Ibn Sina - Compendium On The Soul

Translated from the Arabic original by Edward Abbott van Dyck Verona : Stamperia di Nicola Paderno, 1906

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COMPENDIUM ON THE

SOUL, 11 Y L

1 h7i -'L4/!j CL/-11~~ S C L ! / ~ Z 16rt 'L4/)dct//a/i, l t j n & S ~ h:( i TRANSLATED, FROM THE ARABIC ORIGINAL, I<>

EDl\'ARL) A B B O T T v a n D Y C K , WI'I-I1

G r e t e f ~ l lXcl;nowleclge~nent of the Substantial Help OtI r A I N E D

F]-0111 Dr. S. Laiitiauer's Concise G e r m a n Translation, AND FROhl

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X a c Donald's Literal English Translation; AND

PRINTED AT

VEROiVA, IY'Al, Y, ijz TFTF,'YEAR 1906,

For the Cse of' I'upils ant1 Students of Governmerit Schools IN

Cairo, Q y p l .

PREFACE Several sor1rcc.q out of -\\,hich t o dra\t- infornlatioil nucl seeli gnitlance as to 1b1l Siii;'~'s biog1-ap11y ancl v-ritiirgq, ancl his systems of meclecins a1111 l~hilosopliy, arc: ~~~~~~~days easily accessible to 11ear14- e ~ ~ e roiie. y -41noag such sources the follo\\ring are t,l~ei,est, f u r Egyptian students : 1. Ibu Abi TTc;d-~~hi'all'si t Tttba(l$t-111-,4tij;)bli, , ancl T\7t~estenfr~l(l's .c ,4rabisclle Aertzte. :, 2. lbii Kllalli knn's tc lV7af2y;*l t-ul--1'aybn. 7, 3. Brocliclnlanu's .L Arabische Literatur. r 4. F. 3lehren's Series of Essays on Ib11 Siu;~ i n t h e l'el~iotlical ( 6 XusAon, froin the year 1332 a n d on. 5. (:~G~IIPII t 1Tnart.s Arabic Literature, either in the ~'rclicli Orjginal or in t,ha English Translatiou. G. Carra tie Vaus's tr Les Grands Philosoyhes : Aviceuiia, tr Paris, F k l i s Alcan, 1900, pp. vii e t 3 )'L. 7. T. cie 13oer's cc History of Philosophy i n Isli111, 7 7 both i n Jlu-tch aacl in the Eiiglish translation. 71

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Of1r.l-ing to the Prince in the Fornz

of' a (;ompendinm or1 the Soill, 17 of \vhich the l~*eqt'l,t,I ' i ~ ~ ~ ~ p lis l l enly t attelvlpt a t an English

'I'rauslatiou: is t h e least l i l l o ~ nthroughont Egypt, a11d Syria of' all l b n SillA's nlauy and able literary \vc,rks : ilicleecl I have f'ailecl, after repeated n l l d pr010ugrd eilrlniry, t o c o i ~ i e across so m-rlch a > 0 1 1 ~ .anlong nly many Egyptian acquaintances, rhat, llacl even heard of it. I ~ o c t o rSamnel I ~ a u r l a ~ ~ofe r the Univel-sitj (.f Strassburg pnblisliecl both the Arabic t,rst, a n ~ lhis O I L 11 coucise German translation, of' this Resenrcl~into the Faculties of the Soul, i n voI n m c 2)for the gear 1875 of the Z. d. 1).M. G., togetller nit11 his critical ilotes ant1 exhaustively erudite cont'rontations of t h e original Arabic with inanCVGreek passages from Plato, Aristotle, Alexander Aplirodisias, ailcl others, that Ibil Sill6 llacl access to, it ~ ~ o u lappear, d socond hand, i. e. throtigll translations. Doctor liandauer made use also of a \-er.. ].are Latin translation by Anrirea.; 4lpagus, printeit a t Veriice i n 1544;; and of the Casspl seconcl etlition of ,lehnda Ilall6vy's religious Dialogue e~itit~led I
his coinmailcl only two mannscript copies, the one, preserved i n t h c Library a t Leyclen, being very f a u l t y ; arlrl t h e other, i n t h e Biblioteca Aalbrosiaiin a t Jlilan, being f a r niore accurate and correct. This text w a s reprintecl talis qualis, b11t .i\.ith omission of every kind of'ncte, iu 1884 a t BcirAt, Syria, by J
M y present Ii:11glis11 reudering of this Essay by Aviceua 011 t h e Powers of the Soul has beell macle directly and finally from tho Arabic Origiual as gi-s~eui n t h e JJanclaner Test, with constant consnltation however of both t h e L a n d a i ~ e rGerm a n translatioll and tlle Mac Uortald English constrne : it has been ma(1e not for European ~ c h o l a r sand Arabists but solely for pupil students in E g y p t , which circunlstance called i n a g r e a t measure for the use of tx-o or more nearly synonymous n ~ o r d s\ ~ l l e r e tlla Arabic original oftell has but o n e only. I r ~ d e e dI at11 not asllarned t o say further t h a t i n some places l hiire failed t o

fi11llJn tllc clrift, nncl uucicrstan~l t h e purport of l i , u Si1l:t.s argurlzent : so t h a t i n s u c h passages T a111 t111ly too col~scioas of 11o\i7 f i ~ rmy reudering lrrny pe1.11ajts ha\-c wallcleretl fro111 t l l t ~ 1-igllt ailcl t i ~ ~-iPrI ) - P . l:nj, tlle al~t,Ilorllinlseif' t l t ~ c l i ? rt ~h ~a t 1>\,~~1101~~;; 1s oiie 01' the clecpcst a n t i clarliest t f ' .;t;rllii.s : ;il i [ l Ile relates of Ilimself i n his arrtobiogr;~i,l~;,! 11 i t 11e lik1~1 rea(1 0 1 1 ~oj2Aris~ot,le's17 riLiugs f',,l.t~ t i i ~ l l A \ i ' \ T c ~ , nillil I I V Li,lci got, it, 11~7iicnrt, aiic1 J t it::il failcti ~o srtl t lle l ) o i t,~ ~illl(l he goes o u 1 0 tcall oi' lio\\. it n-as t1i~1 t 1 1 i l o n e (13)- stnllibletl A

- i!1:~L:l~7'~ JraqA( id l~r>X'(~ll1>(jll l > l ~ l i t aliglit l ( l a \ \ ~ l e c 1U I ) O I ~ 1bi11~a - l , tllcl p11rl)orj of Ll~zt\\-ritii~g. ' ~ I I O - . : ~ l t ~ r\I l , )in 1 11:1ve ina(l? i t 1101\- lcilo~v v, 1 t l 1 1 i s 1i is I t l ant1 \iCL^ cl ills, 118) st)i~iei,itnesB T ' P I I \j-c?r;ly aud ll::ej. ?

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tlie ~ I P Y ~~- i l ~ r 'session s \\ ill in a l l lil;e!ij~ootl i ~ r i l ~\I gi t l ~i t tile cesyatioir of 1114. coullect i 1 1 1 1 \J i r b t,he IClietli~,-ial S c l ~ o o l of' I l a ~ v . A \ l o r c tllaii t l ~ i s: 1 a m get,t i i ~ g\\-ell 011 i n lif5(z-,so tllnt t,llis tl-ulisldtion \\+ill m o s t liliely be t h e last \e~-ious11 orl; tll,-tt,1 sllall ?-\.er ljrl-f'or~ll i n t h e service o f I7ouilg b:g~-pt. Such rel-lectiolls a \ \ ~ a l i e n i11 my i l i l n f i ~ 1soul all sorts of f'eelings ancl tllo11g11t,sa l ~ i t n tthe slr~irtlles.:aiiil Jleetingiicss of this ~a rr 111) l i L., tlle lieppiuehs o f cllildhoo l and youth, t l i ~t l a r l i ~ i ~of~ ~tile q gritye, a i ~ dt h e 11;ter despair 'I'lle

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that w i l l snrelj, e n g a l f 1110 soul at t h e l a s t h o u r s , unless - marl; nlj- nrortls - ~ i l l r s st h e s1,roilg a r m of o u r l-leavelllj E'uthcr laj- 1iolt.l u p o ~ z t h i s soul t h a t i s 1 1 0 ~\ \~i t h i l l ine, a n d t a k e i t off aricl LIP, t o b e jnilled u u t o t h e lnillions of' snnls of' 1la1.c g,)ne bei'ore. w h i t h e r too all, all tliose \\-h() . ,an3 other inillions; i n a shall fullon. s o ~ ~ l a n ) m ivorcl, -unless (%CIDhave inere) ul3on me, e v e n a s 1Te l i a s 11ad m e r c j 11poi1 1113- fore ia t1lel.s ailcl 111otl1e r s sirice lunnj- generaiioils. 'I'llis hope i n Iris mercj7 a n f l grace is mj- ever - s t r e n g t l l e l l i ~ l gp r o p aiiil st,aj-, t h e older i l l l ~ l f'eel~ler 1 g e t . S o r --ill n n j - ni' those f o r 11-horn I ivrite t l l ~ sl i~n e s e r e r fillcl a s t r o i ~ g e ro r n I~etttll.. iilld t h e tilne will v m y ::;oo11 conic \\-lle~leach a n d every o n e of them, h ~ \ \ ~ c - \ -lcorn g inay be 1lis life herebelon-, will s n r c l j lleetl it, t o save liim f r o m sillliillg i n t o tlle hlacl; notllirlg~lessof' tloubt, incliflerence, a n d despair.

EUTVAIl,D ABIZOTT Trail DYClC.

W e r f e r t i g ist, ciem i s t ilichts r e c h t zrl tnacheu: E i n werdender \ \ - i d i m m e r danlrbar seiil. [ L u s t i g c Person, i u Goethe's Faustl

INTRODUCTION I n the Name of' GOD, the Merciful, the Con?passionate : May GOD bless our Lord &Iuhamnlad and his liiasfolk, ant1 give them peace. 0 1113' God facilitate jthis undertaliing] ; and inake [it] e n J i n goo~l,0 Thou Bount,eous Beiiig ! Abu-'Aly, Ibii S i n a , the chief elder, the learnc:rl and erudite leader, the precise and accurate researcher, Truth's plea against mankind, the physician of physicians, the phiiosoplier of Isltim, max tlze Most H i g h GOD have lliercx upom him, saith : The best of beginnings is t h a t which is adorned with praise to the Giver of strength for praising Him; and fhr iilvokillg blessing an& peace upon our Lord Muhammad, His prophet and servant, and upon his good and -pure offspring after him. And after this beginning, he saith further : Had not custom given leave to the small and low to reach up to the great and high, i t ~ v o u l d be inost difficult for them ever to tread those paths i n going over which they need to lay hold of their upholding arm (1) and seek the help of

tl~ciz.si1pr.rio1- q i 1~11g111 ; to attail1 t o a p o ~ i t i o ni n t h t ~Si st:: ' r i i ~ c ~ ant1 . ,join t(lie13~selvesto their social c-lrclt~: t o 111-iilc tllemselvcs o u lravjilg becolfit. cct~~thcctc~(l n-i t l r tllei?l, :tllil openly c l ~ cal r e their ri.1ia11c.i. 7 1 ~ 1 0 1 7 them. Nay, t h e v e r j I)on;L wllicil j i ~ i ~tlie ~ sconllnnri l r l a i l t o the man of olite ~ r o n l d 1 , S~ I ~ T C ' I * C I ? ,a l l , ] I l i p rpliance, of' the: flocl; I I ~ O ~i tL\ ~ l ~ ~ ~ l ~ l lol:l.~t ( - r ( iC , \ C I \ P : t l l ? l'ri~il\j o111(1 110 loi~ger ilci:c,l~~c;ro\\ c ~ r f u l ihl-ong!i 111c sirengtli. o f ' tlie ~ n i g l ~ t yt ~, ( t rt l , ~loi\-lsni-n rihe through t l ~ e I)roI 1 I i I of i11e high-lmrn ; t h e i;>i?iihlr ' ? r ~ : ( ' i n o t be ;il)le t,o c-orrort l1i.r f o l l y aiicl Iglio1.ailci1 1)) il!ti.rt*ol~rsrlU-it11 tlic ljrntient ail(l :\ i ! P j ~ l - i l \ i ? ~ ~ t ;. l a 1 ~ ~ I 11 1 a r e given prevc21c1lc.c t o I 'tit. 11101igllttlixt 11-1~-c1roic.e ougltt t o f a l l 1 r j ~ ) na11 o l ! , , t i ~ i \\ l l i ~ 1I\~ill a t once loo 1liost H C c ( ~ ~ ~ x I ) I to c 111111, a l i c l l>(-l\i, r i ~ l ~ u l a t e t o~ al t t a i n my aim o i i n g r n i ititins 111) -,cl{ i n t o his favv:. ; nut1 t l l i q , a f t ~ rc o l ~iin { : to f h e c~1.t trill C C ) U C ~ I I S ~ O I Ithat i l , ~c.llief virtnc-; n1.a t ~ i o , l ~ a r n o l j 1. Love of \ \ iqt10111 a-. tq r t i c > A r t , i c l t . s of li'aitll; i. e., Love l i l o l i l l i,heortlt,ical p r i n c i p l e s ) ; a n d L'. Cjl~oicc>o i ' tlio l;lo.;t, Iic~nestof deeds as to inl,\

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tent,ioli (i. C . , t h e preference of puro purposes i n practical life:. And i n this c o n ~ l e ~ t i o In find the I'riace, Gocl l ~ r o l o n gliis days, t o have give11 to liis intrinsically IT-orthy cllaracter so ~ n u c ~ofh tlie polish ancl lustre imparted bp ivistloul t h a t lie far outstrips his rivals among the: princes, ancl (IT-ertops all sncll as are o f his liill~l. ,$11d lle~ico 1 clearly perceive t l ~ to f all preaezts tllc one h e \rill tippreciate most is sncli as condnces to t h e most precions of tlie virtues, t o ~ v i t isdo don^. I had, Ilowrver, so far protit,t~tlfro111 a carefal perusal of the boolcs of t h e lexmC(1. as t o find t h e i r r e s e a r c h ~ sillto t h e spiritual i'nn,nlties a1norig the most ahqtrnse ancl refractory against tlie inind's gracping \vhat they mean, ailcl t,lie most bewiltlerilig, ol)scn~-rant1 n l i \ l e a ; l i ~ ~as g t o their results. Aud j e t I have w e n if, r ~ p o r t c c lal)i>nt,a n n l ~ l h e r of \i ise inell (")hilosoplncl-si and pions I 2) s:iints t h a t they agree i n illis dictum (motto), v i z : u TTrhoso I
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~ n ~ u t i o l i i l itlie g tli-:t,ailce s e p a r a t i i ~ g tlle E r r i n g i roil1 Ii i s Inclrcy : S l ~ r a hb9, al-Hasllr, v. 19 : t r they 1; trg, ) t G ocl; atlcl He lilade theill forget the~rlselves:i ; i h lit Ilis l l l a l i i ~ gthe forgetting of self to depend 111" 1i f'&rg(>tting fliln cll-rne so as t,~, au.al;en tlle t tell t ion to His closely binding tllo reiliembrsnce ol F j l ~ l l\\'ith t h e i.emembrance of self, and tlie liu~o\\-lr~t\ge of Hi111 \\ itli t l ~ o li~lo\\-ledge of self, ~ c i l i c ~ col' ~ tone's o\\ 11 qt)ul Y Partlleriuore, I lla~re of-' ilie rt~ic>ielltstllat the IlartK zt-atl i l l tilt. 1~rjol~s tab],: (If going i l ? e l ~ l j -iuto t l ~ e1;1io1\-ledge of self' hat1 i ) r l t l c11 ~ ~ioi iietl u p o l ~tllcin by\ a11 oracle tljat !lall clr\ 'crlcl~;[II;)CIIL i , l ~ e na~t ono of' tllr temples iIre gotl*. \I lricii say:: : CL liuon- tllyself, 0 man, ,o s:lnlt 111on lcuo\\ t l i ~ -Lortl. I llsve also reacl :\!at t h i s s'lyiug \\-as cngrxvecl in t,lle iLac;ade of tlte I c n l l ) J ~01' Aescnlapiins, \\-l10 is 1;ilov-n aiiiollg tllelli ;is one of tllc propliets, and \vllose lnost f a m o ~ i sniiracJe is t h a t Ile n-ac3 \\-out t o heal t h e .;icl, I,y 1ncArr,loncl snppli~ittioll; nncl so clid all l ~ l . i t . - i r \\l10 perfc>rinctd suertlotal fulictious i n llis t e l n l ~ l t . . Froin l~illi have philosol~llers got tlte scielice of nieclecine. Tlius 1 have tlrongllt fit t o nzal~e for t h e Prince a b001i on t l ~ csonl, in tlie fhrin of a c o i n ~ ) e ~ d i u: iand r ~ T a,r:k tlie Most Fiigll Gocl t o p r o l o i l g llis lii'e, to lamp i u t a c t from t h e evil eye lliq 1'1 ;ii l aild mortal body, t o refresh tllrougll I-1iii1 \\ isiicnirl :tft;er its facling, to revive it after i t s I t i i ~ g : : ~ i s lt ~o ireneiz ~ ~ g ~ i t s lrligllt tllrougll Iris migllt', 1:

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tzilrl to give i t l e ~ l g t , lof' ~ days t l ~ r o u g l l leligtll of clays t o l l i ~ n ,i n ostler t1l:it bx his [)restige t11lc advantag:.rs accruing froin t h e prest,ige of' i t s liiil s l ~ a l lbecome all-et11 bracing, a n d t l ~ ta t11e nnrnber of tile seeliars a f t e r ii -l !'l~IIllt~~s ~ l l i ~abo11n;l. ll Nor

sllitll I a c l i i ~ ~ vtoh i s IUJ- a l n l ~ i t i o n save t1irougi.l Goil : I-Zo is 111)- all-s11flicic.11t stay, cilil best tlolper. I Ilavtl arr;ii~gecttllci Bl)oli in sent,ions, I 1.11 i n a l l : 1. 'l'o Esta1)lislr t l ~ oExist-.rice, ot' t h e F a oultir.: of tllc Sol11, tlie c l ~ t n i l c f ariiilysis l a, i l e s plauak 011 ot' \i-I11rl1I llave ~ ~ i l ~ l e r t , ~ l < ~ ~ i i . 2. l l i v i s i k ) ~:1111l ~ Claqsili(>at,ion of' i,he Prim a r y ~ P r i ~ n i t iFvi t~( ' ~1 1~1 t i ~01'~ tlle Sonl, ant1 1)efinit,lc,ll oi' the Sol11 a t large (or as s \L hole). 3. r i ' l l a t No~lt*of tile l ? t ~ ( : ~ ~i l te ~of the So111 origins t ~ sf'r.orn t l l t ~ ( Io~riLi~liii icin (I3letl(lii1g) of t h e F o u r E i i . l u e u t ~ ,l ) n ~o n tllr c o ~ l t , r a ~ caomes y L I ~ L ~ them I f'l-oln \j-itllont. 4. 1)c~tailc~ci St,at rulent, c o n c , r r ~ ~ i u{,he g \?ege t d l ~ l e l',)\"\ tJi*.: ( t ' i i ( > ~ ~ l t ia~1 ~ 1 ()1, J I f ~ i l ~ i o u it ~l ~i ~g Se~:ll f o r E;I(:IL01ie (of' Il ~ e n t . 5. Ijetliilt s i l S t , a t , ~ i r ti ~coti(:erl~i l~ tig f,l~eL A ~ ~ i m a l F C ~ c n i t , i r(~)ows-rrs), s < ) n r 1 M e ; ~ t i o ~ i i lt11e l g Need f o r Each One of t l ~ r ~ t l . (;. D~i,iiile(lS I t,, t~ ~1~ 1 > ~ 1t1 i - o i ~ ~ tI Il ~I . t~~ l~ ~ cl7xtel'~l~11 ( h l ) p a l - ~ n tS ) L~l.-;cis, a:ltl 11 , \ c tll-j, perceive, nieni ionil~gtf,llt? s i - r g r c l r i ~ l ~[ c~i f~ It ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A I ~ ~ : aI sI c ~ s to Seeing is l ) t ~ ~ . f o r ~ n c i l . 7. U~tailecf $1, I I cli~lent coilcerli i tlle Tn1 1 ~ ;

terllstl (Tliddeu) Senses, and the Rody Moving Power. S. Meil-ioir on t l ~ e~ a i n a nSoul f r o m t h e Stage nl' its Ltcginninf; t o t h e Stage of its Perfectic)ii. 1). I+:qt :lblisliing t h e P r o o f s necessalay f o r a f f i ~ l - i l i ~i l~l pg T C ~ ~ e ~ ~ t of i a lthe; i t ~ ~Spcaliiag (Rational ) S o n l , by t h e logiclal rl~etlroil. 10. E \ i i i l ) l i ~ i ~ i tllc r ~ g Xrgulncnt for t l l c ? ]<xisteuoe of' tllr i ~ l t , c l l e c t , i ~ aEsscricc, l d i s t i n c t from Iloclics, h i a l ~ ~1l~i gt o the E a t i o n a l (sllec21~ilig) Facnlties ~n tlic s t e a d of' n B1onntain, and i n tlle stcacl of Ligl~t,to Sight; aucl S1lo~viil.g illet IZational csl)~:ll\irlg) Soills r e n ~ n i l l united wit11 I t after t111i7 t l r a t i l of tJle l , o d j , secnre and safe from corl-nl-,tiol~n i l l chn::gr.; : I I L ~It ~ i s \vllat is callecl T-Tllivrr:;~~ l ('cl:, c rip) Illtr!ligence, ( I ) Tlle figr~1.c:~JL' hpeecli in t,he Arabic is looplloles B ; C U I I ~ ~ ) ~ LSu12ilh I*C 2 : S);, and 31 :21, i~11tlIUejrdAwi's C ' o ! n l u e ~ i r n i ' ~ . ( 2 ) T h e c( ~\;:tl?>> pel*ii)rams rrliracles only, M hereas the <( 11ak))->> pei'l'ornls niir;icles, ailcl also foretells l'ul[t~.c: evelits. ( 3 ) IJ-llo was illis prilice ; ant1 wllp dicl the author stnilil i n sncll neerl ol' Ilis couotenalice as to tledicute t o I l i ~ nthis ljoolilet i n the humble and le11gt11~ tol.~nsof al)ology \vllic;!l r4un 1,llrough the gre:tter4 1)al.t of' the T~~t~~oL!uctioli '! It is Doctor S. Lnudauel.':, opi~iion that, with this Essay, lbrl SinA began llis caloeer as a, wiiter. After he had coml)letetl the sisteeiltll jre:tr of his ago, he was s u n l m o ~ ~ etod llle bedside of the suffer~ing S&1uti11it1p1.i ~lce.NI'iIl ih:l Mari~in~~, \v110 resided a t

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succeetletl in crlt-irig h i m . '1'11e!i followi?tl a long ii period tluring which I b n S i u , ~~.cjrnovedf ~ ~ o r tlie Court oi' oiie 1t;ller to t h a t of' a i i o t l l e ~ ~a1111 , WLL~ successively engagc?tl in t h e sot1\-ice of' vhl.ii);lh T'ettj- Ilyna-sties in I\liurasiin Ii' tlicn this 13asa.y was his ~rlaiclelll~roductiotr - a.; Docto~.I,:~lldsuer assuliles - tllc i~utlior* \\;As h t i l l cloitc? 3 oil~ig, ancl stood in 1 1 c ~ toi' 1 t l ~ c patl3onagc: Ile si) p a l b uectly i~nplot*e\.P ~ ~ ~ ~ t l l r t i . : utllc:.~! o l ~ e i s ;L Ilinriuscrlil~tirl L,eyrlen, lnit1.1ioi c'ocles 958. ;LLI 1 1111111tjere~l1968 i l l tllo Catalogue. \vllich is :L \111rti1 treatise oil tlie soul b) I l ~ r l S n:t, c l o ~ l l ~ :'as g fOl Iowa : << I hat1 produced n s l ~ o r iessay 011 t h e exposition o t' t h e liuox-ledge of the soul, auil \\ h a t is co~lriectoiltllc:l%e\~ itli, ; i t tllo b e g i ~ i l ~ i lo~lg luy careol* i'i112ty ?-ears ago. i l l tel. I h e put2e1j plii losor~. n-ishes pliic~ti~iietllod of' i ~ ~ ~ c s t i g a t i o\l~lioso t o I \ ~ r o wtliat ii;ctllotl, Ict l ~ i mperuse it, for. i t i h atli~l>ttltlto tlie scelieras of' re sear cl^. )> 'J lie (i40 J e a r s ago )> fit exactlj-, i f s t n d e ~ ~o11e t$ :i.ssunles t l ~ tile ~ ~liiel-ary t p ~ ~ o d u c ~ .reterr-et1 ~ori to is tlie otie 11o tledicated to
.

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SECTION FIRST To Establish the Existence of the Spiritual Faculties, the Detailed Analysis of which

I have undertaken.

3Vlioso wisl~esto describe snytl-ling ~rhatsoever before proccecliilg to establish first i t s (1) realit,y of existence, s n c h a one is counted by the wise among those who deviate from tlie broad beaten track of perspicuous statenient. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to first set to work to establish the existence of the spiritual powers, before starting t o define each one of them singly, and enlarge upon it,. And wrliereas tile inost peculiar cllaracteristics of spiritual properties are two - one of tlrlelii Setting in Motion (Impulsion), and t h e other Perception - i t is incunlbeut upon us to show that to every moving body there is a (") moving cause (ground, reasou, motive, pretence). Then it will beconie evident t o 11s therefrom t h a t bodies moving i n nlotions over and above the uatural lnotions - a n example of natural motions is the sinking of the heavy, ancl the rising of the light

- 11::vr mo-\ ing i ' 1 c : ~ ~ ~ q c\\. rllicli , \f e call souls or h p i r i t i ~ a lPOT\-er-; a u i l t l ~ a t \\ e f n r t l ~ e r ~110~2; i,'lnt, oli:\ bi\tly, in ko f:11. a.; it, ~ l l o \s\ sjgiis ( t r a c e s ) t rel="nofollow">liat i t is p ~ r ~ r p t i ~q 1t1-~ 1, 1l ) e l ~ c ~ p t i oby l l it cannot l)(. \-cilicll~asrrihc3tl t o it-; l ) l ) J y i excrpt l ~ e c a u s eof ; ~ o \ \ c ~ ! * -if,r:>itltieq) i l l it, tllnt arc: c , n p d ~ l (o~f ' percept ioij. T\'v ~ i o . i \ - \ t a r t by s a j illg t , l ~ n t not n shatio\~to c) 1 cl0111 , t o r Ilr'~-pl~:Li t y l l n i l l p ~ ~ r111e s I I I ~ I L C ~ :?,S , 5ll~rtc ~ n s~onicl oile i l l i l ~ g I11i11;1,\ i ? :+ . o i , ~ vo i ' t l ~ ~ i t ihst i ! I ~ ~ O I ~ L + > ~ O~I !: , I ,tlii'it~r I i , ~:lil ot,h lr; ailcl \>;lii<-l, i~ s l ~ : ~ r 1~ 1< ~Vl ~ I I ~ I I , i'q o t j l e r ~ 1 ) r t i l~ ~ C ill L L w l r : t ~ l ~t i l i clifJ't~r.'L1ilc ininil eni-oulliers all 7~odies nil itll ill a btl'FLigllt l i n ~i t i s established 1 ) l~t L \ 7 lry f'ul*m ih;ir i t -\I ill x o t ~ ) I - O C P ~ Csave ~ f ' c o ~ n\tc,jll,illg.: .incl t o S ~ L ? ~ ) J ) ~ I(re\ting-l~laces I~S to rr>t ilig-l)l,toci;). Fielice i t i s eviclellt illat bodies clr? not i,o be clotlictl nit11 the attribute of motion l ~ e c : t - i ~they ~ e are bodies, but f o r reasolls [canses) 1 4 1 3 0 ~ 7 n.lzcl ~ l ~ e y o i l i ltheir co~poreit3-,froni wliich cansilk their rnotiolls p r o c e e ~ l , like tlie resulting

(*) n !TT1~?- ancl n'hcl.cfo'u13e moving it. Note tile dilfere ~ l c eI,et-\~eensal,ab and 'illi~I1.

of the footprint from the wallrev (or, just as tlle effect proceeds from the agent). So mucl1 having become clear to us, we say t h a t we find, among bodies generated from the F o u r E l e r n ~ n t s ,(2) ::11ch as moves, not by constraint, i n two lrinds of motion between wliich there is lliore or less diiference : The one Iiind iiilierellt ill its element by reason of the supremacy over i t of the power of one of it,s constituents, and thus decreeing it,s motion towards thc positio~l appoiiltecl for i t , as for t-xample i n i p w e r~ati~r;-rlly a ~nan'.: rliovillg by the nature of 111s proponderating (3, heavy elernext in his body clownwards ; nor will tliis killtl of t l ~ elnotions o f bodies be fonncl to take place sxve i n one clirectiol~ and wit11 a constant, tendencj ; 3'11e second kind of rnotioll goiug ag:tilist, t!ltl tlclcree of its ele~lient, \~-11ichdccree is either rest i n tlie natural position t as for e x a m p l e as snnn a.; i t reac>hest l ~ a position, a man's itloving llis I)oily along its natural home ~vllichis t,he Eartll's surface ; or else a moving away froin the ~ l a t u r a l position w11en already separated from it, like a fljing bircl's motion with i t s l ~ e a v ybody high up t l l r o ~ ~ gthe h sky. I t lias thus beeu made lilaviifest [.to t h e reader] t h a t the two motions have two acco~lntiugcauses, and tha,t they are quite different one rrom the other: the one is called Natura,l, alid the second called Soul or Spiritual Fzculty. Hence i t is quite

sound, as to motion, to affirm the existence of spiritual faculties. Whereas, i n respect of Perception, because t h a t bodies exist with this i n common, viz. t h a t they are hodies, and wit11 this i n distinction, viz. t h a t they are repeatedly perceptive, i t is quite manifest by t h e first (prececlingj process of cliscrimiliation t h a t perception will not ever differ f'ronz bodies through difference of their substance, b u t by certain powers or faculties borne within tllose bodies. I t therefore becomes quite clpar by this sort of exposition t h a t spiritual faculties have a n esistelice: a n d this is what we ~vislled t o i!eaionstrate. (1) Reality of existence; or its \vller~eabouts.Doctor S. Larltlaue~~ thinks that the x ~ o r dayniyyat in the

text must be wrong, because nowhere thraoughout this section is the Whereabout >> of the mental 1,ower.s so much as hinted a t ; whereas the burden of the whole chapter is to prove merely that such !lowers do exist, i. e., their inniyjat, 71 llicli is a word used by Arab Logicians. (%) The foula ele~kle~its: earth, air, fire, water. ( 3 ) 1ler.e 1b11 Sins seems lo have had a rather clear preinonitio~iof Kewton's 'I'heo~dy of Gravitation, seven llrindred years before the falling ol' the farnot; s apple.

SECTION SECOND Of the Division of the Spiritual 1F:aculties and their Classification into Three Main Classes,

'

and t h e Definition of the Sou1 in a General

Way.

I t has been clearly showll by us i n the foregoing that of things there are some which have one thing i n common and diEer i n an other, i n t h a t t h e one in colnrnon is other than the one differed in. Then we fonntl compound ensonlecl bodies - I mean possessing souls - t o have agreed ancl differed in the properties both of their impulsion and their perception. As to iln- . pulsion, they agree and dif'fe~., ill that, one and +l of tllem has i n comrnon t h a t tllejr move ill qnnntity tlle il~ot,ioilo f growtll; and they differ, in t h a t one s e t t a m o n g thern rnoves, togetller with t h a t g r o ~ v t l ~ill, local motions accorcling to the wil! ; and one other sett an:ong then1 does n o t P O move, such as plants. Liliewisc living beings have i n common t h a t they are hoth sentient

ancl perceplivc, np t o certain sort of scilsuous pel-ccption : 311d tile11 af'tcr\vards they differ i n t h a t one sett a m o l l g t l i e l r ~ perceives, t o g ~ t l wit11 ~e~ t l l n t sort c S :,elisllons percept ion, by illCellectua1 ;+ncli as tlie :?SS a n d tlie horse. TT-e fill-t11c1-f;~nii:i tlia pc!\\ e r of iil~pulsion t o be :north \iitIcIj- ~ l l l l ~ l - , i i f i l1 ~ 1 1g~ 1 1t1ie 1)0\fer of perc . c l ~ t i o ~i l~l . i!i,t \ t t : t'oiu~tlp12111 7 10 lac!; the lai,ter ~~tt,c.~.lj-. IIrllcc .T,; iiucjv f~ r ccrt,airi that, thc, f;lcnllj- il: llic.11 tllc. nllilnal agreeq wit11 t l ~ ep l a n t is 1110regttll(:rcll ~ , I I : \ I I iliib l)ercepti;-e f'aclilt,~, atld i l i a ~ !t11,l i i l ~ plliug * f<$c>111ty v) lticli i d ill t h e a l i i ~ n a ;l aiitl 0~tc.11 L ~ L ~of O ili('tll i q 1 1 1 0 1 ' ~ ;,(~11eraI 111a11 t h e sL)c~aI;il~:;~.,:tionoI f,dc~ll?? I! liicll I ~ c l o ~ ~t og nlari. * 'i'i~us t tiic.11, t1:t. spirit ~ ~ i - t I',:cul!ics l come fortli (or stali(l 0111 1 ) i ~Ct)re n.; sei, a u t l r'a~lgt'cl; i l l r e s ~ 3 e ~ 1 o f i11c Colili?lOll niltl tlic pecilliar? i. e., accorcling so l lle g e ~ i e r a lniid s p e c i a l t ' ) i ulicler t!il.ce c1:asst.s T ~ I I I ~ :~S

1; r- t ol' \\ l ~ i c l li s lcnon n ;is tllt: plant or egrta11:c~I I O \ \ rr, ' r l i R C S O U I ~01' ~ t h e participation ~ 1 1 ~ 1 , e(~f i n 1 . 1 ~ a ~111al ~ iant1 l ) l c ~ n; t 'l'iil.

s

r

1l 1 1 ~~e('o11cl !'-:

!iltij\~ll

a s tlte aliili~nlpoTver ;

'Fl~e tliircl, a s t,lle speal
l lie~.cfore, tile prinlarj; p a r t s of tllo soul, in

coat,ernplating i t f r o m tlle staudpoiilt of i t s p o vem. are three.

T o tl-e:t t n o w of' Llie cieii~litiollof' tlic S o u l a t large, I rneall the nni L-ersal, a b s o l u t ~ , g e u e 1 . i ~ soul. 'I'l~isxiill becomo apparent>,accorcling to tlre

telicts I I:c)lcl, t h a t arllollg t r u t h 3 tliat are plainly m a n i k s t one is t l ~ a t esarg o n e n f a l l rlntural Isodie.; j s compo~incledof ~i hyli. T 1 1 1 ~ i i l l m a t t e r , ancl 0:' form. ,4s for lly!;), 011e of i t s pi-c)pcrties i s tlla: tllrougll it :t i ~ a t n r a lhotly is affect,~cl(or acted npoli) i n i t s very s e l f ; seeillg that, t h e sword. for insiance, does riot c u t tllrougll i t s iron, b u t t111'011g11i t s ~ l l a r p l l t r ~ s h:. E1icI1 is i t s for111 ; n l l e r e a s i t g e t s jagged o w i n g t o its iron, and n o t o w i n g t o i t s f o r m . Anotller of tlrose properties i s that bodies do n o t differ tllrough it, I meail tllro~~fi.11 i h e 11y16; for e a r t h does n o t cliffer f r o m w a t e r tI1rougl.l j ts m a t t e r , b u t t l ~ r o u g l i i t s the form. ( l ) .Still anotller p r o p e r t y i s t h a t it llylb or m a t t e r - does n e t afford (supply, furnish) n a t u r a l bodies t h e i r characteristics p e c u l i a r l y bel q n g i n g t o t h e m , save p o t e n t i a l l y ; since i n Inan, e. g., his h ~ u n a n i t y- his b e i n g maxi - is n o t a r t n a l l y derived from t,he f o ~ i r rlements, save potentially. A s f o r t h e form, i t s peculiarity i s 1 . O t h a t t h r o u g h it bodies put f o r t h t h c i r actions (or perform t h e i r manifold deeds ancl workings) ;

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silice a s w o r ~ ldoes not C I I ~t h r n l ~ g hits iron, but tllrough its sharpness ; ancl 2." t h a t bodies diill'or one fro111 the other o ~ l l ythrongh their genus or kiild, I llieall t h e form, since earth does not differ from water save through its f o r l ~ iwhereas , in i t s matter i t does not ; and 3." tha,t natural bodies get (derive, acquire) their b e i ~ ~w gh a t t h e y i n fact are fro1ii t h e form, since as t o m a n , liis being ,r nnan (his hurr~anity)is i n fact througll his i'ortil, a n d n o t ilirongll his matter, wllicll is o f t h e four elements. c L e t U, proceed a little f a r t h e r , and ~ v shall say t h a t a live body is a natural coiiipo~ui~d body t h a t ~iiscriminatesthe iian-living through its soul, ancl n o t t l ~ ~ o n gi ths body ; ancl t h a t perform7 nlultifarious anillial m-orks through its soul, anrt not through it,? body ; anrt is alive through its soul and iiot t>lirough its body ; and its soul is \+lithin it. Nox*, \\.hat is within a thing, while tllis form of its corltinues, is i t s forlu [or, this its for111 hciilg so allcl n o t otherwise, is etc.]. Thus the:: the sorll is n f l r ~ :; ~n111l f o r m s a r c real zc'tl yerfectiorls (entelt'chia), since through them t h e features (identities, charactcristics) of things becolme perfect. The soul thel*eforeis a perfection (realized ideutitp). And perfections (en tel&chia,s)come uiicler tn-o divisions : either the principles underlying t h e doings and their effects, or t h e very doings a n d effects tlienist.lves. The one of t h e t ~ v odivisions is first, ancl t h e oiher is second. The first is t h e principle

( o r source and origin), and t h e second is the doing

and the effect (or trace). I u this sense t h e soul is a first perfection (or prime actuality) ; for i t is a p r ~ n c i p l e (source), not nu outcome of a prillciple (sor~rcej.And of perfections, there are such as be3oug t o bodies, and such as belong to incorporeill substances. I11 this sense t h e soul is a prinie perfectiou attaching t o a body. And aillong bodies, there are sucli as are artificial, and such a s are ~ a t u r a l .Now t h e soul is not a perfectiorl of a n artificial body ; hence i t is a prime perfectiou a t t a c h k g to a natural bocly. Again, aniong llat,ural bodies there are such a s perform their multifazions workings through organs (tools, iilst,ruments), a n d such as do n o t perform their wnrkillgs through organs (tqols) ; as, for example the sirliple bodies, and those acting through t h e p~.evalence(constraint) of t h e sirnple forces. In other words we moy say, if w e like, t h a t among n a t u r a l bodies there are those whose design is, anlong other tllinge, t h a t they produce of themselves jwllose tasli or b ~ ~ s i n e is s s to peifornl animal acts vol~lntarily, of their own will,] ~nallifold auitnal actions ; ancl there are those whose design is, anlong other things, n o t so to ploduce. Hence again, the soul i s n o t a perfectioll attacbing t o t h e two last divisiolls i n both t h e foregoing manners of statement. Tilerefore i t s full and finished definition i s t o say t h a t I t is a prime perfection (consummation, rea-

autl, i f \VC n-iilr, t o say f a r t h e r , a p r i ~ n eperfection att:\c\lling t,;, n n a t u r a l I ~ o t l j -l l ~ v i n gR, life potentiallj- (;I lir3' p e r i ' e c t i n ~ r brlonging t o a n a t u r a l I)o(!y n-hicl1 bqrl~,may have life) ; th:it i s t o say,

1:) tili.: socl,io:! 111.3 ~ O i ~ l - ; ) o : ~ t ? ! .;LLW , + a t fiiast sepnratetl i111.o ' I ' i i ~ ~ ((~' l~~ti e l (!lnsses: ;ti'tei.:ral.ils, in t h. e , f'olli; .$,irig s ~ ? c t i o : ~( s> ; ,L C I ~ O I I C : of* these is ag:utl , s ~ ~ i ) - ~ l i vi i11[-,o ( d ~ :!e\ie:*;~L ~l 1);~t.t~. 1)o .io18 S J , i ~ i il n l l i l ~ ~i, 1 lilt: Jot,(?.; to 1ii.i (10!'111:~11 'ri':~li>I;i ~ i O i l , ~ ' L L O { ? > [L[!!;,

1 i20!tl t 1 1 ~($i'il!>k t t 3 ~ 1O f

h ~ ~ i i l i a)> , ;x1111 (;olllei to tile conc l ~ ~ s t11 i oi ~t 1~b i i S i i l , ~I I ~ L \ , in t l l ? fi last s \ ~ b - s e c t i o ~ ~ pi\,oii Ilic c: ,i~te.!i.; c,f d o t l ~ ~ i n II. i , ~c h i ~ l ) .:?, b u t l l i ~ rc I ~ , ~ I I ~ (l Ire ~ I I or2~lt?i. ,)l' Lilo i(leLks;a ~ t~o dllle tlrnt tile xc?corirl sub-s~ctiol~, ful.t!lel> (;!)llr,lo~io~~ t l c n l i ~ ~\q\ i t h tllo (lcti~liiio~l of ttio soul, is ~ l o ( l l i l ~ g 111oi~:tllall a11 e s t i ' ; ~ ~1'1.0111 t tle i l i l i r n i t [l. chap. l. g l l ~uattol., but; tlli~ougliits (1) tlifr'err, 11ol l l l i ~ o ~ ~iI5 i'o~~ril )): tliis iaesolwesrni~iteralr:lcl\ to One Element; /)11t lie hi.; i i I 1i:i111e({ viz. K , L I + ~ !Air, L, Iqiiae, :l1111 !Vi~tt?i'; 0 1 ' i ' i ~ t l ~ 1le e ~ ' IIILS declxrell t h e clo~llelil.;to be Jcon~-. ,\ ~ai.,t ol,lo'> <<

J)t?

I j ' o ~ i ~ ,

SECTION THIRD 'To Establish that not One of t h e Faculties of

t h e Soul Originates out of n Conlbinatiori (Blei~ding) of the Elements, but on the cotl-

trary Comes upon The111 fro111 Outside.

All tllc va,rious things t h a t are, however composite tl-t~yinzij7 be, aucl for hat eves forin Inay have como about, i~ the corn;)ound, will be ( R ) either i n c l i ~ i n gtosvards some one of tlle forms of' the si~nples,or else xi11 n o t be so. And if they be not so incliizing, they will be (b) either resulting f r o m a n aggregate ( o r mean) of the forms of the sirnples, according to the ciegree of disy)roportion a ~ i t ldeviation of the coilstitueizts from equality, or else (c! they will not be assimilated to ally one of the simple.;, but there will b& made (generated, produced) a f o r m exceeding the requirement of the f d r m s of the simples, both i n regard to the measure of its simplicity and in regard to the measure of its complexity. An example of the first division is the bitterish taste on compounding aloe, which is overpoweringly bitter, and honey, which is feebly sweet. Au example of the

second clivision is the color grey, holding an

eqnal relationship to both o f t h e extremes (contrasts) I)lacl;uess and ~vhiteness,which results on compounding a white xnd n black opposite. An exainplc of the third of t h e said divisions i s t h e se:tlls st<11np (iruprint) remaining in the clay (mortar, putty) ~ ~ l l i cish composeJ of d r x dust and liqnitl witter ou their being mixed up togetlrer ; for i t is known t h a t the i m p r i n t relnainii~g i n t h e p u t t y is not, i n pursuarice t o t h e requirement of the forms of the siilzples, neither ivlletlier t h e y be considcreii i u respect of the resultant compouacl, llor whetiler they be considered i n respect of the simple c~insituelltstaken singlj-. To recapitulate: - it i s 1;110~~11 t h a t t h e first division, if i t be produced: from siml,les whose forins are opposed ( c o n t r a r ~ not, ) through mechanical nlixture (commingling) b u t through (1)blend i n g (aloy, amalgam) - i t is clear I say i n such cases t h a t the over-poll-ered cnntraries will no louger have a n existence of their own, nor a n esistellce of the effects peculiar t c them, because of the impossibility of two contraries working together i n one and t h e same carrier (medium), b u t the utinost effects t h e y can exert will be t o introduce a decrease i n t h e strength of t h e overp o w e r i i ~ gconstituent, ant1 nothing nlore ; and it is kno~viit h a t tllo second division, i n what proportions soever it be found, imposes reciprocity a n d equalit'y both passive and active, t h a t is t o

s a y the manifold workings that the form; of the siinples necessarily exert and the corresponding effects that these forms suffer mutually one from the other must of necessity be reciprocal, and in the ratio of their respective proportions and strengths; and lastly, i t is known that the third division, if it comes about, will not have resulted from the intrinsic (very) self of the compound, since i t i n no way a t all belongs to it, neither i n consideration of its simple nor of its con~posite form. Hence i t is gained (got, acquired) from wi tllout. It is now necessary, since we have- prefixed these premisses, t h a t we go deeper into our pursuit, so we s a y : That the soul has only come forth [for us through the foregoing contemplations] i n compound bodies whose forms are opposed and i n none others ; nor will its manifestation i n them be devoid (divested) of one of the three divisions ; but i t is not of the first division; else it is heat or coldness, dryness or moisture (dampness), i n a n y of which soever a decrease has more or less cBme about ; and how shall any one of these powers be fit to p u t forth from itself multifarious psychical deeds, given the fact of the decrease (defect) occasioned i n the very composition, and given also what i t would have expended i n that decrease out of its strength? nay, how shall any\' one of these powers cansa motion save towards 3. - Buicena's Offering

one direction alone ? and wherefore has i t become necessary to effect mutual exclusion (clisplacemeat) among psychical movenlents so that their mutual exclusioli (displacement) shall engender a dullness (or weariness), since i n the effect (influence) of one identical thing there does not arise exclusion; nor is i t of the secollci division, since the existence of' the second division is an impossibility, and this because tlle c?lement,s, however much they illay be coi~lpounded,uilcler (proportionate) equal i t y of $he powers, this llecessitates in them the stoppage (cessation) of all the effects attaching to each one of tlle two, and thus if the conipourld were left alone (abandoned to itself) i t .cvould never have to move, neither upwards - else the heat is the overpowerer ancl the cold is the one overpowerecl - nor downwards - else the cold is the overpowerer and the heat is the one overpowered - nay nor even ~vould i t remain a t rest ill one of the four spots of space (wherein dwell all the four elernentsj - else Nature which attracts to~r-arclsitself is the overpowerer therein - ~vllereasi t has beell asserted that all of them are equal both to overpower ancl to be overpowerecl. and this is a co~ltradictioli: Therefore this body (suclr a bocly) ;S neither still nor moving, - \rl~ereasevery bociy which is surrouilded by a n o t l ~ e rbody is sither still or m v i n g , - alld this too is a col~tradiction; and what leads to col~traclictionis itself' a con t,radiction ; so the11

our assertion that the elements may possibljr be compounded under equality of the powers is a contradiction, and hence its opposite, to wit our saying that such is impossible, i s true [reduction ad absurdam]. XTherefore the conling forth of the soul, i. e., its combination with body, occurs only after the method of the third division ; and it has been already said t h a t what is after tha method of the third division is gained from outside : The soul then is got from without which is what we wished to show.

(l) Meclianical mixture, blending, conibination, etc.:

compare the Greeli rnisis, lir;isis, and synthesis,

SECTION FOURTJ3i Specification of the Vegetable (Plant) Powers, and Mention of the Need there is for Each One of Them.

Souled bodies, I mean having souls, if considered from the side of their vegetable powers, are found to have in common the getting of nourishment, and to differ in growth and generation ; since, among nourish(reproduction of offupri~g) ment-taking beings, there are such as do not grow, for example a living individual that has reached full growth and the period of stand still, or that has declined therefrom through withering. Yet every growing thing gets nourishment. Again, among nutriment-taking beings there are such as do not propagate, as seeds that are not y e t harvest-ripe, and an auimal that has not y e t reached puberty. Nevertheless, every propagating thing has inevitably passed through a precedillg stage of ilntrition; nor will the state (staga) of propagating ever be deprived of nutrition. F u r ther, we find them, beside having the getting of nourishment i n common, to have growth also i n

common, but to differ i n the propagation (of offspring) since there are, among growing things, sncll as do not beget, as an animal not yet arrived a t puberty, and the worm. (1). Nevertheless every begetter has already passed through a period of growth; nor ~ v i l l the state (stage) of begetting be cieprived of the power of giving g r o ~ v t h[to the young t h a t are being produced]. lIence the vegetable ponrers are three : 1 . the nutritive ; 2. the growth promoting ; a n d 3. the propagating. Of tliese the nutritive is ;ts tlle starting- point; the propagating as the aim ancl ellcl ; and tlie g r o ~ ~ -t promoting h as the means biuding the end to the starting- place. Indeed the sculed body stands i n absolute need of these three pc~Lvers for the follo\viag reasons : 1Vhe1-eas the Divine Conimalld came down upon Nature enjoining (imposing) upoil her the task of forming a compounci living being out o f the four elemellts after such 11-ise fashion as they called for i n i t ; and whereas Nature of herself is unable to originate a souled body a t one stroke, b u t can do so only by promotjng i t s growth little by little; (") and whereas an individual t h a t is p u t together after the manlier of animal composition is susceptible of being again decomposed and melting away by the natures of i t s constituents; and (:':) The germ of the T)octrine of E~rolutionas against

Illstantaneous Ci.eation,

whereas a thing composed of opposites 'will not keep up so protracted a duration and last so long a time as is expected of- i t - therefore Nature is i n want of a power by which slle can fabricate a living body by promotion of growth.; so she has been supplied by Divine Providence with the growth - giving power ; and is i n want of a power whereby she can preserve the souled body a t a n even standard (*) over against the waste which i t undergoes in making up for what disintegration wears away from i t ; so she has beon succoured by Divine Providence with the nutritive power; and is i n want of a power that , shall mould, out of tlle living natural body, a piece that she shall clwell in, i n order t h a t if corruption permeate the body i t shall have sought e, t-o for itself a successor as a s u l ) s t i t ~ ~ twhereby arrive a t the preservatio~l~f species; so she has been helped by the Divine Providence with the propagating (generating) power. And we ought, i u this connection, to bear i n millcl as a certain and true fact t h a t the growth-giving power, although i t has been found, 4

(*) See Ibn Sinii's <( Qcindn,n Section 2, where he says : As to the nutritive power, it is that power which transforms the nutriment into a resemblance with the nourishment-taker, i n order that this nutriment may succeed in the stead of what shall be wasted, and attach itself to the taker illstead of the wasle. - See also << ICitdb-ulNajdI, >> by Ibn Sina.

fronz the standpoint that we have nlentionecl, tobe following close upon the nutritive, and t h e propagating (generating) to' be following close upon the growth-imparting (promoting), yet the precedence of the part played by each one of t h e three, i n their undertaking the task of crezting the living body and preserving i t tlirough their special and peculiar workings, is the other \vay about ; for the first to entllrall the material predisposed to receive life is the generating(procreating, propagating) pourer, since this pomer clothes the niatcrial a t first wit,h the fdr1-n (prototype) of' t h a t 1vhic11 is intended to be realized through the nlinistry (service) of the growtls-promoting and nutritive powers ; and as soon as it has achieved i n t h a t material a perfkct form it delivers over the sway to the growth-promoting power, which assumes i t througll the ministry (service) of the nutritive power, and imparts to the material - all the time keeping up the form of the lliaterial within the due proportions of the [three] dimelmions [length, breadth and thiclrnew] - a motion (activity) of growth towards the end striven after*by it, the growth-prornoting pomer aforesaid. Then this latter stops ; and the nutritive power enthralls tho material. Agaiu, the generating (propagating) power is the one served, not the servant; and i n comparison with it, the nutritive power is the sn,rvant, not the one served. Thus too the growth-promoting power is

served i n one sense, and serving i n a n other sense. And the nutritive power, although it does not exist as the one served in the spiritual powers, yet i t does sometimes employ the four forces of Nature - to wit, the attracting, the holding, the digesting, and the exzreting (repelling). And, even as t h a t which is striven after i n the process of form-making is solely the bringing about of t h e [due] form in matter in the shape (kind, design) proposed, and not a t all the bringing about of growth or of nutrition, - only that there is need f o r t h e two latter for the sake of realizing the desirecl form, an?. not the converse - so also the final aim i n the [several] powers is the procreatilig (propagating) power, to the exclusion of the growth-promoting and of the nutritive. Wherefore, the procreating power is given precedence for a teliological reason. Arid through God is fitness to be achieved.

(1) Probably his view was that worms arise out of a germ of moist clay or mud, and are a sort of developed PI-otoplasm.Compare g 6 of Ibn 'l'ufayl's << Hayy b. Yaqziin, and the Note thereto in the 15nglish Translation about field-rats.

SECTION FIFTH: Specification of the Animal Powers, and Mention of t h e Need there i s for Each One of Them.

I affirm t h a t every animal is sentient, and hence it nioves itself a t will, i n some sort of motion ; and tliat every animal moves itself i n some sort of niotion a t will, and hence i t is s e n t i e n t ; siuce sensation i n what does not move itself a t will is wasted and useless, and the lack ,of i t i n what does move itself a t will is harmful; whereas Nature, owing to t h a t mucli of Divine Providellce as has been joined to her, gives not h i n g whatever that is either wasted or harmful, nor witholds either the necessary or the useful. Perhaps some one may speak o u t hol-e and object to us that sliellfish are of such as feel (are ,sentient) and y e t do not move themselves a t will. This objection, however, will speedily vanish on experiment ; for shellfish, although they do not move themselves from their places i n a sort of organic (mechanical) locomotion at will, yet they do more or less shrink themselves u p and spread o u t inside of their shells, as I have witnessed

with mine own eyes on having tried the experiment more than once, i n tllat I turned the shell o v 6 r onto its back, so t h a t its position for drawiug uourisllnlent became separated from the g r o u ~ ~ d ; -\t-hereup011 i t ceased not to struggle until i t hacl again stood i n a positiou that made i t easy for i t to clraw i u notrishmeut from the mudcly bottom. And now that this has become surely certain fbr us, Ire shall further say : That whereas Divine Wisdom has decreed t h a t a#n animal moving itself a t will sliall be composed of the four elements, and as such animal \voulcl not be secure against the evils of mishaps i n its successive ohnnge of places during locomot i o i ~ ,i t has been fitted out with the touching power (sense of touch), so as to flee through it from unfit places, and seek those t h a t are fit. And whereas any sach animal's constitutioil (makeup) canuot get on without the getting of nourishm e n t ; and as i t s gaining i t s food is a sort of free will effort ; and as some articles of food suit it, ancl other& c10 ilot, - i t llas been fitted o u t with the tasting p o ~ ~ (sense ~ e r of taste). These two powers (senses) are both useful 2nd necessary in life : the rest are useful, not necessary. Next after the Tasting, i n degree of utmost need for i t , comes t h e Smelling Sense, since odors will point the animal towards suitable articles of nourishment, with a strong indication; nor will tlie animal be a t all able to get on

without nourishment, neither will its nourishment b e got by i t save through self-help. S o Divine Providence has deemed fit to impart the smelling power uuto most animals. The next after the snielling power i n usefullless is the Seeing Power: the H o w and Why of its usefulness, as to the animal, wliich moves itself a t will, is that whereas i t s betalring itself to certain spots, such as firehearths, and away from certain spots, such as mountain peaks and seashores, is such as will lead t o its hurt, therefore Divine Providence has deemed fit to impart the seeing power unto most animals. Th9 next after the seeing power in usefulness is the Heariug Power. The How and W h y of its usefullless is t h a t things harmful and things useful may often be recognized as such, through it,, by the peculiarity of their ssuniis and voices ; so Divice P r o v i d e n c ~has deemed fit to impart the hearing power unto most animals. Moreover, the use made of this power by the rational (speaking) species of the animal genus almost surpasses the three [= is of all tliree nearly the highest]. This then is an outline of $he How and Wliy of the uses of the Five Outward (External) Senses. And whereas trustworthy arrival a t a knowledge of the mutual!y suitable and the iilutually repellent will come about only through test (experiment, experience), Divine Providence has deemed fit to impart t h e peculiar participating property

(or sense) - T mean t , l ~ epicturing power - u u t o living beings (animals), i n oriisr t h a t they sliall tllrongli it, preserve t h e fornis of things perceived b~ t h e s ~ i i s e s :and to iltipart t h e r e m e m b e r i ~ l g preserving pon-er, i n ordel. t h a t tlley s l ~ a l lthrough it preserve the nieanings (siguificances) conceived ont of t,hing.; perceived b j 7 t h e sensps ; and t o i m p a r t the irnagii~ativepower i n order t h a t they shall tllrougli i t fit u p (restore) what, shall b e wiped ont fro111 t h e nielilory by a sort of motion ; alid to iinpart t h e c o n j ~ c t a r i t i g(surmising) power i n oriler tllat t l ~ r yshall t l i r o ~ ~ g il tl fix upon the. soantl (trne) anti tlle weal< :false) of what the. iniaginat,ion extracts, nniiielj t o fix upon t,he t r i ~ e aiid false thereof n ~ i t lmore ~ or less presunlption of certitility, until t , l l ~ y /the living I~eings] shall review i t i u t h e niincl. As for the ETow aiid Why of need for the ilioving power; i t is t h a t n-llereas t l ~ eposition of t h e animal is not the sccnlo as tlie position of the p l a n t i n i t s adaptatioii for attracting sucll foocls as are u s e f ~ l l and puslling off' sucli as a r " l i ~ r i l i f ~and l incompatible, b n t on t h e contrary as this i s brought about for the anllnal througll a sort of earning 11j self-help, it, lieeds a ~noviilg power for the purpose of drawing t o itself the useful aliil driving away t h e llarnifnl. IJTllerefore all t h e powers of t h e animal are either perceiving or nlotion promoting. 7'11e rnotioii - promoting is the yearning iclesicieratire, longing, cravirg) power: it, is either-

urging on to tlle search after a chosen object of animal good, and tlien i t is the lusting power ; or else i t is urging on to the warding off of a n object of animal dislike, and then it is the hating power (angry power). The perceiving power too is either outward (apparent), such as the five senses; or else inward (internal, hiddell), such as the picturing, the imaginative, t h e conjecturing, and the remsmberi n g pljwer. Furthermore, the motion-promoting power does not cause to move save on a peremptory bidding from the coiljecturing, through tjhe agency (mealls) [or by tlie employment; of the imaginative. Also, tlle motion-promoting power, i n animals other than the speaking (or rctticnal) specie^, is the aim and end ; and this is so, because the motion-causing power is not imparted unto them i n order t h a t they shall through i t direct aright the workings of sensation and imagination so as to adapt these workings to the attainment of their own good, but o n the contrary the power of sensation and of imagination are imparted t o t h non-speakieg ~ irrational animals solely i n order to direct aright through them t h e workings of motion, and to adapt these workings to the good of the animals. Whereas, the speaking rational species of living beings is on the reverse wise ; because unto i t mras imparted the motion-causing power wholly anrl solely ill order t h a t through.

-

this power i t shall be fitted to set aright the speaking self, i. e., tlze rational intelligent soul, uot tlie other way about. Thus then, the motion-promoting power i n the irrational aninial is, as i t were, the prince commander tlllat is served ; the five senses, the spies that are sent forth; the perceptive power, the post-master of the prince commander unto whom the spies return ; the imaginiug power, the foot-messenger going to and fro between the post (*) and the post-master ; the conject,uriilg power, the priuce's adjutant minister; the remembering power, the closet of state papers. As fur t h e starry firmament and plants, the feeling power and the imagining power have not been imparted unto them, even tllough each one of them has a soul and though it has life : the firrnameut has not these powers, because of i t s loftiness; plants have them not, because of their abasement i n cornparisoil to it. (;+) or wazir, minister.

I n treating of the animal poveru, Ile treats first of the fives senses, and then of the animal Powers. These latter he @ves in this sectioll three times, 2nd each time varalesthe order somewhat, thus : -l st. Order of mention: a, participating, pictur2in8 b. remember'ing, proseraviug c. imaginative, yestoring d. coqjectu~ling,surmisirlg e. moving

2nd. Order of mention :

a. picturing, participating b. imaginative c. conjecturing, suraniising d. remembering Order of mention, in the final Allegorical Sumnlipg U p : a. motion-promoting b. feeling, sentient, 5 out\xrard senses c. perceptive d. i m a g i n i n ~ e. coojecturlng f. remembering. (1) 31oreover. the Text seems in Doctor Laudauer's opinion to iieecl an emendation, i n this Allegory, which is furnished by the L a t h Trarlslation preserved in Florence. hccording to the text, we get a urholly superfluous intermediary notion, to wit t h e Post, which disturbs the p a ~ ~ a l land e l similitude of the allegory. Instead of barkl, tve should read loadr = Latin, inter vicarium principis. If this is done, the ~ v l ~ o passage le becomes clearer, and llangs to - gether better. Yet, for all this, the barld was in those days a highly important branch of the government service: witness, the office of rtiheb-ul-'DarTd,

4. - Auicena's Offering

SECTION SIXTH Treating laa Detail of the Five Senses, a n d of How t h e y perceive. As 50 the seeing pou-er. philosophers have differed on the question of How they perceive. Thus cno set among them asserts that they perceive wholly ancl solely through a ray t h a t shoots out beyond the eye, and so encounters the sensible objects t h a t are seen. This i s Plato' s way. (1) Others assert t h a t the perceiving power itself encounters the sensible objects that are seen, and so perceives them. Still otllers say t h a t visual perception consists i n this : - When tlie interveni n g transparent body becomes effectively transparent by light shining up011 it, then an impression of the outspread (flattened) individual of such geasible objects as are seen is effected i n t h e cristalli~le(2) lens of the eye, just sucll a pictorial impression as is effected in looking - glasses (mirrors); indeed the two effects are so similar t h a t were mirrors possessed of a seeing power they would perceive the form imprinted i n them. This is Aristotle's wax ; ancl i t is t h e sonurl reliable

ol)i11io11. That Plato's view is false, is quite clear. For, were i t true that a ray goes out from t h e seat of sight and encounters sensible objects, then sight would be i n no neecl ~f light, b u t would 011 the contrary perceive i n the dark, and would r a t l ~ c rillnmiaate the air on its exit ilito the (jar];. Moreover such a ray will not fail of one of t\\.o rnocles: either i t will subsist tllrougllout the eye G I ~ J - , i n rnl~icllcase Plato's opinion that i t goes forth from the eye i s wrong; or else i t will subsist tl~rougliout a body other than tlie material of' urhicll the eye is composed ; for it must inevit,ably llave a vehicle t o carry it, seeing t h a t a ray is all accidental quzlity or mode, and furthermore sceing tliat that body nrhicli. is other tllrtn the eye will not fail, in its turn, of being, either, J?iast/y, sent out from tlic eye, i u w h i c l ~case it \\-ill follow a s a inatter of course that the eye \\-ill nc,t see a l l that i s belleat11 the clear blue of the sky, siuccl oiie bociy TT-illnot penetrate tllronghont tlie n ~ l ~ o lofe allotller body, unless forsootll i t inoves tlie IaLter away and occupies its place; and even ~11(>111(1 t l ~ e ilispnter plead a .iracnum, n o t only does l'lat o d e l i j the esistence of a vacuum utterly, but also if ~ v eaccornodatiiigly j-lelcl this point and admit the esistex~ceof a vacuun;, yet for all t l ~ i st,l~elmdy tllat goes forth from the eye will penetrate throngl~outthe 11ody of n-ater, for example, illto s11e1i of it,s its pores as are emptj. only, and not iutc the \ \ l ~ o l eof the ~ ~ a t e r l~ullc 'a ; so that

even accorcling to this opinion it will necessarily so be t h a t the eye will see only some places of all t h a t is ander water; - or else, secorzdly, that body which is other than the eye will not fail of being a n intervening body intermediate between the seer and the seen, i n which case the light (*) which comes forth from the eye will subsist through i t ; nevertheless this opinion too is unsound. for the reason that every thing whatsoever is, in prnxi~nityto its source, so much the stronger, and i n this ~ e s p e c t light has not its equal; whence it follo\vs as regards the object seen that, however closely and nearly i t approaolies to t h e eye, our perception will then be stronger; and thus if we c10 away with the intermediary body, the eye will still perceive the object felt by i t s sense of sight, and thus the intermediary which is the vehicle and carrier of light is no longer needed, save accidentally (by chance) ; and then too there is no need, in order to see, for an exit of light : this too is a falsehood. Wherefore Plato's opinion is worthless. As for such as hold that the perceiver of t h e thing seen is the imaginative power itself through the imprinting of the form (image) of the sensible object upon it: these render the absent 011 the same footing as the present, since i n the imaginative power there m a y exist the iniage of a (") perliaps we ought to read

<(

i l ~ e7'a!j D.

sellsihle object, notwithstanding the absence afterwards of the object t h a t llad been so felt : at wllicll time hou-ever tlie l i v i n g being sc preserving rllat image \rill not be qualified witll sight but \:'itEl imagination and memory. Furthermore these theorists topiners) make a greater blunder still, seeing that they render a thing of Nsture's make aud composition 11-llolly idle, useless, auct tinneeded irL the operation of visual perception ; inasnluch I ? in tllej-.- ol~iniout l ~ eir~iagirlative poTt+eritself rt-teefs i m ~ ~ i e d i a t c l ysensil3le o b j ~ c t s , ar:cl thus :3pares Nat,ure the task of acla,pt-ing an i u s t r u i ~ l e i ~ t i v r ~ a l l ) to , \\,it i h a conlplex eye. lJThercfore the souncl theory is t h a t the config17?ations of thing.; stallcl out i n the transparent a~libient- if it be effectively transparent om tlrc s h i n k g of a lunlinant upou i t - arid hence thtby do not appear bnt i n a polished body capable of receiving them, sac11 as lnirrors and the like; and. SO too there is ill the eye a crystalline lens (or l ~ n m o r )into \\-l~ich the forins (pictures) of t11ing.s are iinprinted, just as their impression int:, ~ n i r r o r s; ant1 i n i t , i. e., the lens or tlze eye, l l a s been fitted up the seeing power; so that, if s l l ~ i'lo~r111s are ilnprinted i n it, i t perceives them. I~Ioreove~., the ~1,~jects of perception Llelonging i n tr:) tl: ancl deed to sight a,rc the Coicrs. As for t l ~ e Hearing Power : i t hears only S O I I X I ~ . And S O I I I I ~ is a motioll of a i r that the ea: feels 011 t n o hard smootk Icclies ccolni~g

quickly close up one to the other, the escaping of the air from between them, i t s striking the ear, and its moviug the air t h a t is kept ready within the instrument (organ) of hearing. Thus, if this inside air iilove the instrument, and if this instrument's motion act upon the nerve of hearing, the hearing power (sense, faculty) perceives i t i n the measure of the strength or weakness of t h a t motion. Indeed hardness is a conclitio sine qua non; for, i n the case of two soft bodies, the air will not escape from them, but will dissipate itself throughout their pores. Snioothness too is just such a condition ; because, i n the case of rough (unsmooth) bodies, not the whole of the air will escape from between them suddenly and violently, but will be witheld (shut np) i n the passages. And rapidity of contact also i s a like condition ; for if it come about gently and slo~vly,the air would not escape violently. Tho echo too will arise from the rebound of the Stir escaping from between the two encountering bodies by reason of its hitting (slapping) against another hard, flat or hollow body filled ~ i t hair, because of the air that is within it hindering the penetration of the escaped air, and the latter's striking the ear [again] after the first. stroke, on the same wise as i n t h e first instance. As to the Smelling Power ; i t smells odors on the sniffing i n of air t h a t has received its odor froin an odoriferous body, as one bocly re-

ceives its warllitll fro111 another warn1 body. T l ~ n s , if au animal snuff's up air like this into its nose tuitil such air touches the front of the brain, and alters i t to its o\iru. odor, tlie sn~ellillg poTlier feels it. ;is for Taste, i t arises ollly o n t l ~ a conling to pass of the i'ollo~vingchange : TTT1lt:n tlie noi isture of tlle tasting i n s t r n ~ n e n t(orgall) -- to wit the tonglze - becomes transform~clinto t l l g juice of the newly-come food ; ancl wllen t h e Inass of this instrument (organj has received t h a t juice, the tasting power mill perceive TT-hat, l ~ a I-lappenecl s u7ithi11 the instrument. As for Touch: it will only arise upon the organ's (iustrument's) receiving the q n a l i t , ~ of t h a t ~vhiclzis tonclied, ancl tipon t,he touching power's perceiving what has been t h u ~presented (offered) ivithin the organ. Furthermore, simple sensibles, t h a t are a t once primary ancl. as such the bases of all others, are i n pairs, of ~vllichtllere are e i g h t ; and if ws make each illto singles, they become sixteen, to wit : (a) Touch, four pairs : -- l. heat and cold; 2. m o i s t n r ~and dryness ; 3. roughliess a n r l smoothness; 4. hardness and softness. Tlie four renlailiiug senses, each having a pair, viz., (1)) Smelling, one pair, which is fragrant odour, and fetid stinking odour, (c) Tasting, one pair, viz., sweet and bitt.11,

(d) Hearing, one pair, namely, heavy sounci and sharp souild (or dull and shrill), (e) Sight, one pair, to wit, white and black. All other sensibles are made up from these simples, and are intermediates between some two of them, as for example grey (dust
14. Ulacliuess, tllrougll gatlleriug [lb. and 16, Sounds : one pair, a s above

uncier d. -1 As to tlie media (interlliediaries) 1)etnreen t h e feeling powers a2(3. the felt foriils, tllej- are them$elves dei-oicl of' the forlns of sensibles ; otherwise i t would not l)e possible for them to be niedia, since their m\-11 fornis -- if they had any - ~ ~ ~ o u l d tllen so engage t h e apposite power a s t o divert ii, fro111 perceivi~lgally other f'orixs. Such voidness o r freec1n1-u fro111 forlils is either voidiless holly and altogetl~el.,o r else relative voidness through ecyuablenes> of t h e forms i n t h e media, such as the equable proportion cl' t h e qualities touclled i n meat, xi11ic11 is a l n e c l i ~ ~between ni tlle tonclling power a n d tlle qnality toucllecl, although meat is incolltestal~lynlstle up of qualities t h a t are touclle(1, yet iiotw-itllstancin tllis the equableness of t h e cyxalit,ies has aunihilated t h e forms i n it. Examples of the first division - absolute voidness and freedoin f r o m form - are t h e freedom of eir, of ~ v i l t ~ allcl r , of 3vl1at resen~l~leq tlle111 among t h e varioub m e d i a of' sight, fronz color; t h e freedom of' air ancl of ixVdtt"r,hot11 wllicll are the tu7o meclinn~sof s ~ n e l l i n g ,from odor: the freeciolu cf \vater, \ ~ l i i c l l i s the ilieclinm of tasting, from f?avor ; and t i ~ esteacliaess of the air, ti-l~ich is t h e metlln!u cf Ileaiing, ancl i t s freedom from motion. f4'urtl:nr. e a c l ~01' these powers, t o wit tile

five senses, if actually functionatiag, perceives clnly through coming into relation ~ vt ih the ob,jezt felt, nay rather i t only perceives a t first so mucl1 as has been traced i n i t of the for111 of the object felt. Tllns, the eye oilly perc3ives t h a t for111 n.hic11 has imprinted itself i n i t of the object felt ; SO also the remainder of the p o ers ~ (or senses). Again, i n the case of strong wearying sensibles, such as a loud noise, a strong smell, a shining and flashing light; if thej- are repeated ilpou the organ (instrument,), spoil ancl dnllen i t tllrongh their over\vorlcing it. Again, each one of tlle five senses perceives, through the lneans of its on-U rightful perception and besides the same, five ot21er things, to w i t : 1. shape; 2.~ n l m b e r ;3 . size; 4. ~ n o t ~ i o n6.; rest (quiet). That sight, toucll: and taste perceive them, is evident. As to hearing, i t perceives, i n accordance (pursuance) with the variety of the number of sounds, the nurnber of the sound-emitting objects ; and, through the strength of the sounds, it perceives the size of the tn-o objects t h a t are hitting against each other : and, i n accordance with a, kind of c l ~ a n g e and fiseduess of the sounds, i t perceives motion anct rest; and, in accordance wit11 their volume around the sound-emitter, be t h e latter solid or hollow, i t perceives some sorts of shapes. As to smelling, i t knows, i n accordance with the change of directions whence the odors are emitted and reach it, and through the variety of these odnrs

i n their qualities, it liuo\vs I say the number of the things smelt; tllrougll tlie measure of abuuclance of the smells, tlle size of such things ; through the measure of proxilnity and distance, chaligeablelless ancl fisedness, i t recognizes their lnotion and their rest ; and, i n accordance with the sides on ivhich their odor reaches it from one and the sallie body, i t I;no~vs their shape. Still, tliese cliscrimillatioils are very weak i n this power anioiig mankind, o ~ v i a g to the weakness of the power itself' i n tllo huniali race. [For all this, men have not the keen scent t h a t many other animals have, a a ~ therefore l sach ciiscriminations are i n lilen very -\veak.]

( 3 ) Plato's Dialogue e~ltitleilcc 'rimaeos, )> 4.3. (2'1 'l'iia names of the different parts of tlle eye are : a. a1-tabaqall a1 c:diball sclel.otica, hard-coat b.

c. d.

e. f.

g. h. i. l\.

- -

choroid, vasculal* skin al-g11asll:i al-slzabaliy = iaetina, net sliin a1-l.atiiha11 al-za~A.jiyjah glass) moisture al-ratitball al-,jal~di,yjali= craj-stallinelens >> >> 'anliabi~ti~xah = ciliary, fibrous, h a i r \\.eb al-hadaclall = pupilla al-tabaclah al-'inabij-l-all = berry, grape coat qarmigyah - - cornea al-nlultahimah -= couj ur~ctiva. >>

3

>)

al-mashimiyyall

SECTION SETEh'TH Dealing in Detail with the Inward Senses, (and

the Motion = Promoting Powers).

I. Not one of the outward senses unites within itself perception of color, odor, and softness ; and yet, we often come upon a body t h a t is yellow, and perceive a t once so much about it, namely t h a t i t is honey, sweet, nice of smell, and fli~id,although we have neitller tasted, nor smelt, nor even touched i t ; ~vhenceit is manifest t h a t mTe possess a power wherein are assenibled t h e perceptions of the four senses, and have tllus become sumnled u p i n i t illto one single form; a n d were i t not for this power we should not know t h a t sweetness,' for instance, is other than blackness, since the discriminator between two things is lie who lias lino\va them both. This is i11e po\17er ~x-llichis designated as the commonsense, and the picturing (or representing) power. And were it one of the outward apparent senses, i t s sway (dominion) would limit itself to the state of wakefulness only; whereas ocular observation attests what is quite otherwise ; for this

pon,el. does a t times perfornl i t s action i n ' u ~ t l r t h e states of sleep and walief~~lness. 11. 3'nrtlleruzore, there is i n animals a power \vhicli sets up snch forms as have assembled i n the common - sense, discriminates between them, ancl differentiate.: them, without the forms themselves disappearing from t h e common - sense. And this power is ulldonbtedly other t h a n the, aforesaid pictnring power ; since i n t h e l a t t e r there a r e none b u t true (real) forms t h a t have been acquired (obtained) from sense; whereas i n this power t h e case niay l)e other.ivise, allcl i t may imagine and picture \\-rongly allcl falsely, and w h a t i t had n o t receivecl after such a [wrong and false] pattern :shape) from ally one of t h e senses. This polrer is tlle one ilamed inlagiuation. F u r t h e r , there is i n animals a power t h a t passes jnclgtllent, upon such or such a t l ~ i i i gthat i t is so or n o t so, decisively, and through which the animal flees away from shunned evil and seelis chosen good. It is also evident t h a t this p o ~ l - e ris other t h a n t h e imaginative, sioce this last imagines (pictilres to itself) the sun, i n accorclallce -\\-it11~ v l i a ti t bar g o t from t h e apposite senJe, to be of the size of i t s d i s c whereas the matter stancls i n this power quite other\\-ise. So too t h e liou fin(1s his prey from f a r off of tlie size of' a srnall bird, yet its form and size i n no way perples him, b u t lie makes for it. I t is also evident t h a t this power is other t h a n the irna-

ginative, and this because the imaginative power performs its manifold deeds without belief and conviction o n i t s part t h a t matters are in, accordance with its imagining. This power is what i s named the conjectaring or the surmising faculty (or *jndgment). 111. Further, there is i n living beings a power that preserves tlie purports (or thoughts and conceptions) of what the senses had perceived, such as, for instance, that the wolf is a n enemy; t h e child, a darling next of kin. Wherefore, so much a t least if not more is evident, t h a t this power is other than the common-sense (or pieturingj, inasmuch as i n the latter there are no forms but such as i t has gained from the senses; whereas, again, the senses did not feel the wolf's enmity, nor the child's love, b u t alone the u7olf1s image, and the cl~ild'sbodily shape; and as t o love and fierceness, i t is the mind's eye alone t h a t has got them, and then stored them up i n this power. I t i s also clear t h a t this power is other than the imaginative power, for the reason t h a t this last does a t times imagine what is othor t h a n that which the n ~ i n i i ' s eye has deemed right, found true, and has derived from the senses; whereas the former power, i. e., t h e one here dealt with, imagines none other t h a n what 'the mind's eye has deemed right, has found true, and has derived from the senses. This power is also other than the conjecturing

(surmising pon-er, for the reasoil t h a t this last does n o t preserve what some other has deemed < o 1)e t r u e , b u t i t of i t s own self deems t o be t r u e , wllilst t h e po\irer here treated of does n o t itself pass jutlgment of t r u t h or falsehood, b u t only preserves w h a t another has cleemeci t o be true. Thi. posver i s called memory, t h e preserving or 1;eepiilg i'ac.nlty. Agiiill, tllr iniagiuative po\ver is called by t h i s name - imagination - if the coi~jectnring (or surrnisillgi power alone use i t : ancl if the spea1;iiig ( ~ ~ a t i o n apan-er l) ure it, i t is called the t h i a l i i ~ l g(cogitative) ponTer. Tile !lea,rt is t,he source (spring) of all these Ilon'ers (faculties), i n Aristotle's opinion; yet t h e sway o v r r tl1i.111 is ill diflerent orgalls (iiistrumei~ts). TLus the sway o v e r t h e o n t ~ v a r d(apparent) senses is i n their fillown organs ; wliereas t h e sway over t h e picturing (representing common-sense) power i s i n tlie anterior 1iollos1- (ventricle) of t h e b r a i n ; t h e sway over the imaginative, in the middle Ilollo~vthereof; t h e sn7ay over the remembering, in t h e posterior I ~ o l l o ~ thereof; v a ~ l d the sway over tile coqjecturing, tliroughout all t h e brain, Ijnt above all i n the cox-npartment of the imaginat i ~ ewithin t h e braill [or, throughout the whole of tlle braill, l ~ n tmore especially alongside of t h e imaginative thereof]. Ancl i n so f a r a s these Irollows (I-entricles) suffer llar~lland h u r t , so will t h e mauifcrl(1 \\.orkings of these powers suffer

also ; for were they, (the powers,) standing independently, that is to say subsisting i n themselves, end efficient independently, t h a t is to say p u t t i n g forth their workings of themselves, they would not need, for their proper and peculiar actions, any sort of instrument or o r g a n : I n this wise one recognizes t h a t these powers do not subsist i n themselves, b u t t h a t the undying power i s t h e Spealiiug (Reasoning) Soul, as we shall hereafter set f o r t h ; yet for all this, the soul does maybe a t times seek o u t for itself afler a fashion (so t o speak) the purest quintessences of the kernels of tlrese powers, and cause them to exist, of themselves, the setting forth of which shall, D. v., so011 follow.

Tlie follo~virlgis the terminology of the five inward senses : 1. Common Sense = hiss mushtarak, mutaqawwirall 2. Vis formans, in~aginatio= khay81, muCawwirah, fantasia, takhayyul, mutakhayyilah. 3. Vis cogitativa, vis imaginativa = mufakkirah, mutakhayyilah, mutawahhimah, zknnah, mutaqarrifah, mutafakliirah, takhayyul. 4. Memory, remembel3iog, preserving = hiifizah, mutazhakkirah, zlikliirah, zhikt-. 5. Vis existimativa, opinativa = wahm, mut a ~ a h h i m a h ,zh$nnah, talrhayyul, wahmiyyah. Here follows an attempt to clear up this bewilderi~lgsubject : 1. Perception, through any one or more of the five outward senses, of the outward concrete form, 5. - Aaicena's Offering

2. Conception of particular notions, over and beyond the concrete form perceived. 3. Ilemoryv, whicli retains both outward forms perceived as well as ~necalls inward pa~.ticular forms conceived. 4. Common Sense, rises a step higher than the tliree preceding, in that it unites two o r more of the plaoducts of any of the three preceding and derives from them a new conception. 5. Opining, n-hicli rises higher still and passes judgment, oi* comes to a definite opinion as to the truth or falsehood of conceptions formed. In respect of memory, Ibn Sinli in his K Kanon of Medicine, makes a distinction. He says : K And just here is a point for scrutiny and judgment as to whether the preserving power and tlie power recalling {to consciousness) such notions as had been stored up by the opining power but have passed away from it, a r e one power o r two. >> Jlere follows still ariother attempt: 1 . Perception, of the Five Senses, through organs. 2. Sway of the Common-Serlse, in the anterior hollo\v. 3. Sway of the Imaginatire Power, in the middle hollow. 4. Sway of t h e Iiemernbering Power, in the posterior hollou~. 5. Sway of the Coujecti~ringPo\ver, throughout all the brain, and alorlgside of the imaginative compartment. Number 1. has been dealt with in Section Six; iiumber 5 belongs exclusively to Man, and will be t'urther dealt with in the next Sectiori ; the ernai aiming three, to wit numbers 2 , 3, and 4, a r e i n all live animals, and a r e dealt with in this Seventh Section. The theory is beautifully clear and simple : vllus, number 2 grasps and appropriates the o u t ~ v a r dform brollght to it by the senses: number 3 grasps and appropriates

particular conceptiotls ; and number 4 stores them up ; thus also, the one cl-velliilg in the front holloxv is not influenced by the action of the one occupying the middle or the hindermost hollow, whereas convel-sely each succeeding faculty has recourse to the one preceding it i n order of place. This theory arose after an acquaintance with the division and arrangement of t h e brain into chambelbs had made col~siderable progress with the Arabs. Those who read German should not fail to study Dr. Salnuel Landaue~a's erudite notes i n vol. 29 for the year 1875 of' the Z. d. D. M. G.

SECTION EIGHTH A Sketch of the Human Soul from the Starting = Point whence it sets out until the End m Point whither it reaches its Perfection.

No doubt t h a t the speaking (rational) species of the [genus] animal is distinguished from the non - speaking (irrational species) by a power, through which i t is enabled to imagine things rational, which power is called the speaking (rational) soul; and the custonl has obtained of calling i t the (1 hylik r, mind, that is to say the potential mind, thus likening i t to the hyl8, which is potential matter. (*) Moreover this power is found i n the whole human species ; and it possesses i n itself a t the outset none of the mentally grasped forms, but these arise within it after two sorts of processes: The first is through a Diviue guidance, without effort of study, and

-

(9 Ibn Sink i n

his G h - ~ l c i h - t ~-Vaj(if l >> says : Indeed it has been called << hylili )> by \\ay of' likening it to primitive I ~ y l i kmatter, whicll in itself has no form a t all ancl j e t is t h e substratum of each and every form.

witllout profitting from the senses, as for example t h e mentally - grasped self - evident axioms, like our col~victiont h a t the wllole is greater than the part', and that two contradictories (contrasts) do iiot come togetlier a t one time i n one and the same thing ; so t h a t sane-minded adults share equally i n the acquisition of such forms. The second sort of process is through earning [the ' mental thought or t,ruth] by reasoning process, and by arraj- of proof and demonstration, such as t h e c o ~ l c ~ e p t i oc)f n logical txnths, like genera, species, ciiff'ereritia, and properties, simple terms, and terins coinpoundecl i n the various modes of conipositions [ o f several idens into one conlposite tern?], justly - ~lioded syllogisms botll valid and false, propositions wllicll if moded into syllogisms lead to necessary tlel12onstrated results, or to argnmeutative probable results, or to equally balanced rhetorical results, or to primary (axiomatical) sopllistical results, or to inlpossible poetical results ; (1) and such mentally - grasped forms as t h e recognition of t h e certainty of riatural realities: lilie hylh (primitive matter) ancl form, pri\-ation (non - existence) and Nature, place and time, rest anci motion, bulky bodies of the sky firmainent and bulky elemental bodies, absolute universal being and absolute nothingness, generation absolute and corruption absolute, origen ctf' tlliugs generated that are within the sky, t h a t are within the deepest depths of mines, and t h a t

a r e c n the earth's crust, amongst which last-named are plant and animal, the true conception ( 1 Man and the t r u t h of the soul's conception of its own self; and still further such -mentally grasped forms as the conception of ideas mathematical, amoilgst which are number, pure geometry, stellar gesmetry, harmonica1 or musical geometry, optical geometry ; aild again, further still, such ideas as the conception of divine affairs, like the knowledge of the principles of the absolute self - existeilt i n so far as he exists pera sc, and of the priuciples co11sequent;y adhering to him, such as potentiality, power and efficiex:cy, first cause and accounting cause, essence and accidens, genus and species, incompatibility and homogoneity, agreement and disagreement, unity and multiplicity ; and, still further, the fixing of t h e principles of the speculative (theoretical) sciences, amongst which are the mathematical, tlle natural and the logical - all which cannot be attained save tllrougll this latter soience; (2) and still further, such as proviilg the first Creator and the first Created, the universal (generic) soul and holo creation came about, the relative po"ition of mind towards creation, and the relative position of soul towards mind, the relative position of hyli: towards nature, and of forms towards t h e soul, the relative position of the skies, orbs, planets and all existing things towards hy16 and towards form, and why and wherefore they differ j,

so widely as they do as to forwards and baolin-ards ( n ~ d z ~ ~xar o v 5 o t ~ ~ o vof ) development ; and tlie k n o ~ ~ l e d gofe r,he divine government, universal nature, primal providerlce, prophetic inspiration, t h e divine 11oly spirit, sublime angels, a t t a i n i n g to the certainty ef t h e Creator's being beyond all partnership a n d sinlilitude [i. e. recognizing ilze t r u t h t h a t polytheism ancl anthropotnorphisnz are to be rejected]; and att,aillillg t o the Iil!owledge of what rewards await t h e right,eons, a n d what punishments impend t l ~ c ~ ~ ~ i c l i eof c l , the clthlight and t h e pain overtaking souls after t h r i r aballdouiug t,he l~oclies. F u r t h e r , this power which conceives these ideas does a t times gain frorn sense forxns mental, imagin ntirre, and inns te irl (instinctive, to) itszlf ; ancl i n b n c l ~a case i t does this i n t h a t it laxs before itself t h e forms t h a t are ill the conceiving power and in tlis remembering (preserving) power, by employing the imagiaative and t h e c o ~ ~ j e c t u r i n g pomer, ant1 t h e n colltelnplates them, and fincls t h e m to have participated i n some forms and t o have diflfered in some other forms ; and finds same ail~ongstthe forms t h a t are i n these powers to be esse~lt~inl, and others to be accidental. Ancl as t o their participation in forms, it is like the participxtiou of t h e for111 Richard and an ass, in t h e conceiver's mi~ril,in t h e idea of Life ; a n d t h e difYeriug of t h e two i n t h e idea of speaking (rational], and non - spe3king (brute). As t o t l l s

essential form, i t is e. g. like the life that is il; them both; as for the accidental, i t is e. g. like their blacliness and whiteness. Sa that if we find the two aforesaid on this wise - i. e., as stated, - [the mind] makes each one of these essential. and accidental, participated ancl peculiar forms, one universal mental form singly and aloue, and thus througli this working - over process, i t gets a t mental genera, species, differenti., properties, accidens; then i t combines these sii~gle notions into particular combinations ; then into syllogistic argi~zrientative combinations and deduces from them corollaries from the results - all which i t gets through the service of the anirnal powers, with the help of arliversal mind, after the manner t h a t w e shall set forth later on, and through the intermediary of such necessary self - evident mental axioms as i t has 1,een endowed with. Moreover this power: although i t derives help from the sensuous l)on7erwhen getting out! single ' m e n t a l forms from tlie sensuous f o r n ~ s , yet it does not need the sensuous power for conceiving these ideas (notions) 1vit)hin itself and for setting up s~llogisnisout of them, neither when affir~ m i n g ,nor when conceiving the t w o dicta [of abstraction & generalization), as we shall afterwards explain. And to whatever extent i t derives sensuous corollaries, for which there shall be need, through the said working - cvcr process, yet it dispenses with the e m p l o ~ment of the sensuous \.

a

powers, nay it is even sufficient for and i n itself, for t h e carrying on of all its manifold activities. And just as the sensuous powers perceive solely and wholly through a11 assimilatio~iof t h a t which is felt, so also do the mental powers perceive solely tllrougll and wllolly through an assimilation of the mentally - grasped ; and this assimilation is the a1)straction of the form from matter, and t h e adhering to i t ; only t h a t the feeling power does i ~ o tget the ceilsuous form through willed niotioll and voluntary action on its part, b u t through the arrival of the very thing felt unto it, either by chance or through the i~ltermetliary of the niotion - promoting power, and laying bare of tlle forms unto it, (abstraction) tllrongh the help of the media that coiinect the forms with i t ; ~vhereas, i n the case of the mental power, (Reason TJnderstanding) t,llis process is otherwise ; for by and tlirough itself i t a t times does itself perform t-lle abstraction (laying bare) of the form from matter as often as i t wills, and then clillgs unto it. Ancl for this reasoil it is said that the sentient power is nicre or less passive i n it.; conception [or, t h a t the feeling power is after a fashion acted upon when i t conceives], and t h a t the mental (nizderstandingj power is active ; nay rather i t i s said, for this reasoil, that the sezlt,ient power cannot c10 withont instrunlents (organs), and has in itself 110 ef'ficiency; and liow is it

possible t o apply such a statement (pr.oposition) to the mental (understanding) power? The mind (Understanding, Reason) is i n fact and deed wholly and solely nothing else t h a n the forms of mentally-grasped things, if these be arrayed i n the very mind potentially, and through it they are brought out to effective action ; and hence i t is said t h a t the mind is i n fact and deed a t once both understanding and understood. Amongst th3 properties of the understanding power is this, t h a t i t unifies the many and multiplies the one through analysis and synthesis. As to mnltiplication, i t is such as the analysis of one man into essence, body, nourishment-getting, animal, speaking (rational). As to unification of t h e many, it is such as the composition (syfithesis) of this one man out of essence, body, animal, speaking (rational) into one notion which i s mankind (human being). Moreover the mind, although i t applies i t s activity within a duration of time i n arranging syllogisms, through using reflection, yet the result itself, which this reflection obtains, and -which is the fruit of thought and the end sought after, is ngt dependant upoil time, nor is i t obtained save a t a n instant; nay more than this, the mind itself is wholly above and beyond all time. And the reasoning (speaking) soul, if it engages itself up011 the sciences, its activity i s called mind or intellect, and it is accordingly

called speculative or tlleoretical mind : \+-llicll I have already described. Ailcl if' i t engages itself upon overcoming blamewortlli powers, that entice unto wrongdoing through their excess, unto folly tlirough their abandonnment, nilto impetuosity thsongh their agitation, unto cowardice through. t h e i ~ .indifYerence or lukewarmness, or unto wickediless through their excitenlent, or unto degeneration througll tlicir smouldering, and leacls thein over illto the paths of wisdom, endurance, chastity - i n short uuto righteousness, then i t s activity is called ruling or governing, and i t is accordingly callccl practical mind or rcason. Again, the reasoning (spealiing) power is sometimes so fittied out in a few pozsons tllrongh (*l vigils ant1 covjullction wit11 the uiliversal nliilil as to be quite independent of' taking refuge unto syllogistic argunleut and reflection, but rather is sufficiently stored wit11 inspiration and revelatioil to render it, wholly absolved from such ordinary nzealls a3 melltal I ratiocination : this pecnlia,r property of the reasouing rr~illd is called hallox7&Jness or sanctity, and i t is accordingly called Holy Ghost. Unto such a favoured rank and degree none shall attain save propllets ancl apostles, upon 1~1101~1 be peace ancl. blessing. (*) lasting, prayer, night-~vatchings.

( I ) This passage as to syllogisms and conclusions rnay be made clearer ) s ~~ ~ e n d e r i nitg thus: -

<< which, if arranged syllogistically, allow of getting to conclusions that a r e (a) necessar~ily true and valid, viz. apodictic ; (b) most always trwe, viz. dialectic ; (c) both true and false, viz. rhetorical ; (cl) praeponderantly false, viz. sophistical ; and (e) merely false, viz. poetical. (2) In his << Yqjcit )> Ibn Sind says of this science: cc Logic is the theoretical speculative science that teaches out of which fbrms and materials there will come about satiscying argumentation, of which argumentation that which is strong, and in~posesan assertion resembling certainty, is called diaiectic ; ancl that which is weak thereof, and imposes a prevailing opinion, is called rhetorical. >> IIis compendious Essay on Logic remains to this day one of the clearest a n d best that beginners can find in the Arabic language on this abstract science of the Laws of Thought.

SECTION NINTH in which the Proofs of the Essentiality of t h e Soul, and of Its Independence of Body in its Structure, a r e s e t forth

it1

pursuance of the Method

of Logicians. SUB - SECTION A : - One of the logical proofs for establishing this Claim : L e t us however first preface it with premisses, among which are : First PI-erniss: that man conceives universal (generic) notions wlierein a greater or less multitude participates, such as man a t largb, a n d animal a t large. Aud of these generic notions there a r e such as he conceives through a particular [or partial, or a n obligatory] synthesis, and there are such others of these generic notions as he does not conceive by any synthesis, but singly and individually. And unless he shall have conceived the latter division (class, sett), it is not possible for him to conceive the former. Further, he conceives each one of thess generic universal uotions only under one form, wholly stripped

(a1)stracted) from all relationship to its concrete sensuous particulars, since the particulars of each one of the generic ilotiolls are potentially endless /ill variety and nnmberl and no one of the particulars lias ally right of priority over another particular i n respect of' t h a t orze form of the generic notion. Secofzcl P1-ri17,iss : that a form, mllatsoever body i t detaclies, reduc,es, and adorns, and i n general whatsoever illdividual o f clivisible things it, so takes 1101~1of, i t clothes the same ancl. exactly fits the same in every one of its parts. And wllatsocver clothes and exactly fits a divisible thing i u all its parts is itself divisible; and hence e r e r y form t h a t has clothed aucl exactly fitted any body wllatsoever is itself divisible. 2'/~ir=ilP~-enziss: that i n every generic (universal) form, if regard be had, i n the division of such form, purely and simply t o its abstract self, then i t will not a t all validly follow t h a t the parts into which i t has been divided shall necessarily resemble the whole i n its complete notion; otlierwise it must follow that the generic form, whose division has been made i11 respect of i t s abstract self, has not been itself divided, b u t t h a t it has been divided into its constituents, nrhetlier these be its various species or its numerous individnals, wllereas mnltiplicity of species or of individuals does llot ilecessarily entail division i n the abstract generic ilotioll itself. But

i t has been laid down as a fact t h a t such division has actually taken place, u-hich is a contradiction. Hence our assertion t h a t the parts of the generic form tlo not resernble i t i n i t s full and complete notioii is a true didturn. Foul-th Prenziss: t h a t i n the mental form, if regard be had to its division, i t will not validly follow t h a t i t s parts are denuded (stripped) of the totality of its notion. This is so because, i f we admit such total denudation, a n d assert t h a t these parts are utterly aloof from t h e complete conception of the generic whole, then the form will arise, i n such parts, only upon their assembling together, so t h a t they are i n fact things devoid of t h a t form which will arise in them on their being set together, which is a quality of the parts of materia capax or passive matter which occupies space ( ~ E X Z ~ X ;~ [Note V ) : The recipient is the actcd upon, a11d i t is called matter, and also place.]; and hence t h e division has not been effected i n t h e generic form, but in i t s objective concrete materials. B u t it has been asserted that the division has come to pass i n i t : this too is a contradiction. Therefore our assertion : 11 I t will not validly follow t h a t its parts are stripped of the totality of i t s notion 97 is a true statement. Fiftf~Pl*emiss: which is the result of t h e two preceding: t h a t i n the generic form, if it be possible that divisibility be considered i n i t , then 6. - Auicenu's Offering

i t s parts are neither wholly dovoid of the perfect form nor are completely exhaustive of it, and are as i t were [component, constituent] parts of its definition and outline (or description). Given tlleu these premisses, we shall further unquestionably sary t h a t a uneatally - grasped forrn - i n sliort all Bllowledge - claims some z~bodesome~vl~ere, which abode is both a n essence itself and a part of man's self, so t h a t such essence will not be devoid of being either a divisiblo (material) body or a. non - corporeal indivisible essence. I however say, t h a t it is not licit t h a t it be a corporeal body; because a generic mentally - grasped form, if it abide i n a body, tllell i t is inevitably possible for divisibility t o befall i t , as w e have shown above. Nor is i t licit t h a t its parts be otherwise than resembliiig the whole from one stand - point, and contrasting with it from allotEler stand - point, i n a word each one of the parts contains somewhat of the notion of' t h e whole; whereas there is no generic form whatsoever out of whose parts a compound can be formed t h a t is partly like i t and 1,artly unlike i t save genera and differentia; consequently these parts are genera and differentia, and hence each o;le of then1 is in its t u r n a generic form ; and thus the same assertion repeats itself as above. Inevitably this will ellcl i n a form that i s no longcr divisible illto genera and differentia,

owiug to t h e i ~ practicability n of progression ad iufinitum into parts JiEering i u uotioils, even i f i t be establislled that corporeal boGies are so divided into parts ad infiaitum. Moreover i t is well-kuown that t h ~generic (universal) form, c o n c e r ~ i n gwllicl-l i t is held t h a t i t is divisible only illto genera and differentia, if there be nevertheless some o f these two t h a t is not divisible into genera and differentia, then this s0112e v i l l be i n itself utterly indivisible i n every sense and respect; and consequently w h a t is compounded7 of these two of that some, will also be indivisible, seeing that i t is well-known, for example, t h a t I I ~ C L I ,cannot be coilceived except along with the two collceptions lioirzg and 1-ational ( s p e a l ~ i r ~ g I) .n short, i t is not possible to conceive a generic universal form t h a t has gellus and differens save by conceiving them all together. Therefore, the form which we heve described a s having taken u p its abode i n the body has n o t takeu up its abode therein, which is a contradiction, and therefore the diametrically contrary t o it i s true, namely our assertion t h a t a generic (universal) mental form does not abide in any corporeal body whatsoever ; and consequently t,he essence i n which a generic mental form abides is a spiritual essence, not qualified with the qualities of bodies, which is what we call the Rational Speaking Soul. And this is what we set o u t to show.

S U I I -SIT,CTION B : - A s ~ c o l l d of the proofs, srl~icllcorroborate this claim and confirm (correct) it, is what I am now going to set forth. I say then t h a t body of and through itself does not eitt'ect conception of mentally-grasped things, since all boclies llave i n ccnimon t h a t they are body, and differ arliongst each other i n capacity for conceiving mentally-grasped things. Wherefore livillg (animal) bodies are qualified to collceive mentally-grasped things 011ly by and through certain powers t h a t are p u t within them. And if these powers coucsive by and through themselves, without the cooperation of the body, i t follows t h a t they are i n themselves fit and apt to be an abode for meiital forms. And what is thus qualified is itself an essence ; consequently if such conception is occurriug, they, namely these powers, are essences. Now, i t is clear that this power conceives mentally-grasped tlliilgs by and through itself only, and not a t all through cooperatiou of body; for, we contend, concerning whatsoever perceives any thing through cooper- , at.ion of body, t h a t the oftener wearying percept i b l e ~are repeated upon i t the more do they t,enil towards ruining and spoiling i t and producing dnlll~essand exhaustion i n i t , i t being nothing but a frail instrument and organ whose strength has been reduced, owing to the over-tasking imposed upon i t on the power's enlployipg i t ; ancl for this cause the seeing pox*er,for example,

gsts weaker the oftener i t persists in looking a t the sun's shape. So too the hearing power, iF loud sounds reach i t repeatedly. Whereas this power, to wit the ohe t h a t conceives mentally - grasped things, the more it perceives wearying mental conceptions the stronger it becomes for its work [the more efficient i t becomes], wherefore i t has no need for an instrcmerat i n its operation of perceiving, and hehce it perceives of itself. Now, we have already shown that every power perceiving s f its own self is an essence; so then this power is an essence, which is what we set out to show. SUB - SECTION c : - Among the proof's that guide to this claim is what I shall now show, so I say as follows. The indwelling (immanence) af form in body is a t once both passive and receptive - passivity of the form and receptivity of the body. And whereas one and the same thing excludes the possibility of its being both doer and done, it becomes clear uhto us that & body is not able of itsellf to dress itself i n one mefitally - grasped , form and strip off anotlier. Yet nevertheless we see a man consciously aiad with forethought conceiving and proceed'ing from olie mentally - grasped form unto another, which operation is not devoid of being either an act peculiar to body, or else an act peculiar to the rational speakihg power, or finally an act commonly shaped between them

Ijnt,ll. It has been already s h o ~ n i1perllal)s Ile here refers to tlle Secolltl Section of this Essay] t h a t i t i.: 110t licit t o attribute a,ctioa and (doing peculiarly allcl specially t o body; u a y I xvill say a n d not eve11 t,o body conjointljr -\\-it11 tlie rational POT:-er; siillce body is a co - adjutor of' illat pan-er, tlclping tto-vc-arcts afrording a n abode for a n y form \\hatsoever i n t h a t body's own self, seeing tllat i t lias beco~llelinon-n to us t h a t body along wit11 t h e p o ~ v e rn ill both becollie fit subjects for tllis fnrln t h a t 118s t h u s a r i s e n ; a subject 1lc)wever is t ~ ljo , stigi~~atized \\rith notlliilg beyolld siiiiple yas.;ivjtj- aloue, whereas botli these t ~ v oare jaggrrs$icc~]acts allcl deeds. Consec~nentlythis is a n a c l jrecrlliar to the poxrer. d l ~ d ever) t,liii~gtliat, ill it.; act ~vllicheman~ztesfrolli i t s OTT-11 self, lias liad ILO ueed for anotlier thing to help i t , -\till not lieeil i n its o ~ structure u anything beyond i t s olvn self to Iielp i t , seeing tliat indel~endeuce or izolation in the structure of self.' precedes indel'encleucc or isolation in the p n t t i n g fort11 of selfe:llanatiag action. Therefore this po\ver is a n essence stallcling of itself [indepeuclelit of l)ocly] ; a u d consecineutly t h e rat,iolial soul is a n essence. SUB-SECTION n : - Anlong t h e proofs t h a t guide (point) t o t h e validity of tlli.: collteiisioll i s ~ v l i a t1 a m now going to say. K O doubt a live body and lil-e organs o r iilstl allzerits, if they accolxplish tlleir growing age a n d tlle age of staildstill, begin t o witller aud

*

.(

diminish, to lose power and waste away, which [in human beings) is on passing forty years. Now, r e r e the rational reasoning power a corporeal organic power, then there would be found not one single irldividual of rnan1;ind a t these years of Iris age hut what, this power of his would have begun to climiuish. Rut the case i n most people is quite otherwise, nay indeed i t is usual amongst the majority t h a t as to intellectnal power they improve i n cleverness and i n c ~ e a s e i n insight. Hence tile structn1.e of the rational power is riot ~ ~ p l l e l cby l the body nor by the organ; and hence this power is an essence standing of it,self, which is what we wished to show. S L B - s e c ~ r oEs: - Among the proofs for the validity of this contellsion is tlie following also. Xo rauch a t least is clear, namely t h a t not one of the bodily powers has the strengtli for performing iufinite multifarious actio~zs; and this is so becnnse the strcngth of the one half of such a body will inevitably be found to he weaker t h a n the streilgth of the whole; and the weaker is less powerful to perform and overcome than the stronger; and whatsoever, other t h a n t h e infinite, gets less is itself fiuite ; hence the s t r e n g t l ~ of each one of the two halves is finite; hence too tlieir sum is finite, since t h a t the sun1 of two finites is itself finite; whereas i t has been contended that i t is infinite, which is a contradiction. Hence the soulld view is t h a t tlie powers of bodies

are not powerful enough ,*to perform infinite manifold deeds. The rational power however is powerful enough to perform nlany infinite deeds, seeing t h a t forms geometrical, arithmetical, and philosophical, which the rational power has to perform among other of its acts, are infinite. Therefore the rational power is not standing by and through the body, and hence therefore it stands of itself and is an essence of itself, Further, so niuch a t least is clear t h a t the corruption of one of two colzjoiiled essences does not entail and enjoin the corruption of the other: wherefore the cleath of the body does not render obligatory the death of the soul, which is w h a t we wanted to shoiv.

SECTION T E N T H T o Establish that there is a Mental Essence, Distinct from Bodies, which stands towards Human Souls In the stead of Light toward Sight, and in the stead of a Source or Fountain ; and T o Establish that Souls, if they leave the Bodies, unite therewith.

As to the mental essence, we find it i n infants devoid of every mental form. Then, later on i n life, we find i n it self-evident axiomatic mentally-grasped notions, without effort of learning a ~ without d reflection. So t h a t the arising of them within it will not fail of being either through sense and experience, o r else through divine outpouring reaching to it. B u t it i s not licit to hold t h a t the arising of such primary p e n t a l form will bc+ through experience, seeing t h a t experience does not afford and supply a necessary and inevitable judgment, since expsrience does not go so far as to believe or disbelieve definitively the existence of something different to the judgment drawn from what i t has perceived. Indeed experience, although i t shows u s bhat

every allinial nre perceive moves on chewing tllo l o n ~ e r,jan-, yet it cloes not supply us -wit11 a convincing jncig~nenl~ that s11cll is t h e case with every animal; for Ayere this true, i t would not he licit for tllc crocodile to exist ~ v h i c hmoTTes his upper ,jaw on cl~en-ing.'I'llerefore not every j n d g n ~ e n t -we llave arrivecl at, as to tliings, tllrougll our sensuous perceptioil, is applicable to and holds good of all that i r e l i ~ perceived ~ ~ s or have not perccivccl c~fsuch b l ~ i l i g q ,but i t -inay so he t h a t nllat lye have not perceivrcl difler froin what -c\-e have perceived. TVllereas o u r conception that a whole i s greater than a part is not [formed] because 11-e have sensnonsly felt every part and every n-hole t h a t are so rclatctl, seeing that even such a n experience will not garanty to us t h a t there nil1 1 ~ eno hole ancl no part, differently related. Lilien ise the dictum conceriling t h e impossibility o f t\ro opposites (contrasts) coming together i n one aud the same thing, and t h a t things which are e q r ~ a lto one and the same thing are eqnal to one another. Aud likejvise the dictum concern i n g our lloliliilg proofs t o be true if they be valid, for the belief i n allcl colivictioii of their validity cloes not become valid by and through learning and sffort of study ; else this would clraw out ad infinitum [inasliiuch as each proof rests upon give11 p r ~ s n l ) p ~ g i t i o nwhose s, validity would i n its t u r n have to he proved]. Nor is this

gained froin sense, for tlle reason that we have mentioned. Collseyuently both the latter as well as the former [certaility] are gained from a godly outflow reaching u ~ l t othe rational soul, and the rational son1 reacl~ingunto i t ; so that this mental forin arises therein. Also, as to this outflow, unless i t have i n i t s osvn self such a generic (universal) mental form, i t mould not be able to engrave i t ~vithixithe rational soul. Hence such form is i n the O I X ~ ~ ~ G MO- T' SV L ~self. Anci whatsoever Self has i n i t a mental form i d a n essence, other than a body, and not within a body, aud standing of itself. Therefore this outflow unto w1lic.h the soul reaches is a nlental essence, not a body, not i n a body, standing of itself, and one which stands towards the rational soul i n the stead of light to s i g h t ; yet however with this difference, namely t h a t light supplies unto sight the power of perceiving only, and not the perceived form, whereas this essence supplies, exclusively by a n d through its sole and single self, unto t h e rationafl power, the power of perceiving, and brings about therein t h e perceived forms also, as we have set forth above. Now, if the rational soul's conceiving rational forms be a source of completion and perfection for i t , anti be effected and brought about on reaching unto this essence, and if worldly earthly labors, such as its thought, its sorrows and joy, i t s longings, hamper the power and withold it from reaching thereunto, so t h a t it will not reach

thereunto save only through abandoning t h e s e powers and getting rid of them, there beil~g nothing to stop i t from continued Reaching save the living body, - then c o ~ s e q u e n t l yif i t q u i t the body i t nrill not cease to be reaching unto its Perfector and attached to Him. Again, what reaches u n t o its Perfector ailcl attaches itself to Hi111 is safe against corruption, all tlle rliore so if even during cliscollnection from Him i t has not undergone corruption. Wherefore the soul after death shall ever remain and contiane unwavering land ~uidyiug]and attached to t h i s noble essence, which is called generic universal mind, and i n the language of the lav-givers t h e Divine Kno.cvledge. AS to the other powers, ~ ~ 3 as 1 1 the animal and the vegetable: Whereas every one of them performs its proper peculiar action only by and through the live body, and i n no other ~ n y con, sequently they will nrver quit live bodies, b u t will die with their death, seeing t h a t every thing which is, and yet has no action, is idle and useless. Yet nevertheless the rational soul does gain, by its connection ~ v i t h them, from them their choicest and pnrest lye anci wash, and leaves for destll the husks. And were i t not so, the rational soul ~ v o u l d not use them i n consciousness. Wherefore the rational soul shall surely depart (migrate, travel) taking along t h e kernels of the other po\vers after death ensues.

W e have thus made a clear statement concerning souls, and got a t which souls are [ever-] lasting, and which of them will not be fitted o u t and armed with [everllastingness. It still remains for us, i n connectioa with this research, to show how a soul exists within live bodies, and the aim and end for which i t i s found within the same, and what measure will be bestowed upon it, ill t h e hereafter, of eternal delight and perpetual puiiishinent, and of [temporary] punisllment that - ceases after a duration of time that shall ensue upon the decease of the live body; and to treat of the notion t h a t is designated by the lawgivers as intercession (mediation), and of the quality (attribute) of the four angels and the thronebearer$. Were it not however t h a t the custom prevails to isolate such research from the research whose path we have been treading, out of high esteem and reverence for it, and to make the latter researcl1 precede i n order of treatmellt t h e former, to tlie end of levelling the road and paving i t solidly, I should (would) have fcllowed u p these [ten] sections with a full and complete treatment of the subject dealt with i n them. Y Notwithstanding all this, were i t not for 'fear of vearyiag by prolixity, 1 would have disregarded the demands of custom herein. Thus then whatever i t may please the Prince - God prolong his highness - to command es to treating singly of' such notions, T shall - p ~ forth, t in humble com-

pliance a n d obeclience, my ntmost effort, Goit' Alilligllt,y ~ v i l l i n g; alld liiay n,isdoin never cease t o revive t l l r o ~ ~ g him ll aftsr fainting, t o flourish after withering, so t h a t i t s sway rnag be renewed throng11 his s w a y , and tllrongh his clays its days m a y collie bnck again, anct that through his prestige t h e prestige of its clevotees be exalted, allcl tile seekers a f t e r i t s fitvor abound, so God almigllty will.

IT IS ENDED.