Scientific Thought And Its Burdens-compressed.pdf

FATIH UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS

SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT RND ITS BURDENS AN ESSAY IN THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

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Alparslan A~1kgen~

ISTANBUL

Fatih Oniversitesi Yaymlan: 3 Sosyal Bilimler Enstittisii Yaymlan: 3 Baskt-Cilt: Mega Bastm A.~. (0212) 551 11 19 (Pbx) istanbul - Mart 2000

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION CHAPTER ONE A GENERAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE A. What is knowledge? ......................................................................................................... 25 B. The Object of Knowledge and the Mind .......................................................... .27 C. Experience and the Mental Representation of the Object .................... 30 1. External or Outer experience ............................................................................... 31 2. Internal or Inner Experience ................................................................................ 33 D. Mental Cognition ................................................................................................................44 1. Mental Consciousness ·.............................................................................................. 48 2. Memory ................................................................................................................................ 50 3. The Imagination ............................................................................................................ 52 4. The Intellect ...................................................................................................................... 53 5. The Will. .............................................................................................................................. 56 6. The Intuition ..................................................................................................................... 57

CHAPTER TWO THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENCE A. The General Framework: Worldview ................................................................. 64 1. The Nature ofWorldviews .................................................................................. 67 2. The Structural Rise ofWorldviews ................................................................ 70 3. The Function of Worldviews ............................................................................... 76 B. The Inner Framework: The General Scientific Conceptual Scheme ....................................................................................................................................... 84 1. The Concept of Knowledge .................................................................................. 88 2. The Concept of Truth ................................................................................................ 89 3. The Concept of Method ........................................................................................... 90 4. The Concept ofTheory ............................................................................................ 91 5. The Concept of Science ........................................................................................... 92 · C. The Specific Framework: The Specific Scientific Conceptual Scheme ....................................................................................................................................... 93

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CHAPTER THREE THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE A. The Scientific Process .... ,................................................................................................ 97 1. The Stage of Problems ........................................................................................ 10 1 2. The Disciplinary Stage ........................................................................................ 102 3. The Stage ofNaming ............................................................................................ 104 B. TheScientific Community ........................................................................................ 105 1. The Interaction Between Science and Society .................................. 107 2. The Nature and Characteristics of Scientific Communities ......................................................... ,................................................... 111 a) The Methodological Aim ........................................................................... 112 b) Scientific Ideals ................................................................................................. 116 c) Formal Linkage ................................................................................................. 117 d) Marginal Ideals .................................................................................................. 118 C. The Scientific Tradition .............................................................................................. 118 1. The Nucleus Contextual Causes ............................................ ~ ..................... 120 a) Moral Dynamism ........................................................ :..................·.................. 121 b) Intellectual Dynamism ................................................................................. 121 2. Marginal Contextual Causes ......................................................................... 124 a) Social Dynamism ............................................................................................. 124 b) The Institutional Dynamism .................................................................... 125

CHAPTER FOUR HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CASE STUDIES A. Greek Civilization ......................................·.......................................................... 128 B. Western Civilization ............................................................................................ 133 C. Islamic Civilization ....................................... :....................................................... 139 1. The Worldview of Islam as the Environment of Islamic Science ...................................................................................................................... 143 ' a) The Emergence of the World-Structure (610-622 A.D.) ..............................................·..................................................... 146 b) The Emergence of the Islamic Knowledge-Structure within the Islamic Worldview (0-1 0 A.H./622632A.D.) .................................................................................................................. l52 2. The Emergence of the Islamic Scientific Tradition (10-200 A.H./632-800 A.D.) ......................................................................... 158

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a) The Emergence of the Islamic Scientific Conceptual Scheme ..................................................................................................................... 158 b) The Emergence of the Early Islamic Scientific Tradition .................................................................................................................. 162

CHAPTER FIVE THE RISE OF PARTICULAR SCIENCES WITHIN THE ISLAMIC SCIENTIFIC TRADITION A. Al-Fiqh .............................................. :.............................................................................. :....... 169 1. The Stage of Scientific Problems (622 - c. 700) .................. 171 2. The Rise of a Disciplinary Tradition (c. 700 -· 750) .............. 175 3. The Emergence of the Stage of Naming in al-Fiqh (c. 100's/750's) ........................................................................................................ 190 B. Kaltim ........................................................................................................................................ 191 1. The Stage of Problems (610 -730's) ........................................................ l92 2. The Rise of a Disciplinary Tradition in Kalam (730's-800's) ........................................................................................................... :.203 3. The Emergence of KaHim as a Science (200's- 350A.H./800's-950's): The Stage of Naming ................ 209 C. Political Philosophy, History and Other Sciences .................................. 212

CONCLUSION A. The Non-Observable Foundation ........................................................................ 221 1. The Environment .................................................................................................... 223 2. The Context ............... :................................................................................................223 3. The Environmental Context ........................................................................... 224 B. The Function ofWorldview in Scientific Advancement.. ................ .224 C. The Observable Foundation .................................................................................... .228 1. The Effects of Environmental Context .................................................. 228 2 .. Material Oppurtunities ................................................................................ :..... .229

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 231

Index ........................................................................................................................ ........,.......................251

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I NTHDOUCTI ON One of the most prominent and compelling human activities since the beginning of human history has been science, which began with the curiosity to know in the form of a simple learning activity. Although our initial statement here implies existence of science since the beginning of our history on earth, this essay will exhibit that only one specific kind of a learning activity is defined as science. As this is the main task of this study, namely the attempt to reach a cogent definition of science, in order to clarify this concept, we have another crucial issue at hand: In recent decades philosophy of science has faced the debate concerning the question whether science is absolute and universal in itself or merely conventional depending on the society in which it flourishes. We take the Positivist stand as defending the former thesis, and the Historicist stand the latter; whereas our stand in this essay shall argue for a stand defending somewhat a middle position between these extremes. If the former is held then science cannot be put into a specific perspective. For in this sense science is taken to be absolute and universal; it is thus the same in all different civilizations, such as the ancient Greek, Islamic, and Western civilizations. But we know that there are in science certain elements which enable us to put science into such models as 'Islamic', 'secular' and 'Christian' . 1 This endeavout: as an attempt in philosophy of science, as understood in this context, is an essay to formulate this position epistemologically. But, at the same time, we shall argue that the matter is not so simple, and that there arein science some epistemological elements springing primarily from the constitution of our mental faculties of knowledge that renders science as a universal human phenomenon. These scientific elements will be termed here 'disciplinary elements', among which the most crucial is the scientific consciousness, which is required by the systematic miture of our mind.

I We must refer to such a usage as, for example, "The Early Growth of the Secular Sciences in Andalusia", by George F. Hourani, S/ 32 (J 970). Since the term 'secular' is a value-laden concept, once it is used in relation to science its implication for other value-laden concepts must be acceptable as well.

By the systematic nature of our mind, we mean that natural mental function which forms an organized unity for itself in order to be able to carry out its operations. As we grow up from infancy to adulthood this mental unity is established gradually, forming itself into an architectonic unity which, as a mental framework, we call 'worldview'. Therefore, when we try to acquire knowledge our mind grasps that knowledge within this unity which has been shaped in the mind. In this way, if a specific subject of inquiry is investigated for a long period of time with an uninterrupted chain of investigators, the knowledge accumulated therein will be perceived gradually within a disciplinary unity. When this awareness emerges in the min9s of ~he scholars involved in that activity they become conscious of the fact that subjects they have been investigating constitutes a: specific discipline, which is then given a certain name designating thus a particular science. It is such an awareness that we shall entitle 'scientific consciousness' which is, as we shall see, the natural result of the constitution of our mind. If scientific consciousness belongs thus to our mind as an epistemological characteristic, then it cannot be conventional. It is this kind of elements that this essay will try to trace in the concept of science in three civilizations taken as case studies; ancient Greek, Islam and the Western. As such though it is an historical essay, since it will utilize a different framework in its historical attempt, we need to develop that framework itself also in this essay. Hence, it is at once historical and philosophical through which the concept of science will be examined from the perspective of the history and philosophy of Greek, Islamic and West~rn science. Among these civilizations taken as cases of study here, Islamic science will be emphasized more in order to reach a definition of science within a specific civilization, which can be applied to other case studies as well. Since no underlying theory has been suggested to clarify what is meant by Islamic science, many objections have been raised concerning even the possibility of this concept. There is also a historical reason behind these objections: in the High Islamic civilization one does not come across the adjectival usage of the term "Islam" in connection to certain things, and more particularly, with certain concepts. But today it has become a common usage, especially in relation to certain activities which are 2

borrowed from other civilizations and adopted by Muslims to their society; constructions such as Islamic science, Islamic economics, Islamic theory of knowledge, Islamic ethics, and so on, were unheard of before. We are thus left with a controversy to determine what kind of an activity and a concept, doctrine or idea is Islamic. A noun is also derived from this adjective; Islamicity. We shall, then, refer to the problems surrounding this concep.t as the 'controversy of Islamicity'. Although this controversy has no relation to philosophy of science in general, it is related to one particular problem to be discussed in this essay; can there be such designations as Islamic science or Western science? Of course no one would object to the simple usage of these terms to refer to merely the scientific achievements in these civilizations without implying any epistemological attribution of these adjectives. Let us try to give an example, taking into consideration one of our case study civilizations, Islam: That physics is a science no one can doubt; and it is an organized and systematized body of knowledge. Yet in it one may find many propositions in contradiction with the Qur'an, such as the eternity of the world, and its implication of the unnecessity of a creator. Therefore, one must either admit that an organized body of knowledge can be in conflict with the Revelation, in which case it is to be chara~terized unislamic, or that all knowledge. is necessarily Islamic, hence, the piece of information contradicting the Revelation is not know ledge at all. Of course, the latter conclusion is also a solution, but unfortunately it leads to some disturbances even from the Islamic perspective. In order to show this point, let us consider the following f:tadlth, which is the other major source of Islamic belief, Qur' an being the first: "My Lord! I seek refuge to youfrom the harmful knowledge." (Muslim, "Kitab al-Dhikr", 73; Abu Dawud, "Witr", 32 and many other l}.adHh books) . It seems that there can be unislamic knowledge, which is a fact that seems so baffling to many Muslim intellectuals and even scientists today and as a result they argue in vain that science is science and it is value-free, hence it is neutral so far as cultures are concerned. This conclusion may not be acceptable to the one who thinks that something unislamic cannot be knowledge, but this is a naive solution and does not

provide an epistemological way out. In that case definition of knowledge from the Islamic perspective must also be studied with much care. One of the most significant intellectual challenges that faces Muslim societies today is also to catch up with the scientific advancement of our time. Unfortunately many individuals within the Muslim civilization today try to encounter this intellectual challenge by resorting to technology which seems to provide a temporarY. brute might. Although especially military might has become very critical for Muslims as well, even such a superiority is not the result of technology alone. The most enduring power is knowledge, but Muslims have never pursued knowledge for this purpose and we should not encourage it either. This brings us to a proposition which is held with a degree of emphasis in one of our case study civilizations, the Western. First of all, we have to admit the truth of this proposition. For truth is powerful, rriaybe not in a physical sense but ultimately in a compelling moral sense. But, secondly, if knowledge is used as power to subjugate nature, animals and other human fellows, then this proposition has a physical sense too. As far as the powerful aspect of knowledge is concerned, it is the use involved in knowledge that makes it a moral concept, not the fact that it renders its beholder powerful. For, the moral power it endows us with makes us indeed feel very weak in an ultimate sense of awareness that all our knowledge compared to the immense Wisdom involved in the system of the universe arriounts to almost nothing, which makes us realize that all we know is the fact that we do not indeed know anything. Therefore, though knowledge is not independent of our mind, yet we can ideally think that in itself it is pure goodness and thus we have \ perceived i~ as pure light opposing darkness in the sense of ignorance. If that is the case, then pow can we face firmly this intellectual challenge that is leveled from the scientific front? This essay is a response to this question from another intellectual front, the epistemological. This means that we must first try to clarify from the Islamic perspective how scientific knowledge is acquired, so that we may approach science from this perspective. Since Islamic science is nothing but science carried out within the Islamic worldview and as such the Islamic worldview is the conceptual, or 4

mental environment within which scientific activities in the Islamic civilization is carried out, we must first attempt to outline in general the Islamic worldview itself, so that we can see what kind of a concept of science may be yielded from such a world view. In order to do that, however, we must clarify what is meant by the concept of worldview in general. This concept, as the general framework of scientific activities will be discussed in the second chapter. In this connection there is a very complicated problem of defining science itself. But conclusive definition of science can only be reached only after a careful examination of the tel'm in different civilizations; an attempt which shall give us the universal characteristic(s) of science. But an examination of science within its sociological environment will also give us differences in scientific activities in different societies, which we show to spring from the different conceptualizations of science itself, hence, we reach the concepts of Greek, Islamic and Western sciences. This essay will attempt to do this task; but in this introduction we shall attempt to reach a provisional and very broad definition of science that is acceptable within all these frameworks; the Greek, Islamic and the Western as well. When those kinds of human activities geared toward acquiring knowledge is examined in qur three case civilizations, we find that there are individually organized bodies of knowledge that can be characterized as disciplines. As a preliminary approach, therefore, we shall refer to any organized body of knowledge as 'discipline', which i& systematized with a certain method, geared at the same time towards furthering that knowledge itself. Each discipline, then, is a body of knowledge which is eventually, through an uninterrupted process, expressed by the term 'science' and as such we must distinguish it from the activity of acquiring knmvledge in a general sense. For science is not possible without scientific activities, but the other way around is possible in the sense that the adjective 'scientific' does not refer to a discipline as an organized body of knowledge. This interpretation assumes that the adjectival usage of the term 'science' may not always refer to the existence of sciences in a given civilization. For example, we may, in a history of science book, try to describe in an ancient society certain activities of learning as 'scientific activities', but this does not necessarily mean that there were sciences as disciplines in that 5

society. It merely means that within that civilization there were certain learning activities, the outcome of which resembles what we call today science. If science is thus taken strictly to refer to disciplines, it cannot but exist only as the output of scientific activities carried out within a consciousness that the subject under investigation can be organized into a body of knowledge. In order to reach at least a preliminary definition of science, therefore, we must, it seems, examine only the essential characteristics of disciplines. For other characteristics belonging to these disciplines individually, and to scientific activities, in a stricter sense, do not constitute what we ordinarily call 'science'. Individual characteristics of disciplines are what make each individual science distinct from each other, and as such they cannot be taken as criteria in the definition of sciences. When we examine all disciplines, therefore, we find that they all have, in the first place, a subject matter; no discipline can thus be called a science unless it has a well-defined and clearly determined body of problems, which constitute its subject matter. Secondly, we also observe that these subject matters in each discipline are examined in a peculiar way, which constitute what is ordinarily called method. Thirdly, in every discipline we see that the application of the method to the subject matter at hand produces some provisional opinions, expressed in peculiar formulations, which is ordinarily called theories. Finally, when these three determinations in each discipline are worked out into a process, it yields an accumulation of knowledge within that discipline. Therefore, subject matter, method, theory and an accumulated body of knowledge are the four essential characteristics of a science; without having all these four characteristics no discipline can epistemologically claim to be a science. Scientific consciousness is, on the other hand, the epistemological ground which is a priori in the mind that holds these within a unity. We shall try. to further elaborate each characteristic. •

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1. Subject Matter Logically speaking every human activity has an object, but usually objects of such general activities are not defined as subject matter. In that case, 6

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only those activities that are 4imed at learning must have objects of study which can be defined as 'subject matter'. Even this broad characterization does not qualify any subject of study to be science. For, a subject of study usually defines its subject matter in such a way that it includes as subject matter only those objects, entities and phenomena which can be classified only under that subject matter; it thus excludes all unrelated subjects of inquiry. It is for this reason that we claim the subject matter of a science to be well defined. Though a subject matter is essential for a body of knowledge to be science, the kind of a subject matter is determined for a specific science by the convention of the scientists involved in that activity. This means that even this characteristic of science has two aspects: one, epistemological and hence, a priori renders it to be absolute; and the other is sociological, hence conventional, and thus relative to the community of scientists involved in specifying that subject matter. The fact that our mind requires a clear cut subject defined for an inquiry constitutes the former aspect; and the fact that a certain type of topic is chosen for a certain discipline constitutes the latter. It is because of these epistemological and sociological nature of this characteristic of science that we sometimes find a science with different subjects of inquily in different civilizations. But one fact never changes in all these different civilizations; having a well defined subject matter delineated for a specific science. We shall try to show in this essay that the way a group of scientists carry out their scientific activities constitutes a 'tradition' which will be termed here 'scientific tradition' in order to distinguish it from other forms of cultural traditions. We shall clarify further what is meant by a scientific tradition in the third chapter. The group of scientists involved in scientific enterprise within a certain scientific tradition are called 'scientific community', ( 'ulama' in the Islamic scientific terminology) which has conventions not similar to that of the society in general as their conventions are of the cognitive nature. Once these concepts are clarified we should understand that subject matter of a science is deter'mined through the convention of the scientific community according to the framework provided within their respective scientific tradition.

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If, for example, we take the Islamic scientific tradition, we can see that any subject that is studied in a speculative manner is identified as the subject matter of kalam; a similar determination of subject matter is found in the Greek scientific tradition where study of any subject in a methodological way is identified as philo-sophia. As the knowledge accumulated around this extremely broad subject matter increases the need to cut down the subject matter arises. In this way, different sciences arose in both scientific traditions. When this happens usually the subject matter gives its name to the newly emerging science; e. g., physics (meaning study of nature), psychology (meaning study of soul) and so on. A subject matter can be well defined if there is a sufficient accumulation of knowledge around that subject of investigation. The accumulated knowledge includes not only the discoveries in that learning activity, if there are any at all, but also the theories developed and the methodology used in these activities. In fact once the subjetc is defined and limited by excluding other discussions in the learning activities through the efforts of the scientific community involved, there usually arises a method of investigation which is peculiar to that subject matter. Therefore, a well developed metij.od is also essential for the newly emerging body of knowledge to be qualified as science.

2. Method The manner in which a scientific investigation is carried out constitutes the concept of method as an essential characteristic pertaining to science. Our definition of method in this context is held broad enough so as to include the conception of method as understood by all scientific traditions. This means that an essential characteristic of science does not have to be conceived in exactly the same way in all traditions. Hence, the concept of method ma:y be defined differently in the Islamic scientific tradition from the way it is defined in the Western scientific. tradition, for example. But the fact that for a body of knowledge to be called 'science' it must have a method, whatever that method may be and in whatever way it may be conceived, is a requirement of not only convention but also of the epistemological construction of our faculties of knowledge. Therefore, it is not a mere accident that in all traditions of learning in which there emerged 8

an organized body of knowledge with a specific name of science, only those knowledge-seeking activities that are carried out with a certain method are regarded science. This is so clear in our case civilizations that in all the three scientific traditions the concept of method is investigated even in a science, defined as methodology, and 'ilm u~ul in the Islamic case. If the method applied in each science changes according to the needs and requirements of the subject matter, then it is possible to divide the methodological aspects of sciences according to the classification of the subject matters. In the Islamic perspective, for example, this has a more significance, because all subjects of inquiry can be divided into three, based on the Islamic worldview: 1. the absolute ghayb, which will be called in this essay 'the Transcendent Absolute'; 2. the relative ghayb, which is called here 'the Experiential Absolute; 3. the shahiidah, which is the physical universe. We have chosen our terminology from the Qur'anic verse repeated many times: iilirri al-ghayb wa al-shahiidah (39/al-Zumar, 46; 23/al-Mu'miniin, 92; 6/al-An'am, 63; 59/al-J:Iashr, 22; 9/al-Tawbah, 105; etc.). The .p1ethodology of Islamic science is thus determined through the worldview inspired by the Qur' an. In order to clarify the concept of method we need to elucidate this point further. We shall argue that like many other scientific concepts that we develop in our scientific traditions, the concept of method also derives largely from the foundational worldview. We can show this on the basis of the Islamic worldview as based on its fundament~! source, the Qur' an. As we have shown, since there are fundamentally three subjects of inquiry derived as a mentality from the Qur' an, then we may ask: how should we go about inquiring them? With regard to the Transcendent Absolute realm, the Qur'an categorically points out that no one can know the gf?.ayb except Allah: "Say (0 Mul,lammad): 'I do not tell you that I possess the treasures of God, nor do I know the ghayb ... I only follow what is revealed'" (6/al-An'am, 50); "Or that the ghayb is in their hands, so that they can write it down?" (68/ al-Qalam, 47); "To God belongs the ghayb of the heavens and the earth." (16/al-Nal;ll, 77); "God alone has the keys of the ghayb; none but He

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knows them." (6/al-An 'am, 59). 2 If this is the case then the only method available for the study of this subject matter is to try to understand the Revelation without any interpretation whatsoever. The evidence for this is the verse "no one knows what its true meaning is, except Allah; and those endowed with knowledge say: 'we believe in it, all of it comes from our Lord'." (3/Ali 'Imran, 7). But in the Experientially Absolute subjects, not only interpretation, but also rational investigation is also allowed, provided that again Revelation is taken as the guide. 3 Therefore, our faculties of knowledge are not left totally independent in these subjects since the subject matter is still the ghayb, such as the existence of God, the existence of a life after death and so on. The fact that the Qur' an lays responsibility on humans concerning these subjects is an evidence that if there is responsibility it must somehow be :j:>ossible to know these subjects. Otherwise, how can we be held responsible in believing in God's existence yet there would be no way of knowing this issue even rationally? This possibility is expressed as an inner experience based on a faculty, called 'heart', on the one hand, and as intellect thinking on the basis of this inner experience on the other hand. For this reason the realm of knowledge in this sphere is termed 'experiential Absolute' meaning it is the Absolute with regard to the external faculties, but experiential with regard to the inner faculties guided by the Revelation as a moral life. Let us take just one among many QUll'anic encouragement to investigate this realm rationally: "There is no lack of proportion in the creation of God. So turn your eyes (and look_around). Do you see any defect? Again, turn your sight (and examine) a second time. But your eyes will come back to you dull and frustrated in a state worn out" (67/Mulk, 3-4). The methods applied in these disciplines will be developed on the basis of the Revelation; otherwise,- the science will lack the Islamic character. This point will be elaborated further in the following pages. 2 In this essay the translations of the Qur'an are based on the following works: A. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation and Commentary (Brentwood, MD: Amana Corp., 1983); A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1976) and T. B. Irving, The Qur'an: Translation and Commentary (Brattleboro, Vermont: Amana Books, 1988). 3 See for example 26/ai-Shu'ara', 88-89; 50/Qaf, 37; 7/ai-A'rfif, 179; 13/ai-Ra'd, 28; 22/ai-I:Iajj, 46, etc. 10

Finally with regard to the sciences dealing with the physical universe, no restriction is brought by the Qur'an, which means that we can develop any method that is suitable for studying such subjects. But of course, even this method will naturally be dominated by the environment of the mental activity itself, that is the worldview; and as such it will naturally, based on the epistemological constitution of our faculties of knowledge, carry 'the characteristic of Islamicity. This is the concept of method that has been applied in Islamic science. The details of this will be developed further in the following sections of this essay. But it must be clear that the method of sciences may thus change from one scientific tradition to another. But the fact that some method must exist is a necessary characteristic of sciences and scientific activities as an epistemological requirement.

3. Scientific Theories When a method is applied to a certain subject matter, usually a provisional formulation is reached; this formulation has different names in different scientific traditions. In the early Islamic tradition they were called 'ra 'y'; in Western and Greek scientific tradition it is called 'theory'. In later Islamic scientifiC terminology, however, with the influence of the Greek scientific tradition the concept of ra 'y was restricted to the legal usage, and instead, na'{.ar was employed. Just as a science cannot be without a m_ethod, in the same way it cannot be witllout a body of theories. Though this is a universal characteristic belonging to science, the way a theoty is conceived and required to be formulated is by no means universal to all the scientific -traditions. What ldnd of a formulation qualifies to be called scientific theory? If we talce into consideration again the Islamic scientific tradition, no the01y can be entertained in the Transcendent Absolute realm, since we are not in a position to acquire knowledge in this field except through the Revelation, in which case the knowledge imparted is also Absolute and thus not a theory. Consider the /:ladith: "if one interprets the Qur' an on the basis of his theory, he has committed an error even if he is correct in his interpretation" (man qiilafi'l-Qur'an bi ra 'yihifa a~aba, fa qad akh,ta')4. 4sunan Abu Diiwud, op. cit., 1036.

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It is the same with regard to an interpretation which does not consider the Revelation in subjects that fall under the Experiential Absolute. But the theories concerning subjects related to the physical universe can be determined by the conventions of the scientific community involved in such investigations. Therefore, their conception may change from one tradition to another. We do accept, however, that there may be some universal aspects of such theories springing primarily from the nature of our faculties of knowledge. The concept of theory is so essential to science that without theories there can be no science. For, science is basically after the unknown to be discovered through the known. Our initial knowledge concerning the unknown is expressed or rather formulated on the basis of certain criteria determined by the investigators in a scientific tradition. Therefore, it is not the case that any initial formulation concerning the unknown is considered a theory. Science in this respect is essentially theoretical knowledge, and as such if a science, let us suppose, runs out of theories, that means it has nothing left to investigate and has exhausted its subject matter; as a result it will cease to be. Therefore, science is not an accumulation of definite knowledge, but rather of such knowledge as well as a large body of theories. If a theory is discovered to be true, then the subject it covers is excluded from the subject matter of that science. This shows the close relationship between the subject matter and theories in a science. The proven theory becomes a scientific discovery and as such is added on the accumulated body of knowledge to be used for other unsolved problems in that science.

4. Accumulation of Knowledge As a necessary characteristic belonging to science, accumulation of knowledge is not a mere aggregation of data; it is rather ~ systematic arrangement of scientific knowledge in such a way that it yields an organized body of knowledge, which includes the methodology of that science, its theories and scientific discoveries. 'Systematic' in the scientific sense means that the knowledge accumulated in a discipline is organized according to certain principles in such a way that this knowledge can be meaningfully related to other areas of investigation whether already formed 12

into a discipline or not. If in this way all sciences are related and constructed together they constitute what we call 'system'. Therefore,. the term systematic already subsumes under itself an organized knowledge so that when we say "science is an organized body of knowledge" this proposition already includes the idea of a system. For this reason, when a systematic body of knowledge is given a name, it is the result of an awareness which perceives the subject of inquiry constituting a discipline. We have entitled this awareness 'scientific consciousness' without which no subject matter can be formed into a discipline. Hence, it seems that scientific consciousness is the most essential characteristic of a body of knowledge which can be called science. It is through this consciousness that an accumulated body of knowledge in an uninterrupted chain of investigators comes to be realized as· constituting a discipline which can also be named, and once it is so named it is perceived as a science, a name which is also givel). conventionally. Therefore, this characteristic is already included in the idea of accumulation of knowledge in a subject of investigation. Otherwise, any kind of gathering information cannot lead to the emergence of a science. We must also understand that scientific consciousness is the result of the function of our mental faculties of knowledge; it is embedded therein a priori. For, as we shall argue in this essay, it is the nature of ou.r mind to perceive things within a certain framework which it builds for itself. It is indeed this framework which is called system if it is constructed philosophically; but if it is formed in our minds through our physical and social environment, we shall term it 'worldview'. We hope that this will be clarified in the first part of our essay. The accumulation of knowledge, therefore, already includes in itself the methodology of that science, as well as the discoveries made and the theories constructed in that science, especially the current ones. Then, that body of knowledge is named. Naming an organized body of knowledge is forming it into a science, which requires a group of scholars working in a . specific subject matter for a period of time, which may take centuries. Therefore, there must be certain unifying principles not only recognized by the members of that group, but accepted and elaborated by them as well. In this way a tradition is established by the group, which thus constitutes a 13

community, which will be called in this essay 'scientific community' a phrase borrowed from the Western philosophic terininology (as mentioned above, the term which roughly corresponds to this in the Islamic scientific tradition is 'ulamii '). If it is such a community to name a science, or in some cases it may be just one prominent member of that community to name it, we can argue that naming a science is also a process, which will be elaborated again in the third chapter of this essay as the sociology of science. Organizing thus the accumulated knowledge in a subject of inquiry into a body of knowledge is done in many ways; in ancient Greek science this was done in the form of commentaries; a scientific tradition which continued in the Islamic science as well. It can be done also in the form of writing text books for a special field. But the most systematic way is the one Aristotle had done; it is constructing a philosophical system, every part of which constitutes a specific science. When Aristotle had done this, he gave a name for each part of his system, clearly also calling them science. That part, for example, which dealt with physical substances he called physics, the part which dealt with imperishable substances and in particular with God he called theology, and so on. He also made it clear that in his general classification the name theoretical philosophy does not constitute a science, but rather it includes some sciences that have similar features. This again shows the systematic approach of a scientific consciousness. Since these four characteristics are said to be essential, they are at once the universal characteristics of scienc.es as well. But we must point out that some of these characteristics are universal but not absolute, there are yet others which are both universal and absolute at the same time. First of all, no human invention can be absolute. For 'absolute' is a term which we apply only to either that which is outside human beings (i.e. genuinely objective, that is real) or that which is divine. Therefore, anything that is established by human beings is conventional. If, on the other hand, there is in science something that follows from the constitution of our faculties of knowledge, then that cannot be conventionally universal but rather absolutely universal. It is this aspect of science that is strikingly similar in all scientific traditions, as it shall become evident in this essay as well. For 14

example, no human being will go about inquiring a subject that is _experimental without any observation or some kind of an experimentation, though the ways of doing these scientific manners may change from culture to culture. We, therefore, accept that scientific conventiqns are established on the basis of the constitution of our faculties of knowledge. For it is our mental faculties that require a systematic approach in acquiring knowledge, which in turn leads to the scientific consciousness. We thus derive three aspects of science from our above analysis: conventions, developed by the community of scholars involved; m;td the subject of inquiry, finally, our epistemological constitution which governs all these activities. Now suppose the subject of inquiry is a mathematical problem or an issue concerning the atomic structure of material bodies; since we know that these subjects are investigated in all the three civilizations, then the subject is the same in all the three scientific traditions. Obviously the third aspect, namely our epistemological constitution, will necessarily be the same, since the investigators in all the three cases are human beings. But if we assume that there was· no influence taldng place between them, would the first be the same as well in all the three civilizations? Of course, conventions can be same in different civilizations but this is only a matter of accident; for they can be different. Hence, scientific conventions f!lso do not resemble out of a necessity; they resemble because of mutual cultural exchanges or as a result of chance. ._ We can clarify one more misconception in this regard: it is sometimes argued that if there is such a thing as Islamic science in the true sense,_ or Western science, then how can be scientific exchange of ideas between cultures and civilizations? The answer is simple; considering the above three aspects, we can say that on the basis of the second and third aspects we are able to cooperate in our scientific endeavours. But cooperation and scientific exchange on the basis of conventions is almost impossible because they involve the worldview of that scientific tradition. Conventions are heavily dominated by the worldview of its environment and therefore without entering meaningfully into that environment it is not possible to grasp the conventions of a scientific tradition. Since in our century many Muslims go to the West to study, in a general sense they become aware of the Western worldview and thus are able to assimilate 15

many of their scientific conventions as well. But the fact that when they return to their country they cannot meaningfully contribute to the advancement of sciences in their homeland, shows that the scientific conventions which they try to use do not work within a foreign frame of mind, i.e. within the environment in which their own worldview is dominant. Instead, if they try to borrow only those characteristics that universally belong to us all and then try to develop a scientific convention based on their own worldview they will be more successful. But this takes time and patience, because it is a tradition and a tradition does not grow over the night. Based on our analysis here we may now attempt to present a worldng definition of science; since in the scientific convention, as understood here, any discipline that has a well-defined body of problems, a scholarly developed method, according to which a well-formulated body of theories emerge, and as a result an accumulation of knowledge arises is a science, we have criteria upon which a definition of science can be grounded: The nam~d awareness of an organized body of knowledge, which arises as a result of the process in determining a subject matter, investigated by a certain method yielding theories, is science.

If we examine the scientific traditions in Islam and the Western civilizations, we will see that in both civilizations as well as the Greek, whatever is called science as a discipline conforms to our definition. This means that our definition is universal because it is based on the natural process of acquiring knowledge. But still certain thinkers offer that for something to be called science it must submit knowledge to a "rational investigation and try to trace causal reiations among its parts". 5 Yet others maintain that science is commonly used to denote:

1. a set of characteristic methods by means of which knowledge is certified; 2. a stock of accumulated knowledge stemming from the application of these methods; 5 See William C. Dampier. A History of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), xiii. 16

3. a set of cultural values and mores governing the activities termed scientific; 4. any combination of the foregoing. 6 If science is taken to mean one of the above taken singly or in any combination of them, then it is definitely misconceived; for science must be taken above all as a discipline in which a body of knowledge is organized in accordance with the principles and methodology that emerged in such an accumulation of knowledge. If this understanding is not included in the definition of science we cannot accurately describe this phenomenon of acquiring knowledge. Hence, we argued that scientific consciousness is an integral part of the concept of science, without which science cannot be adequately defined. Although we specify this definition as universal, the application of it by different scientists can. never be universal. This is because, the application of a certain concept requires a conceptual environment which is necessarily different in each case. By the 'conceptual environment' we mean the worldview of individuals within which science is applied. It is thus in terms of such an environment that the definition of Islamic science must be sought. The conceptual environment will be elaborated in the second as the concept of worldview. It is clear, therefore, that the concept of science, just like many other similar concepts, requires a framework. It is thus inevitable to start our analysis of the concept of science with an epistemology which delineates how scientific knowledge is acquired. If an epistemology is not developed in a context in which a discourse concerning the philosophy of science is carried on it can lead to misunderstanding the ground upon whiCh the concept of science is based. Thet~efore, the epistemology of science must exhibit on what kind of a ground theconcept of science is established. Since our approach in this context is primarily episte-mological, we shall try to show the epistemological ground of any scientific activity. Therefore, we need to demonstrate the epistemological ground on which any scientific activity is necessarily based. This will reql!ire us to outline 6 Robert K. Merton. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, ed. Norman W. Storer (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 268. 17

first a general theory of knowledge, then the extension of that theory of knowledge upon which our scientific activities are grounded more specifically. This will be done in the first chapter. But as we do this, we must concentrate on a general sketch of a theory of knowledge which will be sufficient for our purpose in this context; otherwise, we are not in a position here to develop a comprehensive theory of knowledge. Once this is understood then we can show how scientific knowledge emerges in a given society. This has two aspects: epistemological; and social. The former constitutes what we shall do in the second chapter as the general framework of science. The latter is what we shall do in the third chapter as the sociology of science. For, our scientific activities are governed not only by our faculties of knowledge, but as a human phenomenon occurring within a certain group of people, called either 'scientists' or '·scholars', it must also be governed by the social constitution of this society or community of scientists. Hence, scientific activities emerge out of an epistemological and sociological constitution of humans. This is the case with the concept of science in Islam, as well as within Greek and Western civilizations. Without developing these two grounds of scientific activities we cannot investigate how the term 'ilm, for example, came to mean science in Islam, and episteme in the ancient Greece, and finally scientia in the Western case. Therefore, the fourth chapter will concentrate on the application of these grounds to the Islamic scientific tradition primarily. As far as the other civilizations are concerned we shall try to deduce sufficient evidence from them as well, for if we go into details of the scientific achievements inthese civilizations also, our essay will turn completely into a 'history of science'.

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CHAPTER ONE A GENERAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE Scientific activity is basically an act of knowledge-acquisition which can be explained on the basis of a process through which we acquire knowledge. But scientific knowledge is not just any kind of knowledge, and in fact it has been defined specifically to be a certain kind of knowledge. Therefore, its acquisition must come about through two different processes: first is the general knowledge-acquisition process; second is the specific knowledge-acquisition process through which only scientific knowledge is acquired. The former is primarily natural, whereas the latter is mechanical and hence, it depends on the first process to function. We shall try to explain what we mean by the general and specific knowledge-acquisition processes. Since the acquisition of knowledge through education is learning, the educational process involved in teaching is excluded from the natural knowledge-acquisition process which we take to mean 'acquiring knowledge naturally'. By using the word 'naturally', we do not mean that we acquire knowledge in the same sense as, for example, our stomach digests food without our deliberate intervention. On the contrary, though in early life we may acquire knowledge in this way as well, nevertheless a mature human being does make a conscious effort in attaining know ledge. What we mean by acquiring knowledge naturally is, then, the fact that the process itself is governed by faculties with which we are born. We can in this respect draw an analogy between our faculties of knowledge vis-avis the process of knowledge and a factory vis-a-vis what it produces. Namely, if a factory is producing flour, then the product is like the knowledge our mind acquires. In this case, since the factory is alr~ady built, just like our mind, it has a natural capacity for such a production, and similarly the raw material given to the factory must have such a propensity naturally that it can become flour. But since there is available a variety of raw materials with a nature to become flour there will be naturally a variety of different flour; such as if rice is given the factory will produce rice flour, if barley is given, then it will produce barley flour and so on. Therefore, the human mind functions naturally in this universal 19

way, but because there is a variety of input given to the mind knowledge produced also varies. Even if the input, namely to use Kant's term, the raw material, is always the same the process of our epistemic activity is still influenced by other factors, such as our own inner psychology and the environment, whether physical or social; as a result, still there will be differences in the outcome, though in this case it would be of course less. One may include, therefore, human psychology into the epistemological aspect of the mind, which will influence the knowledge acquired. Moreover, since we are able to intervene in this process we can put our own mark on it as well. This rrieans that the process of acquiring knowledge will have aspects that are universally the same in all humans, and yet some other aspects that are not universally applicable to all humans. Epistemology is a science that is concerned with only the universal aspects of the process of knowing; and hence, it is just like the medical science which tries to explain the phenomenon of sight for all human.s. Therefore, in epistemology we deal only with the general theory of the process of knowing; dealing with particular problems pertaining to the variable aspects of this process does not belong to theory of knowledge unless it is relevantly brought into context. Otherwise they are dealt with in other disciplines, such as psychology, education and their relevant branches. In this case, the general theory of knowledge is a formulation which attempts to capture this·universally valid aspects of the mind and all other faculties involved in this process. The specific knowledge-acquisition is the process of learning, namely, attaining the scientific knowledge, and as such we are not much concerned with it; whatever they may be, they are not natural. Since this process is rather governed by devices which science-teachers and/or educational theorists develop in the educational system. Their influence on the conception of science yielded by such a mechanical system is overwhelming and only in this sense we shall deal with it. If, then, we are concerned with the process of knowledge-acquisition only in the natural sense, this means that we must primarily deal with a theory of knowledge. Therefore, we shall attempt in this context to present a theory of knowledge as the ground of such activities.

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We would like to express in this context an issue which is significantly related to our framework in this essay; although a science, such as epistemology, deals with the universal human problems, such as the process of knowing, yet its theories are interpreted and held within the mind in a certain framework will influence its perspective to a certain degree, and once it is held as such it can acquire adjectives such as Greek, secular, Islamic or Western (epistemology). Of course, the Islamicity of a theory of knowledge is, for example, provided by the Islamic perspective; but this suggestion in itself does not solve our problem, since we can further ask: what is the Islamic perspective? and to that matter continue questioning the Western and other perspectives as well. To treat the problem from all these perspectives would involve a project beyond the capacity of the present author. Therefore, in order to provide at least one sample case, in the third chapter, we shall offer the Islamic worldview as the Islamic perspective, and, therefore, we hope that our clarification of what we mean by worldview will shed light on the problem ofislamicity and the Islamic perspective. Hence, in this context we can only say that if an idea or a theory is developed within the framework of the Islamic worldview, it is Islamic because it is in this sense that it proceeds frorr;t the Islamic perspective. We, therefore offer worldview as the proper perspective of epistemology as viewed within different societies. But now referring to our first issue, we can see that it has problems that are in themselves independent of any worldview. For example, we shall posit that a theory of knowledge is a formulation which coherently and adequately explains the process of how we acquire knowledge in the natural sense. If this is so, then a theory of knowledge is very similar to the anatomical explanation of, for instance, how the human eye perceives objects. Since all human eyes perceive objects under certain light in exactly the same way, one theory of perception is valid for all human eyes. In the same way, if the human mind functions in exaCtly the same way in every human being, then there is obviously one theory of knowledge for all humans. This conclusion may lead to the idea that there cannot be an Islamic theory of knowledge, just as there cannot be an Islamic or secular, Western theories of seeing. I

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This is definitely true so far as the theory in isolation is concerned. But there are two points to be considered in this juncture: first is the fact that a theory is never held in isolation from other related conceptions, and is thus always put into a perspective, or it may itself spring from that perspective in such a way that it will necessarily have certain implications; secondly, certain abstract and more problematic theories, such as a theory of knowledge, present special difficulties in that they necessarily require a perspective before they can be put into formulation, hence they differ in this sense from theories of how the human eye perceives objects. Moreover, since the subject of investigation is elusive, it shuns away from concrete ways of investigation which can be applied with certain ease in case of examining how the eye perceives. As a result of these two reasons, theories of this kind have double aspects: they are universal, and hence applicable to all humans, and yet they are at the same time particular in the sense that they meaningful only within the perspective from which they spring. In the universal aspect, a theory or an idea or a doctrine can be held to be neutral, hence it cannot be qualified with value terms such as Islainic, secular or Western. But in the second aspect, since a theory or an idea is already put into a perspective and is thus situated within a general framework, it cannot be neutral, and hence must be qualified with the general perspective within which it has been placed. This does not, however, mean that a theory cannot be applied to different perspectives in so far as this second aspect is concerned. On the contrary, no matter how difficult it is, because the universal aspect is still dominant in such theorie~. they can still be applied to other environments as well. In this case, an Islamic theory of know ledge will share certain common elements with any other theory of knowledge, since the constitution of the human mind is the same in every human, and yet it will reflect also its own perspective, which will not only make it different from other theories of knowledge but also give it a distinct character that makes it justifiably Islamic. In order to elucidate this point we can give the following example: Kant's theory of knowledge claims that the human mind can attain knowledge only through the faculty of sensibility which provides the raw material for it. The raw material in this case refers to the human experience. The faculty of sensibility acquires its data through 22

sense organs and its pure forms, which are space and time. Therefore, lf the faculty of sensibility does not provide any raw material to the understanding, no knowledge can be attained. 1 Suppose in this case, we attempt to understand th,e nature of God, which is known in the Islamic sense as ma 'rifatullah; some sensible experience of God must be provided to the mind so that it can grasp His nature. But this is not possible, since we already know that God cannot be captured by the sense organs. Thus, concludes Kant, God cannot be an object of human knowledge in this sense. We may talk about some religious experiences and the way we feel God in us, but this kind of experiences cannot be taken to be the raw material to be used in ascientific way. This means that Kant does not include ma 'r(fatullah (knowledge of God) into the domain of scientific knowledge. This cannot be done in the Islamic scientific understanding. First of all, the history of Islamic science shows that, in the past, most scholars of Islam have always conceived of theology as a science; in other words, the science whose subject matter is to understand God scientifically as well, has been included among the sciences. They, nevertheless, admit that its method of study is not the same as that of other sciences. Hence certain rational methods 2 cannot be applied to theology, but rather it must be based on. the Revelation. This can be taken as. a sign for the fact that there is a fundamental idea within the Islamic worldview that leads them to that direction, and that is why they conceive sciences in a different way. Muslim thinkers conceived sciences as any kind of knowledge which is arranged systematically and acquired with a certain method that has a rationality which is compatible with its subject matter, whereas Kant conceives science to be primarily that theoretical knowledge which is based upon sensible experience, and thus sciences are classified accordingly. (What we mean by 'rationality compatible with a subject matter' will be clarified in Chapter V.) 1 Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965); see the relevant sections and especially B 1-2 (41-2); A 19-20 (65-6); also Book I and the Transcendental Dialectic (page nUll}bers in parenthesis refer to the Smith translation). 2 That is, if we conceive 'scientific' to mean 'rational'.

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Secondly, there is indeed an understanding of knowledge within the Islamic worldview that requires a scientific conception of ma 'rifatullah as well. This conception is already contained in the concept of 'ilm, which will be discussed in our investigation; we hope that this undertaldng will decisively demonstrate this point. In this case what we may have to do is to explain what is understood from science in the Islamic sense. It i~ possible, for example, to say that for. Kant, in order for a piece of knowledge to be scientific, it must be a synthetic a priori proposition. 3 An analytic proposition is therefore not a scienti.fic statement. But science can be defined in the Islamic tradition in such a way that Kant's conclusions may not be acceptable, in which case what is scientific in the Islamic tradition may be classified in the Western tradition as unscienJific and vice versa. What we have to do is to show in the first place the theory of knowledge upon which a conception of science is established in general, and in the second place, we must also show what kind of an epistemology of science follows from such a theory of knowledge. Therefore, this chapter will deal with a general theory of knowledge from the Islamic perspective; the second chapter will try to develop the epistemological ground from the same perspective upon which scientific activities are based. Although a theory of knowledge aims primarily at delineating the general anatomy of knowledge-acquisition process, and does not necessarily aim at defining knowledge, it may nevertheless lead to such a definition. On the other hand, since it is knowledge that is the problem here, it will be helpful to explain what is meant by knowledge in this context. After this has been done, we may question where the process of acquiring knowledge begins and ends. This way we shall be able to identify exactly where theory of knowledge must begin so that from this beginning we shall proceed to outline the general anatomy of knowledgeacquisition. Moreover, by identifying where that process ends we shall know where the formulation of a theory of knowledge must stop. In that case, the second topic to be discussed is the sour<;:es of knowledge, since any human faculty which leads us to knowledge is held here to be a

a

3 CPR, A 7-16; B 11-30 (48-62), especially B 73 (90-1). 24

source. This means that the process of acquiring knowledge begins from a source and ends with another. Once this. has been done, then we can proceed to sketch the anatomy of this process.

A. WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? In the history of philosophy many definitions of knowledge are offered. For instance, Rosenthal has collected some 380 definitions of knowledge given orily by the Muslims. 4 All these definitions take certain aspects of knowledge into consideration. Therefore, although we may say that some of these definitions are wrong, yet we must admit that some of them are also true. How can there be several definitions of one and the same thing? If we understand that definitions do not change the nature of what is defined, then we shall see at the same time that the one and the same thing can be defined in several different ways. This is because we utilize definitions for certain purposes, which determine our view of looking at the thing to be defined. Since definitions are used as means to grasp provisionally the thing defined,· there is no harm in doing this, provided that we realize the fact that our definition neither captures the reality of the thing defined in a precise sense, nor affect this reality. We must nevertheless admit that a definition must be true to the reality of the thing to be defined; otherwise, it will lead to the total misconception of the thing defined. If this is what we understand from definition, then we must set up first our purpose for defining knowledge. We are not intending to capture the actual nature of knowledge in our definition; we are merely aiming at a certain general feature of knowledge which can be taken as a criterion in a theory of knowledge. Therefore, we must try to define knowledge in such a way that it must give us that general feature. Since knowledge has always been conceived as something in the mind, then this characteristic is broad enough to be utilized in our definition. We may thus formulate that 'all the contents of human mind is knowledge'. For something to be considered as knowledge, then, it must satisfy at least this condition, 4 Franz Rosenthal. Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam (Leiden: E. J. BrJII, 1970).

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namely that it must be in the human mind; otherwise it cannot even be considered knowledge-. Although we do realize that our definition does not capture the whole nature of what we call 'knowledge', we must nevertheless accept that the most fundamental element and characteristic, or whatever it may be, is the fact that what is called knowledge is something in the human mind. Hence, whatever has an external reality cannot qualify to be termed 'knowledge'. Therefore, definition of knowledge as "the contents of our mind" satisfies our purpose. For our purpose is to utilize it in our theory of knowledge; and we can utilize this definition. For instance, on the basis of this definition we are able to tell where a theory of knowledge must end; since such a theory is supposed to analyze the process of acquiring knowledge it must first be able to know where such a process begins and ends. If only the contents of the mind can be defined as knowledge, then clearly this process must end in the mind. Moreover, since everything outside the mind cim be held to be an object of knowledge, we should be able to say that wherever the first contact between the mind and the object of knowledge is established that point will be the beginning of that process. There is, however, a problem with regard to the beginning point of tJ::le process of acquiring knowledge; since. the contents of our mind is knowledge, we may usually assume the object of knowledge to be outside the mind, which is not the case. For a content of the mind can also be an object of knowledge and as such the first contact with the object of knowledge may begin within the mind itself. One's psychological states can also be an object of knowledge, but our psychological states are not external to us, though they can be held to be external to the mind itself. If, however, psychological states are considered to be mental states, then we will face crucial problems. Since our aim here is not to discover the nature of such states, to make it convenient for our purpose here, we shall ~imply assume that they are external to the mind. Hence, all objects of knowledge can be divided into two categories: mental objects; external objects. The former are all the contents of knowledge which are re-subjected to the process of knowing, and as such whatever is attained as a result of this 26

process, if any, is something like 'the knowledge of the knowledge'. The latter are everything which are not contained in the mind as knowledge. The external objects of knowledge may be divided into two categories as well: external to the mind alone; external to the mind and the knowing subject. The former are our psychological states, including our feelings and emotions. The latter are all objects which are around us, no matter how near or distant they may be. All these divisions can be compiled under three categories as objects of knowledge: 1. mental; 2. psychological (which refers to the first category of the second division just mentioned); 3. external objects. Now that we have clarified what we mean by knowledge as used in our theory of knowledge, we may begin to analyze the process through which such knowledge is acquired. Obviously we must try to do this from the point where such a process begins. The beginning has just been set at the point where the mind meets the object of knowledge. This is, then, the first phenomenon to be explored in our analysis as the object of knowledge.

B. THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE MIND An object of knowledge is such that it is transported to the mind not as an object but as knowledge which can at this stage be regarded as mental object. Hence, an object of kt1owledge is an object of the mind at the same time, and as such knowledge must reflect the reality of its object. Knowledge as mental object has another dimension, which cannot be discussed in epistemology; meaning. We may argue that the mental object is the meaning we attach to objects proper, namely before they are represented in the mind. As we have seen, three objects for knowledge has just been distinguished: mental; psychological; and the external. Therefore, the beginning point of the process of knowledge will naturally be different for each object of knowledge. Yet it is possible to assign a general phenomenon to all the objects of knowledge, from which the process of knowing begins. For example, if the object is a mental one, then it is clear that we will first try to understand that mental object; if it is an external object then we will still do the same. But in case of the mental 27

object, we may try to understand it by analyzing it and grasp its true nature; whereas in the case of an external object, our understanding will begin by examining the object with our hands or other sense organs; in other words, in this case observation and experiment, or to put it roughly examining even by our sense organs may also be possible. We cannot try to understand the external object by analyzing it in the same way as we analyzed the mental object. The same is true of a psychological object of knowledge. It seems that whatever the object may be, one thing is certain that we first try to construct some impressions of the object; and these impressions, whether mental, or psychological, or external, are all of empirical kind. This conclusion immediately leads us to discover the beginning of the knovyledge-acquisition process. For if without some empirical impressions of the object, our mind cannot think any object of knowledge, it means that acquiring knowledge begins from this empirical data. This is in fact true; let us try to form knowledge of any object, in each case we will fail unless we have some empirical impressions of that object of knowledge. In other words, before the thinking process begins the object must be present in the mind. But obviously the empirical impressions of a mental object are not acquired in the same way as the empirical impressions of our psychological states. In whatever manner these impressions are acquired, since they are all empirical, we shall refer to them all under one general mime, which is commonly applied in philosophy for such impressions; expe riencf!. In our terminology, therefore, 'experiepce' means all the empirical impressions of an object of knowledge, whether it be mental, or psychological, or external. Hence, experience is the only beginning for all knowledge, without which no knowledge of any object is possible. Since through experience an object of knowledge is represented in the mind, as a phenomenon, an experience can also be named 'representation'. If there are three kinds of objects of knowledge, it means that there are also three types of expertence: mental; psychological; and external. The first two kinds of objects subjected to the process of knowing are internal; whereas the last one is external, as the name itself announces. Once the object of knowledge is present in the mind, we can express that I

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presentness with a term that is common in philosophy, 'representation'. A representation cannot take place, unless there is a faculty which captures the object of knowledge according to its nature. For example, if the object is an external object it can be captured with its certain characteristics by our external faculties, which are the so-called five senses. They are called 'external' in the sense that they can be observed externally, namely, they can be seen either by us or by someone next to us as organs externally attached to our body. But this does not mean that when they function, they also function externally. Therefore, though they are external, their representation of the object of knowledge is internal. But if the object of knowledge is psychological, then the faculty of representation is internal in the sense that we cannot externally observe the faculty·, but through introspection it can be captured by the mind only. In this way two kinds of functions are discerned: if for a certain epistemological function we can assign a center, namely point to it, that function is called an 'organ', otherwise it is distinguished as a 'faculty'. We cannot experience our internal faculties of knowledge directly. If, however, the object of knowledge is internal, there is no faculty of representation which gives us the experience of that object, except the mind itself, in which case the mind ftcts as a faculty of experience. But since such mental experiences are c,ustomarily called 'thinking', we do not refer to it as experience. Since mental representation is possible through analysis this is in itself nothing but thinking. Therefore, in our terminology, the term 'experience' is reserved for representation of only internal and external objects of knowledge, and it cannot thus be applied for mental representation in the form of thinking. In the first step of the process through which we acquire knowledge is experience, a phenomenon through which an object of knowledge is somehow represented in the mind. Therefore, experience is the beginning point of the process of knowing, as such it is by itself a process in acq\liring knowledge and thus deserves a detailed treatment. In this essay we are not in a position to develop a full theory of experience; however, we are in a position to outline this issue in as much as it is relevant to our theory of knowledge and the epistemology of science in this context. 29

C. EXPERIENCE AND THE MENTAL REPRESENTATION OF THE OBJECT Before we continue we must point out that the term 'object' will be used in two different senses in this essay: 1. the ontological sense, in which it refers to a 'concrete being' that can be experienced by the external senses; and in this sense, we must distinguish it from the term 'entity' which refers to beings that can be captured by the internal experience and not by the external experience; a third kind of object in the ontological sense is neither an object, nor an entity in the trqe sense, and thus it is not subjected to any experience at all; 2. the epistemological sense, in which the term is employed when either an object or an entity is subjected to the process of acquiring knowledge. Since the two senses in which the term 'object' will be employed is clear from the context we shall not use any sign to distinguish both senses. But ontologically, we cannot use the term 'entity' for an object, nor the term 'object' for an entity. The term 'Being' (with an uppercase 'B ') will be used to refer to ariy that which cannot be subjected to any human experience, and as such it cannot be an object of knowledge (i.e., the third kind of object in the above ontological sense). Now, a mental representation is the result of an object's undergoing through the process of experience. For it is through experience that an object of knowledge is mentally represented. But since there only two categories of objects for knowledge, there are also two kinds of experience, external and ~nternal, both of which take place differently. The latter depends on the former; therefore, external experience develops in us first, and thus it is in the first place, the beginning of the process of experience, and in the second place, the beginning of the whole process of knowing. Let us consider a new born baby: we can very safely say that although potentially he is endowed with faculties for internal experience, yet since he has just started having external experience, he needs more time to develop internal experience. In this sense·, internal experience resembles the mind, which needs the representation of the object of knowledge to function. Thus, no entity can be perceived by the faculties of internal experience unless some external representation of objects that can be 30

related to that entity is provided. In order to clarify this we must further discuss the nature of both experiences.

1. External or Outer Experience The awareness of an object of knowledge produced in us is perception. If this awareness is received through one or more of the five senses, then it is a sensible perception; this means that whatever is received through the five senses can be qualified as 'sensible', and everything that is received in this way can also be termed 'sense datum'. There is a variety of such awareness; for instance, we may notice by the sight that there is an object in front of us, but since we do not pay any attention as to what it is, only an awareness concerning the existence of such an object will be produced in us, but if, on the other hand, that object attracts our attention so as we become curious to know what kind of an object it is, then an awareness as to the fact that it is a cat, for example, will be produced as well. Yet we may not examine the cat so as to notice for example its color also or its size and so on, in which case our sensible perception will consist of only the existence of a cat. However, we may examine the object to such an extent that we may know that it exists and that it is a cat, and that it is white and its eyes are brown and so on. All. of these sensations about the object of knowledge produced in us are awareness, which we have termed 'sensible perception'. All th~ data of the sensible perceptiqn is what we call 'external' or 'outer experience'. Can mere awareness be defined as perception? For, let us consider our cat example once again; the fact that we become aware that something exists and that it is a cat, and that it is white and its eyes are brown and so on, involves knowing as well, not just becoming aware of a fact, for example. To become aware of something as existing as a simple perception may be just an awareness, but the further information about the cat involves more· than an awareness. This is true; but in each case, namely, in just the awareness of existence and knowing its existence which will lead to a succeeding awareness, we can distinguish an act of knowing and an act of becoming aware of a fact, which then goes on as a process to become aware of something, and to act to know that awareness, and so on. In each case in this continuous process, there 31

seems to be a chain of awareness connected with a chain of act of knowing. What we are doing here is to distinguish the awareness from the act of knowing and it is that awareness which we term here 'perception'. This objection basically t&kes both phenomena, awareness and act of knowing, together without analyzing them into their proper functions. Once this analysis is done we can see that it is the awareness in this process which philosophers have long termed perception. Since we have no senses other than the five senses to be in contact directly with the external reality, 5 the ultimate beginning point of the process of acquiring knowledge is sensible perception, which originates from the five senses. Sensible perception is received through a physical process that takes place in the body of a perceiver, properly called in epistemology 'subject'; and this process is-completed at the point where an awareness is produced in us of the object which is in contact with one or more of the senses. This leads us to posit the existence of a physical faculty of awareness without which no sensible perception can take place. We must somehow physically feel the object, which is its awareness, namely, we are then able to say that we are aware of the object; hence, that faculty which enables us to have this ldnd of an awareness, is termed 'physical consciousness'. Although the faculty of physical consciousness can be placed in the brain with a specific location, in our theory of knowledge we shall try to avoid its discussion, as it is properly discussed in its proper discipline. We thus assign an abstract location for it. This will facilitate our discussion to explain the process of acquiring knowledge . .The process of outer experience, then, begins at one or more sense organ(s) and ends at the physical consciousness. Since this process as a whole is totally physical, it needs mental consciousness to be conceptualized. If a sensible perception, which is yielded at the physical consciousness, is not conceptualized it cannot be utilized as an object of knowledge. To illustrate this point with a similar example, we may say 5 We use the term 'external reality' to refer to the concrete objects around us, though we mtlst admit that there is also an external reality which is not so readily available to the senses. When the term is used in this sense, we shall prefer to use another phrase instead; such as 'metaphysical' or 'transcendent' (external) reality; or the Qur'anic term 'ghayb'. 32

that the human sensible perception is more or less like the sehsible perception of a tiger when it sees its cubs, for instance. We are not saying here that a human and a tiger see in exactly the same manner, we are rather trying to make a similitude in order to illustrate that the sensible perception is a general phenomenon with a variety of its kinds among all the animals. Therefore, such a perception needs to be perceived by the mind as well so that it can be a proper object of human knowledge. This leads us to posit the existence of a mental perception on the one hand,
2. Internal or Inner Experience The inner perception of an object of knowledge is an epistemic emotion. Our definition again does not aim at capturing the real nature of emotions; since we are primarily concerned with the process of knowledge we have defined emotions from this perspective only. For this reason, we have qualified it with an adjective, epistemic, though in this context we need not so qualify it each time we use the term 'emotion'. For, when we consider emotions as vehicles for knowledge our definition will not be wrong; in other words, at least one feature of their nature is included in our definition. The fact that emotions play a role in the process of acquiring knowledge cannot· be denied. If we show here how they 33

function and thus are utilized in process of knowing, this will be also th.e proof of this fact. Therefore, there is no need to qrgue separately to prove that emotions do play a role in the process of acquiring knowledge. In this connection we must first show what is meant by the 'inner perception of an object of knowledge', which we hfl.ve used in our definition of emotions. First of all, the terms 'inner' and 'internal' are used to refer to the internal aspects of the body without any emphasis on the physical spatiai qualities. Hence, these terms do not mean 'inside' the body; in fact it is extremely hard to point any specific location with regard to the origin of inner experiences. Therefore, these terms are used rather to denote that no external sense organ can be assigned to the faculties ofinternal experience, whereas we aie able to locate an external organ for the experience acquired through external experience. Moreover, whatever undergoes the process of acquiring knowledge is an object of knowledge. This means that it is possible for an experience not to be perceived mentally and thus remain as brute experience. The object of that experience cannot be considered an object of knowledge, it becomes an object of knowledge when it is perceived mentally and thus gone through the process of thinking in the mind. Let us suppose that such an object, say a lion, is perceived through the senses, then a sensible perception of the lion will be produced in the physical consciousness. If we possess the knowledge of a lion, we will know that one must protect himself from such an animal, which means the jdea of danger will be instantly produced in the mind as a result of this perception. This is because the sensible impression of the lion is already received by the mental consciousness and the related concepts are produced in the mind. But at the same time, this sensible perception will be received internally as well; which means that the internal faculty of experience also perceives this sensible impression and produces another kind of awareness, which we call emotion, which is, in this particular case, 'fear'. The intensity of this emotion depends on the sensible perception, though in real life we express it as 'it depends how close the lion is'; i. e., the closer the lion is, the more fear we have (of course, if the lion is closer the sensible perception also represents it as such). Our conclusion necessarily leads us 34

to assume that without some sensible perception no 'emotion is possible, and hence, without external experience no internal experience is possible in theory. After this brief and g~neral description of how both experiences are related, we may now go on to dwell upon the proc~ss through which a sensible perception is received internally. We have already used the term 'faculty of internal experience'. We simply posit the existence of such a faculty on the basis of the fact that we do have emotions. Philosophers have so far inferred the existence of such a faculty but for the external experience; e. g., Kant, who calls this faculty 'sensibility'. We have no proof for the existence of this faculty except the sensible perception; and the same must be true of our internal experiences, i.e., emotions; given their existence, the existence of an internal faculty of experience becomes plausible. Even if we do not assume such a faculty, then we still need to posit some kind of a mechanism for the production of emotions. Of course, because of the elusive nature of emotions it is ext;remely hard to explain what they are and how they are exactly produced. So far we have not even been able to explain sufficiently the physical process involved in the production of an emotion. In this essay, fortunately we are not concerned much with these problems, although some explanation is needed for our discussion, which is primarily centered around the epistern,ological function of emotions. An emotion moves us, excites us or makes us feel miserable, but how .can it contribute to the process of acquiring knowledge? , We may answer this question by referring to the example of the lion again. Suppose we do not have any feeling of fear; would we still run away from the lion even if we knew that a lion is a formidable animal? I am not saying that we still have the emotion but we simply do not fear anything; on the contrary, I mean we have absolutely no such emotion at all. I think it is the emotion and not the sensible perception of the lion that is mentally evaluated and then decided whether to run· or not. For sometimes we think that we have seen a lion, although there is no lion and we ate immediately activated to find a shelter. Similarly the idea of a lion by itself is not sufficient to- make us look for a shelter, even if it is sufficient by itself, it will not prompt us immediately to move. Hence, the decision to look for a shelter is considerably influenced by fear. We would 35

like to formulate this conclusion in the epistemological sense as 'the internal perception of an object of knowledge is given to the mind as raw material' just like the sensible perception of an object of knowledge. In other words, our mental faculties of knowledge cannot function without our faculty of outer experience, nor can they work in isolation from the faculties of inner experience. Our discussion of internal experience has concentrated on emotions though we do not mean by this that our internal experiences consist of emotions alone. This is not the case; in fact the internal experience which is nearest to the sensible perception is the sensible intuition which may perceive an object without physically perceiving it, because no physical object can directly affect our faculties of internal experience. Therefore, if an object is intuited as existing this is the result of the function of the senSible intuition. We call this faculty 'sensible intuition' because it intuits its object the way our mind intuits the conclusion of a deductive argument, and yet the intuition of an object is not mental intuition; since, though a sensible perception is absent, yet it is assumed as mediating between the faculty and its object, it is apt to call it 'sensible intuition'. We also say that it is nearest to the sensible perception because it is the only internal faculty that can provide impressions concerning the physical world around us which thus gives the idea as if it is a faculty of e~ternal experience. It is the faculty of sensible intuition that produces our instincts, which are direct and immediate; and as such they can play a significant role in the manifestation of an emotion. Because of this function, the sensible intuition may interfere to mediate between the sensible perception and the other faculties of inner experience. In a sense, it intuits the data of the sensible perception and makes it available for the other inner faculties. When such a sensible intuition of a sensible perception is made available for an emotional state the corresponding emotion may be yielded. 6 6 It is, I hope, clear from our discussion that the manifestation of an emotion is not an automatic mechanism, for even if all the physical and mental conditions are available the resulting emotion of such states may not be yielded. Yet under certain circumstances none of the usual conditions are present for the manifestation of an emotion, but It may be such that only one certain mental state or physical condition will be sufficient for the manifestation of that emotion. This is because of the again elusive nature of emotions as they are imbedded in human nature In so complicated a 36

Another important function of the sensible intuition is that it retains the copies of our emotions through which we instinctively recogni~e such emotive experiences, becau&e it is the center of our instincts. Otherwise we would not be able to recognize a certain feeling experienced at two different times under different circumstances. The central faculty of our inner experience is heart which assesses our emotions in the sense that it renders them meaningful for the ethical life. The function of the hearfin the epistemological process is to provide our mind with representations of ethical and fundamental concepts of life and death in an experiential way. This function renders the existence of pure practical reason meaningless. So far philosophers have assumed that the moral system is built by the aid of a function of the intellect (or Pure Reason, in the Kantian philosophy), called practical reason; there is no such a faculty. Instead there is our intellect which judges and assesses the experiential data given by the heart and reaches conclusions with the aid of its higher faculties based on that experiential mood. Hence, heart is not a physical organ whose function is to determine the blood circulation; of course, no one can deny the existence of such a physical organ. But the fact that all humans have similar feelings in similar situations, such as the emotion which moves us help the poor, the feeling we have for punishing the thief, feeling sorry·for sorp_eone in distress, loving and hating, proves that there _is a faculty at the center of all these experiential states. Of course, all these emotions are psychological states in themselves, but do they not yield a certain kind of mental contents, which we have identified as 'knowledge'? Why does the feeling sorry for someone makes us think that we should help that person? If that feeling did not produce a mental activity similar to the process of knowing, then emotions would not have been included in epistemology. But if we accept this conclusion then we cannot avoid discussing them with respect to the question; what kind of knowledge do they yield in the mind? Of course heart is not a fa~ulty of way. This means that there is no one single standard explanation for the origins of our emotions, but rather many ways in which an emotion can be manifested. In our discussion 'here, therefore, we cannot exhaust all these ways in which emotions arise. We must, then, contend by citing only some general features of these ways and how they are related to the process of acquiring knowledge. 37

outer experience and as such it cannot perceive external objects, but it Cl:tn perceive objects of knowledge which transcend our external experience. According to our classification of objects of knowledge we cannot name such 'things' objects, but the only way to refer to them in this context is to use this term figuratively. Depending on the nature of such transcendent objec~s. they may be termed 'Being', 'entity' or 'phenomenon'. The sphere of knowledge comprehensive of all things that may be subjected to the epistemological process, which excludes in this sense learning, may be identified as the 'Experiential Realm'. This sphere of knowledge is transcendent to the outer experience; and although the mechanism of experience in general requires the priority of the outer experience, this is not an absolute requirement in all cases. This means that in certain cases without a direct connection wit the outer experience the inner perception of the heart may still take place. Another argument for the possibility of knowledge for us of the experiential realm can be adduced from the perspective of moral (and indeed religious as well) responsibility: For, responsibility of an act necessarily requires the knowledge of that very act. Following the logical implication of our line of argument, we are led to conclude that if we are held responsible for our certain actions involving the experiential realm, then a prerequisite knowledge of that realm in as much as it leads to that act must be granted. In other words, we must be able to acquire sufficient knowledge of the experiential so as to be held responsible for actions ensuing upon that knowledge. Hence, it is clear that from the moral standpoint there is an obligation on the part of man and that he is accountable for his evil acts. This obligation and accountability, however, are intelligible only if the knowledge of their related realm is accessible to us. Their realm is obviously that of the experiential, which is not accessible to the outer experience. We .conclude from this that the knowledge of evil is not deduced through a chain of logical arguments in a speculative fashion; but rather there is in our internal experience an experiential perception which is evaluated and thought out in the mind upon which follows the logical sequence of arguments leading to rational conclusions concerning the good and evil.

38

The sphere of knowledge which transcends all faculties of experience is the Transcendent Absolute Realm, the knowledge of which, therefore, cannot be attained through the process of knowing as described in a theory of knowledge. We shall refer to this sphere as Transcendent Realm, the knowledge of which may be given revelationally only. Such a given knowledge cannot even be interpreted; for any such interpretation inevitably involves the epistemological process described in a theory of knowledge, whereas we have already denied such an involvement. This has already been explained in the following argument: The experiential realm, has no direct effect upon our sense organs; hence, no direct sensible perception of this world is available to us. But we know the external world directly thanks to the fact that it effects our sense organs upon which the mind adds its own capacity to acquire the knowledge of nature. Therefore, the raw data of both realms are needed for the faculty of thinking. As we have seen, in the process of knowing we have acknowledged the existence of internal faculties through which we receive the expe~iential representations of the experiential realm; in other words, every person can experience the experientially existent, provided that he or she pays sincere attention to his heart in so far as the moral life is concerned, and to the guidance of the Revelation in so far as the religious Truth is concerned. For the experiencing of this realm may not be direct; and hence, not immediate, as it is the case with the objects of external experience; we need the revelation to mediate between the Realm Transcendent and the faculties of internal experience, and thus lead to that experience. It is clear that we are distinguishing two kinds of objects for Olll" knowledge in the experiential realm; one moral, the other religious. The former is clear in the sense that its limits can be quite easily presumed. But the latter needs further clarification; is our epistemology involved, for example, in defending the possibility of natural theology? In order to answer this question, we simply need to make a decisive distinction between the experiential and the Transcendent realms. In the theological sense, both realms involve the same subject but different aspects of it; whereas the experiential realm, for instance, encompasses God as an existent Being, the Transcendent Realm has God in the Absolute sense, 39

namely as He is in Himself. Therefore, the experiential representation of God's existence is an inner experience, but His Essence is an Absolute behind "seventy thousand veils". Moreover, our mind also needs the guidance of the Revelation in attaining the theological experiential realm. For as we shall see, our intellect operates with causality in o'rder to infer a Maker for the whole existence; it may thus discover a Cause for the universe, but it still needs another argument to prove that that Cause is God as defined in the Revealed Texts. Is the experiential perception provided by the heart sufficient to make such an inference? This is the greatest dilemma of philosophy and it seems that it is still not sufficient and therefore we need a guidance, which is provided by the Revelation. It is for this reason that there is an epistemological need for Revelation not only for the philosophers, pace al-Farabi, but for all humans. Morally experiential perceptions, however, are sufficient for the mind to deduce the morally good or evil. We thus call all the experiences received in this way through the aid of emotions 'experiential representation'. The faculty that undertakes this function and thus becomes the center of all our emotions is called 'heart' also in the Islainic tradition which is based on Qur'an's usage of the term.? It is, therefore, possible to interpret this Qur' anic term as the main faculty of the inner experience. As the center of inner experience, heart, with all its lower faculties, is the only faculty that can be subject to receive representations from the experiential realm. Hence, it is rather a center for receiving the affections of this realm through emotions, such as desire, guilt; fear, love and hatred. It must be pointed out, however, that the representation of the 7 See, for example: "The day when neither wealth nor sons shall profit, but only the one who comes to God with a pure heart." (26/ai-Shu'ara', 88-89); and: "Verily in this Qur'an is a guidance for anyone who has a heart, or who listens and earnestly experiences (shahid) (what is being given)." (50/Qaf, 37); and: "We have created many jinn and men for hell. They have hearts that they do not understand with. They have eyes that they do not see with. They have ears that they do not hear with. They are like cattle; nay, rather they are further astray." (7/ai-A 'rat', 179); "Those who believe, and whose hearts find satisfaction in the remembrance of God. For without doubt in the remembrance of God do hearts find satisfaction." (13/ai-Ra'd, 28); also: 'Have they not traveled through the· land so that they have hearts to think with, and ears to hear with? It is not the (physical) eyes that are blind, but the hearts within the breasts." (22/al-Hajj, 46). 40

external world in faculties of external experience is direct and immediate, . while the representation of the Absolute Realm by faculties of inner perception, which are held to be represented by heart, is not direct; but rather through a mediation which is provided by the outer experience with regard to the morally experiential, but in the religious aspect by the Revelation. 8 On the other hand, since this mediation is possible only through some reflection, then there is a reciprocal relationship between the heart and the mind. Therefore, some reflection upon the sensible intuition and Revelation is necessary for receiving the experience of this realm. Since I have interpreted the term 'heart' as the inner faculty of experience that receives representations of the world experiential through the guidance of revelation, I can conveniently entitle all areas of learning that fall under this realm, "experiential subjects", as opposed to the directly experimental subjects. This distinction is important as far as philosophy of science is concerned because it yields a significant doctrine on the basis of which one can classify sciences. In fact such a classification is cogent only if it rests on an epistemology. But in this context we are not concerned with this classification, and therefore, we shall not further discuss it. Experiential inquiries belong directly to the inquirer, though they are not perceived directly. What I mean by this is that our inner faculty of representation needs an awakening by and the mediation of Revelation. Just as our faculty of outer experience sometimes needs the mediation of a device to see or hear things afar, though they are perceivable directly; in the same manner the inner faculty needs a finer and more subtle mediation. Again this mediation is guidance, which is reflected in the mental states of the inquirer, and these states represent the terms of the internal experience. Since as such it is primarily our emotions that yield such a mental state we would like to call it "subjective mood".

8 See, for example the following verses: "Do they not then earnestly try to understand the Qur'an, or is it that their hearts are locked up by them?" (47/Mul)ammad, 24); and "Verily in this Qur' an is a guidance for anyone who has a heart, or who listens and earnestly experiences (shah/d) (what is being given)." (50/Qaf, 37; also see 6/aiAn'am, 19; 17/al-Isra', 9; 30/al-Riim, 58; 41/Fu~~ilet, 26, etc.). 41

As a mental state, the subjective mood is very important for the faculties of inner experience to perceive the truths of the experiential realm. Since the. description of the subjective mood explains the way emotions function in the process of acquiring knowledge we shall try to show how it functions in order to lead an inquirer to this experientially mental state. First, we are held with our subjective states that are intimately connected with the heart. In these states and moods, our whole existence is brought into sight; crucial questions are asked about life and death; certain violent and terrifying phenomena of life may be held in imagination. Second, in this way, we find in us sensible perceptions that lead to inner experience of the actual situation; thus a road is opened for the moral life; then we discover the help of Revelation, and thus we are led to clear our mental states from any prejudice or pre-conceptions about the object of knowledge; moreover, by doing so, a certain relationship is established between the inquirer and the subject of discourse. This relationship liberates the inquirer from a dangerous attitude, that is the feeling of indifference to the object of knowledge. This way the inquirer as the student -of Revelation is expected to be sincere and willing to understand and receive the message projected. Third, by analyzing the subjective states of the inquirer, he is also invited to analyze his being and consciousness. This self-analysis, or self-meditation prepares the inquirer for the message of Revelation. Sometimes, in order to achieve this, ref~rence is made to moral concepts and ethical consciousness that is so deeply engraved in man's whole being (fitrah).9 This means that all our ethical behaviors are also grounded upon the representations provided by the internal experience. Those experiential representations, which also reflect our true being (fitrah), are the work of an internal faculty which we· call 'conscience'. This is based on the heart functioning as.a subsidiary faculty. 10 9 See the following verses: 2/ai-Baqarah, 6-20; 4/ai-Nisa', 128; 59/al-l,Iashr, 9; 70/alMa'arij, 19-21; .75/al-Qiyamah, 31-40; 76/al-lnsan, 2-8; 83/ai-Mutaffifin, l-6; 91 /a)Shams, 9-10 96/al-'Alaq, 1-8. 1Opor a detailed discussion of the points raised in connection to inner experience see the

present author's Islamic Science: Towards A Definition (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996), especially 42

Our analysis of the process of knowledge so far has brought us to the faculty of ethical feelings, called 'conscience'. When we philosophically examine this concept we find out that the heart does not represent all our internal faculties, though it is the most fundamental and central one because it is through the heart that most of our moral and religious experiential representation of entities as objects of knowledge originate. This approach solves an issue that remains inadequately answered in the Critical philosophy of Kant. For he holds that Pure Reason can speculate on ethical concepts and reach a rational ethics; in other words, he defends the possibility of metaphysics of morals, but not metaphysics of the transcendent realm. We argue, on the other hand, that moral philosophy is possible because there is in experience a representation of its objects grounded in the experiential aspect of the sensibility. Therefore, just as there is a faculty of experience which provides raw materials to the understanding; in the same way there is a faculty if internal experience, called in general, heart, that furnishes our mind in the same manner with raw materials concerning the ethical field. It is on the basis of this experiential data that ethics is possible, otherwise no metaphysics of morals is ever possible as a science except in a similar fashion as natural theology was conceived to be a science (!) in the philosophies prior to Kant. The process of knowledge through internal experience converges into and culminates at a unity which makes us to be aware of our 'sdf', and as such it functions as a faculty, which we term 'the faculty of consciousness' or 'faculty of the self'. Through this faculty one experientially becomes aware of his/her existence which is very much similar to the external experience through which one becomes aware of an object around him; just as this external awareness is different from the mental awareness, in the same way this internal awareness ofthe subject is different from the mental awareness of the self. Hence, in addition to the external and internal awareness, we must have a mental awareness; the first process of consciousness yields the awareness of things and the world around us, whereas the second one, through the aid of our internal Chapter II; see also my article, "A Concept of Philosophy in the Qur'anlc Context", American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 11:2 (1994).

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faculties and the experience resulting from them, yields the awareness of our inner world which revolves around the cbnsciousness of our self (ego); but the third one, namely the mental awareness, yields a conception of both the external and internal awareness. Therefore, in order to grasp these experiences in the way a human conceives them, the mental awareness is essential. Our analysis logically implies the conclusion that both the external and internal awareness are physical, but· their mental counterpart cannot be physical; a result which can further be elaborated in a context of mind-body problem. But we shall continue analyzing the process of know-ledge at the mental level.

D. MENTAL COGNITION Our analysis of inner experience has revealed the heart as the most significant faculty at this level of the process of knowledge because it is the center of our emotions which are the main carriers of all our experiential experiences. Ali inner experience takes place through a ldnd of an emotion with a degree of intensity. As we have seen, the beginning process of our emQtions is the level where inner experience begins, and this is the lowest inner faculty which we have identified as 'sensible intuition'. Then, comes the heart as the center of our inner experience, then the faculty of moral insight, which has been identified as 'conscience' and finally the process ends at the faculty of consciousness. 11 Since without a mental consciousness, both the external and internal awareness cannot be meaningful, it is at this level that all our sensible and experiential representations are handed to the faculty of mental consciousness, where mental cognition of all representations begin. Although tables can be misleading in philosophy, yet in order to make it more understandable even to the eye, we shall take this risk and try to illustrate on a table our

11 Consciousness appears in our analysis as an emotion; this natural conclusion does not bother us for it seems to me there is no problem in accepting the inner consciousness as a physical process to be similar to, and in fact, a kind of an emotion. But again this discussion will take 1:1s to far from our main topic and we h~pe that we can in future develop this topic in a more detailed theory of knowledge,

44

conclusions concerning the process of knowledge which has been explicated so far (see Table 1). In this essay the term 'mind' ( dhihn) is used in general to mean the 'faculty of conceptual experience'. In this sense, then, 'mind' refers to the totality of our mental activities that are mainly conceptual. Such a conceptual understanding, as we have seen, begins at the level of mental consciousness, which is thus the lowest faculty of the mind. In order to discovered all mental faculties we need to examine functions of our mind:

l

.......

FIVE SENSES

PHYSICAL CONSCIOUSNESS . Sensible perception is produced which can also be called sense data

EXTERNAL

---... ...

EXPERIENCE

. INTERNAL EX

~ER!ENCE

MIND

SENSIBLE INTUITION

I

I

THE SEAT OF EMOTIONS

I

HEART

I

CONSCIENCE

I

INNER CONSCIOUSNESS

Table 1

-...

First, the mind must somehow retain all conceptual activities so that it cajl utilize them in all its functions and this leads us to the faculty of memory (l:uifi:?,ah); second, objects of knowledge must be presented to the mind in a conceptually concrete way, which means the reproduction of representations as images and this poses a faculty of imagination (khayiil); third, the mind must think the objects of knowledge, which leads us to postulate a faculty of thinking which we shall call 'intellect' ( 'aql); fourth, since the mind as a result of thinking must decide in order 45

to know its objects, and that deciding is actually an act of 'choice', the mind must need a faculty of judgment, which is already known as 'will' (iradah); and finally, the mind functions to formulate arguments and reach conclusions out of these arguments, which means that it must somehow possess a faculty which enables it to deduce the implications and entailments of organized propositions, and this is the faculty of inference which we would like to call '(mental) intuition' ((lads). All the above mental activities are already known to us; they are not new discoveries that must be studied now.· In fact, we apply them all in our daily life without thinking that this process which has been taking place in our mind can be analyzed in this way. We do not have to know the process of knowledge in order to acquire knowledge; just as we do not need to know how our stomach functions in order to digest the food we eat. For all the functions of the mind are aJready provided for the process of knowledge which is, therefore, a natural process but we may interfere at certain levels of this process, which makes it different in this sense from digestion. Hence, we do not need to know this process in order to acquire knowledge; but we need to know it for scientific reasons; for instance, if some one argues that science is a universal and absolute activity which cannot change from culture to culture, then, in order to show that this is not the case we must explain how we acquire knowledge in general and then scientific knowledge in . . particular. Hence, in this case we need a theory which explains how we acquire knowledge. For educational purposes also a theory of knowledge would be very useful, because if we know how humans acquire knowledge then we can teach them with more effective methods, since teaching primarily consists of "making the student acquire knowledge", i.e., 'to learn'. In that case, all the above mental faculties are familiar to us and they have already been discovered and named by previous philosophers concerned with epistemology. What is new, however, in this essay is the way we explain their function in relation to each other and to the lower faculties of experience, namely the external and internal. Before we dwell .rp.ore deeply upon this problem, let us show the structure of the mind as depicted here on a table.

46

As we can see on Table 2, the mind receives all the data of experience through the mental consciousness, which in turn converts them to mental entities, which are thus retained in the memory. The imagination is the faculty that creates mental images for those entities whereupon the intellect assigns notions, ideas or concepts corresponding to these image~. Our intellect is then able think these raw materials, though it needs tpe faculty ot: will to produce a judgment.

THE

M

I

N

MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS where an kinds of representations are received from the external and internal experience

I 'MEMORY Faculty of retention

I IMAGINATION objects of knowledge are presented to the m,ind as mental images

I INTELLECT Faculty ofthinking

I WILL Faculty of judgement

I INTUITION Faculty of inference Table2 47

D

The intellect is however able to combine such judgments in such a way that once organized according to the principles of the intellect a conclusion can be drawn from them. But the intellect cannot draw a conclusion without the aid of another faculty, which is called 'intuition' ((lads). Since through inference and all the lower functions in the process of knowing that has taken so far, we can derive every knowledge possible for us to acquire concerning an object of knowledge, the process cannot continue beyond the intuition. Hence, the process of knowing must end at this level. By thus concluding we do not mean that the epistemological process analyzed here follows exactly the order in which we present the mental faculties. In our presentation we have to follow an order; otherwise it is not possible to present more than one faculty which is first in the order. We can say that the order presented hereis merely a logical order with respect to an epistemological analysis, which means that even the logical order could be different if it is viewed from another perspective, for instance, psychological. Therefore, in the actual operation of the process of knowing there could be infinitely many different routes that the process actually takes place. This is because once, for example, a piece of information is restored in the memory, the next process will be operated without the menta] consciousness, as the sensible and experiential perceptions are already present .in the mind. Let us then examine each mental level of this process in a detailed manner.

1. Mental Consciousness The nature of mental consciousness is such that as a mental faculty it can perceive objects, entities and phenomena received through the external and internal faculties of experience and convert them into conceptual data. Objects of knowledge thus become mental entities. What this means is that we become mentally aware of objects, entities and phenomena. The faculty of mental consciousness is thus the emergence of all consciousness; physical, inner and inentai. Since the nature of consciousness is to become aware of something, the function of all three consciousness resemble each other. Without the mental consciousness objects are perceived only physically and/or internally; but both of these

48

consciousness are like seeing without noticing. Therefore, in order to apply a mental activity to these experiences of consciousness they must in a certain way be converted into a mental consciousness which is nothing but a conceptual awareness of the representation of an object of knowledge. Therefore, mental consciousness is where the physical and inner consciousness also converge. The nature of consciousness is a crucial problem in philosophy and in relation to a theory of knowledge it must also be discussed; however, in this context we shall only point to three levels at which we feel conscious of objects, entities, facts and phenomena: at the level of sense perception, which we have called 'physical consciousness'; at the level of experiential perception, which we have called 'inner consciousness'; and finally, at the level of mental perception called 'mental consciousness'. The Physical consciousness can perceive only objects and the physical phenomena, whereas inner consciousness can perceive only entities and the transcendent phenomena; how this process takes place has already been explained in relation to the Qur'anic term ghayb. The mental consciousness, on the other hand, perceives only the data provided by the physical and inner consciousness. Without the mental consciousness, then, an object of knowledge is.perceived only in brute experien.ce; as such, physical and inner perception of something, namely, the representation of an object of knowledge in physical and inner consciousness is merely a blind perception. It is because of this that sometimes we see an object or hear a noise, but since we do not pay any attention to ponder on it so as to know what that really is, we do not even notice what that thing or noise is. If this fact alone is sufficient to distinguish between the mental and the other lower consciousness, the.n it will be easy to deduce the conclusion that the mental consciousness cannot be a physical phenomena, though we cannot explain the nature of it as such. If the lowest function of the mind seems to be different from all our bodily actions, considering the higher functions such as retaining, imagining, thinldng, inferring andintuiting, we can easily arrive at the existence of an aspect of man which is of a spiritual order, which has been called 'soul'.

49

We have arrived at a controversial problem of philosophy; the mindbody duality. As Professor Fazlur Rahman says, the Qur' an does not seem to present man with a dual nature. 12 Moreover, according to him, the duality which became prominent in later Islamic thought is a Greek influence. Although we do accept this, we must, on the other hand, accept also the difference between the mental and the physical which need not lead us to postulate the existence of utterly two different substances, as done by Descartes and some other philosophers. We may simply pose this as an aspect of man related to his inner nature which is utterly closed to us. As a result, as we are not concerned here with the mind body problem, we must simply point out that our theory of knowledge does not formulate an utter distinction between the mind and the body, though it clearly formulates a distinction between what is perceived through experience and our mind. Therefore, this should not mislead us that the language we use indicates a duality; e. g., experience and themlnd. Even in this usage we do not, posit two substances, but rather a thing, i.e., the mind (or even the body) and a phenomenon, (the process of knowing); hence, this duality must be allowed in the process of knowledge which requires a known object and a knowing subject.

2. Memory Since all the raw material provided by our external and internal faculties constitute what we called 'experience', so far as the mind is concerned we can refer to all the external and internal experiences acquired in this way and converted to mental perception by the mental consciousness as 'mental data'. Although there is no need for an independent faculty of retention so far as the data of our experiences are concerned, there is, however, a need for a faculty to store the mental data. This is because the physical consciousness can register each experience within the respective cells of. the concerned organ or the nerves. But the mental phenomena has a more restricted unity, and therefore, the whole data must be restored in a unified manner. This means that the faculty of retention stores not only the data of the mental consciousness but of all the mental faculties. 12See Major Themes of the Qur'an (Minneapolis, Chicago: Biblioteheca Islamica, 1980).

so

The mental faculties, indeed, function in such a strict unity that it is possible to conceive each faculty as just a mental power rather than a faculty. Of course, in our analysis we do not claim these as independent faculties; hence, each faculty expresses one function of the mind. We are able, however, to distinguish these functions as mental faculties thanks to their clear and observable applications in their respective mental activity. For example, when the mind is involved in perceiving a sensible data, in this activity we know that a mental consciousness of the object takes place; but since all mental activity cannot be reduced to just this mental intellection of the object of knowledge we can distinguish this activity of the mind from the rest of its activities and assign it to a particular aspect called 'mental consciousness'. On the other hand, when it restores all the mental data, this function of itcan thus be assigned to 'memory' as a faculty since we can distinctly observe that such data are stored in the mind; and so on we can claim the same for the imagination, intellect, will and intuition. Therefore, the mind is always engaged in manifesting itself in all its functions. When we thus say that the imagination, for instance, produces the images of objects, we simply mean that the mind functions in this way; but since we would like to emphasize the particular function we use the corresponding name as a faculty. If this is the case, then the memory is the faculty that retains all the data and mental experiences 'manifested in our mind. Hence, the data of the mental consciousness, imagination, intellect, will and the intuition are all stored in the memory. The relation of the memory to other faculties can be on the basis of one-to-one relationship as well as one-to-many. We meah by this the. fact that it can take a particular data directly from a faculty and/or through several other faculties and store it as such; when it recollects a data it can also produce it spontaneously as well as through the mediation of one or more faculties. When this also takes place, we are able to produce a mental image of the object of knowledge, which is the function of the mind assigned here to its faculty called 'imagination'.

51

3. The Imagination When an object of knowledge is abstracted from its physical presence, the mind wants to grasp it as it looks in reality and it thus produces its abstract copy, which is called 'image'. The faculty which is assigned for this function of the mind is called 'imagination'. But if the object of knowledge is not physical, but rather an entity or a fact or a phenomenon, then another corresponding process takes place, as a result of which an abstract notion is produced. This means that the imagination functions according to the object of knowledge represented in the mind. But this passive, so to speak, engagement is not the only function of the imagination; for it can connect and hold together all the mental images and notions produced by it together in such a way that the intellect is able to organize them according to its principles so as the mind is able to derive ideas and mental constructions out of them. In this way it is possible to refer to passive and active functions of the imagination. Kant distinguishes between what he calls 'pure' and 'empirical' imagination13; we argue, on the other hand, that the imagination has two significant aspects, or rather functions which are not pure and empirical, as Kant maintains; on the contrary they are passive and active employment of the mind. In the passive employment th'e imagination produces mental images and notions; in the active employment, however, the imagination has two other functions; 'creative' and 'fictitious'. Through the former, the imagination connects images and notions in a rational and coherent manner corresponding to the mental data of the mental consciousness as well as that of the other faculties of the mind; whereas through the latter the same operation is carried out in such a way that the result produced cannot be conceived to be real. We think that the active creative imagination is used in constructing a philosophical system. Whitehead seems to have this in mind in the following statements: (The) ideal of speculative philosophy has its rational side and its empirical side. The rational side is expressed by the terms 'coherent'

13cPR, A J00-103 (132-3); B 150-7 (164-8).

52

and 'logical'. The empirical side is expressed by the terms 'applicable', and 'adequate'. 14 What Bacon omitted was the play of a ti"ee imagination, controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic. The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation. The·reason for the success of this method of imaginative rationalization is that, when the method of difference fails, factors which are constantly present may yet be observed under the influence of imaginative thought. 15

This is called by him 'imaginative rationalization', which is the creative function of imagination. The fictitious imagination, on the other hand, lacks the criterion of, to use Whitehead's words, the 'applicability', and 'adequacy'; but it may be 'coherent', and 'logical'. Thus, it has an affinity to creative imagination but its main role is entertainment, not 'adventure' in the Whiteheadian sense. Creative imagination is adventuresome; coherent, logical, applicable and adequate. The hero of creative imagination is the Muslim_philosopher Ibn 'Arabi. 16 But, unfortunately, he did not develop any criterion to distinguish it from the fictitious imagination.

4. The Intellect That activity of the mind which holds the object of knowledge in abstraction is called 'thought'; the faculty through which thought is actualized is the intellect. Thought, or the activity of thinking itself does not necessarily include judging and inferring, although ordinarily we refer to all these activities as 'thinking'. In our analysis of the process of 14Alfred North Whitehead. Process and Reality (PR), ed. by David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 3. (I shall give the pagination for the Macmillan edition of 1929 In parenthesis, 4.)

15Jbid., 5 (7). 16rn order to see this aspect of his ·system It is sufficient to glance through A. E. Affifi's The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din-lbnul 'Arabi (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1939); and for an exposition of his doctrine of imagination see Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi, trans. by Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series, 1969). 53

acquiring knowledge, we would like to distinguish the thinking activity of the mind which involves judgment and inference from the kind of thinking which is a mere reflection on the object of kp.owledge and .as such requires only ~he activity of the intellect, which can thus be called also 'intellection'. If thinking in the sense of intellection were the same as judging, for example, it would not be possible to think without judgment. We would not be able to accept a judgment without thinking because sometimes by mere intuition we accept the truth of a judgment, which in turn means that we do infer without intellection. What all this means is that thought is a necessary step in the process of knowing although in every knowledge acquired by the mind it may not be used because the preliminary ground has already been prepared by previous intellections. In fact, this is true of all the faculties of knowledge; each faculty is· a necessary element for the process as a whole, but not necessarily needed in every knowledgeacquisition process. The intellect thinks by its inherent principles and operations. The most fundamental principle of the intellect is 'coherence' out of which three logical laws are derived: the law of contradiction; the law of excluded middle; and that of identity. Regularity is another natural principle of the intellect through which the mind is able to perceive the existing laws in nature and to institute laws in society. Even wherever there may not be any apparent regularity the mind will try to organize its concept according to its principles and/or principles it is able to extract from that phenomenon. For example, Hegel's presentation ·of the structure of reality in a strict and systematic regularity of triads is the work of the natural principle of the intellect. The reality may not necessarily be so strictly regular, but the mind tries to grasp it as such. The creative imagination also plays its role in this strict regularizing. The intellect is also able to develop certain principles. This is done in two ways: the mind may apply its own natural principles, such as contradiction and identity to its own content and derive new principles, or it may use the natural operations of the intellect to derive a principle; such as the principle of causality. A natural operation of the mind is its inherent function which cannot be developed artificially; in other words, we do not 54

acquire these mental capacities through experience or tl;le process of knowledge. They are rather already given. Among the inherent operations of the intellect we may count the following: 1. Finding a causal link; without this operation of the intellect the mind cannot but perceive things that occur regularly with one another, and in this way the intellect perceives one as cause of the other. 2. Universalizing and abstracting; through this operation of the intellect the mind is able to abstract certain features of things and reach universal ideas. 3. Classifying; once universal concepts are produced the mind naturally classifies things according to the universal concepts it has produced. 4. Naming; the mind canthink with names naturally, whatever they may be, whether pure concepts or mere words. Although the mind can think without giving a name to a concept it cannot express it without names. We are able to express our thought with words, thanks to this natural operation of the intellect. 5. Association; the similarity or contradiction enables the mind to associate things so that they can be compared and contrasted. Moreover, the association of a word or a concept to an action can be established by the intellect through a regular us.e. For example, of the word 'don't' is constantly uttered in relation to a certain act, the child associates that word automatically to that action, thanks to the associative operation of the intellect. 6. Arguing; the intellect has a natural tendency to organize its ideas according to its natural principles. But it is able to know the conclusion only through intuition. It is the act of intuition that enables the mind to infer the conclusion, not that of the intellect. 7. Perceiving in unity; throughthis operation of the intellect·the mind is able to perceive quantity and quality. 8. Perceiving in plurality; this natural operation of the intellect enables the mind to perceive multiplicity and introduce numbers in order to be able to think about this multiplicity. Hence, numbers are nothing but mental constructions made up by the 55

mind according to its principles and the principles it is able to extract from multiplicity of objects and the phenomena. There are no numbers in reality, which the mind discovers; there is rather a natural tendency in the mind to express the regularity of multiplicity with numbers, as a result of which the mind reaches numbers. Therefore, counting is a natural operation of the intellect. Things in reality are multiple without the numbers, but since the intellect has regularity as its principle, multiplicity can be counted naturally and made up into such an abstract system of numbers that multiplicity itself becomes regular. Out of this strictly regular abstract system of numbers emerged mathematical sciences, which are applicable to reality thanks to the fact that reality has in many cases a corresponding regularity, and wherever it does not have such a correspondence, mathematics cannot be applied which in turn leads us to conclude that mathematics is not a sufficient language of the reality. 9. Proportioning; when the mind finds two characteristics in relation to an object it tries to set a proportion between those two characteristics in relation to the object. Through this operation of the intellect the mind perceives relations as well. Therefore, this operation of the intellect can be called also 'relationing'. It is applied in connection to perceiving multiplicity. For example, when Newton tried to understand gravity he discovered his formula through this natural operation of the mind. In fact all the mathematical formulations of physical laws are based on this operation. 10. Correspondence; the mind uses this natural operation of the intellect to perceive relationships based on correspondence. This does not mean that the mind knows correspondence innately; what it means is that if it does not have a natural capacity for such relations it cannot perceive them.

5. The Will The mind cannot bring any mental data to conclusion without judgment which cannot be an operation of the intellect because the data attained so far are simply reflected upon by the intellect. Judgment primarily requires a choice and it can sometimes act upon a choice which contradicts its principles and violates its natural operations. For this reason we may sometimes make up excuses in order to show the rationale of our 56

judgment. There may be .certain psychological and circumstantial constraints for this kind of a judgment; but whatever it is, it only shows that the judgment requires will besides thought. We think, on the other hand, that we decide or judge as a result of our argument or thinking. Therefore, the faculty which reaches a judgment in thought is called 'will'. In this context we are concerned with the will in so far as it is a faculty of knowledge. We do understand that it ,has another significant function in relation to our actions, that is to chose (whether freely or not we do not wish to discuss in this context) a certain action which is indeed an act of judgment also. Wh~n the will functions as such it is no longer functioning in the same way as it does in the process of knowing. This does not change its character as a faculty of knowledge. In fact when w-e say that if the will functions to chose a particular behavior, it is no longer functioning in the same way as it does in the process of knowing, we do not meant that both ways of willing, i. e., judging, are utterly different; we simply meari that the process involved is no longer that of attaining knowledge and as a matter of fact we see a difference of operation and interference Of other factors in the process.

6. The Intuition The intellect thinks and the will enables the mind to judge; then by using its principle the intellect can combine judgments. Can such combination of judgments lead to an inference or not? Obviously pure thought cannot see this inference which is actually a logical connection. However, this logical connection between judgments, called in logic 'premises', and an inference, called 'conclusion', is not a natural operatidn of the intellect; it rather belongs to another faculty of the mind which we term 'mental intuition', the final stage of the process of acquiring knowledge. It is through this natural intuition that the mind can see the logical connection between such intellectually organized judgments and infer a conclusion. The function of the mental1nference cannot, however, be limited to inferring conclusions; the mind through intuition can see certain truths even without any logical argumentation. In other words, the mind can somehow feel, so to speak, a truth which has already been internalized through previous knowledge that has already been acquired. This intuitive 57

truth can, then, be put into a rational argumentative form and shown as if it was acquired through the regular process of knowledge. For example, a philosopher may have worked on the problem of Being for so long without finding any solution to it; but at a certain time, since his mind. is busy with this problem, suddenly a solution comes to his mind. Now, whether we accept this solution or not, his mind accepts and as such tries to reformulate it rationally; he thus begins to produce arguments for his solution, for which previously he h~d no arguments. This piece of knowledge is reached through the mental intuition. The other faculties of the mind, therefore, prepare the ground for the · intuition. No intuition is possible without some mental groundwork. A butcher cannot discover the law of gravity with intuition; for this is possible only after the groundwork carried out by Newton. Mulla :?adra would not have discovered his doctrine of Being through intuition if he had not gone through the scholarly work he had and reflect on the problem for a long time. Perhaps this is also the most crucial distinction between the sensible and mental intuition; no groundwork is necessary for the sensible intuition though it may incite an intuition, whereas in case of the mental intuition it is a necessary condition. This groundwork may not be a deep reflection in certain sharp minds, the raw material given by the internal and external experience may spark intuitive knowledge in the mind. Since the mental intuition is the last faculty in the process of knowledge, if we try to show .all the faculties on a table it will also represent this process. We may thus show our result on Table 3, which shows the complete process; we must, however, realize that this process may not always repeat itself in every piece of knowledge acquired. This is because our faculties of knowledge .can make the use of previously available data, whether from external or internal experience, or yet from . the sources of our mind itself..

58

PHYSICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

SENSES'

•

Sensible perception is produced

THE MI ND

...... """': 4

MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS represe3tations of objects are receive from the external and Internal experience

I

EXTERNAL~EXPEruENCE----

MEMORY Faculty of retention

I

IN TERNAL EXPERIENCE SENSIBLE INTUITION

IMAGINATION objects of knowledge are presented to the mind as mental images

I

I

HEART (center of emotions)

I

INTELLECT Faculty of thinking

CONSCIENCE

I

INNER CONSCIOUSNESS -

I WILL Faculty ofjudgement

I INTUITION Faculty of inference

Table 3

59

CHAPTER TWO THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENCE That mental framework or perspective out of which naturally and/or actively follows a human activity is henceforth entitled the 'epistemic ground' of that activity. Knowledge proceeds from a mental framework naturally, if it arises purely out of the capacities of the faculties. Therefore, if an activity springs only naturally from the epistemic ground, then it depends totally on the general process of knowledge which we have just outlined. But usually, as we have pointed out, humans are not subjects that acquire knowledge passively; they are rather active agents that contribute to the process of knowledge. In this way knowledge will proceed from the knowledge acquired through both our education and using the natural capacities of the mind. It is this kind of a knowledge acquisition process that we call 'active'. The epistemology outlined in the previous chapter has shown that if nothing is given to start with, .man cannot acquire any,knowledge with his naturally endowed capacity for learning. Moreover, Aristotle's approach in his logic is also clear; the process of knowing must start at a point and that it cannot go on ad infinitum to try to reach a known concept or an axiom from which our knowledge would begin. We may try to capture the nature of that previously given, whatever it may be, a concept, knowledge or an axiom. We can deduce from our theory of knowledge three categories of knowledge as the contents of our mind at present analysis: factual, which is based on the external experience, such as the know ledge of all natural sciences; experiential, which is based primarily on tp_e inner experience as outlined in the previous chapter, such as moral concepts and the existence of God, the problems of resurrection and freedom; and absolute, which is wholly based on the Revelation and thus it can be an object of knowledge in so far as it is revealed, such as God's nature, the nature of resurrection and human. freedom. So far as the factual knowledge is concerned we need only our natural capacity for acquiring knowledge, and the given in this respect means only our biological constitution. This point will be explained further when we outline our doctrine of worldview as an 61

epistemological theory. But the experiential knowledge requires, besides our natural capacity, a given knowledge which is the Revelation itself. In the true sense only the former is scientific knowledge, and the latter is an epistemic ground of the former. On the other hand, so far as the absolute knowledge is concerned our natural capacity is not sufficient at all to acquire; hence, it is totally given. In this respect, our theory of knowledge formulates that no human faculty of knowledge can acquire the absolute· knowledge naturally, but only in a given way by which we mean the instruction of the Revelation imparting the absolute knowledge and our natural mental capacity is such that we are enabled to understand, or intellect that knowledge. Therefore, just because we cannot naturally acquire the absolute knowledge it does not mean that it is unintelligible. Though we admit that it is extremely hard to express this knowledge in human language which is now molded by our natural faculties of knowledge. Just as the experiential knowledge is the epistemic ground of the factual knowledge, in the same way the absolute knowledge is the revealed ground of the experiential knowledge. We have said that in the true sense only the factual knowledge is scientific; when the experiential knowledge is, however, systematized into an organized whole using the guidance of both Revelation and our inner experience, which provides the raw material for this possibility, then it can be formed into certain disciphnes that can be identified as sciences as well; e.g., ethics, psychology and philosophy of law. This conclusion is true on the basis of our definition of science as well, given in the Introduction. The fact that we include inner experience as a faculty of knowledge puts us apart from the Kantian theory of knowledge. As a result, we need not "deny knowledge in order to make room for faith." 1 If faith (imiin) is acquired through our faculties of knowledge, it is easy to see that it is also a kind of knowledge. Of course, it is not identical with factual knowledge which is of the order of natural sciences, and thus, it cannot be acquired in the same way; nor is it a philosophical kind of kilowledge to be acquired in a philosophical way. It is rather that kind of knowledge which involves 1 See Immanuel Kant, CPR where he states: "I found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith." B xxx (29).

62

both the experiential and absolute knowledge and as such its acquisition is very complicated and involves not only our mental-physical and emotional states, but also our psychological and worldly dealings. Hence, faith cannot be acquired as though automatically as if one is studying a book of physics or philosophy whose knowledge can be acquired with a scholarly study. That is why the Qur' an refers to faith as a gift from God, Who "guides whomsoever He wishes". This statement is made in order to encourage us to re-evaluate our whole inner self so that we are p.ot misguided by our faculties, moods and daily dealings. It is for this reason that we pointed out in connection to the inner experience that there is a subjective mood that underlies experiential knowledge, i.e., belief.2 Once this process of acquiring knowledge is well understood, it will become clear that knowledge acquisition is a process that cannot be separated and held fast with regard to different kinds of knowledge. This is because all knowledge will be processed through our system of knowledge-faculties and thus every kind of knowledge can somehow be related to the other. We thus conclude, there is a general framework through which all our knowledge proceeds; a framework that provides an epistemic ground for our faculties of knowledge to operate. In fact, not only our mental operations follow from this general framework, but also our daily activities, and ind~ed all our behavior. Since this general 2 As an illustration of this point the following verse can be examined: "As to those who reject belief (i.e., the Absolute Truth) it is the same to them whether you warn them (i.e., explain them the Truth) or not, they will not believe (i.e., they will not even consider to understand the Truth you are communicating). (Therefore) God has sealed their hearts and hearing (i. e., their perceptive faculties); ~md on their eyes is a veii...They would (try to) deceive God and the believers; but they deceive only themselves and yet do not realize (this). In their hearts is a disease and God has increased their disease. There is a grievous penalty for them because they cry lies (even to themselves). When It is said to them: "Do not make corruption on the earth", they say: "Why, we only wantto establish order". They are truly the ones who cause corruption, but they do not realize (this) .. Their similitude is that of a man who kindled a fire, and when it lighted all around him, God took away their light and left them in utter darkness, unseeing, deaf, dumb and blind; they will not return (to the Truth). Or (another similitude) is that of a rain-laden cloud ti"om the sky; in it are zones of darkness, and thunder and lightning. They press their fingers in their ears to keep out the stunning thunderclap, trembHng from the fear of death. But God is ever encompassing the rejecters of belief... If God willed He could take away their faculty . of hearing and seeing. For God has power over all things." (2/al-Baqarah, 6-20).

63

framework is an epistemic ground, it is possible for certain human activities to emerge not directly but indirectly from the general framework. But even in such a situation, the mind immediately forms another framework as an extension of the general ground. This secondary and somewhat more concrete framework can be termed the 'inner framework'. If the human activity is a highly cognitive activity, such as scientific activities, it will require a more specific framework. Therefore, we claim that every scientific activity emerges out ofthree frameworks: a general, an inner and a specific framework. We shall now try to explain what is meant by these frameworks.

A. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK: WORLDVIEW A framework is an epistemic ground through which we view things, as such it is a mentality on which our conceptions are based. Many concepts which are utilized here in order to explain the epistemological function of worldviews carry the same meaning but emphasizing different aspects of these identical meanings. These concepts are epistemic ground, framework and mentality. We hope that the explanation given below for the emergence of world views in our minds will clarify these concepts further and display the aspects which they represent in a theory of knowledge. Let us take a new born human baby; he/she has no knowledge, but has the complete and sound faculties of knowledge. Until a certain age this baby has no conceptual knowledge; in fact, if we remember our definition of knowledge as 'mental content', whatever experiences this baby gains cannot be entitled knowledge because these experiences have not yet been internalized as mental awareness, as a result of which, they cannot qualify to be called knowledge. All the baby knows (if this can be called 'knowing') is his natural instincts; he/she cannot reason in order to cry so that he/she can get food. What he/she does is to use his/her natural gestures to communicate. Of course this type of communication is not an articulate verbal utterance; it is merely a natural act. But as the baby grows and his/her faculties of knowledge also become more mature, then he/she is able to mentally internalize his/her experiences, whether external or internal. In the terminology of our theory of knowledge, this means that 64

he/she is able to become mentally aware of his/her experiences. As soon as this process begins the baby becomes active in acquiring knowledge. Up to this stage all experiences (lre physical. 3 This means that knowledge is that experience which has become a mental content; if an experience is not converted to some kind of a mental consciousness, it cannot become a conceptionally expressed experience which we call 'knowledge'. It is extremely hard to observe what will be the first experience to be converted into a piece of knowledge. But we can definitely identify what kind of knowledge this mental content is; for example, it cannot be an abstract idea, or a philosophical notion and the like. It will be a kind of knowledge that pertains to the life of the infant. In other words, since the infant is naturally inclined to preserve his life, most of his experiences will be related to the preservation of life, such as finding and choosing certain food and developing habits of how to attract the attention of others to make food available and so on. Therefore, the infant will naturally have such experiences available to the mental consciousness; as a result these are the first raw materials to be converted into mental awareness and thus become knowledge. All the knowledge that is available for us in this way and is primarily related to our natural life makes up that content of our mind which we call 'life structure'. As such the life structure includes most of our daily habits related to the ,preservation of our life. This life structure becomes more refined and sophisticated as we add to it what we learn from our social environment. In this way it begins to include many of pur cultural habits as well, such as habits of eating, the ways of daily behavior, manners and customs. The life structure is the first piece of knowledge we thus acquire and it makes up the priormost contents of our minds. We call it structure because our mind forms it according to its natural rules and principles explained in the first section of this chapter. For this reason, knowledge gathered in this structure is not a hodgepodge gathering of experience in the mental consciousness; it is rather an orderly unity according to certain rules and principles. For inst~nce, our mind cannot accept contradiction 3 In this context we are not concerned with the age at which the baby reaches this stage. Psychologists, such as Pi ages, are dealing with this problem experimentally, and their works must be consulted. 65

and it can even without any deliberate intent feel, or rather intuit a contradiction and thus will not allow contradictory ideas to be included in a mental structure; life structure is also such a coherent mental unity which makes up the total contents of an infant's mind enriching itself until adulthood according to the natural rules and principles of the mind through its social and physical surrounding. We thus claim that as soon as the child begins to form any mental conception of a natural experience, which he had from babyhood onwards, he will begin to act no longer out of his natural instincts alone, but also out of the mental content that he acquired, and which we have termed 'life structure'. The more sophisticated the life structure is the more conceptual becomes the experience and thus the more we act out of our me~tal frameworks. In such a conceptual life structure we may be able to distinguish certain elements, which we call 'mentality'. A mentality is actually understanding or conception of certain things, living types, facts of life and the world. As the infant grows, these mentalities are developed according to his/her personality, mental abilities and the kind of education he/she receives. Each mentality is like a structure and thus can be termed 'sub-structure'. These mentalities are so coherently related to each other that together they form the totality of the life structure. Then, the person arranges his life acco~ding to his life structt~re, which is the totality of the contents of his mind. Since, as a total unity, the mind reflects all the ideas of the person in question, its contents as the life structure will also reflect his/her attitude for life and understanding the universe in general; as such we entitle it 'worldview'. At what stage a life structure can be termed worldview is an interesting investigation; but we shall not be concerned with this empirical topic. We rather say that since worldview, as a word, refers to the way one views the world, we can say that if a life structure is able to reflect the person's conception of the universe, such as the meaning of life, the origin of existence, human destiny and so on, it can be termed 'worldview' no matter at what stage of life itemerges as such. Of course, when we say that a worldview must be able to reveal such conceptions concerning the universe in which we live, we do not mean that these ·problems must be solved in philosophical way. In fact, an everyday

a

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person cannot do this; but he/she can have some notions about these issues no matter how simple they may be. It must have become clear that since any person not only acts according to his/her worldview, but he/she also thinks according to it; in fact, a worldview is the domain within which our mind operates. If the mind cannot develop such a domain, it cannot execute its operations within the process of knowledge. It is clear, therefore, that we take the concept of worldview only as an epistemological term. Since in this sense the worldview acts as a general scheme of all our mental and physical activities, we can term it the 'general framework'. It is also this general framework out of which our scientific activities also spring. We shall, then, try to show this on epistemological grounds. In this context, we are actually claiming that all human conduct is ultimately traceable to a worldview; a conclusion which is sufficient in itself to manifest the significance of worldview not only in individual and social life, but also in our scientific activities. By this conclusion, we would like to emphasize the crucial role of a worldview in our actions; otherwise, we do not have any intention of undermining the significance of other factors in human behavior or performance of an action, such as psychology of the person and the effect of both physical and so~ial surroundings. But above all, from the epistemological perspective, a worldview is far more significant than all the other elements of human behavior, because. it is the most general framework within which the human mind can fully operate in order to attain knowledge. We have two separate issues in this case: on the one hand we must explain the nature of worldviews and the way they arise in the mind; and on the other hand, we must try to show their function as the general framework of scientific · activities, namely, as the epistemic ground of our scientific activities. 1. The Nature of W orldviews

A worldview is an architectonic whole, which usually arises in the mind throughout our daily life out of a natural process. We have already pointed out at the outset of this chapter that knowledge proceeds from a mental framework naturally, if it arises purely out of the capacities of the faculties. In other words, this process is called 'natural' because the mind 67

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has a naturally built-in power to form a cohceptual framework for itself within which it can operate. This feature of forming a coherent framework belongs to the mind in general, and its emergence requires all the faculties of our mind functioning in unison with each other; hence, it is not an epistemological characteristic of a particular faculty of the mind, but of the mind as a whole. Therefore, the process of worldview-formation itself is not governed by natural means if by the 'natural' we understand the 'biological' or the 'physical'; on the contrary, as we have argued above, it is for the most part regulated by the capacities of our epistemological faculties as well as by our psychology, education and society. Other factors that are also dominant in the disclosing process of a worldview are language, natural environment and other social conditions. All these factors can be determined more specifically under two broad categories as epistemological and environmental. The latter can be gathered under four headings: 1. culture, which includes such elements as religion, language, environment and all social heritage; 2. abstract thought which includes the scientific activities and heritage one has; 3. one's psychology, and finally; 4. technology, especially in modern times.Since our epistemological and environmental constitutions are precisely the major factors that lead to the formation of our worldview, we do not make any conscious effort to construct a systematically organized mental unity, called worldview. Therefore, the individual's effort js only to find answers for certain questions that either come to his mind or he simply comes across these questions in an accidental manner in his daily life. Hence, a worldview is formed by the individual as a matter of habit that is dominant in his daily life, through his culture, religion, technology, scientific, and speculative ideas that he acquires throughout his education. A worldview is, therefore, not constructed, but rather formed by the individual in a casual manner out of his daily dealings as he/she grows up from infancy to adulthood; a process which never ends until the death of the person. It is in this sense that we claim its disclosure to be a natural process, rather than a conscious effort to build an architectonically whole framework. For a worldview is, in fact, a mental framework through which the individual views everything. Therefore, no one can evaluate any question or a problem without first assuming a worldview of a sort. In 68

fact, the human mind works only within the context of such an architectonic whole. We can find supporting evidence of our conclusion in this epistemological sense in the views of other philosophers as well. Kant, for example, points out that "human reason is . by nature architectonic. That is to say, it regards all our knowledge as belonging to a possible system." 4 Moreover, he also argues that "systematic unity .. .is indispensable to reason. " 5 Then, he goes on to explain what he means by this: By an architectonic I understand the art of constructing systems. As systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science (Wissenschaft), that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge, architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge ... By a system I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea. This idea is the concept provided by reason ... The whole is thus an organized unity, and not an aggregate. It may grow from within, but not by external addition. It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which is not by ·the addition of a new member, but by rendering of each member, without change of proportion, stronger and more effective for its purposes. 6

It is clear, therefore, that on epistemological grounds no science is possible except from a general perspective which the mind forms for itself, and which we have identified here as 'worldview'. We can illustrate this point by simply assuming a worldview in which there is no concept of science or any other related concepts; obviously no scientific knowledge is possible within such a conceptual environment. The same conclusion is valid with regard to the worldview that already has all these concepts, but that these concepts remain buried under the debris of history without any clarification whatsoever, which is the case with the kind of worldview Muslims acquire today, i.e. the contemporary Islamic worldview, if it can be called as such. Within such an epistemic ground no significant scientific activity can flourish. Epistemology of science thus requires naturally and necessarily a general framework which the mind builds within itself, out of which it can 4 CPR, A474; B 502 (429). 5 Ibid., A 681, B 709 (556).

6 Ibid., A 832-3, B 860-1 (653).

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use. its operations to reach new knowledge from the existing ones. We have identified this general framework as 'worldview', which is necessary for scientific activities as well because a scientific activity is also by its very nature a knowledge-acquisition process and as such it is primarily a cognitive activity. Worldview thus becomes an epistemological necessity for all our activities; but, as we shall see, it is also a functional necessity for scientific activities. If a worldview is necessary both epistemologically and functionally for science, then we must further try to investigate, in more detail, how it can be formed and function in the way to lead to the rise of scientific activities.

2. The Structural Rise of Worldviews We have already shown above that the continual combination of our experiences by the mind according to its rules and principles gradually forms in the mind a framework which is first identifiable as the life structure, and then as it further develops to such an extent that it can manifest certain mentalities, it can be entitled 'worldview'. The worldview thus becomes the mental environment within which the mind operates, and without which it cannot function at all. Therefore, our concept of worldview, in this context, refers to the conceptual totality as an attempt to grasp the universe, and as such a worldview is an architectonic whole, in which notions, ideas and beliefs are so interconnected that together they form a network of organized concepts. This network forms a coherent mental structure naturally, thanks to the constitution of our faculties of knowledge. It is primarily the function of our intellect to combine all the various data collected in the mind and form them into a coherent outlook. In doing so the intellect uses its inherent principles, such as the principle of contradiction, argumentation, association and so on, to form 'the impressions that it receives from the outside world into a coherent unity, as a result of which arises a. worldview. It is clear, therefore; that a worldview is not necessarily constructed by the individual, but rather it arises in the mind of the individual necessarily. It is in this sense that we have claimed that it arises in the mind is a natural process, rather than a conscious effort to build an architectonically whole perspective. 7 For a •

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worldview is, in fact, a perspective from which the individual views everything. A worldview is, therefore, a coherent network of ideas, concep-tions, beliefs and aspirations in which all that make it up are organized in a coherent manner, but not necessarily in a systematically interconnected network (which is called 'system' in the philosophical sense). 8 As we have indicated, the major environmental factors leading to the rise of a worldview in the mind of an individual are mainly culture, which includes such elements as religion, language, social environment and customs; abstract thought which includes the scientific activities and philosophical thought expressed as education; one's psychology; and technology. Since these are precisely the major factors that form a worldview, through the natural operations of the mind, the individual does not have to make a conscious effort to construct a systematically organized worldview. The individual's effort is only to find answers for certain questions that either arise in his mind or he simply comes across them in an accidental manner in his daily life. But we do not mean that the individual has absolutely no conceptual effort in the process of the emergence of his worldview. On the contrary, he contributes to this process in his effort of oqtaining knowledge. What he is not conscious of is the actual formation, or orgqnization which the worldview takes in the mind; which is a mental act of reaching an architectonic totality in the epistemological sense. But this act primarily and naturally belongs to the mind. In other words, when an individual in a daily life applies, for instance, the law of contradiction, he is not conscious of the law, but only of an absurdity which the mind cannot accept. Hence, a worldview is formed by our mind as a matter of habit that is dominant in our daily life with regard to the environmental factors, but as a matter of the nature of 7 In fact if there is such an effort to build a framework systemf!tically, that wlll be a scientific activity which is already e;>dsting in philosophy. Therefore, the counterpart of the term 'world view' in philosophy is the concept of 'system'. We thus distinguish these two terms only in this sense. See the following footnote. 8 For an elaboration and comparison of the concept of 'system' in relation to worldview, see the present author's "A Concept of Philosophy in the Qur'anic Context", The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences", ll: 2 (1994), 170-4.

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the mind with regard to epistemological factors, either through (1) culture, technology, scientific, religious and speculative ideas that we acquire through education and other means, or (2) a conscious effort to acquire knowledge, or (3) in both of these ways. In the first case, a worldview is not constructed, but rather it is formed naturally by the individual in a casual manner; we shall thus refer to this kind of a worldview as 'natural woddview', because the acquisition of its major components is regulated by the n;ltural operations of the mind. But in the second and third cases, the worldview arises in the mind by a conscious use of the natural operations of the mind. As a result, the basic · components of the worldview come into existence in the mind through investigation and search for knowledge. That is why many of the basic ideas, beliefs, outlooks and conceptions in it are clarified to the person trying to search for_knowledge. Obviously this kind of a worldview is completely different from the natural one; we shall thus refer to it as 'transparent worldview'. A transparent worldview may also arise in two different ways: first, in an environment in which the dissemination of knowledge within the spciety takes place quasi-scientifically; second, in a society where scientific knowledge regulates the dissemination of knowledge. In order to make this point clear, I would like to elucidate how scientific knowledge may regulate the dissemination of knowledge, which will shed light on both cases at the same time. Then, on the basis of that I will attempt to clarify the first case. First of all, in order for scientific knowledge to regulate the dissemination of knowledge, there must be a sophisticated mechanism for the production of scientific knowledge. This mechanism, above all, requires a well-equipped scientific conceptual scheme, 9 and a worldview that is suitable for the development of this scheme, assuming that this mechanism works well in a given society then some sophisticated scientific activities begin to exist. Obviously through time there will be an accumulation of scientific knowledge in that society. Besides this there 9 What we mean by this will be clarified in the following section on the inner framework. 72

will be a group of people, called 'scientists' (i.e., the 'ulamii'). But the knowledge put forward by those scientists utilizes a special language, in which many of the everyday words are not used anymore in their daily meaning; a specific scientific meaning is attached to them. Moreover, in certain disciplines, such as philosophy and theology, the concepts used are abstract. As a result, the general masses are unable to understand this knowledge, to which we have referred as 'scientific knowledge'. But the community of scholars well understand the scientific knowledge and if an adequate network of communication is established between them, knowledge disseminates at this level directly and rapidly. Thus is formed the first stage in the process of the dissemination of knowledge which we shall call the 'abstract level'. This group of scientists are called 'ulama .J 0 in the Islamic sense. Secondly, either there will be or there arises, as a result of the emergence of scientific knowledge, in such a society, a group of people called 'intellectuals', such as men of literature, artists, architects, teachers and educators, who are eclucated and are able t~ understand the available scientific knowledge. The intellectuals are not scientists, nor are they scholars, but rather illuminated personalities who develop a transparent worldview within an environment of scientific activities. Therefore, they are able to express and clearly define terms and concepts that occupy a prominent place in their worldview; such concepts may be, for example, God, the universe, knowledge, science, the meaning of life, good, evil, freedom, justice, and many other moral, religious, political, educational and social terms. At this level, since the intellectuals are able to understand the scientific knowledge developed by the 'ulamii ', they will naturally reflect it in their works, because .their worldview is already shaped within that knowledge. Hence, we may term this level in the dissemination of knowledge the 'concretized level'. Since the works of the intellectuals are 10 What we mean by the term 'ulamti' (singular 'tilim) is primarily 'scholars of Islam', which includes all scholars, such as philosophers, theologians, physicists, chemists and astronomers, who carry out their scientific activities within the Islamic worldview. Therefore, we do not mean merely its contemporary usage, which includes only the traditional Islamic scholars as a class of clergy which is indeed a corrupt usage.

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usually of a concrete nature, the scientific knowledge is concretized and thus handed down to the general masses who can understand the concrete ideas more easily. Finally, at the third stage, the knowledge thus far produced enters into a massive dissemination through the educational institutions and mass media. This is possible through the work of scientists and intellectuals, because all the educational institutions are formed in accordance with the knowledge put forward by them. When the scientific knowledge thus disseminates from the top level of abstraction to the bottom level of concretization, it reaches to the masses and begins shaping their worldview according to its welf-defined and systematically developed concepts, ideas and doctrines, namely, according to a system, developed by the 'ulamii '. When a transparent world view is thus formed in accordance with the system developed by the 'ulamii ', it is called 'scientific worldview'; and this.way of worldview-formation we calJ 'scientific worldview-formation'. Therefore, by the scientific development of a worldview, we mean the "inculcation of its major components, i.e., its concepts, ideas and beliefs, to the individuals of the society through clear and transparent definitions and a systematically organized body of knowledge." The scientific worldview-formation is not the only way in which transparent worldviews may be formed in the minds of the individuals. For there may be other ways for the rise ofsuch worldviews in the minds of individuals. We shall not discuss all such possible ways here, but only allude to one of those ways in which historically speaking it occurred in our civilization. This is the Islamic worldview as established by the Prophet in Mecca, through the Revelation. Since the Muslim community as such did not exist at that time, we cannot talk of any scientific knowledge within the newly emerging society. As a result, the formation of the transparent Islamic worldview took place differently. This process of the Islamic worldview-fdrmation was very much similar to the scientific worldview-formation, and as such can be called 'quasi-scientific worldview-formation'. As we know from history each time a new Revelation came, the Prophet explained it to his community and each term and idea thus revealed found a clear definition and a proper place within 74

the Islamic worldview. Hence, since the way the Islamic worldview was established in its original form in the first Muslim community is similar to scientific worldviews, we may call all worldviews that arise in this way in the minds of individuals 'quasi-scientific worldviews '. What distinguishes the transparent worldviews from the natural ones is the dynamism they induce to the individuals in whose mind they are formed. This is clear from the historical world phenomenon exhibited by the early Muslims who once possessed the Islamic worldview they became world leaders in culture, science and civilization. But the worldviews these people had before Islam can be defined as natural which lacked the adequate dynamism to give to the individuals of that society. In such a mental framework no scientific activity would have ever been possible. We must also point out that what makes worldviews dynamic, invigorating and stimulating is the continual renewal through scientific or quasi-scientific activities of the same kind which established the original Islamic worldview. If these activities of renewal cease to exist the transparent worldview can gradually turn into a natural worldview in which scientific and civilizational activities also cease. We may try to apply the concept of worldview in the epistemological sense to our case civilizations as well. The Greek civilization, for example, exhibits a similar development. When we take the early rise of this civilization we can see that it is able to begin to develop a transparent worldview in a quasi-scientific way around 800 B.C. By the time of the Milesian School and the first Ionian philosophers this transparent worldview became scientific, which is clear in the art and literature of that period extant today. It is only that kind of a transparent worldview that leads to a meaningful scientific progress in a creative way. The same process can be observed in the Western civilization beginning around the eighth century. By the Middle Ages, the Western worldview acquired a transparent characteristic and by the nine-teenth century it became scientific in the sense described in the process of knowledge-dissemination. Our exposition shows that some aspects of worldviews are the same in every civilization and society, though some other aspects may be different. For example, although the Islamic worldview and the Greek worldview are utterly different, the way they arise in the mind of an 75

individual in their respective societies is identical, and the way they function within their societies is the same. Since we assert this in the epistemological sense, we may illustrate this point by referring to the way the human stomach functions in relation to the human body, as this is the case with the human mind in relation to knowledge. Some of these points, together with the process of worldview-formation, will become clear as yve try to demonstrate the function of worldviews.

3. The Function of Worldviews In the foregoing discussion we have tried to distinguish two kinds of transparent worldviews: quasi-scientific and scientific, both of which tend to give a certain dynamism to their society, out of which they flourish. This dynamism inherent in scientific worldviews is so crucial that even the mentality dominant in a certain society may emerge out of the worldview dominant in that society .I I Whitehead expresses this fact so clearly: " ... the mentality of an epoch springs from the view of the world which is, in fact, dominant in the educated sections of the communities in question." 12 The most significant dynamism concerning us here is -that dynamism channeled towards scientific activities. We may show this fact by pointing out that in a worldview there are structures, which, once well-defined and clarified, give a stamina and motivation to the ideals of those structures. In this sense, the most significant structure that comes to the fore is the knowledge-structure, which supports, and thus acts within that worldview, as the ground of scientific activities. In order to show this we must clarify how structures arise in a worldview and how they function within it. We have already pointed out that our worldview is formed not out of the mental contents in general, but rather out of only those mental contents that we accept as our own, namely that knowledge which has been approved by us. Since we would not accept that kind of knowledge ' llFor an exposition of what is meant by the 'dominant worldview' see my "A Concept of Philosophy in the Qur' anic Context", op. cit., 176. 12Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (SMW) (New York: The Free Press, 1967), vH. 76

attained by us without our approval, as our own perspective, it would not form a part of our worldview. Therefore, every piece of knowledge accumulated by us in the process of learning does not necessarily form a part of our worldview. For example, we can study Ibn Sina' s theory of knowledge and learn it very well without accepting it, which means that we take it to be a wrong theory. But still this information makes up the content of our mind, although it does not make up a part of our worldview, since we believe it to be false. In that case, knowledge acquired by us without being accepted cannot be included as a structure within worldviews. Therefore, a structure is the largest unity within a worldview. As these unities emerge in a coherent relationship with each other, they form a total mental unity, which is the worldview itself. Hence, each structure within a worldview is also a unity just like the worldview to which they belong. That structure which first emerges in the mind is a natural structure which has already been termed 'life-structure'. In fact, in our early life our worldview consists of only the life-structure and as such the life-stru<;ture is our worldview for a certain early period of our life. As we have explained above, it develops out of the human biology, and in its later phases it emerges conceptually as well and thus acquires an abstract sophistication. It is because, of its biological origin that we may also identify it as 'natural'. The life-structure regulates not only the development of related concepts in this structute, but also our behavior in our daily life. Out of the life-structure grows our culture within a social context. But we are always born into such a context, and that is why we find it available for us. Yet we are always in the process offorrning our culture through alterations. Therefore; most of our cultural behaviour are regulated by this structure, such as our ways of eating, drinking, talking, everyday actions and even professional dealings. But at the same time, as we grow up, our social environment shapes the life-structure as well; hence, just as there is a reciprocal influence between a worldview and its social environment, there is the same kind of relationship between the life-structure, and indeed between all other structures, and their physico-social environment.

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Out of the life-structure from infancy to adulthood gradually develops certain conceptions concerning the world we live in; first, certain fundamental questions arise in the mind, such as the meaning of life, from where we have come and to where we are going. As we try to answer, or find answers to these fundamental questions, a conception concerning the world and things around us is formed. As this conception begins to be more sophisticated, it gradually forms a clearly discernible structure in the mind, which can be distinguished from the life-structure, and thus can be termed 'world-structure'. As soon as this new structure is established within the world view, it begins to function in conjunction with the lifestructure and vice versa. In fact, all the structures of a worldview operate in relation to each other.. None of them cari operate independently; hence, our treatment of them independently is. only a logical analysis of a worldview. Otherwise, it is not intended to establish each structure independently. The emergence of other structures as logically discernible manifestations of a worldview has no fixed order. It may even be possible for certain worldviews to have the rest of the structures as potential mental conceptions within the world and life-structures. Hence, they may remain within them as mere sub-structures. But if the worldview is transparent, it will be possible to analyze within it, first, a 'knowledge-structure', which is a direct extension of the world-structure. Then, either the worldstructure or the knowledge-structure, or the cbmbinatio:t:J. of the two plus the life-structure will eventually lead to a sophisticated concept of morality, which can be discernible as the 'value-structure'. From the composition of such a transparent worldview, it is possible to infer a fifth structure as well, to which we shall refer as the 'man-structure'. In the value-structure we may find moral concepts and/or ideas, doctrines, and depending on the kind of worldview, we may also have ourreligious and legal conceptions in this structure. In the man-structure, on the other hand, we have our conceptions of ourselves, as well as of the society and the societal organization. Let us try to apply our theory concerning the structures of a worldview to the Islamic world view. I hope that our application will clarify also what is meant by each structure. Since the life-structure is 78

grounded in human biology, it will have the most common elements with all other worldviews, and as such the life-structure of the Islamic worldview is its aspect that is most dominant in the Islamic cultural activities. The world-structure is that aspect of the Islamic worldview which includes the most fundamental elements, such as the idea of God, prophethood, resurrection and the ideas of religion and the hereafter, akhirah. We do not mean that these are the only fundamental concepts of the Islamic worldview because each structure by itself represents a doctrinal element which includes within itself many other fundamental Islamic key terminology. But the extensions of these key concepts and terminology constitute substructures; hence, there lie many substructm~es within the basic structures of the Islamic worldview which may not be "so fundamental and as a result differences of opinion in those substructural elements can be allowed. As an extension of the world-structure, knowledge-structure is also a fundamental doctrinal element, which is represented by the umbrella term 'ilm. This structure includes within itself the key scientific terminology of Islamic science and as such it is extremely important in this context. We call this network of the key scientific Islamic terminology the 'Islamic scientific conceptual scheme', which will be dealt with in detail below. The value-structure in the Islamic worldview, on the other hand, includes moral, ethical and legal practices. But since the concept of law in the early Islamic worldview is closely linked with the world'-structure, it naturally included religious law, which cannot be devoid of moral content. Hence, law, religion and morality are manifested as an integral part of one structure. This conceptual understanding of law, religion and morality never brought about a sharp distinction between the three. As a result, there has never been a thinker who developed an ethical philosophy independently of Islam as a religion. In fact there can be no ethical philosophy within the Islamic world view, since ethics is integrally combined with religion. If there is a book on ethical philosophy by a Muslim philosopher, we can very safely identify its alien origin, such as Miskawayh's Tahdhib al-Akhliiq. The same is true of law and legal philosophy. The corollary to this fact is thatfiqh cannot be translated into English simply as 'law', for fiqh includes religion, law and morality so 79

integrally that the one cannot be without the others. Of course, usually many concepts of a worldview cannot be translated into the concepts of another worldview. But there may be concepts in each worldview that can correspond to their related concepts. In this case the concept of law in English as represented within the Western worldview, corresponds, not wholly, but partially, the concept ofjiqh within the Islamic worldview. Finally, the man-structure is represented within the Islamic worldview by the concepts of khalifah and ummah. As such this structure manifests the Islamic understanding of man and society, which is totally grounded in the world-structure because, again, even these conceptions themselves are derived from the concepts of taw/:lfd, prophethood, religion and iikhirah. Since it is not our aim here to expound these conceptions of Islam, we do not concentrate on their exposition. Only their nature so far as it is related to the concept of worldview as we explained here is sufficient. Each structure in a worldview, therefore, has a specific function in life and in human activities. This point can be explained from another perspective as well; let us assume a worldviewin which the knowledgestructure is not discernible as a manifest mentality. In such a case, there will not ensue any scientific activity from the individual having such a worldview. There will not be. in that.worldview any scientific concepts that can form a scientific framework for the mind to work in. As a result, there will be no scientific attitude, nor any scientific tradition that can support such activities. In fact, if there is no knowledge-structure within a worldview, then that world view can only be analyzed into its life and world-structures. For it is the scientific activity which manifests other structures as analyzable units of a worldview; if there is no such activity those structures cannot be developed to such an extent that they become manifest in their respective worldviews. This does not mean that a world view without a manifest knowledge-structure lacks a value system, or a man-structure that acts as the ground of social and political activities; on the contrary, all these activities will be carried out and regulated by a world-structure that may acquire a degree of sophistication within its respec.;tive worldview. But it cannot acquire the level of sophistication manifested in such scientific worldviews that can adequately be analyzed into their knowledge, value and man-structures. This is where the 80

significance of transparent (quasi-scientific and scientific) worldviews lies. For it is only these worldviews that can clearly be analyzed into their manifest structures. Worldviews, therefore, function primarily as general schemes through which we perceive everything, including ourselves. In this respect, their function is to put our conception into a unified whole. Whenever we philosophize, or construct a theory, we inevitably and necessarily, by the very nature of our mind, presuppose a world view. This function of worldviews is elaborated here with regard to the nature of our faculty of knowledge, and hence, it can be designated as the 'epistemological function'. We shall now try to demonstrate this with an illustration. 13 As we have pointed out, just as the environment of any human activity is the worldview within which that activity is carried out, since our scientific activities cannot be without an environment, its environment within which it takes place is also a part of the worldview. That part of worldview which acts as the ground for all scientific activities we have named 'knowledge-structure'. In order to illustrate more clearly the epistemological function of worldviews, we may argue in this respect that every human activity emerges out of an observable and non-observable foundation. We mean by 'foundation', "the reasons and intentions underlying the act, disposition ofthe agent and whatever justification may be given for his action". Afoundation of an action is, therefore, "all the observable and non-observable phenomena assumed to be taking placein relation to that action in the mind, body and surroundings of the person in question, either at the time of his performing the action, or at times prior to its performance". By observable foundation, on the other hand, we mean "whatever preceding action, behavior, disposition and events given as either reason or condition for the action performed". By non-observable foundation, on the other hand, we mean "all the mental operations and dispositions leading to that action considered as either justification for or causes of it".

13 This section of our treatment of worldviews is primarily base on our monograph Islamic Science: Towards A Definition (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996), especially Ch. I. 81

In order to clarify this, we may give the following analogy: a student who cheats may be said to be cheating because he is selfish, dishonest, and because of the circumstances which led him to that undesirable action. We consider all these and similar motives or circumstances underlying the act to be the observable foundation, because they can be observed either directly or indirectly within the action itself. Yet there are also certain other mental conditions that lead the student in question to his action, such as his conception of cheating and the placement of that concept within his worldview. As these are the non-observable foundation for his action, they can only be inferred by intellectual cognition. Upon analyzing that acti'on, therefore, it is possible to distinguish three elements constituting the performance of it: 1. The mental framework within which the action is conceptualized prior to its performance; 2. Certain physiological and environmental conditions leading to the action, and we would like to broaden the scope of these elements by not limiting them just to the environmental and physiological conditions; 3. The performance of the action itself.

As it is seen in our analogy, the development of these foundations in the individual's life must take place in different ways, but in relation to each other. The mental framework, for instance, does not develop instantly, though the action itself is performed at an instance. Even the environmental and physiological conditions may develop instantly, yet in relation to the mental framework and the performance of the action. In fact, the mental framework is the general framework which includes the totality of concepts and mentalities developed by the individual throughout his life, and as such it constitutes what we have called here 'world view'. Since every related concept. and event is evaluated within a certain worldview before a decision is taken to perform the action, it must be the priormost condition of any action. From the foregoing analysis it is possible to reach a general definition of worldview: A worldview is that vision of reality and truth, which, as an architectonic mental unity, acts as the non82

observable foundation of all human conduct, and as the general framework out of which follow scientific and technological activities.

Since we take worldview to be the priormost foundation of any action, we conclude from this that every human action, including scientific activities, is ultimately traceable to its worldview; and as such it is reducible ultimately to that worldview. But unfortunately this foundation of human conduct cannot be perceived by observation directly and as a result, it can be over viewed easily; in order to emphasize this fact we called a worldview the 'non-observable foundation', or to use our other term, the 'environment' of human actions. It must have become clear by now that by· the environment we do not mean the physical surrounding. On the contrary, physical surrounding is only the observable environment; whereas the worldview is the discernible environment, and as such it can be t~rmed 'non-obst:.rvable foundation of human activities', including, of course, the scientific activities as well. Therefore, it can be termed 'the conceptual environment' as well. Our exposition of the concept of worldview thus brings us to the conclusion that science arises within certain worldviews only. This conclusion has other implications as well, besides clearly pointing to the fact that in certain worldviews no science can arise. The proper environment for the rise of sciences means only the adequate worldvieW within which there is a possibility for the flourishing of sciences. Such a worldview is the one in which, first of all, a sophisticated knowledge-structure has emerged. Then, as a result of this, a sophisticated network of key scientific terms, which we call 'scientific conceptual scheme' is established by the early scholars of that society in · which that worldview predominates. This leads us to conclude that although our scientific activities ultimately derives from our worldview, they do not directly follow out of it. For there is a need for another framework which directly supports such activities. Since this second framework is within the worldview itself and as an extension of it depends on the knowledge-structure, we shall term it the 'inner framework of scientific activities'. We shall now embark upon the exposition of this

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mental structure and how it functions in the process of acquiring scientific knowledge. B." THE INNER FRAMEWORK: THE GENERAL SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTUAL SCHEME Before we begin our exposition we must clarify that the epistemology of science we are developing here is a historical exposition, namely we analyze the scientific activities which have taken place so far in history and especially in the history of our case study civilizations, with more emphasis on Islamic civiliz~:,ttion. Hence, it does not represent an absolutely universal epistemology of science. In fact, our exposition should clarify at the same time that there cannot be such a universal epistemology because science is not a universal human phenomenon though, as Aristotle also rightly states, man by nature inquires to know. Such natural and universal aspects of man sometimes confuses us that the activity resulting from such universal human characteristics is also universal in the absolute sense. For it can be a universal phenomenon that man by nature inquires to know but the way humans attempt to know are diversified; hence, the way we do it is not so naturally and absolutely universal. As a result, what one calls science in a certain culture and a worldview may not be so called irt another. Usually those who argue against this stand try to .exhibit the similarities between scientific activities in different civilizations, such as the Islamic and the Western. 14 But they fail to see that since Islamic science was greatly influenced from the. Greek science, and in turn the Western science is greatly influence from the Islamic science, they have a considerable amount of similarities. Of course some of these similarities cannot come as a result of cultural and 'scientific influences alone; for as we have shown, the faculties of knowledge function alike in all humans. For this reason it is not only natural but also inevitable that there should exist some similarities between scientific activities of different 14Among these the worst representative is Pervez Hoodbhoy's Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality (Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed & Co., 1992).

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civilizations. Once this is understood then we can show how scientific knowledge emerges in a given society. This has two aspects: epistemological; and social. The former constitutes what we have been doing in this chapter as the epistemology of science. The latter is what we shall do in the next chapter as the sociology of science. For our scientific activities are governed not only by our faculties of knowledge, but as a human phenomenon occurring within a certain group of people, called either 'scientists' or 'scholars', it must also be governed by the social constitution of this society or community of scientists. Hence, scientific activities emerge out of an epistemological and sociological constitution of humans. This is also the case with the concept of science in Islam. Without developing these two grounds of scientific activities we cannot investigate how the term 'ilm came to mean science and how scientific activities began in Islam. Our epistemology of science suggests that a worldview suitable for the rise of scientific activities must be established first; then such a worldview will have a sophisticated concept of knowledge, which lays down an adequate epistemological ground to carry out such activities. When this takes place the scientists or scholars involved- will develop a technical vocabulary and a specific language for such activities. It is the network of these concepts a~d the vocabulary that we term here 'scientific conceptual scheme'. Since in this section we are dealing with the general nature of this scheme we will try to give a sketch of it with very broad concepts, in order to include every scientific activity of different civilizations. In fact, the concept of worldview .in the epistemological sense was also outlined in this general approach so that in the subsequent chapters we shall attempt to analyze how this took place in the Islamic civilization. Let us first show the results of our epistemology of science on a table. (See Table 4 on page 86.) If it is the knowledge-structure in a worldview that priniarily supports our scientific activities in the epistemological sense, then the first thing that such a structure will have is a sound definition of knowledge which not ·only puts a great emphasis on this concept but also yields in the minds of . individuals of a given society a general framework of a theory of knowledge. This means that the primary concept that provides a framework for, 85

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WORLDVIEW Table4 and is an epistemic ground of any scientific conceptual scheme is the cqncept of knowledge. This is because science itself is fundamentally a knowledge seeking activity; if no solid ground is established for this knowledge-seeking activity, it will remain. as a mere natural curiosity to

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know, and hence, can never emerge as a disciplinary approach that yields a coherent body of knowledge which we call 'science'. The concept of know ledge, then is the fundamental doctrinal element in any scientific scheme. But when we examine the past scientific activities, we can see that concept of knowledge yields the concept of truth, for the primary aim is the true knowledge, which in turn leads to the concept of method because we would like to know how such true knowledge can be attained. Therefore, knowledge, truth and method are three essentially interconnected concepts that must be developed first as a general sketch within the knowledge-structure, and then as a fundamental scientific theory in the scientific conceptual vocabulary. Moreover, as the scientific activities continue, scholars will gradually begin to make a distinction between 'personal opinions' and 'scientific opinions', as a result of which emerges the concept of theory. It is these four fundamental concepts that yield in the mind of scholars a consciousness that the activity they carry out actually. constitutes a disciple because it leads to an organized and systematic body of knowledge, which eventually yields the concept of science. The body of general scientific nomenclature, therefore, developed by the scientists and scholars constitutes what we call 'scientific con~eptual scheme', and as such it inclpdes in general five fundamental concepts: knowledge, truth, method, theory and science. These are the general concepts that every scientific tradition in history has so far developed; but besides these fundamental doctrinal scientific concepts, each scientific tradition developed in its scientific conceptual scheme many other such concepts. We shall give the following example from the Islamic case, without discussing them in this context (see Chapter 4 and 5): 'ilm, u~ul, ra 'y, ijtihiid, qiyii:,", fiqh, 'ctql, qalb, idriik, wahm, tadabbur, .fikr, na1.ar, (tikmah, yaqin, walJ,y, tafsir, ta 'wil, 'iilam, kaliim, nufq, '{.ann, fwqq, biitil, ~idq, kidhb, wujud, 'adam, dahr, ~amad, sarmad, azal, abad, khalq, khulq,firdsah,fi,trah, .tabi'ah, ikhtiyfir, kisb, khayr, sharr, IJ,aliil, IJ,ardm, wiijib, mumkin, amr, imfin, and iriidah. We shall, then, discuss in this context only the five doctrinal concept that are found in the scientific conceptual schemes of all scientific activities that took place in history. There are at least three civilizations in human history 87

which gave rise to the emergence of sciences: the Ancient Greek, the Islamic and the Western. We shall try to snow examples from these three civilizations wherever lt may be convenient to do so.

1. The Concept of Knowledge "All me~ by nature desire to know." 15 But this natural desire leads us only to some extent, and when knowing becomes a burden to try to discover the inner nature of things, it leaves us and another inclination takes over, whfch is the desire for truth, not just for knowledge in general but rather for the knowledge that satisfies us in discovering the true nature of things. In this manner, perhaps the most significant development is the emphasis laid on knowledge, butno longer in general, rather knowledge as a concept. This will naturally lead to inquire into the concept of knowledge itself. This development seems so general that in tQ.e Ancient philosophy we find this attempt, in Islam, and in the western scientific tradition we also find it. But among these three traditions it seems Islam that lays a fundamental emphasis on this concept. For this reason Rosenthal collected more than a hundred definitions of knowledge all of which he classified under twelve categories. 16 As we have pointed out, through historical scientific progress the general concept of knowledge gradually leaves place for a more specific concept of knowledge; that is knowledge in a more systematic sense. This conception of knowledge is scientific, of course it need not be identical in every world view, or civilization. For example the scientific conception of knowledge in Islam is different from that of the Greek. If this kind of e development takes place in the scientific activities of a specific culture or civilization, then the idea of scientific knowledge can emerge. In this sense, knowledge no longer means the general desire to know, but rather a systematic attempt to understand ourselves and the universe in which we live.. Therefore, scientific knowledge is clearly distinguished from the knowledge in geheral at this stage. Every

IS Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980 a. I6Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), 46-69. 88

civilization in which sciences emerged passed through this stage. Let us take our example from the Hellenic civilization. Initially knowledge meant for the Greek scholars a general understanding of things without any qualification. Such is the case with the. Greek mythology, even the Homeric epics and the poems of Hesiod. In these literary works, we do find attempts to understand man and his position in the universe; in particular we find attempts to explain the origin of the world. But as we come to the time of Thales, knowledge no longer takes this general characteristic; it is rather understood as 'wisdom', and the attempt to acquire knowledge already has a name: philo sophia. This means that there is already a consciousness to grasp these efforts as a systematic attempt to understand reality. Therefore, in this sense, knowledge is understood as scientific knowledge. That is why by the time of Aristotle, the term episteme is already invented for such uses. How this conceptual scientific development took place in Islam as reflected in .the concept of 'ilm will be investigated in Chapter 4. Therefore, there is no need to discuss it in this context. But we hope that it is clear how this conceptual development takes place in the scientific activities of a civilization so tha~ it leads to the emergence of a technical concept of knowledge which, as an umbrella concept, makes up a significant aspect of the scientific conceptual scheme of such scientific activities.

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2. The Concept of Truth By the time a scientific activity n~aches this concept it must have achieved a considerable scientific progress. For jnstance, in case of the Greek civilization, when this concept becomes a part of the scientific scheme Parmenides already appeared in this tradition. It is natural for a scientific tradition to develop this concept because without it true knowledge cannot be differentiated from the knowledge in general. In fact, scientific knowledge takes on the character of true knowledge in almost all the three traditions cited here; i.e., the Greek, Islamic and the Western. But in the Greek case, again, by the time of Socrates and the Sophists this debate intensifies. Plato even devotes a dialogue (Theaetetus) for this purpose. In Islam also we have a similar attempt but only after the emergence of a scientific tradition towards the end of the second century (A.H.). This is 89

natural because, as we pointed out," a sophisticated conception of knowledge is needed for such a discourse on truth. The concept of truth in the scientific conceptual scheme does not mean what truth means in everyday life; it is as such a scientific term-. Its meaning as a technical scientific term may change depending on the conceptual environment of the concept in question. In the Greek and Western philosophical context, for example, it has a logical connotation applied to propositions. Of course in the earlier phase of these traditions its logical connotation is not much emphasized. Parmenides, for instance, argued that the common man never notices being, because he goes merely by sense-perception. Sense-perception can acquire only becoming, which is actually an illusion on the part of the senses. Hence, the information about becoming is only an opinion not the Truth for the way of the Truth is Being , which is perceived only by Reason. He thus clearly assigns truth to our mind and establishes a link between it and Being. It is perhaps Plato who, as a result of the Parmenidean approach, saw the connection between truth as a logical property, and the mind. Then, Aristotle established logic as a specific discipline to study truth as a property of propositions. In this way, as we can see, the concept of truth became an integral part of the Greek scientific conceptual scheme. In Islam this development took place differently, and as a result, l:zaqq came to mean at once truth and reality. We shall discuss this development in Chapter 4. 3. The Concept of Method

If the term 'knowledge' in the scientific conceptual scheme is released from its everyday connotation, and means rather 'scientific knowledge', then this new emerging concept of knowledge requires a different way, or manner through which scientific knowledge is acquired. Therefore, the way we acquire knowledge in everyday life is the same as the way we acquire knowledge ,in the scientific sense in so far as the natural operations of the mind concerned; in other words, the scientist does not have a different mind, but he has developed different ways and manners, or rather techniques to acquire scientific kno-yvledge. For, as we have said, scientific knowledge is orderly and systematic knowledge; if so, its acquisition must also be orderly and systematic. This necessarily requires 90

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a new way of going about to acquire knowledge. If a scientific tradition develops this idea, then it will come up with a new concept, known in the history of sciences as 'method', When we examine, again, the three civilizations in their scientific tradition, then we shall see that in the earlier periods of their history they developed a concept of method. Of course, in the earlier phases of its history, the concept of method will be defined in a simple and may be even primitive way. But later it acquired a considerable sophistication; in fact the Western tradition has achieved this to a greater extent. In Islamic scientific conceptual scheme, the term u~ul was developed to undertake this function, which will be discussed again in Chapter 4. We must realize, however, the way a certain tradition conceives the concept of method may not necessarily be the same as another scientific tradition. This is because, since the concept of method is developed within a certain scientific conceptual scheme, it is necessarily connected to a knowledge-structure, which is in turn, necessarily connected to a certain worldview. Therefore, the concept of method, just like any other scientific concepts in a scientific conceptual scheme, will necessarily carry the color of its knowledge-structure and its worldview. Even if this concept is borrowed from another scientific tradition, it cannot be borrowed without a. transformation of a kind into its new conceptual environment and context, i. e., its worldview, knowledge-structure and scientific conceptual scheme. Moreover, this concept as a doctrinal ground within the sciehtific conceptual scheme is quite general and as such does not have to be the same in every specific science: Hence, as it is applied in theology may be, and in fact, is necessarily, different from its application in, for example, philosophy, or chemistry, or mathematics. We must remember that concepts in this scheme are general and as such they are held as part of the scientific tradition in the mentalities of the scientists who acquire them through their scientific training.

4. The Concept of Theory Closely connected with the concept of truth and method is the concept of theory in any scientific conceptual scheme. For, if the aim of scientific knowledge is truth, then there is a need for a scientific method. But 91

suppose that when one applies this method still there are other scientists who are not satisfied whether the knowledge formulated is true or not. Let us point out in this connection that, as we can see here, any scientific conceptual scheme presupposes a community of scholars, which makes the scientific knowledge as a social phenomenon primarily governed by the scientists. This brings forth the social character of scientific knowledge and as such it must be governed by the subjectivity of such a community. It becomes inevitable in this context to launch the concept of 'provisional scientific knowledge' which means in the technical vocabulary of almost all scientific traditions that l):ind of scientific knowledge whose truth has not yet been established conclusively. That is why scientists prefer not to call such pieces of formulations 'knowledge', and thus they term it 'theory'. The way the concept of theory js defined can be different from one scientific tradition to another. But usually it is understood that a theory is a provisional formulation of truth reached after applying a certain scientific method. Again, the concept of theory may be different depending on the discipline in which it is formulated. 5. The Concept of Science

When the scientific activities in a ~ertain society reaches the stage of clearly defining the concepts of know ledge in the sense of especially scientific knowledge, truth, method and theory, usually the scientists in that society gradually become aware that the subjects they are investigating constitute specific disciplines. This is required not only by the epistemological constitution of our mind, but also the practical approach in dividing the subjects of investigation. In the first place, as we have indicated, our intellect has a natural operation to classify things, not only· things but also subjects we investigate, concepts we develop and so ·on. This is just another way we can think, namely by classifying things and concepts. Therefore, when subjects of investigation also diversifies we naturally .tend to classify them. Once this classification is applied, individual sciences naturally emerge, and as a result, the concept of science comes fore. 92

Secondly, when the subjects of investigation diversifies in a complicated way, we naturally think, for practical purposes, to classify these subjects. When this is done, again we face the same concept, science. Therefore, it is natural for any scientific tradition to come up with some kind of a concept of science. If the scientific activities in a given society do not give rise to this concept no scientific tradition can be established in that society. For this reason, the concept of science is essential for a scientific conceptual scheme, without which subjects of investigation cannot be conceived as individual disciplines.

C. THE SPECIFIC FRAMEWORK: THE ~PECIFIC SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTUAL SCHEME If scientific activities are examined from an epistemological perspective, as we have done here, it will be observed that they emerge primarily from the constitution of our mind which works within three frameworks that it has built for itself. The first two frameworks have been discussed as the worldview (the general framework) and the scientific conceptual scheme (the inner framework). The thirdone is also a scientific conceptual scheme but one that is used in a specific discipline, and as such in can also be called 'specific scientific conlceptual scheme'. It is this scheme that is also identif~ed as 'specific framework'. The specific scientific conceptual scheme, as the specific framework, includes in itself the nomenclature of a specific science. Obviously without such a nomenclature no science can be developed. For example, the network of the technical terms and scientific concepts used in Aristotle's physics constitutes its specific framework. The general scientific conceptual scheme as the inner framework of his physics is the network of scientific concepts and the waythey are conceptualized within the Greek scientific tradition of hjs time; the general framework, as his worldview, is the Aristotelian system. Let us give another general example from the Islamic scientific tradition: the technical vocabulary and the theological concepts utilized in kaliim are the specific scientific conceptual scheme of kaliim; the web of the general scientific vocabulary that is utilized in all 93

Islamic sciences is the scientific conceptual scheme as the inner framework of kaliim; and finally the Islamic worldview is the general framework of it. If we try to compare kaUim with Aristotelian theology, we will see fundamental differences. These differences come primarily from the Islamic worldview and the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme. When sciences of difference civilizations are compared and contrasted in this way~ it is possible to trace the most differences to their respective general frameworks; the lesser differences will be traced bac_k to their respective scientific conceptual schemes; and finally the least differences will be found in their specific scientific conceptual schemes, which means with respect to their specific schemes they will have the most similarities. This is because if the worldview~ of both scientific traditions exhibit many differences, this will be I:clkcted on the scientific work itself; but if the two respective worldviews are not so much diversified, obviously the differences in their respective sciences will also be propmtionately less. It must be clear that by the specific framework we mean the technical concepts which form a network of conceptual scheme in a specific science. Since such concepts will he rnu~tly different in every science there is no need to cite them individually in this context. We must point out, however, that a concept in one of the sciences can pe used in another science; hence, there can be a common terminology in different sciences. But as we know, in most cases, terms used in every science differ. Sometimes the same concept may mean different in another science.

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CHAPTER THREE THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE There are some sociologists who claim that science is a social institution, and as such there is an obvious need to study it from this perspective. 1 It is this study which they term 'sociology of science'. In this sense, they argue that the sociology of science is concerned with the social structure of science in order to define the nature of scientific ideas and describe their relations both to other kinds of ideas, such as philosophical, theological and aesthetic, and to various institutional and personality factors. 2 This cannot be acceptable to us; for if science is defined as primarily a body of organized knowledge, as we _have done in the Introduction, it· cannot be defined at the same time as a social institution. There are certain social institutions which make for the emergence and development of science; but this cannot render science, as discipline, a social institution. If science cannot be defined as a social institution, then obviously sociology cannot deal with its nature and structure. The main reason for this is that as a body of organized knowledge, science is primarily a cognitive activity and · as such its real nature can be dealt with only in the epistemology of science, which can be taken as a branch, or even simply a subject, in the philosophy of science. Almost all sociologists dealing with science never take into account the epistemology of science. If we do not consider how we acquire scientific knowledge how can we deal with its sociology? For even the sociology of science depends largely on its epistemology; this is because the nature of the scientific activity is acquiring knowledge which renders it to be a cognitive activity. Robert K. Merton notes that "the subject-matter of the sociology of science is the dynamic interdependence between science, as an ongoing social activity giving rise to cultural and civilizational products,

1 The main proponent of this thesis is Robert K. Merton; see his The Sociology of Science, ed. by Norman W. Storer (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago · Press, l973). 2 See Bernard Barber, "The Sociology of Science", Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, q. v., 92. 95

and the environing social structure." 3 Science, as a discipline, is not a social activity; if we take every human action performed within a society to be necessarily a social activity, then actions done without any relation to a social context must necessarily be considered social as well. Scientific activities of a community of scientists can be social, but its product, as a discipline can have only social aspects, because of the fact that such activities are carried out within a mental framework which is the dominant worldview of that society. The fact that science is not a social institution does not mean that it has no social aspect; for no human phenomenon can escape· the social aspect. Moreover, if we can talk of a scientific tradition we must at the same time accept that there is a community (of scientists) who establish such a tradition. In that case sociology of science must discuss primarily the nature and structure of such a community and how it can shape science. But at the same time we must state that every sociology of science must take into account the epistemology involved in scientific activities. In this sense, we can distinguish primarily three issues that are fundamental to any sociology of science: the first is to understand, interpret and disclose the real nature of the process through which a science comes toemerge within a society as a discipline, which we shall identify as the scient(fic process; the second issue is to understa_nd the nature and the social character of the group of scholars who are actively engaged in scientific activities, to which we shall appropriate the already existing term scient(fic community; and finally the social process that shape at least one aspect of science; the nature and emergence of the scientific tradition. In the first section of this chapter, therefore, we shall discuss the process through which sciences emerge, viz., the scientific process. Since this process may sometimes take years, usually generations of scientists are involved in its development. As a result, not only a group of scholars at a particular time, but rather a group of generations of scholars in a seql:lence of time periods may involve in the scientific process. If there is no uniformity in the social and epistemological structure of these scientists, there cannot be a uniformly organized body of knowledge called 3 Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 585. 96

science. If, on the other hand, there is a uniformity between these scholars, we may, lacking a better one, adopt the term community, since at least one significant aspect of a community is uniformity; especially if this uniformity is of a social· character, then we can talk of a community with some justification. The exact nature of this will make up our topic in the second section. Then, in the third section, we shall discuss the nature and emergence of a scientific tradition in a society.

A. THE SCIENTIFIC PROCESS As we have argued above in establishing a science usually there involve many scholars who form a uniform group that can be called 'scientific community'. In order to see how this community is formed gradually through a natural process, we can just imagine the earliest human history when there is absolutely no science. We do see, however, that at some point in history there arose those who are simply interested in knowing certain problems in a way others do not know. There are many modes in which we can know things; but there is one way of knowing things, which is not only systematic and organized, but also it questions its own findings. In other words, this way of knowing is not satisfied by just having an information about the subject of inquiry, it rather questio~s it and analyzes its findings, if'any, or else its own mode of handling the inquiry so that it can actually know the thing as it is. If in this way some one establishes himself, there usually grows around him a group of interested disciples who are also interested knowing things the way the Master knows things. As soon as this happens, then this group of people have a good chance of establishing a tradition of studying things in order to know them in a way that is different from the ordinary way of knowing things. Let us suppose that this group of people who are interested in knowing things ·as they really are have established a tradition. Usually, as we have argued in the second chapter, we name something in order to be able to communicate about it, as this is also one natural operation of our intellect to name things in order to produce concepts about them. The tradition thus established also will be named becau~e as we have said these groups of 97

people are interested in knowing things in a way that is different from other types of knovying. In that case they will give a name to it, i. e., they will produce a concept expressing their activity so that they can distinguish it from other activities of knowing. We usually choose names, or concepts from the related activity; since the activity is knowing, the best name for this tradition is also knowing. That is why in the Greek tradition Aristotle gave the name episteme for science; in Islam first, as we shall see, the term fiqh (to grasp, comprehend, which still means 'to know differently'), then 'ilm is used to name sciences; in the Western scientific tradition also the Latin term scientia is used for this purpose. The time that passes in this naming of the activity varies from civilization to civilization. In the Greek case, for example it took almost five hundred years until Aristotle finally came up with this name; in the Islamic case, if we take the date of the first Revelation, 610 A.D., as the starting point, w_e can say that it took about 150-200 years until the term .fiqh is used in this technical sense (we shall investigate the history of this usage in the following chapter). This means that it takes not only a scientific community to establish sciences, but also the nature of our faculties of knowledge is required in this process. We may illustrate this on the basis of our historical account: the first master gathers students around him, then some of these students also establish themselves as authorities in knowing. They may begin teaching their learning even when still th.eir master is alive, and thus carry the characteristics of his circle to other newly emerging groups of people interested in knowing things as they are. Then, this process will obviously continue with the same epistemological background in such a way that always the newly emerging groups of people interested in knowing will carry the characteristics of their masters' teachings. Let us assume that after the Ninth Master who came, say, 350 years after the first one, a tradition of learning emerged and it was named 'scientific tradition'. Then, all the scholars involved in this process constitute the scientU'ic community. They do not come together with the intention of establishing such a community; but rather it is in our nature that when we see certain common elements between our fellow human beings we try to be with them, a phenomenon which naturally leads to the establishment of a community. In this case the most 98

striking elements are first our epistemological constitution, second our desire to know which now has been identified as knowing scientifically and third to help each other in this activity of knowing. The third element can be identified as social; for one significant factor in forming societies is the need for help from other fellow human beings. By the first element, namely our epistemological constitution, on the other hand, we mean the need for an accumulation of some organized knowledge, so that we can built new ones on this basis. If there is no such accumulation we can not produce new knowledge. We must realize that the subjects investigated are scattered in t~e first years of a scientific tradition and, therefore, they do not constitute as yet one specific discipline. But after a long period of time, when these subjects accumulate in such a way that they cause many problems in handling them systematically. Since it is the nature of our mind to perceive things in a unity of a system, the scientists of a scientific community cannot continue their investigation unless they begin to organize, systematize and thus to classify the findings of their community. If they achieve this then they will see that each subject of study constitutes a specific discipline. If, however;they cannot achieve this, then no science will be established in that scientific tradition. For by science we understand primarily a discipline, which is distinctly something other than a human activity; it is rather the product of an activity. This means that science cannot be defined as a behavior, as some behaviorists tried to do. A scientific behavior is, therefore, not science, nor is a scientific activity science. For science is only a body of knowledge produced by such activities that it eventually constitutes a discipline. When a scientific tradition thus produces a classification of its subjects of investigation, each subject is named in this 'classification and thus is identified as a specific discipline. This process as it begins from the flrst master of a tradition seems to exhibit stages which cari be entitled 'scientific stages'. First, as we have seen, the first master lays down certain scientific principles that make up the initial cultural mores of that scientific community, which acquire a general acceptance by the subsequent followers who in turn carry this tradition to their students. This way the scattered and discrete studies begin to acquire a unity. The 99

body of collected knowledge thus acquires the status of a discipline. Then, in this process, a scientist gives a name to that discipline, either according to its subject matter, or its method. A discipline is, therefore, a study with a certain method, but not necessarily a well-defined and clear-cut subject matter, although the purpose of the study does assign it a general and loosely defined subject matter. But a science is a discipline with a welldefined subject matter, method, theories and an accumulated body of scientific knowledge. When a body of knowledge acquires the status of a discipline, it may also begin to accumulate theories formulated according to its method, and thus become a candidate to be called a science. It is this developmental stages of a body of knowledge into a unified body of knowledge, and then into a science that we call 'scientific process'. This process can be taken as a social phenomenon, but not governed primarily by social regulations, rather by the scientific rules laid down by the community of the scientists involved. On the other hand, since it is also a process of acquiring knowledge, it is, in this sense, primarily governed by the human epistemological constitution. Hence, we distinguish primarily three stages in the scientific process through which sciences emerge: 1. The stage of problems, where scattered and discrete studies of various problems are carried out for a period of time; 2. The stage of disCiplinary tradition, where a tradition arises as a result of conventional consensus among the scholars; general subject matter and method are determined; 3. The stage of naming this scientific enterprise. If we qbserve in every society what is customarily called science in the scientific convention of the scholars involved, we shall see that what is called science is what emerges as a result of the third stage of the scientific process. It is for this reason that a sociology of science must consider the epistemology through which science emerges, though the process itself may cover many social phenomena as well, as such it falls within the proper domain of the subject matter of the sociology of science. It is for this reason that the scientific process can provide a guideline for the study of science in relation to society. In order to clarify this we shall now 100

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examine the nature and structure ofthe stages and phases of the scientific process.

1. The Stage of Problems

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Every science must pass through a preliminary stage where only certain problems are discussed in a scattered manner. This is the initial stage in which a subject matter has become a candidate to emerge as a discipline. If the knowledge-seeking activities continue in a uniform manner, then this subject matter has a greater potentiality in its future to emerge as a science. Before this subject matter, however, emerges as a science, the knowledgeseeking activities at the stage of problems cannot be called scientific. activities. This is because we.have already restricted the usage of the term 'science' to such activities in which there is a consciousness in the minds of scholars that their activity actually constitutes a discipline. Obviously at the initial stage of a science this consciousness cannot be found. For this reason it is more apt to call the scholarly activities at the stage of problems 'knowledge-seeking activities'. Historians of science have found out that in ancient Egypt and Babylon there were some scientific activities, such as units and rules of measurement, simple arithmetic, constructing a calendar of the year and measuring the periodicity of astronomic events. All these scholarly activities are named scient~fic, not because these subjects were actually formed into specific disciplines as we have them now, but rather we find some similarities between them and the scientific activities that already have the consciousness of their subject constituting a specific disGipline. Moreover, those ancient Egyptians and Babylonians did not name their activities scientific which means that they definitely lacked such a consciousness, which we identified as 'scientific consciousness'. Therefore, we can safely assert that there were no sciences in these earlier civilizations. Moreover, to claim that there were actually scientific activities in Indian and Chinese civilizations, one must be able to point to a science with a specific name; e. g. in the ancient Greece we can say that there was physics after Aristotle who gave a name to this discipline. This means' that the Greek civilization had the consciousness that a subject of study can be formed into· a discipline. What we can say at most with regard to some of 101

the ancient civilizations is that there were activities of learning, but these activities did not develop into disciplines to be named with a specific name to be called science. ·It is thus the ancient Greeks who first in human history became aware of the fact that subjects of inquiry can be formed into disciplines as organized body of knowledge in accordance with the principles and methodology developed in those subjects. They knew that their knowledge-seeking activities constituted specific disciplines which could even be named. As a result of this scientific consciousness they named such activities first philosophia, 'love of wisdom'; an expression which clearl):' refers to the activity rather than the subject of study as a discipline. It seems to have been used first by Pythagoras (c. 572-497 B.C.) by distinguishing the technical· meaning he attached to the term sophia, which is, for him, knowledge attained by contemplation rather than knowledge based on practical shrewdness and the one based on skill like that of a carpenter. What Pythagoras means.is clearly scientific knowledge which he does not name it so. It is, therefore, apt to demarcate this phase of Greek scientific development from the subsequent developments by calling it the 'stage of problems' which extends from the beginning of the Greek civilization until the time of Pythagoras, i e., 500 B. C. Then, after him begins the disciplinary stage (c. 500-300 B. C.) when more rigorous methods were invented and the subject matter of investigation is widened, as a result there is a tremendous accumulation of knowledge. Scholars contributed to this development are Panrtenides, Heraclitus, the Sophists and the Socratic thinkers, until Aristotle. With Aristotle Greek science entered its naming stage (c. 300 onwards) when many subjects of study emerged as specific disciplines. We have given this brief sketch to clarify our terminology, but in connection to the concept of science in Islam they will be applied in a detailed descriptive manner.

2. The Disciplinary Stage If the knowledge seeking activities in a society is carried out long enough,

then usually there arises a need to classify and reorganize the subject of investigation due to a great accumulation of knowledge on that subject matter. If this is not done it will be hard to handle the subject; therefore, 102

the human mind tends to classify the accumulated knowledge in such a way that it will be easy to handle the subject of investigation. This effort of reorganizing the accumulated knowledge of a subject of investigation usually leads to the rise of a new methodology; it thus gradually leads to the scientific consciousness. For if a subject niatter is conceived within a body of unity (which is the accumulated knowledge in this case) to be studied systematically in a certain manner (i. e., the method), then it is inevitable to perceive the subject matter as constituting a specific discipline. It is for this reason that this stage can be called 'disciplinary stage' in which the scientific consciousness concerning each discipline arises. The length of this stage can change from one scientific tradition to the next. Usually the disciplinary stage of a scientific process cannot be distinguished from the stage of problems at its initial level; and from thy stage of naming at its end. This is because of the uniformity of the scientific process in a scientit1c tradition: the stage of problems merge with the disciplinary stage in such a way that they cannot sharply separated from each other, and the disciplinai·y stage consolidates itself with the stage of naming in such a way that no clear cut boarder is possible between them. In fact, sometimes it is possible for any of the two stages to be merged with each other apd form only one stage. For instance, as we shall see, the development of scientific tradition is so rapid in Islamic · science that in case of kalam andfiqh, for example, the disciplinary stage and the naming stage emerge more or less as one stage. The scientific process becomes more palpable at the disciplinary stage simply because knowledge-seeking activities begin to lead already to the rise of a scientific consciousness. The scientific community involved in such activities begin to feel that certain subjects are so different from certain others that they cannot be studied by the same methodology. This way certain scholars may begin to classify subjects in such a way that it will already imply a name for each subject matter. At this level of the disciplinmy stage we can distinguish it from the stage of naming, which indeed leads to the emergence of sciences as specific disciplines. We have already explained the epistemic ground for this naming, which is expressed at the outset as 'scientific consciousness'. 103

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3. The Stage of Naming It is not actually apt to call. this final phase of the scientific process a stage. For with this stage the process ends, therefore, it may not appear in some scientific traditions as an independent stage. In the Greek case, for example, it appears as the final development in the emergence of sciences, But even in this case some sciences, such as arithmetic and geometry, tend to exhibit a scientific process in which the stage of naming is prolonged. When this happens we should not look for a specific name as the name of a science in the sense of a discipline. The name given to the science, however, may be used to refer to such activities, but obviously without specifying it as a discipline. This is usually the case also with Islamic science, as we shall see. But let us take history of mathematics with its branch, geometry, as an example. Both these sciences are still at the stage of problems when they were borrowed by the Greeks from the Egyptians and the Babylonians. Dampier, a prominent historian of science, makes the following observation: The earliest and most successful of such attempts was the conversion of the empirical rules for land surveying, mostly derived from Egypt, into the deductive science of geometry, the beginnings of which are traditionally assigned to Thales of Miietus and Pythagoras of Samos, while the final formulation in ancient times was made by Euclid of Alexandria three hundred years Iater. 4 ·

What he means here by saying "the earliest and most successful of such attempts" is those activities at the stage of problems that lead to the emergence of mathematics as a science. On the other hand, all mathematical studies during Thales and Pythagoras until the time of Euclid represents the disciplinary stage in which both the term 'mathematics' and 'geometry' were used though these sciences had not yet entered the final phase of naming, which actually came alo.ng with its proper scientific consciousness as a result of Euclid's work. Hence the scientific process · ended for the science of geometry with Euclid and this science entered into the phase of its normal development. In this case the stage of naming and the disciplinary stage converge for some time. 4 William C. Dampier. A History of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), xiv.

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Naming a science can be by a person or by a group of scientists, or a certain concept which is utilized prominently in a specific subject of inquiry can emerge as the name of a specific science in the course of its scientific process. The third is the case with such Islamic sciences asfiqh, kaliim and tafsir. But Aristotle's naming of physics, theology and many other disciplines is an example of the first case. The emergence of metaphysics as the later name of theological studies in the Aristotelian fashion is a case example of the second situation. It seems clear from this example that the scientific process which we have tried to put forward here represents only the stages of the emergence of a subject of investigation as. a science, and as such it does not deal with its later developments, nor does it deal with the process through which a branch of science emerges as an independent discipline. Moreover, it must have become clear that the scien~ific process primarily derives from the constitution of our mental faculties of knowledge. Yet it is regulated through the tradition developed by a group of scholars involved in knowledge-seeking activities. This group of scholars have a certain "set of cultural values and mores" 5 governing their activities. For this reason they constitute a community, the structure and nature of which we shall examine now.

B. THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY Our presentation of the scientific process has shown, but rather indirectly, that society has a profound influence on science. This can be seen in the epistemology of science as well, because we have demonstrated that all scientific activities are carried out within a general mental environment, called worldview. In our presentation of the scientific process we have chosen the indirect route for the reason that although the society has a profound influence on science, it is yet primarily the epistemological structure of our mind which governs the structural growth of the scientific 5 I borrow this phrase from Robert K. Merton, see The Sociology of Science, op. cit., 268. Although the use of such phrases may curtail the cognitive character of science, I must nevertheless adopt it here with caution to emphasize the social aspects of scientific activities. 105 \

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knowledge. Had we not have this epistemological structure, we would not have science in the sense of an organized body of knowledge, as a discipline, having a certain subject matter, method and theories. Therefore, we take the scientific process to be the introductory step of the sociology of science: for it is in this phenomenon that epistemology intersects with the sociology of science in so far as science in the sense of discipline is concerned. In other words, since we maintain that the scientific process is governed by the epistemology ofour faculties of knowledge, but yet it is profoundly affected by society, then it must be the phenomenon which leads us to the social aspects of science. Hence, the sociology of science we present here has taken its departure primarily from epistemology that is reflected in the scientific process as well. If it is the scientific process which enables us to take into account the epistemologicai structure of our mind, we shall, then, try to deduce also from this process that social element which furnishes science with its social aspect. We can indeed infer such an element from the scientific process, if we take into account the fact that those people involved in the process do actually form a community. If such a community can be inferred from the process through which sciences emerge, then this community as a subsystem within a certain society will carry not only the soc.ial characteristics of its socie~y but cultural ones as well. Let us, then, try to demonstrate how such a community necessarily emerges out of the socially progressing knowledge-acquisition phenomenon, which is defined here as the 'scientific process'. Our demonstration will try to Clarify at the same time the nature and the extent of the interplay between science and society. In this way we shall try to show also the affect of society on science. Before we attempt to clarify how profound the affect of society is cin science, we must draw attention to the point that we must be careful not to apply social terms to scientific activities. In other words, terms that express the collective existence of man in everyday life cannot express his collective existence outside the everyday life. This is the case with scientific activities; almost all scholars concerned with science state that the scientific knowledge is different from the everyday knowledge in that knowledge is submitted to rational scrutiny, it is organized and thus causal 106

relations among its parts are examined. If this is so it means that the terms of everyday knowledge are transformed into a different Lechnic:.il signification; as a result, the sociological terms cannot be used to express the social aspects of science. It is, therefore, not adequate to refer to principles that become dominant among the group of scientists by such social terms as 'culture', 'mores', 'ethos' and 'community' .6 These terms may cause a lack of understanding in the cognitive nature of the scientific enterprise. Therefore, one must be careful in using certain sociological terms to refer to the social aspect of science. We do employ the term community and in fact sometimes we shall apply these .terms in order to emphasize the social aspect of science based on the similarities found between these social phenomena and the scientific activities. For this reason we feel the need to caution our reader and in fact we shall try to avoid employing these ter1ns in case of science as much as possible. In fact, the term 'community' was never employed in the Islamic scientific tradition; 'ulamii ', as a scientific term, emphasizes the <;:ognitive character of the activity of a group, and as such it means "those scholars involved in scientific activities". But it seems that the term implies the idea of a community, and with some caution, therefore, it can be translated as the 'Islamic scientific community'. I

1. The Interaction Between Science and Society

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It is a mere truism to say that science affects society and society affects science. Hence, we need not reiterate this truism in this context. We shall rather show through the scientit1c process, using also the epistemological structure of our mind, as developed in the first chapter of this essay, that such an interaction is necessary. In order to do this we must first infer the existence of a community of scientists within any scientific process. On the other hand, in order to show that even the existence of such a community is required by our epistemological structure, we shall use the epistemology of science as discussed in the first chapter.

6 For .this kind of usage see ibid.; also Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 4 vols. (New York: American Book Co., 1937), and Bernard Barber, Scienceand the Social Order (New York: The Free Press, 1952). 107

· We have shown in the first place that all our scientific activities are carried out within a general frameworkcalled 'worldview'. But not every worldview is suitable for the rise of science, which is not a mere knowledge-seeking activity. For in such an activity there is no need to perceive the subject matter as constituting a discipline; whereas this kind of a perception is necessary for the unity of a subject matter so that it can be organized into a discipline. We have used the term 'scientific cons~iousness' to refer to this perception. In that case the worldview must have another framework which is able to sustain the scientific consciousness; as the inner framework of our scientific activities we have termed it the 'general scientific conceptual scheme'. The third framework, called 'specific scientific conceptual scheme', which is developed within this general scheme, is too technical and is related directly to the individual sciences; for this reason we do not have to mention it here. But epistemologically speaking, we cannot talk about the scientific conceptual scheme, whether general or particular, unless we assume the worldview which sustains it. If the development of worldview assumes a community, so does the development of the scientific scheme; but a community that is not organized like the one which contains it. We have already used a sociological term, though with a caution, to refer to it as the scient(fic community. For instance, if the general community uses a term in its everyday meaning the community involved in scientific activities does not employ it as such, it thus shifts its meaning to a more conceptual awareness. The aim and organization of the scientific community is also different from the aims and organization of the society in which it emerges. The most important distinction between the scientific community and its society lies in the distinction between the worldview and the scientific conceptual scheme of the scientific community of that society, which emerges within that worldview; hence, what ~he worldview is for its society, the scientific conceptual scheme is for its scientific community within that society. In a sense, we can say that the scientific conceptual scheme is like the worldview of the individual scientists of a scientific community. Hence, the scientist may share the same dominant worldview of a society with any other individual within that society, but besides that 108

the scientist has also two frameworks needed for his scientific activities; the general and the specific scientific conceptual schemes. Hence, the scientific community as a society within a society acquires the characteristic of having a worldview within a worldview. As a result, mutual interaction between the worldview and its scientific conceptual scheme becomes necessary. We have already tried to demonstrate this on the basis of dissemination of know ledge within a society. We may try also to show this by explaining how w0rldviews function as mentally shared frameworks. Usually in a society there :ls one worldview which is dominant; the worldview to which the majority of the people (i.e., at least 80% of the people) are attached, we call the 'dominant worldview'. It is inevitable for a society to have more worldviews besides the dominant one. In fact the ideal society is one in which the overwhelming majority (which can be defined as at least 80% of the individuals in a given society) shares a common worldview and the rest have different worldviews. This way the unity of the society can be preserved and at the same time the dorninaqt worldview is checked and corrected accordingly, because there will be debates and mutual discussions of the ideas and doctrines of these worldviews. The dominant worldview. is, therefore, the one that is common to the majority and in this sense it can also be called 'common worldview'. This does not mean that a common worldview is identical in all the individuals who participate in it. On the contrary, it is impossible for two persons to have an identical worldview. Therefore, by common worldview, we mean "all the worldviews in which most of the basic notions, assumptions and ideas are similar"._ Hence, in our terminology 'same', 'common' or 'dominant' worldviews will refer to only those worldviews that are similar with respect to at least 80% of their contents. Moreover, similarities will be overwhelming in the world-structure, i.e., in the fundamental notions and doctrines of worldviews. But in other detailed structures these similarities will be proportionately less, diminishing until there may be no similarities. On the other hand, by different worldviews, we mean worldviews in which many of the basic notions, assumptions and ideas are either foreign 109

to each other or cannot he related to each other no matter how similar they may seem to each other. In this respect different worldviews will have probably only 20% or less of their contents as similar. Of course, it is not possible to measure the percentage of a worldview; our purpose here is only to give an idea ahout the amount of similarities and differences between worldviews. This means that just as there are no identical world views, in the same way, there arc no world views that do not share at least some similar concepts, ideas and maybe e'ven some doctrines. In fact, as we have shown, since the life-structure of worldviews primarily derive from the human biology, which is universal among the human race, lifestructures in every worldview, irrespective of culture and society, will have an overwhelming amount of its contents as similar and indeed in most cases simply identical. All that is said about dominant and differing worldviews can be said about scientific schemes as well; there is usually a dominant scientific scheme of a scientific community though no two scientists can have identical schemes in every respect. But since in the construction of a scientific scheme, a rigorous cognitive process is involved, terms and concepts of such a scheme are more precisely defined as a result there will be less differences between scientific schemes than differences that may exist between worldviews. As we have pointed out, just as the environment of any human activity is the worldview within which that activity is carried out, since our scientific activities cannot be without an environment, its environment within which it takes place is also a part of the worldview. In fact all ·human activities can be ultimately traced back to a worldview; just as the doctrines and theories of a scientist can be ultimately traced back to a scientific conceptual scheme. 7 Therefore, worldview is the most general framework within which the human mind can operate in order to attain 7 I think it is the general scientific conceptual scheme which Kuhn identifies as 'paradigm', therefore, if it is compared to that notion· it may be helpful to follow what we are saying in connection to the scientific conceptual scheme, e. g. the following statement: "a paradigm is an accepted model or pattern, and that aspect of its meaning has enable me, lacking a better word; to appropriate 'paradigm'". Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 23. ]]()

knowledge, and the scientific conceptual scheme is the next broader framework within which scientific activities are carried out. As a result, the scientific scheme will shape the worldview just as it also shapes the scientific scheme. It is this point that we have tried to prove here. If this is the case, then we can conclude from this that simply based on the epistemology of the human mind our society necessarily shapes our scientific thought through our worldview which is formed within a social context. Just as the society necessarily shapes our scientific thought in the same way science also shapes the society in which it is cultivated. Let us consider a worldview which is influe~ced by scientific ideasi in such a case the concepts, views, ideas, and outlook of the worldview ~ill acquire a certain degree of clarity and distinctness. The individual, in whose mind this degree of clarity and distinctness of worldview is achieved, is called "intellectual". This clarity of concepts activates individuals towards its goals, terms, ideas and insights. These goals, ideas and insights may also be ethical, political, economic, even developmental; and thus attract individuals with some dynamism towards the implementation of these ideals with a certain degree of effectiveness. It is this dynamism that is . vital for the development of a society, whether in sciences or any other crucial human affair; and it is this progressive development in the intellectual life of a society 'that we call the "civilizational function of worldviews" through the scientific scheme. Usually civilizations arise as a result of this progressive advancement in the minds of individuals, because, as Rosenthal acknowledges "civilizations tend to revolve around meaningful concepts of an abstract nature which more than anything else give them their distinctive character. Such [scientific] concepts are to be found at the very b~ginning of a rising civilization". 8 Our conclusion must point at the same time to the crucial role philosophy as a science may play in a society, and more particularly if developed within the Qur' anic context, in the Muslim society as well, because it is philosophy that

8 Franz Rosenthal. Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970),' I. 11 I

examines the concept of world view, calling it. 'system'. Whitehead is the philosopher who resolutely points to this phenomenon: In all systematic thought, there is a tinge of pedantry. There is a putting aside of notions, of experiences, and of suggestions, with the prime excuse that of course we are not thinking of such things. System is important. It is necessary for the handling, for the utilization, and for the criticism of the thoughts which throng into our experience. 9 ... Such a habit of mind is the very essence of civilization. It is civilization.IO

The common worldview of a given society sometimes has a vague and unsystematic character which we called 'natural worldviews'. Sometimes almost no individual of a given society has a specific, clear and systematic worldview, in which case the society as a whole lacks a transparent worldview. This is the downfall of that society; it can never establish its own identity, nor can it ever manifest itself. What is more acute and devastating is the ambiguity that begins to overwhelm ethical concepts and judgments. This state of. affairs comes about as the consequence of intellectual poverty, which is what sociologists and economists call 'underdevelopment'. This evil state of affairs can be remedied and the society can thus be set to development, only if a clear and systematic worldview is established for the society, which has been described in the second chapter a~ the scientific-world-view-formation. Only then the individual begins to acquire a clear outline of program and procedure for life. This task is achieved only by a reflective thinking called 'philosophy'. Since, through philosophical thinking, the society restores a new scientifically-formed worldview, while the individuals, having clear and distinct concepts and ideas within a systematic unity, become morally and intellectually dynamic, which in turn yields a progressive and knowledge-oriented society, as it was the case with the early Islamic civilization. If this brief description tells us how scientific and transparent worldviews lead to civilizational advancement, then the crucial impact of science on society is at the same time established. No society is static or stable; there is always 9 Alfred North Whitehead. Modes of Thought (N~w York: The Free Press, 1938), 2. lOibid., 3. l12

some social change which results in the change of individuals. The worldview of a society must renew itself in parall~lline with the scientific knowledge; otherwise it will no longer satisfy the individuals of that society and slow down the process of civilizational advancement bringing it eventually to a halt. I have tried to outline only the most significant role of worldviews in a society in general. When we consider Muslim communities, this significance does not decrease; on the contrary it becomes the utmost important task of a Muslim to answer such abstract questions as: what is science and knowledge in Islam? What is Islam's attitude towards modern science? What does the Qur'anic terms /:likmah and 'ilm give to the contemporary man? How does Islam provide solution to the predicament of modern man? What is life for a Muslim? What is man and his place in the universe? etc. All these questions must be answered systematically within a unified Islamic worldview so that the result of civilizational development can be achieved. Since a worldview endows our ideas with unity, the unique Islamic goal, identified as taw/:lid, i.e., unity, can be accomplished as well in the most perfect way as described in the Qur' an. In order to illustrate our point, we shall in the next chapter examine the historical development of sciences in Islamic civilization. We may now concentrate on the way society may shape scientific activities as indicated in the formation of a scientific conceptual scheme within a worldview. This is exhibited more clearly in the case of the emergence of a scientific tradition, which will be examined in the next section. Before doing this, let us examine the general cparacteristics of a scientific community in order to pinpoint more specifically the relationship between science and society. 1

2. The Nature and Characteristics of Scientific Communities It is through the worldview of the group of scholars working under one scientific tradition that gives science its social character; such a group of scholars constituting a unity in outlook and scientific conceptual scheme is called 'scientific community', or 'ulamd' in the Islamic scientific tradition. Our definition of scienti:lic community, or 'ulamd' leads us to ascribe all social aspects found in scientific activities to this community rather than directly to science. We have already shown the reciprocal relationship 113

between science and society. We now lay down the following characteristics of a scientific community in general, which lead to that kind of a mutual relationship: 1. methodological aim; 2. scientific ideals; 3. formal linkage; 4. marginal ideals. Of course particular scientific communities will have more characteristics than what we have enumerated here. For instance, in the Islamic case, the scientific com.munity, called 'ulamii' or formerly fuqahli, has characteristics which other scientific communities do not have, because of the Islamic worldview and the worldview of the other scientists. We shall point to some of the characteristics of the Islamic scientific community that follow from the Islamic worldview in the next chapter when we out~ine the emergence of ·the Islamic scientific tradition. We shall concentrate in this context on the nature and characteristics of a scientific colTlffiunity in general, which we have just enumerated under four headings. a) The Methodological Aim A scientific community is a necessary element for the emergence of a scientific tradition,and hence, prior to it. In fact, for the existence of a scientific tradition a scientific community is required with a long history. We have already shown this in our exposition of the scientific process. When the initial group of scholars begin to work on certain issues, they attract students who are interested in their knowledge seeking activity in the way they carry it out. In this way a group is formed as a result of their knowledge-seeking activity. We may pose a question concerning this new emerging group vis a vis the larger group within which they live, i. e., their society: what is it that distinguishes this group of people from their fellow commoners? It is possible to cite two characteristics that belong primarily to the group of scholars which their fellows of the same society do not have: first is that the group of scholars are those who are interested in knowledge-seeking; second but more importantly is that their interest in knowledge-seeking·is in a way that is more systematic and methodical, which distinguishes them from the same activity that may be manifest by everyday people; therefore, that which brings scholars together as a group is the methodological aim of their activity, not the daily needs of life. In

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fact, the daily needs of life bring them together with their other fellow beings into the same society, but not into the scientific community. It must be clear that the aim and objectives of the scientific community is different from that of the general society in which it emerges. Its primary aim is knowledge-seeking, which is an aim that is very broadly identified here so as to include all scientific traditions. It is possible for the Islamic tradition, for example, to have other aims as well. To pinpoint all the characteristics of a scientific tradition requires research within that tradition. This characteristic of the scientific community is what identifies science as a cognitive activity which thus necessitates its definition in terms of discipline. The common objective of the scientific communities is the search after truth. In fact, it is this derive to truth that attracts most members of the scientific community, though it may be more idealized in certain traditions, such as the ancient Greek scientific tradition .. This aim to pursue knowledge and having the objective of searching for truth leads the group of scholars to organize their community in accordance with the needs and requirements of their activity. Once such an attempt is made a cognitive organization is usually achieved in almost all scientific communities. For the cognitive organization is required by our epistemological nature; if all humans acquire knowledge in the same way then there will necessarily be similarities as a result of their epistemological nature. Cognitive organization means setting up the necessary means and the tools needed not only executing their search for knowledge and truth, but also teaching the knowledge they acquired and the ways in which they thrived to search for that knowledge. In this way an educational initiation prepares and thus passes on the scientific tradition developed by the earlier members of the scientific ·community. From the fact that the aim and organization of the scientific community is different from those of the general society, we may infer that the scientific community acquires another methodological aim in that most members, if not all, accept the fact that knowledge-seeking activity must have a method. It is this characteristic together with the scientific consciousness that conventionally gives rise to identify their activity as science. I

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We, therefore, distinguish the scientific community from its society with respect to their aims and organization; all characteristics that distinguish both groups of people from each other are expressed here as 'methodological aim', because, as we have shown, they are primarily related to the cognitive aspects of the activities of the members of the scientific community which involves their method. But the scientific community usually idealizes these aims, which do not belong as characteristics to the society in general. We shall now discuss these characteristics as scientific ideals that may belong to any scientific community. b) Scientific Ideals There are certain scientific objectives which may change from one scientific tradition to another, such as the fact that there are impersonal criteria, impartiality and even certain moral ends that are attached to scientific inquiries. All such objectives that are idealized in a scientific tradition can be referred by a general name as 'scientific ideals'. Since the term science is strictly applied to the product of the activities of a scientific community in the sense of discipline, scientific ideals cannot be applied to science, but only to the scientific community and their usual practices, the product of which is science. Merton applies the scientific ideals to science as a social institution and uses the term 'disinterestedness' to refer to them. 11 First of all, there is n6 institution called science; however, there may be in a society an institution that is governed by the scientific activities and thus can be called 'scientific institution'. Science has only four characteristic elements; subject matter, method, a body of theories and accumulated knowledge. Secondly, it is clear that all these elements are intimately related to our epistemological constitution and thus are cognitive, not social. Therefore, ideals cannot belong. to science, but rather to the scientific community as defined here. We cannot count scientific ideals in a general way because each scientific community depending on their own scientific tradition has a 1 1Robert K. Merton. The sociology of Knowledge: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, ed. by Norman W. Storer (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), 275. 116

different set of ideals. But the following may be enumerated as scientific ideals that belong to some scientific traditions with a varying combination; passion for truth, quest for knowledge, benefit for humanity, disgust for plagiarism, sincerity for impartiality, request for and high esteem of originality, scientific objectivity and even commitment for.the scientific method acquired from the former masters.

c) Formal Linkage Science, as we see it, is the J?roduct of also a mas~er-student relationship which is linked in an unbroken chain of successors and follower to produce a tradition. It is this self-maintained continuity that we call 'formal linkage' as a characteristic of the scientific community. It is indeed the scientific community that prepares the ground for such a scientific continuity which thus enables the establishment of a scientific tradition at the same time. The formal linkage as a characteristic of scientific communities is based like the others upon the epistemological make up of our faculties of knowledge. For instance, we do science in the way we learn from our instructors, just as we live in the way as we learn from our environment including our parents and social surrounding. This learning cannot be transcended totally, but only minJmally which is what we call 'originality'. Therefore, originality is a break from the tradition and it cuts of the usual continuity of a scientific tradition. On the other hand, since originality itself is the product of the continuity implanted within the formal linkage, there is a superimposed formal continuity that governs the very process of originality itself. Therefore,· when such originalities are continually attached through the formal linkage, a new scientific scheme is produced in individual sciences; a process that may take hundreds of years. For example, the Ptolemaic and the Copernican models in astrono·my; Aristotelian dynamics and the Newtonian mechanics in physics; the Ash 'arite atomism and the existentialist theory of creation by the ~iifis in Kalam. Since formal linkage is also a necessary element in the rise of a scientific tradition, no scientific community can avoid to dispense with it. The establishment of such a link requires a well organized teaching system 117

and an educational institution. Such establishments make its product, i. e., science, seem as a social institution. But as we have demonstrated, it is rather the community involved in such activities together with all its establishments that must assume the social character. It is for this reason that we assign the formal linkage as a characteristic of the scientific community.

·d) Marginal Ideals There is also a set of rudimentary characteristics which appears peripheral to scientific activities, such as scientific career and education should be open to talents, scientific activities must be supported not only financially, but socially and politically as well. All such idealized ·principles of a scientific community we term 'marginal ideals'. Just like the scientific ideals, marginal ideals also vary from one scientific tradition to another. But since they are not based on the epistemological nature of our faculties, they are not necessary requirements for the emergence of a scientific tradition, but rather they are complimentary to the necessary ones. They may as such speed up the process of the emergence of such a tradition. Islamic scientific tradition has the most marginal ideals than any other scientific tradition; a fact which contributed to the speedy development of a scientific tradition in Islamic civilization. We shall now try to show how this tradition emerges in general.

C. THE SCIENTIFIC .TRADITION The emergence of a scientific conceptual scheme within a given society leads to a scientific tradition. Therefore, the very concept of scientific tradition involves the assumption of a scientific community. Since the rise of a scientific tradition .necessarily assumes the existence of a society it also demonstrates the mutual interplay between science and society, and as such it must make up another significant topic of a sociology of science. In this sense, the i&~a of scientific tradition which is primarily a cognitive scheme, includes the achievements of generations of scientists within which scientific education is carried out and thus supplies a foundation for their further scientific practices. Sociology of science is concerned with the 118

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emergence of such a cognitive scheme within a culture. We shall, therefore, attempt here to outline a general theory concerning the emergence of a scientific tradition in general. It is sheer truism to say that there must be certain conditions in a society so that science and learning would flourish in that society. But it is not so easily available to ascertain these conditions in a society in which science and learning has already flourished. That is why we deem it necessary to study them here in :order to show that there must have been some conditions at the social level, with all its aspects, for the rise of learning in a given society. Since these conditions are the causes for the rise of learning within a certain social and cultural context, they can be called "contextual causes" for the rise of science. It is possible to distinguish certain contextual causes as more rudimentary and hence, necessary for the emergence of any kind of scientific activity in any society; we shall refer to such necessary elements leading to the rise of a scientific activity as 'nucleus contextual causes'. All other peripheral elements that help the nucleus contextual causes lead to the emergence of science and a scientific tradition can be termed 'marginal contextual causes'. We must at once point out that all contextual causes are social and hence, they have little epistemological import though they may be based on a certain epistemological natpre possessed by our faculties of knowledge. We shall now try to explain this theoretical ground and in the next chapter try to educe specific examples from three civilizations in which science was cultivated as independent discipline; Greek, Islamic and Western. A nucleus contextual cause is a dynamism which manifests itself at two levels: first is at the social level, which causes certain unrest and stirring within the society as if the whole structure of the society is reshaping itself and thus every social institution is affected by this dynamism; but most importantly, the political and educational institutions are re-organized as a result of this unrest; second is at the level of learning and it is this dynamism which causes a lively exchange of ideas on scientific and intellectual subjects among the learned of the community. How this dynamism itself as the nucleus contextual cause is produced is a very complex phenomenon which must be studied more carefully in relation to each society. 119

For instance, in case of Islam we explain how it was internally generated by the thought of the Qur' an through its dissemination within the first Muslim community. But here what we are trying to look for is whether there is any universal rule (or rules) governing the generation of that dynamism. In order to find this out we need some more sample societies in which this kind of progress had already taken place. Let us take as our case study the Ancient Greek Society and the Western Society as well in both of which we witness examples of progress in every field of learning. In order to avoid confusion and for the sake of convenience, we shall call this kind of advancement in learning 'intellectual progress' to mean thereby advancement in every field of study. We shall now try to show that the 'nucleus contextual causes' of intellectual progress is a natural phenomenon, and therefore, it is deeply rooted within the human personality. 12 Moreover, since these causes are related to the human nature as a social being, they must be social in character as well. Since we claim that the nucleus contextual causes of any intellectual progress are natural, we thereby accept that it will be the same universally in eve.ry society. But the way they are manifested in a given society will definitely vary from society to society, due to the fact that cultures, temperaments and inclinations of societies are different. Moreover, by "natural" we mean "a characteristic or a trait given by God", referring thereby to nature as "something that is created by God".

1. The Nucleus Contextual Causes Our exposition so far has distinguished two phenomena as corres-ponding to the nucleus contextual causes for the emergence of a scientific tradition: · the first is moral dynamism; and the second is intellectual dynamism. Therefore, there are primarily two nucleus contextual causes: one is moral in character, the other is intellectual, both of which refer to a dynamism in a given society. We shall try to show how this takes place in a soCiety as a soeial phenomenon.

12We may show one concrete example of this in case of Islamic civilization, in which this idea is expressed in the meaning of the Qur'anic concept, "sunnatullah", e.g. 17/ai-Isra, 77; 33/al-AJ:tzab, 38; 33/ai-AJ:tzab, 62; 35/Fatir, 43; 48/ai-FatJ:!, 23, etc. 120

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a) Moral Dynamism With respect to moral dynamism it is possible to divide the members of a given society into three groups: 1. morally sensitive people; 2. the common mass; 3. the selfish or immorally sensitive people. Among these three classes only the morally and immorally sensitive are dynamic. For the former class struggles to restore morality and good order in society, whereas the selfish remain indifferent to this end by spending their dynamism to their own ends. The masses, on the other hand, are driven to either side, which may lead to a struggle on behalf of both sides to defend their ends that may or may not result with intellectual dynamism. This is because the nucleus corytextuaL cause is not the only cause of such a development; for this development can be attained only when all other conditions are also present. But if the morally sensitive class becomes victorious and draws the masses towards that end, then intellectual progress can take place once the second phenornenon of the nucleus contextual cause, i.e. intellectual dynamism, is present. Since we empirically know that there are in every society, without exception, morally sensitive people, the masses and the selfish, we need not prove that their existence is natural. But the fact that originality and novelty inherently possess dynamism may not be so easily accessible and hence we must show that intellectual dynamism is also natural, that is we find them as given in any society. In order to do this we need only to refer to our sample cases: In the Greek case, we claim that if there were not in each case a new and fresh outlook, the intellectual dynamism would have not flourished and thus the flair of Greek intellectualism would have died out long before Plato. Moreover, just because there is hardly any original theory and doctrine after Aristotle, the Greek intellectualism began right after him to decline. The same is also true for both the Islamic and Western cases, but the way this intellectual dynamism is manifested in all these societies vary.

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b) Intellectual Dynamism The 'dynamism inherent within ·originality and novelty' (of ideas and doctrines) is what we call 'intellectual dynamism'. We consider thjs also as a natural element in human constitution. What we are showing here is

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the idea that originality inherently possesses dynamism, and as such it can contribute essentially to the rise of intellectualism. In fact, originality is invigorating, fascinating and enlivening, it is just like the re-awakening of a land from the demise of winter, and this dynamism is reflected thereby to the society, which is then set into a process of scientific advancement provided that there are no impediments in the way of mutual companionship between science system and its community. Thus without intellectual dynamism no intellectual development is ever possible. But this does not mean that, as we have already stated, once there is original theories and philosophical systems, then such a progress vyill necessarily take place. The reason for this is the other condition of the society, namely, moral dynamism, which must conform to the originality of intellectualism and thus enable it to flourish. Otherwise, intellectual progress will soon die out, which is the case of Greek intellectualism after Aristotle who is the most original Greek philosopher. But his originality was not sufficient to provide a continuity to the apex of Greek thought. In the history this has somehow been the ill-fate of all civilizations; a community or nation at the apex of its civilization becomes 'warn-out', being burdened by the tremendous weight of its history it begins to decline. Although we do not think that this is a necessary development of a civilization, viz. born out-progress-apex-decline and fall, this seems to haye been the course of all past civilizations. If our view here concerning the course that intellectual progress and a civilization takes at its rise, is granted then the opposite course will be the natural process of decline, which means that as long as the contextual causes are kept alive the , civilization will continue to live and progress. One should not, therefore, interpret our claim with regard to the intellectual dynamism that even if there are original and fresh ideas, theories or doctrines it may still not lead to intellectual progress; for it is possible that there may be originality without necessarily leading to intellectual progress, because as we have already pointed out, we are examining the causes of intellectual progress individually. But within society these causes produce the desired end only when they are altogether present. Most importantly, these contextual causes cannot exhaustively be enumerated for all societies. They may be, for example, ten such causes 122

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needed in case of the Greek civilization, but this number may be eighteen for another society. Hence, although the number of the nucleus contextual causes as necessary elements may be precise for all societies, the general number of contextual causes (i.e., the nucleus and the marginal contextual causes taken together) cannot so be determined in a decisive manner. In fact we can give examples from the Western case showing that there were thinkers with original ideas and even with novel philosophical systems which did not lead to intellectual progress. Two famous examples an'< Boethius (d. 524 or 5) and John Scotus Erigena (d. ca. 877). In both of these cases we do not find any continuity of ideas or doctrines after their death, although they both put forward with sufficient vigor original theories. This is because other elements requireP. for intellectual dynamism were not present and, as a result, we do not see any other individual furthering their systems to construct new and original doctrines or systems. Because of this, the origin and the rise of Western philosophy cannot be searched in their philosophies. They shall remain and be studied as 'isolated cases' within the history of Western philosophy. It is possible now for us to elucidate how moral and intellectual dynamism may take place as social phenomena. The moral unrest within a particular society demonstrates a struggle mainly between two classes of people; the morally sensitive, and the selfish class. The masses remain as the middle class between the two. When the struggle is taking place, although it is only between the morally sensitive and the selfish, it is immediately passed on to the masses, which become the battle ground of the good and evil forces. Some of the masses are thus won to the moral side, and yet .others to the selfish front. We may apply here a term from the Islamic civilization, which expresses this social fact: sunn.atullah. 13 This moral struggle is a sunnatullah and thus there is no human society in which this struggle cannot be found in one form or another. When the morally sensitive people have the sufficient vigor, dynamism and energy, they win to their side an adequate number of the masses and thereby produce intellectual and social dynamism. When the moral stnJggle between the two groups continue with a victory of the moral class (for this l3Ibid. 123

struggle never ends with a victory, but always continues in different forms as long as the society exists), the morally sensitive individuals either produce intellectuals or are themselves intellectuals who formulate original ideas, doctrines and systems by introducing fresh and novel definitions of key concepts that are moral and scientific or otherwise. This way a lively exchange of ideas and alternative views come into existence within the society; a phenomenon which is necessary to produce intellectual dynamism.

2. Marginal Contextual Causes We have already identified the secondary contextual causes as marginal. The moral struggle, which is essentially a strife between the good and evil, may either directly give rise to social dynamism, or to intellectual dynamism first, which, then, in turn produces social dynamism. Hence, although in certain cases social dynamism may precede the intellectual one, it does not mean that social dynamism is a nucleus contextual cause for the emergence of a scientific tradition. For the activity in question is of· a cognitive nature, viz., science. Therefore, it is still a secondary contextual cause with regard to the nature of the activity in question. But the social dynamism usually leads to an overall activity within the society, which we call 'institutional dynamism'. Hence, there are primarily two marginal dynamisms, which we shall now investigate. a) Social Dynamism The nucleus contextual causes, i.e. moral and intellectual dynamism, must necessarily produce social dynamism once they are adequately successful. But social dynamism is necessarily preceded by the moral dynamism, which we have described quite simply as a moral struggle between the morally sensitive and the selfish; but it is not necessarily preceded by the intellectual dynamism. On the other hand, all these various dynamisms are required for intellectual progress that eventually lead to the emergence of sciences. Yet we distinguish only the moral and intellectual struggles to be the nucleus contextual causes. Since social dynamism is not found at this foundational level, it cannot be included among the nucleus causes. But it must be recognized as a marginal contextual cause. 124

All these three dynamisms, either together or one after another will yield what I shall call 'institutional dynamism'. When the nucleus contextual forces are at work, a tremendous social mobility and dynamism, as we have shown, begins. It is the dynamism of individuals working together to lead the society as a whole to a morally better situation that we call 'social dynamism', which in turn leads to the re-organization and betterment of social institutions including the political and economic. ones as well. We may now examine this social phenomep.on as an institutional dynamism.

b) The Institutional Dynamism It is this reformative and enlightened efforts at the organizational level

that we call 'institutional dynamism'. When all these contextual causes come together, then they ·lead the society to intellectual progress. But besides contextual causes different societies may exhibit some other different causes of intellectual progress; such is the case with Western philosophy which has Islamic· influencts also as a cause for the rise of Western intellectualism. Whereas in the Islamic case, the causes are found only within the society, although after the development of Islamic intellectualism in the first century of Islam (i.e. 7th. ceritury A.D.) it came under foreign influences, especially that of the Greek philosophy and science, which it did help improve its intellectualism further. Since institutional dynamism takes place at the level of social institutions, we must cite them here because of the crucial role they play in the rise of intellectual progress. The most significant of these is the educational institutions; a great reform and re-organization in accordance with the knowledge produced by the intellectual dynamism is required of all the educational institutions, if the society is to produce intellectual progress. Usually there seems to be a relation, although not a necessary one, between the political body and the educational reform. Either the political body brings about the educational reform at the request and directions of the intellectuals, or intellectuals th~mselves take the initiative and produce educational dynamism, which may in turn lead to a reorganization of the politic;d body and thus produce a great political mobility within the political institutions. These activities which also include the legal undertakings can be called 'political dynamism'. Among 125

these institutional dynamisms we must mention also economic activities. Similar reformations take place in the economic institutions yielding thereby to improve the prosperity of that society and this activity can be called 'economic dynamism'. All these .institutional dynamisms do not necessarily develop together within the same period of time and thus helping each other become dynamic reciprocally; or following a different pattern of sequence in every intellectually progressed society. The educational, political, which also includes legal activities, and economic dynamisms include within themselves with a varying degree of intensity all the nucleus contextual dynamisms explained above, and as such they are the ones that produce culture. If a culture retains its dynamisms long enough such that the culture no longer becomes restricted to one society and region, then it turns into a civilization; ~ phenomenon which can be observed in all our three sarhple cases. Thus, it is I meaningful to talk about Greek, Islamic and Western civilizations. Therefore, cultures are usually restricted to a certain span of time and region or society. But civilizations cannot be. so restricted. If the culture does not retain its dynamism within the sphere of the contextual causes, then a dynamism to the opposite direction begins to take place; first, the selfish gains the majority of the masses and intellectuals become corrupt, then the moral struggle gives in. The culture thus collapses and the intellectual progress comes to a halt. Of course this can happen to civilizations as well; a phenomenon which can be observed both in the Greek and Islamic civilizations. Our theory of contextual causes claims that without these causes learning and especially science cannot flourish in a society. Since these causes furnish the necessary socio-political and cultural setting for intellectual progress, we shall try to apply it in the next chapter to our three case studies; Greek, Islamic and Western scientific traditions.

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CHAPTER FOUR. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CASE STUDIES In this chapter we shall try to apply the framework developed in this essay to the historical development of the sciences in our three case studies; Greek, Western and Islamic civilizations. Accordingly, we need to show in the first place that as a worldview, adequate and satisfactory for the rise of an intellectual and learning tradition, emerg~d out of the nucleus contextual causes in these civilizations, a great sociafmobility began in each of them; first to reshape their respective societies, then to either establish afresh (as in the Islamic case), or re-establish (as in the Western case) the educational and other social institutions. In this way a great dynamism gra~ually led to the rise of a traditionn of learning. As the atmosphere was kept congenial by their respective worldviews, in all these three cases a conceptional scheme emerged, which gradually led to the emergence of disciplinary studies. Then, these disciplin,ary studies were organized into specific subjects of study, each one of which was given a specific name constituting thus a science. As each particular science emerged, this tradition of learning became, a scientific tradition in which there was the conceptual scheme, out of which that scientific tradition itself emerged, and which can now be identified as scientific conceptual scheme. The group involved in these activities is also given a name in each one of these civilizations; philosopher, in the Greek case (which may have other designations as well), 'ulamii' in the Islamic case, and similar ones in the Western case. The extensive scope of the project, which tries to apply the above theoretical epistemology and sociology of science to the three case civilizations, is clear. We shalt therefore, try not to go into details, and in fact the details of the proposed project in cases of the Greek and Western civilizations exceeds the capacity of this author .. For this reason, I shall present the Islamic case more fully than others, though even this project itself may take voluminous study to properly demonstrate. 127

A. ANCIENT GREEK CIVILIZATION "Greek philosophy was born out of the struggle to understand nature, for understanding nature proved to be less simple and straightforward than the earliest Greek scientist had confidently assumed." 1 Is it re~lly true that the Greek philosophy grew out of just a vague struggle to understand nature? Why there is even such a struggle to understp.nd nature? Furthermore, why did the people in this region, namely the Agean civilization suddenly become interested in such an undertaking, and not any other people around the same region did not become interested in it? And why did the Agean people, today known as the Ancient Greeks, become interested in such a struggle at a particular time but not earlier? It is not possible to answer these questions so long· as we assume such simple solutions for a complex phenomenon, i. e. the rise of philosophical and scientific thinking. The present assumption for the emergence of sciences in the Greek speaking Agean civilization is, therefore, a myth born out of the existing material concerning the origins of Greek thought. It simply happens that the existing material we have concerning the early pre-Socratics concentrate on their understanding of nature. We do not think, however, that this can simply be the case. We can explain, therefore, the process through which Greek scientific and philosophical thought took its rise, through a theoretical framework developed here as an epistemology and sociology of science. In this way, we shall try to apply this theoretical framework to the existing material so far as it is possible in order at least to answer some of these questions without so many problems. In this vain, we have shown that sciences and philosophy emerge out of only a certain kind of environment and a context which, at the same time, act as the habitat, so to speak, for their progress. Furthermore, it is possible for sciences to emerge in an environment but not develop there. In that case, scientific and philosophiCal advancement must also be conceived not in terms of a temporal duration, but rather ih terms of its effect and impact upon the culture and civilization within whi'ch it flourishes. Hence, 'scientific advancement'., means all the 1 W. T. Jones. A history of Western Philosophy: The Classical Mind (San Diego, New York, etc.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1970), xvii. 128

scientific activities (including non-physical sciences, such as philosophy, history, sociology, theology and education) that help in establishing a civilization. Therefore, those activities that are found in a comrimnity and characterized as scientific, will not render it a scientifically advanced society, unless those scientific activities bring the culture of that society to the level of a civilization. We hope that this point has also become sufficiently clear from our presentation so far. Therefore, in this chapter, our application will try to keep in view all these civilizational points as well. Of course, we need not argue in this context to prove this sociological, and in some respects, anthropological approach, as we have sufficiently shown this aspect of sciences. . Long before the rise of the Hellenic Agean civilization, there were two great civilizations established in the region. The earliest one of these is the Minoan civilization, so named after the legendary king of Knossos, Minos. It was based in the Agean island of Crete with several thriving cities, among which Knossos was the most splendid. The Minoan civilization was at its peak from about 2000 to 1500 B.C. The other ·civilization is the Mycenaean civilization established in and around the city of Mycenae, a few ldlometres south of the Golf of Corinth towards .the eastern edge, which was the center of the whole Agean world until 1100 B.C. The achievements of th~se civilizations, no dougbt , must have left their overwhelming influence on the subsequent cultural develop-ments. First of all, both of these civilizations developed a highly sophisticated writing techniques. Though not much written document survived from them, the existing tablets recovered from archeological excavations show that there must have been some relatively sophisticated form of learning. Secondly, the spacious palaces built for their ldngs on the island of Crete, the sanctuaries built on the tops of mountains or in caves for their goddesses and the tools and weapons made of copper and bronze show marks of earlier prospering civilizations. 2 · As the Minoan and the Mycenaean civilizations were thriving, however, there occured massive invasions towards the end of the third 2 For a detailed description of these see Chester G. Starr, The Origins of Greek Civilization, 1100-650 B.C. (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991), 36-64.

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millenium B.C. First came the people of Anatolia who settled in the northern islands and the mainland; but the second wave of invasions came from the north and the invaders settled this time in the Peloponnese; it is these invaders that are believed to be the Greeks. As to the language, Greek, there are two theories; one defending the view that it originated in Greece itself in earlier times, and the other claiming that it was introduced . 3 by conquerers at the end of the Bronze Age, in about 1200 B.C. We shall try to argue in this context that the necessary conditions for the rise of sciences in the Agean civilization was about to originate before the Ionian intellectuals, i.e. before 600 B.C. In order to show this we need to outline a brief history of the Agean civilization prior to the Ionian philosophers. We shall thus argue that once the epistemeological and sociological frameworks emerged in this civilization as the necessary environment for the emergence of sciences, then other contributing elements were also developed by the intellectuals of that civilization as the sufficient causes for the rise of sciences, namely for the scientific process. In that case, we must be clear about the fact that a society may have the epi'stemological and sociological conditions necessary for this process without actually yielding any science. This is because the circumstances of the society may require other factors as the sufficient causes for the rise of this process. Hence, although it is possible to enumerate quite decisively the exact number and the nature of the necessary elements for the rise of sciences, we cannot do the same with regard to the sufficient causes. With this understanding we may now enibark upon examining the Agean case forth~ rise of the scientific process. Around 800 B.C. small settlements began growing into cities, which later became the main units of political organizations as well and thus citystates emerged: Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Carinth on the mainland and Miletus on the shores of Asia Minor. The population of some of these cities reached 300.000 with a territorial extent of 1000 to 3000 square miles. We need not further elaborate the moral dynamism which was prevailant around this time in the city-states which was on the way to turn 3 Geoffrey Barraclough, eel. The Times Atlas of Wo~ld History (London: Book Club Associates, 1986), 66. 130

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into a comprehensive culture. The historical description gives us sufficient material just to consider the Greek struggle to maintain their high culture and sophisticated civilization. The wars, mythology, refined social organizations, sophisticated techniques of agriculture and arts show the signs of this dynamism. In the meantime two important developments took place; revival of trade, and invention of Greek alphabet, which was influenced by the Phoenician writing system. Earlier writings were based on symbols representing syllables, now new signs were invented for individual sounds. Phoenicians had no symbol for vowels, Greeks compensated for that defect. As a result literacy became widespread. Records were kept in writing. Once trading and writing brought more wealth and prosperity, they began colonizing. We can observe in this way the intellectual dynamism described in the sociology of science, which will eventually lead to the rise of a scientific tradition. But this development came after the 7th century B.C. and reached its peak around the 6th century B.C., Le. 550's B.C. which means that these contextual ca4ses must have developed within this civilization between 800-500 B.C. so that after 600's social dynamism begins to take place. Moreover, as asign of this social dynamism, a big wave of Greek migration also began around this time because of population growth in the main Greek city-states. On the other hand lo~tg before these developments, the main civilization of the region, Minoan civilization, had already shown signs of weakness around 1500 B.C. Minoans are believed to be early Greeks as tablets discovered in their capital city, Knossos, express an early form of the Ancient Greek language. 4 But after about 1475 B.C. another power became increasingly dominant in the mainland Greece, the Mycenaeans, who established their capital in the city of Mycenae, east of Peloponnesus. The Mycenaeans conquered the Minoan civilization and around 1250 B.C. they won the legendary war against the Trojans. But sometime after 1200 B.C. they were conquered by the more primitive Greeks of the n01thern highlands, the Dorians. The period between 1200- 800 B.C. is described as dark ages. Whatever this may be, the influence and heritage of both

4 William McNeill. The Rise of' the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), 87. 131

civilizations on the rise of classical Greek civilization cannot be underestimated. The fact that even the most important Greek deity, Zeus, was a Mycenaean god. Many historical facts concerning both civilizations are retold by Homer. It is clear from our above outline that the seeds of Greek civilization and hence of the scientific and philosophical achievements of them must be searched not only in these civilizations which preceded them, but also in the social, political and educational dynamism that took place after the 800's B.C. But as far as our theoretical framework is concerned these later developments are more important for us than the history of earlier civilizations, because the earlier civilizations provide neither the epistemological nor the sociological ground for the rise of Greek scientific tradition. These grounds can develop only within the society itself and that is what happened in the Greek case also. We have already shown so far that through the contextual causes, which we have discussed as the nucleus and the marginal, the general framework suitable for the rise of sciences, i.e., the Greek worldview, emerged before the first Ionian philosophers. Then, as Greek mythology developed, gradually a group of peor>le became interested in learning, who are the fore-runners of est~blishing a tradition of ]earning in which we can find a theoretical conceptual scheme that supports these intellectual a·ctivities. The emergence ·of this conceptual scheme within the Greek worldview became the environmental context of Greek scientific tradition. By about the time of Thales, 550 B.C., the activities of learning gradually shifted to a more disciplinary methodology in such a way that by the time of Plato, some of the subject matters studied in this tradition of learning were realized to constitute a specific area of learning which could be named. It was Aristotie who achieved the naming of these subjects and thus completed the scientific process thatbegan the way described above. Although our description is not as specific as one may anticipate, it is, however, sufficient to draw a picture which demonstrates the frameworks developed in this essay. We can thus conclude that it is only after this naming stage that one can talk of sciences in this civilization. Moreover, it is again after the emergence of sciences that the conceptual scheme used thus far in the learning activities can be named 'scientific conceptual 132

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scheme'. Again, it is after the emergence of all these phenomena that the tradition of learning thus far acted as the conceptual and social environment of all these intellectual activities can be named 'Greek scientific tradition'.

B. WESTERN CIVILIZATION The application of our frameworks to the Western civilization presents certain difficulties; for example, in applying the epistemological framework when can we start the whole process? This question itself will present another more complicated problem, for if we answer this question by pointing to the beginning of Western civilization, th~n we can ask when did the Western civilization begin? Can we take a period in history as presenting signs for the rise of a civilization, and in this case the Western civilization? For instance, in case of Islamic civilization this is quite easy; we can take the year in which the first revelation came as the date for the beginning of t?is civilization. In this vein, the birth of the Prophet even cannot be taken as ·a sign because it does not give us anything concerning Islam as the foundation of this civilization. But what about the Western civilization and scientific tradition? In this essay if the frameworks presented are taken as processes, then we can easily see that the beginning will be the history which gives us the contextual causes for the rise ofsciences in this civilization, and that we must reach these causes from today moving back in history· in an uninterrupted process. This view opposes the myth that roots of Western civilization is to be searched in the Greek, or the Greco-Roman civilizations. The fact that previous civilizations influence later civilizations does not mean that the subsequent civilization is a continuation of the former ones. Of course, history is. continuous and in that sense all civilizations that follow each. other in history and geography are continuities of each other. But this would make the whole human history to be conceived as one civilization, which would not justify us' to . distinguish civilizations. Our presentation here shows certain processes which are continuous in themselves but discrete with respect to other processes that take place in history. For a process cannot be discrete in 133

itself, namely end at a particular period and then start again at another period; otherwise it cannot be a process. Once this argument is followed, then we can try to show that the beginning of Western civilization, and hence, of Western scientific tradition, must be searched in the great moral and social dynamism which can be observed around the eighth century A.D. In this respect, the period covering gth, 10th, and the 11th centuries is especially crus;ial, since it is in this period that we see the contextual causes at work for the rise of Western intellectualism which eventually gave rise to Western civilization. It must have become clear that what we mean by the contextual causes of the rise of Western scientific tradition is the socio-political and cultural upheavals of Europe between the gth and 12th centuries. In that case we need to examine these three centuries, viz. gth, 1oth and the 11th centuries, in order to exhibit the contextual causes of the Western scientific tradition at its very inception. But what about the Greek and in fact, even Islamic influences? Actually we do not consider any foreign influences to be among the contextual causes. But the Islamic scientific tradition, as it arose before its Western counterpart, is a crucial contributing element in enhancing its contextual causes by posing a great challenge as a civilization to many Western ideals of the time, more particularly in the religious (i.e. theological) sphere. But the role of Islamic influences cannot be restricted to the role of a contributing element of contextual causes; it is above all the Islamic influences at the philosophic and scientific level that is most felt after the beginning of the 12th century. Therefore, although at the beginning stage -i.e. gth_J2th centuries - the Islamic influences can be reduced to the cultural level as a contributing cause for the rise of contextual causes of Western scientific activities, at later periods - i.e. between 12th. and 17th. centuries - it is at the intellectual level as well. Our treatment of the history of socio-political and cultural conditions, of Europe in the centuries in which we claimed that Western scientific tradition emerged, shall concentrate' on the elements that are cited here as the contextual causes for the rise of a scientific tradition. Accordingly, the element which can be called the environment of Western science is the Christian culture. Of course by the ninth century this culture was well established, but primarily in southern Europe. Especially the conversion 134

of the Emperor Constantine, and later Justinian's closing all the schools of ancient Greek philosophy, opened the way for the consolidation of a uniform Christian culture in the West. As a result, a new mode of philosophical thinking began to emerge within the framework of the Christian faith. In order for this new development to be more effective and take roots within the Christian culture, we have argued above. that there must have been a suitable socio-political and cultural context which would prepare the contextual causes for the rise of a scientific tradition, we shall examine therefore, such conditions, only in this relationship as outlined thus far. In the beginning of the 7th century, however, northern Eur~pe was still largely pagan and totally alien to the Christian culture. The christianized West thus underwent the pressures of two powers in the subsequent centuries: one was the continued attack from the northern pagan gothic tribes; the other was the newly established dynamic political power, Islam, from the South. Only after the second half of the 3th century Charlemagne (7 68-814) carried the borders of the Christian Empire to its farthest limits. In the South, the Franks annexed the Lambard Kingdom in Italy as well; they were also able to push the Muslims back beyond Pyrenees. Then, "Frankish swords converted the stubborn saxons". 5 There was also at this time a tremendous missionary activities among the Frisians, Bavarians and Thuringians; this way the Christian culture of the Latinate society of the southern Europe assimilated the Germanic tribes. All these tribes were thus brought within the circle of Christendom. Finally, on December 25, 800, the Pope crowned Charlemagne as "Emperor of the Romans". Charlemagne thus became the undisputed master in all Western Christendom. After he was crowned, he began a series of reorganization and reform. In order to achieve this, he brought some scholars from Italy and Spain. These scholars established a kind of royal academy which came to be known as the "Palatine School", which existed as a Palace school prior to Charlemagne; but he laid emphasis on intellectual training of pupils drawn from a wider circle of people. Besides these, there were I

5 William McNeill. op.cit., 445.

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also some schools attached to certain monasteries, which provided education for both the members of the religious order and the general public. Around and within these schools libraries began to flourish. Therefore, right from the very beginning of the ninth century there was a great mobility in the Western world which may be summarized mainly to be in the following areas : 1. moral dynamism, to carry the Christian faith to the pagans; and to keep the internal integrity of the society; 2. a great social mobility and intellectual dynamism; 3. political dynamism; 4. educational dynamism. The great social mobility led the Franks to push considerably deeper into continental Europe, mainly through military conquests and religious conversion. Therefore, the geographic base and social might of Christendom were significantly enlarged in the West. There were a few factors contributing to this mobility: first, the missionary defense of Christianity against the pagans; second, the holy war against the Muslims and finally the acute friction between the orthodox and Catholic Christendom. Of course this was to yield gradually an intellectual dynamism in the Western society as it is clear from the fact that one cannot defend one's position based merely on.brute power and that ideas are also needed for an enduring defense. In the ninth century, there was another significant development. In 828, Crete fell into Muslim domination from the Spaniard rule. The prosperous Island of Sicily almost completely ca]lle under the Muslim control after 878. Muslims thus began controlling the Mediterranean from the Eastern shores of Antioch and Lebanon to the Iberian peninsula. The Mediterranean sea became a Muslim lake for the traders, carrying goods and commodities from India and other Muslim lands to the main sea ports of Europe. Muslim goods became the most sought-after commodities in the markets of Western Europe forming the luxuries of the time. The Christian West was thus freed to find new and spacious ground for its development in the north in order to compensate for its losses in the south. Therefore, the littoral of the North Sea and the English channel began to 136

gradually replace the glory of the Mediterranean region. 6 Hence, new centers of culture began to emerge in northern Europe as the most active centers of the Christian West, politically and culturally as well as intellectually. This northward expansion provided more dynamism for the newly emerging Western civilization as the economic basis to raise to a certain level of wealth, prosperity, political and military power parallel to its intellectual and cultural emergence. It is this dynamic mobility of Western society in moral, intellectual and then social, political, economic and educational spheres of culture that led to the search of a more sophisticated and original thought. It is this search that led also to a "tremendous excitement among the curious and unfettered minds that clustered in Paris and other centers of scholastic" learning. 7 It is exactly at this point (namely in the tenth century) that this intellectual curiosity led the Western mind to discover the sophisticated learning and richness of Islamic scientific tradition, which far surpassed that available in the West at this time. Hence, new schools began to emerge especially in the eleventh century to systematically and regularly · study and translate the treasures of Islamic learning to Latin. The factors which gave a speedy momentum to this translation activity were the beginning of the crusades in 1086 and the gradual expansion of Western Christendom in the Iberian Peninsula. The capture of Toledo in 1085, availed the main libraries at the hands of the capturing Christians. Toledo thus became the principal seat of translations from Arabic into Latin in the cl<;>sing years of the eleventh century. Then gradually in Salerno, Sa1amanca, Saragossa, Sicily and in Venice new schools of translation began to emerge. Thus a new period began in the history of scientific tradition, which can conveniently be termed 'translation· period'. The intellectual dynamism thus gave its first fruit. But for the first great philosophers to appear, of course, there needs time, which took about 200 years in this case, because the intellectuals of the newly emerging scientific tradition must first assimilate the translated knowledge and bring about students in these fields. The first able students of the translation period are 6 Ibid., 45!. 7 Ibid., 548. 137

St. Anselm, Peter Abelard, Fulbert, known as the founder of the School of Chartres in 990, disciple of Gerlant of Aurillac, Peter Lambard {11001160) and Adelard of Bath. By the time of these scholars learning activities in the West, as a result of the contextual causes, led to the emergence of two frameworks outlined in the epistemology of science (Chapter 2); the worldview, as the general framework, and the conceptual scheme which is named 'scientific conceptual scheme' after the emergence of its scientific tradition as the inner framework of this tradition. Then, after the eleventh century the Western learning tradition in its scientific. process entered into a more disciplinary stage and thus completed its cycle without the Naming Stage. This is because, the Western civilization had already found sciences named beforehand and there was no need to re-name them. However, scientific consciousness, as the epistemological ground of perceiving each discipline of study as constituting an independent branch of learning that can be named, exists a priori and thus we are not in a_position to show its emergence. For this reason, apart from newly emerging sciences within the Western scientific tradition, there is no naming stage for the scientific process of Western science. We may thus conclude that after the twelfth century Western science completed its scientific process for its emergence, entering thus into its normal phase of development. Our exposition of the emergence of a scientific tradition within the Western case demonstrates at the same time the shaping of science by society. We hope that this will become more fully exhibited when in the next section we illustrate the emergence of the Islamic scientific tradition. We shall see that it is primarily the society with its contextual causes that forms a social aspect for science, as we have seen also in the Greek and Western cases. What kind of characteristics science acquires from its social aspects may also be compared from the dominant worldviews of their respective societies. Since our aim is to investigate this in relation to the Islamic scientific tradition, we shall try to pinpoint 'Some of these characteristics as we attempt to outline the emergence of the Islamic scientific tradition.

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C. ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION We have already pointed out that certain worldviews cannot lead to the rise of sciences. In order to show this we must attempt to outline the early Islamic worldview as established by the Prophet through the guidance of the Qur' an. The contextual causes for the emergence of Islamic scientific tradition predominant in this society will also become apparent in our exposition. We claim in this respect that a rough chronological order of topics in the Revelation will expose how the early Islamic worldview was quasi-scientifically constructed, which eventually led to scientific progress right from the first century of Islam when the new community faced certain serious challenges. These challenges came in the first place from the very culture in which Islam was born. From this angle there was first a moral challenge brought about by the decadent aspects of the Jiihiliyyah culture; second, there was a literary challenge posed by Jiihiliyyah poetry; and more importantly, third, with the rapid expansion of Islam into other civilizations, another challenge was felt from the scientific and philosophical front which was brought about especially by the Hellenistic civilization. All these intellectual challenges could not and cannot be faced without some kind of efficiently trained scholars, who may be called thinkers in a scientific sense. Our claim then amounts to saying that the intellectualism of the first centmy ofislam provided an adequate ground, which are called the contextual causes for the rise of scientific activities, for the emergence of a scientific tradition in Islam. Both the speculative challenge of previous civilizations, more particularly the Jiihiliyyah culture, and the Qur' anic encouragement for reflection on the nature of man and the universe, must have led the early generations· of Muslims to speculate upon certain problems. As they dealt with these questions, the Prophet enlightened them under the guidance of the Revelation. This is the unfolding process of the construction of the Islamic worldview. It is, therefore, not unlikely that the speculative challenges of early civilizations and the Qur'anic encouragement for reflection were overlooked by the early generations of Muslims. It is plausible, therefore, to infer that, from the very beginning, Islamic civilization was based on 139

rational thinking 8 which was guided by the Qur'anic teaching; and in this vein the very early Muslim generations began to explain, supplement and .rethink the speculative allusions of both the Qur' an and (lad'ith. This early intellectual milieu of Islam was dominated by the Islamic worldview developed by the Prophet through the guidance of the Revelation. As we have argued, the fundamental metaphysics of the Islamic world view had already been constructed by the Qur' an while the Prophet was still in Mecca. Therefore, a substantial number of the scientific terminology to be utilized later were contained in the Meccan surahs, for these terms are mostly contained within the fundamental structures of the Islamic worldview. Therefore, even if these scientific terms were not used by the Qur' an and the J:tad'ith in the technical scientific sense, since they were put into the Islamic worldview as fundamental concepts, this prepared the way for their scientific employment. Of course, in the Medinan period terms of different fields, such as most of the terminology in the fields of law and political philosophy, were developed and thereby integrated into the composition of the Islamic worldview. But the fundamental structure of this worldview had already been established in Mecca. But in this context it is important to show how a body of knowledge comes to be established as a science because in this way we shall see the process through which a scientific tradition is established. In order to do this, we shall first demonstrate from the history of sciences the process that is involved in this phenomenon. The epistemology of science developed in the previous chapters claims that science is established within three mental frameworks: first is the worldview (of the scientist), called 'the general framework' which is indeed the conceptual environment within which scientific activities are cultivated; second is the network of a well-defined body of scientific concepts, entitled 'context' (of scien~es), or more properly called 'scientific conceptual scheme', and the third is the network of technical vocabulary and the outlook resulting from such a network of concepts within a specific science. This is because science is not an activity that is 8 For a detailed discussion of the concept of rationality in the Islamic perspective see the present author's "Transcendent Rationality, Ibn Rushd and Kant: A Critical Synthesis", 1\lif 16 (1996). 140

carried out on a general plane; on the contrary, a scientific activity is always concerned with a particular problem with almost no relation to other scientific problems, unless there is a problem pertinent to solving it. Therefore, the scientific conceptual scheme, together with its environment, is not sufficient to further scientific progress; there is the need for a more specific scheme as well in a specific science so that the problems of that science can be solved within that scheme. Since our epistemology of science claims that our mind cannot operate without a scheme, we affirm that this is true not only insofar as the general operations of the mind are concerned, but also of the specific ones. Hence, if a human being wants to place even a biological phenomenon such as walking into a conceptual context, he must have a worldview so that he can situate it into such a scheme; in the same way, if one were to investigate the phenomenon of walking scientifically one would have to consider this problem within a worldview and also within a scientific as well as a biological scheme. The former is the general scientific· scheme, which is already identified here as the inner framework of sciences, and the latter is the biological scheme, which we can identify as the 'specific scientific (conceptual) scheme'. It is possible to identify the general scientific conceptual scheme as the 'scientific tradition' lf it is manifested within a certain civilization and thus takes the name of that civilization. This is because a tradition by its very nature requires a community, identified as the 'scientific community'. Therefore, the Islamic scientific tradition is the manifestation of the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme in the Islamic civilization. As such it is primarily the general scientific conceptual scheme, but since this scheme cannot be without its environment, the Islamic scientific tradition necessarily includes the Islamic worldview. Hence, the Islamic scientific tradition is the Islamic environmental context handed down from one generation of scientists, i. e., the 'ulamii ', to the next. 9 But since in sciences we are primarily concerned with the scientific schemes, we may

9 Obviously, the community of scientists involved in the Islamic scientific tradition is Muslim scientists, but it must also be pointed out that non-Muslim scientists are also included in this community if.they accept and work within the same tradition, which was the case, for example, with Zakariyya al-Razi, I:Iunayn ibn lsl)aq, and Maim on ides. 141

in this context ignore the worldview ahd thus consider the Islamic scientific tradition as only the general Islamic scientific conceptual scheme. Therefore, on this basis we can postulate that the specific scientific conceptual scheme is developed primarily within a scientific tradition. Our epistemology of science, as we have seen, assumes that, prior to the scientific process through which sciences emerge, a worldview that has a sophisticated knowledge-structure must be established within a society as a dominant worldview. It is this knowledge-structure that will spark activities towards the establishment of a scientific tradition, which in turn will lead to the emergence of specific disciplines as sciences. Hence, historically we can illustrate that the Islamic worldview was established in Mecca in its fundamental outlines (of course, later this worldview was broadened through intellectual and scientific activities). Second, in Medina with the leadership of the Prophet, the early Muslim community developed a knowledge-structure within that Islamic worldview. This knowledgestructure was so sophisticated that it eventually led to the rise of a scientific tradition towards the end of the first century of Islam. Finally, in the second century, the accumulation of knowledge in different branches of learning gradually began to emerge as individual sciences, such as J:tadzth, tafszr, history, fiqh and kalam. The physical sciences were mostly borrowed from the Greeks in the third century. Even some of these branches of learning were subsequently established by the Muslims as sciences, such as algebra and chemistry. Our theory of the scientific process, as we have seen in the sociology of science (Chapter 3), suggests that sciences generally follow _this framework of development in every civilization, although the specific course they take is different in every civilization. Therefore, the emergence of physics in Gr~ece, for example, may be the same as the emergence of kalam, for instance, in the Islamic civilization. But in one of them the · study of nature emerged as a science, whereas in the other, the study of religion. It is possible that physics would never _have emerged as a science in Islam; and instead a branch of kaliim may have developed and emerged as an independent science to replace the Greek physics. If we try to trace, therefore, the historical route that the Ishunic scientific process took, all these points will be clarified as well. In order to do this we need to outline 142

first the emergence of the Islamic worldview as a suitable general framework for the cultivation of sciences in Islam. Then, we shall try to show how an Islamic scientific tradition emerged out of this mental framework.

1. The Worldview of Islam as the Environment

of Islamic Science How can we decipher the worldview of Islam? In fact we may ask where to begin to outline it? We shall apply our theory concerning the structures of a worldview to the Islamic worldview and in this way we shall be able to outline th~ fundamental elements of it. I hope that our application will clarify also what is meant by each structure. In this application we cannot start from the life-structure; for, since the life-structure is grounded in human biology, it will have the most common elements with all other worldviews, and as such the life-structure of the Islamic worldview is its aspect that is most dominant in the Islamic cultural activities, it is thus not the foundation of it. In that case an outline of any worldview must begin from its foundation. The foundation of any worldview, as we have seen, is its world-structure. Hence, our.treatment of the worldview of Islam will also begin from its world-structure. The world-structure is that aspect of the Islamic worldview which includes the most fundamental elements, such as the idea of God, prophethood, resurrection andthe ideas of religion and the hereafter, iikhirah. We do not mean that these are the only fundamental concepts of the Islamic worldview because each structure by itself represents a doctrinal element which includes within itself many other fundamental Islamic key terminology. But the extensions of these key concepts and terminology constitute substructures; hence, there lie many substructures within the basic structures of the Islamic worldview which may not be so fundamental and as a result differences in those substructural elements can be allowed. As an extension of the world-structure, knowledge-structure, for instance, is also a fundamental doctrinal element, which is represented by the umbrella term 'ilm. This structure includes within itself the key scientific terminology of Islamic science. We call this network of the key 143

scientific Islamic terminology the 'Islamic scientific conceptual scheme', which will be explained briefly below. The value-structure in the Islamic world view, on the other hand, includes moral, ethical and legal practices. But since the concept of law in the early Islamic worldview is closely linked with the world-structure, it naturally included religious law, which cannot be devoid of moral content. Hence, law, religion and morality are manifested as an integral part of one structure. This conceptual understanding of law, religion and morality never brought about a sharp distinction between the three. As a result, there has· never been a thinker who developed an ethical philosophy independently of Islam as a religion. In fact there can be no ethical philosophy within the Islamic worldview, since ethics is integrally combined with religion. If there is a book on ethical philosophy by a Muslim philosopher, we can very safely identify its alien origin, such as Miskawayh's Tahdhib al-Akhliiq. The same is true of law and legal philosophy. The corollary of this is that fiqh cannot be translated into English as 'law', forfiqh includes religion, law and morality so integrally that the one cannot be without the others. Of course, usually many concepts of a worldview cannot be translated into the concepts of another worldview, they can at most be represented by terms similar to them. Finally, the man-structure is represented within the Islamic worldview by the concepts of khanfah and ummah. As such this structure manifests the Islamic understanding of man and society, which is totally grounded in the world-structure because, again, even these conceptions themselves are derived from the concepts of taw(tid, prophethood, religion and iikhirah. Since it is not our aim here to expound these conceptions of Islam, we do not concentrate on their exposition. Only their nature so far as it is related to the concept of world view as we explained here is sufficient. 10 As we can see, the systematic exposition of worldviews make it easy to analyze the islamic worldview into its main components, namely, structures. Let us exhibit this on the graphic of worldviews, given in the second chapter, 1°For an excellent exposition of these concepts and their place in the Islamic world view

one must consult Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib AI-Attas's Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of the Fundamental Elements of the Worldview of Islam (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995). 144

and then show how the world-structure arose in the early Islamic culture, which then became as the environment for the emergence of its knowledge-structure.

ISLAMIC WORLDVIEW Table 5

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a) The Emergence of the World-Structure (610-622 A.D.) The world-structure of the Islamic worldview was constructed by the Qur'an while the Prophet was still in Mecca. This structure within the worldview of Islam is grounded upon three fundamental ideas; taw/:lid, i. e., the idea of one God, nubuwwah, namely, the idea of prophethood, and finally, iikhirah, namely, the idea of a final questioning. In this way a Muslim conceives of himself or herself responsible only to God. Therefore, if the idea of God is not properly established in the mind of a Muslim, the Islamic ethical concepts will not adequately function in his/her life. 11 Hence, the idea of God as revealed in the Qur' an must be sufficiently clarified for an Islamic life. Therefore, one may even claim that all fundamental ideas concerning a Muslim's behavior derive their validity from One God, who is the creator and sustainer of everything (2/alBaqarah, 29; 6/al-An'am, 101; 7/al-A'raf, 185; 16/al-Nal;l.l, 48; 25/al- · Furqiin, 2). He did not create all these things in vain (3/A.li 'Imran, 191; 67/al-Mulk, 3-4). Moreover, God is merciful (6/al-An'am, 12; 7/al-'Araf, 156), so He forgives (2/al-Baqarah, 173) if we repent from a blunder. The forgiveness of God is so much emphasized in the Qur' an that it is repeated 100 times because this aspect of God is extremely important for the moral life of a human. We may always commit .errors in life. What kind of a mechanism an eth~cal philosophy must have so that it can revert us back to virtues? It is not easy to be generous, helping and self-sacrificing, especially at times when one is in the most needy situation. The Prophet said, on the other hand, that one cannot be a true believer until he sincerely, which means actually, wishes for others what he wishes for himself. For this reason, as the Islamic life is closely linked with the idea of religion, the moral incentive is also imbedded in the idea of God as described in the Qur'an: And who other than God created the heavens and the earth and sent down for you water from the sky, whereby we cause to grow lush orchards, For it is not up to you to cause their trees to grow! Is there, then, a go'd beside God? Yet these are the people who ascribe partners to Him! And who other than Him made the earth a t1rm abode (for you), and set rivers traversing liE. g., see 6/ai-An'am, 91; 22/ai-J:Iajj. 74; 39/ai-Zumar, 67. 146

through it, and put firm mountains therein and sealed off one sea from the other? Is there, then, a god beside God? Indeed, most of them do not know! And who other than Him responds to the distressed one when he cal1s Him and relieves him of the distress; and Who has made you His vicegerents on earth? Is there, then, a god beside God? Little do you reflect! And who other than Him guides you in the darkness of the land and the sea? And who sends forth winds announcing His mercy (i.e., rain)? Is there, then, a god beside God? Far exalted be He above what they associate with Him! And who other than Him brings forth His creation and then recreates it? And who gives you sustenance from the heaven and the earth? Is there, a god beside God? (27/aiN ami, 60-64) As to those who reject the Truth it is the same to them whether you warn them. (Therefore) God has sealed their hearts and hearing (i. e., their perceptive faculties); and on their eyes is a veii...They would (try to) deceive God and the believers; but they deceive only themselves and yet do not realize (this). In their hearts is a disease and God has increased their disease. There is a grievous penalty for them because they cry lies (even to themselves). When it is said to them: "Do not make corruption on the earth", they say: "why, we only want to establish order". They are truly the ones who cause corruption, but they do not realize (this) .. Their similitude is that of a man who kindled a fire, and when it lighted all around him, God took away their light and left them in utter darkness, unseeing, deaf, dumb and blind; they will not retum (to the Truth). Or (another similitude) is that of a rain-laden cloud from the sky; in it are zones of darkness, and thunder and lightning. They press their fingers in their ears to keep out the stunning thunderclap, trembling from the fear of death. But God is ever encompassing the rejecters of Truth!.. If God willed He could take away their faculty of hearing and seeing. For God has power over all things. (2/al-Baqarah, 6-20; see also 22/ai-I:Iajj, 46; 45/alHithlyah, 23; 67/ai-Mulk, 3-4; 96/al-' Alaq, 1-8; 3/Aii 'Imrfm, 190)

Hence, just as God is forgiving He is also punishing the wrong-doer; otherwise, how could it ever be possible for those, who commit the gravest errors of humanity, to die without any retribution and just go untouched? Again how could it ever be possible for those who struggle to 147

achieve justice and good life, leave this world without any reward? The Qur'an thus introduces the idea of a final judgment, al-iikhirah, into man's life: Those before them (also) rejected (the truth), and so the punishment came to them from directions they did not perceive. (39/al-Zumar, 25) Because of their sins they were drow.neo and put into the Fire. They found, in lieu of God, none to help themselves. So Noah said: "0 my Lord! Do not leave a single unbeliever on earth". (71/Niil), 25-26.) You will not be questioned for other's sins, 12 nor shall other's be questioned for what you do. Our Lord will gather us and will "in the end decide the matter between us in truth and justice. (34/al-Saba', 25-6) We shall set up scales of justice for the Day of Judgment, so that not a single person wlll be treated unjustly; even if (the value of your action) is more than the weight of a mustard seed, It shall be taken into account. We are able (to take even such little amounts) into account. (21/al-Anbiya', 47) Does man think that We cannot assemble his bones? No! We are able to put together in perfect otder the very tips of his fingers. But man still wants to do wrong and asks: "when is the Day of Resurrection?" It is when the sight is dazed and the moon is darkened and attached to the sun. That day man will say: "where is the refuge?" There is by no means any place secure. That day only to your Lord will be the safe return. Then, man will be asked to put forward what he had done (in life) ... So he gave nothing in charity, nor did he pray! But on the contrary, he.rejected the Truth and turned away. Then he returned to his family with arrogance. Woe to you (o man)! Woe to you!. Does man think that he will be left uncontrolled (without purpose)? Was he not a drop of sperm emitted (in lowly forin)? Then he became a leech-like clot. Then God made and fashioned him in due proportion. And of him He made two sexes, maJe

12The term 'sin' is the concept of 'vice' used in religion for not only acts that are done against prohibition by the religion, but also for all actions that are morally wrong. 148

and female. Does He not then have the power to give life to the dead? (75/ai-Qiyfunah, 3-13 ... 31-40) 13

The Islamic life system is, therefore, totally based on religion which develops a moral life based· on the Qur'anic idea of God and the questioning in the hereafter. Of course, such an ethical system in the Islamic sense also results with happiness, as the following verse points out: Those who believe, and whose hearts find satisfaction in the remembrance of God. For without doubt in the remembrance of God do hearts find satisfaction. (13/alRa'd, 28)

But happiness in this sense is not emphasized as this worldly happiness; on the contrary, happiness in the Islamic sense is the one that comes in art enduring way which is possible only in an eternal life: [To the righteous person will be said:) "0 you, the happy soul! Come back to your Lord, well pleased and well pleasing to Him. Enter you among my devotees. Enter into My Paradise". (89/al-Fajr, 27-30) [You] have been commanded no more than to worship God, offering Him sincere devotion, being true in faith; to establish daily Prayers and help the poor amongst you 14 • This is indeed the true religion. Those who reject (this) ... will be 'in Hellfire, to dwell therein forever; for they are the worst of creatures. But those who believe and do good deeds 15 are the best of creatures. Theil· reward from God is Gardens of eternity, under which rivers flow. They will dwell therein forever. God well pleased with them and they are

13 Also see 7/al-A'rii.f, IOO, also I 0 I; and 2/al-Baqarah, 7; 24/al-Nur, 37; 16/ai-Nal)l, 108; 17/al-Isra', 46; 18/al-Kahf,57.

14ptease note that although helping others, especially the ones who are in need, is a moral duty for us as human beings, it has been established here as a religious duty. This is the essential characteristic of Islamic ethics, namely, all moral duties are religious obligations at the same time. 15The oft-repeated expression in the Qur'an, "doing good deeds" refer simultaneously .the religious and moral duties of a pet·son. In fact, such duties as the prayers, fasting and helping the poor which are conceived by us as religious obligations are indeecl our moral duties towards God. Hence, the Arabic word ~tili{liit refers to both religious and moral duties at once. 149

pleased with God. All this is for those who obey their Lord. (98/al-Bayyinah, 5-8)

Of course, in this sense it does not mean that Islam wants its adherents to be miserable in this world. What it means is that although the true happiness belong~ to the life to come as an eternal bliss, yet the general meaning of the term includes in itself the present life as well as the life to come. 16 ' The Qur' an also indicates that "human soul is certainly prone to evil, unless (the) Lord saves by His mercy" (12/Yl!suf, 53). How does God save from the evil? Of course not by forcing man not to do evil; rather by guidance given in His Revelation, which is the Qur' an. But this Revelation is given to the Prophets, who are the teachers of this guidance. For the achievement of the Divine Purpose it is necessary that there mustbe sent prophets as the instructors of this Divine Purpose. That is why they are described in the Qur' an as "warners and givers of good tidings" (2/alBaqarah, 213; 4/ai:-Nisa', 165; 6/al-An'am, 48; 18/al-Kahf, 56). In this mission prophets are given Books, which are sent to them by revelation. 17 Thus the Qur'an declares: Every nation has its messenger. When their messenger comes, the issue will justly be decided between them. (I 0/Yiinus, 47) (The Prophet Shu'ayb said to his people): "0 my people! I have delivered to you the message of my Lord and I have admonished you; how shall I waste ~yself on a disbelieving people?" (7/al-A 'rat', 93) (This is) the community of your forefather Abraham, who already named you Muslims before this. So let the Messenger (Muhammad) be a witness over you in. this regard and let you be the witnesses over mankind. Establish prayers, then, and pay zakat (i.e., welfare tax) and hold fast to God Who is your protector; what an excellent protector and what an excellent helper! (22/ai-J:Iajj, 78)

Every messenger is thus described as a witness to his community. Their duty is to inform their community of God's message and to instruct 16For a detailed elaboration of the concept of happiness in Islam, see Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995), 91-1 10·. I7see26/al-Shu'ara', 19i-195. 150

them in the Divine Message. Since the source of this Divine Message is one, all the Prophets teach essentially the same Truth. The only difference that could be found is in the sphere of simple cultural activities because every Prophet is sent to a different cultural environment. Therefore, cultural differences are allowed in religion so long as a cultural practice does not contradict the main tenets of the religion. Fundamental structures of all revealed religions are the same, as the following verses explain: The Apostle believes in what it has been revealed to him from his Lord, as do the people of faith. Every Prophet believes in God, His angels, His books, His Messengers (and in resurrection. 2/al-Baqarah, 285; also see 177; and 3/Aii 'Imran, 114; 4/al-Nisft', 136)

There is a chain of Messengers .that began with the appearance of the first man in human history. Since then every society and nation is endowed with a prophet, Muhammad (ASM) being the universal and the last jn this chain and the Qur' an being the last revelation: We have revealed to you as We revealed to Noah, and the prophets after him, and We revealed to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, Jesus and Job, Jonah and Aaron and Solomon, and We gave to David Psalms. There are messengers we have already told you of before, and messengers we have not told you of. God spoke directly unto Moses. There are also messengers bearing good tidings, and. warning so that mankind might have no argument against God, after the messengers. God is All-mighty, All-wise. But God bears witness to what He sent down to you. He sent it down with his knowledge; and the angels also bear witness; and God suffipes as a witness. (4/ai-Nisa', 163-164; also 48/ai-FatiJ, 28)

The notion of prophethood includes also the existence of angels. Actually it presupposes the existence of God anq angels on the one hand, and revelation on the other. Moreover, every revelation has a proof in itself for its own truth. For example, the Qur' an makes the following challenge as a· proof: If you are in doubt about the revelation to Our servant, Muhammad, then produce a surah (i.e., chapter) like it.

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And call your friends or helpers (in order to prove your doubts). But if you cannot, and certainly you will not, then fear God's punishment. (2/ai-Baqarah, 23) Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but (he is) the Apostle of God, and the Seal of the Prophets; for God has the full knowledge of all things. (33/ai-AI).zab, 40) This day I have perfected your religion for you, completed My favor upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion. (5/ai-Ma'idah,3)

We have thus summarized the world-structure of the Islamic worldview from which necessarily follows the idea of revealed knowledge, al- 'ilm. On the basis of this is developed the knowledgestructure. First of all, the concept of 'ilm is introduced. as a fundamental element; the significance attached to it proves this point. Now on the basis of this approach, we can claim that if we carefully examine the early intellectual history of Islam, we shall see that the seeds of some sciences are already in existence right at the time of the Prophet, and especially in Medina, such as, history, law, literature, grammar, philosophy and theology, which are all at the beginning stage. Towards the end of the first century of Islam, 8th century A.D., most of the knowledge accumulated in these disciplines was already on the way to being established as sciences. In order for this process to take place, we say, on the basis of our epistemology and sociology of science, that a knowledge-structure must have developed within the Islamic worldview. We shall now attempt to trace these developments and to show how this structure emerged. b) The Emergence of the Islamic Knowledge-Structure within the Islamic Worldview (0-10 A.H./622-632 A.D.) The epistemology of science developed here has shown that sciences cannot develop by being imported. In other words, no science can arise in a society by importing scientific knowledge from another civilizational source. This is because sciences emetge from within, and the only way for this to be realized is through establishing a worldview which will act with its knowledge-structure as the adequate environmental context for sciences. The general claim is that Islamic science and philosophy began 152

after the translation of Greek scientific and philosophical works into Arabic. On the basis of the nature of the human mind, this claim is immediately proved to be wrong. For we must see in this respect that when the Greek philosophical and scientific works began to be translated into Arabic, there had already been a sophisticated and distinctly expressed Islamic worldview with a sophisticated knowledge-structure. Moreover, one must see that even before Islam, all those Greek philosophical and scientific achievements were present in the region without there having been any sizable advancement in sciences. The role of the translations from Greek should ·neither be over exaggerated nor underestimated--these translations did not play the role of initiating scientific advancement in the Islamic civilization; they only. helped to further th~ already-started phenomenon of scientific progress. In this way, some of the sciences which were not yet built as· independent branches of learning in Islam, were of course established as new sciences. But above all, the most important feature of these scientific activities is its reflection of both the Islamic worldview with its fundamental metaphysics and the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme. 01,.1r purpose now is to demonstrate that the early Islamic worldview as it emerged after the three periods outlined above was already analyzable into its knowledge-structure as well as value-structure and man-structure. But in this context we are not concerned with the latter two structures; therefore, we shall concentrate on the first one only. First of all, the concept of 'ilm is introduced as a fundamental element within the worldview of Islam; the significance attached to 'ilm proves this point: I

Amongst His servants, only the scholars ['ulamii'] are God-fearing. (35/ai-Fatir, 28) Are those who know, to be considered equal to those who do not know? Only prudent men reflect [on this]. (39/AI-Zumar, 9) God will raise in rank those of you who believe and those who are given knowledge. (Al-Mujadalah (58): II)

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Many more verses in the Qur'an can be given to this effect; it suffices to cite the fact that the Prophet was even asked to supplicate "0 my Lord! increase my knowledge" (l'a Ha (20): 114). The scholars are honored by being mentioned in rank next to the angels: "God is the witness that there is no deity except HimseM, and so are the angels and those endued with knowledge, standing firm on justice" (Ali 'lmran (3): 18). In conjunction with this, the following a/:t{ldith can be cited: Among the signs of the Hour ( ashrii{ al-sii 'ahDoomsday) are the decreasing of knowledge and the appearance of ignorance. ( Al-Bukhari, "Kitab a!- 'lim", 71). God does not take away knowledge by wresting it from the people, but takes it away by tpe death of the scholars ('ulamii') until no scholar is left. People begin to accept the ignorant as leaders. When they are asked, they furnish information without knowledge. They thus go astray and lead the people astray. (Al-Bukhari, "K!Hib al-'Ilm", 86). He who is asked about something that he knows but conceals it will have a bridle of fire put on him on the Day of Resurrection. (Abu Dawud, Sunan, "Bab al'IIm", 3650)18 If anyone travels on a road in search of knowledge, God will cause him to travel on one of the roads of Paradise, the angels will lower their wings from good pleasure with one who seeks knowledge, and the inhabitants of the heavens and the earth and the fish in the depth of water will ask forgiveness for the scholar ('iilim). The superiority of a scholar over a pious (zahid) is like that of the moon on the night when it is full over the rest of the stars. The scholars are the heirs of the Prophets who leave neither money nor property behind, but only knowledge. He who takes it, takes an abundant portion. (Abu Dawud, Sunan, "Bab al-'ilm", 3634; also in aiTirmidhi, "'Ilm", 19, al-Nasa'I, Taharah, 112, Ibn Majah, Muqaddimah, 17, Af:lmad ibn I:Ianbal, Musnad, IV, 239)

18Translations of the af:ziidlth from the Sunan of Abu Dawud are adopted from Ahmad

Hasan's translation Sunan Abu Diiwud (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1984). 154

An intellectual (faqfh) is more vehement to the Satan than one thousand devout persons ('iibid). (Ibn Majah, "Muqaddimah", 222) If God wants to do good to a person, He makes him an intellectual (faqfh) in religion. (AI-Bukhari, "KWib ai'IIm", chapter 14)

The above afuidith are sufficient to show that the knowledge-structure of the Islamic worldview begins with an immense emphasis on the concept of knowledge. Of course in this respect 'ilm is not the only term included in this emphasis, although we have concentrated on it. It seems that in this connection, two terms go together in early Islam: 'ilm andfiqh. Both terms refer to knowledge, although the former express~s exact. precise and definite knowledge, while the latter signifies scientific, and hence knowledge of the rationalldnd . .That is why 'ilm is used by both the Qur'an and J:tadith to refer to revealed knowledge which is definite arid absolute. 19 It is clear that 'ilm is used to refer to knowledge which is either revealed or related to that which is revealed. On the other hand, the same term is used both in the Qur' an and certain a/:liidzth also to refer to knowledge in general: We have given explained it with for people who 4/al-Nisa', 157; 31/Luqman, 20)

them a book (i. e., Revelation) and a knowledge as a guidance and mercy believe. (Al-A 'raJ (7): 52; also see 6/al-An'am, 119; 27/al-Naml; 15-6;

If anyone acquires knowledge of things by which God's own pleasure is sought, yet acquires it only to get some worldly advantage, he will not reach the smell of Paradise. (Abu Dawiid, Sunan, "Bab ai-'IJm", 3656)

When 'ilm is revealed it is absolute and thus is identical with the Revelation; but when it is attained by man, it cannot be identical with Revelation. Therefore, tqe general usage of 'ilm by both the Qur' an and J:tadith refers to the knowledge attained by man. The usage bi ghayri 'ilm- without having any knowledge (6/al-An'am, 119; 31/Luqman, 20, and 19For this usage, see the following verses: 2/al-Baqarah, 120; 3/Ali 'Imran, 61; 6/alAn'am, 119,140, 143; 11/Hiid, 14, 49; 13/al-'Ra'd, 37, 43; 19/Maryam, 43. 155

so on), then, means "'ilm devoid of revelational content ·when it should not be so devoid". Hence, the general meaning of 'ilm is intimately linked in the knowledge-structure of the Islamic worldview with its usage in the sense of Revelation. The ones who do wrong follow their own whims without having any knowledge. Who will guide someone whom God has Jet go astray? They will have no supporters. So keep your face set straight to the true religion, God's natural handiwork along which He has patterned mankind. There is no way to alter God's creation. That is the correct religion, though most men do not know. (30/al-Ra'd, 29-30)

It is clear that the moral dimension is what the Qur' an is developing here as the knowledge-structure of the Islamic world view. If this moral dimension is divested of knowledge, it may lead to disastrous results: Those who have stupidly killed their own children without having any knowledge and forbidden something God has pt·ovided them with, have lost out through inventing things about God; they have gone astray and not been guided ... Who can be more harmful than the one who invents a lie about God to mislead people without having any knowledge. (6/al-An 'am, l40, 144)

Therefore, the Qur' anic approach qualifies knowledge with a moral dimension which is provided again by. the revelation; the attitude of indifference is thereby excluded from the Islamic worldview and its knowledge-structure. Hence, knowledge is not conceived to be neutral to values, it is inherently linked with values; and thus it can be harmful or useful --as the Prophet prayed: "0 God, I seek refuge with You from the knowledge which is not useful" (Muslim, "Kitab al-Dhikr", 73; AbtJ Dawud, "Witr", 32, and so on). Moreover, this aspect of knowledge can be observed in the following verse as weli: "They learn what is harmful and not useful to them." (2/al-Baqarah, 102). The knowledge that is useful is understood as either Revelation itself, as we have seen in the verses mentioned or quoted, or as knowledge derived directly from Revelation, or as knowledge in the general sense, 156

namely as acquired by man, but which can be reconciled with Revelation and thus be based upon it. It is also clear from the verses and a}:tiidith which use the term 'ilm that whenever 'ilm is used in the sense of Revelation or in the general meaning of revealed knowledge, it is almost exclusively used with the definite article ( al- 'ilm). Therefore, the Qur'an definitely wishes to qualify knowledge; in fact, its aim is to guide knowledge in general; that is why revelational knowledge is collated with it at this point. Knowledge in general is no longer left aloof, but it is suggested to be invested with revelational values. Once general knowledge is thus invested, it becomes illumined knowledge, which is no longer knowledge that is not useful. There is no doubt that all these values are delicately infused into the knowledge-conception of the Islamic worldview by the Qur'an. First it states that "the true knowledge is with God alone" (46/al-Al;tkaf, 23), then points out: "above all those who possess knowledge is an All-knowing" (12/Yiisuf, 76). Moreover, it categorically declares that "God knows you do not know" (2/al-Baqarah, 216; see also 3/Ali 'Imran, 65-6). In this way a morality of knowledge is also developed as a part of the knowledge-structure of the Islamic worldview. Knowledge unqualified is considered as though it is not knowledge at all; hence, the phrase "without having any know ledge". For when the Qur' an accuses those people with this allegation, it cannot obviously mean that those people had no knowledge at all; in fact, "they knew only the external look of the worldly life, but they were totally unaware of the life to come ( al-akhirah)" (30/alRiim, 7). That is why their knowledge is as if non-existent. Therefore, unilluminated knowledge is superficial in itself and as such it can be equated with ignorance. . As all these conceptions concerning 'ilm,fiqh and other knowledgerelated terms were developed, a doctrinal understanding gradually began to emerge within the Islamic worldview; it is this comprehensive doctrinal understanding that we call the 'knowledge-structure' of the Islamic worldview. As we have seen, this conception emphasizes knowledge with an utmost care, without even leaving it with a mere emphasis, for it also states that "seeldng knowledge is an obligation for every Muslim" (Ibn Majah, "Muqaddimah", 17, 224). Moreover, besides this emphasis, a 157

framework is also given together with the doctrinal understanding of knowledge. Considering also the Qur'anic encouragement to examine and understand the universe and the nature of certain related problems, it becomes inevitable that as a result of all these comprehensive knowledgeseeking activities, a network of concepts emerges; it is this network which we have called the scient~fic conceptual scheme. Since this scheme emerged as a result of and within the Islamic world view, we identify it as the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme. As we have shown, if such a scheme emerges within a given society or civilization, it is called 'scientific tradition'. Therefore, the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme is the ground of the Islamic scientific tradition. We shall now examine briefly the emergence of this tradition.

2. The Emergence of the Islamic Scientific Tradition (10-200 A.H./632-800 A;D.)

a

The scope of this study does not allow us to give detailed outline of how this general scheme of Islamic scientific activities developed. But a brief description of this process is necessary not only to show its history but also to clarify what is meant by it. Therefore,. we shall attempt to delineate its most general features as it developed in the early centuries of Islam. First of all, since a tradition requires a society in which it can unfold itself, we must try not only to show the existence of a community of scientists in the early centuries of Islam, but how such a community came to exist as well. Secondly, the active framework of the Islamic scientific tradition is the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme. Therefore, as its necessary ground it must have emerged first, or at least simultaneously with the Islamic scientific tradition, so that a tradition is based on it. In that case we shall clarify this scheme and also show its emergence, then how it led to the development ~f a scientific tradition in Islam.

a) The Emergence of the Islamic Scientific Conc~ptual Scheme As we have pointed out, after the Prophet moved to Medina, the revelation which he received was more concerned with other structures of the Islamic worldview, and among these the knowledge-structure is the one that concerns us here. This means that he began setting up certain 158

institutions that became the model of education in later Islamic history. The School of the Bench, known as A~l;lab al-~uffah, or Ahl al-~uffah (i.e., the People of the Bench) is only one of these educational establishments which was founded by the Prophet himself in Medina at the long, covered portico of the Mosque. Those companions who belonged to this School were engaged only in study and worship. They did not work and most of them even did not get married until the Prophet's death. Some of them kept their pace of life in scholarly work and in the preservation of the Prophet's traditions throughout their life. The Prophet provided their livelihood mainly from the booty acquired from expeditions, so that they would not interrupt their study. Their number is said to have reached at times up to 400. 20 ~uffah was origfnally set apart for the lodging of newcomers and those of the local people who were too poor to have a house of their own. But soon it acquired the character of a regular residential school where reading, writing, Muslim law, the memorizing of chapters of the Qur'an, tajwid (how to recite the Qur'an correctly), and other Islamic sciences were taught under the direct supervision of the Prophet, who took pains to see to the daily requirements of the boarders. The Prophet was so much concerned with the education of Muslims that when some Meccans were taken prisoners by him after the victory of Badr, he asked those among them who were literate to teach ten children of Medina how to write. 21 Sometimes this was done in exchange for their freedom. 'Ubadah ibn al-~amit says that the Prophet appointed him a teacher in the school of ~uffah for classes in writing and in Qur'anic studies. 22 Therefore, the School of the Bench cannot be represented just as a welfare house of the Prophet, as this is the impression left by some classical sources. 23 The main purpose of establishing the ~uffah was to 20Ibn Sa'd gives the following names as members of this School: Abu i-Iurayrah, Abu Dharr ai-Ghifari, Wathilah ibn ai-Asqa', Qays ibn Tihfah al-Ghifari, 'Abd al-Ra~man ibn Ka'b al-Asamm, etc. Al-l;lujwiri mentions 34 names in his Kashf al-Ma(tjub; trans. R. Nicholson (Leyden and London, 1911), 81. 21Ibn I;Ianbal, Musnad (istanbul: <;agn Yaymlan, 1992), 1(21): 247; Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqiit al-Kubrii, 2; I: 14. 22sunan Abu Diiwud, trans. Ahmad Hasan, op. cit., 2: 972. 159

preserve the intellectual heritage of Islam. Studying and memorizing the Qur'an and (tadith, spending most of their times in meditation and worship, following the Prophet during the day wherever he went in order to observe what he did and said so as to record his traditions--in this sense, the School of the Bench performed the task of the Prophetic archives, and thus became the first seat of the Islamic scientific tradition. But in most of their archival activities the members relied mainly upon their memory. Some of them, such as Abu Hurayrah, and his disciple J:Iammam ibn Munabbih, wrote on pages which are still extant. Thousands of (tadith are reported on the authority of the members of the Bench. Unfortunately, modern scholarship is very inadequate in bringing to light the historical information about this school. For this reason it may at first appear strange to call this group of people a "school". Yet the fact that the Prophet had not only the intention of providing these people with shelter and livelihood, but that he also aimed at establishing the Bench as a center of learning justifies calling it at least a place of learning, i.e., a school. On the other hand, when we see that the life they led is so clearly distinguishable from that of the other Companions, the plausible conclusion is that they had also a different conception of the world and man's role in such a world. This also justifies us to refer to them as a school of thought in early Islam. But unfortunately, historical material related to this aspect of the School is extremely scarce. There is still much need to do research on the School of the Bench as represented by us here. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence that ~uffah was not the only school in Medina. Ibn J:Ianbal, for example; records that at a certain time, "a batch of 70 students attended the lectures of a certain teacher in Medina, and worked there till morning". 24 In fact, there were at least nine mosques 2 3The members of the Bench were mostly very poor; see 2/ai-Baqarah, 273 which makes a remark about them revealing their miserable situation; also see the relevant verse in Mu)Jammad ai-Zamakhshari's al-Kashshiif (Beyrut: Dar al-Kutiib al'Ilmiyyah, 1995), I: 313.) The school of $uffah provided instruction not only for those who lodged there, but also during the day scholars and casual visitors attended it in large numbers. But there were among them very rich personalities such as AbLi Lubabah, who donated a balcony to the Masjid ai-:Qirar, see Waqidi, Kitiib alMaghiizi, trans. by J. Wellhausen (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von G. Reimer, 1882), 4 t'O. 24Ibid. 160

in Medina at the time of the Prophet. Professor Hamidullah states that each one of these mosques served simultaneously as a school, and that "the people inhabiting the locality sent their children to these local mosques. Quba is not far from Medina. The Prophet sometimes went there and personally supervised the school in the mosque of that place. There are general dicta of the Prophet regarding those who studied in the mosqueschools. He also enjoined upon people to learn from their neighbors." 25 All these educational activities led to the emergence of a group of scholars who handed down the Prophetic tradition of teaching and searching for knowledge to the next generation of scholars who b~came their students. Of course the early generation of scho~ars were naturally very simple in their ideas concerning special sciences, although they were extremely sophisticated in their knowledge of religion and related issues, primarily because of the guidance of Revelation. But soon, as a new generation of scholars began to take over this scholarly tradition, the desire for learning increased; as a result, a group of scholars with a sophisticated scientific mentality emerged. Among them, we can give the following names: Qa<;li ShurayQ. (d. 80/699), MuQ.ammad ibn al-l:lanafiyyah· (d. 81/700), Ma'bad al-Juhani (d. 84/703), Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab (d. c. 91/709), 'Urwah ibn al-Zubayr ibn al-'Awwam (d. 941712), Ibrahim Nakha'I (d. c. 56/717), Aban ibn 'Uthman (d. 100/718), Mujahid ibn Jabr (d. 100/718), 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 102/720), Wahb ibn Munabbih (d. 110, 1141719, 723), J:Iasan al-Ba~ri (d. 1101728), 'Ata' ibn Abi Rahal). (d. 114/732), J:Iammad ibn Abu Sulayman (d. 120/737), GhayHin al-Dimashql (d. c. 123/740), al-Zuhri (d. 1241742), Wasil ibn 'Ata' (d. 1311748), Ibn Isl:laq (d. 151/768), Ja'far al-$adiq (d. 148/765), Abu J:Ianifah (d. 150/767), Awza'I (d. 158/774), Hishain ibrl al-J:Iakam (d. 179/795-6), Malik ibn Anas (d. 1791796), Abu Yusuf (d. 182/799), Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 1611778); al-Shafi'i (d. 204/819), and so on. It is primarily through the efforts of these scientists and many others that a sophisticated technical scientific vocabulary gradually emerged towards the end of the second century of Islam. This technical vocabulary 2 5M. Hamidullah. "Educational System in the Time of the Prophet", Islamic Culture, 13 (1939), 53-55. 161

included, among others, the following: 'ilm, u~ul, ra'y, Otihiid, qiyas, fiqh, 'aql, qalb, idrak, wahm, tadabbur,fikr, na:r.ar, /:tikmah, yaqin, waJ:ty, tafsir, ta 'wil, 'a lam, kaliim, nu.tq, :r.ann, J:taqq, ba_til, ~idq, kidhb, wujud, 'adam, dahr, ~amad, sarmad, azal, abad, khalq, khulq, firasah,fi_trah, .tabi'ah, ikhtiyar, kisb, khayr, sharr, J:talal, /:tariim, wajib, mumkin, amr, iman, iradah, and so on. Who can claim that these scientific terminology were not contained in the Islamic worldview? For all these usage's had a basis in the Qur'an as well. In fact, they were available not only as everyday terms, but also as concepts with sophisticated and · rich meanings that made them available for later technical-scientific usage. The purpose of our exposition is to demonstrate that all these technical terms formed a sophisticated web of scientific concepts until the end of the second century of Islam (in approximately the 830s). As we still need to do more historical research to bring out materials, we cannot go into a detailed exposition of this. We shall rather concentrate on certain key terms only, which will sufficiently prove our case in this context, in order to exhibit the early Islamic scientific tradition.

_b) The Emergence of the Early Islamic Scientific Tradition As we have already defined the concept of a scientific tradition, we can say that the Islamic scientific tradition is the menifestation of the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme within the Islamic milieu. We can show this by examining the scientific meanings attached to the scientific concepts as they begin to emerge in the early Muslimcommunity. In order to do this we shall select only the most fundamental concepts in Islamic science, as they are situated within the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme. We are informed, for example, of al-:Zuhri to have said that a sound theory (al-ra 'y al-J:tasan) is a good piece of knowledge. 26 Ibn 'Abbas reports from the Prophet that he said: "As though I see the women of Banii Fahr circumambulating around the Khazraj (tribe) while shaking their buttocks; they are the polytheists. This is the first polytheism of this community. By God, their wrong theory (sa' ra 'yihim) shall eventually lead them to exclude God from predetermining good, just as they had 2 6see Ahmad Hasan, Analogical Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1986), 8.

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already excluded Him from predetermining evil". 27 Of course_ it may not always be possible to find an equivalent translation of a scientific term of a scientific conceptual scheme, coined for a specific meaning within a certain worldview in another scientific conceptual scheme. This is the case with the concept of ra 'y, which does not have an exact corresponding term in the Western scientific vocabulary; except that the term 'theory' is used very much in a meaning close to the term ra'y. This is attested also in the report of Ibn Sa'd who states that when 'Ata' ibn Abi RabaQ. was ·asked concerning his judgment whether it was 'ilm or ra 'y, he replied that it was 'ilm, if his judgment is derived from a precedent, i.e., athar; otherwise, it was implied that the judgment in question was grounded upon ra 'y. 28 This means that 'ilm is understood as a definite piece of knowledge which is either directly taken from a revealed source, or derived from it on the basis of a precedent practice of the Prophet. But ra 'y cannot be 'ilm in this sense because it is the view of an individual on a certain problem. He~ce, ra'y actually means 'theory' inthe Western scientific terminology. Not only does a theory, i. e., ra 'y, mean 'provisional opinion', it also expresses a rational argumentation because a scientific theory is based on reasoning. This understanding of ra 'y is also clear from the following usage; "ni 'rna wazir al- 'ilm al-ra 'y al-l:tasan" (what a good minister of knowledge is the correct theory) 29 . Moreover, since reason is not authoritative in the absolute thmscendent realm, the Prophet says that "if one interprets the Qur' an on the basis of his theory, he has committed an error even if he is correct in his interpretation" (man qr.llafi'l-Qur'iin bi ra'yihifa a~·iiba,fa qad akhta'y3°, since no knowledge can be based on a theory. It is also reported that "sometimes Ibn 'Abbas held a theory which later he abandoned. " 31 . It is clear therefore, that though our Prophet did not use the term to mean theory in the scientific sense, he definitely paved the way for such a 27 Al.1mad ibn I;Ianbal, op. cit., 1 (21 ): 330. 28Kitiib Tabaqiit al-Kubrii, ed. by II:Jsan 'Abbas (Beyrut: Dar ~adir, 1968), 5: 469. 29AJ-Darimi, Sunari, "Muqaddimah", 30. 30Sunan Abu Diiwud, op. cit., I 036. 31 Al-Darimi, op. cit., "Muqaddimah", 52. 163

usage. As a result, gradually the term began to emerge as a significant concept in the Islamic scientific tradition to mean theory. The knowledge based on a rational argumentation is reached as a result of ra 'y, and such a knowledge was actually defined as fiqh in the early scientific tradition. This is clear in the above quotations of the afttidith in which fiqh occurs. Since such a knowledge is in fact science per se, in certain early usage it was used exactly in the same manner, such as the title of a book written by al-Tha'alibi--Fiqhu'l-Lughah, i.e., the science of lexicography. Later developments, however, diverted this usage, and perhaps as an influence of the Greek sCientific tradition this usage was dropped and thus replaced by the term 'ibn. Moreover, according to Abu I:Ianifah, fiqh meant "speculative thinking". 32 Al-Dhahabi says of 'Abdullah ibn al-Mubarak that he "recorded knowledge, i.e., ftadith, in chapters and concerning fiqh" ( dawwana '1- 'ilm fi'1-abwtib wa '1-fiqh). 33 Of course this usage of the term has a basis in the Qur'an (e.g., 9/al-: Tawbah; 122; Zi yatafaqqahu fi a1-d"in), as well as in the ftadith (see the ftadith quoted above in relation to the Prophet's prayer for Ibn 'Abbas). That is why 'ilm was taken by the Traditionists to mean ftadith. ljtihtid is.also a closely related term in the network of concepts of the Islamic scientific tradition; it means the effort to search for knowledge through ra 'y. Hence, ~jtihad is also a scientific effort which is theoretical. For this reason it is not a definite knowledge, but it must, of course, be based on revealed knowledge. It must be for this. reason that the Prophet says: ''fat;llu'1-'tilim 'ala'1-mujtahid mi'atu darajah", namely, the scholar who bases himself on true knowledge is a hundred times higher in rank than the theoretical scholar. 34 If we want to show the relation of ra 'y to ijtihtid, we can say that ra 'y is the theory which is produced in an ijtihad. This is clear in Mu'ftdh ibn Jabal's interesting usage of (jtihad and ra 'y together in the famous ftadith of (jtihtid: ajtahidu ra 'yi lti tilu; i. e., I shall make my best effort to come up with a theory. 35 But (jtihad is

EP .

32L. Gardet, "'lim al-Kalam", 33 Tadhkirat al-l:fuffti:r. (Hyderabad: The Dairatu'I-Ma 'arlf-il~Osmania, 1955), I: 275. 34At-Darimi, op. cit., "Muqacldimah", 32. 35AJ:!mad ibn I:Ianbal, Musnad, 5: 230.

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necessarily based on the Qur' an and f:tadith, as understood from this f:tadith as well. It is, therefore, the theoretical knowledge based on the Qur' an and the f:tadzth. What about the theoretical knowledge which is primarily derived from discursive thinking? The early Islamic scientific tradition used the term kalam to refer to this kind of knowledge. As such kalam meant 'speculative knowledge'. The earliest reference in this regard can be taken from J:Iasan al-Ba~ri's (d. 728) letter in which he states that "we initiated the speculative study of qadar; just as people initiated the denial of it" ( af:tdathnii al-kaliim fihi). 36 It is also reported that once our Prophet's wife, 'A'ishah, heard J:Iasan al-Ba~ri speaking, and asked: "who is this discoursing with the word of the veracious" (man hadhii alladhf yatakallam bi kala~ al-~iddiqzn). 31 In this sense, kalam comes very close to the term 'philosophy' .as it is used today; i.e., speculative thinking. It is clear why Muslims chose the word '.kaliim' for this kind of knowledge, for kaliim means 'language' or 'speech' but not in the ordinary sense. It rather refers to the kind of human language which is discursive. In this sense, it comes close to the term 'logos' in the Greek scientific conceptual scheme. It may be translated into English as 'discourse', but in the technical sense of today' s Western scientific terminology, it means precisely 'philosophy'. It is clear that all these usage determined the scientific vocabulary of the early Muslims. Not only is the meaning of each term clarified, but so is its relation to other terms and the way, v:iz., method, they ought to be used is also given. For instance, it is possible to think that since .fiqh is a rational understanding, it may be a kind of knowledge that is to be avoided by Muslims, as indicated in the above f:tadith that the scholar who bases himself on true knowledge is a hundred times higher in rank than the theoretical scholar, i. e., the rationalist. But another f:tadfth clarifies that ·rational understanding may be decisive in certain cases (e.g.,faqfh w(lf:tid 36 Julian Obermann, "Political Theology in Early Islam", Jourttal of the American Oriental Society, 55 (1935), 145; Arabic text, Helmut Ritter, "Studien zur Islamischen Fromigkeit I: Hasan al-Basri", Der Islam, 21 (1933), 68, lines 10-11. 37Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-flasan al-Ba,H·l, 8-9; quoted by Mul}ammad 'Abd al-Ral)im, Tajsrr al-f:lasan al-Ba~rf (Al-Qahirah: Dar al-I:Iaramayn li't-Tiba 'ah, 1992), I: 21. 165

ashadd 'alii al-shay,tiin min alf 'iibid). 38 Of course, the Islamic worldview also clarifies in which cases which is to be preferred. To the concept of knowledge in the Islamic scientific tradition of the Islamic science, the term /:tikmah also proved indispensable. Mujahid, fo1· example, explains the term ftikmah in the verse wa man yu'ta al-ftikmah fa qad utiya khayran kathlrii (2/al-Baqarah, 269) as comprising three things: 1. al-Qur'an, 2. al- 'ilm, 3. al-fiqh. 39 Here 'ilm refers to the knowledge of Islamic tradition and the Sunnah,fiqh was held as a rational understanding on the basis of the revealed sources. flikmah, on the other hand, was understood as knowledge derived rationally from a revealed source, as such it is both 'ilm and fiqh at once, but different from independent speculation, which can be understood as kaliim. That is why al-Tabari reports that ftikmah was defined by his predecessors as the Qur' an and its (rational) understanding ( al-/:tikmah hiya al-Qur 'an wa '1fiqh bihi). 40 : In this way every term which was gradually given a specific place in the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme acquired a technical scientific meaning, but always in relation to each other. Therefore, the concepts in this scheme are so related to each other that when they are thus held together, they yield a vision, an insight, and an outlook in the mind of the Muslim scientist; and as a framework in the mind of the Muslim scientists it constitutes what we call here 'Islamic scientific tradition'. No matter in what field the scientist is working, by the very epistemological constitution of his mind, he will necessarily reflect this tradition; and it is this outlook that characterizes a scientific activity as Islamic, since it springs from the Islamic worldview. And again it is in this sense that a scientific activity will render itself as a part of the Islamic science.

38Al-Tirmidhi, "'lim", 13; Ibn Majah, "Muqaddimah". 39 AI-Tabari, Jiimi' al-Bayiinfi Tafslr al-Qur'iin (Beyrut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, 1980), 3: 60. 4°Ibid.

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CHAPTER FIVE THE RISE OF PARTICULAR SCIENCES We have thus far applied the epistemological and sociological framework of science as developed here to scientific traditions in general. In this chapter we shall try to apply this to specific sciences in a given civilization, in this case, Islamic civilization. We may apply the same frameworks to other civilizations, and in this case instead of doiryg that, as this will exceed the scope of this essay, we shall try to point to!the main differences in the three case traditions chosen for our study here. We have already indicated in our discussion of the scientific process that scientific consciousness is necessary for an organized body of knowledge to be called 'sCience'. In that case, can we talk about a scientific tradition without there being any sciences, which would indicate the absence of the scientific consciousness? If we have shown, in the previous chapter the emergence of an Islamic scientific tradition, this means that scientific consciousness must have become identifiable together with it. If, on the other hand, this is the case, it means in turn that there must have been some sciences at that time as well. Since the application of both scientific consciousness and thus the emergence of a tradition is a process, it will cover a long period of time. It will begin with some knowledge-acquisition activities and eventually lead to both phenomena. In the previous chapter we have shown this process to have taken place from the tenth year of the hUrah until the beginning of the third century. (10-200 A.H./632-800 A.D.) This means that it covered about two hundred years of a scientific process. At the beginning of this process we cannot expect to find the scientific consciousness, which brings into the mind the question of when it came to be applied historically. This chapter will mainly deal with this problem in order to apply our framework to specific sciences, and in this case we shall chose Islamic civilization as our case study. We need not actually discover an exact date for the historical application of scientific consciousness, which actually means 'naming specific sciences', and in facr it is extremely difficult to ascertain an exact 167

date because the scientific process is taking its course very naturally in the first century of Islam. Moreover, because sufficient historical material is not available, it is hard to determine in the early period which scientist, 'iilim, for the first time used the terms discussed in their scientific technical meanings. We must nevertheless admit that even close to the end of the second century the scientific consciousness was effectively applied to specific organized bodies of knowledge. This means that it is possible to detect the early formations of sciences in Islam right from the end of the second century (800 A. D.). That is why it is possible to talk about an Islamic scientific tradition as existent around this time. What are the characteristics of the early Islamic science? The most important one is that all subjects under .discussion are regarded as comprising the subject· matter of one comprehensive science. For this reason, only one name is given to all the subject matters investigated; alfiqh which is thus the mother science in the Islamic scientific tradition. It is in a way similar to the early Greek usage of the term philosophia which was in fact a comprehensive term referring to all disciplinary learning activities. As we have shown, in this comprehensive sense al-fiqh does not mean 'law'; it rather means just science. 1 In the early Islamic scientific tradition, therefore, all other subjects of investigation are considered in one way or another as branches of (-1.1-fiqh. That is why Abi:1 I:Ianifa, for example, uses the term al-fiqh al-akbar to refer to subjects . I . related to theology. He seems to be aware that as an umbrella· science it is possible to classify subjects under al-fiqh, which shows the early traces of scientific consciousness. But still we do not find in Abii l:fanifa a clear definition of subject matter and the method that constitutes al-fiqh as a discipline. Our exposition shows that the process out of which individual sciences arose is also important in this respect fdr the clarification of the epistemological and sociological frameworks of science developed here. For this reason we shall in this chapter briefly try to demonstrate how 1 In order to distinguish the early sense of the term· al-fiqh from its later meaning In

the sense of law, we shall use it always with the definite article; hence, al-jlqh shall mean 'science', whereas fiqh will refer in this context to 'the science of Jaw and jurisprudence' in general. . 168

such individual sciences emerged within the Islamic scientific tradition. We shall chose as example cases the most important early sciences; fiqh and kaliim (i. e., philosophy). Since our model is the scientific process, we shall apply it now to our example cases.

A. Al-FIQH As we have argued, the meaning of the term al-fiqh in the early Islamic scientific tradition meant simply science. In the Greek tradition we see 'cl similar case with regard to philosophy, which was first understood as science par excellence, and then it was classified into individual sciences which came to emerge at a later stage. This was the case with the term alfiqh in the Islamic tradition. At a later stage, however, the meaning of this scientific term became limited to religious-moral-legal studies. This was, as we have pointed out, the result of the Greek influences. When the Greek scientific and philosophical works were translated into Arabic, the translators were the Christian Arabs who knew Greek, and no Muslim thinker kriew -sufficient Greek to participate in the translation activities. Since the Christian Arab scholars were not trained in Islamic science, they did not know the technical vocabulary of the Muslims. They thus translated, for example, the Greek term episteme as 'ilm, whereas this was a great mistake, because as we have seen in the Islamic scientific tradition 'ilm meant 'revealed knowledge'. Based our assessment here, we can say that if it had been a Muslim translator, he would have translated episteme asfiqh. If we evaluate this problem,. we qm see that literally episteme and 'ilm mean knowledge, they are thus synonymous. A translator who does not mean the technical meaning of the Arabic term he will naturally translate it in its everyday usage. Muslim philosophers did not object to this. translation because 'ilm as 'revealed knowledge' was conceived to be absolute, i.e. true knowledge, it is this meaning that is conveyed in the Aristotelian episteme. Therefore, in this sense this translation is not altogether wrong, and in fact this may have bearing upon Muslim philosophers' conclusion that both philosophy and Revealed knowledge convey the same Truth. 169

We can adduce more evidence to this effect; the term syllogism was trans~ated as qiyiis which meant in the Islamic scientific vocabulary analogical reasoning. There was as yet no term to correspond to syllogism. Moreover the term philosophia was also problematic; as the Christian translators were not trained in the Islamic scientific tradition they were not well versed in the Islamic scientific terminology. As a result, they tried to use the term f:zikmah to translate into Arabic. This translation was obviously based on the everyday meaning of the term which was known to them. But this caused so much confusion and in fact attracted reaction from the Muslim scientific community that they preferred to use it in its Arabized Greek form al-falsafah. As we have shown the term kaliim came very close at that time to the meaning of philosophia. If these terms were thus correctly translated into Arabic, I believe that there would not have been so much reaction against the Aristotelian philosophy from the early Islamic scientific community. It is, therefore, a significant error to interpret the early reaction of the Muslim scientific community to the Aristotelian philosophy as merely a religious fanaticism against science. The reaction is primarily scientific; as these scholars are used to the meaning of the term 'ilm as 'absolute revealed knowledge', they found many wrong doctrines in the Aristotelian philosophy which would not qualify it to the level of 'ilm. Moreover, how could such wrong theories be f:zikmah? For f:zikmah meant, as we have seen, al-Qur'an wa'l-fiqh bihi. 2 This tension between the Islamic scientific vocabulary and the Aristotelian philosophy led to its rejection by the Muslim scholars. But eventually, this new vocabulary paved its way as certain scholars wrote refutations ag'ainst the Aristotelian philosophy by using these wrongly translated terms. Thus, 'ilm came to mean science and f:zikmah with some reservations came .to mean philosophia, and so on. With these considerations, then we shall attempt to show the emergence of fiqh as an early Islamic science. In doing this, we shall apply again our theory of scientific process developed in the sociology of science (Chapter 3).

2 AI-Tabari, Jami' al-Bayiin fi Tafsfr al-Qur'an (Beyrut: Dar al-Ma 'rifah, 1980), 3: 60.

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1. The Stage of Scientific Problems 700' s)

(0-80's A.H./622-

When the Prophet migrated to Medina a new Muslim community was established on the basis of the Islamic wofldview through which Muslims had been educated. This meant that Muslims ought to have lived in accordance with the new worldview which brought some problems that needed to be solve. Many of these problems required an intellectual approach as well. They were all of diverse subjects; theological, moral, political, legal, and social. Theological and moral subjects coincided, as we have seen, in the Islamic worldview with religion; hence, their solution largely came from the Revelation but their explanation and relevance were elaborated by the Prophet himself. However, still some theological rind moral issues were left ambiguous, and many political, social, legal and economic problems were left for the community to solve. The Prophet was the leader not only in religious issues but in these intellectual issues as well. He thus stressed the significance of understanding the religion in order to apply to one's life, which nieant to find intellectual solutions to these problems .. This is clear in the early usage of the termfiqh to mean understanding the religion for the purpose of applying to one's life (that is, to find {ntellectual solutions to the problems of.their time). Let us consider the following f:zadith: "May Allah brighten a man who hears our word, gets it by heart and transmits it to others. Many a bearer of fiqh transmits our word to one who has more knowledge (fiqh) than him; and many a bearer of knowledge (fiqh) is not a scholar (faqzh)." 3 Although the termfiqh in this usage does not yet means sc,ience, it is yet used in a meaning that has so much affinity to its meaning science that one is tempted here to translate the term faqlh as 'scientist'. That is. why we preferred to translate as 'scholar'. If it is clear that the early Muslim community was trying to find scholarly solutions for their problems, then it is not difficult to see that the Islamic science is now at the stage of problems in its scientific process. Some of these problems may be summarized in this context as legal, 3 Abii Dawiid, Sunan, '"lim", 10; ai-Tirmizi, Sunan, '"lim", 7. 171

economic, literary, political and social. In short, for example, we know that the pre-Islamic legal activities were limited to the law of customs among the Arabs. Tribal organizations was the political body in the preIslamic Arabian society. The tribe was bound by the body of unwritten rules. No one had a legislative power to interfere with the system; modifications of the law naturally occurred through a long period of time. These modifications were mainly introduced by individuals and were accepted if the whole community consented to it. Hence, no official institution of law existed. There was only customary law of the Arabs. Since there was no organized political authority there was also no judicial system. If a legal disputes was not settled through private channels recourse to a (lakam (arbitrator) was made. Usually someone believed to have sup~rnatural powers was chosen as (lakam. Each party had to give something like a security deposit to guarantee that they would submit the decision of the arbitrator. The theological issues did not exist at the time of the Prophet as problems; the most important problem· at the time was to show the absurdity of the pagan deities. Muslims were well aware that such problems cannot be solved by the capacity of our mind; hence, they accepted the Revelation as the only source for such issues. The only intellectual effort required of them: was try sincerely to understand what the Revelation was relatij:lg to them. They only needed to show the irrationality of the pagan theological outlook. This is also clear in the Qur' an: "If there were in the heavens and the earth other gods besides Allah, there would have been confusion in both" (21/al-Anbiyii', 22, and many other verses to this effect). When the Muslim community was thus established in Medina, with the arrival of the Prophet in 622, some kind of a political authority was established and thereby the foundation of an organized judicial systemwas also erected. The Prophet was the central authority. But some companions of the Prophet were drawing conclusions from the Qur' an and the sunnah of the Prophet on all these issues by independent reasoning, which was termed ra 'y, as we have seen. Their conclusions were consented by the other Companions and thereby they became binding on the community. It seems that from the earliest times two characteristics were exhibited in 172

every legal deCision to be admitted universally by all Muslims and to acquire the status of law: 1. independent reasoning based on the Qur' an and the Sunnah; 2. recognition of an authoritative community, in this case of those who have the 'ilm namely knowing the conditions from the time of the Prophet. The termfiqh was thus used very commonly; indeed its usage was so common that soon after the Prophet's death it already began to acquire a technical meaning. Another important scientific activity of the stage of problems is seen in the form of the scholarly works on (tadith. We know that earlier some companions made notes for their personal guidance and usually carried these notes with them, even sometimes for the purpose of instruction and edification to their scholarly circles. There were even some larger notes refereed to as Kitab (Book). This attitude of keeping written (tadith gradually led to bigger compilations; amongst these the following ones are the most celebrated: 1. Kitab ofAsma bint Umays (d. 38/658-9); 2. K.itdb of Sa'd ibn 'Ubadah (d. c. 15/636); 3. $a(tifah of 'Amr ibn al-'A~ (d. 65/684-5); 4. $a(tifah of Samura ibn Jundah (d. 60/679-680). In fact, 'Arnr ibn al-'Af ~a(tifah, also called al-$ahifat al-$iidiqah, contained a few hundred a(tiidith.4 At this stage of compilations we find four significant names of scholars who tried to deal with certain problems of l;l.adith compilations, such as how to organize the /:tadlth literature and developing technical terminology to distinguish authentic and inauthentic J:wdfth: 'Urwah ibn al-Zubayr (c. 25-93/645-710); Aban ibn 'Uthman (c. 20-105/640-723); Al-Zuhri; and Ibn Isl;laq. Al-Tabari records that 'Urwah wrote a series of communication on the early hi~tory of Islam on the request of 'Abd al-Malik. 5 He is cited also among the greatfuqahd' of Medina and was highly regarded as a reliable source of J:tadith in the sources. He is said to have owned an important library on Islamic history and law. He also wrote one of the earliest Kitdb al-Maghiizi, but did not keep a systematic record of (tadith. Ibn Isl;laq, al4 See Ibn ai-Athir, Usd al-Ghdbah, 3: 233 (Cairo, 1285-7) and M. Mustafa Azami, Studies in Early f:!adlth Literature (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1978), 30. 5 V. Vacca, E/1. 173

Tabari and Ibn Sa 'd list many traditions from him. 'Urwah, obviously belongs to the problematic stage in the process of J:tadith to emerge as a science. His contribution to the rise of historical consciousness cannot be denied; he is thus viewed as the initiator of the Medina School of History. 6 Aban ibn 'Uthman ibn 'Affan, on the other hand, is among the earliest scholars to compile books on history. He is well known for his book on the biography of the Prophet. The earliest such works were called Maghazi by the Muslim historians. Aban (sometimes as Aban) was also reputed for his knowledge of legal and social issues. Among his students is the well known historian· al-Zuhri. Aban ibn 'Uthman was a more systematic historian than his predecessors. His contribution to the Islamic historiography lies in his effort to generate interest in the Islamic framework for a world history. Unfortunately none ·of his writings are extant today. But there are many a/:tiidith reported under his authority. His sincerity and scholarly meticulousness in historical accuracy rendered him among the most reliable sources of tradition. Ibn Sa'd reports that his Kitab al-Maghazi was a source book for the later generations of historians. 7 We thus consider him to belong to the same stage as that of 'Urwah ibn al-Zubayr in the process for the emergence of al-fiqh as a science. Of course, the activities concerning the transmission of (ladith are not classified under al-fiqh. but as a scholarly activity this will lead in later periods to the rise of history as a science and a sophisticated methodology to be utilized in such sciences; an activity concomitant with (ladith studies but definitely perceived by the early scholars as al-fiqh also. These and many other activities show that the word which was later chosen to be the name of legal scientific activities has only Islamic origins. Within this background the legal system in Islam began to enrich itself by using the terniinology already developed within the Islamic worldview which was already established in Mecca. Some concepts of this worldview were directly related to the legal understanding such as the last judgment, the concept of al-wa'd wa'l-wa'id, the idea of justice, the doctrine of 6 A. A. Duri. "AI-Zuhri: A Study on the Beginning of History Writing in Islam", BSOAS, 19 (1957), 1. 7 Ibn Sa'd, 5:. 156; Azami, 60. 174

community ummah, the concept of right action, good deeds; 'amal and so on. On the· basis of this, first the law prescribed in the Qur'an was practiced on the authority of the Prophet; the Companions also observed how the Prophet exercised his own opinion in interpreting the legal verses of the Qur' an. In this way most of the legal terminology developed by the Prophet himself either as taken directly from the Qur'an or through the opinion of the Prophet. This can be clearly seen in the /:ladith collected in al-Shafi 'i's Risiilah. E.g. 'adZ, 'afw, ahl al-kitiib, ajal, afir, ajr, 'aqd, 'iiqil, 'amal, amiin, 'amd, bay', /:ladd, /:laqq, /:laliil, /:lariim,fiqh,fit;la, dhimmi, isti/:lsiin, ikhtiyar, ijtihiid, mujtahid, ra 'y, makruh, qiit;li, shibh, shiihid, shakk (shukuk) written document, wajib, 'uquba, wali, (legal guardian), J,iihir, ba-fin, etc. After the death of the Prophet, the Companions continued his tradition and thus as cases increased, proportionate to that the early thought also began to acquire more sophistication. Thus·the stage of problems began to form a body of general knowledge d~ring the first half of the Islamic century. But about two decades later, i.e. 660's, we encounter more specialists whose activities can be regarded as putting all these scattered and discrete discussions under one discipline. This means that the early scholarly activity which can be classified as al-fiqh passed into its second stage.

2. The Rise of a Disciplinary Tradition (c. 700-750) Now the subjects under discussion were broadly recognized, a sufficiently well-formulated method was invented and as a result al-fiqh caine to have a more definite meaning; sCience. For the scholars specialized in the subject, the body of knowledge included in all discussions constituted a discipline, which still mostly includedfatwas or independent decisions of the scholars. Thus, these scholars, namely, the fuqahii ', came to realize that their subject actually constitutes a discipline, which was conceived at. the beginning of the second century as one mother science, al-fiqh. As such any study that was considered to be scientific could have been classified as al-fiqh. If we remember the definition of science, we shall see that scientific means 'that which is primarily theory ( ra 'y )'. It is for this reason that we even see some more specialized subjects which were 175

given names as branches of al-fiqh, such asfiqh al-(ladlth,fiqh al-ra 'y and fiqh al-lughah. Originally these constructions meant in the literal sense, but as more views and discussions accumulated on these subjects, they were gradually perceived as specific sciences. All these developments took place at the disciplinary stage of the Islamic science which can be roughly dated to be between the years 80-130 A.H./700-750 A.D. Prominent thinkers involved in the process of discussions leading to the emergence of al-fiqh as a science at the stage of disciplinary tradition are: 'Abdullah ibn al-Mubarak, of whom al-Dhahabi says "dawwana al8 'ilm fi'l-abwiib wa'l-fiqh ". He is said to have written books and / commentaries on the traditions of the Prophet. 9 Hisham ibn 'Urwa (d. 94/712) and his father were also scholars of this stage; and in fact Ibn Sa'd reports that 'Urwa's many kutub fiqh were burnt at the battle of Barra. 10 'Urwa is said to have witnessed also the death of many fuqahii' in that battle. We must understand that fuqahii' means in this case 'scholars'. But the peculiar usage gives the impression that the scientific consciousness is about to emerge, if not to have emerged yet. Al-Zuhri and I:Jasan al-Ba1;>ri (642 -728) are also scholars (fuqahii') of this stage, about whom Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya says that al-Zuhri's fa twas were collected in three books and I:Jasan al-Ba~ri' s in seven books. 11 Wahb ibn Munabbih from Yaman (c. 655- 732/ 39-114 A.H.) is another scholar of the period;· he wrote many books among which we ---J,.,l.-. can count the most important ones Kitiib al-Mubtada ', Kitiib al-Qadar and J[ikmat Wahb in which he collected the wise sayings of the earlier generations. Wahb's contribution to the development of the Islamic science is tremendous, especially the emergence of history as a science. He dealt with the history of Arabia and the religions before Islam. His work Kitiib al-Mubtada' in which he discusses creation can be considered as an anthropological cosmology. He trained many scholars and his students became the leading scientists of the next generation. 8 Tadhkiratal-J:luffiif., (Hyderabad: The Dairatu'I-Ma'arif-ii-Osmanla, 1955), 1:275. 9 Ibid. l 0 Tabaqiit al-Kubrii, 6: 135.

11 1 'liim 1 : 26. 176

An incident which shows the scholarly activity of this period was the debate between Maymun ibn Mihran and Ghaylan al-Dimashqi where alAwza'i (d. 773) is said to have been present. Caliph Hisharri (1051251727-742) is reported to have commissioned Maymun ibn Mihran to refute Ghaylan al-Dimashql's qadarf opinions. Ghaylan asked Ibn Mihran: "Does God will that sins should be committed?" Ibn Mihran replied with the following question: "Are sins committed against God's will?" Ghaylan was unable to answer and was hence silenced. 12 The complete form of argumentation is not given, but the two questions exchanged· seem sufficient to demonstrate the earliest scholarly argumentation which became a basic characteristic of later kaliim whose subjects are as yet included under al-fiqh. But at this stage it was not an independent discipline; it was: ·distinguished from other subjects by primarily putting a phrase in front of the discussion: "al-kaliim fi ... ", namely "speculative discourse on ... ". One of the foremost authorities in tradition, Mul;lammad ibn Muslim ibn Shihab al-Zuhri (c. 50-129/670-742), belonging to the disciplinary stage, tried to avoid the political upheavals of his time. His knowledge of legal matters was equally acknowledged in his time and in fact the Caliph Yazid II (101-1051719-723) appointed him as the qii(il. Then Yazid's successor Hisham (105-1251723-792) entrusted him with the education of his sons. Although he spent most of his later life in Damascus, he made frequent visits to his native tDWn, Medina, in order to collect T:zadith. His scholarly activities were not limited to merely transmitting T:zadith: he developed a method to determine the accurate chronology of the T:zadith, which he collected. This was necessary for constructing a meaningful history of early Islam. As he was interested in poetry, just like his predecessors, he would cite many poems in relation to the events of which he informed his students. 13 Al-Zuhri is regarded in this respect a good critic of poetry. Moreover, his works in the early Islamic history led to the rise of another literary activity known as the sirah books (biography of the 12AJ-Tabar1, Tiirikh, ed. by Goeje "(Leyden, 1873-1901), II: 1733. Cited by W. Montgomery Watt, The Formative Period. of Islamic Thought (Edinburgh: At The University Press, 1973), 86. · I3Aghiinl, 19: 59 quoted by A. A. Duri, op. cit .. 3. 177

Prophet). It is al-Zuhri who employed the sirah in the technical sense, although he did not use it as a title for any of his works. J:Iajji Khalifah attributes a Maghiizi work to al-z'uhri. 14 But unfortunately none of his works _in tradition are extant today. Some fragments are, however, preserved in mainly Ibn IsQ.aq's Sirah and in the historical works of al-Tabari, Waqidi and al-Baladhiiri (Futu/:t al-Buldan). He thus provided the main framework for the sirah literature. He seems to have treated his subjects with quite an accurate chronological sequence of events. His main purpose in this was to acquire 'ilm, which was employed by the early Muslim scholars to refer to the knowledge of the Prophetic tradition as it meant 'revealed knowledge' in the early Islamic scientific tradition. In this regard we must acknowledge his contribution that the term 'ilm is used in the technical sense. Al-Zuhri, just like his fellow traditionists and even jurists, used the term 'ilm to refer to the knowledge required for Islamic legal, social and religious life. Since many ver~es in the Qur'an made references to the merits of acquiring 'ilm, he regarded his scholarly activities as falling within the same scope. Al-Zuhri also introduced a new method of isnii.d by introducing what is known as the collective tradition, which is a "combination of many 15 traditions into a connected simple narrative." He did not hesitate to refer to the relevant verses of the Qur'an. He does not limit his historical studies to the period of the Prophet: concerning the pre-Islamic history and especially his interest in the history of the past prophets, and even more important for the caliphal period of Islamic history, al-Zuhri recorded all his knowledge and scholarly activities. He dealt at length with the reign of 'Uthma,n and tried to give an impartial account of events. This also shows that al-Zuhri believed in sincerity and religious duty of the historian to record events as objective as possible. In certain cases, however, he did not hesitate to give his own interpretation of the events which he regarded as al-fiqh. Of course, in his lectures he must have provided abundant personal judgment and cases of his personal interpretation. For instance, with regard to the political leadership he noted that the Prophet nominated l4Kashf al-'?unun, Istanbul, 2: 1747; Duri, op. cit. 15 Duri, op. cit., 8. 178

no one as his successor, nor a successor based on hereditary nomination was the case as it was later practiced by the Umayyads. Thus, the leader must be elected by the Muslim community based on the possible successor's personal merits and skills to lead the community. 16 It is clear that al-ZuHri'sperceives al-fiqh as a general science which includes all his scholarly activities based on his rational judgn'lent. His contribution lies in the fact that he represents the passing from the problematic stage of discussing historical events to the development of a scientific tradition in al-fiqh in general and in historiography in particular. He thus belongs to the disciplinary stage of the scientific process in the history of Islamic science. Although he is also known as a jurist, his achievement is mainly in the field of history. He helped in developing · some new terminology in l:zadfth; especially his attempt to develop a new method by which the material transinitted could be edited independently of the various texts which agree in essentials, but are transmitted through several authorities. Moreover, it is no doubt that through the methodology of al-Zuhri that (ladith was on the way to become an unchallenged authority next only to the Qur' an, in all legal, social and theological disputes. One of the most authoritative scholars coming from the Medinese School of history is Muhammad ibn Isl;taq ibn Yasar, known as Ibn Isha.q. He was born at Medina around 851709. He is another scholar that must be mentioned in the disciplinary stage of the Islamic scientific process. We shall, therefore, try to summarize his contributions in the emergence of a disciplinary tradition in al~f'iqh. Ibn Ishaq was the pupil of al-Zuhri, who stated that Ibn Isl;taq was "the most knowledgeable of men in maghiizi". 17 He fell in disagreement with some prominent figures of the Medinese School, such as Hisham ibn 'Urwah and Malik ibn Anas who did not recognize Ibn lsl}.aq as an authority in legal matters, although he was well versed in legal (ladith as well. In fact, Ibn I:Iajar refers to him as the transmitter of 17000 (ladith on 16Jbid., 10. 17Jbn Sayyid ai-Nas, 'Uyun al-Athar fi Funun al-Maghaz"i wa'l-Shama'il wa'l-Siyar . 2 . (Cairo, 1356), 1: 1-17, quoted by J. M. B. Jones q.v. El. 179

leg.al decisions. 18 Finally Ibn Is}:laq settled in Baghdad where he continued his scholarly activities until his death in 1501767. His most important work is the Sl.rat Rasulillah (The Biography of God's Messenger), the first historical treatment of the Prophet's life according to the chronological sequence of events in written form. Two more works are attributed to him; Kitab al-Khulafii' and Sunan. 19 The latter of these works however, is not extant today. Although he was recognized as an authority in the sfrah-maghiizl.literature, some important Traditionists did not consider him reliable in transmitting'}:ladith. I think this important so far as Ibn Is}:laq's career is concerned. For this consideration does not mean that Ibn Is}:laq was not a careful scholar in collecting historical data; on the contrary, his authority in historiography was never questioned. But transmitting (ladt.th required different criteria, such as paying more attention to literal text and the isniid of the (ladl.th, which was more impor:tant for the authenticity of the (ladt.th, rather than the particular historical events which might have been mentioned in the (lad'ith transmitted. It is clear that as an historiographer, Ibn Isl}.aq tried more carefully to record the historical facts. This characteristics of him distinguishes him from the other members of the Traditionist School, who mostly paid attention to the literal transmission of the }:ladith. As a result of the scholarly activities of such traditionists as Ibn Is}:laq, and later his student Ibn Hisham, history was established as an independent science towards the beginning of the third century/lOth century A.D. Hence either with Ibn Is}:laq and his contemporaries, such as Malik ibn Arras, or right after him (ladl.th organizers began to flourish, e.g. al-Bukhari and Muslim. Again great world-historians such as Waqidi, Ibn Sa'd, alBaladhiiri, al- Ya 'qiibi and al-Tabari came after Ibn Is}:laq. One of the most significant aspects of civilizations is that they are concerned with their history and more importantly such scientific civilizations perceive their history as world-history. This is the case with the Islamic civilization, as world-historians emerged right at the early centuries of its beginning.

18J. M. B. Jones, EP, q.v.; Ibn I:I~ar, Tahdhlb al-Tahdhib (Hyderabad, 1326), 9: 41. 19Hajji Khalifa, Kashf al~'?unun, 2: 1008. 180

We must thus accept the contribution of the Traditionist School (almul:zaddithun) for the development of the idea of history in Islam, which eventually led to the development of a philosophy of history. The philosophical discussions of history and historical methodology revolved around the l:zadith literature at the beginning stages, but later these discussions were carried around purely historical studies as well. All these activities matured by the beginning of the second century of Islam (750's) when there emerged a disciplinary tradition in the history of Islamic science. The result of this was the rise of the scientific consciousness among the Muslim scholars. This in turn m~ans that Muslim scientists began around this time to be aware that their learning constitutes an organized body of knowledge with a definite methodology; moreover, this general body of knowledge knbwn hitherto al-fiqh can be classified into proper branches according to the subject matter discussed in the respective disciplines, each of which constitutes an independent science. We shall now endeavor to trace the footsteps of this new development in Islamic science. There were at this time scholars mainly concerned with a central problem in the legal philosophy; how to legislate law? At the beginning this problem was not taken in the philosophical sense, but rather the judges were concerned with how to solve certain legal problems in their everyday court. Since within the Islamic worldview the law must be based on a "revealed source", no one thought of deriving law rationally, i.e. independently of the revelation. Soon' the Prophetic Tradition came to be regarded as an authority as well, the revealed source was imme~iately identified as the Qur'an and Sunna, i.e. the Prophetic Tradition. Thus, the law had only two bases in Islam. But in application these two sources were not always sufficient for deriving a legal decision. In fact, this point is acknowledged by the Prophet in the well-known incident of Mu'adh ibn Jabal who was appointed as the governor of Yaman. When the Prophet asked him, as we have seen in the previous chapter, how he would administer the law, he replied that if he did not find a basis in the Book or in the Sunna, then he would rely on his own opinion (ra 'y). The Prophet consented this principle of Mu'adh and praised his judgment.

L8 L

After the Prophet, however, some jurists felt the need to develop more effective procedure than just the personal judgment of the judge, known as ra 'y. We must point to the relevance of issues discussed by the early jurists and contributed not only to the development of legal thought in Islam, but to the emergence of a science that has more of a speculative nature, which is called Kalam in the Islamic tradition, but known as philosophy in certain other traditions. In order to show this with concrete evidence, we shall thus begin with the earliest schools which emerged a few decades after the Prophet. The Medinese School of scholars are among those who contributed to this effect. As we have seen, the Islamic conceptual scheme of the learning activities had already been established in Medina, which is thus to be recognized as the most ancient school of Islamic science. Although it is, therefore, true that as a school of law, Medinese was established first, because of its insistence on the preference of sunna over personal judgment (ra 'y) the speculative nature of their legal activities developed later than the other legal schools, such as the Kufan School. 20 The most outstanding members of the early Medinese School are usually referred to as the seven lawyers of Medina. But the seven names usually differ; the ones widely mentioned in these lists are; Sa'id ibn Musayyib (d. c. 90/708), 'Urwah ibn Zubayr whom we treated in the stage of problems in the scientific process of Islamic science, Abu Bakr ibn 'Abdurra~man (d. 941712), 'Ubaydullah ibn 'Abdillah ibn 'Utbah (d. 941712 or 981716), Kharijah ibn Zayd (d. c. 991717), Sulayman ibn Yasar (d. c. 1001718), Qasim ibn Mu~ammad (d. 1061724). It is not so clear what ldnd of a legal doctrine these seven lawyers developed. There are scanty information about them. This is perhaps because at their time there exists hardly any serious difference of opinion among the legal schools.

20 cf. Schacht's conclusion that "the development of legal theory and doctrine in Medina was secondary to and dependent on that in Iraq", must be understood in this sense. The Origins, 243. Otherwise, it will be mistaken to interpret it to mean that the Medinese School was established later than the Kufan School; for our conclusion can be attested by the mere chronology of legal events, being definitely later in Kufa than In Medina, which became the Sf':tl of Islmn right from the beginning of Islamic history. 182

The most prominent name right after the seven qii{lis of the Medinese School is al-Zuhri, whom we treated above. We have thus already indicated his qualities as a jurist besides his brilliant career as an historian and traditionist. Al-Shaybani makes reference to this in his statement that "(he was) the greatest lawyer and scholar of the Medinese in his time, and the most knowledgeable among them with regard to traditions from the 21 Prophet. " Al-Zuhri's younger colleague, Rabi'ah ibn Abi 'Abdirral).man was nicknamed Rabi'at al-Ra 'y. This means that among the Medinese School some lawyers approved ra'y as method. We have already pointed out that this scientific concept in the Islamic sense means "theory" and thus it represents reasoning over interpretation of a textual injunction and then its application to a particular legal case in the context of law. In later times, however, ra'y was developedin the legal methodology and thus employed more systematically under such concepts as qiyiis (analogy), isti(tsiin and isti#iih (public interest). We are informed of al-Zuhri to have said that a sound theory (al-ra'y al-(tasan) is a good piece of knowledge. 22 This proves that the members of"the Medinese School differed in the way ra 'y was employed in legal methodology. The school of Medina entered a new phase with one of the most optstanding of its classical representatives, Malik ibn Arras who transformed the school into a literary period. 23 As a result, after him, the Medinese School was transformed into what is known today the Maliki School. Kitiib al-Aghiini relates that Abu 'Abdillah Malik ibn Arras (90-971791708-716-796) first wanted to become a singer, but later was convinced by his mother to study al-fiqh. He is said to have studied under Rabi'at al-Ra'y. He studied J:tad"ith under al-Zuhri and Hisham ibn 'Urwah. The Caliph al-Mahdi consulted him on structural alterations of the Ka'ba and, al-Rashid visited him on the way to (tajj. His magnum opus, Kitiib al-Muwaf.ta' is regarded as the earliest surviving book on al-

21schacht, Origins, 247. 22Ahmad Hasan, Analogical Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamabad: Islamic Research Center, 1986), 8. 23schacht, Origins, 248. 183

fiqh. 24 Besides this authoritative work in Islamic law the following titles are also listed among his works: Kitiib al-Sunan, Kitab al-Manasik, Kitiib al-Mujiilasat, Risalah fi 'l- 'Aqdiyyah, Risalah fi 'l-Fatwa ', Tafsir (of the Qur'an), Risalahfi'l-Qadar wa 'l-Radd 'ala 'l-Qadariyyah, Kitab al-Nujum and Kitab al-Sirr. Malik's contribution to Islamic science can be summed up in his definition of the term Sunna upon which alone ra 'y could be based. He summarizes this view as "the sunna is proof enough, but one also wants to know the reason". 25 It seems clear enough that Malik's use of the concept 'sunna' includes both the Prophetic, as well as the current practices of the Muslim community. Sometimes the current practices of the community in Medina is referred to as
theoretical principles, that are legal, moral, social, and educational at once, for the Muslims to use as guide in their daily lives. It is clear that through the works of such scholars Islamic science entered the third phase of its scientific process; the nanling stage which has its own peculiarities. We shall now discuss how this took place in the early history of Islamic science. We shall examine in this respect the Meccan School of scholars who are also significant in the developm~nt of the disciplinary stage in the scientific process of Islamic science. Ibn 'Abbas is cited as the founder of this School. One must acknowledge, therefore, that it is through the scholarly activities of Ibn 'Abb~s and his students that a legal scientific tradition gradually developed until around the beginning of the second century, whenfiqh was about to emerge as an independent science within the general body of al~fiqh, the early mother Islamic science. The first representative scholar of the Meccan School is known as 'Ata' ibn Abi Rabal;l who was born in Y aman around 26/646 but brought up in Mecca, where he died in 114 or 1151732-733. He is known for his use of ra'y. He is also known for his application of qiyas and istiftsan (approbation). On the basis of this, we can say thatfiqh was on the way to enter into the stage of more technically legal problems at the time of 'AHi'. Abu I:Ianifa states that he attended the lectures of 'Ata' in Mecca, which shows that the Meccah School continued its tradition of formal instruction in Islamic sciences that actually began with the School of !;)uffa during the Prophet and became more technical with the scholarly activities of Ibn 'Abbas. We may conclude from this that 'Ata' is the first legal philosopher in.the school of Mecca to raise issues of speculative nature. There seems to be some reports that 'Ata' was against ra'y, i.e. speculative discussion concerning the bases of law .. But the evidence of the historical data, as Schacht also points out, 27 overwhelmingly shows that he not only approved ra 'y and other rational methods in his jurisprudence, but actually applied them in his decision as well. 'Ata' was also a well-known schol~r for his contributions in ftadUh literature. It is, in the first place, related that he took J:tadith from the well-known 27Ibid., 25 I.

185

Companions, including 'Ali ibn Abi 'falib: 28 He also encouraged his students to transcribe f:tadith. 29 Al-Bukhari states that he wrote down f:tadith and sent out to Yazid ibn Abi I:Iabib (c: 53-128/672-745) who is known as a reliable transmitter. 30 After 'Ata"s death the Meccan School was weakened and the scholarly tradition did not continue; as a result it was gradually absorbed by other schools and especially by the school of Kufa, because many of his students went to Kufa, some to Basra and other parts of the Muslim world. Those who went to Kufa predominated the Islamic legal thought, just as the Medinese School and al-Shafi 'I's School. The Meccan and Basrian Schools of law gradually disappeared, until eventually they were completely absorbed by other schools. But the school of Basra, though lost its significance in law, became the center of speculative thought in Islam. As we shall see, the most philosophically-minded early thinkers came from Basra, including the early Mu 'tazilites. The School of Kiifa is another major scholarly gathering that contributes to the emergence of the disciplinary stage in the scientific process of Islamic science. Scholarship in Kufa began when some of the Companions settled there, after it was founded by Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas in 17/638 as a military camp. When Kiifa grew into a city 'Umar ibn alKhagab appointed its first governor in 22/642. According to the traditional reports, around this time, or probably even before ·a governor was appointed there, the first qa(li of Kiifa was also appointed by 'Umar; this qa(li is said to be Shurayl:l who held the judgeship for over a sixty years of time until his .death between 76-99/695-717. According to Schacht, Shurayl:l was actually a f:takam "of the old style among the Arab tribes in the neighborhood of Kiifa ... and his legendary figure reflects the 31 transition from the old to the new form of administration of justice. " It seems that Schacht's view is correct, especially considering our theory for the emergence of a body of knowledge as a science. But Shurayl:l's time 28Azami, Op. cit., 48. 29Ibid., 80. 30$ai:L"if:z, Kittib al-Buyu', 112.

31 Schacht, Introduction, 24. 18()

corresponds to the stage of problems in the process of the emergence of fiqh as an independent science. On the other hand, he lived a very long life, and according to what we reached in our previous discussion concerning again the development of legal thought into a unified science, the second stage, which we called "the rise of a disciplinary tradition" in the legal thought began around 700's, which means that Shurayl). actually continued his legal activities, whether as a judge or as a J:takam, until about the beginning of this stage. Since at this time many legal terminology already developed, most probably the reference to Shurayl). must include some of this terminology, such as the usage of the terms qar;fi (cf. /:takam), qiyas, isti/:tsan, and some other fatwas of his career reflect this terminology. In fact, we do have such reports, although some of them cannot exactly be verified, yet some of them can at least logically be ascertained merely on the basis of our theory concerning the scientific process. Hence, Shurayl). must have started his legal career, perhaps as a J:takam, which may be authorized by 'Umar himself, and later on came to be called qat;li, which is a later title given to him. On the basis of this analysis, it is possible to assert that in the Kufan School, the legal thought, or at least organized legal activities began with Shurayl).. But it further developed when some companions moved to Kufa. These companions are Jall).a, al-Zubayr, Abu Mus a al- 'Ash 'ari, '~bdullah ibn Mas'iid and 'All ibn Abi Talib, all of whom either lived for a considerable number of years in Kufa or settled down there, which means that they stayed in Kufa long enough to contribute to the development of scholarly· activities there. As a result, among these personalities, especially 'Abdullah ibn Mas 'lid and 'Ali ibn Abi Talib came to be recognized at least in legal matters as leading authorities. It is for this · reason that they are regarded as the tutelary founder of the Kufan School. Ibn Mas'ud (d. 32/652) was actually an authority in many scholarly activities, such as J:zadith, tafsir which was beginning to take a more definite character of a discipline, history and law. He had a group of disciples among whom Shurayl). is also counted. But among the study circle of Ibn Mas'iid by far the most authoritative thinker of the Kufan School of law is Ibrahim Nakha'i, who is also the main transmitter of legal/:tadith from him. Nakha'I was born in c. 50/670 at Kiifa and died c. 187

561717. As a jurisconsult he was the main figure of the Kufan School and perhaps the first thinker who tried to defend the use of ra 'y as a legal methodology on the basis of sunna, but with rational arguments. In this way a new wave of legal thought began at Kiifa, and influenced all other schools of thought mainly through Nakha'i's competent pupils like I:Iammad ibn Abi Sulayman. I:Iammad was born around 60/679. He studied al-fiqh and (tadith under competent scholars in Kiifa and soon became an authority drawing a good number of brilliant students to his circle. Abu I:Ianifa also comes from this circle. When his master died in 120/737-8 there was already a considerable amount of technical legal thought available for Abu I:Ianifa to develop a disciplinary tradition in al-fiqh. The qiir;li of Kufa at this time was Mu:Qammad ibn 'Abd al-Ra:Qman ibn Abi Layla (74-148/ 693-765) whose contributions for this effect must also l?e mentioned~ Ibn Abi Layla studied law under Abu 'Amr 'Amir ibn Sharahil ibn 'Amr al-Sha'bi (d. 100/728) and 'Ata' ibn Abi Raba:Q of the Meccan School. Ibn Abi Lay Hi opposed some ideas of Abft I:Ianifa, but still continued to use the Kufan method of ra 'y in basing his judgments. He is said to have written a Kitiib al-Fariiid. Thus the legal thought in the School of Kufa passed to the second stage when a dis
qtit;l"i al-qu9-at, which shows, his prominence not only in legal thought, but in practice as well. He wrote many books, primarily in Islamic law: Kittib al-fliyal (The Book of Legal Devices), Kitab al-Khartij which is written upon the request of Harfm al-Rashid, Kitab al-Athtir (a collection of legal l)adith, mainly used by the Kufan School), Kittib Ikhtiltif Ab'i flanifa wa Ibn Abt Laylti, and Kitab al-Radd 'alii Siyar alAwzti 'f. His most important disciple was al-Shaybani who also studied under Abu I:Ianifa. Abu Yusuf primarily followed Abu I:Ianifa, but in some minor details he diverged from him; for instance in assigning more prominenc~ to /:tadith than his master, considering Shafi 'I's method Abu Yusuf's attitude can be interpreted as representing the usual course of the legal thought in his time. His main contribution is his consolidation and systematizing of Abu I:Ianifa' s thought and as a result the gradual replacement of the Kufan School by, or may be its transformation into, the school of I:Ianafi. In this process another prominent role is assigned to Abu 'Abdullah Mul)ammad ibn al-I:Iasan ibn Farqad al-Shaybani who was born at Wa1?it in 132174950, but brought up in Kufa. At the early age of fourteen he was accepted by Abu I:Ianifa as a pupil. When he was twenty years old, he was allowed to lecture at the mosque of Kufa. After Abu I:Ianifa's death, he also studied under Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Awza'I, Imam Malik and Abu Yusuf. Therefore, he received his legal training mainly in the School of Kufa, but in l)adith he followed the teachings of al-Thawri and Imam Malik. He was close to the Mmji 'a in his theological doctrines, which is the influence of Abu I:Ianifa. During the reign of Harlin al-Rashid, he served as his qa9-f first at al-Raqqa, then at Khurasan, where he died while still holding this office in 189/805. Imam Shafi 'i is said to have studied under him. Like all the members of the Kufan School, al-Shaybani also used ra 'y, although he was milder than some of the others. He was also known for his knowledge of grammar. Through his works, Abu I:Ianifa's doctrines became the official tendency of the Kufan School which was then referred under the master's name: al-flanafiyya. Some of his major books are: Kitab al-A{dji'l-Furu' (known as al-Mab~ut), Kittib al-Jtimi' al-Kabir, Kittib al-Jtimi' al~Saghlr, Kitiib al-Siyar al-Kabir and Kitdb 189

al-Athar. It is also through his efforts and critical edition of al-Muwa!,ta' that our knowledge of his J:zadi.th master Malik ibn Anas is secured. It is possible to take al-Shaybani as the last thinker in the stage of the disciplinary tradition which came into existence already with Abu I:Iani:fa's thought. Shafi 'i and his time, therefore, can be taken as the starting point for the beginning of the naming stage in the scientific process of the comprehensive Islamic science, al-fiqh. 3. The Emergence of the Stage of Naming in al-Fiqh ( 1 OO's/750's) It is possible that we may assume this stage to be taking a very short time and thus its exact date can be settled with accuracy if the historical data is sufficiently available. This is, on the contrary, not the case with regard to al-fiqh because for the definite names and independence of individual sciences we must review a century of scholarly activities beginning from the time of al-Shafi 'i onwards, namely, between approximately the beginning· and the end of the second century of Islam (7SO's-8SO's). In order to show this and the independent emergence of sciences out of alfiqh, we must examine the scholarly activities between these years in very brief treatment, otherwise we may end up writing the early history of Islamic scientific tradition. Therefore, as we have done in the earlier cases, we shall take up just exemplary ~ases. First of all, the first science that is formed independently, as our above treatment shows is fiqh, of course in this sense, it no longer means the mother science al-fiqh. Hence, the first science that came to be named as an individual discipline is jurisprudence, which must have occurred aro~nd 750's. This can be ascertained from the works of the prominent members of the Kufan School, as cited. above. In these works it is dear that the termfiqh is no longer maintained in its original sense. It is rather used for legal disciplinary studies which not only included at this stage jurisprudence, but also ethics, politics and theological studies. But as we shall see below when kallim came to emerge as a rival discipline it took over some subjects from the subject matter ofjiqh and established itself as a broader science discussing all speculative problems of Islamic science. There are events that contribute to this development, the major one being l90

the political upheavals which led to more rigorous speculative and theological discussions. Another factor is the onslaught of a new wave of thought into the mainstream of Islamic science, primarily the Hellenistic thought. In grammar, for example, each school developed a different tendency: the School of KUfa tried to use the Qur' an and the sayings of some Arabic speaking ancients to elicit or support a grammatical rule. But the members of the Basran School resorted to logical arguments or even to. certain philosophical principles. As this attitude of the Basran School continued with the introduction of the Aristotelian logic; they began introducing elements of Greek logic as well at later stages. 32 Other sciences as well began to take a more definite shape after this stage. We shall now attempt to give as an example only kaliim for its special relation to philosophy and then in a general way discuss the course of other sciences. B. KAlAM ·

The definition of kaliim, according to the later mutakallimun, is "the science which is concerned with firmly establishing religious beliefs by adducing proofs and with banishing doubts." 33 However, earlier al-Hirabi defines it as "a science which enables a man to procure the victory of the creed and actions laid down by the Legislator of the religion, and to refute 34 all opinions contradicting them." If, however, we consider the subjects discussed in kaliim, we find that it mainly discusses system-related questions. Therefore, although there is no systematic system constructed by way of the mutakallimun, it is possible to argue that most kaliim schools do have a system of their own. The Ash' arite, the Maturidite and the Mu 'tazilite kaliim all correspond to a system in the philosophical sense. This lead us to conclude that none of the traditional or classical definitions of kaliim is satisfactory. Kaliim, according to its historical I

32See Fadlou Shehadl, Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy (Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1982), 22. 33see, for example, ai-Ijl's Mawiiq(f: written in the 19th. century/sth.century A.H. 34See his Il;z~a· al-'Uliim, ed. 'Othman Amin (Mi~?r: Ma~ba'at ai-I'timad, 1949), 107-8. 191

subject matter, is the study of systems or system-related problems, but only within the Islamic context. Thus, we can conclude that kaliim is philosophy peculiar to the worldview of Islam which is its general framework; and as such it deserves the name 'Islamic philosophy' more than any other disciplines. Of course its subjects and problems gradually developed throughout the first three centuries of Islam and thus underwent the influence of Greek philosophy. Another evidence for the correctness of our definition is the fact that it underwent the Greek philosophical influence more than any other branch of learning within the Islamic science. Since kalam was the philosophical discipline in the Islamic sense, this was natural, as the Muslim mutakallimun would be interested in the idea of their colleagues in other civilizations. We conclude from this that kaliim is the Islamic term for 'philosophy', not 'l:tikmah ', which is the Arabic term for the Greek 'sophia'. Under the considerations our survey of the process for the emergence of kalam as a science is, in a way, an investigation into how philosophy originated in Islam. We shall try to do this according to the scientific process that took place within the general body of Islamic scholarly activities.

1. The Stage of Problems (c. 0-100 A.H./610-700's A.D.) Since, according to our explanation of 'doing science', the. first framework within which a scholar works is his world view, the general framework of scientific activities, we must first specify that the worldview which provided this framework for the earliest scholars to do kaliim was the worldview of Islam. We have already pointed out that the Islamic worldview was established in the Meccan period of Islam and thus began to provide the most general framework for all the scientific activities developed in Islamic civilization. It is the same worldview that is most relevant in the case of kaliim, because it is the science which is concerned with the subject, as it is intimately connected with worldview. Therefore, kalam finds much of its subject matter witQ.in the Islamic worldview as its broadest framework; such as tawftid, prophethood, akhirah, din, man and his destiny, cosmological issues, causality and so on. All of these issues are taken from the Revelation and systematically organized into an 192

architectonic whole in the minds of the early Muslims with the aid of the Prophet. In the first place, Muslims were familiar with discussing kalcl.mrelated issues, such as God's existence, the nature of prophethood, human destiny, the structure of the universe, the status of knowledge, ignorance, belief and unbelief, the status of a ruler and so on. Hence, the stage of problems for kalam began with the advent of Islam. Of course, as it is the case with all other disciplines, these earliest discussions may not have a scientific character. Since we date the Medinan period as the time for the construction of an Islamic scientific conceptual scheme, we would like to claim that later in this period those kalam-related problems must have begun to acquire a scientific character, which gradually brought these discussion into a disciplinary tradition, which is the second stage in the process for the emergence of a science. In the second place, in Medina, since the Prophet was alive· as an authority, in the early stage of kalam·problems Muslims were not divided into camps, i.e., schools. As a result, it easily escapes our notice. But even with the death of our Prophet, one of the kalarn-problems already catches our notice; how to choose the next ruler, i.e. the problem of the political leader. But it is mainly 'Ali-Mu 'awiyah controversy which divided Muslims for the fist time into political camps; and then into kaliim schools, as each camp tried to justify their political position from the perspective of religion, i.e. the Islamic worldview, which is also 'the broadest framework for all Islamic scientific activities. In the development of kalam as a science, the stage of problems was, therefore, mainly articulated by the Prophet and the Companions in the first place; and then by the political groups which emerged as a result of political controversies after the Prophet and then turned into schools of thought. When those early groups thus turned into schools of thought, they began to have major representatives who are known to us today mainly through secondary works, not through their own works which are either destroyed later, or lost because no one was interested in the simplicity of their ideas to preserve them. Kharijites had, for example, Abdullah ibn Yazid and al-Yaman ibn Rabab (both lived around 20-100 A.H./the first half of the 8th century). Ibn al-Nadim says that both of 193

these scholars composed treatises on tawJ:tid and refutations of the Mu 'tazilite theory of free will. 35 Since Kharijites lost their significance in later developments, they did not produce any thinker of significance. Therefore, their relevance to us in this study lies in the fact that they led to the rise of some new issues to be added to the ones already developed in the early Islamic world view. The two Khariji movements, Azraqites (Azariqa), established by Nafi ibn al-Azraq and the Najdites (Najdiyyah) who supported Abdullah ibn alZubayr in Mecca, but later returned to their native region, Najd, from which their name derives, led to some theological debates: Azraqites. argued against the followers of 'Ali that "the decision belongs to God alone" (la J:tukma ilia Zillah). Hence, any matter must be settled in accordance with the Qut'an only. On the basis of this they argued that a gra:ve sinner belongs to the people of hell, which is clearly stated in the Qur'an. 'Uthman is a grave sinner, because he did not punish the wrongdoers as prescribed in the Qur' an. 36 Azraqites further argued that even the existing authorities had also sinned; hence those who did not join them in fighting against the existing authorities were sinners. A sinner is no longer a Muslim, hence he can be killed and his wealth confiscated. The Najdites held similar views as Azraqites, except they were not so radical. They said that a sinner is a hypocrite (muniifiq) not an unbeliever (kiifir). They also for the first time entertained the view of taqiyyah. 37 Towards the beginning of the 8th century more Khariji movements emerged. Among them Waqifites (Waqlfiyya), i.e. those who suspend judgment, are important in that they led to the rise of another school, Mmji 'ite. They claimed that they cannot judge a wrongdoer as to whether he goes to hell or not. But we must punish ~im, though in such matter we must suspend judgment. In order to show how early kaliim problems arose, We must enter into a detailed account of these controversies. The supporters of 'Ali claimed that they support him because a man like him would not commit any mistakes. But. those who opposed this 3 5Al-Fihrist, 182. 36M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and theology (Edinburgh: At The University Press, 1987), 8. 37Ibid., 9. 194

group claimed that not only 'Ali can commit mistakes, but he has actually committed one already, because he does not openly profess his support for those who killed 'Uthman. According to this group, 'Uthman had already sinned, because he had not punished a prominent member of his administration for his crime. This second group who opposed the 'Ali supporters came to be called 'Kharijites' (Secessors) around 36/657, because they seceded first from 'Ali as they were with him in the war against Mu'awiyah, and then from Mu'awiyah as well in the event of the Arbitration. Jabir ibn Zayd (d. c. 100 AH./720) was an early Basra Iba<;II leader who corresponded with Salim ibn Dhakwan. 38 Abdullah ibn lba<;l was the founder of the lba<;II branch of Kharijites, which was closest to the ahl alSunna among the Kharijites. He wrote two letters to the caliph Abd alMalik.39 We must not consider these simple theological speculations apart from the process of f~qh to emerge as a science. If all the activities geared to scientific speculation are evaluated as a whole, we see that political upheavals give another direction to these activities. As we have alteady established, two frameworks necessary for such scientific activities had already been founded; one of the frameworks is the Islamic worldview (established in Mecca, 610-622); .and the other is the general Islamic scient(fic conceptual scheme, established in Medina and afterward.\~ roughly from the beginning of the first century until its end (622720 's ). Both frameworks had already acquired a considerable sophistication until these controversies began to arise. The first one was at the time of 'Uthman, when there was an uprising against his administrative policies. The second controversy was the 'Ali-' Aisha conflict. The third conflict that occurred between 'Ali and Mu'awiyah as a 38For the details of this see Michael Cook, Early Muslim Dogma: A Source-Critical Study (Cambridge: University Press; I 981 ), 3. Unfortunately, the conclusions of this book are not realiable as the texts are taken in isolation from the frameworks developed in this essay; for mm'e historical information on this see A. K. Ennami, "A Description of New Ibadi·Manuscripts ti-om North Africa", JSS 15 ( 1970). 39Both of these letters are in Kasllf atcGhummah of Sirhan ibn 'Umar ibn Sa'ld in the Ms. British Museum, (Or. 8076); first, tf. 1996-2066; and the second letter ff. 20662122. See Ibid also. 195

result led for the first time to fractions and as a result more sp~culative argumentation was needed to support each group's political and legal stand. But after 'Ali's death, more tragic events took place in the case of his son al-I:Iusayn; as a result of which the 'Ali supporters also withdrew themselves, in the development of controversies, from both the Kharijites and the rest of the Muslims. Thus emerged a second political group in Islam, which came to be known as Shi 'ites.4° Therefore, although some group· of people were beginning to identify themselves as Shi 'ites soon after 'Ali's death in 661, I believe that the attribution of the term Shi' a to this group of people is only a habit of the later sources; during the time when these sources were written the term Shi 'a had already acquired a wide usage. In the earlier texts reference is made to Shi'a, by the epithet Sab'iyyah. 41 Both the Kharijites and the Shi 'i~es, as a result of their orientation, which was political in essence, made continuous revolts against the first dynasty in Islam, the Umayyads. It is possible to include the Umayyads also as another faction in these developments, for, as we shall see, they also tried to give some arguments to justify themselves. 42 This is clear from the following report that two early events occasioned the discussion concerning the problem of qadar (divine predestination): 1. Mu 'awiyah tried to justify himself that he used force by the decree of the qadar; 2. when Yazid (Mu 'awiyah' s son) sieved Mecca in 64/683 the Ka 'ba caught fire, he also seems to have defended himself by a recourse to the idea of qadar. 43 The moderate Qadariyya formulated their position as follows: 4 0There was a small group of the Companions who supported 'Ali's succession after

the Prophet; this group is actually identified as the Shi 'at 'Ali, i.e., the party of 'Ali. But it is not clear if this group actually attributed the name Shi 'a to themselves. According to the Shi 'a sources Shi 'a existed even during the lifetime of the Prophet (see al-Nawbakhti, Firaq, 23). This is of course too far-fetched. At least so far as it concerns us here, Shi 'a becomes important only with al-I:Iusayn as a speculative movement, i. e., c. 680. 41 See al-Dhahabf, Tiirlkh al-lslclm, 3: 559, 80, reference from J. VanEss "Das Kitab al-lrja' Des Hasan b. Muhammad ai-I:Ianafiyya", Arabica, XXI, 1974, p. 23, n. 7 in which the sam.e word, i.e. Sab'iyya occurs on p. 24, para 8. For further details see Efl q.v. Abdullah ibn Saba'. · 42 For instance see al-Tabari's report in his Ttirlkh, ed. by de Goeje (Leyden, 18731901), 11: 1733. 196

God wills only good; evil stems from men or from iblls. Man chooses freely between the two but God knows from all eternity what man will choose (qadar). So, God would lead man astray if man gives an occasion to Him by committing sin. Qadariyyah can be ta.ken as the first philosophical movement that appeared in Islam, (c. 71/690's). The main representative and even sometimes counted among its founders is Ma'bad al-Juhani (d. 84/703). The Umayyads argued for the Absolute Will of God to defend themselves against such scholars, thereby nullifying human freedom, a position which was defended later by another school known as Jabriyyah. Qadariyya, however, argued to defend human freedom in a rather awkward way by not ascribing evil to God. For them, God creates only good; it is, therefore, man who is responsible for evil. But God knows from eternity what man will choose. This pre-knowledge is not a determinant in man's action, which can be only an occasion for God leading him into error. Some of the Qadarite theses were gradually consolidated in the teachings of another school of thought known as Mu 'tazila, which began to emerge soon after the rise of these schools mentioned thus far (80's/700's). Most of these pre-scientific activities were later summarized in the books of refutations, such as Kitdb al-Radd 'ala'l-Qadariyyah, by 'Arnr ibn 'Ubayd (d.l43 or 4/760 or 1) who was a disciple of I:Iasan al-Ba~ri, but later joined Wasil. Caliph 'Umar ibn Abd al-'Aziz who reigned (88-1011717-730) also wrote an anti-Qadarite epistle. 44 In fact, he can be counted among the scholars who contributed to the stage of problems in the scientific process which eventually led to the rise of kaldm as an independent science. His position can be summed up in the following statement: God knows that one will commit sin, although he is still able to refrain from that sin. Therefore, God's knowledge has only the function of "recording" (/:1-iifi'{.),

43sfrat f:lalabiyyah (C~~iro, 1382/1962), I: 185, 15. 44Published in flilyat al-Awliyit' by Abu Nu'aym, ed. M.A. al-Khanji (Cairo, 13328) in vol. 5: 346-53. Then re-edited by J. van Ess in Anfan.ge muslimischer Theologie, (Beirut, 1977), 43-54. He also wrote some other epistles printed in Slrat 'Umar ibn 'Abd al- 'Azlz, ed. A. 'Ubayd, (Beirut, 1967). 197

not that of effecting the action of the sinner. It is, therefore, left to man's own discretion to do good or evil. Since the Qadarite movement did not continue, although its view concerning human freedom vis-d-vis God's pre-knowledge of the act is defended in one form or another by othet schools of thought, it did not develop into a living speculative school, just like the Kharijite movement. But its theory of free will and predestination opened new horizons to the development of kaliim as a science in Islam. We have already indicated that Khadjites came to be a political group out of the 'Ali-Mu'awiyah controversy. When Mu'awiyah proposed 'Ali. to settle their differences through arbitrators, a group of people opposed this on the ground that human tribunal is set above the divine decision. They thus protested this proudly by shouting "judgment belongs to God alone" (la f:tukma ilia Li.llah). This later came to be known as taf:tkim; i.e. testifying God's decision; as a result, th~ KharWtes are also called alMuf:takkimah, i.e. the party that testifies only God's decision. This way the first political group in Islam came into existence, the KhtirUites (37/657). As they tried to justify themselves, the group gradually became a school of thought. But since it extinguished even as a political group at a very early date (c. 700's), the Kharijites school did not continue to become a significant school of thought, only the IbaQ.iyya branch, which is a milder Kharijites movement continued to live until our time; as but even this as a religious sect with its own theology,fiqh and creed. The Kharijites did not have a uniform thought. Hence they defended their political position by discrete ideas developed by various individual thinkers who concentrated on the application of these ideas rather than defending them militarily. Since there are many branches of the Kharijites, it is ·hard to discuss their doctrines in ·a general manner. We shall, however, concentrate on the doctrines of the earliest Kh~rijites until the end of the first century of Islam. This is in fact the period that concerns us here; for the Kharijites doctrines are among those factors that led to the emergence of more speculative thought. The following doctrines without their details comprise the basic doctrines of the Kharijites thought: it is an obligation (fan;/-) for every believer Muslim to proclaim illegitimate and therefore try to depose the leader (imam) who has gone astray; every 198

Muslim who is religiously and morally good (taqwa), is eligible to become imam by the vote of the community; no faith is valid without the life carried out in accordance with that faith. Hence, zman is not valid without deeds. If a Muslim commits a grave sin, he at once becomes murtadd (apostate); all non-Kharijite Muslims are murtadd. The isti 'rae,! (religious capital punishment in their terminology) must be applied to all murtadd, who can never re-enter the faith even with tawbah. A murtadd is killed along with his family, wives and children; purity of conscience and mental cleanliness is a prerogative condition for the cleanliness of the body, which is required for the 'ibiidah, such as ~alah and fasting. Hence, no ~alah or other forms of the 'ibiidah are valid without the mental and bodily purity. Around 76/695 perhaps first by I:Iasan ibn Mu~ammad ibn alI:Ianafiyyah, the grandson of 'Ali, the idea of irja' was introduced. Ibn alHanafiya argued in his Kitab al-Irjii' that Abu Bakr and 'Umar's caliphate can be approved, but postpone ( arja ') the decision concerning those who involved in civil wars, i.e. 'Uthman and 'Ali. 45 Ibn alI:Ianafiyyah is a significant scholar in this respect because his approach is systematic and speculative which is a mark of kalam. It is at this stage that we see the emergence of a disciplinary tradition in kalam. The publications of such books helped in this respect to fasten this development. Shi 'ites, on the other hand, were divided into further branches as their political orientation developed according to the imams they followed. The Imami, Zaydi and Isma 'III branches established themselves quite early as well-defined movements by the revolt of Zayd ibn 'Ali, 1221740. The chief representatives of the early Shi 'a who contributed to the development of the stage of problem<; in the scientific process of kaliim are Mu~ammad ibn al-Nu'man (known as Shaytan al-Taq), Zurarah ibn A'yan (d. 150/ 767), Hisham ibn al-I:Iakam (d. 179/795-6), Hisham ibn Salim alJawaliqi, and 'Ali ibn Isma'Il al-Mithani al-Tammar, who is identified as the first imiim"i mutakallim by Ibn al-Nadim.46 The Zaydi branch, on the 45see J. van Ess, op. cit., 20-52. 46At-Fihrist, 175. 199

other hand, was represented in kaltim at this time mainly by Sulayman ibn Jarir (d. c.1771793) who is said to have been in the circles of Ja'far al-$ adiq (d. 1481765), who himself contributed to the development of kalc"im as Islamic philosophy leading to the rise of a disciplinary tradition. The main problems that were discussed at this stage are human freedom, God's knowledge and its scope, the relationship between God's pre-knowledge ( qadar) and human action, whether as such it has room for free choice (ikhtiyiir), the nature of belief, the relationship between, belief and action, the status of a grave sinnet and the qualities of a ruler. Considering our approach, which does not distinguish at this stage the activities involving these philosophical problems and the legal problems discussed previously, it is possible to regard all these scientific activities as leading to the rise of a sophisticated speculative tradition in Islam. But as problems discussed accumulated, early scholars realized the difference of terminology and method between these existing body of problems. These problems that have more of a speculative character, and thus today they can be classified as philosophical, were beginning to draw nearer to a technical term under which the discussions began to take place, kaliim. The earliest reference can be taken from I:Jasan al-Ba::;ri's (d. 728) letter in which, as we have seen in the previous chapter, he states that "we initiated the speculative study, i.e. kaliim, of qadar; just as people initiated the denial of it." 47 It is evident that kaliim meant "speculative discourse on certain problems". These certain problems were not confused with other problems discussed, e.g., in.fiqh. No one would say like ibn al-Nadim's above quoted passage; for the problems related in these subjects are discussed in fiqh, not in kaliim discussions. In this way through either written or oral tradition, philosophical problems discussed within the framework of the Islamic worldview and scientific conceptual scheme, began to acquire a definitive character, centered around the term kaltim, which acquired an implicit technical definition thanks to the works of these early scholars. 4 7Julian Obermann, "Political Theology in Early Islam", Journal of the American Oriental Society, 55 (1935), 145. Arabic Text, Helmut Ritter. "Studien zur Islamischen Fromigkeit I: Hasan ai-Basrl", Det Islam, 21 (1933), 68, lines 10-11. 200

Al-I:Iasan argued that the judgment about the right and wrong in this conflict should be deferred to God, and Muslims should abstain from declaring either solidarity with them or dissociation from them. He then composed an open letter on his doctrine of irja' and had it read in public. Although some doubt has been cast on the role of al-I:Iasan and the authenticity of the Kitab al-Irja' attributed to him, there are no cogent reasons to reject them. The earliest Murji 'ite doctrine, as reflected in particular in the Kitab al-Irja' attributed to al-I:Iasan ibn al-I:Ianafiyyah and in the Ibac;ll anti-Murji'ite polemics of the Sirat Salim, affirmed unconditional solidarity with Abii Bakr and 'Umar and suspension of judgment with respect to 'Uthman and 'Ali. Suspension on judgment was obligatmy in regard to the past which could no longer be witnessed. They held that Muslims would not lose their status of believers by any actions, but they were prepared to condemn wrongdoers as aberrant believers (mu 'minim (i.ullal) who might ultimately be punished or forgiven by God. The identification of faith with true belief to the exclusion of acts, which later became the essential trait of irja ', was clearly implied, though not central, in the earliest Murji 'ite teaching. In his Risalah ila 'Uthman. al-Bat{i, Abii I:Ianifa rejected the name Murji' a for himself, asserting that it had been given by innovators ( ahl albid'ah) to those who were in fact the People of Justice ('adl) and the Sunna. The term 'adl must be understood here as implying political justice and reform and not the Mu 'tazili doctrine of free will. The meaning of Mmji' a and irja' was henc~forth focused on the definition of faith as excluding acts, a theological doctrine strongly opposed by both the Ahl al-Sunnah and the Mu'tazila. The Murji'a generally did not distinguish between Islam and iman and considered all Muslims as believers except for those excluded by Muslim consensus. Those committing forbidden acts were called sinful believers (mu 'minun fussaq). While the Murji'
201

be temporal and that all would eventually enter paradise through the intercession ( shafii 'ah) of Mul).ammad. The theological teachings of the Murji' a, in the broad definition of the heresiographers, primarily involved the following questions: Faith ('imiin) was mostly defined as both knowledge (rna 'rifah) and public affirmation (iqrar) of God, of His prophets and their message in general. Knowledge of God was moreover often defined as including submission (khurju ') to Him and love (maf:zabbah) of Him. Faith was generally described as an indivisible (la yatajazza') whole of beliefs and affirmation. Partial belief thus cduld not constitute it. On this basis, the earlier Murji' a, including Abu I:Ianifa, generally held that faith can neither decrease nor increase. Under the pressure of Qur'anic passages expressly mentioning an increase of faith among Muslim believers, the later Mmji 'a of the school of Abii I:Ianifa, the Najjariyyah, Matiiridiyyah and others, mostly affirmed that faith can increase but not decrease. This increase was variously explained as an additional knowledge of details of the shar'i'ah beyond the indispensable minimum, as an increase of conviction (yaq'in), or more broadly, of the subjective traits (~iftit) of the believers in relation to the unchangeable essence ( dhat) of faith. Among these mentioned has been made of the fact that Abii I:Ia·nifa wrote to 'Uthman al-BaW a letter. 48 It is on the basis of this letter that he is accused of sharing the general views of the Murji' a though he openly rejects the Mutji 'a. In fact, in his Fiqh Akbar be has ideas contradicting some of the Murji'I. What is important for us is that Abii I:Ianifa entered into discussions that can be properly classified under kaltim. In this way he also contributed to the rise of a disciplinary tradition in the scientific process of kalam. Thus the stage of problems acquired a disciplinary character after the end of the first century of Islam (730's), which can be taken as the beginning of the second stage in the process of kaltim 's emergence as a science. In this way the word kaltim also emerged as the b~st suitable technical candidate to be the name of the science to be emerged, in which all these problems were later taken as subject matter. 48 Printed by M. Z. al-Kawthari together with Kitiib at- 'A lim wa'l-Muta 'allinz and Fiqh Absat (Cairo, 1368.

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2. The Rise of a Disciplinary Tradition in Kalam (730's800's) Kaliim entered a new phase after the scholarly activities of the above mentioned thinkers and their schools, and thus through a collective and a tacit acknowledgment of all those scholars and their written or oral discourses that the term kaliim began to acquire a technical meaning to refer to all speculative discussions concerning the philosophical pr~blems which arose mostly as a result ofpolitical upheavals in both second half of Islam's first century (l.e. after 650's) and sometimes as a result of the scholarly discussions in other disCiplines such as fiqh, tafsir, hadith and history. This is evident in the fact that after 730's scholars began composing treatises on the subject, thereby giving unity and method to their discussions of these problems. It is primarily through the scientific activities of spme prominent scholars, like Ja 'far al-$adiq, Abu J:Ianifa and al-Shafi '1, that kalam entered into a disciplinary stage, which was later, however, dominated mostly ?Y the early adherents of the Mu'tazila, such as Jahm ibn ,Safwan, Wasil ibn 'Ata', 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd, Abu'l-Hudhayl Mul;mmmad al-Allaf, Hisham ibn al-I:Iakam. Rather·than examining all of these figures here~ whose contributions had already been duly acknowledged by many researchers of Islamic studies, we rather shall pick out only one of them, i.e., Jahm ibn $afwan, in order to justify our stance. Abu Mul;lriz Jahm ibn $afwan al-Tirmidhi was born in Khurasan in the town of Tirmidh at an unknown date. There is extremely scare information about his life. All we know is that he joined in a revolt against the Umayyads with al-J:Iarith ibn Surayj in 116/739. This revolt was from time to time successful, and ev.en for a few years al-I:Iarith seized the control of eastern Khurasan. But eventually in 128/746 Jahm was captured and executed. A few months later al-I:Iarith also shared the same fate. Jahm was more like the ideologue or the intellectual propagandist of this movement. According .to al-Tabari, they demanded that the government be administered in ·accordance with "the Book of God and the

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Sunna of the Prophet". 49 Al;lmad ibn I:lanbal informs us that he enjoyed dialectical argument and discourse on God and His essence. 50 He developed arguments to refute the Indian sect of Sumaniyya and tried to prove the existence of God by arguing that although we cannot see, hear, touch or feel God in any way similar to these sense-perception, He does exist. Even if we cannot see, touch or feel sensually our intellect, we still infer its existence from its functions; similarly God is also a being that can in no way be perceived by the senses. In this way, J ahm was perhaps led to advance a rational theology to prove the Islamic idea of God. It seems from the accounts of the historians, e.g. al-Tabari, alBaghdadi, al-Nawbakhti, and even al-Ash'ari and Al;lmad ibn I:Ianbal that Jahm believed in his ability to prove the Qur'anic conception of God rationally. It is clear that he believed in the rationality of the Qur'anic and the Prophetic prepositions concerning God and His essence. In order to show this let us try to trace his ideas from the available sources. Jahm's starting idea is said to be a distinction between God and 'things'. He argues that God cannot be a 'thing'. This idea is backed up by certain Qur'anic verses: 39/al-Zumar, 63; 42/al-Shudi, 9; and 6/alAn 'am, 103. Most of the early thinkers attack this speculative idea concerning the nature of God, and as a result it was held to be a heretical position. There are basically two reasons for this accusation, both of which are very important:

1. Muslims knew as a result of the Islamic worldview that the nature of God is comprehensible only as it was disclosed by the revelation; and thus it can never be captured independently by the intellect. Hence, all speculations are not only futile but dangerous besides revealed idea of God, as rival ideas of God may emerge as a result of this wild speculation. 2. Perhaps literalist thinkers would regard this statement to amount to saying that "If God is not a thing", then He may not be said to exist at all. For these, see the formulation of the J ahmi thesis 49AJ-Tabarl, 2: 157; cf. also 1577, 1583. 50 "K!Uib al-Radd 'ala'l-Zanadiqa wa'l-Jahmiyyah", Darul-Funun /lahiyat Faktiltesi Mecmu 'ast, 4-6 (I 927), 315. Translations are taken with minor adaptations from R. M. Frank, "The Neoplatonism of Gahm Ibn $afwan", Le Museon, 78 ( 1965). 204

by AQ.mad ibn I:Ianbal as "God is an existing thing (shay'un mawfud)." 51 But Jahm's argument to prove his point clearly shows that he is merely trying to develop a natural idea of God, in contrast to the literal idea of God purported by the revelation. Things are created (mu(1dath) and it is the Creator who makes the thing be a thing.52

Hence, things are created, but God is not; this very idea sets Him apart from the things. Jahm is thus reported to have said: I will not say that God is a thing, since this would be to make Him similar to things.53

Then Jahm proceeds that God, according to al-Darimi, has no boundary (J:tadd), no limit (ghiiyah) and no end (nihayah), for a thing is such that it can exist only if it has these characteristics; whereas God, being not a thing, must transcend these characteristics as well. So far two ideas concerning the nature of God have been put forward by Jahm: 1. God is not a thing, 2. God is limitless. Both propositions can in fact be inferred from the Qur' an through discursive interpretation. In the first place, Jahm himself cites some verses; secondly, simply a philosophical expression of Allah akbar may lead to this conclusion. But because of similarities, R. M. Frank concludes that J ahm took these ideas from Neoplatonic sources. 54 Ibn I;Iazm also develops an exact statement of J ahm's position: God is not a thing, but neither is He nothing, because He is the Creator of all things. ·Hence, there is not a thing that is not a creature. 55

The conclusion of this rational idea of God is attributed by AQ.mad ibn I;Ianbal to J ahm:

51Frank, 400, citing al-Baghdiidi, 129, 133. 5 2Frank, 398. 53Frank, 933, citing Maqaliit, 280. 54Frank; 400-40 I.

55At-Fa$l fi'l-Milal wa'l-A/:twiil wa'l-Nif:tal, 4: 205, cited ibid., 40 l-2. 205

God is not described or known by any attribute or act, nor has He any end, or limit; He is not grasped by mind ... whatever may occur to your thought that it is a thing defining Him, He is contrary to it.56

As we have pointed out, Jahm clearly attempts to present a rational formulation of the Qur'anic idea of God. Once an idea is expressed rationally, it necessarily becomes abstract, devoid of any physical characteristic; as such a transcendent idea of God is generated. This is what J ahm does and thereby he reaches the conclusion that God cannot have the qualities of physical things. Since the Qur' an describes God with some anthropomorphic attributes, it causes problems to Jahm's rational descriptions of God, because an abstract idea of God is at once made concrete through the attributes. He thus negates all of God's attributes; a position which is known as ta '.fll. Jahm thus tried to defend an idea of God devoid of attributes, while at the same time having the functions of these attributes: God is totally hearing, sight and knowing (sam!', ba~ar, 'ilm), and is in His totality in every place. If He knows, He knows in His entirety and if He hears, He hears in His entirety and if He sees, He sees in His entirety. God's knowing is in a manner of beholding and immediate witness, as He does not know the thing until it is, so that He knows it in a knowing of and through its coming to be, not In a knowing which is from eternity present in Himself before its coming to be. On the contrary, when He makes the thing to be, He is Himself present to the thing and the thing itself is with Him. If He desires the thing, He designates the thing from its place. This is the encompassing of things by God's knowing.· Hence, there can be no knowledge of any of them in itself prior to its coming to be. 57

What this argument implies is that God does not know things prior to their actual existence. But al-Ash'ari argues that this is not what Jahm 56 Rich~rd

M. Frank here gives a distorted translation of Ibn I:Janbal's wording, perhaps in order to make it parallel to the statements of Plotinus. cf. Ibn Hanbal in Dar alFunun llahiyat fakiiltesi, 5-6 ( 1927), 315.

57 Gosta Vitestam, Kitab al-Radd 'ala'l-Jahmiyya des Abu Sa'ld 'Uthmtin ibn Sa'id

al-Diiriml (Lund/Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960), 59; Frank, op. cit., 411. 206

wants to claim. On the contrary, he claimed that God knows the thing at the instant of its creation (/:liil f:tuduthihi); for it is impossible to know a thing when it is non-existent. Moreover, Jahm defines a thing as an actually existent body; hence, a non-existent can neither be said to be knowable, nor unknowable. 58 It is clear that for Jahm ibn $afwan, God has no attributes in the actual sense. The Qur'anic reference to God with certain names such as rabb, khiiliq, ral:zmiin, ral:z'im and 'allm, can be allowed, because a name is different from an attribute, which denotes an action (ji'l); whereas a name denotes a being in terms of that action. But still a name is other than the thing named. Therefore, we must hold that all names are also created, including the name Allah. Before the creation of these names Allah had no names. Hence, attributes can be identified now with God only in a very transcendent way. A logical conclusion of this is the idea that the Qur' an is a created discourse. Jahm in fact argued that the Qur'an is created, for: God has not spoken, nor will He ever speak. He merely causes something to be, so that God is made known. He thus created the sound of a voice and caused it to be heard. Hence, God's speech cannot take place, except from (jawj) concavity, tongue and lips. 59 ·

Here there is an importan~ problem as the Qur'anic verse states: kun fa-yakun. Jahm argues that "God never said to anything at all any utterance or word be after which it comes to be". 6 For God's creation follows upon His Power (qudrah) which is also created. Thus, argues J ahm, "God has no power until He has created for Himself an act of 61 power". In the same way, God's knowledge is also created. Hence, God does not know until He creates for Himself an act of knowing. 62 .AlAsh'ar1 gives a full account of Jahm's position regarding the creation of these divine acts:

°

58Maqaliit, 454; also see Ahmad ibn Hanbal, al-Radd, 324. 59Ibn Hanbal, al-Radd, 322. 60Frank, 422. 6llbid., 406. 62Ibid., 408; Ibn I;Ianbal, 322. 207

Jahm said that God's knowledge is created (mu/:ldath). He creates it and so knows by means of it. Maybe he believed that God knows all things prior to their actual existence by an act of knowing which He creates before them. 63

Besides these theological doctrines, Jahm is reported to have denied man's freedom on the basis of the idea that man has no power naturally. This means that man's choice, will and his act, are all created in him, just like his~body, color and other physical characteristics are also created. Therefore, "a human being has no act at all nor any power to act, but on the. contrary, God is the omnipotent Agent". 64 Al-Ash' ari summarizes his views concerning this in the following manner: Man has power over nothing, nor is it to be described as having the poWer to act (isti{a 'a); he is entirely constrained from without in his actions, having no power ( qudrah), no will (iriidah) and no deliberate freedom of choice (ikhtiyiir). God alone creates actions in him, just as He created in all other inert objects actions which ·are attributed to him rnetaphorically, as they are attributed to inert objects, as for example it is said that the tree puts forth fruit, that water flows, that stone moves, the sun rises and sets. 65

Therefore, according to Jahm, God alone is the real agent (fa 'il). Hence, actions do not belong to things inherently; e.g. fire does not burn essentially. In this way, as we have seen, a systematic treatment of what we would call today, 'philosophical subjects' are discussed. The term used for referring to such discussions has always been kaliim, as we tried to show in the previous chapter. But as these discussions accumulated they showed the same characteristics, and thus becaiJle to be classified under the umbrella concept kaliim. Although this is the process through which a disciplinary stage came to arise in kaliim, yet at this stage we do not ascertain any evidence for the scientific consciousness in kaliim activities. This development will take place at the stage which we have called 'stage 63Trans. by Frank, 408; Maqaliit, 494. · 64Frank, 406. 651bid., 405; Maqaliit, 273. 208

of naming'. We shall now examine the course of this advancement in the scientific process through which kaliim emerged as a science. 3. The Emergence of Kaliim as a Science (200's350A.H./800's-950's): The Stage of Naming Naming of a science, as we have seen in our discussion concerning the scientific process in the chapter on the sociology of science, can be in various ways. It is possible that just one prominent scholar would name the newly emerging science, such is the case with the naming of physics by Aristotle. But in the case of kaliim, the name given to the activity naturally came to be the name of the science. As a result, it is possible that the scientific consciousness could have emerged long before the middle of the third century of the hijrah (950's); but somehow I have not been able to locate a usage of the kind 'itm al-kaldm, or fiqh al-kaliim (corresponding to the usage fiqh al-lughah, for example) before alAsh'ari, who wrote a treatise to defend the science of kaldm. Later this phrase is used by such prominent philosophers as 'Abd al-Qahir alBaghdadi (d. 429/1037), al-Sh~hrastani (d. 547/1153) and Abii al-Barakat al-Baghdadi (c. 560/1164). For, this usage would have indicated the scientific consciousness in kaldm studies. Al-Ash 'ari's treatise Risiilahfi lstif:tsiin al-Khawrjfi 'ilm al-kaliim contains this phrase. It was written in defense of kaliim, and, therefore, it clearly indicates the scientific cc rel="nofollow">nsciousness. But I am not sure if he was the first to make use of this phrase. He lived in the third century (Z60-324/873-935). Assuming that he wrote this work at a relatively late date, we can safely say that already at the beginning of the fourth century kaliim had been established as an independent science detached from al-fiqh. A brief history of this development can prove this point. We may now attempt this without discussing the theories of the kaliim scholars. Wasil ibn 'Ata' is known to be the founder of the Mu 'tazilites, who contributed most towards the rise of a scientific consciousness in kaliim. He was born in 80/699 at Medina, and died in 748/131. 66 He is known to be a disciple of Abu Hashim 'Abdullah ibn Mul)ammad ibn al-I:Janafiyya. 66 Some information on him is found In Kashf al-Ghumma 'an (ftiraq al-Ummah, by Slddiq Ha">an [Bhopal, India: Matba ·:at Shahjahani, 1304/1886), 19f. 209

But on the issue of imiimate he opposed his master and joined the circle of J:Iasan al-Ba~ri. Ibn Khallikan recounts some of his works, among which the following are mentioned: Kitab al-Manzilah bayn alManzilatayn, Kitab al-Futya and Kitab al-Tawf:zid. None of his works are known to be extant. J:lasan al-Ba~ri died in 728, when Wasil was yet 29 years old. So Wasil's departure from J:Iasan al-Ba~ri must have occurred just a few years before his death. This may accordingly lead us to speculate that the i'tizal incident must have occurred around 1071725. If this date is taken as the official initiation of the Mu 'tazilite school by Wasil, its development must have taken some time. Nevertheless, the doctrinal founder of the Mu'tazila is known to be Abfl'l-Hudhayl Mul)ammad ibn al-'Allaf, who was born in the year .Wasil died (c. 226/840). It is reported that Wasil had frequent meetings at the house of a sumani 67 , Buddhist, in Basra with such friends as 'Abd al-Karim ibn Abi'l-'Awja', ~ali}) ibn 'Abd al-Quddlls who is known for his dualist, i.e. thanawi, doctrines, (by which is probably meant the Manichaeism) and the poet Bashshar ibn Burd. 68 When a serious dispute broke among this group especially over crucial theological issues the regular meetings were disrupted. Then Wasil is reported to have composed a treatise to refute Manachaeism which is not extant today. Then, Bashshar ibn Burd, perhaps inspired by those meetings, developed a heretical theology based on what is called the "doctrine of fire". Against Bashsharian theology the Mu 'tazilites developed a theology based on the natural philosophy of their time (i.e. physics). The poems of ~afwan al-An~ari demonstrates some of this theological outlook. 69 It is perhaps this way that philosophy was for the first time put to the service of theology in Islam.

6 7 Al-Sumaniyyah:

a certain sect of idolaters who assert the doctrine of metempsychosis, and deny that knowledge comes from informations; a certain people, of the Indians, who hold that the duration of the present world is from eternity, or that it is everlasting and assert the doctrine of metempsychosis. The word is said to be an irregular noun from sumanat a town in India. See E. W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon (Cambridge: The Islamjc Text Society, 1984). 68 Cf. al-Shahrastanl, Al-Milal wa al-Ni(u:tl, I: 244; and Kittib al-Aghiinl, 3: 24. 69 AI-JaJ:ti~. Kitiib al-Baytin, I: 16-19. 210

It is important for us to determine the date of these events, in order to detect the foreign influence upon speculative tradition in Islam; i.e. 1501750 and 200/800. The first of these dates indicates the penetration of foreign ideas and doctrines in an unorganized and unsystematic way, mainly through such discussions as those between Wasil and his circle and the Manichaeism; the second date indicates or rather marks a more systematic influence through translations and studies of foreign sources. If this is also clarified, another problem ·put in front us by mainly the Orientalists is also solved. For, some of them go even so far as to claim the origins of fiqh, kalcfm and philosophy in the Greek sources. Our proposal of the scientific process can settle this problem. In fact, it proposes that no science can arise in any civilization through foreign influence which cannot bring about a worldview that is suitable for the cultivation of sciences. Of course here we are talking about scientific influence not cultural influence, which must have been there from the earliest times; i.e. c. 50 A.H. or even earlier. But this cannot lead, as we have shown, to the rise of a sophisticated scientific tradition in Islam. The later development of the Mu 'tazila has two schools: 1. The Basran School, established by Wasil; its later representatives who contributed to the emergence of kaliim as ari independent science, are Abu'l-Hudhayl al, Allaf, Hishiim ibn al-I:Iakam, Mu 'ammar ibn 'Ab bad al-S ulami, alNa~~am, al-Jhlji~ (d. 255/869) and al-Ash'arl's master Abu 'Ali al-Jubbai (d. 303/915); 2. The Baghdad School, founded by Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir (d. 210/825-6) main representatives are Thumama ibn Ashras (d. 210/825-6), Ibn Abi Dawlld (d. 854-5/240), and the famous heretic Ibn al-Riiwandi, who left the Baghdad school for the most extreme riifir)a, 'lsa ibn Qubay~ al-Murdar. Besides the Mu'tazilites, we can count some other names which are extremely important in the naming stage of kaliim, such as Al;tmad ibn I:Ianbal (d. 241/855), and the students of Abu I:Ianifa, Nw;;ayr ibn Yal,lyii al-Balkhi (d. 268/881) and Mul;tammad ibn Muqiitil al-Razl (d. 248/862), also the Mu'tazilite al-Jubba'i's student Abu I:Iasan al-Ash'~ri (d. 324/935), Abu Manl?llr al-Matu(Idi (d. 333/915) and Dawud ibn 'Ali (d. 270/884). All these scholars developed schools of thought and helped in establishing kaliim as an independent science. When the stage of naming 211

came to completion through their works, Muslim philosophers began to do their scientific activities within the 'scientific kaliim conceptual scheme'. For, it is clear that by the middle of the fourth century (950's) the specific scientific conceptual scheme was well established in kaliim. As our epistemology of science has shown this scheme was established within the general body of the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme, which includes in general certain key scientific notions utilized in all scientific activities, such as the concept of knowledge, truth, method, theory and science. But when these concepts are worked out into a network of conceptual scheme it combines many other doctrinal concepts to be employed in all scientific actiyities within a civilization. For their importance we shall cite the following selection as the key terms of the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme, which have been demonstrated historically as well in our above treatment of the scientific process in the rise of individual sciences: 'ilm, u~ul~ ra'y, ijtihiid, qiyds,fiqh, 'aql, qalb, idriik, wahm, tadabbur,fikr, na?,ar, (tikmah, yaqin, wa(ty, tafsir, ta'wil, 'iilam, kaliim, nu.tq, ?,ann, (taqq, bii{il, ~idq, kidhb, wujud, 'adam, dahr, ~amad, sarmad, azal, abad, khalq, khulq,firiisah,fi{rah, {abi'ah, ikhtiyiir, kisb, khayr, sharr, (taliil, (tariim, wajib, mumkin, amr, imiin, and iriidizh. If this is the case, we can briefly now allude to the rise of some other special sciences in order to demonstrate how these general concepts were appropriated in other individual sciences.

C. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND OTHER SCIENCES The Medinan Period begins by our Prophet's arrival at Quba' in the oasis of Medina on the 12th of Rabi' al-awwal, 1/September 4, 622. This date can be taken as the beginning of Prophetic political activities. 70 It is the Qur'anic worldviewproviding the foundation to establish a socio-political community based on religio-moral principles of Islam that led also our Prophet to enter into a new body politic. He achieved this within but ten 70 Watt also accepts this. Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1987), 4. 212

years of his life in Medina: "the Islamic state had no precisely defined geographical frontiers, but it was certainly in existence." 71 The first political activity reported in these years is what is commonly called "the Constitution of Medina", which is an agreement signed between the Prophet on behalf of Muslims, and the inhabitants of Medina (including the Jewish tribes). In this constitution Medina, then Yathrib, is considered as a state in which its citizens and the nature of the state were expressed in the following way: 1. The believers and their dependents constitute a single community ummah; 2. Each clan or sub-division of the community is responsible for blood-money and ransoms on behalf of its members(articles 277); . 3. The members of the community are to show complete solidarity against crime and not to support on criminal even when he is a near kinsman when the crime is against another member of the community (arts 13, 21); 4. The members of the community are to show complete solidarity against the unbelievers in peace and war (arts. 14, 17, 19, 44), and also solidarity in the granting of 'neighborly protection' (jar, art. 15); . 5. The Jews of various groups belong to the community and are to retain their own religion; _they and the Muslims are to render 'help' (including military aid) to one another when it is needed (arts. 24-35, 37, 38, 46)_72 The system of public seclirity in the Arab society of that time was based on the concept of protection, known as jar (neighborly protection), client or mawaU or f:tatif, confederate. Then this was backed up by vengeance system, or biood money and ransoms. All these ~reaccepted by the constitution, but it brought a new Islamic element which is seen by . Watt as a "revolution" 73 ; if one member of the community has committed 71Jbid.

72we have given 5 summary points taken from the document transmitted by Ibn Isl)aq as outlined by Watt, op. cit., 5. See Slrat Rasi:ll A lliih, Ed. by Mu~~afa ai-Saqa, Ibrahim ai-Abyarl, 'Abd ai-Hafi?- Shalabi (Cairo, 1936); trans. by Alfred Guillaume (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1970).

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a crime against his fellow citizen, the ldnsmen of the criminal are to help to see that he is punished, instead of the pre-Islamic custom of supporting him. If, however, a person kills another by an accident, then he is to pay a blood-wit, which the family of the victim is required to accept in which case the state, [or a judge as in later cases] settle the amount. As we can see clearly in this document, the Prophet was tacitly accepted as the head of the State (see arts. 23 and 42). Thus a political conception in conjunction with its legal and social aspects were about to develop from this first agreement between the Muslims and other citizens of Medina. The following terminology clearly emerged in this period; ummah, state (dar al-Islam), dar al-Jjarb, ul al-'amr(head of the state), imam, khalifah, solidarity, mutual help of citizens to be security as the function of police force, inithaq, treaty, oath, shura (consultative assembly), war policies, jihad, ijma ', (taqq, takl~f. mukallc~f. mulk, bay 'ah, huquq Allah, huquq al-bashar and so on~ All these terminology were based on the basic terminology of the Islamic fundamental metaphysics already developed by the Qur' an. Of course, this foundational outlook included many theological and philosophical terminology which required a believer to demonstrate certain kind of conduct in his daily activities, and as such it had a derivative content as well, which is its ethical corollary. In this way, ethics, politics and law were intimately related to the concept of religion in Islam. As an integrated part of the whole worldview of Islam they were all studied under one general science which was named even by the Prophet himself, as inspired by the Qur' anic outlook; al-fiqh. This beginning of the early political activities led to the rise of a sophisticated network of political concepts. Thus emerged Islamic political thought which gradually went through the scientific process as outlined above until this thought also emerged as a specific science, political philosophy. While all these philosophical, theological, legal and· political developments were taking place, another science was also on the way to emerge. There was already a revealed history or rather the story ( qi~~ah) of some Prophets and their communities in the Qur' an. Of course the 73watt, op. cit., 9.

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purpose of the Qur'an is not here to give an historical account as such, but rather to let its addressees have a lesson, 'ibrah, from their history. What is important here is that this lesson-giving qi,Ja.J not only awakened an intense interest among the early community in history but also many historical terminology were thereby elaborated both within the Qur' an and the community mainly through the Prophetic Traditions. This way ·the Qur' an introduced a significant historical principle into the Islamic philosophy [understanding] of history that study of past generations ought not to be a simple idle investigation to satisfy human curiosity; it must rather be an illustration of the past as a set example for us and the coming generations, for God's law concerning human history (sunnatullah) does not change. It is for this reason that many of the Companions became interested to collect materials about past history and present situation so that they began preserving the sayings of the Prophet. This way the early Muslims began to pass from oral tradition, which was then the prevalent method of preserving the cultural heritage among the Arabs to the written tradition. We cannot show the whole scientific process which took place in case of history. But it can briefly be summarized that first books in the form of .JaMfah then maghiizi came out, which, in turn, led to the rise of sirah tradition. Sirah is actually history proper; and this can be seen in the fact that after the s'irah literature Muslim historians became interested in world history. There were those scholars who were interested in world history even when maghiizis were written, such as Wahb Ibn Munabbih whose scientific activities have been outlined above. We must thus accept the contribution of the Traditionist School (muftaddithun) for the development of the idea of history in Islam, which eventuaHy led to the development of a philosophy of history as well. The philosophical discussions of history and historical methodology revolved around the ftadith literature at the beginning stages, but later these discussil;ms were carried around purely historical studies as well. In this way, the scientific process in the science of history went through the stages of problems, disciplinary tradition and naming. The term tiirikh was given as the name of this science, and it might be al-Waqidi (d. 208/823) who used the term in this technical sense for the first time, 215

which means that it in his time that the third and final stage of the scientific process took place. After the 4th century/lOth A.D., a new scientific development began to take place. Muslim scholars met the Hellenistic' philosophy and science in the conquered lands. Of course first they began discussing the issues of this scientific heritage orally with the scholars who knew this scientific heritage. These scholars were mostly Arab Christians who had debates and discussions with the Muslim scholars. When some of the Muslim scientists also became interested in the Hellenistic philosophy and science, they began studying it under the prominent scholars of that heritage. We must realize that these Christian Arab scholars who were studying Greek philosophy and science were not original thinkers; they were merely commentators who knew especially the Aristotelian philosophy very well. But the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme was very dynamic at the time and thus when the Muslim scientists such as al-Kindi (d. 260/873), alFarabi (d. 339/950), al-'Amiri (d. 3811992) and al-Sijistani (d. /987-8), al-Miskawayh (d. 421/1030) met the Hellenistic intellectual heritage, they began philosophizing and constmcting a system of their own based on the framework provided by the Islamic scientific conceptual scheme and the scientific theories of the previous Hellenistic philosophers. In this way, they introduced Greek science. We mustrealize that Muslims did use simple knowledge available to them in these new sciences even before they were introduced into Islam; but these mathematical, astronomical and medical knowledge was not yet formulated into a discipline to be called science. Hence, these are "borrowed sciences", if this term_ can be used in that sense. Once they were established in Islam, Muslims contributed to the progress of these sciences and in fact they enlarged the accumulated knowledge in some of these sciences so much thattheir branches came to emerge as independent disciplines, such as algebra in mathematics and kiml.yii in physics. We must at the same time realize that a society cannot contribute mearingfully for the advancement of sciences by simply borrowing sciences from other civilizations unless the community of scholars in that science develop the frameworks needed for carrying out scientific activities, as we tried to expose in this essay. We shall next

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discuss in our conclusion these issues, namely, how scientific advancement is possible, and the outcome of our exposition in this essay.

217

CONCLUSION This essay has attempted to show that in the first place, science is basically a cognitive activity, as such it is based on human epistemological make up; secondly, it shows that, as a cognitive activity, science has a social aspect which originates primarily from the social make up of its own scientific community and secondarily from its society at large; finally, the epistemology and sociology of science, as these two points are named, can be utilized in a society to cultivate science. In order to demonstrate this point we have tried to describe the process of the rise of scientific thought in three civilizations. In this way, we may also argue that there is a need for an adequate framework through which the history of scientific thought in civilizations can be disclosed. We have primarily developed two perspectives, which, if combined, will yield the framework needed for such a history of scientific thought. The first perspective endeavors to develop an epistemology on the basis of which alone is scientific activities are possible; this has been termed 'epistemology of science'. The second perspective tries to understand the process. through which science emerges and this process requires a community of scientists which must be sufficiently grasped in order to show the necessity of that process; this was called 'sociology of scienc~'. The combination of epistemology of science and sociology of science is used as the proper framework for the emergence of sciences in different societies. This was applied to the history of Islamic science in chapters four and five. We hope that these points are clear. What may not be so clear is some implications of this ~ssay. One of them is that it can be used I as a theory for the problem of the advancement of sciences in a certain society. Therefore, we shall try to illustrate this point with some specific cases. Today in countries where scientific progress is at a halt or very minimal, there is the naive idea that they can scientifically progress by importing science from the West. However, the history of sciences shows that this cannot be the case. The framework developed in this essay can prove this not only historically, but conceptually as well. Historically, we 2L9

have shown that the source of scientific dynqmism had always been within the civilization itself. Although the scientific progress of one civilization can influence another in this respect, if the one under that influence does not accommodate the necessary changes in its conceptual scheme, as we have shown in case of Islam, it cannot cope with the new problems arising out of that scientific influence; and as a result, the scope of the influence will remain limited without any sizable scientific contributions by that civilization. Therefore, imported scientific knowledge will be useful not in yielding scientific progress, but in furthering the already existing scientific activities. Therefore, we can pose· the followidg question; if importing scientific knowledge does not yield any progress, then what is it that yields scientific and in fact also technological advancement? We must, first of all, be clear about what we mean by 'scientific advancement'. In certain cases we may even find a society that is developed technologically and may be misled to think that it is also a ~cientifically progressed society, such as Japan. As a result, we would like to imitate them without knowing what We actually want. We confuse science with technology; although technology largely derives from sciences and to some extent it is based on sciences, yet having an independent characteristic as well, it can be developed independently of sciences. As we have seen in case of Islam, there was no technology and even natural sciences at the beginning history of its scientific tradition. They naturally emerged on the basis of the theoretical scheme provided by the earlier scientific activity. Hence, we would like to claim that sciences emerge out of only a certain kind of environment and a context which, at the same time, act as the habitat, so to speak, for its progress. Furthermore, it is possible for the sciences to emerge in an environment but not develop there. In that case, scientific advancement must be conceived not in terms of a temporal duration, but rather in terms of its effect and impact upon the culture and civilization within which it flourishes. Therefore, by 'scientific advancement', we shall mean all the scientific activities (including non-physical sciences, such as philosophy, history, sociology, theology and education) that help in · establishing a civilization. Therefore, those activities that are found in a comrrtunity and characterized as scientific, will not render it a scientifically 220

advanced·society, unless those scientific activities bring the culture 9f that society to the level of a civilization. In order to clarify this, we need to show the conceptual aspect of scientific development based on the theoretical framework developed in this essay and it is this aspect that we shall examine as our theoretical background.

A. THE NON-OBSERVABLE FOUNDATION Every human activity seems to emerge out of an observable and nonobservable foundation. We mean by 'foundation', "the reasons and intentions underlying the. act, disposition of the agent and whatever justification may be given for his action". Afoundation of an action is, therefore, "all the observable and non-observable phenomena assumed to be taking place in relation to that action. in the mind, body and surroundings of the person in question, either at the time of his performing the action, or at times ·prior to its performance". By observable foundation; we mean "whatever preceding action, behavior, disposition and events given as either reason or condition for the action performed". By non-observable foundation, on the other hand, we mean "all the mental operations and dispositions leading to that action considered as either justification for it or causes of it" ... · In order to clarify this, we may give the following analogy; a person who steals something may be said to be stealing, because he is selfish, dishonest and because of the circumstances which led him to that undesirable action. We consider all these and similar motives or circumstances underlying the· act to be the observable foundation, because they can be observed either directly or indirectly within the action itself. Yet there are also certain other mental conditions that lead the person in question to his action, such as his conception of. stealing and the pll:teement of that concept within his worldview. As these are the nonobservable foundation for his action, they can only be inferred by intellectual cognition. Upon analyzing that action, therefore, it is possible to distinguish three elements constituting the performance of it: 1. the mental framework within which the action is conceptualized prior to its 221

performance; 2. certain physiological and e11vironmental conditions leading to the action, and we would like to broaden the scope of these elements by not limiting them just to the environmental and physiological conditions; 3. whatever they may be, the factors that are involved at the time of performing the action itself. Clearly, the second and third elements are observable either directly or indirectly; whereas the first one is observable only by intellectual cognition. Therefore, within our analysis, the last two elements are characterized as observable; but the first one as the non-observable foundation of the action. As it is seen in our analogy, the development of these observable and non-observable foundations in the individual's life must take place in different ways but in relation to each other. The mental framework, for instance, does not develop instantly, though, the action itself is performed at an instance. Even the environmental and physiological conditions may develop instantly, yet in relation to the mental framework and the performance of the action. In fact, the mental framework is the totality of concepts and mental attitude developed by the individual throughout his life, and as such it constitutes his worldview. Since every related concept and event is evaluated within a certain worldview before a decision is taken to perform the action, it must be the priormost condition of any action. We have thus inferred in this essay that a worldview is the nonobservable foundation of all human conduct, including scientific and technological activities. By 'priormost' we do not mean the immediate, for in a worldview the immediate foundation of our acts are mentalities that are situated in the structures of a worldview. We rather mean the most general framework of an action. Since we take the worldview to be the priormost foundation of any action, we conclude from this that every human action is ultimately traceable to its worldview; and as such it is reducible ultimately to that worldview. That human conduct is ultimately reducible to a worldview is sufficient in itself to manifest the significance of worldview in individual and social life, including, of course, scientific activities. But above all, from the epistemological perspective, we have shown that a worldview is far more significant than all the other elements of human behavior, because it is the only framework within which the . burna~ mind can operate in order to attain.knowledge. 222

1. The Environment Using a Kantian argument we can say that we are already in possession of a certain a priori knowledge. We interpret this to mean: "human mind is created capable of acquiring the knowledge of the universe in which it· is". We must further add to this that the world is also created in such a way that it can be comprehended by the human mind. The first step in acquiring knowledge is initiated as our mind is furnished with representations of that .world through sense perception. To revert back to the Kantian terminology, we are capable of possessing a posteriori knowledge as well. The continual combination of the a priori with the a posteriori gradually forms in the mind a framework, which we called 'worldview'. From the very first inception of a posteriori knowledge, the mind begins to work within that framework as it enlarges it through various combinations of knowledge acquired later. The worldview thus becomes the environment within which the mind operates, and without which it cannot function at all. Let us think of a worldview in which there is no concept of science or any other related concepts. We have tried to show that no scientific knowledge is possible within such an environment. We can now infer from our premises that the priormost non-observable foundation for the advancement of sciences is the clarification of the a worldview, which we have called the 'environment' of any knowledge acquired (or to be acquired).

2.

The Context

The environment by itself, however, is not sufficient to bring about the possibility of a scientific activity, because for that possibility to be realized, there needs to be the conceptual scheme within which all scientific activities are carried out. We termed this conceptual scheme 'the general [scientific] conceptual scheme' which begins with the most general concepts, such as knowledge ( 'ilm), [science] and discipline, and goes down to the most specific theoretical concepts, such as truth, theory, method, experiment and observation. Without such a conceptual scheme, no environment can be prepared for the advancement of sciences. Since this conceptual scheme acts as a closer and thus an immediate environment to the scientific activities, we shall term it the 'context' of sciences. Any 223

context must presuppose a worldview; rto context is, therefore, possible without its environment, viz., worldview. Since the context is intimately related to the worldview, it must also be regarded as a non-observable foundation, which is the conceptual scheme in which an action is supported mentally.

3. The Environmental Context Since the issue here is the advancement of sciences, we would llke to cut off only that part of the worldview that concerns us here, and relate it to the conceptual scheme, which we have called the context of sciences. In that case, we are in a position to combine the environment with the context, in order to show how scientific advancement is possible in a society; with this combination, we come up with the most prerequisite non-observable foundation for the advancement of sciences, which we shall term the environmental context for the advancement of sciences. It is within this theoretical framework that we shall proceed to prove our point.

B. THE FUNCTION OF WORLDVIEWS IN SCIENTIFIC ADVANCEMENT

~

As we have pointed out, human mind is not capable to operate without a worldview. Therefore, whether we want it or not, a worldview shall automatically develop as we grow up. What we have suggested in this essay is that the development of the worldview should not take place haphazardly as it is the case today in the Muslim World. It should rather develop in a way which we called 'scientific'; only then a worldview may render itselfadequate for the advancement of sciences. We defined the scientific development of a worldview as "inculcation if its major components, i.e., its concepts, ideas and doctrines, to the individuals of the society through clear and transparent definitions and a systematically organized body of knowledge". This is achieved at three successive stages as discussed in our exposition of the epistemology of science: The first stage, called 'abstract level'' which is the stage of worldview-formation, and as such, since the worldview is .formed by abstract thinking, it is 224

called 'system' in the philosophical sense. The second stage may be called the 'concretized level', which is the level of intellectuals, such as men of literature, artists, architects, teachers and educators who are able to understand the abstract worldview developed or constructed by the scientific community, and will, or indeed, ought to reflect it in their works. Since the works of the intellectuals are usually of concrete nature, the worldview is concretized and thus handed down to the general masses who can understand the concrete ideas more easily. Finally, the third stage is the level of massive dissemination of the worldview through the educational institutions and mass media. When the worldview thus disseminates from the top level of abstraction to the bottom level of concretization, it reaches to the masses and begins shaping their worldview according to its well-defined and systematically developed concepts, ideas and doctrines.' This way at the level of society the worldview of individuals is formed according to that of the scientific community; it is this way of worldview-formation that we call scient{fic. The worldview-formation at the level of society takes place at two planes: First at the individual plane, where it begins first by experiencing our surroundings, then continues with learning a language, and as we grow up, it becomes more abstract through concept-formations and rising of ideas in the mind. As a result, our mind combines these into larger bo~ies of knowledge adding thereunto, enlarging the worldview as long as we live. Second at the social plane, where all these phenomena of worldviewformation are influenced by whatever ideas or other worldviews circulating in the society. As we have shown, just as the environment of any human activity is the worldview within which that activity is carried out, since our scientific activities cannot be without an environment, its environment within which it takes place is also worldview. Hence, 'environment' does not mean the physical surr6undiiig. On the contrary, physical surrounding is only the observable environment; whereas the worldview is the discernible envirom;nent, and as such we have termed it 'non-observable foundation'. Therefore, proper environment for the advancement of sciences means only the adequate woddview within which there is a potentiality for the cultivation of sciences. What this statement entails is that there are some 225

worldviews within which sciences cannot flourish. A more concrete example of this state of affairs is the pre-and post-Islamic Arabia. As we have seen, it was possible only for the Islamic, and therefore, not the preIslamic, worldview to lead to the emergence of a scientific thought. We may pose here to ask what kind of a worldview provides the proper environment for scientific progress. In order to answer this question, we need to examine only the historical development of sciences in Islamic civilization. What kind of a worldview did Islam give to the Muslims so that they were able to excel in all the sciences? We tried to show this historically and argued that the Prophet developed the Islamic worldview alongside the Revelation as it was disclosed to him. In that case, it is the early Islamic worldview which led to the scientific progress right from the first century of Islam. For example in the early Meccan Period mostly ethico-theological concepts and issues, such as the idea of one God, the concepts of creation, hereafter and human responsibility, helping the poor and protecting the orphans; what is good and bad, are developed; then, later more abstract concepts and doctrines such as the doctrine of Prophethood, the concept of 'ilm, the meaning of religion and 'ibadah, are developed; and finally in Medina such concepts as law, jihad, brotherhood, Muslim community (ummah), etc. are all elaborated together with the earlier topics into a whole unity of ideas, which is what we have called 'the world view of Islam'. Of course when a new topic was introduced, the topics developed earlier did not cease to be discussed; on the contrary, they were further elaborated and clarified. We have thus shown that the seeds of some sciences are already in existence right at the time of the Prophet; history, law, literature, grammar, philosophy and theology are all at the beginning stage. One must notice that all these sciences are intimately related to worldview-formation. As we have shown in the fifth chapter, towards the end of the second and through the third centuries of Islam most of the knowledge accumulated in these disciplines are formed into sciences. Then, it is only in the Fourth Century that we see other disciplines, such as physics, astronomy, mathematics and chemistry, begin to emerge as sciences. The reason for this is not, and cannot be, translations from Greek scientific and philosophic works. For there is only one reason for this, and it is the 226

environmental context which has already been developed by the above mentioned disciplines based on the Revelation. This very fact can be explained in a different way as well; sciences cannot develop by being imported. In other words, we cannot import sciences in order to have advancement of sciences. They must emerge from within, and the only way for this to be realized is through establishing a worldview which will act as the adequate environmental context for sciences. We have thus shown that when the Greek philosophical and scientific works began to be translated into Arabic, there had already been a sophisticated and distinctly expressed Islamic worldview together with its knowledge-structure. Moreover, one must see that even before Islam, all those Greek philosophical and scientific achievements were present in the region; why did they not influence anyone in the direction of advancing these sciences any further? The role of the translations from Greek should neither be over exaggerated, nor underestimated: These translations did not play the role of initiating the scientific advancement in the Islamic civilization; they only helped to further the already-started phenomenon of scientific progress. In this way, some of the sciences, which were not yet built as independent branches of learning in Islam, were of course established as new sciences. In this way, when we combine our theoretical framework developed above with its historical proof, we may thus analyze the phenomenon of scientific advancement in a civilization: the first, and by far, the priormost condition for the advancement of sciences is an adequate worldview scientifically developed as suitable for cultivating sciences; the second and the next crucial condition for this phenomenon is the development of a context for sciences which we called 'scientific conceptual scheme'; the third significant condition in order is the totality of ali other observable circumstances that help the first two conditions to take place effectively in the society, and it is these conditions which we can call the 'observable foundation for the advancement of sciences'. Since the first two conditions are non-observable foundations of scientific progress, most policy-makers in the Muslim world are regretfully unable to see them. As a result, they have been making their 227

poficy according to the observable foundation of scientific activities, which continually results with futile attempts to cultivate sciences in their societies. The proof of this predicament is the present state of sciences in the Muslim world. If a Muslim scientist ever achieves a rewarding scientific discovery, it will be out of environmental context; namely, it is an achievement carried out within the Western worldview and the scientific conceptual scheme, let alone being carried out within the physical Western envin:;mment. Muslims have been grappling with this kind of policy. making for more than a century; and they have been sending students to the West for almost a century as well for the sole purpose of importing scientific advancement. Alas! all these have resulted with a dismay of failure, because they have been neglecting the most crucial and necessary condition for their purpose; the environmental context. As this condition is the non-observable foundation for scientific advancement, it is indeed elusive; therefore, it is easy to evade. As we have argued thus far, the solution for this desperate state of affairs lies in the fact that more attention needs to be paid to the aspect of human behavior which is outlined here as its ultimate foundation. Now we may add a discussion of the observable foundations in order to relate our concern to the technical aspect of the problem.

C. THE OBSERVABLE FOUNDATION As we have argued the elements to be included as observable foundation 0f scientific advancement are easy to detect, as they are the formal conditions of the scientific development. But their application is not possible without the non-observable foundation. It is not possible to enumerate all of these elements; hence, we shall try to cite the most essential ones in this respect. 1.

The Effects of Environmental Context

When the non-observable foundation of the scientific activities are effectively developed, it will begin to work in the society naturally. As we have shown in our discussion of the sociology of science, as a result of the environmental context, certain nucleus contextual causes will be 228

effective within the society. This will bring about some dynamisms which are very effective in the scientific advancement. For example, an institutional re-organization will begin if certain institutions in the society do not conform to the newly emerging scientific outlook, as this was the case with the early Islamic world view which brought about such changes within the early Muslim economic and educational life. Therefore, if such development takes place the society must be ready for the effects of the environmental context. Especially political authorities should try to help such an advancement by providing policies that are congenial for the scientific progress. The most impmtant policy that can be designed by the policy makers is to provide financial opportunities, which can be summarized briefly now.

2. Material Opportunities Unfortunately those who try to offer a solution for the scientific backwardness of contemporary Muslim societies always revert to the financial availability of the sources. It is possible to have such financial opportunities without the scientific advancement, which means that such material availability cannot lead to the scientific progress. It may, however, help speed up the process if it has afready put into its right course by the environmep.tal context. Some of these financial opportunities are to provide a social comfort for not only the scientists but also for the able students who struggle to be active in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. Freedom from the burdens of life is another financial opportunity that can be provided; such as funding generously the scholarly projects, establishing award contests, providing larger amounts of scholarships and even allocating the largest possible salary and wage schemes for the scholars so that their profession draws attention and prestige from the general public so that bright students willingly choose these careers. The education of the scientists can also be considered as a material opportunity that helps for the advancement of sciences in a society. Everyone must have a chance for this kind of an education. All the necessary tools needed for such· an education must generously be provided. Once all these are met, then, hoping that the environmental 229

context is also effectively practiced by the scientific community, scientific advancement will be grounded on sound foundations.

230

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250

INDEH AI-Baladhuri, 180 Bashshar ibn Burd, 212 Bashshariyan theology, 212 Bavarians, 135 Being, 30, 38, 39, 42, 58 Body of knowledge, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14

A ban ibn 'Uthman (c. 20-105/640723), 161, 175, 176 'Abdullah ibn Mas'ud, 189, 190 'Abdullah ibn al-Mubarak, 178 Absolute, 38, 40, 62, 155, 156, 171, 172: activity, 46; k,now-ledge ('illn), 62, 63; realm, 8, 9, 39, 40, 62, 63; science, 1, 7; will of God, 199 Abu I;Ianifah (d. 1501767), 162, 164, 191, 192, 203, 204, 205, 213 Abu'l-Hudhayl a!- 'A!Uif (d. c. 226/840); 205, 212, 213 Abu Yiisuf Ya'qiib ibn Ibrahim, (1131731-182./798), 162, 190-191 Accumulation of knowledge, 8, 12-14, 72, 102, 142, 190 Adelard of Bath, 138 Ai:Jmad ibn I;I~mbal (d. 241/855), 212 'AU ibn Abi 'falib, 187, 189, 196 Al-'Amiri (d. 381/992), 218 'Amr ibn al-'A:;;, 175 Ancient Greek Civilization, see urider Greek St. Anselm, 138 Aristotle, 14! 98, 102, 105, 121, 122, 132, 211 Aristotelian: (episteme), 171; (logic), 193; (philosophy), 172,218 Al-Ash'ari, Abii'l-I;Iasan (d. 324/935), 212 'Ata' ibn Abi·Rabai:J (d. 1141732), 1612 Awza'i (a. 1581774), 162, 179, 191

Charlemagne (768-8 14), 135 Conceptual environment, 17 Constitution Medina, 215 Context, 225 Contextual causes, 131, 132, 133-135, 138, 139: nucleus, 120-124; marginal, 124-126 Copernican, I I 7 Correspondence, 56 Dawiid ibn 'Ali al-Z:ahiri (d. 270/884), 212 Al-Dhahabi, 178 Dorians, 13 I Dynamism: institutional, 125-126; intellectual, 121-123; moral, 121; social, 124-125 Entity, 30, 3 I, 38, 52 Environment, 224 Environmental context, 226, 230-231 Epistemology, 20, 27, 32, 37, 39, 41, 46: Islamic, 21: of science, 24, 29, 61-94; Western, 21 Experience, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30-44; external, 31-33; internal, 33-44; sensible, 23 see also sensible perception Experiential(ly), 10,37, 38, 41 (morally), 42, 61: absolute, 9, 10, 12; aspect of sensibility, 43; data, 38, 43; existent, 39; experience(s),

Al-Baghdadi, Abd ai-Qahir (d. 42911 037), 211 AI-Baghdadi, Abu al-Barakat (c. 560/1164), 211 251

44; faculties, 40; inquiries, 41; knowledge, 61, 62, 63; mental state, 42; mood, 38; perception(s), 38, 40, 48, 49; realm, 38, 39, 40, 42; representation(s), 39, 40, 41, 42, 44; states, 38; subjects, 41

Heraclitus, 102 /:fikmah, 172; 194, 214 Hisham ibn ai-I:lakam (d. 17.91795-6), 162, 205 Historicist, I Homer, 89

Faqlh, (as scientist) 173 AI-Farabi (d. 339/950), 40, 193, 218 al-Fiqh, 170, 171-193 fiqh, 79, 80, 87, 98, 103, 105, 142, 144, 155, 157, 164, 166, 170, 171, 173, 178, 192, 197, 202,204,205,211,213,214 Formal linkage, 116-117 Foundation: non-observable, 222-230; observable, 230 Frisians, 135 Fulbert, 138, see also the School of Chartres

Ibn 'Abbas, 162, 164, 187 Ibn IsJ:taq (d. 1511768), 162, 175, 180, 181, 182 Ibn Sa'd, 163, 176, 178, 182 Ibn Sina, 77 Ibrahim Nakha'i (d. c. 56/717), 161 Intellect, 37, 40, 45, 47, 48, 52, 5356, 57 Intuition, 57-59 Imagination, 52-53 Islamic: civilization, 2, 4, 16, 84, 88, 112, 118, 123, 138-167; epistemology (theory of knowledge), 21, 22; scientific conceptual scheme, 79, 91, 141, 142, 153, 159-162, 166, 195, 197, 202, 214, 218; scientific community, I 14; scientific tradition, 7, 8, II, 14, 18, 89, 93, 107,113,118,126,134,137,139, 141, 158, 162-167; world-view, 4, 5, 9, 21' 23, 24, 75, 78, 79, 80, 94, 113 Islamicity, 3, 13, 21

Gerfant of AurHiac, 138 Ghayb, 9, 10, 49 Ghaylan al-Dimashqi (d. c. 123/740), 162, 179 Greek: civilization, 16, 75, 88, 89, 101, 123, 126, 127, 127-133; epistemology (theory of knowledge), 21; mythology, 89; science, 84, I 02; scientific conceptual scheme, 90, 165; scientific tradition, 8, -1 I, 89, 93, 115, 131-133, 164; worldview, 75

Ja'far al-~adiq (d. 1481765), 162 Jiihiliyyah, 139 AI-JaJ:ti~ (d. 255/869), 212 Jahm ibn ~afwiin, 205, 206-210

I:Iammiid ibn Abu Sulaymiin (d. 120/737), 162 I:Iammam ibn Munabbih, 160 I:Iasan al-Bal?ri, (642-728), 162, 165, 178, 199,202,211-2 Heart, I 0, 40, 41 , 43

Kalam, 87, 93, 94, 103, 105, 117, 142, 162, 165, 166, 179, 184, 192, 193-214 252

Palatine School, 135 Parmenides, I 02 Peter Abelard, 138 Peter Lam bard (1100- 1160), 13 8 Phoenician(s), 131 Positivist(s), l Proportioning, 56 Ptolemaic, 117 Pyrenees, 135 Pythagoras of Samos, I 02, I 04

Kant: Immanuel, 19, 22, 23, 24, 33, 35, 37, 43, 52, 62, 69 Al-Kindi (d. 260/873), 218 Knossos, 131 Knowledge: concept of, 88-89; definition of, 25-27; theory of, 19, 2~ 21, 2~ 23, 2~ 27, 29, 32, 39, 46, 49, 50; Islamic, 24 Ma'bad al-Juhani (d. 841703), 161 Malik ibn Anas (d. 1791796), 162, 181, 182, 185, 186, 191, 192 Marginal ideals, 118 Ma 'rifatullah, 23, 24. Material opportunities, 231 A1-Maturidi, Abu Man1?ur (d. 333/915), 212 Maymiin ibn Mihran, 179 Meccan ·school, see the School of Mecca Medinese School, 181, 184, 185, 188 Medina School of History, 176, 185, see also Medinese School Mediterranean, 136 Memory, 50-51 Mental consciousness, 48-50 Method, concept of 8-11, 23, 46, 53, 90-91 Methodological aim, 114-1.16 Minoan civilization, 129, 131 A-Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), 218 MuJ:!ammad ibn al-J:Ianafiyyah (d. 81/700), 161 Mujahid ibn Jabr (d. 1001718), 161 Mycenae, 131 Mycenaean civilization, 129, 131, 132 .

Rosenthal: Franz, 25 Qac;li

Shurayl~

(d. 80/699), 161

Sa'Id ibn al-Musayyab (d. c. 911709), 161 Salamanca, 137 Saragossa, 137 School of Chartres, 138 School of Mecca (the), 187, 188, 190 Science: . concept of, 92-93; epistemology of, see epistemology; sociology of, 95-126 Scientific: activities, 129, 134, 139, 140, 141, 153, 167; advancement (progress), 128, 139, 153; community, 7, 8, 12, 14, 96, 97, 98, l 04, I 05-118, 141; conceptual scheme: (see also under Islamic, Greek and Western scientific conceptual scheme), 108, 113, 127, 132, 138; general, 84-93, 141, 144, 158, 163; specific, 93-94, 108, 141, 142, 214; consciousness, I, 2, 6, 13, 14 15, 17, 102, 103, 104, 108, 119, 1.38, 169, 170, 178, 183, 211; ideals, 116-1 17; institution, 116; knowledge, 152; mentality, 161; process, 97-105, 130, 132, 138, 142; terminology (see also scientific voca-bulary), 140, 144,

Naming, 13, 14, 55; the stage of, 104105

253

'Ulama', 7, 14, 72-74, 107, 113, 114, 127, 141' 153, 154 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 102/720), 161 Urwah ibn ai-Zubayr (c. 25-93/645710), 161, 175, 176, 181, 184, 185

162, 165, 166; theories, I 1-12; thinking (thought), 128; tradition (see also under Islamic, Greek and Western scientific tradition), 7, 8, 24. 118-126, 127, 140, 141, 142, 143, 158; vocabu-lary, 162, 163 Sense datum, 31 Sensible: experience, 23; intuition, 36, 37, 41, 44, 58; perception, 31-36, 39,42,48 AI-Shiifi'i (d. 204/819), 177, 191, 192, 205: school, 188 Al-Shahrastiini (d. 547/1153), 211 AI-Shaybiini, Abu 'Abdullah MuJ:!ammad ibn al-I;Iasan ibn Farqad, 185, 190, 191, 192 Siciliy, 135 Al-Sijistani (d. 987-8), 218 Sophist(s), 89, 102 Stage (the): disciplinary, 102-103; of naming, see naming; of problems, 101-102; Subject matter, of science 6-8, 23 Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 161/778), 162 System: educational, 20; mechanical, 20; moral, 37; philosophical, 4, l3, 14, 52

Wahb ibn Munabbih (d. l 10, 114/719, 723), 161, 178,217 Waqidi, I 80, 182, 217 Wasil ibn 'AW (d. 131/748), 162, 199, 205; 211-3 Western: civilization, 1, 16, 18, 75, 84, 88, 126, 127, 133-138; epistemology (theory of knowledge), 21; perspective, 22; science, 84; scientific conceptual scheme, 118-1 26; scientific terminology, I 63; scientific tradition, 8, 88, 98, 126, 133, 134138; world-view, 16, 75, 80 Whitehead, 52, 53,76 Will, 56 Worldview: conceptual environment, 4; general framework, 64-84; Greek, see Greek worldview; Islamic, see Islar;nic worldview; its definition, 82-'83; its effects on scientific advancement, 226-230; its functions, 76-83; its nature, 67-70; its structures, 76-79; mental environment, 4; rise of, 70-76; Western, see Western worldview

AI-Tabari, 175, 176, 180, 182, 205, 206 Tafsir, 87, 105, 142, 162, 186, 205, 214 Al-Tha'alibi, 164 Thales, 104, 132 Theory: concept of, 91-92 Thuringians, 135 Toledo, 137 Transcendent, 38, 209: absolute, 9, 38; idea of God, 208; objects, 38; phenomenon, 49; realm(s), I I 38, 39, 43, 163 Truth, 89-90

zeus, 132 AI-Zuhri (d. 124/742), 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 184, 185

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