Statutory Construction Case Digests: 1. Aquino V. Comelec (62 Scra 275) (1975) (pg. 34 Agpalo, I Think) Facts

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGESTS 1. Aquino v. COMELEC (62 SCRA 275) (1975) (pg. 34 Agpalo, I think) Facts: This petition for prohibition, which was led on January 21, 1975, seeks the nullification of Presidential Decrees Nos. 1366, 1366- A, calling a referendum for February 27, 1975, Presidential Decrees Nos. 629 and 630 appropriating funds therefor, and Presidential Decrees Nos. 637 and 637-A specifying the referendum questions, as well as other presidential decrees, orders and instructions relative to the said referendum. This is on the ground that President Ferdinand E. Marcos does not hold any legal office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and orders. Issue: Whether or not President Marcos has the capacity to pass the foregoing presidential decrees. Ruling: Yes, since under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires; can continue in office beyond 1973. In addition to that, the sovereign people expressly authorized him to continue in office even beyond 1973 in order to finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law; and this was the decision of the people, in whom "sovereignty resides and all government authority emanates.” 2. Ople v. Torres (293 SCRA 141) (pg. 34 Agpalo) Facts: The President issued administrative Order No. 308, entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System,” on December 12, 1996. Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of said Administrative Order on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; and (2) its impermissibility intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. Petitioner contends that the Administrative Order is not a mere administrative order but a law and, hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He further alleges that said Administrative Order establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope,

affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. Issue: Whether or not it is beyond the power of the President to issue such administrative order. Ruling: Yes, since it pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well- worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget." 3. Arroyo v. De Venecia (277 SCRA 268) (pg. 30 Agpalo) Facts: During a house hearing, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval of the Conference Committee report on the bill that became R.A. 8240. This led the Chair, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, to ask if there was any objection to the motion. Representative Joker Arroyo asked, "What is that, Mr. Speaker?" The Chair allegedly ignored him and instead declared the report approved. Petitioners in this petition for rehearing and reconsideration of the Court's decision dismissing their petition for certiorari and prohibition claim that the question "What is that, Mr. Speaker?" was a privileged question or a point of order which, under the rules of the House, has precedence over other matters, with the exception of motions to adjourn. Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 8240 should still be subjected in rehearing and reconsideration since the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting the law. Ruling: It doesn’t matter since, even if petitioners' allegations are true, the disregard of the rules in this case would not affect the validity of R.A. No. 8240, the

rules allegedly violated being merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of laws. It is well settled that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance with internal rules. 4. Republic Flour Mills Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs (G.R. No. 28463m 31 May 1971, 39 SCRA 268) Facts: Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic corporation, primarily engaged in the manufacture of wheat flour, and produces pollard (darak) and bran (ipa) in the process of milling. During the period from December 1963 to July 1964, petitioner exported pollard and/or bran, which was loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade while anchored near the breakwater. The respondent assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues on the said exportations in the sum P7,948.00, which assessment was paid by petitioner under protest. The petitioner complained that such wharfage dues is contrary to law on the ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the Philippines, they are merely waste and not the product, which is the flour produced. That way, it would not be liable at all for the wharfage dues assessed under such section by respondent Commission of Customs. Issue: Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law. Ruling: Yes. The language of Section 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code appears to be quite explicit: "There shall be levied, collected and paid on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines . . . exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage . . . " Even without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. It does take a certain amount of hairsplitting to exclude from its operation what petitioner "waste" resulting from the production of flour processed from the wheat grain in petitioner's our mills in the Philippines. It is always timely to remember that, as stresses by Justice Moreland: "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." Petitioner ought to have been aware that deference to such a doctrine precludes an

affirmative response to its contention. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. It is as simple as that. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It is desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue restriction of the coverage of the Act be kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative mandate. That kind of approach in statutory construction has never recommended itself. It does not now. 5. Pesigan vs. Angeles (G.R. No. L-64279, April 30, 1984) Facts: Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination. They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the livestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot. However, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by Lieutenant Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was based on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed . . . to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos and damages. The sheriff could not execute the replevin order. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. It appears that the Executive Order was published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982.

Issue: Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaos and the dismissal of the petition by Judge Angeles were proper. Ruling: No they were not proper since the Executive Order became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. The livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order. 6. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance (235 SCRA 630, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994) Facts: Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association [CREBA]) reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630), which it approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text of the House bill." Issue: Whether or not such action of the Senate is inappropriate. Ruling:

Art. VI, § 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that S. No. 1630 is an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its certification that it was passed by the Senate, implying that there is something substantially different between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197. 7. Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals (351 SCRA 44, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001) Facts: Petitioner spouses, sugarland owners and planters, entered into several crop loan-financing schemes secured by chattel and real estate mortgages with respondent PNB. The latter was authorized to negotiate and sell sugar produced and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations. Respondent PHILEX, under P.D. No. 579 (Rationalizing and Stabilizing The Export of Sugar and For Other Purposes) was authorized to purchase sugar allotted for export with PNB. Meanwhile, the petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar. PNB ignored the request. Petitioners conveyed several properties to PNB as dacion en pago when asked to settle their accounts. Petitioners reiterated their request for accounting, but PNB again failed to heed the same. Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 14725 for accounting, specific performance and damages against PNB. PHILEX was impleaded as party defendant. During the trial, petitioners alleged that the loans granted them by PNB had been fully paid by virtue of compensation with the unliquidated amounts owed to them by PNB. The trial court, without notice to the Solicitor General, rendered judgment holding PD No. 579 unconstitutional, ordering private respondents to pay petitioners the whole amount corresponding to the residue of the unliquidated actual cost price of sugar exported and to pay moral damages and attorney's fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared the dacion en pago valid and ordered PNB to render an accounting. Issue: a. Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the

parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court. b. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional. Ruling: On the first issue, it is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides: "SECTION 3. Notice to Solicitor General. — In any action which involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be noti ed by the party attacking the statute, executive order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question." The purpose of this mandatory notice is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. In this case, the Solicitor General was never noti ed about Civil Case No. 14725. Nor did the trial court ever require him to appear in person or by a representative or to file any pleading or memorandum on the constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of the required notice made it improper for the trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questioned presidential decrees. And for the second issue, Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and speci c performance. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PNB's obligation to render an accounting is an issue, which can be determined, without having to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In fact there is nothing in P.D. No. 579, which is applicable to PNB's intransigence in refusing to give an accounting. The governing law should be the law on agency, it being undisputed that PNB acted as petitioners' agent. In other words, the requisite

that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. 8. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS (267 SCRA 408, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997) Facts: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. The petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel, which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. Issue: Whether or not such provision of the constitution is self-executory Ruling: Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino

people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudable, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul, a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. The Court cannot extract rhyme or reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a quali ed Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. 9. Astorga vs. Villegas (56 SCRA 714, G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974) Facts: On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the ViceMayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor. When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, Senator Arturo Tolentino introduced substantial amendments

to Section 1. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one, recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments, which were the ones, actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065. The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. Issue: Whether or not a R.A. No. 4065 should remain a law since it already signed into law by the President of the Philippines. Ruling: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. The Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. The Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. Both the President of the

Senate and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for the Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. 10. Victoria’s Milling v. SSC (114 Phil 555, G.R. No. L-16704, March 17, 1962) Facts: On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor: "Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2- 1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month." Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victoria’s Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term `compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Issue: Whether or not it is beyond the powers of the Social Security Commission to issue such circular.

Ruling: Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8(f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows: "(f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so." Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to: "(f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month." Therefore, the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular No. 22 is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting some exceptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been

given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law. 11. Morales v. Subido (27 SCRA 131) Facts: In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that Section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance. . . . The provision of the substitute bill reads: 'No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.' At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase 'has served as offcer in the Armed Forces' was inserted so as to make the provision read: 'No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.' It is be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the phrase 'who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher,' under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the phrase ["who has served the police department of a city or"] was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained. It would thus appear that the omission, whether deliberate or unintended of the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city or," was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of the engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading thereof; that the change was made not by Congress but only by an employee thereof; and that what purportedly was a rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences was

in truth an alteration of meaning. It is for this reason that the petitioner would have us look searchingly into the matter. Issue: Whether or not the enrolled bill stands when there is no record in the Journal, which results to the changes. Ruling: It is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters, which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question, which the Court does not now decide. All the Court hold is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy. This is based on theory that if there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. 12. Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 669, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919) Facts: The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the provincial officials of that province are illegally depriving the Maguianes of their liberty. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation. The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows: SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor — With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. Issue: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head. Ruling: No, the Philippine Legislature here has conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board. In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case. In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, is better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.