Republic Of The Philippines V. Maria Lourdes Sereno G.r. No. 237428, 11 May 2018 Case Digest

Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes Sereno G.R. No. 237428, 11 May 2018 Ponente: Associate Justice Noel Tijam Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, filed a Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void Respondent Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (SC) and to oust and altogether exclude her therefrom on the ground that she is ineligible for the position for lack of proven integrity, as required by the Constitution, manifested by her non-compliance in the submission of SALN. When the position for Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the opening for applications and nominations, requiring applicants from the government to submit all previous SALNs up to 31 December 2011 (instead of the usual last two years of public service) and stating that, “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Ironically, Sereno who was then an Associate Justice, was not able to comply with the submission of the required number of SALNs for those applicants coming from the government, but was included in the shortlisting of qualified applicants and eventually victoriously appointed as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Come August 30, 2017, or five years after respondent's appointment as Chief Justice, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon (Atty. Gadon) against respondent with the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives (House Committee on Justice) for culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The complaint also alleged that respondent failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. Upon several hearings facts revealed that Sereno failed to comply the exacting requirements to be appointed as Chief Justice as set by the Judicial and Bar Council, which was the submission of all previous SALN. Instead, she just submitted only 3 SALNs from 2009-2011. In her justification, she emphasized that considering her government records in the academe are more than 15 year old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files. She also pointed out that the JBC, in including her in the shortlist of nominees was a clear manifestation that she meets the required qualifications and documentary requirements for the position. Thus arising to two relevant incidents: (1) (2)

the proposal of the House Committee for this Court to investigate on the proceedings of the JBC relative to the nomination of respondent as Chief Justice which is now presently docketed as A.M. No. 17-11-12 and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC; and the reason for this petition which is the Letter dated February 21, 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against respondent.

The Republic contends that respondent's failure to submit her SALN s as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset, from being a candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking her SALNs, respondent has not proven her integrity which is a requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus concludes that since respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto. In her defense, SERENO argues that the Chief Justice may only be ousted from office by impeachment on the basis of the Constitution and a long line of jurisprudence. Alternatively, she argues that the present petition is timebarred, as it should have been filed within one year from the cause of ouster, and not from the discovery of the disqualification. Respondent also stresses that the failure to file SALNs or to submit the same to the JBC has no bearing on one's integrity. The submission of SALNs was simply among the additional documents which the JBC had required of the applicants for the position of Chief Justice. It is respondent's position that the non-filing of SALN is not a ground for disqualification unless the same was already the subject of a pending criminal or administrative case or if the applicant had already been finally convicted for a criminal offense involving said failure to file SALNs. In this case, respondent points out that the JBC was made aware as early as July 20, 2012 that respondent had not submitted to the JBC her SALNs as a U.P. professor and yet none of them invoked Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the "integrity rule." In refuting respondent's arguments, the Republic justifies its resort to the unconventional method of quo warranto. It reiterates its argument that it seeks respondent's ouster, not on account of commission of impeachable offenses, but because of her ineligibility to assume the position of Chief Justice.

Issue: 1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives; 2. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription; 3. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice: Rulings: 1. YES

(a.)

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Section 7, Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the venue for an action for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC when commenced by the Solicitor General. While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this case is justified considering that the qualification of a Member of the Court is in question, and the issue is of public concern. The petition for quo warranto is of transcendental importance. The instant petition is one of first impression and of paramount importance to the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility and appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an action for quo warranto.

(b.)

On the argument that Respondent is an impeachable officer such that a quo warranto petition cannot prosper, the Court held that the origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different. While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature; while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts. Furthermore, there is no forum-shopping, as alleged by the Respondent, because quo warranto and impeachment can proceed independently and simultaneously, as they differ as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of a public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense. Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be ordered to cease holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction shall result in the removal of the Respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. Furthermore, the impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against the Respondent. The proceedings in the House are merely in the nature of a preliminary investigation whereby probable cause is sought to be determined.

(c.)

Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office. Even the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer (see cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. MacapagalArroyo where SC took cognizance of a quo warranto petition against former President MacapagalArroyo considering whether former President Estrada’s act of resignation ended his official status as President). Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers: “[T]he Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office ...” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal. That the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute such that only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment does not mean that it is to be taken as a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. The word “may” cannot also be understood to qualify only the imposable penalties because it would lead to the conclusion that other lesser penalties may be imposed — a situation not contemplated in the language of the Constitutional provision. The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned, on the basis of citizenship or membership in the Bar, for example. Unless such an officer commits any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such would result in permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from office through impeachment.

(d.)

The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. At the outset, an action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude the House of Representatives from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude the Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment. In this case, it is incidental that the non-filing of SALNs also formed part of the allegations in the Articles of Impeachment, which in itself is a Constitutional requirement, the violation of which constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution. But unlike other impeachable officers, Respondent’s position also demands compliance with the qualifications of having to be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence — and the failure to submit SALNs goes into the very qualification of integrity. For the guidance of the

bench and the bar, and to obviate confusion in the future as to when quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, and in keeping with the Court’s function of harmonizing the laws and the rules with the Constitution, the Court herein demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. On the contrary, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise. (e.)

The exercise of judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, is thus misplaced. An outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Respondent will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle an actual controversy squarely presented before it. There is also no possibility of a constitutional crisis upon which an abdication of such duty is to be premised because, as discussed, it is within the Court’s judicial power to settle justiciable issues or actual controversies involving rights, which are legally demandable and enforceable. It is not arrogating upon itself the power to impeach, which is a political exercise.

(f.)

Seeking affirmative relief from the Court is tantamount to voluntary appearance. Respondent cannot now be heard to deny the Court’s jurisdiction over her person even as she claims to be an impeachable official because Respondent in fact invoked and sought affirmative relief from the Court by praying for the inhibition of several Members of this Court and by moving that the case be heard on Oral Arguments, albeit ad cautelam.

2. NO (a.)

Prescription does not lie against the State. The one-year limitation is not applicable when the Petitioner is not a mere private individual pursuing a private interest, but the government itself seeking relief for a public wrong and suing for public interest. Indubitably, the basic principle that “prescription does not lie against the State” which finds textual basis under Article 1108 (4) of the Civil Code, applies in this case.

(b.)

Respondent cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that she should not be required to submit the said documents as she was considered to be coming from private practice; that it was not feasible to retrieve most of her records in the academe considering that the same are more than fifteen years old; and that U.P. already cleared her of “all academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from administrative charges”. She has never been clear on whether she had filed the required SALNs or not. Given the foregoing, there can be no acquiescence or inaction, in this case, on the part of the Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its right to seek redress against a public wrong and vindicate public interest.

(c.)

Lastly, the Court finds it more important to rule on the merits of the novel issues imbued with public interest presented before Us than to dismiss the case outright merely on technicality.

3. In this case, it was found that respondent is ineligible to hold the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court position for lack of integrity on account of her failure to file a substantial number of SALNs and also, her failure to submit the required SALNs to the JBC during her application for the position. Again, one of the Constitutional duties of a public officer is to submit a declaration under oath of his or her assets, liabilities, and net worth upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law. 335 When the Constitution and the law exact obedience, public officers must comply and not offer excuses. When a public officer is unable or unwilling to comply, he or she must not assume office in the first place, or if already holding one, he or she must vacate that public office because it is the correct and honorable thing to do. A public officer who ignores, trivializes or disrespects Constitutional and legal provisions, as well as the canons of ethical standards, forfeits his or her right to hold and continue in that office. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom. The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the application and nomination process.