provisions involved here were criminal in nature. Mayor Biron was sought to be charged with an election offense punishable under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Every reasonable doubt must then be resolved in favor of the accused.

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