Operations In Woods And Forests: Army Field Manual

Army Code 71739

ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 2

OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

PART 6

OPERATIONS IN WOODS AND FORESTS

2001

Issue 1:0. June 2001

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The contents provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experience and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operations and training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is proved that you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find you criminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements of health and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a person criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP could result in disciplinary action under the provisions of the Army Act.

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“The woods are lovely, dark and deep But I have promises to keep and miles to go before I sleep.” Robert Frost

“Two weeks after entering the Hurtgen Forest, 9th US Division had advanced 3,000 yards at a cost of over one casualty a yard, 4,500 men killed, missing and wounded. They were replaced by the inexperienced men of 28th Infantry Division, who found a nightmarish landscape awaiting them. At terrible cost they learned the lessons of survival in the forest. Foxholes were useless if they were not covered with logs and sod. Shells did not explode on the ground, in the Hurtgen they exploded in the air on impact with the trees. Caught in the tree blasts, it was pointless to throw yourself on the ground as this would expose your entire body to the deadly hail of shrapnel. Survival required standing upright in the shelter of a tree and a strong prayer. Two weeks were enough for 28th Division, most of the rifle companies suffered 50% casualties or more. Tanks were useless in the murk and mire, orderly evacuation of the wounded was impossible. Most of the time the battle was reduced to the view-point of the individual infantryman crawling across the slimy, leafchoked floor of the forest and peering through the deep green mass ahead. “Fallen Eagle” – Robin Cross

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PREFACE 1.

This publication covers operations in woods and forests and is designed to provide an insight into combat in large scale woods and forested areas, generally in temperate climes. A strict dividing line between a wood, a forest and the jungle is difficult to differentiate in generic publications of this type and so the tactics described here are those that relate generally to deciduous or coniferous forested areas of the northern hemisphere.

2.

The British Army has a great deal of experience of fighting in woods which are not that large or extensive. However, there is little real experience of a campaign fought in wooded and forested areas that extend for many miles. At a time when the Army is involved with deployed operations almost anywhere in the world it is possible that these environmental conditions may be encountered in future operations.

3.

This publication is written to guide battalion and company level commanders about the conduct of operations in these conditions. High intensity operations in these environmental conditions is less likely – at least for prolonged periods, but military operations to move through forested areas, or to clear particular objectives are much more likely and it is hoped that this publication will assist the basic military thought processes involved in such operations.

4.

Acknowledgements are due to the Bundeswehr for allowing the use of diagrams to display graphically some of the military activities involved in such operations. DGD&D is grateful for their co-operation.

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CONTENTS LIST PREFACE PART A THE ENVIRONMENT CHAPTER 1 Section 1 Section 2

- FORESTED AREAS AND THEIR TACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE - General - Types of Forest Stands

PART B COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS CHAPTER 2 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5

THE TACTICAL LIMITATIONS -

CHAPTER 3 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6 CHAPTER 4 Section 1 Section 2

Characteristics Command and Control Combat Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Observation The Movement of Troops Deployment OPERATIONS

-

Offensive Operations Defensive Operations Delaying Operations Combat Under Special Conditions Dealing with Opposition in the Rear Area Conclusions MINOR TACTICS

- Points to Note in the Advance - Points to Note in Defence

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PART A THE ENVIRONMENT

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CHAPTER 1 FORESTED AREAS AND THEIR TACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SECTION 1 – GENERAL 1.

Forested areas influence the battle dependent on their size and density, the type of forest stand, their soil conditions and their trail network. They facilitate camouflage and favour surprise. Forested terrain allows even weak forces to fight successfully. Observation and reconnaissance, as well as liaison and orientation, become more difficult; movements, visibility and weapons effects, especially of mechanized units, are severely impaired. Hence, dismounted infantry will bear the brunt of fighting in wooded and forested areas.

2.

Despite the densely developed route network, wooded and forested areas can hinder all movements. Roads, trails and lanes are often easily blocked. The obstacle value of woods against armoured fighting vehicles, however, is smaller than generally presumed. A pine stand cleared of underbrush with a mean tree thickness of 30 cm and a mean distance between trees of 3 m is not an obstacle to individual armoured vehicles. Nevertheless, woods will always hamper the employment of armoured vehicles. They become an obstacle if steep slopes, soft soil or the trees that a tank has toppled, piled up to stop the vehicle (Figure 1-1).

Figure 1-1. Tank attempting to pass through trees 3.

Visibility depends on the density of the forest stand and on the diameter of the trees. In middle-aged stands that have been cleared of undergrowth, the tree trunks themselves (even without underbrush) limit visibility to about 150 m (Figure 1-2). Even thermal sights offer such limited visibility ranges only. 1-1

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Figure 1-2. Visibility in a pine stand cleared of undergrowth 4.

This limited visibility entails both advantages and disadvantages: a.

Protection from observation and to a large degree also from direct fire.

b.

Favourable conditions for deceiving and surprising the enemy.

c.

Restricted fields of observation.

d.

Land navigation and command and control more difficult.

5.

The effective ranges of direct fire weapons are generally shorter than the visibility. Dependent on the density of the woods, there are only few, narrow gaps between the trunks, in which the target may be acquired, aimed at and engaged. The use of antitank guided weapons is possible only along straight forest lanes and trails.

6.

Mortar fire controllers and artillery forward observers operate generally dismounted far forward among the infantry. They may also occupy observation posts outside the woods if good fields of observation are available there. Frequently, all forward observers or mortar fire controllers are committed. Often, the fire positions of heavy weapons are sited behind the manoeuvre companies on lanes and clearings, using all forms of mortar or gun deployment to conform with the ground. Artillery and mortar fire fused “super quick” will result almost without exception in treebursts. Delay-fused rounds generally detonate among the tree trunks, dependent on the type of forest stand. Before smoke rounds are used, it must be remembered that smoke lingers longer in the woods than on open ground and may thus also affect friendly operations.

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7.

The fire hazard is great especially after prolonged dry periods, especially in dense pine and fir stands. Pyrotechnical munitions and the flare pots of illumination rounds may quickly start forest fires if they continue to burn on the ground. High explosive mortar and artillery rounds generally do not set the woods on fire.

8.

In the attack, it is necessary to:

9.

a.

Conduct careful battlefield and ground reconnaissance throughout the zone of action.

b.

Give commanders freedom of action without allowing the battle to disintegrate into isolated actions.

c.

Select easily identifiable axes of advance and intermediate objectives.

d.

Ensure the especially close cooperation between infantry, armoured fighting vehicles and artillery/mortars in the forests and woods.

e.

Attach reinforcing/supporting forces from the start of the operation.

f.

If possible, employ armoured engineers in front of the armoured fighting vehicles.

In the defence of large wooded and forested areas, it is important to a.

Employ mobile forces with a strong antitank capability to deny the enemy an easy access to the woods.

b.

Site the positions in depth of the woods and to conceal their exact location so that the enemy runs into them surprisingly.

c.

Identify enemy movements at an early time by using a dense reconnaissance network between the outpost line and the main positions.

d.

Attack and ambush the enemy repeatedly in order to fragment and attrit him.

e.

Exploit every opportunity to attack the enemy in the flanks and rear.

10.

Field defences should be provided with overhead protection against indirect fire. To control friendly indirect fire support, a large number of partially fired, partially silently marked targets should be recorded. This allows all commanders to call fire on these targets.

11.

Armoured fighting vehicles may be attached to infantry small units to guarantee especially close cooperation. The combat effectiveness of a defending unit is determined primarily by the time it has for: a. Reconnaissance. b.

Construction of primary and alternative fighting positions. 1-3

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12.

c.

Emplacement of obstacles.

d.

The preparations of the fire fight, including the clearing of firing lanes.

Throughout the operation it is necessary to: a.

Ensure that woods and forests devastated by friendly heavy weapons do not restrict friendly movements, command and control and the cooperation among friendly forces.

b.

Be constantly on guard against ambushes and raids.

c.

Keep local reserves close at hand. SECTION 2 – TYPES OF FOREST STANDS

13.

Each type of forest stand (Figure 1-3) entails its own problems for the fight and, hence, affects battalion- and company-level operations. It is especially important to appreciate the wooded ground during the estimate of the situation. The individual types of forest stands are assessed for: a.

Visibility and fields of observation, as well as concealment.

b.

Effectiveness of direct and indirect fire.

c.

Mobility and obstacle value.

These assessments are a guideline only and cannot replace a detailed terrain reconnaissance.

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Forest Stand (Symbol used in this publication)

Photo

Designation

Diameter at chest height

Tree nursery

Distance between trees

Tree height

1–2m

0.3 – 1.5 m

3 – 10 cm

1–2m

1.5 – 10 m

10 – 20 m

2–3m

10 – 17 m

Mature stand

20 – 30 m

3–4m

15 – 25 m

Old stand

more than 30 cm

4–8m

20 – 30 m

Young stand

forest

Pole stand

wood

The use of different colours is intended to facilitate illustrations. Figure 1-3. Tree Nurseries 14.

Stands with plants of a short height whose branches do not yet touch each other are called a tree nursery. Very young nurseries hardly differ from clearings (Figure 1-3). A standing man can look over taller nurseries. Dismounted infantry finds adequate 1-5

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concealment here. Tree nurseries offer negligible protection against direct fire. The fragmentation effect of high explosive rounds is actually amplified because the super quick fuses detonate on contact with even small twigs and cause the round to explode above the ground. The fragmentation range of artillery and mortar fire is barely reduced. Armoured fighting vehicles can drive through clearings of all tree sizes. Infantry proceeds through them without problems.

Figure 1-4. The Young Forest Stand 15.

Young stands are the densest type of forest stand. They are characterized by the closely entwined branches reaching down to ground level. They form an almost opaque green wall. Visibility is limited to a few metres, no matter if a man is standing or lying on the ground. It is possible to look over the younger ones of these stands from the top of armoured fighting vehicles. Direct fire rarely penetrates deeper than 50 metres into this stand. Calibres above 12.7 mm already cause major damage; the fragmentation effect of explosive rounds concentrates on the edges of young stands. To fire small arms from a young stand, the soldier generally has to cut firing tunnels through the scrub. Artillery and mortar fire produces almost exclusively treebursts (especially if super quick fuse settings are used) because of the extremely dense canopy of this type of forest stand. Young forest stands do not constitute an obstacle to the movements of armoured fighting vehicles, yet they hamper movements because visibility is severely limited. Dismounted infantry can move through young stands, albeit with considerable difficulty.

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Figure 1-5. Pole Wood Stands 16.

Pole wood stands are also characterized by relatively short mean distances between trees. By contrast to the young forest stands, pole stands are marked by the individual, slender tree trunks (Figure 1-5). In younger pine stands, barren twigs may reach down to the ground and limit visibility. Grown pole wood stands are marked by smooth trunks. From the outside, it is possible to look into this stand to a depth of up to 60 metres. Visibility within the stand varies between 50 and 100 metres, dependent on its age and the presence of underbrush. Fire from turret weapons generally penetrates to a depth of 50 metres. Calibres greater than 12.7 mm already cause severe damage. After prolonged firing, the effects reach deeper into the woods. The effective ranges of small arms are limited to about 50 metres in pole wood stands. Artillery and mortar fire does not only break off branches and treetops, but may fell entire trees. Frequently, more than 50 per cent of the incoming rounds explode in the treetops. The fragmentation effect is amplified considerably in the vicinity of these treebursts. The canopy deteriorates rapidly under indirect fire. The pole wood stand changes its appearance dramatically. Pole wood stands do not constitute an obstacle to the movements of armoured fighting vehicles. Nevertheless, they complicate movements. Observation is severely limited. Turret weapons should be in the 6 o’clock position. Dismounted infantry move through pole wood stands without difficulty.

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Figure 1-6. The Mature Timber Stand 17.

The mature timber stand already has a mean distance between trees of 3 to 4 metres. The trunks have a diameter in excess of 20 cm (Figure 1-6). Visibility in mature stands is limited primarily by the trunks themselves rather than by undergrowth. It extends to 150 to 200 metres. The fire of automatic cannons generally penetrates to a depth of up to 100 metres into the stand. Even small calibre explosive rounds may fell individual trees. Shooting a swatch into the stand remains an exception due to the inordinate amount of ammunition required. The effective range of small arms reaches out to approximately 80 metres in mature stands. Mature stands suffer the most profound damage through artillery and mortar fire (Figures 1-9a, b, 1-10). Dependent on the density of the stand, the proportion of treebursts may be up to 50 per cent. Branches and treetops litter the ground already after a few rounds, often resulting in severely limited fields of fire and observation and hampering command and control. Armoured fighting vehicles can drive through this stand, however, the toppled trees ultimately pile up to form a tank obstacle. Only few stands have mean distances between trees that are wide enough for fighting vehicles to pass between them. The turret weapons must be in the 6 o’clock position. The mobility of dismounted infantry is not impaired in mature timber stands.

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Figure 1-7. Old Timber Stands 18.

Old timber stands are the oldest of all forest stands. The wide distances between the individual trees with a diameter that is generally in excess of 30 cm give them a bright appearance (Figure 1-7). Old stands offer even better visibility and mobility than mature stands. Old stands uncluttered by undergrowth permit a visibility of 200, sometimes even 300 metres. The effects of automatic cannon fire reach into this stand to a depth of 150 metres. Small calibre explosive rounds (20 mm) cause comparatively little damage. Small arms fire is generally effective to a depth of 120 metres. Except in extremely dispersed stands, artillery and mortar fire produces damage in old timber stands that is comparable to the effects in mature timber stands. The distances between the trees are so wide that armoured fighting vehicles may drive through this type of stand ready for action. Dismounted infantry finds adequate cover from direct fire only behind the trees.

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PART B COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS

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CHAPTER 2 THE TACTICAL LIMITATIONS SECTION 1 - CHARACTERISTICS Introduction 1.

Reduced fields of view and fire, coupled with severe movement restrictions normally implies that the Infantry has to take the lead in operations in woods and forests. Nevertheless, the intimate support of the other combat arms is essential. This calls for very close co-operation between the arms if operations are to be conducted successfully. All involved must be aware of the strengths and limitations of the other arms. As far as possible, training should be on an all arms basis. In addition, the dispersed nature of such operations means that all units, including logistic ones, must have a clear understanding of the characteristics of this type of operation and be practised in the relevant skills. Characteristics

2.

Tempo. The established tactical principles of attack and defence apply equally to these operations although all are influenced by the particular characteristics of close country. All the characteristics tend to slow down the pace of operations. The commander in offence must therefore make every effort to maintain momentum without prejudicing success while the commander in defence will use these characteristics to delay and disrupt the enemy momentum. It follows that operations in woods and forests may impact on the ability of a commander to achieve tempo.

3.

Leadership. This imposes great strains on both leaders and led. The fragmented nature of the fighting, the fact that commanders can only influence the few men in their immediate vicinity and the ever present elements of surprise and high risk, can lead to uncertainty and exaggerated reporting. Commanders have to be prepared to delegate decision making down to the lowest level (fire team) in order to maintain the initiative. Allied to this, everybody has to be conversant with the commanders’ intentions. In this type of operation there is no substitute for firm, courageous and energetic leadership by commanders who are well practised in the peculiarities of this type of fighting.

4.

Limited Observation. The degree of visibility is dependent on terrain and the time of year, with visibility being reduced to as little as 5m to 10m. This will make it difficult to identify friend from foe. This will also degrade situational awareness. Without aids, map reading is very difficult and may lead to confusion of own, other friendly and enemy locations. For this reason, the possibility of fratricide is a major consideration.

5.

Concealment. It is difficult to locate the enemy in close country and consequently to estimate strengths, deployments and intentions of units and formations.

6.

Reduced Fields of Fire. The combination of trees, broken ground and natural features will generally result in restricted fields of fire. Therefore, short range 2-1

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weapons, grenades and explosives will predominate in close quarter fighting. Mutual support may be difficult to achieve. 7.

Restricted Space. Forests consisting of mature trees will limit the movement of vehicles and will restrict the employment of support weapons. Where vehicle movement is possible it will probably be canalised and vulnerable. Use of armour on tracks will severely degrade the tracks leaving them impassable to wheeled vehicles and even cause problems to men on foot.

8.

Weather. The weather will tend to have a more pronounced effect on operations in forests than it will in open country. Particular points of significance are:

9.

a.

Mists and Fog. Mists and fog will tend to linger longer, reducing fields of observation even further. Lower light levels in forests will further exacerbate the problem.

b.

Rain. Drainage in forests tends to be slow. This will make marshy areas more of an obstacle than normal. In addition, the softening effect on unmade tracks will increase their degradation when used by vehicles. Slopes covered in leaf mould will be less easy to climb even by tracked vehicles.

Night Operations. All the normal difficulties associated with operating in forested areas are worsened at night. Silent movement off tracks is almost impossible to achieve. This limits the effectiveness of patrols and renders night movement extremely difficult, even when the additional problems of route finding and maintenance are discounted. SECTION 2 – COMMAND AND CONTROL Manoeuvre Forces

10.

Combat in woods and forests requires firm, farsighted, energetic leadership by commanders who are able to cope with the peculiarities of this type of warfare and avoid unnecessary crises and reverses. During initial engagements uncertainty about the enemy and terrain is far greater than in the open. Unpleasant surprises may occur at any moment – in dense forests because of lack of observation and in swampy areas because of the difficulty in obtaining an accurate terrain estimate. In such situations, ignorance on the part of the staffs, defective organization, or lack of advance planning will have an immediate effect on the physical condition and the morale of the troops and may cause a loss of human lives which could have been avoided.

11.

In forest fighting, commanders easily lose control over their troops. In the forward area their direct influence is confined to the men in their immediate vicinity. Limited observation, the intensified noise of combat, and the excitement created by fighting at close quarters make it difficult to distinguish between friend and foe, increase the danger of overestimating purely local events, and the danger of panic is thereby aggravated. Combat of this type will always prove to be a heavy strain on troops. Units which have been engaged in serious forest fighting frequently are unfit for action for a considerable time thereafter. Any unit that no longer is able to provide 2-2

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adequate reserves for its combat missions should be temporarily relieved or rehabilitated before it is completely battle-worn. 12.

The general features of tactics in open terrain – the teamwork of mutually supporting arms and services, culminating in a main effort at the decisive point or points – also apply to combat in large woods and forest areas. Only the outward forms are changed insofar as they have to be adapted to the conditions created by nature, specifically to the lack of observation and the absence of suitable roads. The objectives remain the same.

13.

The place of the small unit commander is within view or earshot of his men, where he is able to exercise direct control and take charge of critical situations. Command posts of larger units are protected by the forest and rarely exposed to enemy reconnaissance. Their locations, therefore, are selected less for reasons of concealment than for good communications with friendly troops. Approaches have to be marked by unmistakable day and night road signs to aid messengers and subordinate commanders in finding their way.

14.

Large wooded area provided an abundance of concealment for movement and troop concentrations, even against an enemy with superior air forces. Furthermore, they offer distinct advantages in the conduct of delaying actions, blocking manoeuvres, and diversionary attacks. They are not, however, suitable as a battleground for major decisions. This is true not only for large wooded areas but also applies in even greater degree to forest areas. The attacker, if at all possible, should therefore seek to avoid large, continuous forests by passing them at both flanks, particularly with mechanized and motorized units. Only if the enemy is firmly entrenched in such areas and appears determined to fight, despite the danger of being outflanked and enveloped, must he be attacked or at least effectively contained. Otherwise, the successful conduct of subsequent operations might be jeopardized.

15.

In the defence, on the other hand, or for the purpose of blocking the enemy’s manoeuvre, it may be advisable to exploit extensive woods and forest areas, even by occupying them with one’s own forces. This will seriously interfere with the adversary’s plans, force him to use his troops on time-consuming missions, slow down his movements, and hamper his supply operations. Moreover, woods and forests often provide favourable opportunities for raids and attacks on the aggressor’s flanks and rear.

16.

It is generally agreed that in Northern European/American climes midwinter is the most suitable season for offensive operations in that type of terrain. When the streams, lakes and marshes are frozen, so that wide stretches off the roads become passable, the so-called winter roads are established. Running across the frozen surface of open moors and swampy tracts of woodland, such winter roads constitute the natural lines of communication during the long winter and thus make it possible to utilize the terrain for military purposes. The proper equipment has to, of course, be available to operate under such circumstances.

17.

Since the many items of technical equipment necessary for living and fighting in almost inaccessible woods and forest areas cannot be available everywhere at the 2-3

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right time and in sufficient quantity, commanders of all echelons have to apply themselves to the art of improvisation. 18.

As a means of orientation in the interior of extensive woods and forests, maps alone are inadequate and unreliable. The picture presented by the landscape is subject to constant change brought about by natural growth and the varying effects of water in every form, and every commander should use his maps only with the greatest caution. Any map information needs to be supplemented by aerial photographs and by interrogation of local inhabitants, as well as by the evaluation of captured documents. Foreign place names may have to be overprinted in one’s own alphabet. A uniform map with a standard grid system is an indispensable prerequisite for the proper coordination of all arms.

19.

In such areas, more than in any other type of terrain, commanders must be seriously concerned about providing adequate medical and sanitary facilities and individual equipment in order to make life bearable under the most adverse conditions.

20.

The conduct of operations in woods and forests requires the most meticulous preparation in every respect. This is true not only for reconnaissance and security but also for the composition and commitment of units, their equipment, the organization of communication and command channels, the training of the various arms, and last but not least for the utilization of local resources.

21.

Operations in these conditions are further characterized by the methodical execution of all measures. This, of necessity, involves a loss of time and requires an increased number of other categories of troops. In many respects it constitutes a departure from the conventional principles of combat in open terrain, which emphasize initiative and independent action on the part of all command echelons. Arms and Services

22.

The task of conducting a successful campaign against a tough opponent who is able to take advantage of the peculiar conditions of woods and forests calls for welltrained troops of high morale and unusual physical endurance. Here the individual fighting man assumes even greater importance than during combat in open terrain. Fighting at close quarters plays a major role and numerical superiority is less significant than personal courage. Light and heavy infantry weapons, automatic weapons, hand grenades, bayonets and the long hunting knife are the most suitable weapons for this type of combat.

23.

In forest areas the use of horses and other animals for transportation, often regarded as obsolete, could still have many tasks to perform. They have been successfully employed in envelopments and flank attacks, pursuits and long-range missions – admittedly not in the sense of the cavalry of former times but rather as a highly mobile mounted infantry with great powers of endurance. Also, the man on horseback was often indispensable in maintaining liaison and carrying messages.

24.

The composition and employment of the artillery needs to be adapted to the peculiarities of woods and forests. Lack of observation, especially from the flanks, and unusual difficulties in selecting suitable positions are the main handicaps of 2-4

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artillery commitment in this type of terrain. In dense forests it is never easy to identify even the foremost enemy line. Unobserved fire on targets proved even more uncertain. Finally, the artillery face a downright impossible task whenever the front line fluctuates in attacks and counterattacks and when observation, even at close range, fails to provide a reliable picture. 25.

In forest fighting the psychological effect of artillery fire is greatly amplified while that of small arms fire is generally reduced. Prepared concentrations, if laid down to block the enemy’s main route of approach, can be highly effective. Only in exceptional cases, however, is mass employment of artillery possible in direct support of attacking or defending forces. A suitable solution could be to attach one artillery battalion to one infantry regiment. Frequently a further subdivision may be necessary and individual batteries could be attached to infantry battalions. Thus, during combat in woods and forests the artillery will find its main function in the close support of front-line infantry.

26.

The number of forward observers equipped with suitable communications can never be too large; several are necessary to direct the fire of each battery.

27.

Massed fire on important targets has to be planned with extraordinary care. Systematic area fire from map data has little promise of success and, in most instances, merely constitutes a waste of ammunition. In forest areas, furthermore, a considerable part of the fragmentation effect is lost unless time fuzes are available.

28.

The artillery has to use high angle fire in direct support, especially in tall forests, once the advancing infantry is separated from the enemy by only by the range of a hand grenade. The use of infantry heavy weapons, particularly mortars, is subject to similar principles.

29.

In densely overgrown terrain, LAWs have a considerable effect on morale, particularly at night. Even if little accuracy can be achieved, the enemy could be forced to evacuate because of grass and brush fires started in the impact area.

30.

Engineer troops are called upon for a great variety of tasks in wood and forested terrain. A large number of well-equipped engineer detachments have to be available not only for combat missions and construction of obstacles but also for mine laying and mine detecting, clearing roads and fire lanes, constructing bridges, corduroy roads, and fascine mats, and for building observation towers and abatis. Particularly necessary will be the need for bridge and road construction units.

31.

German experiences in Russia demonstrated that even armoured units can be employed in the forests of Eastern Europe, particularly in those areas that have a fairly adequate road net and are not too densely overgrown. Despite all technical advances, however, the difficulties imposed by the peculiarities of terrain remain enormous. They are further aggravated by greater density of tree growth and deep snow and, during the muddy season or after extensive rainfall, become insurmountable in swamp areas. In continuous woods and forests, therefore, the employment of entire mechanized divisions should be avoided. If this is impossible, the tanks should be held in reserve and only infantry and combat engineers should be committed at first. Utilizing the existing road net and considerably echeloned in 2-5

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depth, the armour should then move up on a narrow frontage. Much greater opportunities present themselves for the employment of individual tanks, sometimes in small groups up to platoon strength, and of assault guns and tank destroyers. Of course, they too are hampered by difficulties of terrain and lack of observation. So long as the ground is reasonably firm, however, their commitment appears justified since the infantry cannot expect too much support from any of the other arms. 32.

Close air support in forest areas is subject to restrictions similar to those present in the employment of artillery. Lack of observation and the absence of distinct features in the terrain such as crossroads, railroad tracks, and inhabited places, often lead to serious errors in the commitment of aircraft. Attacks in forest areas have a strong psychological effect. The aircraft engine noise, the detonation of bombs, and the crashing of falling trees wreak havoc on the nerves of all but the most seasoned troops. On the other hand, the employment of attack aircraft requires the most methodical coordination, correct timing, and the greatest possible accuracy in the designation of targets, all of which can be achieved only under the most favourable conditions. Although less effective in close support of forest fighting than under other conditions, aerial platforms of one sort or another are capable of keeping vast combat areas under constant surveillance and of providing a prompt and reliable supplement to ground reconnaissance.

33.

In support of an advance over terrain that offers practically no ground observation, air reconnaissance has the additional task of reporting the location of forward elements and of indicating points where major road congestions have occurred.

SECTION 3 – COMBAT INTELLIGENCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION 34.

When an attacking force approaches a large wooded and forested area it is usually provided with intelligence estimates indicating whether or not the area is occupied by enemy forces. But since intelligence estimates furnished by higher headquarters cannot always provide conclusive data, it is the responsibility of every commander to obtain more specific information about the enemy and terrain in his operational area. This can be accomplished by deep and close battle. If deep reconnaissance tasks fail to obtain adequate results, improper employment of forces can hardly be avoided. Failure to carry out adequate close and battle reconnaissance may involve the danger of falling into an ambush or encountering unexpected enemy resistance. This applies in an immeasurably higher degree to wooded and marshy areas than to any other type of terrain.

35.

All items of information concerning the road net in the area of advance has to be entered on road maps which are distributed before going into action. Numbers or names need to be assigned to all roads and prominent terrain features that are not so marked on the maps. Such designations proved invaluable in simplifying orientation and communications in previous campaigns.

36.

Apart from air reconnaissance and aerial photography, strong combat patrols are still the primary means of obtaining suitable surveillance. Wherever the terrain is suitable and affords adequate observation, single tanks or armoured reconnaissance vehicles may be employed, provided they can be accompanied by force protection and mine-detecting groups. 2-6

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37.

In conjunction with continuous reconnaissance to the front the security of both flanks has to be assured. Any commander who neglects to provide for all around security, particularly in woods and forests, has but himself to blame if his troops sustain heavy casualties from enemy surprise attacks or are caught in a prepared ambush which was not recognized in time. The more difficult the terrain, the greater is the need for continuous and intensive reconnaissance. In contrast to operations in open terrain, reconnaissance and security patrols have to operate close to the main force. Advancing by bounds, they should work their way through wooded and forested areas and not lose contact with their units. Prearranged signals, such as rockets, signal flares, warning shots, and coloured smoke, are suitable means of communication even in woods with dense underbrush. Whenever possible, observation posts should be established on high ground, in treetops, hunting lookouts, and observation towers. Climbing irons and rope are indispensable items of equipment in terrain of this type.

38.

Similar principles apply to a defensive situation in woods and forests. Forward of the main line of resistance the defender have to attempt to establish a closely knit security and reconnaissance network, a task that is greatly facilitated since the forces are familiar with the terrain. Reconnaissance units in contact with the enemy will have the additional mission of deceiving the attacker as long as possible as to the actual location of the main line of resistance.

39.

In exceptional cases, for instance when contact with the enemy has been frequently broken or lost altogether, the employment of so-called raiding detachments may become necessary. These are long-range combat patrols with the mission of collecting specific information, harassing the enemy rear area, and creating unrest behind the enemy lines. Their success will depend entirely on the proper selection of personnel, notably the leader, and on the suitability of their equipment. They need to be led by a man of unusual abilities who combines the best qualities of a trained soldier with the natural instincts of an experienced hunter. Every man in the patrol should carry his own rations, weapons, protection against inclement weather, and any items that might be needed to care for the wounded.

40.

On missions of this type vehicles are likely to be a hindrance rather than a help. During winter periods, however, small vehicles with runners such as sledges could prove useful for transporting weapons, ammunition, equipment, and occasionally for evacuating casualties. These sleds can be drawn by one man and, in far northern regions, could be pulled through the most difficult terrain by snowmobiles. SECTION 4 – THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS

41.

An advance through a large forest region traversed by several hard-surfaced roads will generally follow the same principles that are observed in any other type of terrain, except that the units involved are echeloned in greater depth than usual. Strong advance guards should be pushed well ahead of the main body. Moving along the roads, they should advance through the woods and forests as quickly as possible with the primary objective of gaining open terrain and securing it for succeeding elements. These advance guards have to be strong enough to overcome the resistance of small enemy forces in the woods and, in cooperation 2-7

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with air manoeuvre units, should be able to hold newly gained open terrain until reinforcements arrive. 42.

Road conditions permitting such an advance could prove to be the exception rather than the rule. Road nets, or what appears as such on the map, could consist mainly of unimproved, sandy or swampy country roads, frequently no more than beaten tracks through the wilderness. In these circumstances the advance of large units had to be carefully planned and organized in every detail. For example, with no more than one through road available, as was often the case, the movement of a formation sized force would be carried out as follows: a.

Each element of the advancing column should be preceded by its own advance guard. This unit, in addition to its usual tactical functions, would report the presence of mines and roadblocks along the route of advance and to indicate the time required for their removal. It was also responsible for reconnoitring all possible detours around obstructed or impassable stretches of the road.

b.

The order of march, especially with respect to forward components of the column, would be so prescribed as to eliminate any need for subsequent changes. On narrow roads it proved virtually impossible to move any unit from the rear of the column to the front without causing considerable difficulties.

c.

All advance detachments would be accompanied by engineer details which could repair the worst stretches of the road and placed road and terrain markers to aid in the orientation of previously issued road maps. At an early stage of the movement, construction units were put to work along the entire route of advance. When movement was interrupted by rest periods or at night, these units performed road maintenance, constructed bypasses, and built bridges and corduroy roads. In addition, a highly mobile engineer unit was held in reserve to cope with special emergencies.

d.

Traffic control would require careful organization and more personnel than in other types of terrain. The Traffic Control Officer would be responsible for the even and uninterrupted flow of the movement. In order to enforce strict traffic discipline and to prevent any column or single vehicle from moving in the opposite direction, he should be given special authority within the scope of his assignment.

43.

On many occasions the poor condition of the only available route of advance would be necessary to provide towing facilities at particularly difficult points along the road. The regulation of supply operations so as to keep them from interfering with troop movements has to be planned in every detail. One item of major importance in moving through woods and forests is the procurement and transportation of safe drinking water.

44.

Along the route of advance effective air defence and adequate communications have to be provided. Immediate local security measures had to be taken by every unit during rest periods or extended halts in the forest. At night it is advisable to provide 2-8

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for all around defence by forming concentric security and defence belts around individual elements of the column. 45.

In any advancing column the location of the commander is of great importance. This is particularly true of movements through woods and forests which, far from being mere road marches, might at any time turn into meeting engagements. The best location for a formation commander in a movement through wooded terrain is with the reconniassance battalion or, when such a battalion was not organic, with the foremost elements of a combat team. In the case of two combat teams forward, the commander should place himself with the one that, according to the situation, is of greater importance. He has his own communications with him and is usually accompanied by the combat team commander. The forward echelon of the formation staff is under the command of the COS. It did not move with the column but was established in a suitable location along the route of march to allow the formation commander to know the overall picture not only of the situation at the head of the column where he himself is located, but also of anything that occurs behind him.

46.

Even the most careful regulation and supervision of movements through difficult terrain cannot altogether prevent traffic congestions if troops fail to observe proper march discipline. Since strict central control is an absolute necessity, all movement through woods and forests follow a more rigid pattern than those in open terrain and are generally executed at a lower rate of speed. The proper procedure, whenever contact with strong enemy elements in forests appears probable, is an advance by bounds. This procedure assures firm control of troops at all times.

47.

When the leading echelons of the formation column is about to enter the woods, the commander has to decide whether his force should deploy or continue to advance in column. His dispositions for this phase depend to a high degree on the adaptability of troops to the difficulties of the terrain.

48.

Densely overgrown areas always present considerable problems of orientation. Under the conditions existing in most forests experience has shown that it is most important that every officer and man be able to orient himself on the terrain. Otherwise, any action is likely to end in confusion with the troops losing their bearings, deviating from their march objective, and eventually firing on friendly forces. In many situations the compass proved the only means of orientation, but it is always difficult to determine the exact distance from the starting point because of the many detours involved in an advance through terrain of that type. Serious mistakes can be prevented only after considerable experience had been gained by officers and men alike.

49.

To aid succeeding units in finding their way, directions were indicated by the use of marking tape, luminous paint, and tree and road markers. To provide orientation at night, vertical searchlight beams and the firing of tracer ammunition can prove helpful.

50.

Marches of armoured mechanised columns through forests calls for the most careful preparation. All elements, not only the formation units, have to proceed in close formation under strict observance of road space and rate of march. Thus, as a rule, 2-9

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a superior headquarters did not order its other units to move forward until the last elements of the formation had cleared a certain phase line. Air observation of such movements is of the greatest importance. Air observers report the location of traffic congestions or unusually prolonged halts, as well as the phase lines crossed by the various units and the over-all progress of the movement. 51.

In any daylight advance of armoured columns through woods and forests, effective air cover is an absolute necessity. Under attack from the air, armoured or motorized units are unable to disperse off the narrow roads, and are therefore infinitely more vulnerable than in any other terrain under similar tactical conditions. To carry out any large-scale movement of such units at night, however, is not practical. SECTION 5 – DEPLOYMENT

52.

Generally, the deployment of a column in wooded terrain becomes necessary as the troops approach close contact with the enemy. Individual units continued to advance in a broad formation behind a screen of strong reconnaissance forces and with adequate flank protection. Frontage and depth of the formation depended largely on the type of terrain to be crossed, but the primary consideration is always the possibility of exercising effective control over all elements of the formation. Furthermore, every unit has to be ready to meet the enemy at any moment and therefore has to adopt the formation most suitable for close combat under the prevailing terrain conditions.

53.

Equipped with close combat weapons, automatic rifles, and hand axes, the advance guard follows the reconnaissance force. Heavy weapons should be held ready for action. The rifle companies, in wedge formation and advancing by bounds, followed the advance guard at a distance. Battalion reserves and additional heavy weapons were brought up close behind the main body.

54.

If the terrain is densely overgrown or if darkness or fog made it difficult to maintain contact, the advance of each separate column is controlled by so-called centre guide lines and phase lines. A centre guide line is a prescribed line along which the centre of a unit is ordered to advance. In the absence of visible reference points in the terrain, the compass is usually the only reliable means of maintaining direction. Phase lines run perpendicular to the direction of march and divide the zone of advance into several parts. Conspicuous terrain features, such as fire breaks, trails, clearings, streams, peat banks, and villages or several individual houses, are usually designated as phase lines. These are entered on maps or aerial photographs and troops informed either verbally or by the distribution of sketches. Each advancing unit has instructions to halt as soon as its leading elements reached the next phase line and to establish contact with the units on its left and right. This procedure enables the leading elements of all units to keep abreast and assured the maintenance of order and contact in the advance, even over difficult terrain. If there are no conspicuous features that could be indicated on the map or identified in the terrain, the halts are arranged according to a time schedule. During darkness it was sometimes possible to establish contact with adjacent units by the use of blinker lights shielded from the enemy.

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CHAPTER 3 OPERATIONS SECTION 1 – OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS General 1.

In forests, for smaller wooded areas the attacker seeks to gain success usually by enveloping action, making certain that any protruding salients are attacked and occupied in the course of the envelopment. The artillery can blind the enemy’s observation by smoke and neutralizes the hostile weapons capable of delivering flanking fire against the attack.

2.

If wooded areas of moderate depth are to be crossed, special care has to be taken to prevent any substantial body of troops from advancing beyond the far edge of the woods without adequate fire support. In such situations there is always the danger of running into a counterattack or being cut off from the main body of troops.

3.

An offensive action in large forest regions without adequate observation calls for a considerable expenditure of time and the most painstaking preparations. This seemingly obvious requirement cannot be overemphasized and should be fully understood by all commanders. Swift and bold action and close-range assaults are indicated only in the case of a meeting engagement or for the elimination of minor enemy pockets. In all other instances the attack has to be carefully planned and developed. Much time and effort will be saved if the troops are deployed in proper formation and have gained the necessary width and depth during the advance. All such preparations should be made in strict conformity with the general plan of attack, and the expected location of main efforts needs to be taken into consideration. Maps alone are of limited value for this purpose, and every commander will first have to conduct a thorough reconnaissance on the ground.

4.

Quick success may sometimes be achieved by an advance and break-through off the main road, but only if the enemy has committed the obvious error or neglecting to secure the intermediate terrain. Planning

5.

Planning for an offensive operation in a forested area demands considerable attention to detail. Thorough preparation down to the lowest level is a pre-requisite for success. The following topics have to be addressed carefully during the planning process: a.

Grouping. All arms groupings should be arranged in such a way that sub unit and platoon commanders are able to react swiftly to changing situations, exploit success and achieve surprise.

b.

Axes. The nature of the terrain and vegetation will make it very difficult to maintain direction. Axes and boundaries must therefore be clearly identifiable on the ground. 3-1

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c.

Bounds and Objectives. Command and control will be extremely difficult, however problems will be eased if objectives are kept limited. There must be scope for local exploitation, but troops must not be allowed to lose contact with neighbouring elements.

d.

Report Lines. Report Lines are a fundamental aid to control and must be selected and laid down so that they are still identifiable even after heavy bombardment.

e.

Frontages. All attack frontages must be kept narrow in order to achieve local concentration and favourable force ratios.

f.

Deception. Deception must be employed as to the direction and composition of the assaulting force.

Selection of Objectives 6.

Under the conditions peculiar to combat in woods and forests the selection of objectives is always one of the most difficult tasks. As a rule, commanders have a tendency to assign objectives as distant as possible. Experience has shown, however, that units engaged in prolonged forest fighting soon become intermingled, are then extremely difficult to control, and lose much of their striking power. Assigning too distant an objective may have the effect of jeopardizing, if not completely precluding, any change of success. Flank threats and the disruption of communications between the attacking elements and their supporting heavy weapons and artillery are some of the immediate consequences. Assigning too close an objective, on the hand, prevents the full exploitation of gains made in the attack.

7.

It is clear that this problem cannot be solved by any rule of uniform applicability. In view of the difficulties of observation and orientation in large forest areas, the troops need distinct terrain features which are easily recognizable as objectives, such as rivers and streams, ridges, clearings, crosscuts, trails, or the edge of swamps. Generally, if only for reasons of proper control and cohesion within the units, major objectives in forests and swamps will be selected at closer range than in open terrain. Intermediate objectives in the form of successive phase lines are required particularly in dense woods.

8.

The attack itself will not be carried out by a single assault wave of great width and density, but rather by separate assault detachments and assault columns which must be properly organized and equipped. Success will be assured not by the number of men but by the combined effect of all arms and by the constantly renewed cooperation of all elements participating in the attack. The composition of these assault detachments cannot be determined by any standard rule. Decisive factors, apart from the enemy situation, will be the density of trees and undergrowth and the general passability of the terrain.

9.

Special antitank teams composed of infantry, antitank, and combat engineer units can be attached to the leading elements. They could be used for close-range antitank combat and are extremely valuable in the forests where the dense 3-2

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vegetation facilitated their unobserved approach. Generally, these teams should advance on foot carrying their antitank weapons. 10.

Even in woods and forests commanders should strive to use artillery and close air support under principles similar to those for combat in open terrain. Since observed fire in densely overgrown areas is often impossible, it follows that such support cannot always be obtained. It should also be noted that the actual damage inflicted by artillery and air bombardment on enemy positions in the woods is normally not as great as the psychological effect on enemy personnel. Dropping incendiary bombs on identified or suspected centres of resistance may facilitate the mission of the attacking infantry. Because of the danger to friendly troops from resulting forest fires, the wind direction has to be carefully observed. Since all traffic is of necessity channelized, harassing fire on bivouac areas, frequently used roads, and defilades has a considerable effect on the enemy’s dispositions.

11.

If the enemy has established himself in a continuous line through a wooded and forested area, each individual strong point has to be reduced separately, either by envelopment or by frontal attacks.

12.

For any advance in this type of terrain squad columns are better suited than skirmish lines. Also, the troops must not be permitted to bunch up in the immediate vicinity of roads and trails, where they are more likely to encounter strong enemy ambush parties.

13.

Local reserves are held close by. They are immediately used to exploit any break in the enemy line or to restore the situation in case of unexpected reverses. Larger reserves follow at the usual distance. Prior to an attack, artillery observers should be attached not only to forward elements but also to the reserves, because under conditions peculiar to woods and forests it may not be possible to do so later on.

14.

Enemy counterattacks or flare-ups of enemy resistance behind the FEBA have to expected at all times. Particularly in such situations it is the foremost duty of junior commanders to maintain strict control within their sectors, since the means available in the field cannot assure the clear identification of the FEBA in that type of terrain.

15.

The terrain features usually designated as objectives in these conditions are stretches of road over high ground, railroad embankments and dikes. Whereas the protection and support of heavy weapons and low-flying aircraft are here more easily obtained, the attacking infantry finds its greatest difficulties in approaching such objectives over the surrounding open areas. Even without effective enemy interference the infantry may have to resort to various expedients in order to accomplish its mission over soft ground. Bridges can be constructed in the rear areas and brought forward in sections under the cover of fire. In overgrown areas where the surface vegetation is densely intertwined and formed small, firm islands, it usually is sufficient to take along duckboards and suitable footwear. Furthermore, some of the brush can be cut down and used to cover the soft ground between areas.

16.

In the woods and forests even the successful break-through of an enemy position usually does not mean that the struggle for that position is over. As a rule an enemy 3-3

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can re-establish himself quickly and force the attacker to dislodge him again from his new hide-outs and strong points. Even a successful force has to therefore take full precautions in the form of reconnaissance and security measures and continue to patrol the area for dispersed enemy units. It is well documented that for days and even for weeks remnants of enemy units and individual soldiers have held out behind the forward lines in completely hopeless situations, harassing and disrupting rear communications and there are many examples from history to show this. Conduct of the Attack 17.

This should take into account: a.

Reconnaissance. It will be very difficult to obtain accurate information on an enemy deployed in a forested area. The full range of ISTAR assets must be used to supplement foot and vehicle reconnaissance whenever possible. Every effort must be made to look for weaknesses and seek routes forward.

b.

Routes. It will be necessary to clear routes through forested areas and to hold them open for the passage of vehicles. Leading elements, usually dismounted infantry, must avoid the temptation to follow tracks directly and should seek to exploit the areas between routes in order to infiltrate and develop local attacks from unexpected directions.

c.

Movement. All movement should be as tightly controlled as possible. Advancing troops must be alert for enemy ambushes as they look for weaknesses in the enemy positions. Every effort should be made to maintain momentum, although thoroughness should not be sacrificed for speed.

d.

Strongpoints. As the attack progresses, strongpoints may be encountered. The enemy is likely to have dug in thoroughly, mined and wired his positions and have armour and AFVs in support. Detailed reconnaissance, a fire plan and close infantry/armour co-operation and engineer support will be necessary. The choice will have to be made between fixing and bypassing, or the systematic reduction of every bunker and fire position. The attacker must constantly be on his guard for an enemy counter attack.

Role of Armour, Artillery and Engineers 18.

Although attacks into and through forested areas are primarily the business of dismounted infantry, AIFV, armour, artillery and engineers all have a supporting role to play. a.

AIFVs. As far as possible, normal company group tactics should be employed for the initial assault on the forest edge and the gaining of a lodgement. Thereafter the number of armoured vehicles committed to the attack will be the result of a judgement of the battlegroup or sub unit commander, who has to weigh up how many vehicles the terrain will permit, against the minimum he requires to tackle the known or suspected enemy obstacles and positions. Attacks may be slow and it is important, therefore, to avoid nose to tail columns of vehicles building up. This will simply block tracks and provide 3-4

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targets for enemy tank hunting patrols. All armoured vehicles, less those required in the forest, should be held in a cleared area or deployed to cover open flanks, or likely enemy withdrawal or counter attack routes. Armoured Infantry will be intimately supported by a proportion of its AIFV and have tank support on call whenever possible. Because of the difficulty in providing accurate indirect fire support, the direct fire of armour and AIFV is of great importance during attacks. Aggressive driving and imaginative commanding will in many cases permit attacks to be launched straight through immature trees, young plantations and bushes. The ensuing surprise may well be decisive. However, all vehicles are very vulnerable in close country and close co-operation between the mounted and dismounted elements of the attacking force is essential. b.

Artillery. It is extremely difficult to provide pinpoint grid references of enemy positions during an attack. This fact, coupled with the problem of avoiding friendly casualties, makes the engagement of opportunity targets very difficult. As far as possible, predicted on-call fire plans should be used. Allied to this, the complexity and risks inherent in calling for fire in the attack make it essential that the main burden is carried by FOOs and MFCs. They have to be well forward, dismounted and able to deploy to positions of observation at short notice.

c.

Engineers. During offensive operations, engineer effort will be confined almost exclusively to clearing obstacles and mines and improving mobility. It will be impossible to anticipate all requirements, so engineer reconnaissance has to move behind the leading elements so as to provide an immediate reaction to obstacles. The speed at which clearance operations proceed will frequently dictate the overall pace of operations. Consequently the need for a cautious approach to potentially booby trapped areas will have to be balanced by the requirement to get armoured direct fire support forward to maintain momentum. SECTION 2 – DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

19.

In wooded and forested areas, where the attacker is usually less familiar with the terrain, the defending force will make every effort to increase this natural element of uncertainty and to keep the enemy in the dark about the situation. This may be accomplished by outpost action, raids and ambushes, aggressive patrol activity, effective camouflage, mines and booby traps planted on the enemy’s natural avenues of approach, and the construction of tank traps.

20.

In forests of moderate depth the location of the main line of resistance will depend upon the possibilities of observation available to the supporting artillery. The edge of the forest has to be avoided because it serves as a reference for hostile artillery observation. Even if the defender withdraws into the forest for only a short distance, he will hardly eliminate this disadvantage. Therefore, the most advanced defences are preferably located either far outside or at a safe distance inside the woods. In the latter case, combat out-posts must be placed at the edge of the forest where some rifles and automatic weapons can be very effectively employed from trees. 3-5

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21.

Positions located outside the woods have the advantage of better command and control facilities and are also more easily provided with effective fire support. Their main disadvantage lies in the difficulty of obtaining proper cover and concealment.

22.

In large forest areas the main line of resistance runs across areas far from the edge of the forest. It is irregular in trace and well concealed from ground and air observation. Many principles otherwise applied to the defence, such as the use of flanking fire and the need for good artillery observation, are of secondary importance here. The primary requirement is to keep the attacker from discovering whether he has actually hit the main line of resistance, an outpost line, or a strong point, or what relation the resistance encountered locally may have to the general plan of defence. Planning

23.

When making a plan the battlegroup commander should consider the following: a.

Enemy Routes. Consideration has to be given to the routes the enemy may wish to use to enter, transit, exit or bypass the forested area. This in combination with identification of the best killing areas and key terrain will provide him with the skeleton framework, around which he can base his plan and allocate troops to task.

b.

Options. The defender has four choices when planning his defence:

c.

(1)

Defend the forward edge.

(2)

Defend within the forest.

(3)

Defend the exits from the forest.

(4)

A combination of the above. If the battlegroup commander decides on a combined approach he has three further tactical options: (a)

To concentrate all his forces around his vital ground and defend in strength.

(b)

To divide his forces into small groups and conduct hit and run ambushes throughout the forest placing emphasis on the likely approaches.

(c)

To establish a strong position in depth from which he can patrol and ambush aggressively, the aim being to cause delay and attrition before falling back to a prepared position.

Grouping. Fighting in forests should be planned on all-arms groupings below sub unit level. In this situation tank troops or even single tanks and platoons and sections may well fight as an entity carrying out independent actions. Throughout the operation the defender has to continually seek to seize and maintain the initiative. This can be achieved through having a strong reserve and conducting vigorous counterattacks as required. Even if lack of numbers 3-6

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precludes planned counterattacks, every opportunity should be taken to insert ambushes and patrols behind the enemy advance to inflict casualties and delay and unbalance the enemy.

24.

d.

Anti-tank Weapons. The battlegroup commander should consider deploying anti-tank guided weapons and some armour forward of the forest in order to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main position. If this option is chosen then these assets should not be sited on the forward edge of the forest since not only will their position be easily determined but their withdrawal routes could be blocked by blow-down or enemy infiltration.

e.

Obstacle Plan. The obstacle plan should include the approaches to the forest and ambush positions. The areas in between should be used to canalise, block, disrupt and delay, whilst leaving routes open for withdrawal and counter action, maximum use should be made of booby traps.

f.

CSS. A defensive operation based on ambushes or with an ambush phase will rely on pre-dumped ammunition particularly LAWs, mines and explosives. The logistic bill may therefore be considerably heavier than for a normal defensive battle because dumps may be missed, only partially used or destroyed. Casualty evacuation is very demanding in manpower and an evacuation plan should be prepared covering the use of all available assets using the medical 1-2-4 principle.

Conduct of the Defence. a.

Preparation. (1)

Protection. When preparing defensive positions the following should be borne in mind (a)

Overhead protection is essential. Tree bursts will produce high rates of casualties from shell and forest splinters amongst unprotected troops. Felled trees can be used to achieve this and best results are achieved using a combination of layered logs and packed earth.

(b)

Digging will be difficult because of the presence of tree roots and rock. Maximum use should be made of plant, high cycle equipment and explosive digging.

(c)

All strong points must be sited for all round defence and protected by mines and wire.

(d)

If engineer plant is available, scrapes reinforced by logs and well camouflaged, should be provided for all armoured vehicles. Priority must be given to main and alternative battle positions, but survival of vehicles for use in subsequent operations demands that they should be dug in whenever possible. 3-7

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(2)

(e)

Fields of fire may have to be cleared, though wherever possible positions should be sited in such a way to make best use of natural cover. If it does prove necessary to clear vegetation then it should not expose defensive positions. Potential cover for attackers such as fallen logs should be removed.

(f)

There is a danger of infiltration by enemy dismounted reconnaissance early in the process.

Mobility. As these types of operation call on all arms grouping, attention needs to be given to route improvement. It may also be necessary to create or improve helicopter landing sites within forests. Tasks include: (a)

Route Improvement. Narrow fire breaks, low classification tracks, bridges and culverts and tight bends and junctions all need to be overcome. Engineers must therefore be prepared to deploy the full range of route improvement techniques from overbridging to laying trackway.

(b)

Helicopter Landing Sites (HLS). In certain circumstances, helicopters may provide the most efficient, or indeed the only means of deploying reserves or evacuating casualties. HLSs should be as inconspicuous as possible and kept as small as possible in order to deny them to the enemy for his airmobile use. Winching of personnel and stores may have to be considered if an HLS cannot be cleared.

(3)

Counter Mobility. Since all movement in forested areas is governed largely by the availability of tracks, great care must be taken to coordinate the countermobility plan, in order that the free movement of friendly forces is not unduly impeded. Enemy recce will attempt to find the easiest routes, so particular attention needs to be paid to main tracks, rides and firebreaks. Once these have been covered, consideration must be given to minor routes and places where small deviations between trees offer bypasses. There will be a need for tactical minefields on the approaches in order to canalise the enemy. Inside the forest everything possible must be done to delay, confuse and disorientate the enemy. A great deal of planning will be required. The object is not necessarily to block every track; rather it is to draw the enemy into increasingly isolated places which will provide opportunities to destroy him in detail.

(4)

Defensive Positions. (a)

Ambush Positions. Ambush positions should be prepared and obstacles, mines and explosives used extensively.

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(b)

b.

Defensive Positions. Defensive positions should be properly prepared. It is essential to use protective wire obstacles around strong points or other areas important for the defence. Low wire entanglements are particularly effective and can frequently be used to thicken up the natural obstacle value of scrub or bushes.

Offensive Action. (1)

Reconnaissance. As early as possible the battlegroup commander must find the enemy’s main thrusts, his direction, strength and composition. Providing that sufficient covered withdrawal routes are available, he should consider the deployment of AIFV and armour forward in addition to designated recce troops. He should normally deploy FOOs, MFCs and OPs well forward. All dismounted OPs have to be dug in and concealed to avoid discovery and destruction.

(2)

Attrition. It is essential to start attrition of the enemy early. He will be seeking to bypass the forested area, so unless he is threatened sufficiently to have to enter it he may be able to ignore it. Early destruction of enemy recce using ATGW, artillery or armour will compound his problems once he has entered the forested area. Dummy positions on the front edge of the forest can persuade the enemy that it is being held in strength and he will waste time and ammunition on its neutralisation.

(3)

Mobile Defence. Once the enemy has entered the forest he has to be destroyed in detail. Standing patrols, snipers and ambushes should be used to impose delay, cause confusion and disruption. The enemy has to be constantly harried and every opportunity taken to destroy his vehicles. The highest standards of junior leadership will be required in order to ensure that ambushes cause maximum attrition, but do not get embroiled in uneven firefights. Ambushes will usually be based on a platoon or in some cases a section. However, thought should be given to deploying lightly equipped fire teams in specialist vehicle hunting roles. Wherever possible patrols should reinfiltrate the enemy and attack them from the sides and rear. ambushes, mines and boobytraps should be used in areas already cleared by the enemy.

(4)

Static Defence. As the battle develops, the defenders may be forces to withdraw to their main defensive positions, however, every opportunity has to be taken to infiltrate out of these in order to attack the enemy from unexpected directions. These defensive positions should be fully prepared with maximum use made of wire and mines.

(5)

Reserves. None of these stages is mutually exclusive and throughout reserves must be maintained. Because of mobility problems, there is a case for holding reserves well forward.

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25.

Armour. The use of armour will be dependent upon the availability of adequate routes and close infantry support. They will play a vital role in all stages of the defensive operation. Commanders should consider their use in the following ways: a.

Forward or on the flanks of the forest as part of a screen to deny access to the feature to the enemy.

b.

As a reserve towards the rear of the forest from where they can deal with any enemy attempting to enter, exit, bypass or outflank the forest.

c.

There is a role for armour in ambush positions, dominating defiles or supporting the main defensive position. In every case these locations and the routes between them have to be co-ordinated with the dispositions of the Infantry.

26.

AIFV. AIFV can undertake a wide variety of tasks in defence. These range from contributing to the screen forward of the forest, to providing a means of deploying reserves rapidly or for CASEVAC. AFVs can be dug in, in support of dismounted infantry, adding firepower to the defensive battle, providing protection and contributing to the surveillance plan.

27.

Engineers and Assault Pioneers. Engineers and Assault Pioneers are essential in OIWF to assist in preparing parts of the obstacle plan and in giving advice on the construction of simple obstacles by platoons. They will also be employed in opening withdrawal, or reinfiltration routes.

28.

Indirect Fire. The nature of the terrain and the vegetation impose considerable constraints on the deployment and effect of indirect fire assets. For artillery arcs of fire are likely to be restricted and it will probably be necessary to use high angle fire. Arc restrictions will also reduce the number of guns which can be brought to bear and high angle fire will mean longer times of flight, increasing the chance of detection by radar. If artillery is operated from forested areas, it is vital to ensure that its deployment options are not so limited that patterns are created and it becomes vulnerable to counter battery fire. Another difficulty in operating artillery in forests is that of resupply. Poor tracks and narrow roads are likely to compound logistical problems. Each battery can require up to 350 tonnes per day and priorities for the use of the few available tracks may have to be adjusted accordingly. It will therefore be preferable to site guns outside forests. Mortars have greater utility within this environment, especially their mobility and ability to fire over very short distances. Within forests a network of observers (FOOs and MFCs) will be required to call for all fires in less than ideal conditions. Visibility may be as little as 10-20 metres, which underlines the need for all arms down to section commander level to be able to call for fire. In order to simplify this as much as possible, a far greater number of DFs than normal must be planned. Providing time is available care should be taken to accurately fix the position of DFs. This is especially important, because the majority of fire missions will be close targets and actual adjustment of them could pose considerable hazards to friendly forces. This problem with adjustment underlines further the need for a comprehensive network of DFs because it may be impossible in many areas to take on opportunity targets. Mortar and artillery fire has a very 3 - 10

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considerable psychological effect in forests. Air bursts in trees which produce splinters have an extremely good neutralising effect. 29.

Command and Communications. Even with the benefit of selection of the ground, C3 poses considerable difficulties for the defender. Forested areas, especially when they are combined with pronounced physical relief, degrade VHF communications considerably. Maximum use has to be made of line, LOs, despatch riders and runners. Fighting in forests is always likely to degenerate into a series of local skirmishes. It is therefore extremely difficult for commanders to gain a feel for the battle and to exert their influence upon it. There may be merit in commanding forward from an AFV but movement of these vehicles without infantry protection is extremely vulnerable to enemy operating on foot. SECTION 3 – DELAYING OPERATIONS

30.

In delaying operations through woods and forests there is always the danger that the enemy, by concentrating against a few selected places, might break through or overtake the withdrawing force. The defender who wants to break contact with the enemy and withdraw his troops takes advantage of the woods and forest to obscure the movement of the main body, to cause successive delays to the pursuing forces, and inflict the greatest possible losses on them. For this purpose covering forces have to maintain contact with the enemy and prevent him from conducting a rapid pursuit. All elements that are no longer needed for actual combat, especially units of limited mobility, need to be withdrawn at an early stage, at the cost of whatever support these units normally provide for the troops.

31.

Especially at night and during the extended periods of morning and evening fog that are characteristic of damp forests, the evacuation of a position cannot be observed from the air or ground. Information on such a withdrawal can be obtained only through the continuous activity of combat patrols and from the statements of captured enemy personnel. Units engaged in rapid pursuit, on the other hand, cannot permit themselves to be lured into a trap, which the enemy had ample opportunity to prepare, and thus be cut off entirely from their main force.

32.

In the execution of withdrawal operations in forests, the timing is of paramount importance. As a rule, a body of troops should not be withdrawn alone but in connection with similar movements on adjacent areas. Higher formation would prescribe the time for the beginning and completion of the movement and designate intermediate lines of resistance as well as the ultimate defence positions. Pertinent orders should be issued as early as possible to subordinate commanders who then proceeded to make the necessary preparations for the withdrawal. Unit boundaries are to be announced and successive lines of resistance based on natural compartments in the woods and forests designated on the map. The requirement that the enemy, after taking one line of resistance, should be forced to redeploy his artillery before attacking the next line determines a suitable distance between successive lines.

33.

Experience has proved beyond doubt that a unit which plans and fortifies its own line defends it with greater obstinacy. The preparation of lines of resistance in a 3 - 11

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withdrawal operation should be the definite responsibility of units within their respective sectors. 34.

Whenever sufficient time and adequate construction forces are available, the fortification of several successive lines of resistance should be started simultaneously. Viewed in the perspective of subsequent withdrawal actions, it is a tactical error to waste time and labour on the line of resistance closest to the enemy. As a result positions farther to the rear will be inadequately prepared or not prepared at all. Particularly in the closeness of woods and forests a unit engaged in a withdrawal for any length of time has to be able to fall back on prepared positions. If such positions do not exist, the battle will assume the characteristics of a war of movement in which the advantage is clearly on the side of the stronger attacking force.

35.

When any withdrawal is begun, demolition measures acquire increased importance. Such measures include burning or blowing up all bridges, demolishing roadbeds, destroying wells, flooding fords, and mining all narrow passages. A detailed demolition plan – depending on the time and the number of engineer troops available – has to be prepared for every sector. Much more effective than a large number of demolitions can be a few large scale demolitions at points of tactical importance where repair work is difficult and few bypasses, if any, exist. (Such places may latter be turned into permanent obstacles to the enemy by subjecting his repair efforts to constant interference from the air.) All bypasses, of course, have to be mined.

36.

Withdrawal activity is not necessarily damaging to the morale of the soldier. If the commander succeeds in maintaining proper control and achieves some striking successes in the conduct of the defence and if he does everything possible to care for the combat troops, their fighting spirit should remain unimpaired. SECTION 4 – COMBAT UNDER SPECIAL CONDITIONS

37.

At night or in fog most of the difficulties normally encountered in woods and forests are greatly intensified. In terrain of this type, therefore, large scale engagements at night should be avoided. The attack bogs down in most cases, friendly troops fire on each other, the danger of confusion and panic increases, and the result is generally failure.

38.

Activities during night and in fog will be restricted, as a rule, to reconnaissance and raids on well-defined, nearby objectives. Even after a successful break-through, a night advance through the woods will usually fail to produce the desired results. It is far better to let the troops rest, reorganize, and not continue the advance over wooded and forested terrain until daybreak.

39.

If the situation is such that a tactical movement at night cannot be avoided or if conditions appear unusually favourable, only small task forces should carry out the advance during darkness, the remainder of the main force following at daybreak. It is clear that at night any movement through woods and forests will take much longer than during the day. Bright moonlight may reduce many difficulties, but it will at the same time aid the enemy in his defence. 3 - 12

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40.

Heavy frosts create favourable conditions for movements and offensive action in wet forests and particularly in swampy areas, because the hardened surface of the ground permits far better utilization of the terrain for tactical purposes. On the other hand, the rapid construction of earthworks in deeply frozen soil of high moisture content will be extremely difficult.

41.

Snow, particularly large snowdrifts, will constitute a considerable hindrance to all movements. It may require extensive snow clearing operations and the construction of special winter roads. Furthermore, a single heavy snowfall can neutralize the effect of all minefields in the area. But it will also create favourable conditions for the employment of properly equipped ski troops, which are ideally suited for the rapid execution of long-range reconnaissance and combat missions in forests and swamps. For such purposes a supply of sleds, protective winter clothing, snow goggles, and white camouflage suits should be held in readiness. In an area blanketed by snow effective concealment is very difficult to obtain. Footprints and ski tracks in the forest are easily detected by the enemy.

42.

Thaw and masses of melting snow will slow military operations in every type of terrain. In woods and forests such conditions can have the effect of virtually immobilizing a substantial force for some time. All manoeuvre is limited to the movement of foot troops and the lightest type of vehicles. Small unit actions take the place of large scale operations.

43.

Twice each year, during the spring and autumn muddy seasons, the terrain difficulties normally encountered in woods and forests become insurmountable, and large areas turn into formidable natural obstacles in the path of any military advance. Heavy floods are not infrequent and impose serious restrictions on all military operations. On such occasions the construction and maintenance of even the smallest airfield or landing strip will be a difficult problem.

44.

Entire sections of tall forests are sometimes knocked down overnight by violent windstorms, with the effect of blocking any passage. Also, the occurrence of extensive forest fires, often the result of long periods of drought, may force the commander to alter its plans of operation. SECTION 5 – DEALING WITH OPPOSITION IN THE REAR AREA

45.

Remnants of enemy units, having escaped capture or annihilation in earlier engagements, may be able to hide in almost inaccessible places and often form the nuclei around which the armed opposition can be rallied. Bands of hardy individuals, well acquainted with the terrain and controlled by trained leaders, could be combined into a substantial fighting organization and conducted ruthless guerrilla warfare against friendly forces in the woods and forests within and behind the combat zone.

46.

It should be noted that for an attacker, however, while operations are going well the effect of these activities on the course of major military operations is not quite so serious as one might believe or anticipate on the basis of some reports. The danger grows considerably as soon as an advance is halted. The attacking forces suffer reverses, fail to take effective countermeasures at an early stage, then the enemy 3 - 13

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groups will rapidly increase their efforts against railroads, highways, and communication lines which, in woods and forests, are as scarce as they are vulnerable. 47.

Ordinary combat units are not particularly well-suited for these types of operation. As a rule, they lack the necessary flexibility and thus are not equal to the combat methods of a tough and ruthless enemy who is usually invisible, difficult to apprehend, and who attacks without warning. This calls for special units which are properly equipped and thoroughly trained in forest fighting. Local inhabitants may be used as valuable reinforcements, but only if their loyalty can be assured beyond doubt.

48.

Experience has shown that the key to success against opposition groups of this type operating in wooded and swampy areas where ordinary means of intelligence fail is a smoothly functioning network of agents and informants. This alone will make it possible to identify and apprehend the more important leaders and to locate and seize main supply bases. Following the pattern of large-scale raids, such actions should converge on a definite objective, achieve complete surprise, and be executed with the utmost thoroughness. Merely combing through a vast forest area for opposition groups or trying to seal it off will require the use of inordinately large forces and perhaps, may have the effect of pacifying the area temporarily. But the result in the long run will hardly justify the means employed. SECTION 6 – CONCLUSIONS General

49.

Combat in woods and forests calls for great endurance and unusual resourcefulness. Soldier fighting in such conditions will be in a much better position to stand the physical and psychological strain involved if they are subjected to a thorough training programme in this specialized type of operations.

50.

Combat in the Environment. Instruction in the peculiarities of these conditions should include: a.

Training in endurance of hardships imposed by unusual climatic conditions such as excessive humidity, subzero temperatures, extended periods of darkness, and violent storms.

b.

Effect of these peculiarities on the individual and the unit.

c.

Training the eye and ear for the sights and sounds characteristic of woods and forests; recognition of tracks; woodcraft.

d.

Practice in pathfinding and orientation in densely overgrown terrain by day and night and during all seasons of the year, with or without the help of satellite navigation aids.

e.

Practice in moving swiftly and noiselessly through high forests, second growth, thickets and morass, with particular emphasis on continuous 3 - 14

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observation, effective use of cover and concealment, and constant readiness for action. 12.

52.

53.

54.

Close Quarter Combat. Special instruction in close combat, using the most suitable weapons and techniques. a.

Practice in rapid fire on close targets; training as tree-snipers.

b.

Preparing ambushes and organizing raids.

c.

Close cooperation of separate assault detachments with each other and with special antitank detachments.

d.

Construction and defence of obstacles, strong points and artificial islands in swampy areas.

e.

Ski training and the use of winter camouflage.

Field Defences. Preparation of earthworks and other defence installations. a.

Use of whatever materials may be available such as felled trees, bushes, and reeds, with emphasis on proper concealment to blend with the surrounding foliage.

b.

Construction of cover and foxholes in spite of high ground-water levels

Survival. Promotion of personal resourcefulness in case of separation from the unit. a.

Construction of primitive shelters made of logs, brushwood, reed or snow.

b.

Building of fires with wind protection for heating or cooking.

c.

Training in first aid in case of accidents or snakebite; protection against vermin.

d.

Recognition of edible fruits, berries, or mushrooms.

e.

Observation from trees; use of pole climbers.

f.

Instruction in the most important phrases and written characters of the enemy’s language.

Unit Training. This should be adjusted to the unusual requirements of combat in woods and forests. Such a programme, which would presuppose the completion of individual training, would have to include the following: a.

Exercises for troop commanders with the use of maps and sand tables for the solution of difficult problems of movement, particularly designed to promote efficiency in the assembly and movement of supplies as required for combat in wooded terrain. 3 - 15

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b.

Command post exercises extending over several days, for the purpose of training staffs and communications personnel in guiding columns through woods and forests with the aid of current navigation aids

c.

Exercises in the assembly and movement of entire units, including their rear echelons.

d.

e.

55.

(1)

Movement at night and under other conditions of poor visibility.

(2)

Rapid construction of short stretches of corduroy road.

(3)

Training entire march units in turning around on corduroy roads and on narrow, swampy forest trails.

(4)

Preparation by each unit of all around defence at halts in woods and forests.

(5)

Training suitable officers and non-commissioned officers as leaders of raiding parties

Thorough preparation of the various arms and services for their special tasks in woods and forests. (1)

Training engineers in repair of swampy roads and in the technique of removing mines and obstacles.

(2)

Training tank commanders in the tactics and techniques of armoured combat in woods.

(3)

Training the artillery in observation and fire direction in densely overgrown terrain.

(4)

Training some CSS troops in the use of animal transportation means.

(5)

Training air observers in recognition and photographic reconnaissance over dense forests.

Special sanitation courses in the prevention of epidemics, frostbite, and diseases likely to occur as a result of living on damp ground.

Summary. All these measures, however, will solve only part of the problem. To assure maximum performance, not only the instruction and training of individuals and entire units but also clothing and rations, equipment of men and horses, weapons and vehicles have be adjusted according to climate and geography to the varying requirements of combat in woods and forests. Still, even the best and most complete preparations will not rule out the possibility that some units or individuals might find themselves in situations in which all available means are inadequate. In addition to thorough training and the most suitable type of equipment the soldier will need self-confidence and the ability to make use of improvisations and field expedients. 3 - 16

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CHAPTER 4 MINOR TACTICS SECTION 1 – POINTS TO NOTE IN THE ADVANCE General Tactical Points to Note 1.

Forest areas limit firepower mobility and observation. Nevertheless, the battalion group, which is designed for dismounted operations, is particularly well suited for attacks in this type of terrain due to its large inventory of small arms, light antitank weapons and other munitions.

2.

Battlefield reconnaissance has to be sent out on a broad front and far enough ahead to permit changes in the task organization as more information on the enemy arrives. Reconnaissance patrols employed in the flanks and rear reduce the danger from ambushes.

3.

The ability to exercise command and control is impaired. As a consequence, the companies receive short-range intermediate objectives and phase lines located along identifiable terrain features. In addition, the commander may employ liaison teams and contact patrols.

4.

The commander generally forms the main effort of his attack only in the course of the operation; it may become necessary to shift the main effort. Shifting troops laterally is very time-consuming. Hence, the commander should not tie down all of his forces prematurely.

5.

The commander should form strong reserves and order them to follow the main body closely. This allows him to reinforce the attacking companies quickly, to form or to shift a main effort. An unclear situation and the close, broken terrain may force the battalion commander to order the companies to form their own reserves.

6.

If a wooded area has to be cleared of enemy forces, it is cordoned off in sectors that are swept from one direction only. Additional forces have to be kept ready to destroy or pursue broken out enemy forces. Wooded Areas

7.

Detailed individual points to note are: a.

Offer concealment from ground and aerial observation and suitable hides.

b.

Restrict visibility, make navigation, liaison and contact more difficult, thus slowing down all movements.

c.

Hinder observed fire support, particularly by indirect fire, but amplify the weapons effects, eg by ricochets and treebursts or large forest fires.

d.

Limit the mobility of armoured fighting vehicles. 4-1

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e.

Favour concealed dismounted movements.

f.

Facilitate the emplacement of obstacles.

g.

Provide some protection from inclement weather.

h.

Careful and stealthy movements from cover to cover.

i.

All-round observation and instance readiness to fire, seeing without being seen.

j.

Close attention to all sounds and movements without causing any noise.

k.

Constant contact within the fire team and the remainder of the section.

Weapons Effects in Woods and Forests 8.

In wooded areas: a.

The rifle is the most versatile and most important weapon.

b.

Ammunition consumption is higher because targets are frequently hard to pinpoint. Many of them have to be engaged with bursts.

c.

The projectile of the 40 mm RLG may be employed to engage defiladed targets with fragmentation.

d.

A large number of weapons is required to dominate dense forest stands or a large number of eyes and ears to ensure surveillance.

e.

The positions should be sited in the denser stands with arcs of fire into the more dispersed stands.

f.

Fighting positions must have overhead protection against the splinters from treebursts – especially in pole wood, mature and old timber stands.

g.

Obstacles are employed to canalize the enemy. They may be concealed in the woods. Mine and wire obstacles are hard to emplace and to remove in dense stands.

h.

AFVs can frequently be engaged with light antitank weapons and antitank mines only.

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Useful weapons

Types of Forest Stands

Obstacles

Tree nursery

AT mines

Young forest stand

Wire obstacles

Pole wood stand

AT mines also with tripwires Tree blocks Wire obstacles with tripflares Mature timber stand

AT mines also with tripwires Tree blocks Wire obstacles with tripwires Old timber stand

AT mines (also with tripwires) Abatis Wire obstacles with tripflares

Figure 4-1. The Employment of Weapons and Obstacles in the Types of Forest Stands

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9.

Tree nursery

Young forest stand

Pole wood stand

Mature timber stand

Old timber stand

a.

dismounted Move through the stands quickly – surprise the enemy.

b.

Issue orders only for short, foreseeable phases.

c.

Maintain line of sight contact between the armoured fighting vehicles and the dismounted infantry.

d.

Use all possibilities to bring up the infantry fighting vehicles also off the trails. Figure 4-2. Movement through Woods and Forests 4-4

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mounted

10.

The staggered file is the most useful movement information for the advance to contact in wooded areas. The soldiers maintain line-of-sight contact and cover each other’s movements. Cohesion and contact among the soldiers and with the section commander are indispensable. The section commander generally leads using hand signals. It is expedient to advance parallel to trails, fire breaks and clearings because they facilitate navigation. It is wrong to advance on these exposed features. Fire breaks and trails should be crossed in a collective dash. Wherever possible a base of fire should be prepared. Clearings should be bpyassed if this does not deviate too much from the line of advance.

11.

It is often necessary to comb through a wooded area to determine whether it is free of enemy forces and to sweep out infiltrated enemy and stragglers. The troops advance in extended line from one feature to the next for the sweep. They stop at trails, fire breaks and water courses running across the direction of advance. There they make sure that they are still moving in the right direction and that they are in contact with adjacent troops. If necessary, the forces reorganize.

12.

Whilst elements of the section form a base of fire, the remainder advances noiselessly from cover to cover. Frequent listening stops must be made even if visibility is good. Within each team, one soldier observes the ground up to head height. He scans the undergrowth, stacks of wood, piles of brushwood and tree stumps for signs of concealed positions and looks out for obstacles. Another soldier scans the treetops for treetop snipers. The enemy may not only be expected to allow friendly forces to advance to close distances of his positions, but also to allow the friendly forces to pass through his forward elements in order to engage them from the rear also. As a result, the fire team must also cover its rear. The soldiers carry their loaded weapons with the safety off in the alert position. They keep their weapons pointed in the direction they are looking. If the section identifies enemy sentries and remains unseen, they overwhelm them noiselessly in close-quarter fighting. If they encounter enemy suddenly and unexpectedly, they open fire immediately. Treetop snipers are eliminated by quickly aimed single shots; often it may be necessary to spray the treetops at short ranges with bursts from rifles or machine guns. If the situation is favourable and the enemy inferior, the section assaults.

13.

If a section succeeds in crossing obstacles unnoticed and in approaching the enemy position, the soldiers should exploit every opportunity to infiltrate through gaps between the enemy positions and to attack them from the flanks and rear. If this is impossible, the enemy covering the obstacle must be neutralized first before breaching is attempted. If the situation and the ground prevent the employment of machine gunners and snipers, the section advances to hand grenade range and forces the enemy to take cover with a hand grenade volley before the assault. The grenades must be thrown so that they do not catch in the undergrowth or roll back. After this, the section assaults under the covering fire of machine guns and snipers in order to engage the enemy in depth.

14.

During the fighting through the depth of the objective, the soldiers advance by fire and movement in pairs. They break enemy resistance by attacks into the enemy flanks and rear in close-quarter fighting. Tank hunting parties engage enemy armoured fighting vehicles. During the fight through the depth, all commanders are 4-5

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required to control their troops by giving them short-range objectives, by maintaining the direction of advance and contact between subunits and small units in order to prevent friendly fire casualties. In close terrain, the attacking troops should stop repeatedly, reorganize and reestablish contact with adjacent forces before continuing the attack. When contact has been lost, an all-round or perimeter defence should be established. Figure 4-3 Never stop at trail junctions!

In the advance to contact a.

Dismounted patrols ahead and in the flanks.

b.

Increase the distances between the platoons, but maintain line of sight contact. Reduce the distances between the infantry fighting vehicles.

c.

The dismounted patrols determine the speed of advance. The AFVs follow at high speed from bound to bound.

Movement is good protection

Figure 4-4 In the Assault

Where can the AFVs follow off the road

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a.

Exploit the firepower of the automatic cannon.

b.

The dismounted infantrymen advance in front of the vehicles.

c.

Maintain contact supporting AFVs.

d.

Use every opportunity for a faster mounted advance.

e.

IFVs not employed in direct support of the dismounted infantry are responsible for their own local security.

with

the

Figure 4-5a a.

Always send reconnaissance patrols ahead to the next terrain compartment.

b.

During the advance to contact, armoured fighting vehicles drive in staggered file on both sides of the road.

c.

The infantry move inside the woods and within supporting distance of the armoured fighting vehicles. Maintain line of sight contact.

d.

Designate one linkman to maintain line of sight contact with the vehicles. He should wear a marking that the tank commanders can recognize easily.

Figure 4-5b a.

b.

During the advance, the infantrymen reconnoitre places where the armoured fighting vehicles may follow through the woods and occupy firing positions.

Stay out of the line of fire of the armoured fighting vehicles. Maintain continuous line of sight and radio contact. Figures 4-5a, b – The Platoon Reinforced by Elements of a MILAN Platoon in the Attack 4-7 Issue 1.0: Jun 01

Combat Outpost Line

a.

Prepare alert positions in the woods and a large number of obstacles.

b.

Site positions also for all-arms air defence.

c.

At night or in darkness reinforce the protection measures by additional sentries, reconnaissance and roving patrols provided by the dismount element of the armoured infantry section in the Combat Outpost Line (SL). Figure 4-6. The Protection Measures for an Armoured Infantry Company in an Assembly Area 4-8

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Attack stalled, am suppressing enemy in front of me ... request support

Unable to bypass obstacle

a.

An enemy is rarely able to occupy and block a forest entirely. His weak spots are often found in dense forest stands.

b.

This young forest stand allows the armoured infantry platoon to break in mounted.

c.

Command and control, however, is more difficult in this attack. The young forest stand requires careful reconnaissance before the mounted break-in.

d.

The rapid thrust through this stand achieves surprise and, hence, an important prerequisite to success. Figure 4-7. The Armoured Infantry Company in a Break-in Battle

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a.

Advance on separate routes and deliver a coordinated punch. This requires careful planning.

b.

Infiltration takes time and must be overwatched. attention by background noise.

c.

Tanks, with an infantry close protection party, follow in depth and dash forward in order to support the infiltrated forces.

If required, divert the enemy’s

Figure 4-8. The Company Group in the Attack Phase 1

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Figure 4-9. Overlay for Figure 4-8. Phase 2

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a.

Hold the objective. Site MILAN and machine guns forward at the edge of the woods.

b.

Reorganize the forces repeatedly.

c.

Assign short-range, clearly identifiable intermediate objectives; employ contact patrols.

d.

Launch the attack away from roads and trails. Attack the enemy in the flanks and rear.

e.

Send out a dense screen of reconnaissance patrols well ahead of the main body.

f.

Coordinate the fire of supporting weapons with the movements of the infantry.

g.

Advance by compass bearing and pace count.

h.

Use roads and trails as navigation aids only.

i.

Approach in deeply echeloned formation.

Figure 4-10. The Battalion Group in the Attack

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SECTION 2 – POINTS TO NOTE IN DEFENCE 15.

Fighting in wooded areas generally entails close quarter fighting with small arms and grenades. Small units, such as fire teams and sections, must cooperate closely in all situations. They should not rely on support by heavy weapons. Frequently, targets are fleeting in nature; occasionally, their presence can only be suspected based on the noise they make. Soldiers have to be prepared at all times for sudden contact with the enemy, in most cases at short ranges and often enough in an unexpected direction. Constant all-round vigilance and readiness to fire are essential.

16.

Careful terrain reconnaissance is required before all operations in wooded areas. Dependent on the situation and the mission, this reconnaissance effort will focus on:

17.

18.

a.

The type and size of the wooded area.

b.

The density of the forest stnd and the thickness of the trees.

c.

The frequency and size of clearings and of other unwooded areas.

d.

The composition of the soil.

e.

The number, size, width and trafficability of fire breaks, trails and roads.

The enemy infantry is the most dangerous enemy in a wooded area. Often enough, they can only be destroyed at close quarters. a.

Riflemen should be posted in well-concealed positions, eg under tree stumps, in stacks of cordwood, piles of brushwood or fallen trees, so that they are able to surprise the enemy by fire.

b.

Machine guns cover positions and obstacles with enfilading fire, as well as trails, fire breaks and clearings.

Armoured fighting vehicles may be expected primarily on trails. advance through tree nurseries and young forest stands.

They may also

a.

Site positions for light antitank weapons (LAW) to cover target areas in front of obstacles by flanking fire.

b.

Snipers should be employed to enable them to engage enemy key personnel eg commanders or indirect fire controllers, independently. They should be able to exploit their long effective range. The employment as a treetop sniper sited in depth of the friendly position may prove advantageous.

c.

The [40 mm] grenade launcher gunner should be sited to allow him to engage enemy troops in front of the obstacles and in dead ground.

d.

Listening posts should be employed in front of the friendly dispositions also when visibility is good. 4 - 13

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Avoid the edges of the woods – site positions in depth 19.

Site positions well in depth of the woods to conceal them from indirect fire observers and direct fire weapons.

up to 150 m

Figure 4-11. Depth of Penetration of Direct Fire 20.

This does not imply that the edges of woods should be abandoned lightly. Frequently, they offer favourable observation posts and firing positions for flanking, enfilading fire. The following may serve as a rough guideline:

Positions of AFVs

Observation and listening posts (especially at night)

Outposts

Forward observation officers/mortar fire controllers

Dummy positions

Long-range antitank weapons

Figure 4-12. Siting Positions in Wooded Areas 4 - 14 Issue 1.0: Jun 01

Ambush Figure 4-13a Ambush

Figure 4-13b Allow the enemy to approach before opening fire.

Figure 4-13c Block the enemy’s line of advance and counterattack from the flanks

Figure 4-13a, b, c – Options in Defence 4 - 15 Issue 1.0: Jun 01

a.

Site the section positions away from trails and lanes with arcs into more open ground.

b.

Seek mutual support by flanking and enfilading fire.

c.

Dominate trails and lanes with turret weapons from positions in depth. Prepare a dug-in position for the infantry fighting vehicle, but avoid limiting its mobility. Figure 4-14. The Armoured Infantry and the Section in Defence

4 - 16 Issue 1.0: Jun 01

a.

The platoon frontage depends on the density of the forest stand.

b.

Disperse the platoon positions no more than is possible to ensure interlocking arcs of fire.

c.

Prepare firing tunnels or lanes, especially for flanking and enfilading, as well as for “silent” weapons1 - but remember the long preparatory time.

d.

Site obstacles close enough for effective coverage in front of the fighting positions. They should canalize rather than stop all movements. Figure 4-15. The Positions of a Platoon

1

A “silent” weapon, frequently a machine gun, does not fire until the main enemy assault. It must not fire during enemy reconnaissance missions or probing attacks to escape premature detection.

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a.

Battle tanks must be employed at least in section (2 tanks) strength.

b.

Prepare as many dug in positions as possible.

c.

Ensure close infantry – tank cooperation. The infantrymen provide close security for the tanks of the antitank platoon. Figure 4-16. The Company Group in Defence

4 - 18 Issue 1.0: Jun 01

a.

Employ long-range weapons already forward of and at the edge of the woods.

b.

The dismounted elements fight from field fortifications in depth.

c.

Site obstacles and positions to draw the enemy into interlocking and infilading fire.

d.

Conceal the exact location of the field fortifications by siting them in an irregular trace and by camouflaging them carefully.

e.

Prepare as many positions and alternative positions for the infantry fighting vehicles as possible.

f.

Employ MILAN ATGWs mounted or dismounted, preferably under central control, at the edges of the woods for flank protection. Figure 4-17. The Armoured Infantry Company in Defence 4 - 19

Issue 1.0: Jun 01

The sector of this battalion group lies “in the woods” as far as the 1:50,000 map is concerned. In fact, these “woods have a very diverse character.

In the left-hand part

In the right-hand part

•

•

• •

- Old and mature timber stands offer relatively good fields of fire and observation; some are even passable to armoured fighting vehicles. - Straight trails facilitate command and control and offer good enfilading fields of fire. - The large tree nursery permits the employment of antitank (guided) weapons.

•

- Young forest and pole wood stands limit the fields of fire and observation severely. Armoured fighting vehicles can drive through them. - Curved and winding trails render command and control more difficult, but favour the emplacement of obstacles.

Figure 4-18

4 - 20 Issue 1.0: Jun 01

a.

The relatively dispersed tree stands and the straight trails in the left part of the sector allow the enemy to use armoured fighting vehicles off roads and facilitate his navigation and command and control. The dense stands on the right favour infiltration.

b.

Hence, the main effort of antitank operations is in the dispersed stands. Owing to the good visibility and the arcs of fire, the subunits employed here are able to detach platoons to form a battalion reserve.

FEBA

Counterattacks

Reinforce Contain

c.

The dense stands on the right with their limited visibility are occupied by relatively weak forces. Hence, numerous obstacles and more reconnaissance patrols are required here.

d.

The forces employed on the left in the battalion main effort are able to bring a considerable amount of firepower to bear on the enemy.

e.

The MILAN ATGW detachments should be withdrawn from the rifle companies for massed employment elsewhere. The antitank platoon may be employed at the edges of the woods for flank security. Figure 4-19. Possible Disposition of a Battalion Group 4 - 21

Issue 1.0: Jun 01

COMMENTS AND/OR SUGGESTIONS ON DGD&D PUBLICATIONS From: Name ........................................................................................................................... Unit

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Address ...................................................................................................................... ..................................................................................................................................... To: RO1 Author DGD&D Trenchard Lines Upavon SN9 6BE I have the following comments and/or suggestions1 to make for the improvement to: TITLE OF PUBLICATION ........................................................................................... ..................................................................................................................................... ..................................................................................................................................... ..................................................................................................................................... ..................................................................................................................................... ..................................................................................................................................... ..................................................................................................................................... ..................................................................................................................................... ..................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................... (PTO if required)

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Note: 1. Comments generally should relate to content and matters of fact. Notification of typing and spelling errors would also be appreciated.

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OTHER PUBLICATIONS IN THE AFM SERIES (as at June 2001) VOL 1 – COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS AC 71587 AC 71648 -

Pt 1 Pt 2 Pt 3

AC 71676

Pt 4

AC 71652 AC 71344 AC 71630 AC 71674 AC 71658 AC 71749 -

Pt 5 Pt 6 Pt 7 Pt 8 Pt 9 Pt 10 Pt 11

Formation Tactics Battlegroup Tactics Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)1 Countersurveillance, OPSEC and Deception Operations in an NBC Environment Combat Service Support Training for Operations Command and Staff Procedures Tactics for OOTW Counter Insurgency Operations Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Field Security1

1995 1998 -

One amendment One amendment -

1999

No amendments

1990 2001 1997 1999 1998 2001 -

Three amendments No amendments Three amendments One amendment Two amendments -

VOL 2 – OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS AC 71654 AC 71655 AC 71649 AC 71656 AC 71657 AC 71739 Note: 1.

Pt 1 Pt 2 Pt 3 Pt 4 Pt 5 Pt 6

Mountain Operations Jungle Operations Desert Operations Cold Climate Operations Urban Operations Woods, Forests and Swamps

1996 1995 1998 1996 1999 -

One amendment One amendment One amendment One amendment No amendments -

In preparation

All publications are recorded electronically on the Official DGD&D CD-ROM which is completely revised in July of each year.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01