Tropical Operations: Army Field Manual

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Army Code 71655

ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 2

OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

PART 2

TROPICAL OPERATIONS

2003

Issue 1:0. September 2003

CONDITIONS OF RELEASE Copyright

This work is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights for this publication belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). No material or information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form outside MOD establishments except as authorised by both the sponsor and the MOD where appropriate.

Security

This document is issued for the information of such persons who need to know its contents in the course of their official duties. Any person finding this document should hand it into a British Forces unit or to a British police station for its safe return to the MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.

Authority

This publication is issued under the overall direction of the CGS. It is an MOD Approved Code of Practice (ACOP). Where issues of health and safety are concerned it takes into account the provisions of the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974.

Status

The contents provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experience and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operations and training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is proved that you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find you criminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements of health and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a person criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP could result in disciplinary action under the provisions of the Army Act.

Amendment Amendment No

Date

Amendment No

Date

Distribution As directed by DGD&D who is the sponsor and to whom comments and queries concerning this publication should be addressed.

The Romantic View "For the wind is in the palm-trees, and the temple bells they say: Come you back, you British Soldier; come you back to Mandalay!" Rudyard Kipling - Mandalay.

The Realistic View Some of the units are so thin that you would be shocked to see them. This trip is a physical nightmare .... Yesterday we were twelve hours on the track and most of us were 'out on our feet', but we had to keep going ... You spend four hours rising 2000 feet painfully step by step with your heart pounding in your throat, resting every hundred feet of rise. And then when you reach the top it is only fifteen feet wide, and you immediately begin to descend 2,000 feet. This is dangerous, as well as painful, because you get 'laughing knees', and only the prop stick in front of you keeps you from falling headlong. The farther down you go the weaker your knees become, but you don't lie down and die, as you feel like doing; you keep resting and going on and on ........ An Australian Pte Soldier writing about crossing the Kokoda Trail in New Guinea - arguably the foulest area that any troops fought over in World War II.

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PREFACE 1.

The jungle can be seen as the environment closest to mankind's primeval origin and the setting in which he, or most of his kind, is least at home. Certainly whenever mankind has chosen such regions for conflict, the physical conditions have always posed unique problems and demanded special military skills.

2.

Before the Second World War the British Army had little real depth of knowledge of fighting in jungle terrain and hardly considered this military skill necessary for the defence of its colonies. At that time "jungle fighting" as opposed to fighting in the jungle had few acknowledged supporters or experts in the Army. Operations during the Second World War in South East Asia illustrated not only the error of this previously misguided thinking but also what can be achieved subsequently by revised policies, determined leadership, good training and prodigious courage in the most adverse of circumstances: Colonel Spencer Chapman being the personification of this in Malaya during the Second World War.

3.

Since those days, British forces have been deployed on active service to the jungle and tropical regions of Malaysia, Brunei, Borneo, Guyana, Belize and East Timor, and as a result there has been a continuing need to retain and improve the skills and techniques learnt at such cost in the Second World War, albeit in different circumstances. In these uncertain times when British forces are being deployed to fresh parts of the globe it is prudent to retain the capability to fight in jungle and in tropical regions.

4.

The aim of 'Tropical Operations' is to provide a guide for use by commanders and staff in units and formations at HQs when operating in jungle or tropical terrain. It describes what effects the jungle or tropical environment will have on combat operations, which could include 'operations other than war' (OOTW). These effects cover the major functions in combat, the employment of weapon systems, and on the soldier himself. This publication fills the gap and Volume 1 Part 2 of the AFM Battlegroup Tactics for units and formations operating in any environment; it covers the tactical requirements needed for a formation to operate in jungle or tropical environments which are in addition to those described in 'Battlegroup Tactics'.

5.

It is not possible to predict the precise circumstances in which the UK government would deploy forces into a tropical region. Such a deployment could vary from a company sized group up to brigade or possibly divisional level. There will invariably be a national command element at any HQ.

6.

While the jungle environment places some constraint and limitation on the application of military principles there is no call to alter or change these principles at all: indeed, the reverse is true. The jungle is probably one of the last natural environments where full and untrammelled use of operational doctrines in the conduct of war can be exercised. However, these constraints and limitations do influence the conduct of military procedures, and to take account of new equipments and techniques as they are taken into service, hence the need for this publication. It is important to note that 'Tropical Operations' covers operations in a jungle and tropical bush environment where military characteristics and constraints are similar. Other environments, such as on the rim of the jungle and in other tropical regions

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where there is no jungle, or tropical bush may well form a geographical part of the overall theatre of operations in which British troops are deployed. Operations in these different environments would allow for more mobile warfare and would differ intrinsically from those in a jungle environment. 7.

Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons have not been used in jungle conditions, and the prospect of their use in the future is considered to be remote. Nevertheless, this may change given the growing proliferation of nuclear weapons systems and the scope for rapidly producing biological and chemical agents. Many nations already have the ability to produce chemical and biological agents. Defoliants were used in Vietnam, and since then; there have been confirmed reports of the use of chemical agents elsewhere. It would be wrong to discount the possible use of these weapons, or to overlook the accumulated knowledge gained about the effects of these weapons on combat operations.

8.

The impact of some technological developments used in recent operations in Iraq (2003) have not been properly evaluated in jungle or tropical conditions at unit and formation level. While there are obvious advantages to be gained from the coordinated use of such equipment as GPS, the more modern Remote Ground Sensors (RGS, Thermal Imagery (TI), Night Vision Goggles (NG) and the use of UAVs, the tactical implication of their use in jungle operations has not been tested in battle conditions; neither has the logistic burden of additional equipment maintenance been properly evaluated. Once more information has been gained, amendments and additions to this publication will be put in hand. The main deduction to be derived from these potential technical advances is that they will need to be tested properly in a jungle environment during the period of acclimatization for troops, which could lengthen the overall time it takes to reach operational readiness.

9.

Servicemen and women committed for duty in a jungle environment require special training, time to acclimatize and time to assimilate medication to offset the more prevalent diseases occurring in these regions. Furthermore, until troops have adequate time to train with the correct equipment and weapons in a jungle environment they will not be effective.

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CONTENTS PREFACE

iii

CHAPTER 1 - THE ENVIRONMENT Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6 Section 7

Definitions Topography Vegetation Climate and Weather Habitation Plant, Fruits and Water Other Factors in Tropical Regions

1-1 1-1 1-3 1-10 1-11 1-12 1-12

CHAPTER 2 - LIVING IN THE JUNGLE Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5

The Soldier Health and Acclimatization Leadership Morale Navigation

2-1 2-2 2-4 2-5 2-6

CHAPTER 3 - OPERATIONAL FACTORS IN TROPICAL ENVIRONMENTS Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6

The Potential Threat Joint Operations The Operational Framework Command, Control, Communications and Liaison Air Operations Maritime Operations

Annex A

Riverine Operations

3-1 3-3 3-4 3-6 3-7 3-9

CHAPTER 4 - TACTICAL FACTORS IN TROPICAL OPERATIONS Section 1 Section 2 Section 3

Operational Self Reliance Dominating the Tropical Environment The Functions in Combat

4-1 4-1 4-2

CHAPTER 5 - THE EFFECTS OF THE TROPICAL ENVIRONMENT ON OPERATIONS Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6 Section 7 Section 8 Section 9

General Effects on Ground and Air Forces Combined Arms Activity Infantry, The Leading Combat Arm Armour Artillery Engineers Signals Army Aviation Special Forces

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Section 10 Combat Service Support Section 11 G1 Considerations Section 12 G5 Considerations

5-16 5-20 5-21

CHAPTER 6 – OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS Section 1 Section 2 Section 3

Planning and Attack Fire Support Conduct of the Attack

6-1 6-3 6-5

Annex A

Adjustment of Armoured Fighting Vehicle Fire by Continuous Calling

6-A-1

CHAPTER 7 – DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS Section 1 Section 2 Section 3

Background Planning a Defence Conduct of the Defence

7-1 7-2 7-11

CHAPTER 8 – TRANSITIONAL OPERATIONS Section 1 Section 2 Section 3

The Advance The Pursuit Withdrawal

8-1 8-4 8-5

CHAPTER 9 - NBC DEFENCE IN A TROPICAL ENVIRONMENT Section 1 Section 2 Section 3

The Potential for NBC Operations The Environmental Effects Protection against NBC in a Tropical Environment

9-1 9-1 9-4

Annex A

Work And Rest Times And Water Uptake Requirements

9-A-1

CHAPTER 10 - TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS Section 1 Section 2

Developments Since 1945 Future Developments

10-1 10-2

CHAPTER 11 - AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5

The Soldier Campaign Experiences The Battle for Long Tan - 18 Aug 66 Op BARRAS - A Coy 1 PARA Operations in Sierra Leone Sep 99 Bibliography

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CHAPTER 1

THE ENVIRONMENT

SECTION 1 - DEFINITIONS 1.

The Tropical Zone is that area between the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn (latitude 23o27' north and south of the equator.) Within the zone, conditions can vary widely as a result of terrain and climatic influences. The zone is characterised by high temperatures. High rainfall and dense forest cover are not always the characteristic of the Tropical Zone, arid and desert conditions can exist.

2.

The term 'Jungle' is used to describe extreme close country in tropical areas throughout the world. Jungle exists in areas of high temperature and humidity and where the natural vegetation is largely forest. The dominating features of jungle areas are a high and constant temperature, heavy rainfall during the greater part of the year and oppressive humidity. Seasonal changes of temperature are insignificant compared with seasonal variation in rainfall. The year has no summer or winter, only cyclical wet and dry seasons. In some jungle areas climatic variations are so slight that there are no seasons.

3.

The largest concentrations of jungle are in three areas. In Asia, the jungle extends from Burma through Malaysia, Indonesia, New Guinea to Queensland, Australia. In West Africa, the rainforest is mostly in Zaire. In Central and South America, the jungle runs from the Yucatan Peninsular (Belize) to Bolivia, and includes the Amazon.

4.

Man’s demand for raw materials and land to grow crops, including those for the drug trade, together with the ability to use modern technology and methods to clear jungle quickly, has led to vast areas of primeval jungle disappearing in recent years throughout the tropical regions. Large areas of secondary jungle scrub, and despoiled areas could take the place of the primary jungle in these regions. SECTION 2 - TOPOGRAPHY General

5.

Topography typical of the tropical regions consists of plains, hills and mountains, with occasional plateau, valleys and basins in the uplands. Some mountainous areas may reach up to 3000 metres. Much of the area consists of rugged, deeply dissected mountains mostly covered by dense forest. Hills occupy a transitional zone between plains and mountains and are in general cultivated by the local population, particularly in valleys. Large river systems form deltas of swamp, and causes flooding in low-lying forested areas and paddyfields before reaching coastal regions.

6.

Jungle areas are sparsely populated with the majority of the inhabitants living on the more open plains, river basins, and delta areas, where they work in agricultural or forestry, logging trees. Travelling by water may be the easiest way to move using the grain of the country.

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Coastal Areas 7.

The coastline of jungle areas varies considerably from open beaches to dense mangrove swamps, which can extend for considerable distances inland. Good ports and docking facilities are rare; movement across beaches may be difficult and made more hazardous by tropical storms and physical barriers such as coral reefs. Kunai grass grows abundantly in these areas to between four and eight feet high effectively precluding ground observation. Coconut groves are usual near inhabited areas.

8.

The coastal belt behind the beaches may vary from alluvial plains to narrow strips with foothills rising abruptly near the shore line. In flat coastal areas and near river deltas the region is seldom well drained, resulting in numerous slow-moving streams, many of which flow into large swamp areas. These often have a tidal effect which can be experienced well inland. Rivers are often the only suitable way of reaching the interior of such an area.

Figure 1-1. Tropical River Littoral Areas 9.

Littoral areas are defined in military operations as a coastal region consisting of the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore that has to be controlled to support operations ashore, and the landward area inland from the short that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. The requirements to operate in littoral waters are, in many respects, different from those operations in open waters. Local weather phenomena, which may differ significantly from the general weather pattern, often occur in littoral areas and may affect coastal operations and the performance of

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sensors, weapons and communications. The topography degrades detection ranges and reduces reaction time available for evaluation, decision and response. Detection of an unidentified or hostile surface - or aircraft and the rapid development of a situation, due to the high risk of late detection will therefore demand immediate actions and an ability to react promptly. 10.

Tropical areas close to a coastline are advantageous to the defender - the attacker is exposed to land, air and maritime threats. Any kinds of sea mines are likely to be laid and pose a threat to submarines and surface ships and craft. Coastal defence systems, such as radar stations and/or batteries armed with surface-to-surface missiles, guns or torpedoes, are often positioned at choke points. Fast patrol boats (FPBs) are a significant threat due to their high mobility, ease of concealment and potent weapons systems on small platforms - they can be armed with missiles, guns and torpedoes and may be equipped with automated command and control information systems as well as digital integrated weapon systems. They are able to react quickly, to concentrate their efforts locally and to shift concentration rapidly. Helicopters are also versatile threats in littoral operations and may be used for reconnaissance, identification or third party targeting, as well as a weapon platform for air-to-surface missiles and guns. Additionally, a submarine operating in the vicinity of a coast may pose a serious threat to operations. The most dangerous threat is a combination of the above systems operating in coordination.

11.

If there is a need to operate a force in an adversary's littoral, operations to shape and eliminate sea denial forces should be carried out. They may compromise operational and tactical surprise. Reconnaissance by air and other means is necessary to gain a surface situation picture. A combination of naval mine countermeasure forces to ensure safe passage, aircraft and/or helicopters equipped with air-to-surface weapons, own FPBs, submarines, ground, amphibious and special forces operating in coordination is the best means to oppose threats in the littoral. Inland Rivers

12.

Heavy rainfall and humidity produces fast flowing rivers which rapidly erode the banks leaving them with steep sides and causing rapids (white water). Large amount of vegetation and slurry can end up blocking streams and rivers and adding to the swamp areas in river deltas.

13.

There are normally very few permanent bridges across rivers; those that there are tend to become important because movement is canalised. Flash flooding is a regular feature and can seriously impede movement for long periods of time, particularly if bridges are destroyed. SECTION 3 - VEGETATION General

14.

Heavy rainfall and high temperature encourage rapid and continuous growth resulting in a profusion of vegetation. Within a single tropical area more than one type of vegetation may occur each having its own particular characteristics.

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15.

The various types of jungle are classified by characteristic plants with transition from one type to another being gradual rather than sharp. The types are numerous and intermingle with each other making a clear classification more complicated. Some trees grow tall and straight without branches to 50 metres high before the branches spread out and interlock forming a canopy. Sometimes this canopy is formed from two or more successive layers of vegetation. Types Of Vegetation

16.

General. Movement is slow on foot, but tracked vehicles may well be able to crash their way through with good ground reconnaissance. Bamboo grows rapidly in some secondary jungle and is often dense and impenetrable. Movement is invariably noisy and very slow with visibility rarely beyond 20 metres.

17.

Vegetation. The main types of vegetation are:

18.

a.

Rain Forest (Primary).

b.

Monsoon Forest (Mixed Deciduous Forest).

c.

Mountain Forest.

d.

Open Forest.

e.

Swamp Forest.

f.

Secondary Growth (Scrub).

g.

Grasslands.

h.

Cultivated Areas.

Rain Forest. Rain forest is primary forest, termed jungle, and is the original growth of tall evergreen trees and generally occurs in lowland tropical areas where the annual rainfall averages 2000millimetres or more. This heavy rainfall causes trees to rot from the inside and they can fall without warning. Trees normally grow in three storeys to about 10, 25 and up to 60 metres high. The trunks of the high trees are very thick and rise to above 25 metres before the appearance of branches. a.

Visibility and Observation. Visibility is restricted and seldom exceeds 50 metres and the overall light level is comparable to twilight.

b.

Movement. Movement on foot is reasonably easy, the main obstacles being fallen trees and streams. Where trees are widely spaced the ground may permit some vehicle movement, but roots, fallen trees and creepers may frustrate this and cause long delays. There is almost total cover from the air.

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Figure 1-2. Primary Jungle 19.

Monsoon Forest. Monsoon forests are found in areas with distinct wet and dry seasons. The occurs in Northern Thailand, Burma, New Guinea and Eastern Indonesia. In the wet season, monsoon forests resemble the jungle, but the canopy is lower (25 metres), trees are further apart with less foliage and the undergrowth is less dense. In the dry season most of the trees shed their leaves. Bamboo predominates is tough and can be a serious constraint on movement.

20.

Mountain Forest. Above 600 to 1000 metres the forests are more open and the trees shorter. Mixed deciduous and pine trees largely replace the evergreens although bracken and fern are still abundant. Moss forests exist at about 2000 metres and provide a damp thick blanket of moss, which covers all vegetation. Moss does not occur where there is a noticeable dry season. Movement on foot is slow and tedious with ground visibility seldom exceeding 15 metres. Cover from the air is excellent.

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Figure 1-3. Mountain Forest 21.

Open Forest. In some areas of low rainfall and poor soils, vegetation exists which is transitional between monsoon forest and grasslands. It is characterised by deciduous trees up to 30 metres high, spaced several metres apart.

Figure 1-4. Tropical Open Forest Issue 1.0: Sep 03

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22.

Swamp Forest. A swamp forest includes the following vegetation: a.

Mangrove. Occurs in regions which are subject to tidal influence and can be found well inland in delta and river areas as well as coastlines. Mangrove varies in height from two to twelve metres and has many tangled roots above and below the waterline. It thrives in shallow water and mud. Movement is only possible on foot and then at a very slow rate; where there are deeper water channels movement by boat may be feasible. Visibility is restricted to a few metres but protection from ground and air observation is good.

b.

Nipa. Nipa palms are found beyond the mangrove where salt water is replaced by brackish water, or, where the water is fresh at low tide. It is normally confined to narrow belts near slow moving water and seldom exceeds 6 metres in height. Movement on foot through nipa palms is nearly impossible. Visibility is severely restricted but cover from ground and air observation is excellent.

c.

Sago. Sago palm is found in fresh water swamps and grows in liquid mud reaching a height of 15 metres with a trunk span of half a metre in diameter. Movement through sago palm is normally difficult except in populated areas where paths may have been cut for the extraction of the pith from the palm. Visibility off-track is very limited.

d.

Fresh Water Swamp. These occur in low-lying inland areas and comprise of tangled trees and thorny undergrowth, reeds, grasses and bamboo. Movement on foot is very slow and visibility varies from 5 to 20 metres.

Figure 1-5. Tropical Swamp

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23.

Secondary Growth. Wherever primary jungle has been logged or cleared and abandoned, secondary growth (jungle) will occur. Exposure to sunlight causes the rapid growth of new vegetation which can reach a height of 2 or 3 metres a year.

Figure 1-6. Secondary Growth

24.

Grasslands. Natural grasslands, sometimes known as savannah, occur in open country or high plateaux where there is a long dry season. Grasses range from 1 to 5 metres in height and may be sharp edged and dense. Such grasses can be unpleasant to walk through, cause minor cuts and abrasions, and are generally very hot because of trapped heat. Cover from the air is invariably poor. Tall grasses may affect helicopter landing and extractions. Secondary growth, such as clearings in the jungle where grass has become predominant is generally thicker and more matted than open savannah. This grass tends to be tangled with other plants making movement almost impossible.

Figure 1-7. Tropical Grassland

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25.

Cultivated Areas. Cultivation in the jungle varies from the small requirements of local inhabitants to agriculture on a larger scale, perhaps by international companies. Commercial crops are divided into four general categories: a.

Tree Crops. Coffee, rubber, coconut, oil palm and cocoa are common tree crops. The trees are planted at regular intervals in rows and the ground are normally cleared of thick undergrowth. Well developed track and roads often exist. Cross country movement on foot is easy and it is possible to move vehicles providing there is no extensive drainage system to hinder them. Visibility is generally good, but cover from ground and air observation can vary with the type of crop.

b.

Bush Crops. Tea, cotton and tobacco are common bush crops. They also are planted in a regular pattern, but being smaller than tree crops tend to be planted closer together. Movement by foot and in tracked vehicles is not difficult.

c.

Dry Crops. Maize, millet, sugar and certain types of rice are common dry crops. They generally present no obstacle to movement on foot, although sugar cane can present significant movement problems when fully grown.

d.

Wet Crops. Rice is the main wet crop and the ricefields (paddy) are flooded extensively for between 5 and 10 months of the year; when dry the earth becomes very hard. Earth dykes, or bunds, up to a metre high and 6 metres wide separate individual ricefields. Movement in tracked vehicles is possible when fields are flooded but this becomes difficult when the mud is glutinous. Wheeled vehicle movement is confined to the dykes or when fields are dry; in the latter case the crossing of dykes is a major problem.

Figure 1-8. Tropical Semi-Cultivated

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SECTION 4 - CLIMATE AND WEATHER Climate 26.

Heat, humidity, heavy rainfall and an all pervasive dampness are sources of heat exhaustion, skin infections and much discomfort. Regions near the Equator have rainfall during the late afternoon of almost every day while those further away from the Equator have long dry seasons followed by months of torrential rain or monsoon conditions.

27.

Annual precipitation in tropical regions varies considerably between 1600 and 12000 mms, the heaviest rainfall occurring during the late afternoon or early morning, often accompanied by severe electric storms. Hurricanes and typhoons are common in tropical regions. Temperature And Humidity

28.

Although seasonal variation in temperature increases gradually as one moves away from the Equator, in the lowland humid tropics, the mean annual temperature seldom varies for more than 5 degrees between 26°C and 28°C with extremes between 18°C and 35°C.

29.

In jungle conditions the mean average temperature at sea level is normally 25°C. The variation between the mean daily maximum and minimum temperatures is small. However, temperate and even cold conditions may exist in mountainous jungle, particularly during the wet season. In areas of open savannah temperatures can build up to over 37°C.

30.

The relative humidity in a tropical rain forest can average between 75% and 85% humidity during the day and over 90% percent at night although each region will have its own variation. The nature of the vegetation, the dark moistness of the surface soil, and the manner in which papers, fabrics and metal become mouldy unless frequently exposed to sun and wind are all indicators of the high average relative humidity. Cloud And Visibility

31.

Tropical days and night are nearly equal in length and the transition between them is rapid. It is usually more cloudy along the line of the Equator and generally the cloud inland near the Equator is at a maximum in the afternoon, while coastlines tend to experience more cloud cover during the night.

32.

Early morning mist often occurs over inland jungle, swamp areas and valleys. Low cloud at about 150 metres occurs during the more violent storms; mountainous areas are seldom free of cloud. Violent Weather

33.

Electrical storms occur frequently in jungle areas but are normally of short duration; their effect on radio communications, aircraft and helicopter activity can be serious

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and prejudice operations. Tropical cyclones (typhoons and hurricanes) occur in some regions, usually towards the end of the summer months. Torrential rain raises the level of jungle streams very quickly causing sudden and severe flooding downstream and in coastal areas. Heavy rain can also cause premature detonation of artillery and mortar rounds during flight. Winds of over 100 mph are not unusual and can uproot the stoutest of trees and cause chaotic conditions on the ground. 34.

Early warning of impending bad weather conditions is vital to avoid or mitigate the worst effects of violent weather. Precautions can then be taken, such as moving to higher ground and providing protection for vulnerable equipment. A rule of thumb is that rainfall means mud which means additional movement problems. SECTION 5 - HABITATION Human Habitation

35.

Most jungle areas are sparsely populated, with centres of population along lines of communications, particularly rivers. A friendly indigenous population can be a great help in supporting operations but, if made hostile, their local knowledge of the environment could be of major use to an enemy. Whatever the level of conflict every effort should be made to obtain and keep the support and loyalty of the indigenous local population, although it may be prudent to include some form of operational security covering future plans when dealing with local communities.

36.

It is important to be aware of local customs and cultures and to have interpreters available when needed. Provision of medical aid is always welcome. In addition to providing basic intelligence and information, local populations can be employed as scouts, trackers, porters, guides and possibly irregular forces acting in a guerilla role. Wildlife

37.

The animal population of jungle areas is abundant and diversified but rarely seen or encountered. The forest canopy abounds with animals, decreasing steadily in both species and number to the forest floor.

38.

In savannah and secondary forests which provides good shrub and bush are home to many large animals. These animals rarely attack unless provoked, but their presence and appearance can cause undue fear and trepidation until confidence in living in the jungle has been established. For the most part animals, other than insects, that inhabit the jungle are not a significant hazard. In the jungle the soldier is but another animal and has to operate in harmony with the environment.

39.

In summary, there are few dangerous animals but those that are, can be a threat to humans. To minimize the danger of attracting attention from wildlife, troops must maintain a high degree of field discipline, hygiene and in particular must dispose of waste efficiently. Further details on wildlife can be obtained from the Pamphlet No 5 and The Personal Survival Safety Guide.

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SECTION 6 - PLANTS, FRUITS AND WATER Plants And Fruit 40.

The rain forest contains a wide variety of edible wild plants and some cultivated ones which frequently grow wild. Although plant food may not produce a balanced diet, it is capable of providing sustenance for long periods. Plant foods, for example, nuts and seeds, provide sufficient proteins for normal efficiency; most provide energy and calorie producing carbohydrates. Pamphlet No 5 and The Personal Survival Safety Guide provide the necessary information on plants and fruit. Water

41.

Demands on water are likely to be greatly increased and particular care must be taken in planning. Even in tropical regions water can be a scarce commodity. Advice on the location of sources of water can be obtained from the Pamphlet No 5 and The Personal Survival Safety Guide. SECTION 7 - OTHER FACTORS IN TROPICAL REGIONS Environmental Issues

42.

In the last two decades pressure to exploit the natural resources within tropical region has increased enormously especially in South America where large sectors of primary rain forest has been cut down for the timber and paper industry. Whole regions have been deforested and then burnt with a view to subsequent cultivation; indigenous inhabitants are moved away and wildlife destroyed. Despite world-wide awareness and publicity, the destruction of rain forests continues in some areas and remains an explosive environmental issue which can cause real tension locally and internationally. Drugs

43.

Remote jungle regions have always been used to grow various plants for the purpose of producing drugs. However, since the exponential increase in the growth of the drug trade in America and Europe in the last twenty years, the demand has turned local transactions into national and international drug rings controlled by criminal syndicates. Some regions like the “golden triangle” in South East Asia and Columbia have become notorious for drug - running, and the local armed forces in the area have been totally preoccupied in trying to stamp out this activity - generally with little success. Competing Commercial Interests

44.

While deforestation and drugs have attracted increased public attention in recent years, the requirement for intervention by the armed forces of nations not directly involved is currently remote. However, in the future, when natural resources become scarcer, competing commercial interests may well cause both these environmental issues to become the subject of international arbitration, and hence the possibility of an armed presence to promulgate any agreements reached.

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CHAPTER 2

LIVING IN THE JUNGLE

SECTION 1 - THE SOLDIER General 1.

An army trained and equipped for operations in temperate climates requires both acclimatized specialist training and additional equipment for deployment to a tropical region. This essential prior preparation may dispel apprehension and uncertainty amongst soldiers who have never experienced these conditions and environment and could place additional pressures on commanders at all levels.

2.

The use of mission command and main effort will be just as important as tools of command in tropical conditions as elsewhere. The commander who restricts flexibility by issuing over-detailed orders is likely to restrain his subordinates from using their initiative and may miss the opportunities that changes in the general situation and the weather might present. By designating a main effort a commander will be indicating where his priorities lie, thus allowing subordinates to act in accordance with the mission and in the absence of new orders. The Adverse Conditions

3.

For most soldiers the tropics is hot, very humid and wet. In the extreme, the jungle is perceived as a state of permanent semi-twilight, gloomy and dark in creeks and narrow valleys even at midday. It is a condition of permanent dampness, rain or sweat, of stifling windless heat, of dirty clothes, smelly bodies, heavy loads, cocked weapons, tense reflexes, and ever-tired limbs.

4.

The history of the 3rd Australian Division in New Guinea records that, “Such conditions of rain, mud, rottenness, stench, gloom and the feeling of being shut in by everlasting jungle is all-pervasive and depressing. In addition, to add the constant expectancy of death from behind an impenetrable screen of green is sufficient to strain the strongest of nerves”. Junglecraft

5.

The term “junglecraft” came from the endeavours of soldiers fighting in Burma, Assam, and New Guinea during the Second World War. Its meaning covers a large number of skills, such as the ability of an individual soldier to live and fight in the jungle; to be able to move from point to point and arrive at an objective fit to fight; to use ground and vegetation to the best advantage; to be able to melt into the jungle when necessary; to use his eyes, ears, and sense of smell like an animal, and to move silently in darkness, where necessary, while having the ability to retrace his steps. Since the Second World War, 'junglecraft' has been developed during operations in Malaya, Borneo and operations in Vietnam taking account of evolving threat technology and improved weapon systems.

6.

In short, junglecraft is the way in which the adverse conditions of the jungle are overcome by an individual soldier It is not quickly or easily, acquired, neither is self confidence, but without both there will be little chance of any real success. Good

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leadership, realistic training in the jungle and high morale are the indispensable keys to becoming skilled in junglecraft. Most of the attributes of 'junglecraft' can be applied in tropical regions and it is as much a state of mind as an acquired skill. SECTION 2 - HEALTH AND ACCLIMATIZATION Diseases 7.

Troops operating in humid tropical conditions will be exposed to a variety of diseases. Personal hygiene, avoiding animal life and waste control will reduce non battle casualties. The mosquito transmits malaria, yellow fever, dengue fever, elephantiasis and some forms of encephalitis. Some typhus and plague are transmitted by insects such as the mite flea and tick.

8.

Sleeping sickness is limited to Africa because the tetse fly which transmits the disease is not found outside Africa. Diseases can be transmitted by infected water or food. Theatre specific medical advice must be included in all pre-deployment briefs.

9.

Various types of fungi produce the most widespread infections. Constant exposure to high temperatures and humidity causes most troops to harbour fungus. This then grows at a rapid rate unless the body can be kept dry. Foot care is most important, although fungus infections occur commonly elsewhere on the body. In these conditions fatigue comes more easily and recovery from cuts, abrasions, bites, and fractures is slowed. If commonsense medical treatment is not administered quickly, more serious trouble will rapidly follow. Medical Precautionary Measures

10.

Most diseases can be avoided if suitable precautions are followed, and in this respect dental care is equally as important as medical care. Experience shows that sound discipline and good leadership are needed to counter the worst effects of preventable sickness if casualties from this cause are not to exceed those imposed by an enemy. Furthermore it has been shown that a high level of physical fitness is a good way to ward off the debilitating effects of the jungle environment.

11.

The medical services will indicate the particular precautionary measures necessary for the chosen area of operations. Once in the jungle the need for enhanced medical and dental supervision will continue to be necessary. At one stage in the war in Burma the chances of evacuation from operations because of illness was about 130 times greater than that of becoming an operational casualty.

12.

At times it is often difficult, or perhaps impossible, to move or evacuate casualties because of the operational situation and it is in these circumstances that medical knowledge is at a premium. It is because of this sort of situation that all soldiers, regardless of their rank, should be able to administer basic first aid competently before entering the jungle.

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Acclimatization 13.

The climatic conditions of the tropics and in particular, the jungle, are very different from those of Europe and it is essential that all servicemen are fully acclimatized before they can take part in any jungle operations. The time required for acclimatization will depend entirely on the physical health of the formation and any recent experience in a jungle environment.

14.

Acclimatization is best achieved with a graduated programme of fitness training in theatre but this will take time to achieve. As a guide this should be for at least a period of 2 to 3 weeks for troops who are already reasonably fit. The training should include marching with increasingly heavy loads and deployment into jungle areas. Part of this training should rehearse and demonstrate the qualities of mental and physical stamina required to avoid the debilitating effects of isolation and insecurity in jungle conditions. Physical Fitness

15.

Physical fitness for all ranks involved in jungle operations is a must, - and it will take quite a large proportion of the training time available to ensure that adequate standards are reached. A jungle environment seldom requires explosive effort or the ability to run at any great speed, but upper body strength and general physical endurance to carry a pack (up to 70-80 lbs) slowly and quietly through the endless obstacle course presented by the jungle is vital to sustain operations at any level. Work And Rest Rates

16.

During acclimatization the work and rest rate of military activity needs careful attention to avoid dehydration. This becomes of crucial importance if the wearing of Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) is ordered. Annex A of Chapter 9 gives further guidance for troops during acclimatization, in conjunction, with advice from the medical authorities which will be necessary to set precise work /rest and water consumption rates. Dehydration

17.

Water is essential for survival. Working in the tropical conditions of a jungle environment causes the body to sweat and lose vital fluids. This loss can result in either heat exhaustion or heat stroke, both of which are life threatening conditions. The symptoms of these conditions need to be recognised early and the right treatment administered quickly to avoid serious developments. The control of water and the resupply of water becomes an essential discipline which all commanders should enforce throughout the theatre of operations. Clothing

18.

In the jungle fast-drying lightweight cotton camouflaged clothing and webbing are essential. Each man should have at least two sets of this clothing and a further set of NBC clothing if there is an threat of the use of these weapons or agents. A personal survival kit is also essential. Suitable boots and socks are vital.

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19.

Wear and tear in jungle conditions is rapid and clothing can deteriorate to the extent that it causes skin rashes and contributes, in due course, to infection. Sufficient stocks of clothing to allow for frequent changes should be available. Suitable body armour for use in these conditions may well become necessary.

20.

It should be noted that a tropical form of IPE has not yet been produced, but until such clothing is available, temperate weather IPE is the only suitable form of protection available. The wearing of this type of clothing will have a direct and immediate bearing on the pace and effectiveness of operations. The decision to wear this type of clothing will have to balance the risk of future NBC casualties against a possible loss of tactical initiative. Summary

21.

The deployment and committal to operations of troops not fully acclimatized or physically fit could rapidly result in serious medical problems and a subsequent loss of morale. SECTION 3 - LEADERSHIP Formation and Unit Commanders

22.

The overall nature of any future operations in the jungle is most likely to stem from a political or national objective, and hence the primary function of a senior military commander is to ensure that strategic military guidance he receives is translated into military objectives which can be understood at all levels of command. This should also provide a firm basis for effective leadership through the medium of clear, simple, and achievable orders, which take full account of the operating difficulties, the severe logistic constraints, and the vagaries of jungle weather.

23.

Since jungle operations normally involve actions over a widely dispersed area, it is possible that success or failure in one part of the battlefield could have an inordinate effect on the commander’s overall aim. Thus extra care is needed to ensure that tactical plans are flexible and can be adjusted quickly to reflect the new situation without compromising the overall aim.

24.

Commanders should have a clear understanding of the combined arms battle, and the characteristics of the Combat and Combat Support Arms. All commanders gain through experience that instinctive ability to be in the right place at the right time. In the jungle this ability is more difficult to exercise, but it can often make the difference between the success and failure of an operation.

25.

The publication ADP Land Operations1 has much useful material with regard to leadership and should be read in this context. In addition, Field Marshal Slim’s views about the lack of higher direction of the war in Burma during 1942 have a timeless relevance to the conduct of any operation in a jungle environment; these may be found in Chapter 12.

1

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Junior Commanders 26.

Jungle operations present unusual physical and mental challenges both for the soldier and his commander; the remoteness and loneliness of the jungle, whether real or imagined, which is exaggerated by the usual requirement to deploy in small groupings or on narrow frontages, means that much of the practical burden of leadership falls to the junior officer and NCO.

27.

The exercise of leadership in the jungle does not especially vary from other operational theatres but there are important differences of degree in the application of leadership. Junior officers and NCOs will need to display very firm leadership and exercise initiative at the point of contact with an enemy without recourse to outside help.

28.

The opportunity for more senior commanders to take over control of such situations quickly is not normally present, and thus the junior commander needs much more latitude for the interpretation and execution of orders. This would be consistent with the decentralised command process encapsulated in the mission command doctrine. Commanders at all levels will need to comprehend the overall concept of operations, the designated main effort, and their own part in these plans. Furthermore, junior commanders need to have the ability to call for assistance from other Combat Arms; in effect to coordinate the use of other assets and to plan further tactical moves rapidly. This will come with good basic all arms training, will enhance a junior commanders ability to lead others effectively, and help to provide more instinctive confidence. SECTION 4 - MORALE The Maintenance of Morale

29.

Although morale is, in principle, a state of mind and attitude, it can be altered very rapidly and depends on many factors. Good morale is generally rooted in a shared sense of purpose, a clear appreciation of the aim, confidence, both in oneself and in others, coupled with effective training and firm discipline.

30.

This applies to all theatres of war, but the remoteness and claustrophobic conditions of the jungle can cause severe psychological pressures not experienced elsewhere. Most of these can be overcome by good leadership, but additional supporting measures should be considered and introduced where necessary.

31.

Such additional measures could include: a.

Adverse Conditions. Awareness of the conditions and hardships faced in the jungle, and suitable training to offset the worst effects of these adverse conditions.

b.

Medical. Effective medical and dental preparation and training. must be his own paramedic in the jungle.

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c.

Evacuation. properly.

Practical casualty evacuation plans that are seen to function

d.

Losses/Casualties. Accounting properly for casualties after contact with the enemy. This includes locating, where appropriate, downed or missing aircrew.

Discipline 32.

The attention paid to self discipline and the embodiment of sensible standards of corporate discipline cannot be overrated. It is the glue which binds together the other aspects of morale and allows a commander to achieve the framework of trust and comradeship so essential for the conduct of successful operations. Without this, the difficulties and frustrations of the jungle will invariably reduce an individual soldier’s military performance but also reduce the ability of a commander to achieve any real measure of operational efficiency. SECTION 5 - NAVIGATION General Points

33.

Operations in the jungle will require the movement of troops through jungle tracts in columns or files, and while appropriate ISTAR plans are made for finding and following a route at company level upwards, it is prudent for every soldier to be generally aware of his destination and some detail about how to get there by day or night. If this can be achieved then greater flexibility can be built into tactical orders and suitable drills can be developed to counter ambush or surprise attack by an enemy.

34.

This will require a large measure of initial training and the building up of individual self confidence and will undoubtedly pay dividends in subsequent operations. It cannot be over emphasised that it is easy to become lost in the jungle. Movement in pairs, constant revision of procedures for “lost men” and the nomination of easily recognisable emergency RVs are an effective means of reducing this problem, as is the firing of artillery on to known grid references.

35.

Jungle maps are usually created from air photographs of the canopy, which has an overall leveling effect of the terrain beneath. Much detail on the maps is therefore interpretation and guesswork. There are many unmarked knolls and spurs on ridgelines that can because confusion to even the most experienced navigator. Tributaries are notoriously inaccurately marked and should seldom be used as navigational features. These factors will only be overcome with practice and experience. Constraints on Navigation

36.

The jungle limits visibility to an extent that equates with night navigation and thus it is appropriate to utilises similar techniques for moving through the jungle. Maps are often inaccurate and out of date with regard to changes of cultivation, tracks and clearings.

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37.

Jungle navigation is conducted by dead reckoning; by plotting the direction and distance covered. A rule of thumb indicates that for every type of independent group on the move in the jungle the commander and another designated person should be responsible for navigation so that errors can be checked and corrected. Regular updating on current locations during rest breaks is helpful where this is appropriate.

38.

In recent years the introduction of GPS making use of satellite communications to provide accurate map coordinates has proved invaluable. GPS is difficult to acquire in the jungle environment. It can and should be used as a useful aid to navigation, but is no substitute for the map and magnetic compass. For the future, secure communications, data and situational awareness will ride on the GPS, commanders must not rely on GPS as their sole means of navigation. Summary

39.

The ability to navigate efficiently in close country is a key to successful tropical operations. There is no substitute for the map, magnetic compass and pacing in the jungle. Time spent during pre-deployment training on navigation will ensure troops have sufficient self confidence when faced with the limited visibility close country. Navigation training in the jungle should be conducted in small groups and supervised by qualified jungle instructors only. Both Pamphlet No 5 and the Personal Survival and Safety Guide give full details of navigation in the jungle.

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CHAPTER 3 OPERATIONAL FACTORS IN TROPICAL ENVIRONMENTS SECTION 1 - THE POTENTIAL THREAT Background 1.

The wide dispersion of the world’s jungle precludes a precise definition of any potential threat. However, some outline definition is necessary as an essential background against which our own operational planning and tactical procedures can be set and from which our own training programmes can subsequently be derived.

2.

Over the last 50 years the main threat to stability in tropical regions has been from those factions who have drawn their inspiration from revolutionary left wing politics or communism. Vietnam, Laos, Cuba and parts of Latin America and Central Africa are all places where fighting in tropical and jungle conditions has occurred during this period. Political unrest in Irian Jaya, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Panama, the Philippines and drug cartels in Columbia have all resulted in military intervention. The later areas emphasised the need to operate in tropical conditions over multivarious terrain, both urban and open as well as close country. Figure 1 shows the areas of instability across the world in Tropical Regions and Figure 2 shows SE Asia.

3.

Since 1989 the threat to stability in these regions from communism and left wing socialism has been much reduced, although not eliminated; but these have been replaced by a more aggressive form of nationalism or self determination based on religious, ethnic, or cultural values. Such examples as the Philippines and Indonesia show how the stability of a region can be affected by such actions. Tropical jungles are also suitable regions for growing plants for use as drugs or narcotics. Drug trafficking and illegal associated activity in jungle areas can also be the cause of serious instability and regional violence. Planning Assumptions

4.

Overt armed aggression by the regular forces of one or more nations against another in one of the many jungle regions of the world is probably the most serious threat that could develop. This aggression could take many forms, but at worst, it could be an all out war in which the jungle and tropical regions are used as the battleground for obtaining a decisive result.

5.

It is this worst case assumption that forms the backdrop to the subsequent chapters of this manual. Other lesser potential threats - such as revolutionary or guerilla warfare are dealt with in AFM Vol 1 Part 10 Counter Insurgency Operations.

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Sierra Leone Ethiopia Zaire

Somalia

Cambodia Thailand Philippines

Venezuela

Indonesia Columbia Ecuador

Liberia

Sri Lanka

Congo Angola

Madagascar

Peru Zimbabwe Bolivia

Figure 3-1. Areas of Instability Across the World in tropical Regions

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Threat Characteristics 6.

The location of the tropical regions would indicate that a potential enemy could have large and generally well-equipped armed forces, but more significantly, have access to modern weapons systems and military resources from friendly neighbours in the area. It would thus be wise to assume that any future enemy is likely to be adequately trained and equipped and could sustain land and air operations in the jungle for long periods. Enemy Aims

7.

It should be assumed that an enemy has gained the ability and experience to fight in the tropical and jungle conditions. Similarly, it has to be assumed that the enemy has the ability to conduct operations on a large and coordinated scale at formation level, and that he would aim to dominate and control jungle areas and defeat an adversary as quickly as possible. The enemy would use the jungle as a means to conceal movement towards MSRs, population centres and critical areas of infrastructure.

8.

An enemy would also take advantage of the same operational principles that we adopt and would utilise the same sort of military resources to a similar level of sophistication. However, the constraints and limitations that affect fighting in the jungle will apply equally to the enemy and this, if used to advantage, could contribute to his defeat if the operational initiative can be wrested from him. SECTION 2 - JOINT OPERATIONS Background

9.

Following a government instruction to deploy a force for operations in a tropical or jungle environment, decisions would be taken within the MOD on the type and size of force to be sent and on its subsequent deployment. These are beyond the scope of this manual.

10.

It is unlikely that British forces will operate alone in any future operations in such an environment. The prospect of operating in conjunction with a multi national Alliance, or Coalition is more likely. JWP 0-10 United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint & Multinational Operations, AJP-01(A) Allied Joint Doctrine, and ADP Vol 1 Operations all provide further details on Joint and allied cooperation. Coalitions/Alliances

11.

Such a military grouping could come under UN, NATO, WEU, Commonwealth or Coalition auspices depending on the circumstances. Ensuring integrated command and control arrangements becomes a key consideration.

12.

It is also likely that the British Authorities would nominate a self contained formation for such operations, although it is feasible to nominate only a formation headquarters, or even individual trained staff officers, observers and specialists to assist other nations or governments.

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13.

Whatever the British contribution, an awareness of the main characteristics of working within a group of other military partners is important. These are set out in Chapter 6 of ADP Operations and will require careful study. Joint/Combined Operations

14.

Any British force committed to operations in the tropics will invariably be joint at the appropriate level of command and will be working to a single joint force commander.

15.

In the absence of Alliance (NATO) procedures in the operational area , UK Joint Operating Procedures should be utilised until other operating arrangements are agreed. SECTION 3 - THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK Concepts for Fighting in Tropical Areas

16.

This publication deals primarily with how to operate tactically in tropical conditions wherever they may occur as it requires commanders to adapt tactics to the specific environment. The areas are normally large and generally inhabited by very few people. As with other military operations there is clear advantage in capturing or holding areas of vital ground, such as passes over mountains or high ground where movement is canalised, perhaps because of tracks or roads.

17.

There is, however, every reason to prevent the enemy from making use of the terrain features, weather conditions and civilian population to sustain his operations; this can be achieved by seeking to dominate and control critical terrain and the airspace above it in such a way that the enemy cannot operate there without disruption to his plans.

18.

When this is achieved the ground can be used to canalise or restrict enemy movement which then can lead to more aggressive activity to destroy an enemy's will and capability to fight.

19.

The first major task could be to regain the tactical initiative from the enemy by establishing control and domination over the designated area of operations prior to making any further plans to defeat an enemy. Once this has been established operations on a larger and more coordinated scale can begin.

20.

Experience from previous campaigns in tropical terrain indicates that, at an operational level, the use of bold thrusts that move directly to areas of vital interest, while making use of deception to mask the moves of reserves, could provide the basis for military success. The terrain, weather conditions and seasonal changes (heavy monsoon rain) could have an disproportionate effect on the chances of success or failure and certainly alter the pace and tempo of operations. A commander who ignores the opportunities afforded by the terrain and changes in weather conditions will not succeed.

21.

Similarly, a commander will need to arrange his forces in such a manner to make best use of the resources available. The grouping and regrouping of forces to take

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account of the task in hand will offer the greater potential for success. The use of trackers has proved invaluable in close country in recent operations as the primary means of providing ‘battlefield visibility’ to commanders and to enable the ‘find’ function. The use of the helicopter is a significant force multiplier, but this also implies the appropriate control of airspace. 22.

There will undoubtedly be constraints and limitations that affect a commander's ability to conduct operations in tropical regions but these do not alter the overall approach to operations described in Chapter 2 of ADP Vol 1 Land Operations1 and in more detail in AFM Vol 1 Pt 1 Formation Tactics. Manoeuvrist Approach

23.

The manoeuvrist approach to operations applies to tropical and specifically jungle operations as in any other environment. Due to the nature of the jungle terrain a commander can exploit the terrain to conceal tactical movement. The shattering of the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight is a pre-requisite for success. Identifying and targeting the enemy's centre of gravity is a vital component to ensure military success. The commander's use of combined arms effects and joint operations will alleviate some of the constraints imposed by the close country jungle terrain and bring about the enemy’s defeat.

24.

In the tropical regions, attacking and fragmenting an enemy's cohesion and rendering his resistance ineffective is deemed to be potentially more rewarding than other tactics, at least initially.

25.

Breaking cohesion can be achieved in many ways and a commander will need to be flexible in utilising any number of factors to tighten the noose until it becomes a stranglehold. The main techniques that can be applied are:

1

a.

Tempo. The rate of activity relative to the enemy is the key factor. The terrain will inevitably slow the pace of battle for all sides in comparison with operations elsewhere. The onus is for the commander to make decisions quickly and execute them by utilising any means available to maintain or increase momentum. The force's ability to move from one aspect of operations to another rapidly could ensure that the operational initiative is maintained.

b.

Firepower. The selective application of firepower to attack vital bases, communication sites, command posts and logistic installations are probably those targets which have the greatest worth in tropical terrain. The ability to target and thus deliver firepower requires the commander to utilise all STA assets efficiently and selectively.

c.

Simultaneous Operations. In conjunction with tempo this technique seeks to overload an enemy commander so much that he is forced to divert time and resources away from his main operational aims.

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d.

Surprise. There are many possibilities for achieving surprise both in timing and location and these should be applied at every suitable opportunity across all levels of command.

26.

All opportunities to pre-empt, dislocate or disrupt enemy operations have to be seized and followed up with determination. Although the jungle is neutral, the hardships caused by the environment can adversely affect troops if their morale is strained.

27.

Targeting the enemy's centre of gravity could lead to his defeat. To effect this the commander has to utilise the full spectrum of the joint battlespace by applying the core functions of find, fix, strike leading to exploiting the situation. The complexities of jungle terrain can make it difficult to find an enemy, therefore, the commander has to pay attention to the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace to ensure troops and resources are used efficiently. Once an enemy is found, the complexity of the terrain can make it difficult to fix him, a commander should consider using air and artillery assets to fix an enemy whilst manoeuvring troops for the strike. Artillery units should retain a freedom of action and flexibility to switch their combat power rapidly, while air power can deliver considerable ordnance in support of operations. A plan for the exploitation of success has to be available and effectively followed through once an enemy's resistance collapses.

28.

The use of mission command is essential in an environment where communications are not necessarily available 24 hours a day. The pre-requisite of jungle operations requires a functioning decentralised style of command, allowing subordinates freedom to take action, clearly understanding the higher commanders intent in order to achieve unity of effort. SECTION 4 - COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND LIAISON General

29.

The principles of command and control of operations are described fully in ADP Land Command and AFM Vol 8 Command and Staff Procedures are not repeated here. However, a salient feature of campaigning in the jungle is that of overall planning at the highest appropriate level followed by decentralised execution; scarce military resources can then be utilised in the most effective manner.

30.

Once operations begin, the problems of command and control in practical terms, devolve down to junior commanders very quickly. Simplicity is thus the key to planning at formation level. A commander should make his operational aim and the method of achieving it very clear - not least because it enhances control. It is important to note that good workable and well rehearsed are essential to allow for effective devolution of command and control.

31.

However, a large element of initiative and latitude has to be built-in to any plan to allow subordinate commanders the ability to overcome the difficulties, delays and frustrations inherent in any jungle fighting. The hazards and danger of changing fundamental aspects of an operation in the jungle cannot be overstated. See the

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article on 'Tactical Techniques Burma 1943-45' in Chapter 12 for further details on command and control. 32.

The organisation of C2 in tropical operations will depend on whether open or close (jungle) terrain is the area of operations. Close jungle operations will require excellent communication for both access and radio communication links to and from main HQs both rear and forward. Main HQs need to consider their organisation and siting carefully. The commander must be able to move forward quickly at critical moments either by helicopter, boat or foot in time to affect operations. Rear HQ should be located with a support group, such as an echelon. Communications

33.

Radio communication is usually the only means of direct contact between a commander and his different formations and units. It may well be advantageous to establish a forward or advance headquarters at a suitable location which moves as operations develop. Redundancy and replication of communications should be considered where appropriate to improve direct contact with other users. Liaison

34.

Liaison officers at all levels of command are essential. They should be suitably chosen and briefed, and capable of moving rapidly around the jungle area (probably by helicopter). Given suitable radio links, liaison officers can back up and endorse the commander's control of the operational area, as well as confirming any changes in tactical planning, or reporting developments as they occur. This should allow a commander to be at the place of best information during periods of activity. Combat Identification

35.

Positive identification of enemy targets is always difficult but in the jungle it is even more complicated due to reduced visibility and the importance of all troops to be informed of current dispositions cannot be overstated. The danger of contact between friendly forces is a permanent hazard of fighting in the jungle and a clear definition of boundaries, objectives and other ground locations is necessary to reduce the chance of this danger.

36.

Misunderstandings and accidents cause casualties, prejudice security and lower confidence. SOPs have to contain precise instructions for identification, both on the ground and in the air. Policy for the location and marking of mines and traps should also be clearly defined. SECTION 5 - AIR OPERATIONS Air Power

37.

Air platforms and systems have a vital role at all levels of warfare in joint (and multinational) operations. UK air power consists of seven core capabilities. Elements of each core capability are likely to be involved in any operation and all should be of concern to the Land Commander.

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38.

In general Formation Commanders will only be directly concerned with the Joint Force employment of air power and specifically elements of the 2 core capabilities of: indirect and direct air operations; and combat support air operations. These offer a major contributions to the joint battle and often act as force multipliers and extenders. The Air Campaign

39.

General. As a precursor to any other operations an acceptable degree of control of the air must be achieved and maintained. This will allow friendly operations to proceed at a time and place of the commanders choosing and be free from interference from enemy air forces. All operations within a jungle environment will be affected by the density of the canopy, type of jungle and by constraints imposed by the weather. The threat from enemy GBAD systems also has to be considered as it may affect when, where and how operations are conducted.

40.

Indirect Air Operations. Carefully selected Air Interdiction (AI) operations can be used to shape the battlefield by targeting Lines of Communication, concentration areas, choke points etc beyond the reach of Land forces. Armed reconnaissance can be used along lines of communication to disrupt the enemy, thisneeds to be closely co-ordinated with the ground commander to avoid potential fratricide and ensure the effect supports the ground commander’s aims.

41.

Direct Air Operations. Close Air Support (CAS) can provide the ground commander with concentrated firepower but requires close co-ordination and control. The problems of target acquisition and identification and identifying the location of friendly forces will be a factor under the canopy, this can be offset if an accurate target position can be passed to the aircraft. The density of the jungle vegetation may reduce munitions effectiveness.

42.

Air Transport including Support Helicopters. Air insertion of patrols, battlegroups and even formations, can provide a commander with increased mobility allowing him to dominate jungle areas and seriously disrupt enemy plans. The use of rapid air insertion such as abseiling and fast roping provides a commander with additional courses of action. The use of air resupply and CASEVAC helps sustain formations in the jungle and increases a commander’s flexibility to plan his course of action. Movement and resupply from the air may be limited by landing site availability and in turn may limit the element of surprise and compromise operational security, an effective deception plan will help negate these problems.

43.

Air Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Fixed wing aircraft and helicopters can make a vital contribution to reconnaissance in the jungle, using a wide variety of sensors. Though the canopy provides enhanced concealment the very nature of the dense vegetation forces the use of specific lines of communication on which observation can be concentrated.

44.

Electronic Warfare. Most airborne EW assets are controlled at the highest appropriate level of command but the output of Electronic Support Measures (ESM) that search passively for, intercept, identify and locate radiated electromagnetic energy can provide electronic warning and surveillance data for the commander.

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SECTION 6 - MARITIME OPERATIONS Littoral Operations 45.

Most jungle regions have coastlines and many nations which possess jungle environments are also maritime nations to some extent. In a wartime situation it may well be necessary to incorporate naval forces to assist in defeating an enemy, particularly if that enemy is making use of ports and shipping lanes to resupply his forces.

46.

Maritime operations in conjunction with Alliance or Coalition partners to conduct sea control, sea denial, or maritime power projection can be established relatively quickly and normally in advance of the arrival in theatre of the designated land forces. Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) can have a significant influence on land operations and should be utilised on every suitable occasion. However NGS can never be guaranteed. Any threat to the ship will negate the mission.

47.

If the arrival in theatre of land forces is likely to be opposed then naval forces will be crucial to any further operations and may well become the leading service until landings have been established. Amphibious Operations

48.

Amphibious operations can be mounted with the appropriate type of naval shipping. These divide into two main categories; larger operations mounted from a Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) or a Landing Platform Dock (LPD), and smaller operations mounted from minesweepers, rigid raiders, local craft or dinghies, and perhaps hovercraft. If such operations are necessary advice from the Royal Navy should be sought. Riverine Operations

49.

The riverine environment is an inland, coastal or delta area comprising both land and water, characterised by limited land lines of communication (LOCs). The area is likely to have extensive water surface and/or inland waterways (including lakes) that provide natural routes for transportation and communications. It is three-dimensional, with surface, sub-surface, and air environments. Waterways serve as primary LOC and frequently constitute key terrain. To control this key terrain, forces operating in a riverine environment must able to control all three environments. (Riverine operations are distinct from water crossing operations which are covered in ATP 35(B).)

50.

Amphibious forces are not the only forces that can conduct riverine operations but, by nature of their training and equipment, they can be configured to conduct, or contribute to, riverine operations. However, a detailed mission analysis and threat assessment must always be conducted before committing amphibious forces to riverine operations to ensure that their training and equipment is suitable for the mission and threat. Annex A describes riverine operations in sufficient detail for commanders to understand the concept.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 3 RIVERINE OPERATIONS SECTION 1 - GENERAL Riverine Operations 1.

Introduction. The riverine environment is an inland, coastal or delta area comprising both land and water, characterised by limited land lines of communication (LOCs). The area is likely to have extensive water surface and/or inland waterways (including lakes) that provide natural routes for transportation and communications. It is three-dimensional, with surface, sub-surface, and air environments. Waterways serve as primary LOC and frequently constitute key terrain. To control this key terrain, forces operating in a riverine environment must able to control all three environments. (Riverine operations are distinct from water crossing operations which are covered in ATP 35(B).) Note: Amphibious forces are not the only forces that can conduct riverine operations but, by nature of their training and equipment, they can be configured to conduct, or contribute to, riverine operations. However, a detailed mission analysis and threat assessment must always be conducted before committing amphibious forces to riverine operations to ensure that their training and equipment is suitable for the mission and threat.

2.

3.

Amphibious Dimension. a.

Riverine areas may be considered as an extension of the littoral and therefore offer an important conduit for the conduct of amphibious operations. They offer natural littoral penetration points and the possibility of achieving high tempo manoeuvre in a deep, close and rear operational framework, achieving operational and tactical surprise in order to attack the enemy’s COG. In short, riverine operations may permit ship to objective manoeuvre – albeit in an environment which may channel movement.

b.

ATFs, with their mix of naval units, surface and air movement assets, organic fire support, LF and well developed C2 arrangements may be well suited to form the core of a riverine force.

Concept of Operations. a.

Riverine operations seek to project power ashore by exploiting the riverine manoeuvre space. They are based on the principle of manoeuvre and should be conducted by a riverine force task organised to operate within the unique characteristics of a riverine area. A single riverine force commander with his own AOOs, appropriately supported by command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance assets, is key to the riverine concept. The riverine force will integrate and

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employ various types of surface and air movement assets, specialist vehicles, weapons and appropriately trained personnel. There must be the capability to task organise the force, from the insertion of small reconnaissance teams for clandestine operations to the rapid movement of large manoeuvre units to create or exploit the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities. b.

The riverine force will seek to use organic and long range fires to fix and strike the enemy from an unexpected direction. In humanitarian operations, “strike” may include the delivery of medical assistance or other aid. Riverine force mobility will be by a combination of surface and air movement. SECTION 2 - COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE FOR RIVERINE OPERATIONS

Command Relationships 4.

5.

The principles of C2 are defined in AJP 3 Chapter 2. A single riverine force commander functioning at the tactical level will command the riverine force within his own designated AOO. There are three options in designating the riverine force commander outlined below. The proportion of the AOA that is assigned as the riverine force AOO will be a significant factor in determining which option is chosen. a.

The JFC appoints an existing component commander, dual hatted, as the riverine force commander. The JFMCC, JFLCC or JFSOFCC are the most likely to be suitable.

b.

A component commander appoints a subordinate as the riverine force commander.

c.

The JFC establishes the riverine force commander as a separate additional functional component commander in his own right. (This is the least likely option because, even if the riverine area is so significant that it dominates the landmass within the JOA, it is likely that the LCC will be dual hatted as riverine force commander.)

Whichever option is chosen the commander with the preponderance of riverine force assets and the best capability to directly control riverine force operations will normally be designated as the riverine force commander. He will assume TACOM of all additional riverine force elements which are not permanently under his command. The supported/supporting relationship between the riverine force commander and other components or elements of the force will be defined by the JFC. Command And Control

6.

A riverine force HQ, including staff, communications, and life support will support the riverine force commander. Where possible, appropriate staff work should be conducted at higher or rear HQs and made available to the riverine force commander through reliable CIS. The riverine force commander must be able to liaise/communicate with any supported forces. The riverine force commander

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requires the capability to deploy forward rapidly with a small tactical HQ element afloat. 7.

Ideally the riverine force HQ should be embarked in a vessel or craft suitable for the purpose. This provides mobility, enabling the riverine force HQ to move without the need for a step up HQ, enhances protection, and reduces the logistic burden. Much of the life support requirements such as power, light, catering, and accommodation will be integral to the craft. Alternatively the riverine force HQ may be deployed ashore. This will facilitate the use of landline and static satellite ground stations. A possible solution is the use of a craft with communications vehicles embarked to provide the CIS requirement and the ability to deploy the riverine force HQ ashore.

8.

Appropriately equipped small fast raiding craft, communications vehicles, and helicopters in the airborne command post (CP) role can provide the platforms for the tactical HQ. Communication and Information Systems (CIS)

9.

The CIS requirement will be characterised by the potential need to conduct riverine force operations over extended ranges. This will be complicated by the nature of riverine areas, which are usually low lying estuaries, deltas, or river valleys. Whilst the ability to deploy an afloat riverine force HQ forward may improve the problem of communicating to forward riverine force elements, this may reduce the ability to communicate to higher and flanking HQs. Afloat, shore-based or airborne rebroadcast (REBRO) facilities may have to be established. The riverine force commander will need real time access to the joint operations picture (JOP). Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)

10.

The riverine force will require access to ISTAR product, and may require its own ISTAR assets. Sensor platforms, to include sub-surface, which can be launched and recovered by organic riverine force assets, are necessary. These sensors must also possess the ability to connect to higher and adjacent elements of command in order to contribute to the compilation of the JOP. The riverine force requires the ability to see in all three mediums of the three dimensional riverine battlespace, to include an enhanced ability to reconnoitre waterways, inspect unknown vessels, and provide mine countermeasures ability without loss of initiative or tempo.

11.

The riverine force commander will require access to rapid environmental assessment (REA) to enable him to fully exploit opportunities arising in the complex riverine environment. SECTION 3 - PLANNING FOR RIVERINE OPERATIONS Planning Principles for Riverine Operations

12.

The planning tools and the estimate process described in AJP 3 equally apply to riverine operations. In addition the principles and planning procedures for the various land Operations of War laid down in ATP-35(B) and the types of amphibious

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operations laid down in this ATP should be applied in riverine operations, as appropriate. Specific Planning Factors for Riverine Operations 13.

As well as the enemy, the factors characteristic of the riverine environment need to be considered in any intelligence preparation of the battlespace. The following list of such factors emphasises the importance of REA, or other knowledge of the riverine environment. a.

b.

The River. (1)

Tidal or Non-tidal Reaches. Craft may be trapped by falling tides or unable to proceed upriver at low water. Care will be required to prevent salt water corroding vulnerable equipment. The draft of surface craft will vary between salt water and less buoyant fresh water, which may affect performance.

(2)

Stream. The strength and direction of the current, which may alter with the tide, will affect operations.

(3)

Water. The nature of the water itself, which as well as salinity, includes visibility, turbidity, and waterborne disease.

(4)

Width. The usable width of river may limit the type of craft employed. As a general principle craft should not navigate past a point where they cannot turn around quickly and easily.

(5)

Depth. The minimum depth to be encountered will be a limiting factor for surface craft. The effects of tide and seasonal variations must be considered.

(6)

Riverbed. The nature of the riverbed will determine if it provides good holding ground for anchorage and if it is suitable for mining. Where the depth is suitable for wading, the riverbed may not support the weight of a man or vehicle.

(7)

River Banks. Sections of the river banks suitable to land/embark troops or vehicles need to be identified. Craft require sufficient depth of water to access the river banks. The banks may be firm, marshy, forested or inhabited, provide cover from view/fire, and include infra-structure and local resources which can be exploited.

(8)

Traffic. The riverine force must determine what local craft use the river and how they will affect riverine force operations. Friendly or enemy forces may be able to use them. Changes in normal traffic patterns may be indicators of enemy activity.

Obstacles. These are anything that could be hazardous to, slow down, or stop a craft. Obstacles will be natural and civilian and military man-made.

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They will be on, above, and below the surface of the water. Some will be fixed, whilst others will be floating with the current. The effect obstacles have will differ between craft. For example, LCAC will be unaffected by sandbars, but may not pass under low bridges. Obstruction removal and MCM are critical planning considerations. c.

Riverine Landing Areas (RLAs) and Riverine Landing Sites (RLSs). A RLA includes a segment of riverbank, or similar, along a waterway over which troops, supplies, or equipment can be landed from craft. A RLA contains one or more RLS which, in turn, contain one or more points at which individual craft land and disembark troops and materiel. The criteria for selecting RLAs are: (1)

Riverine force mission and composition.

(2)

Riverine force craft characteristics and capabilities.

(3)

Disposition of the enemy.

(4)

Hydrography.

(5)

Riverbank/terrain (including the hinterland).

(6)

Obstacles.

Surface Craft 14.

To a large extent, the flexibility to plan for the riverine force to undertake different missions and tasks is dependent on the surface craft employed. As well as the usual considerations of range, payload, maintenance, and sustainment, survivability/protection is an essential factor. Survivable, deployable surface craft that minimise detection by the enemy and acquisition by advanced weapons are vital. These attributes are achieved through a mix of stealth, speed, manoeuvrability and armour. Aircraft

15.

Fixed- and rotary-wing air operations play a valuable role in the riverine environment. Mission, enemy threat, operational environment, available resources, and support requirements determine the composition of air elements assigned to support the riverine force. The riverine force needs aircraft capable of operating under the conditions found in a riverine environment. Advanced V/STOL aircraft are ideally configured for this role. Air support facilities (arming, refuelling, and maintenance) will be required to support aircraft when ranges to the objective area and the need for decreased cycle times necessitates temporary separation from sea-based platforms or land bases outside the riverine area.

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Reserves 16.

As in all military operations, the retention of a reserve is essential for the riverine force commander to have freedom of action in dealing with anticipated and unexpected developments. To maintain tempo and exploit fleeting opportunities, the reserve must be held at high readiness. This requires flexibility, careful planning, rehearsal, co-ordination, and reliable communications between all elements. An airmobile reserve can deploy directly against located enemy positions and is usually the preferred type. Whilst providing the quickest response, maintaining a reserve on airborne alert is very demanding on resources and, therefore, will only be done during critical phases of an operation. Surface-borne reserves can provide a rapid and effective response and will often be the only type available. Reserve forces, at the appropriate readiness, are maintained in assembly areas either ashore or afloat. To facilitate their immediate employment, reserve forces should be prepared for anticipated tasks, including rehearsals where possible. Force Protection/Safety

17.

Force protection will be a major consideration for the riverine force commander. The requirement for safety precautions specific to riverine operations will have to be balanced against other requirements such as speed. Loading and unloading of personnel is a hazardous operation, especially at night. There is always a danger of personnel falling into the water and being carried away by the current. The following safety precautions will apply particularly to the movement of civilians or nonspecialist personnel. a.

Where possible, a safety boat equipped with a swimmer in harness, portable floodlights (night), and life rings attached to lines, shall be positioned close downstream during loading or unloading operations.

b.

All personnel and boat crews will wear lifejackets during loading and unloading. In the event of falling in the water, troops should be capable of easily ditching any equipment worn. To the maximum extent, all personnel should have both hands free; they should pass heavy equipment between river assault craft and pontoon piers prior to loading and unloading.

c.

Buoy markers should be placed on equipment to facilitate salvage in the event of loss. SECTION 4 - LOGISTICS IN RIVERINE OPERATIONS

General 18.

Logistic support in riverine operations falls into three categories: a.

Logistic support integral to the riverine force.

b.

Logistic support provided to the riverine force by others.

c.

Logistic support provided by the riverine force to others.

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Integral Logistic Support 19.

In designing the riverine force’s integral logistics, a balance must be struck between making the riverine force self sufficient for as long as possible and keeping the riverine force as small, agile, and defendable commensurate to the mission. The riverine force should be capable of the following: a.

Obtaining re-supply as necessary, including re-fuelling.

b.

Self maintenance and repair, including damage control and craft recovery (salvage).

c.

First aid medical support.

d.

The logistics requirements of the entire riverine force should be integrated. The initial load for individual surface craft should include food, water, and ammunition for embarked troops, so that they can operate and be sustained by the same craft from which they fight.

External Support to the Riverine Force 20.

Logistic support provided by external forces and agencies must be responsive to the needs of the riverine force. Re-supply of surface craft in the AOO will be largely dependent upon the duration and expenditure rates of planned operations, as well as the total lift capacity of the force and the geography of the riverine environment. A system must be established with the capability of performing the following functions. a.

The provision and transport of supplies and equipment to locations designated by the riverine force commander. Normal means of re-supply are: (1)

Surface craft.

(2)

Air landed.

(3)

Overland.

(4)

Air drop.

b.

Evacuation of casualties that are beyond the medical capability of the riverine force.

c.

Maintenance and salvage operations beyond the capabilities of the riverine force.

d.

Evacuation of prisoners of war and refugees.

e.

Provision of battle casualty replacements.

f.

A planning consideration throughout will be the level of overtness/covertness of the riverine operation.

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Riverine Force Logistic Support to Others 21.

The provision of logistic support could be the riverine force’s main effort, either when the riverine force is in support of other formations or components, or when the riverine force mission is essentially humanitarian. The riverine force could provide a waterborne main supply route (MSR), hold materiel afloat, provide self-contained medical and maintenance facilities, and accommodate and administer troops whilst waiting for or recuperating from operations, thereby preserving and re-generating combat power. Logistic Concept of Operations

22.

The provision of logistic support to the riverine force follows the same principles as for any other operation. The main difference is the ability to exploit waterways as a medium for movement, and the inherent capacity of surface craft for a range of logistic functions. First line logistic support will be grouped with the fighting echelon. Second line support will be provided from a main operating base (MOB) which will be the focal point for all logistic support. Dependant on the size and composition of the riverine force, together with the extent and nature of the riverine force’s AOO and the mission and tasks assigned, the riverine force may also push forward second line support by establishing one or more forward operating bases (FOBs). A waterborne MSR may be established along with afloat distribution points (DPs). Logistic Command and Control

23.

The riverine force commander will appoint a MOB commander who will normally be in overall C2 of waterborne logistic operations. The MOB commander may be collocated with the riverine force HQ or may have a discrete HQ. The C2 arrangements must ensure that riverine force logistic requirements are integrated with those of the Joint Force (JF) as a whole. Main Operating Base (MOB)

24.

The riverine force MOB may be established afloat or ashore. If established afloat, it may be sea based and operating from OTH using a combination of amphibious ships, other naval support ships and commercial shipping. Alternatively, the MOB may use smaller vessels and craft capable of navigating shallower inland waterways. If ashore, the MOB may exploit seaports, inland harbours and other infrastructure or be established in a field site.

25.

As well as providing second line support to the riverine force, the MOB will receive third-line re-supply for onward movement and back-load material for third-line support elsewhere. All or part of the riverine force fighting echelon may be collocated in the MOB and use it as a patrol and or fire support base. Likewise, the MOB may also contain the riverine force HQ and aviation assets.

26.

Dependent on the circumstances, the MOB may be collocated with other elements of a JF or dispersed. Wherever it is located, the MOB will need protection commensurate to the threat. The MOB commander will be responsible for local security. The riverine force commander will have to allocate resources for the wider

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protection of the MOB. If the MOB is collocated with other elements of the JF in another commander’s AOO, then the riverine force commander may delegate TACON of the MOB to that commander for the purpose of protecting the MOB. If sea based, protection of the MOB will be the MCC/CATF responsibility. Forward Operating Base (FOB) 27.

A FOB may be established, as required, and will have many of the characteristics of a MOB. The most likely requirement for establishing a FOB is when the riverine force is operating over extended distances; when the MOB is sea based; or when a phase of an operation requires a surge in logistic support. A FOB is more likely to be held afloat and collocated with elements of the riverine force fighting echelon. Like the MOB, the FOB will need appropriate protection and, to that end, should be capable of moving every 24 hours if necessary. Waterborne Main Supply Route (MSR)

28.

The basic principles of moving stocks on road transport apply equally well to waterborne operations. The main difference is in deciding whether it is better to maximise craft lift by transporting stocks only, or reducing loading times and double handling by keeping stocks on vehicles where possible. CPs must be established at each end of the MSR with control parties. These must be capable of organising reception, parking, embark/disembark, and dispatch of vehicles and craft. Local protection, liaison, and communications will also be required. Waterborne Distribution Point (DP)

29.

The same principles for operating a DP from a craft apply as they would on land. A DP may be established to re-supply other waterborne elements of the riverine force or other forces ashore. If re-supplying other waterborne assets, this can be done underway, at anchor, or moored alongside dependant upon the tactical situation and local conditions. If re-supplying forces ashore, it should be noted that the most effective means is to establish a vehicle exchange point ashore and exchange full for empty vehicles. SECTION 5 - OFFENSIVE RIVERINE OPERATIONS Scope

30.

A riverine assault operation commences when troops begin tactical loading at the riverine base or assembly area for an operation (which could be at sea). Termination begins when all forces involved have returned to the base, redeployed for subsequent tasks, or as ordered.

31.

The phases of the riverine force assault operations are pre-planning (covered in Section II), tactical loading, movement, landing attack, subsequent operations, and planned withdrawal, if required.

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Tactical Loading 32.

Tactical loading of troop units in riverine assault craft from a land or afloat base must be carefully planned and co-ordinated. Detailed tactical loading procedures must be established and promulgated with the operation order if they are not covered in the SOPs. Factors that must be considered are: a.

Safety of personnel during loading.

b.

Timing.

c.

Logistics requirements.

d.

Security.

e.

Accountability of personnel.

f.

Availability of standby craft in the event of a casualty.

g.

Dispersal of key equipment.

Tactical Loading Plan 33.

The plan is prepared when surface movement asset availability and troop loading requirements are firmly established. Tactical loading of troops into air movement assets from either land or afloat bases will be in accordance with established service doctrine. Movement

34.

When transiting waterways to an objective area, riverine assault forces must be prepared for unforeseen situations. Commanders will be provided with a detailed and current intelligence estimate of the AOO and the movement route. In view of the fact that independent action is frequently required by individual craft crews, they must be adequately briefed. As rivers and canals narrow or shoreline vegetation increases, so increases the danger from hostile fire, ambush, and mining. Unit commanders must maintain a readiness posture consistent with the enemy capabilities and threat. Tactical Organisation for Movement

35.

The tactical organisation for movement should parallel the organisation for landing to avoid re-organisation upon arrival at the RLA.

36.

The waterborne elements of the riverine assault force are task organised to provide an advance guard, a main body, and rear guard. Essential tasks such as reconnaissance, mine clearance, fire support, troop lift, and escort are assigned to movement groups and units, as appropriate.

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Command and Control 37.

During the movement phase, the commander designated by the riverine force commander exercises operational control of the forces assigned.

38.

Control measures employed normally include the use of water checkpoints and a movement table to regulate the water movement. Techniques

39.

The following techniques may be applicable during movement to and from the objective area. a.

Escort. An escort should be provided for transport movement, whenever possible. Escorts could be provided by surface or air assets, depending upon the tactical situation. Provision of escorts is the responsibility of the commander of the unit controlling the movement.

b.

Avoiding Patterns. When operations are being conducted over an extended period, times of transits and routes for troop rotation or re-supply will be varied, consistent with operational requirements.

c.

Targets of Opportunity. Targets of opportunity may occur during movements to and from the objective area. These may be waterborne or on land. ROE may require that authorisation be obtained before engaging such targets. Consideration must be given to the assigned mission before taking action which may delay movement of the force.

d.

Attack on the Force. If the force is attacked during movement, immediate action will be taken to neutralise the hostile fire. C2 boats and troop carriers (with troops embarked) should clear the area of attack at best possible speed, unless the decision is made to assault the enemy. If required, NGs, artillery, and air support will be requested. When the tactical situation permits, a quickreaction force may be landed to conduct follow-up operations. If the decision is made to counter-attack, river assault craft will land previously designated counter-ambush forces.

e.

Responsibility. The reaction to unforeseen situations is the responsibility of the element’s assigned commander: the person responsible for accomplishing the assigned mission. However, once forces have been landed for ground operations, the authority and responsibility for subsequent action ashore must rest with the CLF.

Landing Attack 40.

The landing attack phase begins with the arrival of the main body of the riverine assault force in the landing area and ends with the seizure of initial objectives. It encompasses shaping operations, assault, and seizure of objectives.

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41.

It is always desirable, and often necessary, to control both banks of rivers on which riverine forces operate. However, it is especially important to control the shore opposite the area in which landings take place. As a minimum, the opposite shore must be controlled by fire and, in many instances, it will be necessary to have troops physically occupy the opposite shore to provide the necessary rear security for the LF making the main attack. Task Organisation

42.

The aim of task organisation is to project a tactically configured force ashore immediately ready for combat. The organisation should maintain the tactical integrity of assault units, provide flexibility in reacting to the situation encountered, and facilitate control of subsequent manoeuvre. The basic unit is the boat team. Landing Techniques

43.

When making the final approach to the river landing site, artillery, river assault craft gunfire, and air and naval fire may deliver preparatory fires. Pre-designated fire support craft mark the limits on either flank of the RLS. These craft may beach if conditions permit in order to deliver more effective fire as the troops land. A C2 boat should be stationed in the vicinity of the transport craft landing area. Escort craft are stationed to protect the transport craft. Escort duties may include establishing patrol barriers up and down stream from the RLS to seal river approaches and along the opposite bank to protect the rear of the force.

44.

When the transport craft of the first wave reach positions opposite the river landing points, they turn (independently or upon signal) and beach on the shore where troops and vehicles are landed. After disembarkation, the transport craft retract, clear the RLS, and move to act as a blocking force or transit to an assembly area by prescribed routes, avoiding interference with succeeding waves. During landing operations, riverine assault craft may also provide afloat command facilities, close fire support, evacuation, and re-supply.

45.

If available, amphibious vehicles may be used to land troops. Depending on the situation, troops may be disembarked or stay aboard amphibious vehicles to achieve the objective ashore.

46.

When the landing is completed and the riverine force mission is to operate ashore for a specified period, river assault craft will assemble at a designated staging area, take up patrol, blocking or fire support stations, conduct mine clearance operations, and perform other assigned tasks. If the riverine force is to remain ashore, all or part of the supporting riverine assault craft may be returned to the riverine base, depending upon the mission and the tactical situation. Scheme of Manoeuvre

47.

Riverine operations normally have destruction of the enemy forces as their primary mission and schemes of manoeuvre designed to fix, entrap and destroy a hostile force in a given AOO. The lack of definite intelligence may make it necessary to base

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the selection of objectives on terrain rather than a hostile force location. However, the primary objective is the hostile force, not the terrain itself. 48.

Riverine assault operations capitalise on supporting surface craft capabilities and the tactical flexibility inherent in the continuous availability of assault support craft to support tactical manoeuvre. Craft may: a.

Transport and support units in the assault.

b.

Withdraw or re-deploy troops.

c.

Act as, or in support of, a blocking force.

d.

Conduct waterborne reconnaissance, security, and combat patrols.

e.

Transport a raiding force.

f.

Deploy crew-served weapons.

g.

Transport reserves.

h.

Perform re-supply and evacuation.

i.

Provide a command platform.

j.

Serve as mobile aid stations.

k.

Provide direct and indirect fire support.

l.

Evacuate friendly personnel, prisoners of war, defectors, or detainees from a threat environment.

m.

Perform damage control, salvage, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations (on a limited basis).

Fire Support 49.

The riverine force will use all supporting arms where appropriate. The use of supporting arms will be in accordance with current NATO doctrine. The following is of special note during the landing attack. a.

The use of all means of mobility is a key factor when employing artillery in riverine operations, since artillery frequently must be repositioned prior to the assault landing. This usually requires that artillery positions be supported by air and other artillery during movement. Additional protection/security forces may be required as temporary augmentation to displaced or isolated units.

b.

Lack of adequate artillery reserved areas (ARAs) may deny use of the quantity and calibre of artillery normally dictated by hostile strength and area characteristics.

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50.

c.

Artillery batteries may be deployed by either surface craft, helicopters, or on barges which act as firing platforms.

d.

Positions selected for either land or afloat fire support bases should permit providing fire support for the manoeuvre force while en route to or from the AOO.

e.

Normally, the lack of commanding terrain in the area of operations increases emphasis on aerial observation, particularly during waterborne movement. A combination of aerial observers with forward observers on the ground allows the best artillery coverage, co-ordination, and surveillance of the battle area.

Assault Craft Fires. Assault craft fires are supporting direct and indirect fire provided to the riverine force by craft. These craft deliver direct fire with a wide variety of automatic weapons. Craft can also provide indirect fire support with mortars installed on selected craft. A high degree of co-ordination is required to provide support of troops ashore. a.

The force commander of the riverine assault operation is responsible for coordination of all fires, including assault fires, in support of operations ashore.

b.

Once troops begin landing, all assault craft fire into the area of operations must be either delivered at the request of the supported units or cleared by the force commander.

c.

Direct Fire Support. Assault craft providing direct fire in support of a specified unit for one phase of an operation will normally be in direct support of that unit. The boat unit commander advises the supported commander concerning the capabilities of assault craft weapons. These weapons may be given neutralisation, interdiction, harassing, or destruction fire missions. They may augment infantry weapons with fires through gaps in friendly lines. Whatever the mission, their fires must be executed in co-ordination with the supported unit commander’s fire support plan. (1)

Vehicle-Mounted Weapons. Vehicle-mounted weapons may provide direct fire support. Depending on their characteristics, vehicle-mounted weapons might be employed whilst still embarked in suitable craft or, once landed, to fire positions on a flank or opposite bank, or with the assaulting force in direct support.

(2)

Indirect Fire Support. Craft equipped with indirect fire weapons may be employed as a fire unit. With all craft in close proximity, one can direct the fires of all to provide supporting indirect fires. Normally, indirect fire will be observed by an aerial or ground observer who can communicate directly with supporting boats, through the ground unit fire supporting boats, or through the ground unit fire support co-ordination centre.

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SECTION 6 - DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS Purpose 51.

Defensive operations are usually undertaken to defeat or deter a threat in order to set the conditions for offensive action. These operations may be used to gain control of waterways in order to support subsequent riverine assault operations. Defensive operations serve five basic purposes: a.

Protect friendly lines of communication.

b.

Deny hostile forces the use of waterways.

c.

Collect intelligence information.

d.

Perform security missions.

e.

Enforce population and resources control.

Concept of Operations 52.

Manoeuvre is the decisive element at all levels in defence. The concept of riverine defensive operations is based on mobile riverine force elements, including both surface craft and aircraft, conducting waterway interdiction, barrier, surveillance and security operations. These operations are also highly suited to crisis response missions. The type of craft selected will depend on the environment, the enemy threat, and the assigned mission. The air and surface operations are mutually supporting and may be conducted independently or concurrently. Waterway interdiction, barrier, surveillance, and security operations are achieved by establishing framework patrolling and observation posts (OPs). The principles and types of patrol found in land operations, standing, fighting and recce, apply equally to riverine operations. Surface patrols will be predominantly by watercraft, however, vehicle, foot, or a combination of patrolling methods will also be used. Where possible, patrols should be mutually supporting, requiring close co-ordination of supporting fires.

53.

Effectiveness of the combined surface and airborne operation can be aided by rigid enforcement of curfews and traffic/zone restrictions, as appropriate.

54.

Remote sensors used in conjunction with supporting arms or remotely fired demolitions are an effective method of interdiction offering minimal risk to friendly personnel.

55.

Effective control of the smaller rivers and canals in the riverine area can best be maintained by controlling the banks and adjacent territory. However, connecting tributaries between major waterways may be controlled by patrol-blocking action. Waterway interdiction, barrier, surveillance, and security forces will conduct patrols and inshore surveillance to enforce curfews and prevent enemy infiltration, movement, and re-supply along and across the major waterways of the area.

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56.

These operations often will be conducted with the added hazards of operating continuously within weapon range of the enemy. Command Relationships

57.

The CO of the waterway interdiction, barrier, surveillance and security forces will be designated by the riverine force CO and will exercise tactical command of assigned forces. The command relationship structure should be flexible, with necessary changes being implemented as required. Tactics and Procedures

58.

Tactics and Procedures. This section outlines various tactical considerations and procedures; however, these are not all-inclusive, nor do they necessarily apply to all phases of waterway interdiction, barrier, surveillance, and security operations. a.

Area Familiarisation. Prior to initial patrols, COs will arrange for area indoctrination and familiarisation of personnel.

b.

Secondary Missions. Patrols may be modified, at times, to accommodate requests for combat support of forces ashore, including blocking and similar operations.

c.

Craft Movement. The patrol route must be divided into tactical bounds and rendezvous (RV) designated. Craft will move in line, astern, always keeping in sight of each other, but a tactical distance apart as ordered. Craft move around blind bends as shown in Figure 3A-1, always keeping one on the bend to contact craft in either direction. (1)

Where depth of water may be a problem, craft should follow the main tract of the river (outside of bends). Where the presence of hostile forces ashore is anticipated, craft should hug the un-populated or friendly bank if there is one, and if not, take the centre of a waterway.

(2)

All feasible landing points should be considered prior to the patrol. These should be noted when moving on the river, while looking for additional landing points.

(3)

Good communications between craft and between the patrol and the patrol base are essential. Visual signals should be used where possible, while craft must have ID signals for operating at night or in reduced visibility.

d.

Mutual Support. Multiple boat patrols are frequently useful in providing mutual support.

e.

Rafting Drills/Mooring. Standing patrols will require to lay up, while there will be other occasions when it will be necessary for craft to lay up. The options are to raft up at anchor in mid-stream, to lie alongside a jetty or bank, or to beach. The method chosen will depend upon a number of factors including

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likely enemy dispositions, type of craft, and the nature of the river, riverbed and its banks including cover and tidal range. Uninhabited islands make good defendable lying up areas, but care should be taken to avoid obvious locations. Craft should be camouflaged and troops should provide protection from the banks, if possible. Craft should always be held at very short notice to move, and ideally be able to do so in more than one direction. Line of Sight

3 2

4

3 4

2 1

1

Figure 3A-1 Craft Movement f.

Time and Pattern of Patrols. Boats will conduct a random patrol, and not establish a pattern such as passing through the same points on subsequent passes, or at regular intervals. This may invite mining or ambush.

Ambush 59.

60.

Setting friendly ambushes and avoiding enemy ambushes play an important role in waterway interdiction, barrier, surveillance, and security operations. A few examples of likely ambush positions are as follows: a.

Where craft have difficulty manoeuvring (eg, in fast flowing narrow reaches or shallows).

b.

Blind bends.

c.

Reaches where craft cannot gain the bank to land own troops for counter attack.

d.

Where obstacles force craft to slow down or navigate close to a hostile bank.

e.

Where the river is dominated by high ground, such as gorges.

Helicopters can be used to spot possible ambush sites and to provide over watch. When patrols cannot avoid likely ambush sites, they can pre-empt them by landing foot or vehicle patrols to provide covering fire.

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a.

Craft in Killing Ground. These can either drive into the ambush bank to carry out a counter attack (Figure 3A-2 (a)), or move on as swiftly as possible through the killing ground to the next RV (Figure 3A-2 (b)). Other alternatives are for these craft to deploy troops to the opposite bank as covering fire group (Figure 3A-2 (c)), or to move further up river on the same bank to act as a stop group or to take part in an encircling movement.

b.

Use of Smoke. If used carefully, smoke can be advantageous. It can be generated from a canister or smoke dispenser mounted on the craft, from a light mortar or vehicle embarked and capable of firing from a craft, or by smoke grenade. The disadvantage is that the view of following craft may be obscured, reducing their ability to manoeuvre and provide fire support.

Response to Hostile Fire 61.

The response must be governed by the type and volume of fire received and the ROE in effect. The presence of civilian populace and/or other friendly forces in the operational area must also be considered. ROE and measures to prevent mutual interference must be observed. Anti-ambush Drills

62.

During the briefing, arcs of fire and signals for opening fire must be designated. The numerous possible responses to an enemy ambush will depend on the circumstances. Good briefing and communications together with well-practised drills and rehearsals are essential in every case. If craft are moving tactically, the likelihood of more than one craft being caught in the killing area is reduced.

Enemy Position

Enemy 3 3

4 1

4

2

1 2

(a)

(b)

Enemy

(b)

Return Fire (c)

Figure 3A-2 Craft in Killing Ground

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CHAPTER 4

TACTICAL FACTORS IN TROPICAL OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 - OPERATIONAL SELF RELIANCE 1.

Over and above all the functions in combat which have been described above, the factor of operational reliance in tropical areas is paramount. This is not just the provision of sufficient material resources and equipment for the task in hand.

2.

Self reliance in tropical regions starts with the attitude that, as an individual, a soldier has the ability to sustain himself, both with food and water, and with his ability to live in the jungle and tropical areas, move by day or night without detection, and has enough medical knowledge to provide basic first aid for himself.

3.

Beyond this, all commanders should group themselves and their resources in such away as to provide protection and self reliance of the group or sub unit so that they are capable of fighting and surviving in the jungle without the support of others if necessary.

4.

Morale and confidence increase when it is seen that all levels of command are involved in ensuring that operational reliance of all formations and units is sustained. Self reliance is an attitude of mind, a function of good leadership which goes far beyond the careful control and allocation of resources and equipment. This attitude will go a long way towards breaking the mentality of a 'linear approach' to fighting. Jungle and tropical operations have to be characterised as non-linear and there is generally no flank or rear protection for any formation or unit. Mutual support between units is often not possible and formations will have to be prepared to act independently at all times, including CSS units and other fixed military installations. SECTION 2 - DOMINATING THE JUNGLE General Points

5.

Success in tropical operations, particularly jungle fighting turns on the ability to dominate the terrain, and to do so in all phases of war. Whatever the operational situation the first task will probably be to establish a presence in the area of operations and then take steps to dominate the area of operations. This task can be substantially aided by the user of tracker-trained personnel, at patrol level, to apply a high degree of discrimination to evidence of activity observed, thereby allowing a focused deployment of ISTAR and other assets.

6.

It will be necessary to challenge the enemy’s ability to control jungle and other areas, wrest the initiative from him, and then to build up an organisation that can ensure control is fully retained thereafter.

7.

The need to balance forces correctly to sustain a dominating presence is paramount. Placing force elements in positions where they can achieve domination without either overstretching them or compromising the effect requires a highly focused effort, placing forces where there is known activity and not expending effort in those areas where there has been no activity.

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Domination 8.

Tactical domination in the jungle and other tropical regions requires the establishment of control over the main routes and potential landing sites; tasks which cannot be achieved until the surrounding area has been dominated. Distinguishing between hostile, neutral and unknown presence will be vital in maintaining local support from the local population, and, in a PSO environment, maintaining consent. A gradual gaining of the initiative can be built up by the following sequence of events: a.

Patrols. Inserting a variety of patrols with trackers into enemy held territory with the task of locating the enemy and the routes that he uses.

b.

Bases. Establishing temporary bases. Patrols can then gain local control over small areas of jungle at a suitable distance from the enemy and check on landing sites. (Movement by day, ambushes by night).

c.

Seeking the Enemy. Using the firm base to make positive contact with the enemy. Patrols can then gradually enlarge to combat team/company group size to form a jungle base or even a fire support base where appropriate. Tasks would be enlarged to include dominating larger areas and attacking any enemy found.

d.

Ambushes. Various types of ambush are normally the primary method of seeking and closing with the enemy in jungle terrain. Ambushes provide the opportunity to defeat the enemy disrupt his plans and lower his morale. During the East Timor operation, blocking forces were forward mounted omn information supplied by tracking teams to ambush the enemy on their anticipated routes with great success.

e.

Control. Dominating the area around the base. One or more combat teams are inserted and establish controlled areas. A battle group HQ can then be introduced to provide control over all areas dominated and to act as a coordinating point for further tactical operations of a more wide ranging nature.

f.

Presence. Establishing a permanent combat presence throughout the area of operations.

g.

Enlargement. Repeating and enlarging the cycle. SECTION 3 - THE FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT

General 9.

The principles of war are the basis for the successful employment of military force in combat. The guidance of these broad principles is translated into operational concepts which are known as 'functions in combat'. The practical expression of the 'functions in combat' is combat power - physical capabilities. When guided by

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doctrine and with the human dimension added, the result is 'fighting power' which defines the ability to fight. 10.

These 'functions in combat', their validation and their use on the battlefield are covered fully in AFM Formation Tactics. Additional factors which apply to a jungle environment are mentioned in subsequent paragraphs. Command

11.

The jungle conditions and environment make the achievement of good and effective command and control (C2) more difficult than elsewhere unless the aims of any tactical activity are very simple, clear and direct.

12.

The synchronisation of assets in a tropical campaign requires skill and a sound knowledge of the environment. Realistic timetables and timings based on sound practical knowledge of jungle conditions are critical for success. If in doubt plan for at least twice the time it takes to achieve the task elsewhere. Where movement by night is proposed, times will be much greater and must be bounded by realistic rehearsal in each environment anticipated.

13.

Once committed to operations, C2 should devolve very rapidly to junior commanders in order to allow them the flexibility to take advantage of tactical opportunities as they occur. Jungle operations are the classic situation where mission command, especially the decentralisation of command, has to work effectively.

14.

Difficulties in observation, communications and the passage of information mean that commanders will perceive a lack of information. They must be prepared for this, and an apparent slowing in tempo (compared to other environments). The thorough training of subordinate commanders, will reduce command frustration, and expectation management will be a key component of the commander’s training. Information and Intelligence

15.

As in every other theatre of war, a major difficulty confronting the commander in the tropical regions will be the acquisition of reliable and timely intelligence. The tropical area can shroud an enemy's intentions just as easily as it can conceal his movements. While the principles of intelligence collection remain unaltered by external influences, the collection of information and intelligence will be made even more difficult by the inhospitable nature of the jungle environment.

16.

In the jungle the Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR) of a tactical commander is relatively localised but, within that AIR, information and intelligence are still difficult to acquire. Given the reduction in the amount of IMINT likely to be available to the tactical commander, he will have to rely, to a large extent, on HUMINT and SIGINT to meet his intelligence requirements.

17.

Despite the variable propagation conditions experienced in the tropical regions, electronic reconnaissance provides one of the few means of area surveillance, detection, identification and location to a commander. To augment this, focused patrolling, in conjunction with visual tracker teams, will provide a consistent picture

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within the AIR. The success of military tracking in recent operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and especially in East Timor, has lead to its resurgence, especially in jungle operations, as a primary ISTAR asset. Further details are given in Infantry Tactical Doctrine Volume 1, Pamphlet 6 ‘Military Tracking’. 18.

Electronic attack is the only means of interfering with an enemy’s activities when the physical location of the target is not accurately known. Ground based EW equipment can provide a longer term, more continuous capability and can be deployed closer to the target than airborne EW assets.

19.

At the outset of operations the scarcity of intelligence at the tactical level will probably dictate that the initial missions focus on the 'find' function, rather than the destruction of an enemy. A commander’s tactical intelligence requirements are likely to be:

20.

a.

Terrain. Ground reconnaissance is vital for any commander. Mapping of a jungle region is notorious for inaccuracies. Patrols should be tasked to confirm terrain and mapping. Water sources can be a combat indicator.

b.

Enemy Strengths, Locations and Intentions. In addition to the more conventional methods of identifying enemy activity, information can often be gained from local civilians. This, however, can be time consuming and requires co-ordination and resources.

c.

Reinforcement and Resupply Routes. It is often easier, particularly for IMINT assets, to identify enemy routes into the jungle from the fringes. This information can then be used within the IPB process to assess where they exist inside the jungle, in order to focus efforts to monitor the most likely locations.

As in any Theatre, a commander will never have sufficient assets to collect all the information he requires. The limitations of IMINT caused by the thick canopy have already been addressed, and SIGINT is often limited by the temperature and climatic conditions (and is rarely available for taskings on behalf of the lower level commanders). Notwithstanding this, and remembering that all soldiers should collect information every time they deploy, especially on patrols, the following assets are particularly useful in this environment: a.

Tracker Teams. Tracker teams trained to recognise and interpret sign are invaluable in the jungle. They offer a rapid means of assessing areas of activity within an AO, allowing reconnaissance assets to be cued into areas more likely to be fruitful than those derived purely from map recces. Teams will also identify areas of inactivity, which, while they must be regularly reviewed, has considerable benefits in reducing the need to flood an AO with troops, thereby degrading them early in a campaign as well as potentially harming CIMIC operations.

b.

HUMINT Teams. Emphasis should be placed on using HUMINT assets to make contact with local non-combatants living in the AO, although locally employed civilians and PWs should also be considered. It should be

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remembered that HUMINT is often a slow process, as it involves the establishment of trust, therefore early planning is essential. Deep operations to acquire HUMINT are an ideal task for Special Forces if they are available. 21.

A large and growing number of technical devices are now available for use by formations and units; navigational aids, remote ground sensors, improved radio and radar facilities and laser range finders are examples of this technical proliferation. Most of these devices have not been fully tested under jungle conditions, but offer some potential advantage. The suitability of some short range devices for use in jungle operations is given below: a.

Image Intensifiers. Unlikely to be very effective even when used in conjunction with an active IR light source (threat dependent). However, when used with a laser pointer mounted coaxially on the rifle for short range targets, the results were impressive on jungle fringes and less dense canopy.

b.

Thermal Imagers. While thermal imagers can see through camouflage to a limited extent, the jungle's high humidity and reduced thermal difference between target and surroundings compromise their effectiveness. In addition their weight and logistic support requirements are considerable. It will seldom be possible to use their long range detection capability to the best advantage in a jungle environment.

c.

Lasers. Most laser devices fail to penetrate dense foliage and PNGs associated with lasers are debilitating to the user, even if night operations are planned. However, laser devices may be of benefit on the jungle fringe; (1)

Range Finder. Only useful for navigation when known reference points are visible. The lightweight laser binoculars are probably the most suitable device for troops on the ground.

(2)

Target Marker (Designator). Laser Target Markers (LTM) are only effective on the jungle fringe where there is adequate clearance to both mark targets and for the reflected energy to be picked up by aircraft or weapons.

d.

Remote Ground Sensors (RGS). These may be employed for many tasks. They can also be utilised to trigger other sensors and weapon systems. , although their inability to differentiate between hostile, neutral or unknown triggers must be weighed against their benfits, especially in a campaign against an asymmetric enemy. RGS can survive full immersion in water and high temperatures. Careful siting will be necessary to prevent foliage or animals from triggering the device. The links between RGS sensors and their base unit must also be considered. The attenuating effects of foliage on radio waves reduces their effective range and line can easily be compromised. Homing beacons are of particular use to identify RV locations for aircraft or helicopters.

e.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). A UAV has uses in terrain which is either not accessible to other forms of surveillance or where there is no need to

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place troops, a form of flank protection. UAVs normally have TI and/or daylight cameras, or can be fitted as a radio-rebroadcast facility Although most sensors are blind over the canopy, a UAV could be usefully flown down river lines to assess local activity. In wide jungle areas, the launch and recovery of UAVs is a major factor. Manoeuvre 22.

Sensible planning by formation staffs taking full account of the capabilities of the soldier, his weapons systems and his level of training, will prevent over ambitious assumptions about movement (and hence manoeuvre) in the jungle. This, combined with an allocation of appropriate weapon systems and combat supplies, will also keep the necessary balance and cohesion in our own forces during moves and allows for unexpected contacts or delays.

23.

In the jungle, mobility which is a major factor in achieving manoeuvrability, is a three dimensional factor of great value. A commander who is aware of the canalising effect of jungle terrain and can make positive use of the ground, the air and suitable rivers to move troops and supplies will gain the tactical advantage that mobility provides: a.

Ground Mobility. The speed of movement through the jungle will depend entirely on the terrain. Dense vegetation, steep slopes, ravines, unfordable rivers and other associated obstacles make movement through the jungle much more difficult and arduous. During the rainy season these conditions are often made worse and hence movement is either extremely slow or impracticable. Keeping to the higher ground and moving on ridges is usually the easiest method of moving through the jungle.

b.

Time and Distance. Timing yardsticks tempered by consideration of local conditions and terrain can assist staff in planning movement in close country. Detailed advice can be obtained from Pamphlet No 5. Unless routes have been reconnoitred, precise timings cannot be confirmed. While speed of movement through the jungle can be reduced through a variety of methods, any attempt to increase speed is often quite impossible to achieve without serious consequences such as loss of surprise, physical exhaustion, or splitting of forces. These conditions affect all parties in the jungle, friend or foe; but reducing the chance of navigational error would be advantageous and illustrates the vital need for good maps and training in jungle movement.

c.

Use of Rivers. In many jungle areas some tactical and logistic movement could be by water, along rivers, deltas and coastal areas. In South America, movement by boat is often the only means of deploying into the AO. The use of powered inflatable dinghies, assault boats, landing craft and local ferries or ships could prove most useful. Naval and marine specialists, together with those from the Royal Engineers and Royal Logistic Corps are invaluable for these operations, but units and formations will need to acquire some of these skills to operate in more forward areas when specialists may not be available. Swimming instruction, river crossing techniques, roping procedures and

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flotation aids will need practice and rehearsal before troops move into the jungle. Firepower 24.

The jungle can seriously reduce the effectiveness of much of the firepower available to modern armies. The problems of visual observation and accurate target acquisition inhibits the use of longer range weapons and restricts the advantage of heavier supporting weapons, but does allow for the lighter shorter range weapon systems to be utilised more extensively.

25.

Manportable rocket launchers, grenade launchers, as well as hand grenades have all proved their worth against armoured vehicles and bunkers, - even the shotgun has its uses on foot patrols. Flame throwers have been used to good effect in the past, and although they are not currently in service, if needed, this type of weapon could be reconstituted and utilised again. The introduction of the 40mm grenade launcher has added considerable flexibility to the commanders repertoire of fire effects available at the lowest level.

26.

Dense vegetation mitigates the effect of high explosive; the jungle canopy and undergrowth absorbs shell fragments readily and the burst radius of bombs shells and mortars is similarly reduced. However, this allows rounds to be brought in much closer to own troops and therefore true close support is achieved. The use of delayed action fuses may penetrate the canopy but higher rates of ammunition expenditure will be required to effect full neutralisation.

27.

Experience shows that medium calibre mortars provide the most practical form of manportable firepower readily available to troops in a jungle terrain in virtually all circumstances, although their siting, fire control and provision of ammunition must be carefully considered. Wire guided missiles are of dubious value, except on the jungle fringes, because of lack of visibility and physical obstruction. Remote control devices are badly affected by line of sight problems but could still be very effective if well located on the jungle fringes

28.

Targeting indirect fire and offensive air support is very difficult as many targets are obscured by the canopy. The ability to accurately adjust fire is also considerably degraded by lack of direct observation. The technique of aural adjustment must be taught to and practised by all those required to call for fire. Protection, Concealment and Cover

29.

All round protection, whether on the move or halted, is absolutely essential at all times. In defence the subtle use of natural features within the jungle, such as swamp or fallen trees, can be integrated into a defensive position in order to canalise the enemy towards fields of fire covering minefields or booby traps.

30.

Jungle vegetation provides good cover from both ground and air observation. This however, can provide both sides with the opportunity for infiltration, deception and ambush. Strict track discipline and control is necessary to keep jungle clearing to

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the minimum compatible with good security. Increased sign awareness of deployed forces will: a.

Help to limit the amount of sign left by friendly manoeuvre units, reducing the information available to enemy forces, thus preserving security further.

b.

Increase the effectiveness of and confidence in clearance patrols around harbours and firm bases.

31.

Body Armour. Experience has shown that combat body armour and helmets considerably reduce casualties, especially from fragmenting munitions. However, they are extremely debilitating on the soldier, which makes their constant wear in a jungle environment undesirable, so they should be carried and worn as required. They can either be carried centrally and brought forward, if the time and means allow, or carried individually and donned prior to a deliberate offensive operation. Patrolling (including advance to contact) while wearing Combat Body Armour and helmets, the latter which markedly reduce peripheral perceptions, should be avoided.

32.

Cover from view is not necessarily cover from fire and careful training on the need for proper protection against bullet and bomb is essential. Combat Service Support (CSS)

33.

The principles of good combat service support pertain equally to the jungle as to any other operational area, but the nature of the jungle and its conditions could impose some severe constraint on normal operating procedures and methods of support.

34.

The restrictions on movement and observation in the jungle environment mean that soldiers deployed away from a firm base are likely to be deployed for prolonged periods. Not only does this place a heavy mental and physical demand on the soldier, it also places a significant burden on his resupply requirements and the logistic chain’s ability to service them. Since vehicles and even helicopters can not necessarily resupply at any time or place, the soldier will usually have to carry everything he needs with him.

35.

Establishing lines of communication in a jungle campaign is fraught with difficulties. It should be normal practice to assume that the enemy can cut or disrupt the lines of communication, especially where they run through heavily forested areas.. Alternative means of resupply and casualty evacuation should always be considered and contingency plans prepared for such a situation.

36.

Planning for CSS is described in AFM Vol 1 Pt 6 Combat Service Support and also in AFM Vol 1 Pt 1 Formation Tactics. Those aspects that have particular relevance to tropical operations are reiterated below: a.

CSS Framework. Integrated with operational plans should be a CSS plan which provides effective CSS activity within a framework of reliable communications and simple staff procedures.

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b.

Preparation Time. Forward thinking by a commander and staff to allow adequate time to assemble sufficient stocks and to cater for the unexpected.

c.

Opportunity. CSS activity is best achieved out of contact with an enemy and when this occurs every chance should be taken to resupply, evacuate casualties, and to repair equipment. In the jungle constant awareness of the current situation is the only sure means of anticipating opportunities, or equally important, a change in the weather conditions. An effective CSS framework will also enhance the ability to react quickly to events as they occur.

d.

Distance. A careful balance is needed to ensure that CSS units are close enough to sustain operations properly but are at a sufficient distance away to avoid enemy attention. In the circumstances of jungle warfare this balance is probably fundamental to the success of any operation and will require constant review by a commander and his G1 and G4 staffs. There is very little room for error and it may be appropriate, despite the additional overheads, to have more forward dumps with fewer stocks in each to offset potential shortages. Time and method of delivery require careful thought. Consideration must be given to means other than mechanical, such as porters and pack animals, to achieve resupply.

e.

Duration. A soldier’s endurance will limit the duration of an operation when deployed away from a firm base. Resupply to extend the duration of an operation must be balanced against the soldiers continued ability to function effectively. As well as a debilitating effect on the soldier himself, his equipment, especially electronic equipment, will be adversely affected by a jungle environment.

f.

Logistic Control. Close application to the principles of command is essential to ensure that the logistic disadvantages of fighting in the jungle are overcome. A basic requisite of logistic control in the jungle is that of centralised planning at the highest appropriate level followed by decentralised execution; in that way the normally scarce resources can be utilised in the most efficient manner. Once operations start the problem of communication, liaison and logistic control effectively and rapidly devolve down to more junior staff and commanders.

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CHAPTER 5

THE EFFECTS OF THE TROPICAL ENVIRONMENT ON OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 - GENERAL EFFECTS ON GROUND AND AIR FORCES Ground Forces 1.

As described in Chapter 1, visibility in the jungle is permanently restricted and limited. Almost nowhere will there be sufficient daylight for good clear observation; the effects of rain, mist and sometimes smoke will invariably degrade observation further. In primary jungle visibility is generally not more than 50 metres, while in secondary jungle this is reduced to 5 metres or less. “Windows” can be cut in the vegetation to allow some greater visibility, particularly for machine guns or mortars, but even these measures are not always very effective.

2.

The lack of good mapping and an inability to see further than 50 metres ensures the need for navigation. The result of this lack of visibility will mean that contact with the enemy will invariably be sudden, close and probably fleeting, which will put an enormous strain on combat soldiers. A high degree of individual training, constant alertness and well developed jungle craft is needed to counter this. The constancy of high humidity sometimes reaching 95-97% is debilitating and will affect the soldiers mental faculties. Air Forces

3.

Aircraft and in particular helicopters greatly increase mobility and logistic support across the jungle but can be constrained on the point of delivery.

4.

The freedom of manoeuvre afforded to aircraft and helicopters gives them an advantage of being able to deliver ordnance onto known targets. A major problem however is the ability, even with the availability of TI and IR, to identify the target under a canopy. The same advantages and problems also relate to surveillance and reconnaissance operations.

5.

As temperature and altitude increase aircraft performance will decrease most noticeably in payload and range for helicopters and transport aircraft. As a general rule the effects are not noticeable until the temperature rises above 30° C and the altitude rises above 1000m. These problems may be further exacerbated with the requirement to operate from jungle clearings with limited room for manoeuvre and from rough clearings where runway length and condition and surrounding terrain and vegetation will affect take off and landing performance.

6.

Extreme weather conditions will have an adverse effect on air operations. However whilst these are predictable they tend to be transient in nature. Surveillance and reconnaissance including the use of TI and IR will be limited through heavy cloud and rain.

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SECTION 2 - COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITY General 7.

The application of the Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command can be applied in tropical regions with great success. Because of the nature of the vegetation the Infantry will play the most dominant role. The problems of meeting superior forces unexpectedly, the difficulties of rapid movement and the ease of constructing strong defences indicate that a combined arms approach to operations in the jungle is absolutely essential. Mobility and counter mobility tasks can be enhanced by the use of engineers, utilising helicopters, boats and landing craft where appropriate.

8.

Firepower can be increased by the use of armour, artillery, mortars, naval gunfire and close air support where this is appropriate; and flexibility improved by the use of enhanced communications and the addition of air transport for logistic resupply and reinforcement. Operations in the jungle invariably take much longer to organise and coordinate than elsewhere; the conduct of operations may turn factors not present in operations elsewhere, such as the movement of armoured vehicles into precise positions for supporting fire, providing fodder for pack animals used in the carriage of ammunition and stores, or even just plain bad weather, into very significant issues. Any successful operation in the jungle will depend to a large extent on the care and attention paid to the prior planning of the role allocated to all the combat Arms and Services. SECTION 3 - INFANTRY, THE LEADING COMBAT ARM

9.

The Infantry plays a dominant role in this environment, especially in close country and all other Arms work mainly in a supporting role. Special training is necessary to acquaint troops with the conditions of the jungle, but for the infantryman this implies the ability to carry his equipment, ammunition and rations on his back for days on end; to move and operate in jungle conditions and to dominate the jungle so completely that the enemy cannot use the region at all. Whether this is done at unit level or at formation level, the Infantry will invariably be the leading combat arm.

10.

All combat arms will need to acquire, through training, a full awareness of junglecraft in order to play their appropriate part in jungle operations. Pamphlet No 3 provides full details on individual and section basic skills and drills that should serve as a model for the training of all Servicemen who have to operate in a jungle environment. Principles of Employment

11.

As with night operations there is the same emphasis on control, limited objectives, consolidation and the use of surprise when fighting in the jungle. Infantry units initially may be employed on widely dispersed patrols, ambushes and in the domination of jungle areas around any defended localities. Once this has been achieved Infantry units should be utilised to follow up and harry the enemy at every opportunity, taking advantage of their relative mobility, short range firepower and the concealment offered by the jungle to achieve this.

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12.

Continuous, silent and aggressive patrolling and ambush activity is the key to success and will normally be the major Infantry task. In offensive operations, direct assault on defended positions is generally costly, so greater emphasis should be placed on encirclement and flank attack, making use of other combat arms to fix the enemy while manoeuvring into position.

13.

The vulnerability of other arms in close country will often depend on dismounted infantry to provide close protection. This will need to be prioritised by commanders. In operations in Vietnam in Feb 66, an Australian battalion and artillery battery were required to support engineers building a 6 kilometre road. Firepower

14.

In the tropics the side who can gain supremacy by effective fire power will likely dominate the battlefield. In open cultivated areas of the tropics the normal application of fire can be applied however, in the jungle with its restricted visibility and poor fields of fire cuts down the effectiveness of longer range platoon and company weapons.

15.

However, the present day issue of small arms has improved the infantryman’s ability to deal with an enemy effectively at short range. a.

Small Arms. The present rifle with its short barrel length, light weight and lethality is almost ideal for use in the jungle, although the sighting system and safety catch may need altering. However, the effectiveness of the 5.56mm round in close country is much reduced by thick vegetation. Reduced battle ranges could adversely affect the advantages of SUSAT and night sights (II and TI). The Machine Gun when used in the sustained fire role could play a significant part of any defensive operations, however the weight of ammunition could reduce its effectiveness in offensive operations. In the light role the GPMG can be a valuable addition to platoon fire power. Snipers could have a much enhanced role in the jungle making good use of concealment to surprise and disrupt enemy movement, but the more traditional longer range role for the sniper would not normally be possible. Use of snipers in the jungle is at Annex A.

b.

Mortars. The 81 mm is very effective in the open and close country in the tropics. Due to its trajectory, it does penetrate the canopy and produces an excellent cocktail of canopy burst (good for anti sniper), half way down the trunk (similar to air burst) and ground burst using a quick fuse. The 51 mm is useful in jungle fringe operations but it is not a jungle weapon but use is limited in deep jungle.

c.

Anti Tank Weapons. It is possible to use short range anti tank weapon such as LAW in all but secondary jungle, but their employment will need to be subject to careful planning and reconnaissance. The lighter more mobile weapons can be utilised against point targets, groups of enemy at close range and bunkers. Wire guided Anti Tank systems could be used in defence of base areas where cleared and longer fields of fire can be prepared on jungle

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fringes. All Anti Tank weapons should have the ability to fire at night by utilising suitable sighting devices. d.

Grenades. The grenade was the favoured weapon of the Australians during the Second World War. It is most effective in jungle areas where its close nature enhances its effectiveness and silent delivery conceals its point of origin. Care is necessary in the use of signal smoke grenades; the smoke can drift under the canopy and may rise through the canopy at a distance from its point of origin, which could cause delay, confusion and danger. Grenade launchers are excellent weapons for use in jungle operations being light, easy to operate and able to deliver a heavy weight of fire over short ranges.

Other Capabilities 16.

Some other capabilities and items of equipment are discussed below but this list is by no means exhaustive: a.

Use of Dogs. The jungle does provide good conditions for dogs. No patrol during the 12 year Malayan Emergency was ever ambushed when the patrol had a dog. Dogs are able to give several minutes warning of the approach of outsiders. Dogs are categorized as Infantry Protection or Tracker. Tracker dogs are most effective under the canopy and can be deployed in the follow up to an enemy contact or sighting in the ‘hot pursuit’.

b.

APCs/Other Tracked Vehicles. The protective shield, mobility and firepower characterised by this type of vehicle can be of great value when the terrain and tracks can be utilised. Their utility as a firm radio base, fire support centre, load carrier and general “battle wagon” can often outweigh their potential disadvantage in difficult terrain. Given suitable reconnaissance this type of vehicle should not be discounted in tactical planning.

c.

Wheeled Vehicles. Usually less suitable than tracked vehicles for movement in jungle areas, nevertheless they are of use in providing some firepower and protection on cleared jungle tracks or recognised routes between defended areas. Vehicles used for these types of duty should be sandbagged for additional protection. Drivers and troops should have prearranged and rehearsed procedures for dealing with the enemy in the event of a contact.

d.

Explosive Ordnance. The use of claymore mines and other explosive devices (trip and illumination flares) to assist defensive and offensive operations, deny the use of ground or to cause delay in withdrawal would be considered normal procedure in any theatre. In the jungle these devices can have added significance and can cause disruption to an enemy which is out all proportion to their intrinsic value.

e.

Surveillance Equipment. The high temperature and humidity commonly experienced in the jungle coupled with short fields of view and low levels of ambient light, even in daylight, present a formidable surveillance challenge to the soldier. There will also be a heavy logistic burden to keep surveillance

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devices functioning properly in these conditions. Electro optical devices will need special care to prevent misting the optical surfaces, and although high temperatures should help to retain battery life, increased humidity will have a significant reverse effect unless suitable precautions are taken. Night vision goggles will be uncomfortable to wear for prolonged periods at night and are an extra burden to carry during the day. Most surveillance devices have come into service since British troops were last deployed in jungle regions on operations and it will be necessary to re-evaluate the usefulness, or otherwise, of these aids to fighting in the jungle before operations begin. However, night sights, thermal imagery, laser range finders and satellite navigational aids are four examples of devices that could, in the right circumstances, materially assist the combat arms in jungle operations. SECTION 4 - ARMOUR Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) 17.

While the tropics may not be the best environment for AFVs there are many roles where such vehicles are useful. Both during the Second World War and Vietnam tanks and AFVs were utilised in both open and close country in the tropical region.

18.

Armoured forces today, including armoured infantry units, use a variety of armoured vehicles, some of which could suitably be employed in a tropical environment. Armour in the jungle should not be discounted. Tanks continue to be the best form of bunker busting.

19.

Before the deployment of any force from the UK for operations in the tropics a decision on the suitability of armoured vehicles in this force will have to be addressed. This should be based on an assessment of the utility of the types of wheeled and tracked armoured vehicles available at the time, and the nature of the potential threat. Armoured/Mechanised Reconnaissance

20.

Low ground pressure, limited protection, speed, and firepower make armoured and mechanised reconnaissance vehicles, in suitable conditions, an ideal manoeuvre unit for a commander. When operating on roads, tracks, and more open areas reconnaissance vehicles can make best use of their radios, optics and thermal imagers to provide information about enemy movements and locations.

21.

In closer, denser country some of these capabilities will be diminished and in some areas become ineffective. Escorting convoys and providing a quick reaction force will always be routine tasks for armoured and mechanised reconnaissance units. Dismounted infantry skills will be essential for troops in this role. Use of AFVs

22.

For suitable light tanks and APCs movement off roads and tracks is likely to require concerted engineer effort. Gradients and soft ground are serious limiting factors against the use of these vehicles unless adequate reconnaissance has been done in

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advance. In open country they can be used more aggressively and contribute towards a commanders ability to manoeuvre and hit an enemy. Armoured vehicles are also very vulnerable to mines and booby traps in jungle fighting. This factor probably more than any other, prevents a more rapid and general use of armoured vehicles in the jungle and cannot be overlooked or dismissed too lightly. 23.

For defensive operations tanks and APCs can utilise their main armament provided that suitable fields of fire can be prepared; opportunities for counter attack using armoured vehicles may be limited, but these should not be discounted or overlooked provided that there is sufficient time for preparation. In more open jungle and plantation tanks and APCs can be used for ambushes and to assist in the reinforcement or extradition of forces.

24.

In offensive operations tanks and APCs are most useful in the fire support role to assist in the clearance of routes, fire support and the destruction of strong points. Here direct fire support weapons are of greater use than indirect fire support weapons when speed of action and effectiveness are critical. Infantry protection is however a vital factor to ensure successful operations.

25.

The Americans and Australians in Vietnam both made excellent use of tanks that were in service at the time in the wet and dry seasons. Tanks were used in attacks on bunker systems, base camps and defended villages during the dry season and to defend main bases in the wet season.

26.

Good maintenance and timely logistic support for all types of armoured forces are essential to ensure sustained operational coherence. Summary

27.

There are natural disadvantages in operating with armoured vehicles in a tropical environment. In the past with proper support and careful planning, these disadvantages have been overcome and the firepower available to use against enemy troops has often proved decisive. The deployment of armour will usually require infantry close protection.

28.

This is feasible again in the future although a decision about the role of armoured forces in the tropics will have to be made during the early stages of mounting a deployment. SECTION 5 - ARTILLERY General

29.

Artillery available for use in the jungle in the early stages of deployment is likely to be limited to close support of ground troops, the provision of some form of air defence weapon system and mobile locating equipment.

30.

For close support, towed or air portable, rather than self propelled, artillery has the advantage of greater flexibility and wider deployment over longer distances Ideally such artillery should be capable of being underslung by a medium lift helicopter. General support artillery may be required to provide increased range and weight of

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fire; though it is unlikely to be deployed in dense jungle unless adequate routes can be provided. 31.

Artillery has a number of advantages over offensive air support in tropical operations: it is capable of more accurate and sustained fire, is available day and night, switch fire in minutes, and is moreover, not curtailed by weather conditions. Due to the thick vegetation rounds can be brought in closer. In addition, mobility can be provided by the helicopter for those artillery pieces that can be underslung. Artillery does, however, need protection at all times and placing guns within a fire support base for improved security must be a routine jungle practice. The Effects of the Environment

32.

The tropics has a marked effect on the capability of artillery units to carry out their role. These are that: a.

Survey. All survey is done by GPS and inertial systems. Satellite coverage and initial set up may still be a problem, but you can always “shoot” out an error, or apply common grid to overcome these problems.

b.

Meteorological. Weather and meteorological conditions are subject to rapid and violent change which can adversely affect the prediction of fire. Lightweight met systems have the potential to be deployed with guns.

c.

Target Acquisition. Observation and target acquisition can be extremely difficult and slow. New systems being introduced have yet to be tested in this environment.

d.

Gun Positions. Gun positions are not always easy to find in the jungle, and the clearing of ground or landing strips takes time, although all guns/howitzers can fire at high angles of elevation.

e.

Crest Clearance. This can be a serious problem and proximity fuses could be activated prematurely.

f.

Fuses. The jungle canopy may prevent shells from reaching their intended target unless delay fuses are used and even then these are not always effective.

g.

Low Level Air Defence. The problems of low level air defence in the jungle are considerable and will probably need resolution at JFHQ or national level where tri-Service arrangements can be integrated.

h.

Movement of Guns. The difficulties of moving artillery which cannot be air lifted should not be overlooked. The time involved could constrain the pace of any operations.

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Employment 33.

For all artillery the standard types of fire support can be used in the jungle. Towed close support artillery can be moved by water, air dropped or, slung under a helicopter if appropriate and moved rapidly to other locations.

34.

Guns can be utilised singly, in pairs or as a battery or batteries, but always within a protected area (normally a fire support base). The artillery commander should ensure that guns in one protected area can provide mutual support for other defended locations where possible.

35.

Larger calibre guns and rocket systems will always make a considerable contribution where conditions allow, but the problems associated with the restricted movement and heavy logistic demands make their employment less likely, unless operating on a coastal plain or in similar circumstances. Target Acquisition

36.

Target acquisition is the most important task for the artillery and yet the most difficult. The US Army successfully used locating radar to detect mortars and guns in this environment. These can be deployed in fire bases to locate mortars, adjust artillery fire and help to locate own forces using radar flares. Radar performance can be diminished due to humid conditions. The current generation of radars (COBRA/MAMBA) have applications in this environment (but have not been tested). Sound ranging is still extant, with the Advanced Soundranging Programme (ASP). All will work in theory, practice may or may not validate it, but historically it has worked and been useful. MSTAR certainly has utility in dismounted operations, but really only in defence.

37.

The practical performance of thermal imagery in jungle conditions has not been sufficiently evaluated to prove beyond doubt, although it can be effective at close range below the canopy. The use of UAVs in combination with radar could be of value in the following areas:

38.

a.

Riverine Operations. TI sight on UAV patrolling along river ahead of patrol boat.

b.

Mangroves and Swamps. Searching for caches. Infantry can then go direct as opposed to patrolling and searching.

c.

Secondary and Plantations.

d.

Coastline.

Newer more sophisticated tracking and locating equipment produced since those days is available to improve the ability to locate enemy guns and acquiring targets, but this will need careful assessment in local conditions. Sound ranging equipment has proven versatility particularly when used in conjunction with radar.

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Adjustment of Fire 39.

For gunners the most difficult single task in the jungle is that of the Forward Observation Officer (FOO). This officer is generally located close to the infantry commander and thus not usually in the best position to observe the fall of shot effectively; any movement to a suitable observation point may also be impossible. All Infantry commanders down to section 2ic level must be capable of calling for and adjust indirect fire by the use of aural adjustment.

40.

An airborne OP could be an alternative but this may be difficult to organise and could suffer from the vagaries of the weather and the denseness of the canopy. Infantry commanders at all levels should be trained to call for fire support and to make their own adjustments to bring fire on to the target.

41.

Adjusting fire in jungle or scrub conditions is notoriously difficult and requires considerable training time if artillery is to be used effectively. Several methods are used and are detailed in Pamphlet 5 Infantry Company Group Jungle Tactics. The best method which is good for any close country and restricted visibility is Aural Adjustment. Communication

42.

Artillery communications with their emphasis on short range HF and VHF radio nets coupled with the associated computer Fire Control application could be a potential weak link in the provision of accurate and timely fire support in jungle areas. Line of sight for VHF radio is not always possible and most computers rely on batteries which can deteriorate rapidly in jungle conditions. The tropical environment can badly degrade communication distances and equipment batteries Technology has made for smaller, truly portable, fire planning computers and associated equipment.

43.

If vehicles have to be changed, drastically modified, or abandoned in jungle operations then the speed of response to calls for fire support will also take longer to process. Artillery Logistics

44.

The logistic support necessary for artillery units in jungle areas is likely to be formidable and will tax the resources and ingenuity of those involved in the CSS chain of support. Much care and attention will be needed to ensure that sufficient scales of ammunition are available in theatre at base locations before operational deployment.

45.

Weather will affect resupply, first line ammunition scales may need to be revised to ensure self reliance when the weather closes in.

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SECTION 6 - ENGINEERS General 46.

Engineer support is always at a premium and there are never enough engineers to carry out the tasks that need to be done. As early as possible in the deployment phase, sufficient engineers will need to be in theatre to begin construction of any secure operating bases and any other facilities needed. Priorities for engineers will have to be allocated at the highest operational level. As with armoured forces, engineers will need infantry protection during operations.

47.

Once operations have started, improving and maintaining mobility in the jungle will be the commander’s main priority and engineer resources will normally be allocated to this in the first instance. After this comes the task of countering the enemy’s mobility.

48.

When planning the allocation of engineers to other combat arms it should be noted that because of the difficulties of redeployment in the jungle, engineers should be attached to all forward units. In this way there should always be engineer advice and assistance to deal with mines, booby-traps, bunker systems and other obstacles. Mobility

49.

The construction and maintenance of roads and tracks are the initial means of improving mobility. Heavy rainfall, the clearance of vegetation, drainage and the movement of plant and stores all combine to make this a long and painstaking task. Once constructed, routes will need regular maintenance.

50.

Landing sites and drop zones will need construction to enhance the ability to move men and stores by air transport and helicopters within theatre. However, with training and advice other troops should be able to take on some of these tasks.

51.

Crossing obstacles such as large rivers, may well need sapper advice and perhaps some plant and machinery, but once suitable material for the construction of boats, rafts and small bridges has been provided, other troops can normally complete the task. Bridging of obstacles to allow vehicle passage should remain an engineer task.

52.

Minefields in the jungle are likely to be of the nuisance or protective variety and will remain an engineer task for clearance. Engineers may also be required to breach enemy defensive positions and to clear booby-traps. Counter Mobility

53.

The main counter mobility tasks for engineers will be to block roads, lay mines and booby traps and to carry out demolitions. Blocking roads or tracks is always particularly effective because this will delay the enemy, canalise his movements and provide opportunity for counter action such as ambush or air strike.

54.

Counter mobility could also assist in the development of a deception plan provided this is coordinated at the highest appropriate level.

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55.

Mines and booby traps should be fitted with anti- handling devices to avoid their removal and/or re-use by the enemy, although this practice may be banned if international agreements can be reached in the future. Other Tasks

56.

Engineers will have a large variety of other tasks and commitments which will demand their advice and attention. In the early stages of a deployment these are more likely to be concerned with the establishment of a secure base.

57.

In tropical operations the priority amongst these are likely to be: a.

Water. The supply, purification and treatment of water in conjunction with the medical authorities.

b.

Protection. The construction of defensive positions, field fortifications and protective locations for combat supplies.

c.

Artillery Tasks. The preparation of gun positions.

d.

Survey. The provision of mapping and other survey tasks as appropriate.

e.

Watermanship Duties. Specialist watermanship support during river crossings or for other small boat operations. SECTION 7 - SIGNALS

Strategic Communications 58.

Establishing strategic Information and Communication Services between the UK and deployed elements is an essential first step. Strategic links must be robust and include both redundancy and a reserve. Specific consideration must also be given to providing additional environmental protection to C2 nodes in order to operate sensitive/commercial electronic equipment in extremes of climate. Further direction on strategic level CIS can be found within JWP 6-00 CIS.

59.

Due to constraints placed on Tactical level ICS by the difficult nature of the environment, Strategic and Operational level ICS assets may need to be force packaged and employed at the Tactical level. However, such resources are scarce and commanders at all levels must give careful consideration to their requirements and/or allocation. Tactical Communications

60.

On operations radio communication between dispersed and widely separated units is critical and yet at the same time this can often be seriously hampered and impaired by the jungle environment.

61.

Dense foliage causes attenuation of radio waves and reduces range. Elevated antennae, radio rebroadcast and radio relay links can offset the attenuation to some

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extent. The same applies to the difficulty of communicating in steep and rugged terrain. 62.

The very variable propagation and radio path conditions that exist in the jungle make the selection of the optimum frequency crucial to the establishment and maintenance of communications. The allocation of sufficient frequencies is required to enable each net/ link to use the most suitable frequency for the prevailing conditions.

63.

The careful selection of frequencies applies equally to ground, surface and sky wave propagation and thus to all frequency bands. Variable propagation conditions may result in radio nets ceasing to be all-informed. Individual links may be the only method of achieving communications with all locations, in these circumstances radio procedures should be adopted.

64.

Specific effects of the jungle on frequency bands are as follows: a.

HF Band. Atmospherics are poor in the lower end of the HF band, particularly at night.

b.

VHF Band. This band is usually free from atmospherics but requires near line of sight for good results, thus effectively restricting its scope to shorter range communication. To offset this restriction more tactical delegation to junior commanders may well be appropriate.

c.

UHF Band. The UHF band is subject to the same restrictions as the VHF band but is useful for ground to air communications.

Line 65.

There are many inherent problems about the use of line in the jungle not least its vulnerability to breaks. It is also vulnerable to heavy rain, damp conditions and humidity.

66.

To insure against these difficulties the use of two separate connections can be employed to ensure a greater chance of communication. While there are many uses for line in the jungle its permanent use as a means of communication should be confined to secure base areas. Operation and Maintenance

67.

Radio security is essential for all operations and adequate plans and procedures have to be adopted to avoid intercept or eavesdropping by a third party. Practical measures such as radio silence, making contact at particular times and the use of morse and codes can help and should be incorporated into the overall communications plan.

68.

The ever present problems of maintenance are more difficult to resolve. High temperatures and humidity can cause rapid deterioration of equipment unless proper precautions are taken. Batteries lose their charge quickly even in store and need to

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be kept in cool dry conditions; repair is equally difficult. Only common sense precautions and regular checks of equipment will ease the situation. New Equipment 69.

The rapid and unabated development of communications and information systems technology, much of it for the commercial sector, dictates that new devices are constantly becoming available. Small hand/head sets for close contact operation, improved ground to air radios, the use of satellite communications, particularly single channel tactical satellite communications, and other secure means of passing messages all help to improve the commanders ability to maintain flexibility and control the battlefield. However, the employment of new technology on tropical operations must be given careful evaluation due to the special environmental conditions likely to be encountered. Conversely, where commercially available equipment is identified to offer an increased and robust capability, it should be fully exploited and, moreover, assumed that an adversary has the potential to do likewise. SECTION 8 - ARMY AVIATION General

70.

The Operational Roles of Helicopters do not change in a tropical environment. Helicopters' inherent mobility, speed, range payload and firepower considerably enhance the prospects for military success in ground operations. Principal Aviation Roles

71.

The Roles of Aviation are considered below with their relevance to operations in a tropical environment. a.

b.

Offensive Action. (1)

Aviation can engage with direct fire TOW missiles up to a range of 3750m. In dense and undulating terrain the height advantage of airborne weapon systems is considerable. The mobility and firepower of aviation can be used effectively in both the Close and Deep battle areas. The introduction of the WAH 64 Attack Helicopter will significantly improve the weight and accuracy of firepower.

(2)

Suppressive Fire in the form of helicopter mounted MG will also prove effective against non armoured targets.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR). (1)

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c.

(2)

Aviation is particularly useful for the insertion and extraction of OP parties that make up the surveillance matrix.

(3)

Using TI aviation can locate enemy concentrations through the canopy from firm heat sources such as vehicles and fires. Body heat is less likely to be identified.

Control and Direction of Firepower. The control and direction of firepower has been a long standing role for Army Aviation. (1)

Every pilot gets trained to direct artillery and mortar fire from helicopters using Air Observation Post (AOP) techniques.

(2)

Pilots trained as Forward Air Controllers (FAC) can utilise the Laser Target and Designator and Range Finder (LTDRF) to guide Fast Air Munitions onto a target.

(3)

Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) operations involving the coordination of Fast Air, Artillery and Aviation firepower can be effectively coordinated from an Army helicopter.

d.

Command Support. There has always been a need to move commanders around the battlefield, helicopters can deliver a commander to the appropriate place to maintain command during high tempo operations. Aircraft also have the ability to act as airborne Command Posts for an operation.

e.

Movement of Personnel and Materiel. The majority of tasks for helicopters to move personnel and materiel will fall to Support Helicopters, possibly using under-slung load techniques. However there are still a number of specialist tasks that fall under this category. (1)

Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) and Forward Aeromedical Evacuation (FAME) are important tasks for aviation that are important for the moral of fighting troops.

(2)

When moving stores or personnel a suitably sized Landing Site (LS) will not always be available. Abseiling, fast-roping and in some cases winching are all recognised helicopter de-planing techniques, but will all require some degree of training before they can be used.

Constraints Against the Use Of Aviation 72.

Weather Limitations. Weather cycles in tropical climates can be unpredictable and severe. Weather and the forecast weather may have an impact on helicopter operations. Operations should be planned with this in mind. Some specific constraints of weather are discussed. a.

Rain. Heavy rain showers over tropical terrain will reduce visibility and may affect aircraft systems. It generally has to be avoided which adds time to any task.

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b.

Temperature. The high temperatures reduce the aerodynamic performance of a helicopter, this will reduce payload or fuel load. The temperature and humidity will also increase the onset of aircrew fatigue.

c.

Altitude. Operating in high terrain will compound problems of helicopter aerodynamic performance and reduce the payload even more.

d.

Light Levels at Night. When flying using Night Vision Goggles the lack of ambient light over the jungle combined with a moonless night or cloud cover can lead to pilot disorientation. Longer lead times than normal are required to plan for such sorties.

73.

Vulnerability to Small Arms. Helicopters should be considered as soft skin vehicles, and particularly vulnerable to small arms fire they will not be able to hear.

74.

Operating Bases. Helicopter operating bases are large, very vulnerable, and need protection. The supply of aviation fuel and missiles should be considered as part of the overall CSS plan. Combat Service Support (CSS) for Aviation Support

75.

The standard method of providing equipment support would be employed, but it is highly likely that any aircraft requiring support beyond the capabilities of aviation Close Support platoons will necessitate lifting by air because transport by ground vehicle will be either impossible or impracticable.

76.

As with most elements of a force engaged in jungle operations, it is likely that resupply will have to be effected by air. The CSS component that is likely to prove most significant for aviation, and perhaps problematical, is the supply of aviation fuel. SECTION 9 - SPECIAL FORCES General

77.

In the UK Special Forces (SF) are troops who are trained, equipped, and organised for tasks of a more clandestine nature and are generally deployed under national arrangements in pursuit of strategic objectives.

78.

When operating within an alliance or coalition a UK commander should note that other nations may have a looser interpretation of the term "Special Forces" and that the role for these other forces may well not be the same as for the UK. The chain of command for British SF may also vary from those of other UK forces.

79.

There is scope for the use of SF in a jungle environment, particularly in the task of finding and fixing the enemy. Operational tasks could include attacking an enemy's C2 facilities thereby slowing his tempo of operations and damaging his cohesion. Tactical task could include sabotage activity, observation and reconnaissance in border areas and, where applicable, operating with local forces under suitable conditions.

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SECTION 10 - COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT General Points 80.

The means by which combat service support (CSS) is moved to and into the battle area is probably the most difficult and frustrating task facing the G4 staff. Conventional methods of resupply relying on the use of second and third line transport to move items forward is often not practicable.

81.

The variety of means available are covered in more detail below: a.

Roads / Tracks. All weather roads are rare in the jungle and tracks quickly become rutted and worn. In heavy rain tracks quickly become impassable and a large amount of engineer effort is needed to maintain such tracks for operational use. The employment of local labour to improve the road conditions may help to keep the route open but in the early stages of operations the movement of logistics by roads or tracks is likely to be limited until adequate routine maintenance can be achieved.

b.

Railways. Usually confined to low lying and coastal areas and often consisting of only one line constructed to move crops to ports or railheads. Provided security can be maintained, railway lines can prove very useful for the carriage of logistic resupply, generally between the port of entry and Support Area. However, beyond the maintenance area, utilisation of a railway line should be treated as a bonus and not as a mainstay of any logistic plan.

c.

Waterways. Estuaries, rivers and streams can provide economic means of moving supplies into the jungle and military craft and amphibious vehicles are suitable for such use. These can be supplemented by local craft where available and by rafts made out of local material. One potential problem with waterways is the vulnerability of boats to attack from the riverbank, generally from dense jungle. It will be impossible to provide full bank security and so the risk of this event will have to be carefully assessed when planning this type of logistic routing.

d.

Air Resupply. Air transport can be used to overcome many of the limitations of surface transport, which can enable the rapid and flexible movement of stores and equipment to battle areas direct and returning with casualties and mail. Local air superiority is vital before this method can be properly applied, although darkness and bad weather can also curtail and disrupt resupply. Fixed wing aircraft can operate to greater distances but need landing strips, which in the initial stages of an operation may not be possible. Once this can be achieved many resupply possibilities become possible. Support helicopters are well suited to the resupply role and can be operated over shorter ranges making use of their greater turn around time to improve the rate of resupply. Stores can also be air dropped by fixed wing aircraft or winched down from helicopters to remote or inaccessible locations in the jungle. Finally there is jungle line resupply in which a "load" is suspended some 150 ft below a parachute by a strop. This allows the load to penetrate

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through the jungle canopy and leave it suspended above the ground without the parachute becoming entangled. e.

Pack Animals. Despite the progress in military mobility it still may be suitable to use pack animals to move stores and supplies. Mules, donkeys, horses and elephants can, despite progress in other forms of transport, still provide a very useful service for those capable of taking advantage of these assets. Moving stores forward of the maintenance area to within the divisional area can be an ideal task for these animals. Native handlers should be utilised where possible; this will save troops and probably ensure a more rapid turn around time. However, there will be a vital need for the proper control of handlers, provision of fodder and some veterinary support available if the animals are to be effective. In forward areas these animals and their handlers may prove more of a hindrance than help. Furthermore, experience from Burma showed that in some areas tactical considerations took second priority to the forage and feeding of animals, thus illustrating dramatically the importance of logistics in the jungle.

f.

Porters. In some locations it may be feasible to use porters for the carriage of stores. Although this method of transportation is slow and laborious it can still be useful. It does however, have some drawbacks. Security, feeding and protection are three such drawbacks, which can be most difficult to resolve.

Combat Supplies 82.

To alleviate transportation the dumping of supplies in a divisional area could be planned in order to speed up resupply and to make it more simple for forward units to obtain the items they need.

83.

Stocks held in the divisional area should generally only be sufficient for the essential battle needs, (rations, ammunition, mines and some medical supplies), and high turnover items, (clothing, boots, webbing equipment, and possibly NBC clothing).

84.

However, in a tropical environment stocks held at divisional level should also reflect the ability of an enemy or the weather to close down the resupply route for prolonged periods. a.

Ammunition. The lack of visibility and difficulties of target acquisition tends to increase the demand for ammunition especially coloured smoke and phosphorous ammunition. The construction of defensive locations will also require demolitions, mines and other types of pyrotechnics. The protection and handling of dumped stores absorbs valuable manpower, and if ammunition and explosives can be supplied by air the proportion kept on the ground in combat areas will normally be limited to that required to sustain operation during periods of restricted air activity.

b.

POL. There will only be a limited need for fuel for vehicles in forward areas, but the need for AVTUR in bulk for helicopters and aircraft will be considerable. Bulk refueling is the ideal solution but this will seldom be

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feasible forward of a divisional area where either packed fuel or airportable fuel containers could be utilised. The contamination of fuel due to humidity coupled with pollution and the ever present fire risk make this a serious potential resupply problem which could easily affect operational capability. Storage of Supplies 85.

Requirement and Responsibilities for Correct Storage. Although all supplies provided should be treated to withstand tropical conditions, the rapid deterioration brought about by heat and humidity make careful attention to optimum storage of supplies essential. Storage of supplies, in depots and within the supply system is the responsibility of the supply service, which issues technical instructions and whose supply units can advise on storage requirements. Storage of supplies in unit areas is a unit responsibility; succeeding paragraphs describe simple measures which must be taken to ensure adequate storage of supplies by units.

86.

Effects of Heat and Humidity. Hot humid conditions cause rapid deterioration to supplies by:

87.

88.

a.

absorption of free and atmospheric water,

b.

rotting and rusting, and

c.

moulds and fungi.

Countering the Effects of Heat and Water. The following measures will minimize deterioration to supplies in storage: a.

Supplies which may be damaged by direct exposure to sunlight or rain should be covered when stored. Covers should never completely enclose stocks as this causes sweating and condensation, and inhibits proper ventilation.

b.

If cover is not available then the arrangement of top cases in stacks to deflect rain-water away from the centers of stacks may assist in obviating deterioration.

c.

Supplies should be stacked on suitable dunnage to aid ventilation and protect them from ground water.

d.

Spacing should be provided in all stacks. Large square stacks are preferred to long narrow ones to promote circulation of air to reduce the incidence of rot, mildew and fungus.

e.

Cases which have been damaged may be protected by stacking them on the inside of stacks or with their damaged side towards the center.

Local Expedients. Units which may be required to hold supplies should be provided with adequate supplies of axes, wedges, and cordage, to assist in the use of local resources. Service pattern storehouses, tentage and sawn dunnage will

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rarely be available in forward areas and reliance should be placed on local expedients such as:

89.

90.

a.

whole or split logs for dunnage.

b.

tarpaulins erected as files or on frames made of local timber, and

c.

roofed shelters thatched with suitable local materiel.

Speed of Deterioration. Deterioration, even of supplies not normally considered perishable, may be rapid and even in small unit holdings emphasis needs to be placed on the following: a.

Frequent inspection of supplies is necessary to detect deterioration in storage.

b.

Unless equipment has been specially prepared for storage, equipment (particularly weapons) will deteriorate more rapidly than when issued or in use. Equipment in unit stores requires regular inspections and maintenance.

c.

Care has to be taken to ensure returned or withdrawn equipment is fit for storage.

d.

Rotation of stocks is necessary to ensure that supplies which have been in storage for a long period of time, or have suffered deterioration due to packaging, are issued and consumed before they become unserviceable. Particular care should be taken to ensure that supplies at the bottoms and backs of stacks are not held until they become unserviceable.

Storage and Care of Ammunition. In addition to considerations of safety and security, all measures for correct storage of supplies apply equally to ammunition. Equipment Support

91.

The climate and terrain combine to make the maintenance and repair of vehicles and equipment more complicated and time consuming. Engines overheat; weaponry corrodes and regular servicing is often difficult to arrange.

92.

It is generally more effective to bring service and repair teams forward to maintain equipment rather than conform with the backloading system. A forward repair system is normal in other theatres of operations; nevertheless in the jungle it may be more practical to increase the size of the repair pool for main equipments and operate a replacement system rather than a forward repair system. This would utilise the chance of a better repair of important equipment in a more secure area. Helicopters can speed this process enormously; placing key repair items in forward maintenance areas can also contribute to a more rapid and efficient turn around.

93.

Electronic equipment suffers badly from humidity and it may be more practical to keep this type of equipment permanently switched on to avoid the hazards of damp and wet conditions.

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SECTION 11 - G1 CONSIDERATIONS General 94.

There will be many duties to be carried out by the G1 staff and services such as military police and other branches of the AGC but these do not vary significantly from their role in other theatres. Most of these duties will be conducted in the rear areas. Nevertheless during operations in the tropics, it is entirely possible that enemy action could occur in these areas and so it is incumbent on all local commanders to ensure that the same standard of battle training, acclimatization, fitness and medical training as other combat arms is achieved throughout the theatre, regardless of role or location. Medical

95.

Following the mandatory period of acclimatization for all troops before operating in tropical conditions, it will be necessary to continue medical precautions to prevent occurrences of diseases such as malaria, typhoid, yellow fever and dysentery.

96.

Medical resources need to be moved as far forward as is practicable, particularly life saving drugs and first aid equipment. The allocation and deployment of doctors, dentists and trained medical staff will require careful attention and due consideration given to the location of first and second line medical and dental support facilities. Advice should be sought prior to deployment on the appropriate medical measures to be incorporated into the logistic plans for the potential theatre of operations.

97.

The principles remain the same as for other theatres, to give treatment and evacuate casualties' back as quickly as possible if necessary to a surgical team. The jungle aggravates the problem because of the wide dispersion of troops and difficulties of movement. If soldiers are confident that if they become a battle casualty good medical assistance is rapidly available even in remote conditions, this will make a strong contribution to their morale and operational efficiency.

98.

Factors that will assist the medical evacuation and treatment are: a.

First Aid. A thorough knowledge of first aid by all ranks to obviate the need to evacuate minor casualties and to enable serious casualties to be properly attended while waiting for evacuation.

b.

Medical Priorities. A system of allocating a medical priority for casualties to allow for the more seriously ill to be evacuated first.

c.

In Transit Care. The deployment of doctors and medical technicians with helicopters and ambulances.

d.

Surgical Teams. These teams need to be at a central location to allow the surgical teams to make best use of the available medical resources. If possible a reserve team should be able to move forward to treat further casualties.

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e.

Medical Teams. These teams need to be forward with troops to ensure immediate first aid, stop the loss of blood, can be applied in order that they can be evacuated by the fastest means to field hospital. SECTION 12 - G5 CONSIDERATIONS

General Points 99.

The provision of G5 support embraces the conduct of relationships with the civil authorities and civil populace. Military effectiveness may be enhanced by the provision of some items of CSS from local in-country resources by avoiding civilian inspired interference with operations (such as refugee problems and civilian demonstrations); and by promoting co-operation through legitimacy and the recognition of cultural factors and legal obligations. It may also be beneficial to provide support to the local communities.

100.

It may be necessary to deny resources to the enemy by use of controls on food and licensing weapons.

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CHAPTER 6

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 - PLANNING AN ATTACK Introduction 1.

General Considerations. The following general considerations apply to an attack in close country: a.

Restricted Observation. A commander's opportunity for complete reconnaissance and a thorough identification of objectives and routes will be limited. The application of close indirect fire support and air support may be hindered by: (1)

Difficulties of Control. (a)

(b)

(2)

b.

Maintenance of direction is difficult and control measures should be instituted. i.

to guard against collision and confusion between flanking assault elements, for example, allot each element a distinctive smoke colour which may be used to mark the element's flanks when required; and

ii.

to ensure an effective and rapid means of recognition between sub-units which have to approach an objective from different routes (though that situation should be avoided if possible).

Once the attack is launched, impediment to movement may hinder the commitment of reserves. This should be considered when reserves are being positioned.

Reduced Mobility. Mobility of the force will be reduced by limitations on transport, and the buildup of stores and equipment, especially mortar ammunition, necessary for the attack will be delayed. Replenishment after the objective has been secured will be restricted, and exploitation and pursuit will thus be hindered. Extra combat supplies should be brought forward to allow for this.

Exploitation of Jungle Conditions. Tropical close country provides many opportunities to gain surprise, and allows close, detailed reconnaissance by skilful patrols. It also creates condition for compromise of friendly force intentions and operations. The effect of small forces will often be disproportionate to their size. Opportunities for manoeuvre of units and subunits occur frequently. All ranks have to be aware of the plan of the higher commander so that initiative may be used and effective advantage taken of the opportunities.

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Preparation and Planning 2.

Gaining Information. Sufficient information about enemy dispositions and terrain will not usually be available from static OP. Active, focused patrolling to determine enemy locations and strong and weak points will be necessary.

3.

Maintaining Contact. Loss of contact with the enemy for even a short period may profoundly influence an operation, for the enemy may withdraw or redeploy during the pause making reconnaissance efforts and preparation fire ineffective and causing time, effort and casualties to be lost in regaining contact. For this reason, once sufficient information is gained for commanders to formulate plans, aggressive patrolling has to be continued in order to maintain contact.

4.

Manpower Limitations. In the tropical environment, increased emphasis on patrolling and security of the LOC, and preliminary operations to secure assembly areas and forming up places (FUP), will tend to produce a scattered and committed force at the time when a commander will most require concentration. Particular care is required to ensure that strengths committed to these tasks is the minimum required for their effective performance.

5.

Timings. The following should be considered: a.

Night Movement. In close country, movement by night does not substantially aid concealment as observation is already severely restricted by vegetation. In addition, noise of movement is greater by night and control is more difficult.

b.

Attack Timings. Close country can provide adequate cover, even in daylight. The available light will make an attack easier to control. Using darkness to cover the approach, and attacking at dawn, can be advantageous. The light makes it easier to control the fight-through and reorganization. Attacking at last light means the approach is easier and darkness covers the actual attack. However, control and coordination can be very difficult in the dark, and attacks at night should only be attempted by well-trained, experienced troops.

6.

Rate of Movement. Rates of movement will depend on the ground and the vegetation but will generally be slower than in temperate areas. Where leading elements are forced to cut their way through the undergrowth the rate will be very slow and fatigue will have to be considered. Careful consideration of the time factor is necessary to coordinate covering fire plans with the assault and suitable rehearsals may be necessary.

7.

Identification of Objectives. If it is not possible for commanders of assault elements to reconnoiter or study objectives from OP, or if they cannot readily be defined during the progress of the assault, it is desirable that the objective itself (or boundaries and limits of exploitation) should be chosen so that they are easily recognized when reached (for example, a village, a river line or a track at right angles to the axis).

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8.

Marking Control Features. Routes from assembly areas, FUP and lines of departure should be clearly marked. The axis of attack should either be marked or specified as a compass bearing.

9.

Location of Headquarters. Control is enhanced when the headquarters can directly observe progress, but that may not be possible in close country. Increased reliance may have to be placed on radio and other means of communication for information on the progress of the battle. Headquarters' locations should be chosen which, while being adequately concealed, allow effective radio communications and are easily found by orderlies. Siting near readily recognizable terrain features may aid this with due consideration to "obvious" features being enemy DF/NAI/TAI. It may be desirable, when an attack includes more than one phase, for the commander to increase his personal control by moving to intermediate objectives once they are secure.

10.

Offensive Manoeuvre. Existing tracks will frequently be identified as key terrain and defences are likely to be located astride them on relatively narrow frontages and in considerable depth. Frontal attacks and attempts at penetration of such positions will have little chance of success unless very heavy fire support is available, but opportunities will exist for envelopment or infiltration. SECTION 2 - FIRE SUPPORT

11.

Close Air Support. This can be provided by fixed wing aircraft or attack helicopters, although weather may limit or prevent their use. The air-delivered munitions described below can be employed: a.

Bombs. Bombs are delivered by either strike or purpose-designed fixed wing aircraft. They provide high levels of destruction and in the attack, are most suitable for preparatory bombardment. Limitations of bomb strikes are as follows: (1)

(2)

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Difficulty of Distinguishing Targets and Friendly Forces. Objectives designated as targets in close country may not be readily distinguishable to fast moving fixed wing aircraft, and friendly forces' locations likewise may be indistinct. Strikes by fixed wing aircraft will usually be controlled or coordinated by an airborne forward air controller (FAC) in communication with both forward ground troops and strike aircraft. Additional measures which may be employed are: (a)

visual target marking by marker rockets delivered by the FA or Army aircraft or by marker smoke delivered by guns or mortars;

(b)

electronic target designation using lasers or similar devices; and

(c)

identification of friendly locations by colour-coded smoke, heliograph mirror, marker panels or possibly the use of balloons.

Troop Safety Distances. Because of the highly destructive effects of bombs, safety distances for unprotected troops are larger than for

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surface fire support munitions. On occasions it may be necessary for troops in contact to withdraw from objectives to provide requisite safety distances. Care has to be taken that the enemy does not employ close-embrace tactics by moving and remaining close to friendly forces thus precluding the safe use of bombs. It may be necessary to engage enemy and vacated friendly force positions with ground fire to fix the enemy while friendly troops are withdrawing and before air strikes. (3)

12.

Effects on Visibility and Going. Bombing could fell large numbers of trees around the target location and may cause large craters and fire. This may appreciably increase fields of vision and fire but fallen trees and bomb craters may substantially hinder movement. This may require bombs to be fuzed in such a way as to avoid canopy-burst.

b.

Rockets and Precision-Guided Munitions. These are delivered by fixed wing aircraft or helicopters, and are suitable for destroying point targets where they can be identified. Problems of target acquisition guidance and friendly force identification are reduced by using helicopters or UAVs if these are available.

c.

Cannon and Machine Gun Fire. (1)

Fixed Wing Aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft responding to impromptu air support requests may be armed with cannon or machine guns only. These weapons can provide a destructive and neutralizing effect against area targets, but their employment is limited by target acquisition and friendly force identification problems, and by the short duration of the neutralizing effect.

(2)

Helicopters. Attack helicopters flying tactically in close cooperation with ground forces can provide intimate, accurate fire support. Their mobility provides better observation and target acquisition than that provided by ground troops, and they can destroy or neutralise targets in close proximity to assaulting forces.

Artillery and Mortars. The following factors should be considered when employing artillery and mortars in a tropical environment: a.

Adjustment of Targets. Lack of suitable OP may necessitate FOO and MFC moving forward with patrols, to adjust targets in preparation for an attack. FOOs will be required to move with assault elements to coordinate modifications to the fire plan, engage targets of opportunity and to adjust and record defensive fire on reorganization by use of aural adjustment.

b.

Troop Safety Distances. Safety distances for artillery and mortars are the same in close country as in open country. Particular details of safety distances should be made available to FOOs and MFCs in advance of any operations. The predicted impact of projectiles in the jungle canopy will need to be assessed to avoid casualties to friendly troops in the target area. Movement rates will be slower than in open country because of the thick vegetation, broken ground and debris felled by impacting shells, and the fire

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plan has to reflect the slower rates. The fire plan will incorporate infantry direct fire support, including sustained fire of machine guns, and the fire of AFV and attack helicopters. c.

13.

Mortars. Although mortar fire is extremely effective in steep country and through the jungle canopy, a major limitation will be the supply of ammunition into forward infantry locations. Mortar ammunition should be conserved as much as possible and should not be expended when tasks can effectively be carried out by artillery.

Armoured Firepower. The employment of armour in close country will largely be restricted by the suitability of the ground, and mass employment of tanks will rarely be possible. However, shock action can be achieved by delivering accurate, intimate direct fire support for assaulting troops. Considerations for the effective use of armoured firepower are shown below: a.

Preparation of Routes. In the preparatory stages of the attack, routes should be selected and prepared for the forward deployment of AFV in the assault.

b.

Protection of AFV. The limited visibility of AFV crews in rain forest or secondary growth means AFV are vulnerable to close range anti-armour weapons. It is the responsibility of the supported infantry to ensure that close range anti-armour weapons do not effectively engage supporting AFV, particularly from the sides and rear. A protective element should remain with each AFV.

c.

Troop Safety. AFV can push over quite large trees, pull vines and creepers about and, because of their limited visibility, are unable to run over the unwary.

d.

Adjustment of AFV Fire. Normal methods of communication and adjustment of AFV fire are applicable in the tropical environment. In addition, where observation of targets is severely restricted, for example, by dense foliage, and the AFV commander or gunner cannot see a pin-point target, the continuous calling method described at Annex A may be used. SECTION 3 - CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK

14.

Frontages. Although attacks in close country will usually be on a narrow front, to facilitate control, the selection of routes making use of changes in vegetation for observation, concealment or navigation may cause a certain amount of dispersion.

15.

Position of Reserves. The concealment afforded by vegetation will allow reserves to be placed, prior to the launching of the attack, well forward in an area most suitable for their subsequent deployment to influence the course of the battle. Reserves will usually be required to follow the assault elements closely. An advantage will be that intermediate objectives are occupied by reserves, preventing any enemy who has avoided the flank of the assault, from reoccupying them after the assault has moved on. Guides should be used to avoid mixing the assault force with reserves.

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16.

Mopping Up. Close country provides opportunities for small enemy parties to remain concealed, and for small posts to be missed by assault elements. Pockets of enemy resistance remaining after the assault elements have passed are capable of creating disorganization out of proportion to their size. For this reason, mopping up will usually be the responsibility of each assault element on its own objective. The limit of exploitation should be identified.

17.

Exploitation. If objectives can be easily identified, limits of exploitation may be clearly defined. However, if positions are such that the degree of exploitation required to secure the objective is uncertain until the objective is reached, the forward commander is best able to decide limits of exploitation. Forward assault elements should be used for exploitation as this maintains contact with the enemy and saves time which would otherwise be lost in passing through fresh troops. If forward assault elements are tasked with exploitation other troops must be nominated to occupy positions already gained.

18.

Reorganisation. Troops on forward objectives may have difficulty determining the location of the enemy and counter-attacks may occur without warning. Reorganisation when objectives are reached must be rapid to ensure defence against counter-attacks. Support weapons should be moved forward quickly, and active patrolling forward of the position and to the flanks should be quickly initiated.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 6 ADJUSTMENT OF ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLE FIRE BY CONTINUOUS CALLING 1.

The continuous calling method of adjustment for AFV fire is used to engage targets where their observation is severely restricted, for example, by dense foliage, and the AFV commander or gunner cannot see the target.

2.

The coaxial machine gun is used to adjust the fire onto the target and the tank then engages with either the machine gun or the main armament. An infantry commander may not actually be able to see the AFV but he has to have an accurate idea of its position, either from the noise of its engine and armament or from directions given by other infantrymen in the area.

3.

An infantry commander attracts the attention of the AFV, offers the target, and gets the AFV to look in the right direction. He then indicates and describes the target by the methods of target indication. If the AFV commander cannot identify the target, the following procedure is used: a.

The infantry commander orders 'FIRE BURST FOR REFERENCE AND I'LL START CALLING'. (Alternatively the crew commander may request the infantryman to 'START CALLING'.)

b.

AFV fires a long burst of 20 to 30 rounds in the direction indicated.

c.

As soon as the infantryman identifies the burst on the ground he commences to call corrections. If the fall of shot is LEFT of target he calls RIGHT and continues to do so for each subsequent burst. The AFV gunner adjusts in the direction called by a standard, equal correction, until a burst falls RIGHT of target, then he calls LEFT. Succeeding diminishing corrections are applied and called until the lay is correct for line. He then similarly corrects for range by calling 'ADD;, or 'DROP' until a target burst is achieved.

d.

The target can then be engaged by the appropriate AFV armament for the desired effect.

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CHAPTER 7

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 - BACKGROUND Introduction 1.

General Considerations. Area, delaying and mobile defensive operations are conducted in tropical areas on the same basis as in other environments. The tropical environment affects the defence of localities and defended areas, both of which are used in these three types of operations.

2.

Effects of Climate. Tropical climate affects defensive operations as shown below:

3.

a.

Reduced Daylight Hours. In tropical areas there are about 12 hours of daylight. The canopy causes early darkness before sunset and prolonged darkness after sunrise. Efficient digging and other defensive work in darkness will require practice and training.

b.

Physical Capacity. Tropical heat and humidity adversely affect men's physical capacity, especially for tasks such as construction of defence works. Completion of defence works may take longer in tropical areas than in temperate areas, especially if working in NBC conditions.

c.

High Rainfall. Tropical downpours may flood defensive works unless they are properly drained. In many cases this may be a most important factor in siting positions.

d.

Deterioration of Stores. Reserve ammunition, food and stores of all types should be protected from rain or they will become unusable in a short time.

Resupply Rates. The slower ground resupply rates, caused by the poorly developed routes usually found in tropical areas, may adversely affect operations as follows a.

Development of Positions. Slow forward movement of defence stores may delay completion of defence works.

b.

Conduct of the Battle. Restrictions on the forward movement of supplies, particularly ammunition, may affect the conduct of the defensive battle. The following are some considerations. (1)

Strict control of ammunition expenditure may be necessary.

(2)

Restrictions may have to be placed on the amount of ammunition available for harassing, interdiction and even (DF) tasks to conserve supplies for use against an attack on the Main Defensive Position.

(3)

Launching of counter-attacks or subsequent offensive operations may have to be delayed to allow the build-up of ammunition to support them.

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4.

Small Arms Firepower. Because of the restricted visibility in tropical close country, ranges of engagement will be reduced and a high intensity of small arms fire can be applied to assaulting enemy troops whose movement will be slowed by the vegetation and going. Thus, individual defended localities have the capacity for a high measure of stopping power but can be defeated by direct assault at great cost to the enemy. Fire lanes/fields of fire may need to be cut. Likewise, enemy elements which have penetrated defended areas are capable of quickly developing an effective defensive posture and inflicting heavy casualties on counter-penetration and counter-attack forces. SECTION 2 - PLANNING A DEFENCE

5.

Design for Battle. The defended area will consist of a series of defended localities, held by companies and platoons, and sited to deny the enemy approaches to the vital ground. The following factors will apply: a.

Mutual Support Between Localities. In defence in open country an enemy can rarely pass between two localities without being subjected to heavy, aimed, small arms fire. In jungle conditions, field of observation and fire will restrict the application of small arms fire, and the proximity of friendly troops may restrict the application of indirect fire support. There will need to be clear signals to indicate when to open fire in support of a supporting locality.

b.

Penetration of Localities. Penetration of defended localities by enemy forces is not acceptable; the intruders must be ejected by local counter-attack. Counter attack rehearsal: double edged sword. Essential for success, but sign may compromise intentions.

c.

Counter-penetration. The speed, depth and consequences of penetration must be minimized by the siting of localities, including localities defended by arms and services other than infantry, in depth, to impede, disrupt and eventually halt enemy penetration. The occupation of counter-penetration positions, as alternatives to units' normal positions, will seldom be possible because of reduced speed of movement. Penetrating forces, once halted, will be destroyed by counter-attacks.

d.

Infiltration. Countering enemy infiltration can be made difficult because the enemy objective may not be apparent while the infiltration is in progress. Methods to counter infiltration include the following:

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(1)

Fighting patrols within the defended area will disorganize and destroy enemy infiltration elements and prevent concentration at rendezvous (RV).

(2)

Ambushes can be set on likely infiltration routes. To conserve manpower, the ambushes may be sited but not manned until initial signs of infiltration are detected. Tracker team are very useful in detecting these signs.

7-2

(3)

Aggressive patrolling action should be maintained against areas from which infiltration is being launched.

6.

Surveillance. When planning the defence it is important that units acquire information about the terrain, but at the same time denying the enemy information about friendly dispositions. The enemy has to be held at a sufficient distance from intended defensive positions to enable own unit reconnaissance to be effective. Considerable effort may have to be devoted to such covering operations. Particular attention needs to be given on the reconnaissance to identifying all approaches to own unit positions. The surveillance plan for the defence will take account of the limited line of sight in the tropical terrain and will rely heavily on patrols and listening posts, assisted by thermal imagers and unattended ground sensors, where usable. Airborne visual reconnaissance may be employed for specific tasks.

7.

Fire Support. The application of indirect fire support and offensive air support will be hampered by observation difficulties, and artillery units have to be prepared to provide observation elements to move with patrols. All forward elements should be capable of calling for and adjusting indirect fire. The proximity of friendly troops may make difficult the use of indirect fire within the defended area.

8.

Obstacles. Use needs to be made of natural obstacles because the creation of artificial obstacles can be limited by logistic considerations. Tropical close country and going, in themselves, provide obstacles to tactical mobility and movement.

9.

Air Defence. Tropical vegetation may enhance concealment and other passive air defence measures, but restrictions on fields of fire and view may limit the effective employment of all arms weapons in air defence. Difficulties of movement may hinder effective deployment of air defence artillery.

10.

Anti-Armour Defence. Long and medium-range engagement of armour is unlikely, and the employment of wire-guided missiles will be seriously restricted by vegetation. The uncontested employment of armoured fire-power can provide a decisive advantage, and so reliance will have to be placed on the following measures to defeat enemy armour:

11.

a.

Short range anti-armour weapons, located in forward positions in large quantities.

b.

Anti-armour minefields on likely armour approaches, covered by fire to prevent breaching and the recovery of damaged AFV.

c.

Vigorous offensive patrolling by AFV hunter-killer teams.

Counter-penetration and Counter-attack. In close country, defended localities will tend to be sited closer together. Gaps will be reduced and so fewer counterpenetration positions will be required. Movement difficulties will demand that any counter-penetration manoeuvre needs to be planned and thoroughly rehearsed, and routes should be cleared and marked; caution is necessary to avoid compromising counter attacks and intentions. Counter-attack manoeuvres should be treated similarly. To allow a counter-attack force to reach an objective in time to be

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successfully, it should be held further forward than in open country. However, the concealment available in close country should allow the force to be positioned well forward without becoming involved until the commander decides. The close country will make impromptu counter penetration and counter-attack manoeuvres very risky and a commander's flexibility will be reduced. Ground 12.

Selection of Vital Ground. In open country, long fields of view and fire allow a significant feature to dominate a large. This can lead to the feature being chosen as the vital ground, regardless of a commander's task and his perception of the enemy's mission. For example, having been ordered to prevent the enemy using a certain road, taking up a defensive posture about a dominating feature some distance away could achieve the aim. In close country this approach would not work. It would be necessary to secure the road, even if that allowed the enemy to secure the dominating feature. In close country, the selection of the vital ground will be based more on a commander's task and his assessment of the enemy's intentions than on the topography.

13.

Approaches. As in open country, all likely approaches to the vital ground have to be considered. The close country may make it easier for the enemy to move closer to, around and behind defended localities, so more attention needs to be paid to approaches from the flanks and rear than would be usual in open country. Defence of Defended Localities

14.

Mutual Support. Although mutual support may not be attainable between localities on all occasions, mutual support by aimed small arms fire between posts within each locality is essential. Although individual weapon pits may not be dug closer together than in open operations, defended posts within the locality have to be sited sufficiently close together to ensure that mutual support can be achieved between them. Fire lanes should be cut and it may be necessary to clear fields of view for commanders.

15.

All-round Defence. As mentioned in paragraph 5b, penetration of localities cannot be accepted in close country. On the other hand, a commander has to be prepared to accept penetration between localities. Since the enemy will have the ability to assault from any direction, each locality has to be capable of all-round defence. although they will normally be organized to cover the most likely approach, posts and pits within a locality should be prepared to fight in any direction in an emergency.

16.

Depth. Posts within defended localities have to be sited to provide depth so that an assaulting enemy, having passed through one post, is confronted with successive positions, each causing its measure of attrition and disorganization. Depth forward of localities need to be established and maintained by offensive patrolling, screen and covering force operations, standing patrols, and sentry and listening posts. Where screens are not provided by higher formation, units and sub-units have to be prepared to conduct their own screen operations.

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17.

Maximum Fire-power on Likely Approaches. Defended posts should be sited, and interlocking and alternative arcs of fire designated, to bring maximum fire-power to bear on the most likely enemy approaches. Effective fire discipline and control measures are necessary, and indirect fire expedients such as improvised fixed lines may be utilized to bring to bear into areas which are obstructed by vegetation.

18.

Control and Communications. During defensive operations in a tropical environment the communications aspects to be considered to the following command levels are detailed below a.

Section and Platoon Level. At section and platoon level control and communications will largely rely on visual signals and voice. Communication may be supplemented by cords and vines, telephone or radio. It is desirable that at least one fire trench of each section (preferably the section commander's) is within voice range of platoon headquarters, and platoon and section headquarters have to be sited to allow some observation of subordinate positions. Observation lanes may be cut for this purpose.

b.

Company and Battalion Level. At company and battalion level reliance will be placed on radio and line to provide information to commanders and convey orders and directions forward. Line communications may be disrupted or rendered insecure by artillery and mortar fire, and infiltrating enemy. Radio is vulnerable to EW, so both radio and line should be used.

c.

Patrols. Where available, radio will be the primary means of communication and control used for patrols. It is particularly desirable because it allows them to make the best use of indirect fire support and, if necessary, to send early reports on their missions. Control is also achieved by specifying routes, boundaries and timings.

d.

Range Cards. Although range is generally limited, range cards will ensure a knowledge of own position and siting. Thus approaches from those directions will be expected and not be subject to challenge or firing.

19.

Concealment. Concealment of positions within defended localities provides the main opportunity for the defence to achieve surprise, gain the initiative and inflict casualties. Close country aids concealment but track, litter, movement and noise discipline and camouflage of weapon pits have to be carefully observed because of the cover afforded by dense vegetation to enemy reconnaissance. The enemy will employ every ruse possible to locate section and crew-served weapons, and fire plus track discipline is essential. It includes reserving major weapons for employment only against main enemy assaults, and using alternative weapons such as automatic rifles against minor probes. Indiscriminate cutting of vegetation, within areas and for fire lanes, have to be avoided. For fire lanes, cut only the lower branches of bushes to knee height, leaving upper branches undisturbed. Concealment should not be prejudiced by unnecessary or careless construction of alternative positions.

20.

Dispersal. Dispersal to minimize vulnerability to enemy indirect fire should be considered, but pits and posts must not be so dispersed as to allow infiltration by night or to present problems of control. Care needs to be taken to ensure adjoining

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defended posts are not sited too close together, as large areas of undergrowth will be removed by shell and mortar fire during the conduct of the defensive battle. Depth 21.

Depth within Defended Areas. The key to defence in close country, where manoeuvre of counter-penetration and attack forces may be limited, is the siting of defended localities in depth on all approaches to the vital ground. All elements, including supporting arms and services, may be required to hold ground and maintain the integrity of their defended localities so that enemy penetration forces are checked, canalized and disrupted, and eventually fought to a standstill, making conditions favourable to successful counter-attack.

22.

Depth Operations Forward of the FEBA. Depth forward of the defended area has to be established and maintained by offensive patrolling, screen and covering force operations to deny the enemy ground observation of the main defensive position, and to give the defending commander time to appreciate the enemy's objective and to take action accordingly. Fire Support

23.

General. Employment of indirect fire support weapons on targets within the defended area will usually be limited by troop safety considerations, so targets will usually be on the enemy's approaches to the defended area and on his concentration areas and the routes to it.

24.

Counter-penetration. Effective counter-preparation fire will depend on target acquisition based on combat information from such sources as sensors and patrol reports. Targets may have to be engaged by predicted fire, with heavy ammunition expenditure and uncertain results.

25.

Interdiction. Interdiction fire on tracks and routes may force the enemy to deploy, increasing his difficulties and slowing his rate of advance. Where a single route passes through a defile, interdiction fire may, if sufficiently concentrated, break up an attack before it develops fully.

26.

DF. The most effective employment for artillery will usually be in providing DF on main enemy approaches. Infantry and artillery officers may be required to make a reconnaissance on foot or by air forward of the defensive position to select FPF and other DF tasks. Information provided by the surveillance plan will assist in selecting DF tasks in depth. Patrols, sentries or listening posts may have to be used to indicate which DF target areas are being entered by the enemy, and artillery observers may be located forward with those elements (particularly with standing patrols) to call for and adjust fire.

27.

Counter-battery Fire (CBF). The acquisition of CBF targets may be difficult because flash spotting opportunities may be limited. Reliance may have to be placed on locating radar, shell and mortar reports, sound ranging, and other means.

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28.

Ammunition Expenditure. Terrain and vegetation difficulties will increase ammunition expenditure. So, too, will the special procedures required in adjustment of targets and close DF tasks.

29.

Gun Positions. The siting of gun positions in tropical close country presents particular problems

30.

a.

Areas have to be selected which are large enough and sufficiently clear to allow efficient handling of the guns in action. The ground should not be subject to flooding. Tree heights and around gun positions may produce a local crest problem to the gun. Guns may be forced to fire high angle missions, with the attendant problem of reduced minimum range. Gunners may be required to fell and clear trees to make gun positions suitable, and that could delay fire support. Alternatively, engineers may be employed for the purpose. Clearing of gun positions will make them easy to see from the air.

b.

The ground may be soft and unsuitable. Gunner or engineer effort may be required to improve gun platforms.

c.

Roads and tracks leading to suitable gun positions may be poor or nonexistent. Deployment by helicopter may be possible but ammunition resupply and dumping may require heavy commitment of helicopter resources. Redeployment may become difficult or impossible should the air situation become unfavourable. Priority of effort may have to be given to establishing satisfactory ground routes to gun positions.

Defence of Gun Positions. Gun positions should be sited within other defended localities (whose size may have to be adjusted to allow for them). If that is not possible, they would be sited where maximum protection will be afforded by other localities. Even when sited in conjunction with other localities, gun positions have to be capable of defending themselves and of helping to canalize enemy penetration. Troop safety and the location of neighbouring positions have to be considered when guns are used in the direct fire role in defence of the gun position, particularly when firing HE. Security

31.

Principal Measures. Tropical close country allows an attacker to select covered routes and short covered approaches which can reduce warning and engagement times in the defence. Security measures have to be designed to overcome any advantages concealment may give the attacker, either in launching an attack or in reconnaissance. Those measures can include the following a.

Screen and Covering Force. Preparation and improvement of main defensive positions needs to be protected from interference. That protection can be achieved by screen and covering force operations which also contribute to the depth of the defence.

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b.

Active Patrolling. The areas between screen, covering forces and defended localities should be dominated by active patrolling to deny enemy reconnaissance, infiltration routes, assembly areas and FUP. Tracker team can help to give priorities for the patrol effort by providing a data on recent activity.

c.

Sentries and Listening Posts. Sentries and/or listening posts have to be employed to ensure that localities are not surprised by enemy reconnaissance, attacks or raids.

32.

Alternative Positions. Restrictions on the movement of forces to prepared alternative positions during the defensive battle will limit their effectiveness, and the advantage afforded an attacking enemy (especially infiltrators) by the occupation of a prepared position may make the construction of alternative positions undesirable.

33

.Dummy Positions. Because of his increased ability for close reconnaissance in the thick vegetation, the construction of dummy positions and fire lanes to mislead the enemy may not deceive but may merely prejudice the concealment of the whole defended area.

34.

Tracks. Tracks within a defended area may aid an attacking enemy in finding localities and posts within the area but will also tend to direct his penetration and canalize his forces, thus providing suitable ambush sites for defenders. Compromise of positions by tracks may be minimized by making a track plan and enforcing track discipline with deception in mind, with tracks running past or through critical localities instead of directly to them. Maximum use may be made of the canalizing effect of tracks by siting ambush positions on them for occupation during the defensive battle.

35.

Camouflage and Concealment. Effective camouflage and concealment of positions and intentions are necessary to defeat the enemy's reconnaissance effort and to achieve best use of surprise in the defensive battle. Progressive camouflage and track, litter, movement and noise discipline must be carefully observed.

36.

Fire Discipline. Fire discipline within defended localities has to be strictly observed, especially with section and crew-served weapons, to avoid compromising their positions to feint operations staged deliberately to find them. It may be necessary to withhold some DF in a similar situation until the main enemy thrust becomes clear.

37.

Local Protection of Supporting Arms and Services. All troops should be prepared to provide for their own local defence and protection. Where infantrydefended localities are of battalion or greater size, support elements may be placed within them. Normally, though, support elements will form their own defended localities. While support localities will be sited to take maximum advantage of protection afforded by infantry positions, they will be required to deny or eject enemy penetration of their perimeters, to mount patrols and ambushes against enemy infiltration, and to maintain the integrity of the localities to canalize enemy penetration. Disruption or delay to services and support as a result of this activity may have to be accepted. Logistic installations should not be sited so close together that congestion and lack of dispersal occur.

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38.

Protection of Headquarters. Protection of headquarters is essential. Headquarters will be subject to enemy raids seeking to disrupt command and control and the application of firepower. In certain cases is may be necessary to site them within infantry localities but, where possible, this should be avoided, even o the extent of providing additional infantry detachments for their defence. Where terrain and vegetation precludes the use of wire - and laser-guided ATGW, consideration could be given to re-roling the Atk Pl as an additional protection platoon. Familiarity with Terrain

39.

Commanders and those likely to lead patrols in rear areas have no less a requirement to become familiar with the terrain surrounding their locality than the troops in the forward localities. Knowledge confined to the track in and the track out is not sufficient. Thorough reconnaissance of the ground around rear localities has to be undertaken, in the early stages of occupation, preferably by patrols manned by those who will be required to lead patrols later. The information should be carefully recorded for hand-over to later incoming units and for patrol briefings. In summary, the need for effective navigation training and practice is paramount. Obstacles, Field Defences, Routes and Tracks and Engineer Tasks

40.

Natural Obstacles. Tropical vegetation and terrain provide obstacles to tactical mobility and logistics. Restrictions on manoeuvre may apply equally to both sides, but if the defenders have a thorough knowledge of the terrain and deny the enemy that knowledge, the defence will possess a great advantage. Major natural obstacles should be selected and used to full effect in defensive areas. These have to be selected from the ground and not the map. This applies at all tactical levels.

41.

Artificial Obstacles. Besides the difficulties of forward movement or engineer stores and plant, the construction of deep obstacle belts in tropical areas will be deterred by the limited vision and consequent inability to cover the obstacles by fire.

42.

Barbed Wire. Where the assault is already slowed by thick jungle, the regarding effect of barbed wire fences is less pronounced. The bulk and weight of barbed wire may limit its employment in forward defended localities. Low wire entanglements which may be supported by trees and secondary growth instead of pickets, and which require relatively little barbed wire, are an effective means of adding to the slowing effect of close country.

43.

Mines. Tropical vegetation makes the laying of extensive minefields difficult and precludes the use of mechanical mine laying. The use of anti-tank mines may be confined to areas of roads, tracks and open approaches to defend localities. Command detonated mines (including claymores) may prove the most appropriate in close country, although the one-shot nature of these weapons has to be recognized. The locations and boundaries have to be carefully recorded, as for conventional minefields.

44.

Improvised Alarms, Trips and Rattles. In areas where other devices are in short supply, or are inappropriate, such as where there is considerable movement by friendly patrols or wild animals, harmless improvised alarm devices using strings,

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cords, vines or trip wires and tin cans may be used to warn sentries of enemy movement and infiltration, particularly at night. 45.

Mechanical Protection of Logistic Installations. The use of artificial obstacles, unattended ground sensors and other devices to protect logistic installations and to release manpower otherwise required for this purpose should be considered. The provision of defence stores, such a barbed wire, to rear installations should be weighed against meeting the requirements of forward infantry localities. Movement of materials into rear area localities may be relatively easy and the provision of obstacles may delay an enemy attack long enough to allow reaction by a central reaction force, economizing on manpower.

46.

Weapon Pits and Emplacements. Construction of weapon pits in soft, wet soil may be difficult. Sumps and channels may be required for drainage, and revetment will almost always be required. Forward movement of defence stores will be restricted and local timber may have to be used. Progressive camouflage must be maintained. Concealment should not be prejudiced by indiscriminate cutting of timber for revetment.

47.

Fields of Fire and Observation. Fields of fire and observation of likely enemy approaches may need to be improved by cutting. Cutting should be done by disturbing standing vegetation as little as possible. If surprise is lost and concealment of the defended area becomes less necessary, then drastic clearance of fields of fire should be undertaken to maximize the effect of defensive firepower, although the precise location of positions may still be able to be concealed. Where fields of fire extend into grassland, it may be burnt, or, if too wet, rolled flat by a log dragged behind a light vehicle. Observation of flanking posts and positions is necessary for commanders.

48.

Construction and Improvement of Tracks and Routes. Tracks will form an important part of the defensive framework. Their development, improvement and maintenance has to be a continuing programme. This will be a difficult and timeconsuming task involving engineers and other arms and services in tree clearance, drainage and hard surfacing (using soil or corduroy road) on main and alternative routes, and on diversions which will be required to allow maintenance of the main route.

39.

Traffic Control. A system of control will be instituted as soon as a track is opened, and adequate MP will be provided to ensure effective policing of the system. This control is essential, particularly on one-way sealed tracks, to ensure that the road and track capacity can be fully utilized for both administrative and operational traffic.

50.

Employment of Engineers. Engineers are best employed in supervising or assisting work forces provided by other arms or services at all arms tasks, in operating engineer plant and equipment, and in using explosives and engineer special techniques. The primary responsibility of engineers in the defence will be route maintenance and the preparation of tracks for movement of AFV and counterattack forces. In addition, engineers: a.

may lay anti-armour minefields where an enemy armoured threat exists,

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b.

will assist and supervise the construction of field defences and obstacles,

c.

will establish and maintain water supply and storage, and

d.

will execute necessary demolitions. SECTION 3 - CONDUCT OF THE DEFENCE

51.

52.

Limitations on Counter-penetration Measures. Tropical close country imposes the llimitations on counter-penetration measures shown below: a.

Counter-penetration Positions. Restrictions on speed of movement, and the consequences of the occupation of prepared positions by enemy infiltrators, mean that the preparation of alternative defended localities to be occupied by counter-penetration forces has to be carefully considered. Furthermore, it may be difficult to find forces to man such positions.

b.

Denial of Penetration of Fire. The engagement of penetrating forces by aimed small arms fire from neighbouring defended localities will often be restricted by vegetation. Troop safety of these localities may also limit the employment of indirect fire.

Halting Penetration. The basis of halting enemy penetration and minimizing its effects will be as follows a.

Depth. Localities, including those defended by supporting arms and services, have to be sited in depth on all approaches to the vital ground.

b.

Integrity of Localities. The holding of a 'front; and defeating penetration between localities may not be possible. Any penetration of localities have to be ejected by local counter-attack.

c.

Continued Offensive Action by Localities. Localities which have been bypassed should continue offensive action against the enemy assault by:

d.

(1)

engaging enemy forces with small arms fire,

(2)

directing artillery and mortar fire onto enemy forces, and

(3)

aggressive patrol action against enemy elements moving on the axis of penetration.

Ambushes. Although occupation of counter-penetration positions may not be possible, siting of ambushes, which will only be manned once penetration or infiltration is identified, may prove an effective and manpower-economic method of halting or disrupting penetration. If the ambushes are sited to the flanks of defended localities, the best opportunities for inflicting casualties will occur; enemy elements attempting to avoid the locality may be destroyed.

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53.

Counter-attack Areas. The siting of localities in depth and to the flanks of approaches will disrupt, canalize and eventually halt enemy penetration in areas which may be reconnoitred in advance for counter-attack.

54.

Counter-attack Deployment. Once enemy penetration has been halted, the speedy delivery of the counter-attack in full force will achieve his destruction. The difficulties of movement have to be overcome and the following measures will aid timely delivery of maximum combat power: a.

Central Assembly Area. Assembly areas for counter-attack forces should be sited centrally to allow the launching of counter-attacks onto any of the selected objectives. They should be as close as possible to the likely objectives, without being so close that the counter-attack force could get involved in the battle before the commander orders it to move.

b.

Counter-attack Routes. Counter-attacks routes have to be selected, reconnoitred and developed to the maximum degree possible so that full advantage of knowledge of terrain may be taken. If AFV are employed, the development of routes is particularly important. This will enable the delivery of armoured firepower with surprise and decisive effect. Counter-attack routes should be clearly marked and necessary traffic control measures applied.

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CHAPTER 8

TRANSITIONAL OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 - THE ADVANCE General Considerations 1.

Terrain and Weather. Open country, in the dry season, may allow fast moving mechanized operations. Close country and wet weather may restrict operations to a slow, deliberate advance on foot. Terrain and climatic conditions between these extremes will influence the operational plan.

2.

Operations without Vehicles. In close country, where roads are not available and time is important, armour, unit vehicles and plant have to be left behind while units advance on foot. This cannot be undertaken unless adequate resupply (by air, porters or water-craft) can be provided, and alternative fire support can be arranged.

3.

Reconnaissance. Tactical cross-country vehicle movement may be difficult, if not impossible, and ground reconnaissance in vehicles will generally be confined to areas close to existing roads and tracks. In close country, foot patrols provide the most reliable information source although such patrolling is slow and may be a considerable drain on manpower. Difficulty of movement and restricted visibility will usually limit ground reconnaissance to those areas from which the enemy could seriously threaten the security of units or affect the accomplishment of their tasks. The use of tracker teams to identify those areas where there has been recent activity will allow priorities to be set for the overall reconnaissance planning.

4.

Frontages and Routes. Since parallel tracks rarely occur, an advance on a broad front using several axes may not be possible. For movement off tracks in rain forest, the tops of ridges, where the growth is usually less dense, will often provide the best going. In addition, movement along ridges and high ground offers greater security against surprise of ambush than does movement on ground dominated by such features.

5.

Flank Security of Cleared Route and LOC. In comparison with open country, the extent of daily advances will be less in tropical close country. In any given distance, the number of maintenance installations, parks, dumps and terminals will be greater and the LOC more vulnerable, possibly necessitating a relatively heavy commitment of troops for the protection and security of the cleared route and LOC.

6.

Grouping. Formations advancing in close or difficult country may experience difficulty or delay in regrouping to meet unexpected changes in the operational situation. Additional emphasis on correct grouping at the start of the advance may be needed in order to minimize the problem, and air transport may be used, if the air situation permits, to overcome unexpected developments.

7.

Continuous Operation. In open country, some degree of immunity from air attack and ground observation is afforded by advancing at night. However, the advantages of night movement will be less pronounced in close country where there will also be difficulties of route clearing and troop fatigue. Continuous operations are possible

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but will require reliefs of forward elements to be positioned by ground or air transport, whose movement may be rendered difficult by the terrain and climate. Conduct of the Advance 8.

Control. Confinement to few, narrow routes results in advancing forces being strung out and difficult to control. Careful attention has to be paid to the employment of control measures.

9.

Bounds and Harbour Positions. When selecting bounds and harbour positions, the following factors should be considered a.

Tactical significance.

b.

The ability of indirect fire elements to engage targets.

c.

The nature of obstacles.

d.

The availability of water.

e.

Fatigue of troops.

10.

Rate of Advance. The capacity of following formations to take over responsibility for security of the cleared route, LOC and vital points may not be sufficient to keep up with lightly equipped forward units whose combat power may thus be seriously depleted by the requirement to secure the cleared route. In order to ensure that forward units retail sufficient combat power both to maintain momentum and to secure ultimate objectives, it may be necessary to exercise close control on their rate of advance.

11.

Covering Force and Advance Guard. The tasks and principles of employment of covering forces and advance guards will be similar to those for open country. When terrain prevents vehicular movement, lightly equipped infantry or air-mobile troops will be employed in the covering force role. The distance between the advance guard and the main body will be less than in open country, and supporting arms moving with the main body may be able to provide some support to the advance guard. If not, allocation of supporting arms should be made to the advance guard. The following points should be considered: a.

Employment of Armour. Where terrain is suitable and resistance is expected, tanks should form part of the advance guard. If close country precludes their use for movement of the advance guard or covering force, APC may be used to ferry troops.

b.

Employment of Artillery. Limitations on supply of ammunition may make it desirable to deploy fewer guns with a comparatively large supply of ammunition per gun, rather than a large number of guns with a small amount of ammunition for each gun. The normal allocation of artillery liaison and communications has to be maintained or increased to ensure flexibility in the application of fire support of forward elements.

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c.

Reliefs. Arrangement should be made for frequent relief of troops leading the advance. Relief of the advance guard may be difficult; the length of the column may cause time to be lost by moving forward a relief at too frequent intervals. The vanguard element should be relieved frequently. The strain on scouts and point platoons is intense.

d.

Movement and Contact. The advance guard will usually move astride the axis until contact is made with the enemy. The extent of the enemy position can rarely be determined from a single OP, and planned, determined patrolling will be necessary to locate the enemy's flanks.

e.

Action by Patrols. Enemy deployment may be extremely fluid; ground which is reported clear in the morning may be held again in the afternoon. In open country, reconnaissance to detect static enemy may be sufficient, reliance being placed on other surveillance means to detect enemy deploying. In close country, continued picketing of key terrain and dominant features, after reconnaissance, may be the only way of detecting their occupation or reoccupation by the enemy. When such features are ahead of the advancing force, economy of effort will be achieved if plans allow reconnaissance elements to move to their objective, report the situation, and remain there until relieved by the advancing force. There may be advantage in making patrols and covering force elements strong enough to hold ground as well as to search for information.

12.

Main Body. The composition and movement of the main body will be similar to that for open country. Unnecessary fatigue and disorganization will be avoided by sound traffic control and by calling forward groups, units or sub-units from one harbour area to the next only when the route is clear.

13.

Rear and Flank Security. Extended routes and LOC are vulnerable to attack or interference. Security is provided by the following: a.

Rearguards. Rearguards have to be strong enough to defeat enemy elements which have remained undetected during the passage of the main body. If the enemy elements are too strong, the rearguards should allow sufficient time for the main body to deploy.

b.

Flank Guards. Flank guards have to be employed where necessary to give early warning of any threat of enemy interference from the flanks. They are employed as follows (1)

When tracks run parallel to the axis of advance, and especially if they follow higher ground from which the advance may be overlooked and interrupted, flank guards should move along them. The movements of the flank guard should be co-ordinated with those of the main body.

(2)

When parallel tracks do not exist, the delay which would result from the cutting of tracks for the flank guard would so delay the progress of the main body as to be unacceptable. In that case, small patrols should be dispatched to significant features along lateral tracks.

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(3)

Lateral tracks leading off the main route should be cleared. Tracks may rejoin the main route further along the axis, and care should be exercised in co-ordinating the marrying up of clearing elements with other elements of the advance guard or main body.

14.

Action on Contact. In close country, contact may be initiated at ranges of 20 m or less with resulting close fighting, noise and confusion. Commanders will not be able to issue orders immediately because little will be known of enemy strengths or dispositions. To counter this initial period of surprise, contact drills appropriate to forward elements have to be developed and rehearsed, and battle procedures devised and promulgated in SOP, to ensure passage of information and effective reimposition of command and control at unit and sub-unit level.

15.

Route Maintenance. Tracks will require constant maintenance, and emphasis will be placed on the clearance of trees (where their retention is not needed for concealment requirements), drainage, and provision of hard surfacing. Engineer strength will not be sufficient to undertake all the tasks required, and infantry assault pioneers or elements of the reserve rear units may also be employed.

16.

Traffic Control. However well built and maintained, tracks can be quickly spoilt by improper use and poor traffic control. A rigid system of control has to be instituted as soon as a track is opened, and adequate MP has to be provided to ensure its effective policing. The types and classes of vehicles and trailers that are to be allowed to use the track have to be regulated. When the track is affected by rain it is advisable to suspend all movement until the track is again fit for traffic rather than to attempt to drag vehicles through and cause further damage. SECTION 2 - THE PURSUIT General Considerations

17.

Major Limitations. The fluid nature of the pursuit and the limitations of the tropical environment affect: a.

the ability to maintain the pursuing force.

b.

the availability of engineer resources, and

c.

the ability to provide frequent relief of forward troops.

18.

Maintenance. Maintenance of the force will require close liaison between logistics staff and engineers so that maximum effort can be devoted to the most important LOC. The air situation may permit air maintenance of the pursuing force until the LOC is suitably developed.

19.

Advantage of Terrain. Tropical terrain favours a withdrawing enemy. In close country, where movement is confined to one or two narrow tracks, the enemy can seriously impede the movement of a pursuing force by the skilful use of route denial, ambush, and guerilla activity. This may give the enemy force an opportunity to

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reorganize and prepare new defensive positions. Should that occur, the operation would no longer be a pursuit and should be conducted as an advance. 20.

Security Elements. Although bold action in the pursuit is required in close country, some flank and rear security forces have to be provided. Conduct of the Pursuit

21.

22.

Fire Support. Maximum use should be made of all agencies for the delivery of fire support in the pursuit. The following factors apply: a.

Armour. Armour is of great value in the pursuit as a mobile source of firepower capable of reducing strongly entrenched defences which may delay pursuing infantry. However, route denial and natural obstacles may reduce the rate of advance of AFV and it will be usual to move AFV in rear of the leading infantry, ready to be called forward when serious opposition is met. It is seldom possible to use more than one tank troop or one reconnaissance troop in support of the pursuit along each track in close country, but the squadron organization should be preserved. The remaining troops should be used for relief of the troops operating forward with the infantry.

b.

Artillery. Artillery units should leap-frog or step up so that some guns are always in range and full advantage can be taken of quick response and the range to harass the preparation of enemy delaying positions.

Envelopment. Speed in the pursuit of the enemy main force will be essential. Wide outflanking movements which delay the impetus of the pursuit should be discouraged. Close envelopment of delaying positions and continued pressure on the main body should be the aim. SECTION 3 - WITHDRAWAL

23.

General Effect of Tropical Close Country. Tropical close country conditions favour withdrawing forces. Enemy attempts at enveloping the flanks will be both slow and exhausting, unless based on a track or road system. The main threats of interference will be from infiltration or penetration and possibly airmobile or airborne envelopment. Ambushes laid by the withdrawing force will enforce caution on the pursuer.

24.

Mobility and the Air Situation. Mobility of withdrawing forces by air, road and foot will be affected by the air situation. The likelihood of enemy air attack may restrict movement to areas of heavy cover or during darkness. Restrictions may also be placed on offensive and transport air support. In particular, the movement of transport and administrative echelons may be restricted, and the threat of enemy air power on limited routes and defiles has to be considered.

25.

Planning. Movement during withdrawal may be confined to a single narrow track or route, and may be difficult and slow. Confusion will only be avoided by a plan in which the movement of sub-units is carefully timed and that of the whole column is

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strictly controlled. Rear movement of non-essential stores has to be initiated early, especially where the movement will be slowed by manpack or animal porterage. Conduct of the Withdrawal 26.

Sequence and Time of Withdrawal. If enemy pressure is anticipated during a withdrawal, rear elements should be positioned to fight for a clean break, and forward elements should withdraw past them. If little pressure is expected in close country by day or night, a commander can attempt to conceal his withdrawal by maintaining an intact front and withdrawing rear elements first.

27.

Covering Forces. The narrow approaches, the concealment and the difficulties of movement in close country can allow a small covering force to delay an enemy for longer than would be the case in open country. The covering force should have greater mobility than the enemy. This mobility may be able to be provided by helicopters. Where AFV and artillery deployment is difficult, attack helicopters may be able to provide fire support.

28.

Conduct. Withdrawal from forward localities has to be fast and orderly. Routes should be reconnoitred and clearly marked. Guides should be nominated and have to know the routes in detail. Fire support needs to be maintained, therefore the withdrawal of fire support elements have to be co-ordinated with the remainder of the force.

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CHAPTER 9 NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DEFENCE IN TROPICAL ENVIRONMENTS SECTION 1 - RISKS AND HAZARDS INTRODUCTION 1.

A significant number of nations have growing capabilities to develop and field biological and chemical weapons. In some cases, they also possess or aspire to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. These State programmes have also served to draw the attention of lesser political groupings to the perceived benefits of NBC weapon ownership and use. Notably, the resulting risks of employment are particularly evident in areas of chronic political instability where vital UK interests are at stake; these frequently embrace tropical environments.

2.

NBC doctrine at the Joint Strategic and Operational levels is published in JWP 3-61 NBC Defence in Joint Operations and the subordinate JWP 3-61.1 whilst detailed ‘skills and drills’ will be captured in the future development of JWP 3-61.1.1. Within the Land Component, guidance for the conduct of operations in NBC and analogous Toxic Industrial Hazard (TIH) environments is published in AFM Vol 1 Part 5 Operations in NBC Conditions; this includes detailed discussion of the special impacts of extreme climates both on NBC hazards and on the implementation of defensive countermeasures. The AFM should be consulted to supplement the brief guidance in this Chapter.

3.

This Chapter draws upon the sources cited at para 2 above and especially the AFM to give an overview of the particular challenges offered by NBC weapons and resulting hazards in hot climates. It then goes on to consider the impact of high temperatures on defensive countermeasures and needed modifications to procedures. Where appropriate, distinctions are made between jungle or densely vegetated conditions as compared to desert regions, noting that the latter are also addressed in Chapter 9 of AFM Vol 2 Part 3 Desert Operations. NBC WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT AND EFFECTS

4.

High temperatures will modify the effects and hazards arising from the use of all classes of NBC weapons, as described later in this Chapter. However, variations from the temperate norm are unlikely to be so pronounced as to govern the initial decision to use such weapons; this will ordinarily be conditioned by wider political and military factors. Within that latter process, however, 2 common characteristics of tropical areas are likely to be influential: a.

Population Density. Tropical regions frequently contain large tracts of desert or dense jungle with very low population densities. In consequence, it may be possible to use NBC weapons at the tactical level with minimal risk to cities and the population at large. To that extent, inhibitions to use may be diminished.

b.

Temperature. Human efficiency is a prime determinant of success in military operations and physical stress is a pronounced feature of especially land

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combat. Many NBC defence procedures involve the use of whole-body Individual Protective Equipment (IPE). This is stressful even in temperate conditions and that effect is greatly exacerbated in high temperatures, severely degrading operational tempo. An NBC-equipped adversary may be tempted to capitalise on this, where necessary accepting limitations on his own conventional operations to allow free use of asymmetric means. 5.

Where the temptations to use NBC weapons prove persuasive and release occurs, the specific impacts of high temperatures on their immediate effects and resulting hazards are: a.

Nuclear. High temperatures do not, of themselves, greatly influence immediate nuclear weapons effects. However, the open terrain characteristic of deserts will increase the range of immediate radiation, blast, heat and flash effects on all but previously warned and protected forces. Conversely, dense tropical vegetation may serve to diminish some of these effects but at cost of widespread tree blow-down and secondary fires, both of which will restrict subsequent movement. Residual radiation in the form of fallout will be more pronounced where the fireball takes up sand from desert surfaces whereas much of this may be entrapped by jungle canopies, distancing the hazard from troops on the ground. In the latter case, however, tropical rain may be expected to wash the contamination into depressions, streams and rivers with resultant ‘hot spots’ that will only decay over extended periods of time.

b.

Biological. Many airborne or deposited biological agents quickly lose viability in the presence of the ultraviolet component of sunlight, although some toxins and spore-forming agents may be unaffected. Similarly, many agents cannot survive at very high ambient temperatures. Other agents benefit from hot, humid but protected positions. Across the spectrum of potential agents these factors will tend to favour employment at night, perhaps using the onset of daylight as a means of limiting downwind effect. In the case of dissemination in jungle areas, agent travel will be inhibited but made more difficult to predict due to complex airflows. Diseases that are not found in temperate or cold climates occur naturally in tropical areas. This may hinder the detection, identification and attribution of biological agent attacks. Additionally, the widespread presence of insect vectors will significantly increase the risks of secondary infection.

c.

Chemical. Chemical agent behaviour is greatly influenced by the interrelated effects of the surfaces on to or above which they are deposited or released, the temperature and movements of the air; Specifically: (1)

Surfaces. In deserts, sand will tend to absorb or cover liquid agents. In wooded areas, a dense tree canopy will hinder chemical agent delivered by spray or airburst munition from reaching the jungle floor. In this case, however, bombs or projectiles with delay fuses will be able to build up effective concentrations.

(2)

Temperature and Air Movement. Agents become more volatile as the temperature rises. This will result in higher concentrations of vapour

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over shorter periods of time. In the case of persistent agents, the contact hazard time will be similarly reduced. In deserts and in daylight, vapour will quickly disperse and evaporate in the heat of the sun and the turbulence of the air. At night when the temperature drops and the hot air rises, cooler air is trapped between the ground and the warm air above. This temperature inversion produces a stable layer of air in which chemical vapour is trapped, thus becoming increasingly effective as the night passes on. Just before dawn the agents will reach optimum concentration and hence effectiveness. In dense vegetation, however, the temperature, humidity, and lack of wind beneath the tree canopy means that drops of liquid agent trapped in vegetation and chemical vapour in the windless air will be more stable in behaviour, resulting in longer-term contact and respiratory hazards. A Table showing the indicative persistency of selected chemical agents at various temperatures is at Annex A. PERSONAL PROTECTION IN TROPICAL ENVIRONMENTS 6.

The principal challenge to the maintenance of an effective NBC Defence posture and hence operational capability in tropical climates is human performance degradation.

7.

Wearing respirators and protective clothing is exhausting in a hot climate. NBC suits hinder the evaporation of sweat and heat loss to such an extent as to induce serious stress. Excessive sweating may reduce the effectiveness of a NBC suit. Inner gloves and socks become saturated, leading to maceration of the skin. They should be changed as often as possible and allowed to dry out. Hot weather, particularly if humid, encourages troops to loosen or remove clothing. However, for the NBC suit to provide effective protection, it must have underneath it as least one layer of lightweight clothing as well as a layer of underclothing that covers the armpits and crutch. Wearing these 3 layers of clothing in such conditions will make troops considerably less efficient and more subject to heat stress.

8.

Heat Stress. Heat stress is a grave danger. Commanders must watch carefully for symptoms and consult their medical staffs. Where possible strenuous work should be carried out by night or in the cooler part of the day. The work/rest ratios for active tasks will have to be adjusted to avoid heat stress; when wearing IPE it may be necessary to reduce the ratio to as low as 10 minutes work with 30 minutes rest, as set out in the Guide at Annex B to this Chapter. Commanders should reduce the NBC dress state whenever possible but any decision will need to be made based on careful and informed judgments if troops are not to be exposed to undue risks (see Paragraph 10 below). Atropine, when injected, interferes with the sweating mechanism, thus tending to worsen the effect of heat stress.

9.

Water Intake. The amount of water a soldier wearing a respirator and protective clothing needs to drink to avoid dehydration and heat exhaustion is greatly in excess of the normal quota. A mandatory drinking routine will have to be stringently enforced to replace liquid lost by the body; it will not be sufficient to just quench the thirst. A guide to the individual water requirement for varying states of NBC dress and temperatures is at Annex C. Although the S10 Respirator is fitted with a drinking device there remains the problem of supplying and carrying sufficient water in battle.

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10.

Assessment of Risk. When considering the dress state to be adopted, commanders must balance the risk of surprise attack, either directly on their own units or indirectly by being stationed downwind of a likely target, against the risk of heat exhaustion and the general degradation of all-round efficiency. Commanders must continually reassess the risk in the light of the development of operations and the enemy’s perceived intentions. The temptation to keep troops in IPE as insurance must be resisted. Factors which should be considered include: a.

The task and the workload involved in relation to the temperature and humidity.

b.

The fitness, freshness or fatigue of the troops.

c.

The availability of water.

d.

The anticipated amount of warning of attack.

e.

The detection equipment and alarms available.

f.

The protection afforded by any cover.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 11.

In addition to the primary need to sustain individual performance in hot climates, notwithstanding the implementation of burdensome defensive countermeasures, there will also be a requirement to adjust tactics. These will be influenced both by the types of weapons that may be employed and the particular physical environment. For convenience, these issues are considered under the separate headings of Desert and Jungle, the latter implying any form of dense vegetative cover.

12.

Desert Conditions. Operations in the face of NBC hazards in desert environments will be characterised by:

13.

a.

Limited opportunities for concealment, resulting in enhanced risks of successful enemy targeting.

b.

High daytime temperatures with resulting degradation of human efficiency.

c.

Lack of water, compounding the effects of heat stress and reducing opportunities for decontamination.

d.

Extended lines of communication across potentially huge distances and via a limited number of routes, rendering the supply chain vulnerable to interdiction.

Vulnerability reduction measures such as concealment, dispersion and deception will build upon wider operational doctrine, enhanced by the detailed hazard-specific guidance offered in AFM Vol 1 Part 5 Parts B, C and D whilst the means of countering the risks of heat stress have been discussed at paras 7 - 9 and Annexes B and C. Additional tactical and procedural responses to the threatened or actual use of NBC weapons in various phases of operations are set out below.

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14.

Offensive Operations. Concentration in advance of break-in and breakthrough operations against prepared defences will provide an adversary with ideal nuclear and chemical targets; biological attack will be less likely having regard to the delayed time-to-effect. Even though the assault troops might escape attack once intermingled with the enemy, the supporting artillery and reserves would remain vulnerable so that the assault echelon might be deprived of support and reinforcement. There will be a premium on using the space of the desert for enveloping and encirclement operations on as wide a front as the ground allows. Engaging the enemy’s reserves from an unexpected direction and overrunning his logistic and headquarter areas will inhibit his use of chemical weapons. Similarly, advance and pursuit should be carried out on a wide front to avoid presenting attractive targets in defiles and amongst the congested traffic, which builds up behind bottlenecks.

15.

In the heat of the day, the activity of troops wearing individual protective equipment (IPE) will be severely limited. Operations will not be impossible but their scope will be restricted. If there is a chemical threat, the optimum times to carry out an attack will be in the cool of the night or in the early morning before the sun gets too hot. This will leave the enemy, who may wish to use these weapons to support a counterattack, with the options of wearing IPE in the heat of the day or postponing the operation until nightfall, so giving friendly forces time to consolidate on the new position. It must be assumed, however, that an enemy - particularly if desperate and facing defeat - may use NBC weapons at any time of the day.

16.

Defensive Operations. Every effort must be made to deny NBC capable adversary detailed knowledge of friendly dispositions. Strong covering troops and a false front to prevent ground reconnaissance of the main defensive position, an air defence umbrella and at least a favourable air situation over the area of operations will all help to make enemy target acquisition more difficult and uncertain. All troops, whether in defensive positions or held in reserve, must be well dug in and protected, especially in the face of a nuclear threat. It may pay to deploy the minimum number of troops forward to hold key terrain against the risk of a conventional attack, consistent with avoiding the risk of defeat in detail. The remainder should be kept in reserve, well dispersed, to avoid presenting a worthwhile target. These reserves should be capable of concentrating for counter-attacks to regain key terrain should the threat recede. The greatest threat of chemical attack is at night or in the early morning when it is cool enough for the attacking enemy to wear IPE and when chemical weapons would be at their most effective in terms of agent behaviour. Similarly, biological attacks are most likely in the night hours; the aim here will be attrition rather than preparation for an early attack.

17.

The Withdrawal. A withdrawal in the face of nuclear or chemical threats should be carried out suddenly, secretly, with great rapidity and over as wide a front as possible to prevent the enemy from locating, targeting and striking troops while they are at their most vulnerable on the move. If time permits the rearmost troops and echelons should be thinned out discreetly beforehand. Careful route planning and traffic control will be necessary to avoid offering profitable targets, especially at defiles through broken country or in bad going.

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18.

Jungle Conditions. In addition to the debilitating effects of heat, compounded by the difficulties of moving through dense vegetation, NBC defence in jungle environments demands attention to the following issues. a.

Entrapped Hazards. The jungle canopy may inhibit the initial deposition and spread of radioactive, biological and chemical hazards at ground level. But material that does fall to this level may be trapped, resulting in ‘hot spots’ that will be slow to decay or dissipate in the absence of exposure to the wind and direct sunlight. Furthermore, the frequent rainfall will tend to carry contaminants from the canopy into streams, pools and swamps. Careful and continuing reconnaissance will be required to guard against these post-strike risks.

b.

Health and Hygiene. Disease spreads rapidly in tropical environments, assisted by the presence of insects. Injuries, including those caused by the immediate effects of nuclear detonations, mustard agents or beta particles, can quickly become infected whilst the general systemic weaknesses resulting from exposure to NBC hazards will render casualties susceptible to endemic diseases. Scrupulous attention to health and hygiene precautions and the protection of wounds is essential.

c.

Equipment Husbandry. The combination of heat and humidity found in the jungle causes the rapid deterioration of materiel. Rain and sweat will reduce the effective life of IPE whilst NBC instruments will readily succumb to penetration by damp. Frequent checks have to be made to ensure that instruments and equipment remains usable. Planned usage rates of items such as the respirator canister and clothing will probably be exceeded and resupply may be difficult. G4 staffs should be prepared to overstock NBC clothing and related equipment to cater for surge demands, although packing material seals should not be broken any sooner than necessary. Storage areas need to be dry and, where possible, air-conditioned.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 9 INDICATIVE PERSISTENCY OF SELECTED CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS Class

Agent

(a) Lethal

(b) NERVE Non-Persistent (GB) Semi-Persistent (GA/GD/GF) Persistent (TGD/VX) CHOKING Non-Persistent (CG) BLISTER Persistent (H, Q)

Lethal Lethal Lethal Damaging

Incapacitating

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Typical Delivery Means (c) Artillery, MBRL

Persistency at Various Temperatures 10°C

20°C

30°C

40°C

(d) Up to 20 mins

(e) Up to 10 mins

(f) Up to 5 mins

(g) Up to 3 mins

Artillery, MBRL Artillery, FFR, SSM, Bombs Artillery, MBLR

More than 12 hours More than 24 hours Up to 5 min

Up to 12 hours

Up to6 hours

Up to 3 hours

More than 12 hours Less than 5 min

Up to12 hours

Up to 6 hours

Less than 3 min

Less than 2 min

Artillery, FFR, SSM, Bombs

More than 1 week

Several days

More than1 day

Less than 1 day

Artillery, MBRL

Several days

Less than 1 day

Few hours

Few hours

9-A-1

ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 9 WORK REST RATIOS WHEN WEARING NBC INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 1.

The physical effort required for a task has a direct effect on the level of degradation imposed by the wearing of IPE. The higher the temperature the shorter will be the time during which physical work can be carried out. When a high workload is combined with high temperatures, heat stress casualties are likely and the onset of these will be accelerated if there is insufficient water intake. The time required to rest and cool down will also increase with workload.

2.

As general guidance, when the operational situation permits and when the temperature does not make heat stress a limiting factor, it is advised that a routine be followed of 50 minutes work followed by 10 minutes rest.

3.

When the temperature makes heat stress a limiting factor, Table 1 below should be used as a guide for work and rest periods. The times shown are based on average responses of fit, young men. The figures are not absolute nor are they reliable predictions of the physiological responses of all individuals. The commander will have to temper these guidelines with his experience and knowledge of his unit’s standard of physical fitness, training and acclimatisation.

4.

Personnel must be alert for signs of heat stress, such as rapid breathing and pulse rate, nausea, dizziness, cramp, or a hot, sweaty, flushed face turning cold. In hot weather, these symptoms will not always be apparent to the sufferer.

5.

In cold conditions, insulation and work rates will have to be varied to avoid saturation of inner clothing by sweat.

6.

The following table assumes: a.

The NBC Dress States are as detailed in AFM Vol 1 Part 5, Part E, Chapter 1.

b.

Workloads have been taken as: (1)

Light. Sedentary work, light vehicle driving, vehicle maintenance, and routine guard duty.

(2)

Moderate. Marching in battle order, heavy repair work, moving light stores, digging.

(3)

Heavy. Forced marching, dismounted assault, fire fighting and resuce, moving heavy stores, digging in under fire.

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Ser

Temperature

(a) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

(b) Below 20°C1

NBC Dress State (c) Any 2,3

Warm (20° - 24°C) 4R

2,3 Hot (25° - 30°) 4R

2,3 Very Hot (30°C) 4R

Work Load (d) Light Moderate Heavy Light Moderate Heavy Light Moderate Heavy Light Moderate Heavy Light Moderate Heavy Light Moderate Heavy

Work Period (mins) (e) 50 50 20 – 30 40 – 50 30 – 45 15 – 20 40 – 50 30 – 45 15 – 20 25 – 40 20 – 30 10 – 15 30 – 40 20 – 30 10 – 15 15 – 25 15 – 20 5 – 10

Rest Period (mins) (f) 10 10 10 – 15 40 – 50 30 – 45 15 – 20 40 – 50 30 – 45 15 – 20 50 – 80 40 – 60 20 – 30 60 – 80 40 – 60 20 – 30 45 – 75 45 – 60 15 - 30

Table 1 – Recommended Work/Rest Periods2 7.

When the operational urgency is such that no rest can be permitted, the maximum work periods to minimize heat casualties are shown in Table 2, for personnel wearing a combat suit or when wearing shirt and light trousers (together with suitable underwear in each case), under the IPE.

1

Heat stress unlikely to be a limiting factor. This table is based on the Mk 3 NBC suit, S6 Respirator, and the combat suit which pre-dated Combat Soldier 95 clothing. The heat stress arising from this ensemble will be greater than from the Mk 4 NBC suit, S10 Respirator, and Combat Soldier 95 clothing. 2

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Ser

Temperature

(a) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

(b) Below 20°C3

NBC Dress State (c) Any 2,3

Warm (20° - 24°C) 4R

2,3 Hot (25° - 30°) 4R

2,3 Very Hot (30°C) 4R

Work Load (d) Any Light Moderate Heavy Light Moderate Heavy Light Moderate Heavy Light Moderate Heavy Light Moderate Heavy Light Moderate Heavy

Work Period (mins) (e) 50 80 60 90 70 85 75 45 70 60 40 45 35 25

Rest Period (mins) (f) 10 80 90 100 55 110 80 60 70 50 40

Table 2 – Maximum Work Periods

3

Heat stress unlikely to be a limiting factor.

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ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 9 WATER CONSUMPTION REQUIREMENTS WHEN WEARING NBC INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT The Table below provides a guide to water consumption requirements at various dress states, temperatures and workloads. It is based on average needs and may not reflect the full requirements of any particular individual. Therefore, in addition to enforcing the consumption regime set out in the Table, commanders should continuously monitor their troops for sight of dehydration. Ser

Temperature

NBC Dress State

(a) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

(b) Mild (10° - 19°C Warm (20° - 24°C) Hot (25° - 30°C) Very Hot (30°C +)

(c) 2 4R 2 4R 2 4R 2 4R

Water Required Under Work Conditions1 (litres per day) Light Moderate Heavy (d) (e) (f) 5 5 5 5 7 7 5 7 7 7 7 10 7 10 15 10 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15

Table 1 – Water Uptake Requirements in NBC IPE

1

Work Conditions have been taken as: a. Light. Sedentary work, light vehicle driving, vehicle maintenance and routine guard duty. b. Moderate. Marching in battle order, heavy repair work, moving light stores, digging. c. Heavy. Forced marching, dismounted assault, fire fighting and rescue, moving heavy stores, digging in under fire.

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CHAPTER 10

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

SECTION 1 - DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1945 1.

Since the early 1950s the United Kingdom has focused its defence resources on NATO and the possibility of a campaign in North West Europe against the Soviet Union. Research and development has likewise been focused on producing weapons and equipment to suit this type of potential war, and although some of the weapon systems and equipment are suitable for use in any theatre of war, many are only suitable in a mechanised and fast moving campaign in a European environment; developments in doctrine and training have also followed this route.

2.

The operations in jungle regions between 1945 and 1966, mainly in South East Asia, were primarily of a counter-insurgency or counter revolutionary type of campaign. The many valuable lessons learned from these campaigns made no real contribution to the research and development of new weapons and techniques required by NATO forces to counter the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact although many technological developments were made by the Americans in Vietnam which have impinged on British research and development since then. After the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the situation has almost reversed. It is now entirely feasible to plan for a British military contribution to an international force almost anywhere in the world and thus the need to have a range of suitable weapons and equipment for a variety of tasks.

3.

Some of the Army's present weapon systems and equipment are not designed for the more specialised conditions of the jungle. Tanks and self propelled artillery could be examples of this potential mismatch. In other areas, such as communications technology, helicopters, navigational aids and the potential for mobility and command and control in jungle areas has vastly improved, although as yet these improved capabilities have not been tested in such an environment. SECTION 2 - FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS General

4.

The impact of modern communications and information technology in military terms became apparent during the Gulf War in 1991 and it is clear that this evolution, which is only just beginning, will have a profound effect on the way in which operations will be conducted in the future.

5.

Future developments in science and technology should have considerable impact on the conduct of jungle operations. Advances will be characterized by the miniaturization of electronic components, improved surveillance capabilities and increased performance of conventional equipment and weapons. These are considered within the context of functions in combat. Command

6.

Command in tropical operations will be enhanced by expected improvements in intelligence and logistics systems, together with more reliable and secure communications systems. However, the increasing reliance on complex

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communications equipment and automatic data processing will make them more vulnerable to electronic warfare and to the effects of the jungle conditions and the ability of the logistic system to replace and repair items. The growing use of vehicle borne computers for many aspects of command and control may not work properly in tropics and in particular, the jungle, and alternative means of doing the same task will have to be considered. Miniaturization may help to reduce this vulnerability. The growing use of HF radio picture transmission, and the ability of helicopters and light aircraft to fly in all weather situations are separate examples of technical developments improving the capability for command. Manoeuvre 7.

Both the strategic and tactical mobility of the armed forces may be expected to improve in the longer term. The greatest advances are likely to be in tactical mobility due to improvements to ground vehicles and helicopters. These improvements should provide an increased capability for rapid deployment to prevent the enemy establishing superiority in combat power or retaining it for any length of time. It would also reduce the relative security of bases in remote jungle areas, but this could be countered by enhanced mobility for small groups of forces to strike at various targets, both locally and in deep operations, in rapid succession. Navigational aids will also prove more and more reliable, even in the closest of jungle terrain thus enhancing the scope for manoeuvre. Firepower

8.

The technological implications for firepower are: a.

Man-portable Weapons. Improvements in, and a probable greater availability of guided, man-portable, air defence and anti-armour weapons are likely to impose constraints on the tactics and movement of forces around jungle areas - particularly in any form of vehicle.

b.

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons. The likely proliferation of small, portable, nuclear, chemical and possibly biological weapons, may increase the possibility of enemy forces obtaining such a weapon or at least making more credible claims of possessing them. Developments in the chemical and biological fields of science are still unpredictable and move forward erratically. Nevertheless the possibility of the use of new chemical or biological agents to deny or utilise ground and airspace cannot be overlooked - particularly as they are relatively cheap and easy to produce and arms control measures for this type of warfare are in their infancy.

c.

Conventional Weapons. Both direct and indirect fire conventional weapons are likely to be improved markedly in both rate of fire and accuracy. Sighting systems for improved accuracy of fire (Laser pointers for personal weapons, and laser designators for artillery/aircrew) will enhance the prospect of accurate fire by day or night.

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d.

Area Defence Systems. The development of controllable mine systems and remote sensors should enable larger areas to be controlled by fewer men, thus helping to free fighting troops from static security tasks.

Information And Intelligence 9.

General. The information-gathering capabilities of armed forces are likely to be greatly enhanced by developments in: a.

Surveillance equipment.

b.

Target acquisition systems.

c.

Night observation equipment.

10.

Night Observation. Improved night vision equipment should increase the capability of both sides to operate by night, particularly in the air, placing a greater emphasis on electronic protection measures as well as physical protection measures.

11.

Sensors. Improved methods for the detection of explosives and concealed mines and booby traps, including the use of bio-sensors, should restrict the enemy's ability to hinder operations and allow greater opportunity for manoeuvre. Thermal Weapon Sights (TWS) which rely on ambient light for their use and can penetrate darkness, smoke, dust and bad weather could enhance a commanders ability to acquire more information and intelligence.

12.

Information Handling. Handling of increased information about the enemy will pose a new problem. The use of automatic data processing systems should ease the problem and simplify tasks associated with the coordination of operations. However, these systems will need to be "tropicalised". Combat Service Support

13.

Administrative support in jungle operations should be improved by the use of automatic data processors. This, together with improved mobility and stores handling equipment, should give commanders increased flexibility in planning operations and greater assurance of support with reduced response times. Automatic data processing systems should facilitate better control of stores and supplies and may result in enhanced security. Summary

14.

When a British force is committed to operations in a tropical environment a force commander would have to consider how best to utilise the technical advances that have been made in the availability of information and the developments in firepower and mobility. This will need to be reviewed against the background of a jungle environment which inhibits movement, observation, and the effective use of firepower. Furthermore the lack of suitable data and recent military experience in operating in such an environment will not help the process of making the right military decisions early in any planning for operations in the jungle. Given early warning of deployment most of the problems associated with technical developments and untested equipment can be overcome.

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General Sir William Slim GOC in C 14th Army 1943-45

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CHAPTER 11

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

SECTION 1 - THE SOLDIER Weather Extract from the History of the 23 Indian Division in Burma 1942. “The weather was dirty during that monsoon. The rain raced out of the sky for days on end, the mountain tops were shrouded in a continuous mist and the heavens were blotted out except when jagged streaks of lightning tore the clouds apart. It was as though Nature was determined to show that she resented our intrusion into her kingdom. For the first thirteen days of July it rained without ceasing, and during a violent August thunderstorm the base communications were dislocated when the signal office was struck by lightning. Those who have experienced the fury of the monsoon know that it is beyond the mind’s devising to keep dry unless you have a stout roof overhead and strong walls around you. Officers and men alike were wet all day and all night. Even bamboo bashas were little protection against the elements as the wind thrust through the countless crevices and swirled round inside the huts, driving in the inescapable dampness to moisten the lives of those who could secure the pleasure of dryness only when they were relieved at their forward posts and sent down for a few days. The shortage of essential equipment increased the strain of a life exposed to the elements. There were serious deficiencies of blankets, greatcoats and waterproofs and, perhaps worst of all, nearly everyone had only one pair of boots. It is little wonder that under these conditions the health of the Division began seriously to suffer. Owing to the ravages the climate and of malaria, many units were by early September reduced to half their normal strength and some were much lower than this, one battalion at one point having only a hundred and twenty men fit for duty. A battalion commander has expressed the opinion that some units never fully recovered from the wastage during this monsoon, when the medical resources were overwhelmed by an incidence of disease such as none had foreseen. With the road back to India washed away and air evacuation far away in the future, there was nothing for it but to hold casualties forward. Our medical units were small and few, so that at times battalions were holding a many as two hundred cases in their own lines. Among the diseases to be treated there was one which, if not dangerous, ranked very high for the utter discomfort it caused. Sufferers from “foot rot” will not readily forget the agony of each step and the sensation of complete helplessness when the skin cracked between the toes and the fungus began to spread until, in the worst cases, there occurred a process of internal combustion which brought up filthy blisters on the feet, as though they had been plunged in boiling water. Mud, wet, cold and disease - these, the inescapable companions of our everyday life, worked insidiously upon the mind and spirit; there was no relief from, no easement of, the unending discomfort which sapped at morale. None could at times escape the feeling that life was not worth the living when, after a day’s work in the rain and mud, which made each step a physical effort, men returned drenched to the skin to a sparsely furnished hut if duty did not demand that they continue to face the

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elements during the night. Even under cover the nights brought little relief to those who lay in wet clothes under insufficient blankets, trying to forget the cold which made a mockery of the desire for sleep. Gradually the mind became numbed and drove on the body to function as an automaton, and men went stolidly about their business because they were disciplined soldiers for whom there was no quitting. They could live only in the present: to glance backward was dangerous for the contrast the past presented; to look forward was futile, for there was nothing to support hopeful expectations.” Leadership Extract from “Major General O C Wingate - An Appreciation”. “Of such was the General’s command. Our judgement was based on what we knew of him. He lectured us on column tactics, he taught us how to throw the enemy off our scent, how to light fires without any smoke, even to split bamboo to make a noiseless fire. We became self-sufficient in a way few other soldiers ever did. We could cross rivers wider than the Thames, without any fancy gadgets, and get our mules to cross with us. Most could read a map and use a compass without difficulty so, if ever cut off by the enemy, they could navigate their way back to safety. We could march the feet off any soldier who ever breathed. We could track, we were our own Quartermasters and cooks, all due to Wingate. He could be a hard taskmaster demanding perfection. If we felt the lash of his tongue, so did the officers who would have to make public penance in the same way as ourselves. Like Crauford of the Light Brigade, in the days of the Peninsula War, his officers had to conform to what was expected of the men. Above all, the General told us of his plans, as far as was reasonable, remembering that we faced a savage and barbaric enemy, at whose hands to be merely killed, if captured, would have been a relief. He spelled out the dangers and the hardships, and the unpleasant things that could happen to us if wounded or stricken with disease, though he took what precautions were possible to alleviate the plight of the sick and wounded. We knew he would share the same discomforts and dangers as ourselves. When we staggered bowed and aching for all those hundreds of miles under the immense load that we carried, when a fight would have been a relief if only to shed our big packs, it helped to know that he would be sharing the same numbing burden. Indeed, all officers had to endure that same bondage to the big pack, as ourselves. Once, on training, we were blasting away at dummy Japs scattered about in the jungle, when the General came on the scene. He proceeded to lecture us on conserving our ammunition, and told us how many bullets and shells it had taken to kill or wound each soldier in the Great War. God knows where he got his facts from, but no-one had any doubts that they were true, such was his forcefulness. Again, I remember the day before we set off from the Ledo Road to march through North Burma to get behind the Jap main front. We had an issue of flame-throwers, and PIAT projectors. No-one had seen them before and, when we tried out the PIAT, we found that their bombs failed to explode on impact. As we were engaged in ribald comment, the General strode on to the scene. He told us the bombs were an early type and their fuse was liable to damp. This at a time when the rain was

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teeming down. He called for a fire to be made and, by trial and error, holding the bombs near enough for the fuses to dry out, he found that two minutes was enough to ensure that they would explode on impact. I have never heard of any other General who would have dived in like this, and taken the personal risk involved in finding the solution to our problem. These are the sort of things that made us follow him and give him our trust. Rough and cussed as we soldiers were, we only asked for someone over us who was a craftsman at his job, and took all possible care with our welfare and lives. If he was hard in his demands for perfection, we did not mind. The perfection he demanded lay in our unique Chindit skills, not in bull and shining parades. If he was famous as an eccentric, that was fine by us, for it gave us something to laugh at and, anyway, we knew that he was a soldier of the highest calibre.” Written by Pte J Allmont, 2nd Leicestershire Regiment 1944. Discipline Extract from “Defeat into Victory” by FM Sir William Slim. “The more modern war becomes, the more essential appear the basic qualities that from the beginning of history have distinguished armies from mobs. The first of these is discipline. We very soon learnt in Burma that strict discipline in battle and in bivouac was vital, not only for success, but for survival. Nothing is easier in jungle or dispersed fighting than for a man to shirk. If he has no stomach for advancing, all he had to do is to flop into the undergrowth; in retreat, he can slink out of the rearguard, join up later, and swear he was the last to leave. A patrol leader can take his men a mile into the jungle, hide there, and return with any report he fancies. Only discipline -not punishment - can stop that sort of thing; the real discipline that a man holds to because it is a refusal to betray his comrades. The discipline that makes a sentry, whose whole body is tortured for sleep, rest his chin on the point of his bayonet because he knows, if he nods, he risks the lives of the men sleeping behind him. It is only discipline, too, that can enforce the precautions against disease, irksome as they are, without which an army would shrivel away. At some stage in all wars armies have let their discipline sag, but they have never won victory until they made it taut again; nor will they. We found it a great mistake to belittle the importance of smartness in turn-out, alertness of carriage, cleanliness of person, saluting, or precision of movement, and to dismiss them as naive, unintelligent parade-ground stuff. I do not believe that troops can have unshakable battle discipline without showing those outward and formal signs, which mark the pride men take in themselves and their units and the mutual confidence and respect that exists between them and their officers. It was our experience in a tough school that the best fighting units, in the long run, were not necessarily those with the most advertised reputations, but those who, when they came out of battle at once resumed a more formal discipline and appearance”. Extract from the Japanese history of its 15th Army in Burma.

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“It was observed that the British forces maintained their traditionally high standard of discipline throughout a most difficult campaign. The high standard of morale and discipline of the colonial forces surprised the Japanese troops.” Mental Fatigue Extract from an Operational Analysis Report after the Second Chindit Operation April 1944. “ Probably the most important moral factor in long operations in the jungle is the ever-increasing mental strain on officers, particularly commanders of all ranks. The nature of operations necessarily throws a far greater immediate responsibility on commanders than more normal operations, and there is no relief from this responsibility day or night. Commanders have to undergo the same physical activities as the men, and suffer inevitably the same steady deterioration of physical condition. In spite of this, additional mental concentration is required, made more difficult by the impossibility of detachment and survey of the situation on a wider scale. The effects of this strain are evidenced by an increased lack of attention to detail as the campaign proceeds. Minor irregularities are allowed to go unchecked simply because the effort required to check them cannot be produced. Viewed from secure surroundings it must inevitably appear that this falling off in enterprise and enthusiasm is indicative of an in-different standard of determination in officers. This is most emphatically not the case. The cause is probably partly physical, but mainly due to the continuous and prolonged concentration required. One’s mind is on duty twenty-four hours a day, prepared for surprise by night even if one is asleep, actively considering duties by day. No relaxation and above all no recreation is possible and mental fatigue is cumulative. The deadening effect of daily routine and mental exertion required to keep going on the march is also cumulative. Physical exertion requires mental control, and few things are less conducive to alertness than forcing oneself to “stick it out” carrying a heavy load day after day. The importance of attention to this point of mental fatigue cannot be overestimated, as it is probably the limiting factor to the duration of effective long range operations. This is more likely to be true of future operations where, owing to improvements in rations etc the physical limit could well be extended. Extension of the physical limit of endurance will naturally extend the mental limit, but certainly not in a direct proportion. There was, of course, considerable individual variation of the effects of this fatigue. Taking as evidence the extent of attention to detail, the amount of high spirits shown, and the type of conversation prevalent, it would be fair to say that no effects were noticed until about four weeks after the start of operations. By then there were many indications of the effects of mental fatigue evidenced as above, but the limit was far from reached. Like all fatigue, mental and physical, there is in all probability no ultimate limit at which breakdown inevitably occurs. There must be a point however, at which it is no longer a sound military proposition to keep troops in the field, and it is repeated that this point is more likely to be determined by mental rather than physical weariness. Mental fatigue was not of

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course confined to officers, but in the case of men was much less obvious, probably because confidence in leaders was so high. But mental and physical fatigue had some curious results. After six weeks of steady plodding it was extremely difficult to make men run or undertake any enthusiastic violent exertion, even in battle. In fact in the last two engagements recorded, there were several cases of men in battle under fire going to sleep over their rifles when watching a flank or not actually moving. Getting up and moving on one’s feet for a few minutes, however, completely restored alertness.” Training Extract from “Chindit” by Richard Rhodes James. “At about 7.30 came that dread signal, “Packs on”, and we shouldered our gargantuan loads feeling again the creases and bruises of yesterday’s march. That first hour was by no means the worst of the day. With the sun not properly risen and one’s insides aglow with the tea of a few minutes back, we could march with ease and confidence, silent and settled, hearing only the clink of a mule harness and the rattle of a badly adjusted load. The rise and fall of the equipment of the man in front had not begun to irritate and served only to emphasise the rhythm of the march. There is leisure to look around before the weight of the pack has bent the back and fixed the eyes in a weary gaze at the boots of the next man or the hooves of the mule in front. There is enchantment in this early hour more clearly defined in its contrast to the toil ahead and the troops after they have overcome the depression of the early rise, are ready to face the day. The enchantment is shortlived, and especially in our case with unaccustomed bodies and soft feet. The sun mounts and sheds no kindly light but a merciless glare on the column. The sweat begins to collect under the pack and flows in great salty streams from the forehead through the eyes and down the chin. All the aches and pains of yesterday appear again, to be joined by the peculiar discomforts of today. The illadjusted pack, the rubbing of the water bottle or haversack, that place where the belt fails to coincide with the contours of the body, the place you long to scratch but cannot reach. And then the boots, pinching, slipping, rubbing, the socks sliding down the foot and collecting in an abrasive bundle at the heel. The first sign of weariness is easily recognised. It is the furtive glance at the watch, first occasionally and then increasingly frequently until we glance every few minutes in a desperate hope that time has passed and the hourly halt is due. The hour seems longer and longer as the day lengthens, and woe betide the commander who dares to trespass one minute across the boundary of that time of rest. Impressed immediately with the great monotony of the march we sought to evolve means of keeping our minds occupied. When the hypnotist tells you to “make your mind a blank”, he is asking the impossible. And we found that our minds craved an outlet from the prison which our physical activity imposed on them. The Gurkhas did not find much difficulty in sustaining interest; the noises of the jungle and the sight of game satisfied them. For the British troops the problem was more difficult and no one but the individual himself could tell how successfully he overcame it. For myself I used the method of the marching tune, and prided myself on my ability to convert any tune into the rhythm of the march. Conscious thoughts were less easy to

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arrange. They varied from a pride in physical achievement, which lasted only a short time, to nostalgic memories of physical comfort. There was always a special place reserved for anticipation of the midday halt or the night’s bivouac, but it was not wise to encourage these thoughts too early in the day. The first big moment of the day has arrived and after four or five hours of marching we disperse for the midday halt. Instructions are given: “Signals under that big tree over there with the set 100 yards to the right”, “Command Post under this tree” (selecting the choicest position). “Transport along the line of trees off the track”, “ Medical half left by that bush”. “Orders in twenty minutes”. Each man barely reaches his allotted station before he hurls off his pack, slumps down and surveys the scene wearily. But the rest is shortlived. There are mules to unload, fires to prepare, water to fetch and blistered feet to inspect. I move to take up my position by the wireless set and have the supreme luxury of having my pack removed for me. The world is acceptable again and the brigadier is already removing his boots.” The Soldier's Load Extract from an Australian Army Training Bulletin No 69 - Infantry Battalion Lessons from Vietnam. 1988. “To carry out their task in the most efficient way for the period of time required to conduct an effective operation, infantry sub-units had to carry a heavy load of weapons, rations and equipment. The load on the individual soldier presented a number of specific problems: a.

It reduced his mobility.

b.

It reduced his range of action.

c.

It slowed his reaction time to enemy action.

d.

It made him tired.

e.

Carrying a heavy load used energy that should have been available for fighting.

The study of the load carried by the soldier was not simply an exercise in finding lightweight equivalents to the weapons, equipment and rations carried by the soldier. A reduction in the weight of an item may have operational significance. The example used was rations. A lightweight ration which gives all the necessary energy, protein and vitamins could be used to reduce the weight carried by the soldier or it could also enable a sub-unit to stay away from base, or operate without resupply by air for a longer period. The lighter ammunition of the M16 enabled soldiers to carry more ammunition whilst on operations. In spite of all the studies and efforts to lighten the soldier’s load, it remained too heavy. Soldiers suffered a serious tactical impairment unless they went into battle carrying less weight than they are accustomed to march and train with. It was noted that men suffer a loss of muscular strength when moving under fire yet the Army still

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allowed and required soldiers to carry more food, equipment, personal items and ammunition than experience indicated would be needed. All items in the soldier’s load should be examined critically. The example was given of studies conducted by both the US and UK armies which indicated that a soldier’s maximum load should be 30% of his body weight. There was a requirement for a lightweight carrying frame, to enable radio operators to carry both their pack and radio on the one frame. This would also have allowed them to attach and detach either the pack or the radio without a major repacking of all the equipment carried. The US Special Forces lightweight tubular frame with an adjustable shelf and straps would have been suitable for this purpose.” In Action Tpr J Leyin 25th Dragoons. Recorded in The Times of 24 Feb 94 “ The orders were that we were to stand firm. We were surrounded by a force of more than 10,000 experienced jungle fighters who in the thick jungle no one could see. Out of the night mortar bombs rained down on us and phosphorous shells exposing us to whatever else they thought fit to let fly at us. There was shouting, screaming and a frenzy of searing, flashing, exploding lights. In the daytime I remember the aching eyes, the tired limbs, the sweltering heat, the sweat-sodden bodies and the pungent smell of burnt cordite inside our oven-like tank. I remember the abandoned vehicles and equipment, the burnt out trucks, the stench of decaying flesh, the malaria, the dysentery, the ringworm, the mosquitoes and the flies. But most vividly of all, I remember the day when the last Japanese were cleared from their strongholds overlooking the Ngakyedauk Pass and the relief we all felt.” After 19 days and nights of fierce and unrelenting action the siege of 7 Indian Div’s “Admin Box” at Ngakyedauk (Okedokey Pass) was lifted; an assortment of signallers, butchers, clerks, muleteers and medical orderlies together with the 2nd West Yorks and the 25th Dragoons had stopped the Japanese infantry from advancing further during the 2nd Arakan Offensive early in 1944. Tactical Techniques - Burma 1943-45 Extract from “ Defeat into Victory.” by FM Sir William Slim. “In Burma we fought on a lower scale of transport, supplies, equipment, supporting arms, and amenities than was accepted in any other British theatre. Yet, largely because of this lack of material resources, we learned to use those we had in fresh ways, to achieve more than would have been possible had we clung to conventional methods. We had not only to devise new tactics but to delve deeply into the motive forces of human conduct and to change our traditional outlook on many things. The result was, I think it true to say, a kind of warfare more modern in essence than that fought by other British forces. Indeed, by any Allied force, with the exception of the Americans in the Pacific. There, their problem, the opposite of ours, was to use the immense resources that became increasingly available to them most effectively in the peculiar circumstances of an ocean war. They solved it brilliantly and evolved a

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new material technique. We, also in strange conditions, evolved our technique of war, not so much material as human. Compared with the forces in Europe, the combat forces used in Burma were not large. They fought on a front of seven hundred miles, in four groups, separated by great distances, with no lateral communications between them and beyond tactical support of one another. My corps and divisions were called upon to act with at least as much freedom as armies and corps in other theatres. Commanders at all levels had to act more on their own; they were given greater latitude to work out their own plans to achieve what they knew was the Army Commander’s intention. In time they developed to a marked degree a flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them to act swiftly to take advantage of sudden information or changing circumstances without reference to their superiors. They were encouraged, as Stopford put it when congratulating Rees’s 19th Division which had seized a chance to slip across the Irrawaddy and at the same time make a dart at Shwebo, to ‘shoot a goal when the referee wasn’t looking’. This acting without orders, in anticipation of orders, or without waiting for approval, yet always within the overall intention, must become second nature in any form of warfare where formations do not fight closely “en cadre”, and must go down to the smallest units. It requires in the higher command a corresponding flexibility of mind, confidence in its subordinates, and the power to make its intentions clear right through the force. Companies, even platoons, under junior leaders became the basic units of the jungle. Out of sight of one another, often out of touch, their wireless blanketed by hills, they marched and fought on their own, often for days at a time. They frequently approached the battle in scattered columns, as they did for the crossings of the Irrawaddy, and concentrated on the battlefield. The methods by which they did this and, above all, the qualities the needed to make these tactics possible and successful repay study. They may be needed again.” SECTION 2 - CAMPAIGN EXPERIENCES General As indicated in the preface much of the development of jungle warfare came about as a result of the fighting in South East Asia during the Second World War. For the British, operations in the jungle since then have been mainly to counter insurgency, revolution, or attempts to gain independence. These more recent operations in the post- war era have, generally, been at battalion or possibly brigade level, and controlled by some form of joint headquarters which would have included the civil authorities. From this period there are, few, if any, suitable examples to record in the context and setting for this manual, although it is well appreciated that many tactical skills and new techniques have been developed in the Army as a result of the lessons learned in these and other similar operations. It is substantially recognised that while there are many examples to hand from the Second World War of the successful application of military principles by Allied Forces in South East Asia, most of these are at the corps or divisional level of conflict. Nevertheless it is illuminating to read of the sea-change that took place in the 14th Army after the retreat from Burma in 1942 and the depressing results of the

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First Arakan Campaign in 1943. Examples of these are the major changes in command and the administrative reorganisation (1943), the First Chindit Operation (1943), the defence of Kohima and Imphal (1944), and the brilliantly conceived advances to the Chindwin and Irrawaddy rivers during that year are all classic examples of the way to regain a strategic initiative and apply the principles of war to the conduct of a very difficult and frustrating campaign in the jungle. These operations are well known; they have been recorded in many publications since the war, and have become enshrined in British military history. The bibliography at the end of this chapter provides a list of suitable reading material about the Burma campaign which graphically illustrate this radical change of fortune in that “forgotten” theatre of war. In order to provide extracts from jungle campaigns that do have direct application for the British Army today, it is apposite to choose examples that are pitched at a suitable level and have some relevance in the context of operating within a coalition. The two extracts chosen vary enormously from one another but come from the same war, Vietnam, which is probably the only case of a near - total war fought in a jungle environment since 1954. It has to be noted that very few of the many gallant and professional actions fought by the Americans and their allies during these years in Vietnam are generally known about within military circles. In the example of the defensive battle for Khe Sanh in Vietnam during the early part of 1968, some 6000 US Marines held a Combat Base for over 70 days against over 20,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in what appeared at the time to be a re-run of the battles for Dien Bien Phu. The battle is recorded in Section 3 of this Chapter and was a battle that the Americans won on a scale that severely crippled the North Vietnamese Army. Amongst other factors pertaining at that time it may well have caused the North Vietnamese to think that they could not, in future, win an all-out military conflict with the Americans. The military success of Khe Sanh was almost totally obscured by the Tet Offensive which followed soon after. At the other end of the military scale the Australian contribution to the coalition of forces in Vietnam during this time was small but by no means insignificant. A Task Force of up to 3000 Australian soldiers operated in conjunction with the Americans in a southern province of South Vietnam from June 1965 until the end of 1971. Their experiences in the jungles of the Phuoc Tuy Province, coupled with their similarities to the British military ethos make this a useful and relevant example. In Section 4 of this Chapter an account of the battle for Long Tan in August 1966 epitomizes the high standards of all round professionalism attained by a Task Force composed of National Servicemen led by a few Regular Officers and NCOs. SECTION 3 - THE BATTLE FOR LONG TAN - 18 AUGUST 1966 Extract from “Tactics of Modern Warfare” by Mark Lloyd. The Background "Australia sent its first advisers to Vietnam in August 1962. Initially the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam consisted of no more than 30 officers and NCOs and worked exclusively with the South Vietnamese Army. By 1964, however, it had been

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increased to 80 members, many of them from the Australian Special Air Service Regiment, and had begun to work closely with the US Special Forces who held its expertise in great esteem. In April 1965, in response to a request from President Johnson for international support on the ground, Australia deployed the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment to Bien Hoa outside Saigon. In July of that year the battalion was augmented by a 105mm battery of New Zealand artillery and two months later by a further battery of Australian gunners. In March 1966, spurred on by the success of the existing force, Canberra agreed to increase its presence to full Task Force status. The Task Force usually comprised two infantry battalions with dedicated armour and artillery, a squadron of the Special Air Service, logistics, signals and other support. The Royal Australian Air Force’s contribution to the war consisted of a squadron of Canberra bombers. Later that year the 1st Australian Task Force as it was now designated was redeployed to Phuoc Tuy, a coastal province to the north-east of Saigon, within which it was granted full autonomy. Geographically the area was ideally suited to the size and composition of the Australian forces. About 3,900 sq kms (1,500 square miles) in size, it consisted essentially of scrubland with a few low hills and the occasional patch of virgin jungle. The population of 100,000, many of whom were well indoctrinated Communist sympathizers, was largely concentrated along the coastline where movements would be easy to monitor. The 5th Vietcong Division was known to be hiding in the May Tao Hills to the north-east, supported by the locally raised D445 Battalion which operated covertly from the local villages. Until the arrival of the Australians, the area had been largely ignored by the United States and South Vietnamese forces. Brigadier Jackson, in command of the ATF, decided however to make his presence felt at once. Having set up his Force headquarters at Vung Tau, on the coast, he established a small hill base at Nui Dat, some twenty miles to the north. Having placed his artillery in Nui Dat he ordered his infantry to begin a policy of ‘aggressive patrolling’ under the protection of the guns with the aim of clearing the Vietcong from the local villages, so driving a wedge between them and the main population centres. The Setting Nui Dat was not an ideal location. It had few facilities, the gun pits soon became waterlogged and the troops were forced to live under canvas. Nonetheless, the Australian volunteers soon acclimatized. Unlike their American counterparts they had received jungle training before being posted to Vietnam and so were able to begin a purposeful routine of patrolling, the success of which soon made them the envy of their allies. SAS teams would push deep into the hinterland of Phuoc Tuy Province to spring ambushes on the unsuspecting, and until then relatively safe, Vietcong forces. This allowed the infantry to create a fire zone around the base to secure it from sniper and mortar fire. A combination of 5.56mm M-16s and heavier 7.62mm FN automatic rifles were carried by each patrol to give it a unique blend of firepower and versatility. In the process the villages of Long Phuoc to the south and Long Tan to the east of Nui Dat were evacuated, their somewhat unwilling occupants being moved to less vulnerable areas.

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The Battle Australian intelligence, like most others, was not always accurate, and this allowed the Vietcong to take further advantage of a small initial success. On 17 August 1966 a Communist patrol managed to pierce the outer defences at Nui Dat and mortar the sleeping Australians, killing one and wounding 23. Brigadier Jackson was facing a dilemma. At the time the ATF consisted of two infantry battalions, (5 and 6 RAR), most of which were out on patrol, leaving only three infantry companies with which to guard the base and pursue the enemy. He immediately ordered the recall of the outlying patrols to counter the possibility of a large-scale attack and dispatched B Company 6RAR on a sweep of the area to the east of the base. Having found nothing that day, the Company was ordered to return to base next day, when the search would be continued by D Company under command of Major Smith. Unknown to the Australians, the Vietcong had decided to destroy Nui Dat completely and were at that precise moment moving north with seven battalions comprising over 4,000 men. Three of the battalions were converging on the area of immediate Australian interest. Four battalions however, were approaching their objective through the Long Tan rubber plantation to the east, the same area through which D Company was destined to patrol. At 11.00 am on 18 August, D Company left Nui Dat with 12 Platoon, in the lead. Two hours later they met up with B Company who showed them evidence of Communist activity near the Long Tan Plantation some 2,000m (2,168 yds) east of the Nui Dat perimeter. Having completed his reconnaissance of the area, the Company Commander ordered his company forward along a clearly defined track into the plantation. After about 300m (327 yds) the track split into two, the left hand fork going north and skirting the edge of the plantation, the right hand fork continuing forward directly into the rubber trees. 10 Platoon was ordered to probe north, while 11 Platoon, supported by 12 Platoon and the Company Headquarters element, continued east into the plantation. At approximately 3.45 pm, after 40 minutes of painstakingly slow progress the forward scout of 11 Platoon spotted a squad of six Vietcong. The Australians opened fire without warning, taking the Vietcong completely by surprise. The survivors fled further east deeper into the plantation, pursued by the leading elements of the Australian platoon. At 4.08 pm, as 11 Platoon entered a small clearing which marked the eastern boundary of the plantation and the beginning of jungle, it came under sustained fire. Two Australians died immediately and the rest of the platoon dived for cover. The platoon rapidly formed an area of all round defence and frustrated the Vietcong attempts to overrun their position. Company headquarters, with 12 Platoon to its rear, attempted to advance in support but were brought under heavy mortar fire and stalled leaving 11 Platoon isolated and perilously exposed. At this point the situation might have deteriorated further had not the Royal New Zealand Artillery forward observation officer, attached to D Company, been able to bring down accurate and sustained 105mm artillery fire from the guns at Nui Dat, directly on to the enemy’s position. Supported by a battery of American 155mm field guns co-located at Nui Dat, the 24 guns continued firing ceaselessly for two and a

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half hours, ranging to and fro across the enemy’s forming up points making it impossible for him to execute a concerted assault on the exposed Australian platoon. Hearing the firefight, 10 Platoon located to the north, immediately attempted to relieve the pressure. Under the cover of a cloudburst and assisted by the noise and confusion of the battle, the platoon managed to infiltrate the enemy’s position unseen before opening fire. The enemy quickly recovered however, and at once shifted some of his available reserves to threaten 10 Platoon which was then forced to withdraw into a hastily improvised defensive position. Once information had reached Battalion Headquarters the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Townsend, immediately assembled a relief force from the few soldiers available to him in the local area. A Company, recently returned from patrol, was ordered to replenish its ammunition stocks and enbus on a section of ten M113s attached to the 1st APC Squadron. At 5.45 pm A Company left its position at Nui Dat and headed for a crossing point on the Suoi Da Ban River. By this time D Company was running dangerously short of ammunition. An attempt by two sections of 12 Platoon to fight through to their colleagues in 11 Platoon had failed, leaving the latter in desperate straits. At 5.00 pm Smith had ordered the survivors of 10 and 12 Platoons to reform on his headquarters, now positioned in a small hollow some way to the west. 11 Platoon, unable to extradite itself and completely surrounded, had to be left to its own devices. At approximately 6.00 pm in an act of particular gallantry, two Australian-crewed UH1 helicopters took off from Nui Dat and overflew D Company’s new defensive position. Guided by colour flares and taking advantage of a deliberate halt in the barrage they hovered low over the headquarters to enable ammunition boxes to be dropped to the men below. Almost simultaneously the Vietcong mounted a suicidally brave human-wave assault which the Australians were only able to counter with extreme difficulty. Grasping his opportunity, Sergeant Buick, in command of 11 Platoon since the death of the platoon commander, used the ensuing firefight to lead the remnants of his men through the enemy positions to the new company lines. For the first time in three hours of bitter and vicious fighting the survivors of D Company were reunited. Despite their heavy losses, the Vietcong continued their relentless attempt to annihilate the remnants of Smith’s company. D445 Battalion was ordered to sweep west behind the Australians to complete the encirclement. In so doing they ran directly into A Company’s advancing APCs. Both sides were taken completely by surprise but the Australians recovered quicker. Remaining on the move they brought their vehicle mounted 50-cal machine guns into devastating effect, cutting swathes through the confused and terrified Vietcong. One vehicle was forced to withdraw when its commander was badly injured but the other nine continued their advance and at 6.40 pm entered the D Company perimeter. B Company, which had fought its way to the scene on foot, taking advantage of the fighting around the perimeter, organized its own breakthrough, and joined D Company in the now rapidly strengthening defensive lines. Disorientated and

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confused, the Vietcong broke off the action and retired to the comparative safety of the jungle. Lieutenant Colonel Townsend, who had arrived with A Company, now assumed command and at once set about regrouping on a small clearing to the west. The dead and wounded were evacuated by helicopter, leaving the survivors to spend a restless night listening to the sounds of the jungle. The Vietcong made no further attempt to attack but instead busied themselves scouring the area for their own casualties. Supplies were brought forward, both to Nui Dat (where the artillery had expended 2,796 rounds of ammunition) and to the Company perimeter itself. At daybreak, D Company was ordered to reconnoitre and if possible secure the area. They found the area devastated but deserted. Two wounded Australians were discovered and evacuated but otherwise the area was empty save for the bodies of the fallen, whom the Vietcong had not managed to drag away during the night. Conclusion The battle for Long Tan gave the Australians the initiative in Phuoc Tuy Province. They had lost 17 dead in the battle but Vietcong fatalities had been enormous. A total of 245 bodies were located and buried but everywhere there were signs of others having been removed. The influence of the Vietcong 5th Division was severely eroded. Throughout the engagement at Long Tan the initiative had rested with the Vietcong yet they had been soundly defeated. The Australian Task Force had demonstrated that firepower alone is no substitute for excellent leadership, a cool head, experience and training.” SECTION 4 - OP BARRAS. A COY 1 PARA SIERRA LEONE [Extracted from a Report by Major M P Lowe PARA] A Company 1 Para was part of a joint operation (Op BARRAS) to secure the release of some members of a UK Training Team held hostage in the jungle beyond Freetown Sierra Leone in September 1999. This article focuses exclusively on A Company's capture of a small village as part of the overall operation and describes some aspects of the estimate, orders and conduct of the battle carried out by the Company Commander. "The initial briefing for the Company Group took place in the departure lounge at the Operational Mounting Centre. Usually a BG brief is held here as part of the mounting process. The Battalion IO came directly from the Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood (PJHQ) and explained the ground and enemy to the company. It was clear that the West Side Soldiers (WSS) were a rebel grouping with similar characteristics to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) that the battalion had already had experienced. Interestingly, during negotiations they had sought to be integrated into the Sierra Leone Army (SLA)1. The WSS had access to a wide range of direct and indirect weapons including twin ZPU-2 (14.5mm) HMG, 60/81mm mortars, AK series assault rifles, medium machine guns, RPGs, anti-personnel mines and grenades. They had the ground of their choice and had successfully survived two United Nations operations to deny them their 1

The WSS leader, KALLAY, had been a Sergeant in the SLA, joined the then West Side Boys (WSB) and been party to the pro-government coalition of tribal and bandit factions that fought the RUF during OPp PALLISER.

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jungle-operating base. Loosely organised into five "Battalions" their centre of gravity and the location of the hostages was known to be Gberi Bana, a small village on the northern side of the Rokel Creek. Access to the village was from the south across the creek and the village of Magbeni. From Magbeni, which was identified as the location of the "Gulf" Battalion, operations were mounted to the main supply route from Freetown to Masiaka. Here they kept their vehicles including a captured SLA Bedford with twin 14.5mm MG and at least three "technicals", pick-up trucks with heavy machine guns mounted on the back. Critically the distance from Magbeni to Gberi Bana is only 1600 metres, well within the reach of HMG and mortars. The British patrol had been captured by the WSS in Magbeni and taken across the Rokel Creek to Gberi Bana. Their vehicles including a WMIK were known to be in the village. Another battalion of WSS who effectively controlled the Laia Junction held the road south from Magbeni to the supply route. This brought another concern that they could reinforce to counter any friendly action to the north. It was clear that we needed additional G3 support in the form of a staff captain and additional G2 staff. The planning group consisted of myself, three platoon commanders, the operations officer and G2 staff, a clerk and a signaller. This grouping was formed on the assumption that the main body was likely to follow on from the first flight and that an amount of planning could be done concurrently. Last thing on Saturday night the planning group got together for a final brainstorming session. HQ LAND had deployed a G3 officer and G4 LO who were of great assistance. They also brought computery to give us SECRET level communications. On Sunday morning the planning group flew to Dakar in Senegal, the main body practised section and platoon level battle drills in the UK. In Dakar we had our first real insight into the nature of the joint operation and access to planning aids and information on Magbeni. With this information the planning team conducted an estimate in case of an unexpected hastening in mounting the operation. At this stage two possible landing sites (LS) were identified and the road from Laia Junction was considered as a tactical approach. However OPSEC concerns ruled out the most obvious (land) approach. On Monday evening I was briefed in Freetown that my primary task would be to secure Magbeni. On deduction from the estimate was that the HMG in Magbeni had to be suppressed until the company could bring direct fire weapons onto them and that, because of the close jungle, suppression would have to come from the air. Of the two LS, LS1 in the middle of the village had surprise in its favour but also was exposed to direct fire from the ground; it needed a two ship (2 x CH47) inload to guarantee enough combat power surviving the insertion to complete the mission. LS2, offset but with a strip of secondary jungle between it and the village, needed to be confirmed as suitable and its viability and ease of approach to the village became my Critical Information Requirement (CIR).

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One of the Objectives in Magbeni with a 'Technical' Parked Beside It The village lies along the road to Laia Junction and needed to be blocked to prevent the WSS reinforcing along this route. The thickness of the walls in the village was unknown and while the roofs were corrugated iron we needed to be able to penetrate the walls with direct fire weapons. The 66mm LAW was taken for this purpose. Notwithstanding the humidity and environment the proximity of the objectives and the enemy's arsenal of weapons necessitated the wearing of helmets and body armour in the assault. There was a clear need for a Restricted Fire Line (RFL) to coordinate the movement of the assaulting company with direct and indirect fire. We could not deploy the mortar line until a part of the village had been secured; again a battlespace management issue. Communications were insecure and whilst they could have been monitored by the WSS, the tight battlespace and speed of the operation favoured timely and accurate communications on an all informed company net. We were provided with secure communications to platoon level. Follow-on equipment was arranged for a short or long duration operation and held at the Forward Mounting Base (FMB). Concurrent activity focused on section, platoon and company level live firing. The platoon commanders replicated the objectives and rehearsed the possible sequence of attack again and again. By Wednesday the rehearsals concentrated on two courses of action, the key difference being in either a simultaneous or sequenced attack. The simultaneous attack from LS1 needed 2 x CH47 while the sequenced attack could be done with 1 x CH47 from LS2. Information that civilians were being held in one of the objectives led to a revision of the Rules of Engagement specifically for that task; again this was rehearsed live. For our part of the overall operation we were allocated 1 x CH47 for the initial insertion. This led to the sequenced attack as we could insert enough combat power on one lift to keep on mission while the second lift turned around and brought in the balance of the company group's "Bayonets". We were also to maintain an in-theatre reserve and Liaison Officer's mobility and protection with 2 x WMIK. An Air Landing Airborne Refuelling Platform (ALARP) would be flown forward to refuel our air assets as the operation progressed with protection from within the Company Group. Rehearsals and experience led us to take 2 x GPMG per section instead Issue 1.0: Sep 03

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of LSW. A heavy enough weight of firepower cannot be found from any magazine system and the GPMG, while harder to skirmish with, pays back in its weight of belt firepower. The sight for the RGGS is currently mounted to the SUSAT sight whereas iron sight performs better in the jungle. Dedicated RGGS rifles had to be fitted with SUSAT.

fed fed the the

A Coy in the Attack on Magbeni. GPMG were Favoured Over the LSW

Sketch of Target Area

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The sequential attack, well rehearsed and now familiar in the minds of the company was executed on 10 September around first light. The initial insertion went as planned. LS2 was chest deep swamp that could be waded through and the route through the secondary jungle brought us out close enough to the break-in point for the village. The CSM's group spent a few lonely minutes longer on the side of the LS closest to the enemy than perhaps they would have liked but were quickly joined

Taken from V towards Objectives X and U - 2 Pl Move Through the Village by the balance of the company. 3 Platoon assaulted the eastern objective (Z) first with little difficulty. 2 Platoon then encountered enemy direct fire as they moved to assault objective Y. With 3 Platoon providing fire support company headquarters moved forward to orientate them onto their objective. At this point an enemy mortar round2 exploded, wounding the platoon commander, his signaller, my signaller, two of platoon HQ and myself. The village still had to be secured; our mortars had yet to set up, and the blocking position had not secured the east of the village. Sgt Fitzwater took command of 2 Platoon and the company 2IC took over from me. Radios, ammunition and rifles were taken from us and we were dragged a short

2

The WSS had 2 inch, 60mm and 81mm mortars in action against us. A significant amount of 60mm was later recovered in Magbeni.

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3 Pl in the Area of Road-Block on Laia Junction Road distance, still well within the contact battle, to a CH47 which extracted us. 2 Platoon secured objective Y, 3 Platoon moved parallel to them, with red phosphorus thrown to cover 1 Platoon's move across the track. Here the platoon concentrated their firepower into the eastern edge of LS1 where enemy had been seen withdrawing. 1 Platoon assaulted objective X and W, which included the WSS ammunition dump. 3 Platoon then moved to the east clearing V, U and T en route to blocking the road from Laia Junction. 1 Platoon conducted clearance patrols in the secondary jungle to a depth of about 20 metres due to the going. At this point our mortar line was flown in to the initial LS which was found unsuitable. They were subsequently flown across to LS1. On LS1 the mortar line had difficulty adjusting their fire. Smoke was fired but because of the dense jungle could not be adjusted. Putting the MFC in a helicopter also failed due to communications difficulties. Ultimately the fire was adjusted aurally close to our forward positions on the FPF. Magbeni village was secure by approximately 0800 hours.

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Re-Org. Direct Fire Peppers the Building. To the Right a Tent Covers the WSS Ammunition Pit In the village the twin ZPU-2 and three "technicals" had been destroyed, a large quantity of mortar ammunition, RPG rounds, ammunition and an array of military equipment had been abandoned by the WSS. The British vehicles were driveable

The ZPU-2 Centralised During the Battle and Soon to be Destroyed and with spare keys flown in, were centralised, rigged for underslinging and extracted by CH47. Anything that could possibly have been of any use to the WSS was destroyed with

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either plastic explosive or petrol and red phosphorus. On withdrawal the main body withdrew to LS1 leaving 13 men under the 2IC to ensure the final destruction of the village. The casualties were treated within 15 minutes of wounding, at the surgical facility on the RFA PERCIVAL and were then flown to the UK on 11th September with the Main Body returning the next day. The Forward Mounting Base Party, under the QM(T) returned from Dakar on 16 September." SECTION 5 - BIBLIOGRAPHY Recommended Reading (This is not a complete or exhaustive list). a.

Burma 1941-45. Defeat into Victory, by Field Marshal Slim. The War against Japan Vol 2 & 3, Official history published by HMSO. The Longest Retreat, by Tim Carew. The Ball of Fire, by Anthony Brett- James. Beyond the Chindwin, by Bernard Fergusson. The Road past Mandalay, by John Masters. Orde Wingate and the Historians, by Peter Mead. Return via Rangorn, by Philip Stibbe

b.

Malaya. The Jungle is Neutral, by F Spencer Chapman. The War of the Running Dog, by Noel Barber.

c.

Vietnam

d.

Street Without Joy, by Bernard Fall. Vietnam: A History, by Stanley Karnow. A Soldier Reports, by William Westmoreland. General Jungle Warfare, by John Cross.

Training Aids SSVC Video Series. These comprise three relevant video tapes as follows: a.

C1642 - War in the Jungle.

b.

C1643 - Training in the Jungle.

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