Issue 8

ISSUE 8

IN THIS ISSUE

NATIVE ADVANTAGE:

14

New enablers bridge the culture, language gap for squadrons.

LEARNING THE LINGO:

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A new program teaches foreign languages to operators. 17

GROWING THE FORCE:

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Focusing on Families:

Recruiters and the Center take action to bring the best candidates to BUD/S.

Learn how the FOCUS program supports operators and families.

Third Location Decompression:

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A pit stop after deployment helps warriors reintegrate into post-combat life. 24

Operators benefit from the same medical support as pro athletes.

FOR A JUST CAUSE:

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SEAL Team 4 remembers Operation Just Cause. 3

NSW trains with Filipino counterparts.

STEALTH ON THE NEW FRONTIER:

Unit 10 ramps up in support of SOCAFRICA.

A LONG-TERM HUMAN INVESTMENT:

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New Anchor Units signify renewed commitment to foreign partnerships and regional expertise. 10

DANGER OR DELUSION? A SEAL describes the Al Qaeda affiliate group in Northern Africa.

S TA F F

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SCIENCE ENTERS THE FIGHT:

WHERE THERE’S A RHIB, THERE’S A WAY:

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THE TACTICAL ATHLETE:

COMMANDER > Rear Adm. Edward Winters FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER > Cmdr. Gregory Geisen DEP. PAO/EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS > Lt. Cate Wallace DEP. PAO/INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS > Ms. Patricia O’Connor EDITOR > MCCS (SW/AW) Scott Williams

Defense scientists use cutting edge technology to help NSW.

ON YOUR MIND 28

TRUST ME: An essay about an essential virtue from a retired SEAL.

29

Book Review:

A SEAL reviews Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan.

PRODUCTION MANAGER > MC1 (SW/AW) Andre Mitchell ASSOCIATE EDITOR > Ms. Mandy McCammon STAFF > MC2 (SW/AW) Arcenio Gonzalez, MC2 (SW) Shauntae HinkleLymas, MC2 (SW/AW) Dominique Lasco , MC2 (SW/AW) Erika Manzano, MC2 (SW/AW) John Scorza

Ethos is an authorized official production of the Naval Special Warfare Command Public Affairs Office, 2000 Trident Way, San Diego, Calif. 92155-5599. Send electronic submissions and correspondence to [email protected] or call (619) 522-2825. Front cover photo by MC2 Michael D. Blackwell Table of contents photo by MC2 Michael D. Blackwell

The Ever-Evolving

Art

WAR

Naval Special Warfare is known for its ability to carry out the toughest missions and adapt to new threats with innovative thinking and dynamic action. 2010 will showcase these hallmark traits of our warriors and organization as we continually adapt our operations. This issue focuses heavily on our forward operations, highlighting the newly developed NSW Anchor Teams. As you read further on page six, the Anchor Teams are our response to SOCOM’s requirement for a focused, persistent presence in key geographic locations where we expect to operate for the foreseeable future. Small teams of operators will provide continuity to our foreign and interagency partners by bridging the gap between squadron deployments. They will be assigned to an AOR for a four-year tour, establishing relationships and learning everything possible about the local culture, language and customs. NSW has a legacy of serving in an ‘advise and assist’ role. Now it is time for a new generation of operators to further the legacy. The first Anchor Teams roll out the door next month. I expect to see our brightest and most skilled SEALs and SWCC step forward to take on this new, challenging assignment. To help bring NSW focus in Africa, read on page four how the newly formed NSW Unit 10 will set the example of how we work with our foreign partners in this new front against the enemies of the United States. While we have tracked terrorist activity in places like the Horn of Africa, there are emerging threats in the northern region of the continent. Lt. Cmdr. Chris Fussell, a SEAL and Naval Postgraduate School student, wrote an excellent analysis of this new threat for this issue on page 10.

As we grow our end strength of operators and expand their mission sets, our technical enablers are mirroring their efforts. New units are being organized and fielded by the Support Activities. These include Unmanned Aircraft Systems Troops, Multi-Purpose Combat Canine Teams and Cultural Engagement Troops. The Center is also in the midst of its own transformation in training our future warriors. We are now seeing gains in the quality and quantity of candidates completing BUD/S. Read more about this beginning on page 14. While this Ethos is very operationally focused, we are still paying attention to how we can take care of the warrior and his family here at home. Beginning on page 20, read how Project FOCUS and the third location decompression program that we initiated months ago are maturing and evolving as we learn more about how to maintain and even improve our lives beyond the battlefield. NSW is evolving like never before, and we will raise direct and indirect special warfare capabilities for the fight to new levels. Operators, Sailors in combat support and combat service support roles, and civilian staff must recognize this transformation and continually support it with fresh ideas. I am committed to ensuring Naval Special Warfare remains flexible and innovative, and building upon the legacy of honor we inherited from our pioneers. Rear Adm. Edward Winters

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n the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, four SEALs died and eight were injured during an attempt to secure Punta Paitilla Airfield, disable Gen. Manuel Noriega’s plane and prevent him from leaving the country. In December 2009 and January 2010, both the White House and SEAL Team 4 hosted remembrance ceremonies honoring service members who participated in the action, otherwise known as Operation Just Cause. Navy SEAL Capt. Adam Curtis did not attend either ceremony, but he will never forget what happened. It was almost Christmas, 1989, and Curtis was looking forward to a great evening with his wife Bonnie who was visiting him in Panama. Curtis was a lieutenant assigned as a riverine division officer at a special boat unit in Panama at the time. “I transferred on an unaccompanied tour to Panama. I had been married a year and a half. I went down for what was intended to be a 14-month tour,” said Curtis. Curtis and Bonnie had just finished eating dinner at a local restaurant and were on the way back to his barracks when they reached a Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) checkpoint. The couple was questioned and their car was searched. Curtis recounted. “While we were there, another group of Americans came to the road block, three Army guys and a Marine – all officers. They (the Americans) felt threatened, they gunned it through the road block, and five PDF soldiers turned and fired at the car. The officer in the back, an Army lieutenant named (Robert) Paz, was killed.” That night, the PDF held Curtis and his wife at a detention center where they were interrogated for hours. Their ordeal was a moment that changed their lives and American history. Tensions between the United States and Panama had been escalating long before Curtis’ situation and the PDF had been harassing Americans stationed there for a while, he said. According to Curtis, President George H. W. Bush made the final decision to invade Panama after hearing about how Curtis had been beaten during his interrogation, and particularly how wis wife was terrorized while they were detained. By Sunday, elements of Navy SEAL Teams 2 and 4 had infiltrated the country. The two teams were given the task of destroying Panamanian patrol boats and taking control of Paitilla Airfield. At that point, Noriega was the leader of Panama and one of the world’s most scandalous dictators. At around midnight, elements of SEAL Teams 2 and 4 were on the move. SEAL Cmdr. Norman Carley, task unit commander for SEAL Team 2, was with his men aboard combat rubber raiding crafts in a mangrove, waiting to launch his four SEAL swimmers to attach explosives to the Presidente Porras patrol boat. “The commander of the whole operation, Gen. (Carl) Steiner, thought 2

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that the operation had been compromised, and he moved up the time to execute the operation by a half hour,” Carley said. “But the clocks and safety and arming devices on the explosives were already set.” “As they were doing so (attaching explosives to the patrol boat), a fire fight was going on and grenades were falling into the water,” said Carley. “They (SEALs) thought that they were detected. But they finished attaching their explosive devices before swimming away.” As the clock struck 0100, a large blast from the SEAL’s explosives shook the walls of buildings across Panama, sending PDF soldiers scrambling for an imminent battle. This part of the mission was a historic success — it was the first time SEALs successfully executed an underwater swimmer attack against an enemy ship of battle. At the same moment near Paitilla Airfield, more SEALs were coming ashore in small inflatable boats. “We saw and heard the explosion in Panama City while waiting for our swim scouts to signal the beach landing site,” recounted SEAL Capt. Dennis Hansen, a lieutenant at the time, and platoon officer in charge for SEAL Team 4. “As we advanced, I heard yelling,” Hansen said. “The plan was to tell security guards to go away. This seemed to work well until we got to Noriega’s plane hangar. There, a gun fight broke out after a brief exchange of words. The platoon adjacent to mine was directly in front of the hanger. They were to disable the plane. About half of the platoon was wounded. I sent my assistant officer in charge (AOIC) and his squad to support the platoon that was in contact. They took effective fire also, killing my AOIC and wounding a couple of other men.” Four team members died in the fire fight: Lt.j.g. John Connors, Chief Engineman Donald McFaul, Boatswain’s Mate 1st Class Chris Tilghman, and Torpedoman’s Mate 2nd Class Isaac Rodriguez III. The SEALs who participated in Operation Just Cause endured a bittersweet ending. Bonnie and the other SEAL families remained in Panama, having to endure the nearby fighting, while Curtis joined his teammates in the invasion. Noriega turned himself into U.S. authorities 14 days after SEALs invaded the country. MC2 Matt Daniels MC2 Shauntae Hinkle-Lymas

Sharing the Knowledge

OUR GLOBAL FOOTPRINT

JSOTF-P SEALs assist in training of Philippine Armed Forces

ourteen members of Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) recently finished training on 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boats with NSW personnel attached to Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines at Naval Base Cavite. The six-week course was designed to give students follow-on training after four RIBs were purchased by the Philippine government in July 2009 from the U.S. Maritime Institute. These are the first 11-meter RIBs purchased for use by Philippine Naval Special Operations Units. JSOTF-P’s Task Force Archipelago was asked to conduct an advanced, detailed course for its Filipino counterparts at Cavite which would be similar to the training a U.S. SWCC receives. “The people going through this course will become trainers themselves, now that they are experts on the boats. After the class, they will go back to their respective units and train others on what they learned here,” said the JSOTF-P Navy SEAL officer in charge. Students in training learned different parts of boat operation and mission execution, such as mission planning, schematics of the boat, night navigation, medical training, weapons employment and how to perform maintenance to keep the boats fully operational. Sharing this knowledge and enhancing the skill sets of the NAVSOU was an honor for the East Coast-based Special Boat Team. Military subject matter expert exchanges are one of the key mission capabilities of JSOTF-P. “The (Philippine) Navy SEALs did a great job during this class,” said

(above) Armed Forces of the Philippines Navy SEALs participate in a training evolution aboard AFP Navy logistics support vessel BRP Dagupan City (LC-551) during a maritime interdiction operation exercise. (left) Personnel aboard an 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boats (RIB) owned by Armed Forces of the Philippines Special Operations Group prepare to perform a maritime interdiction operation exercise in Manila Bay. Photos by Lt. j.g. Theresa Donnelly

JSOTF-P’s RIB detachment leading chief petty officer. “Their motivation to receive this knowledge is great. I was continuously impressed with their enthusiasm and commitment to the training. I am fully comfortable with their ability to operate the boat.” The RIBs will be sent to various units which will enhance the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ capabilities to address transnational crimes and counter maritime threats by conducting maritime interdiction operations. By Lt. j.g. Theresa Donnelly CJOSTF-P Public Affairs ETHOS

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OUR GLOBAL FOOTPRINT

A FORCE

MULTIPLIER

n emerging Navy component will focus on foreign special operations partnerships in Africa. Naval Special Warfare Unit 10 (NSWU 10) will stand up later this year to support Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA).

MCC Stan Travioli

Rear Adm. Edward Winters, commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, recently directed the re-commissioning of NSWU 10 to be the maritime component command of SOCAFRICA, a theater special operations command. SOCAFRICA integrates SOF into U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) theater security plans by matching the appropriate SOF with mission requirements, and maintains operational command and control over all SOF forces in theater. Immediately after SOCAFRICA establishment Oct. 1, 2008, it began listing its mission requirements – many of which were tailored for SEAL and SWCC operators. AFRICOM, a unified command, gives DoD one military headquarters focused on U. S. initiatives on the continent. Previously,

responsibility for DoD activities in Africa was shared among U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific Command. The establishment of U.S. Africa Command indicates the growing strategic importance of Africa and the need for a united approach when dealing with regional peace and stability issues. Co-located with NSWU 2 in Panzer Kaserne, Stuttgart, Germany, the command that will become Unit 10 is projected to grow to an initial operating capability of 25 personnel over the next year. Currently, NSWU 10 has a unit identification code and billets; and over the next few years, manning will grow to approximately 53 personnel, mirroring other NSW units. NSWU 10 is working with select partner nations to increase their capacity to secure their coastlines by training and advising maritime counter terrorism units. Additionally, NSWU 10 is establishing the capability to rapidly deploy SEALs and SWCC as NSW task groups in support of contingency operations. NSWU 10 coordinates efforts from deployed NSW leadership and regional experts with U.S. diplomatic teams and host nation military. Rotating NSW squadrons deploy to meet most of the operational

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Cameroon elite Battalion d’Intervention Rapide forces are training with SEAL and SWCC operators on basic boat handling skills, waterborne patrols, GPS navigation and vessel interdiction. The efforts have already proven successful in halting terrorists’ actions.

Cameroon Kenya

requirements in this area of operations. SEALs and SWCC train with and advise partner nations, work with interagency partners and engage enemy combatants. NSW forces are assuming important roles supporting SOCAFRICA and its subordinate commands, Joint Special Operations Task Force, Trans-Sahara (JSOTF-TS) and the Special Operations Command and Control Element, Horn of Africa (SOCCE-HOA) in two of the most volatile regions on the African continent. JSOTF-TS is charged with countering the growing Al Qaeda threat within the Trans-Sahara region. SOCCE-HOA focuses on the growing challenges with piracy and terrorism in Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea and Tanzania. Two of NSW’s key partners in Africa are Kenya and Cameroon. NSW is working alongside select groups from these countries to combat the emerging threat of piracy and terrorism, and in the process, creating the model within SOCAFRICA for persistent engagements. Both engagements are producing tangible results; the Kenyan and Cameroonian forces have executed successful unilateral vessel interdiction operations. These engagements are laying the framework for enhanced security and stability on the African continent.

KENYA

NSW supports operations at Manda Bay, Kenya with a Special Boat Task Unit, along with assistance from the Navy Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School. SEAL and SWCC operators are training Kenyan naval forces with over-the-horizon interdiction. With NSW’s mentoring, Kenya’s maritime forces are pushing past the basics and learning advanced seamanship and tactics, and will soon have their own trained instructors to develop these skills even further. The task unit also assists civil engineers with evaluating ports in need of repair, and indentifying small construction projects to benefit the local populace.

Illustration by MC2 Arcenio Gonzalez Jr.

Africa

The contributions by NSW forces in Kenya will enhance the maritime security environment – especially along the Somali border – and set the conditions for a more stable economy, both for the Kenyans and the region.

CAMEROON

NSW forces are also making significant contributions in the nation of Cameroon. A mix of SEAL and SWCC operators are training the Cameroon elite Battalion d’Intervention Rapide (BIR) and building infrastructure for maritime defense. The comprehensive program focuses first on basic boat handling skills. As the students progress, NSW operators incorporate waterborne patrols, GPS navigation and vessel interdiction. Like the Kenyan partnership, the efforts in Cameroon have quickly produced results; the first graduates have already halted terrorists’ actions, including a recent engagement which eliminated a small group of pirates. As NSW expands into the AFRICOM area of operations, understanding the mission, partner nation capabilities, the terrain and the local population will be key. NSWU 10 will be a springboard and valuable force multiplier for SOCAFRICA, allowing continued success in bringing stability to volatile regions, thwarting terrorism and piracy, and ultimately, protecting U.S. strategic interests.



MCC Stan Travioli NSWG 2 Public Affairs

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OUR GLOBAL FOOTPRINT

Anchor Teams Nearly 2,300 years ago Sun Tzu wrote, “Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster.”

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Sun Tzu espoused a philosophy that was focused on state warfare but still applies in today’s struggle against loosely organized insurgencies and terrorist networks driven by ideology.

NSW ANCHOR DETACHMENT In order to adapt to the demands of irregular warfare and find a balanced operational tempo, NSW has ordered the reinvestment and expansion of indirect warfare capabilities. A tasking order issued in December directed the implementation of a new organizational tool that will provide an enduring ownership of the problem set with a human investment for creating, nurturing and sustaining various relationships in places where our forces are currently involved in SOF missions. This tool is the Naval Special Warfare Anchor Detachment (NSWAD). NSWAD is an umbrella term for small teams of regionally-focused operators who are committed to specific Partner Nation (PN) forces and cultural expertise. The NSWAD is the CONUS-based element of operators reassigned to NSW Support Activities. Each NSWAD will deploy small elements,

Illustration by MC2 Arcenio Gonzalez Jr.

key component of knowing our enemy is to understand the human terrain of the places where we are engaged. In a recent article for Joint Force Quarterly magazine, Adm. Eric T. Olson, commander of USSOCOM, summed up the value of knowing our enemy in broader terms: “The surest means of winning against an irregular enemy is to defeat him before the shooting starts. Consensus must be favored over coercion, and the ability to do so proactively requires a holistic approach to warfare aimed at both eliminating adversaries and eroding the conditions that foment and foster their behavior.” Irregular warfare against these “non-state actors” tends to be in areas of strife where “weak or failed governments” are no longer capable of adequately meeting the basic survival needs of the population, he wrote. Hence, organizations such as the Taliban in Afghanistan step in to provide those needs or simply fill the power vacuum. Their strength lies in the ability to create binding ties of real value to the population and take advantage of their knowledge of the terrain, both physical and human. It is their relationship with the population that gives them advantage. Countering this advantage requires persistent presence in the environment to develop the knowledge, expertise, relationships and trust with partner nations and other agencies. Naval Special Warfare’s traditional six month deployment cycle and limited repeat deployments by NSW operators to key areas hinders ownership, continuity and long-term expertise. One simple solution would be to extend all deployments out to nine months or a year to give time for these relationships to build, but this would have a negative impact on our families and eventually the battlefield.

“The mission of these teams is to “foster continuity, cultural expertise, connectedness, and long-term commitment – the four C’s of counterinsurgency.” Rear Adm. Edward Winters commander, NSW

known as NSW Anchor Teams (NSWAT), to geographically-assigned areas. They will answer to their Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) for tasking. According to Rear Adm. Edward Winters, commander of NSWC, the mission of these teams is to “foster continuity, cultural expertise, connectedness, and long-term commitment – the four C’s of successful counterinsurgency.” Anchor Detachments derive their name from the SOCOM 2006 Capstone Concept for Special Operations (CCSO), which says “Serving as strategic anchors, small forwardbased joint SOF teams will be situated in or adjacent to critical or sensitive countries. They will build stability through sustained engagement over a period of years with host nation security forces.” While today’s NSW operators have been largely focused on direct action and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

missions in support of combatant commanders, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a growing demand for irregular warfare missions, including counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense (FID), and security force assistance (SFA), as well as advanced intelligence operations and liaison. This “advise and assist” role is similar to the missions encompassing SOF operations in Vietnam with partner nations and interagency partners during the early days of NSW. PERSISTENT PRESENCE Today’s watchword is “persistent,” as in maintaining a persistent presence. Personnel assigned to NSWADs are expected to complete a four-year tour with multiple deployments of various lengths to their area of responsibility (AOR). They will become immersed in the local language, culture, customs, attitudes and beliefs in their AOR. “There are some locations where anchor teams will be co-located with other DOD forces,” said Cmdr. Robert Newson, deputy assistant chief of staff for operations plans and policy at NSWC. “In other locations they may be the only DOD element. They will have extensive interaction with the embassy’s country team security assistance office and other members of the country team. They will be embedded with partner nation forces and working from forward operating bases.” The NSWATs are designed to be the bridge between DOD forces, partner nations and interagency partners, eliminating the awkwardness, disassociation, memory loss and transactional friction created by the complete turnover of personnel every six months, a phenomenon known in NSW leadership circles as ‘flush and fill.’ “We’re also talking about the unique language and culture of other U.S. government agencies,” said Newsom, “whether it’s Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development or anybody else. We want these guys to be the ones who move seamlessly in and out and communicate DOD thoughts in a language that people understand. “Their (NSWATs) year-long deployment shifts their time focus, so they’re not so concerned about getting things done on a sixmonth cycle,” he said. “This is significant to a country team that views six-month TDYs as transients; whereas they see guys who are there for a year or more as professionals who are invested in their problem set.” “NSWAT members are expected to develop and maintain core competencies such as combat skills, instruction and assessment, security assistance and interagency relations. This goes along with the language, regional continued ETHOS

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Lt. j.g. Theresa Donnelly

Training with partner nation forces is a key mission for Anchor Teams. FID, SFA and combat advisement provides longterm relationships with partner nation forces, which in turn gives them both the authorities and ground truth they need to conduct operations.

expertise and cultural knowledge they must attain.” “The complexity of the present strategic environment requires that SOF operators maintain not only the highest levels of warfighting expertise but also cultural knowledge and diplomacy skills,” said Olson to JFQ. This would require “a multidimensional force prepared to lay the groundwork in the myriad diplomatic, development, and defense activities that contribute to the U.S. Government’s pursuit of vital national interests. “If we do not commit a significant portion of our personnel to living abroad in other cultures for extended periods,” he continued, “and to specializing rather than generalizing our skill sets, then we will fail to gain the trust, credibility and faith of those nations and partners we claim to be fighting alongside.”

A SELECT PERCENTAGE OF THE SEAL AND SWCC COMMUNITY The total number of personnel assigned to NSWADs will remain a very small select percentage of the entire community of SEAL and SWCC operators. Initial selection of personnel has already occurred at the Group level and more than 100 operators were considered for the few dozen available NSWAD billets. “Each of the Groups nominated a range of Sailors that fit a discrete profile,” said Cmdr. Sam Havelock, commanding officer, NSW Support Activity 1. “There was a very long list of nominees which was whittled down to the most ideal people for the job.” What type of operator fits the description of the ideal NSWAT member? “We are looking for a guy who has deployed

to that area,” said Newson. “They have to be adaptable, mature and professionally seasoned with an affinity for this kind of work – it’s a blend of rank, operational experience and personality. “This is a refining school for NSW unit leaders. It’s the refinement and professionalization of the SEAL/SWCC capability. If you plan on being a SEAL master chief in NSW, you should try to get on an anchor detachment because that will help make you competitive in the future environment where an entire squadron is no longer going to Iraq but instead distributed across the globe.” NSWADs will also feature some limited civilian billets. “We are looking at prior SOF guys to be operations and

“If we do not commit a significant portion of our personnel to living abroad in other cultures for extended periods, and to specializing rather than generalizing our skill sets, then we will fail to gain the trust, credibility and faith of those nations and partners we claim to be fighting alongside.” Adm. Eric T. Olson commander, USSOCOM

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CAREER MILESTONES NSW leaders anticipate the community may wonder how a tour of duty with an NSWAD will affect career paths. Rear Adm. Winters plans to give guidance to promotion selection boards in order to enhance the careers of those operators participating in the NSWADs, Newson said. “In his community guidance, he talks about the career milestones, the important schools the guy would have; he would discuss the importance of being an Anchor Team member and how that is valuable to the community.” “Maturing operators view career milestones as tours of duty with a platoon, task unit, or cross-functional troop (CFT),” Newson said, “and they may not understand how an NSWAD fits into a successful career model. A misperception might be that a specialization tour with an NSWAD focused on one geographic area or country may stunt the growth of a career, but this is not the case. In my mind, it’s no different than a disassociated tour to be an instructor at the Center or a staff officer of a TSOC.” SIMILAR TIME AWAY FROM HOME Operators may also be concerned with how the longer deployment may affect family life. Havelock said his first priority after mission success was to take care of the operators and their families, but the operator should note that the actual time spent away from home as a member of the NSWAD will be quite similar to a tour of duty with a squadron. “If you do a comparative analysis between a squadron’s inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC) schedule and what we have planned for NSWADs, you’re going to find Sailors will spend nearly the same time TDY away from home over the course of four years,” he said. OPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES Havelock said NSW members should look at duty with an NSWAD as a way of linking NSW into sustained operational opportunities with partner forces, especially as the political

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Micky M. Bazaldua

plans officers for the anchor detachments, but they may also deploy,” said Newson. “They could be on a multi-tour assignment with that detachment. It’s an opportunity to tap into that graybeard experience level that we need to provide additional maturity and continuity.” The first deployment will happen no later than April. The PCS transfer of personnel to remaining NSWAD billets is expected to be final by October.

In order to adapt to and counter the enemy’s advantage, Naval Special Warfare has ordered the reinvestment and expansion of indirect warfare capabilities. A task order issued in December implemented a new organizational tool that will provide an enduring ownership of the problem set with a human investment for creating, nurturing and sustaining various relationships in places where our forces are currently involved in SOF missions. This tool is the Naval Special Warfare Anchor Team.

appetite for unilateral (U.S.-only) operations decreases. “Many people think Special Forces embrace FID just because they like doing FID,” he said. “They embrace FID because it serves as a platform to remain relevant in whatever stage of war in which they find themselves. FID, SFA and combat advisement provides long-term relationships with partner nation forces, which in turn gives them both the authorities and ground truth they need to conduct operations. “Once major combat operations wind down, dynamic operations become fewer and far between,” said Havelock. “You have to go out and build the capability you want to fight beside, develop the information you need, and operate under the authorities that only the partner nation’s force or other agencies will possess. “If you want operational opportunities,” continued Havelock, “you have to be forward, you have to be in small teams, and you have to be alongside people who have the authority to operate. This notion that you are going to be operating less, and that you will have no operational opportunity as an NSW adviser is flawed. Mike Thornton won the Congressional Medal of Honor while serving as one of two SEAL advisers leading a Vietnamese squad in combat. His story is just one across a long legacy of NSW combat

advisers.” Specific deployment areas and exact composition of the NSWADs is too sensitive to discuss here, however, Newson said more information will be communicated to the force via ‘town hall meetings’ with Rear Adm. Winters, and through other official channels. Havelock, in the meantime, is confident the Anchor Detachments will be successful. “I have no doubt the guys are going to exceed everyone’s broadest hopes for the program,” he said. “Once SEALs and SWCCs are given a mission, they succeed. We are committed to providing them the training, flexibility, and command support to make this effort a success.” The future may include fleet interoperability initiatives for some Anchor Teams and a concentration on a foreign language program to enhance force flexibility and strengthen a diverse force. “The strength of SOF,” said Olson during his JFQ interview, “is not in raising basic armies or police forces; it is in developing and mentoring the special forces, commandos, paramilitary, and surrogate forces of other nations, which we are doing in both Iraq and Afghanistan.” MCCS Scott Williams

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Al Qaeda

in the land of the Maghreb:

Matthew Binard

Danger or Delusion?

n Sept. 11, 2006, senior Al Qaeda deputy Ayman alZawahiri announced via video release that the Algerianbased Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) would henceforth be officially affiliated with Al Qaeda. This was followed in January 2007 with an announcement from GSPC that its name had officially changed to the Organization of Al Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). At first glance, this represents the manifestation of many Western fears about the Al Qaeda organization. GSPC was created as a militant Islamic organization

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focused strictly on the power struggle inside of Algeria with the goal of putting an Islamic government into power; their transformation into AQIM purported to represent a unifying jihadist banner for all movements in North Africa under the umbrella of the Al Qaeda (AQ) global association. A merger such as this, to the reactionary constituency, represented the viral nature of the Al Qaeda organization and was a sure sign of things to come in the ongoing struggle to defeat AQ. The merger and subsequent GSPC-to-AQIM name change could be read as a sign of Al Qaeda’s impressive ability for expansion and

suggested that AQ’s global jihad ideology would begin to turn onceregionally focused organizations such as GSPC into part Al Qaeda’s ever-expanding global terror network. This view is captured well by analysis from Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center: “The name change is indicative of the group’s desire to transform itself into an Al-Qaeda regional affiliate, expand its aims beyond Algeria to create a regional caliphate, and adopt a pan-Islamic, as opposed to nationalistic, jihadist ideology.” But does such rhetoric overstate the importance of the GSPC-AQ merger and the emergence of AQIM while missing the true meaning of the evolution? In simplest terms, does this merger represent the emergence, in AQIM, of a new globally-focused jihadist organization; or, is it simply a marriage of convenience resulting from the selfish interests of both GSPC and Al Qaeda? The following analysis will address this question by tracing the membership, actions and tactics of GSPC and AQIM to demonstrate that there is, in fact, little evidence of the emergence of a significantly more dangerous transnational threat as a result of the merger. What will be evident is a dominantly Algeria-focused campaign, with minimal actions in the Maghreb and Sahel regions, that sees AQIM continuing on a very similar course as their predecessors. But while there is little evidence to support the alarmist view, the existence of AQIM as a transnational network of contacts and relationships warrants close monitoring and continued dismantling efforts. Regardless of the demonstrated kinetic capability of the organization, the connectivity of the network implies a latent danger that should be aggressively disrupted as it does improve the global reach and information campaign of Al Qaeda.

History The history of Algeria from the late 1980s to the late 1990s is violent and complex. Along with radical political struggles, the decade saw the emergence of a series of Islamist groups whose ideologies were, in most part, expressions of discontent for the ruling regime in Algeria. This is not, of course, an uncommon pattern in the post-colonial Middle East, where corrupt ‘democratic’ regimes have often served as a catalyst for the creation of violent opposition groups. The Algerian government, however, demonstrated a particularly poor approach to its first encounter with the progenitor of Algeria’s antiregime movement, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The FIS was, albeit under the banner of excessively militant rhetoric, seeking power through legitimate democratic channels and their electoral gains in the early 1990s caught the Algerian regime by surprise. The threat of a legitimately elected Islamist element gaining control of the parliament was too much for the Algerian military leadership to accept and they chose to execute a bloodless coup in 1992, thereby blocking FIS’s legitimate avenue to political control. Five years of extreme violence would follow, as the military’s heavy-handed oppression tactics fueled the ideology of more militant Islamist groups who had believed all along that FIS’s approach had been destined for failure. The ensuing conflict between the military regime and the Islamist groups, spanning most of the 1990s,

would witness the violent deaths of 150,000-200,000 Algerian citizens, rebels and military personnel in the combined efforts of both camps. The strongest element to emerge from the anti-government forces was the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), but the atrocities they inflicted upon Algerian citizens during this period, combined with improved counterinsurgency strategy on the part of the Algerian government, led to their slow delegitimization in the eyes of the Algerian citizenry. In 1998, then senior and seasoned GIA leader Hasaan Hattab broke away to start his own faction, the Groupe Salafist pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC). Hataab’s breakaway was due, in large part, to his discontent with GIA’s targeting of Algerian citizens that was, for all practical purposes, highly indiscriminate. In announcing the creation of GSPC, Hattab quickly established the intent of GSPC was to focus on outside enemies and their collaborators in Algeria, not on innocent Algerian citizens. But the counter insurgency of the Algerian regime was proving effective, and following the GSPC’s establishment, the group quickly came under great pressure from the increasingly successful efforts of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Hataab would leave the organization in 2001, and the organization would see a series of leadership changes over the years following. By 2003, GSPC was in a position of relative weakness, having come under additional pressure following the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks as the United States increased financial support to Bouteflika’s counter-terror efforts. From this position, GSPC began a campaign of overtly aligning themselves with Al Qaeda. This relationship continued to evolve for several years, culminating in the 2006 announcement by Zawahiri that officially welcomed GSPC into the fold of Al Qaeda’s global jihadist movement. The organization subsequently changed it name, and AQIM was officially born. This analysis of AQIM will look at four aspects of comparison between GSPC and AQIM activities: membership, the number of kinetic operations executed, the locations of these operations and the tactics utilized by AQIM. Taken in total, these variables will offer conclusions as to the actual threat posed by AQIM, and demonstrate whether the transition from GSPC to AQIM created a more dangerous entity.

Membership Given Hattab’s initial rhetoric concerning the creation of AQIM, one would expect to have seen consistent efforts on the group’s behalf toward unification with other jihadist groups in the Maghreb. This has not occurred. AQIM has not become a coalition-led organization with Tunisian, Moroccan and Libyan jihadist leaders joining the AQIM leadership circle. Nor has it been able to establish a relationship with the other wellestablished jihadist organization in the Maghreb, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) that waxed and waned in its interest in establishing a similarly direct relationship with Al Qaeda. Ultimately, based on the membership variable, there is little evidence that AQIM has had any success in creating the pan-Maghreb jihadist organization it is intended to represent. Instead, its leadership and membership remains dominated by Algerian nationals. While this does not make the organization any less of a threat within Algeria, it does suggest that there is continued ETHOS

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U.S. Army 2nd Lt. Michael Snodgrass, of 2nd Platoon, Charlie Troop, 1st Squadron, 32nd Cavalry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, speaks with Sons of Iraq members about Al Qaeda activity in Abu Bakur, Iraq.

little about its current make-up to differentiate it from what GSPC would have likely evolved into.

Kinetic Operations

Table 1 below from Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center provides a visual representation of the increases and decreases of AQIM kinetic operations, within Algeria, from 2002 to 2009. The figures are divided into micro and macro attacks, where macro attacks are those specifically designed to kill more than 20 people, involve explosive devises more than 100 lbs., or involve the destruction of a major transportation asset (aircraft, train, etc.). This shows a steady but not dramatic increase in both micro and macro attacks following the 2007 named change to AQIM, with a dip in macro-attacks in 2009. (Final statistics for 2009 are not yet available, but numbers are trending down from previous years.) This level of violence, while notable and warranting attention, pales in comparison to the bloodshed seen in Algeria during the 1990s. As noted by Hanna Rogan, “compared to [the violence of the 1990s], the levels of violence and numbers of attacks that have taken place during the last eight years [2001 – 2008] have been limited and relatively constant.” On scale, this level of kinetic activity does not demonstrate a radical increase in capability on the part of GSPC following its transformation into AQIM in 2007. Table 1 is limited to those AQIM kinetic operations within Algeria, which provide the best picture of the majority of the organization’s activities. AQIM has not demonstrated a high capability for executing kinetic operations in parts of the Maghreb or in the Sahel. Table 2 below (AQIM area of operations) will provide greater data on these strikes, but the numbers are minimal and the attacks have posed a relatively small threat to governments in neighboring nations.

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Micky M. Bazaldua

Area of Operations

While these attacks likely represent a vision of where the organization hopes to go, they by no means represent a legitimate capability to execute an effective trans-national kinetic campaign.

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As to its ability to expand its area of operations, AQIM has shown similarly lackluster results since its inception. Similar to membership expansion, one would expect that AQIM would focus heavily on expanding its operational area in order to establish itself as the transnational threat it was purporting to be. However, since the 2007 name-change, the majority of its operations have taken place in the same areas once struck by GSPC, with only a very small number of attacks taking place outside of Algerian territory. As noted in Jane’s Insurgency and Terrorism data base: “Despite its new international image, attacks since early 2007 have been largely confined to a swath of territory east and southeast of Algiers. This area of operation suggests AQIM has yet to expand itself beyond the traditional GSPC strongholds, particularly those areas under Droukdel’s [current AQIM commander] direct control.” Table 2 from Jane’s shows the number of incidents associated with AQIM in the Maghreb and Sahel regions over the past 12 months: Algeria clearly remains the focal point of AQIM activities, and its ability to affect other nations of the Maghreb is limited. Additionally, in Mali and Mauritania, where there seems to be a respectable amount of AQIM activity, there are actually very few fatalities associated with these incidents. The vast majority of terrorism-related deaths in the Sahel are tied to local, nationally focused organizations (e.g., the Taureg rebel groups in Mali). While AQIM’s rhetoric and publicized vision is trans-Maghrebian and global in nature, its actual activities are strictly regional. They are mostly limited to traditional strongholds within Algeria. Attacks outside of Algeria have been sporadic, with single-digit occurrences in 2008 and 2009, and limited mostly to countries of the Sahel with marginal results. While these attacks likely represent a vision of where

the organization hopes to go, they by no means represent a legitimate capability to execute an effective trans-national kinetic campaign.

Tactics

The tactics employed by AQIM have shown a dangerous evolution, but not necessarily in a positive direction for the organization. Following its formal change to AQIM, suicide bombers and suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) were soon adopted as a tactic, with the first SVBIEDs appearing in April 2007, less than three months after the name-change. These tactics have had a significant impact on the visibility and level of destruction associated with AQIM operations. These new tactics are most likely explained by the return of knowledgeable fighters from Iraq (both Algerian and some non-Algerians), where these tactics continue to be the mainstay of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). As noted by Jean-Pierre Filiu, the statements of AQIM consistently present a global jihadist tone, but the only major shift has occurred at the tactical level. “Despite the inflamed global rhetoric and the Internet echo chamber,” said Filiu, “the main difference [between GSPC and AQIM] lies in the generalization of the suicide attacks, which were practically unknown in Algeria before 2007.” As seen in Iraq, the benefit for a terror organization of utilizing large suicide attacks is seen in the return on investment (the loss of one member can inflict great harm on the opposition) and in the information-operations realm, as the world media has an established pattern of devoting significant coverage to large scale bombings. However, the down side (also visible in the lifecycle of AQI) is the indiscriminate nature of such strikes that commonly involve civilian casualties. Lianne Boudali, with West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, summarized the situation: “Detonating a large bomb in a public place represents a reversal of GSPC’s pledge to avoid civilian casualties; however it is entirely consistent with al-Qa’ida’s fondness

Table 1.

The tactics

employed by AQIM have shown a dangerous evolution, but not necessarily

in a positive direction for the organization.

for mass casualty attacks that generate a lot of publicity.” The employment of these tactics, while increasing the visibility of AQIM, is likely to keep them isolated from the Algerian people from whom AQIM would hope to garner support. In essence, without expanding its area of operations, adopting AQI tactics simply makes AQIM appear as a myopically focused, more brutal, regional problem. The empirics of AQIM’s history tell a story that clearly runs counter to the group’s rhetoric. It has not become a global, or even significant regional threat. Instead, it has defaulted to activities in the same areas that GSPC traditionally struck. It has not been able to significantly increase its level of kinetic operations, nor has it managed to diversify its membership, with its ranks and leadership still dominated by Algerian nationals. The most significant change has been its willingness to adopt the indiscriminate suicide bombing tactics of AQI, a decision that makes AQIM look as unconcerned with civilian deaths as its forebears, the GIA. It should not be discounted, however, that Al Qaeda can still claim an information-operations victory in its acquisition of GSPC. In its ongoing efforts to maintain global relevance and a perceived ability to control jihadist actions around the world, any internationally recognized terror-group carrying the Al Qaeda brand name increases the perceived power of the parent organization. The vast majority of the global audience will never know the nuances of the AQ-AQIM relationship, or the details of its transition from GSPC. Instead, the real target of this overt expansion – the global consumer of main stream media – simply sees that Al Qaeda is now able to execute operations in Africa, and will make little distinction between Maghreb and Sahel, or between high or low complexity in targeting. From this angle, despite its inability to truly grow as a regional or global threat, AQIM represents a small win for Al Qaeda as long as it is able to remain active in the eyes of the world’s media and the consumers of that media. Note: This article was originally created by the author for the Naval Postgraduate School as part of a curriculum requirement. Source citations are available upon request. Lt. Cmdr. C.L. Fussell

Table 2. ETHOS 13

W ay

OUR GLOBAL FOOTPRINT

NSW’S CULTURE MOVEMENT Since the early days of the Korean War and Vietnam, the U.S. military has used a variety of different programs to leverage the language and cultural awareness skills of foreign nationals or foreign-born service members. Today’s combat theaters also require these valuable enablers.

Scott A. Thornbloom

eaders at Naval Special Warfare recognized the demand and activities for theater task unit special operations commanders and incorporated a new organization that will meet this need: interagency and host nation partners. the cultural engagement troop (CET). Cmdr. Sam Havelock, “The concept is to recruit heritage-born language and regional commanding officer of Naval Special Warfare Support Activity 1, experts from specific geographical areas,” said Senior Chief Special illustrated the reason for importing the talents of culturally-diverse Warfare Operator (SEAL) Daniel Gearhart, senior enlisted advisor for Sailors. the program. “When we show up to “The LREs will have peoples’ villages and it’s deep organic regional and the first time they’ve seen cultural expertise,” added Americans up close, they’re Lt. Jason H. Booher, usually terrified,” he said. commander of the CET. “They don’t understand “We’re going to look at the what’s going on and individual: his background, contracted translators can’t his education level, his really help because they tactical competency and aren’t service members and his experience, then don’t really know the full deploy him to the location context of our mission. that will have the greatest “If we want those who strategic impact.” have been exposed to combat The idea is based very situations to understand loosely off the Army’s what just happened in their “09 Lima” program, the village,” he continued, “we military occupational have to bring people who specialty for interpreters. understand them, their NSW has been in frequent language, their region and contact with the Army and TAKE YOUR OATH The first U. S. Navy Sailors to participate in the Secretary of Defense’s their culture. If we don’t several other organizations Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) pilot program are issued the Oath of have cultural experts to that have created similar Citizenship at the Region Legal Service Office. advise us and translate our programs in the past. mission, we simply create more insurgents.” “We’ve approached the development of this program from a ‘best The CET is charged with organizing, manning, training, equipping practices’ perspective of attempting to learn from others’ successes and deploying language and regional experts (LRE) to strategic and failures,” said Booher. locations across the NSW area of operations. These experts will Sailors are recruited into the CET through various pipelines, interface with local cultures and provide other combat support including the Special Operations Forces Access Recruiting Program,

NSW culture movement 14

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Kultura ng paggalaw ng NSW ay Filipino

NSW utamaduni harakati Swahili

Cultuur NSW beweging Dutch

m H

SO1 Joel Beam

BUDDY AID A member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Naval Special Operations Group participates in a battlefield exercise during a combat medic subject matter expert exchange at Naval Base Cavite, Philippines. The new language and regional experts will be able to assist operators in specific geographical locations.

mouvman kilti NSW a Haitian Creole-Alpha

NSW se kultuur beweging Afrikaans

The CET will be located away from other NSW units to limit security risks. LREs will deploy and augment NSW operational units upon successful completion of their individual qualification training and security screening process. Some MAVNI candidates have already graduated recruit training and are in the process of being received at Support Activity 1. Deployments are expected to begin next year. MC2 Kevin W. Clark

NSWG 2 Public Affairs

Lt. j.g. Theresa Donnelly

consisting of the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) and the Navy’s Heritage Language programs. The CET program is a USSOCOM priority and aligns with the U.S. Navy language skills, regional expertise and cultural awareness strategy, said Booher. The MAVNI program is designed to encourage foreign nationals to join the Department of Defense by offering expedited U.S. citizenship in return for a four-year enlistment in the military. Prior to recruitment, the MAVNI graduates are subjected to extensive security screenings due to the sensitive nature of special warfare. This includes an appearance before an oral board of NSW leadership. Then the candidates attend recruit training with other Sailors prior to reporting to the CET. “The Navy has been very careful to develop a program with high standards and careful screening to limit the risk,” said Lt. Cmdr. Renee J. Squier, Navy Recruiting Command liaison to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations staff. “Because we want them to be SEALs or in support of SEALs, we knew that security screening was most important.” “They’ll come from boot camp and begin training that will prepare them to be area expert advisors as well as to shoot, move and communicate,” said Booher. The training pipeline will be similar to that completed by NSW combat support personnel. They will learn weapons, communications, field medical procedures and everything else they’ll use on the battlefield on top of what’s required for them to function as competent LREs, said Gearhart.

AFTER ACTION An SO1 medic assigned to JSOTF-P critiques students from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Naval Special Operations Group who are administering first aid to a victim with an arm injury during a field medical exercise.

NSW kulttuuri liikkuvuus Finnish

Gerakan budaya NSW Indonesian/Malay

DCN’s diwylliant symu Welsh ETHOS 15

OUR GLOBAL FOOTPRINT

The Center teaches language, regional expertise and cultural awareness As NSW continues to evolve and take on new missions around the world, it needs to maintain the ability to adapt and rapidly move into these areas. Just as competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur, language and cultural capabilities cannot be created after the need exists. NSW must continuously look forward to the needs of future battlefields, while continuing to support the operations of today. dm. Eric T. Olson, commander of USSOCOM,

directed all SOF forces to dramatically increase their language and cultural abilities, building highly proficient operators into the basic units of operations, defined for NSW as the SEAL platoon. “Our ability to communicate directly with indigenous peoples in our highest-priority operating areas has withered significantly,” he said. “In order to regain this essential mission skill, we must revamp and reprioritize our language training and management.” The Naval Special Warfare Center has been tasked with establishing local (East and West Coasts) language, regional expertise and cultural awareness (LREC) training and education programs to support the NSW Groups. LREC training will focus on developing individual linguists as well as provide deployment specific training support to every operational element. The goal is to meet USSOCOM’s guidance of having one 2/2 (DLPT score for listening/ reading) and one 3/3 qualified linguist in every tactical element. A level two score indicates basic proficiency and ease of cultural comprehension. A level three score indicates fluent speaking, listening and writing of target language. This fluency will include accent and the ability to form cogent arguments at academic and thoughtful levels, including abstract concepts. More than 400 NSW operators will receive initial acquisition training (IAT) in foreign languages per year in order to reach the goal of developing individual linguists. Every new SEAL and SWCC operator will attend the 12-week IAT training, as will a select group of current operators in order to meet the requirements of specific 16

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deployments. Approximately one quarter of the IAT students will be selected to move on to advanced language training (12 or 24 weeks), with the goal of reaching a 2/2 in their target language. The Center is formalizing a curriculum for immersion and other specialized programs to sustain fluency and continue to grow an individual’s capability. This will be flexible enough to support operators despite duty station and deployment rotation. LREC training will be provided to tactical units during the interdeployment training cycle that is specific to deployment location. Each unit will receive a two-week LREC primer during professional development, unit-level training and squadron integrated training. Role players with regional language expertise will be inserted into scenarios, enabling units to continue to develop their LREC capabilities in a simulated operational environment. Initially, NSW will build a capability in eight languages tailored to needs of the current fight while keeping the next ridgeline in sight. Operators attaining proficiency in languages are eligible for additional pay benefits as incentive. Currently, the targeted languages include pay bonuses of between $100 and $500 per month based on language, assignment and proficiency. Up to three bonuses can be stacked for proficiency in multiple languages, to a maximum of $1500 per month. NSW will develop robust, competent and adaptive language abilities and cultural understanding across the force and at the tactical levels to remain at the forefront of special operations. Lt. Frederick Martin







NSW Center Public Affairs Officer

he growth goal of the community is to balance retention and production. In the first few years following 2001, retention was challenged by civilian security companies who lured operators away with large salaries and bonuses for short-term contractor positions. In 2004, the net loss to the enlisted SEAL inventory was 46. As a result, reenlistment and retention bonuses were dramatically increased to contend with those external competitors. Retention goals were set at 75 to 100 per year to make up the deficit of roughly 500 enlisted SEALs; and although retention dramatically improved, the NSW community only grew by an average of 11 each year from 2005 to 2007.The SEAL Production Process Improvement (SPPI) working group was established in 2006 to evaluate and guide the process of increasing production through BUD/S and SQT. The group was chaired by Deputy Commander USSOCOM (then Vice Adm. Eric T. Olson) and the Chief of Naval Personnel (then Vice Adm. John Harvey). Other key members of the board of directors were the commanders of the three predominant commands that directly affect recruitment, basic military training, assessment, selection and training of SEAL candidates: Commander, Naval Recruiting Command (CNRC); Commander, Naval Services Training Command (CNSTC); and Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (CNSWC). The SPPI established cross-functional teams and evaluated the entire process, from recruitment to recruit training through BUD/S and SQT. All phases of training were reviewed. A core mission of the SPPI was to maintain the standards of BUD/S and not sacrifice quality of SQT graduates simply to gain quantity. CNRC succeeded in recruiting quality candidates at rates never before achieved by increasing from approximately 850 recruits to 1,289 annually. CNRC also established the Special Operations Mentor

Illustration by MC2 Erica Manzano

Since Sept. 11, 2001, the need for SEALs to conduct global operations has increased dramatically. In response, Naval Special Warfare’s authorized enlisted billets have doubled to support the development of four new NSW squadrons as well as Support Activities. This rapid growth caused an immediate and dramatic difference between authorized end strength and qualified personnel on hand. This required the community to recruit and train enlisted SEALs at a dramatic rate in order to meet battlefield demand.

program at each Naval Recruiting District, pairing a retired SEAL, EOD or Diver with recruits during their delayed entry program to ensure that they maintain their PT regimen as well as learn more about the program prior to entering recruit training. The Naval Special Warfare Center invested in a robust Recruiting Directorate (RD) run by a SEAL captain to assist CNRC with its marketing and recruiting of quality recruits. The NSW RD initiated multiple studies of successful candidates and contracted Gallup, a human behavior research organization, to provide data for a revamped marketing campaign to target successful SEAL candidates. Additionally, the NSW RD Web site, www.sealswcc.com, provides potential candidates with accurate and updated information directly from the Center on physical preparation, nutrition and expectations. It provides a forum for young men to discuss their own preparations with each other and RD personnel, which is now realigned under WARCOM. CNRC recently implemented an additional classification screening test at the Recruiting Districts for SEAL recruits. The Computerized Special Operations Resiliency Test (C-SORT) was developed over continued ETHOS

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The mental and physical quality of candidates entering the BUD/S pipeline is the highest it has ever been in the history of the program.

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MC2 Michelle Kapica

three years by a multi-command group that measures a candidate’s tolerance for psychological adversity, or “mental toughness.” When combined with the other significant factor that could predict success, the candidate’s initial Physical Standards Test, the result was an assessment that could accurately predict – with 97.5 percent confidence – who would likely drop out of BUD/S by the completion of Hell Week. Armed with knowledge gained from C-SORT, CNRC implemented new policy for recruitment of SEAL candidates and effectively removed 20 percent of applicants who would have previously dropped under instruction at the Center. Naval Recruiting Command has also changed vision standards from 20/200 to 20/40 and 20/75. This more stringent requirement eliminates about 150 candidates annually who would have to be placed in a medical hold status at the Center to receive corrective eye surgery prior to starting BUD/S. Candidates with the poorer vision historically were at a severe disadvantage, less likely by half to graduate compared to their peers with better vision. Naval Services Training Command focused on decreasing SEAL candidate losses at recruit training in Great Lakes, Ill. Recruits with SEAL contracts go through basic training together in a special division. This allows a medical officer to be available on accession day to rectify any medical discrepancies found in the recruit’s record. The special division conducts extra physical training events to keep them physically fit during boot camp. These measures have reduced the decline in physical performance traditionally found in boot camp, and allows recruits to attend the basic training with individuals with similar career goals. Following the lead of the EOD and Diver community, NSW established the Naval Special Warfare Preparatory School at Great Lakes. This eight-week course following boot camp focuses on physically and mentally preparing candidates for the rigors of BUD/S. All enlisted candidates including fleet accessions go through the course. Candidates work out five days a week, focusing on strength and conditioning and learning running and swimming techniques and

UP AND OVER Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) students battle through the surf during their last day of Hell Week. SEAL candidates coming to Coronado for training have already completed an eight-week prep course in Great Lakes, Ill., hopefully improving their chances of graduating from BUD/S.

other testable skills at BUD/S. Candidates learn SEAL heritage and history, military bearing, ethics, the SEAL Ethos, mental toughness, nutrition, stretching and physical training theory. Classes ship from the NSW Preparatory School as a team and arrive at the Center having already met entry standards. Cdr. Brian Sebenaler, commanding officer of the Naval Special Warfare Basic Training Command, said the Prep School and new recruiting efforts are producing dramatic results. “Students are more physically fit and mentally prepared than ever before, and it shows in the improved success rates, as well as the number of students we are graduating,” he said. BUD/S Orientation, formerly INDOC, was restructured to three weeks to ensure that candidates were not being broken down physically prior to entering BUD/S. It specifically focuses on transitioning a “coached” candidate into a safe and knowledgeable trainee who understands the exercises, standards and requirements of BUD/S. BUD/S Orientation includes training on the obstacle course, log PT, IBS (inflatable boat small) drills, open water swimming and running on the soft beach sand. The standards to transition from BUD/S Orientation to BUD/S also remain the same as the old INDOC program.

The Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL program itself was also carefully examined. The curriculum and standards over the last 20 years were left largely unchanged. In 2009, the Naval Audit Service was commissioned to analyze BUD/S and recommend changes that might increase candidate success while not jeopardizing fundamental standards. As a result, they recommended building an “ocean-side galley” to reduce the volume of running that was not directly attributed to training requirements. This would theoretically reduce candidate rollback and loss rates due to stress fractures. This expeditionary-style meal-service facility is scheduled for construction at Gator Beach and should be ready for use by July. Additionally, the audit team identified the remarkable difference in success rates between the winter season and the summer season. The Center complied and rescheduled classes to avoid beginning during the winter season. Now six BUD/S classes per year will begin between February and October vice January and October. The Center is also employing research and technology and cutting edge protocols to reduce the rate of

Spc. Bobby L. Allen Jr.

MC2 Dominique Lasco

KEEPING COUNT Sailors perform pull-ups while taking a physical screening test at Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado. Sailors interested in applying for SEAL training must not only pass the physical requirements, but must take an exam that evaluates their tolerance for psychological adversity, or “mental toughness.”

medical losses from training. It has a new medical and rehab facility that is remarkably staffed to support the increased student load and resultant increase in medical rehab demand. The medical facility now has an X-ray machine for immediate diagnosis, which enhances decisions regarding candidate retention in the event of injury. The NSW medical facility has a direct link to Naval Medical Center San Diego to rapidly review all specialist’s assessments and radiology reports. The medical staff educates the instructor cadre on early detection of injuries and contributing exercises or activities that exacerbate the possibility of overuse and acute injuries. Curriculum activities have been modified to lessen potential causes of catastrophic injuries. For example IBS squats during Hell Week were reduced in response to an increase in hip and pelvis fractures. The Center continues to explore the edge of medical science, using a small pill, swallowed by candidates before Hell Week, which measures their core temperature and reports it to a corpsman via a handheld scanner. This allows for faster, more accurate and more thorough tracking and diagnosis of heat and cold-related injuries. Naval Special Warfare Center’s Commanding Officer, Capt. Stewart Elliott, said “Our program is a systematic, time-proven and objectively verified curriculum – but a curriculum isn’t a program. The instructors, all combat-proven SEALs, are professional, dedicated and committed to training the next generation of frogmen.” In addition to focusing on the candidate and the curriculum, the Center has focused on supporting the development of its instructors. Every SEAL instructor now attends the Center’s Instructor Qualification Course. This four-week course not only satisfies Naval Enlisted Classification requirements, but also addresses the unique situations of the SEAL training process. It touches on the philosophy of basic training, training techniques, risk management and the psychology of the SOF training environment. Reviewed by instructors as “a course I wish I had before my LPO tour” and “every E-6 and E-7 should have this course,” it has been very successful at supporting the transition of operators and leaders from combat to the training environment and providing them with the skills to be professional instructors. The mental and physical quality of candidates entering the BUD/S pipeline is the highest it has ever been in the history of the program. Larger BUD/S classes are, and will continue to be the new status quo. The quality of new SEALS upon graduation from the 58-week BUD/S and SQT training pipeline has never been better. The Center consistently interacts with the NSW Groups to ensure that the quality of the new SEAL graduate meets current and future operational requirements. First-time deploying SQT graduates are meeting or exceeding professional development, unit level and squadron integration training standards at the Groups and Squadrons and their performance on the battlefield has been magnificent. NSW Center Public Affairs

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What would you do if your daughter hadn’t spoken to you in a month? She’s hurt and angry with you, that much you know, but why? She won’t speak. When you ask, you fight. And you’re leaving for deployment in three weeks. With the current cycle of deployments within NSW, more parents are faced with this or a similar scenario, more often than ever before. In the United States today, about 1.2 million children have an active duty military parent, and within NSW, about 40 percent of service members have at least one dependent child under the age of 18. And since 2001, nearly every child has been affected by a recent or current deployment of a parent to the combat zones of Iraq or Afghanistan, or sometimes worse – location unknown.

Wartime deployment takes a toll on both the service member and family members on the homefront, with multiple deployments often causing additional stress. Research on parents with stress reactions has demonstrated that such difficulties interfere with parenting, family life and child adjustment across a range of contexts, disrupting family roles and routines, and decreasing support within the family. To date, thousands of military service members, their children and families are at risk and stand to benefit from family-centered resiliency training. The growing awareness of the significant impact of deployments on military family life and child and family well-being prompted a new initiative from the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps. In 2007, the Defense Health Board Task Force on Mental Health identified

a critical need for prevention and intervention services to foster resiliency within military families and initiated with UCLA Project FOCUS. FOCUS (Families OverComing Under Stress) for the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery’s (BUMED) is a psychological health resiliencybuilding program designed for military families facing the psychological challenges of combat operational stress during wartime. FOCUS is based on leading evidenced-based family intervention models for at-risk families and has been shown to have positive emotional, behavioral and adaptive outcomes for families. FOCUS services augment existing Navy Medicine and Navy and Marine Corps community support programs in order to provide a comprehensive system of care that supports family readiness and wellness. In addition, FOCUS services are offered to Army and Air Force families at select installations through funding from DOD Office of Military Family and Community Policy. The Marine Corps saw much success in the San Diego area and in 2008, the FOCUS Project was brought to NSW. “Communication between a child and a parent is so critical in life – especially when you are living and dealing with multiple deployments in a time of war,” said Cmdr. Dave Barnes, the family and community support program manager for NSW. “We are very grateful to have Project FOCUS here in the NSW community.” Resiliency is the ability to effectively cope with, adapt to and overcome adversity, stress and challenging experiences.

FOCUS supports the mission of NSW by providing support to service and family members in the form of resiliency training. Mia Bartoletti Project FOCUS site director, NAB Coronado

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“FOCUS supports the mission of NSW by providing support to service and family members in the form of resiliency training,” explained Mia Bartoletti, the NAB Coronado site director for Project FOCUS. “This includes working with parents and children to prepare for upcoming missions, trips and trainings, as well as to assist families throughout the deployment.” Because of the unique nature of NSW missions, FOCUS staff work closely with family members to understand and adjust services in order to provide a highly customized level of family support. Working with the existing teams of dedicated military family services personnel, FOCUS staff assists families in understanding how combat operational stress affects them and the service family member, how to manage stress, and how to strengthen their family. FOCUS uses a structured approach to facilitate engagement and skill building across the family. Initial sessions focus on preparing family members to identify and share their concerns and understanding of family members’ deployment reactions. In separate sessions with parents and children, family members are taught emotional regulation, problem solving, goal setting and communication skills. Families then meet together to share their experiences using these skills and tools to enhance family communication and support. FOCUS works with families to strengthen their skills in meeting many of the challenges and stressors commonly experienced by military families during wartime, including: Children often become worried, sad or even angry about their parent leaving for deployment. Children and parents miss sharing special events together (e.g., birthdays, anniversaries, child taking their first steps), as well as the daily routines of their lives. Parents may have a hard time readjusting to their usual roles upon return from deployment (e.g., the non-deployed parent may be used to handling all the household tasks by themselves, the deployed parent may have difficulty adjusting to being in a non-combat environment again). Children may show concerning behaviors, such as acting argumentative, disruptive, aggressive, withdrawn or tearful. Similarly, couples may argue more, have a harder time communicating, or may withdraw from each other. “Our goal is to strengthen communication within the families,” Barnes explained. “We should not leave our families with the ‘bill’ from our community being at war for essentially nine years.”

Some of the ways FOCUS helps families learn to communicate are to : Help families to identify and build upon their existing strengths and positive coping strategies , Increase parents’ and children’s understanding of how different family members might react to wartime stress, Help service members and family members communicate and better understand how each were affected by deployment , Work with spouses to better support one another in dealing with the stressors that can arise from long separations , Assist couples to work more effectively as a team in parenting their children before, during, and after deployment, as well as increase parents’ skills in dealing more effectively with some of the emotional and behavioral reactions that children can have when experiencing stress. Using some of the project’s core components, like parent and child skill building, dealing with deployment stress, and goal stressing, families can receive a variety of assistance to meet their specific needs. “Family members are provided with an opportunity to get trained and practice on core resiliency skills, including active communication, effective problem solving, setting and maintaining goal achievement strategies and successful family emotion regulation,” said Bartoletti. “Results of FOCUS program evaluation suggests that military family members benefit from higher levels of overall satisfaction and lower distress and difficulties as a result of participation in the program.” “FOCUS is not the answer to all problems,” Barnes explained. “FOCUS is a tool to help families overcome issues, and they do a great job.” Mandy McCammon Source information courtesy of BUMED

FOCUS PROJECT POCs

There are resources for Project FOCUS on both coasts, as well as in Mississippi and Hawaii. For more information, please contact your local representative. JEB Little Creek - Fort Story / NAS Oceana Dam Neck Annex, Virginia Phone 757.962.4470 Kimberly Lahm, M.A., LMFT Site Director [email protected]

NAB Coronado Island, California Phone 619.522.7674 Mia Bartoletti, Psy.D. Site Director [email protected]

Naval CBC Gulfport, Mississippi Phone 228.224.3457 Shelly Gomez, LCSW Site Director [email protected]

Naval Station Pearl Harbor Phone 808.257.7774 Devin Price, LMFT Site Director [email protected] ETHOS

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WarZone

Going from the

Home front Illustration by MC2 Dominique Lasco

to the

oming home from a deployment can be a happy occasion, however changing your state of mind from the battlefield to home life isn’t as easy as turning off a switch. Sometimes, a break from both can make for a smoother transition. 22

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Third location decompression (TLD). You might think it has something to do with a new science to decompress persons after a dive. However, it is actually a program to emotionally “decompress” special warfare operators and combat support Sailors returning from deployment. TLD was first tested by the Canadian Special Forces with a goal of detecting Post Traumatic

Stress Syndrome (PTSD) early. The program later proved invaluable in not only detecting PTSD early, but helping members switch from a high-stress mindset before returning home to families. After hearing of the success, former Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, now Vice Adm. Joseph Kernan, mandated the program for the NSW squadron post-deployment schedule and included it as part of the Operational/Combat Stress Control program. Before TLD, the cycle for a SEAL team was to deploy, return and take leave, start training, begin work ups and deploy again. TLD is now mandatory between the team’s deployment and leave period. Each NSW Group has a different TLD location chosen for different reasons. “They are in a city with military infrastructure that they can tap into, but they are also completely out in the local economy, where they

seminars on topics such as dealing with stress, family reintegration and anger management. Although not all of the operators who go through the program have families, Celani said all personnel go through the same training. “Maybe one particular piece of info doesn’t apply to one Sailor but it may apply to people who you are working with or leading. You have to be able to be sympathetic to that as a leader.” They are also given a “checkup from the neck up” by the Group psychologist. “They get a brief checkup by the psychologist to give them the opportunity to talk about issues they might have after deployment and to address them prior to going home,” said Cmdr. Eric Potterat, Group 1 psychologist. “The discussions are private and confidential, and it gives the operator a chance to talk about issues that they may not talk about publicly because they don’t want to be perceived as weak or crazy.”

Despite some objections from both family and operators, feedback on TLD has overall been positive and most understand why the program is necessary. “I had a good time,” said Chief Special Warfare Operator William Gibbens. “It was managed extremely well. The support staff there managed both the force protection and the moving of people so there wasn’t any trouble.” Gibbens, having previously deployed four times, said the TLD stop combined with a family retreat organized by Group 2 capped off a good deployment. Other SEALs just enjoyed the time to relax. “My favorite part was really just having a beer with my meal, sitting back and getting a chance to relax and kick back with my friends,” remarked a West Coast-based SEAL. “It’s nice to switch over from that combat atmosphere to something more normal.”

“The psychological benefits of TLD and the family retreats are going to create a more stable person who can handle multiple deployments. It is also going to create a more stable home life that will allow the operator to handle the deployments better.”

SOC (SEAL) William Gibbens Force Medical Tactical Advisor

can begin reintegrating with non-military people,” said Lt. Cmdr. James Celani, Group 1 TLD officer in charge. When returning deployers arrive at their TLD location, they are assisted by a support team to help keep the desk work, such as checking in gear and travel claims, to a minimum. “They are afforded the opportunity to take a break from the work and the stressors that accompany that work,” said Celani. “We are setting up a designated travel claim point where they can complete and process their claim within a day. We have worked on the support team manning and are picking up gear that is sensitive and making sure that it gets back (to San Diego).” Deployers are given a hotel room rather than a barracks to start the relaxation and decompression process. “We are trying to get them to relax without the annoyance of someone asking for their ID card every time they go somewhere,” said Celani. “It allows them time to take a shower in a room that has constant hot water or sleep in a bed that is more comfortable than what they had been sleeping on.” Once they settle in, each Sailor attends training

This check up is one of the vital parts of TLD. It allows for the early detection of PTSD and gives the operator the knowledge of how to handle combat stress or PTSD once they get home. It also provides information on further treatment if necessary. After completing the mandatory training and exam, the operator has the next two days free “so when they come back they have a clear head and they are fresh and are ready to tackle their next set of requirements,” said Celani. “They are on the buddy system, but formal group activities are not part of the program. We have found people want to not be part of the big group, they want a little bit of time to hang out with just a couple people.” Many spend it by sightseeing, dining or simply going for a jog. Some operators and their spouses were concerned when they found out the trip home was delayed. “My wife wondered why I was spending three days away to blow off steam, why couldn’t I just come home three days early,” said one SO1. “Once I explained it to her though, she got onboard with the program.”

Currently it is each Group’s responsibility to monitor, organize and execute the training according to instruction. As of the end of March, all the SEAL teams will have rotated through TLD at least once. The Groups closely monitor changes and feedback, and certain adjustments have been made to accommodate the everchanging deployment cycles of NSW squadrons. As of now, only operators and support personnel that have been deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq go through TLD. Individual Augmentees and other DoD personnel continue a war fighter transition program elsewhere. The TLD program will continue for the foreseeable future, and many operators agree that continuing it would benefit the future of the NSW community. “The psychological benefits of TLD and the family retreats are going to create a more stable person who can handle multiple deployments,” said Gibbens. “It is also going to create a more stable home life that will allow the operator to handle the deployments better.” MC2 Dominique Lasco

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Illustration by MC2 John Scorza

It is commonly understood that over the course of a career, most warfighters will experience some type of injury. Naval medical experts often compare warfighters to professional athletes and refer to them as tactical athletes. A career tactical athlete will typically complete 20 years or more of active military service. In comparison, the average pro baseball player career span is a mere 5.6 seasons and the average professional football player lasts only 3.5 seasons, according to professional players associations. The tactical athlete may sustain a wide variety of injuries during 20-plus “seasons” that sports athletes would not expect, some similar, such as torn knee ligaments and some unusual like gunshot wounds. “If you compare SEALs to professional

athletes, it’s a similar demanding lifestyle, but probably more rigorous,” said Lt. Kirk Parsely, medical officer for NSW Group 1. Lt. Cmdr. Jim Cowan, head of BUD/S physical therapy, said his patients today are not regarded as “an injured military guy, but rather as an injured athlete.” With that in mind, NSW medical professionals are investing in sports medicine, human performance practices, and specialized staffing for treatment and prevention of injuries to special operations personnel. According to Capt. Scott Jonson, NSW deputy force medical officer, this fiscal year SOCOM allocated funding to the components to begin Warrior Human Performance and Sports Medicine programs for operators. This initiative sprouted into NSW’s Tactical Athlete Program (TAP). “TAP is designed to combine sports medicine and human performance initiatives

“Ultimately, this will help us accomplish which is to expand the functional lifespan of the operators.”

our goal - Lt. Kirk Parsely, Group 1 medical officer

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for NSW tactical athletes to optimize injury recovery, physical training, and overall continuous performance and longevity,” summed Jonson. “Our new program model is more in line with a division one (collegiate) program or professional organization,” said Cowan.”They (NSW Groups) will have sports medicine rehab personnel, a nutritionist, and really move toward preventative and performance types of programs.” This year alone, SOCOM has funded WARCOM with $2.2 million to hire 15 civilian subject matter experts to aid tactical athletes in performance and injury recovery. These specialists include strength and conditioning coaches, nutritionists, rehabilitation experts, and sports psychologists. Additionally, $15 million is budgeted for the program over the next six years. “Ultimately, this will help us accomplish our goal which is to expand the functional lifespan of the operators,” said Parsely. “We want to make them able to withstand the rigors of the job for 20 years and still be able to live a healthy life.” In addition to getting more help at the group level, BUD/S Medical is looking to round out its staff. Currently, BUD/S Medical has two physical rehabilitation personnel helping 900 students per month. It will gain two strength and conditioning coaches this year. The TAP model is broken down into two sections: human performance and sports medicine.

MC2 John Scorza

WATERY WEIGHTS SN Shaun Roberts and HM3 Justin Richins, BUD/S candidates, train in the BUD/S state of the art swimming pool to help them recover from thier injuries.

program for several years. With the increase in funding, NSW now has the opportunity to blend best practices across the force. “The last two years we’ve been able to combine team and individual level training programs,” said Dallas Wood, Group 2 human performance program manager. “We have designed performance enhancing programs specific to unit level training.” Wood is proud of the progress NSW has made and is optimistic about the TAP model’s future. “We’ve received a lot of positive feedback from the operators and they seem to be really

buying in to the program,” said Wood. “We’ve progressed a lot and things seem to be going pretty well, but we are still learning and still refining new programs and ideas. Things are only going to keep getting better.” According to NSW Force Medical Officer Capt. Gary Gluck, “Our vision of the Tactical Athlete Program is to draw the very best practices from the Teams, human performance, sports medicine and professional athletes alike to develop a comprehensive physical lifestyle that encompasses the entirety of an operator’s career and beyond.” MC2 John Scorza

MC2 John Scorza

“The human performance model was designed to enhance the physical performance capabilities of healthy individuals,” said Jonson. “The sports medicine model was designed to diagnose and treat injuries and rehabilitate athletes.” These two models, said Jonson, are designed to work together to individually tailor a road map for injury prevention and recovery. NSW experts agree that preventive care is an essential part of keeping tactical athletes healthy. “The way you’re going to get 20 years out of SEALs is to prevent them from being injured, not to recuperate their injuries more quickly,” said Parsely. “There is a big difference between treating disease and maintaining health.” Data collection is becoming a bigger element in injury prevention. NSW is collaborating with the University of Pittsburgh to gather data to detect trends of what injuries are caused on specific career paths. Currently, data is collected by all medical centers treating tactical athletes. Teams and centers are working together to streamline the type of data to be tracked to help paint a clear picture of how injuries occur and where they occur. “Maintaining health is all about prevention and as we get more educated on the mechanism and trends of what’s causing the injuries within the teams, we’ll be able to predict certain injuries,” said Parsely. “Once we can predict them, then we can prevent them.” “We’re reaching out (to operators) through videos and documents on the Web site (www. sealswcc.com) which are mainly preventive strength programs,” said Cowan. Prior to and during BUD/S, experts reach out to new recruits to stress preventive care. Once a recruit has been selected for the SEAL program, they are provided a mentor to help prepare them for training. The mentors, who receive specialized training themselves, are retired and former SEALs strategically located in in regions around the United States to maximize contact. As a result of the Web site and mentors, Cowan said stress fracture rates at BUD/S have fallen from 16 percent to four percent in the last two years. “Stress fractures are our most common injury at BUD/S,” said Cowan. “For every stress fracture, candidates will lose roughly 110 days of training.” The NSW Groups and Teams have been on the leading edge of this initiative, experimenting with versions of the TAP

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WARFIGHTER NHRC’S PERFORMANCE LAB STUDYING THE MILITARY’S MOST COMPLEX WEAPON Wouldn’t it be something if the Navy had a virtual reality simulator that could test a military member’s performance in battle without putting anyone in danger? Or, test how warfighters are able

to think in extreme hot or cold environments? A place where the latest equipment is tested to its limits? Wouldn’t it be something if there was a research facility available where you could walk in, pose virtually any question and have scientists find the answer? This place is not a fantasy. Naval Health Research Center’s (NHRC) Warfighter Performance Lab, located at Naval Base Point Loma, is that place. The lab’s goal is to provide Sailors and Marines with a warfighting edge through advances in human performance, protection, autonomy and power and energy. In the simplest terms, the lab helps to improve the warfighter. The main research explored by the lab includes applied physiology and biomechanics, applied cognitive science, epidemiology, physical therapy and psychology. The Warfighter Performance Lab is an 8,100 square-foot facility equipped with state of the art equipment such as a Virtual Environment

“

(VE) system, dual-temperature chambers, Dual-Energy X-ray Absorptiometers (DXA) and much more. NHRC ‘s $1.1 million VE system is one of only 15 VE systems in the world, three of which are located in the United States. The VE is a full biomechanics and exercise physiology lab on a motion platform that can pitch, yaw and roll by 25 degrees. On the platform, is an integrated split-belt (side-by-side) treadmill and instrumented force plates to measure the pressures applied during walking, running or marching. In front of the motion platform is a nine-foot tall screen that curves 180 degrees around the platform to view programmed simulations. The environment is also equipped with a full-motion capture volume to record the subject’s movements. These movements are picked up from reflective markers similar to the ones used in making video games. “By placing little reflective markers all over their body, you can record exact movements in real time,” said Senior Chief Damage Controlman Eric Duckworth, lab manager. “The markers control the interaction between the subject and the computer program. The system can also be integrated with other equipment such as reduced-oxygen

”

research will be used to optimize warfighter capabilities as well as advance the rehabilitation of

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wounded warriors.

- Capt. Lanny Boswell, head of Warfighter Performance

MC2 John Scorza

The VE

breathing devices to simulate different altitudes.” “The screen is used so we can create an immersive environment for people to move in,” said Lt. Jamie Bartlett, Warfighter Performance Lab’s operations officer. “Right now we have eight programs including a virtual Afghanistan where we can perform studies as if the warfighter was out in the field. The platform moves in sync with the terrain, so when they see an incline they feel an inclination of the platform while moving on the treadmill belt. It feels realistic.” “We intend to use virtual environments as a research platform to immerse subjects in realistic military environments and see how they perform,” said Bartlett. “For example, load carriage is a big issue now. We can test a subject in full battle rattle, with a 150-pound pack on his back and walk at patrol pace in Afghanistan terrain. While moving in this environment, not only can we examine the effects of load and fatigue on the body, we can also see how they do performing cognitive tasks such as land navigation, working memory, identifying targets or using a first-person shooter type of simulation.” Experts agree that although all warfighters will benefit from VE research, personnel within the Special Operations Forces may see the greatest impact from the research. “The VE will be critical for studying groups that continually operate in diverse and highly extreme environments such as SWCC and SEAL units,” said Bartlett. “The changing demands of their duties make them one of the military’s most complex weapon systems and now we have the ability to keep up.” “This lab is very unique,” said Capt. Lanny Boswell, head of Warfighter Performance. “With it, we can immerse a warfighter in a virtual reality and measure his physical and cognitive performance simultaneously. Once this is fully developed we can study operationally-relevant issues in a controlled environment. The VE research will be used to optimize warfighter capabilities as well as advance the rehabilitation of wounded warriors.” Although the VE is a huge acquisition for the lab, it’s not the only tool used for testing and research. The lab’s temperature chambers are beginning to play a bigger role. “These are used a lot for heat tolerance testing,” said Bartlett. “For

Never-ending room

City walk Simulation

U.S. Navy Photo

U.S. Navy Photo

(bottom left) Senior Chief Damage Controlman Eric Duckworth test out a program on the VE simulator used to enhance the performance of warfighters and rehabilitate wounded warriors. (top left) Dr. Jessie Hascall and Lt. Jamie Bartlett perform a load carriage test during a study.(below) Sailors test out the joint-service aircrew mask developed by NHRC.

example, if a guy falls out on a 15-mile march from a heat injury, they would recover, then come back here and see if they are truly recovered; or, if their core temperature jumps right back up during testing, we would know then that they have a physiological problem. We can put people on treadmills, bikes or on whatever we need to in order to accurately test them in an extreme temperature environment.” BUD/S Medical is now sending patients with heat related injuries to the Warfighter Performance Lab for testing. “Patients who have had a heat stroke are sent over to NHRC after six weeks of recovery to find out if they have an inborn problem with cooling off their bodies,” said Cmdr. James Doran, BUD/S senior medical officer. “Based on if they can show normal physiology in a heat environment, we will put them back into the program (BUD/S).” “Creating a cold environment within the chamber is used for studying performance with hypothermia,” said Bartlett. “One of our scientists is working on a wet clothing study. You have these SWCC guys out there getting soaked, moving really fast. Well, what happens is you get cold. So, we are studying the clothing they wear as well as the adverse effects of how these guys perform mentally while being under adverse temperatures and conditions.” For more than three decades, the Warfighter Performance Department has been a leader in applied physiology and cognitive science research and will continue to provide Sailors and Marines with a war fighting edge through their research efforts. MC2 John Scorza Virtual Afghanistan

Boat driving simulation

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Mother Theresa, the Coach, and Machiavelli TRUST IS an essential element in any high functioning organization, but especially in a small, very inter-dependent special operations unit. I’ve always thought that an important part of predeployment training is sorting out Trust issues within a platoon, a Team, a task unit, a boat det. No one wants to deploy with someone they don’t trust; members of a Team must trust each other not only to do their job to the best of their ability, but also to put the Team’s success ahead of their own personal comfort and advantage. When we deploy overseas, for training or combat, we insist on deploying with others who will ‘have our back,’ no matter what the circumstances. This short essay is a simple look at three aspects of Trust I think are important. Mother Theresa: The Mother Theresa side of Trust speaks to that part of us which seeks to be good. An essential part of being good is being trustworthy, in almost any context. Trust is something we seek for ourselves, and when we’ve earned it, we’ll do almost anything to preserve it. That part of us which is ‘good’ is not deceitful, in word, deed or demeanor. If what we say is false or we fail to keep a commitment, it is either unintentional, or due to circumstances beyond our control, or because our initial commitment may be over-ridden by the dictates of honor, common sense or a good greater than our own. In striving to be ‘good,’ we consider it a matter of honor to be trustworthy – to never do anything that would cause anyone to question our integrity. The Coach: Being a good coach is a key function of effective leaders at all levels. All good leaders are coaches – we have all been developed by our mentors, and good leaders, in turn, develop others. The coach, the boss, the person in charge, develops subordinates by trusting them. Sometimes our coaches have pushed us and trusted us when we weren’t sure we were ready. Even when we have failed, good coaches have continued to trust us, have given us another

Trust is (ideally) a two-way street; for the truly trustworthy, the two-way street becomes a network of roads and highways which allow the rich flow of positive energy and collaboration between and among trustworthy people. 28

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chance, and have trusted us to keep striving and to get better. They teach us to trust ourselves. The LPO, the chief, the platoon commander, the CO develop their subordinates, by trusting them to do things they may have never done before. The coach as leader takes risk by giving Trust. In my own leadership, Trust is something I give to subordinates initially and readily, and it is then theirs to lose. I have rarely been disappointed, but I have been disappointed. That’s part of the deal. Machiavelli: Machiavelli warns us against trusting unwisely and counsels us to exercise prudent caution in whom we trust. We must protect ourselves from predators who would manipulate or exploit us, who seek their own ends at our expense. Yes, these people also exist in the Navy and even in the Teams, though in the crucible of life in the Teams, they are usually found out. Machiavelli saw the world as an unforgiving place, in which self-serving people compete, sometimes viciously, in the game of life, eagerly preying upon those who are less clever or less wary than themselves. Without being deceitful, one must be wary of those for whom being trustworthy is not as important as their personal ambition. This practical aspect of Trust was reflected in Benjamin Franklin’s axiom, “Love thy neighbor; yet don’t pull down your hedge.” But then, Will Rogers once said, “I would rather be the person who bought the Brooklyn Bridge than the one who sold it.” Trust is a complicated subject; books have been written about it, to include “The Speed of Trust: the One Thing that Changes Everything,” recently published by Stephen M. R. Covey. Here I’ve distilled the complexity of Trust down into three simple dimensions: First, be trustworthy; second, don’t be afraid to give Trust; third, don’t foolishly expose yourself by trusting unwisely. Like so much in leadership and ethics, good judgment and experience are necessary to effectively balance these three imperatives. Trust is (ideally) a two-way street; for the truly trustworthy, the two-way street becomes a network of roads and highways which allow the rich flow of positive energy and collaboration between and among trustworthy people. This is what we strive for in the teams, in our Navy, and, in fact, in our society. Bob Schoultz retired after spending 30 years as a NSW officer. He is currently the Director of the Master of Science in Global Leadership School of Business Administration at the University of San Diego.

Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan

By Antonio Giustozzi

After studying Afghanistan and its counter-insurgency policies since the pro-Soviet regime in the early 1980’s, Dr. Antonio Giustozzi, a research fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science, offers a striking portrait of the resurgent Taliban and why it is making a comeback. His extremely well researched monograph plainly identifies significant events that sparked the birth of a Neo-Taliban insurgency, marked its growth, and displayed glaring incongruities of allied counter-insurgency strategy. As the national debate over Afghanistan persists, this book provides an authoritative social context that must be understood by all Special Operations Forces personnel currently serving, or soon to be, downrange in Afghanistan. In his book, Giustozzi argues that the Neo-Taliban insurgency would have been nothing more than a “mere annoyance” if it had not been able to exploit weaknesses within the state of Afghanistan and counter-insurgency efforts had been quicker to identify the sources of the insurgency and appropriately mitigate them. He effectively supported his argument through a litany of relevant sources and a systematic chapter structure. Giustozzi divides his book into six chapters, five of which concern the Neo-Taliban insurgency sources, recruitment, organization, strategy and tactics. Appropriately, the sources of the insurgency are identified first and help characterize the Neo-Taliban movement as one that maintains fundamental Taliban beliefs coupled with an aspect of selectivity. This selectivity becomes a reoccurring theme as the Neo-Taliban seeks to utilize new technology, strategies and tactics that the old Taliban regime did not practice. Perhaps the most significant component to the Neo-Taliban insurgency was the shift in policy concerning the various tribes within Afghanistan. Instead of maintaining a rigid standard concerning which tribes or individuals should be included within the Taliban organization, the Neo-Taliban movement took a more open stance willing to accept any ethnicity or tribal affiliation. Giustozzi goes to great length to highlight the effect of this strategy in garnering popular support amongst Afghans

from differing regions, provinces and tribes. His superb assessment not only provides insight into the key factors of the insurgency, but also the failures of the counterinsurgency to orchestrate a consistent strategy. In the last chapter, Giustozzi smartly acknowledges that the Neo-Taliban influence is not independent of the counter-insurgency efforts waged by the state of Afghanistan and its allies. Since the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, Giustozzi aptly brings to light the high turnover of senior military officers and the consequent variation of coalition strategies. These coalition strategies fluctuated between targeting insurgents through conventional “clear and sweep” operations versus the irregular warfare approach that seeks to separate the population from the insurgents. This inability of the coalition to remain consistent gave the Neo-Taliban insurgency enough political and physical space to develop their strongholds. Now, two years after this book was published, Gen. Stanley McChrystal is faced with the same Neo-Taliban insurgency that has grown in strength. Coalition hopes have been pinned on the U.S. military commander, but the key factor to success is the special operators remotely located and on the ground. Any special operator with a future deployment to Afghanistan would do well to read this book. It is not enough that the general in charge understand the inherent complexities of the insurgency in Afghanistan; the counterinsurgency practitioners must be the ones to successfully engage the populace to achieve a real victory. Lt. W. Jake Roberts Roberts is a Navy SEAL and has made deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines.

Any special operator with a future deployment to Afghanistan would do well to read this book. It is not enough that the general in charge understand the inherent complexities of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the counter-insurgency practitioners must be the ones to successfully engage the populace to achieve a real victory. SEAL Lt. W. Jake Roberts

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PREVENTING SEXUAL ASSAULT IS EVERYONE’S DUTY. GULFPORT: NORFOLK: 228-596-0697

HAWAII:

808-722-6192

757-438-3504

SAN DIEGO: 619-692-5909