Should Engineering Ethics Be Taught?

Sci Eng Ethics (2011) 17:583–596 DOI 10.1007/s11948-010-9211-9

Should Engineering Ethics be Taught? Charles J. Abate´

Received: 1 December 2009 / Accepted: 18 May 2010 / Published online: 4 June 2010  Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract Should engineering ethics be taught? Despite the obvious truism that we all want our students to be moral engineers who practice virtuous professional behavior, I argue, in this article that the question itself obscures several ambiguities that prompt preliminary resolution. Upon clarification of these ambiguities, and an attempt to delineate key issues that make the question a philosophically interesting one, I conclude that engineering ethics not only should not, but cannot, be taught if we understand ‘‘teaching engineering ethics’’ to mean training engineers to be moral individuals (as some advocates seem to have proposed). However, I also conclude that there is a justification to teaching engineering ethics, insofar as we are able to clearly identify the most desirable and efficacious pedagogical approach to the subject area, which I propose to be a case study-based format that utilizes the principle of human cognitive pattern recognition. Keywords Engineering ethics
Engineering education
Case studies
Paradigms
Pattern recognition

Introduction For the past several decades, literature has been replete with attempts to address the issue whether ethics can––or to frame the question in a more normatively apt form, whether engineering ethics should––be taught to students in engineering curricula (Vesilind 1988; Davis 1994). Some of this body of literature has addressed certain pedagogically practical, but philosophically peripheral questions: ‘‘Is there enough time or room in the curriculum to accommodate extra course material?’’ (Daniel C. J. Abate´ (&) Electrical Engineering Technology Department, Onondaga Community College, Syracuse, NY 13215, USA e-mail: [email protected]

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2007; Cruz et al. 2004), or ‘‘What are the practical guidelines and recommended practices for teaching engineering ethics?’’ (Bucciarelli 2007; Kaufman 1998; Whitbeck 2006; Davis 2006a). Other authors appear to beg the question by presuming or ignoring some of the basic issues that lend philosophical importance to the topic in the first place: we should––they argue––teach engineering ethics, because (of course) we want our engineering professionals to be moral individuals (Børsen Hansen 2005; Gorman 2001–2002; Pell 2001). While I find the former type of discussion important to ask and relevant to the issue at hand, I do not find it particularly interesting in a philosophical sense. The latter approach, on the other hand, is philosophically relevant, but seems too presumptuous to permit a meaningful answer to the central question it addresses. In this article, I want to propose a slightly more fundamental approach to the question whether engineering ethics should be taught. I shall suggest that we cannot even provide a meaningful answer to the question until we first resolve several core issues: 1) 2) 3)

What are ‘‘engineering ethics,’’ and how are they distinguished from ethics simpliciter? What are the defensible criteria for ‘‘teaching’’ engineering ethics? What is the ultimate aim of this proposed pedagogy?

I shall not, in the course of my discussion, attempt to resolve centuries of debate among classical philosophers about some of the more controversial nuances of these topics, preferring instead to pursue a more colloquial approach to some of the basic concepts and syntax that usually frame discussion of these issues among technical academics and engineering professionals. In this manner, I hope to shed light on why I (as a professor of my own engineering ethics course) contend that we should not, nor should we attempt to, ‘‘teach engineering ethics’’ in the typically held commonplace sense, despite the rather obvious truism that we would like our engineering students to be ‘‘moral individuals.’’

What are ‘‘Engineering Ethics’’? Morality––the primary normative focus of ethics––is sometimes divided into three convenient categories: 1) 2)

3)

common morality––a body of ethical ideals shared by most members of a group or culture; personal morality––one’s own ethical principles which are typically acquired from family or religious training, and which can be modified later in life by personal reflection; professional ethics––the set of ethical principles adopted by a particular profession qua professionals, and usually instantiated into a body of ‘‘professional codes’’ (Harris et al. 2009).

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In this article, morality is to be understood in a positive sense, i.e., as a body of ‘‘rules’’ or guidelines––tacit or explicit––that constitutes a society’s or group’s expectations of desired normative behavior within that group or society.1 Engineering ethics, of course, is considered a subset of professional ethics. But it is important to recognize that the three categories enumerated above are, at least in some critical sense, not necessarily mutually exclusive. It has been suggested by Michael Davis that professional ethics differs from profession to profession and therefore cannot be deduced from ordinary morality or philosophical theory (Davis 1994). Davis’ observation may, strictly speaking, be correct. It is not immediately obvious how certain normative guidelines from the engineering ethics codes (such as the principles governing conflicts of interest; client confidentiality; loyalty to one’s employer; primary obligation to the safety, health and welfare of the public; and so on) could be literally deduced from the general principles of common morality. Nevertheless, one would appear remiss in denying that the professional ethics codes have at least some sort of conceptual connection with the tenets of basic common morality. Professor Davis suggests that: Engineering ethics in fact includes standards of ordinary morality, e.g., honesty (don’t lie, cheat, or steal). Engineering ethics differs from ordinary morality, insofar as it does differ, only in demanding more (a higher standard. (Davis 2006b). Clearly, ethical principles for engineers do not occur within a conceptual vacuum. At minimum, the engineering ethics codes seem to reflect a logical compatibility and consistency with certain principles of common morality, including exhortations to respect others as moral agents and treat them as one wishes to be treated oneself, to strive to avoid harm to individuals and the environment as much as possible, and the like. What distinguishes the principles of engineering ethics is primarily their expansion on the basic tenets of common and personal morality for the specific circumstances of professional practice. In this context, one might appropriately propose that the professional ethics codes are ‘‘inspired’’ by the general ideals of common morality. The professional codes help to serve the ideals of ordinary morality, and more (if not all) of the provisions of professional morality can be better understood and justified in light of the principles of common morality. It is within this general conceptual framework that we shall understand engineering ethics to be one branch of what we have earlier called ‘‘professional ethics.’’ Moreover, it seems quite evident that when scholars raise the question whether ethics can, or should, be taught in the scientific and technical curricula, they are referring to professional ethics (as opposed to common or personal morality). It is, therefore, this category of ethics to which we shall restrict our attention in the remainder of this article when considering the question of the feasibility of ‘‘teaching ethics’’ within the technical curricula.

1

I do not wish to propose this characterization of ‘‘morality’’ as a formally comprehensive definition of the term. Nothing much of conceptual importance to the main thesis of this paper hangs on one’s inclination to refine or elaborate on the suggested characterization.

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Criteria for ‘‘Teaching’’ Engineering Ethics There seem to be at least three general pedagogical approaches that might be characterized as ‘‘the teaching of ethics’’ to engineers: a) an exposure to the history of philosophical debate over classic ethical issues; b) an introduction to certain bodies of established rules of behavior (engineering codes); c) a training in systematic and thoughtful evaluation of applied normative issues; or, perhaps, an amalgamation of the options listed above, such as is suggested by Michael Davis (1993)—a proposal to which we shall return shortly. Now, while (a) might prove a desirable and beneficial supplement to engineering students’ academic curricula (arguably, even highly so, since an exposure to classical philosophical argument can encourage students’ clarity of thought, definition of key terms and strength of analytical evaluation), it is not without its drawbacks as a pedagogical model for teaching engineering ethics. First, there is the pragmatic problem that not many philosophers are sufficiently grounded in the sorts of topics likely to constitute normative dilemmas for professional engineers, and not many engineers have the appropriate academic background to capably teach philosophical ethics (Stephan 2001–2002). Second, and more importantly, the issues that compose classical ethical debate are––at least in a practical sense––mostly divorced from the likely real-life dilemmas that are apt to confront professional engineers. Thus, even engineers who have been exposed to the writings of the classical ethical philosophers would still be obliged to deal with their everyday ethical issues and dilemmas ‘‘from scratch,’’ or on a contextual caseby-case basis. Finally, it seems rather clear that proponents of teaching engineering ethics are advocating a subject matter intuitively different from that of classical philosophical ethics, with a primary focus on applied, rather than purely conceptual, issues. Such proponents seem far less interested in exposing students to the history of ethical debate than they are in encouraging and (some hope) possibly producing actually moral engineers. Thus the primary end of engineering ethics appears, for many, to be the production, or at least the encouragement, of certain kinds of attitudes and behavior, as opposed to ‘‘mere’’ knowledge (though it seems likely that certain kinds of knowledge are necessary conditions for the production of the desired attitudes and behavior in question). As for (b), it can be argued that much of the credibility of such an approach relies heavily on what is meant by ‘‘an introduction’’ to the engineering codes. What is not very defensible is the position that an ‘‘introduction’’ to engineering codes consists solely in the rote enumeration of the specific guidelines contained within that body of codes (in the manner of one’s memorization of the Ten Commandments or the 50 American states and capitals). Aside from its potential pedagogical banality, such an approach would offer little hope of influencing students’ attitudes and behavior in the manner presumably desired by (at least some) engineering ethics educators. More promising is the position that students need to be sufficiently acquainted with the specific engineering codes primarily to be able to interpret and debate their meaning, normative justification and applicability to

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real-life professional circumstances. This type of analytic assessment of the engineering codes possesses the virtues of allowing and encouraging the evaluation and debate of professional moral guidelines; the clarification of key issues in the application of those guidelines to specific cases; and the possible resolution of various types of established or emerging moral dilemmas and conflicts of principle or interest. But in this characterization, option (b) seems to represent merely one specific facet of the more general approach advocated in option (c). The primary aim of teaching engineering ethics, it would appear, is training in the systematic, analytic, and thoughtful evaluation of applied normative issues for professional practices. Michael Davis (1993) has defined teaching engineering ethics as having four components: raising ethical sensitivity, enhancing ethical knowledge, improving ethical judgment, and increasing ethical commitment. While I have no issue with the appropriateness of any of these endeavors, I suspect that they do not all possess the same level of conceptual primacy in the process of teaching engineering ethics. Attempts to raise ethical sensitivity and to increase ethical commitment may be necessary conditions for successful teaching of engineering ethics, but they are not sufficient conditions. Students may be made aware that they will have to resolve certain ethical problems as professional engineers, yet remain unequipped to satisfactorily do so without the appropriate pedagogical training. Likewise, engineers who are more likely to follow particular standards of conduct in the company of other engineers rather than in isolation might also be inclined to ‘‘follow the herd’’ even in cases of controversial or debatable professional practices. What makes both of these criteria plausible components of successful teaching of engineering ethics is students’ actual ability to resolve the ethical problems they face as engineers once they recognize the problems as such, and the ability to evaluate and distinguish between justifiable and questionable group consensus for various ethical issues. And this suggests a primacy of the other two components advocated by Professor Davis: enhancing ethical knowledge and improving ethical judgment. To the extent that the enhancing of one’s ethical knowledge lies in the analysis and interpretation of standards, such as those presented in the engineering codes, this component––as I have suggested earlier––represents one specific facet of the more general endeavor of improving one’s ethical judgment. And this latter endeavor is most clearly identifiable, or so it seems to me, as what I have previously described as option (c)––a training in systematic and thoughtful evaluation of applied normative issues. Whatever else we might wish for our engineering students, we would presumably most desire them to possess and utilize the appropriate conceptual tools to reason their way through such ethical issues and dilemmas as they are likely to face on the job, and ideally, to intelligently decide on a morally appropriate course of action. Given this type of training, the other components mentioned by Professor Davis are likely (or at least more likely) to follow naturally.

What is the Ultimate Aim of Efforts to Teach Engineering Ethics? If what I have suggested thus far is cogent, then an answer to the above question is relatively straightforward: the ultimate aim of efforts to teach engineering ethics is

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not to produce moral engineers, but rather to instill careful clarity of insight and cogent decision-making skills. As P. Aarne Vesilind succinctly observes, teaching engineering ethics ‘‘is not teaching right or wrong, or good or bad, but rather methods of making personal decisions about these qualities’’ (Vesilind 1988). Common morality is ‘‘taught’’ primarily in the sense that it is inculcated in (mostly young) individuals, and constitutes expected behavior by certain groups or cultures. Adherence to the codes of professional ethics, on the other hand, must be willfully adopted by individuals as they assume membership into their chosen profession, and is subject to evaluation, analysis, debate, assessment, and revision. For engineers to successfully and consistently carry out these conceptual activities with respect to their professional ethical principles, they need to be exposed to the techniques of philosophical analysis and the need for clarity of conceptual evaluation. It is these tools, I contend, with which we need to arm our engineering students in the hopes of enabling them to ‘‘think ethically.’’2 Those individuals who learn to think ethically, of course, stand the greatest chance of being able to act ethically in a variety of diverse or unpredictable circumstances. It would be misleading, and perhaps a bit unfair, to allege that I am in fundamental disagreement with those who advocate ‘‘teaching morality’’ to engineering students. To the extent that students are normatively open-minded, and therefore teachable, I have every expectation that they can be ‘‘taught’’ how to be moral engineers. Even appeals to conform more closely to the ideals of common morality may produce a distinctly favorable outcome with students having ‘‘borderline’’ personal ethical standards. Where I part ways with those whose presumptions I have attempted to delineate and rebut thus far is in the nature of the pedagogical activity that is required to achieve this result. Certainly, we can hope, as educators, to achieve at least the following kinds of outcomes in our engineering ethics courses: Students can definitely achieve cognitive goals in knowledge and reasoning. They can understand, interpret, and apply provisions in the code of ethics of the National Society of Professional Engineers. They can distinguish between copyrights and patents, and between bribes, gifts, and extortion. They can analyze cases to identify moral issues. They can evaluate actions according to moral criteria (Hashemian and Loui 2005). This is the kind of education, I am convinced, which if sincerely and consistently embraced by engineering students, can encourage and nurture the development of the sort of enlightened moral individuals that we all desire to populate the engineering fields.

The Role of Case Studies in Engineering Ethics But what kind of pedagogical ‘‘delivery system’’ is most efficacious and appropriate to achieve the kind of successful teaching of engineering ethics as we have 2

Professor Vesilind suggests that students can be taught to ‘‘think ethically’’ in much the same way that they can be taught to ‘‘think scientifically.’’

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described above? There is considerable agreement in the literature that the superior method for teaching engineering ethics is through the use of case studies (Harris et al. 1996; Richards and Gorman 2004; Lovrin and Vrcan 2009). The proposed advantages of case studies for teaching engineering ethics are numerous. Case studies have been credited with: introducing students to ‘‘the complexities and ambiguities of real-world ethical problems in an effective and memorable way’’ (Stephan 2001–2002); as well as ‘‘allowing engineers to explore the nature of a problem and circumstances that affect a solution, to learn about others’ viewpoints and how they may be taken into account, to define their priorities and make their own decisions to solve the problem, and to predict outcomes and consequences’’ (Lovrin and Vrcan 2009). Case studies are alleged to promote active learning (Meyers and Jones 1993), the ‘‘development of philosophies, approaches, and skills’’ (Shapiro 1984), and higher-level cognitive skills (Leake 1996; Kolodner 1993). Case studies are favored by many because they are thought to help develop and promote skills in analysis, sound reasoning, and critical thinking (Richards and Gorman 2004). What has not been widely discussed in the literature, however, is the mechanism by which the case study method is able to achieve its alleged superiority as a pedagogical model. Although a few authors have hinted at such a mechanism, such as Shapiro’s (1984) representation of the case study method as a model based on the concepts of ‘‘metaphor and simulation,’’ I have not seen a systematic attempt to flesh out and justify the mechanism in the area of engineering ethics. In this context, my thesis shall be that the strength and superiority of the case study method for teaching engineering ethics derives from its conceptual reliance on cognitive pattern recognition.

Paradigm Cases and Pattern Recognition Activities such as playing a game of chess or simplifying a digital Boolean function by use of a Karnaugh map are enhanced by the development of pattern recognition skills. Any activity that operates under a series of finite rules will generate characteristic outcomes that fall into certain types of patterns (albeit some more complex and numerous than others). When practitioners of the activity become acquainted with enough paradigm patterns, they more easily adapt to an analogous instance, and are more readily able to resolve that particular problem. In similar fashion, I will allege, case studies encourage learning––and facilitate moral behavioral decisions––by serving as paradigm cases for similar potential real-life experiences.3 What makes this kind of parity of reasoning most powerful, I shall suggest, is the human mind’s facility with what is commonly known as pattern recognition. This feature of human reasoning, I shall claim, is what allows students 3

The notion of applying paradigm cases to the resolution of moral dilemmas is certainly not a novel idea. Its application was revived, and its practicality defended, by Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin some 20 years ago. While their defense of ‘‘casuistry’’ has not made significant impact among classical moral philosophers, it has been rather positively received in the area of bioethics and, I believe, deserves serious consideration in other areas of applied moral ethics as well.

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that are exposed to paradigm engineering ethics case studies to more capably understand and resolve similar real-life ethical issues and dilemmas to which they might be exposed on the job. The general concept of pattern recognition is widely recognized and utilized in a vast array of applications. For many decades, it has been touted as a requisite criterion of expertise in the game of chess (Chase and Simon 1973; Gobet 2009); explored as an exercise in computer programming and artificial intelligence (Frantz 2003); and studied as a critical evolutionary human property in psychology (Jain and Duin 2004). In common parlance, pattern recognition is generally understood as an ability to recognize certain kinds of recurring similarities in two or more objects or events. The specific nature of these similarities, of course, differs from one type of environment to another. For example, pattern recognition in chess presumes a player’s ability to recognize the similarity, and hence applicability, of a particular sequence of moves from a previously played (or possibly even imagined) match to one’s current game situation. Pattern recognition is also the subject of certain psychological studies, involving the question how people are able to recognize similarities in, e.g., particular human emotions (fear, sadness, hostility) expressed in various human faces––or even in the recognition of faces themselves. Finally, in the field of artificial intelligence, computer programmers employ the concept of pattern recognition in the efforts to produce computer-recognized records of, e.g., human fingerprints. When students of digital electronics learn to simplify Boolean expressions by the use of Karnaugh maps, they are usually introduced not only to some of the basic rules of K-mapping, e.g., all 1s in the map must be a member of at least one grouping; group sizes must be integer powers of 2: 1 cell (20), 2 cells (21), 4 cells (22), and so on, but they are also typically exposed to some of the characteristic patterns of K-map groupings. This is important because K-maps are drawn twodimensionally, but they are actually presumed to be spherical in form, which has critical implications for the concept of adjacently grouped cells. Students would probably struggle to envision and produce the optimal grouping patterns with only a knowledge of the basic rules of K-mapping, but after having seen a variety of K-map grouping patterns, they become significantly quicker and more accurate in their ability to simplify similar K-maps––even maps that they have never previously encountered.4 Additionally, many studies have been conducted on the issue of expertise in chess––specifically, how chess masters can consistently make superior moves, even under severe time constraints and significant limitations in computational capacities. The research has found little, if any, correlation between chess masters’ expertise and superior intelligence, memory, or ability to think ahead many moves. A groundbreaking study by de Groot (1965) revealed that masters calculated no further ahead than weaker players, and often examined fewer possible move variations, yet consistently selected superior moves. And Chase and Simon (1973) 4

I have become persuaded of the truth of this conclusion after many years of anecdotal observations in my own digital electronics courses.

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concluded that the superior ability of chess masters over weaker players was explained by their superior skills in pattern recognition. In the general context of human cognition, pattern recognition is a powerful and effective tool for assessing the new and unfamiliar in terms of the alreadyencountered and familiar (Gentner 2002). As noted by J. Corey Butler (2009), in the context of chess playing: there is no doubt that familiar patterns of information are processed much more efficiently than unfamiliar ones…. If not for the power of pattern recognition, humans would have no chance at all against the phenomenal number crunching ability of computers. Computers can almost always outcalculate humans in terms of the sheer number of moves to be analyzed, but they do not always outplay us. Despite the dearth of research into the role played by pattern recognition in the specific domain of engineering ethics, there is a considerable body of research by cognitive psychologists on the general topic of analogical reasoning in humans, and the utilization (and efficacy) of analogy and similarities in the problem-solving process––including the area of deontic relations such as permission and obligation (Gentner 2002). There is at least minimal research to date that supports the thesis that engineering designers often employ an ‘‘associative system’’ of analogical reasoning in the problem-solving phase of engineering design: The associative, similarity-based reasoning system is where problems are reasoned about through associations or similarities with other known information (Daugherty and Mentzer 2008). This similarity-based analogical reasoning system affords individuals ‘‘the ability to pick out patterns, to identify recurrences of these patterns, despite variations in the elements that compose them’’ (Holyoak et al. 2001). Technology educators commonly rely on students’ cognitive facility with analogical reasoning and their recognition of similarities in helping to clarify otherwise unfamiliar concepts. Daugherty and Mentzer (2008) cite examples of how technology instructors can use one model of multimeter to demonstrate basic meter functions, while expecting students to subsequently apply their knowledge to various other models of meters. Additionally, instructors may rely on students’ familiarity with automobile traffic on a highway to clarify the basic concept of current flow in an electric circuit. In such cases, it seems evident that pattern recognition, or the recognition of similarities between a paradigm case and some of its related tokens, is a productive and effective means of transferring understanding from a previous instance to newer, similar instances. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) cited the ability to recognize new situations as similar to remembered situations as a ‘‘distinguishing mark of proficiency’’ in individuals. Now, while such empirical evidence admittedly does not speak directly to the specific issue of whether paradigm engineering ethics case studies can and do facilitate the resolution of similar situations yet to be encountered, it would be surprising––and even startling––if the human analogical skills that are demonstrably

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so prominent and effective in other areas of cognition, reasoning and problemsolving were not equally prominent and efficacious in the resolution of professional ethical dilemmas and conundrums. In the absence of reasons for thinking that professional ethical deliberations are cognitively unique, and dissimilar from other categories of human problem-solving, then we must, I believe, conclude that such deliberations are carried out in much the same fashion (and with much the same effectiveness) as the human brain utilizes for its other cognitive problem-solving processes. Indeed, it would be the denial of such an assumption that would stand in need of justification, empirical or otherwise. I conclude, therefore, that we have good reason to believe that paradigm case studies can also facilitate (in terms of both deliberation time required and soundness of reasoning) the resolution of reallife moral situations in much the same manner, and for much the same reasons, as the examples and evidence cited above. It is perhaps worth noting that case studies for engineering ethics need not rely on real events or situations (although many case studies do); it should be reasonably clear that a case study could be completely fictional, yet just as instructive and guiding as a real-life case. For example, the practice routines (katas) that are performed in the martial arts are, essentially, combinations of fighting moves carried out against a nonexistent opponent, that are intended to prepare martial arts students to defend themselves in similar situations against real opponents. Likewise, fictional videos are commonly used in the training of police officers to prepare them to decide, under stressful and time-constrained conditions, whether and when to use their firearms in similar real-life situations. In both of these cases, it is clear that the fictitious status of the training in question in no way diminishes the value of the training itself (and is in fact actually preferable by virtue of its greater safety than training under real-life circumstances). Thus, the primary goal of engineering ethics courses, or so I would maintain, is to expose technical students to as many paradigm engineering ethics case studies as possible, in hopes of inspiring and developing in them the philosophical and rhetorical skills requisite to intelligently and thoughtfully resolve such similar reallife ethical dilemmas as they might encounter in the course of their professional careers. This is not at all to say, of course, that students should not be exposed to the professional engineering codes, along with discussions, debate, and guided interpretation of the specific meanings of such codes. Nor is it implied by our thesis that case studies can somehow be discussed and analyzed in conceptual isolation from underlying moral theories; for without appeals to such underlying moral theories, there could be no grounds for deciding why a particular ethical action in a case study was right or wrong in the first place. It is granted that exposure to the engineering codes is an important part of someone’s discovering and interpreting exactly what is expected of the engineer as a professional, and discussions of underlying moral theories supplement the requisite analytical tools by means of which case studies are intelligently and coherently understood as paradigms for yet to be experienced but possible real-life token situations. Such topics are decidedly critical components of the more basic process of resolving professional ethical issues by the use of pattern recognition and analogical thinking.

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But it is the case studies themselves, I believe, that must take center stage in one’s introduction to the discipline of engineering ethics.

Criticisms of the Case Study Method One criticism that has often been lodged against the case study approach is its vulnerability to subjectivity in the analysis and resolution of analogous cases. And, although I recognize and grant this potential shortcoming, I would also suggest that subjectivity––in this negatively connoted sense––reflects a failure of clear thinking and logical reasoning rather than any specific weakness in the case study method itself. Subjectivity in deliberation finds no special niche in the case study approach that could not also pervade any alternative method for resolving normative dilemmas. On the contrary, the special emphasis on clarity and cogency that characterizes the case study method––as I have defended it here––is likely to foster a superior ability to analyze and resolve ethical dilemmas, in contrast with possible rival pedagogical approaches. Once we have become trained to recognize the features of a case study that render it critically analogous to certain other cases, we can––I maintain––more readily resolve a new, similar situation based on our analysis of its paradigm model. In this context, one can readily imagine how appeals to, and analyses of, paradigm cases involving issues such as conflict of interest, divergences between professional and personal ethics, divided loyalties between employer and client, whistle blowing, and the like could yield important general principles that one could apply to similar situations in the future. Furthermore, it seems likely that the more thoroughly analyzed a paradigm case is, the more sound will be one’s moral judgment in similar circumstances. That being said, I do not wish to underestimate the significance of the challenge involved in attempting to identify and resolve critical similarities and differences between two ethical scenarios. A determination of how two ethical situations might be similar or dissimilar is, doubtless, an extremely complex task, involving many more variables and factors than solving a Karnaugh map or even playing a game of chess. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that the use of paradigm case studies, despite any acknowledged shortcomings, still proves more advantageous in guiding normative actions or resolving ethical dilemmas than moral decisions made in the absence of such ‘‘guiding models’’. As a perhaps more serious caveat, however, I hasten to concede that choosing an optimal presentation format (i.e., the case study method) might be a necessary condition for good pedagogy regarding engineering ethics, but it is decidedly not a sufficient condition. Even if it is granted that the case study approach is the most favorable and efficacious format for teaching engineering ethics, such an approach could fail miserably in practice if the course instructor lacks either the requisite insight to identify relevant paradigms and applicable patterns, or the philosophical tools for clear and rational deliberation, as we have discussed them here.

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Conclusion Can engineering ethics be taught? As I have attempted to indicate in this paper, my response to the question is qualified: it all depends on how one defines ‘‘teaching engineering ethics,’’ and on one’s specific method of delivery. If we understand ‘‘teaching engineering ethics’’ to mean training engineers to be moral individuals, then I fear that advocates of this endeavor have set for themselves an impossible task. As John Dewey (1944) rightly observed, ‘‘while we can shut a man up in a penitentiary we cannot make him penitent.’’ Morality, similarly to penitence, involves intentional behavioral dispositions that may be encouraged, demanded or even behaviorally conditioned, but it cannot be ‘‘taught,’’ at least not to adults, in an academic sense. What we can hope for as educators, I believe, is to encourage cognition and practice in a form of parity of reasoning through the use of paradigm illustrative case studies involving various engineering ethics situations. In this light, it ought not be claimed that we are teaching students to be moral individuals, but rather that we are sensitizing them to what I have identified as paradigms and ‘‘pattern analogies.’’ So, should engineering ethics be taught? Based on the provisos I have enumerated and discussed in this paper, I would answer this question with a qualified ‘‘yes.’’ It is, no doubt, a self-evident truth that we prefer morally ‘‘good’’ engineers to those that are unscrupulous or dishonest. But we cannot wave a magic wand and make engineering students instantly virtuous, any more than we could do the same for society at large. In this vein, nor can we teach students to be moral engineers even after a semester-long ‘‘training session.’’ What we can hope to instill, at least in our morally open-minded students, is a recognition of how moral dilemmas tend to cluster into certain types of analogous patterns, and that if we recognize how to address and resolve paradigm cases within these pattern types, we stand a much better probability of resolving similar real-life cases with which we might be personally confronted. We can hope, through the use of case studies and philosophical problem-solving techniques, to foster in our students the sorts of conceptual tools needed to analyze––and carefully and intelligently resolve––their own personal moral dilemmas. It has been said that if we give a man a fish we feed him for a day, but if we teach him to fish, we feed him for a lifetime. This adage offers a good deal of insight toward efforts to teach engineering ethics. If we tell our students what is or is not good in certain circumstances, then we (at best) educate them about those particular circumstances. But if we train our students to analyze, to think critically, to soundly evaluate, and to recognize normative patterns using the case study method, then we educate them for a lifetime. Idealistic and optimistic educators could scarcely hope for more––both for ourselves and our students.

References Børsen Hansen, T. (2005). Teaching ethics to science and engineering students. Center for the philosophy of nature and science studies at the university of Copenhagen. http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/files/ 8735/11289332261TeachingEthics_CopenhagenReport.pdf. Accessed March 18, 2009.

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