Land Law

GURU GHASIDAS UNIVERSITY, BILASPUR, CG

ACADEMIC SESSION: 2019-20

“Land Reforms Before Independence” PROJECT: LAND LAW

Submitted To:

Submitted By:

Mr. Sushil Jain,

Simran M. Toppo & Sonali Marndi

Assistant Professor (Land Laws),

B.A. LLB 8th Semester

Guru Ghasidas University, Bilaspur

DATE: 17.03.20 1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It feels great pleasure in submitting this research project to Mr.Sushil Jain, Asst. Professor (Land Law), without whose guidance this project would not have been completed successfully. Next, I would like to sincerely thank my seniors, friends and family members, whose suggestions and guidance assisted me throughout the entire tenure of making the project. I would also like to express my special thanks to those original thinkers, whom I have taken the privilege to quote. Last but not the least, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude towards the examiner who would take pains to go through the project. Though a lot of care has been taken, there may be scope for some improvement. All criticism and suggestions are kindly invited.

Simran M. Toppo & Sonali Marndi B. A. LLB. 8th Semester

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CERTIFICATE

I am glad to submit this project report on “Law Reforms before Independence” as a part of my academic assignment. The project is based on Research methodology and further discusses the interview method. I think this would be significant for academic purposes as well as prove Information to all the readers. Here though I declare that this paper is an original piece of research and the borrowed text and ideas have been duly acknowledged.

Faculty Signature

________________

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DECLARATION

I, SIMRAN M.TOPPO & SONALI MARNDI, BA-LLB 8 thSemester of GURU GHASIDAS UNIVERSITY do hereby declarethat this project is my original work and I have not copied this project or any part thereof from any source without acknowledgement. I am highly indebted to the authors of the books that I have referred in my project as well as all the writers of all the articles and the owners of the information taken from the website for it. It is only because of their contribution and proper guidance of my faculty advisor Assist. Prof. Mr. SUSHIL JAIN that I was able to gather light on the subject.

SIMRAN M.TOPPO & SONALI MARNDI B.A.-LL.B 8th SEMESTER

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................6 NEED FOR LAND REFORMS AND THEIR OBJECTIVES..................................................8 LAND REFORMS MEASURES................................................................................................10 ABOLITION OF INTERMEDIARIES...........................................................................................................10 IMPACT ANALYSIS:.............................................................................................................................11 TENANCY REFORMS...............................................................................................................................13 IMPACT ANALYSIS:.............................................................................................................................14 CEILINGS ON LAND HOLDINGS..............................................................................................................16 IMPACT ANALYSIS:.............................................................................................................................17

ADDRESSING THE SHORTCOMINGS: SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY FOR LAND REFORMS MEASURES................................................................................................20 ABOLITION OF INTERMEDIARIES:..........................................................................................................20 TENANCY REFORMS:..............................................................................................................................21 CEILINGS ON LANDHOLDINGS:..............................................................................................................22

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................24 BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................................25

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INTRODUCTION “Land reforms have become a major political issue throughout the developing countries of the world today. The insecurity and lack of status of the actual tiller cannot but have a disastrous effect on the whole system. It is not surprising that agrarian unrest has been at the root of all social and political upheavals in history.1 The tenure status is not simply an indicator of agricultural income; it is also a matter of human dignity for the actual tillers of the soil. A secure status provides them with the freedom to exercise their will to put the land to the best use.” “The primary purpose of economic growth in the context of land reforms is to ensure the improvement of the conditions- economic and social- of the majority of the population who are actual tillers of the soil and producers of agricultural products. The form of land tenure has a direct bearing on the distribution, accumulation and improvement of a nation’s wealth particularly, in a country like India where agriculture is the basis of national economy.” “Land reforms may be viewed as purposeful re-planning of land tenure system with the authority of the government. Some people feel that it is dangerous for any society to allow unregulated private property rights in lands. They generally make out a case for enlargement of present social control for making it more effective. This control may be direct, i.e., the outcome of legislations with specific conditions of enforcement and penalties for violation, or indirect i.e., through custom and opinion. The major social purposes of controlling landed property are to secure just, efficient and acceptably satisfactory utilization of natural resources.” “Direct control of landed property may be exercised in various ways but is generally affected through some form of penal power, of eminent domain or through taxation measures. These powers are being exercised by governments of different states in India for the purpose of land reforms. In an attempt to remedy the ills of agrarian structure, three objectives of land reforms were set in India:” (i)

Abolition of intermediaries;

(ii)

Tenancy reforms to ensure security of tenure; and

Kathleen Gough, “Indian Peasant Uprising” in Peasant Struggles in India, A. R. Desai (ed.), Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1979, pp. 87-126. 1

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(iii)

Imposition of ceilings on land-holdings and distribution of surplus land among the landless agricultural laborers and land-poor cultivators.

“The task of land reforms in India even though was looked at as a critical issue at the time of independence, to ameliorate structural inequality has been a long abandoned cause for the Indian welfare state. Land as a resource for a fast developing nation like India has come to be hotly contested in the midst of the growth versus justice paradigm. However, the Indian State has had throughout the history of independent India, stated explicit goal of balancing the two. The justice aspect has been fading after neo-liberalization set in the 1990s, but the pressures of democracy have kept it in discourse.” This paper critically examines the impact of major land reforms in changing the unequal and exploitative agrarian structure. The paper also seeks to provide the context in which the reforms were introduced, their objectives and the measures that they put forth. The three major land reforms introduced since India gained independence, i.e., abolition of intermediaries, tenancy reforms and ceilings on landholdings have been dealt with in the paper in detail and thereafter, the researcher has attempted to come up with the defects in them. Recommendations for future land policy regarding these reforms have also been put forth.

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NEED FOR LAND REFORMS AND THEIR OBJECTIVES The British Raj was characterized by highly unequal land ownership. There was a parasitic class of intermediaries who played no role in production. On the other hand, the vast majority of actual cultivators were either tenants or subtenants, without any security of tenure. According to the National Commission on Agriculture (1976), this was the root cause of the state of chronic crisis in which Indian agricultural economy was enmeshed before the attainment of Independence. 2 Before Independence, there were three major systems of land tenure, namely Zamindari System, Mahalwari System and Ryotwari System.3 The Zamindari system was introduced by Lord Cornwallis in 1793 through permanent settlement that fixed the land rights of zamindars in perpetuity without any provision for fixed rents or occupancy rights for actual cultivators.4 Under the permanent settlement, zamindars were found to be more interested in higher rent than in agricultural improvement. During the early nineteenth century, efforts were made to undo the adverse effects of permanent settlement and to provide for temporary settlement as a matter of policy. Regulation VII of 1822 Act provided for temporary settlement with provision for periodic settlement in parts of the United Provinces.5 In the provinces of Madras and Bombay, Ryotwari system was prevalent. 6 Each ryot was recognized by law as the proprietor with the right to transfer or mortgage or sub-let his land. Moreover, in parts of United Provinces and Punjab, Regulation VIII of 1822 Act and Regulation IX of 1833 Act provided for Mahalwari Settlement with the entire village community. 7 This

Report of the National Commission on Agriculture, 1976, Part I, Review and Progress, Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, New Delhi, para 2.4.5, p. 131. 3 Dr. Md Hamid Hussain, Firoj High Sarwar, “A Comparative Study of Zamindari, Ryotwari and Mahalwari Land Revenue Settlements : The Colonial Mechanisms of Surplus Extraction in 19 th Century British India”, IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 2, Issue 4, September-October 2012, pp. 16-26, available at: last accessed: 3rd October, 2017. 4 “British: The Permanent Settlement”, Indian Saga, available at: last accessed: 3rd October, 2017. 5 T. Haque and A. S. Sirohi, “Agrarian Reforms and Institutional Changes in India”, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1986, p. 16. 6 Comparison with Zamindari and Ryotwari, p. 222, available at: last accessed: 5th October, 2017. 7 B. H. Baden Powell, “Administration of Land Revenue and Tenures of British India”, Ess Ess Publication, New Delhi, 1907, p. 149. 2

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required each peasant of the village to contribute to total revenue demand of the village on the basis of the size of holding. In 1885, the Bengal Tenancy Act was passed with a view to conferring occupancy rights upon ryots who were in continuous possession of land for 12 years. 8 The tenant could not be evicted by the landlord, except by a decree of court. Similarly, the Bihar Tenancy Act of 1885 and Orissa Tenancy Act of 1914 granted occupancy rights to tenants. 9 Besides, the Madras Tenancy Act of 1908 provided for protection of ryots from eviction as long as they paid the rents. 10 Nevertheless, since majority of actual cultivators were unrecorded tenants-at-will, these legal measures could not bring much relief to the tiller of the soil. Although the adverse effect of landlordism on agricultural production was most profound in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa, other states that were under Ryotwari and Mahalwari Systems also witnessed the growth of a large number of intermediaries with all its adverse impact.11 The leased-in area constituted nearly 35 per cent of the total operated area in 1950-51. Most of the leases were unwritten and tenants did not have legal security of tenure. The rents varied from 50 per cent to 70 per cent of gross produce. 12 In addition, tenants were often asked to provide free labour to landlords. After Independence therefore, it became necessary to undertake some land reforms measures for removing the feudal character of the agrarian economy and paving the way for rapid agricultural growth with social justice. Thus, broadly speaking, the agrarian reforms sought to change the unequal and unproductive agrarian structure and remove exploitative agrarian relations, often known as patron-client relationship in agriculture. The underlying idea was of course, to promote agriculture growth with social justice.

“Tenancy Legislation”, p. 270, available at: last accessed: 18th October, 2017. 9 Ibid. 10 Id, p. 272. 11 R. Deshpande, “Current Land Policy Issues in India”, FAO Documentary Repository, available at: last accessed: 18th October, 2017. 12 Ibid. 8

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LAND REFORMS MEASURES After Independence, the Indian National Congress appointed the Agrarian Reforms Committee under the Chairmanship of J.C. Kumarappa, for making an in-depth study of the agrarian relations prevailing in the country.13 The committee submitted its report in 1949 which had a considerable impact on the evolution of agrarian reforms policy in the post-independence period.14 The committee recommended that all intermediaries between the state and the tiller should be eliminated and the land must belong to the tiller subject to certain conditions. Committee also felt that there should be a ceiling to the size of holdings which a farmer should own and cultivate. The Committee also considered collective farming for the development of reclaimed waste lands on which landless labourers could be employed. It held that peasant farming would be the most suitable form of cultivation. All the land reforms policies undertaken by the various State legislatures till date are based on the recommendations of the Kumarappa Committee.15 Adhering to the guidelines recommended by the National Government, the State Legislatures enacted and enforced various land legislations for bringing about land reforms in different states of India. Since Independence, most of the legislative energy to increase land access was funnelled into three areas: the abolition of intermediaries, tenancy reform, and enactment of ceilings on land holdings.16 Such steps to introduce reforms undertaken in the land tenure system can broadly be studied under the following heads: (i) abolition of intermediaries, (ii) fixation of ceilings on land holdings and (iii) redistribution of surplus land among landless or semi-landless peasants. Besides, any special measures adopted to prevent alienation of tribal land and consolidate fragmented holdings come within the broad definition of agrarian reforms.

ABOLITION OF INTERMEDIARIES Land Reforms in India since Independence, p. 42, available at: last accessed: 10th October, 2017. 14 All India Congress Committee, Report of the Congress Reforms Committee, New Delhi, 1949. 15 Supra 13, p. 43. 16 T. Besley, R. Burgess, “Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, No. 2, pp. 389-430, 400. 13

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The first wave of land reform legislation after India’s independence concentrated on the abolition of intermediary land right holders between the tillers and the government. The Indian Constitution, which grants states exclusive authority to enact land tenure legislation, provided a starting point.17 Soon after assuming power, several state governments initiated action to extinguish intermediary interests. By the end of the 1950s, almost all states had enacted legislation aimed at abolishing intermediary interests upon the payment of compensation. The abolition of intermediaries in all forms that covered around more than 40 percent of total land area started in 1948 with the enactment of legislation in Madras, following the recommendations of Kumarappa Committee. Later on, other states followed the suit although the nature and effects of such legislation varied from state to state. The abolition brought large section of farmers into direct relationship with Government i.e. the tillers were made the owners of land they cultivated and were responsible to pay land revenue to the Government.18 IMPACT ANALYSIS: The social and political powers of the intermediaries were greatly reduced, particularly in West Bengal, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, and the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh. 19 The legislation significantly reduced forced labour, exploitative serfdom, and other forms of oppression prevalent in many parts of the country, and forced the zamindars to share power with the beneficiaries, their erstwhile “superior” tenants, most of whom belonged to the upper and middle castes. These beneficiaries gained increased social status and, more gradually, increased political power.20 The legislation to abolish intermediaries also reduced the multiplicity of legal land tenures that previously existed and thus simplified and clarified land tenure law in most Indian states. Uttar Pradesh, for example, had some 40 types of legally recognized tenure types before the adoption of legislation to abolish intermediaries reduced the number of tenure types to three. Especially in a country with substantial illiteracy in rural areas, complexity of land tenure law tends to Constitution of India, Article 246(3) and Seventh Schedule, List II(18). Dr. Anupama Rajput, “Land Reforms”, School of Open Learning, available at: last accessed: 5th October, 2017. 19 T. Haque, A. S. Sirohi, “Agrarian Reform and Institutional Changes in India”, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1986, p. 38. 20 Supra 16, p. 414. 17 18

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disfavour the poor; the more educated and well-off are more capable of understanding, using, and taking advantage of the law – to the disadvantage of those less capable, usually the poorest. However, the legislative shortcomings herein resulted in harmful consequences and missed opportunities. Most significantly, the laws created the impetus for zamindars to evict substantial numbers of tenants forcibly. Employing legal and illegal methods, the zamindars were particularly successful at evicting “non-superior” tenants (including tenants-at-will, undertenants, and sharecroppers), many of whom had farmed the land from which they were evicted for generations. In every state, legislation permitted ex-intermediaries to retain their home-farms or “personally cultivated” land; only a handful of states placed a limit on the size of such homefarm land retained. The legislation loosely defined “personal cultivation” to include cultivation through sharecroppers, servants, and wage labourers. Most state laws even allowed the intermediary to evict tenants from land he had not been “personally cultivating” but now wished to “personally cultivate,” and the legislation allowed the ex-intermediaries to select the land they wanted to retain.21 The legislation protected the interests of ex-intermediaries and did little for their former tenants. Most significant, the laws purposefully did not confer rights upon tenants-at-will and sharecroppers. The combination of these and other shortcomings in the substance of the laws opened the door for ex-intermediaries to gain ownership over much or even all of the land for which they had an intermediary interest. 22 Moreover, the states generally compensated the exintermediaries more than adequately for the rights they did lose, at a substantial burden to the state exchequer. According to the National Planning Commission Report, the compensation paid to the lowest slab of ex-intermediaries reached as high as 15 to 30 times of their annual net income.23 Frustratingly, most did not repay the favour: the ex-intermediaries were generally disinclined to invest their compensation in industry or other worthwhile economic activities. 24 Finally, while state laws often granted tenants the right to purchase lands from willing landlords at set rates, these provisions had serious shortcomings that precluded any significant change in landownership patterns. Prices fixed for land were high, particularly given the limited nature of G. Kotosky, “Agrarian Reforms in India”, People’s Publishing House, New Delhi, 1964, p. 119. D. Thakur, “Politics of Land Reform in India”, Commonwealth Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 58- 59. 23 GOI Planning Commission, Report of the Panel on Land Reforms, 1959, pp. 71-76 cited in B.K. Sinha, Pushpendra Dutta(eds.), “Land Reform in India: An Unfinished Agenda”, Sage Publication, New Delhi, 2000, p. 32. 24 P. S. Appu, “Land Reforms in India”, Vikas Publishing, New Delhi, 1996, p. 79. 21 22

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the landlord’s rights, and instalment payments spaced within too limited a period of time. 25 The end result was that an opportunity for tenants to become owners slipped by. In sum, the legislation abolishing intermediary rights gets mixed reviews. Most informed observers praise the beneficial impacts; the legislation reduced (and in cases entirely extinguished) the feudal nature of agrarian relationships in many parts of India. Observers also note that despite the deficiencies of the legislation, the states implemented this phase of India’s land reforms more successfully than the land ceiling and tenancy reforms that were to follow. TENANCY REFORMS The Agrarian Reforms Committee recommended against any system of cultivation by tenants and maintained that leasing of land should be prohibited except in the case of widows, minors and disabled persons.26 This viewpoint received further strength subsequently in various Five Year Plans. According to the Second Five Year Plan, abolition of intermediary tenures and bringing the tenants into direct relations with the state would give the tiller of the soil his rightful place in the agrarian system and provide him with full incentives for increasing agricultural production.27 The abolition of most intermediary tenures brought the whole of India under a uniform tenurial system (albeit with some local variation) within the first decade after Independence.28 Simultaneously, certain amendments to the existing tenancy laws were made with a view to providing security to the tenants of ex-intermediaries. Provisions in the abolition of intermediary laws intending to secure the right of tenants of exintermediaries were largely ineffective and, in some cases, counter-effective. The key aspects of these laws related to: defining tenant; landlord’s right to resume tenanted land for personal cultivation; conferment of ownership rights on tenants; voluntary surrender of tenant’s rights by the tenant; prohibition of future tenancies; rent levels for those tenancies that are allowed; length of term for those tenancies that are allowed; tenants’ rights of pre-emptive purchase; public recording of tenancies, etc.

Supra 19, p. 40. Supra 14. 27 2nd Five Year Plan, Planning Commission, available last accessed: 5th October, 2017. 28 Supra 24, p. 82. 25 26

at:

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IMPACT ANALYSIS: The single largest legal loophole in the tenancy reform laws was probably the generous rights of resumption for “personal cultivation” granted landowners. Landowners took full advantage of the unfettered rights of resumption in most state laws, resulting in tenant evictions. Upon the abolition of intermediaries in Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, tenancy laws in those states prohibited landowners from resuming any tenanted land outside of their home-farms; the laws granted existing tenants on the non-home-farm lands permanent and heritable rights on that tenanted land.29 In all other states, tenancy reform laws permitted landowners to resume tenanted land for personal cultivation. These states loosely defined “personal cultivation” to include cultivation through servants or laborers. No tenancy law mandated direct landowner supervision of the labor or residence in or near the village in which the land was located (although some laws adopted a residential requirement for at least one family member). Only the state laws of Manipur and Tripura (later) required the input of at least some personal labour in cultivating resumed land. 30 In short, the “personal cultivation” provision presented no barrier to resumption; even absentee landowners easily satisfied the requirement. “Voluntary” surrenders of tenancy rights by tenants have frustrated the objectives of tenancy reform. Many landlords have repossessed even their non-resumable land by “persuading” their tenant(s) to give up their tenancy rights “voluntarily.” Once such coercive tactics became widely recognized (and probably after most forced surrenders), the National Planning Commission recommended that states amend their legislation to protect against coercion by requiring that revenue department officials verify tenant surrenders, prohibiting landowners from taking possession of land in excess of the resumption limits even if voluntarily surrendered, and (later) assuming state ownership of voluntarily surrendered land. Most states responded to the central policy recommendations by amending their laws. All state laws now provide for revenue department authorities to verify that surrenders are bona fide, except for Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh. Some state laws (including Gujarat, Himachal

29 30

N.C. Behuria, “Land Reforms Legislation in India”, Vikas Publishing, New Delhi, 1997, p. 7. Id, p. 8.

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Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tripura) call for the government — rather than the landlord — to take ownership of land voluntarily surrendered by the tenant. Whether states would permit the creation of future tenancies was perhaps the most controversial aspect of tenancy laws. Heated debates resulted in provisions that fall into four broad categories.31 • COMPLETE PROHIBITION: The laws in two states (Kerala and Jammu & Kashmir) place a virtual or absolute prohibition on the creation of agricultural tenancies. • GENERAL PROHIBITION/LIMITED LEASING: The laws in some states like Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Orissa are characterized by a general prohibition on future tenancies combined with an allowance of leasing by certain defined categories of landowners and/or under certain other conditions. In some cases, the legal effect of such general prohibitions is fairly limited because the exceptions are very broad. For example, in the Telangana area of Andhra Pradesh, landowners who own less than three times a “family holding” may lease out land. This includes at least 95 percent of all landowners in Andhra Pradesh. In other states, the exceptions are much more narrowly defined. For example, Karnataka’s legislation only allows soldiers and sailors to lease out their land. Most other states that have a general prohibition combined with defined exceptions fall between these two extremes; although they tend to be more similar to Karnataka, only allowing additional exceptions for minors, widows, unmarried women, female divorcees, physically disabled, imprisoned, and/or students. Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal are unique. Madhya Pradesh’s exceptions to its general prohibition on leasing include a provision allowing any landowner to lease out their land for at least one year during a consecutive three-year period. West Bengal does not allow fixed-rent tenancies, but does allow sharecropping (although, because the law gives permanent rights to such sharecroppers, it creates a powerful chilling effect on the creation of future sharecropping relationships). • PERMISSIBLE LEASING WITH OWNERSHIP POTENTIAL: Five states permit leasing, but with a stipulation that the tenant acquires a right of ownership or a right to purchase ownership after some specified period. These states include Assam, Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra, and 31

Supra 24, p.100.

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Punjab. The time period ranges from one year in Gujarat and Maharashtra to six years in Haryana and Punjab. • NO PROHIBITIONS ON LEASING: Three states place virtually no prohibitions on leasing. These include Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu. Even in these states, however, provisions on maximum rent, minimum length of term, and tenants’ rights to purchase land can have the effect of preventing landowners from renting out their land or pushing tenancies “underground.” Almost all State Governments provided for the regulation of rent, excepting Kerala where leasing out was completely prohibited. The regulated or fair rent ranged between 1/4th to 1/6th of the produce.32 But actual rent remained always higher than the regulated or fair rent. In many places where small and marginal farmers leased-in land from large or absentee landowners, the situation continued to be exploitative, thereby discouraging the actual tillers to cultivate the land efficiently. The state tenancy reform laws contain prominent defects and sizeable loopholes that have limited their potential reach. Despite the numerous defects and loopholes in the law and the less-thanserious manner in which the laws were implemented in many settings, they did provide real benefits to a substantial number of households. However, those negatively impacted by tenancy were the tenants who were evicted as a result of the laws; and potential tenants who desire to but cannot access land through tenancy because of ongoing legal restrictions. Throughout India, tenancy reform was the impetus for the large-scale ejectment of tenants.

CEILINGS ON LAND HOLDINGS The term ‘ceiling on land holdings’ refers to the legally stipulated maximum size beyond which no individual farmer or farm household can hold any land. 33 Like all other land reforms measures, the objective of such ceiling is to promote economic growth with social justice. It has K. Venkatasubramanian, “Land reforms remain an unfinished business”, Planning Commission, Government of India, available at: last accessed: 19th October, 2017. 33 Ceilings for Landholdings, Economy Watch, available at: last accessed: 16th October, 2017. 32

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been duly recognised by India’s planners and policy makers that beyond a point any large scale farming in Indian situation becomes not only uneconomic, but also unjust. Small farms tend to increase economic efficiency of resource use and improve social equity through employment creation and more equitable income distribution. According to C.H. Hunumantha Rao, small farms offer more opportunities for employment compared to large farms. Hence, even if large farms produce relatively more output per unit of area, they cannot be considered more efficient in a situation of widespread unemployment and under-employment prevalent in this country.34 In 1959, Indian National Congress (Nagpur Resolution) resolved that agrarian legislation to cover restrictions on the size of land holdings must be implemented in all states by the end of 1959.35 Accordingly, all the State Governments excepting north-eastern region imposed ceilings on land holdings in the 1960s. The states of West Bengal and Jammu and Kashmir had already imposed ceilings on land holdings along with the laws for abolition of intermediaries in the early 1950s. However, the Nagpur Resolution of 1959 had significant impact as various State Governments immediately took to the ratification of ceiling legislation. All Indian states have adopted legislation that places ceilings on the amount of agricultural land a person or family can own, with the objective of redistributing land in excess of the ceiling to poor, landless, or marginal farmers. The ceiling laws were enacted and enforced in two phases: (1) the period from 1960 to 1972, when no specific policy guidelines were present; and (2) the period since 1972, after the adoption of national policy guidelines.36 IMPACT ANALYSIS: As the ceiling laws were not ratified simultaneously with abolition of zamindari, except in West Bengal and Jammu and Kashmir as stated before, several nami and benami transfers of land took place. This reduced the potential ceiling surplus land that could be available for redistribution. The perceived ineffectiveness of the ceiling laws during the first phase led to an establishment of a Central Land Reforms Committee and several high-level policy meetings on land reforms. The Case for Redistributive Land Reforms: A Theoretical Discussion, p. 20, available at: last accessed: 16th October, 2017. 35 K. S. Gill, “The Nagpur Resolution: Agrarian Organisation Pattern”, The Economic Weekly Annual, January, 1959, p. 223 available at: last accessed: 17th October, 2017. 36 A. N. Das, “Agrarian Unrest and Socio-Economic Change in Bihar, 1900-1980”, Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1983, p. 85. 34

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Central Land Reforms Committee convened a Chief Minister’s Conference in July 1972. At this conference, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi was able to push through a set of National Guidelines for future state laws on land ceilings.37 Following the formulation of these National Guidelines, all states introduced legislative changes in response. While the new or newly amended laws on land ceiling followed a common pattern, variations existed on several key aspects. Some of those aspects are summarized below including: (1) the unit to which the ceiling applies; (2) the ceiling area; (3) exemptions from ceiling; (4) retrospective application; (5) compensation; and (6) defining and prioritizing beneficiaries. Several states including Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Orissa, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal followed individuals as the unit of application for ceiling, while family as the unit of application was adopted in Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu in the first phase of land reforms, i.e., pre 1970. Although ‘family’ is now the basis for determining the level of ceiling, the term ‘family’ has been used with different meanings in different states and the major sons have been allowed a separate ceiling unit in almost all the states. 38 Thus, since the new ceiling laws do not seem to have attacked the various sources of law evasion, the question of proper ceiling legislation and its implementation has not been solved even after the National guidelines. There is little commonality concerning the definition of the ceiling area limit. All states reduced their ceiling laws after the 1972 policy. The ceilings now range from nine standard acres in parts of Jammu & Kashmir to 54 standard acres for certain circumstances in Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu.39 Most state laws reduced the number of exemptions in the early 1970s. The common exempted categories now include: (1) land held by any level of government; (2) land held by educational institutions; (3) land held by industrial or commercial undertakings; and (4) plantations of coffee, cocoa, or tea. Most state laws also include some additional minor exceptions. 40 These exemptions as provided in the ceiling laws gave rise to problems of law evasion by manipulating the Supra 24, pp. 155-169. Supra 19, p. 85. 39 Ibid. 40 Supra 36, p. 110. 37 38

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classification of land. Also the size of the ceiling surplus land available for redistribution was consequently reduced.

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ADDRESSING THE SHORTCOMINGS: SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY FOR LAND REFORMS MEASURES ABOLITION OF INTERMEDIARIES: The legislation abolishing intermediaries is largely of historical significance and has limited relevance for current land policy reform dialogue. These reforms were introduced decades ago and whatever implementation that is to happen has largely happened. That phase of India’s land reforms would likely have better realized its objectives if the state governments had taken simultaneous steps to limit the size of home-farms and extend protection to the non-superior tenants, especially those on the home-farms. Devoting policy attention to these laws would be wasted effort; such policy attention is much more warranted on other topics such as tenancy reform. However, the design and implementation experience of these laws does provide a few general lessons that may be applicable in revising other types of land legislation: • Provide adequate compensation to existing holders of land rights when extinguishing their rights: One important reason why abolition of intermediary laws were more fully implemented than land ceiling laws is that the former provided more compensation than the latter, which decreased resistance from those whose land rights were to be taken. • Simplify land tenure types and land legislation generally: When land legislation is exceedingly complex and when land tenures recognized by laws are numerous, poor (and especially illiterate) people suffer. Such complexity can and often is exploited by those who can afford lawyers and by government officials charged with implementing laws that ordinary citizens cannot possibly understand. Intermediary abolition laws took simplification steps in the right direction, but some states continue to retain too many legally recognized tenure types. Most states could benefit from efforts to simplify and clarify land legislation. • Land law and policy reform can lead to beneficial social change that is at least as important as the direct economic benefits: Intermediary abolition legislation is a case in point. In considering land policy reform alternatives and their likely impacts, policy makers should consider the social and political impacts as well as the potential economic impacts.

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TENANCY REFORMS: Throughout much of the 20th Century, tenancy in India (as in many parts of the developing world) was cast in the role of an exploitative institution and charged with negatively impacting socially optimal equity and productivity outcomes. In general, Indian states should consider amending tenancy legislation to better meet (and, in some cases balance) equity and efficiency objectives. The basic aim should be two-fold. First, consolidate the benefits of past tenancy reform by converting “protected,” “registered,” or “occupancy” tenants into owners. Second, liberalize ongoing tenancy prohibitions and excessive tenant “protections.” The specific content of these amendments will differ from state to state and should be informed by the results of rigorous field research. In general, however, the following guidelines for policy and legislative changes are suggested: 

In settings where past tenancy reform beneficiaries are not full owners, states should consider converting them into owners: This will require legislative changes that will differ from state to state. In West Bengal for example -- the state with the largest number of tenancy reform beneficiaries (bargadars) -- the law could be improved by giving bargadars a unilateral right to become owners by “buying out” the landlord for a government-determined sum, by providing for a streamlined voluntary transaction process, and/or by activating the financing mechanism for bargadar purchases of barga land that is already contemplated by the Land Reform Act.41



In settings where tenancy is now prohibited, states should consider amending the legislation to legally recognize tenancy while incorporating enforceable provisions that balance the interests of the tenants and landlords: The drafting of these provisions balancing the interests of tenants and landlords should, as always, be informed by rigorous field research. They might include stipulations that:  Tenancy agreements be in writing, using a mandatory, standardized form that forces the parties to clearly state the rent amount, the length, and other important terms of the lease;  Guarantee the tenant exclusive possession of the tenanted land for the duration of their agreement, but without maximum rent payments or minimum length of terms that deviate significantly from those prevailing in practice (otherwise they become unenforceable);

T. Hanstad, R. Nielsen, “From Sharecroppers to Landowners: Paving the Way for West Bengal’s Bargadars”, RDI Report No. 121, 2004, p. 70. 41

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 Clearly state that new tenants will not be given any long-term or hereditary rights to land beyond that contained in the written agreement between tenant and landlord; and  In settings where there are fears that liberalizing leasing will result in excessive land concentration and further limit opportunities for the landpoor, states might consider: (1) revising land ceilings to include owned and rented-in land; or (at least initially) (2) limiting lessees to those owning less than a prescribed amount of land. 

In settings where tenancy is allowed, but subject to maximum rent levels and/or a minimum lease term, states should consider amending the legislation to remove the maximum rents and minimum length terms. If that is not politically feasible, the states should revise the maximum rent levels and/or minimum lease terms to reflect more accurately what is reasonable and enforceable.

CEILINGS ON LANDHOLDINGS: While in most states the ceilings have not led to a significant government redistribution of land, those ceilings may be serving a useful role in preventing a further excessive concentration of land and in providing appropriate incentives for some large landowners to sell land to smaller farmers and/or diversify into the non-agricultural sector. States might consider focusing their efforts in this area on the following: • Remove the obstacles preventing the distribution of the nearly 20 lakh acres (India-wide) that have been declared surplus but not yet distributed to individual beneficiaries. 42 Because lengthy litigation is a principal obstacle, Indian states could focus more legal aid resources or establish special tribunals to resolve long-standing cases. • Allocate the remaining land for distribution in smaller plots in order to benefit greater numbers of landless. States should consider allocating the remaining unallocated land as either house-andgarden plots or small field plots (one acre or less) so that the benefits can be enjoyed by a larger number of families. • Amend legislation so that land ceiling beneficiaries are not permanently prohibited from selling their land. International experience indicates that permanent prohibitions on sale are

Sumit Chaturvedi, “Land Reforms Fail; 5% of India’s Farmers Control 32% Land”, The Wire, available at: last accessed: 19th October, 2017. 42

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unnecessarily restrictive and not a good practice. 43 States with permanent prohibitions should consider revising the law to provide for time-bound restrictions of perhaps 10-15 years. If any Indian states do plan to continue using land ceilings as tool to redistribute land, the following legislative changes should be considered: • Use individuals rather than families as the unit to which the ceiling applies. West Bengal’s experience indicates that this ensures greater equity and eliminates an easy loophole by which larger families split into additional families in order to retain more land.44 • Limit the amount of ceiling-surplus land that a beneficiary family can receive to one acre. Given the large numbers of rural, landless households, it is more important to increase the number of beneficiary families than to provide each beneficiary family an “ideal” amount of land. If any states are seriously considering increasing or removing land ceilings, they should first undertake rigorous empirical research to determine the equity and efficiency effects of revising existing land ceilings.

CONCLUSION India should both rethink and go beyond the twin pillars of past land reform efforts: tenancy reform and land ceilings. Other new and feasible methods exist for improving the poor’s secure access to land. Much of the legal framework already exists. What is most needed is the political will of Indian leaders at the Union and state level to reform land policy and laws in a manner that L. Rolfes, Jr., Land Transactions in R. Prosterman & T. Hanstad (eds.), “Legal Impediments to Effective Rural Land Relations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia”, World Bank Technical Paper No. 436, 1999. 44 T. Hanstad , J. Brown, “Land Reform Law and Implementation in West Bengal: Lessons and Recommendations”, RDI Report No. 112, 2001, p. 55. 43

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advances the interests of the poor and marginalized. The reforms can be both pro-poor and market friendly, and the required costs are not unthinkable. At bottom, the legislative foundations of land law and policy reform in India (abolition of intermediaries, tenancy reform, and land ceilings) were designed to increase the poor’s access to rural land. To date, the effectiveness of the legislation has been mixed and progress over the last few years has slowed. The following approach, which involves selected revision to existing legislation and adoption of new methods of increasing land access, will help achieve the original equitable objectives of the legislation: • Revitalize tenancy reform by: (1) solidifying the gains of past tenancy reform by converting protected tenants into owners; and (2) selectively liberalizing excessive tenancy regulation and restrictions; • Assist beneficiaries of ceiling legislation in realizing the benefits by removing obstacles to land distribution and relaxing moratoriums on the transfer of ceiling surplus land; The work required on India’s land laws and policies in order to broaden access is significant, but should not be paralyzing. The existing legal framework provides a solid starting point. With an open mind, a commitment to benefit the poorest, exploration and piloting of new approaches and an emphasis on implementation the objectives of land reform are achievable. India’s poor deserve nothing less.

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