Supreme Court

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC May 12 1948 GR No. L-1347 YELLOW TAXI AND TRANSPORTATION WORKER'S UNION PASAY (CLO), recurrent, vs. MANILA YELLOW TAXI CAB COMPANY, INC., Appeal. D. Severino P. Izon in appellant dela representation. D. Amado B. and D. Leon Isaac N. Lico in representation of the appeal. PAUL, M.: This is an appeal by certiorari against the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. The appellant, instead of discussing the finding of the Tribunal - no industrial dispute between the parties that the claim was presented one day after the suspension of the business of the company - contends that the Court of Industrial Relations has authority (a ) to resolve the dispute between the respondent and his workers amounting to more than 30 and were released from work without prior notice, and (b)to determine the compensation thereof. The findings of fact of the Industrial Relations Court in its decision appealed are: "the company appealed before the outbreak of war was in the business of transportation bytaxicabs with certificate of public convenience After the release of the City. Manila and its suburbs, opened his new business but its operation suspended again on September 11, 1946 Due to such suspension, had to stop their work 42 drivers, 15 mechanics and a boy, gas supplier. Of this number dismissed employees, 37 drivers, a mechanic and a supplier of gas are members of the appellant union which is the Yellow Taxi and Pasay Transportation Workers' Union (CLO). Later, four or five of the drivers involved were taken by the company respondent to manage choches Service and two of these are members of the appellant junction, before the

suspension of the operation had not filed any lawsuit against the company under appeal by the appellant junction; before the suspension, the respondent company had 24 cars in operation for the management of which alternated drivers, receiving a commission of 20% of all collections registered by taximertros; that the days of payment dates were 1, 11 and 21 of each month; that the appellant union is a labor organization whose registration is under consideration in the Department of Labor, and is affiliated to the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO); the suspension of the operation of the taxicab business judgment as well as the sale of their cars and other materials related to its operation, are in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Board on September 4, 1946; that the respondent obtained from the Public Service Commission, on October 14, 1946, an order (Exhibit 1) authorizing him to withdraw from public service 17 cars, subject to certain conditions;the spare parts necessary for the repair of taxicabs during operation could not be obtained but rates 4-27 times higher than the price before the war (Exhibits 2 to 12) so that the maintenance of their cars turned very costly to the company; five months before the suspension of its operation, the company's ganancies emperazon to decline to such an extent that in the month of August 1946 was recorded as lost and in the following month, September, a loss, much larger due they no longer had income from the suspension of its operation; but meanwhile was holding office employees. "The examination by the auditor of the Court reveals that the net earnings of the company during its operation until the end of September 1946, and were transferred tosurplus were P12,762.12, in August 1946, the respondent suffered a loss P533.65 net, and in September 1946, P6,784.22. This examination shows further that the expense item that has consumed a large portion of the profits of the business is that of 'repairs of cars,' whose total in September 30, 1946, amounted to P27,808.89, which is greater than spending for 'Office salaries' to P26,316.10 amount corresponding to the period. " Following several decisions of the High Court, issued in accordance with Article 2, Rule 44 of the Regulations, we do not review these findings of fact. But of them we can deduce that the temporary suspension of the business of transportation of appeal was not due to the unjust desire to deprive the workers of their work: it was the inevitable result of inservibilidad cars, they could no longer provide the public an

appropriate service and, above all, safe. If the respondent, being able to repair old cars and did not, we conclude that had the insane intent to deprive the members of the appellant of its work; business then the suspension was not justified. In this case, members of the appellant who lost their jobs are entitled to claim compensation due. In this case, no unwarranted attack. Assuming for a moment that a fire had broken out in the garage of the respondent and that all cars have been burned - rather than being pure junk old cars and it was not possible to repair without having to buy replacement parts price of 4-27 times higher than in normal times - they will require that the defendant to pay compensation or compensation to drivers because, without warning, lost their jobs? Under such circumstances, we do not believe such a resolution that is fair because the suspension of the business was not done in bad faith or with the purpose to deprive the workers of their work. Order the respondent to pay compensation to drivers not paying any service because the cars were not administer non-functional justice is to promote injustice. Article 4 of the Law No. 559 of the Commonwealth provides that "... the Court becomes aware of any conflict ... industrial motive or cause a strike or lockout because of differences arising in the matter of wages, participation or compensation, dismissals, terminations or suspensions of employees or workers. " Upholding the literal meaning of this provision, the Industrial Relations Court decided that in this case there is no dispute between the parties that the claim of the members of the appellant was presented one day after the suspension of the operation of the business of the appeal.This interpretation of the law is untenable. The spirit that informs the law must be the light that will guide courts in the application of its provisions. They should stick to the letter of the literal interpretation dley when separated from the intention of the legislature, and especially when it leads to conclusions inconsistent with the stated purpose of the law. When there is conflict between the literal interpretation and the interpretation based on the purpose of the law, the last shall prevail. (2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, 693; against Limjap Vergara, 56 Jur Fil, 153..)

The intention of the legislature in passing the statute creating the Court of Industrial Relations was to provide workers a fast and simple remedy to get justice in their disputes with the employer. It is obvious that a worker who has been deprived unduly of his work by the employer on the occasion of unemployment should have been entitled to by the Court of Industrial Relations. Assuming that instead of a suspension justified, as there have been in the present case, the respondent, without losing their business, but, on the contrary, good earnings marginalized, and only for the purpose of casting service to drivers and other workers, has declared the strike, would not have these rights before the Court of Industrial Relations to request remedy cease their abuse? Should apply to the ordinary tribunals? Do not have the right to seek compensation for having lost his job because the company unreasonably and in bad faith, suspended their business? Unemployment and strikes not only hurt the parties - the employer and the worker - but also the general public. Hence it is that the State in the exercise of its police power is obliged to intervene in either case. The Industrial Relations Court must not only take cognizance of industrial disputes arising prior to the declaration of the strike or unemployment but also of those that arise later.Complaints about damage caused to the workers for their termination on the occasion of unemployment must necessarily arise later and can not be before. If you have no power or jurisdiction the Court of Industrial Relations for such claims arising after already declared unemployed, the homeless quedarian then thrown out of work without any justification. The employer then would have an indirect method of dispatching workers without any remedy of these, which is contrary to the constitutional mandate that "the State shall protect all workers ... and shall regulate the relations between labor and capital. " (Title XIII, Section 6 of the Constitution.) And the primary purpose of the law creating the Court of Industrial Relations is "to provide for the protection of the worker." After mature consideration declare that the Industrial Relations Court has power to decide the claim of the workers but was filed after the suspension of business of the employer, or after the arrest. In this case, the Industrial Relations Court should investigate whether the close of business is justified or not, if it was done in good or bad faith. If not justified, then this in order to determine that the employer must pay

compensation to workers who have stopped their work without notification within a reasonable time. In this case we declare that according to the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations, the suspension of the operation of taxis was justified. It is not fair to force a company to continue operating its business that is losing. The appeal is dismissed. Moran, Pres., Feria. Bengzon, Briones, and Tuason, MM., Are compliant. Yarn and Padilla, JJ., Concur in the result. Separate Opinions PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting: Petitioner Complains of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, dated December 16, 1946, dismissing petitioner's complaint filed in case No. 34-V, where they 'Alleged That respondent company dismissed them from the service without previous notice or warning or justification, only Because the majority of the employees are members of the petitioning joint. The lower court ruled That, Because petitioner's Demands Were Presented to the respondent company on September 12, 1946, one day after the suspension of the operation of the company's business, the Latter has not-committed any unfair labor competition and there nonindustrial is dispute Between the parties. Petitioner prays for the reversal of the decision of dismissal and That it be Granted a new trial, the Court of That Maintaining Industrial Relations erred in declaring That there is no dispute Industrial Between the parties, the declaration implying That there is no such matter upon Which STI to exercise jurisdiction. Petitioner Invokes the price provider of section 1 and 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 , in Connection with the provider server constitutional That "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people Should

be the Concern of the state" and That "Shall the state Afford protection to work ... and Shall Regulate the landowner and tenant relations Between and Between work and equity in industry and agriculture." The Court of Industrial Relations Adopted a narrow-minded point of view That When It ruled there is no industry dispute Between the parties upon the mere fact That Petitioners Presented to Their Demands only respondent company on September 12, 1946, one day after the employees of said company who are members of the labor union petitioning Have Been dismissed or laid off. The presentation of Demands was said and is not an essential element for the existence of a labor dispute Between employer and employees. In the present case, from the very instant That the members of the labor union complaining Were dismissed or laid off without Their consent, Arose a labor dispute there. Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 Should be interpreted to comprehend a situation: such as the present is Presented in case. The sentence "Causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout" embodied in said section shouldnt be read as limitative but rather as descriptive of the nature of the dispute or import of Which the Court of Industrial Relations is to take cognizance for settlement. From the very facts found by the Court of Industrial Relations, we are convinced That the members of the petitioning labor union Were unjustifiably laid off, the respondent company using as a pretext a temporary suspension of the business Because its old equipment no longer Could be continued to be operated at a profit, and That action of the company was motivated by the affiliation of the members of the petitioning junction With the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO). Forty-two drivers, mechanics and gas fifteen boy Were laid off from work. Of Their number, thirty-seven drivers, one mechanic, and the gas boy are petitioning members of the joint. Four or five drivers Were later taken back to man the service cars of the company. According To respondent's answer, the company has acquired new 1947 cars.

If the laying off of the members of the petitioning labor union was due to the going down of the profits of the business of the company During the five months before the suspension of the business to the Extent That in August, 1946, the operation already registered a loss, why has the company dismissed employees ITS suddenly on September 11, 1946, without any previous hint or advice to the Affected drivers and mechanics, so That They May Have Time to look for other jobs and not just leave them empty-handed in the streets? If the company was to acquire and HAD acquired brand new cars to replace the old ones, what is the reason for a sudden suspension of the business while waiting for the new cars to be put in operation? For all the foregoing, we vote for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, dated December 16, 1946, and to order said court to Proceed with the retrial of the case so as to determine the relief That should be Granted to the members of the petitioning junction in Accordance With the pronouncements made hereof. PARAS, J.: I concur in the foregoing concurring and dissenting Justice review of Mr. Perfect.