Hagad Vs Dadole Case Digest

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Title

:

HAGAD VS DADOLE

Citation

:

G.R. No. 108072 December 12, 1995

Ponente

:

Facts

:

VITUG, J.:

Administrative complaints were filed by Mandaue City Councilors Dionson and Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Mayol, for having conspired to falsify Ordinance 018/92 to increase the allocated appropriation from 3.4M to 7M. The councilors moved for the preventive suspension of the said officials. Aside from opposing the motions, the said officials also moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. They averred that Section 63 of the LGC vested the power to investigate and discipline local officials (of provinces/highly urbanized cities/independent component cities) with the Office of the President. The Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and placed the officials under preventive suspension. The officials filed for a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO with the RTC. Respondent judge ruled in favor of the officials, enjoining the enforcement of the preventive suspension, hence this petition.

Issue

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Whether the Ombudsman has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective officials by virtue LGC of 1991?

Held

:

SC agreed with the SolGen that there is nothing in th LGC to indicate that it has repealed the provisions of the Ombudsman Act. Repeal of laws by implication are not favored, unless the two laws are absolutely incompatible. In the old LGC of 1983, the authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government. With the passage of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman was vested with concurrent authority. Since Sections 61 & 63 of the new LGC were adopted from the old LGC, except for the substitution of the “Minister of of Local Government” by the “Office of the President”, no other change was effected except for such substitution.

The 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is not repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the LGC. The two laws govern differently. The 6-month preventive suspension under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act may be imposed on all public officials, whether elective or appointive and to justify it, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and a. the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty b. the charges should warrant removal from the service; or c. the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him On the other hand, to justify the imposition of the 60-day preventive suspension under Section 63 of LCG of 1991 on an elective local official, it would be enough that the issues have been joined and a. there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, b. the evidence of culpability is strong, c. the gravity of the offense so warrants, or d. the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

Hearing is not a requirement before preventive suspension is imposed. In this case, the Ombudsman imposed the preventive suspension after the officials filed their opposition and Mayor Ouano filed his memorandum. Being a preventive measure merely aimed to aid to the investigation and not to serve as penalty, there is no need for a finding of guilt before it can be imposed. The charges being of very serious nature, it was within the Ombudsman's judgment to determine of the imposition was proper. The RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for remedy. Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act provides that no court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. The order of the RTC ANNULLED.

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