Evidence

ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 127240, March 27, 2000

CASE DOCTRINE: Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that these rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. FACTS: Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness against him, he remarked: Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed and annexed several documents in its appellant brief to support its contention against the granting of the petition before the lower court. On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance of naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. ISSUE: Whether the rule on evidence is applicable in naturalization proceedings HELD: Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence,

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they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,"[12] so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143[13] of the Rules of Court which provides that – These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added) Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decision in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.[14] Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents. Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process.[15]We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.

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ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

CASE DOCTRINE:: The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence. HELD: There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision, petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner’s attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason, it is contended that the 3 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent’s complaint. Indeed, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.5 The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

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PEOPLE vs. YATAR G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004

CASE DOCTRINE: No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented. Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi. FACTS: On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmother’s (Isabel Dawang’s) house, despite her intention to go forth Tuguegarao City, as her other former’s housemate-relatives left in the morning. At 10:00 am, accused-appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where Kathylyn stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyn’s first cousin saw Yatar, who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, descended from the second floor and was pacing back and forth at the back of Isabel Dawang’s house, Judilyn didn’t find this unusual since Yatar and his wife used to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn, telling the latter that he would not be getting the lumber he had been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now wearing a black shirt (without collar) and blue pants; and noticed that the latter’s eyes were “reddish and sharp”. Accused-appellant asked about the whereabouts of Judilyn’s husband, as the former purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatar immediately left when Judilyn’s husband arrived. In the evening, when Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her house turned off, the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which she asked Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the second floor to check whether the teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the door therein was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded opening the tied door with a knife, and as she groped in the darkness of the second level of her house, she felt Kathylyn’s lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyn’s clothes and undergarments beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with blood was also found 50-meters away from Isabel’s house. Meanwhile, semen has also been found upon examination of Kathylyn’s cadaver. When subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the sperm specimen is identical to Yatar’s genotype. Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the same by the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court in order to assail the court a quo’s decision. On appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred in giving much weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on him, in lieu of the seminal fluid found inside the victim’s (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2) the blood sample taken from is violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the conduct of DNA testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex-post facto laws. ISSUE: 5 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as evidence for Yatar’s conviction? HELD: DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt. Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

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NENA LAZALITA* TATING vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, et al. G.R. NO. 155208, March 27, 2007

CASE DOCTRINE: The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus by either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade FACTS: On 1969, Daniela sold her property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. As a consequence, title thereto was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972 to 1988. Daniela died on July 29, 1988. On 1989, Daniela’s heirs herein respondents found a sworn statement executed by Danila stating that she had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property. On September 6, 1989, Respondents filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela. RTC rendered its judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. CA Affirmed its decision. Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-examine her. ISSUE: Whether or not a sworn statement/affidavit of a deceased may be given probative value for purposes of deciding a complaint. HELD: In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private respondents’ evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative weight to this document. There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. 7 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them. Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant. Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner. In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed property. In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA Y BELLO G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012

CASE DOCTRINE: A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death - There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. FACTS: The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time. Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged and convicted of murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the CA. The basis of the conviction is the testimony of the victim’s uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told him that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him. ISSUE: Whether or not a statement made to another person by a victim of murder before he died is admissible as evidence. HELD: Yes. An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death - There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician; (c) that the declarant is

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competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

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SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 128538, February 28, 2001

CASE DOCTRINE: Rule 130, Sec 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corporation obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc. (SIHI). Upon failure of SCC to pay, SIHI filed an action for a sum of money. During Pre-Trial, SCC admitted the existence of the loan executed through its officers. SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision. Trial court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI. The appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment. SCC elevated the case before the SC with the following contentions: (1) that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated in violation of Sections 36, Rule 130; and (2) that due execution and authenticity of private documents evidencing the loan was not proved during trial. ISSUE/S: (1) Whether or not a defendant who failed to conduct cross-examination due to its own fault may questioned the admissibility of the evidence for violation of hearsay rule. (2) Whether or not the due execution of loan documents is necessary when the existence of the loan had already been admitted during pre-trial. HELD: (1) Petitioner’s reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross- examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party’s witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial court’s finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross- examine the opposing party’s witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence. (2) No. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation.

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LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPS. VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL G.R. No. 143276, July 20, 2004

CASE DOCTRINE:: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party, which are not obtaining here. FACTS: Spouses Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19+ hectares of agricultural land situated in Camarines Norte. DAR, pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, compulsorily acquired a portion of the land. Petitioner Land Bank valued the expropriated portion at P173, 918.55. Unsatisfied with the Land Bank valuation and the subsequent affirmance of such by PARAD, Respondents filed before the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation impleaded, as respondents were the DAR and the Land Bank. After the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Trial court computed the just compensation for a total of P703, 137.00, which is beyond respondent’s valuation of P623, 000.00. In concluding that the valuation of respondents’ property, RTC merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in another case pending before it and applied the same to instant case without conducting a hearing. Issue: Whether or not a court may take judicial notice of the records of one case pending before it and apply the same to another case also pending with it without conducting trial and without the knowledge or consent of the parties. HELD: The answer is in the negative. Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party, which are not obtaining here. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, to wit: SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAILON KULAIS et al. G.R. Nos. 100901-08, July 16, 1998

CASE DOCTRINE:: Courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. FACTS: Appellants were charged with five (5) counts of kidnapping for ransom and three (3) counts of kidnapping before the RTC. Trial court convicted the seven accused positively identified by the victims. Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts. Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross- examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latter’s testimony should not be used against him. Issue: Whether or not a court may take judicial notice of the testimony of one witness in a case pending before it and use the same to another case also pending with it. HELD: No. It is settled that courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in any other proceedings, even if tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge. It should be emphasized that in criminal cases, the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross- examinations conducted by appellant’s counsel.

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MENANDRO B. LAUREANO vs COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 114776, February 2, 2000

CASE DOCTRINE: As a general rule, Philippine Courts cannot take judicial notice of the existence and provisions/contents of a foreign law, which matters must be alleged and proven as a fact. If the existence and provisions/contents were not properly pleaded and proven, the Principle of Processual Presumption applies i.e. the foreign law will be presumed to be the same as Philippine Laws and it will be Philippine Laws which will be applied to the case. FACTS: The plaintiff Menandro B. Laureano applied in 1978 as Director of Flight Operation and Chief Pilot of Air Manila through its area manager. He was appointed for five years with extension of two years from Jan 21,1979 to Jan 20,1984. Due to economic recession in 1982, Air Manila initiated cost cutting measures to its (17) expatriate captain in the airlines. They were not right away terminated but requested to have a leave of absence. Upon evaluation for promotion for B-747 fleet, there were 12 found qualified. But unfortunately Laureano was not one of them. The plaintiff was informed that he did not qualified and that he will give 3 months’ salary for his leave and but lessened only to 2 months. Disappointed, the plaintiff filed illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter in June 29, 1983. On the other hand, Defendant on Feb 11, 1987, filed a motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional grounds. Since he was employed in Singapore. Therefore, Singapore law should apply in his contract. ISSUE: Whether or not courts may take judicial notice of foreign law. HELD: The answer is on the negative. The Philippine Law applies our law do not take judicial notice of laws in Singapore. The defendant was not able to prove the application of Singapore law to this case.

14 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING vs COMMISION ON ELECTIONS ET. AL. GR No. 195649, July 2, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: As a general rule, Philippine Courts cannot take judicial notice of the existence and provisions/contents of a foreign law, which matters must be alleged and proven as a fact. If the existence and provisions/contents were not properly pleaded and proven, the Principle of Processual Presumption applies i.e. the foreign law will be presumed to be the same as Philippine Laws and it will be Philippine Laws which will be applied to the case. FACTS: The respondent Armando is a natural born Filipino citizen. But changed his citizenship upon his stay in United Stated of America. But he applied for repatriation in the Consul of General of the Philippines in San Francisco and took an oath of allegiance again to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008. On Nov. 30, 2009, Armando filed his certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. His opponent Lino Baluag filed a petition to disqualify him for using his US passport in entering and departing in the Philippines. Armado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor. Then Armando filed his answer that when his affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship was executed he was already divested of his American Citizenship. ISSUE: Whether or not courts may consider applicability of Foreign Laws to a case upon reference to it by one of the parties HELD: The ruling of the court is in the negative side for it cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public documents of a foreign country and must be “evidenced by an official publication thereof”. The mere reference on it in a pleading is not applicable on Philippine Law by virtue of doctrine of processional presumption.

15 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GAMAL BAHARAN , et al. G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011

CASE DOCTRINE: Rule 130, Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. (Rules of Court) FACTS: Herein accused were charged of multiple murder in relation to the Valentine’s Day bombing. The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group - Abu Solaiman - announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentine's Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks. As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview sometime after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine's Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February. Accused were convicted largely due to the testimony of Asali who turned state witness and the testimony of the conductor who identified the two accused to be those who alighted from his bus shortly before the bomb exploded. Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a co-conspirator made during a televised interview and repeated during trial may be admissible as evidence against a co- conspirator. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. While Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rule of Court provides that statements made by a conspirator against a coconspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Distinction must be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant's coaccused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former.

16 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN et al. G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011

CASE DOCTRINE: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. FACTS: In 1993, SB ordered the consolidation cases related to the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos Family and cronies. At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion stating that petitioner wishes to adopt in Civil Case No. 0009 testimonies and the documentary exhibits presented and identified by them in another related case. This motion partly denied insofar as the adoption of testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud for the reason that said deponents are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the respondents. Petitioner then filed another motion asking SB to take judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane deposition, together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. This was again denied by the SB, to wit: Judicial notice is found under Rule 129. This provision refers to the Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the Court. Such being the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which need not be acted upon as the same is considered redundant. Petitioner’s 3rd motion was again denied by SB. Hence, petitioner filed the instant motion alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of SB’s refusal to take judicial notice of or to admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence. Petitioner asserts that the case where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence is but a "child" of the "parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and admitted in any of the "children" cases should be considered as evidence in the "parent" case. ISSUE: Whether or not courts in trying consolidated cases may take judicial notice of testimony and evidence presented in one of the cases consolidated. HELD: In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. This rule though admits of exceptions. As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. Courts must also take 17 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioner’s argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases.

18 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

MONICO LIGTAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: Courts must consider “every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence.” Equally settled is that “where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be acquitted.” FACTS: Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) was charged for theft for taking of the harvest of Abaca in the plantation of belonging to Anecita Pacate, having feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without the consent of said owner. Where Ligtas pleaded not guilty, alleging himself as the owner of the said property as he is the one who cultivated such, he further alleged the following defenses; setting an alibi that the alleged taking did not happen since he claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting happened but later on when confronted he admitted harvesting the abaca but claimed as plantation owner, being a tenant of 1.5 to two hectares of land that he just prevented the men to harvest from the land which he himself cultivated. Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21, 2000. On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land. While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and without any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines. In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that “the prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft” Ligtas’ “defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and Anecita Pacate duly corroborated by any witness.” ISSUE: Whether the DARAB Decision, finding Ligtas as tenant of the conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft? HELD: YES. The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner’s consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft. No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime until proven guilty. “It is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person.” Thus, courts must consider “every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence.” Equally settled is that “where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be acquitted.” In adjudicating a case on trial, courts are not authorized to take a judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge; Rule admits of exceptions. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 662 SCRA 152 [2011]) 19 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

JUNIE MALILLIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 172953, APRIL 30, 2008

CASE DOCTRINE: The chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. FACTS: Junie Malillin, the accused in this case, was charged with violation of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act 9165 before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City. During trial, the prosecution alleged that a team of five police officers raided the residence of Malillin. The search allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance. Two (2) members of the raiding team, Esternon and Bulanon; Forensic chemist who examined the seized items. The member of the raiding team who conducted the recording and marking of the seized items were however, not presented. Furthermore, the forensic chemist admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed. The items seized were not presented to the judge who issued the warrant. Accordingly, Malillin was convicted. He consequently appealed before the Court of Appeals and averred that there was irregularity on the conduct of the search.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of the raiding team and the forensic chemist is sufficient to establish the identity of the seized items by virtue of a search warrant? HELD: No. Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. It has been established by the Supreme Court in many cases that the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Further, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the

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photographing and the physical inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has been served. In this case, Esternon deviated he brought the seized items immediately to the police station for the alleged purpose of making a "true inventory" thereof, but there appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not be made in petitioner's house. Likewise, Esternon's failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a departure from the directive in the search warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and verified inventory of the same, as required by Rule 126, Section 1246 of the Rules of Court. People v. Go characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by interested parties. Therefore, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City as well as the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. Accused Malillin was acquitted.

21 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FELIMON PAGADUAN y TAMAYO G.R. NO. 179029, AUGUST 12, 2010

CASE DOCTRINE: Strict compliance to the chain of custody rule may not always be possible under field conditions. Non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. FACTS: Felimon Pagaduan y Tamayo, the accused in this case, was charged with violation of illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 before the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. During trial, the prosecution revealed that Captain de Vera, SPO1 Balido and PO3 Almarez conducted a buy-bust operation which resulted to the apprehension of Pagaduan. Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought Pagaduan to the Diadi Police Station for investigation. At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory examination. Pagaduan was transferred to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained. Two days later, or on December 29, 2003, PO3 Almarez transmitted the letter-request, for laboratory examination, and the seized plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were received by PO2 Fernando Dulnuan. Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an examination on the specimen submitted, and found it to be positive for the presence of shabu. After trial, Pagaduan was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court. Consequently, he appealed the decision of the RTC and claimed that: (1) his guilt was not prove beyond reasonable doubt due to failure of the police did not conduct a prior surveillance on him before conducting the buy-bust operation; and (2) a period of two days had elapsed from the time the shabu was confiscated to the time it was forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination. ISSUE: Whether or not chain of custody was sufficiently established when the two-day period which lapsed between the day of apprehension and day of turn- over to the laboratory was not explained? HELD: No. The chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. Thus, noncompliance thereof is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to had been preserved.

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In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to justify the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory, photographing of the seized drugs and the details of the turn over during the two-day period. The records show that PO3 Almarez forwarded the seized specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory on December 29, 2003, where it was received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI Quintero. However, the person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory was not identified. As earlier discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer who received the shabu, as well as the person who had temporary custody of the seized items for two days, had not been established. Therefore, the decision of the Regional Trial Court as well as the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. Accused Pagaduan was acquitted.

23 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

NARCISO SALAS VS ANNABELLE MATUSALEM G.R. NO. 180284, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: Baptismal certificates may be considered public documents. They can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity. FACTS: Annabelle Matusalem, the respondent in this case, filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas and claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas. In his answer, Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo. At the trial, Matusalem and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Murillo corroborated Matusalem’s testimony as to the payment by Narciso Salas of apartment rental, his weekly visits to Matusalem and financial support to her, his presence during and after delivery of her baby, her attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with Salas’ wife at the headquarters. Matusalem also presented the following evidence: (1) certificate of live birth of Christian Paulo which she allegedly filled up with entries supposedly dictated by the Petitioner; and (2) baptismal certificate. After trial, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of Matusalem. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that CA erred in holding that the filiation of Christian Paulo was duly established pursuant to article 175 in relation to article 172 of the Family Code and existing jurisprudence and therefore entitled to support from the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not illegitimate filiation may be proved by mere testimonial evidence that the alleged father provided financial support and unsigned birth certificate and love letters? HELD: No. Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states that the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
 (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the

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certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father. The rest of Matusalem’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of Salas and Matusalem inside their rented apartment unit are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to Salas as they were not signed by Salas and contained no statement of admission by him that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis- à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The petition was granted.

25 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERIC ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL G.R. No. 209588, February 18, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: Chain of Custody Rule. Section 21, Article II of R. A. No. provides that the PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. FACTS: Eric Rosauro y Bongcawil, the accused in this case, was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R. A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. During trial, the prosecution alleged that the police authorities received an information that drugs were being distributed at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. On the basis of the unconfirmed reports that Rosauro was selling and distributing drugs, the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit of Misamis Oriental eventually conducted a test-buy operation in the Municipality of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental using a confidential agent. The confidential agent was able to buy shabu from Rosauro. In exchange for the one (1) sachet of shabu given by Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter gave him a marked 100-peso bill. Consequently, the substance bought from Rosauro was examined by the PNP crime laboratory and yielded a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (commonly known as shabu). On the other hand, Rosauro testified that the police asset went to his house four (4) times and convinced him to do an errand for him. Rosauro refused to buy shabu as he did not know where to buy one. He alleged that it was the confidential informant who told him to buy the prohibited drug from a certain "Kael" and to deliver it to the former’s house. When Rosauro went to the house of the confidential informant as instructed, he was arrested by the police officers. The sachet of shabu was not even recovered from him but from the confidential informant. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment finding Rosauro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Sec. 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00. Consequently, Rosauro appealed before the Court of Appeals but the Court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. It ruled that what transpired in the case at bar was an entrapment and not an instigation and that all the elements of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs were duly proven. Also, it ruled that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the lone witness of the prosecution do not affect the result of the case and that the apprehending team was able to preserve the integrity of the subject drug and that the prosecution was able to present the required unbroken chain in the custody of the subject drug. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: Yes. The guilt of Eric Rosauro Y Bongcawil was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court, in number of cases, laid down the essential elements to be established for a successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully consummate the buybust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Further, as laid down by the Supreme Court, in every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs is the presentation of evidence of the seized drug as the corpus delicti. The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It must also be established with the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit In this case, all the elements for a conviction of illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs were proven by the prosecution. The identity of Rosauro as the seller, and that of the confidential informant as poseur-buyer were established, as well as the exchange of the sachet of shabu and the marked money. After the sale was consummated, the confidential informant gave the seized item to apprehending officer who placed tape on the sachet and marked it "Exhibit A." Upon reaching the police station, he executed the Certificate of Inventory, as well as the request for laboratory examination. The request, the specimen, as well as the marked money and Rosauro were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. They were received by the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office, who then forwarded them to the Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Moreover, the seized item was duly identified by apprehending officer in open court as the same item seized from accused-appellant. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

27 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014

CASE DOCTRINE: Chain of Custody Rule. Section 21, Article II of R. A. No. provides that the PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. FACTS: Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta, the accused in this case, was charged of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. During trial, the prosecution alleged on November 13, 2003, while PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident. PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiao’s companion .38 revolver. The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 PABLO TEMENA, police investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials, "NM". Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug. The testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that he personally saw those bricks of marijuana confiscated from the accused.

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MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the suspects boarded was also presented in open court and testified as to what he knows about the incident. He confirmed that on that date, two (2) persons boarded on his taxi and upon reaching C-3 Road, they alighted and fired three (3) shots and ran away. Aside from the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution also documentary evidences to boost their charge against Calantiao. On the otrher hand, Calantiao offered a different version of the story. According to his testimony, this instant case originated from a traffic mishap where the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost collided with another car. Reyes then opened the window and made a "fuck you" sign against the persons on board of that car. That prompted the latter to chase them and when they were caught in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the persons on board of that other car alighted and kicked their taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped the latter and uttered, "Putang ina mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba ako kilala?" Said police officer poked his gun againstReyes and when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and Reyes were then handcuffed and were brought to the police station. Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking and their wallets and money were taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and informed them that they will be charged for drugs. A newspaper containing marijuana was shown to them and said police officer told them that it would be sufficient evidence against them. They were detained and subjected to medical examination before they were submitted for inquest at the prosecutor’s office. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision finding Calantiao guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the petition with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence obtained, the marijuana, is inadmissible as evidence against Calantiao for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the rules on chain of custody. HELD: No. The chain of custody of the seized drugs was not broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence. The Supreme Court, in many cases, has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.

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In this case, the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. Thus, the Supreme Court has no reason to overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence. Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such burden. Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

30 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. G.R. No. 199689, March 12, 2014

CASE DOTRINE: Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court. FACTS: Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a. "Jojit", the accused in this case, was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City of violation of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. During the trial, the prosecution alleged that on January 20, 2005, Police Superintendent Mariano Rodriguez, the Chief of Police of Tuguegarao City, received a report from a confidential informant that a certain Jojit was selling illegal drugs in the said city. P/Supt. Rodriguez immediately formed a buy-bust group composed of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Noel Taguiam, SPO2 Alexander Tamang, SPO1 Arthur Blaquera, Police Officer (PO) 3 Edwin Hernandez, and PO3 Rolando Domingo. PO3 Domingo was designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust money, consisting of one ₱500.00 bill and five ₱100.00 bills, were dusted with fluorescent powder and their respective serial numbers were recorded in the police blotter. The team proceeded to Reynovilla St., Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao City, the place where, according to the informant, Jojit was selling shabu. PO3 Domingo positioned himself beside a street light while the rest of the team hid behind a nearby concrete fence. After waiting, Constantino arrived on board a tricycle. PO3 Domingo recognized Constantino as the Jojit described by the informant. PO3 Domingo approached Constantino and asked him if he was Jojit. When Constantino replied in the affirmative, PO3 Domingo next asked, "Mayroon ka bang stuff?" ("Do you have stuff?") In response, Constantino inquired of PO3 Domingo how much he wanted to buy. PO3 Domingo said he wanted to buy ₱1,000.00 worth of shabu, simultaneously handing over the buy-bust money to Constantino, who, in turn, handed two plastic sachets to PO3 Domingo. Thereupon, PO3 Domingo turned his cap backwards, the pre-arranged signal for the consummated sale. Upon seeing the signal, the other members of the buy-bust team approached the scene at once and arrested Constantino, from whom SPO2 Taguiam recovered the buy-bust money. Thereafter, Constantino was brought to the police station where the recovered drugs and money were turned over to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang. The recovered drugs were then marked with

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the initials "A-1" and "A-2." The incident was recorded in the police blotter with an inventory of the recovered drugs and money. P/Supt. Rodriguez and SPO2 Tamang then submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Services, Camp Marcelo Adduru, Tuguegarao City, a request for laboratory examination of two plastic sachets with white crystalline substance marked as "A-1" and "A-2" as well as both hands of Constantino, one piece ₱500.00 bill, and five pieces ₱100.00 bills. Per Chemistry Report and Physical Identification Report prepared by the Forensic Chemist, the contents of the two plastic sachets tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride; while the other specimens tested positive for the presence of bright-yellow ultraviolet fluorescent powder. Constantino, on his part, denied the accusation against him and asserted that he was merely framedup. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding Constantino guilty as charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the chain of custody was established in this case so as to prove the guilt of Constantino beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: No. the prosecution failed to establish the evidence’s chain of custody. The Court cannot consider that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved. The Supreme Court, as held in many cases, finds that the crucial part in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. The marking upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting" or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.1âwphi1 In this case, PO3 Domingo, as poseur-buyer, received two plastic sachets of shabu from Constantino in exchange for ₱1,000. However, PO3 Domingo himself did not put any markings on the two plastic sachets of shabu. Instead, upon arrival of the buy-bust team with Constantino at the police station, PO3 Domingo turned over the two plastic sachets of shabu to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang, who was also a member of the buy-bust team. PO3 Domingo testified that it was SPO2 Tamang who put the marking "NBT" on the said sachets of shabu. The prosecution was completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseur-buyer, despite having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu purchased from Constantino, failed to immediately mark the seized drugs before turning over the custody of the same to another police officer. This lapse in procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the identity of the drugs actually seized from Constantino during the buy-bust and the ones presented before the trial court, especially

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considering that three different people, during the interval, supposedly received and marked the same. After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court found inconsistencies affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from Constantino. The inconsistent testimonies of PO3 Domingo, PO3 Hernandez, and P/SInsp. Tulauan as to who, when, and where the two plastic sachets of shabu were marked lead the Court to question whether the two plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were the very same ones confiscated from Constantino. The doubtful markings already broke the chain of custody of the seized shabu at a very early stage. Therefore, Constantino was acquitted of the crime charged, not because the Court accords credence to his defense of frame-up, but because the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

33 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERCURY DELA CRUZ ALIAS “DEDAY" G.R. No. 212171, September 07, 2016

CASE DOCTRINE: The prosecution, as embodied in the chain of custody rule, must be able to present through records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused by the arresting officers; turned over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected. The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. FACTS: At around 7:15 o'clock in the evening of November 10, 2006, PO3 Batobalonos, PO1 Reales, PO1 Bullido and their civilian asset proceeded to Sitio Cogon, A. Lopez St., Barangay Labangon. When the team went inside the interior portion of Sitio Cogon, PO1 Reales together with the civilian asset approached the house of Dela Cruz, while PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido were strategically hidden more or less ten (10) meters away. The civilian asset called Dela Cruz and told her that they will buy shabu worth P200.00. Thereafter, Dela Cruz handed PO1 Reales a small plastic containing white crystalline substance and in exchange he handed to the former the P200.00 bills. Upon getting hold of the money, PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido, who saw the consummation of the transaction rushed to the scene. When PO3 Batobalonos got hold of Dela Cruz, the latter shouted for help and resisted arrest. Dela Cruz was able to run and so the team chased her, however, her neighbor Arthur Tabasa Ortega ("Ortega") blocked their way. The team introduced themselves as policemen but Ortega did not listen, so PO3 Batobalonos fired a warning shot as the people likewise started to gather around them. Meanwhile, Dela Cruz was able to evade arrest. The team then arrested Ortega for obstruction of justice.On their way to the police station aboard their patrol car, PO1 Reales handed to PO3 Batobalonos the small plastic containing white crystalline substance which he purchased from Dela Cruz. Thereafter, upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Batobalonos marked the seized item with "DDM 11/10/06." Afterwards, a Request for Laboratory Examination of the seized item was prepared by PO3 Batobalonos. The Request and the seized item were delivered to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office-7, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City by PO1 Reales at around 1:10 o'clock in the morning of November 11, 2006. Thereafter Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas issued Chemistry Report No. D-1771-2006," with the finding that the specimen gave positive result for the presence of Methamphetamine hydrochloride. Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, Cebu City, found the accused-appellant guilty of illegal sale of shabu under Sections 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 91653 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s case should be dismissed due to failure of the police officers to comply with the procedure in the custody and disposition of seized drugs (chain of custody).

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HELD: We agree with the lower courts that in the absence of any intent or ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely impute commission of a crime against the accused-appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is entitled to great respect and deserves to prevail over the bare, uncorroborated denial and self-serving claim of the accused of frame-up. Also, we reject the appellant’s contention that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of Section 21, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 9165, which provides for the procedure in the custody and disposition of seized drugs. Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling of evidence, “substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item” is sufficient. This Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused by the arresting officers; turned over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected. The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties. Accused appellant in this case failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit. In fact, accused-appellant did not even question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. She simply anchored her defense on denial and alibi.

35 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

SPOUSES EDUARDO and LYDIA SILOS vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK G.R. No. 181045, July 2, 2014

CASE DOCTRINE: The binding effect of any agreement between parties to a contract is premised on two settled principles: (1) that any obligation arising from contract has the force of law between the parties; and (2) that there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality. Any contract which appears to be heavily weighted in favor of one of the parties so as to lead to an unconscionable result is void. Any stipulation regarding the validity or compliance of the contract which is left solely to the will of one of the parties, is likewise, invalid. FACTS: Petitioners secured a revolving credit line of P150,000 from PNB which was increased to P1.5million then subsequently increased to P2.5 million. These were secured by real estate mortgage of petitioner’s properties and in addition, petitioners issued eight Promissory Notes8 and signed a Credit Agreement. This July 1989 Credit Agreement contained a stipulation on interest which provides as follows: (a) The Loan shall be subject to interest at the rate of 19.5% per annum. Interest shall be payable in advance every one hundred twenty days at the rate prevailing at the time of the renewal. (b) The Borrower agrees that the Bank may modify the interest rate in the Loan depending on whatever policy the Bank may adopt in the future, including without limitation, the shifting from the floating interest rate system to the fixed interest rate system, or vice versa. Where the Bank has imposed on the Loan interest at a rate per annum, which is equal to the Bank’s spread over the current floating interest rate, the Borrower hereby agrees that the Bank may, without need of notice to the Borrower, increase or decrease its spread over the floating interest rate at any time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future. The eight Promissory Notes, on the other hand, contained a stipulation granting PNB the right to increase or reduce interest rates "within the limits allowed by law or by the Monetary Board." The Real Estate Mortgage agreement provided the same right to increase or reduce interest rates "at any time depending on whatever policy PNB may adopt in the future." Petitioners claim that interest rates imposed by it are null and void for the reasons that 1) the Credit Agreements and the promissory notes were signed in blank; 2) interest rates were at short periods; 3) no interest rates could be charged where no agreement on interest rates was made in writing; 4) PNB fixed interest rates on the basis of arbitrary policies and standards left to its choosing; and 5) interest rates based on prime rate plus applicable spread are indeterminate and arbitrary. Respondent argued that this issue (signed in blank) was never raised in the lower court and besides, documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence; Lydia Silos’ testimony in this regard is self-serving, unsupported and uncorroborated, and for being the lone evidence on this issue. The fact remains that these documents are in proper form, presumed regular, and endure, against arbitrary claims by Silos – who is an experienced business person – that she signed questionable loan documents whose provisions for interest rates were left blank, and yet she continued to pay the interests without protest for a number of years. ISSUE: Whether or not the interest rates are null and void for not being stated in the agreement of the parties and thus considered as parole evidence.

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HELD: Yes. In a number of decided cases, the Supreme Court (SC) struck down provisions in credit documents issued by Philippine National Bank (PNB) to, or required of, its borrowers which allow the bank to increase or decrease interest rates “within the limits allowed by law at any time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future.” It is basic that there can be no contract in the true sense in the absence of the element of agreement, or of mutual assent of the parties. If this assent is wanting on the part of the one who contracts, his act has no more efficacy than if it had been done under duress or by a person of unsound mind. Similarly, contract changes must be made with the consent of the contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement. In the case of loan contracts, it cannot be gainsaid that the rate of interest is always a vital component, for it can make or break a capital venture. Thus, any change must be mutually agreed upon, otherwise, it is bereft of any binding effect. Any modification in the contract, such as the interest rates, must be made with the consent of the contracting parties. By requiring the petitioners to sign the credit documents and the promissory notes in blank, and then unilaterally filling them up later on, respondent violated the Truth in Lending Act, and was remiss in its disclosure obligations. Further, respondent’s arguments relative to the credit documents, that documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence; that the credit documents are in proper form, presumed regular, and endure, against arbitrary claims by petitioners, experienced business persons that they are, they signed questionable loan documents whose provisions for interest rates were left blank, and yet they continued to pay the interests without protest for a number of years – deserve no consideration. Therefore, the petition was granted.

37 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP. vs. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP. G.R. No. 201001, November 10, 2014

CASE DOCTRINE: Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides: “Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. FACTS: MCMP Construction and Monark Equipment Construction Corporation agreed to the lease of heavy equipment by MCMP from Monark thru a Rental Equipment Contract (Contract). Thus, Monark delivered five pieces of heavy equipment to MCMP’s project site in Tanay Rizal, evidenced by Documents Acknowledgment Receipt No. 04667 and 5706, received by MCMP representatives Jorge and Rose. During trial, Reynaldo, Monark’s representative, testified that there were two original copies of the contract, one for MCMP and one for Monark; however, Monark’s copy was lost and despite diligent efforts, cannot be located, hence he presented photocopy of the Contract which he had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of the secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof, since there were no diligent efforts to locate it, but did not produce MCMP’s copy of the contract despite a directive from the trial court to produce it. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of Monark, ordering MCMP to pay the balance of the rental fees inclusive of interest as well as 25% attorney fees. MCMP appealed to the Court of Appeals when its motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, but the appeal was also denied, hence it elevated its case to the Supreme Court, on the issue of whether or not secondary evidence may be presented in the absence of the original. It argues that the custodian of the original document was not presented to prove its loss; its loss was not even reported to the police; it was only searched by Monark for purposes of the instant case. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court should have disallowed the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of the Contract, following the Best Evidence Rule. HELD: No. “Petitioner’s contention is erroneous. The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original document whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides: “Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence

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shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of a lost document: “Section 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Section 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. — If the document is in the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.” In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court set down the requirements before a party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original document whenever the original copy has been lost: Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, “findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court.” Hence, the Court will respect the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino. MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the contract that they entered into. Yet, it has failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite the request of the trial court for it to produce its copy of the Contract. Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have asked for and retained a copy of their agreement. Thus, MCMP’s failure to present the same and even explain its failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the disputable presumption adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that “evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.”

39 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

WILGEN LOON, e al. vs. POWER MASTER, INC. G.R. No. 189404, December 11, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: While courts generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original documents for inspection. FACTS: Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin (collectively, the respondents). The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. They further averred that the respondents made them sign blank payroll sheets. On June 11, 2001, the petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal dismissal as their cause of action. They claimed that the respondents relieved them from service in retaliation for the filing of their original complaint. Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter except on April 19, 2001 and May 21, 2001 when Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondents’ behalf. The respondents’ counsel also appeared in a preliminary mandatory conference on July 5, 2001. Six (6) months after filing their notice of appeal, Respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached photocopied and computerized copies of list of employees with automated teller machine (ATM) cards to the supplemental appeal. This list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the employees’ ATM cards. On the other hand, petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion where they asked for the deletion of the supplemental appeal from the records because it allegedly suffered from infirmities. First, the supplemental appeal was not verified. Second, it was belatedly filed six months from the filing of the respondents’ notice of appeal with memorandum on appeal. The petitioners pointed out that they only agreed to the respondents’ filing of a responsive pleading until December 18, 2002. Third¸ the attached documentary evidence on the supplemental appeal bore the petitioners’ forged signatures. NLRC giving weight to the photocopy of computerized payroll records ruled in favor of respondent. It maintained that the absence of the petitioners’ signatures in the payrolls was not an indispensable factor for their authenticity. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not mere photocopies as documentary evidence filed 6 months from notice of appeal are admissible in evidence where there is an allegation of forgery by the adverse party. HELD: The answer is in the negative. While strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required in labor cases, the liberality of procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately explain any delay in the submission of evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Respondents, in this case, failed to 40 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Why the respondents’ photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners’ claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While courts generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals, especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. Failure to present the originals raises the presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.

41 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

THERESITA DIMAGUILA et al. vs. JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014

CASE DOCTRINE: As to the Hearsay Rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. FACTS: On July 5, 1993, respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro, along with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa and Clarita Nobleza filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages before the RTC against the Dimaguilas, together with the Borlazas, alleging that the parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a residential house and lot in Laguna covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. The Monteiros anchored their claim on a Deed of Sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila. The Dimaguilas argued that there was no co-ownership at all since the property had long been partitioned to Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, with Perfecto becoming owner of the southern half and Vitaliano owning the northern half. The defendants claim that they are Vitaliano’s heirs and further averred that the Monteiro’s claim to the property is null for they were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing the RTC’s orders which denied several of their motions and the proceedings were suspended while such petition was pending. The CA upheld the RTC’s orders and, upon resumption of the proceedings, the spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint which was granted by the RTC. The Monteiros admitted in the amended complaint the defendants’ allegation of a partition and avert hat a third of Perfecto’s share was sold to them through a “Bilihan”; and that, upon their attempt to take possession of that portion, they found that the Dimaguilas were occupying it. The Dimaguilas, in their answer to the amended complaint now contravened their original answer that the subject property was actually divided into northern and southern halves, replacing it with a division “into two and share and share alike.” This resulted to an admission of a co-ownership, contrary to their original position. According to the Dimaguilas, the “Bilihan” also violated Article 1485 of the Civil Code for not specifying the metes and bounds of the property sold and that, even if it was specified, the sale was still void since a co-owner can only sell his undivided share in the property. The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro after perusing evidence aliunde of a cadastral map of Liliw, Laguna and a corresponding list of claimant as to show that the property had indeed been partitioned into southern and northern portions. The RTC concluded that the Dimaguilas were stopped from denying this partition and the “Bilihan” document was regular and authentic absent any evidence to the contrary. The Dimaguilas appealed their case to the CA which affirmed the trial court’s decision. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed by the petitioners but it was denied, hence, this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not a certified true copy of cadastral map is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it violates the best evidence rule and hearsay rule.

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HELD: The answer is in the negative. Anent violation of Best Evidence Rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record. Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. As to the Hearsay Rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

43 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON. JESUS M. MUPAS G.R. No. 181892, September 08, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: When the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. FACTS: Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) for the construction and development of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. On the other hand, Paircargo Consortium composed of People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Philippine Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS), and Security Bank Corporation (Security Bank) submitted its competitive proposal to the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC).Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the Government a total of P17.75 billion as guaranteed payment for 27 years while AEDC offered to pay the Government a total of P135 million for the same period. Hence, DOTC awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium (that later organized itself as PIATCO). A Concession Agreement with PIATCO for the construction, development, and operation of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-operate-transfer scheme was made to authorize PIATCO to build, operate, and maintain the NAIA-IPT III during the concession period of twenty-five (25) years. PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka, as well as, Asahikosan, both foreign corporations organized in Japan, for the construction of the NAIA-IPT, however, PIATCO defaulted on its obligations, and to settle the problem Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer PIATCO’s payments until June 2003. Trial ensued, there has been an issue as to the attendant costs of the construction, PIATCO was required to submit the original documents to the court, however PIATCO argues that his non-submission is justified under Sec. 3 rule 130 of the ROC, referring to the submission of numerous accounts. ISSUE: Whether or not the non-submission of original documents is justified. HELD: The court held in the negative, that although the contention of non-submission due to numerous accounts of the document is justifiable under the rule. However, as a condition precedent to the admission of a summary of numerous documents, the proponent must lay a proper foundation for the admission of the original documents on which the summary is based. The proponent must prove that the source documents being summarized are also admissible if presented in court. Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.—under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court. Thus, PIATCO having failed to establish that the photocopied documents he presented in courts are authentic, theses photocopied documents are deemed as hearsay, and shall not be admissible as evidence, or reference to the claimed attendant costs of the project.

44 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

RAFAEL S. ORTAÑEZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G. R. No. 107372, January 23, 1997

CASE DOCTRINE: PAROL EVIDENCE. Sec. 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “when the terms of the agreement are reduced into writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence can be admitted other than the contents thereof.” Although Parol Evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of the contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing – unless there be fraud or mistake. FACTS: Private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively as evidence by two (2) deed of sale. Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. When the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles, Private respondents, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and petitioner’s acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions. Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions which were never reflected in the deeds of sale. ISSUE: Whether or not parol evidence relating to certain stipulated condition made orally may be admitted in evidence in addition to those expressly provided in a contract. HELD: NO. Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties. Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that “the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.” Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such fraud or mistake exists in this case. 45 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORP G. R. No. 126006, January 29, 2004

CASE DOCTRINE: PAROL EVIDENCE. While parol evidence is generally admissible to explain the meaning of a written contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating unto said contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned in the writing, unless there be fraud or mistake. FACTS: Respondent bank filed instant collection suit against Petitioner Foundation and previous president Tan for failure to pay four matured loan as evidenced by promissory notes signed by Tan in his capacity as president of the said Foundation. In disclaiming any liability for the loans, the petitioner Foundation maintains that said loans were contracted by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity. On the other hand, while admitting that the loans were his personal obligation, petitioner Tan avers that the same is not yet due as he had an unwritten agreement with the respondent Bank that these loans would be renewed on a year-to-year basis and paid from the proceeds of his shares of stock in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Trial Court ruled petitioners are liable to the bank solidarily. On appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of the court a quo. CA likewise rejected petitioner Tans assertion that there was an unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank that he would pay the loans from the proceeds of his shares of stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. ISSUE: Whether or not an alleged unwritten agreement between the creditor and the debtor which is not reflected on the promissory note (PN) evidencing the loan is admissible in evidence in addition to the terms of the PN. HELD: NO. The parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the obligation. Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank. Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case. 46 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

MODESTO LEOVERAS vs. CASIMERO VALDEZ G. R. No. 169985, June 15, 2011

CASE DOCTRINE: To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties. FACTS: Respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of the subject property, to wit: Petitioner Modesto Leoveras – 3,020 square meters and Respondent Casimero Valdez – 7,544.27 square meters. In 1996, the respondent learned that the petitioner had already obtained in his name two TCTs: one - covering an area of 3,020 square meters; and two - covering an area of 1,004 square meters. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion on the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the parties' Agreement. In his defense, the petitioner claimed: (1) that the parties has agreed that the extent of their ownership would be based on their actual possession; (2) that he actually possessed and subsequently acquired has a total area of 4,024 square meters, which he subdivided into two portions and caused to be covered by the two TCTs in question; and (3) that respondent participated in executing an Affidavit of confirmation of subdivision, which corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement and confirmed the petitioner's ownership over the disputed property. ISSUE: Whether or not an allegation of ownership that is contrary to those expressly stated in an agreement may be used as evidence. HELD: NO. The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity the Agreement entered into between him and the respondent. However, he claims that since the Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties' true intention. Factual findings of the CA holding that such affidavit is spurious due to discrepancy of respondent’s signature therein leads us to rely only on the agreement as the basis for the claim of ownership of both parties. The petitioner's argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule, i.e., when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned. To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties. 47 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G. R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; c) The validity of the written agreement; or d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. FACTS: Lucia was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit and Kimwa is a construction firm that sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers. On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted" by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia’s permitted area in Toledo City at ₱240.00 per truckload. Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Sometime after this, however, Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates. Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the Agreement, Lucia filed the Complaint for breach of contract with damages. In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates from Lucia. It argued that the controversial quantity of 40,000 cubic meters represented only an upper limit or the maximum quantity that it could haul. Kimwa asserted that the Agreement articulated the parties’ true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently. ISSUE: Whether Spouses Paras were able to establish that Kimwa was obliged to haul a total of 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995. HELD: YES. Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to acquire from Paras. Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing: Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

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a) b) c) d)

An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; The validity of the written agreement; or The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol evidence sought to be introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it. That is, it must be relevant, tending to "induce belief in [the] existence" of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms averred by the party seeking to introduce parol evidence. In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party. Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s failure to express the true intent of the parties. Further, Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras’ pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol evidence.

49 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GAYAM PASIMIO G. R. No. 205590, September 02, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing. FACTS: Pasimio filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, she alleged having a peso and dollar time deposit accounts with PNB in the total amount of P4,322,057.57 and US$5,170.80, respectively; that both investment placements have matured; and when she sought to withdraw her deposit money with accrued interests, PNB refused to oblige. PNB admitted the fact of deposit placement but it claimed that Pasimio is without right to insist on their withdrawal, the deposited amount having already been used in payment of her outstanding loan obligations to the bank. PNB narrated how the set off of sort came about: Pasimio and her husband took out three "loans against deposit hold-out" from the PNB Sucat branch, as follows: Three Million One Hundred Thousand Peso (P3,100,000) loan on March 21, 2001; a One Million Seven Hundred Thousand Peso (P1,700,000) loan on April 2, 2001; and a Thirty-One Thousand One Hundred US Dollar (US$31,1 00) loan on December 7, 2001. During the trial following the joinder of issues, Pasimio denied obtaining any loan from PNB, let alone receiving the corresponding loan proceeds. While conceding signing certain documents which turned out to be the Peso Loans Against Peso/FX Deposit Loan Applications, the Promissory Notes and Hold-out on Savings Deposit/Peso/FX Time Deposit and Assignment of Deposit Substitute and the Disclosure Statements of Loan/Credit Transaction (Loan Documents), she professed not understanding what they really meant. She agreed to affix her signature on these loan documents in blank or in an incomplete state, she added, only because the PNB Sucat branch manager and Customer Relations Officer led her to believe that what she was signing were related to new high-yielding PNB products. Pasimio would also deny re-lending the loan proceeds to Paolo Sun. The RTC ruled in favor of Pasimio. The disposition is predicated on the postulate that Pasimio had proven by convincing evidence that she did not obtain any loan accommodation from PNB. As a corollary, the trial court held that there was no evidence showing the release by PNB of the loan proceeds to Pasimio. CA affirmed the RTC decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision granting Pasimio's complaint for a sum of money HELD: YES. In upholding the RTC's finding respecting Pasimio's never having received any loan proceeds, the CA doubtless disregarded the rule holding that a promissory note is the best evidence of the transaction embodied therein; also, to prove the existence of the loan, there is no need to submit a separate receipt to prove that the borrower received the loan proceeds. Indeed, a promissory note represents a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to repay it on the date and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower and the lender. As has been held, a person who signs such an instrument is bound to honor it as a legitimate obligation duly assumed by him 50 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

through the signature he affixes thereto as a token of his good faith. If he reneges on his promise without cause, he forfeits the sympathy and assistance of this Court and deserves instead its sharp repudiation. The Court has also declared that a mere denial of the receipt of the loan, which is stated in a clear and unequivocal manner in a public instrument, is not sufficient to assail its validity. To overthrow the recitals of such instrument, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence is necessary. A contrary rule would throw wide open doors to fraud. Following this doctrine, Pasimio's notarized promissory notes bearing her signature and that of her husband must be upheld, absent, as here, strong, complete, and conclusive proof of their nullity. The promissory notes, bearing Pasimio's signature, speak for themselves. To repeat, Pasimio has not questioned the genuineness and due execution of the notes. By signing the promissory notes, she is deemed to acknowledge receipt of the corresponding loan proceeds. Withal, she cannot plausibly set up the defense that she did not apply for any loan, and receive the value of the notes or any consideration therefor in order to escape her liabilities under these promissory notes. But the foregoing is not all. PNB presented evidence that strengthened its allegation on the existence of the loan. Here, each promissory note was supported by a corresponding loan application form and disclosure statement, all of which carried Pasimio's signatures. Isolated from each other, these documents might not prove the existence of the loan, but when taken together, collectively, they show that Pasimio took the necessary steps to contract loans from PNB and was aware of their terms and conditions. Finally, it is well to consider this rule: that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing. Under this rule, parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be given to contradict, change or vary a written document, except if a party presents evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a written agreement and puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties; (c) the validity of the written agreement; and (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement. Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to overturn the written agreement. Since no evidence of such nature is before the Court, the documents embodying the loan agreement of the parties should be upheld.

51 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN vs. ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA et al. G. R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003

CASE DOCTRINE: The facsimile signature in this case, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means is but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions. Thus, even generally pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies and not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic will not apply to this case. FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondents and alleged that the disputed property was owned by Marcos Saez, predecessor of petitioners; that Marcos’ son Adolfo, for humanitarian reasons, allowed respondents to occupy a portion of Marcos Saez’ land without paying any rental. On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they were the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessors of the premises. MTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. On appeal, RTC reversed the said decision. Affirming the RTC, the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. The CA lend credence to the Certification issued by the DENR’s community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person. Therefore, respondents after sufficiently proving their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960 have better right to possess alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Hence, this Petition, petitioners avers that CA gravely abuse its discretion in giving weight to the CENR Officer’s Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda. ISSUE: Whether or not a certification issued by a public officer bearing a facsimile signature is inadmissible in evidence. HELD: NO. The rule stated in Garvida v. Sales Jr that – “Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic” is not applicable to the instant case. The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions. Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998. If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former’s direct control and supervision.

52 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) G.R. No. 193531, December 14, 2011

CASE DOCTRINE: A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. FACTS: Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) who was terminated due to his alleged participation in padding of Credit Meter Readings (CMR) or slot machines at Casino Filipino-Hyatt. Petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR for illegal dismissal. CSC held that petitioner's appeal had already prescribed. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It found that a verification of one of the telephone numbers where petitioner allegedly sent his letter reconsideration disclosed that such number did not belong to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors; and that petitioner should have mentioned about the alleged facsimile transmission at the first instance when he filed his complaint and not only when respondent PAGCOR raised the issue of prescription in its Comment. Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of his dismissal on August 13, 2007, which was within the 15-day period for filing the same; and that he did so by means of a facsimile transmission sent to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors. He claims that the sending of documents thru electronic data message, which includes facsimile, is sanctioned under Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Petitioner further contends that since his letter reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR, he then filed his complaint before the CSC. ISSUE: Whether or not a letter reconsideration filed through facsimile is allowed. HELD: NO. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery. In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., it was held inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that: “x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x” Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act.

53 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD G.R. No. 182832, April 20, 2010 CASE DOCTRINE: Electronic Evidence Rule do not apply to criminal actions. The said Rules applies only to civil actions, quasi- judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. FACTS: Rustan Ang was charged of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act for purposeful sending Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). ISSUE: Whether or not text messages to be admissible as evidence in a criminal case must be authenticated following the Electronic Evidence Rule. HELD: NO. Electronic Evidence Rule do not apply to the present criminal action. The said Rules applies only to civil actions, quasi- judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. (A.M. No. 01-701-SC, Rule 1, Section 2.) However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

54 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL ENOJAS G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. FACTS: The defendant, taxi driver Enojas, was stopped by police while parked suspiciously in front of a glass shop. Enojas provided the police with identification that the officers suspected to be fake. The officers then asked Enojas to accompany them to the police station. Enojas agreed. On the way, the officers stopped at a 7/11 to use the restroom. The officer who went into the store apprehended two robbers, one of whom shot and killed the officer. The other officer got out of the car upon hearing the gunshots. Returning to the police car, he found that Enojas had fled the scene. Later, the police searched his abandoned taxi car and found Enojas’ phone. They monitored the messages on the phone and communicated with the other suspects, resulting in an entrapment operation. Enojas, along with several other defendants, was charged with murder in 2006 before the Las Pifias Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction. The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified. 2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a conviction. HELD: 1. NO, it is admissible. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. In the case at bar, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them. 2. Yes, it is sufficient for conviction. This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the accused.

55 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG vs. TERESITA D. RIVERA G.R. No. 200148, June 4, 2014.

CASE DOCTRINE: The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty. FACTS: Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in the instant case. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF) while Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation as Accounting Manager of BANFF, effective on February 3, 2006 and continued working for BANFF until March of the same year to complete the turn-over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas). Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong. Hence, on April 6, 2006, Rivera sent libelous text message to one of BANFF's official cellular phones held by Lumapas. Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund. On April 16, 2007 pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, and the public prosecutor finds probable cause to indict Rivera the crime of libel. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ordering the outright dismissal of the complaint of Syhunliong on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were privileged communication? HELD: NO, the court made no error. The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty. In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice. Presiding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA' s declaration that Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she was speaking in response to duty, to protect her own interest, and not out of an intent to injure the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond that of conveying it to the party concerned.

56 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

ELLA M. BARTOLOME vs. ROSALIE B. MARANAN A.M. No. P-11-2979, November 18, 2014

CASE DOCTRINE: Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain conditions and may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the communications or has personal knowledge thereof. FACTS: This administrative matter started through the sworn affidavit complaint of Ella M. Bartolome (complainant) filed against Rosalie B. Maranan [respondent, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite], charging her with extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court employee. The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the amount of ₱200,000.00, which was later reduced to ₱160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case for annulment of marriage. She further alleged that the respondent undertook to have the case decided in her favor without the need of court appearances during the proceedings of the case. In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint, among others, the transcribed electronic communications (text messages) between her and the respondent; and a versatile compact disc (VCD) containing the video taken during the entrapment operation conducted against the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the pieces of evidence she submitted are sufficient to prove the respondent’s anomalous activities, and prayed for the immediate resolution of her complaint. HELD: Yes. Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chat room sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained. It may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the communications or has personal knowledge thereof. Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof. In the present case, there is no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages as evidence in considering the present case. The complainant, who was the recipient of the text messages and who therefore has personal knowledge of these text messages, identified the respondent as the sender through cellphone number 09175775982. The respondent herself admitted that her conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and that the cellphone number reflected in the complainant’s cellphone from which the text messages originated was hers. She confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment operation conducted by the Imus Cavite Police.

57 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

BBB vs AAA G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: Any question as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party raising such issue admits authorship of the subject messages. FACTS: BBB and AAA allege that they started to date seriously only in 1996. AAA was then a medical student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, named CCC, a boy. During their relationship, AAA bore two more children namely, DDD (born on December 11, 1997) and EEE (born on October 19, 2000). BBB and AAA married in civil rights to legalize their relationship. The birth certificates of the children, including CCC’s, was amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage. Later on, their relationship turn sour and they decided to live separately. Citing economic and psychological abuse and presenting text messages likewise as evidence, AAA filed an application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the same permanent after due hearing, before the RTC. Finding good ground in AAA’s application, the RTC issued a TPO. The TPO was thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC dated August 14, 2007. BBB appealed before the CA. CA affirmed RTC’s decision but ordered the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the proper proceedings to determine who shall be awarded custody of the children. The CA found that under the provisions of RA9262, BBB had subjected AAA and their children to psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule causing her emotional and psychological distress. Further, BBB verbally abused AAA either in person or through text messages. While BBB alleged that FFF was only a professional colleague, he continued to have public appearances with her which did not help to dispel AAA’s accusation that the two had an extra-marital relation. BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to Render Judgment Based on a MOA alleging that he and AAA had entered into a compromise regarding the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE: that BBB shall have the custody over both children. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA and the RTC correctly admitted into evidence the unauthenticated text messages adduced by AAA. HELD: Yes, the court made no error. In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, it is stated that any question as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party raising such issue admits authorship of the subject messages. In the case at bar, BBB attempted to justify why he sent the messages to AAA. However, in doing so, he, in effect, admitted authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as evidence. It is likewise noted that BBB did not deny ownership of the cellphone number from which the text messages were sent. Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of the text messages requires an interpretation of the rules of evidence, this Court does not find the same to be necessary. While BBB had admitted authorship of the text messages, he pleads for this Court to consider those messages as inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBB's arguments are unbearably self-contradictory and he cannot be allowed to take refuge under technical rules of procedure to assail what is already apparent. 58 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

ASTORGA & REPOL LAW OFFICES VS. VILLANUEVA A.M. No. P-09-2668, February 24, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: In previous administrative cases involving other court personnel, text messages were admitted as evidence and given probative value by this court. In those cases, the court considered the content of the text messages and the identification of the person sending them as substantial evidence to prove the commission of administrative offenses. FACTS: This is an administrative Complaint filed by Astorga and Repol Law Offices against Alexander D. Villanueva, Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City. Complainant Astorga and Repol Law Offices is represented by Atty. Arnold B. Lugares. Astorga & Repol Law Offices represented FGU Insurance Corp. in a complaint for damages against NEC Cargo Services Inc. The RTC decided in favor of FGU Insurance which became final and executory. Writ of Execution was issued in 2006 and in 2008. Judge Villarosa issued an order granting Astorga & Repol Law Offices’ motion to appoint special sheriff, thus, Sheriff Villanueva was assigned to execute the decision. On October of 2008, Sheriff Villaueva and Atty. Legares started coordinating with each other for the execution of the decision. There were exchange of text messages between the two and there was an alleged demand for money. Thus, Sheriff Villanueva was charged with willful neglect of duty and serious misconduct due to graft and corruption or extortion. ISSUE: Whether or not the text messages from Sheriff Villanueva serve as sufficient substantial evidence to hold him liable. HELD: Yes, there is substantial evidence to support Atty. Lugares’ allegation of neglect of duty. The Supreme Court held that in previous administrative cases, text messages were admitted as evidence and given probative value by the court. In those cases, the court considered the content of the text messages and identification of person sending them as substantial evidence to prove commission of administrative offenses. The content of the text message sent to Atty. Lugares show an actual evasion of duty to implement the writ constitute substantial evidence that justify the finding of administrative liability of Sheriff Villanueva. Atty. Lugares was able to present the text messages he received in his cellular phone. He attached photographs of the screen of his cellular phone, showing the messages as they were received. He submitted respondent’s calling card that contained the same phone number seen in the text messages. Through this calling card, he was able to prove that respondent was the source of the text messages. Respondent denied meeting with Atty. Lugares, but he never denied sending the text messages to him.

59 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS VS. HEIRS OF DR. ANDRES NAVARRO G.R. No. 198240, July 3, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called. FACTS: Marcos and her sister discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. The heirs of Andres Navarro based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property where Andres, Sr. (common ascendant of both petitioner and respondent) donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation. After the pre-trial, The Heirs moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. RTC granted respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. Petitioners elevated the case before the CA by way of petition for certiorari. CA denied the petition. ISSSUE: Whether or not an expert, whose examination is not authorized by the trial court, disqualified from being a witness. HELD: No. A witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides the qualifications of a witness, i.e., all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. The disqualifications are as follows: (1) Section 19, Rule 130 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses; (2) Section 20 of the same rule providesfor disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship; (3) Section 21 provides for disqualification based on privileged communications; and (4) Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules.

60 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE VS. SALVADO GOLIMLIM G.R. No. 145225, April 2, 2004

CASE DOCTRINE: A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. FACTS: Golimlim was charged and convicted of the crime of rape committed against Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), a mental retardate who is the niece of the accused’s wife. The accused, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true "[b]ecause her mind is not normal," she having "mentioned many other names of men who ha[d] sexual intercourse with her." The trial court in convicting the accused gave credence to the testimony of Evelyn. ISSUE: Whether or not a mental retardate is not qualified to become a witness due to her mental state. HELD: No. Sections 20 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. On the other hand, Section 21 of the same rule provides that the following persons cannot be witnesses: (a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others; (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of truth.

61 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

MAXIMO ALVAREZ VS. SUSAN RAMIREZ G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005

CASE DOCTRINE: Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. FACTS: On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection. On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification. ISSUE: Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. HELD: Yes. Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants. The reasons given for the rule are: 1. 2. 3.

There is identity of interests between husband and wife; If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.[11] But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at

62 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes. It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

63 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE VS. CASTAÑEDA G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979

CASE DOCTRINE: Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case. FACTS: On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document. At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court The prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband. ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed against herein private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto — who allegedly forged the signature of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear that the latter gave her marital consent to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not — may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification. HELD: We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband. Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.

64 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

RAZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992

CASE DOCTRINE: The purpose of the law is to 'guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.” The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. FACTS: Vicente Chuidian filed a complaint for the delivery of the certificates of stocks representing the 1,500 share holdings of his deceased father, Juan Chuidian, in the E. Razon, Inc. In the answer, Razon alleged that he owned the shares and the same remained in his possession. It was alleged that the late Juan Chuidan did not pay any amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares in question. CHUIDIAN’s EVIDENCE: On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,5000 shares of stock of defendant corporation was issued in the name of Juan Chuidian (Juan). Razon had not questioned (not until the demand was made) Juan’s ownership of the shares and had not brought any action to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled. RAZON’s EVIDENCE (In the answer and in his oral Testimony): After organizing E. Razon, Inc.,Razon distributed shares, previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators, to some friends including Juan. The shares of stock were registered in the name of Juan only as nominal stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares were owned and held by the Razon (as he was the one who paid for all the subscription). Juan was given the option to buy the same but did not do so. CFI (RTC) declared that Enrique Razon is the owner of the said shares. IAC (CA) reversed and ruled that Juan Chuidian is the owner. IAC excluded the testimony of Razon under the dead man’s statute rule (DMS) under Section 20 (a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, although such testimony was not objected to during trial. ISSUE: Whether or not Razon’s testimony is within the prohibition under DMS Rule. HELD: No. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. The purpose of DMS Rule is that “if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to 'guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.” The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. 65 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

SUNGA-CHAN VS. CHUA G.R. No. 164401, June 25, 2008

CASE DOCTRINE: The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: 1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. 2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; 3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind; 4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind FACTS: Lamberto T. Chua verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto L. Sunga in the distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience, respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the intention that the profits would be equally divided between them. Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without respondent's consent. The trial court and the ca ruled in favor of the respondent. Both court held that partnership existed between Lamberto Chua and Jacinto Sunga until the latter’s death. Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacintos death. In the absence of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argue that these courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacintos death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the Dead Man’s Statute. ISSUE: Whether or not Josephine’s testimony is covered by the dead man’s statute. HELD: No. The Dead Man’s Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the

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transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: 1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. 2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; 3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind; 4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Mans Statute to this case. First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim] against respondent in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the Dead Mans Statute. Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.] Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased. Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the simple reason that she is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term assignor of a party means assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen. Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff. We are not convinced by petitioners allegation that Josephines testimony lacks probative value because she was allegedly coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his favor. Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested by respondent to testify and that if she were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to see how we can conclude from this candid admission that Josephines testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent. Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of her testimony since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses. Petitioners reliance alone on the Dead Mans Statute to defeat respondents claim cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.

67 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

CHAN VS. CHAN G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk. The right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not privileged.” Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined” regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial. To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records — the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent. FACTS: Josielene filed before the (RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation. Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no longer be repaired. During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. The RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication. HELD: RTC was justified in denying Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records. ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.

69 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

LACUROM VS. JACOBA A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006

CASE DOCTRINE: We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to him as the author of the motion. The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental." Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba’s defense which was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s assertion that she had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case. Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him. This petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacoba’s handiwork. The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion. FACTS: The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion ("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos ("Barrientos"). The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge. Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion. Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) dated 30 July 2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"), The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff a fighting chance" and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside. Atty. Olivia VelascoJacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm. Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion. Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000. Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future." This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then suspension from the practice of law. Judge Lacurom issued another order, this time directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in contempt. Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements 70 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500. ISSUE: Whether or not ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, committed contempt of court HELD: WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondents that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.

71 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

SAMALA VS. VALENCIA A.C. No. 5439, January 22, 2007

CASE DOCTRINE: Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated.” The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. FACTS: A complaint was filed by Clarita J. Samala against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia for Disbarment. One of the following grounds being that the respondent served on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC. One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's adversary either in the same case or in a different but related action. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorneyclient relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by representing contending parties HELD: ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution. 72 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

ALMONTE VS. VASQUEZ G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

CASE DOCTRINE: At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB’s function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding “illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting.” Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations. Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their contention that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that the “only item of expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential” is that which refers to the “purchase of information and payment of rewards.” FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988" and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders. Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. ISSUE: Whether or not such documents are privileged matter HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.

73 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

CASE DOCTRINE: Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons. While the validity of claim of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must be clearly asserted. FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire-tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional? HELD: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

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The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

75 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008

CASE DOCTRINE: Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, the Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. FACTS: The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by executive privilege. HELD: Yes. The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege. It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. Elements of presidential communications privilege: 1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. 2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President. 3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. 76 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

OSCAR CONSTANTINO ET AL. vs. HEIRS OF CONSTANTINO G.R. No. 181508, October 2, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions. FACTS: In this case, there are two (2) deed of extrajudicial settlement involving estate properties of Pedro Constantino, Sr., i.e., one in 1968 involving the 192 sqm and another in 1992 involving the 240 sqm. The separate Deeds came into being out of an identical intention of the signatories in both to exclude their co-heirs of their rightful share in the entire estate of Pedro Sr. Respondent, who are grandchildren of Pedro Sr. from Pedro Jr., filed a complaint seeking to annul the 1992 extrajudicial settlement involving the 240sqm lot on the ground that they, who are also heirs of Pedro Sr., were excluded thereto. On the other hand, Petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against them considering that the respondents’ already have their lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr. by virtue of the 1968 Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver. During the pre-trial, respondents admitted that they executed the 1968 Deed to partition the 192 sqm which is the share of their predecessor Pedro Jr., in Pedro Sr.’s Estate. RTC rendered a Decision finding both plaintiffs and defendants in pari delicto. On appeal, CA rule in favor of respondent and declared that the 1968 Deed covering the 192 sq m lot which actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. Hence, heirs of Pedro Jr. (herein respondent), did not adjudicate the 192 sqm lot unto themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Petitioners now assails the erroneous disregard by the CA of stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference. ISSUE: Whether or not admissions made during pre-trial are binding upon the parties. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. However, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission. However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the trial.

77 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLENDO GAUDIA G.R. NO. 146111, February 23, 2004

CASE DOCTRINE: A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception; Following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of the accused’s parents in offering to compromise cannot prejudice the accused, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. FACTS: Amalia Loyola left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old) and Kimberly (1 year old) at their house. At the time, her husband was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in the afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any information. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her from a grove of ipilipil tree. She found Remelyn crying, naked, and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucuslike substance coming from Remelyns private organ. A witness stated he saw Rolendo Gaudia pass by her house and take Remelyn. At this point, the parents of Rolando told Amalia to just just settle the incident and they are willing to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed. ISSUE: Whether or not the offer of Rolando Gaudia’s parents to settle was tantamount to an admission. HELD: No. Gaudia’s charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia, and by Gaudia himself to Amalia’s husband should not have been taken against him by the trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made by Gaudia to Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer, and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception. The offer of compromise allegedly made by Gaudia’s parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of his parents cannot prejudice Gaudia, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence against Gaudia but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of the Gaudia.

78 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

CONRADO C. DOLDOL VS PEOPLE G.R. No. 164481, September 20, 2005

CASE DOCTRINE: Partial restitution of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of the missing funds. FACTS: Provincial Auditor conducted an audit of the cash and cash account of Conrado C. Doldol, the Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a shortage of P801,933.26. The State Auditors submitted their Report to the Provincial Auditor on their examinations showing his shortages. On the same day, Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer requesting that a re-audit be conducted on his cash and cash account, taking exception to the findings of the State Auditors. Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On September 15, 1995, he remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he was issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to pay the balance of his shortage, as follows: P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, andP884,139.66 on or before November 30, 1995. However, he reneged on his promise. Two information for malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional Trial Cour of San Carlos City. Doldol was convicted. ISSUE: Whether or not, person convicted of malversation may assail his conviction when he had already partially paid the alleged shortage. HELD: The said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with appellant's commitment to gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromised which must be treated as an implied admission of appellant's guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use. Except for his bare testimony, the petitioner offered no competent and credible evidence to prove that the missing funds were actually cash advances of employees in the municipality. The petitioner could have offered in evidence the documents evidencing the names of the recipients and amounts of the cash advances, but failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner wrote the Provincial Auditor and offered to refund the missing funds as follows: P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, P200,000.00 on or before October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on November 30, 1995. He was able to pay only P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, and failed to remit the balance of his shortage. Such partial restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of the missing funds.

79 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

RICHARD A. CAMBE VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 212014-15, December 6, 2016

CASE DOCTRINE: Probable cause simply means "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual and positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice." FACTS: Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total amount of P517,000,000.00. The charges are contained in two complaints, namely: 1. A complaint for plunder filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod 2. A complaint for plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 filed by the Fieled Investigation Office. (a) Sen. Revilla, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, for authorizing the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of his allocated PDAF through his endorsement of fraudulent Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) created and controlled by Napoles JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation in relation to "ghost" PDAF-funded projects and for receiving significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds as his commission or "kickback; (b) Cambe, as Chief of Staff of Sen. Revilla during the times material to this case, for processing the utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF and for personally receiving his own "commission" or "kickback" from the diverted funds; (c) Napoles, as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF through: 1. the commencement via "business propositions" with the legislator regarding his allocated PDAF; 2. the creation and operation of JLN-controlled NGOs to serve as "conduits" for "ghost" PDAF-funded projects; 3.the use of spurious receipts and liquidation documents to make it appear that the projects were implemented by her NGOs; 4. the falsification and machinations used in securing funds from the various implementing agencies and in liquidating disbursements; and (5) the remittance of Sen. Revilla's PDAF for misappropriation; (d) Lim and De Asis, as staff employees of Napoles, for assisting in the fraudulent processing and releasing of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs cralawred through, among others, their designation as Presidents/Incorporators of JLN-controlled NGOs, namely, Kaupdanan Para sa Mangunguma Foundation, Inc. and Ginintuang Alay sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. respectively, and for eventually remitting the PDAF funds to Napoles's control;and (e) Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare (Relampagos, et al.), as employees of the Department of Budget and Management, for participating in the misuse or diversion of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, by acting as contacts of Napoles within the DBM, and thereby, assisting in the release of the Special Allotment Release Orders and Notices of Cash Allocation covering Sen. Revilla's PDAF.

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As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator - in this case, Sen. Revilla - with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF. The Ombudsman found that the diversion and/or misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF was coursed through a complex scheme involving various participants from Sen. Revilla's Office, the DBM, the IAs, and the JLN-controlled NGOs. The Ombudsman then went on to conclude that through the said scheme, they were able to siphon out government funds. Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder. ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of probable cause against all petitioners should be upheld. HELD: It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the context of a preliminary investigation which is "merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it." It "is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence. Therefore, the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. Accordingly, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings. This Court has ruled that "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay," and that even an invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta at this stage of the proceedings is improper. In this case, the Ombudsman (and the Sandiganbayan as to Relampagos, et al.) did not err in finding probable cause against all the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by the evidence on record and no semblance of misapprehension taints the same. Moreover, this Court cannot tag key documentary evidence as forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay at this stage of the proceedings; otherwise, it would defy established principles and norms followed during preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence teaches us that in dealing with probable cause at the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Overall, based on the foregoing disquisitions, the standard of probable cause was adequately hurdled by the prosecution in this case. As such, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayanin the proceedings a quo. All the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they were charged.

81 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO DACANAY G.R. No. 216064, November 07, 2016

CASE DOCTRINE: An extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt. In this connection, extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved. FACTS: Antonio Dacanay was charged with the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the RPC. Norma, the wife of Antonio, was found lifeless with several puncture wounds on the bathroom floor of their home by their son, Quinn, who came from school. Quinn likewise observed that the rest of the house was in disarray, with the clothes and things of Norma scattered on the floor, as if suggesting that a robbery had just taken place. At that time, Antonio had already left for work after having allegedly left the house at around six in the morning. Quinn went to the house of his aunt, Beth Bautista, to tell her about the fate of Norma, and then proceeded to the workplace of Antonio. Both Quinn and Antonio proceeded back to their house and were met by some police officers who were then already conducting an investigation on the incident. During the interview, Antonio informed PO3 Santos that Php 100,000 in cash and pieces of jewelry were missing. Antonio mentioned the name Miller as an alleged lover of Norma who may have perpetrated the crime but after several investigation made, it was never ascertained that Norma knew this person. Antonio was again invited for another investigation who was willing to confess about the killing of Norma. PO3 Santos apprised Antonio of his constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent. However, as determined by both the RTC and the CA, despite having been apprised of his rights, Antonio nonetheless confessed to the crime before the media representatives, who separately interviewed him without PO3 Santos. The media representatives testified that Antonio voluntarily admitted his complicity in the crime without any intimidation or coercion exerted on his person. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA, in affirming the RTC, erred in finding Antonio guilty of the crime of Parricide on the basis of his extrajudicial confession. HELD: The answer is in the negative. It bears stressing that during the separate occasions that Antonio was interviewed by the news reporters, there was no indication of the presence of any police officers within the proximity who could have possibly exerted undue pressure or influence. As recounted by both reporters during their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily narrated how he perpetrated the crime in a candid and straightforward manner, "with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in him". Antonio’s confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead,

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he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters. Hence, as extensively discussed above, considering that Antonio failed to rebut such presumption of voluntariness regarding the authorship of the crime, coupled with the fact of death of his wife, Norma, we find Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Parricide.

83 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

JOSUE R. LADIANA vs PEOPLE G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002

CASE DOCTRINE: The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from the accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel during a custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused during the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as evidence against the affiant. FACTS: Josue Ladiana, a member of the Integrated National Police (now PNP), was charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan for the death of Fancisco San Juan. During the trial, Cortez, the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, testified that the accused executed before him a counter-affidavit admitting the commission of the crime. Before Cortez was presented as witness, Defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. However, Accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense. The same counteraffidavit became the basis of SB in convicting the accused. The court a quo held that his CounterAffidavit, in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victim’s death, may be used as evidence against him. On appeal with the SC, petitioner argued that the counteraffidavit cannot be considered an extrajudicial confession as the same was executed during custodial investigation with the assistance of a counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of the commission of an offense while invoking self-defense in a counter-affidavit executed during preliminary investigation without the assistance of a counsel may be admitted as an extrajudicial confession against him. HELD: The answer is in the negative. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows: "SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. "SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him." In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession. Ladiana admits shooting the victim, which eventually led to the latter’s death but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him as the voluntariness of the execution thereof was admitted by the defense. 84 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY G.R. Nos. 131799-801. February 23, 2004

CASE DOCTRINE: The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. FACTS: The case at hand is an automatic review of the Decision dated December 17, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City finding appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape. In the same decision, the appellant was convicted of two counts of acts of lasciviousness. For each count of rape, the trial court sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, while for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the appellant was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The appellant was, likewise, ordered to indemnify the victim Lucelle Serrano, the amount of P50,000 for each count of rape and P20,000 for each count of acts of lasciviousness. Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four informations were filed against her uncle, the appellant. The appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Joint trial of all the cases ensued and on December 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of all the crimes charged. The trial court ruled that although Lucelle did not testify on the contents of her sworn statement the same were admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae. In view of the trial courts imposition of the death penalty on the appellant, the said cases were brought to the Supreme Court on automatic appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the statement of the accused is admissible as evidence. HELD: Yes. Although counsel did not assist the appellant at the time he gave his statement to the barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him because he was neither under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his statement. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers investigation conducted by police authorities, which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government. The barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellant’s statement before the barangay chairman is inadmissible.

85 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA, PATRICIO G.R. No. 147201 January 15, 2004

CASE DOCTRINE: Extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accused’s rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. FACTS: On November 9, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, found appellant Benjamin Sayaboc guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. It also found appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide. On December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and the accused attacked, and assaulted Joseph Galam y Antonio, inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. The appellants argued that the extrajudicial confession of the appellant may not be admitted in evidence against him because the lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office, who was his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel for remaining silent during the entire proceedings, was not independent, as he was formerly a judge in the National Police Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of the accused when it was taken without the assistance of a competent and independent counsel not by an effective and vigilant counsel. HELD: The Supreme Court held that Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession cannot be used in evidence in this case. Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
 ”Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. (2) These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.” Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accused’s rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible. Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains the passing of information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional 86 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

principle." It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.

87 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

CARLOS TANENGGEE vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 179448, June 26, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: The proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt is applicable only in custodial interrogation, which means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. FACTS: On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations for Estafa were filed against the petitioner. The RTC then entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter a plea and the cases were then consolidated and jointly tried. The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be prepared promissory notes and cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo Tan. Appellant approved and signed the cashier’s check as branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch located at New Divisoria market building, Divisoria, Manila. Appellant affixed, forged or caused to be signed the signature of Tan as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to show that the latter had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed the checks to the Loans clerk, Maria Dolores Miranda, for encashment. Once said documents were forged and falsified, appellant released and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and misappropriated the same to his use and benefit. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written statement in the form of questions and answers. Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank, testified that he conducted and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in said interview, appellant admitted having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the promissory notes; that the proceeds of the loan were secured or personally received by the appellant although it should be the client of the bank who should receive the same; and that all the answers of the appellant were contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed, thumbmarked, and signed by him (Exhibit "N"). After the joint trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty of the crimes charged. Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA. The CA promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the petitioner’s written statement based on its finding that he was not in police custody or under custodial interrogation when the same was taken. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation, which means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, “(1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above.” In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled 88 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement as it was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility.

89 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

MARIA PAZ FRONTRERAS Y ILAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 190583, December 7, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made, constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibility and validity of a confession, thus hinges on its voluntariness. FACTS: The petitioner was the Vault Custodian of the 685 Old Balara, Tandang Sora, Quezon City branch (Old Balara branch) of Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop (Cebuana). She was tasked to safe keep all the pawned items and jewelry inside the branch vault. Likewise employed in the same branch were Teresita Salazar (Salazar) and Jeannelyn Carpon (Carpon) who served as Branch Manager and District Manager, respectively. Salazar was responsible for the overall operation of the Old Balara branch and was also tasked to handle the appraisal of pawned items and the recording of such transactions. Carpon, on the other hand, supervised the overall operations of the branches within her district ensuring that they are operating within the objectives, procedures, and policies of Cebuana; she also monitored the district bank account and handled the appraisal of pawned items and the recording of cash. On October 27, 1998, a surprise audit was conducted at the Old Balara branch by Cebuana’s internal auditors, Mila Escartin (Escartin) and Cynthia Talampas (Talampas). The audit revealed that 156 pieces of jewelry, with an aggregate value of ₱1,250,800.00 were missing. A cash shortage of ₱848.60 was likewise discovered. When the petitioner was asked to explain the discrepancy, she told Escartin that she would reduce her explanation into writing. The next day, an audit report was sent to Marcelino Finolan (Finolan), Area Manager of Cebuana. Upon receipt of the audit report on October 28, 1998, Finolan immediately proceeded to the Old Balara branch to conduct an investigation. He called Escartin and the petitioner for a meeting during which the petitioner handed over several pawn tickets while Escartin gave him a handwritten letter made by the petitioner On May 10, 1999, an Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC against the petitioner, Salazar, and Carpon. Salazar and Carpon entered a “Not Guilty” plea upon arraignment on July 13, 1999. The petitioner likewise pleaded “Not Guilty” during her arraignment on August 9, 1999. Trial thereafter ensued the RTC found sufficient circumstantial evidence establishing that the petitioner perpetrated the offense. The petitioner’s co-accused Salazar and Carpon were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. The petitioner moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied but it reduced the penalty it had earlier imposed to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Undeterred, the petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and upheld the RTC’s findings and conclusions. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a serious error in not finding that the trial court gravely erred in rendering judgment upon conjecture and surmises vis-à-vis the absence of circumstancial evidence. HELD: NO. The Supreme Court stated that intent to gain can be deduced from the petitioner’s possession of the foregoing pawn tickets which were surrendered, together with the redemption payment by their respective pledgors. She submitted them during the spot audit along with a confession letter 90 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

stating that portions of the ₱1,250,800.00 missing value of jewelry were actually already redeemed. The tenor of the foregoing declaration and the circumstances of the petitioner at the time she wrote and signed it, all militate against her bare allegation that she was threatened with an administrative case unless she admits her transgression. The petitioner wrote and signed the confession letter spontaneously. When Escartin asked her if there are any problems in the Old Balara branch, the petitioner answered that she will write down her explanation and will submit it to Escartin. The petitioner also told Talampas that if she will escape, she will just be afraid that someone will go after her and that she will just face the consequences. Talampas then saw the petitioner make and sign the confession letter. When Finolan went to the Old Balara branch for further investigation, Escartin handed her the confession letter from the petitioner. The language of the confession letter was straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity and it was replete with details which could only be known to the petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious that losing one’s job in an administrative case is less cumbersome than risking one’s liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really commit. It is thus implausible for one to be cajoled into confessing to a wrongdoing at the mere prospect of losing his/her job. The petitioner’s declarations to Talampas show that she fully understood the consequences of her confession. She also executed the letter even before Finolan came to the Old Balara branch, thus, negating her claim that the latter threatened her with an administrative sanction. Under the law, it is stated that a confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made, constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibility and validity of a confession, thus hinges on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present in this case. The petitioner’s extrajudicial written confession coupled with the following circumstantial evidence all point to her as the perpetrator of the unlawful taking.

91 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DIONISIO SANTOS G.R. No. 127492, January 16, 2004

CASE DOCTRINE: Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity of the weight of their testimonies. FACTS: That on or about October 22, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill, and by means of treachery and with the aid of armed men, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, and use personal violence upon the person of VALENTINO A. GUEVARRA by then and there hacking and stabbing him with jungle bolos and samurais on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said Valentino A. Guevarra multiple hack and stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. At the trial, the accused invoked alibi, claiming that when tragedy struck on October 22, 1989, he was in Balut, Tondo, where he worked as a plumber, far from the place of the killing. He admitted, however, that he started work only on October 24, 1989, and returned to their house in Pepin Street, Sampaloc, Manila on October 29.26 He claimed that prosecution witness Rodelio Dipana pointed to him because they once had a quarrel during a drinking spree. After trial, Dionisio was found guilty of murder and sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Dionisio appealed to Supreme Court and cites an inconsistency between the testimonies of Lucita and the other prosecution witnesses. When asked what time the incident happened, Lucita mentioned noontime. The two other witnesses, however, testified that the incident occurred late in the afternoon. ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged inconsistencies affect the credibility of the witnesses no the veracity of the weight of their testimonies. HELD: No. Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity of the weight of their testimonies. The fact that, immediately after the hacking, Ernesto del Rosario went to the victim’s house and informed Lucita of the incident, does not lead to the conclusion that she was not present at the scene of the crime. It is entirely possible that a well-meaning person may inform another of an incident not knowing that the latter already had prior knowledge of the same. Indeed, there is no reason why the victim’s mother would fabricate a story to accuse an innocent person of such grave a crime. The natural interest of the witness, who is a relative of the victim in securing the convictions of the guilty would deter her from implicating a person other than the true culprit. It is therefore highly unlikely for her to lie as to the identity of one of her son’s assailants. Moreover, the defense did not present any evidence of ill motive on the part of the victim’s mother. In the absence of any evidence tending to question her motive and integrity, her testimony should be given fall credit. The absence of improper or evil motive for a prosecution witness to make false imputations against the accused strengthens her credibility.

92 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO NARDO y ROSALES G.R. No. 133888. March 1, 2001

CASE DOCTRINE: Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. FACTS: Lorielyn Nardo, the Plaintiff, filed a case of rape against her father which happened on 24 February 1996 that at 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, after they had lunch, Vicente (Plaintiff’s grandfather) left for work. Alfredo (Defendant) told his sons, Leonel and Louie, to go out. He then ordered Lorielyn to get his cigarettes in his bedroom. When Lorielyn went inside the bedroom, her father followed her. He embraced Lorielyn from behind and began mashing her breasts. Lorielyn pleaded, “Papa, please stop it Have mercy.” Her father ignored her. Instead, he undressed her and pushed her to the bed. Lorielyn started to cry, while Alfredo took off his clothes. Then, he lay on top of her and had sexual intercourse with her. He kissed her from the neck down. She tried to free herself but Alfredo took hold of a knife from a nearby cabinet and pointed it at her right ear. He threatened to kill their whole family if Lorielyn told anyone what he did. Alfredo again asked Lorielyn for another sexual intercourse but Lorielyn went to her aunt, Carol until she filed the case of rape against her father. In the trial, after the prosecution and defense presented their witnesses, Lorielyn was recalled to the witness stand by way of rebuttal evidence with regard to the allegation on the unremitted salary. Then on clarificatory questioning, Lorielyn reiterated that her father, Alfredo, had sexual intercourse with her. The RTC ordered the Defendant of guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonial evidence of the Plaintiff is credible. HELD: Yes. Jurisprudence provides that courts usually give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, particularly if it constitutes incestuous rape because, normally, no person would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the details of her ordeal were it not to condemn an injustice. Needless to say, it is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. In this case, the defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited wherein Lorielyn supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents’ permission to leave the house. However, Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: “Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.” While lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one’s own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.

93 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HEIRS OF ALEJAGA G.R. No. 146030, December 3, 2002

CASE DOCTRINE: A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person—the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith and the former’s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule. The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. FACTS: On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against respondents, the PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering Free Patent Application (VI2) 8442 of the parcel of land with an area of .3899 hectares more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City. The RTC rendered judgment declaring the approval of Free Patent Application and issuance of Original Certificate of Title in the name of Felipa Alejaga is by means of fraud, hence null and void ab initio. The CA reversed the RTC decision and ruled that petitioner failed to prove its allegation that respondents had obtained the free patent and the Certificate of Title through fraud and misrepresentation. Further, the CA brushed aside as hearsay the Isagani Cartagena’s testimony that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent application of Felipe Alejaga, Sr. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Isagani Cartegena that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the Free Patent Application is not admissible on the grounds of hearsay. HELD: No. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person—the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith and the former’s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule. Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-examination, the Investigation Report he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay. In addition, the doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.

94 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

ANNA LERIMA PATULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012

CASE DOCTRINE: The rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same. FACTS: Petitioner was charged with Estafa before the RTC of Dumaguete City by Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footlucker’s). At the trial, Karen Guivencan, only other witness for the Prosecution declared that Go, a former branch manager of Footlucker, had requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told him that they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstanding balances for them. She discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a written report denominated as “List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997” marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had misappropriated the total amount of P131,286.92. In the course of Guivencan’s direct-examination, petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court. With that, petitioner’s counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the information. ISSUE: Whether or not Guivencan’s testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion was inadmissible for being hearsay. HELD: Yes.The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information. In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice. In this case, Guivencan’s testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion, on the ground of hearsay.

95 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO D. CALINAWAN a.k.a. “MEO,” G.R. No. 133888. March 1, 2001

CASE DOCTRINE: For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the following conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. FACTS: At around midnight on September 26, 2007, Marigor Silan (Marigor), Janice’s seven (7)-year-old daughter, saw Calinawan stabbing her mother in their kitchen. Thereafter, Calinawan quickly fled the scene. Meanwhile, Jonathan Nevado (Jonathan), Janice’s brother and neighbor, was awakened by shouts coming from his sister’s house. He rushed to her house and saw her children crying. After bringing her children to his house, he went looking for Janice whom he saw outside a neighbor’s house pleading for help. Seeing her bloodied, he carried her and asked her who stabbed her, and she answered it was Calinawan who did it. Then, Jonathan brought Janice to the hospital. When Darwin Silan, Janice’s husband, arrived at the hospital, he also asked her who stabbed her and she reiterated that it was Calinawan. After three (3) days, Janice died in spite of the medical treatment at the hospital. The RTC convicted Calinawan for murder. The trial court noted that Marigor positively and categorically identified him as the one who stabbed her mother. It noted that she was able to identify him because of his amputated fingers. In addition, the trial court pointed out that the dying declaration of Janice to Jonathan corroborated Marigor’s statement that Calinawan killed her mother. The RTC stated that his positive identification trumped his denial and alibi, which were considered as inherently weak defenses ISSUE: Whether or not the dying declaration of Janice is admissible evidence. HELD: Yes. For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the following conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. In this case, first, the stabbing incident constituted the startling occurrence. Second, Janice never had the opportunity to fabricate a statement implicating Calinawan because she immediately identified him as her attacker when Jonathan saw her shortly after the assault took place. Lastly, the statement of Janice concerned the circumstances surrounding her stabbing. Hence the dying declaration is admissible evidence.

96 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GATARIN G.R. No. 198022, April 7, 2014.

CASE DOCTRINE: The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending. FACTS: Sonny Gatarin, the accused, armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof and with violence against or intimidation of person, did then and there will fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob, and carry away cash money amounting to Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias “Ka Maning,” to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount and that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, the said accused with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias “Ka Maning,” thereby inflicting upon the latter the stab wounds to [the] anterior chest and right shoulder and right axilla, which directly caused his death. RTC indicted the accused guilty of homicide. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC however the CA considered Januario’s statement to SPO3 Mendoza, that the accused were the ones who stabbed him and took his wallet, not only as part of res gestae but also as a dying declaration. ISSUE: Whether or not the dying declaration of Januario to SPO3 Mendoza is admissible evidence. HELD: No, not as a dying declaration. For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the following conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the statements. The rule is that, in order to make adying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying declaration. However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae.

97 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE P. PALANAS alias “ABE” G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4) conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus, constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. FACTS: On November 3, 2004, at 8 o’clock in the evening, Umali was riding a bicycle on his way home when he saw Januario being mauled by two persons opposite Dom’s Studio in Poblacion, Mabini, Batangas. Upon seeing the incident, he stayed in front of the church until such time that the accused ran away and were chased by policemen who alighted from the police patrol vehicle. On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle performing their routine patrol duty when they met two men, later identified as the accused, who were running at a fast speed. When asked why they were running, the accused did not answer prompting the policemen to chase them. The policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and when it became evident that they could no longer find them, they continued patrolling the area. There they saw Januario lying on the street in front of Dom’s studio. As he was severely injured, the policemen immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the Zigzag Hospital. While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He answered that it was "Jay-R and his uncle" who stabbed him. The uncle turned out to be the appellant herein, while Jay-R is his co-accused who remains at-large. At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who found him in critical condition. Three fatal wounds caused by a bladed weapon were found in Januario’s body which eventually caused his death. CA affirmed RTC decision hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether Dying Declaration by the victim on this case is admissible evidence. HELD: No. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death. In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the 98 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying declaration. However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

99 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THEODORE BERNAL et al. G.R. No. 113685, June 19, 1997

CASE DOCTRINE: A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: “(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.” FACTS: Accused was charged with Kidnapping Openda, Jr. During trial, the prosecution, in order to prove that accused has a motive in perpetrating the alleged crime, presented Enriquez, a common friend of both the accused and the victim, as witness. Enriquez testified that Openda, Jr. confided to him that the latter is having an affair with accused’s wife. The trial court, giving credence to Enriquez’s testimony as well as testimony of other witnesses attesting to the circumstances prior to the alleged abduction, convicted the accused. Accused assailing the decision of the trial court and for admitting the testimony of Enriquez. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony made by a witness as to a statement made a deceased person that is against the interest of the latter may be admissible in evidence as against a third person. HELD: Openda, Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal’s wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.: "Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons." A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:" (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true. Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.

100 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON & RENE R. DEZOLLER vs. COURT OF APPEALS & TEODORA DOMINGO G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997

CASE DOCTRINE: A declaration about pedigree is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, is subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon. FACTS: Martin Guerrero, the surviving spouse and only heir of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero (TDG), sold the property originally owned by the latter to herein respondent Teodora Domingo. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter’s name. When Martin Guerrero died, herein petitioners, alleging to be TDG’s niece and nephew, filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation from TDG. During the trial, Corazon, one of the petitioners, testified that she is the niece of TDG and submitted documentary evidence such as pictures, baptismal certificate etc. to prove the alleged filiation. Private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero. The trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence. In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation ISSUE: Whether or not testimony as to filiation to a deceased person is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence. HELD: The answer is in the negative. The court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon. There is no dispute with 101 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration. Distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family. We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself.

102 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998

CASE DOCTRINE: The common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. x x x [Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community. FACTS: Monina Jison filed a petition for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison. In her complaint, she alleged that: (1) at the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes); (2) MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo; (3) since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family; and (4) that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. At trial on the merits, MONINA presented as documentary evidence letters written by Francisco’s relatives as proof of her recognition as illegitimate daughter of the latter. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, CA reversed the ruling of the trial court and held that Monina was able to establish her filiation as FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter not just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record. Francisco elevated the case before the SC and assailed the admissibility of the letters of his relatives. ISSUE: Whether or not letter of the relatives of a putative father is admissible in evidence as part of the family reputation. HELD: No. Under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question. Neither may it be admitted under under Rule 130, Section 40. Rule 130, Section 40, provides: Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree. (emphasis supplied) It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether letter presented in this case as private documents, fall within the scope of the clause "and the like" as qualified by the preceding phrase "entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights and family portraits," We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its 103 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been described as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family," or those "which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition." Plainly then, letters, as private documents not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation, it having been observed that: the weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Thus, matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.

104 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014

CASE DOCTRINE: There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae. FACTS: On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries. An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, with the Regional Trial Court. A separate information were also filed against them for the attempted murder and another for frustrated murder. Issue: Whether or not evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible. Ruling: Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in this case. According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae. As a general rule, "a witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x x." All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus: Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, this court has previously discussed the admissibility of testimony taken as part of res gestae, stating that: A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. x x x x The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the 105 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae. In People v. Albarido, however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human experience:" x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference. Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects because different persons have different impressions and recollections of the same incident. x x x The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were unmasked. When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account

106 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. GILBERTO VILLARICO G.R. No. 158362. April 4, 2011

CASE DOCTRINE: The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. FACTS: Accused were charged of murder for the death of Haide Cagatan. During the trial, prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Remedios, sister-in-law of the victim, who testified that she saw accused pointing their gun at the victim; (2) Lolita Cagatan, mother of the victim, who testified that she was at the sala when she heard gunshots followed by seeing the victim wounded and asking for help stating that he was shot by Berting (accused); (3) Francisco, father of the victim; who testified that he also heard gunshots and saw accused aiming their guns upward and were about to leave. RTC convicted the four accused of homicide aggravated by dwelling. The RTC accorded faith to the positive identification of the accused by the Prosecution's witnesses. On intermediate review, the CA modified the RTC's decision and convicted the accused with murder. The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses did not actually see who had shot Haide and that Lolita’s testimony is a hearsay. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony relating the last statement of the victim immediately after the shooting incident is admissible in evidence. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: “Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.” The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestaeincludes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance 107 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. We find that the requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal act - the shooting of Haide - was a startling occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother about being shot by the group of Berting was made before Haide had time to contrive or to devise considering that it was uttered immediately after the shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned the startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is, the identities of the assailants). Verily, the statement was reliable as part of theres gestae for being uttered in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.

108 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTHONY MELCHOR PALMONES G.R. No. 136303, July 18, 2000

CASE DOCTRINE: In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. The following factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself. FACTS: The prosecution presented Sonny Boy Redovan who was the nephew of the victim. According to him, he asked the victim what happened of which the latter answered that he had been waylaid. When asked who was the assailant, the victim answered that it was Juany andTony Palmones which were the nicknames of the two accused-appellants. He also claim that there were nurses and bystanders who were present in the room when the victim made such statement. Another witness was Dr. Aguyao who said that the victim told him that he did not know the assailant because it was dark. On cross-examination he stated that it was Sonny Redovan who was with the victim at the time he interviewed the victim. The third witness was Police Inspector Tagum, he testified that while chasing a suspected motor vehicle PO3 Aniceta called him on the radio and told him that the accused-appellants were the assailants. It was confirmed when he went to the house of the two whom he met Triny Palmones and asked the latter if her brother owned a Kawasaki motor vehicle of which it affirms. OSG ordered of the acquittal of the accused-appellants on the ground that the Trial Court erred in admitting the alleged dying declaration of the victim as an exception to the hearsay rule. ISSUE: Whether or not the admission by the victim be considered as dying declaration? HELD: In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the declarant concerning the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death were made under the consciousness of impending death. No proof to this effect was ever presented by the prosecution. It was not shown whether Sonny Boy Redovan or Inspector Alexander Tagum ever asked the victim whether he believed that he was going to die out of his injuries or any other similar question. Sonny Boy Redovan claimed that he was able to talk with the victim for around an hour but the only thing he revealed of their conversation was the alleged identification of the victim of his two assailants. For his part, Inspector Tagum admitted that the only question he asked of the victim was if the victim knew who had shot him. While it is true that the law does not require that the declarant explicitly state his perception that he has given up the hope of life, the circumstances surrounding his declaration must justify the conclusion that he was conscious of his impending death. In the instant case, it was not proven that the victim was ever aware of the seriousness of his condition.

109 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim, we rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of time had already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these statements not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part of the res gestae.

110 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. RAMOS G.R. No. 92740, March 23, 1992

CASE DOCTRINE: A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as part of the res gestae FACTS: Respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner alleging the following: (1) they are passengers of PAL Flight No. 264 on September 24, 1985; (2) they check-in at least one (1) hour before the published departure time; (3) no one was at the check-in counter until 30 minutes before departure; (4) upon checking-in, they were informed that their tickets were cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers; (5) they have to take the bus instead; and (6) they suffered damages due to the cancellation. Petitioner disclaims any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of Respondent on said flight was due to their having check-in late for their flight. During the trial, defendant presented the check-in counter clerk at their Naga Branch on the date of respondent’s scheduled flight. The clerk testified that: (1) the respondents were late and that he noted the time of check-in on their tickets; and (2) there were other passengers who came late before the respondents. In relation to the testimony, two documentary evidence were offered, namely: (1) the ticket bearing the notation “late 4:02” of the clerk; and (2) the passenger manifest showing the other names of other passengers who were also late. Respondent objected to the documentary evidence submitted and argued that those are self-serving. ISSUE: Whether or not the entries made on a ticket by employees of a party in the course of their business may not be given weight on the ground that the same is self-serving. HELD: The answer is in the negative. The plane tickets of the private respondents with the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264 which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go and the private respondents are entries made in the regular course of business which the, private respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies. Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written document that speaks a uniform language

111 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

Private respondents’ only objection to these documents is that they are self- serving cannot be sustained. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as part of the res gestae.

112 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

LAO vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. G.R. No. 140023, August 14, 2003

CASE DOCTRINE: Entries in official records. An exception to the hearsay rule are entries in official records as provided under Sec. 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. FACTS: While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At around 8:00 p.m. of April 24, 1985, in Barangay Buhang, Jaro, Iloilo City, the insured truck bumped another truck, with Plate No. FBS917, also owned by petitioner Lao. The latter truck was running ahead of the insured truck and was bumped from the rear. The insured truck sustained damages estimated to be around ₱110,692, while the damage to the other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the accident, were placed at ₱35,000 more or less. Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the proceeds from his policy. However, the claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that when its adjuster went to investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper driver’s license at the time of the accident. The restriction in Leonardo Anit’s driver’s license provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the "authorized driver" clause of the insurance policy. Respondent cited a police blotter where it was indicated therein that it was Leonardo Anit who is driving the insured vehicle. Trial court dismissed the case for it lacks sufficient cause of action. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition. Petitioner assails the admissibility and evidentiary weight given to the police blotter, as a basis for the factual finding of the RTC and the CA. He contends that the same entry was belied by the Motor Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the investigating policeman himself, attesting that it was Giddie Boy Coyel, not Leonardo Anit, who was driving the insured vehicle. ISSUE: Whether or not police blotter is admissible and may be given probative value? HELD: Yes. The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, the following are the requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. 113 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was properly admitted as they form part of official records. Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the information subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was driving the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. This is unlike People v. Mejia, where we said that "entries in the police blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value," since the Court there found that "the entries in question are sadly wanting in material particulars". Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The person who made the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names.

114 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

SABILI vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 193261 , April 24, 2012

CASE DOCTRINE: Entries in official records, as an exception to the hearsay rule, is admissible when the following requisites concur: a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. FACTS: COMELEC denied due course to and canceled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) Sabili for the position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections for allegedly not complying with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials. When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. One of the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner is the Certification from the Barangay Captain of Pinagtong-ulan. The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade that petitioner had been residing in Brgy Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this oversight was raised as an issue in petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public and, hence, "cannot be relied on." Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notary public. ISSUE: Whether or not the Certification from the Barangay Captain shall be admissible in evidence HELD: Yes . The SC disagrees with the COMELEC’s treatment of the Barangay Captain’s Certification and find the same tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrade’s Certification would not only be admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to due consideration. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence: (a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

115 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to "keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay." Regarding the second requisite, we have explicitly that "it is the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay." Anent the third requisite, the Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary. Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrade’s Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.

116 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

CERCADO-SIGA vs. CERCADO, JR G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: Entries in official records. It has been settled in the case of U.S. v. Evangelista that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. FACTS: Petitioners seek to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. (Vicente) and Leonora Ditablan (Leonora) among the respondents. They claim that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. Petitioners claimed that upon the death of their father Vicente and by virtue of intestate succession, ownership over the subject land pertained to them as heirs; that upon the death of Benita, her share was acquired by petitioners by operation of law. To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented the following documents: 1) Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract; 2) Certification dated 19 November 2000 issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente of its acceptance of original marriage contract; 3) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Simplicia issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; 4) Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia; 5) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Ligaya issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; and 6) Joint Affidavit of two disinterested persons attesting that Ligaya is the child of Vicente and Benita. Respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal. They averred that petitioners are not the real-parties- interest to institute the case because they failed to present their birth certificates to prove their filiation to Vicente; that the marriage between Vicente and Benita was not valid; that the document showing that Vicente was married to Benita is not a certified true copy; and that they are now estopped by laches. The trial court first upheld the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita and it concluded that the subject property was part of the conjugal property of Vicente and Benita. Consequently, the trial court held that the Deed is null and void because it deprived Benita of her share of the property as surviving spouse and impaired the shares and legitimes of petitioners. The appellate court found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a private document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence. Moreover, the appellate court did not consider the baptismal certificate submitted by petitioners as conclusive proof of filiation. The Joint Affidavit executed by a certain Mario Casale and Balas Chimlangco attesting to the birth of Ligaya to Vicente and Benita was not given credence by the appellate court for being a hearsay evidence. For failure of petitioners to prove their cause of action by preponderance of evidence, the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the RTC. Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim 117 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should be regarded as original. Petitioners emphasize that the certification issued by the Iglesia Filipina Independiente Church, the joint affidavit of two disinterested persons, the baptismal certificate presented by petitioners, and the open and public cohabitation of petitioners’ parents are sufficient proof of their marriage. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that said document should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the requirement of authentication. ISSUE: Whether the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to prove the fact of marriage between Vicente and Benita. HELD: No. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the case of U.S. v. Evangelista, it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate. Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate original, hence, the original need not be produced. We do not agree. We had previously ruled in Vallarta v. Court of Appeals that " a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non- production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy." Next, while petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration. The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement. In Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court ruled that the requirement of proper custody was met when the ancient document in question was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. In this case however, we find that Simplicia also failed to prove her filiation to Vicente and Benita. She merely presented a baptismal certificate which has long been held "as evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to her kinsfolk. 118 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

MERALCO vs. QUISUMBING G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000

CASE DOCTRINE: Certain commercial lists and reports of matters of interest to persons engaged in a particular occupation are admissible in evidence as an exception to hearsay rule, provided, they are made by persons engaged in that occupation and are generally used and relied upon by them and those lists and reports are published. (Sec. 45, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court). FACTS: There was a labor dispute between Meralco and Union due to an alleged unfair labor practice. The Union insisted their economic and political demands. The Union relies on the estimate that All Asia financial analyst had published that Meralco's net operating income for the same year was about P5.7 billion to support its claim on the wage increase. Meralco alleged that its actual total net income for 1996 was only P5.1 billion, The Secretary of Labor directed the parties to execute a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the 2,200 increase in wages and increase in other benefits, such increases were based on the P5.7 billion Meralco’s net income as published by All Asia. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor’s reliance on the published report of All Asia regarding Meralco’s net income in granting the increase in wages and benefits is misplaced HELD: Yes. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position regarding the wage issue cannot be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides: Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be admitted only "if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein." The report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance with certain governmental requirements.

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The Secretary gravely abused his discretion in making this wage award by disregarding evidence on record. He misappreciated the evidence in favor of claims that do not have evidentiary support. The MERALCO projection had every reason to be reliable because it was based on actual and undisputed figures. On the other hand, the union projection was based on a speculation that the union failed to substantiate. The All-Asia Capital Report was nothing more than a newspaper report that did not show any specific breakdown or computations.

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PEOPLE vs. ORTIZ-MIYAKE G.R. Nos. 115338-39, September 16, 1997

CASE DOCTRINE: For Sec. 47 of Rule 130 (testimony or deposition at a former proceeding) to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or desposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. FACTS: Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In addition, she was indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan alone. In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted a previous decision of Branch 78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction for estafa promulgated on July 26, 1993, rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 74852-53, involving the same circumstances in the instant case, wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa. This decision was not appealed and had become final and executory. In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the decision therein of the Regional Trial Court stated that the facts in the foregoing estafa cases were the same as those in the illegal recruitment case before it. It, therefore, adopted the facts and conclusions established in the earlier decision as its own findings of facts and as its retionale for the conviction in the case before it. The position of the Solicitor General is that the conviction of appellant should be merely for the lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment. He submits that the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale because the conviction was based on an earlier decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque where appellant was found guilty of estafa committed against Generillo and Del Rosario. It is argued that the Makati court could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of the Parañaque court to show that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario as well. Illegal recruitment was allegedly proven to have been committed against only one person, particularly, Elenita Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may only be held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and not of such offense in large scale. He further submits that the adoption by the Makati court of the facts in the decision of the Parañaque court for estafa to constitute the basis of the subsequent conviction for illegal recruitment is erroneous as it is a violation of the right of appellant to confront the witnesses, that is, complainants Generillo and Del Rosario, during trial before it. ISSUE: Whether or not trial court may admit decision in the previous proceeding to prove guilt of the accused in subsequent proceeding

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HELD: No. Rule 130 Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the administration of justice orderly and expeditious. Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the Parañaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments. In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous decision in the estafa case. A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.

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GO vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012

CASE DOCTRINE: Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding – The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. As provided under Section 15, Rule 119, the examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. To take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. FACTS: Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) because of defrauding Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations to the effect that they have chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in which they executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 in favor of ML Resources and Highdone Company Ltd. They represented that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the accused well knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK CORPORATION. Li Luen Ping is a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the case hearings. Subsequently, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. The private prosecutor filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia and that upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health in which the MeTC granted. RTC declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face. CA held that MeTC did not committed grave abuse of discretion for allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases. ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of the prosecution’s motion to take the testimony of a witness by oral depositions in Laos, Cambodia must be upheld. 123 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

HELD: No. The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered under Section 15, Rule 119. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony. Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination of witnesses – both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses." The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party. But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus: SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to

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present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not. Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. While the SC recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules. It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also under the circumstances. However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically ruled out by the Court. It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise." The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of the Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases and overlooked fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses. In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.

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PEOPLE vs. IBANEZ G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: Child Witness Rule. Under Sec. 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), a statement of a child may be allowed in evidence in any criminal or noncriminal proceeding. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child. FACTS: The defense, accused-appellants herein, tried to further discredit Rachel’s testimony by arguing that Rachel was a mere child who had studied only until the first grade of elementary school and could barely read, and did not know how to tell time. ISSUE: Whether or not Rachel’s testimony may be admitted HELD: Yes. We cannot take Rachel’s testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully. With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child. Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father. We likewise note that the line of questioning of the defense during cross-examination on the competency of Rachel to read and tell time did not distract her in recollecting how her father was attacked by accused-appellants. From her position underneath the house of her "Kuya Unyo," she saw her father, Wilfredo, attacked by accused-appellants. Although she was astonished as the happening unfolded, her ability to perceive, remember, and make known her perception was not diminished.

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PEOPLE vs. ESUGON G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: Child Witness Rule. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child. FACTS: Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On crossexamination, he related that the assailant took money from his father’s pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetrator because there was no light. Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, which illumined the ground floor through the stairway. Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that after the incident she took Carl and had him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone but she did not see who it was since there were many people passing by. Later, the police asked Carl whether he saw somebody enter their house and he answered yes and demonstrated how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that the person who stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity. He then pointed to appellant and said " siya po yung pumasok sa bahay namin." As a resident there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall and sometimes watches the television at the house of the victim. PO1 Fabela also testified that when he went to the hospital and interviewed the persons thereat. Carl pinpointed and positively identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his mother and robbed them of their money. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police station. PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was questioning people in the area, Carl pointed to them the suspect who was one of the bystanders. They were asking Carl questions when he suddenly blurted out that it was appellant who entered their house and stabbed his mother. They invited the appellant to the police station but the latter denied having committed the crime. RTC pronounced the appellant guilty of the crime charged. The appellant posits that the adverse testimony of the 5-year old Carl, being filled with inconsistencies, was not credible, but doubtful; that unlike him, his sisters, who were then at the second floor of the house, were not roused from sleep; that contrary to Carl’s recollection, the place was not even dark when the stabbing attack on 127 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

the victim occurred because his father said that he had turned the light on upon hearing somebody shouting " Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had then gotten his bolo, and gone outside the house. ISSUE: Whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant as the person who had entered their home, robbed the family, and killed his mother. HELD: Yes. The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit: Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons cannot be witnesses: (a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others; (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a) That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child. The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-examination. All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.

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It seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did not concern the principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged but related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not negate the positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the investigation and during the trial. Worthy to note is that the child could not have been mistaken about his identification of him in view of his obvious familiarity with the appellant as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the child’s family.

129 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE vs. ABRIOL G.R. No. 123137, October 17, 2001

CASE DOCTRINE: An expert witness is one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possess special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an opinion. There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. The question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rest with the discretion of the trial court. FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged of murder and illegal possession of firearms at RTC of Cebu City for killing Alexander Flores. Among the witnesses presented by the prosecution were Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news reporter then aboard his jeep who heard a couple of gunshots; Po3 Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police Station No.3 who found four(4) .45 caliber shells some four(4) feet away from the victim’s body, and two(2) deformed slugs where the victim had lain; Dr. Ladislao Diola Jr., Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory who had autopsied the victim’s body; and SPO4 Lemuel Caser, a ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Accused-appellant Abriol also testified that he surrendered his service firearm to the BBRC Administrative Officer when he was served a warrant of arrest for murder in Criminal Case No. CBU-28843. However, the handgun was defective and it was returned to him for repair by Armscor. He presented a Memorandum Receipt authorizing him to carry the government-issued .38 revolver. The defense also presented Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-legal officer of the Cebu City PNP Command, to testify on the caliber of the firearms which might have caused the gunshot of the victim. The trial court found appellant’s version of the incident neither convincing and credible and, as earlier stated, it believed the prosecution’s version. Petitioners were convicted of the offenses charged.Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of both the medical doctor and ballistic expert should be stricken down. HELD: No. The office of the Solicitor General points out that Dr. Diola’s testimony is supported by Dr.Pedro P. Solis, a medical expert, in his book entitled Legal Medicine. The factors which could make the wound of entrance bigger than the caliber include : (1) shooting in a contact or near fire; (2) deformity of the bullet which entered; (3) a bullet which might have entered the skin sidewise; and (4) an acute angular approach of the bullet. However, where the wound of entrance is smaller than the firearms caliber, the same may be attributed to the fragmentation of the bullet before entering the skin or to a contraction of the elastic tissues of the skin. Dr. Diola testified that a .45 caliber pistol could have caused the grazing wounds on the victim’s head and extremities. Dr. Cerna corroborated Dr. Diola’s findings in this regard. Such expert opinions disprove appellants theory that the .45 caliber handguns confiscated from them could not have been used in killing the victim. An expert witness is “one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possess special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an opinion. There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; 130 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. The question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistic rests with the discretion of the trial court. In giving credence to Caser’s expert testimony the trial court explained. The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics ballistics and identifying firearms. Much stress is given to the absence of photographs of his examination. Nonetheless, the Court is satisfied Caser’s examination, findings and conclusions with the use of a microscope. Caser’s conclusion based on his examination deserves credit. He found the impressions on the primer of the fired cartridges that were test-fired to have the same characteristics with those recovered at the scene of the crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a bullet into the body of his victim, he releases a chunk of concrete evidence that binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel deeply imprints on every bullet its characteristics marking peculiar to that gun a d that gun alone. These markings might be microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing their origin. And they are as infallible for purposes of identification, as the print left by the human finger. An expert witness need not present comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his findings. Examination under a comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient.

131 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

BAUTISTA vs. CA G.R. No. 158015, August 11, 2004

CASE DOCTRINE: Expert Witness. The opinion of an expert, having special knowledge, skill, experience or training may be admitted in evidence as stated under Sec. 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The court, however, is not bound by the opinion of an expert witness. Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. When faced with conflicting expert opions, courts give weight and credence to that which is more complete, thorough and scientific (Bacalso v. Padigos, 552 SCRA 185). A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. FACTS: The dispute involves a parcel of land which was previously owned and registered in the name of the late Cesar Morelos. Cesar is the uncle of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, being the brother of her mother, Rosario Morelos. Cesar, who was married to Rosario Duran, did not have any children. Rosario died in 1972. Cesar died of cardiac arrest. During his lifetime, Cesar sold and conveyed the parcel of land in favor of Laura as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale" notarized by Luis M. de Guzman. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of petitioner Laura Bautista. Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate child of Cesar Morelos with Angelina Lim-Gue, instituted a complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale. Petitioner asserts the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale and invoke the testimony of Carmelita Marcelino, the instrumental witness to the signing of the document, who confirmed that it was the decedent Cesar Morelos who affixed his signature to the document. On the other hand, respondent contends that the decedent's signature on the Deed was forged. He presented the testimony of Francisco Cruz, Jr., Chief Examiner of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, that the signature of decedent on the questioned instrument, when compared to other documents bearing the authentic signature of Cesar Morelos, did not match and appeared to have been authored by a different person. Cruz, Jr. declared that the latest document bearing the genuine signature of the decedent is dated March 31, 1982, while the alleged forged signature was made on April 5, 1982, or a mere lapse of five days. According to him, it is not possible to have significant variation between the two signatures, considering the proximity of time when the signatures where affixed. Another witness, Major Braulio Monge, Chief of the Fingerprint Division of the PC-INP, testified that the thumbmark of Cesar Morelos appearing on the residence certificate indicated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, when compared to those affixed on previous residence certificates issued to the decedent, did not match and appears to be the thumbmark of another person.

132 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

RTC rendered judgment declaring the Deed of Sale valid while the CA reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of expert witnesses are conclusive to be a strong basis to nullify a duly executed and notarized deed of absolute sale. HELD: No. Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. It is well-settled that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn this legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant to establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract. As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. Due to the technicality of the procedure involved in the examination of the forged documents, the expertise of questioned document examiners is usually helpful; however, resort to questioned document examiners is not mandatory and while probably useful, they are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. Hence, a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert. The authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of Absolute Sale, confirmed the genuineness, authenticity and due execution thereof. Having been physically present to see the decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista affix their signatures on the document, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioners. Witness Francisco Cruz, Jr. failed to establish the fact that the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was not that of Cesar Morelos. He merely concluded that the document was a forgery without 133 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

citing any factual basis for arriving at that conclusion. Cruz did not point out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing, which would ordinarily escape detection by an ordinary lay person. Authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration, such as the position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and paper used. These play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between a questioned handwriting and an authentic one. Besides, a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity. The authenticity and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale must therefore be upheld.

134 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

BOBBY “ABEL” AVELINO BULAWAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 181444, July 17, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. Minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do not destroy the probative value of the testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the accused. FACTS: On October 5, 2000, around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Alfredo Manalangsang was riding on a tricycle going to Baseco Compound, Tondo Manila. Since Manalangsang was the last passenger to board the tricycle, he sat behind the driver. Upon reaching a certain point between Muelle Del Rio and 2nd Street, Port Area, Manila, the tricycle which Manalangsang was riding on passed at the left lane instead of the right lane of the road to give way to the owner-type jeep owned by the barangay and driven by its Chairman, Generoso Hispano, herein victim. While Chairman Hispano was entering the nearest route near the center island, a man suddenly emerged and blocked Chairman Hispano’s vehicle. Instantaneously, Manalangsang heard bursts of gunshot which prompted him to jump from the tricycle. Manalangsang instinctively hid behind the center island of the road. Manalangsang positively identified the third assailant as appellant Bobby “Abel” Avelino, whom he saw stooping down at the Chairman’s body and pulling the opening of his bonnet down to his chin to ascertain if the Chairman was still alive. Sensing that it was safe for him to leave the scene, Manalangsang boarded a tricycle again and went home. When the police arrived at the crime scene, Chairman Hispano was already dead. Denying tge accusation, the defense presented as evidence the testimonies of petitioner, PO2 Anthony P. Galang, Adonis T. Bantiling and Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito D. Cabamongan. Petitioner advanced the defense of denial and alibi. He testified that on October 5, 2000, he and his wife went to the Land Transportation Office in Pasay City to renew his license as they planned to go to Baguio that day. But as he was issued a temporary license late in the afternoon, instead of going home, he and his wife checked in at the Pharaoh hotel in Sta. Cruz, Manila to spend the night. He parked his car along Dasmariñas Bridge and slept. Later, he woke up to transfer his car but his car was gone. Thus, he and his wife went to the Anticarnapping Unit along U. N. Avenue to report the incident. After the trial, the RTC, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. As aforesaid, the CA, in its assailed decision, denied petitioner’s appeal and upheld the RTC decision with modification by increasing the award of actual damages. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Cañada and disregarding the inconsistencies between the statements of Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the position of the gunman. HELD: No. The Court have carefully studied the records of this case and find no cogent reason to overturn the ruling of the CA which is accord with law and jurisprudence. 135 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

The CA was also correct in not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan as regards the position of the gunman when the latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that the gunman was on board the owner-type jeep when Hispano was shot, which is opposed to Manalangsang’s testimony. However, case records reveal that Cabamongan was presented as an ordinary witness. Hence, his opinion regarding the location of the gunman in relation to the place where the empty shells were found is immaterial. Expert evidence is admissible only if : (a) the matter to be testified to is one that required expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial. Jurisprudence further provides that minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do jot destroy the probative value of the testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the accused. Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner as the gunman by Manalangsang, as corroborated by Cañada, must stand.

136 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE vs. DURANAN G.R. No. 134074-75, January 16, 2001

CASE DOCTRINE: Ordinary Witness. The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding – (a) the identify of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted (Rule 130, Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence). It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness' own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.”

FACTS: Complainant Nympha Lozada, who was 25 years old at the time of the incidents in question, is considered to be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. She is unemployed and simply does household chores for her family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainant's family in the same apartment where he rented a room that he shared with several other people. The first rape took place in the afternoon of March 7, 1994. Nympha was standing by the door of her grandfather's house when accused-appellant suddenly placed his arm on her neck and dragged her inside the common bathroom. Complainant said that accused-appellant kissed her and then removed her shorts and underwear as he held her hands with his other hand. She did not cry for help because accused-appellant threatened her that he would get angry if she did she claimed that accused-appellant was able to rape her while standing up despite her resistance. After the incident, complainant was sent out of the bathroom and went directly home. The second incident occurred in the early morning of March 8, 1994, according to complainant. She said she was cleaning the premises of her family residence when accused-appellant pulled her from her house and took her to his room. According to complainant, accused-appellant asked his brother, who was then cooking, to leave the room. As soon as his brother had left, accused-appellant laid her on the floor and raped her. Complainant said she was forced to submit to accusedappellant's lust because of his threats. After the incident, accused-appellant sent her letters professing love her and telling her how beautiful she was. Complainant said she tore up the letters after reading them. In another incident, on March 12, 1994, accused-appellant asked complainant to let him use their bathroom. However, after being given permission, he grabbed complainant by the hand, pulled her inside the bathroom, and started kissing her on the lips and neck after closing the door behind them. He only stopped molesting her when he heard somebody coming.

137 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant Nympha Lozada y de Lara, complainant's mother Virginia de Lara Lozada, and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon. Virginia Lozada testified that she saw her daughter leave the bathroom, quickly followed by accused-appellant. Virginia noticed that her daughter's lower lip was bruised. When she confronted her daughter about it, the latter revealed for the first time what had happened to her. They then filed affidavits and two informations for the crime committed and then they took complainant to Camp Crame for examination. Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon, who examined complainant, submitted a report which contained findings of some inflammation that could have been caused by friction due to intercourse indicating the possibility of intercourse that caused complainant's loss of virginity within the last five days. The defense thereafter presented its witnesses, namely accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan, accused-appellant's alleged roommates, Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig, and his wife Carlita Duranan. With respect to the first incident of rape it is contended that accused-appellant could not have committed such because he was not at home at that time. As to the second incident of rape, accused-appellant contends that it was impossible for him to commit rape in his room because there were at least six other people there at the time of the alleged rape. Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig confirmed accused-appellant's schedule. Bariquit claimed that he was always with accusedappellant and knew where he was all the time. Both witnesses said rape could not have been committed in a room where at least five other people were sleeping. RTC finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal two (2) counts of rape On appeal, accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victim's mental age was not proven. He argues that under Art. 335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the complainant's mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve. He further claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived. ISSUE: Whether or not the opinion of the ordinary witness (mother of the victim) regarding the mental condition or sanity of the victim be received in evidence HELD: Yes. Rule 130, Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding --a. the identify of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; b. a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and c. the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. The mother of an offended party in case of rate, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter. It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors

138 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness' own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion. In the case at bar, Virginia Lozada testified on the mental condition of her daughter that at the age of 25 she still thinks like a child but from her narration or statement it can be seen that her declaration are true or believable.

139 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE vs. DIOPITA G. R. No. 130601, December 4, 2000

CASE DOCTRINE: Religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved in the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. FACTS: Accused-appellant Rafael Diopita Guzman, a “Ministerial Servant” in the congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God, Diopita dragged the victim Dominga Pikitpikit through the banana plantation towards the cornfields and sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest her and her belongings – ladies watch, bracelet, ring with russian diamonds, wedding ring and P1, 000.00 cash. As he was sexually assaulting her, Dominga made desperate struggles and frantic calls for help but her efforts proved futile until he finally satiated his lust. The defense denied the charge and invoked alibi. Accused-appellant claimed that between 8:30 to 12:00 o’clock in the evening on April 16, 1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan and fellow Jehovahs Witnesses Roger Custorio and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio Nisnisan for an informal Bible session upon the invitation of Juan Nisnisan. Accused-appellant also claimed that during those hours, he never left the place. Flora, Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan corroborated his alibi and testified on his good moral character as a ministerial servant of their faith. The trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of crime charged; consequently, accused appellant appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not Diopita is entitled to acquittal because of his good moral character and exemplary conduct. HELD: No. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such “sterling” qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of “Ministerial Servant” in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing. Credence to the testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that these are Jehovah’s Witnesses and as such, they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to his whereabouts at the time in question. This argument is as puerile as the first. The precision with which the witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovah’s Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the facility with which it may be concocted and fabricated. The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is at best and most competently performed by the trial court. 140 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY (FEBTC) vs. ROBERT MAR CHANTE GR. No. 170598, October 09, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely: (a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply the production burden or the burden of evidence. FACTS: Instant complaint was filed by FEBTC against Chante to recover from Chan the principal sum of P770,488.30 representing the unpaid balance of the amount fraudulently withdrawn from Chan’s ATM. FEBTC alleged that Chan had withdrawn funds totaling P967,000.00 from the PNBMEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila; that the withdrawals were done in a series of 242 transactions with the use of the same machine, at P4,000.00/withdrawal; and that the transactions were processed and recorded by the respective computer systems of PNB and MEGALINK despite the following circumstances, namely: (a)the offline status of the branch of account (FEBTC Ongpin Branch); (b) Chan’s account balance being only P198,511.70 at the time; (c) the maximum withdrawal limit of the ATM facility being P50,000.00/day; and (d) his withdrawal transactions not being reflected in his account, and no debits or deductions from his current account with the FEBTC Ongpin Branch being recorded. FEBTC asserted further that defendant took advantage of a system bug which allowed the excessive withdrawals. Chan denied liability and instead insisted that he had been actually home at the time of the withdrawals. He alluded to a possible “inside job” as the cause of the supposed withdrawals, citing a newspaper report to the effect that an employee of FEBTC’s had admitted having debited accounts of its depositors by using his knowledge of computers as well as information available to him. Chan claimed that it would be physically impossible for any human being like him to stand long hours in front of the ATM facility just to withdraw funds. ISSUE: Whether or not a civil action be decided in favor of the plaintiff where the defendant relies on bare and uncorroborated denial of the former’s allegation. RULING: No. The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of investigating and presenting the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the respective parties. The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability. Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely: (a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply the production burden or the burden of evidence. In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises. In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to 141 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second concept passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue. Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon the weakness of Chan’s evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to make the withdrawals, and that he had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another person to make the fraudulent withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from him any funds supposedly improperly withdrawn from the ATM account.

142 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

IBAAN RURAL BANK INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS GR. No. 123817, December 17, 1999

CASE DOCTRINE: When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent. FACTS: Spouses Tarnate entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question from its original owner Spouses Reyes. The Tarnates failed to pay the loan and the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. At the public auction, the bank was the sole bidder. Consequently, a certificate of sale was issued. The said certificate stated that redemption period expires two (2) years from the registration of the sale. Certificate of sale was registered on October 16, 1979. Within the two (2) year period, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots and tendered the redemption amount. However, petitioner Bank refused and argued that the right to redeem had prescribed, as more than one year had elapsed from the registration of the Certificate of Sale. Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the foreclosed lots. They argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed lots because they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price before October 16, 1981, the deadline of the 2year. ISSUE: Whether or not failure to previously contest the redemption period stated on the certificate of sale precludes the bank from asserting it as a defense to oppose the exercise of right of redemption. RULING: Yes. By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For two years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period specially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent.

143 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

SPOUSES ALCARAZ vs. PEDRO M. TANGGA-AN et al. G. R. No. 128568, April 9, 2003

CASE DOCTRINE: Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it. FACTS: Reynaldo leased a building from Esmeralda’s predecessor (Virginia). At the time of the perfection of the contract, the Reynaldo, as lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor, owned the land on which the rented house stood yet they signed the same, obliged themselves to comply with the terms thereof for five years and performed their obligations as lessees for two years. After two years from the effectivity of the lease contract, Esmeralda filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, with damages against Reynaldo for failure to pay rent. On the other hand, the latter alleged that they paid the rent to the new owners (Virgilio and Angelita) of the lot where the building stood and not to respondents since the latter supposedly no longer had the legal right to collect rentals. They further claimed that the lease contract ceased to be effective because Virgilio’s assumption of ownership of the land stripped the respondents of ownership of the building. MTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs. MTC ruled that petitioner failed to show that the subject house belonged to Virgilio. On the other hand, the respondents proved that the property in question is registered in their name. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC based on the petitioner’s failure to present any documentary evidence modifying or amending the contract of lease to justify the transfer of payment of the monthly rental to Virgilio Tanga-an who claims only as the registered owner of the lot on which the leased house is located. ISSUE: Whether or not a defendant in a suit to which the cause of action arises from a contract assail the operation of such contract by disputing a previously affirmed fact. RULING: No. Reynaldo was aware that the lot in question was not owned by the lessors at the time the lease contract was entered into. After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the Reyanldo is barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the Esmeralda lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that: Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; xxx

144 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS ET. AL. GR No. 194964, January 11, 2016

CASE DOCTRINE: Conclusive presumptions are presumptions that may not be overturned by evidence, however strong the evidence is. They are made conclusive not because there is an established uniformity in behavior whenever identified circumstances arise. On the other hand, disputable presumptions are presumptions that may be overcome by contrary evidence. They are disputable in recognition of the variability of human behavior. Presumptions are not always true. They may be wrong under certain circumstances, and courts are expected to apply them, keeping in mind the nuances of every experience that may render the expectations wrong. FACTS: Guillermo B. Torres and Dolores P. Torres incorporated and operated two (2) thrift banks: (1) First Iligan Savings & Loan Association, Inc. (FISLAI); and (2) Davao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (DSLAI). Guillermo B. Torres chaired both thrift banks. He acted as FISLAI's President, while his wife, Dolores P. Torres, acted as DSLAI's President and FISLAI's Treasurer. Upon Guillermo B. Torres' request, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas issued a P1.9 million standby emergency credit to FISLAI. On May 25, 1982, University of Mindanao's Vice President for Finance, Saturnino Petalcorin, executed a deed of real estate mortgage over University of Mindanao's property in Cagayan de Oro City in favor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. "The mortgage served as security for FISLAI's PI.9 Million loan" It was allegedly executed on University of Mindanao's behalf. As proof of his authority to execute a real estate mortgage for University of Mindanao, Saturnino Petalcorin showed a Secretary's Certificate signed by University of Mindanao's Corporate Secretary, Aurora de Leon. The Secretary’s certificate states among others the authorizing of the chairman to appoint Satunino Pactolerin to represent the University of Mindanao to transact, transfer, convey, lease, mortgage, or otherwise hypothecate the subject properties. Saturnino Petalcorin executed another deed of real estate mortgage, allegedly on behalf of University of Mindanao, over its two properties in Iligan City. This mortgage served as additional security for FISLAI's loans. FISLAI and DSLAI eventually merged with DSLAI as the surviving corporation in an effort to rehabilitate the thrift banks due to the heavy withdrawals of depositors. DSLAI later became known as Mindanao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (MSLAI). MSLAI failed to recover from its losses. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas later on foreclosed the mortgaged properties. University of Mindanao filed two Complaints for nullification and cancellation of mortgage. One Complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, and the other Complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. University of Mindanao alleged that it did not obtain any loan from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and that Aurora De Leon’s certification was anomalous. That it never authorized Saturnino Petalcorin to execute real estate mortgage contracts involving its properties to secure FISLAI's debts and it never ratified the execution of the mortgage contracts. The Regional Trial Courts ruled in favor of University of Mindanao. The Court of Appeals however ruled that "although BSP failed to prove that the UM Board of Trustees actually passed a Board Resolution authorizing Petalcorin to mortgage the subject real properties, Aurora de Leon's Secretary's Certificate" clothed Petalcorin with apparent and ostensible authority to execute the mortgage deed on its behalf. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas merely relied in good faith on the Secretary's Certificate. University of Mindanao is estopped from denying Saturnino Petalcorin's authority.

145 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

ISSUE: Whether or not University of Mindanao bound by the real estate mortgage contracts executed by Saturnino Petalcorin. RULING: No. Petitioner argues that the execution of the mortgage contract was ultra vires. As an educational institution, it may not secure the loans of third persons Securing loans of third persons is not among the purposes for which petitioner was established. In ruling in favor of the contract’s validity, this court considered the incidental powers of the hotel to include the execution of employment contracts with entertainers for the purpose of providing its guests entertainment and increasing patronage. This court ruled that a contract executed by a corporation shall be presumed valid if on its face its execution was not beyond the powers of the corporation to do. Thus: When a contract is not on its face necessarily beyond the scope of the power of the corporation by which it was made, it will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed to be valid. Corporations are presumed to contract within their powers. The doctrine of ultra vires, when invoked for or against a corporation, should not be allowed to prevail where it would defeat the ends of justice or work a legal wrong. Presumptions may be conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are presumptions that may not be overturned by evidence, however strong the evidence is. They are made conclusive not because there is an established uniformity in behavior whenever identified circumstances arise. They are conclusive because they are declared as such under the law or the rules. Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court identifies two (2) conclusive presumptions: SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions.— The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: (a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.On the other hand, disputable presumptions are presumptions that may be overcome by contrary evidence. They are disputable in recognition of the variability of human behavior. Presumptions are not always true. They may be wrong under certain circumstances, and courts are expected to apply them, keeping in mind the nuances of every experience that may render the expectations wrong.Thus, the application of disputable presumptions on a given circumstance must be based on the existence of certain facts on which they are meant to operate. "[P]resumptions are not allegations, nor do they supply their absence[.]" Presumptions are conclusions. They do not apply when there are no facts or allegations to support them. If the facts exist to set in motion the operation of a disputable presumption, courts may accept the presumption. However, contrary evidence may be presented to rebut the presumption.

146 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

HOSPICIO D. ROSAROSO et al. vs. LUCILA LABORTE SORIA et al. G.R. No. 194846, June 28, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. FACTS: Rosaroso filed a complaint for nullity of the SPA authorizing Soria to sell the subject disputed lots to Meridian, as well as the deed of sale entered into pursuant to the said SPA. Petitioner alleged that the said lot had already sold to them by their predecessor Luis Rosaroso. During trial the second wife of Luis, Lourdes testified deed of sale in favor of petitioners, was obtained through fraud, deceit and trickery. She explained that they signed the prepared deed out of pity because petitioners told them that it was necessary for a loan application. RTC ruled in favor of Rosaroso. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. The CA ruled that the first deed of sale in favor of petitioners was void because they failed to prove that they indeed tendered a consideration for the four (4) parcels of land. It relied on the testimony of Lourdes that petitioners did not pay her husband. The price or consideration for the sale was simulated to make it appear that payment had been tendered when in fact no payment was made at all. ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of a contract be assailed on a mere testimony that it has no consideration. RULING: No. Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted. In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that the sale was made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court. The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It relied heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to sign the deed of sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not pay the purchase price for the subject properties. This testimony, however, is selfserving and would not amount to a clear and convincing evidence required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption that there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed.

147 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA vs. HEIRS OF DIONISIO CAÑADA G.R. No. 175874, December 11, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: Notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. FACTS: Cipriano Trazona owned Lot No. 5053–H. Sometime in 1997, when the heirs of Cipriano, herein petitioners, tried to secure a copy of Tax Declaration No. 07764, they were informed that Tax Declaration No. 07764 had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Tax Declaration No. 23959 was issued in the name of Dionisio, the owner of the property adjacent to Cipriano’s lot. Apparently, respondents had caused the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 23959 by submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly executed by Cipriano in favor of Dionisio. The deed of sale covers a portion of Cipriano’s property which was encroached upon by Dioniso during the former’s lifetime, but the new tax declaration issued covers the whole property of Cipriano. Consequently, petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959. Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 was a forgery. During the trial, petitioners presented an expert witness testifying to the forgery of Cipriano’s signature on the assailed deed. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, CA ruled that petitioners had failed to prove by requisite evidence their allegation that the assailed deed was a forgery. The deed, being a notarized document, enjoyed the presumption of authenticity and due execution and that the deed was an ancient document that remained unaltered after so many years, bodes well for its authenticity. ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of regularity of a notarized ancient document may be assailed by the testimony of an expert witness and independent observation of the trial court RULING: Yes. It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. In this case, clear and convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed was presented. First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed had been forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise. Second, the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. It likewise supported its finding that the signature was forged through independent observation. Lastly, when the record management analyst from the Bureau of Archives presented the assailed deed, the paper was noted to be white, while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch from where it was taken had turned yellow with age.

148 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

LUIS UY vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA* MENDOZA G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: The presumption established that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage (Semper Praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage) may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence. FACTS: Luis Uy filed with the RTC a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana). Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married in until they separated and lived apart. Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone in favor of Spouses Lacsamana over a property he alleges to be a part of their marital property regime is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her paraphernal funds. She added that she and Uy cohabited and attempted to formalize their marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage contract. Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim dated claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of the subject property. Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana is valid. RULING: YES. Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper Praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence. Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, it was held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other. While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife, defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage 149 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, the Court held that persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting married. The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary. Both the trial and appellate courts is correct in that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal. Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the presumption that any property acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple in equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had every right to sell the same even without Uy's consent.

150 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

DOLORES DIAZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 208113, December 02, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides the legal presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences. FACTS: Leticia S. Arcilla filed against Dolores Diaz before the RTC a information for estafa for her alleged failure to return or remit the proceeds from various merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her in trust. Leticia alleged that she is a businesswoman engaged in the business of selling goods/merchandise through agents (one of whom is petitioner) under the condition that the latter shall turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items to her a month after they were entrusted. She averred that she entrusted merchandise worth P35,300.00 to Dolores as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt signed by the latter. However, petitioner was only able to remit the amount of P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to make further remittances and ignored respondent's demands to remit the proceeds or return the goods. Petitioner admitted having previous business dealings with respondent but not as an agent. She clarified that she was a client who used to buy purchase order cards and gift checks from respondent on installment basis and that, during each deal, she was made to sign a blank sheet of paper prior to the issuance of POCs and GCs. She further claimed that their last transaction was conducted in 1995, which had long been settled. However, she denied having received P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from respondent. RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay respondent the amount of P32,000.00. CA upheld petitioner's civil liability. It ruled that respondent was able to establish by preponderance of evidence her transaction with petitioner, as well as the latter's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case the items were not sold, the fact of which having been substantiated by the acknowledgment receipt. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be held civilly liable for the value of the merchandise. HELD: YES. Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust receipt in blank during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to retrieve after paying her obligations, is a bare allegation that cannot be given credence. It is well-settled that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. On the contrary, respondent was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the fact of the transaction, as well as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case such merchandise were not sold. This was established through the presentation of the acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996, which, as the document's name connotes, shows that petitioner acknowledged receipt from respondent of the listed items with their corresponding values, and assumed the obligation to return the same on March 20, 1996 if not sold.

151 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. In this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also, respondent's possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.

152 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE G.R. No. 137664, May 9, 2002

CASE DOCTRINE: Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that "evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. FACTS: Roberto Padrigone, Jocel Ibanita, Michael San Antonio and Abel Triumpante broke into the house of Rowena Contridas at 3:00 a.m. of January 3, 1995, and at knifepoint successively raped Rowena, then 16 year old. They threatened to kill Rowena and her 14 year old sister, Nimfa that they will be killed if they reported the incident to others. The victim became insane after the incident and was not able to testify in Court thus it was Nimfa who testified. The trial court, disregarding the Accused’s defense of denial and alibi, convicted the accused. On appeal, Accused-appellant claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena, the victim, when the latter should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court deprived appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it was only appellant who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latter’s conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not failure to present as witness the victim of a crime who became insane by reason of such offense amounts to suppression of evidence. HELD: No. The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that "evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from "Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition" and thus "cannot stand judicial proceedings yet." The non- presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.

153 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 122899, June 8, 2000

CASE DOCTRINE: When evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary FACTS: Chia and Respondent GTP entered into a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage wherein the latter assumes the former’s indebtedness with Metrobank. Respondent, pursuant to the balance declared by Metrobank prior to the execution of the sale, paid Chia’s loan balance with Metrobank in the amount of P116,416.71. This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject property despite repeated requests, thus prompting respondent GTP to file an action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia. Metrobank refused to discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due loans” as there exist a stipulation in subject Deeds of Mortgage that mortgagors’ debts subsequently obtained would be covered by the same security. Hence, the payment made by GPT does not extinguish the mortgage. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. On appeal, CA reversed the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not failure of the mortgagee to present the proof of loan secured by the mortgage estopped him from further asserting the existence of such liability HELD: Yes. It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. The scheduled oral arguments before the CA was supposed to be Metrobank’s golden opportunity to prove the existence the "other unliquidated past due loans" which is the basis of its refusal to release the mortgage property. But Metrobank failed to appear thereon. No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist."

154 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BARTE G.R. No. 179749, March 1, 2017

CASE DOCTRINE: When there is failure to comply with the requirements for proving the chain of custody in the confiscation of contraband in a drug buy-bust operation, the State has the obligation to credibly explain such noncompliance; otherwise, the proof of the corpus delicti is doubtful, and the accused should be acquitted for failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. FACTS: The accused-appellant was charged in the RTC with a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, following his arrest for selling a quantity of shabu worth ₱l00.00 to a police officer-poseur buyer in the evening of August 10, 2002 during a buy-bust operation conducted in Consuelo Village, Mandaue City. The RTC convicted Barte as charged giving credence to the arresting officers’ testimonies although no evidence has been produced compliance of the procedure. ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of the accused is proven beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: No. Although non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements (Section 21 of RA 9165) would not automatically render the seizure and custody of the contraband invalid, that is true only when there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Any departure from the prescribed procedure must then still be reasonably justified, and must further be shown not to have affected the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Otherwise, the non-compliance constitutes an irregularity, a red flag, so to speak, that cast reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti. The State's agents who entrapped the accused-appellant and confiscated the dangerous drug from him did not tender any justifiable ground for the non-compliance with the requirement of establishing each link in the chain of custody from the time of seizure to the time of presentation. The conclusion that the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu confiscated were consequently not preserved became unavoidable. The failure to prove the chain of custody should mean, therefore, that the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the sachet of shabu presented during the trial was the very same one delivered by the accused-appellant to the poseur buyer.

155 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

DE LOS SANTOS V. COA G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. FACTS: Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco (Cuenco) of the Second District of Cebu City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital), appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT Program). Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. Petitioner herein succeeded Dr. Alquizalas as the Medical Center Chief. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners should be held solidarily liable for the disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10. RULING: Yes. VSMMC, through its officials, should have been deeply involved in the implementation of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA and, as such, has acted as custodian and disbursing agency of Cuenco’s PDAF. Provisions of the National Budget Circular No. (NBC) 476 dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for a congressman’s PDAF authorized under Republic Act No. 8760 were not followed in the implementation of the TNT Program, as well as other existing auditing laws, rules and regulations governing the procurement of medicines. Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. The Court finds that the petitioners herein have equally failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing rules and regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto.

156 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CADIDIA G.R. No. 191263, October 16, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: "In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers." FACTS: During a frisk search in the Manila Domestic Airport, the officer/frisker noticed something unusual and thick at the buttocks of accused Candidia upon her entry in the departure area. When asked by the officer, Candidia answered it was her sanitary napkin. Unconvinced, the officers brought Cadidia to the comfort room where the latter was asked to remove her underwear. The officers discovered that there were two sachets of shabu inside her underwear and the sachets were turned over to their supervisor. The specimen was later submitted to a forensic chemist which identified the substance as shabu. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of Trayvilla and Bagsican (the officers who searched and frisked the accused) failed to overcome the accused’s presumption of innocence. HELD: No. In People v. Unisa, this Court held that "in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers." The prosecution’s witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled the accused who entered the x-ray machine of the departure area. There was no pre-determined notice to particularly search the accused especially in her private area.

157 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JESUS EDUALINO G.R. No. 119072, April 11, 1997

CASE DOCTRINE: The moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be the victims of rape FACTS: Rowena, the complainant was in a party with her mother and was later joined by her cousin Antero whom she asked to drink beer with. When Antero got drunk and fell asleep, the accused Edualino approached the complainant and offered her a beer. She accepted the beer and felt dizzy after drinking it. Edualino then dragged her toward a grassy area where he allegedly raped her. The complainant alleged that she resisted the assault but Edualino was stronger. The RTC held the accused guilty of the crime of rape. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime of rape based on his contention against the character of Rowena. HELD: No. The moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be the victims of rape. In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations that the victim was drunk and under the influence of drugs and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and responsible married woman, were true, said circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped. Accused also contends that the victim, to save her marriage, concocted the charge of rape. The Court held that it would not believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. The Court failed to understand how a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances averred by accused-appellant.

158 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE G.R. No. 146697, July 23, 2002

CASE DOCTRINE: The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party. FACTS: Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court of raping his own daughter Marilou Fabre. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her mother and the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou, along with the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense, during its turn in the presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the accused himself. On appeal, the defense argues, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength for the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court should give full weight as to the veracity of a testimony which was not subjected to cross-examination by the adverse party. HELD: NO. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party.

159 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA G.R. No. 142556, February 5, 2003

CASE DOCTRINE: As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. FACTS: For automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Jesus S. Perez guilty of raping Mayia P. Ponseca and imposing on appellant the death penalty. On appeal, Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular. Appellant points out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses that when Mayia identified him in open court, she referred to him as a man named "Johnny" and did not give any description or any identifying mark. Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him after the police arrested him. Appellant bewails that the identification was not done with the usual police line-up. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the minor-victim should be expunged on the ground that leading questions were asked during her testimony in court. HELD: NO. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain. The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice."

160 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. et al. G.R. No. 139412, April 2, 2003

CASE DOCTRINE: Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made. FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellants Ronald Castillano alias "Nono" and Jaime Castillano, Jr. of murder of the Diosdado Volante. On appeal, Appellant Jaime, Jr. avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He asserts that the testimony of Luz Volante, the widow of Diosdado, was inconsistent with her testimony during the preliminary examination in the municipal trial court and her sworn statement before the police investigators as well as the testimonies of SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime Favier, and the physical evidence on record. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony of Luz, the prosecution’s principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary examination before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police investigators for the reason that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence ISSUE: Whether or not a testimony made in open court may be impeached by asserting that the said testimony is inconsistent with those made by the witness in the preliminary examination. HELD: NO. Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross- examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made.51 This Court held in People v. Escosura that the statements of a witness prior to her present testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her credibility unless her attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an opportunity to explain said inconsistencies. In a case where the cross-examiner tries to impeach the credibility and truthfulness of a witness via her testimony during a preliminary examination. In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any 161 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

discrepancies between her present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court, said transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.

162 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO G.R. No. 90198, November 7, 1995

CASE DOCTRINE: The initial assessment on the testimony of a witness is done by the trial court, and its findings still deserve due regard notwithstanding that the presiding judge who pens the decision is not the one who personally may have heard the testimony; Reliance on the transcript of stenographic notes should not, for that reason alone, render the judgment subject to challenge. The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states: “Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum.—A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded;but in such casethe writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.” Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. FACTS: Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery with homicide. The Regional Trial Court did not give credence to the defense of alibi. It convicted the three accused of murder. The instant appeal was interposed by the three convicted appellants. Appellants attack the credibility of the prosecution's lone eyewitness. It is asserted that the testimony of Francisca Espina should not be given worth since, while testifying, she would at times be seen reading some notes written on her left palm. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness, who during her testimony was seen looking at some notes written on her palm, should not be given credence HELD: No. The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states: A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution. Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like details. 163 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION G.R. No. 96202, April 13, 1999

CASE DOCTRINE: The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following conditions: 1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify; 2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; 3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; 4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and 5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. FACTS: Canque entered into two contracts with Socor Construction Corp. Socor Construction Corporation. Due to Canque’s refusal to pay the amount billed by the Socor Construction Corp., the latter brought a suit to recover from the former the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month. To prove the unpaid bills of the Canque, Socor Construction Corp. presented its Book of Collectible Accounts and their bookkeeper, Dolores Aday to testify on the entries of the said book. During the trial, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the materials stated in the bills were supervised by "an engineer for such functions. The trial court, giving due weight to the plaintiff’s Book of Collectible Accounts, as well as Aday’s testimony, ruled in favor of Socor Construction Corp.. On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the CA. Canque contends that Aday’s testimony is considered a hearsay for lack of personal knowledge of the entries made as the information entered was merely provided to her by the engineers of the Socor Construction Corp.. It is nonetheless argued by Socor Construction Corp. that although the entries cannot be considered an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, Section 10 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, Canque contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for which it was offered cannot be admitted for another purpose. Issues:

1. Whether or not testimony of a witness as to entries made by her based on bills provided to her is inadmissible on the ground of hearsay evidence rule.

2. Whether or not the testimony of a witness as to entries made by her based on information provided to her may be admissible as memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness HELD:

1. YES. When the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and the person who gave him the information is individually known and may testify as to the facts stated in the entry which is not part of a system of entries where scores of employees have intervened, such entry is not admissible without the testimony of the informer.

164 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

NO. Assuming that the book of collectible accounts presented by the Socor Construction Corp. would qualify as a memorandum, the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he supports his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence.

165 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

YASUO IWASAWA vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness; Not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. As provided in the Civil Code: ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. FACTS: Iwasawa, a Japanese national married Custodio in 2002. In July 2009, Iwasawa noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, Custodio confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband passed away. This prompted Iwasawa to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to Custodio as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one During trial, aside from his testimony, Iwasawa also offered the following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the NSO: (1) Certificate of Marriage between Iwasawa and Custodio to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on November 28, 2002; (2) Certificate of Marriage between Custodio and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994 Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo; (3) Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to Custodio RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove Custodio’s prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while Iwasawa offered the certificate of marriage of Custodio to Arambulo, it was only Iwasawa who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that Iwasawa’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of Custodio’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between Custodio and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further ruled that Iwasawa’s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight. HELD: NO. There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by Iwasawa are all public documents. Art. 410 of the Civil Code provides that “the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.” 166 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the Iwasawa did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the Custodio nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.

167 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. vs. PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. G.R. No. 181163, July 24, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules: SEC. 20. Proof of private document.—Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine. FACTS: Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors 219 packages containing 120 units of brand new Nissan Pickup Truck on board the vessel S/S "Calayan Iris" from Japan to Manila. The shipment was insured with Philam against all risks. When the package arrived and was unloaded by ATI, it was found that the package marked as 03-245-42K/1 was in bad order. The shipment was withdrawn by R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc., the authorized broker of Universal Motors, and delivered to the latter’s warehouse. Owing to the extent of the damage to said cargoes, Universal Motors declared them a total loss. Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages against Westwind, ATI10 and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. When Universal Motors’ demands remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and was compensated by Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors issued a Subrogation Receipt in favor of Philam. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay Philam. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. When the case was elevated to the SC, Asian Terminal objected to the admission of Marine Certificate and the Subrogation Receipt for being hearsay as they were not authenticated by the persons who executed them. ISSUE: Whether or not certificates and/or receipts offered as evidence required authentication. HELD: NO. The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. 168 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules: SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine. Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private documents which Philam and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business. Since none of the exceptions to the requirement of authentication of a private document obtains in these cases, said documents may not be admitted in evidence for Philam without being properly authenticated.

169 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

LOMISES ALUDOS substituted by FLORA ALUDOS vs. JOHNNY M. SUERTE G.R. No. 165285, June 18, 2012

CASE DOCTRINE: Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. “The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. FACTS: Lomises acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to occupy two stalls in the Hangar Market in Baguio City. Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent Johnny M. Suerte for the transfer of all improvements and rights over the two market stalls. Before full payment could be made, however, Lomises backed out of the agreement and returned the P68,000.00.Thus, Johnny filed a complaint against Lomises for specific performance with damages. RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure to secure the consent of the Baguio City Government to the agreement. The RTC found that Lomises was a mere lessee of the market stalls, and the Baguio City Government was the owner-lessor of the stalls. On appeal, CA agreed with the RTC that the assignment of the leasehold rights was void for lack of consent of the lessor, the Baguio City Government. The sale of the improvements, however, was valid because these were Lomises’ private properties. Lomises, however, objects to the CA ruling upholding the validity of the agreement insofar as it involved the sale of improvements on the stalls. Lomises alleges that the sale of the improvements should similarly be voided because it was made without the consent of the Baguio City Government, the owner of the improvements, pursuant to the May 1, 1985 lease contract. ISSUE: Whether or not a document repeatedly mentioned in the pleadings of the parties which was presented only on appeal may be considered for purposes of adjudicating the case. HELD: NO. The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the May 1, 1985 lease contract between the Baguio City Government and Lomises, as it was not formally offered in evidence before the RTC; in fact, the CA admonished Lomises’ lawyer, Atty. Lockey, for making it appear that it was part of the records of the case. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. "The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight." Although the contract was referred to in Lomises’ answer to Johnny’s complaint and marked as Exhibit "2" in his pre- trial brief, a copy of it was never attached. In fact, a copy of the May 1, 1985 lease contract "surfaced" only after Lomises filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision.

170 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR. et al. G.R. No. 194128, December 7, 2011

CASE DOCTRINE: The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. It is elementary that objection to evidence must be made after evidence is formally offered. FACTS: Respondents filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages arising from their investments against Westmont Investment Corporation (Wincorp) and respondent Pearlbank Securities Inc. the case was set for the presentation of the defense evidence of Wincorp. On March 7, 2003, three (3) days before the scheduled hearing, Wincorp filed a written motion to postpone the hearing. The RTC denied Wincorp’s Motion to Postpone and considered it to have waived its right to present evidence. The Motion for Reconsideration of Wincorp was likewise denied. On September 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Francias and held Wincorp solely liable to them. The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Wincorp filed an MR with the CA attaching to the said motion evidentiary evidence which it was not able to present during trial. ISSUE: Whether or not documents attached to a motion for reconsideration made before the appellate court may be considered for purposes of adjudicating the merits of the case. HELD: NO. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence states that: "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified." A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Evidence not formally offered during the trial cannot be used for or against a party litigant. Neither may it be taken into account on appeal. The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected. Prescinding therefrom, the very glaring conclusion is that all the documents attached in the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court and all the documents attached in the defendantappellant’s brief filed by defendant- appellant Wincorp cannot be given any probative weight or credit for the sole reason that the said documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial court because to consider them at this stage will deny the other parties the right to rebut them. 171 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. 192024 July 1, 2015

CASE DOCTRINE: It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary evidence was rejected by the lower court and the offeror did not move that the same be attached to the record, the same cannot be considered by the appellate court, as documents forming no part of proofs before the appellate court cannot be considered in disposing the case. For the appellate court to consider as evidence, which was not offered by one party at all during the proceedings below, would infringe the constitutional right of the adverse party. Failure to seasonably avail of the proper remedy provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, petitioner is precluded from doing so at this late stage of the case. Clearly, estoppel has already stepped in. FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corp. is the manufacturer and producer of its cigarette brands and prior to 1997 were subject to ad valorem tax. However on Jan. 1, 1997 R.A. 8240 took effect and caused a shift from ad valorem tax to specific tax. As a result of such shift, the aforesaid cigarette brands were subjected to specific tax. Fortune Tobacco Corp. later on filed a claim for tax credit or refund under Sec. 229 of the NIRC for illegally collected specific taxes. After trial on the merits the Court ruled that it was contrary to law and that there is insufficiency of evidence on the claim for refund. Fortune Tobacco Corp. elevated the case to the CTA but the latter found no cause to reverse the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant or grant the Fortune Tobacco Corp.’s claim for tax refund. HELD: NO. The denial of Fortune Tobacco Corp.’s claim for tax refund in this case is based on the ground that it failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove its claim and amount thereof. As a result, Fortune Tobacco Corp. seeks the Court to re-examine the probative value of its evidence and determine whether it should be refunded the amount of excise taxes it allegedly overpaid. This cannot be done. The settled rule is that only questions of law can be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of the SC. to analyze or weight all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The Court’s jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only the errors of the law that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of the factual issues is the function of the lower court whose findings on these matters are received with respect. A question of law which the Court may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DELFIN CALISO G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011

CASE DOCTRINE: In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome and he is entitled to an acquittal though his innocence may be doubted. A witness’ familiarity with the accused although accepted as basis for a positive identification does not always pass the test of moral certainly due to the possibility of mistake. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender like the crime itself must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime. FACTS: Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court found him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA, a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, CA affirmed Caliso’s conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the RTC had rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite his back being turned towards her during the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she made a positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident happened at noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact that Amegable’s view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAA’s body had been submerged in the water. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a witness attesting to identifying the perpetrator of a crime by merely seeing his back constitutes positive identification that warrants conviction. HELD: NO. No matter how honest Amegable’s testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable circumstances showing him to be AAA’s killer. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where,although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to 173 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014

CASE DOCTRINE: A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law. FACTS: Accused was charged with forcible abduction with rape. During the trial, complainant testified that she was abducted by the accused and brought to the latter’s residence where the former was repeatedly rape for 8 days. However, in the course the complainant’s testimony, she testified that in between those 8 days, she was able to visit her grandmother. Furthermore, when prosecution presented Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the following observations about AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and can readily admit a normal-sized erect male penis without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether it was AAA’s first sexual intercourse as the vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations. On the other hand, the defense presented Wilma Enriquez, a friend of the complainant, who testified that after the dates wherein the latter was supposedly rape, the latter visited her and discussed plans about marrying the accused. Trial court convicted the accused. On appeal with CA, conviction of the accused was confirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not a person accused of rape may be convicted based solely on the testimony of victim who positively identified him to be the perpetrator notwithstanding blatant inconsistencies therein. HELD: In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. So long as the private complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human knowledge, observation and common experience of man. Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.

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The following inconsistencies in complainant’s testimony is found to be incompatible to human experience: (1) the admission that she during her abduction she was brought to accused’s house where 8 family members of the latter also resides; (2) that she was not able to ask for help from any of the family member nor any of them was able to realize that accused was keeping her against her will; (3) the discussion of wedding plans with her friend after her ordeal; (4) admission that she was able to visit her grandmother within the period of the alleged abduction when she was supposed to be kept inside accused’s house against her will; and (5) lastly, that she was repeated mauled by accused on their way to his to residence and within the duration of abduction but no physical injuries was seen during the medical examination conducted after the incident. A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation.

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SUPREME COURT vs. EDDIE V. DELGADO et al. A.M. No. 2011-07-SC, October 4, 2011

CASE DOCTRINE: The basic principle in Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses. FACTS: On 2 June 2011, SC Associate Justice and Second Division Chairperson Antonio T. Carpio caused the transmittal of two (2) sealed Agenda to the Office of Clerk of Court – Second Division (OCCSD). The said Agenda contain an itemized list of cases taken up by the Court’s Second Division during the sessions held on the concerned date and the handwritten marginal notes of Justice Carpio noting the specific actions adopted by the division on each case. Owing to the confidential nature of the contents of an Agenda, the OCC- SD follows a very strict procedure in handling them. Thus, only a few specified personnel within the OCC-SD are authorized to have access to an Agenda – e.g., only Ms. Puno is authorized to receive and open; only four (4) persons are authorized to photocopy. Herein Delgado were charged with grave misconduct for taking specific pages in the said agenda without being authorized thereto. The complicity of each respondent are as follows: Madeja and Florendo asked respondent Delgado for a copy of several items included in the 30 May 2011 Agenda. Acceding to the request, respondent Delgado removed pages 58, 59 and 70 from a copy of the Agenda entrusted to him for stitching and gave them to respondents Madeja and Florendo. During the initial and formal investigation, Delgado admitted that he removed and took the said pages from the agenda and gave the same to Madeja and Florendo. However, while respondents Madeja and Florendo admitted during the initial investigation that they asked for and, in fact, obtained the missing pages in the 30 May 2011 Agenda, they vehemently denied having been involved in the taking of the missing Agenda pages during the formal investigation of the OAS. ISSUE: Whether or not mere denials made by respondent during formal investigation warrants prevails against the contrary testimony of their co- respondent implicating them in the alleged deed. HELD: NO. The basic principle in Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses. It was never shown that respondent Delgado was motivated by any ill will in implicating respondents Madeja and Florendo. As a witness, the credibility of respondent Delgado remained unsullied.

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GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

CASE DOCTRINE: Standard of Proof — An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and Hong Kong signed an “Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons.” Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with the offense of “accepting an advantage as agent”. He also faces counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC issued an Order of Arrest against Muñoz. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Muñoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. The CA declared the Order of Arrest void. The DOJ filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari praying that the Decision of the CA be reversed. The Supreme Court granted the petition of the DOJ and sustained the validity of the Order of Arrest against Muñoz. Meanwhile, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC a petition for the extradition of private respondent. For his part, Muñoz filed in the same case a petition for bail, which was opposed by Hong Kong. The RTC denied the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high “flight risk.” Muñoz filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by respondent judge, allowing Muñoz to post bail. Hong Kong filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied.

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ISSUE: What is the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail in an extradition proceeding? HELD: An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”

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PEOPLE VS. ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012

CASE DOCTRINE: Once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.— By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings. FACTS: At around 9:30 p.m., Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for murder against At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving. The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had “no necessity to employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death” due to the victim attacking him only with bare hands. ISSUE: What is the standard of proof required in order for self-defense to be appreciated? HELD: By invoking self-defense, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, 180 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings. The plea of self-defense was belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais.

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PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK VS. ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N. RAMOS G.R. No. 158143, September 21, 2011

CASE DOCTRINE: Preponderance of Evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth, evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. —In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in opposition. This Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., 443 SCRA 293 (2004), defined “preponderance of evidence” in the following manner: Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment, subject to the overriding rule that the burden to prove his cause of action never leaves the plaintiff. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not merely a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if established, will constitute an “avoidance” of the claim. Even if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot be entered in the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain his cause of action. —Given that PCIB failed to establish Ramos’ participation in Balmaceda’s scheme, it was not even necessary for Ramos to provide an explanation for the money he received from Balmaceda. Even if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot be entered in the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain his cause of action; to reiterate, a preponderance of evidence as defined must be established to achieve this result. FACTS: PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages before the RTC against Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. In its complaint, PCIB alleged that between 1991 and 1993, Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager, fraudulently obtained and encashed 31 Manager’s checks. PCIB moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint to implead Rolando Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda’s alleged fraud. The RTC granted this motion. Since Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the other hand, Ramos filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme. According to Ramos, he is a reputable businessman engaged in the business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and Balmaceda was one of his clients. Ramos admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of the source of Balmaceda’s money. RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB. On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latter’s fraudulent manipulations.

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ISSUE: What is the quantum of evidence required in civil cases? HELD: In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in opposition.This Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.,defined “preponderance of evidence” in the following manner: “Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment, subject to the overriding rule that the burden to prove his cause of action never leaves the plaintiff. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not merely a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if established, will constitute an “avoidance” of the claim. Thus, PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive assertion that Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latter’s scheme to defraud the Bank. Given that PCIB failed to establish Ramos’ participation in Balmaceda’s scheme, it was not even necessary for Ramos to provide an explanation for the money he received from Balmaceda. Even if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot be entered in the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain his cause of action; to reiterate, a preponderance of evidence as defined must be established to achieve this result.

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DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA VS. REBECCA BIONG G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013

CASE DOCTRINE: He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence.—In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence. In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred. FACTS: At around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical injuries. The traffic investigation report identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style of “Pongkay Trading” and was engaged in a gravel and sand business. Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. She consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy. She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. Dr. Flores operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae. The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession despite the surgery. Dra. dela Llana, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. Thus, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the RTC. She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an average monthly income of P30,000.00. She further prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving.

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ISSUE: Whether Dra. Dela Llana established her case by preponderance of evidence HELD: No. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that “[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict.” Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer. She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption — that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel — arise. Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, “an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.” The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations. In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence. In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred. Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence: (1) the pictures of her damaged car, (2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and (3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established.

185 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

ZACARIA A. CANDAO, ABAS A. CANDAO AND ISRAEL B. HARON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 186659-710

CASE DOCTRINE: Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. FACTS: A team of auditors from the central office of the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an Expanded Special Audit of the Office of the Regional Governor, Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ORGARMM) and the financial transactions and operations. It was found that illegal withdrawals as stated in Special Audit Office (SAO) were made from the depository accounts of the agency through the issuance of checks payable to the order of the (Disbursing Officer II) petitioner Israel B. Haron, without the required disbursement vouchers. Criminal cases for malversation of public funds was filed in the Sandiganbayan by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against the (ORG-ARMM Regional Governor) Zacaria A. Candao, (Disbursing Officer II) Israel B. Haron, (Executive Secretary) Abas A. Candao and (Cashier) Pandical M. Santiago. At their arraignment, all of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of malversation of public funds. It was also explained that the procedure with respect to the processing of cash advances as follows: that there were cash advances made in ARMM which cover travels, salaries, etc. but particularly it is for "peace and order campaign," it starts with the ORG when the Regional Governor issues an authority for cash advance, and then they process the voucher (Finance and Budget Management Services). Heidi L. Mendoza (COA State Auditor IV), prosecution’s lone witness testified that their expanded audit disclosed illegal withdrawals of funds from the PNB and Treasury accounts of ORG-ARMM without the required disbursement vouchers and have no assigned voucher numbers. Mendoza admitted the belated submission of original vouchers to the COA Central Office but these are without supporting documents. The Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds committed in conspiracy. The Sandiganbayan found no merit in petitioners claim that the subject checks were covered by existing disbursement vouchers which were belatedly submitted and received by the COA Central Office. The Sandiganbayan found that the petitioners allegation of advances intended for “peace and order campaign” presented no proof that it were spent for public purposes. In fact the alleged disbursement vouchers were not explained as to the nature of expense such as purchase of equipment, services, meals, travels etc. and ultimately there were no supporting documents such as the Request for Issuance of Voucher, Purchase Request and Inspection Report if the items said to be purchased. Disbursement vouchers were not issued in accordance with the existing COA circulars due to it was all unnumbered and undated.

186 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

Liabilities of petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao, the Sandiganbayan held that by their act of co-signing the subject checks, petitioner Haron was able to consummate the illegal withdrawals without the required disbursement vouchers. Thus, by their collective acts, said court concluded that petitioners conspired to effect the illegal withdrawals of public funds. ISSUE: Whether or not the equipoise doctrine applies to this case HELD: Yes. The Sandiganbayan did not err in holding that the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the petitioners failed to overcome the prima facie evidence of misappropriation arising from Haron’s failure to give a satisfactory explanation for the illegal withdrawals from the ARMM funds. Petitioners likewise did not accomplish the proper liquidation of the entire amount withdrawn, during the expanded audit or any time thereafter. Also there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the equipoise rule. Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Such is not the situation in this case because the prosecution was able to prove by adequate evidence that Disbursing Officer Haron failed to account for funds under his custody and control upon demand, specifically for the ₱21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn from the said funds. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary in malversation cases. The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the liability of petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao, that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron to effect the illegal withdrawals and misappropriation of ORG-ARMM funds. No checks can be prepared and no payment can be effected without their signatures on a disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In other words, any disbursement and release of public funds require their approval, as in fact checks issued and signed by petitioner Haron had to be countersigned by them. Their indispensable participation in the issuance of the subject checks to effect illegal withdrawals of ARMM funds was therefore duly established by the prosecution and the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron in embezzling and misappropriating such funds.

187 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. ANTONIO T. REYES G.R. No. 170512

CASE DOCTRINE: In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. FACTS: Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit with the Office of the Provincial in Camigiun against respondent Antonio Reyes (Transportation Regulation Officer II/Acting Officer-in-Charge) and Angelito Pealoza (Clerk III) of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) District Office in Mambajao, Camiguin but the same affidavit was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The latter office ordered that Reyes and Pealoza to submit their counter-affidavits within the ten days from notice. In Pealoza Counter-Affidavit he denied the allegation of Acero telling that if the latter was willing to pday additional costs, Reyes and him would reconsider his drivers license examination application. Also Pealoza submitted the affidavit of one Rey P. Amper (driver examiner). In his affidavit he narrated that Reyes verbally instructed him that all drivers who flunked the examination must be submitted to him and gave Amper a piece of paper containing the rates to be charged to re-take the application with additional costs. Pealoza and Amper allegedly reported the matter to their District Representative Pedro Romualdo but no action from the latter was made only expressing his regrets for having recommended Reyes to the position. Amper left the LTO because of the practice of illegal exactions of Reyes. In Reyes Counter-Affidavit he claimed that Aceros complaint was mere blatant distortion and fabrication of the truth. In fact it was Pealoza who processed the drivers examination application of the complainant; the money paid by Acero was allegedly given to Pealoza; and Reyes had no participation and was not present when Pealoza and Acero changed hands for the additional costs of money. He allegedly reprimanded and ordered Pealoza to return the money of the complainant. Reyes contended that he did not ask or receive money from Acero and it was Pealoza who pocketed the P500.00. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao ordered that in view of the non-appearance of the respondents, they were considered to have waived their right to preliminary conference. The case was then immediately submitted for a decision. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a Decision adjuging Reyes and Pealoza guilty of grave misconduct and guilty and simple misconduct respectively. Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference and Pealoza filed a motion for Reconsideration. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued a Joint Order denying the aforesaid motions. Reyes then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and reversed the judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. The same was, however, denied in the assailed Resolution. Hence, Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition. The Office of the Ombudsman avers that the findings of the fact are entitled to great weight and must be accorded full respect and credit as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner argues 188 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

that it is not the task of the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before an administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by the substantial evidence. HELD: No. The Court finds merit in Reyes’ contention. Petitioner settled this issue in the affirmative, while the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise. In the instant case, petitioner plainly disregarded Reyes protestations without giving him a similar opportunity to be belatedly furnished copies of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and the other witness to enable him to refute the same. As it were, petitioner rendered its Decision on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes. This the Court cannot sanction. A judgment in an administrative case that imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also rendered with due regard to the rights of the parties to due process. Reyes faults petitioner for placing too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Pealoza, as well as the affidavits of the witnesses. Reyes claims that he was not furnished a copy of the said documents before petitioner rendered its Decision. Reyes, thus, argues that his right to due process was violated. Department of Health v. Camposan restates the guidelines laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations that due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved. In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioners decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct. The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via a Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the violation of his right to due process in this case. Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his right to due process. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoz and the witnesses, whether before or after the Decision was issued. Thus, it cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. 189 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

XAVIER C. RAMOS VS. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK. And/or ALFONSO L. SALCEDO, JR. G.R. No. 203186

CASE DOCTRINE: Substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "in cases filed before administrative or quasi- judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. FACTS: Petitioner Xavier C. Ramos was employed by BPI Family in 1995 and eventually became Vice-President for Dealer Network/Auto loans Division. A client named Trezita B. Acosta who entered and obtain several auto and real estate loans which were approved and promptly paid. However she did not authorize nor personally apply for the subject loan for the purchase of a Toyota Prado vehicle rendering the transaction fraudulent. BPI Family conducted an investigation and later on discovered that: (a) a person misrepresented herself as Acosta and succeeded in obtaining the delivery of a Toyota Prado from the Toyota-Pasong Tamo Branch, pursuant to the Purchase Order (PO) and Authority to Deliver (ATD) issued by Ramos; (b) Ramos released these documents without the prior approval of BPI Family’s credit committee; and (c) Ramos was grossly remiss in his duties since his subordinates did not follow the bank’s safety protocols, particularly those regarding the establishment of the loan applicant’s identity, and that the promissory note was not even signed by the applicant in the presence of any of the marketing officers. Ramos shouldered the proportionate amount of P546,000.00 from BPI lost of P2,294,080.00 and was deducted from petitioner benefits which accrued upon his retirement. Ramos filed a complaint for underpayment of retirement benefits and non-payment of overtime and holiday pay and premium pay before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC claiming that the deductions made were illegal. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on the basis that the deduction made on his retirement benefits was “legal and even reasonable”. The NLRC reversed the LA Decision. It found Ramos’s consequent signing of the quitclaim to be without effect. It ordered BPI Family to return/refund to Ramos the amount of 546,000.00, with additional payment of 10% thereof as attorney’s fees. BPI Family moved for reconsideration which in turn was denied by the NLRC. BPI Family filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos. It also attributed negligence on the part of BPI Family since it sanctioned the practice of issuing the PO and ATD prior to the approval of the credit committee. Finding BPI Family’s negligence to be concurrent with Ramos, the CA found it improper to deduct the entire ₱546,000.00 from Ramos ’s retirement benefits and, instead, equitably reduced the same to the amount of ₱200,000.00 ISSUE: Whether or not the conclusions of NLRC are supported by substantial evidence whose absence points to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

190 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

HELD: Yes. As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial evidence. The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of labor tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence. The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be supported by substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "In cases filed before administrative or quasi- judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." The Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramos’s retirement benefits was improper. BPI Family was not able to substantially prove its imputation of negligence against Ramos. Well-settled is the rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue It is readily apparent that Ramos’s action of issuing the PO and ATD ahead of the approval of the credit committee was actually conformant to regular company practice which BPI Family itself sanctioned. As such, Ramos cannot be said to have been negligent ion his duties. To this end, it is well to note that in loan transactions, banks are mandated to ensure that their client wholly comply with all the documentary requirements in relation to the approval and release of loan applications.48 As BPI Family "uncharacteristically relaxed supervision over its divisions," yielding as it did to the demands of industry competition, it is but reasonable that solely bears the loss of its own shortcomings.

191 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

JESSE U. LUCAS VS. JESUS U. LUCAS G.R No. 190710

CASE DOCTRINE: A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. During the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. In cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing. FACTS: Petitioner Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City to establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing). Lucas narrated that his mother Elsie Uy worked in a known nightspot and later on had developed an intimate relationship and got impregnated by respondent Jesus S. Lucas; and to whom she gave birth to petitioner. However, the name of respondent was not stated in the certificate of live birth of Jesse U. Lucas. For a period of about two years respondent allegedly extended financial support to the mother and petitioner but as soon as the relationship ended, Elsie started to refuse the financial support and insisted that to raise petitioner on her own. Respondent was not served a copy of the petition. Respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. Only his counsel went to the court and obtained a copy of the petition. Respondent then filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. The RTC also directed that the Order be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and that the Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and represent the State in the case. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father. Respondent alleged that the petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence The RTC issued an Order dismissing the case and held that Jessie failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a parternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera vs. Alba, namely, a prima facie, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. The RTC held in the new hearing that the grounds relied upon by the petitioner for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown has not yet taken place. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favor of the respondent, it noted that the petitioner failed to show the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case. ISSUE: Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order 192 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

HELD: Yes. It was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case visavis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing. The court opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. The court observed that the petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioners statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any affirmative defenses. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity case is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. The CA view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Courts attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

193 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. AMELIO TRIA GR No. 193250

CASE DOCTRINE: Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. FACTS: Amelio C. Tria (Tria) was a former Branch Manager of petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB), assigned at PNBs Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System Branch (PNB-MWSS) located within the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) Compound, Katipunan Road, Balara, Quezon City. MWSS opened current account No. 244-850099-6 at PNB-MWSS with initial deposit PhP 6,714,621.13. This became dormant by 16 April 2003. Tria, one time requested for a list of dormant accounts and inquired about the irregularities involving managers checks. On 22 April 2004, PNB-MWSS received a letter-request from MWSS instructing to issue PhP 5,200,000 worth of managers check payable to Atty. Rodrigo Reyes. This letter-request was evaluated and verified. On 26 April 2004, despite sufficient available cash in PNB-MWSS, Tria accompanied Atty Reyes to PNB Quezon City Circle Branch (PNB-Circle) for the encashment of the managers check. Tria proded the Sales and Service Office (SSO) of PNB-Circle, George Flandez to receive the cash the same day and that Tria will just sign the check to prove that he identified Atty. Reyes. In the same month, Tria revised the minutes of the meeting from 06 August 2004 after it has been signed by all the attendees. He inserted the portion where he identified himself as branch manager who “assists in accompanying valued client/clients to QC Circle Branch for encashment of MCs merely to identify the bearer/payee and confirmation of the MC whenever we are short in cash.” Tria then retired by November 2004. On 14 February 2005 MWSS wrote to the new branch manger of PNB-MWSS, Ofelia Daway, expressing surprise at the withdrawal and demanding the refund or restoration of the same amount. PNB conducted its own investigation and sought to hold Tria liable for qualified theft. Tria contends that (1) there was no taking of personal property; (2) there was no intent to gain on his part; (3) the personal property does not belong to PNB even if it is the depositary bank; (4) there was no grave abuse of confidence on his part; and (5) his alleged identification of the payee is not the operative act that triggered the payment of the managers check by the PNB-MWSS Branch. Instead, Tria argued that it was Flandez who approved and paid the managers check even beyond his authority. He added that it was the other bank employees who should be held liable for the loss. The Assistant City Prosecutor did not find probable cause to file information against Tria citing that Tria’s identification of the payee did not consummate the payment of the Managers Check. Rather, it was held, the consummation of the payment occurred during Flandez approval of the encashment. PNB elevated the matter to Department of Justice and Court of Appeals. Both affirmed that no probable cause was established against Tria. ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ erred in failing to consider the existence of probable cause? HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. There was more than probable cause to proceed against Tria for qualified theft. 194 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. As defined, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without the latter’s consent. If committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes qualified. The elements of which are: 1. Taking of personal property; 2. That the said property belongs to another; 3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done without the owner’s consent; 5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and 6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

195 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 185125

CASE DOCTRINE: Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. FACTS: Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of Del Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut. ISSUE: Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 by mere presumption that the petitioner has dominion and control over the place where the shabu was found? HELD: No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession. The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. 196 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA GR No. 178771

CASE DOCTRINE: Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred per reason and common experience FACTS: Conrado Estrella and his wife employed AAA and Sulpacio Abad as maid and driver respectively. Sometime on the afternoon of 07 May 2002, the group of Fernando Fernandez (Lando), Alberto Anticamara (Al), Dick Taedo (Dick), Roberto Taedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), and Fred Doe entered the house of AAA’s employer whilst she was sleeping. Thinking that the intruders left the house already, she attempted to run but Dick was still there. After a brief commotion, the group decided to tie AAA and was led outside the house. AAA saw Abad tied and blindfolded inside a vehicle. AAA was brought to the fishpond, there she saw Necitas Ordeiza-Taedo (Cita). The group brought Abad outside the vehicle and was led away. AAA heard the group discussing to make a decision since Abad apparently has been shot four times. Later on, Lando and Fred boarded the vehicle taking AAA with them to San Miguel, Tarlac. She was kept in Lando’s house until 09 May 2002. On 09 May 2002, Lando told AAA that Fred and Bert has intention to kill her and he brought her to a hotel. Through threat, Lando sexually molested AAA. Later on Fred, Bert and Lando transferred AAA to the house of Fred’s niece in Riles, Tarlac. Fred kept AAA as a wife and repeatedly raped her at night, threatening to give her back to Lando whom she knew killed Abad. On 22 May 2002, Fred, together with his family, transferred AAA to Carnaga. AAA was made to stay as a house helper in the house of Fred’s brother-in-law. On 04 June 2002, AAA escaped the house and sought help from her friend who called AAA’s brother. Arriving Mandaue City, AAA and her brother reported the incident to police authorities. The cadaver of Abad was autopsied and cause of death was gunshot wounds on trunk. Lando, Al and Cita pleaded not guilty during arraignment while Dick, Bet, Marvin and Fred Doe remained at-large. The Regional Trial Court convicted both Lando and Al for the crime of Murder and Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention. Whereas Cita was found not guilty for both crimes due to insufficiency of evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Lando appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the court gravely erred in considering the evidence presented by the accused-appellant which is more credible than that of the prosecution. ISSUE: Whether the Court erred in finding circumstantial evidence against the accused-appellant sufficient to convict them? HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; 197 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator. In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio. In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter “Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan. (Our agreement is that whoever comes our way should be eliminated).” Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim’s death was the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth was also found tied at the remnants of the left wrist. In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.

198 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DE OCAMPO GR No. 185212

CASE DOCTRINE: The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion: the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others FACTS: Francisco noticed a portion of the land planted with camote. Francisco found the place unlikely for camote since it was shaded from the sun. Those who boarded at the house said that it was Maritess and Efren who planted them. With the help of others, Francisco dug up the suspected spot. There they found the decomposing bodies of Melanio and Lucena. Based on the post-mortem report, Melanio was strangled with a wire; Lucena was stabbed. RTC found the four-accused guilty of murder of Lucena, with Efren and Edwin as principals and Maritess and Elmer as accessories ISSUE: Whether the accused Efren was responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based on circumstantial evidence. HELD: Yes, the circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion: the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others. Here, those circumstances abound. Efren had always been banned from the old couple’s house because they strongly disapproved his relationship with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he had no business being around that house. The old couple were enjoying good health before the evening of May 27, 1998. On May 28 they were suddenly gone from the house, meaning that they were killed on the night of May 27 or early morning of May 28. On the night of May 27 the security guard at Salaman Institute saw Efren and Edwin standing on the school side of the fence next to the old couple’s house. They even tried to conceal themselves in the school toilet. The next day, the guard discovered that the fence wire had been cut. At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound of a woman sobbing and what seemed like the butchering of a pig. At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolod kitchen.From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couple’s house, with Efren wearing the old man’s watch. Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive parents going to Cotabato City and subsequently to Davao City for medical treatment when people started looking for them. They were of course buried in the garden. A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant more camote on a pile of red soil beside the house. The bodies of the old couple were found underneath those plants. The alibi of Efren that he was in Maguindanao at about the time the old couple was killed does not encourage belief. The security guard saw him with his brother at 8:30 p.m. of May 27 near the couple’s house where they had no business being there. A neighbor saw Efren at the kitchen of that house on the morning following the slaying of the couple. And it was not physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene when it happened. Sitio Gila-gila, South Upi, Maguindao was merely 15 kilometers from Lebak, Sultan Kudarat.

199 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

EDUARDO CELEDONIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 209137

CASE DOCTRINE: A person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned by him. FACTS: That on or about the 22nd day of April 2007, in the Municipality of Navetas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and by means of force upon things, and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the herein complainant by destroying the backdoor of said house, and once inside, take, rob and carry away the following one gold bracelet 24K, 3 necklace 1 one 24K and 2 two 18K, 2 two digital cam Sony player, 1 one DVD portable 1 one wrist watch Taugher, 1 one sun glass Guess,1 one camera Canon, 1 one Gameboy advance, 1 one calculator, 1 one Discman Sony, 2 two pcs. 100.00 US dollar bill, 22 twenty-two pcs., 2 two necklace 18K worth, 2 two bracelets worth, 2 two gold ring, 1 one wedding ring worth 14K, 1 one wrist watch swiss military, 1 one cellphone NOKIA 8250, 3 three pairs of earrings, 3 three pcs. of 100.00 US dollars, 60 sixty pcs. Of Php50.00 bills, 100 one hundred pcs. of Php20.00 bills, 15 fifteen pcs. Of Php100.00 bills owned and belonging to CARMENCITA DE GUZMAN y SERRANO, to the damage and prejudice of the herein complainant, in the amount of Php223,000.00. ISSUES: 1) WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING THAT THE PETITIONER’S GUILT WAS PROVEN BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 2) WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED ON THE PETITIONER WAS ILLEGAL, RENDERING THE ARTICLES RECOVERED INADMISSIBLE. 3) WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESS ADRIANO MARQUEZ WAS ILL- MOTIVATED IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE PETITIONER. HELD: The petition lacks merit. 1) Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of the stolen items when the police officers flagged down his motorcycle during their follow-up operation. He failed to give a reasonable explanation as to his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned by him. 2) no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers asked where the stolen items were, they merely made a general inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-up operation. Records did not show that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the stolen items were in Celedonio’s motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any showing that the police officers frisked Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle. There was no showing either of any 200 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

force or intimidation on the part of the police officers when they made the inquiry. Celedonio himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he was asked if the items were the stolen ones, he confirmed it. The police officers, therefore, were left without any recourse but to take him into custody for further investigation. At that instance, the police officers had probable cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. He did not have any explanation as to how he got hold of the items. Moreover, taking into consideration that the stolen items were in a moving vehicle, the police had to immediately act on it. 3) contrary to Celedonio’s argument, Marquez was a credible witness. Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

201 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO