Urban Operations: Army Field Manual Volume 2 Operations In Specific Environments

Army Code 71657 (2009)

VOLUME 2

ARMY FIELD MANUAL OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

PART 5 URBAN OPERATIONS

This publication supersedes AC 71657 AFM Vol 2 Pt 5 Urban Operations (2002) 2009

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The contents provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experience and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operations and training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is proved that you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find you criminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements of health and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a person criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP could result in disciplinary action under the provisions of the Army Act.

Amendment

Amendment No 4.1

Date Nov 09

Amendment No

Date

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PREFACE BACKGROUND 1. The increasing complexity of the contemporary and future operating environments, of which the urban environment is but one aspect, will pose a challenge to armed forces which operate in them, demanding new tactics, specialized equipment and heightened levels of discrimination. This emphasises the need for an agile and flexible force that can succeed when faced with situations across the spectrum of conflict. Such agility and flexibility will, in part, be determined by the composition of the deployed force; but it is critically dependent on that force being well practiced in Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP). 2. This manual describes the different TTPs required to operate in the urban environment and deliberately focuses on combat operations as these are the most demanding circumstances under which soldiers will have to operate. However, many of the TTPs are relevant to operations across the Spectrum of Conflict and there is a new chapter on Stability Ops. Soldiers deployed on operations, where they will have to undertake tasks in towns and villages, will employ these TTPs to varying degrees depending on the intensity of combat operations. Training for combat operations is the foundation for all operations in an urban environment. “The Army will need to be cautious about drawing general conclusions from urban operations in Basra and Baghdad. Unless all or most of the favourable factors apply in a future operation, the result could be very different. There is considerable reason to continue to teach tactics for urban operations in the anticipation that it will not be so easy, whilst stressing the need to be pragmatic and to exploit local circumstances”1. 3. Whatever challenges are inherent in warfare are magnified significantly in the urban environment. From Stalingrad to Inchon to Panama to Basra, operations in urban areas have been characterized by “poor communications, difficult command and control, difficult target acquisition, short engagement ranges, reduced effectiveness for fire support assets, and difficulties in providing logistical support”. Tall buildings, sewers, and tunnels give the battlefield dimensions of height and depth that are absent on open terrain. 4 In essence, fighting in urban areas is primordial and brutal. The enemy is at close range; snipers and explosive devices may be present; stress is extremely high; and the opposing force is frequently indistinguishable from the civilian population. Demographic and urbanization trends in the developing world are likely to lead to such environments that are even more stressful and more difficult for operations. Increasingly better informed through the growth of media sources, urban human populations will be the “vital ground” in the resolution of any armed conflict. Nevertheless, brutal, close combat demands that a war fighting ethos be maintained throughout all levels of training and education. 5. Historical data suggest that it is extremely difficult for modern forces to make best use of their technological advantages against a determined adversary in an urban environment. The different characteristics of the various urban environments, including 1

Operations In Iraq - An Analysis From The Land Perspective. Page 3-16 (Army Code 71816).

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population and structure density, low, medium and high buildings, subterranean structures et al, tend to negate the technological advantages (e.g. close air support, mobility, communications, etc) enjoyed by modern military forces. The advantage of military technology, typically associated with long-range, high technology weapons platforms that use mass and mobility, is significantly reduced in urban environments. 6. It is precisely for this reason that less sophisticated forces are drawn to urban areas. Such battles in the recent past, like at Grozny, Mogadishu, Jenin and Gaza 09 have been characterized by conflict between modern combined arms forces and informally organized irregulars. Aware of the increasing unwillingness to take casualties or cause collateral damage, and understanding the lack of comparative advantage in the urban environment, adversaries are increasingly likely to engage military forces in cities. 7. The degeneration of urban operations into a series of small group or even of individual battles was evident in operations as different as Stalingrad, Hue, and Beirut. The nature of built up areas is responsible for this fragmentation process. As battles proceed, the streets and building-blocks of the urban physical morphology fragment urban operations into conflict, between force elements usually of section or platoon size, with generally insufficient space for the deployment and manoeuvring of larger units. Combat disintegrates into a series of more or less separate and isolated conflicts around such fortress areas. 8. Given that much of an urban battle is likely to take place inside buildings or underground, it is likely to be invisible to all except those actually fighting it on the ground. As a result, it will difficult for higher-level commanders to maintain an accurate picture of the battlefield at any given time. Given this inevitable fragmentation, operational effectiveness will depend greatly on the quality of leadership at lower levels. AIM 9. The purpose of this publication is to explain the effect that combat in urban areas will have on the conduct of military operations and to describe the tactics and procedures involved in their prosecution. 10. The doctrine underpinning the overall principles for military operations does not change simply because of the altered physical conditions of the urban environment and thus this publication complements AFM Volume 1 Part 2 ‘Battlegroup Tactics’. It also records those tactical factors that need greater emphasis where urban conditions affect operations. SCOPE 11. The publication is split into three parts. Relevant historical examples and appropriate quotations are included throughout to provide an insight into how soldiers have operated in these conditions during previous campaigns. a. Part A. Part A describes Urban Warfare, the environment, issues relating to coalition operations and the military interaction with the civilian population.

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b. Part B. Part B deals with fighting the Urban Battle, the purpose of which is to provide a guide for use by commanders, staff officers and regimental planners in units and at formation level when operating in urban and built-up conditions. It describes the effects that this environment will have on combat operations, the functions in combat, the employment of particular weapon systems and the tactics used by the combat arms. c. Part C. Part C deals with aspects that concern the individual, how he survives, lives, trains for and operates in these conditions and is designed for the young officer and NCO as a basis for further instruction. It provides some tactical features about the movement of troops and urban operations at Section and Platoon level. It also covers subterranean operations, night operations and the use of obstacles. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 12. The content of this publication is not an authority to operate outside the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and must not be used or interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the principles below (IAW JSP 383, LOAC Manual 2003). In the event of any doubt, guidance must be sought through the chain of command. APPLICATION THROUGH LEADERSHIP 13. Although doctrine and TTPs provide practical guidance on the conduct of operations, their publication, alone, will not significantly add to operational success. Unless soldiers understand doctrine, are well trained in the TTPs and are sufficiently motivated to carry out their tasks to the best of their ability their effectiveness on the battlefield, as individuals or part of a team, will be limited. It is leadership which ensures that training is effective and drills are learned and followed correctly. It is leadership which drives effective action and motivates soldiers to give their utmost to achieve the common purpose. It is leadership which turns the bald statements of facts in these publications into battle winning or lifesaving action. And moreover, it is strong leaders who recognise that doctrine writers do not have a monopoly on wisdom and adapt and develop this guidance to win in the prevailing circumstances.

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ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 2 OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS PART 5 URBAN OPERATIONS PREFACE

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CONTENTS

v PART A – URBAN WARFARE

CHAPTER 1 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 CHAPTER 2 Section 1 Section 2 CHAPTER 3 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3

THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT The Military Significance of Urban Warfare The Nature of Urban Operations The Nature of Urban Terrain Other Factors in Built Up Areas

A-1-1 A-1-2 A-1-4 A-1-8

URBAN COALITION OPERATIONS Urban Coalition Operations Operating Under US Command

A-2-1 A-2-2

MILITARY INTERACTION WITH THE CIVILIAN POPULATION The Status of Civilians Military Responsibilities and Authority Civilian Factors

ANNEX A TO PART A

TYPES OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION

A-3-1 A-3-2 A-3-5 A-A-1

PART B – FIGHTING THE URBAN BATTLE CHAPTER 4 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 CHAPTER 5 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4

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PREPARING FOR THE URBAN BATTLE Operational Planning Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace ISTAR Command, Control and Communications

B-4-1 B-4-7 B-4-12 B-4-15

ALL ARMS COMBAT Close Combat Combat Support Combat Service Support Recent Lessons Identified

B-5-1 B-5-23 B-5-42 B-5-50

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CHAPTER 6 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 CHAPTER 7 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 CHAPTER 8 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6

CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS Introduction Planning an Attack The Stages of Offensive Action Urban Strike Operations

B-6-1 B-6-4 B-6-7 B-6-15

CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS Introduction The Elements of a Defensive Operation The Use of Delay in Defensive Operations Enhanced Blast Weapons

B-7-1 B-7-1 B-7-10 B-7-14

STABILITY OPERATIONS Introduction Factors for Consideration during Stability Operations Security and Control Initial Restoration of Essential Services and Facilities Interim Governance Tasks Military Support to Security Sector Reform

B-8-1 B-8-2 B-8-4 B-8-6 B-8-7 B-8-7

PART C – URBAN COMBAT SKILLS CHAPTER 9 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6 Section 7 Section 8 Section 9 Section 10 CHAPTER 10 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6 Section 7

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COMBAT SKILLS Camouflage and Concealment Fighting Positions Movement Entry Techniques Clearing Buildings Defended Localities Navigation in Built-Up Areas Casualty Evacuation Ammunition Resupply Isolated Personnel in the Urban Environment

C-9-1 C-9-3 C-9-11 C-9-16 C-9-27 C-9-32 C-9-34 C-9-35 C-9-37 C-9-39

WEAPON EFFECTS Introduction Small Arms Grenades Heavier Infantry Direct Fire Weapons Tank Weapons Indirect Fire Weapons CBRN

C-10-1 C-10-2 C-10-4 C-10-5 C-10-6 C-10-7 C-10-7

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CHAPTER 11

SUBTERRANEAN OPERATIONS

C-11-1

CHAPTER 12

NIGHT OPERATIONS

C-12-1

CHAPTER 13

THE USE OF OBSTACLES IN URBAN OPERATIONS

Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5

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Introduction Lethal and Non-Lethal Obstacles Mines Demolitions Booby Traps

C-13-1 C-13-1 C-13-2 C-13-3 C-13-4

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URBAN OPERATIONS PART A URBAN WARFARE

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CHAPTER 1 SECTION 1 – THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF URBAN WARFARE ‘The future of war is not the son of Desert Storm, but the stepchild of Chechnya.’ General Charles C Krulak, USMC 1. Whereas 2% of humanity lived in urban areas in 1800, 47% of the world’s population do now and by 2030 this figure is estimated to grow to above 60%. In developing nations, the current trend towards conurbations with 10 million or more inhabitants is expected to continue. Land Forces should expect to operate routinely in urban areas, where the adversary operates amongst the population and where cultural understanding and sensitivity will be crucial to military success. Land Forces need to be appropriately structured, equipped and trained to understand the constraints and exploit the opportunities presented by such complex battlespace. 2. Potential enemies recognise the inherent danger and complexity of the urban environment to the outsider and may view it as their best chance to negate the technological and firepower advantage of modern armed forces, possibly as a component of hybrid warfare1. 3. An intelligent enemy will exploit this benefit in a number of ways. The urban environment gives him the opportunity to cause a significant number of casualties that will damage both the morale of his opponents and the support of their domestic electorate. He may incite mistakes and over-reaction against the civilian population. Above all, he will strive to seize and retain the initiative or at least delay his opponents’ attempts to do the same. He fully understands that his conflict is fought ‘amongst the people’ and, especially in large conurbations, he will attempt to capitalize on his endeavours both internally through direct influence of the local population and externally through indirect influence of the world community facilitated by the ever present media. 4. The same skills required to defeat an enemy in a complex, modern urban environment will also be required in other situations where the enemy makes use of mud built houses or subterranean tunnels. Such skills demand a high level of training, all arms co-operation and judicious and comprehensive use of all the resources available. 5. Non-combatants present a particular difficulty in urban warfare as operations are likely to be fought amongst the civilian population. Their presence demands a variety of additional skills and resources in order to gain their support and to prevent them from both interfering with our own operations and providing willing or unwilling succour to the enemy. 6. Irregular opponents and complex terrain mean that engagements are often fought at low levels with outcomes determined by initiative, resolution, firmness, skill, courage and, above all, sound leadership.

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The Land Warfare Centre working definition of hybrid warfare is, ‘Asymmetric strategies waged by operationally integrated hybrid adversaries, adopting a broad range of modes of conflict1, methods in warfare1, and types of technology/capabilities, whose tactically fused actions will usually be synchronised for strategic effect, and which usually take place in a populated battlespace1 within complex terrain’.

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7. The high density of communication and information systems in the urban environment favours the rapid and widespread dissemination of information. Information and news will spread like wildfire, whether intended or not. This carries the risk that the situation is misjudged by rumour or deliberately propagated misinformation and that, consequently, wrong decisions are made. 8. The worldwide use of the English language and developed communications systems of all sorts will enable even the most backward insurgent or enemy to interfere with insecure communications systems and take advantage of poor voice procedure and security. The insurgent is able, with currently available technology, instantaneously and effectively to coordinate his operations, fires and activities against a conventional opponent over a wide time and space continuum. SECTION 2 – THE NATURE OF URBAN OPERATIONS BACKGROUND 9. The UK should expect urban operations to be an integral and principal part of any military campaign. In the final instance, military campaigns may well be won or lost in the urban environment. Military operations require UK, coalition and allied forces to conduct a range of activities right across the spectrum of operations, from Military Assistance to Civil Effect (MACE), through Counter Insurgency (COIN) to Fighting in Built-Up Areas (FIBUA). All these operations may take place predominantly in urban areas. 10. Contemporary operations have been characterized as being ‘...confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three adjacent city blocks’ – the ‘Three Block War’2. The concept of a ‘Three Block War’ relates to military operations of varying intensity taking place in close proximity to each other. It demands the highest levels of professional collective and individual competence at the same time as discipline, war-fighting skill, courage and leadership. THE SPECTRUM OF OPERATIONS General. The three principal land tactical activities are offensive, defensive and 11. stability operations3. Any and all of these activities could take place in built-up areas, and the operational conduct of each will be affected by the urban environment. FIBUA is attritional in nature, costly in casualties and involves large amounts of resources, time and effort. Historically, the strategic advantage of the early and rapid seizure of ground led to the operational military imperative to bypass built up areas. Sophisticated, long-range antiarmour defence tended to be based in the forward edges of villages and the leading edges of woods, designed to canalise armour into killing zones between towns and villages. Consequently, there was little need to prepare for fighting in built up areas. Experience over the last decades has shown that the advantage of conventional armed forces is largely negated in the urban environment. The future operational environment will demand the highest levels of skill on the part of all military forces to defeat his enemy who will often be

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The ‘Three Block War’ was a concept devised by Gen Charles Krulak in the late 1990s to describe the complex spectrum of challenges likely to be faced by soldiers on the modern battlefield. In three contiguous city blocks soldiers may be required to conduct full scale military action, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief. 3 Army Doctrine Publication, Land Operations, DGD&D, AC 71819.

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operating on his home territory while, if necessary, gaining and retaining the support of the indigenous population. 12. Offensive Operations. Conventional operations in an urban environment heavily favour the defence. Historical evidence4 suggests that to capture and hold a city the attacker may require an advantage of 5:1 or 6:1. Three tactical concepts, Penetration, Thrust and Saturation, should be considered for use in offensive operations. a. Penetration. Urban penetration is designed for operations against clearly defined objectives, either enemy or terrain, that can be secured, defended and subsequently used as forward operating bases. b. Thrust. Urban thrust is focused on attacking an enemy on a narrow axis of advance. The thrust maximizes combat power at the point of the attack with a view to upsetting the enemy balance, capturing ground and forcing the enemy to withdraw. c. Saturation. Urban saturation is a similar tactic to that used by police forces responding to an emergency and requiring backup. The saturation concept considers numerous fire teams or section-sized units operating in a dispersed, noncontiguous fashion in the urban environment. As these units patrol their assigned area, they have to be prepared to respond rapidly to calls for assistance by neighbouring teams. 13. Defensive Operations. In large built-up areas, the concept of defensive operations should be mobile and should exploit depth, with the defender concentrating on moving forces from key terrain features or buildings to other similar features, to counter the main enemy thrust and to maximise his weapons’ capabilities. Although the principles employed are the same as for other defensive operations, the differences lie in the techniques employed and the prioritisation and emphasis on essential features. These are: a. To give early warning of the intention to defend a built-up area. This is essential to enable the necessary pre-positioning of Combat Supplies and other defence materiel. b. When time permits, to ensure that planning for the defence is detailed and centralised. Since most actions are conducted by small units, control is decentralised. Detailed Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) will be essential and has to include types of building construction, routes through and around the battlefield, including underground systems, and civilian communications facilities and utilities. The defence should seek to exploit the three dimensional nature of urban operations. 14. Stability Operations. Stability operations are planned continuously and conducted concurrently with offensive and defensive operations. They are defined as military operations which contribute to order, security and control in order to set the conditions to allow the primacy of non-military and indigenous organisations to develop accountable institutions and mechanisms of government. These operations will include Peace Keeping, Peace Enforcement, Conflict Prevention, Humanitarian Assistance, Irregular Warfare, PostConflict Reconstruction and Non-Combatant Evacuation. The training requirements 4

Russian wars in Chechnya (Grozny) 1994, 2000.

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involved in the preparation for involvement in stability operations can be found in Army Field Manual Volume 1, Part 9, ‘Tactics for Stability Operations’. SECTION 3 – THE NATURE OF URBAN TERRAIN 15. Civilisation is in the middle of a surge of urbanisation with more than a dozen new ‘mega cities’ and slums having been established in the last two decades. One of Africa’s largest slums is in Nairobi and is home to some 750,000 people. The population there is growing by 5% each year and it is widely believed to be close to crisis. Municipal wastecollection rates dropped from 90% in 1978 to 33% in 1998. When it rains, storm water washes the accumulated waste into the water sources used by the poor. Yet Nairobi is not exceptional by international standards. Conditions such as these are the main reason why, every day, there occur about 6,000 deaths around the world from water-borne diseases. Despite all this, people are moving to cities in droves. In 1950, two-thirds of the world’s population lived in rural areas. New York City was then the only settlement with more than ten million people. Today there are twenty such mega-cities and more are on the way. Most of these mega-cities are in developing countries that are struggling to cope with both the speed and the scale of human migration. Estimates of the future spread of urbanisation are based on the observation that in Europe, and in the Americas, the urban share of the total population has stabilised at 75-85%. If the rest of the world follows this path, it is expected that in the course of the next decade an extra 100 million people will join the cities of Africa and 340 million the cities of Asia – the equivalent of a new Bangkok every two months. By 2030 it is estimated that nearly two-thirds of the world’s population will be living in urban areas.

Fig A-1-1 The Surge of Urbanisation Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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16. History also shows that the transition can be uncomfortable. The slums of Manchester were, in their time, just as awful as those of Nairobi today. But people move there for exactly the same reason; however nasty conditions seem, the opportunities of urban life outstrip those of the countryside. 17. Some experts indicate that governments, international donors and aid agencies spend too much on rural development and neglect the cities. Most states have a rural development policy, but only a few have urban ones. Moreover, these experts point out that, although rural areas often have worse sanitation, greater illiteracy and homelessness than cities, such figures are deceptive. Being illiterate, homeless or without access to unpolluted water are far more serious problems in a crowded city than in the countryside. In many rapidly developing cities, the slums and shanty towns are growing twice as fast as the whole city. Worldwide, more than one billion urban dwellers live in inadequate housing. These neighbourhoods are characterised by newly arriving rural immigrants building haphazard shanties on squatter plots. Such slums become epicentres of unrest, disease and hunger and are focal points for aid relief and efforts to improve or demand change. However, operations in these areas can be more difficult than in a high rise city centre due to transient populations and temporary structures. The conditions in urban areas will give rise to grievances and long standing rivalries and could well be the cause of future political instability. It is reasonable to anticipate that future military operations, conventional or otherwise, will have to focus more on undeveloped slums in and around major cities. Sadr City in Baghdad is one example. URBAN CHARACTERISTICS 18. Built-up areas are characterized by density of construction and population, street patterns, compartmentalization, affluent and poor sections, modernization and the presence of utility systems. The differences are in size, level of development and style. A typical urban area consists of the following elements:

Fig A-1-2 Example of a Town Centre, Newry, Northern Ireland, 2006 Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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a. City Core. In most cities, the core has undergone more recent development than the core periphery. As a result, the two regions are often quite different. Typical city cores of today are made up of high-rise buildings which vary greatly in height. Modern planning for built-up areas allows for more open spaces between buildings than in old city cores or in core peripheries. Outlying high-rise areas are dominated by this open construction style more than city cores. b. Commercial Ribbon. Commercial ribbon development includes rows of stores, shops and restaurants that are built along both sides of major streets through built-up areas. Usually such streets are wide and open. The buildings are uniformly two to three storeys tall – about one storey taller than the dwellings on the streets behind them. c. Core Periphery. The core periphery consists of streets with continuous solidly constructed buildings. d. Outlying Areas. Residential sprawl and outlying industrial areas consist of low buildings that are normally detached and arranged in irregular patterns along the streets with many open areas

Fig A-1-3 Residential Sprawl e. Subterranean. It is not so easy to categorise the underground systems that abound in cities and towns, and which provide an additional dimension to urban operations. Most European houses have cellars, usually self-contained, which differ with the type of building. Many towns have sewage systems or, less commonly, conduits for electric or telephone cables which are large enough to permit passage of troops. Some cities have underground railways or rivers. It is important to be aware of the tactical implications of any underground systems.

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f. Historical City Centre. For towns, particularly the centre of towns or the older parts of the town, the houses are normally closely packed with smaller streets and open areas laid out in an irregular manner. Outside the town a more modern and methodical layout can be assumed. g. Villages. Most villages are small and compact, usually comprising a few streets with one central street where any shops and offices may be situated. Although there may be much open land around a village, within the village itself the density of housing and construction could well be the same as for a town.

Fig A-1-4 Village of Mud Dwellings, Afghanistan

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SECTION 4 - OTHER FACTORS IN BUILT UP AREAS TERRAIN 19. Urban terrain is complicated. The primary impact of urban terrain is that it limits individual fields of view. A soldier in an urban environment could find himself fighting almost alone or with perhaps only one or two other men from his section within sight. The enemy could be 20 cm away behind a wall, cognisant of his presence, or not. A family of non-combatants could be similarly situated. Movement is canalised by doors, stairways, alleyways, streets, roads, walls and fences; some provide protection, some do not. The enemy could be in front of him, behind him, above him or below him, and he will not know. His sense of direction will be distorted by the way the streets are laid out, and his hearing will be affected by the noise of battle echoed and distorted by buildings. The sound of rifle shots will ricochet like the rounds themselves and he will not know from where they were fired. He will not always be able to see his commander or necessarily know where he is. Using his radio will frequently be impossible and voice contact difficult, dangerous or pointless. The advantage will always start with the defender who will know the ground better than his opponent, will have prepared his fields of fire and obstacles and is at home in his warren. 20. Classic urban operations training has focused on the difficulties of fighting in first world villages, towns and cities. The problems posed by the potential western urban battlefield have been exacerbated by the growth of multi-story urban cores, residential, commercial and industrial areas and subterranean levels. The contemporary urban environment could also include the complete spectrum of habitation from large, unmodernised towns crowded by small streets and alleyways, through underdeveloped slums in and around rapidly developing cities, to mud huts and jungle villages. 21. Operating in built up areas is exacerbated by difficulties beyond war-fighting. Inadequate housing in slums and shanty towns, neighbourhoods characterised by rural immigration and by haphazard shanties on squatter plots will become epicentres of unrest, disease and hunger. Even relatively low levels of damage to urban infrastructure can cause serious problems to water supply, sewage disposal and to communication links. The efficiency, health and survivability of the soldier as well as the non-combatant will all be affected and threatened. 22. All arms fighting in built up areas is very likely to cause collateral damage. The damage to buildings of all types will create difficulties for the movement of vehicles and troops and can cause fundamental changes to the topography of the urban terrain. Rather than enable the destruction of the enemy, our use of heavy and support weapons can provide him with improved obstacles to conventional offensive military operations, with cleared fields of fire and improved defensive protection. The nature of operations can Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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radically alter the terrain in a built-up area in a short period. Incidental or intentional demolition of structures can change the topography of an area and destroy reference points, create obstacles to mobility and provide additional defensive positions for defenders.

Fig A-1-5 High Rise Residential Area, Grozny, Chechnya THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 23. Operations, especially those of an urban nature, are conducted amongst the people and in the presence of the media. As well as providing the enemy with the chance to reduce the technological advantage of his opponent and cause him significant casualties, the urban environment allows the enemy to provoke mistakes by conventional forces against the civilian population, such as over-reaction, collateral damage against their homes, disruption of vital facilities, large-scale arrests and the break-up of families and communities. Fighting in population centres gives give the enemy a chance to win the battle for the “hearts and minds” of the non-combatant civilians. Moreover, objective and subjective media reporting provides opportunities for the enemy to gain the initiative and prevent his opponents from doing so. 24. The populations of large cities and towns throughout the world are dense and complicated. Unlike rural inhabitants, discrete urban dwellers are permitted an anonymity wherein they can foster a distorted view of the general good. Soldiers involved in urban operations must understand the historical background and aspirations of the different networks of the urban society in which they operate, be prepared to anticipate people’s reaction to events and expect to be able exploit their knowledge by the way they operate. 25. Anonymity. In an urban environment the insurgent or terrorist can remain anonymous. The urban environment can provide the home and background for the friends and relations who can provide his cover. By using disguise or subterfuge, the enemy combatant or foreign fighter can immerse himself into the indigenous population. Being Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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anonymous, the enemy can plan and conduct operations more easily and without risk of compromise. He or she can undertake offensive actions for longer and more precisely than in conventional warfare, often under direct view, but without the knowledge of the external force. 26. Density of Population. The density of urban population increases the difficulty of the identification of the foe, facilitates the initiation of terrorist actions, enables the use of willing or unwilling human shields and makes atrocities more effective. The presence of numerous civilians results in many becoming casualties, as a result of both the primary effects of munitions and the secondary effects such as collapsing structures and flying glass. 27. Information and Influence. The presence of the media in built up areas can be exploited by the enemy. The enemy needs the oxygen of publicity to survive and win. The effects of his actions can be disseminated rapidly around the globe in the presence of the media. A clever enemy will also exploit the media to place his opponent in a bad light. CIVILIANS 28. The term ‘civilian population’ refers to all civilians living in the area of operations who are not members of the armed conflicting parties. It includes formal, informal, national and international organisations and groups, as well as government and non-government organisations. Neither the civilian population nor individuals uninvolved in combat can be made the target of attack. 29. History has shown that people invariably will not or cannot leave the urban environment even when it becomes the scene of intense military combat. The presence of possibly large numbers of uninvolved people may thus be a characteristic feature of urban operations, and tactics and operations must take account of this fact.

Fig A-1-8 Civilians 30. The attitude of the civilian population will have a decisive impact on the planning and conduct of military operations.

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MAPPING AND DIGITAL MAPPING DATA 31. Conventional urban cartography will not necessarily provide sufficient detail, currency or accuracy for an adequate terrain analysis of built-up areas. Consideration should therefore be given to the use of intelligence gathering systems to get the best information. Image maps are regularly produced along with some overlay information, such as roads and key buildings in order to provide the most up to date mapping for urban operations. However users should be aware of the disadvantages of imagery over conventional mapping namely; loss of detail due to glare, shadow, vegetation and snow and the potential displacement of buildings due to height. 32. Other than by the study of open source internet information, which may be out of date or inaccurate, electronic intelligence-gathering systems will not always be able to quickly capture information about the sewer, subway and underground water systems that an enemy can use for individual and group infiltration and movement. The capacity and capability of elevated railways and major transit routes to carry troops and vehicles will be critical to operational planning. Knowledge about fuel and gas supply and storage facilities, electric power stations and emergency systems, and mass communications facilities is critical to the urban battle and there are country-wide infrastructure booklets available from the Defence Intelligence Services (DIS) or other military sources. 33. Certain public buildings need to be identified during the Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE) phase of an IPB. Hospitals, clinics, surgical facilities, buildings that may pose a RADIAC hazard and religious buildings will need to be treated according to the laws of war and the rules of engagement. Public utilities, such as power stations and water processing plants, must be identified and careful consideration given to whether or not they should be targeted. Lack of water, for example, could well force population movement to seek adequate supplies resulting in both hindrance to military operations and the distracting requirement to avert humanitarian problems. The locations of civil defence facilities, such as air raid shelters, and food supplies will similarly affect operations. 34. Public stadia, parks, sports fields, school playgrounds and other open areas will offer all troops, in particular snipers, relatively good visibility of their targets and must be noted. Such areas can also provide civilian holding areas, interrogation centres, insurgent segregation areas and prisoner of war holding facilities. These open areas can provide the opportunity for re-supply by air and consideration must be given to their protection from fire and view. 35. Construction sites and commercial operations such as warehouses, building supply depots and railway maintenance yards, can serve as primary sources of construction materials when rubble is not present or insufficient. 36. Roads, rivers, streams and bridges can provide suitable avenues of movement. Public baths, swimming facilities and cisterns are useful in providing bathing facilities. They also provide an alternative water source in the event of the breakdown of public utilities. WEATHER 37. Some consequences of weather effects are peculiar to an urban environment and will affect tactical considerations.

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38.

Precipitation. a. Heavy precipitation can destroy roads, railways, bridges and other structures, particularly those in close proximity to waterways. b. Rain or melting snow can flood basements and subway systems. If automatic pumping facilities that normally handle rising water levels are deprived of power, storm drains and other sewer systems will become hazardous or impassable. c. Chemical agents may be washed into underground systems by precipitation. Systems may contain agent concentrations much higher than surface areas and become contaminated ‘hot spots’. These effects become more pronounced as agents are absorbed by permeable sewer walls.

39. Visibility. a. Air inversion layers are common over low lying cities located in depressions or in river valleys. Inversion layers trap dust, chemical agents and other pollutants, reducing visibility, and also creating a rise in ground and air temperature. b. Many large urban areas are located on rivers and river junctions. Rivers, canals and waterways often create a potential for fog in the low lying areas. 40. Wind. The channelling of strong winds through city streets and their effect on high rise buildings may present difficulties and have an adverse effect on the conduct of operations.

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CHAPTER 2 SECTION 1 - URBAN COALITION OPERATIONS “The requirement for successful military operations will remain based on skill, courage, character and resources: but there is a new element, multinationality, which has more potential, particularly in terms of human resource, than anything that preceded it.” RUSI Journal, Apr 1996, “Partnership for Peace”, Lt Col PJF Schofield RGJ. COALITION OPERATIONS 1. UK urban operations may be conducted as part of an international response to a crisis, under a UN mandate for example, as part of a formal military alliance such as NATO or as a coalition of international partners. The UK could be in a leading role with other nations’ forces OPCOM, OPCON or TACOM, or it might be subordinated to another nation or multinational headquarters. A formation or battlegroup involved in such operations should expect close military interaction at all levels with headquarters, commanders, staff, units and sub-units from other nations. The danger and difficulty of fighting in the urban environment may be exacerbated by the unfamiliar experience of such intercultural reliance, and it is therefore vital that friction is minimised if all elements are to add value in an optimal manner. This is best achieved by developing an understanding of the other nations’ culture, doctrine and capabilities, preferably prior to deployment. 2.

The following are general considerations for UK Forces operating with other nations: a. Planning Practices. Superior HQs from other nations may expect planning practices that UK commanders may find prescriptive or perhaps only partially useful. Joint drills and planning procedures should be confirmed and rehearsed, and acronyms explained and understood. Commanders should make personal confirmation of the mission and execution of urban operations. There may be a requirement for additional Reports and Returns and shared SOIs and SOPs. b. The Chain of Command. Units attached to other nations during urban operations may lack the support of an appropriate intermediate command and may require higher HQ functions1. There may be no dedicated UK Legal Advisor. National Political Caveats in urban operations may oblige units to adjust operational plans at short notice. Headquarters’ establishments may have to be increased. Consideration should be given to the use of liaison officers at appropriate levels of command to improve operational situation awareness. c. Rules of Engagement (ROE). ROE may vary between allies, affecting tactics and operational procedures. Pre-operational agreements must include a commonly understood ROE matrix. d. Equipment Interoperability. Complete equipment interoperability is an unrealistic aspiration. However, capabilities utilizing the electromagnetic spectrum must at the very least avoid mutual interference, and should where possible offer a

1

For example in Joint Fires, expanded J2, J5, HUMINT, ISTAR, Battlespace Logistics and Planning,

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workable degree of interoperability. Where this is not possible, consideration must be given to modifying or replacing existing equipment, or indeed procuring new capabilities. The first priority for any headquarters acting within a coalition is to ensure that there is IT and communications interoperability. Other areas that must be considered include intelligence databases, ECM and force tracking systems. e. ABCA2. Although not a formal alliance, the armies of ABCA nations have served together on numerous occasions. The ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook (COH) provides general advice on coalition operations and specific guidance on urban operations. SECTION 2 - OPERATING UNDER US COMMAND

Fig A-2-1 US Task Force 2-2 Tactical Operation Centre, Fallujah 2004 3. In the case of major combat operations, strategic guidance3 states that the UK is to be prepared to provide a combat division to work within a US corps. Similar but lower levels of subordination might occur. The US Army has identified the generic military capabilities needed to support the types of possible operational relationships between the US and allied/coalition forces in urban operations. The list is not exhaustive4, but includes: a.

Integrated multinational command and control.

b.

Interoperable communications and information systems.

2

An organization promoting interoperability between the armies of America, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 3 Defence Strategic Guidance, 2008. 4 Further detail can be sought from the US Army Multination Force Compatibility Concept and the US Army International Activities Plan (AIAP).

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c.

Common situational awareness.

d.

Collaborative planning.

e.

Integrated coalition combat identification system.

f.

Integrated battlespace management.

g.

Exchange of intelligence and classified information.

4. When operating under US command in the urban environment UK elements should request the appropriate levels of resources to achieve full interoperability. Units should ensure: a.

Close and adequate integration in the superior headquarters.

b.

Sufficient US representation in UK headquarters.

c.

Passage of information and data exchange.

d.

Understanding of the specialised use of information technology.

e.

Exploitation of intelligence and ISTAR assets.

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CHAPTER 3 MILITARY INTERACTION WITH THE CIVILIAN POPULATION SECTION 1 - THE STATUS OF CIVILIANS THE PRESENCE OF CIVILIANS 1. The presence of civilians complicates the conduct of operations, and civilians abound in urban areas. In many cases, people will not or cannot leave the urban environment even when it becomes the scene of intense military conflict. Their presence has a significant and not necessarily negative impact on the planning and conduct of operations. For example, a commander should attempt to capitalize on their presence by shaping their attitudes, but he may be constrained in his freedom of action by both his mandatory obligations and any discretionary commitments in respect of their welfare and benefits.

Fig A-3-1 Bloody Sunday, Londonderry, 30 January 1972 2. The term ‘civilian population’ refers primarily, but not exclusively, to the indigenous inhabitants, but not only them. It also refers to all civilians present in the area of operations who are not members of the armed conflicting parties. It includes formal, informal, national and international organisations and groups as well as government and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs). According to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), neither the civilian population nor individuals uninvolved in combat can be made the target of attack.

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NON-COMBATANTS, PERSONS ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES AND CIVILIANS ON THE BATTLEFIELD 3. Under the LOAC, some members of armed forces, such as medical personnel and chaplains, are classified as non-combatants and do not have the right to take a direct part in hostilities1. 4. Persons accompanying the armed forces with an identity card authorizing them to do so are treated as PWs when captured. Examples are civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units and personnel manning service organisations responsible for the welfare of the armed forces2. 5. Civilian combatants who take up arms against an invading enemy force without time to form regular armed forces (levée en masse) are entitled to PW status if they wear a fixed, distinctive insignia that can be seen at a distance; carry their weapons openly; and operate according to the rules and customs of warfare. Other civilians who provide assistance to such groups may or may not be entitled to status as combatants, depending on whether or not they are actually members of the resistance group. When dealing with such individuals they should be treated as PW until a higher authority determines their status. 6. Armed civilian groups that do not meet the criteria of a legal resistance as described above, or individuals caught in the act of sabotage, terrorism, or espionage are not legal combatants. If captured, they may be considered criminals under the provisions of the LOAC. They are to be treated humanely and with respect, but should be interned in a facility separate from that in which PWs are held. When possible, they should be transferred to the local police as quickly as possible. Reprisals, mass punishments, taking of hostages, corporal punishment, pillage and destruction are prohibited. SECTION 2 - MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY CIVIL OBLIGATIONS 7. General. The Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) staff and the Legal Advisor (LEGAD) have the responsibility to advise the commander about his legal and moral obligations to the civilian population. This requirement can be fulfilled by CIMIC staff conducting coordination for the health and well being of civilians. It can include the reestablishment of water systems, the distribution of available food stocks, clothing and medical supplies and the establishment of displaced persons, refugee and evacuee camps. If the civil government is not functioning, it is the commander’s responsibility to conduct evacuation planning and to provide for the well being of the civilian population. He should do this only with those internal assets already available. 8. Liaison. Liaison between CIMIC staff and, where sanctioned, Host Nation (HN) government departments, promotes the conduct and success of urban operations. 9. Responsibilities. The primary responsibility of the CIMIC staff is the co-ordination of activities necessary for the evacuation of civilians from the battle area. This is accomplished in two separate but supporting actions: 1 2

JSP 383, Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, paragraph 4.2.2. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoner of War (GC III), Art 4.

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a. CIMIC staff co-ordinate with the military police and, where present and friendly, local police, in planning civilian evacuations. Such evacuations are, where possible, geographically de-conflicted with military operations. b. CIMIC staff co-ordinate with Psychological Operations (Psyops) staff, local government officials, radio and television stations, newspapers and others, to publicise the evacuation plan. 10. Relations with the Media. While free access by the media to units in the field is desirable, operational security, existing guidelines and rules of engagement considerations take first priority. All members of the media visiting the operational theatre must have an escort officer. Ensuring that the media follows the established guidelines and understand the rules of engagement will help prevent negative publicity that could jeopardize the operation. Consideration should be given to units appointing a representative to serve as a point of contact with the local population, in order to deal with their concerns. LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT CONSIDERATIONS 11. General. One of the main purposes of the LOAC is to protect civilians from the effects of hostilities. Civilians may be reluctant or unable to leave their homes, and their presence must be considered in the planning and conduct of urban operations. The impact of civilians in the urban battlespace will affect: a. Mobility. Refugees fleeing the urban area in numbers will cause blockages on routes used or targeted by the military. Plans should be made to provide alternative routes that will have to be broadcast, marked and controlled, although there is no guarantee that the population will do what it is told. Help from any local authorities should be sought. b. Firepower. The principle of proportionality must guide the commander in his planning decisions. The LOAC draws distinctions between military personnel and their resources and civilians and their possessions, including their homes, religious buildings and communities. Commanders must do everything possible to minimise civilian casualties and minimise collateral damage caused to civilian property and possessions. The presence of civilians will influence the choice of weapon systems or munitions to achieve the necessary military effect as well as the designation of no-fire and restricted-fire areas. c. Protection. The types of defensive obstacles in the urban environment will be limited by the presence of civilians. Minefields must be marked and guarded to prevent unwitting entry by anyone3. LEGAL ADVICE 12. Legal advice is offered to the formation commander through the Legal Advisor (LEGAD) on his staff. The LEGAD provides support on operational law issues including ROE, LOAC, use of force, and captured personnel. Additionally, the LEGAD will have an understanding of host nation law and other policy guidelines that may apply. 3

The UK is a party to the Ottawa Convention 1997 and possession or use of anti-personnel landmines is prohibited. The use of anti-tank mines is permitted in some cases. Minefields cannot be used to designate refugee routes. (JSP 383 6.13 – 6.14).

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LEGAL AUTHORITY 13. The limits of the authority of a commander must be understood. Where UK forces are present in a state by virtue of an invitation from the government of that state, the actions of the commander must fall within the mission mandate and not infringe the sovereign powers of the government. When there is no ruling government, the authority of the commander may reach further and will encompass the civil tasks that would otherwise be met by the Host Nation government. A commander will need that degree of authority necessary to accomplish his mission. A host government, where possible, remains responsible for the safety and well-being of the civilian population. 14. Commanders at all levels are responsible for protecting civilians and their property to the maximum extent possible. Looting, vandalism, excessive collateral damage and brutal treatment of civilians are all strictly prohibited and individuals who commit such acts may be in breach of the LOAC and military law. The religions and customs of the civilian population must be treated with respect. Women, particularly, should be protected against any form of abuse. Operations in built-up areas may result in complex situations that may require further legal advice. Certain control measures such as road blocks, curfews, escorts, buffer zones and no-go areas should be considered to ensure the safety and well being of civilian communities. 15. Civilian property and possessions must be respected and not attacked. Private property must be respected. The requirement to respect private property is subject to the conditions of the conflict. For example, military operations inevitably cause damage to private property. In some cases, forces are entitled to requisition property for necessary military purposes. Still, the principle of respect is important. Moreover, specific guidance should be issued for the procedures armed forces must follow if and when requisitioning is considered necessary. A note detailing the use of or damage to civilian property should be kept or given to the owner so that he has evidence of a claim if compensation for use or damage becomes available. In some cases, use of homes or property requires that payment be made. In some circumstances, an occupying force may requisition commodities. 16. The presence of deployed troops should be under the authority of a politically brokered mandate that will provide the force with legitimacy and define how it may conduct operations. 17. The legal authority of the commander over civilian government officials and the civilian populace must be determined rapidly. The host nation’s responsibility for its own population can affect the commander’s authority in civil-military matters. In areas where the local government’s authority is limited, the commander may be required to assume greater responsibility for the safety and well being of the civilian population. CONTROL MEASURES 18. A commander may enforce control measures to conduct operations, maintain security, or to ensure the safety and well-being of the civilians, as follows: a. Curfew. A commander defending a town could establish a curfew to maintain security or to aid the control of military traffic. The curfew may not be imposed as a

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punishment; it would not be legal. A curfew should be imposed through the offices of the civilian authority, if present and effective. b. Evacuation. If the purpose is to use buildings or quarters for operational reasons, to enhance security or to safeguard civilians, the commander can require the evacuation of civilians. If he does so, he must specify and safeguard the evacuation route. Food, clothing and sanitary facilities should be provided at their destination until the evacuees can provide for themselves. c. Forced Labour. The LOAC prohibits the use of civilians in combat. However, civilians can be used if the operational requirement demands it as long as it is out of contact. Guidelines for the use of civilian labour should be published by the appropriate formation commander after seeking higher authority. The commander may oblige civilians over the age of 18 years to work, and permitted jobs could include the maintenance of public utilities, so long as those utilities are not used in the general conduct of operations. Jobs can also include services to the local population such as care of the wounded and burial of the dead. Civilians can be obliged to help evacuate and care for military wounded, so long as it does not involve any physical danger. Prohibited jobs include digging entrenchments, constructing fortifications, transporting supplies or acting as guards. Civilian volunteers can, nevertheless, be employed in such work. SECTION 3 - CIVILIAN FACTORS “In June 2006, US Army and US Marine Corps units and elements of the Iraqi Army commenced Operation Together Forward, the attack to regain coalition control over Ramadi. Instead of a classical approach to urban warfare involving overwhelming use of forces and firepower, Coalition Forces opted for an operational design built around the concept: Clear-Hold-Build. Coalition forces attacked Ramadi from three sides (the fourth being protected by a river). Along each axis of attack, the objective was fairly shallow – just deep enough to establish a new Combat Outpost (COP). As soon as the COP was established and security in place, efforts shifted to training and introducing Iraqi Police and Army units. Additionally, Civil Military Operations Centers were introduced and local works projects were begun. Once all of this had been initiated, Coalition Forces and Iraqi forces would leave enough force behind to ensure continued security and would commence another shallow attack where the process was repeated. Without a doubt this process lasted longer than alternative approaches; however, the advantages were clear. The Iraqi Police and Army were given as much responsibility as they could handle. This Iraqi face on operations built confidence in Government of Iraq’s ability to provide security. Cleared areas were held, instead of simply captured and then abandoned. This provided continuous security throughout cleared parts of the city, and established the security backdrop that was vital to enabling the reconstruction process to begin. Finally, a slower and more deliberate approach, minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage, built civil support not only for the operation, but for Coalition Forces” US LTC Matthew J. Van Wagenen 1-37 AR Task Force, Ar Ramadi

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT 19. The military may be required to undertake a range of civil administration tasks in support of a weak host nation government, or in the absence of a working indigenous or international administration. This is particularly likely to be the case in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations, when the military may be the only organisation capable of delivering governance. 20. Such tasks may range from CIMIC liaison to the establishment of an interim military government and are likely to include some responsibility for the provision of essential services. 21. The military should seek to hand responsibility for governance tasks to an appropriate indigenous or international civil organisation at the earliest appropriate opportunity. Its primary role will be to establish the environment in which civil agencies can operate. 22. A close liaison and working relationship should be developed with local government police and military forces. In addition to information on items of special interest, they may provide information on the following: a.

The population

b.

The density of the built-up area

c.

Fire fighting capabilities

d.

The location of hazardous materials

e.

Security capabilities

f.

Civil evacuation plans

g.

Key public buildings.

They may also provide English interpreters. 23. Further advice about the provision of governance can be found in Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 9, Tactics for Stability Operations. FOOD 24. Rapid urbanisation in developing countries, including the wide-scale abandonment of rural life and family farms combined with undeveloped and inefficient industrial urban programmes and social infrastructure have frequently led to food shortages. The military implications are significant. As well as being the cause of mass migration and instability, food shortage leads to revolts and increased support for armed opposition groups. 25. Neutral, non-governmental organisations that supply food can be the target of armed factions and deployed troops may be required to provide and maintain humanitarian and

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food distribution networks. It could be the responsibility of deployed troops to provide life support to populations who could be providing succour to their opponents. DISEASE 26. Operating in the urban environment requires an efficient and comprehensive service infrastructure to remain healthy and sound. It needs clean water, food supplies, sewage and rubbish disposal, hospitals and the associated social infrastructure to counter disease and function properly. In some areas the rapid growth in urbanisation has overtaken the development of basic infrastructure such as the development and expansion of sewage and water supply systems. 27. In many parts of the world, in overpopulated shanty towns, many even without toilet facilities, thousands of people live cheek by jowl, thereby providing ideal conditions for the transmission of airborne, waterborne and contact-transmission diseases. The problems are exacerbated by rapidly increasing population size and the lack of social support infrastructure. Troops deployed into urban areas are required not only to provide for their own health needs, but may require the resources to provide basic and improved medical support to the indigenous population. They need to do so as part of the operational requirement, and as part of the tactical battle and strategic campaign to win over the support (hearts, minds and bodies) of the people. 28. Maintaining the health and welfare of troops in an urban environment requires planning, preparedness and good organisation and the maintenance of essential services. Arrangements will have to be made for constant supplies of fresh water, effective sewage and rubbish disposal and full time medical support. The same hygiene arrangements must be made available to the indigenous population to achieve operational and strategic campaign goals. POLLUTION 29. Pollution can cause health and environmental problems. For example, cities in China have recorded up to nine times the levels of sulphur dioxide in comparable developed cities. Sub-surface land and water levels contaminated by toxic waste have caused high levels of birth defects in babies. One of the responsibilities of a force deployed into the urban environment will be to ensure its own protection and possibly that of the civilian population, against the consequences of widespread pollution and associated disease. TOXIC WASTE4 30. Within an urban environment there is a particular threat from chemical, radiological and biological toxic hazards. All those operating in such an environment must be mindful of the implications of 'not knowing what is behind the wall'. Exposure to toxic chemicals may come from natural sources or more likely from general industrial toxic waste. A military force must be aware of the medical implications. 31. Environmental and Industrial Hazards (EIH) may have immediate or long term health effects on personnel, as well as impacting on a commander's operational capability. Toxic materials may be released through battle damage, accidents or terrorism. 4

See also Chapter 10, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 26-30.

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REFUGEES 32. The danger of operations in urban areas together with infrastructure damage is likely to result in significant proportions of the civilian population fleeing to seek refuge elsewhere. Such migrations may both interfere with the conduct of military operations and create humanitarian problems en route and at any final destination.

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ANNEX A TO PART A TYPES OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION INTRODUCTION 1. Chapter One, Section 3, gives a broad description of the nature of urban terrain and conurbations. This annex provides some structural information and factors that should be considered when selecting buildings to be used in the prosecution of military operations. It is intended to provide an overview for the all arms commander. More detailed technical information can be found in Military Engineering, Pamphlet Number 2, Field Fortifications1. 2. The following descriptions and diagrams of buildings are intended to help commanders identify the type of construction and their key characteristics. The table at the end of this Annex2 provides generic information about building characteristics and advice on their suitability for defence. MASS CONSTRUCTION BUILDINGS 3. Mass construction buildings are those in which the outside walls support the weight of the building and its contents. Additional support, especially in wide buildings, comes from using load-bearing interior walls, strong points (called pilasters) on the exterior walls, castiron interior columns, and arches or braces over the windows and doors. Modern types of mass construction buildings are wall and slab structures such as many modern apartments and hotels, and tilt-up structures commonly used for industry or storage. Mass construction buildings are built in many ways: a.

The walls can be built in place using brick, block, or poured-in-place concrete.

b.

The walls can be prefabricated and "tilt-up", or as panels.

c.

The walls and roofs can be prefabricated and assembled like boxes.

Fig A-A-1 Mass Construction Buildings

1

Further advice about structures and fortifications is available from the Brigade Close Support Engineer Regiment or Works Group RE 2 Building Types and Characteristics, taken from Military Engineering Vol 2, Pam 2

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BUILDINGS BUILT WITH BRICK 4. Brick buildings are the most common and the most important of the mass construction buildings. In Europe, brick buildings are commonly covered with a rendered finish so that bricks do not show. a. Small Shop. One of the most common uses of brick buildings is the small shop. These buildings are found in all built-up areas but are most common at the edge of any business and industrial area.

Fig A-A-2 Brick Buildings

b. Warehouse. A warehouse is another common mass construction building usually situated in industrial areas and along commercial ribbons. It is normally built of poured-in-place reinforced concrete or of prefabricated walls that are "tilt-up". The walls of warehouses provide good cover, although the roof is vulnerable. These buildings are built on slabs, which can normally support the weight of vehicles. The wide doors and entrances can provide excellent cover and concealment for tanks.

Fig A-A-3 Warehouse c. Public Gathering Places. Public gathering places (churches, stadiums) are mass-construction buildings with large, open interiors. The walls provide good cover, Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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but the roof does not. The interior walls are not load-bearing and are normally easy to breach or remove. Public gathering places are most common in the centre and edge of cities, residential, and outlying high-rise areas.

Fig A-A-4 Public Places

FRAMED BUILDINGS 5. Framed buildings are supported by a skeleton of columns and beams and are usually taller than frameless buildings and the exterior walls are not load-bearing. These are often referred to as clad buildings. There are three main types:

Fig A-A-5 Light Structured Framed Buildings a. Heavy Clad Framed Buildings. The walls of heavy clad buildings are made of brick and block that are sometimes almost as thick as frameless brick walls, although not as protective. Heavy clad framed buildings are found in the centre and edge of large cities and towns. They can be recognized by a classic style or architecture in which each building is designed with three sections the pediment, shaft, and capital. Unlike the brick building, the walls are the same thickness on all floors, and the windows are set at the same depth throughout. Often the frame members (the columns) can be seen, especially at the ground floor. The cladding, consisting of Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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layers of terra cotta blocks, brick, and stone veneer, does not provide as good a cover as the walls of brick buildings. It provides some protection against small-arms fire and light shrapnel fragments but does not withstand fire from heavy weapons. (1) The floor plans of these buildings depend upon their functions. buildings normally have small offices surrounding an interior hall.

Office

(2) Department stores normally have large, open interiors. Often there is a mezzanine level within the store. Steel fire doors often exist between sections of the store. The steel fire doors are normally activated by heat. Once closed, they are difficult to breach or force open, but they effectively divide the store into sections. (3) Another type of heavy clad framed building is used as a high-rise factory. Such buildings are normally easily recognized because the concrete beams and columns are visible from the outside. They are usually located in older industrial areas. Because the floors are often made to support heavy machinery this building provides good overhead cover.

Fig A-A-6 Heavy Clad Framed Building

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Fig A-A-7 Heavy Clad Framed Department Store

b. Light Clad Buildings. Light clad buildings are modern buildings constructed mostly of glass. Most framed buildings built in recent years are light clad buildings. They are found in both core and outlying high-rise regions. Their walls consist of a thin layer of brick, lightweight concrete, or glass. Such materials provide minimal protection against any weapon. However, the floors of the buildings are much heavier and provide moderate overhead cover. The rooms in light clad framed buildings are much bigger than those in heavy clad; buildings also usually stand detached from other buildings. The interior partitions are thin, light, and easy to breach.

Fig A-A-8 Light Clad Framed Building

c. Multi Storey Car Park. A building in the urban area where all floors can support vehicles. Multi storey car parks are normally high enough to provide a 360-degree field of fire for Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) weapons.

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Fig A-A-9 Multi Storey Car Park FLOOR PLANS 6. Floor plans in buildings follow predictable patterns. One of the factors that will determine a floor plan is the building shape. The basic principle governing building shape is that rooms normally have access to outside light. This principle helps to determine the floor plans of large buildings.

Fig A-A-10 Building Shapes and Sizes

RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS 7. In cities with European influence houses are normally mass construction brick buildings interspersed with tall concrete apartment buildings. 8. Rural buildings in North and South America, and south-east Asia are commonly made of wood. In continental Europe, southwest Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, where wood is Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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extremely scarce, rural buildings are normally constructed of concrete blocks. 9. In the Middle East and tropical regions, the most common housing is the enclosed courtyard. Houses are added one to another with little regard to the street pattern. The result is a crooked, narrow maze, which is harder to move through or to operate vehicles and weapons.

Fig A-A-11 Enclosed Courtyard

BUILDING TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS 10. Certain characteristics of both mass construction and framed buildings can be helpful in analysing a built-up area. Details are shown below3: Ser (a) 1

3

Construction (b) Post and Frame

Examples © Old farm houses, cottages

2

Masonry

Town halls, banks, chateaux and large manor houses.

3

Good quality brick or concrete block.

Detached or semidetached houses.

4

Low quality brick

Terraced houses, shops.

Characteristics (d) Weak walls and timber rafters offering no frontal protection. Stone or brick outer infill. Studded partition interior walls. High fire risk. Sway reinforcement probably necessary. Probably solid walls. Usually two to four storeys high with wooden floor joists, but banks may have solid floors. Thickness of walls diminishes with height. Possible fire hazard. Floors may require props. Movement within buildings invariably easy. Resistance to sway governed by location of interior walls. Buildings probably have cavity walls and may have reinforced concrete floors. Small fire risk. Sandbags needed to provide full protection. Party walls provide some resistance to sway. Props needed if floors have timber joists. Buildings easily demolished by direct fire weapons. Medium fire hazard. Walls offer little protection, but shops may have cellars.

Recommendation (e) Avoid where possible.

Usually a good choice if not isolated.

Good choice.

Avoid unless cellars can be used.

Taken from Military Engineering Volume II Pamphlet No 2 Field Fortifications, Chapter 8

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5

Large commercial

Type A – Modern department stores, factories or commercial offices

Type B – Older department stores and commercial premises 6

Medium/high rise concrete block construction

Type A – Offices

Type B – Apartments.

7

Single floor industrial

Warehouses and single floor factories.

Solid concrete or steel frame buildings with strong floors but walls may be weak, frequently with large windows. Difficult to collapse building and frame resistant to sway. Likely to have cellars. Movement within building easy. Low fire risk. Strong walls and floors. Fire hazard low to medium dependent on type of floor. Walls give good protection but additional sandbags desirable. Internal movement relatively easy. Large windows, frame construction, reinforced concrete floors, weak walls. Probably low fire risk. Difficult to collapse building but walls and windows offer no protection. Movement between floors usually difficult. Tall buildings conspicuous. Probably have cellars. Small windows, reinforced concrete load-bearing outside walls. Probably good protection, but movement between floors probably difficult. Usually low fire risk. Tall buildings usually surrounded by open space with lack of covered routes for removal of casualties etc. Note: Some apartment blocks have prefabricated walls and are prone to vertical collapse. Difficult to identify. Usually steel or reinforced concrete frame construction with brick or lightly clad walls. Little overhead or frontal protection unless there are substantial dwarf walls, but floors are usually strong.

A possible choice if protection can be achieved.

Good choice.

Possible choice if protection can be achieved.

Possible choice.

Poor choice. Of little value without substantial protective work, but they provide cover from view.

11. The table above describes the construction and materials used in industrialised and developed areas. It should be noted that construction standards are variable in less well developed or regulated areas and, even if a structure appears to fit into one of the categories described in the table, caution should be exercised where there is any doubt about the quality of construction or materials used. There is always potential for unexpected and catastrophic collapse.

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URBAN OPERATIONS PART B FIGHTING THE URBAN BATTLE

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CHAPTER 4 PREPARING FOR THE URBAN BATTLE SECTION 1 - OPERATIONAL PLANNING “In one moment of time, our serving members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping operations – and, finally, they will fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle – all on the same day…all within three blocks.” General Charles C Krulak, USMC

Fig B-4-1 The Three Block War, UNPROFOR, Former Yugoslavia 1993 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 1. Operations in the urban environment are an integral part of any military deployment or posture and cannot be viewed in isolation. The need to fight in built-up areas will be dictated by the strategic and operational requirements, the commander's intentions, and the apparent intentions of the enemy. The urban environment has certain implications for operational planning. a. Offensive Operations. Planning for offensive operations must assume that fighting will take place in the parts of built-up areas where people live. These urban areas, from small rural hamlets to large, modern cities may be of tactical, operational or strategic importance. They may encompass the infrastructure of government, communications centres, transit routes or industrial or logistic facilities. They may include centres of population that need to be defended and protected against an

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insurgency that aims to use them for malevolent purpose. During any offensive operation, plans will need to be made to capture, clear or neutralise built up areas. b. Defensive Operations. The defence of an urban area can be made either to deflect an enemy advance into killing areas between urban areas or to draw the enemy into the urban environment in order to wear him down by attrition and delay. The concealment and protection afforded by towns and villages confer considerable advantages to the defender. Built-up areas may canalise enemy armour into open country where it becomes vulnerable to flank fire from the edges of the built-up areas. This may disrupt an enemy force requiring it to carry out repeated fixing or clearance operations. In close country the judicious use of built-up areas by the defender, in conjunction with other obstacles, can block and delay the enemy advance by forcing him to undertake lengthy and costly clearance operations. The nature of built-up areas makes them suitable for delaying operations although the potential for becoming fixed, isolated or decisively engaged should not be underestimated. Small forces can hinder the tactical movement of much larger forces and ultimately may be able to trade less space for time than in open country. c. Large Town and City Fighting. Large built-up areas pose difficult problems for attacker and defender alike. Their size, density, and complexity will require large numbers of troops and significant time for preparation neither of which may be available. Large towns and cities cannot be disregarded, however, since they may offer good transit routes or protection which is denied in open country, or they may be strategically significant. d. Stability Operations. In addition to delivering the kinetic effect traditionally associated with military activity, there will be a requirement to influence the perceptions and attitudes through influence activity. Military operations may be multitasked and troops may be conducting stability operations alongside colleagues involved in conventional military operations. Stability operations will take place amongst the people and be conducted within the urban environment. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING 2. The urban environment has implications for command nodes at every level. The more limited capacity for surveillance and target acquisition, the presence of noncombatants, the requirement for increased intelligence capture and force protection, difficulties with communications, the fleeting nature of targets and limited engagement opportunities will provide additional challenges to headquarters. 3. Consideration should be given to enhancing the resources for headquarters nodes at battlegroup level and below to include assets responsible for: a. ISTAR. ISTAR devices can provide useful information if it can be gathered, collated and appropriately disseminated rapidly and laterally. The information provided by UAV, air, aviation and technical and close observation sources should be organised, prioritised and rapidly disseminated. The volume of data can be increased during coalition operations. b. Human Terrain Mapping. Intelligence gathering in the urban environment and particularly in the context of hybrid war is critical to operational success. Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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People-centric intelligence based on human terrain mapping, including information about tribal dynamics, indigenous social and caste behaviour, work and social routines and politics should be gathered, recorded and passed quickly to the levels that need it. c. Influence Activities. Close quarter fighting is a psychologically charged activity that affects all sides, and can be exploited for advantage. (1) The successful tactics of the Chechen insurgents in Chechnya in 19991 had a major effect on the self-confidence of the conventional Russian forces, and consequently on the tactics of the Russian commanders. When Hamas in 2008 manipulated images of the Israeli invasion of Gaza for international media consumption, their propaganda successfully affected the operational battle by limiting the types of operation the IDF2 could undertake. At the strategic level, potential casualty lists may have consequences for each level of urban fighting. (2) The co-ordination of Media, CIMIC and Information3 operations (“Influence Activities”) supports the execution of conventional military operations through the following: (a)

Shaping the presentation of the conflict.

(b) Isolating the opposition from positive or supportive local and international opinion. (c)

Offensive operations (PSYOPS, Media, EW, CNO).

(d)

Defensive activity.

(e)

Exploiting psychological and media opportunities.

d. Fires. Owing to the presence of non-combatants, the need to provide protection to civilians and the possibility of fratricide, the integration and management of the three-dimensional battle-space in the urban environment requires enhanced control. e. Soldiers-First. The all-round threat in urban environment requires the preparation of soldiers from all arms to be prepared to fight to achieve their primary task, be it repair, equipment maintenance, resupply or other duties. Consideration should be given to the preparation and training for urban combat of all troops involved in urban operations.

1

Russian armoured columns attempting to penetrate Grozny were ambushed, sealed and destroyed, with substantial loss of life. 2 Israeli Defence Forces. 3 Including PSYOPS, EW, Deception, Key Leader Engagement (KLE), Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP) and Computer Network (CNO) operations.

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THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH TO OPERATIONS IN URBAN AREAS 4. The nature of built-up areas restricts tactical movement and operations may necessarily develop into a series of low-level tactical engagements. Offensive momentum can easily be lost and an operation may develop into a battle of attrition. Attritional operations prove costly in time, casualties and resources. While this may be necessary or unavoidable at some stages of an operation, planning should be guided by a manoeuvrist approach to such operations. INFORMATION 5. The collection of detailed and accurate information, and the intelligence produced as a result, is more complex in urban operations than for operations in any other environment. There has to be a detailed collection plan and co-ordinated collection effort both before and during the operation. The information gathered should then be incorporated into a comprehensive IPB, and continually monitored and amended as the operational situation dictates. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 6. The attacking force should have a superiority of at the very least 3:1 in order to overcome the advantages of the defence. The defender will have greater local knowledge of the terrain. He will have made his defensive plans around the nature of the urban infrastructure in which he chooses to fight. He will try to limit by every means at his disposal the information gathering capability of his opponent. He will site his killing areas around structures that limit the flexibility of the attacker. To gain the initiative over the defence, the attacking force should always use its combat power to seize objectives that reduce or negate the capacity of the defence to continue to fight. This should be done by coordination of direct and indirect fire and the strict synchronization of the movement of every element involved in the attack. The attacker must gain and retain the initiative as early as he can. He must dictate the tempo of operations. As well as being systematic in his approach to the capture and retention of key ground and to his destruction of the enemy and his ability to fight, the attacker must be prepared to exploit any and every weaknesses in the defensive plan. He must risk bypassing enemy locations in order to secure key objectives and all troops involved in the operation should expect to have to fight in all directions as the operation progresses. The use of deception will give the attacker advantage at every stage of the operation. The infantry should provide the majority of the troops involved in any urban operation, but plans must make use of every soldier from every arm and every available weapon system to achieve the commander’s aim. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 7. As in every other defensive operation, urban defence must be aggressive. Wherever possible, the battle should be taken to the attacker. The attacker’s options should always be limited by the actions and the initiative of the defence. The defender should seek to destroy the cohesion of each attack force. The attacker will be unsure of his ground. He will be uncertain of what and whom he is facing, and he will be afraid. This weakness, like every other, should be exploited by the defence. The defence must not allow the attacker to retain the initiative. Defence should be conducted using a combined arms force and every weapon and soldier available. The defence should seek to exploit the advantage of his intimate knowledge of the built-up area to delay and disrupt the attack Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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with highly mobile forces able to move rapidly from one part of the battlefield to another. The defender should aim to surprise his enemy, to ambush him where he does not expect it. He should channel enemy forces into killing areas dominated by strong points where the defence maintains the initiative, freedom of movement and local superiority in firepower. Maximum use should be made of reserves, particularly during the later stages of the operation. Small and comparatively lightly armed and equipped forces in defensive operations can be singularly effective, can impose delay and can causing significant numbers of casualties on significantly larger forces. The employment of local counter attacks, ambushes and determined attempts to re-occupy previous defensive locations will be effective ways to discomfort, confuse and disorientate the enemy. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 8. Urban operations of any type will create increased demands for resources, ammunition, engineer stores and large numbers of specialist stores. There will be a likelihood of high casualty rates and high ammunition expenditure that will require additional planning, production and issue. Additional resources may be required to reinforce and expedite existing casualty evacuation and improve ammunition re-supply chains. Re-supply points for all natures may need to be much closer to the forward elements than would otherwise be the case. ORGANISATION 9. Combat in urban terrain can have implications for the command organisation at unit and sub-unit level. Consideration should be given to the increment of intelligence staff at sub-unit level as a result of the increased intelligence requirements for all urban operations. It can also be considered at platoon level in the case of detached platoons. The increased collation and planning requirements for stability, and particularly COIN, operations may also need to be reflected in incremental change. 10. The need to organise urban combat along ‘all arms groupings’ requires the reorganisation of platoons and companies to be able to fight independently and with the capacity to use every arm and tool at its disposal. There is a need to include engineer, support weapons, air and indirect fire control and interpreter facilities at platoon level and below to enable mission-orientated groupings COMMAND AND CONTROL 11. Urban combat is a particularly confusing form of combat where the commander’s will is not always straightforward to execute. The commander will need to take advantage of every opportunity to unbalance the enemy and it is imperative that the intention of the overall commander is clearly understood by every soldier at every level, and that, if possible, the outcome of each small, low-level tactical engagements conform to his plan. 12. Retention of the initiative will be a defining factor in the success, or not, of all urban combat. Once the commander’s parameters are decided, defined and promulgated, subordinates can be give as much freedom of action and, if possible, time, to achieve their tasks. 13. In order to provide and encourage the maximum amount of freedom of action to his subordinates (and thereby extend his influence over the battlefield), the commander should Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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provide the best possible system of immediate communication and situational awareness to all. Urban operations can create increased difficulty to communications and may require significantly more communications assets to overcome limitations on range than would normally be required. OTHER OPERATIONAL FACTORS 14. Built-up areas are often hubs of road and rail networks. Roads and rail are needed as axes for movement and lines of communication. There are thus likely to be circumstances when it will be necessary to retain or regain control of built-up areas in order to dominate the transport infrastructure. Furthermore these areas often contain valuable economic installations and large numbers of workers. They may therefore be regarded as areas of strategic importance. 15. Whether attacking or defending, a large number of dismounted infantry are required. If a built-up area is defended, it may be preferable to an attacker to bypass or encircle it rather than become engaged in the task of capturing the area. Operational imperatives will determine whether this is either necessary or possible 16. A built-up area which can easily be avoided has little defensive value though it may have a channelling effect. A built-up area is usually only worth defending if it will oblige the enemy to make a time-consuming manoeuvre to bypass it. The decision to defend an urban area will involve the use of a significant number of troops for a considerable amount of time and will place the indigenous civilian population at threat. GUIDELINES 17. All operational and tactical planning for urban combat, at every level, should include reference to the points below: a. Simple Plan. Fighting in urban areas is particularly difficult to control, and communication is likely to be difficult. A simple and flexible but thorough plan that exploits the benefits of mission command is therefore essential. b. Thoroughness. Fighting in the urban environment is multi-dimensional: the enemy will be in sewers, in rooms, along streets and on rooftops. Absolute care must be taken to clear and secure all areas as they are captured in order to prevent re-infiltration and counter-attack. c. Momentum. Urban operations are characterised by brutal, high intensity combat. In every type of urban operation commanders must ensure that the relentless pressure is maintained on an enemy who is never allowed to retain or regain the initiative. d. Fires. Within the imposed operational constraints of collateral damage and ammunition resupply and availability, maximum use should be made of all available firepower, munitions and weapon systems. e. Deception. In urban areas, deception is a particularly useful means of confusing the enemy and its use should be encouraged at all levels.

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SECTION 2 - INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE WITHIN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT ‘Failures in intelligence preparation meant that the 6,000 Russian force attempting to penetrate the city was fighting an enemy far better prepared for a defensive battle, and much larger than expected. Within the first few hours of battle, Russian units were trapped in the streets, their armoured vehicles destroyed by enemy troops shooting from upper and lower stories of buildings that main tank guns could not engage. As happened 50 years before in Berlin, entire tank columns were effectively paralyzed by the immobilisation of the lead and tail vehicles. Russian troops unwittingly collaborated in the destruction by remaining in the APCs, mistakenly believing that they were safer in their armoured vehicles that out.’ Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994-2000 Lessons from Urban Combat, Rand

Fig B-4-2 Russian BMP1P, Grozny INTRODUCTION 18. The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)4 process within an urban environment broadly follows that for any operational planning, although several factors require further consideration. This section is not an explanation of the IPB process, but rather it outlines some of the considerations for conducting IPB in support of urban operations. GENERAL 19. The continuing growth of built-up areas around the world increases the likelihood of conducting the full spectrum of operations within complex urban environments. As with any IPB, the initial stage of the process graphically records the results of the Intelligence Estimate, including; analysis of the ground, the adversary, most likely and most dangerous courses of action and indicate where friendly forces may best target adversary weakness.

4

Details of the IPB process are outlined in AFM Vol 1 Part 8 Command and Staff Procedures Chapter 3 Annex A.

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IPB WITHIN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 20. The urban environment is viewed by many hostile factions as a means to negate the technological and firepower advantage of a sophisticated army. Any future conflict is likely to have a significant urban dynamic. It will increasingly be important to maintain the social, economic and political institutions almost simultaneously in order to maintain a degree of stability. Intelligence support to the IPB process is not doctrinally different to any other environment, there are simply different considerations and potentially larger volumes of data to be managed operating within a complex environment5. The three distinguishing characteristics of the urban environment are: terrain, society and infrastructure.

Fig B-4-3 Russian Soldiers Patrolling through Grozny, 1999 BATTLESPACE AREA EVALUATION6 21. Mobility Corridors. Urban areas are often considered restricted or severely restricted for any manoeuvring unit, especially armoured and some mechanised formations. However some urban operations will require certain mechanised and armoured elements to operate within the confines of an urban environment. Outside of conventional high intensity operations the ability of an adversary to move around within an urban area using a predetermined Mobility Corridor (MC) must be considered in terms outlined below in the terrain analysis section. 22. Avenues of Approach. While units may be unable to deploy in a conventional tactical formation, an urban Avenue of Approach (AA) should not be discounted in the first instance. The option of a conventional adversary conducting manoeuvre operations within an urban environment should always be considered in terms of capability (both fire power 5

The 4 stages of the IPB process are Battlespace Area Evaluation (BAE), Threat Evaluation (TE), Threat Integration(TI) and Decision Support is the from of the Decision Support Overlay (DSO). 6 BAE outputs are Mobility Corridors/Avenues of Approach, Terrain Analysis and Weather Analysis.

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and mobility) and nature of the urban terrain. When friendly forces are conducting a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) or Peace Support Operation (PSO) an adversary is likely to be operating as an irregular force and as such the considerations for MC and AA will be potentially different. The aggregation of adjacent and adjoining MCs may determine primary routes and direction of threat that may be deemed an AA. 23. Terrain Analysis. The specific type of urban area must be considered. Density, layout, pattern and construction type can have significant effects on survivability, Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) efforts. For example, buildings may collapse or whole city blocks may be destroyed or burned down, leaving only rubble. These effects can be tactically significant, as some terrain features will significantly change and fields of fire will open and close. The output outlines the effect of the urban environment on both friendly and enemy operations. This analysis should inform the commander how the adversary may use the ground to best advantage. When considering urban terrain it is necessary to adopt a more lateral approach to the determination of MC and AA. A three-dimensional approach should be adopted. The following list is by no means definitive or exhaustive: a.

b.

c.

Surface. (1)

Road.

(2)

Railways.

(3)

Tram.

Sub-Surface. (1)

Impassable.

(2)

Negotiable – walking.

(3)

Negotiable – crawling.

Above-Surface. (1)

Interior – rooms, stairwells, lifts, and internal utilities ducting.

(2)

Exterior – walkways, fire escapes, tiered structures.

A major consideration is the obstruction to movement within the urban environment. Any obstruction, whether man made or as a result of destruction of the infrastructure, will canalise movement. An understanding of the land use will outline some mobility considerations for both adversary and friendly forces. 24. Analysis of the Society. Operations within an urban environment are likely to involve a large number of non-combatants. The increased likelihood of any future operation having a significant urban dynamic requires all soldiers to have a level of cultural awareness. Intelligence Staffs with a higher level of knowledge and sound cultural understanding will deliver better results from IPB. A greater understanding will assist the

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IPB process, reduce cultural bias and provide a degree of decision support to the commander. Such considerations are: a. History, Culture and Social Structure. An understanding of the local population and the origin and development of the dominant culture in the region can give an insight into likely adversary activity. Fundamental to this is attempting to identify key leaders (tribal, political, religious and economic) for subsequent engagement. An understanding of the local culture, customs, politics and religion combined with a level of understanding of the social structure will assist in assessments of likely civilian population reaction to military activity. b. Population Density, Ethnic Mix, Economic Situation and Education. An understanding of such factors can highlight possible targets for Ops Support and provide an indication of the likelihood of certain Ops Support functions being successful. Knowledge of the urban population dynamic is likely to give an indication of the possible Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRE) that may immediately impact friendly forces. 25. Analysis of the Urban Infrastructure. Within the urban environment the infrastructure is likely to be a key consideration. Such infrastructure has significant implications for the mobility of ground, aviation and air assets as well as sustaining the indigenous population. Analysis of the infrastructure will also indicate possible Toxic Industrial Hazard (TIH). Areas for consideration include: a.

Transport networks including road, rail, bridges, ports and harbours.

b. Communications networks including radio, TV and telephone networks such as landline and mobile options. c.

Urban fuel supplies including coal, oil and gas.

d.

Water supply.

e.

Waste disposal.

f.

Medical facilities, including the maintenance of the indigenous capabilities.

g.

A nuclear power plant or commercial chemical installation.

26. Weather Analysis. Within any environment analysis of the weather provides implications for both air and ground operations. Weather can impose considerable restrictions on sensors and certain manoeuvre elements. The output is the production of the weather overlay. An example within the urban environment could be the impact of rainfall and subsequent runoff rendering tunnels as severely restricted terrain.

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THREAT EVALUATION 27. Threat Evaluation (TE)7 is the definition of the enemy capability, unconstrained by the effect of the environment. The threat within an urban environment can be more difficult to define. Due to the large civilian population the threat spectrum can range from conventional to hostile irregular forces, criminal elements and political movements and demonstrations. Conventional forces are likely to conform to an urban doctrine template utilising known weapon systems. However, irregular forces operating within an urban environment are unlikely to follow a template and the Threat Evaluation will depend on the specific adversary and urban area. Such threats could include sabotage, subversion and even theft. As with any IPB, the threat will require continual review for each assessed adversary in order to develop a recognised modus operandi (MO). THREAT INTEGRATION8 28. Similar to the terrain considerations, the threat within the urban environment is 3dimensional and due to the possible nature of the adversary, multi-faceted, from high intensity conventional urban operations to lower intensity COIN or PSOs. The constraints of the battlespace on the adversary tactics and likely deployments will outline a Most Likely (ML) and Most Dangerous (MD) COA. DECISION SUPPORT OVERLAY 29. The end product of IPB, the Decision Support Overlay (DSO) remains a graphical display of the commander’s plan based on the assessed threat COA. Production of the DSO within the urban battlespace provides the same outputs; where the enemy should be targeted by direct fire, indirect fire, air, aviation and engineer assets in order to achieve a desired affect in time and space. It is based on both friendly and assessed enemy timelines. It is important to also consider the impact of non-kinetic effects within the threedimensional urban battlespace. INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 30. Urban areas impose considerable constraints on certain collection assets. The full spectrum of collection capability from National to Tactical assets can be deployed to good effect in order to answer intelligence questions within the urban battlespace. The individual representatives from each of the following disciplines will be able to best advise on the capabilities including; human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence including geospatial intelligence (IMINT/GEOINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), counter-intelligence (CI) and open-source intelligence (OSINT).

7

Threat Evaluation is an understanding of the enemy capability, tactics and vulnerabilities. Outputs are: Doctrine Template, High Value Target List (HVTL), Operational Situation Data, Organisational Charts, and Threat Evaluation. 8 Threat Integration develops likely enemy Coarse of Action (COA) and attempts to identify activities that when observed will confirm or deny a particular COA the enemy commander may have chosen. Outputs are: COAs, Event Overlay, Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), and recommendations for the ISTAR plan and Situational Overlay.

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SECTION 3 - INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLEANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE ISTAR IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 31. The Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability provides timely and actionable information to support the commander and the decision making process. UK doctrine states that operations should be intelligence-led; the ISTAR process builds on the Intelligence Cycle9 with practices and procedures designed to harness the capability of the collection assets. The information gathered, assembled and collated at HQ level will provide the intelligence critical to the planning and conduct of successful military operations. At the basic, but frequently the most productive, level ISTAR is provided to the commander through the eyes and ears of his soldiers. In conventional operations, battalion resources will include the reconnaissance platoon with its specialised vehicles, training and equipment. In certain environments, information can be gathered through covert operations and close observation techniques. 32. It is critical that commanders at all levels understand the type, quantity and capabilities of the ISTAR assets available to them, and should understand: a.

How ISTAR works within formations.

b.

Who is responsible for conducting ISTAR.

c.

What products are available and how to bid for them.

d.

ISTAR collection effects.

33. The nature of the urban environment can render reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence and target acquisition problematic. The urban environment limits the individual’s field of view. The enemy could be behind a wall, and so could a family of noncombatants. Urban furniture, buildings, doors, stairways, alleyways, streets, roads, walls and fences impede movement, limit observation and deny intelligence gathering. The practical limitations of manoeuvre in and amongst buildings and the advantages provided to the defender of ease of concealed movement make the physical gathering of accurate and timely information difficult. The advantage will invariably remain with the protagonist who will know the ground better than his opponent.

9

Direction, Collection, Processing and Dissemination.

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Fig B-4-4 Conducting Real-Time Urban Surveillance 34. In the urban environment, ISTAR is a support to planning. ISTAR improves situational awareness and targeting, enables real-time monitoring and surveillance, assists decision making and improves force protection. A battlegroup deploying on operations can have access to a wide range of ISTAR assets and should expect to receive comprehensive briefings on their capabilities. The battlegroup should include these assets in planning and training prior to deployment. 35. During urban operations the battlegroup G2 cell may be supplemented by ISTAR, PSYOPS, HUMINT, CIMIC and other specialists. The intelligence that the G2 cell provides about enemy intentions and capabilities will derive from the intelligence and information gathered from formation HQ, the analysis of information from casual contacts gained through patrolling, patrol reports, and the information gathered by all the available ISTAR assets. This intelligence may be further supplemented by other sources and agencies. ISTAR ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES 36. Technological advances continue to improve ISTAR capabilities and effect. With increased stand-off, ISTAR assets are delivering better effect, viewing and listening to a wider portion of the electro-magnetic spectrum and communicating this data back to deployed HQs in greater detail over longer distances at greater speeds. ISTAR gathering sensors are contained in satellites, fixed10 and rotary wing11 aircraft with cameras and a ‘sparkle’ function12, manned and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs13), balloons, overt and covert ground vehicles, masts, unattended covert systems and ground sensors and covert military activity. The bearer systems deliver various options for communicating information. Further systems aid the interpretation, translation and analytical function to provide corroborated intelligence to meet the original Request for Information (RFI). Fusion of multiple assets is the key to maximising the potential of ISTAR. 37. Real-time ISTAR input provides an essential aid to battlespace management, allowing the ground commander to fight the battle with the most accurate and recent 10

For instance NIMROD at 28,000 feet. For instance BROADSWORD, an Electro Optical Infrared MX5 Camera fixed to a SEAKING helicopter at 8,000 feet. 12 LO with UHF comms to ground units and an IR beam to designate targets visible through II sights. 13 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Characteristics will be found in the ISTAR Handbook and the SOHB. 11

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information available. A Ground Control Station (GCS) monitors the real-time and other ISTAR input. The downlink can be viewed in the battlegroup operations room14 and on a mobile version in battlegroup tactical HQ. THE ISTAR PLANNING FOCUS 38. The planning focus is influenced by detailed planning needed to conduct operations in a built-up area, the impact of the presence of non-combatants on kinetic operations, the need to gain and retain the support of the local population and the human dimension on media operations. a. For certain operations, JARIC15 can provide detailed aerial photography and imagery analysis. b. Current intelligence and historical information should be available from within battlegroup and brigade resources. c. ISTAR assets, including guard (point of origin) reports, CCTV footage and information analysis can provide intelligence to supplement force protection. d. UAVs provide high-resolution imagery of any target and area of interest and a real-time downlink to the GCS. Low altitude, oblique photos of targets (IMINT16) in the urban environment can be obtained, enabling accurate estimates to be made of building dimensions17, occupation details, use and target status. e. Surveillance of the electro-magnetic spectrum enables radio and telephone signal capture and additional information. f. ISTAR can provide route cover for vehicles by looking ahead and in depth for the enemy18. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 39. ISTAR assets with Target Acquisition and Precision Strike19 capabilities enables engagements in line with the normal targeting process. Theatre SOIs should describe the decision-making requirements for Positive Identification (PID). ISTAR ASSET USE 40. The availability of technical means of information gathering does not negate the need for the analysis of historical and current threats, the synchronisation of intended targets and the allocation of co-ordinated nicknames to geographic points and areas in order that the land, air and maritime components of all participating nations have a common understanding. 14

Consideration can be given to including the Royal Engineer representative, the BC, the FOOs and the FAC in the GCS. 15 Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre, UK based. 16 Imagery Intelligence. 17 Wall height, gate width and approximate strength, window elevation from the ground, window size, roof height. 18 Including, in Stability Operations, RPG gunmen, IED teams and SA firers. 19 For instance Fast Air with targeting pod and armed UAV, such as HERMES and PREDATOR.

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41. The standard of IMINT from many of the ISTAR sources can be of high quality, but consideration should be given to the use of several source types, not necessarily airborne, focussed on a specific location to capitalize on the strengths and overcome the weaknesses of each. 42. The strengths and weaknesses of ISTAR assets, and associated capabilities, must be understood. The best imagery in the world might be of little use if the operating crew and downlink are of dubious quality. The use of secure internet chat rooms with UAVs can involve delay and a time lag following commands. Pre-training for ISTAR operations using non-UK equipment should be considered in a coalition environment. 43. The G2 elements of the battlegroup must remain inquisitive, and use the assets to their full potential during the limited time that they are assigned. SECTION 4 – COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS ‘With ill-defined front lines, and a defence in depth of no more than a few hundred yards in places, command posts were almost as vulnerable as forward positions. Colonel Vishnevsky, the commander of the 62nd Army’s artillery division wrote to a friend from hospital. “When I left the bunker, I could hear sub-machine gun fire all around us.” A German tank came right up to the entrance of his bunker and “its hull blocked the only way out.” Vishnevsky and his officers had to dig for their lives to escape into the gully on the far side.’ Anthony Beevor, Stalingrad, Penguin Books COMMAND 44. Commanders must be able to engage and interact with the enemy, to keep pace with the complex urban environment, to predict how the operation is going to change and to minimise the impact of combat on the civilian population. 45. In order to be able to maintain mobility and to minimise the stress levels of their troops in a complicated and dangerous environment, plans should be flexible enough to be able to do the following: a.

react quickly to the changing situation.

b.

ensure effective all arms co-ordination and

c. gain the maximum benefit from dynamic training and liberal interpretation of doctrine, so that soldiers will either instinctively know what to do or use their initiative to overcome an unforeseen problem. 46.

The factors that underpin successful urban operations are as follows: a.

Tactical and mental agility in the three block war context.

b.

Identification and location of friend, foe and non-combatant.

c.

Sharing and acting upon pertinent information.

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d.

Location, observation and tracking of the enemy.

e.

Provision of precision effects with graduated firepower.

f. Provision of physical mobility able to cope with the constraints of urban terrain. g.

Provision of timely Combat Service Support.

h.

Interpretation of the local culture, customs and behaviour.

CONTROL ‘In urban areas, ground operations tend to become decentralized. It is therefore highly important that C2 be flexible, adaptive and decentralized as well. Essential to C2 is the thorough knowledge and understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of command. To further enhance decentralized C2, commanders at all levels should issue mission-type orders and use implicit communications wherever possible.’ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2002 47. Operations in urban areas are invariably difficult to control. In every campaign theme and tactical activity commanders and headquarters at battlegroup level and below need to be far forward, in immediate contact behind and close to the troops in combat. Troops fighting in built up areas may know little about how the battle is progressing or where their commanders are. Situational Awareness (SA) information passing through headquarters must be made available to the lowest level. Shared situational awareness (SSA) is key to understanding the progress of the battle and to avoiding friendly casualties. All soldiers must be aware of the location of friendly troops across or within their own boundaries. 48. The presence of NGOs (such as the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, Charities, Private Military Companies), OGDs (such as DfID20 and the FCO21), and local agencies and authorities, must be accounted for. Troops must have a clear understanding of where they are, what they are doing, how they are controlled and how they affect the tactical plan. The Civil-Military Cooperation plan should be briefed to the lowest level. 49. The screening of radios and GPS and the complex three dimensional urban environment restrict the ability to know where troops are and what they are doing. Personal, visual and electronic communication is difficult in areas subject to significant screening, both within buildings and in streets between buildings. Consistently manned secure voice radio is the key to all-informed real time command and control. 50. All round observation using eyes and ears is necessary in the contact battle, but this should be balanced against the security offered by ISTAR and surveillance devices operated remotely or from behind armour. Troops in combat should be fighting ‘heads up’ for best effect, or if they cannot, due to incoming fire or the threat of snipers, through optics and sights. Peering at a computer screen could prove fatal, both to AFV crewmen and to those they are supporting with fires and kinetic effect. 20 21

DfID – Department for International Development. FCO – Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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51. The complexity of urban operations and vulnerability of all ranks, including commanders, demands simple drills, clearly understood by everybody. Complicated plans, drills and procedures may lead to confusion, exacerbated if commanders become casualties and communications fail. 52. The information provided by fighting vehicles with access to battlefield management, including automated position location technology, must be made available to the dismounted troops. HQ locations should be selected for both security and access to protected reliable communications. 53. Combat ID is useful but not infallible means of avoiding fratricide. Its effectiveness can be enhanced by the use of boundaries as restrictive fire lines. Boundaries are a fault line, but SSA and better multi-spectral ISTAR offers the chance to move with assurance, to engage targets more precisely and to permit closer direct and indirect fires. Precision and tailoring of effects and yields allows strike to be modified and the minimisation of collateral damage. 54. In the urban environment, the importance of sectors, report lines, boundaries and collection points is increased and can be significant. Attention must be paid to all three physical dimensions – above, on and below ground. a. Sectors. Clearly defined and recognisable sectors should be numbered or lettered. Sectors will normally be allotted as company group tasks and then divided into sub-sectors for platoon tasks. b. Report Lines. Report lines should reflect clearly identifiable landmarks, for example, for streets, rivers, railway lines, at right angles to the line of advance. c. Boundaries. Boundaries between units and sub-units should be clearly identifiable. Main thoroughfares provide the obvious approach for enemy movement, the likely focus for operations, and equally identifiable alternatives should be sought. Direct fire weapons provide the ability to interlock and overlap arcs, but in the urban environment, in order to reduce the chances of fratricide, consideration can be given to using boundaries as restrictive fire lines. d. Collection Points. Protected and accessible collection points should be established by each company group. It is here that combat supplies are delivered by the battlegroup and collected by platoons, and casualties and PWs collected and escorted to the rear. COMMUNICATIONS ‘Under fire, the battalion commander was still trying to get communications with his subordinate units. The radio operators in the [command vehicle] were still having difficulties receiving and sending radio messages. The two-storey houses they were bumped up against were masking the VHF signals. Even in his Humvee, he couldn’t get a consistent signal among the labyrinth of houses.’ Nasiriyah, Iraq, 2003, from “Ambush Alley” Tim Pritchard

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55. Military operations in urban areas have demonstrated how easily VHF radios are screened and how their range can be reduced. Commanders should be prepared to encounter difficulty in establishing and maintaining communications; they should therefore plan for the frequent re-siting of rebroadcast stations in order to ensure communications, and consider the consequent force protection issues. All radio users should be trained in and employ basic skills which are just as important in the era of digital communications – movement to establish communications, elevation where possible and avoidance of obscuration from walls or buildings. Although movement between defensive locations may be difficult and dangerous, command must be close and personal. Once battle is joined, communication difficulties may demand a greater level of mission command and delegation of authority, and will place greater importance on planning and mission rehearsal. Inadequate communications and VHF screening necessitates a greater emphasis on simple plans, defined sectors and clear boundaries. Commanders must consider the need to use runners, dispatch riders and, as a last resort, local communication systems, landline and mobile phones. The use of low level codes like BATCO can help negate the security issue. The assumption must be made that everything said will be heard and compromised. 56. Although Personal Role Radio (PRR) equipment is robust, light and user-friendly it operates on VHF and therefore suffers from screening. It may be both necessary and possible during protracted COIN and Peace Support operations to establish a radio network based on commercial secure bulk CIS developed either on satellite telephones, where there could again be security issues, or a pocket-phone network based on high VHF or UHF bands via permanent, protected rebroadcast stations. Radios should be carefully sited and maximum use made of rebroadcast stations and the remoting of antennae to high spots. The use of the upper end of the VHF band and high power options on radios, where these exist, might improve communications. Security is critical, even relatively unsophisticated enemies will exploit the radio spectrum. For example, local civil systems22 within an urban environment are able to monitor and interfere with military communications. If all electronic communications fail, information might have to be passed by foot or motor transport. SECTION 5 - ELECTRONIC WARFARE ‘Communications will be difficult and the security of communications vital. During the battles for Grozny, the Chechens, many of whom had served in the Russian Army and spoke Russian, were able to use the Russian radio net to their advantage. The young, inexperienced and not fully trained Russian troops initially often spoke in clear, in large part because the forces operating the equipment were not familiar with the requirement for secure communications. Their conversations were not only monitored, but the Chechens were able to transmit disinformation which led to Russian forces being drawn into harm’s way.’ Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994-2000, Lessons from Urban Combat, Rand 57. The problems of Electronic Warfare (EW) in the urban environment are exacerbated by the density of radio and particularly mobile telephone use and by screening from urban infrastructure. EW systems have to function with the clutter and multi-path effects inherent in built up areas, and frequently suffer reduced range and low-power transmission.

22

For instance those from local taxi firms, local radio stations etc.

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58. In the urban environment EW detachments are deployed either in static HQ overwatch or embedded with units. EW detachments can be deployed on foot, by vehicle or at short-halt capable of 24-hour operation. Where possible EW sensors should operate from a secure location, but can be deployed in the light role if required. 59. The purpose of EW is to provide the commander with electronically gathered information of the enemy’s intentions and capability. EW operators are able to provide the bearing, location, intentions and movement of the threat and can be networked with other detachments and ISTAR assets to provide a position fixing capability. EW detachments are capable of electronic attack, although its use should be co-ordinated in order to minimise the impact on other spectrum users. 60. Increasingly sophisticated enemies operating in a built up area will have similar electronic surveillance and electronic attack resources capable of significant intercept and intrusion. Units must ensure rigorous emission control policies, good voice procedure and communications security.

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CHAPTER 5 ALL ARMS COMBAT SECTION 1 - URBAN CLOSE COMBAT ‘They knew the houses they were hiding in and where the most complex hiding spots were located. They knew the spots that gave them the best geometry to fire on us without us seeing them. These guys were smart, well trained and, worst of all, willing to fight to the death…..they knew how to fight us in an urban environment. They didn’t challenge the tanks or armour but blended in…without obvious signs to target. They would move from house to house and fall back as we approached. They had weapons and ammunition staged in every house. It was really complex.’ Al Fallujah, Iraq, 2004 ‘A Tale of Three Cities’, Russell Glenn

INTRODUCTION 1. Urban Close Combat is a brutal, manpower intensive infantry-led business. Combat is often at very short range and the soldier is faced with an enemy who can be above him, below him and behind him1. Fratricide is an ever present danger2. 2. The nature of military operations since the end of the Cold War and global urbanisation since 1945 reinforce the fact that operations in urban areas are not only increasingly likely in any future conflict, but may well be a future enemy’s preferred ground for his military operations. THE FUNCTION AND ROLE OF TROOPS IN CLOSE COMBAT 3. Unit and formation structures should be optimized for urban fighting into taskorganized combined arms groups. 4. The combination of forces at the lowest levels, such as armour, infantry and aviation with engineer support to each, are likely to be critical to achieving success in urban terrain. The groupings must always have the necessary elements of manoeuvre, firepower, protection, command structure, and logistic support to achieve and capitalise on tactical success. The grouping should be dependent upon the mission and the enemy threat. The types of forces employed will be dictated by the operating environment. 5. The urban environment favours close combat by dismounted troops. Weapon platforms with long range weapon systems are limited by cover and range from getting the maximum advantage from their systems. They are also vulnerable to attack at close range by small arms and short range anti-tank weapons.

1

Nearly every unit involved in the attack on Fallujah by US forces in 2004 suffered more casualties from rifle and machine gun fire from behind them than from in front. The enemy had either been bypassed or, more often, had moved into empty buildings captured, cleared and then vacated by the advancing US formations and units. 2 The majority of Russian fatalities during the first battle for Grozny in 1994 were caused by their own side.

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6. In the urban environment, whether in offence or defence, dismounted forces will normally be based on infantry formations. Support to the infantry will be provided by other arms and services which must be able to operate in the dismounted role. The primary aim of the infantry and the other dismounted troops will be to close with and defeat the enemy by firepower and close combat. 7. The means by which dismounted troops close with the enemy can be various. Tactical and operational movement into the dismounted environment can be by armoured fighting vehicle, on foot or by helicopter. Each of these methods offers different levels of mobility, protection and firepower, but will not change the fundamental role of the dismounted soldier once he has closed with the enemy. The tactical mobility of the dismounted troops will dictate the level of integral fire support and logistic backup available. The Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) will provide the higher level of fire support and logistic backup required, play an important part in the commander’s tactical plan, provide a communications base and, if necessary, improve the speed for casualty evacuation. However, in spite of ever increasing levels of physical protection, such as additional armour packs, they will remain vulnerable to Emplaced Explosive Ordnance (EEO). 8. Despite significant advances in weapon, equipment and vehicle development the way to conduct close combat and fight at close quarters has not changed for many years and is unlikely to change significantly in the future. Developments in technology for urban operations will provide alternative ways of gaining intelligence but close combat will be won by individual initiative, courage, leadership, determination and collective team work. 9. Every soldier in the urban environment, of any rank and from any arm, is vulnerable to attack at close quarters. He or she can expect to be required to engage in close combat with the enemy. The scope of urban operations will range from infantry units fighting with or without armour support, through every level and type of stability operation, to encounters by support personnel with the enemy at close range. Distinction cannot be drawn between those whose raison d’être is to close with and engage the enemy and those for whom such an encounter would be unlikely in a rural environment. 10. Urban close combat has been defined as 'operations which take place on foot, in direct fire contact with the enemy and involving the deliberate application of concentrated violence to achieve the mission'. Following this definition, the following lessons can be drawn: a. Weapons, ammunition and equipment used in close combat should be small and light enough to be carried and used effectively in close combat. Consideration should be given to the issue of a pistol to all ranks as a secondary weapon. b. For the dismounted soldier, close combat will generally take place at ranges from 200m down to the length he need thrust his bayonet. The shorter the range over which he is fighting the more stark, dangerous and personal the environment becomes. The soldier should seek to use all his available weapons to give him the greatest possible stand-off distance and all round utility. c. The constant 360 degree vulnerability of the close combat soldier increases the need for all round defence and protection.

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d. Fighting can be at very close range for protracted periods of time. At Stalingrad in 1942 and 1943 the defending Russians used every different type of weapon and soldier to fight the battle. They hugged the enemy as close as possible to prevent him effectively using his supporting arms, exhausted him through constant attrition and by fear and proximity, thereby causing him to open fire at every opportunity, day and night, to give away his position. 11. Dismounted close combat involves both individual and collective activity. The individual fighting soldier is constrained by time, space, and the range of the weapons and equipment he can carry. Collective activity will be based on the ability of individual groups of soldiers to move, close with and encircle his enemy, supported by direct-fire and longer range weapons. 12. Summary. Regardless of his arm or service, the core function of the urban soldier is to close with the enemy and defeat him. Whatever he does, in order to survive and win, he must have the right weapons, and the ammunition and support that he needs to complete his task. THE USE OF GRENADES IN CLOSE COMBAT3 13. Grenades. HE Hand grenades are an essential weapon for assaulting and clearing buildings. Grenade ammunition expenditure is likely to be heavy. During WW2, it was common for a battalion fighting in urban areas to use in excesses of 500 hand grenades in a day. The HE grenade is the most commonly used grenade during combat in built-up areas and is used while clearing rooms. The overuse of HE grenades in lightly constructed buildings may cause total, or partial, collapse of walls. There is a risk that fragments may penetrate internal walls, risking injury to friendly forces in adjacent rooms. 14. Grenade Machine Gun. The Grenade Machine Gun (GMG)4 can provide high explosive fire support to a range of 2000m. With a cyclic rate of 350 rounds per minute, it provides the battlegroup commander with an accurate high rate of fire. It can also be fired in single shot. It is particularly useful against dismounted personnel, soft skinned vehicles and light armoured vehicles. 15. Underslung Grenade Launcher. In comparison to the use of hand thrown grenades, the use of an Underslung Grenade Launcher (UGL) significantly reduces the vulnerability of the firer. UGL should be used to assist initial entry into buildings and launch grenades into openings above ground floor level. Their use inside buildings for room clearance is likely to be limited. The 40mm UGL fitted to the SA80 L85A2 rifle fires the High Explosive Dual Purpose (HEDP) Grenade. It can:

3 4

a.

Penetrate 45 mm of steel.

b.

Penetrate 300mm of concrete.

c.

Produce casualties within a 5m radius of grenade.

See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Para 10. Man-portable or vehicle mounted, normally fired by a two or three man team but can be

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Fig B-5-2 UGL Being Fired in Afghanistan, 2007 SNIPERS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT5 16. General. Snipers can be highly effective in a number of roles in the urban environment. The value of the sniper to a unit depends on the type of operation, the level of conflict and the Rules of Engagement. To provide timely and effective support, the sniper needs a clear picture of the commander’s concept of operations and intent in order to operate independently when necessary. Clear control measures must be employed to prevent fratricide and to maintain control. An effective sniper group can disrupt the enemy a great deal and cause delay out of all proportion to its numbers. The effectiveness of a sniper will largely depend on the terrain, and the complex nature of the different types of urban dwellings will directly affect how the sniper can be employed. 17. Capability. A sniper can provide a 24 hour capability and his role is not limited to simply engaging enemy targets. Likely tasks for snipers in the urban environment are as follows:

Fig B-5-3 - UK Sniper, Afghanistan, 2007

a. Urban to Rural/Rural to Urban Engagements. Snipers are in a good position to utilise their weapon ranges to the maximum without becoming decisively engaged. Their stealth is a huge advantage in mixed environments. b. Denial of Key Terrain. Snipers can efficiently and effectively deny key terrain such as routes and specific buildings to the enemy in a built up area. 5

See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Para 9.

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c. Covering Obstacles. Snipers can be utilised to cover obstacles and assist in choking enemy movement. Enemy commanders are likely to move forward to observe and should be priority targets. d. Supporting the Close Battle. Snipers are able to support troops during urban penetration and urban thrust operations in a variety of different ways. They are able to support local counterattacks with precision fire and provide a screen either as part of an ISTAR plan or part of a guard force providing both precision fire and observation. e. Isolated Employment. Sniper teams can be employed in isolation, maximising their stealth, although this may carry significant risk. f. Control of Offensive Support. A sniper should be able to call in and adjust Offensive Support (OS) and should be employed within the OS bubble. He may wish to utilise OS rather than compromise his position using his rifle. Snipers should be able to call in and control mortar and artillery fire. The use of black light to enhance night capability offers a distinct advantage. g. Counter Sniping. The enemy will almost certainly have his own snipers/sharp shooters operating in the urban environment. Snipers will be looking for signs and patterns of enemy snipers. Our own snipers can reduce and restrict the enemy sniper’s observation, movement and their ability to shoot.

Fig B-5-4 Bosnian Sniper, Former Yugoslavia 1993 h. TASKORG/Groupings. Snipers may well be employed by the commander in a mixed grouping eg ISTAR. Flexibility should be used when employing snipers for a specific task particularly when screening or guarding an area - using a cocktail of weapon systems in a screen or guard matrix may produce the best effect. i. Flank and Rear Observation. Snipers can be used to protect troops by the provision of early warning of follow up action and counter attacks, and by engaging such activity with precision fire and OS. j. Attacking Targets of Opportunity. Targets of opportunity may be given priorities by the commander. Types of targets might include enemy snipers,

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commanders, vehicle commanders, radio operators, engineers, and machine gun crews. k. Observation Posts. Snipers will inevitably use OPs as a means to observe and carry out much of their task. Both urban and rural OPs can be used depending on the ground. Urban tasks could include gaining information on the enemy, establishing enemy habits and patterns, triggering reserves and QRFs, monitoring local reactions to operations, calling for OAS and destroying key personnel. l. Heli-Sniping6. Firing from helicopters is a task for which snipers are not normally trained, but heli-sniping is a possibility for short duration urban operations, particularly when elevation and clear shoots are difficult. Heli-sniping may be used by a commander on specific urban penetration operations. 18. Positioning. A sniper does not have to move or be positioned with lead or fighting elements. He may have to occupy a higher position to the rear or flank, potentially some distance away from the element he is supporting. By operating far from the other elements, a sniper avoids decisive engagement but remains close enough to engage distant targets. A sniper is likely to get the best observation and arcs of fire from elevated positions, although he should not be placed in obvious positions, such as church steeples and roof tops, since the enemy can often observe and target such locations. Indirect fire can generally penetrate rooftops and cause casualties in top floors of buildings. Furthermore, snipers should not be positioned where there is heavy traffic; these areas invite enemy observation as well. A sniper must consider a variety of factors when selecting a fire position or observation post including the following: a. Communications. A sniper needs good communications in order to both coordinate with the force elements that he supports and apply offensive support. This may be difficult to achieve in urban terrain.

Fig B-5-5 1BW Snipers, Iraq, 2004 6

Firing unrestrained weapons from helicopters requires specialised training, and may only be carried out by suitably qualified aircrew and snipers operating (and practised) as an integrated team, specifically authorised for the task.'

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b. Observation. Good observation with cleared fields of view over likely enemy locations and routes is essential. Ideally, a fire position should offer long-range fields of fire and all round observation. c. Concealment and Survival. The sniper must be covert and understand the three dimensional aspect to concealment in the visible light and thermal spectra. The use of solid, robust structures for protection from both direct and indirect fire should be sought. As well as selecting a suitable position with cover from fire, he also needs protection from the elements. d. Sustainability. Depending on the duration of the operation, snipers will need to be re-supplied. Thought must be given to the method of re-supply including the use of covered approaches and caches. e. Alternative Positions. After engaging a target, snipers should withdraw to a pre-planned alternative position in order to avoid compromise. 19. Building Construction. The material and structure of buildings in the area of operations should be considered, in respect of both protected positions and planning weapon effect. The type of building and the materials used in its construction has an impact on ammunition penetration thus ammunition selection. 20. Sniper Target Building Breakdown. The following is a diagram of how a sniper might define a point on a target building. This method is easy to use and brings troops onto the target quickly and efficiently.

Fig B-5-6 Sniper Colour Clock Code

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21. Offensive Operations. Sniper tasks during an offensive operation in an urban environment can include the following: a. Investment. Snipers can be employed during the investment, dominating ground around the objective. b. Break-in. The attacker will be at his most vulnerable during the break-in battle. Precision fire support is critical in order for assaulting troops to secure a foothold. c. Securing the Objective. The assaulting troops should conduct a systematic approach to the securing of the objective and will require support throughout. The enemy is likely to have established strong defensive positions with a comprehensive obstacle plan. Overwatch through the provision of precision fire support and the coordination of OS by snipers enables commanders to manoeuvre more freely. d. Clearance. In clearing the remaining enemy from the area, snipers can be used as cut-offs and in overwatch positions, guiding clearance troops on the ground and engaging enemy when necessary. e. Re-organisation. The threat of enemy counter attack and sniper fire is high during the re-organisation. Snipers can be employed to counter this and provide commanders with early warning of any enemy attack. 22. Defensive Operations. Sniper tasks during a defensive operation in an urban environment can include the following: a. Perimeter Force. Snipers can be an integral part of the perimeter force providing observation for early warning, coordination of OS and precision fire. b. Disruption Force. Snipers can be used in conjunction with the disruption force, either organic to it or in support. c. Main Defensive Area. In the main defensive area snipers can be tasked to engage in selected killing areas, cover obstacles and assist in preventing the enemy from grouping for coordinated attacks. d. Reserve. On deployment of a reserve, snipers can be used to provide precision fire support, assist in guiding their manoeuvre on the battlefield and adjust OS. 23. Effects Of Sniper Weapon Systems. When employed effectively, snipers not only have a physical impact on the enemy but also a significant psychological effect, particularly in an urban environment. Commanders need to have an understanding of the effects of the weapons and optics a sniper carries in order for him to be employed for best effect. Part C, Chapter 11 contains detail of sniper weapon effects. 24. Sniper Priorities. Engagement priorities for snipers are determined by the relative importance of the targets to the enemy. Sniper targets usually include commanders, enemy snipers and the personnel of crew served weapons.

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25. Limitations on Employing Snipers in the Urban Environment. Limitations on the use of snipers in the urban environment may include the following: a.

Degraded communications.

b. Disrupted command and control, leading to degraded situational awareness and the possibility of fratricide. c. Difficulties in sustaining the sniper(s). This is a particular issue when snipers are deployed in relative isolation. The duration of sniper operations will generally be short as re-supply will heighten the risk of compromise. The pre-positioning of combat supplies can extend duration. d.

Restricted fields of view and arcs of fire due to the complex terrain.

e. Ammunition penetration of buildings. necessary.

Armour piercing rounds may be

f. Employing snipers in isolation carries risk. dedicating a QRF.

This can be mitigated by

g. All buildings that need to be occupied by a sniper should be cleared first. A sniper may need assistance to clear a suitable fire position or OP before occupation. h. There is a risk of compromise after an engagement with a sniper rifle. The use of suppressors and alternative positions will mitigate this. i.

The weather has an impact on visibility and sustainability. FIGHTING VEHICLES7

GENERAL 26. Fighting vehicles consist of tanks, tracked and wheeled Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), recce vehicles and other armed vehicles8. They can be used very effectively in intimate support of dismounted forces in urban operations. In urban terrain, their mobility, firepower, communications and surveillance and target-acquisition attributes are invaluable to dismounted troops. Up-to-date descriptions of the capabilities of AFVs in current use may be found in the All Arms Tactical Aide Memoire. 27. In built-up areas, AFVs are vulnerable as their mobility and firepower can be restricted. In urban terrain streets and alleys constitute ready-made fields of fire and killing areas. AFVs are restricted by obstacles, can be canalised by urban infrastructure and can be subject to possible ambush and short-range attack. Gun elevation, depression and traverse are restricted. Infantry intimate support reduces the risk to AFVs, however, and should be considered the norm.

7 8

See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Paras 16-20. including protected mobility platforms.

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28. Conventional FIBUA defensive operations are centred on prepared and fortified positions. All approaches to these positions are normally covered by fire and may be protected by landmines, IEDs9 and obstacles. Tanks and other AFVs can be used effectively with dismounted infantry in the pursuit and in armoured raids into urban terrain. Consideration should be given to avoiding weight-supporting constructions (eg bridges, flyovers) until they have been cleared by dismounted forces and confirmed, if necessary, by specialist reconnaissance. THE EMPLOYMENT OF AFVs OTHER THAN TANKS 29. AFVs other than tanks that can contribute to the urban battle consist of CVR(T) Scimitar, Warrior IFV and other armed protected mobility vehicles that may be issued for specific operations. They may all, to varying degrees, offer protection, firepower and mobility as well as providing the means for the movement of personnel, freight and casualties. AFVs IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 30.

The likely tasks for AFVs in urban offensive operations are to: a.

Provide protected transport for infantry as close as possible to the objective.

b.

Provide intimate support to assault troops on the objective.

c.

Destroy enemy positions with direct fire.

d.

Breach walls en route to, and in, the objective area.

e. Isolate the objective by movement and with direct fire to prevent enemy withdrawal, reinforcement, or counterattack. f.

Counter enemy armour.

g.

Provide II and TI illumination of targets.

h.

Establish roadblocks and barricades.

i.

Provide re-supply of ammunition and explosives for the assault force.

j.

Provide a mobile reserve.

k.

Evacuate casualties.

31. To maximise offensive momentum dismounted infantry and AFVs must work together. Good communications between the dismounted infantry and AFV is critical. External telephones fitted to AFVs provide the primary and best means of communication to dismounted infantry. AFVs can provide direct fire support to dismounted infantry who themselves can provide close protection to the vehicle. Combined Arms training should be conducted at all levels down to single AFV/section level. 9

Improvised Explosive Devices.

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32. Smoke from AFVs can be used to screen the movement of the vehicle10 and dismounted troops or blind the enemy. Consideration should also be given to the incendiary effect of smoke munitions. AFVs IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 33.

Typical tasks for AFVs in urban defence include: a.

Providing a mobile reserve.

b. Providing fire support including DFs and FPF for the defending forces and mutual support to other AFVs from protected fire positions. c.

Providing rapid, protected transport for the infantry.

d.

Providing mutual support for anti-tank weapons.

e.

Covering obstacles by fire.

f.

Providing re-supply of ammunition and other supplies.

g.

Evacuating casualties from areas under fire.

h.

Defending flanks

i.

In co-operation with the dismounted infantry defending buildings and routes.

34. AFVs should be integrated into the defensive plan to make use of their protection, firepower and mobility to cover likely approaches and selected killing areas. Routes and fire positions should be carefully prepared to provide protection against enemy anti-armour weapons. Plans for the defence should include the use of alternative fire positions for AFVs and the preparation of withdrawal routes.

10

Either from Multi Barrelled Smoke Grenade Discharger’s (MBSGD) or, in the case of CR2, its on board smoke generators.

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Lessons from an extended defensive fire fight using IFVs at Red 10, Basra City, 21 May 2007: • • • • • • • • • •

Importance of good vehicle maintenance and battle procedure by all section members. Importance of good driver training. Drivers must be confident and able to use their initiative. Live firing from vehicles should be practised every day, including the use of alternative fire positions. Target Indication is difficult. Good target indication and clear fire control orders are essential. Use tracer and, if necessary, button compasses on wrist watches for target indication. Smoke will obscure the enemy and blind your fire. Carry as much vehicle and personal ammunition as you can in your vehicles. Be proactive in defence. The driver is alone. He can hear gunfire and commands on his headset. Get down to him. Use more protection on armoured vehicles – eg sandbags. The vehicle crew must multi-task – use BOWMAN, drive, command the vehicle. Cpl J P Smith, R Coy, 4 RIFLES, 2007

AFV CANNON 35. General. The 30mm Rarden cannon11, mounted on CVR (T) Scimitar and Warrior 510/511, can provide significant firepower to the infantry and can be used either in intimate support or from a stand-off position. In addition, the co-axially mounted machine guns can enhance the level of suppressive fire. Two types of ammunition are available: a. Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot. Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) is the main anti-armour round available for use with the 30mm cannon. It is suitable for engaging light armoured and soft-skinned vehicles out to 1500m. b. High Explosive. High Explosive (HE) rounds are suitable for engaging softskinned vehicles, bunkers and dismounted infantry out to 1500m. HE has the most utility in an urban environment, providing assistance to assault troops without the more extensive collateral damage of a High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) round. 36. Limitations. There are several limitations when using 30mm cannon in the urban environment: a. Like the tank main armament in the urban environment, 30mm cannon is restricted in elevation and traverse. b. HE rounds may have limited effect against hard structures, eg concrete or reinforced buildings. 11

See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Paras 14-15. The Rarden Cannon is soon to be replaced by a 40mm CTA (Cased Telescope Ammunition) system.

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c. The weapon platforms may have difficulty in manoeuvring in an urban environment due to their size and weight. d. Although not as hazardous to dismounted troops as the 120mm tank gun, 30mm cannon does produce a minimal danger from ejected rounds, as well as the associated dangers of the phosphorous from the smoke grenade dischargers. TANKS12 ‘When the lead UK tank came into sight, they made a direct hit with the first [anti-tank] round, disabling the tank and blocking the route of advance with the whole line stalled behind it. Similarly, when a tank came to a halt beside a tall building on a second road, a demolition team collapsed the façade of the building on top of the tank, thereby stopping the second tank.’ Jaffa, Palestine, 1948 “City Fights”, Benjamin Runkle

Fig B-5-7 UK Sherman Tank in Palestine, 1948 37. The powerful, high-velocity gun that is mounted on tanks provides the infantryman with major contribution to success in built-up areas: heavy, direct, fire support. Although the infantry assumes the lead role during combat in built-up areas, tanks and infantry must work as a close team. The tank, using HESH, can provide effective direct fire against buildings as the round will breach most walls and fortifications. The co-axial machine gun can provide effective neutralising covering fire. EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS 38. As part of the all arms battle, tanks are best suited to tasks within the Investment Force, or direct Fire Support Group in offensive operations and in the Perimeter Force in defensive operations. In these roles they can make maximum use of their firepower and

12

See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Para 16-20.

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mobility without exposure to the threat of hand held anti armour weapons. Other points to note are: a. Tanks need infantry on the ground to provide security in built-up areas and to designate targets. Against targets protected by structures, tanks should be escorted forward to the most covered location that provides a clear shot. On the spot instructions by the local infantry commander are essential to ensure that the tank's fire is accurate and its exposure is limited. The tank commander may have to halt in a covered position, dismount, and reconnoitre a route forward into a suitable firing position. b. Tanks are equipped with very effective thermal sights that can be used to detect enemy personnel and weapons that are hidden in shadows and behind openings. Dust, fires, thick smoke and atmospheric conditions significantly degrade these sights. c. Burning particles from white phosphorous turret-mounted grenade launchers can easily start uncontrolled fires and are hazardous to dismounted infantry near the tank. The tank commander and the local infantry commander should coordinate when and under what conditions these launchers can be used. d. The tank's size and armour can provide dismounted infantry with cover from direct fire weapons and fragments. With co-ordination, tanks can provide moving cover for infantrymen as they advance across small open areas. However, enemy fire striking a tank but not penetrating is a major threat to nearby infantry. Fragmentation generated by anti-tank rounds and ricochets off tank armour have historically been a prime cause of infantry casualties while working with tanks in built-up areas. e. Some tanks (normally the squadron 2IC's tank) are equipped with dozer blades that can be used to remove rubble barriers under fire, breach obstacles, or seal exits. 39. Limitations. Tanks can be particularly vulnerable to hand held anti-tank weapons which can find ample cover in the urban environment. However, this limitation is only valid where the enemy has such a capability that can defeat our tanks. Intelligence staff advice on the current and any likely future enemy anti-tank capability should thus be sought before planning operations, in order to assess the risk. Particular limitations of elevation, depression and traverse are shown in Figures B-6-7 and B-6-8. Where possible, tanks should take advantage of open areas which offer the best fields of fire. The weight of tanks may cause collapse of cellars, drains and underground systems and therefore routes and firing positions have to be reconnoitred with care.

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Fig B-5-8 – Challenger Two Elevation Restrictions

Fig B-5-9 – Challenger Two Depression Restrictions 40. Firing Angles. Tank guns produce their best urban target effects when fired perpendicular to the hard surface. ANTI-TANK WEAPONS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT13 PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT 41.

The likely tasks for anti-tank weapons14 in the urban environment are as follows: a. Surveillance Operations. Javelin has an effective thermal sight and should be incorporated into the STAP. When the armoured threat is low and observation difficult, Javelin should be fully utilised for observation. b. Force Protection. The primary weapon used for force protection will be NLAW15. Concurrent with all operations is the requirement to use anti-armour weapons for force protection. This type of operation will be carried out by all troops throughout the urban battlefield.

13

See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Paras 11-12. This section should be read with Chapter 10, section 6, Anti Tank Weapons Effects. 15 See below. 14

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c. Flank Protection. The long range (2500m), thermal sight and anti-armour capability of Javelin means that it can be ideally used for flank protection on the edges of the built up area. SPECIFIC FACTORS FOR THE USE OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS IN URBAN OPERATIONS 42. Consideration should be given to the following factors when using anti-armour weapons in the urban environment: a. Soft Launch. Both Javelin16 and NLAW can be fired from a confined space. This potential should be exploited where possible. b. Firing from Elevated Positions. The use of NLAW from upper storeys will protect the firer from an enemy’s tank main gun and coaxial machine guns fire due to the limits of weapon elevation. Furthermore, the top armour on a tank is thinner and will improve the chance of an effective immobilizing strike. Using these techniques, NLAW may be used in offensive and defensive operations. It is particularly effective in ambushes. c. Safe Launch. Safe Launch will be critical in the urban environment. Any obstruction can cause premature detonation or ricochet. Commanders should ensure they are aware of, and if necessary remove, potential obstructions from the likely flight path of the missile d. Use of Other Systems. Effective use can be made of other weapon systems in an anti-armour capacity, particularly in the urban ambush. The use of snipers will be highly effective against exposed AFV commanders and drivers. Blast and directfire damage to antennae, optics and other external equipment can significantly reduce AFV fighting ability. NLAW

Fig B-5-10

NLAW

43. General. NLAW17 is one man, disposable, fire-and-forget weapon with a range of between 20-400m for moving targets and up to 600m for static targets. NLAW can be fired

16

Javelin has a minimum range of 65m, NLAW a minimum range of 20m.

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from an enclosed or exposed position in the Over-fly Target Attack (OTA) or the Direct Attack (DA) mode 44. Scaling. NLAW is an all arms weapon, available to all troops operating in the battle-group and should be deployed with all groups operating in the urban battlefield. All units receive high-scaling of NLAW for anti-armour tasks in urban operations. NLAW should be deployed with rifle platoons and the anti-tank platoon for offensive and defensive action in the urban environment, and to other elements of the battle-group, including attached CSS elements, for self-defence. 45. Employment. NLAW is primarily used to defeat light armoured vehicles and neutralize fortified firing positions. Due to the design of the warhead and the narrow blast effect, it is not as effective in this role as heavier weapons such as a tank main armament. a. NLAW is most effective when firing from upper storeys, or from the flanks and rear. When firing at main battle tanks, these weapons should always be employed against weaker areas in volley or paired firing as they normally require a number of hits to achieve a kill on a tank. Firing from upper stories protects the firer from tank main guns and coaxial machine gun fire since tanks cannot sharply elevate these armaments. In addition the top armour on a tank is normally much thinner than elsewhere, thus greatly improving the chance of an effective immobilising strike. Using these techniques, NLAW may be used in offensive and defensive operations. It is particularly effective in ambushes. b. The effect of NLAW against buildings or defensive positions is likely to be limited. The shaped charge is unlikely to create a significant breach in a wall or cause casualties to those inside the building. However, the blast and shock may be sufficient to neutralize a defensive position in a room for a short period. Against structures, shaped-charge weapons should be aimed about 6 inches below or to the side of a firing aperture in order to increase the probability of killing the enemy behind the wall. 46. Back-blast. During fighting in built up areas, the back-blast area in the open is more hazardous due to loose rubble and the channelling effect of the narrow streets and alleys. It is not advisable to fire NLAW from inside a building although firing from an enclosed space is possible. The most serious hazard that can be expected is hearing loss. Structural damage to the building can also occur. These risks should be assessed against the advantages gained by firing from cover. JAVELIN 47. General. Javelin18 provides a highly flexible stand-off precision weapon ideally suited to ISTAR and fire support tasks. Its use in urban environment will depend on the possibility of using its range, its lethality and flexibility of employment. It is man-portable and has a low logistic burden. Primarily an anti-armour weapon, it can be used against secondary targets. A number of specific tactical considerations must be considered in order to employ the weapon effectively:

17

Due into service 2009. This section should be read in conjunction with section 6, Chapter 10; NLAW Fire Effects. 18 This section should be read in conjunction with section 6, Chapter 10; Javelin Fire Effects.

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a. Range. As engagement ranges are likely to be close, the minimum range of only 65m in direct attack mode provides a particularly useful capability. Longer engagements are possible in less dense areas and where the Command Launch Unit (CLU) has line-of-sight to the target position. b. Visibility. Urban developments are often located along canals and rivers which create potential for fog in low lying areas. Air inversion layers are common especially where cities or towns are in low lying bowls or valleys. These trap dust, chemical agents and pollutants, increasing obscuration and reducing visibility. Like all thermal surveillance devices, the CLU will be affected by these obscurants. c. Time. Engagement times are likely to be short as the urban environment will only present fleeting targets. Timely ISTAR feeds, careful targeting, efficient inaction drills and fire control will all be of paramount importance. Engagement difficulties will also demand a greater scale of battery coolant units (BCUs) than is usually allocated. To increase in-action time, operators should adopt the tactical carry when contact is imminent. d. Field of Fire. To improve the opportunities for target acquisition and reduce vulnerability in the urban environment, use should be made of separate observers to locate the target and call forward the Javelin and any other direct fire system, by providing a quick and accurate target indication. Care must be taken to note and avoid the urban furniture (street lights, power lines, walls, fences, bridges, trees and large shrubs, vehicles, television antennae, and rubble) that will affect the ability to engage moving targets. The requirement for improved fields of fire may necessitate the occupation of an exposed building. e. Firing Positions. Firing positions can be constructed on or inside buildings, although positions outside of buildings may offer considerable tactical advantages. Positions should be selected that provide protection from direct and indirect fire. Safe Launch is absolutely critical in any environment. An obstruction could cause a premature detonation or ricochet. Concealment, including the use of thermal protection, will be essential for urban OPs. f. Secondary Targets. Secondary targets such as buildings, bunkers, sniper positions, fire bases, mortar base plates, hovering rotary aircraft and non-armoured vehicles will present themselves in the urban environment.

Fig B-5-11 Point of Aim against a Masonry Structure Issue 4.1: Nov 09

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(1) Engagements. The attack mode will needs to be carefully selected for the target type and the track gates adjusted to the visible centre of mass. It may be difficult to achieve ‘lock-on’ with small targets at longer ranges. (2) Weapon Effect. The Javelin warhead will penetrate approx 1500mm of concrete or sandbag structure and create an over-pressure effect inside. If fired against soft surfaces (ie glass, wood, etc.) the larger secondary charge may not detonate until a subsequent impact is made. Against a robust structure the penetration will only create a fist size hole and is therefore unsuitable for creating access points. If the structure is weak, there is a far greater chance it may create larger damage and possibly even collapse. g. Trigger OPs. The use of an OP matrix in the urban environment maximises the ability of Javelin teams to identify armoured targets. The ISTAR feed mitigates the fleeting nature of urban engagement, allow the early initiation of Battery Coolant Units (BCUs) by anti-tank detachments and the immediate engagement of targets on acquisition. h. Time of Flight. Commanders must be aware of the time of flight of their weapon system to any likely targets in their chosen engagement area. If an AFV is capable of transiting through the engagement area more quickly than any missile will reach its intended target, either a new position must be found, or obstacles must be placed to slow down vehicles. i. Attack Profile. Due to the attack profile of the Javelin missile in top attack mode, it is likely that some ‘street furniture’ may have to be removed to ensure safe launch of the weapon system. If this is unfeasible, direct attack should be used, although frontal engagements will be less successful. ANTI-STRUCTURE MUNITIONS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT19

Fig B-5-12 Anti-Structure Munition

19

See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Para 13.

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48. The UK Army will use the Anti-Structure Munition (ASM) from 2009. Lighter but the same length as the NLAW, the ASM is also a one-man disposable, fire-and-forget weapon for use against (primary targets) urban structures and bunkers and (secondary targets) light AFVs and soft skinned vehicles. With a combat effective range of between 15m-400m, the ASM has a tandem warhead break-in charge (BIC) and a follow-through bomb (FTB) that penetrates concrete structures and enables subsequent physical access. The purpose of the BIC is to create a hole sufficiently big to enable access to fighting troops. MORTARS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT20 49. The 60mm21 and 81mm mortars can be used effectively in the urban environment.22 In comparison with their use in open terrain, mortars in the urban environment have reduced killing zones, an impaired ability of the observer to record and adjust the fall of shot and poor communications between the commander, the MFC and the mortar base-plate positions. Nevertheless, the array of mortar ammunition and fuse type will provide an effective and useful contribution to both offensive and defensive operations in urban areas. 50. The urban environment greatly restricts low angle indirect fire. The trajectory of mortars operating in the high angle will be less affected but ‘dead space’23 will be about half the height of the building behind which lies the target. MORTAR EMPLOYMENT 51.

In urban operations, the following points about the use of mortars should be noted: a. In offensive operations mortars can fire into buildings and the deep spaces between them. In defensive operations mortars positioned behind buildings are difficult for the enemy to accurately locate and even harder for him to hit. b. Mortars can be fired through the roof of a ruined building if the ground-level flooring is solid enough to withstand the recoil. If there is only concrete in the mortar base plate area, mortars can be fired using sandbags or Raschen Bags24 as buffers under the base plates and curbs as anchors and braces. c. The 60mm and 81mm have limited effect on stronger structural targets. Even with delay fuses they seldom penetrate more than the upper stories of light buildings. However, their wide area coverage and multi option fuses make them useful against an enemy force advancing through streets, other open areas, or over rubble. d. Mortar platoons often operate more than one mortar detachment during fighting in built-up areas. Mortars can be dispersed and converge on the same target to achieve a similar beaten zone as a mortar line. e. All of the standard mortar projectiles are useful during fighting in built-up areas. HE is likely to be the most commonly used round. WP is effective in starting

20

See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Paras 24-25. The 60mm Mortar is due into service in 2009. 22 This section should be read with Chapter 10, section 7, Indirect Fire Effects. 23 The area that will not receive the fall of shot. 24 A Raschen Bag is a bag of ballast that is placed underneath the baseplate to improve the accuracy of the mortar when used in snow or other soft ground conditions. It is named after Colonel Dan Raschen, Royal Engineers, the inventor. 21

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fires in buildings which may force the enemy out of cellars and light frame buildings. It is also the most effective mortar round against dug-in enemy tanks. Even nearmisses blind and suppress tank crews, forcing them to close hatches. f. Mortar smoke tends to persist longer and give greater coverage in built-up areas than in open terrain. However this tendency to linger means that its indiscriminate use can create adverse affects for friendly forces. g. Urban areas degrade the effects of illuminants. They are often of limited use because of the deep canyons and building shadows. Rapidly shifting wind currents in built-up areas also affect mortar illumination, making it less effective. EMPLOYMENT OF MORTARS IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 52. During the ‘break-in’ phase of an assault of a defended urban area, mortar sections should normally be deployed outside the built up area. MFCs should be located with an Infantry Company or battlegroup, either with the commander, the lead platoon or in an Anchor or Air OP. The use of an Air OP has to be judged against resources and the current air threat. The concept will be to provide a heavy enough weight of fire, coordinated with other indirect and direct assets, to allow the infantry to enter the town or city and gain a foothold. Other roles will be harassing fire to the depths and flanks of the urban area to stop enemy reinforcement of the defended localities or to neutralise enemy forces attempting to leave the town. 53. Indirect Role. The key to indirect fire is good observation. The MFC must be high enough to be able observe the target areas, and maintain good communications to the tactical commander. The mortar line can remain centralised, grouped as in sections or deployed as dispersed barrels. It is important that the MFC understands the tactical plan in order to react quickly when the plan changes. Accurate and rapid mortar fire can be used in urban areas to destroy enemy positions, block enemy approach routes, forming up positions and disrupt possible counter attack. In the assault, fire must be lifted at the last safe moment (LSM). LSM must be judged carefully, but can be reduced by the tactical commander. Tactical commanders may choose to reduce the safety distances. 54. Direct Role. Mortars can be used in the direct fire role, if necessary. The target is adjusted by sight by the section commander until the rounds are accurate. EMPLOYMENT OF MORTARS IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 55. The range and concentrated fire capability of the mortar should be exploited in the early stages of an enemy assault by being deployed to the forward edge of the built up area. The mortar OPs should be sited as far forward as possible in order to maximise their range. Reserve mortar lines should be reconnoitred and prepared amongst the streets and buildings as the OPs withdraw into the urban area. Base-plate positions should be preprepared to allow for a swift re-occupation. 56. Mortars can be deployed to the rear of, or outside, the town or city in order to provide unrestricted fire. Communications will be critical to the coordination of accurate and timely indirect fire; the use of line can also be used as a back up to VHF communications. The MFC needs to be high enough to maintain good visibility of the target area. He may deploy

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to a tall building, a building on a street junction or an air OP if the aircraft are available and the air threat is low. 57. Concentration of Fire. The concentration of fire must be carefully coordinated to achieve the greatest destructive damage to the enemy. Mortar fire is unlikely to penetrate armour but will force the crew to close down, restricting their view and capability. Splinters will damage surveillance and communication equipment, and thereby degrade the operational effectiveness of armoured vehicles. Converging fire on a specific target in order to maximise concentration must be judged against the resources available and the type of target that is being engaged. The use of mortar rounds onto a street in a linear fashion can be used to break up an attack in depth. The re-supply of mortar lines must be carefully coordinated and can be achieved through the use of pre-dumped ammunition. AMMUNITION 58.

Mortar ammunition includes: a.

High Explosive. (1) Lethality. The lethality radius of HE rounds is reduced by the walls of buildings around the point of impact. However a round detonating in an enclosed area has a greater level of lethality which may be enhanced due to the ricochet effect off road surfaces and buildings. (2) Delay. Use of the delay fuse on the HE round will enable the round to penetrate a tiled roof before exploding. The delay will be about 0.05 of a second between first penetration and explosion. Use of the delay fuse against thick, sun dried mud roofs will be less effective. (3) Proximity. Use of the proximity fuse will enable rounds to be exploded at seven feet or 14 feet above ground. Tall buildings can cause proximity fused mortar rounds to detonate prematurely if they pass too closely.

b.

Illumination. (1) The 81mm mortar burn time for white illumination is 33 seconds over a 200m radius. The 60mm burn time is 25-35 seconds over a 200m radius. The radius could be limited by shadow caused by buildings and walls in the immediate vicinity. (2) The use of IR illumination by the 81mm mortar enables troops equipped with Night Vision Systems to see without the enemy being aware they are being illuminated (IR Illumination has a small noise and light signature when used). The radius is the same, 200m, but the burn time is increased to 90 seconds. (3) Urban areas degrade the effects of illuminants. They are often of limited use because of the deep canyons and building shadows. Rapidly shifting wind currents in built-up areas also degrade mortar illumination.

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c.

White Phosphorous. (1) White Phosphorus (WP)25 is effective in starting fires in buildings which may force the enemy out of cellars and light frame buildings. It is also the most effective mortar round against dug-in enemy tanks. Even near-misses blind and suppress tank crews, forcing them to close hatches. (2) Mortar smoke tends to persist longer and give greater coverage in built-up areas than in open terrain. However this tendency to linger means that its use can create adverse affects for friendly forces. SECTION 2 – COMBAT SUPPORT

ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE IN SUPPORT OF URBAN OPERATIONS26 59. General. Firepower is the fundamental capability of field artillery27. It shatters the enemy’s cohesion and undermines his will to fight. It enables the combat arms to manoeuvre through either the application of firepower or the demonstrable capability to apply firepower. The roles and tasks of close support artillery and Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) do not change in the urban environment, although the manner in which they are applied must be tailored to that environment. The wider proliferation and increased availability of precision guided munitions, in particular GMLRS, has increased the utility of artillery in urban operations. Provided that the target information is sufficiently accurate, then the significant reduction in probable error means that the impact of collateral damage is vastly reduced. 60. Deployment. The close proximity of buildings and other obstacles affects manoeuvrability, and can create a significant cresting problem. The deployment of guns can also be complicated by the proximity of the local population. Furthermore, the effects of guns firing in built up areas may reduce the stability of buildings and structures and create the added danger of falling masonry on own troops and civilians. However, mindful of certain considerations and constraints, guns can deploy into and fire from urban areas. Examples are firing from within a roofless building with walls capable of withstanding the blast and overpressure created by firing, or hiding in buildings and moving outside to engage from a firing point. 61. Employment. Artillery can have significant utility in urban operations, although due consideration must be given to collateral damage and ROE issues. In the indirect role, UK artillery systems can be fired in the high angle, thereby reducing the constraining impact of ‘dead space’ behind buildings at the target end. The advent of precision-guided artillery has vastly increased the utility of artillery in urban areas with a limited collateral damage footprint. The following factors should be considered when directing effect from artillery systems into urban areas: a. Fuze Settings. The fuzes on artillery HE rounds can be set to suit certain conditions as follows:

25

The use of WP can be deemed unlawful if it is employed contrary to the LOAC, in particular against civilians and their property, and against combatants were it to cause unnecessary suffering. 26 See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Paras 21-23. 27 This section should be read with Chapter 10, section 7, Indirect Fire Effects.

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(1) Proximity. Artillery fuzes can be set to proximity (airburst), which is effective against personnel and soft-skinned vehicles in the open, although it has little effect against robust structures; this might be taken into consideration as a way to reduce collateral damage. The safety distances for proximity are greater than for other fuze settings. (2) Point Detonating (PD). HE PD is effective against structures, but the round explodes on impact with the ground or a structure, so if a round were to hit a structure, then much of the explosive effect would be outside of that structure. (3) Delay. If a round with a delay fuze were to strike a structure, then it is likely that the round would penetrate and detonate inside the structure, with the structure itself perhaps containing some of the fragmentation and blast effects from the round. Furthermore, if the round were to strike the ground, then – depending on the nature of that ground – the round might detonate in the ground, which would absorb some of the blast and fragmentation effect. This might be taken into consideration as a way to reduce collateral damage. b.

Ammunition. (1) High Explosive. High Explosive (HE) is best used in the high angle (as described above) when firing into or from an urban environment. High angle allows the engagement of targets on the ground between buildings that may otherwise be in the shadow of said structures. High angle also allows the blast and fragmentation to be directed straight down onto the target rather than losing kinetic effect on walls and other obstacles behind which the enemy may take cover. When engaging targets with HE, consideration should be given to the penetration qualities of the rounds. Setting a delay on the fuze will allow the round to penetrate some roofs before detonating within the structure. The blast effect of an HE shell detonating within a closed structure should be considered as the main effect of the round as opposed to fragments of splinters. The blast will be contained within a structure and follow the path of least resistance (through open doorways, along corridors) and will have a greater effect than shell splinters, the effects of which may be constrained by thick walls and floors. The blast of an HE shell is likely to cause secondary fragmentation from windows and doors which will add to the splinter effects and may cause injury outside of the safe distance of a round. This is especially true in areas with large, glass fronted structures. Proximity can be used to neutralise threats in the open and on top of buildings. However, as with mortar proximity fuzes, shells passing close to tall structures may function prematurely due to the sensitivity of the Doppler radar based fuze system. (2) Smoke. Smoke can be used in the urban environment but consideration must be given to what effect it will have on friendly forces as well as the enemy. Unlike mortar smoke, artillery smoke is not WP but Base Ejecting (BE). BE red phosphorous (RP) can still be used to blind enemy forces including armoured crews but is less likely to have an incendiary effect. RP will hug the ground more than WP which has a tendency to pillar, and due to this ground hugging characteristic it may leave the tops of taller buildings

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exposed and the enemy on them unsuppressed. The movement of air through an urban environment means that smoke fired into it will linger on the downwind side of any structure and may swirl in directions other than straight downwind. This may cause problems for any friendly troops who may subsequently move into that location. Smoke can be used to mark targets for air assets but it will be more difficult to locate a point of origin within an urban environment especially if there is any wind present due to the swirling effect of the smoke. (3) Illumination. Artillery illumination suffers from the same problem as mortar illumination (see above). Illumination can also be fired to burn on the ground which can be an effective marker, both day and night, for air assets. Illumination burning on the ground or on buildings may also start fires which may force the enemy out of cellars and light frame buildings. Users must be aware of the secondary effects of burning buildings, such as smoke, and the consequences for friendly troops who may need to fight through the area later on. There may be a risk to own troops from illumination carrier shells. Also, in counter insurgency campaigns the enemy have been known to use expended carrier shells to construct IEDs. (4) Inert. Inert ammunition can be used in both the direct and indirect fire roles. In the direct fire role it can be used to knock holes in structures and destroy the fabric of buildings. This requires the guns to be relatively close to the target and this is not desirable. In the indirect role, inert rounds can be used to as a statement of intent alongside a deliberate info ops campaign in order to have an effect on the enemy whilst reducing collateral damage. Due to the lack of any blast effect, an effect on the enemy from an inert round requires an obvious direct hit on the intended target, or at least an indication in the mind of an adversary that a round has landed. 62.

Precision Munitions. a. Guided Munitions. GPS guided munitions such as GMLRS have significant utility in urban operations due to their accuracy and the ability to use a delay fuze, thereby achieving penetration into a structure and potentially containing much of the effect of the strike within the structure. GPS guided munitions rely on a mensurated grid for target engagement, and are therefore not suitable for use against mobile targets. The following table illustrates some of the characteristics of GMLRS:

Ser 1.

Characteristic Purpose (Effect)

2.

Warhead

3.

Target Set

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Remarks • Destruction and Neutralisation – effective • Attrition – possible (resources permitting) • Suppression and harassing fire – ineffective 200lb class warhead, blast optimised, containing 54lbs of HE. One rocket has a lethal splinter (fragmentation) distance of 40m. The warhead (incl. rocket) has poor fragmentation qualities. • Compounds – Point Detonating (PD) is effective • Buildings & trenches – Delay Shallow (DS) is effective • Bunkers – Delay Deep (DD) is effective (dependent upon

B-5-25

4.

5. 6.

7. 8.

protection) 28 • Personnel – PD is effective (static only) • Soft skin vehicles – PD is effective (static only) • Armoured vehicles – Ineffective Accuracy GMLRS accuracy depends principally upon the ‘quality’ of the target location GR. On operations in Afghanistan FSTs routinely observe GMLRS impact within 10m of the point of aim when used in conjunction with a mensurated target GR. Surprise The rocket glides silently for the last 2/3 of its trajectory. The rocket impacts without warning. Trajectory Default is ‘vertical - 89º’ (nominal - 65º is available). Weapons that impact vertically spread fragment less than weapons coming in from the side. Vertical trajectory negates any error in the fire mission altitude. Range Maximum 70km, minimum 15km Responsiveness Planning time from the call for fire until the platform is ready to fire can be significant due to the requirement to clear airspace. (On Op HERRICK 9 in 2008/9 the average has been around 8 mins.) Time of flight varies from 20 seconds to 2.5 minutes, depending on range. b. Loitering Munitions. Loitering munitions (LM) are due into service in 201029. LMs will provide a precise method of engaging a static or moving target.

63. Point of Aim. In an attempt to reduce the collateral damage effects of massed or non-precision artillery, the point of aim can be adjusted by the observer. For example, artillery fire can be employed on the fringes of urban areas as a cut-off, or to fix an adversary, whilst reducing the destructive effect of artillery inside the urban area. In a similar vein, artillery can be used to demonstrate close to or in urban areas, most notably with non-lethal natures such as smoke or illumination. However, steps must be taken to ensure that the empty carrier shells do not cause undesired effects30. 64. Factors Affecting Employment. In the Contemporary Operating Environment it is very unlikely that forces will be able to operate without restrictions, even in high intensity operations. The following should be considered: a. Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE). The CDE process may limit the ability of an observer to attack targets. While the use of artillery should be proportionate and collateral damage minimised, this must not so restrict freedom of action that the required effects cannot be achieved. Specific and clear instruction on CDE must be given to maximise freedom of action, including procedures for authorising fire when required. b. ROE. ROE authorising the use of crew served and indirect fire weapon systems often have a number of conditions. Built up areas are likely to include Restricted or Prohibited Targets within their bounds and civilians could still be, or be 28

A proximity fuze for GMLRS is due into service in 2009. This will increase the efficacy of GMLRS against personnel in the open and soft-skinned vehicles (static only). 29 As at Apr 09: EOC is Dec 10. 30 During 2008 while firing in support of troops in contact and aware of the risks, a carrier shell fired from UK artillery killed an Iraqi woman in Basra province.

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presumed to be, in the area, all of which must be considered when planning for the use of artillery in the urban environment. Any procedures for the clearance or authorisation of fires must be clear and responsive to the needs of the troops in contact. c. Ammunition. The need to select the ammunition which will achieve the required effect is not specific to the urban environment. CDE and ROE may limit the ammunition available for selection. The environment itself can limit the effectiveness of some ammunition or change the manner in which it can be used. Illuminating ammunition can be used to mark targets for aircraft by allowing the flares to burn on the ground; in the urban environment this may start fires that could create obstacles, obscuration or even force troops out of key locations. d. Location of Observers and Fire Support Teams. The coordinated use of indirect fire in any environment relies on the effective deployment of observers in order to conduct dynamic procedural control of fires and joint fires. Observers and Fire Support Teams (FSTs) find maintaining coverage of the ground challenging, particularly when mobile, as fields of view are usually very limited. Observers need the ability to move quickly (protection should be a key consideration) to control engagements and to communicate effectively if they are to influence the battle. A combination of anchor Ops and observers with the manoeuvre troops is one way of achieving this. The anchor will have a good general command of the ground, with the other observers more limited in their coverage, but well placed to conduct individual attacks. The plan for the deployment of observers must be specifically addressed during the Plan Review Execute Evaluate (PREE) cycle and use of Air Observation Posts (AOPs) should be considered. When in range, naval gunfire can provide effective fire support. If naval gunfire is used, a liaison team should be attached to the appropriate units. Any liaison unit would operate at the unit’s main CP. Two firepower control teams normally operate at the company level, providing ship-to-shore communications and coordination for naval gunfire support. It should be noted that due to the nature of naval gunfire support (NGS) and technology, certain constraints apply to the type of fire that can be made available. Current NGS offers highly accurate flat trajectory fire rather than effective suppressive fire. e. Ammunition Selection. As indicated, the nature of the environment may change the selection criteria for some ammunition natures. The risk of fire has been highlighted and must be considered when planning missions, particularly with illuminating and WP rounds. PD and Delay fuzes will function in the upper levels of a building, with little or no effect on the lower ones. Against concrete reinforced structures considerable amounts of ammunition may be required to cause damage and casualties, which may be prohibitive wither in terms of CSS or damage caused. HE fuzed with proximity will have little effect on the structures themselves, but is effective for clearing streets or rooftops. The availability of precision munitions will directly affect the way that artillery is fought in this environment. GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems) is extremely effective as it has good penetrative capability and (providing the target information is sufficiently accurate) it can be used to attack specific parts of the building thus containing the effects, reducing collateral damage and the risk to friendly forces. f. Engagement Ranges. Experience has shown that in the urban environment engagements happen at very short range. This affects the way that artillery can be Issue 4.1: Nov 09

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used as targets may be too close to friendly forces to be engaged with ‘dumb’ munitions. However the buildings themselves may provide sufficient protection for fire to be brought into very close range, although the weight of fire (eg the number of guns) and ammunition nature (area coverage) have to be considered. GMLRS will allow the execution of attacks within close proximity to friendly forces. g. High/Low Angle Fire. In relation to the line of fire, there will be areas ‘behind’ buildings which artillery cannot engage. High angle fire reduces the size of these areas because the angle of descent is much steeper. However, there will always be areas which cannot be engaged, although the size will vary considerably depending on the complexity and high rise development of an urban area. Other weapon systems will be required to achieve effects in these areas. h. Direct Fire. In the direct fire role artillery has historically played an important part in urban operations. Whilst use of artillery in the direct fire role would normally be associated with defence of the gun position, it could feasibly be utilised as a direct fire weapon in certain situations, for example to achieve elevations that some other direct fire weapon systems are unable to reach. However, the minimum ‘time to fuze’ function must be considered. Furthermore, artillery can be used in the direct role to destroy structures when ‘top attack’ might not be feasible; the advantage with using artillery in this way, as opposed to weapons systems such as tanks which fire a high velocity round using a fixed charge, is that the artillery round can be fired using a low charge. This ensures target effect with a reduced danger template beyond the target, and consequent reduction of ROE and collateral damage concerns. Self-propelled artillery has particular utility in this role, since the detachment is afforded a degree of protection by the gun. . i. STA. Artillery STA systems are effective in the urban environment, but their use must be carefully planned in order to reduce any limitations produced by the physical conditions. The ASP sound ranging system will detect acoustic events, but accuracy may be reduced as buildings can affect acoustic wave propagation. Radars have significant dead ground in their coverage as a result of buildings blocking the radar beam; this is equally true of moving target and weapon locating radars. UAVs remain a potent capability in built-up areas, although the more dense and high rise an urban area is, the more complex the mission planning will become. AIR DEFENCE IN SUPPORT OF URBAN OPERATIONS 65. Air Defence (AD). AD systems can be effective in urban operations. The major constraint is the requirement to acquire and track targets in an uninterrupted manner over a significant missile time of flight. This is hindered by the presence of tall buildings, but may be mitigated by deploying launchers on high points. HVM can be dismounted and fired from the shoulder or from the LML31, which gives it greater flexibility to deploy in urban areas including, if necessary, deployment by SH or stairs to high rise roof tops. Rapier FSC is more constrained by its radar requirements, but could, for example, be driven to the top of a multi-storey car park. The denser, more complex and high rise an urban area, the more difficult AD operations will become and consideration should be given to deployment outside or on the fringes of the urban area.

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Lightweight Multiple Launcher.

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ENGINEER SUPPORT TO URBAN OPERATIONS 66. General. The overall co-ordination of engineer effort for all operations lies with the Joint Force Engineer. However, decentralised execution is never more critical than in the urban environment, where reaction times must be fast and effort targeted at the local level. Although it is normal to resist ‘penny-packeting’ of engineer resources, the best use of combat engineer assets is often gained by using small teams to support the fighting in an urban environment. Nevertheless, there will be times when sub-unit or even a unit is focussed entirely on formation level objectives, with peacetime troop, section and crew structures being broken up to create teams that can work on specialist capabilities (eg electrical supply, water provision etc). Sufficient flexibility of mind and quick re-organisation is essential to be able to meet the rapidly changing nature of tasks. 67. Roles. The recognised roles of employment of engineers for operations apply equally to operations in the urban environment as they do anywhere else: a. Mobility Support. A variety of man-made objects such as steps, ditches, craters, barriers, man-made obstacles, rubble and/or mines could be used to deny freedom of movement or canalise a force. The Trojan breaching vehicle offers an enhanced capability in leading a penetration or thrust in the form of a grab arm and increased power and protection. It can also operate closed-down with the use of cameras. Explosive breaching methods may have to be used, though the risk of causing collateral damage is likely to be significant. Booby trap clearance requires dismounted combat engineers and route maintenance tasks require additional plant assets. Titan bridge-layers can be used to cross gaps during the investment and break-in phases on the edge of the urban environment in order to assist in the breakthrough of protective obstacle belts that cannot be crossed by Trojan and its fascines. Titan can also be fitted with the Bulk Earth Moving Attachment (BEMA) and full/track width mine plough if necessary, allowing it to clear mines and some ditch/earth obstacles. Likewise in defensive operations Titan fitted with a BEMA can create ‘A’ vehicle pits. b. Counter-mobility Support. Employment of obstacles and mines can be used to deny, delay, disrupt or canalise the enemy, as part of an investment as much as in defence. The principle of emplacing mines within obstacles and covering them with fire remains extant. c. Survivability Support. Survivability is an all arms responsibility. Close support engineers have only a limited knowledge of structures and weapon effects, but can seek specialist advice from Wks Gp RE. Static defensive positions may require fortification32 and formations or units employing a mobile defence can be advised on existing structures that offer enhanced survivability33. In the Contemporary Operating Environment and Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, field fortifications are required to increase the survivability of potential targets such as camps, patrol bases, observation posts (OP), vehicle check points (VCP). Clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW), weapon collection and disposal also

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ME Vol 2 Field Engineering - Pam 2 Field Fortifications, Chapter 8 Urban Fortification. ME Vol 2 Field Engineering - Pam 2 Field Fortifications, Part B Chapter 1 Building Construction Types and Table 8-1.

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increase the survivability of a force. The likely scale of battlefield munitions clearance and the associated manpower requirement should not be underestimated. d. General Engineer Support. In the build up to combat operations there will be a requirement for general engineering support such as camp infrastructure, range construction and PW cages. Although Close Support (CS) engineers will be focussed on preparing for combat, the Joint Force Engineer will be required to balance the competing needs of different elements of the Force. Close support engineer units can undertake most general support engineering tasks, including limited restoration of essential services, route maintenance, camp infrastructure and PW cages. 68. Guidelines for Employment. The following factors should be considered when employing Engineers in the urban environment: a. Combined Arms Teams. At the tactical level, operations in an urban environment normally require the deployment of integrated all arms teams. In an urban operation close support engineers may need to be represented as low as platoon or section level. During the battle for Basra in 2003 some of the lead platoons had two-man engineer teams in each Warrior fighting vehicle. On dismount the two-man engineer team would often be the first to exit the vehicle to identify and clear mines and booby traps or gain entry to buildings. It is essential therefore that close support engineers are able to fight effectively and are afforded the same degree of protection and mobility as the combat arms that they are supporting. Similarly, larger engineer tasks in the urban environment will normally require the provision of combat arm escorts and protection, unless being undertaken in a benign environment. b. Early Warning and Reconnaissance. Terrain and infrastructure information is vital to the planning process for all operations. Such information includes mapping, types of urban areas, layouts, building construction, key installations, likely weapon effects on buildings, etc. Much of this is available from open sources and a variety of manned and unmanned collection assets from across the force can contribute to the picture; specialist engineers may be required to collect/provide some information (eg building construction, weapon effects). The urban environment can swallow manpower, equipment and materiel very quickly. Early warning of likely tasks and information on availability of local materiel is essential. Unit diving teams can also provide key information on bridges, waterways and sub-surface systems. c. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. Allied to the need for an effective means of accessing or collecting terrain and infrastructure information is the need to develop a broad approach to the IPB process. Engineers can advise on the availability and vulnerability of essential and non-essential services to local communities, so that a balance can be struck between targeting during war fighting and the need for such services during the subsequent reconstruction and development. d. Battle Procedure. Slick battle procedure is always necessary for the effective delivery of close engineer support, but even more so in the urban environment where the demands placed by the three block war can change the nature and type of engineer support (principally between combat and construction Issue 4.1: Nov 09

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engineering) very quickly and over very short distances. A high tempo of response and reaction is therefore required. Effective communications across the engineer command is essential to deliver this. Information will have to go up, down and across to ensure engineer commanders remain constantly updated. It is vital that all incidents are reported in an accurate and timely manner in order that ongoing and subsequent operations can benefit from experience already gained. The introduction of Bowman and the Makefast Battlefield Information System Application 34 will enhance the communication function. 69.

Engineers in Offensive Urban Operations. a. The Investment. Past tactical doctrine for the employment of engineer reconnaissance at both formation and battlegroup level has focused on rural warfighting with very little direction for urban operations. During the transition from the rural battle to the investment of an urban area a key requirement for all arms reconnaissance assisted by engineers, will be to identify routes, vulnerable points, obstacles etc. Their ability to quickly pass likely tasks to the squadron within a battlegroup will enable concurrent activity within the troops and ultimately maintain momentum. Slick battle procedure is necessary for the effective delivery of engineer support in the urban environment where the nature and type of engineer support can change very quickly and over very short distances. A high tempo of response and reaction is therefore required. (1) Terrain and infrastructure information is vital to the planning process in all operations. (a) Formation and battlegroup reconnaissance assets, usually supported by engineers, will be required to select a number of approach routes based on the identification and assessment of natural and man-made obstacles surrounding and leading some way into the urban environment. The provision of detailed 3-dimensional terrain analysis including the subterranean attack corridors is likely to be key to success. (b) Early identification of the types of urban terrain35 including key structures, likely enemy strong points, HQs or communication centres, will be critical to shaping the operation. (c) The identification of essential services (water, gas, electricity) will be critical. The assaulting force must understand how each utility system works in order to be able to disable key elements as necessary and reinstate them post conflict. (2) As the battle progresses reconnaissance assets should be focusing on the identification of enemy in-depth positions, likely counter-attack routes and counter-mobility tasks. When faced with a large urban sprawl, reconnaissance assets will have to travel greater distances to circumnavigate an urban area to avoid a tactical engagement. Alternatively, the

34

Engineer planning tool on Bowman Financial/Business district, Historical/Old town, High, Medium and Low Residential and Slums/Shanty towns, Heavy Industrial and Light Industrial. See Part A, Chapter 1, paragraph 20.

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reconnaissance assets will be forced to move into depth using a secure urban avenue of approach some distance from the objective. (3) As part of FR and operational intelligence gathering, conduct route reconnaissance; early identification of obstacles, structures (including sewers and tunnels) and strong points; terrain analysis; and potential counter-mobility options on possible counter-attack routes. b. The Break-In. The use of engineer assets to contribute to the collection of terrain and infrastructure information has been covered in the paragraphs above, but it is worth reiterating that their tasks are continuous and as varied as each new avenue of approach that presents itself. The engineer assets embedded in Formation Recce will remain with squadrons gathering high-level, coarse-grained information. Engineers working with the battlegroup close recce will refine the knowledge of terrain, infrastructure and routes. Integral recce, ie those assets within engineer squadrons, will complete detailed recces to enable engineer tasks to be undertaken. (1) Close Reconnaissance. Working with battlegroup close recce, engineer close recce assets should be focussing on the detailed reconnaissance of obstacles along the avenue of approach. Other tasks will include the preparation of initial reports and the preliminary identification of harbour areas/hides etc. (2) Integral Reconnaissance. Integral reconnaissance, ie those assets within engineer squadrons, will complete the detailed recce of engineer tasks to enable materiel and troops to be brought forward and the task completed in a timely manner. (3) CS Engineering. A variety of man-made objects such as ditches, craters, barriers, rubble and emplaced explosive ordnance can deny freedom of movement or canalise a force. Mechanical (Trojan or plant) or explosive (PE4) breaching methods should be used. Whether light, armoured, field or a mixture, commanders should expect to be tasked to provide the following support: (a) Armoured Engineering. Trojan is a suitable lead vehicle if obstacles and mines are anticipated, otherwise it should be positioned well forward. Careful control is required to ensure that it does not become isolated from the armour/infantry it is supporting by becoming too focussed on the task ahead. Situation dependant, the vulnerability of Trojan and the increased chance of flanking or elevated RPG attacks in the urban environment make it essential that mutual support and close armoured protection is maintained whilst engineers are on task. The rapid deployment of fascines to combat anti-tank ditches and well practised mechanical breaching drills will enable the remainder of the battlegroup to exploit success. (b) Combat Engineering. The engineers are key to sustainable mobility measures and influencing the momentum of a battlegroup through mobility tasks during the break in battle.

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(i) Mobility. Battlegroup and follow-on forces require defile lanes, the clearance of fields of fire and route clearance along alley ways, through structures (houses /gardens /garages) all of which may contain mines or booby traps. The clearance of UXO and the associated manpower requirement should not be underestimated and rarely will there be sufficient specialist EOD troops to clear everything: it will be essential to prioritise the work and it may be necessary to use combat engineers on occasion with the authority from the JF engineer. At the same time, infantry soldiers do not receive training on the identification, assessment and disposal of booby traps and mines. Therefore, in order to maintain momentum and to ensure routes are opened in a timely manner it is essential that engineer assets are placed well forward and grouped with the assaulting sub-units. (ii) Counter-Mobility. The employment of obstacles and mines can be used to deny, delay, disrupt or canalise the enemy. The principle of employing mines within obstacles and covering them with fire remains extant in any type of operation. (iii) Survivability Support. A close support engineer unit can offer some advice on building structures and defensive measures though specialist engineers will be required to advise on weapon effects, particularly defensive measures against Enhanced Blast Weapons (EBW). Temporary static defensive positions or patrol bases may require some degree of fortification against counter attacks, reiterating the need to have engineers placed well forward within the lead companies during the break-in battle. b. Urban Penetration. The close engineer support to the tactic of Urban Penetration required is likely to be: (1) Mobility. Trojan is a suitable lead vehicle if obstacles and mines are anticipated, otherwise it should be positioned well forward. Titan is vulnerable deployed in the urban environment and should be held further back and cued by engineer recce. Mine clearance and removal of demolition charges may have to be conducted by hand36. Engineer (Search, EOD and Combat Engineer trained) or Assault Pioneer representation may be required down to section level. If sub-surface routes are being used, dismounted combat engineers, divers or specialist working in Confined Spaces (WICS) trained troops may be required to clear and prove routes. (2) Counter-Mobility. Once seized, the target area may be threatened by counter-attack. Hasty obstacles may be required to defend the objective. Ditching, improvised obstacles and hand emplaced mines all offer timely solutions.

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During the battle for Basra in 2003, mines were cleared from routes by hand whilst under enemy fire.

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(3) Survivability. EOD/booby trap clearance may be required and the survivability of the defending force can be enhanced by digging fire support positions using all available mechanical assets (eg Trojan and plant) or fortifying the position (bunds, sandbags or Hesco37 walls). c. Urban Thrust. The provision of close engineer support to the tactic of urban thrust could include: (1) Mobility. Trojan is a suitable lead vehicle if obstacles and mines are anticipated, otherwise it should be positioned well forward. Titan is vulnerable deployed in the urban environment and should be held further back and cued by engineer recce. Mine clearance and removal of demolition charges may have to be conducted by hand. Engineer (Search, EOD and Combat Engineer trained) or assault pioneer representation may be required down to section level. If sub-surface routes are being used, dismounted combat engineers, divers or specialist working in Confined Spaces (WICS) trained troops may be required to clear and prove routes. (2) Counter-Mobility. During an urban thrust, the force is vulnerable to attack from the flanks. Hasty obstacle emplacement may be required to protect the flanks of thrusts. Hasty obstacles may also be used to facilitate the withdrawal of friendly forces from the thrust. d. Urban Saturation. The key to the tactic of urban saturation is speed and flexibility; effective mobility support is essential. Teams responding to a call for assistance must be able to reach the intended target area rapidly. Engineer representation with each of the deployed teams is preferable, but may not be practical. Accurate terrain intelligence and mapping must be made available prior to the operation; engineer reconnaissance and analysis must remain responsive throughout an operation. e. Securing of Objectives. Situation and ROE dependant, commanders should expect to find themselves carrying out a protracted break-in battle which may or may not culminate in an objective. At the same time, engineer troops previously employed with the lead platoons who have gone into a defensive stance may be asked to reorganise in order to provide engineer assistance to secure an objective which by its very nature is likely to be fortified in some way. f. Clearance and Reorganisation. Once the key objectives have been secured it remains an all arms responsibility to conduct a thorough clearance of the area whilst the reconnaissance assets continue to carry out their primary task of identifying enemy counter attack routes or in depth positions. (1) CS Troops. In order to upgrade hastily built defences and to upgrade routes, CS troops will find themselves retracing their steps to carry out such tasks as mine and ‘bypassed house’ clearance, route upgrades and the marking or clearing of patrol lanes between buildings. (2) EOD and Search. All Arms search teams should be used whenever possible. Although not held in close support regiments some RE search and 37

Hesco-Bastion; manufacturer of mesh/geofabric gabions to construct protective walls.

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EOD assets may be allocated to a formation committed to the clearance of the urban environment to ensure, as a minimum, access and clearance of the real estate to be used by own troops. Further capability will be required if concerted search operations, or clearance of EO hazards to the civilian population is to be undertaken. (3) Engineer Logistics. A robust engineer logistic chain is required to support the varied demands of both combat and force support engineering. The latter demands the wherewithal to conduct local procurement of resources to meet the high tempo of urban operations. This must include the delegation of purchasing authority to regimental or even squadron level. g. Engineer Tasks. Engineers will be required to undertake a variety of tasks during offensive operations, including: (1) Conducting a close technical reconnaissance to determine the exact location and type of enemy obstacles and minefields, and to make breaching recommendations. (2) Clearing obstacles38, including mines and booby traps where necessary. (3) Using of hand-emplaced demolitions to destroy fortifications and strong points that cannot be reduced with the unit's organic assets. (4)

Laying mines and other obstacles to protect flanks and rear areas.

(5) Conducting rapid mobility operations (and non-explosive methods of entry, gap crossing, support to CSS). (6) Constructing rapid reinforcement and force protection of temporary own force locations, together with the provision of counter-mobility effects. (7) 70.

Restoring utilities/services during subsequent consolidation.

Engineers in Defensive Urban Operations. a. Defence against Armour. In defensive situations, when opposed by an armour-heavy enemy, priority should be given to the construction of anti tank obstacles throughout the built-up area. Use of local materials, where possible, makes obstacle construction easier and reduces logistical requirements. Streets should be barricaded in front of defensive positions at the effective range of anti tank weapons. These obstacles are used to increase the destruction by anti tank fire, to separate dismounted enemy infantry from their supporting tanks, and to assist in the delay and destruction of an attacker. Anti tank mines in and around obstacles and covered by fire, help to stop an enemy attack. b. Survivability. Engineer armoured vehicles and plant, in particular Trojan, but also MWT and LWT, have wide utility in defensive urban operations, whether by

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Eg rubble, wire, vehicles, as well as urban structures such as walls, ramps, steps, etc.

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moving rubble, demolishing buildings for fields of fire or digging in troops and vehicles. c. Engineer Tasks. Engineers may perform the following tasks during the defence of a built-up area: (1)

Construct complex obstacle systems.

(2) Provide technical advice to commanders, to include use of existing facilities. (3)

Convert buildings to rubble.

(4)

Lay mines.

(5)

Assist in the preparation of defensive strong points and fields of fire.

(6)

Maintain counter-attack, communications, and re-supply routes.

(7)

Enhance movement between buildings, catwalks, bridges, and so on.

(8) Construction of operating bases, including force protection and essential services (9) 71.

Fight as infantry, when needed.

Engineer Capability Requirements. a. Command and Control. Sufficient command and control nodes are required to cope with concurrently employing assets in close support of Battlegroups whilst also delivering more general engineering support across the formation’s area of responsibility. In particular, the engineer staff in a brigade headquarters must have the ability to cope concurrently with war-fighting, peace support and humanitarian assistance tasks, including EOD. BGEs will always need to remain with Battlegroups, but squadron headquarters must be able to switch away. Responsibility for the CIMIC and reconstruction effort at formation and battlegroup level could rest with close support engineer COs and OCs, who must interface with the relevant specialist staff at divisional level and above. b. Reconnaissance. A robust engineer recce capability is required at all levels to work with formation and battlegroup recce as well as being tasked separately to meet critical engineer information requirements. These include identifying sources of materiel, the detailed analysis of damaged structures and the technical assessment of essential services. c. Combat Engineering. Basic combat engineering will remain the foundation for the delivery of engineer effort in the urban environment. It has applicability across the spectrum of operations. d. Armoured Engineering. Armoured engineers are key to assisting with mobility support to war-fighting missions. Consequently, they must also have the

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capability to dismount and reinforce combat or construction tasks in the urban environment. e. Search and EOD. Although not held in close support regiments it should be expected to deploy search and EOD assets with a formation committed to the urban environment so as to ensure, as a minimum, access and clearance of real estate for use by own troops. This will often have to be deployed alongside combat engineers with the formation’s fighting echelons. Further capability will be required if concerted search operations, clearance of EO hazards to civilian populations or the training of a local clearance capability is to be undertaken. HELICOPTERS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 72. Typically, the use of helicopters in urban operations focuses on support to ground troops, who will be predominantly dismounted infantry. Missions may involve any of the fundamental aviation roles39, but their viability will depend on the level of threat, and the degree of risk that the commander is prepared to take. a. Where there is a significant threat from enemy AD systems or air interdiction, the preferred tactics for minimising risk are 'nap of the earth' (NOE) flying; agile manoeuvre and long sensor/weapon stand off ranges. As a rule, urban terrain will limit or preclude these preferred tactics by reducing fields of view and engagement ranges and constraining the helicopter’s agility because of the compressed manoeuvre space. However, the degree of impact will vary across terrain profiles ranging from small population centres to urban sprawl and high-density high-rise city centres. NOE flight has the advantage of masking the aircraft’s approach, which increases surprise. It also exposes the helicopter to the threat of small arms fire (SAF) and other 'low tech' short range weaponry, as urban terrain provides the enemy with an abundance of well concealed and protected fire positions. b. Flight at medium altitudes (1500' - 3000' above ground) substantially reduces the effectiveness of SAF and low-tech projectiles, but increases vulnerability to air to air and surface to air systems, including MANPADs40. Technical countermeasures41 can reduce vulnerability to Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), but the threat from Air Interdiction and sophisticated AD systems will remain. Consequently, when faced with a predominately low-tech threat, such as in PSO and COIN operations, medium level flight is the preferred tactic for reducing risk, and has the added bonus of improving acquisition ranges for sensors and weapons. Medium level flight can also be used in a high intensity, hi-tech threat environment, but is only viable when risk can be mitigated by suppressing the enemy AD and air interdiction capability by utilising either ground based systems/activity42, or air component support43. 73. Helicopter crews are able to build detailed situation awareness and a useful rapport with ground units, which will increase with the ability to operate from medium level for 39

Offensive Action, ISTAR, Control and Direction of Firepower, Command Support, Movement of Personnel and Materiel. 40 Man-pack (shoulder launched) air defence missile systems. 41 Defensive Aids Suites (DAS) fitted to helicopters can include a variety of countermeasures, including jammers, flares and chaff, which are designed to defeat specific threats. 42 For example: GBAD, Arty Suppression and EW. 43 For example: Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) packages to establish local Air Superiority.

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protracted periods. Attack Helicopters (AH) are capable of quickly providing accurate fire, particularly from the 30mm gun housed in the chin-mounted turret, and effective against personnel and lightly armoured vehicles. AH free-flight rockets may be used against area targets, but must be delivered from a more deliberate flight profile than the off-axis capable chin-gun. Hellfire missiles, although primarily intended for use against heavy armour, may also be used successfully to penetrate buildings. Missiles are available with either Radar Frequency (RF) guidance (which can only recognise vehicle targets), or Semi-Active Laser (SAL). Targets for SAL missiles may be designated by the AH onboard laser or remotely. Operators of Laser Target Designators (LTD) need to be aware that flat, reflective surfaces, typically found built-up areas, increase the risk of false lock-on. 74. ISTAR. AH are equipped with an excellent range of Electro Optical (EO), Thermal Imaging (TI) and radar sensors, which although optimised for target acquisition, can also be used for observation and surveillance tasks. Other helicopters can be fitted with EO and TI surveillance systems, many of which can provide real time imagery down-linked to ground stations. Such systems used over urban areas at medium height, beyond enemy weapons range, by day or night, can overcome many the difficulties faced by ground based observation, and provide the ground commander with vital information that is responsive to the situation as it develops. 75. Helicopter Assault Operations. Helicopter assault operations are normally split into two categories: a. Large-Scale Assaults. Spaces big enough for large scale helicopter operations can be found within built up areas, for instance car parks and sports arenas, but they need to be found and consideration must be given to factors such as ingress and egress routes. b. Small-Scale Assaults. Small teams or individuals may have to be landed onto the rooftop of a specific building. Success depends on minimum exposure, thus urban direct assault operations are normally conducted at night. However night operations have a high degree of risk due to the degradation of Night Vision Devices (NVD) in brightly lit areas and the difficulty in identifying urban obstacles (eg electrical wires, telephone poles, antennas, mines and wire). Such operations are normally conducted by aircraft which routinely support SF Ops. Before making such an assault there should be confirmation that no obstacles exist (eg electrical wires, telephone poles, antennas, mines and wire) that could damage either the helicopter or the deplaning troops. In many urban areas there may be buildings with purposebuilt helipads but other buildings, for example multi-storey car parks, are usually strong enough to support the weight of a light helicopter. The delivery of troops onto a building can also be accomplished by abseil, fast-roping or hover-jumping from the helicopter. 76. Air Movement of Troops and Supplies. The tempo of urban operations can result in a greater turn-over of troops engaged in combat, and there may also be more casualties than with units fighting in open terrain. At the same time, roads are likely to be crowded with re-supply units and evacuation vehicles, and may also be blocked by craters or rubble. Helicopters provide a means of bypassing such obstructions, and delivering troops to the last covered position short of the fighting. Similar techniques can be used for air movement of supplies and for casualty evacuation.

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77. Support for Convoys and Vehicle Patrols. Helicopters, in particular AH, can provide excellent observation and fire support (top cover) to convoys and vehicle patrols. Overall effectiveness in this role increases with the ability to operate from medium level for protracted periods. 78. Close44 Combat Attack. Close Combat Attack (CCA) is a mission flown in close support of ground forces to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, delay, deter or otherwise affect enemy forces and requires detailed integration with the fire and movement of friendly forces. AH is the best platform for providing CCA in the Urban Operations. Other armed aviation can conduct CCA, but limited firepower and protection reduces effectiveness and survivability. The fires capabilities of armed aviation will be maximised when integrated with other force elements including Close Air Support (CAS), Indirect Fire Support and GM. Armed aviation can be task organised to Ground Manoeuvre brigades and Battlegroups for CCA operations and therefore all commanders and their staffs, down to the lowest level, must understand how CCA can be utilised in support of GM units45. 79. CCA Control. CCA will normally be conducted through a trained controller46 using a standardised (NATO) call for fire. This ensures that the observer understands and considers the issues relating to ROE, collateral damage, fratricide, and battlespace management. However, in an emergency situation, it is possible for an untrained observer to call for Emergency-CCA (E-CCA) using a simplified format, which alerts the aircrew to emergency nature of the mission, and that they must take full responsibility for the target effects. Detailed call for fire procedures are contained in Annex A to AFM Volume 1 Part 12 – Air Manoeuvre Operations. 80. Communications Planning. Aviation units providing support to ground manoeuvre forces must be included in the communications plan. At present Battlefield Helicopter (BH) radios are not fully interoperable with BOWMAN, and the deployment of Secure Voice Rebroadcast (SVR) may require special consideration47. Helicopters can also assist C3 (airborne relays and command posts). AIR (FIXED WING) SUPPORT IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 81. General. The compressed battle space in the urban environment increases the difficulties experienced under the planning and conduct of ‘traditional’ Close Air Support (CAS48) aircraft operations. Targets are hard to locate and identify, non-combatants and both enemy and friendly forces could be intermingled, there is a significant risk of fratricide, and enemy short-range air defence weapons are hard to suppress. 82. Threats. Urban terrain provides excellent cover and concealment for a variety of weapon systems. The terrain and infrastructure may limit suppression options and the cluttered environment with light, fire and smoke will make threat and target acquisition difficult. 44

The term “close” refers to the battle situation and does not imply a specific distance. AFM Volume 1 Part 2 – Battlegroup Tactics. 46 A trained controller refers to an individual who has completed a recognised course in CCA and carried out live controls. This is normally restricted to FOO, OP Ack levels 3&4, MFC (A&B), NGA levels 3&4, FAC, and AAC Aircraft Commanders. The opportunity for live controls currently only occurs during Mission Specific Training (MST).' 47 Appendix 2 to Chapter 2 to AFM Volume 1 Part 12 - AH Interoperability with BOWMAN gives more detail on the capabilities and deployment of SVR. 48 ATP-3.3.2.1 Tactics, Techniques and procedures for close air support operations. 45

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83. Employment. When employing CAS aircraft in support of forces operating in the urban environment the following should be considered: a. Surveillance. CAS platforms normally have the ability to remain in a holding pattern above the threat whilst being able to transmit real-time intelligence to the Ground Commander. UAVs will offer longer persistence in this surveillance role. b. Presence. The overt presence of CAS platforms can dissuade the enemy from engaging. c. Shock and Concussion. Heavy air bombardment provides tactical advantages to an attacker. The shock and concussion of the bombardment reduce the efficiency of defending troops and can destroy defensive positions. d. Rubble and Debris. The rubble and debris resulting from air attacks may increase the defender's cover while creating major obstacles to the movement of both defending and attacking forces. e. Proximity. The proximity of opposing forces to friendly troops may require the use of precision-guided munitions and may require the temporary disengagement of friendly forces in contact. In addition, the use of precision guided munitions may be limited by the proximity of structures which may affect acquisition or the terminal phase of flight of an air weapon. f. Indigenous Facilities. The use of air weapons may be restricted by the presence of civilians or the requirement to preserve key facilities within a city. g. Limited Ground Observation. Limited ground observation may require the use of an airborne FAC. 84.

Offensive Operations. CAS may be employed during offensive operations to: a. To support the Investment Force by interdicting entry and exit routes to the built up area. b. To support attacking units by reducing enemy strong points with precision guided munitions. c. To conduct tactical air reconnaissance and to provide detailed intelligence of enemy dispositions, equipment, and strengths.

85.

Defensive Operations. CAS may be employed during defensive operations: a. To strike enemy attack formations and concentrations outside the built-up area. b.

To provide precision-guided munitions to support counter attacks.

86. Command and Control. Urban terrain presents severe problems in maintaining communications due to manmade structures that inhibit Line of Sight (LOS) and absorb or reflect transmitted signals, similar to weapon employment problems. While these problems Issue 4.1: Nov 09

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will force a higher degree of decentralization, the combat force should make every attempt to minimize them. 87. Forward Air Controllers (FAC). In CAS positive air to ground communications are essential to coordinate and authenticate markings. Considerable training in an urban environment is required for both FAC and aircrew. A high FAC proficiency in normal CAS procedures is critical if the FAC is to step into an urban environment with no previous urban training. For successful urban CAS there are a number of specific considerations: a. If an FAC on the ground cannot see the target, the engagement should be handed over to an airborne FAC, if available. b. The commanders should be aware that an FAC may not be in position to observe all areas and buildings containing friendly forces due to surrounding structures and battlefield confusion. c. During urban CAS it is likely that the FAC will be marking and engaging targets within 100 meters of his own position, ie within Danger Close parameters, which will in turn be affected by surrounding infrastructure. The FAC must therefore select the appropriate ordnance to limit the potential of fratricide. d. The tactical situation will be changing rapidly from building to building and the CAS aircraft may need to be used to confirm and report targets in an ISR role. e. The FAC must plan for redundant communications and marking tools as a single tool will not work in all urban environments. A FAC will have to apply greater consideration in utilizing a laser designator as the cluttered environment will affect acquisition and attack directions. An elevated position will greatly increase attack success: a ROVER FMV49 link provides a pseudo-elevated position50 to the FAC. At night, the FAC can employ the FMV link and use CAS IR pointers to mark for other CAS platforms or ground forces. f.

Normal FAC equipment for urban CAS operations will include: (1)

IR strobe light.

(2)

Chemlights/cyalumes.

(3)

Pyrotechnics (smoke/illumination).

(4)

Access to a grenade launcher with illumination and smoke rounds.

88. Ground to Air Co-ordination. Navigation in the urban environment is difficult. It is essential for Air that reference systems are produced centrally. Ground forces, FACs and aircrew should perform detailed mission planning to maximise the effectiveness of all assets. An urban grid system should be prepared. The FAC should avoid “overtargeting”51 and select grid sectors based on what the aircrew/aircraft sensors can more 49

Full Motion Video. Although the FAC is on the ground, through ROVER he is getting an elevated ‘Bird’s Eye’ (pseudo) view of the battlespace. 51 ie By numbering every building in the built up area. 50

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easily see52. Maps fail to show the vertical development of urban terrain and rapid movement from position can often create confusion between ground and aerial observers as to friendly and enemy locations. Ground forces, FACs and aircrew should perform detailed mission planning to maximise the effectiveness of all assets. An urban grid system labelling structures and prominent features should be prepared. The FAC should select grid sectors based on what the aircrew/aircraft sensors can most easily see such as rivers, road junctions, buildings, bridges etc. The FAC should avoid over targeting (ie numbering every building in the city) and simply number buildings in the expected and adjacent objective area. CAS planners need to ensure that all involved are using the most current and accurate maps, imagery, etc that are being used for reference. 89. Basic Urban Grid. The basic urban grid demonstrates lettered and numbered buildings. Reference to block, letter and number will provide a quick cueing process.

SECTION 3 - COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT “All units in the division were on the “front lines”. There was no sanctuary on the battlefield. Virtually every element of the division was engaged at some point in the fight. All movements in the division zone were combat operations….Small paramilitary teams attacked U.S. forces around the built-up areas in an attempt to draw the division into a city fight. Unit check points, assembly areas, command post areas, as well as forward elements faced the constant threat of car bombs, dismounted suicide bombers and limited rocketpropelled grenade (RPG) and small-arms attacks by two to four-man teams….All elements in the division had to provide for their own security because the division did not have sufficient maneuver assets to dedicate to force protection.” nd

B Battery, 1/10 Field Artillery, 2

US 1st Sergeant Fullard, Marine Infantry Brigade, Nasiriyah, Iraq, 2003

CSS GUIDELINES 90. During operations in built-up areas, the terrain and the nature of warfare creates unique demands on units and formations. The delivery of timely CSS is affected by increased ammunition consumption, high casualty rates, transport difficulties consequent of the decentralized nature of the threat and the 24 hour and all round vulnerability of all arms. Enduring operations require intimate close support, characterised by discrete task organised logistic groupings that provide first-line support to deployed force elements. Innovative techniques and in-depth planning are required. 91. Troops involved in defensive operations may be fighting for protracted periods in small, often isolated, groups. Resupply, reinforcement and maintenance will need imagination, anticipation, robust communications and constant updated situation awareness. Every means of transport asset should be considered to achieve the aim. 92. An attacking force is also likely to encounter difficulties. CSS planning and preparation has to be thorough for both attack and defence. Although logistic resupply will be more difficult in urban terrain, some circumstances and for limited periods there could be extra 52

eg Rivers, roads, road junctions, major buildings and bridges.

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resources available locally, particularly defence stores and food. procedures should be observed.

Proper requisitioning

93. The nature of the urban environment means that CSS personnel are likely to be caught up in close quarter fighting. Training must prepare CSS personnel to be equipped and ready to fight in the urban environment. Every soldier will need to be prepared to drive, maintain and repair vehicles, navigate, communicate, provide medical assistance and fight to get support forward. The number and complexity of points of delivery will increase the tempo of operations and the skill required of detachments. 94. In urban COIN operations, similarly there is no distinction between forward and rear, especially when logistic bases form a hub and spoke system. In an era of 360° resupply operations, logistic troops must be more highly trained to enable them to ‘fight logistics through’ and the logistic plan must be in synergy with the overall campaign plan. Logistic resupply of Security Force (SF) and logistic bases may require the creation of Combat Logistic Patrols (CLP), deliberate operations involving all arms and may be joint. Fig B-5-13 Russian Ration Resupply, Stalingrad, 1942 95. Urban operations are manpower intensive. Economy of force may demand the use of logistic troops for operational tasks such as base protection, but these must be of a defined duration, within the capability of the troops deployed and not to the detriment of sustaining the force. 96. Forces providing support for combat in an urban environment will require a high and constant degree of self-sufficiency. Guidelines to providing effective CSS to units fighting in built-up areas are as follows: a. Provide supplies to units in the required quantities as close as possible to the location where those supplies are needed. b. Protect supplies and CSS groups from the effects of enemy fire by using surprise and avoiding detection. c.

Disperse and decentralize CSS detachments.

d.

Provide them with the appropriate communication facilities.

e. Plan for the use of carrying parties and stretcher bearers, down to the lowest level. f.

Position support units as far forward as the tactical situation permits.

g. Plan for the provision of specialist equipment such as grappling hooks, ladders and explosives.

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h. Plan and use host nation support and civil resources when authorized and practical. COMBAT SUPPLIES “Besides ammunition, the most pressing need was water. The Germans cut the main water supply to Oosterbeck on the first day of the battle, so as the UK drained their canteens, the search for water became paramount. Storage tanks, central heating systems, even fish bowls were drained.” Arnhem, Holland, 1944 “City Fights” by NL Lt Col G.A. Lofaro

Fig B-5-14 Street Fighting in Arnhem, 1944 97. Commanders must plan for the provision of combat supplies in detail. In attack, plans should be made to enable quick replenishment and to provide suitable assets to bring supplies forward. In defence, defended locations must be self-sufficient and supplies predumped in accordance with the tactical plan. There will be a requirement for large quantities of engineer defence stores to be transported and dumped in accordance with the tactical plan. 98. Ammunition53. Combat in the urban environment is characterized by constant high ammunition expenditure rates with a corresponding requirement for replenishment. Average ammunition consumption rates will exceed the standard rate by a factor of two or more. Plans must include how ammunition is to be moved right forward to the troops fighting the battle. AFVs will be required to defend assets and provide casualty evacuation as well as for the provision of ammunition if the terrain prevents logistic vehicle traffic. The use of carrying parties should be considered if streets are blocked by rubble. In defensive operations ammunition should be stockpiled if possible. Early consideration should be given to breaking ammunition packs down into multi-nature packs to facilitate distribution to dispersed groups. 99. Water. The climate and season affect the operational requirement for water. The planning rate for normal conditions is 10 litres/man/day, and the worst case is 25 53

This paragraph should be read with the section on Ammunition Resupply on p C-9-40.

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litres/man/day54. Plans for the distribution of water should be made as a priority during both defensive operations and prolonged offensive operations, and should take as high a priority as for ammunition and fuel. 100. Fuel. Fuel consumption will vary from that of rural war fighting. Combat vehicles will perform less cross-country movement and normally use less fuel in built-up areas. Engineer equipment and power generation equipment will require fuel, although overall requirements will be relatively small. There may be a greater requirement for packed fuel. 101. Rations. Obstacles, obstructions and other restrictions to movement in the urban environment may limit the amount of equipment individual troops can carry. Troops may be obliged to carry only ammunition and water, and rations will need to be brought forward at least daily when the tactical situation allows. During defensive urban operations consideration can be given to centralised cooking. EQUIPMENT SUPPORT 102. General. Maintaining operational availability, and with it combat effectiveness, is particularly demanding during urban operations and requires engineering commanders with both tactical situational awareness and technical knowledge. The complex urban battlespace is demanding and has the potential to present pervasive threats; the ES challenge is compounded by rapidly-evolving tactical situations and consideration must be given to the implications of the time taken to conduct repairs. Nevertheless, in order to maintain combat effectiveness, mission critical equipment should be repaired as close to the point of failure or damage as is technically and tactically feasible. Consequently, expedient repair is likely to form the foundation of repairs and should be complemented by robust and agile recovery plans that enable the move of equipment casualties to appropriate repair locations. 103. ES Principles. The over-arching ES principles are applicable to all types of operations in all environments. Details of these principles and other aspects of ES doctrine are contained in AC 71877 Battlefield ES Doctrine, which must be consulted for urban and all other operations. The close and complex terrain, potential for rapid situational changes as well as complexity of command and control (C2) within urban operations all compound the challenge of delivering ES. Specific considerations for ES in urban operations have therefore been articulated below, using the ES principles as a framework. 104. Repair Forward. Mission critical equipment should be repaired as close to the point of failure or damage as is technically and tactically feasible, in order to maximise combat effectiveness. The urban battlespace is unlikely to be rigidly structured into linear forward and rear areas, however repair forward remains highly applicable in the context that ‘forward’ is in relation to the equipment casualty and its point of failure. Recognising the complex threat that exists within this environment, ES elements will be relatively soft targets whilst manoeuvring and operating forward. They must therefore be highly capable of fighting in urban operations, in addition to conducting their specialist role. To reduce exposure to risk, ES commanders should develop robust and agile recovery plans that enable repairs to be conducted in the most tactically and technically suitable locations, whilst remaining in the forward environment. Where these recovery assets are exposed to elevated risk, additional force protection should be considered. 54

JWP 4-01.1 dated Mar 05. The planning rate is 10 litres/man/day, and the (NATO approved) worst case is 25 litres/man/day.

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105. Stability. In a complex urban environment there will be tactical and technical situations that do not provide the stability required to conduct repair. Consequently, the majority of lengthy and complex repair tasks will take place between missions, to deliver inter-mission and subsequent mission ES effect. To generate these effects, there is a requirement for ES capabilities with the stability and time available to generate the longterm sustainment of the force. This is of particular concern during urban operations, when the close environment can impede situational awareness, tactical changes can quickly undermine stability for ES, and equipment failures can be high and require increased sustainment effort. However, the urban environment can also provide substantial benefit to the conduct of ES, through the use of hard-standing to improve the efficiency of repairs, and buildings to enhance force protection, provide cover from view and enable the use of non-tactical light in aid of ES. Buildings offer the additional advantage of suppressing the noise resulting from ES activity. The use of specialist infrastructure such as utility supplies and overhead cranes can also provide clear benefit to the efficient completion of complex ES tasks. 106. Echelons of ES. ES capability is organized into echelons in order to concentrate effort, optimise effectiveness, minimise the CSS footprint and meet protection requirements. Such organization also enables the principle of repair forward by structuring tactically and technically capable assets. The ES structure is layered with mobile and well protected assets integral to battlegroups, and progressively less mobile and protected, but technically more capable, assets in a more tactically benign environment. Urban operations may vary considerably in nature, duration and complexity, therefore the supporting ES echelons may require further task organisation into larger or smaller elements to provide the most suitable balance of concentrated effort, effectiveness, CSS footprint and protection. 107. C2 at Every ES Echelon. For the output of the ES organisation to be responsive to the changing requirements placed upon it, effective C2 at every ES echelon is essential. Directed Logistics aims to improve support to units by meeting ES and CSS demands more precisely through accurate forecasting of forthcoming mission requirements. REME commanders at every ES echelon are required to direct the required resources effectively, efficiently and intelligently to provide the required equipment availability to enable the commander’s plan to be executed. The close nature of the urban terrain, difficulty in maintaining situational awareness and the potential for a rapidly changing situation all further complicate ES activity and increase the demand for robust planning and highly effective ES C2. Recovery assets, FRTs and ISTs require particular emphasis, since these ES assets will frequently be employed forward, across boundaries and into high threat situations. CONVOY OPERATIONS 108. Convoy operations in the urban environment should be considered as operations in their own right, properly planned and resourced like any other operation in war. The proximity of buildings to the road, restricted numbers of alternative and escape routes, vulnerability to direct conventional and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive (VBIED) attack and the presence of large numbers of civilians makes reaction to attack extremely difficult. 109. Protection and Security. A tactical convoy is a group of at least four vehicles moving under a single commander over the same route. The convoy must be able to deploy tactically at short notice. Stocks of similar natures and commodities should be equally distributed throughout the vehicle packet to ensure the delivery of at least some of all the natures demanded. Convoys must be afforded protection appropriate to the threat. Issue 4.1: Nov 09

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Consideration can be given to the use of an escort force to provide the convoy with additional firepower if required. Consideration should always be given to the planning of Close Air Support and indirect DF fire support on targets such as choke points, suspected ambush sites, known danger areas and easily identified terrain features along the route. This requires co-ordination, good communications, training and rehearsal. 110. Ambush Locations. Where possible, convoys should not halt in the urban environment. Possible ambush locations include junctions, bridges, high buildings, crowds, roundabouts, traffic lights and over and underpasses. PROVOST 111. Provost Marshal. The Provost Marshall (PM) serves as the commander's proponent for policy, plans, procedures and doctrine of all provost activities. During urban operations, the PM is focussed on the provision, advice and support for the handling of PWs, the regulation of all movement and manoeuvre, and the investigation of all criminal activities. Where viable integral civil and military police forces exist, the PM may interact between these agencies, on behalf of the commander, to ensure information sharing, close cooperation and liaison. Where such forces do not exist, the PM will be required to ensure the maintenance of law and order within the local population, with priority given to the restoration of the local police force, the constitutional and legal system, and judicial and penal services. 112.

Tasks. The RMP can perform the following tasks during urban operations: a. The regulation of movement and manoeuvre, such as route reconnaissance, route selection, signing and manning of routes and circuits into and around the urban area, and the provision of MP stations and posts. b. Control of displaced persons and refugees in close cooperation with indigenous military and civilian police forces and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs). c. The specialist military police element of a routine UK Forces patrol55, providing special to arm advice on the ground directly to the commander on arrest and detention, searches of people, property or vehicles, incident control, and crime scene management. They will also provide surety to correct handling of evidence and detainees in support of pre-planned operations. d. Provision of advice to the chain of command on PW/Internee/Detainee issues in accordance with Joint Doctrine (JDP 1.10). e. The implementation of crime reduction initiatives to prevent the wilful and wanton destruction of buildings and materiel. Such initiatives should also prevent Service Personnel and civilians from looting, pillaging and other criminal activities in the aftermath of a conflict. f. Liaison with Other Governmental Departments (OGDs) and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs).

55

Including the provision of Close Protection where required.

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g.

Policing the force protection measures imposed by the chain of command.

h. The provision of close protection to ‘at-risk’ military personnel and in support of OGD. i. The investigation of all incidents involving absentees and deserters from the UK Forces. 113. Post Conflict. Conflict in an urban area may lead to a complete collapse of law and order and a rapid deterioration of any social fabric. Where this is the case, there will be a requirement for a protracted military force presence and a defined plan to prevent further deterioration and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR). The RMP can contribute towards this plan by: a. Providing a credible police force. The priority will be to fill the vacuum created by conflict; in most cases, the RMP will be the only viable police force able to effectively restore law and order. The focus for the RMP will be maintaining law and order within the local population and service personnel, clarification of the constitutional and legal system56, restoration of the local police force, civilian courts and judiciary, and the continued supervision of these establishments. b. The use of the RMP SIB to deal with complex and protracted investigations such as war crimes. c. Specialist oversight and surety to the correct handling and processing of prisoners of war, internees, and detainees in accordance with Joint Doctrine (JDP 1.10). d. Through policing activities gather, process and assimilate information and intelligence. e. The regulation of movement and manoeuvre, such as route reconnaissance, route selection, signing and manning of routes into and around the urban area, and the provision of MP stations and posts. f.

Assistance to OGDs and humanitarian agencies.

g.

The training and mentoring of indigenous civil and military police forces.

MEDICAL 114. General. Major combat operations within an urban environment may cause significant casualties due to fragmentation; burning, collapsing buildings and environmental health hazards. From the point of wounding the subsequent extraction, treatment and evacuation of casualties will be combat power intensive within this challenging environment. Confidence in the delivery of the medical plan will ensure the sustainment of the force and the maintenance of moral. Clinical effect will be best achieved through the early grouping and forward positioning of assets whilst maintaining balance.

56

In consultation with Army Legal Services.

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115. Time Related Constraints of Medical Care. Time is a fundamental factor in patient survival and recovery, and the siting of medical facilities based on the 1-2-4 hour principle is a clinically critical factor. Ideally, a medical treatment facility offering Primary Surgery (PS) will be located within one hour of own troops; where this is not achievable, the 1-2-4 Hour principle offers a number of alternatives involving multiple treatment nodes providing damage control surgery linked by evacuation capabilities. Critically injured patients who cannot receive PS within one hour should undergo damage control surgery within two hours and PS within four hours57. 116. Medical Planning. In addition to ‘time’ the critical components of medical planning are the Population at Risk (PAR) and the estimated casualty figures. These coupled with the dispersion of the force will determine the lay-down and force packaging of medical support. 117. Allocation of Medical Assets. The generic allocation of a medical regiment and a close support hospital in support of a ground manoeuvre brigade provides the framework for the delivery of the Seven Capabilities of Care58 and the flexibility to support the 1-2-4 Hour principle. 118. Command and Control (C2). The timely passage of accurate casualty information facilitates efficient medical decision-making. At battlegroup level the medical troop commander provides this function and at brigade level the medical regiment commanding officer provides advice and direction, with SO2 Medical coordinating the staff branch. 119. Sub-Unit Level. Initial treatment will be delivered via ‘buddy-buddy’, team medics and Combat Medical Technicians (CMT). The casualty will be ‘extracted’ from the immediate danger; ‘treatment’ will then be given and subsequent ‘evacuation’ to the most appropriate medical treatment facility will occur. The triage59 category will drive the clinical imperative for evacuation. Situational Awareness and cross boundary liaison will be required to ensure that the most effective and timely method of evacuation is supported. Sub-units should be able to identify and enable the use of Emergency Helicopter Landing Sites (EHLS) to receive the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT)60. 120. Battle Group Level. The battlegroup should be enhanced with a medical troop. This will supplement the Unit Aid Post. Capabilities will include C2; a treatment section; an ambulance section and a dental section. This will allow the commander flexibility to enhance the unit aid post or to provide an alternative Role 1 facility. 121. Brigade Level. The planning and conduct of these operations is complex. In addition to the support provided to the battlegroups the medical regiment and close support hospital will be able to enhance the baseline ground evacuation capability with the following:

57

JDP 4-03 Medical Support to Joint Operations 2nd Edition dated January 2007. The 7 Capabilities of Care are: Force Health Protection (including Medical Intelligence); Pre Hospital Emergency Care (PHEC); Primary Health Care (PHC); Deployed Health Care (DHC); Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC); Medical Command, Control, Communication, Computerisation, Information, Recording and Management (C4IRM) and Medical Logistics. 59 Triage is the allocation of priorities to casualties. 60 MERT delivers the Forward Aero medical Evacuation (Fwd AE) clinical capability which might be from the point of wounding. 58

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a. MERT. MERTs are trained to deliver Pre-Hospital Emergency Care (PHEC) including resuscitation. The vulnerability of helicopters to small arms fire within the urban environment may limit their freedom of action. b. Role 2 Light Manoeuvre. A Role 2 Light Manoeuvre (LM) can be deployed to ensure the delivery of damage control surgery within two hours of wounding. This enhances the opportunity to manoeuvre whilst ensuring clinical timelines are supported. Role 2 LM has a planning constraint of 72 hours. c. Close Support Hospital. A close support hospital delivers primary surgery and can deploy in support of a manoeuvre brigade to ensure that primary surgery can be delivered within four hours of wounding. The holding policy of the facility will affect it’s agility and ability to manoeuvre. Tactical MEDEVAC to subsequent deployed hospital care may be undertaken by ground or air. 122. Force Support. The Force Support Hospital underpins the provision of deployed hospital care; this can either be a Role 2 Enhanced or a Role 3 facility. Strategic MEDEVAC out of the theatre of operations will take place; this is likely to be to Role 4 (National Health Service) capability in the UK. 123. Inter-Hospital Evacuation. The evacuation assets allocated to the force will provide inter-hospital evacuation. The span of responsibility for this ground evacuation for the deployed hospital care ranges from the Role 2 LM to the Force Support Hospital. 124. Psychological Impact. The management of the psychological impact on soldiers is a commander’s responsibility. At unit level Trauma Risk Management (TriM) can be undertaken following a traumatic incident which has the potential to cause physical, emotional and psychological harm. Trained medical personnel within the Field Mental Health Team are able to provide both hospital based care and outreach services within battlegroup areas. SECTION 4 - RECENT LESSONS IDENTIFIED 125. Background. Recent experiences of fighting in an urban environment are the Second Battle of Fallujah and the earlier battles for Baghdad and Basra during the warfighting phase of operations in Iraq. 126. Basra and Baghdad. There are a variety of reasons why recent operations in Basra and Baghdad were unlike those of other earlier urban operations. These include the following: a. The aggressive use of armour in urban operations was only possible to the extent seen because of the protection enjoyed by our AFVs. One Challenger received 14 hits from RPGs, and none penetrated the armour. However, the antitank systems used by the Iraqis were of old patterns such as the Russian RPG-7. b. Coalition air forces could operate over built up areas with considerable freedom, which provided two benefits. The first was effective aerial surveillance, largely from UAVs. The second was the ability to attack precisely using Precision Guided Munitions (PGM).

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c. Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and other PGMs were employed in urban operations for the first time. This meant that, once pinpointed, Iraqi strong points could be attacked accurately with considerable effect and little risk of collateral damage. d. Iraqi forces were insufficiently numerous to form continuous fronts. They could only occupy very small areas of any built up area, leaving gaps and areas of weakness. e. For a number of reasons, including a lack of support from most of the local population, Iraqi forces deployed into enclaves in which they could be accurately located. Consequently they had little freedom of movement. f. HUMINT was available both from the local population and from other sources. This allowed Iraqi positions to be accurately located, then attacked using either PGMs or ground assault. g. Most buildings were only one or two storeys high, minimising the threat to armour from upper stories and rooftops. h. Coalition forces adapted rapidly to the circumstances in which they found themselves. For example, when they found that their armour was largely invulnerable to the anti-tank threat, they adapted their tactics accordingly. This is partly a reflection of their professional quality and partly due to the way they are trained to 'think on their feet'. 127.

Fallujah. The key lessons learned from the US urban operations in Fallujah include: a.

Training. (1) Where possible, those involved in urban ops should train with the equipment with which they will fight. (2) FIBUA training needs to be built into more training activity and not simply be the preserve of light role infantry. All arms (and joint) integration is essential. (3) Language training is vital for urban ops where the ability to converse with locals may provide instant clues to what is around the corner.

b.

Tactics. (1) The time taken to clear a single (two storey) house was about one and a half hours – if fire support was not used. (2) Clearing houses from the top down was preferred if easy access could be gained to the roof. Methods of entry had to change constantly to avoid setting patterns, sometimes entering stealthily, at other times ‘dynamically’ – ie with all guns blazing.

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(3) Extensive rehearsals are required with all force elements and equipment. (4) Tanks proved vital in providing immediate fire support and suppression capability. (5) Fire support varied in effectiveness. Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) represented a very effective method of prosecuting targets but could not always be delivered in a timely manner. CAS was insufficiently reliable but was good for destroying structures. Artillery, aviation and mortars were effective but did not achieve the same degree of destructive power. AC-130 offered a good combination of precision and destructive power. (6) The US managed to totally dominate the streets through the use of ISTAR and fires. This forced the insurgents to fight in buildings rather try to dominate the approaches to them. It also prevented mutual support being achieved. The US was, however, required to force entry into virtually every building. A considerable variety of methods of gaining entry – from tanks down to sledgehammers – were used. (7) Combat ID, especially for CAS, requires considerable thought and practice. Avoidance of fratricide relies on clear instructions and detailed knowledge of the ground and grids. (8)

Night time allowed re-supply and hot meals to be brought forward.

(9) CASEVAC required hardened vehicles, an in depth knowledge of a robust plan by all and effective team medics. c.

Operations. (1) Tactical surprise is still possible even if operational surprise is lost, through the use of deception and with the committal of sufficient resources. (2) Having taken the decision as to whether to de-populate the urban area or not, it remains vital to seal the city effectively to prevent escape. (3) When the population had been cleared from the city, methodical and slow (‘swamp’) clearance proved more effective and reduced casualties, in comparison to penetration/thrust where insurgents were missed and were able to attack troops from behind. (4) The tactical pause became an essential part of the battle rhythm, allowing control to be re-established and CASEVAC and re-supply to take place. (5) Do not expect insurgents to abide by the LOAC. Anticipate boobytraps, and the misuse of religious sites and hospitals.

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(6) 1st US Marine Division (1 MARDIV) proved willing to conduct manoeuvre and kinetic strikes in support of intelligence collection operations, especially EW. This yielded information on enemy strong points, C2 etc. (7) Even with a fully night capable force, the US chose not to fight at night due to the problems of fratricide and command and control. The risk of insurgents infiltrating behind troops during darkness was mitigated by ISTAR assets. d.

Equipment. (1) Innovative use of war fighting equipment was essential. Line charges (similar to Giant Viper) were used for the initial breach and to clear daisychained IEDs. (2) Eye protection in urban operations where the volume of dust and debris is generally high led to a number of casualties being avoided.

Fig B-5-15 Eye Protection for Urban Operations (3) Body armour proved particularly effective and minimised fatal casualties. (4) In order to prevent re-infiltration by insurgents the US used (but did not distribute enough) gunpowder residue detection kits to separate civilians from the Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF), particularly at food queues. The recommendation is for five per battalion. e.

Communications. (1) Line of sight communications posed problems. VHF performed better than UHF for air/land communications. It became necessary for communications hubs to be established on buildings as the advance continued. (2) Tank communications proved vital in providing a link back to company HQs from squads61 on the ground. (3)

61

The infantry/tank telephone was extensively used.

Squad is the US term for an infantry section.

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(4) Maintaining crypto fills required close management. Signallers came forward and filled half the channels with the new crypto while leaving old crypto in the other channels so that those who could not be reached could still be in communication. (5) All levels of command have to be aware of the value of info ops to exploit enemy excesses. The US did not always manage to get images back quickly enough to meet the requirement.

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CHAPTER 6 CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION ‘Stalingrad: Urban Warfare favours the defence, 4:1 or 6:1. The prerequisite for a successful attack on an urban area is an effective blockade, prior to the start of operations, combined with comprehensive intelligence and reconnaissance and detailed contingency planning.’ N.N.Novichkov, Kholveg-Infoglob, 1995 URBAN PENETRATION 1. Urban penetration is designed for operations against clearly defined objectives, either enemy positions or specific terrain. 2. The tactical capture and holding of key terrain is critical to the manoeuvrist approach to urban operations. Key urban terrain includes potential objectives such as power plants, water plants, government buildings, communication centres and food storage and distribution centres, the ownership and management of which should provide the means to establish authority and control of the urban population and environment. 3. Urban penetration requires the early and rapid seizure of the objective by any means possible. Having seized it, the objective will need to be isolated, to be defended against enemy action and counterattack and to be provided with protection from illegal and spontaneous action by the local population. Movement to the objective can be by air, land, waterway or underground or a combination of all available options. Fig B-6-1 Saint Aubin-Sur-Mer, D Day, 6 June 1944 4. Forces committed to the penetration must be sufficient strong to physically seize the objective, to overcome any opposition during the move to the area of the objective and to provide sufficient security to the site once it has been captured. Sufficient firepower and protection must be secured to reach the objective area in sufficient force to capture and hold it with enough force in reserve to protect it and establish control. Stealth should be considered as the preferred movement tactic in order to maximize surprise and force protection, but this could be difficult to achieve. Any penetration operation should include the maximum flexibility and initiative in supporting the commander's intent. Consideration should be given to conducting the attack on multiple axes of advance by dispersed units, as well as on several dimensions (subsurface, surface, structural, etc).

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5. The defending force must be sufficiently strong to accomplish its mission and should include elements with the capacity to call for direct, indirect fire and air support from outside the objective. If the commander chooses to withdraw once his objective has been achieved, the penetration will take on many of the characteristics of a raid and should be executed accordingly. The withdrawal could take the form of a subsequent penetration to a second objective. URBAN THRUST 6. Urban thrust attacks an enemy on a narrow axis of advance. The thrust maximizes combat power at the point of the attack. It can be described as a dagger thrust into the enemy defence. As such an attack occurs the axis of advance must be defended in order to protect each flank against enemy attacks. This can be accomplished through a combination of forces, sensors and lethal or non-lethal barriers. 7. The urban thrust can be conducted on multiple axes simultaneously. These attacks should be conducted in parallel and should be mutually supporting. Where possible, the thrust should be conducted at an oblique axis to the street layout, which will reduce exposure in open spaces that could provide the primary or principal killing zones for the enemy. 8. In conducting urban thrust, a commander should consider periodically altering the direction of advance in order to confuse the enemy and not establish a pattern that permits the early preparation of obstacles, demolitions, mines and booby-traps. This requires a high level of planning and co-ordination in an environment of communication and coordination challenge. In an urban operation of this nature, the commander’s intent must be known and understood down to the lowest level. 9. The urban thrust on multiple axes can present the commander with different options. One thrust can be stopped at a certain point to form a ‘hammer’, while another may be initiated to act as a ‘hammer’. Thrusts can also be orchestrated so that while one element is stationary, a second element conducts a right or left hook to effect encirclement. 10. A well executed urban thrust avoids a linear assault, confuses the enemy, forces his flanks, separates his forces and deceives him as to the objective. It could initiate the enemy’s withdrawal before engaging in the necessity of a room-by-room clearance of the town or city. If the enemy is forced to withdraw, his resulting exposure can be exploited by tactical aviation and indirect fire. URBAN SATURATION 11. Urban saturation involves the use of numerous fire-teams or section sized units operating in a dispersed, non-contiguous fashion. As these force elements enter and assimilate their assigned area, they should be prepared to respond rapidly to calls for assistance by neighbouring teams. Their response to a call for assistance will depend on their own situation, the distance from those making the request and their capacity to add value to the task. The speed of reaction will be critical to the success of the concept. This concept will most likely be employed in the capture of villages, small towns or suburbs. 12. A call for assistance should include a brief estimate of the support required. This request should be transmitted up the chain of command and to all other teams on the net. Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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The commander can then direct the appropriate number of teams to respond to the request and adjust other units to fill the gaps created. Alternative methods can include the teams closest to the supported unit responding without direction, simply reporting their intention to respond. Good passage of information, accompanied by high levels of training, professional skill and situational awareness, assisted by technical intelligence gathering aids where available and appropriate, is critical to the success of saturation operations. As in all urban operations, fratricide remains a risk that must be managed. 13. Command of the incident should remain with the commander of the unit requesting support as long as he retains the best and most current awareness of the situation. He should assume tactical command of responding units. Command of the incident can be assumed by the senior commander at the earliest appropriate moment. 14. The key to saturation tactics is speed, confidence and mutual support. The requesting unit must offer rapid and concise information to all potential responding units. Responding units must enable the calling unit to manoeuvre them to advantage as they arrive on the scene until the Fig B-6-2 Street Fighting1 in Caen, June 1944 commander can assume control of the situation. Responding units must have the flexibility and training to enable early seizure of the initiative. Implicit in this concept is the capability of junior leaders to assume increased levels of responsibility and command. The tactic also requires the chain of command to respond quickly and effectively and to adjust forces to cover gaps as required. ‘Benefiting considerably from the human intelligence network that MI6 had established in Basra after the first Gulf War, UK commanders possessed an accurate and up-to date picture of what was happening in the city. They realised that the Baath Party activists and the fedayeen were firmly in control in the city. Defended by units of the regular army, consisting of Shiite conscripts, its commander, Ali Hassan al-Majid, devised a political and military approach that aimed to achieve two goals, to keep tight control over Basra’s Shiite population right to the very end and to draw the UK into fighting within the city, hoping that the confusing urban landscape would maximise civilian casualties and take a heavy toll on UK forces. But the UK refused to be drawn into fighting in Basra until they were ready. The UK intentionally kept the cordon around Basra loose. The down side of this strategy was that the fedayeen could use the fleeing crowds as human shields, whom the Baathists mortared enthusiastically as a warning to the others and to gain propaganda value. On the other side, looser control of access, allowed the UK to infiltrate agents, sniper teams and Special Forces in and out of the city. The defenders even sent out tanks to the edge of their lines of control and then backed them into urban areas, teasing UK troops to follow. UK commanders realised that only gradual, carefully calculated military and political action would loosen the Baathist vice. 1

British troops using a French M 1914 Hotchkiss .30in (8mm) machine gun.

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By 27 March, the UK felt comfortable enough to send more snipers into the city and small raiding teams of Warrior APCs attacked areas of Basra supposedly free of significant Iraqi military forces or irregulars. The aim of these probing attacks was at first psychological, but the larger aim was to ensure that the city could be taken without heavy losses or extensive collateral damage. This was followed up by swift raids on Baathist hideouts in the city, carefully coordinated with human intelligence from the inside. Fig B-6-3 Fighting in Basra, 2003 On Sunday April 6th, the UK launched a three-pronged attack with battle-groups of the 7th Armoured Brigade consisting of Challenger 2s and Warrior. The initial plan was to punch deep into the city and then pull out that night. The operation went so well that they remained where they were and the main fighting took place in a factory complex where there were no civilians and where the UK could call in air support. Major General Brims decided to finish off the Iraqis with a final stroke. One battle group now moved against the last stronghold, the university defended by 300 fedayeen. Clearance of the stronghold took about four hours. The UK could not use air or artillery support, nor could they identify clear military targets on the ground. Warrior infantry sections, with supporting fire from Challengers and the Warriors themselves had to winkle out the Iraqis room by room, building by building. In the words of one of their officers, “It all came down to good old-fashioned bayonet and rifle work.” Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr, “The Iraq War”, Harvard University Press SECTION 2 - PLANNING AN ATTACK GENERAL 15. The conduct of urban operations demands the employment of specific tactical concepts, and specialised skills and techniques. The principles of war remain extant and the concepts of the manoeuvrist approach to operations and its tactical tenets should be applied. 16. Offensive operations in built up areas can require large numbers of troops. Planning must be centrally coordinated but execution should be decentralised where appropriate. 17.

The following points are important when planning offensive operations: a. Simplicity. Control is difficult and plans have to be simple and flexible. Tactical planning must allow for the exploitation of local success and opportunity.

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Orders should cover the whole operation in outline and only the first stage in detail. Plans for each subsequent stage should be made and detailed orders issued as the preceding state is being completed. Passage of information to the lowest level is important if control is to be maintained and success to be achieved. b. Information. More than in any other operation of war, comprehensive IPB for urban operations is critical to success and the minimization of casualties. The maximum amount of information on the city infrastructure and the defender's dispositions must be acquired and analyzed. The information sources will include: (1) Maps2, town plans, guide books and plans of essential services. Street maps, in particular, should be issued down to fire team level. These maps3 can include a building designation system. (2) Technical information gathering means, including commercial imagery services such as Google Earth Pro4, Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV). (3)

Reconnaissance patrols, standing patrols and OPs.

(4) Overhead imagery and Electronic Warfare (EW) (including a SIGINT capacity). (5) HUMINT including PW, local agencies, including national territorial forces, inhabitants and refugees. THE PLANNING FRAMEWORK 18.

The planning framework for offensive operations is as follows: a. Force Ratios. Offensive operations are governed by the need to generate high force ratios well in excess of 3:1. During the Battle for Berlin in 1945, the Red Army planned its assault based upon a force ratio of 8:1. b. Support. As soon as it seems likely that an assault on an urban area will take place, there should be an early re-supply of large quantities of ammunition and explosives of all appropriate natures. Engineer support and advice should be sought early to identify all available sapper and assault equipment and decisions taken on its distribution. Medical support and the casualty evacuation system should be reinforced, including early decisions taken about the organisation and distribution of armoured vehicles for casualty evacuation for assaulting units. c.

Objectives: (1) In the case of an assault on an urban area defended in depth, the attack should be planned so that progress to the final objective is made

2

Electronic mapping will be also needed to be distributed in a form and scale that will be useful to users with User Data Terminals (UDTs). 3 There maybe a requirement in complex urban operations to show height above ground, ground level and underground systems. 4 A subscription service. Includes Google Street View. Also available to the enemy.

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through a series of intermediate objectives. These intermediate objectives provide the firm base for subsequent stage planning and operation. Consideration should always be given to the retention in strength of intermediate objectives to prevent re-occupation by the enemy. The selection of buildings as objectives may be necessary but consideration must be given to the factors of both ground and enemy to determine the tactical and operational objectives. Buildings can be bypassed and commanders should try to avoid buildings becoming objectives and becoming the focus of operations. (2) The selection of the final objective should ensure that its capture will make any further defence untenable. (3) The break-in battle may be conducted at night, either as a silent or noisy attack, as an aid to security. (4) Momentum must be maintained during the attack. Planning must remain flexible and tactical success should always be exploited. d. Re-grouping. Sufficient time should always be allowed for reinforcement, regrouping, orders and rehearsals. At battlegroup level, the assaulting force is likely to be organised as follows: (1) Investment Force. indirect fire observers.

Reconnaissance troops, armour, aviation and

(2) Fire Support Group. Armour, anti-tank weapons, helicopters, GPMG (SF) and indirect fire observers. (3) Assault Force. Infantry sub-units, engineers, assault pioneers, armour and indirect fire observers with some artillery in the direct fire role. (4) Reserve. A reserve should ideally be a third of the total force. It must be a minimum of an infantry sub-unit with combined arms support. e. Control. Experience has shown that fratricide is a constant danger in urban operations. Strict control by commanders and frequent re-briefing at all levels is vital if fratricide is to be avoided. Axes of advance, objective, report lines, fire support control measures and boundaries will assume particular importance. f. Tempo. Success in offensive operations will be achieved by maintaining a high operational tempo, and keeping the enemy off balance. An offensive operation in an urban environment is a 24 hour battle, characterised by short bursts of violent action followed by periods to regain balance. Failure to retain balance will lead to unnecessary casualties. To locate (find) and immobilise (fix) the enemy can be a matter of cunning and stealth and can be conducted at varying rates of operational tempo. Destroying the enemy (strike) should be conducted at a tempo where the defender remains immobilised and unable to deploy his reserves or his weapon systems (fixed). The essential requirement is that commanders determine a sustainable tempo of operations while achieving a higher operational tempo than the enemy. Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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g. Momentum. Momentum5 is the benefit gained by a judicious combination of tempo and mass. Momentum must be maintained: delay or insufficient/inappropriate/inefficient force gives the enemy opportunity to regroup, react and regain the initiative. The plan should allow for: (1) Successive units and sub-units taking over the advance doing so by a passage of lines operation. Limitations on manoeuvre may oblige sub units to be in echelon. (2) Reserves being placed well forward in order to be able to react quickly to the unexpected and exploit tactical advantage. (3) Ammunition expenditure of all natures being heavy and requiring the high prioritization of the organisation of the means of resupply. The same will apply to other combat supplies and to the evacuation of casualties. The difficulties of casualty evacuation must not be underestimated. There are likely to be heavy casualties in all urban operations and the RAP will require additional medical resources prior to the start of the operation. There could be a requirement for medical teams to move up each axis closely behind the leading assault forces if momentum is to be maintained. Their tasks would be to administer immediate first aid, apply triage, mark casualties and move them to suitable collection points. In addition a battlegroup may need to generate a sufficient number of soldiers to act as stretcher bearers between the RAP and the Collection Points. Consideration must be given to the use of AFVs for ammunition resupply and casualty evacuation at every stage in the operation. (4) Knowing exactly what is happening. There may be a need for the configuration of increased number of communication systems to achieve the required level of situational awareness. Consideration should be given to the deployment of radio rebroadcast systems as units move forward. SECTION 3 - THE STAGES OF AN OFFENSIVE ACTION ‘By the time it reached Berlin, Red Army forces had created special assault “storm” groups, specifically developed for independent action in urban terrain. Each storm group included a rifle battalion, a sapper company, and armour company or self-propelled assault gun battery, two mortar batteries, a cannon or howitzer battery, one or two batteries of divisional artillery, and a flamethrower platoon. A detachment was divided into three to six assault groups, and a support group. Each assault group comprised a rifle company, included one or two sapper detachments, an anti-tank rifle detachment, two to five individually carried flamethrowers, smoke devices, three or four other man-portable weapons, and two or three tanks or self-propelled assault guns. Sometimes, groups were further subdivided to better focus on such missions as fire, command, reserves, reconnaissance, and obstacle clearing.. Individual soldiers were supplied with a large number of grenades and explosives. Training and preparation for the urban environment emphasised independent thought and action from each soldier.’ Stalingrad, Anthony Beevor, Penguin Books

5

The linear momentum of a body is the product of its mass and its velocity. Oxford ‘A Dictionary of Physics’.

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ATTACKS ON BUILT-UP AREAS 19. General. The attack on a built-up area can be divided into five stages, although some stages may overlap. There should be no pause between them and units should try to immobilise (fix) the enemy and rapidly exploit any penetration before the defender can react. The five stages are investment, the break-in, securing the objective, clearing the objective and reorganisation. 20. Investment. The purposes of investing the urban area should be to isolate the area occupied by the enemy, to seize the principal terrain features and to dominate the approaches. a. Grouping. Ideally the investment force, for which reconnaissance troops and armour are best suited, should be grouped under a dedicated commander. Controllers of indirect fire, aviation and air should included. b.

Tasks. The principal tasks in the investment are to: (1)

Provide information on enemy dispositions.

(2)

Prevent enemy withdrawal or limit withdrawal options.

(3)

Prevent enemy reinforcement.

(4) Support the break-in, including provision of direct and indirect fire support. c.

Planning Considerations. The three principal planning considerations are: (1) Careful planning of the deployment of the different elements of the Investment Force to ensure surprise in timings and approach. (2) Co-ordination of the employment of the Investment Force with the subsequent stages of the operation. (3) Consideration, direction and instruction on the treatment of civilian noncombatants in the battlespace, the need and location of interpreters and arrangements for PWs.

21. The Break-In. The break-in phase is the assault to seize a foothold in the urban area. The attacker will be vulnerable to the killing zones, obstacles, mines, booby-traps and deployed weapon systems of the defender who will have had time to prepare his defended localities and their mutual support. It is a critical stage of the offensive operation, and the attacker will be at his most vulnerable. a. Grouping. The break-in force should comprise infantry and armour with engineer or assault pioneer support and indirect fire controllers. The minimum combat power necessary at battlegroup level is a rifle company group.

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(1) Armour6. Armour may be used to support the break-In but is vulnerable to concealed anti-tank weapons. (2) Artillery and Mortars. The use of HE and smoke to support the break-in can destroy key points (particularly with precision munitions such as GMLRS), neutralize enemy positions and cover the movement of assault forces. In addition, artillery may be used to 'fix' any enemy out of direct contact. Commanders must consider risk of injury to civilians and the problems created by obscuration and rubble. (3) Aviation. Aviation may be used to provide direct fire support and/or a real-time, man in the loop, ISTAR feed on enemy dispositions or counter moves. (4) Air. Air support should be coordinated with indirect fire support. Early consideration should be given to the use of precision guided munitions in order to limit collateral damage. (5) Technical Intelligence Gathering Assets. The use of UAV and UGV can be considered to assist in information gathering, tactical awareness and the enhancement of command and control. b.

Tasks. The main tasks of the break-in force are to: (1)

Establish a foothold in the urban area.

(2)

Identify the principal enemy defended localities

(3)

Determine the strength, location and future intentions of the enemy.

(4)

Oblige the enemy to commit his reserve, if possible.

(5)

Establish routes for forward passage of lines.

(6)

Provide a fire support base for subsequent stages of the operation.

c. Planning Considerations. Consideration should be given to the following planning considerations: (1) The plan should be simple and, in the case of a large and welldefended urban area, the objectives limited. (2)

The synchronization of direct and indirect fire support is critical.

(3) Effective engineer support is critical to success. Obstacle, mine and route clearance, the construction of safe lanes and assistance to the assaulting sub-units necessitate detailed coordination. (4) Silent or noisy, the break-in can be conducted at night, as an enhancement to security. Night time will increase the difficulties of command 6

Including armoured Engineer assets, eg TROJAN and TERRIER.

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and control, IFF issues for air, aviation and indirect fire controllers and the risk of fratricide. (5) Effective fire support at every level and in support of every sub-unit move is critical during the break-In phase. Direct and indirect fire on the immediate defended enemy localities, those providing mutual support and those in depth is vital to both cover unavoidable movement in the open and prevent the enemy from moving his assets. (6) Consideration must be given to the concentration of combat power in the successful break-In. In order to maintain momentum it may be necessary to conduct frequent forward passage of lines. (7) Consideration should be given to the use of deception as an aid to surprise. To be effective it must be credible and coordinated, and the enemy must be given time to react in accordance with the feint. (8) The use of Anti-Structure Munitions (ASM) should be considered as an aid to blocking enemy routes and limiting enemy arcs of fire. 22. Securing Objectives. The objective or objectives are secured from the foothold gained by the break-in. The aim of this phase is to consolidate firm bases from which to either launch assaults on subsequent objectives, or unhinge the enemy’s defence. a. Grouping. Grouping for securing objectives should be similar to that for the break-in (para 21.a.). b.

Tasks. The following tasks should be included: (1) The seizure of key terrain and objectives. The ground must be dominated, and the principal routes, bridges, buildings and subterranean features of tactical significance seized. (2) As a priority, the enemy’s freedom of movement and initiative should be limited by observation and fire as much as possible. (3)

Enemy defensive localities must be identified and neutralized.

(4) Enemy withdrawal, administrative and logistic routes should be blocked, although consideration should be given to subsequent own passage. (5) Enemy reserves, command posts and communications should be neutralized. c.

Planning Considerations. Planning considerations are: (1) A systematic approach should adopted to ensure that the enemy’s ability to influence the securing of each objective is limited. This demands careful coordination between force elements.

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(2) Strict security and control of the objectives seized and the routes to, from and between them must be maintained in order to prevent enemy reinfiltration and counter attack. (3) Consideration should always be given to the securing of objectives in daylight when enemy positions can be clearly identified. Night operations can be undertaken by troops that are trained and specifically equipped but the dangers of fratricide and the chances of overlooking enemy positions increased. (4) Medical support needs to be as close as possible to fighting elements, and safe routes constantly identified and reconnoitred for CASEVAC. The demand for ammunition will be great, stocks will need to be well forward and arrangements must be made for continuous resupply. (5) The use of precision munitions to destroy known and clearly identified defensive positions should be considered. Consideration should also be given to having indirect fire controllers well forward to react to the unforeseen and be well placed for subsequent phases. 23. Clearance. The purpose of clearance is to strip the enemy and associated threats from the area around the objective or between the objectives in order to gain control of the terrain. Clearance must be methodical and thorough. No enemy can be allowed to escape or remain hidden. All civilians in the locality must have their non-combatant status confirmed. Residual threats such as mines, booby-traps or IEDs must be rendered safe. This role can be given to reserve or echelon forces if the original echelon is tasked to continue the assault. a. Grouping. Grouping for clearance should be similar to that for the break-in (para 21. a.). b. Tasks. The principal task will be to clear the area of enemy and associated threats. c.

Planning Considerations. Consideration should be given to: (1) The use of sectors, or similar control measures, to ensure the clearance is systematic and no enemy, in pockets or as individuals, are left. (2) Clearance tasks can be allocated to small groups of platoon or section strength. (3)

Clearance tasks are most effective in daylight.

(4) Provision must be made for casualty collection, control of PWs and the evacuation of civilians. 24. Reorganization. The reorganization will be no different to that for any other offensive operation. The conduct and time available for reorganization will be dictated by plans for subsequent operations. Nevertheless, the following points should be considered:

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a. Despite systematic clearance of the defended location, the threat from snipers and counter attack could remain. Care must be taken to cover every approach, including tunnels, alleyways and rooftops, by observation and fire, if possible. Immediately subsequent to the assault, temporary defensive measures should be adopted at every level, including the preparation of direct and indirect-fire defensive fire plans. b.

Regrouping must be considered if casualties have been high.

c.

Immediate or early resupply of ammunition, water and fuel is critical.

d. The evacuation of casualties and civilians, and control of PWs requires considerable manpower and time. THE CAPTURE OF KEY OBJECTIVES ‘Time taken to clear a single (two storey) house was about one and a half hours – if fire support was not used. The US managed to totally dominate the streets through the use of ISTAR and fires. This forced the insurgents to fight the buildings from within rather try to dominate the approaches to them. It also prevented mutual support being achieved. The US was, however, required to force entry into virtually every building. A number of methods of gaining entry – from tanks down to sledgehammers – were used. Clearing houses from the top down was preferred if easy access could be gained to the roof. Methods of entry had to be changed constantly to avoid setting patterns, sometimes entering stealthily, at other times ‘dynamically’ – ie with all guns blazing. The infantry/tank telephone was extensively used.’ ‘A Tale of Free Cities’ by Russell Glenn (Fallujah, Iraq) 2004 25. Offensive operations to capture large towns and cities are likely to be conducted at formation level. Battlegroups could be tasked to capture key objectives or features or to secure certain areas. Large towns and cities are invariably centred on key features such as rivers or road junctions and key objectives could include river or road bridges, closegrouped government buildings or apartment blocks. Areas to be captured could be heavy or light industrial, residential (suburb), office or city-centre. 26. The operational requirement may not allow time for a deliberate assault and the commander could be required to plan a rapid advance through the built up area, leaving the task of clearing to following units. In such instance, the following points should be noted: a. This type of operation has the greatest chance of success when the enemy has not had time to establish a proper defence. Maintenance of the momentum of the assault and keeping the enemy off-balance is vital. The importance of the early seizure of the objective, while the bridge, for example, is still intact, will allow the commander to get through the area quickly before the enemy can react effectively. b. In such cases, contact with the enemy should be avoided if possible. Enemy resistance should be bypassed. Anything that delays the seizure of the objective should be avoided. c. In order to deceive and confuse the enemy as to his intentions, and to allow himself sufficient flexibility in the case of resistance, the commander could organize Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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his forces for movement on multiple axes. The lead unit on each axis would need to conduct reconnaissance on the move, possibly using armoured vehicles. Enemy positions might be fixed by fire, and bypassed. d. Momentum can be achieved by mounting infantry in armoured vehicles, albeit at the risk of attack by anti-armour weapons. Elements of the force, in platoon or section strength, should be dropped off to assume blocking positions, to provide flank, route and rear protection to aid the advance. In such cases, it is important to ensure effective command and control between the different elements. Plans must be made for the deployment of a reserve in the case of counter-attack. e. Once the objective is seized, a perimeter defence should be established. Dismounted troops should clear the buildings and establish all round defence. The objective should be defended with all available means, including indirect fire and weapons mounted on vehicles. Plans should be made for the early relief of route protection parties. Patrol plans should be made for listening posts, OPs and deeper reconnaissance to forestall enemy movement and counter attack. INFILTRATION ‘Much of the fighting consisted not of attacks, but of relentless, little battles. The battles were fought by assault squads, generally six or eight strong, from the ‘Stalingrad School of Street Fighting’. They armed themselves with knives and sharpened spades for silent killing, as well as sub-machine guns and grenades.’ Stalingrad, Anthony Beevor, Penguin Books

27. In certain cases, for example in the case of a city or town not being strongly defended, consideration could be given to the use of infiltration to access the objective. Identified defended localities might not be mutually supporting. They might consist of anti-tank positions on the outskirts, defensive positions and protective posts on the main approaches, or blocking positions on the approaches to the key features in town. Reserves and strong-points might be located in depth inside the towns or cites. The battle group might seize its objective by infiltrating platoons and companies between enemy positions. By using the cover of the town’s infrastructure, the buildings, the alleyways and other covered approaches, the battle group might be able to seize key street junctions or terrain features, isolate enemy positions, and enable following Fig B-6-4 German Troops Fighting at Stalingrad Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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units to pass into the built-up area. Ideally, the tactic of infiltration is performed in poor visibility or darkness. Consideration should be given to the following factors: a. Control. Control of movement is important. Each sub-unit should use its own infiltration ‘lane’. Depending on the way the built-up area is laid out, each infiltration lane may need to be 500 to 1,500 metres wide. b. Movement. The infiltrating companies should advance on foot, using stealth and all available cover and concealment. Diversion can be effected by mortar and artillery fire to cover the sound of infiltrating troops. Consideration can be given to the use of real-time (down-linked) imagery from manned or unmanned aerial platforms. c. Armour Protection. Anti-tank weapons can be positioned to cover likely avenues of approach for enemy armoured vehicles. Reconnaissance platoon patrols, including elements using hand-held anti-tank weapons, can also provide a screen for battle group flank protection. d. Flank Protection. Companies moving into the built-up area must secure their own flanks. Protective elements may be placed along the route as picquets. Engineers can assist by providing counter mobility resources. e. Action on the Objective. On arrival at the objective, infiltrating force elements should consolidate, reorganize and organise the defence. Patrols be mounted to dominate the ground, and ‘blind spots’ nullified by judicious sighting of weapons and observers. A limit of exploitation can be established to ensure control and security. ASSAULTING A TOWN, VILLAGE OR HAMLET 28. Clearing Streets. Clearing streets and buildings incurs heavy ammunition expenditure. Prophylactic fire using all available weapon systems is useful. To clear a street, two sections or platoons should work in parallel along opposite sides. The third section or platoon should be kept as an immediate reserve. Commanders should be well forward, immediately behind the forward elements, able to observe progress and control movement. Sub-units should move forward alternately with fire support given by the other. Direct fire support can be given by tanks that should move between fire positions and be able to provide fire at short notice. AFVs or artillery in the direct fire role can also be used to provide fire support. The protection of tanks, AFVs and artillery must be balanced against their effect. 29. Clearing Buildings. Prior to the assault of the block or building that is to be cleared, ammunition should be re-supplied and covering fire organised from another sub-unit. Regardless of how the building is captured, from top, bottom or from an alternative level, it must be turned into a firm base from which to cover the seizure of a subsequent building. Sections must be able to communicate by voice and hand signal. Buildings should be marked to show entry points, whether or not they are clear, casualties, booby traps and the location of the FLOT. The use of chalk or alternative methods of silent communication must be taught, understood and practised.

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30. Individual House Clearing. Sections should move from building to building by unpredictable routes such as through walls and sewers or over rooves. If possible, open streets exposed to enemy fire should be avoided. Ideally each building should be entered at the top and cleared downwards. Each building must be thoroughly search as it is cleared, including the outhouses and cellars. Reorganisation can only take place when each floor has been cleared, and ideally should take place on the ground floor, where greater protection will be afforded against indirect fire. Casualty, PW collection and ammunition re-supply points should be established at ground level. SECTION 4 – URBAN STRIKE OPERATIONS 31. Urban strike operations are focussed against individuals or groups of people. They normally involve the arrest and detention of insurgents or capture of enemy combatants. 32. Although the size of the force required to carry out urban strike operations may vary, such operations are typically conducted at battlegroup or lower level. 33. The tenets of the Manoeuvrist Approach to urban operations remain extant for Strike operations. To overcome or negate the enemy’s will to resist requires an attitude of mind in which achieving surprise and using initiative is combined with high standards of discipline, organisation and a ruthless determination to complete the arrest. The enemy’s ability to react, flee or resist will be defeated by a combination of high grade current intelligence, tempo, surprise, and simultaneity. 34. Urban strike operations are ‘simple’, where target buildings are adjacent and require only one cordon. They are ‘complex’ when the converse situation pertains. 35. In order to achieve surprise, troops must be capable of reacting quickly to the timely information provided by technical gathering assets, and high levels of competence and readiness are thus essential. PRINCIPLES 36.

The principles of strike operations are: a.

Offensive spirit.

b.

Flexibility.

c.

Surprise and security.

d.

Simultaneity.

e.

Simplicity.

f.

Service Support.

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TASK ORGANISATION 37. Groupings vary according to the size of the task and the number of troops available. Normally a platoon-size operation for a single small building strike will comprise of the following groupings/tasks: a. A breaching team of one or two separate teams to gain entry, clear and secure the compound. It may include a RE EMOE7 team. The team will provide the inner cordon. b. Assault group one, a minimum of two teams, each consisting of two pairs to secure and clear the ground floor. c. Assault group two, a minimum of two teams, each consisting of two pairs to secure and clear the first floor and the roof top. d. Command team, compromising platoon commander, signaller and the reserve team. This can be the breaching team. e. Platoon sergeant group comprising medics, Tactical Questioning (TQ) team, RMP, interpreter and female searcher, if required.

Fig B-6-5 – Rangework, Shields, Pistols and Rifles 7

Explosive Method of Entry.

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ENTRY AND OPERATION 38. The operating procedures will depend on the threat, the commander’s plan and the resources available. A typical sequence of events is illustrated below.

Fig B-6-6 – Urban Strike Procedure 39.

The following additional points should be noted: a. Troops should be ‘stacked’ out of sight until they are required to enter the building. This aids protection and surprise. b. The use of a hand grenade, burst of automatic fire or ‘flash bang’, depending on rules of engagement, prior to entry to each room may neutralize any opposition. c. The first soldier to enter each room should be equipped with a pistol and shield. d. Information such as arrests made and the number of occupants should be passed to the command group, and subsequently up the chain of command, as quickly as possible.

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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 40. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) governing the regulations for opening fire, the arrest and detention of persons, and the actions of troops in civilian houses and vehicles will be the determining discipline for the actions of the forces involved. 41. The ROE must be learned and understood by every member of the force involved, and will be published in Theatre Standing Operational Instructions (SOI). FACTORS 42.

The following factors are critical to the success of the strike operation: a. Current intelligence. Every soldier must be briefed on the best available information regarding factors such as the layout of the building, the number of likely occupants and the threat that they might pose. b. Deception. In order to maximise surprise consideration should be given to all possible means of deception. c. Planning. Planning for a strike operation might include plans for the positioning of inner and outer cordons, the domination of roof tops, fire support coordination measures (including boundaries, No Fire Lines, identification markers), rigorous command and control measures, preparation for follow up strikes on nearby buildings and complex strikes where more than one building is to be assaulted. d. Environment. A hostile environment may require a mixture of armour and infantry to provide an iron sleeve through which the strike element can approach the target building. In a helicopter delivered strike operation, consideration must be given to the type of ground support required. e.

Combat Service Support. (1) Equipment Recovery. Robust plans are necessary to ensure the recovery of every vehicle involved in the operation, to understand the capabilities of the recovery assets available and to rehearse elementary skills such as wheel change and track repair, at night if necessary. (2) Medical. Arrangements must be made for immediate medical support and CASEVAC.

f.

‘Actions On’. Plans for ‘Actions On’ should include: (1) Vehicle breakdown en route and on target, including plans for crossdecking. (2)

Vehicle denial policy.

(3)

Wrong target.

(4)

Ambush.

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(5)

Casualties.

(6)

Withdrawal.

g. Attachments. attachments:

A simple strike operation could include the following

(1)

Tactical questioner.

(2)

Interpreter.

(3)

Female searcher.

(4)

RMP.

(5)

RE search team.

(6)

Dog handler and dog.

h. ISTAR. Consideration must be given to utilizing ISTAR capabilities to establish patterns of life and reaction, track individuals, clear routes ahead of road moves, provide deception measures, support cordon surveillance and provide technical surveillance and ground and aerial fire power. Aerial assets could be used to provide video image to the commander. i. Command and Control. The location of the commander warrants consideration. A choice should be made between commanding dismounted and thereby intimately influencing events, and remaining mounted and being more able to communicate and control wider aspects of the operation. All troops must know the location of their immediate superior. Brevity codes, identification markers, control measures and orders for opening fire must be known by all.

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CHAPTER 7 CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION 1. Enemy Intentions. The principles of defence1 apply to urban operations as much as to those in any other environment. Planning for an urban defence is best preceded by consideration of the enemy’s intentions, which may include the following: a. Pre-emption of the Defence. The enemy commander tasked with assaulting a built-up area will try to prevent the defender from the preparation and consolidation of a strong defensive position. He will try to achieve surprise, either by a rapid rate of advance bringing his forces to bear before a defensive position can be effectively established, by using an air-assault force or a forward mobile or mechanised detachment to achieve early penetration, to by-pass unprepared opposition or to seize vital ground in the urban area before it can be prepared for defence. b. Avoidance of Attrition. The likely attrition rates and the time and resource consumption of prolonged urban operations may lead the enemy commander to avoid or to minimise his involvement in the urban battle. When time allows, consideration should be given to the advantages of conducting a comprehensive defence of all the approaches to the town or city using the long-range all arms and integral support weapon capabilities to destroy or divert the enemy, and prevent the further preparation of the defensive position before the urban battle is joined. c. Bombardment. The enemy could use intense indirect and direct fire and air bombardment to significantly reduce resistance in a defended urban area, anticipating that subsequently inserted ground forces would face less effective resistance. SECTION 2 - THE ELEMENTS OF A DEFENSIVE OPERATION GENERAL ‘Chukov’s plan was to funnel and fragment German mass assaults with ‘breakwaters’. Strengthened buildings, manned by infantry with anti-tank guns and machine-guns, would deflect the attackers into channels where camouflaged T-34 tanks and anti-tank guns waited, half buried in the rubble behind. When German tanks attacked with infantry, the defenders’ main priority was to separate them. The Russian’s used trench mortars, aiming to drop their bombs just behind the tanks to scare off the infantry while the anti-tank gunners went for the tanks themselves. The channelled approaches would also be mined in advance by sappers, whose casualty rate was the highest of any specialisation. Wearing camouflage suits, when snow came, they crawled out at night to lay up anti-tank mines and conceal them. An experienced sapper could lay up to 30 a night. Stalingrad, Anthony Beevor, Penguin Books 2. In any built-up area, defensive operations should be aggressive, mobile and should exploit depth. The defender should concentrate on retaining the initiative, particularly in terms of his capacity to move forces and locate those of the enemy, in order to counter 1

Offensive Action, All Round defence, Depth, Mutual Support, Concealment, Deception, Striking Forces.

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enemy penetration. The defender should seek to disrupt and frustrate enemy intentions in every phase of battle. In the preparation for defence in the urban environment, consideration should be given to the following: a. The commander’s intentions should be made known as early as possible. Early warning of an intention to defend a built-up area will enable the correct grouping of his own forces and the necessary early pre-positioning of engineer resources and combat supplies. b. Preparation of the battlespace by the defender will be essential. Consideration should be given to the clearing of fields of fire, the construction of bunkers, the construction and reinforcing of obstacles, the laying of anti-tank mines and booby-traps2, the construction of concealed routes and underground movement systems, blocking possible enemy avenues of approach and the protection of civilian and military communications and utilities. The defender should always seek to exploit the three dimensional nature of urban operations. c. Concealment and cover will be available but line-of-sight observation will be difficult. Use should be made of observation devices to cover possible enemy infiltration approaches. Close attention should be given to ensuring mutual support and all-round defence. The nature of the terrain will lead to close-quarter combat. Defensive measures may include the barricading of streets and the employment of short-range direct fire weapons. Ideally the defence should be based on the following: (1) The Perimeter Battle. The aim of the perimeter battle is threefold: to provide information about the enemy’s strengths, intentions and avenues of approach, to delay his approach, and to allow more time for preparation for defence of the battlespace. Information gathering should be carried out with every technical means available and by troops committed to the perimeter force. Delay can be provided by indirect fire, air and aviation support and direct fire and aggressive operations by the perimeter force. The perimeter force must move or withdraw when they can no longer influence the battle. (2) The Disruption Battle. The aim of the disruption battle is to cause attrition, to disrupt the enemy principal and subsidiary approaches, to confuse the enemy about the strengths and dispositions of the defence and draw the enemy towards selected ‘killing areas’. The disruption battle should be a coordinated mobile battle that employs small forces in delaying operations. (3) The Main Defended Area (MDA) Battle. The aim of the MDA battle is to prevent the enemy from breaking in to the urban area. The MDA should consist of a series of defended localities, ideally mutually supporting, with each comprising strong points sited to defeat the enemy in selected engagement areas. The use of mobile reserves is important at every level and in each sector. This battle must be based on an aggressive defence and the initiative must be wrested from the enemy at every opportunity. Unless the enemy is moving unknowingly towards a designated killing area, every enemy assault or advance should be counter-attacked by any available force 2

According to the Ottawa Convention 1997, the use of booby-traps is permitted if they are directed only. against enemy combatants and not civilians, and their use is not indiscriminate.

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of any size, preventing the enemy from establishing a secure footing from which he can exploit further advances. (4)

Reserves. A mobile reserve is essential to any defensive operation.

PERIMETER FORCE 3. The perimeter force should be the first element of the defence to encounter the enemy. Its role will be vital to the intelligence preparation of the defensive battle and the conduct of the initial phase of the battle. Consideration should be given to its grouping and employment as follows: a. Grouping. The perimeter force should dominate the approaches to the builtup area and be grouped as tactically appropriate. Each group can comprise reconnaissance, armour, anti-armour, and infantry support. Support from indirect fire, air and aviation should be integral to the grouping. Engineers may be required to provide mobility corridors for force withdrawal and can provide obstacle and minelaying support. b.

Tasks. Typical tasks for the perimeter force are: (1)

To identify enemy strengths, intentions and main effort.

(2)

To delay and destroy enemy reconnaissance and investment forces.

(3) To delay and destroy assault forces in assembly areas and FUPs, using and indirect fire and its integral offensive assets. (4)

To cover obstacles with observation and fire.

c. Planning Considerations. Planning considerations for the perimeter force should include the following: (1) Siting. Information gathering devices should be sited to give as early and accurate warning of enemy intentions as possible. Perimeter force elements can be sited both on the outskirts of the urban area and beyond. The force must use camouflage and concealment to achieve the task of providing information about the enemy. They are likely to be priority targets for enemy indirect and air attack. (2)

Command. The Perimeter Force must have its own commander.

(3) Strength. The amount and type of combat and combat support in the perimeter force must be balanced against the need to prepare the effective defence of the urban area, to enable the collection of timely and accurate information about the enemy and to minimise the loss of equipment and capability before the start of the battle. Consideration must be given to the importance of mobility and careful planning of the perimeter force withdrawal.

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DISRUPTION FORCE 4. The disruption force should cause attrition, disrupt the attack and draw the enemy towards selected killing areas. The disruption force should cause significant delay to the start of the enemy operation. a. Grouping. The grouping of the disruption force should be based on small infantry teams conducting fighting patrols, ambushes and tank-hunting patrols. Use should be made of snipers, armoured support and indirect fire. b.

Tasks. Tasks for the disruption force may include the following: (1)

Cause enemy attrition.

(2)

Delay and disrupt the enemy assault.

(3)

Draw the enemy into the MDA killing areas.

(4)

Confuse the enemy about the layout of the defence.

c. Planning Considerations. following:

Planning considerations may include the

(1) Location. The Disruption Force should operate between the perimeter force and the MDA. It can operate outside and within the built up area and to be effective it should be prepared to conduct mobile, offensive and aggressive action. (2) Obstacles. Maximum use should be made of indirect fire, obstacles and mines to slow the enemy's movement and channel him onto selected routes. (3) Deception. The disruption force should use deception both before and during the battle, to deceive the enemy as to the location, strength and intentions of the defender. (4) Command and Control. The disruption force conducts independent operations, but effective control is essential if it is to contribute to the overall defensive plan. Consideration can be given to the use of the fire support company headquarters to command the force. (5) Communication. Good communication between the disruption force and the battlegroup HQ is essential. THE MAIN DEFENSIVE AREA The fighting in Ortona has become a classic example in the art of street fighting. The. 3rd German Parachute Regiment was responsible for the Ortona Sector and had made its 2nd Battalion under Captain Liebschev responsible for the town. Liebschev prepared his defences with extraordinary thoroughness, choosing only to defend the northern half of the town. The southern half was turned into a nightmare Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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of booby trapped and mined houses some blown into the streets to form road blocks and others to create fields of fire. All his strong points were linked by mouse-holes from house to house. All the approaches to defended sector were either heavily mined or under concealed enfilade fire. The 2nd Canadian Brigade was given the task of clearing a way through the town and was forced to fight its way from house to house. Every building, when taken, had to be occupied to stop the Germans infiltrating back into it. The fighting was at such close quarters that artillery support was impossible3 and so ruthless that little quarter was given”. The capture of Ortona, December 1943 Extract from a report by 1st Canadian Division

Fig B-7-2 1st Canadian Division Troops Fighting Through a Defended Town in Italy, 1943 5. The Main Defensive Area (MDA) consists of a series of defended localities, ideally mutually supporting and of company group strength with armoured support. These localities form the bulwark of the defence. Their construction should be the first priority for preparation of the defensive position. a. Grouping. Grouping should be primarily infantry supported by armour and artillery in the direct or indirect fire role. b.

3

Tasks. The tasks of the defended localities may include the following: (1)

Destroy the enemy.

(2)

Break up the momentum of the enemy attack.

(3)

Prevent the break out of the enemy.

The capture of Ortona, December 1943. Extract from a report by 1st Canadian Division.

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c. Planning Considerations: following:

Planning considerations should include the

(1) Alternative Positions. If time permits, alternative positions for every level of command should be prepared. (2) Killing Areas. Defended localities should be sited to cover designated killing areas. Mutual support between localities is important and covered movement between defended localities essential. (3)

Reserves. Each defended sector or area requires a local reserve.

(4) Fire Plan. Where conditions allow, a defensive fire plan should be prepared. (5) Counter Attack. Plans should be made for counter attack at every level of command and at every opportunity. Rehearsals should be conducted. RESERVE 6. The reserve should be located centrally and should be mobile. It may be used to support any part of the defence. a. Grouping. The grouping of the reserve should be based on infantry and armour. Engineers should be included if available. b.

Planning Considerations. Consideration should be given during planning to: (1) Selection, maintenance and protection of covered routes for counterattacks and for movement between localities. (2) The need for the reserve to be immediately available to the commander and for its commanders to be aware of the current phase of the defensive battle. (3) Options for the employment of elements of the perimeter force after their withdrawal.

THE CO-ORDINATION OF A DEFENSIVE OPERATION 7. The coordination of all forces involved in defensive operations is crucial to success. The following points should be noted: a. Planning. A well-planned defence in depth involving the mutual support of defended buildings and localities, the use of obstacles, mines, booby-traps, cleared fields of fire and the canalisation of the enemy into killing zones will demoralise the enemy and can contribute to a successful defence. b. Aggressive Action. The defender should exploit his intimate knowledge of the built-up area to retain the initiative and act offensively. Aggressive patrolling, raids, sniping and ambushes should be used continuously to confuse, surprise and Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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put strain on the enemy. His planning should be disrupted and his weaknesses and failures exploited. The defender should be relentless in attempting to infiltrate into areas behind the enemy, captured and cleared but not occupied, and should then attack his headquarters and support areas. c. Counter-Attacks. The battlegroup reserve can be used for counter-attack, but in the urban environment such initiatives require careful and centralised planning, not least to minimize the risk of fratricide. At every level, counter-attacks should be as spontaneous and immediate as can be achieved, and should take advantage of the cover and concealment afforded by the built-up area. Small elements, such as fire-teams, can achieve surprise and recapture terrain and buildings against elements of their own size or bigger when the enemy is disorganised. d. Frontages. Defence of towns or cities requires a higher density of troops and smaller defensive sectors than in open terrain. An infantry company occupying 1,500 to 2,000 metres in open terrain can be reduced to a frontage one-third the size, 300 to 800 metres, in a built-up area. The tactical situation, the building density, collateral damage and street patterns will dictate the frontage of the unit. As an approximate guide the minimum frontages in built-up areas are as follows: Unit (a) Battle Group Company Group Platoon

Frontage (b) 4 to 8 blocks 2 to 4 blocks 1 to 2 blocks

Depth (c) 3 to 6 blocks 2 to 3 blocks 1 block

Note: An average city block is taken to have a frontage of 175 metres. These minimum figures apply in areas of dense, block-type construction, multi-storey buildings and underground passages. DEFENCE IN LIMITED VISIBILITY 8. The attacker may try to use limited visibility conditions, smoke or night-time activities, to conduct operations to sustain or regain momentum. Plans to counter this threat should be an integral part of the STAP4 and should employ the following measures to defend against attacks at night or limited visibility. a. Defensive positions and crew-served weapons can be moved just before dark/stand-to to deceive the enemy as to their exact location. Individual, fire-team, section and gun group positions can often be moved forward, or to an adjacent building where they can cover the same likely enemy approach. b. Unoccupied areas between force elements, which can be covered by observed fire during daylight, should be occupied by standing or listening patrols or secured by mobile patrolling at night. c. Radar, remote sensors, and night observation devices including those of artillery observers should be used to cover streets and open areas at all times.

4

Surveillance Target Acquisition Plan, made by the comd to coordinate STA resources.

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d. Nuisance mines, booby-traps, wire and OPs should be positioned on secondary avenues of approach. e. The irregular use of artillery and mortar DFs, OPs, planned direct fire, patrols and anti-intrusion devices should be used to prevent infiltration. f. Artificial illumination can be used where feasible, but it can provide help to both sides. g. Indirect fire weapons, grenade launchers and hand grenades should be used where possible when defences are probed to avoid disclosure of firing positions. h. During an enemy night assault, pre-planned DFs and FPFs should be initiated. Crew-served weapons, AFV weapon platforms and individual riflemen should fire within their assigned sectors. Grenades and command detonated mines should be used to supplement fire during the approach and the attack. Rapid and early counter-attack should be employed to exploit the enemy’s confusion. i.

Defenders should move back to daylight positions before first light/stand-to.

KEY TERRAIN 9. Key terrain is any place where seizure, retention or control affords a marked advantage. Examples of key terrain are bridges over canals or rivers, building complexes, public utilities, or open areas. The identification of key terrain allows the defender to select his defensive positions and assists in determining the enemy's objectives. OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE 10. General. The attacker must cross streets and open areas between buildings to advance, and will do so using fire and movement. The fire can be indirect mortar and artillery fire: it can be direct tank, anti-tank, rocket-propelled grenade or machine-gun fire. The defender must remain able to observe these open areas and bring effective fire to bear. The use of concealed machine guns and snipers can be very effective against enemy movement across streets or open areas. 11. Cover and Concealment. The cover and concealment provided by buildings, rubble and the urban jungle should be used to prepare and improve defensive positions. Positions may be easily and quickly improved by using materials at hand. When the defender has to move, he can reduce his exposure by: a.

Using prepared breaches through buildings.

b.

Moving through reconnoitred and marked underground systems.

c.

Using trenches.

d.

Using the concealment offered by smoke and darkness to cross open areas.

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rounds are fired. Inside buildings, lightly constructed interior walls and furniture are likely to be penetrated. These effects should be considered both when firing at enemy positions and when balancing the risk to friendly forces in the area. The following common barriers in built-up areas stop a 5.56 mm round fired at less than 50 metres: a.

One thickness of sandbags.

b.

2 inch concrete wall (not reinforced).

c.

55 gallon drum filled with water or sand.

d.

Small ammunition container filled with sand.

e.

Hollow concrete building block filled with sand (block will probably shatter).

f.

Brick veneer.

g.

Car engine block.

13. 7.62mm Bullet Penetration. 7.62mm ammunition is considerably more penetrative than the 5.56mm. The AK47 fires 7.62 x 39mm and is the most common assault rifle in the world. FIRE HAZARDS 14. Detailed knowledge of the terrain allows the defender to avoid potential fire hazards. All built up areas are vulnerable to fire, especially, but not only, those with wooden buildings. Special attention must be paid to the fire hazards of petroleum stores, gas tanks and electricity stations. All defensive positions should have fire-fighting materials and evacuation plans. COMMUNICATIONS 15. Past operations in urban areas have demonstrated how easily VHF radios are screened and how their range can be reduced. As a consequence, radios must be carefully sited and maximum use must be made of rebroadcast stations and the remoting of antennae to high points. The use of the upper end of the VHF band and high power switches on radios, where these exist, will also assist. Commanders should be prepared to encounter difficulty in establishing and maintaining communications; they should therefore plan for the frequent re-siting of rebroadcast stations in order to ensure communications. All radio users should be trained in and employ basic skills which are just as important in the era of digital communications, such as movement to establish communications, elevation where possible and avoidance of obscurance from walls or buildings. Commanders should also be aware of the effect of environmental factors on range and plan accordingly. If time and the battle situation allow, use can be made of civilian fixed and mobile telephony, although it will be insecure and may only be used in accordance with theatre specific mandates. DEFENCE OF VILLAGES, STRIP AREAS AND TOWNS 16.

Villages. Villages are often on choke points in valleys, dominating the only avenue

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of approach through the terrain. If the buildings in such a village are well constructed and provide good protection against both direct and indirect fire, a strong defensive position can be created using a company group, while controlling close and dominating terrain with other battalion elements. Villages on the approaches to large towns or cities may be used by a commander to add depth to the defence or to secure the flanks. These villages are often characterized by clusters of stone, brick or concrete houses and buildings. Company-sized battle positions can be established in these small villages to block approaches into the main defensive positions. 17. Strip Areas. Strip areas consist of houses, shops and factories and are built along roads or down valleys between towns and villages. They afford the defender the same advantages as villages. If visibility is good and suitable fields of fire are available, a unit acting as a protective force need occupy only a few strong positions spread out within the strip. This will deceive the enemy, when engaging at long ranges, into thinking the strip is an extensive defensive line. Strip areas often afford covered withdrawal routes to the flanks once the attacking force is deployed and before the protective force is engaged. 18. Towns and Cities. Advantage can be gained in the defence of a town or small city/choke point by placing tanks, anti-tank resources and pre-planned indirect fire on the critical approaches through the built up area. By denying the enemy the ability to bypass the town or city, the defending force will retain control of the key terrain. Reserve forces should always be placed to provide rapid reinforcement. Minefields, other obstacles and indirect fire will assist in slowing and canalising an attack. Finding positions in towns and cities that provide both good fields of fire and cover is frequently difficult. The forward edges of a town will provide the best fields of fire but are obvious and will be targeted by the enemy. Civic buildings, and other stronger structures which provide adequate cover and are more suitable for defence, will more likely to be found in the centre of towns and will have more limited fields of fire on likely avenues of approach. The city centre is likely to consist of high rise buildings that will offer the defender observation, protection and good fields of fire, but it will attract indirect and direct fire, limit egress and will be to the detriment of mobility. SECTION 3 - THE USE OF DELAY IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS GENERAL 19. Delay within a defensive operation is a sub-phase of conventional war that is conducted against a numerically, and possible technically superior enemy in a situation of wide scale hostilities. It should not be confused with other operations such as key point defence in an urban environment. THE PURPOSE OF DELAY 20. Delay is an operation in which a force under pressure can divert and slow down enemy momentum and inflict damage without becoming decisively engaged. The defender may be outnumbered, the air situation may well be unfavourable and the initiative is likely to be with the enemy. 21. The use of an urban area to delay the enemy can provide the hinge around which the enemy will be either required to manoeuvre and be channelled into an area favourable for his destruction, or oblige him to assault the defended village, town or city to maintain or Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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regain his momentum. By using indirect and long-range fire effectively, exploiting the restrictions on tactical movement, improving the obstacles generic to urban terrain and using aggressive action to limit the enemy’s options and wrest the initiative away from the enemy, a commander may conduct a successful delay from and in a built-up area. 22. A battle group is likely to be tasked to conduct a delaying operation as part of a higher formation's plan in one of the following circumstances: a.

As a covering force during a withdrawal.

b. As an advance guard when encountering superior forces or in response to an enemy counter-attack. c.

As a fixing force in mobile defence.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 23. When planning this type of operation, the formation commander attempts to satisfy one or more of the following objectives: a.

To slow down the enemy's advance.

b.

To determine the enemy's main effort.

c.

To manoeuvre the enemy into areas where he is vulnerable to counter-attack.

24. A delay operation may be conducted in conditions of enemy ground and air superiority. Command, control and communication could be difficult, particularly in a multinational or coalition environment, and commanders should pay particular attention to the cohesion of the force while the enemy retains the initiative. When making his plan the commander should consider the following measures to aid the maintenance of cohesion and control. He should: a.

Make a thoroughly aggressive plan using all available resources and forces.

b.

Give the opportunity for offensive action at all levels.

c.

Retain defensive mobility as long as possible.

d.

Maintain a viable combat service support system.

25. The methods employed to conduct a delay operation are similar to those pertaining to the perimeter force and disruption force. The ultimate intent is to oblige the enemy to alter his line of advance or to delay him by inducing him to attack. THE CONDUCT OF A DELAY 26. General. A delay operation is likely to be complicated and confused, but there will be a number of separate and linked actions for which the commander should plan and prepare. These stages or actions are:

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27.

a.

Preparatory.

b.

Delaying Action.

c.

Breaking Contact.

Preparatory Action. The following procedures should be adopted: a. Organisation. In delaying operations the organization of the area used is similar to that of the defence. The delay normally starts on a line given in the mission and extends rearward to a line where responsibility for the enemy is passed to another force, or to a line where the type of operation changes (normally the FEBA, a phase line forward of the FEBA, or possibly the handover line). Within the area given, the forces will usually be assigned lateral boundaries. Unit and formation frontages will tend to be larger than in the defence. The commander of a delaying force has to decide which parts of the assigned area he will use for his operation, which parts he may abandon earlier than others, and which ones need only be monitored. In a built-up area less combat power may be required for each task and the nature of the terrain lends itself to dispersed and more mobile operations, however, this increases the problems of command and control. b.

Battle Procedure. Sufficient time should be allocated to: (1)

An early estimate of the enemy’s intentions.

(2) The deployment and employment of indirect and direct-fire weapon systems, and the preparation of withdrawal routes. (3) Selection and preparation of defended positions and routes through the built-up area.

28.

(4)

Selection and preparation obstacles, barriers and killing areas.

(5)

Coordination with superior and adjacent units.

Delaying Action. a. Concept. The concept of the operation is to oblige the enemy to change his routes, to divert his resources and to take offensive action in urban terrain that will cause him delay. When conducting a delaying action, elements of the delaying force will have to both attack and defend. The commander should therefore consider the following points: (1) Aggression. The delaying force must take every opportunity to initiate aggressive action. Troops will be employed in maintaining surveillance, engaging the enemy at long and at short range, delaying the enemy aggressively, withdrawing to the next delaying position or being available as a reserve. (2) Frustration of Enemy Intentions. Frustrate the enemy's desire to move quickly through the area by blocking roads. Destroy a committed

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enemy by sealing routes behind him. destroy an unprepared opponent.

Relatively small urban forces can

(3) Depth. A delaying force should make use of the depth of the urban area to ambush men and vehicles and to attack the enemy's flank and rear. The majority of the defending troops can engage the enemy along his most likely approach routes and bring a heavy weight of direct and indirect fire to bear. (4) Intelligence. The tactical situation will change frequently and rapidly. The commander should ensure that he has well organized ISTAR assets providing sound and timely intelligence, good communications and as strong a reserve as possible. (5) Counter-Attacks. Maintaining close contact with the enemy and using counter-attacks at every level and every opportunity contributes significantly to the success of the delaying operation. b.

Execution. The delaying force will normally consist of three elements: (1) Screen. The screen might consist of reconnaissance forces, longrange anti-tank teams, armour and aviation and indirect fire controllers. Its task will be to provide early information on the location, strengths and movement of the enemy, to engage and destroy enemy armour and the draw the enemy into the built up area. Every opportunity should be taken to cause delay and inflict casualties. (2) Delaying Forces. Delaying forces in built-up areas should consist of a combined arms grouping with infantry in the lead. Mobility, built around a number of prepared positions, is the key to urban delay. (3) Reserves. Reserves should be held available to deal with unexpected reverses that threaten the cohesion of the defence.

c. Coordination. In order to oblige the enemy to take offensive action that will prejudice his advance, the following points should be considered: (1) Every advantage offered by the terrain should be exploited. The enemy’s advance should be impeded and every opportunity should be taken to surprise and ambush him, taking care to ensure timely disengagement. (2) Elements of the delaying force in danger of being overrun or outflanked should be prepared to disengage and withdraw. (3) The fluid situation during delaying operations will necessitate constant and close coordination between sub-units, and effective fire control. d. Disengagement. Troops withdrawing from a defensive position should break cleanly, if possible. Local counter-attacks can help achieve disengagement. The use of subterranean routes, smoke, direct fire, hasty indirect fire plans and deception may also be considered, but the need for good planning and control is paramount. Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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29. Breaking Contact. The withdrawal of the delaying force is difficult, especially if the force has been unable to disengage. The commander’s aim should be to prevent his force from being 'fixed' by the enemy. Control of the withdrawal is critical and the enemy should be given as little indication as possible of the intention to disengage. The withdrawing force must provide accurate information to formation headquarters on its plans. Liaison elements should be attached to superior and adjacent commands to identify withdrawing units as they retire. SUMMARY 30. In a high intensity conflict against numerically superior forces a unit or formation can expect to be tasked with imposing delay on the enemy. Although the defender might be outnumbered, the air situation unfavourable and the momentum and initiative with the enemy, a large built up area can provide ideal terrain upon which to conduct a delaying operation with a comparatively small force. The force will need to be a combined arms grouping and will require long and short range anti-armour and anti-personnel weapon systems and engineer support. The defence must be aggressive and should be based on the principles of mobility, resolution, surprise and clean disengagement. Control will be difficult to achieve but critical to success. SECTION 4 - ENHANCED BLAST WEAPONS 31. Enhanced Blast Weapons (EBW) rely on blast to inflict damage, rather than explosively driven metal projectiles, fragments or shaped charges. They may or may not be thermobaric.5 32. Troops must be prepared to defend themselves against EBW without reducing their defence capability against other weapons. Although the anti-personnel effect of the EBW remains lethal at or near the point of impact, the intensity of the wave that passes into adjacent rooms and the wider kinetic effect of the weapon will be reduced below the lethality threshold. This will prevent damage to the structure and reduce the chance of structural collapse. 33.

The structural defensive measures against EBW are as follows: a. Venting. ‘Venting' involves creating vents sufficiently big to reduce the intensity of the blast wave. The creation of suitable ‘vents’ by removing the walls, sections of walls, and/or roofs will have to be balanced against the consequent loss of ballistic protection from other weapons. b. Premature Detonation. Causing EBW warheads to detonate outside the structure at a distance from the exterior wall will reduce the effects of the explosion on the structure. Rocket screens similar to those once used in Northern Ireland should cause the detonation of a single warhead, such as the RPO-A Schmel6. Against a tandem warhead, such as RShG-17, the kinetic effect will also be reduced. The detrimental effect on camouflage and concealment of the defended position must be taken into consideration before screens are erected.

5

Denoting a very large fuel–air bomb which ignites into a fireball when detonated, creating a powerful wave of pressure that sucks out oxygen from any confined spaces nearby. Concise OED. 6 Russian hand held thermobaric weapon. 7 Russian hand held tandem warhead thermobaric weapon.

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c. Building Selection. If the enemy are equipped with EBW, consideration should be given to selecting only those buildings with a structural framework of steel or reinforced concrete that will defeat the warhead. d. Building Preparation. The preparation of prepared positions with lateral and overhead cover should be considered.

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CHAPTER 8 STABILITY OPERATIONS SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION 1. Stability operations are planned continuously and conducted concurrently with offensive and defensive operations. They are defined as: ‘Military operations which contribute to order, security and control in order to set the conditions to allow the primacy of non-military and indigenous organisations to develop accountable institutions and mechanisms of government.1’ 2. Stability operations form a key component of land tactical activities and have become increasingly prevalent in recent years. Military involvement could range from conflict prevention measures in failed or failing states to providing support to nation building. Where the security situation is such that civilian actors2 (international or HN) are unable to operate, the military may have to take initial responsibility for the provision of the rule of law, basic utilities and governance until a handover of responsibility can be achieved. 3. There are four interrelated groups of tactical activities associated with stability operations and these cross all likely lines of operation: a.

Security and control.

b.

Initial restoration of essential services and facilities.

c.

Interim governance tasks.

d.

Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR).

4. The detail on these activities is contained in AFM Vol 1 Pt 1,’Formation Tactics’, Chapter 5, ‘Stability Operations’. This should be read in conjunction with AFM Vol 1 Pt 9, ‘Tactics for Stability Operations’, which provides detail on TTPs. 5. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the issues pertinent to the conduct of stability operations in the urban environment.

1

AFM Vol 1 Part 9 Tactics for Stability Operations. Civil actors is a collective term for the range of civil agencies, bodies and organisations that may be involved in addressing the circumstances and conditions of a conflict or crisis situation. These include: OGDs, International Organisations (IOs); international donors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU); security forces such as the Civil Police; Non Government Organisations (NGOs); the corporate sector; local authorities; and local populations. 2

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SECTION 2 – FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION DURING URBAN STABILITY OPERATIONS 6. Demographics. A thorough understanding of the physical and cultural environment is essential to the successful conduct of any stability operation. The following list provides a flavour of some of the subjects requiring analysis in the urban environment:

Fig B-8-1 1 A&SH Protecting Roman Catholic Parents and Children Going to the Holy Cross School, Belfast, October 2001. a. The location of inter-ethnic, -social and -economic boundaries and any resulting areas of contention or violence. b.

Cultural norms and attitudes.

c. The location of key infrastructure (government facilities, power and water plants, schools, hospitals etc) and significant cultural/religious sites. d. The key leaders and opinion formers amongst the population (these may include political, tribal, religious, economic, criminal leaders) and how they communicate with them. e.

Where the loyalties/sympathies of elements of the population lie.

f. Expectations and prejudices of the population (attitude towards police, foreign troops, NGOs, HN government etc). g.

Standard of service provision (sewage, electricity, water, health care etc).

h. The movement of goods and people. How are they moved, where can crowds gather easily, ingress and egress routes for adversaries etc. 7. Influence Activities. Support, or at least tolerance, for the military by the local population is essential to success. Influence activities are required to influence local, national and regional attitudes and perceptions in order to support the establishment of a secure environment, the development of law and order and the establishment of a legitimate form of government. Any information vacuum will be ruthlessly and rapidly exploited by adversaries who are likely to have the advantage of local knowledge and who Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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are unconstrained by the need to tell the truth. The military must use influence activities in support of all lines of operation. Methods include Key Leader Engagement (KLE), the use of tactical PSYOPS teams and presence, posture and profile to shape the perceptions of a variety of audiences. Understanding the environment, in its broadest sense, is essential to ensuring that the correct message is delivered. Some examples of how Influence Activity may be employed are given below: a. Promote the authority of and generate popular support for legitimate HN institutions and indigenous security forces. b. Marginalise violent factions, criminals and other spoilers from the majority of public support. c. Develop and protect consent (or tolerance) towards the MNF by the local population. d.

Explain the reason for operations and the use of force by the military.

e.

Communicate instructions, provisions and rules to the population.

f.

Shape conditions prior to military activity in order to pre-empt negative effects.

g. Reinforce and strengthen the will and resolve of the indigenous security forces and allies. 8. Use of Force. The use of force will be governed by ROE. In the urban environment, given the density of the population and buildings, there is a strong likelihood of collateral damage and a subsequent effect on others besides the intended target. Consideration must, wherever possible, be given to the appropriate use of force. It may be legal to use a particular weapon system (eg JDAM) in response to a given threat (eg sniper team in a minaret) but would it improve the overall situation? 9. The Adversary. Adversaries likely to be encountered in the complex terrain of the urban environment will be highly diverse. They will be driven by different motives (eg religious, political, criminal and ethnic), capable of and willing to employ a range of methods to achieve their ends (including a mix of conventional and asymmetric attack, information operations, intimidation and establishing shadow government) and willing to form alliances of convenience to achieve common goals. Unconstrained by international law they will ruthlessly exploit opportunities that present themselves, seek to undermine what we perceive to be legitimate governance and compete for the support/compliance of the population. 10. COIN. The conduct of stability operations in the urban environment is likely to bear many of the hallmarks of a COIN operation. The principles of COIN3 provide a sound basis for the conduct of stability operations. 11. Intelligence. Success in urban stability operations is normally dependent on the acquisition of accurate and timely intelligence. The allocation of additional man-power and resources to the collection and subsequent processing of information is therefore critical. 3

See AFM Vol 1 Part 10 Counter Insurgency Operations.

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a. HUMINT. In urban stability operations the most critical information and subsequent intelligence comes from the population. The quantity and quality of this data is dependent, to some extent, on the credibility of the military force, the security that it can provide to the local population and the ability of as many ‘stability operators’ as possible to understand and speak the local language. Every member of the military force has to be aware of the overall intelligence requirements and how his interactions and observations may assist in the Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP). This awareness can and should be developed by regular briefings and debriefings. b. IMINT. Exploitation of imagery intelligence is coordinated within the Joint Intelligence Cell (JIC). Imagery from Tactical Air Reconnaissance (TAR) is interpreted and distributed on request by a Joint Reconnaissance Intelligence Cell (JRIC). Collection aircraft may be manned or unmanned, fixed wing, rotary wing or ducted fan, and the product may be “wet film” TI or IR film, digital images or a real time down-link. In addition there are a large number of ground based systems ranging from the basic camera to highly sophisticated and specialized photographic equipment. UAVs can and should be made available to provide real time situational awareness to deployed troops. c. SIGINT and EW. SIGINT and EW4 can provide a considerable advantage in an urban environment, particularly if the assets are tactically placed well forward and if the information gathered is fed directly to the forces engaged in the fighting by the shortest possible loop. The possibilities have been demonstrated by the increased use of Light EW Teams (LEWT) on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. d. Other Sources. Support to SSR involves working alongside the indigenous security forces who will have their own intelligence capability and intimate knowledge of the operating environment. A system for using information provided by the indigenous security force should be established. Members of NGOs may also have useful information. This should be obtained and used sensitively, without compromising their neutrality or their relationship with the military, most likely through CIMIC teams. SECTION 3 - SECURITY AND CONTROL 12. Introduction. Security and control is likely to be the main focus of military activity when conducting stability operations. The specific challenges posed by the urban environment stem from the high densities of buildings and people. Such a complex environment restricts fields of view, disrupts communications and requires significant numbers of troops to control whilst providing adversaries with the opportunity to blend in and move with impunity. 13. Aim. The aim of security and control operations is to provide individual security for the population and set the conditions for civil actors to be able to operate. The main challenge to progress on the security line of development is that it cannot progress in isolation. Progress is also required simultaneously on governance, development and economics if success is to be achieved. Military activity clearly needs to be coordinated with the other lines of development and should not hamper their progress. Coordination of activity through an ORT or other similar setup is required. 4

Further details are contained in Part B, Chapter 4, Section 5 – Electronic Warfare

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14. Tasks. There are a number of tactical tasks associated with security and control. Details for the TTPs for each task are provided in AFM Vol 1 Part 9 ‘Tactics for Stability Operations’ and theatre-specific SOIs will provide additional guidance. Possible tasks may include the following: a. Patrolling. Patrolling enables the military force to dominate ground in order to deny its use to hostile forces and gain information. b. Convoy Protection. Convoys are often seen as soft targets by adversaries. Their protection is required to maintain our own operations. c. Public Order Operations. The military may need to conduct public order operations to maintain law and order where the civilian police are unable to deal with the situation. d. Cordon and Search. Cordon and search operations may be required in order to detain individuals, obtain evidence or deny weapons and equipment to hostile elements within an area. e. Route Protection. The protection of routes may be required as a Force Protection (FP) measure or to deny freedom of movement to hostile elements. Route Search and the use of Vehicle Check Points (VCP) provide the means by which this is achieved. Current TTPs cover movement control measures, the checking and search of routes, the use of ECM and IED counter-measures. f. Enforcement of Out of Bounds Areas. Key infrastructure, government buildings, vulnerable communities, food storage depots, armouries, magazines and other sensitive locations may need to be kept out of bounds or protected. g. Curfews. Curfews provide a means by which the movement of personnel can be controlled during specific periods of time. The following points should be considered: (1) Design of Curfew-Timings. Curfew timings should support the establishment of a secure and stable environment but not prevent the civil community from going about its legitimate business (religious activity, obtaining food, fuel etc). (2) Communication. Curfew restrictions, the reason for them and the consequences of breaches must be clearly communicated. (3) Enforcement. Framework patrolling, Vehicle Check Points (VCP), Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) triggered by observation posts, standing patrols and other ISTAR assets provide the means by which the curfew may be enforced. 15. Asymmetric Threats. The adversary faced in the urban environment will employ asymmetric methods against conventional military forces, HN institutions, the civil population, civil actors and opponents. Kidnapping, sniping, ambushes, beatings, torture, intimidation are common tactics as are the use of IEDs. The latter has become increasingly prolific and effective in recent years. Adversaries now employ devices with a range of Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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sophistication and means of delivery and are constantly adapting their TTPs to circumvent countermeasures. A system to constantly evaluate the threat and conduct counter-IED operations5 must be established. The TTPs and first principles to counter IEDs and suicide IEDs are given in AFM Vol 1, Part 9, ‘Tactics for Stability Operations’, and these means must be adapted by theatre specific methods aimed against the latest threat developments. SECTION 4 – INITIAL RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND FACILITIES 16. Military effort may be required in the early stages of an operation, and subsequently in periods or areas where the security situation deteriorates, to restore essential services and facilities6. This is especially important in the urban environment for the following reasons: a.

The urban population is reliant on municipal services.

b. Civil agencies and the instruments of government will be based in towns and cities. c. Civil agencies are incapable of delivering the required effect in a poor security situation. d.

Security may be improved: (1) Directly, for example by fixing populations (using methods such as the provision of clean water in a given area), improving routes (permitting, armoured vehicles/QRF and commercial access) and improving street lighting. (2) Indirectly, by removing causes for discontent amongst the civil population, denying a ‘shadow government’ the opportunity to occupy a vacuum and providing employment for disaffected elements of the population.

17. The restoration of essential services and facilities for a civilian population, linked to an Info Ops campaign and other lines of activity, is an early measure that can be taken to increase the chances of mission success. Restoration work must be linked to the Info Ops messages in order to capitalise on goodwill from the local population and deny criminal groupings unwarranted credit. It should be conducted in conjunction with security and control activity, linked to plans for economic growth and complement the longer term development plans of OGDs. Restoration activity is likely to be conducted primarily by military engineers or contractors with CIMIC staff playing a coordinating role until such a time as civilian actors can take responsibility. The military medical services may also be involved where there is a requirement to restore medical facilities for the civilian population and to provide advice on environmental health issues. 18. The nature and size of the military contribution will vary. In some circumstances it may be appropriate to focus the military engineering effort on the restoration of services for the population at the expense of the provision of facilities to the force.

5 6

Prevent, Detect and Neutralise, Mitigate, Exploit – JDN 05-06 C-IED. Sewage, Water, Electrical and Trash (SWET).

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SECTION 5 - INTERIM GOVERNANCE TASKS 19. It is accepted that the provision of governance is not generally a military responsibility and if the military do get involved it is most likely to be in a supporting role. However, in some circumstances, the military may be the only organisation that is able to take responsibility for governing an area. JWP 3-50 – The Military Contribution to PSO, identifies that the military may be required to undertake a range of civil administration tasks in support of a weak HN government or in the absence of a working indigenous or international administration. Such tasks may range from CIMIC liaison to the establishment of an interim military government and are likely to include some degree of responsibility for the provision of essential services. The military should seek to hand responsibility for governance tasks to an appropriate indigenous or international civil organisation at the earliest appropriate opportunity. Its primary role will be in establishing the environment in which civil actors can operate. SECTION 6 - MILITARY SUPPORT TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 20. Definition. Security Sector Reform (SSR)7 describes the overall (and largely political) process by which effective security structures are developed in order to allow the citizens of a state, including urban dwellers, to live in safety. SSR is likely to be a core task in countries emerging from conflict but may also make a significant contribution to conflict prevention in fragile or failing states. In all cases it is seen as a critical activity that provides the basis for longer-term stability and will address two broad areas; the quality of governance in the state (in terms of the relationships between security sector institutions, wider government apparatus and the general public) and the technical competence and professionalism of those in the security sector.8 21. The Security Sector. The composition of the security sector differs from country to country so there is no universally applicable definition of it. The military are most likely to be directly involved with a range of core security actors9 (not just the military) and will need to understand their relationship with and the role of security management oversight bodies, justice and law enforcement institutions and non-statutory security forces. 22. Tasks. The precise nature of tasks required to support SSR will vary according to a range of factors. Broadly speaking military support will likely involve training tasks, mentoring and then monitoring elements of the indigenous security force (through joint patrols and joint operations), capacity building, equipping and developing the whole range of G1-G9 skills as required10. Such activities must include consideration of urban operations. 23. Opportunities. Working alongside indigenous security forces provides the opportunity to give legitimacy to the operation by showing HN involvement and ownership 7

See AFM Vol 1 Part 1 Formation Tactics Chapter 5 for more detail. Joint Doctrine Note – The Military Contribution to SSR provides the strategic level doctrine on SSR and covers the comprehensive cross government approach. 9 Security Actors: armed forces; police and gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, government backed militias) and veterans groups. 10 Details on how to approach the development of an indigenous security force and building military capacity are contained in AFM Vol 1, Part 10, ‘Countering Insurgency’ and in AFM Vol, 1 Part 9, ‘Tactics for Stability Operations’ and Doctrine Note 07/16 Developing Indigenous Armies. 8

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of security operations from the outset. It also provides the opportunity for external military forces to capitalise on the local knowledge of the environment and low level HUMINT provided by the security forces.

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URBAN OPERATIONS PART C URBAN COMBAT SKILLS

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CHAPTER 9 URBAN COMBAT SKILLS ‘Russian and Chechen sources agree that non-standard squads (sections) were the basis of the rebel force. Such a squad might include two men with RPG-7 or Mukha (RPG-18) shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launchers, two with machine guns, and possibly a sniper. Alternatively, it could comprise one man with a machine gun, one with a RPG, and a sniper, backed up by one or more riflemen, automatic riflemen, ammunition bearers and medics. Approximately three such squads, with support made up a larger 25-man cell. Three 25man groups made up a 75-man unit. Each of the latter was allocated one mortar crew. This structure contributed significantly to the effectiveness of resistance ambushes. The rebels divided the city into quadrants. Within those quadrants, 75-man units deployed along parallel streets with the snipers in covering positions. One 25-man subgroup, which included the unit command, deployed in smaller, six or seven-man formations in the lower stories of buildings along one side of the street (to avoid crossfire and to establish escape routes). The two other 25-man teams deployed similarly intro the basements and lower stories at the point of entry to the ambush site. From there, they could seal the area and reinforce their compatriots as needed. In some cases they mined the buildings at the point of entry. As the Russian forces approached the entry teams informed the others by Motorola.’ Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994-2000 Lessons from Urban Combat, Rand SECTION 1 – CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT GENERAL 1. Camouflage and concealment in built-up areas is as important to the survival of troops and equipment as in any other environment. The changing patterns of terrain and the differing nature of individual buildings make the task of blending with the terrain significantly challenging. APPLICATION OF CAMOUFLAGE 2. Urban areas provide plenty of cover from view which should, where possible and practicable, be used to conceal soldiers and materiel. Where such concealment is not possible, Urban Camouflage Material (UCM) and locally available materials should be applied using innovation and initiative. The following points should be noted: a. Buildings provide numerous concealed positions. Armoured vehicles can often find isolated positions under archways or inside small industrial or commercial structures. Thick masonry, stone, or brick walls offer excellent protection from direct fire and provide concealed routes. b. After camouflage is completed, the soldier should inspect a position from the enemy's viewpoint. He should make routine and periodic checks to see if the camouflage remains natural looking and actually conceals the position. If it does not look natural, the soldier should rearrange or replace it.

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c. Positions have to be progressively camouflaged as they are prepared. Work should continue until all camouflage is complete. When the enemy has air superiority, work may be possible only at night. Shiny or light-coloured objects that attract attention from the air should be hidden. d. If the enemy has Thermal Imaging (TI) capability, soldiers have to be aware that UCM and other drape materials will not, on their own, conceal vehicles. Thermal Camouflage Woodland (TCW) has to be used in conjunction with the UCM. Care should also be taken to avoid giving a heat signature to an obviously derelict building. THE USE OF SHADOW 3. Buildings in built-up areas throw sharp shadows, which can be used to conceal vehicles and equipment. Soldiers should avoid areas that are not in shadows. Vehicles may have to be moved periodically as shadows shift during the day. Emplacements inside buildings provide better concealment. Other features of shadows that can have useful military application are that: a. Soldiers should avoid the lighted areas around windows and loopholes. They will be better concealed if they fire from the shadowed interior of a room. b. A lace curtain or piece of cheesecloth provides additional concealment to soldiers in the interior of rooms if curtains are common to the area. Interior lights should not be used. TEXTURE AND COLOUR 4. Standard camouflage pattern painting of equipment is not as effective in built-up areas as a solid, dull, dark colour hidden in shadows. Since repainting vehicles before entering a built-up area will not always be practical, the patterns should be subdued with mud or dirt. a. The need to break up the silhouette of helmets and individual equipment exists in built-up areas the same as it does elsewhere, but care must be taken not to negate the effectiveness of helmet-fitted night vision equipment. Predominant colours are normally browns, tans and greys rather than greens, but each camouflage location needs to be checked for texture and colour. b. Weapons emplacements should use a wet blanket canvas, or cloth to keep dust from rising when the weapon is fired. c. Command posts and logistical emplacements are easier to camouflage and better protected if located underground. Antennas can be remoted to upper stories or to higher buildings based on remote capabilities. Field telephone wire should be laid in conduits, in sewers, or through buildings. d. Soldiers should consider the background to ensure that they are not silhouetted or sky-lined, but rather blend into their surroundings. To defeat enemy surveillance, soldiers should be alert for common camouflage errors such as the following:

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(1) Tracks or other evidence of activity. hardened roads and tracks wherever possible. (2)

Vehicles should be kept to

Shine or shadows.

(3) An unnatural colour or texture, camouflage net should not be used in an urban environment. (4)

Muzzle flash, smoke, or dust.

(5)

Unnatural sounds and smells.

(6)

Movement.

e. Dummy positions can be used effectively to distract the enemy and make him reveal his position by firing. SUMMARY 5. Built-up areas afford cover, resources for camouflage, and locations for concealment. The following basic rules of cover, camouflage, and concealment should be followed: a.

Use the terrain and alter camouflage habits to suit your surroundings.

b.

Employ dummy positions in buildings.

c. Continue to improve positions. Reinforce fighting positions with sandbags or other fragment - and blast absorbent material. d.

Maintain the natural look of the area.

e.

Keep positions hidden by clearing away minimal debris for fields of fire.

f.

Choose firing positions in inconspicuous spots when available. SECTION 2 - FIGHTING POSITIONS

GENERAL 6. One of the most important defensive tasks in urban operations is the preparation of individual and fire-team fighting positions. Fighting in built-up areas is likely to be at short range, fighting positions have limited arcs and casualties are caused as much by collateral damage as by kinetic or Enhanced Blast Weapons (EBW). Consideration should also always be given to the tactical advantages offered by fighting positions outside buildings. FEATURES OF A FIGHTING POSITION 7. Commanders should consider the following factors when establishing fighting positions:

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a.

Protection. (1) Buildings. Buildings should be selected to suit the tactical plan and consideration should be given to the value and amount of protection the building can provide. Weak structures will require time, manpower and resources to prepare them for defence. Where possible, solidly constructed buildings able to provide maximum protection from conventional weapons should be used first. Consideration should be given to the building's potential for collapse if subjected to kinetic or EBW attack. Buildings with an integral framework such as steel beam or reinforced concrete should be selected first. Weak buildings with no integral framework, such as most modern domestic dwellings, should be avoided. Firing positions should, where possible, be positioned on the ground floor with their own structural integrity and should include overhead protection. This will help protect the defender in the case of structural collapse. (2) Destroyed Buildings. The use of buildings that have been destroyed to create fire positions affords the defender better protection and makes the enemy’s task of identifying fire positions more difficult. Creation of such fire positions can be improved by constructing reinforced bunkers on the ground floor and collapsing the building around them. Routes in and fields of fire are then created and camouflage improved. Although this option offers maximum protection, it will be difficult and time-consuming to achieve and should not be underestimated. (3) Fighting Outside. Fire trenches outside buildings can provide effective fire positions. Trenches can be incorporated into a trench system linking fire positions, allowing communication and providing covered routes for movement. Such systems will nevertheless require considerable preparation and will be manpower and resource intensive.

b. Dispersion. Defending troops should be dispersed, with the minimum personnel in any one building required to achieve the task. The dispersion of individuals and fire-teams must not reduce the capacity for effective mutually supporting fire. Consideration should be given to the use of alternative positions to reduce the impact of casualties caused by collateral damage and building collapse. Once a position is located by the enemy the defender must be able to use sufficient heavy and accurate suppressive fire from concealed mutually supporting positions to allow his rapid escape and redeployment. c. Fields of Fire. In order to provide effective fields of fire over all approaches to the position and to provide mutual support, it may be necessary to reduce or destroy surrounding buildings and structures. d. Identification of Enemy Firing Positions. Fields of fire should cover all potential enemy firing positions. These firing positions should then be denied to the enemy by the use of obstacles, booby traps or by their destruction. e. Covered Routes. Firing positions should have at least one covered route to allow resupply, casualty evacuation, reinforcement and withdrawal. Firing positions

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paired with alternative positions should have connecting covered routes. PREPARATION 8.

Preparation of fighting positions requires careful planning. a. Selecting Positions. Every rifleman and weapon system must be allocated a primary arc of fire. Alternative positions should be selected that cover that same primary arc. These positions can be located in adjacent rooms or nearby buildings. Each firing position should have a secondary position covering a different arc in order to engage attacks from other or unexpected directions.

Fig C-9-1 Selecting Positions b. Weapon Positions. Individual resourcefulness should be encouraged when establishing fighting positions in a building. Positions should be situated primarily on the ground floor although the tactical plan must reflect the enemy’s modus operandi. Positions should be sited as far back into a building as possible. The temptation to fight from windows, doorways and the forward edge of buildings should be avoided in spite of improved arcs of fire. Fields of fire should be obtained by firing from alternate positions, perhaps from different rooms or buildings and should not be achieved by siting the weapon closer to the window. Every firing position must be designed to suit the firer, his weapon and the surroundings. Each position can be improvised from furniture, sandbags or other material and debris available.

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Fig C-9-2 Weapon Positions 9.

Other key considerations in the preparation of a firing position are as follows: a.

Positions should be situated as far back into the building as possible.

b.

Dummy positions can be used to attract enemy fire.

c. Windows/openings that are not required should be blocked to prevent entry. In the case of an EBW threat they should be of light construction so they blow out in the event of an attack. d. The forward apertures should be of the minimum size possible, notwithstanding the requirement to provide firepower onto the likely avenues of approach. The erection of rocket screens or the use of items such as chain link fencing can negate the effects of Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attack, although this may negate concealment and hinder the use of certain weapons. 10. Fixed Installations. Fixed military installations in the urban environment must be camouflaged and protected by direct and indirect fire and purpose-made or ad hoc rocket screens. 11. Building Positions. building.

There are many ways to establish a fighting position in a

a. Window Position. Soldiers should kneel or stand on either side of a window. To fire downward from upper floors, elevated firing positions should be constructed back from the window using tables, sandbags or anything else available placed against the wall, positioned to prevent the weapon from protruding through the window. Junior commanders should inspect individual fire positions to determine the arcs of fire available to each soldier.

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b. Loopholes. To avoid establishing a pattern of always firing from windows, loopholes can be prepared in walls. Again, individual firing positions should be sited back from loopholes in order to improve protection.

Fig C-9-3 Cone Shaped Loopholes (1) Several loopholes are usually required for each weapon (primary, alternative, and secondary positions). Loopholes can weaken walls and reduce protection against grenades and small-arms fire. Loopholes should not be obvious. Explosive blasting of loopholes can result in a large hole that will provide insufficient protection and will be seen by the enemy. (2) Loopholes should be cone-shaped to achieve the best arc of fire, to facilitate engagement of high and low targets, and to reduce the size of the exterior aperture. When not in use, loopholes should be concealed and protected by sandbags to prevent their use by the enemy to throw grenades or small arms fire. (3) Loopholes should also be prepared in interior walls and ceilings of buildings to permit fighting within the building. Interior loopholes should cover stairs, halls, and rooms, and, if possible, be concealed by debris or furniture. Loopholes in floors will allow the defender to engage the enemy on the floors below with small-arms fire and grenades. (4) Although walls will provide protection, they should be reinforced with sandbags, furniture filled with dirt, rubble or other material. Each position should have overhead and all-round protection. c. Other Construction Tasks. There will be a requirement to complete other construction tasks in basements, on the ground floor, and on upper floors. (1) Basements and Ground Floors. Both basements and ground floor levels will require the same amount of preparation. Every access to the building, underground or through the attic, that could provide enemy access must be blocked.

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(2) Doors. Unused doors should be locked, nailed shut, and blocked and reinforced with furniture, sandbags, rubble, barbed wire or other suitable material. (3) Hallways and Stairs. While allowance must be made for the defender's movement, hallways and stairs should be blocked with furniture, barbed wire and if possible booby-trapped.

Fig C-9-4

Blocking Stairwells

(4) Windows. All glass should be removed from every window. Windows not in use should be blocked with boards or sandbags. (5) Fighting Positions. Individual primary and alternative fighting positions should be constructed throughout the building. Fighting positions must offer protection from direct-fire weapons and grenades. d. Unoccupied Rooms. Rooms not being used should be sealed, and blocked with wire or other obstacles. (1) Upper Floors. Upper floors require the same preparation as ground floors. Windows should be covered with wire mesh to block grenades thrown from the outside. The defender must retain the ability to drop his own grenades. (2) Interior Routes. Defending troops must prepare and know their way around the building. They must be able to deal with any threat and engage the enemy from any direction. Withdrawal routes should be planned, prepared and rehearsed to allow rapid evacuation from the room or the building. ‘Mouseholes’ big enough to allow access to a crawling man should be made through interior walls to allow movement between rooms. Mouseholes can be booby-trapped and should be marked for both day and

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night identification. Rehearsals should be conducted to allow everyone familiarity with the internal routes around the building. (3) Fire Prevention. Buildings that use wood in their construction require comprehensive fire prevention measures. The attic and other wooden floors should be covered with at least 2-3cms of sand or earth. Water containers should be positioned around the building for immediate use. Fire-fighting materials (earth, sand, fire extinguishers, and blankets) should be assembled and placed on each floor. Available water basins and bathtubs should be filled as a reserve for fire-fighting. All electricity and gas should be turned off. Fire breaks can be created by the destruction of adjacent buildings. (4) Communications. In urban defence, consideration should be given to the extensive use of land-line. Telephone lines should be laid through adjacent buildings or underground systems, or buried in shallow trenches. Radio antennae can be concealed by placing them among other antennae or along the sides of chimneys and towers. If possible they should be hidden from ground observation. Telephone lines within the building can be laid through walls and floors. (5) Rubble. Destruction of parts of the building provides additional cover and concealment for weapons emplacements, and impedes enemy progress. Engineer advice and help should be sought to achieve this, if possible. (6) Rooftops. Consideration should be given to the building of obstacles on large flat-roofed buildings to prevent helicopter landings. Rooftops accessible from adjacent structures can be covered by fire or with wire and other obstacles. All obstacles should be covered by fire. Entrances to buildings from rooftops should be sealed and blocked. Any structure on the outside of a building that could assist scaling the buildings to gain access to upper floors, or to the rooftop, should be removed or destroyed. (7) Obstacles. Obstacles should be positioned in adjacent streets and roads to buildings in order create killing areas and to impede enemy armoured and infantry movement. (8) Fields of Fire. Fields of fire should be maximised around the defensive position. Buildings can be destroyed to enlarge fields of fire. Obstacles to anti-tank guided missiles should be cleared. Dead space should be covered with mines and obstacles. FIGHTING POSITIONS FOR TANKS, AFVs AND OTHER ARMED VEHICLES 12. Fighting positions for tanks, AFVs1 and other armed vehicles are essential to complete an effective defensive plan in built-up areas. Vehicle positions are selected and developed to obtain the best cover, concealment, observation and fields of fire, while still retaining the vehicle's ability to move.

1

For further details see Part B, Chapter 5 ‘All Arms Combat’, Section 1, Paragraphs 26-47.

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a. Vehicles should use hull-down positions to provide themselves additional cover and routes to alternative firing positions must be kept clear. Collapsed buildings may impede the movement and routes for some vehicles. It should be remembered that armoured vehicles and their crews will remain most vulnerable to top and rear deck attack. b. Vehicle hide positions provide cover and concealment. Inevitably, structural obscuration greatly limits or prevents the crew from seeing advancing enemy infantry. Close co-ordination and good communications, by radio and telephone, is vital between mounted and dismounted troops. Alternatively an observer from the vehicle can be concealed in an adjacent building from where he can acquire the target and direct the vehicle to move to its firing position. After firing, vehicles should move to alternative positions to avoid compromise.

Fig C-9-5 Vehicle Hide Position, Utilising an Observer FIGHTING POSITIONS FOR ANTI-TANK WEAPONS 13. Anti-tank weapons2 should be employed to maximize their capabilities in the built-up area. a. Whenever Javelin is fired in the urban environment, urban furniture, including rubble, can interfere with missile flight. When firing down streets, missiles require at least one metre of clearance over rubble. Other obstacles to missile flight can include trees and large shrubs, vehicles, television antennae, buildings, power lines and wires, walls, and fences. b. NLAW is better suited for urban combat:. Its minimum arming distance (1020m) will allow close-range use. Elevated firing positions should be chosen to allow engagement of the top and rear decks of armoured vehicles.

2

For further details see Part B, Chapter 5 ‘All Arms Combat’, Sect 1, Paragraphs 48-55.

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FIGHTING POSITIONS FOR SNIPERS 14. Snipers3 can be highly effective in urban operations. An effective sniper or pair of snipers can cause considerable disruption to enemy movement and cause delay out of all proportion to their numbers4. Particular points to note are: a. General areas (a building or group of buildings) will be designated as the sniper positions, but the sniper himself will select the best position for engagement. Masonry buildings that offer the best protection, long-range fields of fire, and allround observation should be chosen. The sniper should also select several alternative and secondary positions to cover his arcs and areas of responsibility. b. Engagement priorities for snipers are determined by the relative importance of the targets to the effective operations of the enemy. Sniper targets usually include commanders, enemy snipers and the personnel of crew served weapons. c. Built-up areas may limit snipers to firing down or across streets, while open areas will allow engagements at long ranges. Snipers can be employed to cover rooftops, obstacles, dead ground, and gaps. d. Consideration can be given to using snipers on the flanks of a defensive position to impede or interdict enemy movement. SECTION 3 – MOVEMENT INDIVIDUAL MOVEMENT 15. Movement in urban areas is restricted by poor communication, buildings, rubble and obstacles. Movement is also limited by the difficulties of observation and the location of enemy positions. All movement must be supported by accurate direct fire support. The passage of good, clear information and intelligence on enemy positions is vital. This will reduce casualties and avoid the natural tendency to focus on the nearest buildings. 17. Movement in built-up areas is a skill that every soldier must master and must be learned, practised and rehearsed. Silhouette will be visible against blank walls as well as in open areas and a soldier must select his next covered position before making any move. a. Crossing a Wall. After he has reconnoitred the other side, the soldier should roll over the wall, keeping a low silhouette. The speed of movement and a low silhouette will deny the enemy a target. This method of movement must be practised by all soldiers.

3 4

For further details see Part B, Chapter 5 ‘All Arms Combat’, Sect 1, paragraph 16-25. Further details are contained in Infantry Training Volume 1 Pamphlet 4.

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Fig C-9-6 Low Silhouette Whilst Crossing a Wall b. Movement Around Corners. The area around a corner should be observed before a soldier moves to it. A common mistake is to allow a personal weapon to extend beyond the corner, and expose a soldier’s position and intention.

Fig C-9-7 Looking Around a Corner

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Fig C-9-8 Looking Around a Corner with a Mirror c. Movement Past Windows. Movement past windows present another hazard; the most common mistake is to expose the head. The correct technique to pass a window is to stay below the window level. The same technique is used to pass basement windows where the most common mistake is not being aware of it. The correct procedure for negotiating a basement window is either to avoid it or to stay close to the wall of the building and step or jump past the window and provide minimum exposure to view. d. Use of Doorways. Doorways should not be used if possible. They may be covered by fire or booby-trapped. If a soldier has to use a doorway, he should move quickly through it to his next position, staying as low as possible to avoid silhouetting himself. Pre-selection of positions, speed, a low silhouette, and the use of covering fire should be employed when using doorways.

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Fig C-9-9 Crouched Movement Past a Window e. Moving Parallel to Buildings. Soldiers will not always be able to use the inside of buildings to advance, so movement forward may be necessary outside buildings. Movement should always be concealed and covered by smoke and covering fire. Correctly moving outside a building, the soldier ‘hugs’ the side of the building, stays in the shadow, present a low silhouette, and moves rapidly to his next fire position. If an enemy inside the building fires on a soldier, he exposes himself to fire from other fire-team and section members. Enemy further away or to a flank should be engaged by flank sub-units or direct and indirect fire support. f. Crossing Open Areas. Open areas, including streets and alleys, cannot be avoided. They are natural killing areas, but can be crossed safely if certain fundamental rules are applied: (1) Preparation. Before moving, a soldier should select the next position that offers the best cover. At the same time, he should select the best route to take to get to that position, offering concealment or speed. He must ensure his fire-team or section can provide direct fire support prior to any move. (2) Least Exposure. The shortest distance across streets and between buildings should be used and smoke from hand grenades can be used to conceal movement. The cover provided by walls should be exploited for as long as possible. By doing so, the individual will reduce the evidence of his intentions and the time that he is exposed to enemy fire. (3)

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FIRE TEAM MOVEMENT 18. Moving as a fire team, from building to building, is the best method of tactical movement. The fire team must ensure that every room is clear of enemy and should use the protection of the buildings as cover for as long as possible. Fire team movement between buildings must be covered by fire, preferably by another fire team. Bunching should be avoided to minimize the effect of automatic weapons and booby-traps. Movement can be made at street level or by using roofs and underground systems. The hreat of an effective counter-attack will be most real immediately after the successful capture of a building.

Fig C-9-10 Fire Team Movement

Fig C-9-11 Soldier Firing from a Covered Position

19. When moving from position to position, each soldier must ensure that he does not mask his supporting fire. When he reaches the next position, he should be prepared to cover the movement of other members of his fire team or section. The most common error a soldier can make is to fire over the top of his cover and silhouette himself against the wall or building to his rear, and provide the enemy with a clear target. The best technique for firing from a covered position is to fire around the side of the cover, and reduce his exposure to the enemy. SECTION 3 - ENTRY TECHNIQUES GENERAL 20. This section describes the tactics, techniques and procedures employed to gain entry to a building, and to create and successfully exploit a breach. An exploitable breach is one through which armed and equipped soldiers can move quickly, without hindrance and able to use their personal weapons as they move. 21. Gaining entry to buildings or other structures will be necessary in war to engage and destroy the enemy. In certain operations, it may be necessary to gain entry to enable the arrest of wanted individuals and the search of the premises. In both cases, a breach to assist or enable the entry to a building can be made manually or by using explosives. Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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22. In conventional operations, breaches can be made using windows or doors, or using large calibre direct or indirect fire weapons5. During strike (arrest and search) operations, the surprise and momentum of the assault will be enhanced by the shock of the assault and the rapid exploitation of the breach. CONVENTIONAL ASSAULT

Fig C-9-12 Training on a Bomb Site, London Docklands, 1942

SECTION 4 – ENTRY TECHNIQUES 23. Top Down Entry. Clearing a building from top down is the preferred method. To get into a position to create such a breach, walls should be scaled and use can be made of ladders and grappling hooks to gain entry. Consideration can be given to the use of vehicles, abseiling and mechanical lifts to assist entry and casualty evacuation.

Fig C-9-13 Assaulting a Building Using Ladders

Fig C-9-14 Using Grappling Hooks

5

Tank fire, direct fire artillery, ASM (Anti-Structure Munitions), air or ground launched PGM (Precision Guided Munitions).

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24. Entry at Lower Levels. Top-down entry may not be feasible or realistic, for instance when the building's upper storeys are either too high or exposed to enemy fire. When entering at ground or lower levels from a stand-off position, the point of entry must be clearly identified and known by every member of the assaulting section. The approach of the assaulting section and its reinforcements to the building should be covered by smoke and small arms fire.

Fig C-9-15 Soldiers from 40 Commando RM Gaining Access, Afghanistan 2007 25. Exploitation. should be noted:

The breach must be exploited quickly.

The following two points

a. The Entrance. In conventional assaults, entry should be avoided through windows and doors that can be booby-trapped and covered by enemy fire. Rapid entry through the breach will maximise the effects of the blast, concussion and the shock of the unexpected direction of the assault. Nevertheless, on reaching the point of entry, the assaulting section should be prepared to enlarge the entry point. When the only entry to a building is through a window or door, supporting fire, including the use of grenade launchers, should be directed at it immediately prior to its breach. b. Grenades. Grenades should be used to clear the first room and reinforce the kinetic effect of the breach.

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Fig C-9-16 Building Floor Exploitation CREATION AND EXPLOITATION OF A BREACH 26. Whether or not the breach will be made manually or using explosives, the breaching party must assemble (stack) as close as possible to the entry point to be able to exploit the breach immediately. The commander should confirm the positions of the assault team, stacking left or right of the entry point. 27. Whether making a manual or explosive breach to a building, the commander’s preentry point recce must: a.

Clearly identify the entry point.

b.

Confirm the position of the assault team.

c.

Identify the cover available to the assault team.

d.

Confirm what is on the other side of the entry point.

e.

Know the floor plan behind the entry point.

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Fig C-9-17 An Exploitable Breach 26.

27.

The planning for an explosive breach must include the following: a.

Actions in the event that the breach is compromised.

b.

Actions in the event that the breach is not possible.

c.

The size and shape of the charge to be used and the charge preparation.

d.

The safe stacking distance.

e.

The identification of an alternate or reserve breach.

The following factors should be considered when planning to exploit a breach. a. Previous explosive breaches should be avoided as they are likely to be mined or booby-trapped. b. Corners of rooms should similarly be avoided as fire positions for the same reason. c. To suppress defenders when entering a room, a series of rapid shots should be fired at all identified targets and likely enemy positions. This is more effective than long bursts or spraying the room with automatic fire. d. When targets reveal themselves in buildings, the most effective engagement is the quick-fire technique with the weapon up and both eyes open. e. Within built-up areas, burning debris, reduced ambient light, shadows and smoke all limit the effect of night vision and sighting devices. The use of aiming stakes in the defence and of the pointing technique in the attack, both using bursts,

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are night firing skills required of all infantrymen. A soldier using Head Mounted Night Vision System (HMNVS) should be paired with a soldier not wearing HMNVS. f. Shields should only be used where there is sufficient room to enable unimpeded access. A shield man should be the first to enter the building. In spite of the weight of the shield6 the shield man must carry his full complement of fighting equipment to allow him to be fully integrated into the team should the shield need to be passed to another team member. The shield man’s personal weapon will be slung and his pistol employed to deal with any threat unless he sees fit to use his rifle. g. Exploiting the shock effect of the assault to its best effect, the assault team should move into the first room at the same moment on either side of the shield. Assaulting troops must be able to use their weapons to engage the enemy whilst on the move, and training must reflect this requirement. h. Ideally every member of the assault group should carry a pistol as his secondary weapon. Strapped to his leg, each man must be trained to draw and use his pistol in case of a stoppage on his primary personal weapon. THE MANUAL BREACH

Fig C-9-18 Creating a Manual Breach 28. Breaching a Door. When planning a manual breach through a door, consideration should be given to the following: •

6

The door itself: o The purpose, type, height and thickness of the door. o Inward or outward opening. o Left or right action. o The presence of glass panels.

Type 4 shield will provide protection from 7.62mm rounds at very short range.

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• • •

o Whether the door is barricaded. The door frame. The hinges. The locks.

29. Manual Methods of Entry. Manual methods of entry can be made using a variety of tools and equipment, including the following: • • • • • •

By shoulder, hand or boot. Sledge hammer. Enforcer7. Halligan Tool8. Thermal Cutters. Hydraulic Ram.

ASSAULT BREACHING USING EXPLOSIVES 29. Explosive breaching charges can be applied to walls, doors and windows to facilitate entry to buildings. The components, construction and effect of the individual charges can be found in Military Engineering Volume II, Field Engineering, Pamphlet No 4, Demolitions (Army Code 71670). 30. Explosive breaching devices must be prepared by suitably qualified RE or assault pioneers with access to the appropriate material and with the competence to construct the necessary charge. The RE or assault pioneer Explosive Methods of Entry (EMOE) team should be used to lay and prepare the charge for the breaching team in a house assault. In order to create an exploitable breach, it is critical that: a. As much of the shock and blast as possible should be used to apply the maximum directed force to the explosion. b.

A number of charges should be distributed over the required area.

c.

The individual charges must be initiated simultaneously.

SAFETY 31. General Safety Considerations. Reflecting surfaces, such as walls immediately in the vicinity or opposite, can considerably increase harmful blast overpressure. RE or assault pioneer advice on safety distances must always be sought. 32. Correct Charge. The net explosive quantity (NEQ) of the charge should be adequate to defeat the target. Catastrophic structural failure caused by excessive explosive charge might cause blast or other injury to the assaulting troops and hinder successful exploitation9.

7

The Enforcer is a one man operated battering ram commonly used by police. The Halligan Tool is a forcible entry combined lever and cutting edge commonly used by firefighters. 9 “You’re only supposed to blow the bloody doors off!”, Michael Caine, The Italian Job, 1969. 8

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Reflecting Surfaces & Blast Traps

Reflecting Surfaces & Blast Traps

` Fig C-9-19 Reflecting Surfaces and Blast Traps 33. Safety Distances. Safety distances will vary according to the NEQ of the charge and the presence of opposite and adjacent blast reflecting surfaces. The minimum ‘safe stacking’ distances for small and medium sized breaching charges in the open are10: Ser (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Charge NEQ (g) (b) 125 250 500 750 1000 1500 2000

Safe Distance (m) (c) 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

34. Charge Effect. The use of explosive breaching charges reinforces surprise, shock and aggression. Consideration should be given by the commander to the blast and shock effects of the charge on non-combatants, for instance during urban strike operations. TERMINOLOGY 35. Coupling. Coupling describes the effect of the explosive device against the wall or aperture so that the force of the blast is directed through and not parallel to the wall. As much of the blast as possible should ‘couple’ with the target to apply the highest peak shock load (‘punch’) and the highest and longest duration impulse (‘push’). 36. Initiation. Breaching charges on the same device must be detonated (“initiated”) simultaneously. This will ensure that the peak shock against the target is maximised, undetonated charges are not decoupled and colliding shock waves from individual charges do not interfere with each other. 37. Tamping. Tamping a charge implies packing the charge with water or other materials to enhance the effectiveness of the explosive. Increasing the amount of tamping material decreases the amount of uncoupled blast and increases the effectiveness of the charge.

10

D/DGD&D/18/27/167 Military Engineering Volume II, Field Engineering. Army Code 71670.

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BREACHING CHARGES 38. Explosive breaching devices must be prepared by the RE or assault pioneers and should be used to lay and prepare the charge for the breaching team in a house assault. a. Breaching charges using in-service explosive stores. service explosive stores include:

Charges using in-

(1) Standard Frame Charge using ‘Charge Demolition Cutting’11. A standard frame charge is a squared-off, hollow “D” with five sides. For ease of carriage a hinged carrier frame is usually constructed, although a one-piece frame can be used. Charge Demolition Cutting (CDLC), commonly known as ‘Blade’, is a robust, exceptionally flexible and explosive-efficient family of linear shaped charge, designed to cut a wide range of engineering and building materials. Blade is manufactured in various sizes specified by weight of explosives per metre, 63 g/m, 100 g/m, 240g/m, 450g/m and 1150g/m. The performance characteristics of CDLC (‘Blade’) are detailed in Table 1. Max Cutting thickness (mm) Ser Nature g/m Steel Aluminium Wood Laminated (Oak) Glass 1 63 3 10 30 10 2 100 6 20 40 10 3 250 10 35 70 26 4 450 15 45 100 5 1150 30 150 200 Table 1 – CDCL (‘Blade’) Performance

Fig C-9-20 Standard Frame Charge with CDLC (‘Blade’)

11

The Effect

Commonly known as ‘Blade’.

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(2) ‘Gatecrasher’. Gatecrasher12 is a specialist breaching system, consisting of pre-moulded plastic forms utilising water tamping. It consists essentially of a plastic frame to which plastic explosive (PE) or detonating cord is moulded into the recesses (depending on target thickness) and then water is added to the tanks of the moulds to act as tamping. The effectiveness of the explosive is enormously enhanced by heavy tamping using water in an integral compartment.

Fig C-9-21 Gatecrasher (3) ‘Gatecrasher’ Modular 1. Modular Gatecrasher is employed in a similar manner to the original Gatecrasher but the pre moulded plastic form is replaced by a flexible plastic sleeve. It consists of a plastic sleeve with a series of containers which are loaded with explosive and filled with water. The charge may then be rolled up and transported. To deploy the charge, it is unrolled and placed against the target.

Fig C-9-22 Modular Gatecrasher

12

Gatecrasher is used predominately by US forces.

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(4) Bangalore Torpedo. The latest Bangalore torpedo was introduced into service in 2009. Owing to the torpedo’s low NEQ and the secondary fragmentation hazard of the steel body, the Bangalore torpedo should be only be used as a breaching charge if nothing else is available. b.

Improvised Breaching Charges. Improvised charges include: (1) Basic Improvised Cruciform Charge. Constructed from a simple “X”, the cruciform charge, made of poles no longer than 750mm long, comprises four plastic explosive (PE) charges at the extremities and a centrally placed ‘kicking charge. The charge is propped against the target. The performance of the cruciform charge is unpredictable. The dimensions of each charge tend to be small and may not produce an exploitable breach.

Fig C-9-23 Basic Improvised Cruciform Charge - Failed Breach due to Poor Charge Size and Distribution (2) Improvised Frame Charge. The improvised frame charge has a softwood frame that is loaded with detonating cord in the manner of a squared-off figure of eight, or can be loaded with sheet explosive with plastic explosive charges taped on. The improvised frame charge offers superior performance over improvised cruciform charges.

Fig C-9-24 Improvised Frame Charge

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(3) Fracture Sheet Charge. The fracture sheet charge can be constructed from a lightweight plastic sheet fitted with pockets into which charges are loaded. To be effective, fracture sheet charges must make intimate contact with the target over their entire surface, usually achieved by using ‘Hydrogel’ or purpose-made Breacher’s Tape. Due to the difficulty in achieving charge-to-target adhesion, fracture sheet charges tend to be used as secondary or reserve charges.

Fig C-9-25 Fracture Sheet Charge

The Effect

(4) Charges Using Inert Charge Container Systems. Inert charge container systems are plastic or metal containers intended for other applications, packed with explosives by the user. This example shows a plastic mortar round container containing caving explosive, PE and detonating cord. Such dedevices are very powerful, simple to construct, robust, easily portable and can be propped or hung against the target.

Fig C-9-26 Charges Using Inert Charge Container Systems (5) Improvised Slab Charges. Slab charges can be made by preparing two plywood or rigid plastic frames approximately 250mm x 350mm and taping three PE slabs on to each one. Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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(6) Barmine Slab Charges. Barmines have been used extensively on recent operations for breaching. To utilise a barmine for EMOE the fuse is removed and either the full or half of the explosive quantity is used as a charge to conduct a breach. A half barmine has a NEQ of approximately 4kg.

Fig C-9-27 Barmine Slab Charges SECTION 5 - CLEARING BUILDINGS PLATOON ORGANISATION 39. The basic manoeuvre unit for a building clearance is the platoon. should be organised as follows:

The platoon

a. Command Group. The command group includes the platoon commander who is to co-ordinate the support to the assaulting fire-teams or sections. He should give a clear achievable mission to the assaulting section commanders. The command group should be a tactical bound behind the assaulting section and should not become involved unless critical to the success of their mission. This is a matter of judgement and the platoon commander must decide the best position from which to co-ordinate the support to the assaulting section. b. Assault Section. The assault section assaults the building and clears it. The section should maintain two identical fire teams. The section commander is responsible for the clearance of the building. The section 2IC should simultaneously identify likely enemy counter attack options. The section commander decides if his section has the combat power to successfully complete his mission. If more manpower is required, another fire team should be allocated. He should not hand over command until he has achieved his mission. If more than one additional fire team is required the platoon commander needs to reassess the situation. Once the mission is achieved the section commander is to be ready to provide a secure base to launch the next section into the assault. If necessary they will provide fire support to the next assaulting section until the echelon section takes over. The assaulting section then becomes the reserve. e. Manoeuvre Support Section. The manoeuvre support section provides fire support to the assaulting section throughout. This must include depth positions and they should avoid becoming totally focused on the building being cleared. They should be in the best position to support the assaulting section and not necessarily in

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the building next to them. They should be prepared to move at any time during the assault. d. Echelon Section. The echelon section is the next assaulting section. They should be ready to move at all times. The echelon section should be prepared to provide an additional fire team to the assaulting section if required. e. Reserve Section. The reserve section may be tasked to assist the platoon sergeant with ammunition re-supply or casualty evacuation. CLEARANCE DRILLS 40. Ideally, each assault group should comprise at least four men. The basic procedure to support this is as follows: a.

Cover Group. The cover group deploys to support to the assault.

b.

First Assault Group. The first assault group effects entry into building.

c. Second Assault Group. As the section commander of the second assault group enters the building, the commander of the first assault group (by shouting) tells him what has been found in the room, for instance room clear, door leading to cellars, manhole in ceiling. This allows the section commander to carry out a quick appreciation and decide the next logical room to be cleared by the second assault group. ROOM CLEARANCE 41. Once the section commander has decided the next room to be cleared, he indicates it to the next assault group. Blast shields should used if available. The next sequence of action is: a. The assault group leader will nominate who is to open/break down doors, hatches, windows, post grenades and be the first to enter the room. The assault group post a grenade in the room and enter immediately after it has exploded, shooting into cupboards and likely hiding places. Automatic fire should not be used unless required, as most modern houses are constructed of concrete which will cause ricochets and in turn may cause friendly casualties. If furniture is in the room the assault group should check behind to ensure it is not concealing an enemy mousehole. b. Once the room is clear, the assault group should cover any vulnerable points such as doors, mouseholes and windows. At the same time, the assault group leader is to ensure an exit point is nominated in case of an enemy grenade and report room clear. c. At this stage, the section commander and the next assault group move into the cleared room. The link man will be left behind to pass on all information to the remainder of the section/platoon, and mark the entry point. Once in the cleared room, the section commander will once again decide the next logical room to be

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cleared and task the next assault group to continue the clearance. This procedure will be continued until the whole house has been cleared. d. Each room has to be completely cleared and secured before moving into the next room; likewise each floor before moving on to the next. If rooms do have vulnerable points then soldiers have to be left behind to secure that room to prevent an enemy counter attack. CLEARING A STAIRWAY 42. When mounting stairs movement should be covered by fire and be swift. If possible a tank machine gun or LMG should fire into the upper storey before the stairs are rushed. In passages troops should keep to the sides and take cover in doorways. Blast shields should be used if available. The drill to follow is as follows:

Fig C-9-28 Clearing a Stairway Note Use of Shield by Front Soldier a. A single assault group is chosen by the section commander to carry out the clearance of the stairway. b.

Two soldiers move to the base of the stairs.

c. The first soldier throws a grenade up to the next hallway. After it has detonated, he should be prepared to assault the stairs, firing if necessary. He should position himself at the top of the stairs away from the wall in order to enable the next member of the group to pass through without crossing in front of his line of sight. d. Either the first assault group continues the clearance, or, the second assault group can be called forward to clear the next flight of stairs. The same drill is used until the whole of the stairs are clear. The same drill should be used if clearing the stairs downwards.

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FIGHTING FLOOR TO FLOOR VIA MOUSEHOLES 43. At some stage during the clearance it may be necessary to use vertical mouseholes to continue the clearance of the building. The following drill is carried out when fighting from floor to floor, via vertical mouseholes: a. The section commander decides to use a vertical mouse hole as an entry point to the next floor. b. The assault group chosen by the section commander drops, or throws, a grenade through the mousehole into the next room. c. After the grenade has detonated the assault group drops, or climbs up into the room firing into likely hiding places and furniture. The assault group reports room clear. d. The section commander and second assault group then enter the room via the mousehole, from this point normal room clearance drills are followed. OTHER FACTORS IN HOUSE CLEARANCE 44. Crowding. The sections should avoid bunching in one room or stairwell for too long. This is because a single grenade or contact could cause numerous casualties. Once a room has been secured the assaulting sections should spread out as quickly as possible. 45. Use of Cover. Individual soldiers should select suitable cover when moving through the building. They should keep to the walls and avoid windows, doors, floor and ceiling openings. They have to realise it is their responsibility to select the cover, not the section commander’s. 46. Booby Traps. Always beware of booby traps. If found they have to be left alone for specialist attention. The exact location of the device should be marked and at the point of entry a blue flag or blue marker should be displayed to indicated the requirement for engineer assistance and to act as a warning that a booby trap is in that house. All other members of the section/platoon need to be warned of the presence of booby traps. 47. Use of Grenades. Care must be taken when using grenades as they can be a double edged weapon. If subject to grenade attack from the enemy, the immediate action should be to move out or to take immediate cover by lying flat on the floor. This is because the majority of the blast and fragmentation is directed upwards and outwards. When clearing a house use dummy grenades whenever possible. Live grenades should only be thrown when enemy are known to be in the room. If live grenades are used in every room, the house would soon be weakened and clearance would become impossible due to dust and rubble. Distraction (flash-bang) grenades should be used in the case of rooms known to be occupied by civilians. The use of HE grenades increases the risk of fratricide. 48. Automatic Fire. The drill for assaulting a room may include the use of automatic fire. Most modern houses have concrete floors, walls and even ceilings and these may cause rounds to ricochet and cause fratricide. Similarly if automatic fire is used throughout the house, ammunition expenditure would be high and increase the demand for resupply.

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Ideally, most shooting inside a house should be instinctive single shots which will be far more accurate. Conversely, some houses have very thin internal walls, shots will penetrate these walls and could again cause fratricide. Pistols can be used where possible. 49. Clearance. Each room needs to be completely cleared and secured before moving on to the next room, likewise each floor before moving on to the next. If rooms do have vulnerable points then soldiers should be left behind to secure them to prevent an enemy counterattack. 50. The Marking of Buildings. During combat, there will be a need to mark buildings. This is to show which buildings have been cleared, the location of entry points, the FLOT, the location of casualties and booby traps. Below is the NATO colour coded marking system: a.

Red

-

Forward line of own troops (facing forward). Entry point, building not clear (at entry point).

b.

Yellow

-

Casualty in building, CASEVAC required.

c.

Green

-

Entry point/building clear.

d.

Blue

-

Engineers required, Booby Traps/obstacle in building.

51. Entering a Friendly Held Building. Movement through a building via mouseholes, stairs and doors will be continuous after the attack; ideally the safe route through the building should be marked. Troops passing from room to room known to be in friendly hands should call out "COMING THROUGH" before entering as identification. 52. Difficult Points of Entry. If the assault group require assistance to gain entry into a difficult entry point, an additional soldier from the team that has just cleared the last room may be used. The drills remain the same. 53. Enhanced Blast Weapons. If the enemy has an effective EBW capability, commanders should weigh the risk of occupying buildings against any benefit gained. If buildings are to be occupied, the risk may be partially mitigated by minimising the number of soldiers in any individual room or volume of space likely to be affected. REORGANISATION 54. Immediately the house/building has been cleared the section commander should start to reorganise. This should be done quickly in order to be ready for any possible counter attack. Reorganisation drills are: a.

The section commander should: (1)

Immediately prepare the defence of the building.

(2) Allocate fire tasks to each rifleman, LMG, NLAW and any other section weapon.

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(3) Check on casualties and ammunition, then report to the platoon sergeant.

b.

(4)

Arrange for redistribution of ammunition.

(5)

Deal with PWs and captured equipment.

Fire Support elements should: (1)

Rejoin the remainder of the section as quickly as possible.

(2) Check LMGs, NLAWs and any other platoon weapons are positioned in the best location to provide fire support for counter-attack, the next phase and for surprise enemy locations. c.

Riflemen should: (1)

Check weapons and equipment.

(2)

Check ammunition and prepare grenades.

(3)

Recharge magazines.

55. In principle, the section commander is responsible for the operational reorganisation of the section, arcs, position etc, while the section 2IC deals with the administrative reorganisation (ammunition and casualties). Casualties should be dealt with and evacuated as quickly as possible once the whole objective has been cleared. WEBBING AND EQUIPMENT 60. Webbing and equipment should be kept to a minimum. If webbing and equipment is carried, it should be assembled to allow for quick release to improve entry. SECTION 6 - DEFENDED LOCALITIES GENERAL 61. A defended locality consists of a number of strong points sited in depth. They must have good communications, all-round defence and be able to provide mutual support. Counter attack plans should include providing a local reserve force. The decision as to which buildings should be used is made by the local commander with engineer advice. The selection has to be a trade-off between the tactical and engineer requirements. STRONG POINT 62. A strong point must not be restricted to one building which can be isolated, and cannot be defended without mutually supporting fire. Robust communications to other strong points and headquarters are essential. Defensive strength can be achieved by grouping strong points around an intersection, with fire positions in two or three different buildings providing interlocking and mutually supporting fire. Strong points may be of at

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least platoon strength and should include combined arms assets and direct and indirect fire support. BUILDING REQUIREMENTS 63. In principle, strong points that include a number of buildings improve the defender's chances of survival. Choices between flats and single storey houses should be made with survivability and defensive principles in mind. Consideration must be given to a. Identifying Buildings. It is not easy to compare the attributes of buildings from the ground. To determine the suitability of a building, it is helpful first to determine what the building is used for because this will usually give a good guide as to which are the strongest. Examples are: (1) Department stores used by the public will have fairly strong floors and the fire risk is usually low. (2) Office blocks with large windows are usually built with a strong frame but have weak walls. (3) Apartment blocks can be deceptive and it is best to take engineer advice as to their strength and weakness. b. Small Buildings. Some buildings afford insufficient space for troops who must occupy them, and thus concentrate them. A single direct hit, on the building may destroy the whole group. c. Large Buildings. Large buildings may force the defender to spread his defences too thinly in terms of both manpower and resources. TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS 64. Fields of Fire. There will always be some areas of ground around a building into which the defenders will be unable to fire. These will often be close to the building itself and in the concealed volumes formed by adjacent buildings. The attacker must be prevented from reaching these areas of dead ground. The use of dannert wire is probably the best method. The employment of all obstacles and their cover by direct or indirect fire must be an integral part of the defensive plan. 65. Dominating Buildings. Denial of access to blocks of flats or multi-storey car parks to the attackers can be accomplished by mines, booby-traps, wire or obstacles. 66. Covered Routes. Covered routes to and from defended locations allow freedom of movement of own troops for casualty evacuation, reinforcement and resupply. Routes should provide both cover from view and fire. Such routes should be improved during the preparation of the defensive position. 67. External Fire Positions. External fire positions should be sited to engage the enemy at up to the maximum effective range of the weapons used. Arcs should overlap

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and each position should be mutually supporting. Fire positions and withdrawal routes should have overhead cover where possible. SECTION 7 - NAVIGATION IN BUILT UP AREAS GENERAL 68. Navigation in built-up areas presents a unique challenge. In the centre of a city, the normal terrain features depicted on maps may not apply - buildings become the major terrain features and units become tied to streets. Whilst always trying to minimise collateral damage, fighting in the city destroys buildings whose rubble blocks streets. Street and road signs are destroyed during the fighting if they are not removed by the defenders. Operations in subways and sewers present other unique challenges. However, maps and photographs are available to help the unit overcome these problems. The Global Positioning System (GPS) can aid navigation in built-up areas, although its performance may be downgraded. MISSION SPECIFIC MAPPING 69. The scale of a city map can vary from 1:2,500 to 1:50,000, depending on the importance and size of the city, density of detail, and intelligence information available. The mission specific military map can be a topographical map or an image map of a city that is usually at a large scale (1:5,000, 1:10,000 and 1:12,500 are common), delineating streets and showing street names, important buildings, and other urban elements a. Mission specific map products, prepared by supporting geospatial engineers, can assist navigation in built-up areas. Usually put together using the latest imagery available, these maps have been designed or modified to give information not covered on a standard map, which includes attribution of road and bridge networks, railways, built-up areas, and essential services. They can be used to supplement military city maps and topographical maps. b. Once in the built-up area, soldiers should use street intersections as reference points much as hills and streams in rural terrain. Again special mapping products can supplement or replace topographic maps as the basis of navigation and are often called “Spot Maps” due to them having coloured routes and numbered spots providing those reference points. These maps enable units to better articulate their position and movement improving command and control, particularly in areas with destroyed buildings and blocked routes. c. The techniques of compass reading and pace counting can still be used, especially in a blacked-out city where street signs and buildings may not be present. The presence of steel and iron in this environment may cause inaccurate compass readings. Sewers have to be navigated in much the same way. Maps providing the basic layout of the sewer system are normally maintained by the civil authorities. This information includes the sewer lines and distances between manhole covers. Along with basic compass and pace count techniques, such information could enable troops to move through city sewers.

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d. Operating in a built-up area can adversely affect the performance of electronic devices such as GPS and data distribution systems. These systems function in a similar way to communications equipment by line-of-sight. They cannot determine underground locations or positions within a building. Such systems should be employed on the tops of buildings, in open areas, and down streets where obstacles will not affect line-of-sight readings. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY 70. Aerial photography can supplement military city maps and is an excellent aid to detailed planning, by virtue of its currency. SECTION 8 - CASUALTY EVACUATION GENERAL 71. Experience has shown that the number of casualties in urban combat is likely to be high. Every effort should be made to evacuate casualties as quickly as possible, although casualty evacuation will be difficult and will consume manpower. Suitable drills need to be practised at all levels. Every soldier has to know how to give first aid and assist in the evacuation of casualties, and there must be a co-ordinated and effective CASEVAC plan at all levels of command. CASEVAC AT PLATOON LEVEL 72. There are three stages to casualty evacuation as follows: a. Stage One - Extraction. Stage one is the immediate protection of the casualties and their extraction out of the contact area. A robust and rapid approach towards CASEVAC is needed, especially if there are multiple casualties. Anyone able to walk should be ordered back through the safest line of communication, to enable medics and available manpower to concentrate on more serious casualties. At this stage it is likely to take at least two men to extract a serious. When in contact, the best method is to drag the casualty by the shoulders of the body armour. Due to the bulky and cumbersome nature of personal equipment, some of it may have to be removed by cutting webbing straps to ease extraction, especially through confined spaces such as mouseholes. b. Stage 2 - Treatment. Once casualties have been extracted from the immediate contact area, life saving first aid can be administered. Vital equipment such as radios, maps and weapons should be recovered from the casualties and if possible returned to the fighting force. Whilst first aid is being administered, preparation for the move back should start. Stretchers need to be prepared and the triage state should be reported as soon as possible. A light-weight stretcher will need four men to carry the casualty. Consideration should be given to the use of reserve platoons to deal with this stage of evacuation. Friendly dead must be covered up, kept separate from the other casualties and prepared for evacuation. c. Stage Three - Evacuation. Stage three involves the movement of the casualties to a Helicopter landing Sight (HLS) or a Casualty Exchange Point (CEP).

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The sub-unit sergeant major must ensure that the RMO is waiting to receive and treat the casualties at the CEP. The transfer of casualties to the CEP may be physically challenging and involve moving them down stairs, over obstacles and open ground, through mouseholes and over ditches in order to provide cover from enemy fire. Good communication is vital. MARKING CASUALTIES 73. Casualties that cannot be evacuated must be marked. Using the standard NATO marking system, a yellow marker should be positioned at the point of entry to indicate a casualty in a particular building. A casualty in the open should be moved under cover for protection and his position indicated. If necessary this should be done by sticking a weapon into the ground, bayonet first. The helmet should remain on the casualty. STRETCHER IMPROVISATION 74. Improvisation may be necessary to provide a stretcher. An improvised stretcher should be strong, light and narrow with some form of handles or grips. The following items might be considered for use: a.

Doors/tables/gates.

b.

Ladders.

c.

Bedding/carpets.

d.

Furniture, ie chairs/bed frames.

e.

Poncho, IPE, combat jackets.

f.

Cables/ropes.

CASUALTY PROCEDURES 75. Redistribution of Equipment. All personal equipment, including rifle and helmet, should travel with the casualty to the CAP. The following equipment should be considered for redistribution: a.

Radios.

b.

Medical supplies.

c.

Platoon weapons such as LMGs or NLAWs.

c.

Ammunition and explosives.

d.

Maps.

76. Movement. When moving casualties back to the CAP, the casualty evacuation party must avoid exposing themselves or the casualty to enemy fire or danger. The

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following should be considered: a. Movement of an unwieldy stretcher weighed down by a casualty is extremely difficult within a building. Progress will be hampered by narrow corridors, doorways, mouseholes, stairs, rubble, other troops, resupply parties, reinforcements, resting sections and reserves. Movement should be controlled and organised so that normal triage can take place. b. Movement between buildings is again hazardous and difficult. Use must be made of any cover, such as walls, dead ground and smoke. If under contact, covering fire from a section must cover any movement. Movement should be made along existing safe routes. c. If secured, underground systems can be used as safe routes for evacuation of casualties. Movement may be restricted by the confined space of some tunnels, but it may be the quickest, safest and least congested option. d. Whenever possible, vehicles (particularly armoured vehicles) should be used for casualty evacuation. e. In a defensive position the priority for the use of safe lanes for casualty evacuation should be covered in orders. Use of safe lanes will need to be controlled in order to allow for the movement of reinforcements, ammunition re-supply as well as casualty evacuation. 77. Medical Supplies. Section, platoon and company commanders must ensure that sufficient first aid supplies are carried at every level. First field dressings, morphine, crepe bandages and Intravenous (IV) drips should be carried and all ranks must be trained in first aid, self aid and treatment of the most likely injuries. 78.

Casualties. a. Dead. All dead bodies, friendly or enemy, should be processed, including the redistribution of all weapons and equipment. The bodies should then be placed separately and preferably out of sight. b. Wounded. All casualties, enemy or friendly, should be given first aid and evacuated. Use can be made of enemy equipment, ammunition and weapons. SECTION 9 - AMMUNITION RESUPPLY

79. Ammunition Carriage. The amount of ammunition and explosives expended in any urban battle is likely to be high. The need for an efficient system of ammunition resupply13 is thus vital. The following factors need to be considered: a. In urban combat each man is likely to require more ammunition than in any other environment. A minimum of eight magazines per man should be issued. Each man should also carry at least two bandoliers (clipped ammunition) and as many 13

This section should be read in conjunction with the paragraph on Ammunition Resupply on p B-5-48.

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grenades as possible. If possible, magazine for magazine exchanges should be organised. In addition magazine chargers should be issued to enable rapid charging. b. Plans must be made for the carriage of extra ammunition. All spare ammunition should be carried individually in a small sack or by sandbags attached by string. If a protracted battle is likely, consideration should be given to dedicated ammunition carriers with bergens or ammunition boxes stacked on metal frames (for ease of carriage). These will act as either platoon or company ammunition reserves. c. Explosive breaching entry charges should be prepared in advance and should be distributed to the assaulting sections. All preparation should be completed as a part of battle procedure in the assembly area. As with any other ammunition natures, explosives must be controlled and resupplied as required. d. The only practical way of achieving a constant and timely resupply of ammunition throughout the battle may be to allocate ammunition parties. These parties should be organised at platoon, company and battle group levels. 80. Fire Discipline. Throughout the battle, there is a need for fire discipline to prevent unnecessary wastage of ammunition. The employment of automatic fire should be strictly controlled in the urban environment; quick accurate single shots (rapid fire) are normally far more effective. 81. Resupply14. Each section should carry enough ammunition for its initial task. The platoon sergeant with the aid of the reserve section should carry out the resupply task. The following points should be considered: a. It is the responsibility of individuals to inform their section 2IC when their ammunition is low. It is the responsibility of each section 2IC to give the platoon sergeant an accurate ammunition state and inform him when the section requires a resupply. b. Any resupply should be along a safe route and, whenever possible, the same route as the assaulting forces. If this is not possible, a separate route should be reconnoitred and marked. Possible markings could be a green coloured symbol or cylume, at the entry point of each cleared building. Red and white mine tape can be used to mark the clear and safe route between buildings. c. Extra mousehole and satchel charges should be prepared prior to battle. These should be stored close to the assaulting sections to ensure a quick resupply is possible. d. Ammunition is heavy and bulky and plans must be made for its carriage in the built up area. The use of stretchers and ladders are an option. Any ammunition party must have a group dedicated to providing local protection.

14

This paragraph should be read in conjunction with Part B, Chapter 5, Section 3 ‘Combat Supplies’.

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e. If available, armoured vehicles should be used for ammunition resupply. However, the local area has to be free from the threat of hand held anti-armour weapons out to a minimum range of 400m. f. The supply of ammunition can be linked to the casualty evacuation plan. Stretchers, or vehicles, used for ammunition resupply should be used on the return journeys for any casualties. g. In defence, carefully planned ammunition dumps can reduce the need for resupply. h. In the assault a reserve pack of ammunition should be prepared in the assembly area. This should include spare LAWs, mouseholes, satchel charges, sacks full of charged magazines and bandoliers. It should be carried by the reserve platoon or ammunition parties ready for quick deployment. SECTION 10 - ISOLATED PERSONNEL IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 82. General. The urban environment places significantly different and potentially far greater demands and stress upon an evader15. Everything will happen much faster, and the consequences of getting it wrong will be far more immediate. Furthermore, unlike other specific environments such as arctic and jungle, the urban environment covers a wide spectrum of potential evasion locations, from small shanty towns, through areas of heavy rubble, to large high-density modern cities. A standard urban evasion scenario is thus difficult to define. The nature of urban conflict is such that the risk of isolation is no longer the exclusive premise of the teeth arms, and all personnel should be prepared accordingly. 83. Civilians. Large numbers of civilians may be alerted to the initial location of the evader, particularly if the isolation event is caused by asymmetric or paramilitary attack close to a densely populated area. Once the immediate danger has passed, the vast majority of such personnel move toward an ambush or vehicle crash site. Evaders may be confronted by a crowd whose actions cannot be predicted. Even members of the same tribal, ethnic social or religious group may be motivated by a broad mixture of intent, and as such an evader cannot hope to predict their actions. a. Assessment of Intent. Evaders must assume the worst case should a situation arise. Their aim must therefore be to place a barrier between themselves and a crowd and thus try to prevent themselves falling into the hands of hostile civilians. Such a barrier may be a physical (eg hard cover) of psychological (eg the threat of violence). The crowd should perceive the barrier as a risk should they approach the evader. b. Investment of Buildings. Urban evaders should adopt hard cover, such as a corner in an exterior wall, an entrance to a deserted warehouse or pedestrian underpass, or any appropriate protection. Although every situation will be different, evaders are generally discouraged from entering and taking over houses or occupied buildings for the following reasons:

15

See Doctrine Note 06/06 Isolated Personnel in Urban Environments.

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(1)

Occupation of a building may seriously restrict recovery force options.

(2) House owners in many operational theatres are routinely armed and likely to use force to defend their property. (3) It is morally questionable to enter an occupied building while in contact and thus taking the fire fight to the occupants. (4) The investment and defence of an occupied building will often require resources and capability not necessarily available to the evader. c. Use of Lethal Force. Evaders should also be aware that, should the use of personnel weapons become necessary, warning shots are only likely to work once. A crowd should perceive that evaders can and will use lethal force to protect their own lives if it becomes necessary to do so.

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CHAPTER 10 WEAPON EFFECTS ‘First Chechen War, 1994 - Russian Errors: - Significant numbers of Russian soldiers were untrained, did not know or properly understand their weaponry, night-vision equipment, armour, etc. Moreover, much of the equipment was in poor condition, and military professionalism was sorely lacking in all ranks. - Ad hoc units were assembled hastily, and did not train together before they went into combat. Soldiers did not understand the effects of the weapons the insurgents were using against them, in spite of the fact that many of the weapons they were using themselves.’ Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, Rand SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION 1. The characteristics and nature of combat in built-up areas affects the choice of weapon required. Commanders at all levels should consider the following factors when selecting the effect they need: a. Hard, smooth, flat surfaces are characteristic rounds impact perpendicular to these flat surfaces. round and increases the threat of ricochets. The glancing blows against hard surfaces means that explosive rounds may not detonate.

of urban targets. Rarely do This reduces the effect of a tendency of rounds to strike up to 25% of impact-fused

b. Engagement ranges are close. Studies and historical analyses have shown that only five percent of all targets are more than 100 metres away. About 90 percent of all targets are located 50 metres or less from the identifying soldier. Few personnel targets are visible beyond 50 metres and usually occur at 35 metres or less. Minimum arming ranges and troop safety from back-blast or fragmentation effects should be considered. c. Engagement times are short. The enemy presents only fleeting targets. Enemy-held buildings or structures are normally covered by fire and often cannot be engaged with deliberate, well-aimed shots. d. Depression and elevation limits for some weapons create dead space. Tall buildings form deep canyons that are often safe from indirect fire. Some weapons can fire rounds to ricochet behind cover and inflict casualties. Accurate target engagement from oblique angles, both horizontal and vertical, demands superior marksmanship skills. e. Smoke from burning buildings, dust from explosions, shadows from tall buildings, and the lack of light penetrating inner rooms all combine to reduce visibility and to increase a sense of isolation. Added to this is the masking of fire caused by rubble and man-made structures. Targets, even those at close range, tend to be indistinct.

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f. Conventional urban fighting often becomes confused mélées with several small units attacking on converging axes. The risks from friendly fire, ricochets, and fratricide have to be considered during the planning phase of operations and control measures continually adjusted to lower these risks. Commanders and soldiers alike have to be aware of the locations and intentions of friendly forces and clearly mark their own progress to avoid the potential for fratricide. g. Both the firer and target may be inside or outside buildings, or they may both be inside the same or separate buildings. The enclosed nature of combat in built-up areas means that the weapon's effect, such as muzzle blast and back blast, has to be considered as much as the round's impact on the target. h. Modern engineering and design improvements mean that most large buildings constructed since WW2 are resilient to the blast effects of bomb and artillery attack. Even though modern buildings may burn easily, they often retain their structural integrity and remain standing. Once high-rise buildings burn out, they are still useful for combat purpose and are almost impossible to damage further. A large structure can take 24 to 48 hours to burn out and become cool enough for soldiers to enter. SECTION 2 – SMALL ARMS 9MM PISTOL 2. The pistol enables the individual to engage targets at close range, to an effective range of 45m. It is effective in buildings and room clearance. RIFLE AND LIGHT MACHINE GUN 3. Close combat is the predominant characteristic of urban engagements and the rifle and Light Machine Guns (LMG)1 are the most common weapons fired in built-up areas. Small, fleeting targets are difficult to hit from bunker apertures, windows, and loopholes. This requires pinpoint accuracy with weapons fired in the semi-automatic mode. Killing an enemy through an 20 cm loophole at a range of 50 metres is a challenge, but one that may be common in combat in built-up areas. 4. The performance of ball ammunition is affected by a number of variables including range from the target, material against which it is fired, manufacture quality and age. The penetrative effect of ammunition depends on both the velocity and stability of the round; the greater the range, the lower the velocity. Consequently, at very short ranges a round will not be fully stable, and this may lessen the effect of the greater velocity. 5. Weapon Penetration. The penetration that can be achieved with 5.56 mm rifle ammunition round against exterior walls of brick or concrete is limited unless significant numbers of rounds are fired. Nevertheless, inside buildings the 5.56 mm round may penetrate interior walls and furniture. Consideration should be given to the risk of ricochet to friendly forces both when firing at enemy positions.

1

LMGs fires 5.56 mm ammunition and include the MINIMI and Light Support Weapon (LSW).

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6. Protection. The following common barriers in built-up areas stop a 5.56 mm round fired at less than 50 metres: a.

One thickness of sandbags.

b.

5 cm concrete wall (not reinforced).

c.

55 US gallon drum filled with water or sand.

d.

Small ammunition can filled with sand.

e.

Cinder block filled with sand (block will probably shatter).

f.

Brick veneer.

g.

Car engine block

MEDIUM AND HEAVY MACHINE GUN 7. Weapon Penetration. Like the 5.56 mm round, the ability of 7.62 mm and 12.7 mm (0.5 inch) rounds to penetrate is affected by the range to the target and type of material it is fired against. The 7.62 mm round is affected less by range than the 5.56 mm, whilst the 12.7 mm's penetration is reduced least of all. The table below explains the penetration capabilities of a single 7.62 mm (ball) round at closer ranges: Range (metres) (a) 25 100 200

Pine Board (b) 33 cm/13 inches 46 cm/18 inches 104 cm/41 inches

Dry Loose Sand

Cinder Box

(c) 13 cm/5 inches 11 cm/4.5 inches 18 cm/7 inches

(d) 20 cm/8 inches 25 cm/10 inches 20 cm/8 inches

Concrete (e) 5 cm/2 inches 5 cm/2 inches 5 cm/2 inches

For hard targets, 12.7 mm penetration is affected by obliquity and range. Both armour piercing and ball ammunition penetrate 36 cm/14 inches of sand or 71 cm/28 inches of packed earth at 200 metres, if the rounds impact perpendicular to the flat face of the target. 8. Weapon Effects. It should be noted that the AK47 (7.62 x 39mm) is the most common assault rifle in the world and that the penetrative qualities of its ammunition are significantly greater than those of 5.56 mm ball. The 12.7 mm heavy machine gun can be fitted to a number of different platforms, and in view of the excellent penetrative capacity of its ammunition, it can be the weapon of choice in the urban environment. SNIPER RIFLE (L115A3)2 9. Snipers exploit the long range, high hit rate probability and penetrative effect of the 8.59mm round fired from the L115A3 rifle to achieve significant physical and psychological effect. Commanders should have an understanding of the effects of the weapons and

2

See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 16-25.

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optics that a sniper carries in order to fully utilize this capability. summarises the capabilities of the equipment employed by snipers: System (a) Sniper Rifle

Weapon (b) L115A3 8.59mm Accuracy International

Ammunition Type

8.59mm Ball 8.59mm Armour Piercing 5 x 25 x 56 Schmitt and Bender Telescopic Sight x 40 Leopold Spotting Scope SIMRAD KN203 Image Intensifier Sight Sniper Thermal Imaging Capability (STIC) (Weapon and Spotter)

Optics

The table below

Capability (c) Probability hit rate: Under 600m – 70% 600m-800m – 50% 800m-1000m – 30% Harassing fire from 1500m+ Defeat CRISAT3 man at 800m Excellent daytime optics with large zoom capability Sniper Engagement range 400m upwards Detect heat source: Man size target: 1200m-1400m MBT size target: 2500m-3000m

SECTION 3 – GRENADES4 10. Grenades. Grenades, whether thrown by hand or projected by a weapon, provide a useful method of delivering significant effect very quickly. HE hand grenades are an essential weapon for assaulting and clearing buildings. Grenade ammunition expenditure is likely to be heavy5. The overuse of HE grenades in lightly constructed buildings may cause total, or partial, collapse of walls. There is a risk that fragments may penetrate internal walls, risking injury to friendly forces in adjacent rooms. a.

Effects6. (1) L109A1, Hand Grenade. The hand grenade L109A1 incapacitates a protected man at five metres and an unprotected man at 20 metres7. (2) Under-slung Grenade Launcher (UGL). On impact, the UGL projectile explodes and is designed to penetrate up to 45mm of steel, 300mm of concrete and cause casualties to a distance of 5m from the explosion. The UGL burst safety distance of 450m in the open may be reduced by the nature of urban terrain. (3) Grenade Machine Gun (GMG). On impact, the projectile explodes and is designed to penetrate up to 50mm of steel, 350mm of concrete and cause casualties to a distance of 5m from the explosion. The GMG burst

3

CRISAT - Collaborative Research Into Small Arms Technology, is the EU/NATO standard in the manufacture of military equipment. 4 See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 13-15. 5 During WW2, it was common for a battalion fighting in urban areas in Italy in 1943 to use in excess of 500 hand grenades in a day. 6 Infantry Training Manual Vol III, SAA (Sect and Pl Weapons). 7 Infantry Training Manual Vol III, SAA (Sect and Pl Weapons).

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safety distance of 165m in the open may reduced by the nature of urban terrain. (4) CS Grenade (C13). The anti-riot, irritant hand grenade (CS) is effective 25-35 metres (dependent on wind) from burst. SECTION 4 – HEAVIER INFANTRY DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS ANTI TANK WEAPONS8 11. Javelin. The primary role of Javelin is to defeat main battle tanks and other armoured vehicles, although it is also effective against structures. The warhead will penetrate 1500mm of concrete or sandbag structure and create an over-pressure effect inside. If fired against soft surfaces (ie glass, wood, etc.) the larger secondary charge may not detonate. Against a robust structure the penetration will only create a fist size hole. Although such a hole cannot provide access for a man, it may provoke collapse. 12. NLAW. NLAW is primarily used to defeat light armoured vehicles and neutralize fortified firing positions. Because the shaped charge warhead has a narrow blast effect, NLAW has limited anti-structure effect. However, blast and shock may be sufficient to neutralize the personnel within a building for a short period. Against structures, shapedcharge weapons such as NLAW should be aimed about six inches below or to the side of a firing aperture in order to increase the probability of killing the enemy behind a wall. ANTI-STRUCTURE MUNITIONS9 13. The UK Army will use the Anti-Structure Munition (ASM) from 2009. Lighter but the same length as the NLAW, the ASM is also a one-man disposable, fire and forget weapon for use primarily against urban structures and bunkers and in a secondary role against light AFVs and soft skinned vehicles. With a combat effective range of between 15m-400m, the ASM has a tandem warhead break-in charge (BIC) and a follow-through bomb (FTB) that will penetrate concrete structures and enable physical access. The purpose of the BIC is to create a hole sufficiently large to enable the FTB to detonate within a wall, thereby both neutralizing any occupants and creating access for fighting troops.

Fig C-10-1 Anti-Structure Munition

8 9

See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 41-47. See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Para 48.

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30MM CANNON FIRE10 14. General. The 30mm Rarden cannon and 7.62 mm coaxially mounted machine gun, mounted on CVR(T) Scimitar and Warrior 510/511, can provide substantial firepower to the infantry. The 30mm cannon can be utilised from either a stand-off or from an intimate support position. Two types of ammunition are available as follows: a. Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS). APDS is the main anti-armour round available for use with the 30mm cannon. It is suitable for engaging light armoured and soft-skinned vehicles out to 1500m. b. High Explosive (HE). HE rounds are suitable for engaging soft-skinned vehicles, bunkers and dismounted infantry out to 1500m. HE has the most utility in an urban environment, providing assistance to assault troops without the more extensive collateral damage associated with a tank HESH round. 15. Limitations. There are several limitations to the use of 30mm cannon in the urban environment: a. 30mm cannon may be restricted in elevation and traverse within a built up area. b. HE rounds can have limited effect against harder structures, ie concrete or reinforced buildings. c. The weapon platforms may have difficulty in manoeuvring in an urban environment due to size restriction and weight. Obstacles will also prove more difficult to negotiate in an urban setting. This will be more prevalent for Warrior variants than CVR(T) Scimitar. SECTION 5 – TANK WEAPONS11 16. In spite of the tank’s vulnerability to short-range anti-tank weapons, the physical and psychological impact and the shock effect of armour, at close range, in conjunction with infantry, can be overwhelming in urban close combat12. The range, accuracy, destructive potential and absence of minimum range of the tank armament are enhanced by the tank’s protection and mobility. 17. Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) is the principal antiarmour round for the L30 120 mm rifled gun and is designed for engaging enemy armoured vehicles out to a range of >2000 m. Its utility against buildings and bunkers is limited. 18. High Explosive Squash Head (HESH). HESH rounds are suitable for engaging bunkers, armoured and soft-skinned vehicles out to a range of 1500 m or area targets out to 8000m. HESH has great utility in an urban environment due to its explosive effect and is particularly useful against concrete reinforced urban structures in support of assaulting troops. 10

See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 37-40. See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 41-47. 12 See Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’. 11

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19. The smoke round has a range of up to 8000m and provides excellent cover for defiles and choke points in urban areas. However, the smoke is generated by white phosphorus and the use of such ammunition may therefore be restricted by extant ROE. 20 The two 7.62 mm machine guns mounted on the Challenger II tank, one coaxially mounted with the main armament and one located above the loader’s hatch, are particularly effective for suppressive fire. SECTION 6 – INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS13 21. General. The urban environment greatly restricts low angle indirect fire. Mortars and artillery operating in the high angle are less affected. For low angle artillery fire, dead space is about five times the height of the building behind which the target sits. For mortars and artillery operating in the high angle, dead space is only about one-half the height of the building. Both mortars and artillery firing in the high angle can therefore provide effective indirect fire support during urban operations. 22. Lethality. In open terrain the 105 mm shell has a lethal radius of 40m (ground burst) and 50m (air burst) , and the 155 mm shell 55m (ground burst) and 85m (air burst). GMLRS rockets have a lethal radius of 80m for ground burst, which varies with altitude for air burst. In built up areas the range of the blast and fragmentation of the shell or rocket may be lessened by the physical obstruction of the buildings, although hard surfaces may increase the ricochet range and effect of the explosion. MORTARS (60MM AND 81MM) 23. The multi-option fuze on mortar rounds makes them particularly effective weapons in urban terrain. Delay settings can slightly increase penetration and proximity bursts can increase the lethal area covered by fragments. Tall buildings can cause proximity-fused mortar rounds to detonate prematurely if they pass too closely. The 60 mm mortar round will not penetrate most rooftops, even with a delay setting. HE rounds are effective, however, in suppressing snipers on rooftops and preventing roofs from being used by enemy observers. 60 mm smoke may be effective when two or three mortars are grouped together. SECTION 7 – CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR (CBRN)14 24. General. Commanders should be aware of how the urban environment affects the response to a CBRN threat15. Buildings will provide some protection against liquid contamination and fallout. However, in a post-attack situation, hazards may be increased by the tendency for contamination to remain in enclosed spaces and sheltered areas. In addition, urban areas represent an increased risk from Environmental and Industrial Hazards (EIH). 25. Detection, Identification and Monitoring. Inconsistent wind conditions and variations from one building to the next may mean that detectors are better employed inside 13

See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 67-73. See also Chapter 3, Section 4 ‘Civilian Factors’ Paras 35-36 – ‘Toxic Waste’. 15 Details are in AFM Vol 1 Pt 5: Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) conditions. 14

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a sheltered space than in an assessed upwind location. The vapour hazard may vary from one room to the next and the use of LCAD16 will be essential when outside the protection offered by MCAD17. Buildings must be surveyed before being occupied. 26. Warning and Reporting. The behaviour of down-wind hazards will be greatly affected by built-up areas. Plumes may be channelled, reducing the spread of vapour. Conversely, eddying and turbulence may cause vapour hazards to spread more widely in an unpredictable way. Only survey and reconnaissance will determine the actual extent of contamination. 27. Physical Protection. Protection may be enhanced in a built up area. Overhead cover and some protection from blast is an advantage. Risk taking may allow some troops to reduce their dress state where liquid contamination has been avoided and only a vapour hazard remains. 28. Hazard Management. In general terms hazard management is complicated by an urban environment. The effects of weathering are reduced due to shelter provided from sunlight and wind. Complicated surfaces, spaces and objects are more likely to harbour contamination. Conversely, access to some essential counter measure resources such as water may be easier in an urban environment, and it may be possible to identify areas of shelter which have been unaffected by the CBRN agent used.

16 17

Lightweight Chemical Agent Detector. Manportable Chemical Agent Detector.

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CHAPTER 11 SUBTERRANEAN OPERATIONS “As it became increasingly difficult to move above ground, the Poles soon took to using the sewers to send messages, move units and conduct supply operations throughout Warsaw. Soon after, the struggle in the sewers matched the intensity of what was transpiring on the streets above and quickly changed the nature of the fighting.” Warsaw in 1944 from City Fights by Maj David M. Toczek, Ballantine Books

GENERAL 1. Knowledge of the nature and location of underground facilities is of great value to both the attacker and defender. To exploit the advantages of underground facilities, detailed maps and plans should be used and, if possible a reconnaissance undertaken. This chapter describes the techniques used to deny the enemy use of these features, the tactical value of subterranean passages, and stresses the psychological aspects of extended operations in the underground environment. TACTICAL FACTORS 2. In larger cities, subterranean features include sunken garages, underground passages, railway lines, utility tunnels, sewers, and storm drains. Many of these features will allow the movement of troops. Even in smaller European towns, sewers and storm drains permit soldiers to move beneath street level during operations. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 3. Subterranean passages provide the attacker with covered and concealed routes into and through built-up areas. The attacker may launch his main attack at street level while using subterranean passages to infiltrate a smaller force. The objective of such an attack may be to insert a unit into the defender’s rear, thereby, disrupting his defence and obstructing the avenues of withdrawal for his forward defence. Even if a subterranean effort is not immediately successful, it forces the defender to fight on two levels and to extend his resources to more than just street-level fighting. The attacker has to consider: a. The need for plans and maps of subterranean passages and, if possible, reconnaissance. b. The threat from ambush and the ease with which the defender may employ obstacles to block subterranean passages. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 4. The existence of subterranean passages forces the defender to defend the built-up area above and below ground, but the defender may use subterranean passages to his advantage. When thoroughly reconnoitred and controlled by the defender, subterranean passages provide excellent covered and concealed routes to move reinforcements or to

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launch counterattacks. They also provide ready-made lines of communication for the movement of supplies and evacuation of casualties, and provide places to cache supplies for forward companies. The defender needs to consider: a. Tunnels afford the attacker little cover and concealment except for the darkness and any man-made barriers. The passageways provide tight fields of fire and amplify the effect of grenades. Obstacles at intersections in the tunnels provide excellent ambush sites. Booby-traps can turn the subterranean passages into a deadly maze. b. A thorough reconnaissance of the subterranean or sewer system should be made. To be effective, obstacles be located at critical intersections in the passage network so that they trap attacking troops in a killing area while allowing the defenders freedom of movement. c. There will be a requirement for escape routes in case of bypass by the enemy or the collapse of the subterranean system.

Fig C-11-1 Subterranean Operations RECONNAISSANCE PATROL TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES 5. Reconnaissance of the subterranean passages of a platoon or company area should normally be the responsibility of a patrol of section size. Only in extremely large subterranean features should the size of a patrol be increased. a. The patrol commander should organize his patrol with one soldier tasked with security to the front (the lead scout man) and one tasked with security to the rear. The patrol commander moves directly behind the lead scout, and navigates and records data collected by the patrol. The grenadier should follow the lead scout, and the demolitions man should follow the grenadier. Two riflemen should be left as a security post at the point of entry. They are responsible for detecting enemy who

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come upon the patrol unit's rear and for acting as the communications link between the patrol commander and his headquarters. Communications with platoon headquarters will be difficult. b. The patrol commander should carry a map, compass, street plan, and notebook in which he has written the information he has to gather for the higher commander. The grenadier should carry the tools needed to open manhole covers. If the patrol is to move more than 200 to 300 metres or if the patrol commander directs, the grenadier should also carry a suitable telephone and line for communications. The whole section should be equipped with night vision devices, and an infra red source, to maintain surveillance within the sewer. In addition, the lead scout will need a ‘feeler’ for trip wires. c. All soldiers entering the sewer should carry a sketch of the sewer system to include magnetic north, azimuths, distances, and manholes. They should also carry protective masks, gloves, flashlights and chalk for marking features along the route. Ideally, the patrol should also take a safety rope to which each man is tied. To improve their footing in slippery sewers and storm drains, the members of the patrol can wrap chicken wire or screen wire around their boots. d. A constant concern to troops conducting a subterranean patrol is chemical defence. Chemical agents if used in tunnels are normally encountered in dense concentrations, with no chance of dissipation. A suitable CBRN detection system carried by the lead scout could provide warning of the presence of chemical agents. Detector paper can also be used to detect chemical agents. At the first indication that harmful gases are present, the patrol should put on their respirators. e. In addition to chemical agents, noxious gases from decomposing sewage, especially methane gas, can also pose a threat. These gases are not detected by the CBRN detection system, nor are they completely filtered by the protective mask. Physical signs that indicate their presence in harmful quantities are nausea and dizziness. The patrol commander should be constantly alert to these signs and know the shortest route to the surface for fresh air. f. Once the patrol is organized and equipped, it moves to the entrance of the tunnel, which is usually a manhole. With the manhole cover removed. The patrol should wait 15 minutes before entry to allow any gases to dissipate. Then the lead scout descends into the tunnel to determine whether the air is safe to breathe and if movement is restricted. The lead scout should remain in the tunnel for 10 minutes before the rest of the patrol follows. If he becomes ill or is exposed to danger, he can be pulled out by the safety rope. g. When the patrol is moving through the tunnel, the lead scout moves about 10 metres in front of the patrol commander. Other patrol members maintain 5 metre intervals. If the water in the tunnel is flowing fast or if the sewer contains slippery obstacles, those intervals should be increased to prevent all patrol members from falling if one man slips. All patrol members should stay tied to the safety rope so that they can easily be retrieved from danger. The rear security man marks the route with chalk or spray paint so that other troops can find the patrol.

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h. The patrol leader should note the azimuth and pace count of each turn he takes in the tunnel. When he encounters a manhole to the surface, the grenadier should open it and determine the location, which the patrol leader then records. The use of recognition signals should prevent friendly troops from accidentally shooting at the grenadier as he appears at a manhole. i. The patrol should carry a field telephone in addition to radios and lay line for communications in order to establish a series of tap-in points. Plans have to be made to deny the enemy use of the line. j. Once the patrol has returned and submitted its report, the commander should decide how to use the tunnel. In the offence, the tunnel could provide a covered route to move behind the enemy's positions. In defence, the tunnel could provide a covered passage between positions. In either case, the patrol members should act as guides along the route. WEAPON SYSTEMS IN TUNNELS 6. The confined space of tunnels and sewers amplifies the sounds of weapons firing to a dangerous level. The overpressure from grenades and mines exploding in a sewer or tunnel can have adverse effects on friendly troops such as ruptured eardrums and wounds from flying debris. Additionally, gases found in sewers can be ignited by the blast effects of these munitions. For these reasons, small-arms weapons should be the principal weapon systems employed in tunnels and sewers. Friendly troops should be outside tunnels or out of range of the effects when mines or demolitions are detonated. The provision of additional ear protection for subterranean operations should be considered. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 7. Combat operations in subterranean passages are much like night combat operations. The psychological factors that affect soldiers during night operations reduce confidence, cause fear, and increase a feeling of isolation. This feeling of isolation is further magnified by the tight confines of the tunnels. The layout of tunnels could require greater dispersion between positions than is usual for other operations. 8. Commanders should enforce measures to dispel the feelings of fear and isolation experienced by soldiers in tunnels. These measures include leadership training, physical and mental fitness, sleep discipline and stress management. 9. Commanders should maintain communication with soldiers manning positions in the tunnels either by personal visits or by field telephone. Soldiers manning positions below ground should be given as much information as possible on the organization of the tunnels and the importance of their task. They should be briefed on plans and other positions if their primary positions become untenable. 10. Physical and mental fitness can be maintained by periodically rotating soldiers away from tunnels so they can stand and walk in fresh air and sunlight. Stress management is also a factor of operations in tunnels. Historically, combat in built-up areas has been one of the most stressful forms of combat. Continuous darkness and restricted manoeuvre space can cause more stress to soldiers than street fighting.

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CHAPTER 12 NIGHT OPERATIONS THE CHALLENGES OF NIGHT 1. Night-time and limited visibility degrades all the senses, but particularly the primary sense, sight. Night vision devices (NVD) are of great value but they do not replace continuous all-round visual awareness. Darkness gives an unqualified advantage to an enemy who knows the ground well1. These disadvantages can be overcome by discipline, mental strength, enlightened leadership and professional experience. Training and preparation for night operations in the urban environment might be protracted and rigorous, but they are essential to success. 2. At night-time, the human body needs time to recover from daytime activities. During prolonged operations, it is necessary to allow for the movement of combat supplies, equipment and vehicle maintenance and rest. Night-time may provide that opportunity and a lower activity regime. 3. There is a need for a different form of discipline at night-time. Day-time reactions, small team drills, hand-signals and the use of oral commands are conducted differently. Training at night must include the night-time passage of information between individual soldiers. 4. The difficulties of conducting urban operations are exacerbated at night. Commanders must anticipate the physical effects of night conditions on soldiers and the technical restraints on their operations while training and preparing soldiers for unbroken day/night operations. There is a need for greater control and rehearsal to overcome the problems of operating at night. 5. Night operations in the urban environment increases risk. The risk of fratricide is higher, the risk of failure to anticipate or understand the enemy’s movement or intentions is higher and the risk of plans being misunderstood or going wrong is greater. These factors increase the need for greater control and the restriction on individual action. 6.

Vehicle Mounted Operations. a. Confusion. All night urban operations, even simple ones but particularly those conducted in vehicles, can lead to confusion and disorientation on the part of individual soldiers. Changes to plan, changes to timings, and changes to vehicle manning must be understood and rehearsed every time by all ranks. Briefing must be comprehensive, the control and counting of individual team members at junior, senior NCO and junior officer level is vital. Count them out, check, count them in, check, count them back. b. Task Flexibility. All ranks, all trades, all soldiers must be able to carry out the all tasks of their immediate colleagues. Driver, commander, signaller, gunner,

1

This was particularly well understood by the Russians in Stalingrad who defeated a more technically superior enemy by ‘hugging’ him close, separating the infantry from his indirect fire support and wearing him out. The same applies to the Taliban attacking defended outposts in Afghanistan.

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each soldier must know how to operate the vehicle, the radios, the weapons in his vehicle and be able to replace and carry out the duties of his comrades. c. Actions On. The potential confusion that limited visibility brings will amplify the difficulties in nearly every situation. Armoured vehicles might be ambushed, might get lost, might get separated and will break down. Tactical commanders must plan for the actions on vehicle breakdown and recovery, at night, in contact, with casualties and in a confined and hostile environment. Vehicle commanders and crews must rehearse and be confident in the plan and their part in it. 7. Surprise and Operational Tempo. Contemporary experience shows that in urban operations disciplined conventional forces can use the surprise that the cover of night provides to conduct operations at night-time with less restriction than they might be able to by day. The civilian population may be subject to some form of curfew; there may not the same opportunity for the enemy to mingle and hide amongst the civilian population. There may be a greater opportunity for aggressive and kinetic response to enemy activity. Urban strike operations, for example, can be carried out at night-time with an element of surprise and freedom of movement. Operations involving military interaction with the civilian population may only be possible during the daytime, when there is no curfew and the population can be fully and peacefully engaged. ‘A more general tactic evolved, based on the realisation that the Germans were short of reserves. Chuikov ordered an emphasis on night attacks, mainly for the practical reason that the Luftwaffe could not react to them, but also because he was convinced that the Germans were more frightened in the hours of darkness, and would become exhausted. The German Landser came to harbour a special fear of the Siberians from Colonel Batyuk’s 284th Rifle Division, who were considered to be natural hunters of any sort of prey. ‘If only you could understand what terror is; at the slightest rustle, I pull the trigger and fire off tracer in bursts from the machine-gun’. The Russians also kept up the tension by firing flares into the night sky from time to time to give the impression of an imminent attack. Red Army aviation, partly to avoid the Messerschmitts by day, kept up a relentless series of raids every night on German positions. It also served as another part of the wearing down process to exhaust the Germans and stretch their nerves.’‘ Stalingrad, Anthony Beevor, Penguin Books “OWNING THE NIGHT” 8. The advantages brought by technology, discipline, the training advantage and professionalism can give conventional armed forces the opportunity to close with and defeat the urban enemy at night. 9. Tactical Night Vision Technology. Combined Arms urban warfare brings a variety of NVD technology to the battlegroup. The soldier’s Thermal Imaging Head Mounted Night Vision Systems ((TI)HMNVS) improves individual night-time vision. Information available to the battlegroup is aided by infantry, artillery and engineer armoured vehicles’ short and long range Thermal Imaging (TI), and in the case of tanks, longer range Image Intensification (II). Sensor pods mounted on AH and fast-air platforms can bring overhead TI imagery as far down as the battlegroup.

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10. ISTAR. By observing a wide portion of the electromagnetic spectrum and communicating this to deployed HQs, ISTAR assets deliver information that can be translated into intelligence. ISTAR gathering sensors in satellites, fixed and rotary wing aircraft with cameras, manned and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), balloons, overt and covert ground vehicles, masts, unattended covert systems and ground sensors (UGS) are used to provide such information. ‘Operating in urban terrain in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom at night places a premium on training, skilled small unit leaders, and technology necessary to acquire and engage the enemy. Maintaining situational awareness to see the enemy, ourselves, and terrain, is difficult but mission essential. In the COIN fight, we use the night to maneuver unimpeded, to infiltrate and to set the conditions for operations. The urban fight at night will make an already difficult task doubly so. Thermals and passive NVGs don't excel at telling the difference between an armed and unarmed man in the dark. In all but the most high-intensity scenarios this places a premium on good leadership and judgement. In the urban fight, owning the night is the ultimate high ground; it offers a decisive advantage to those who can seize it, but to get to that point requires a great level of preparation in leader development, training, and use of technology.’ LTC John W Karagosian; XO, 1-506th, 101st ABN (AASLT) ADVANTAGES OF NIGHT OPERATIONS 11. When fighting in built-up areas at night, attacking or defending forces have certain advantages as follows: a. In all operations, advantage should be taken of the technology offered by thermal imagery and image intensification. The ability to identify, engage and destroy targets before detection by an enemy may favour night operations. b. In periods of limited visibility, attacking forces should take advantage of the enemy's reduced awareness and approach and engage before being detected. c.

Night-time and limited visibility gives the attacker a greater chance of surprise.

d. There may be a greater opportunity at night for conducting covert, small- or large-scale operations or aggressive or kinetic response to enemy activity. DISADVANTAGES OF NIGHT OPERATIONS 12. When fighting in built-up areas during night operations, attacking and defending forces face the following disadvantages: a. The cover of night can give an advantage to the enemy, and particularly the insurgent, to move, to mount surprise attacks, to escape and to prepare ambushes without being seen.

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b. Fighting through noisy, dark and unfamiliar rooms and houses by torchlight is chaotic and command and control difficult. The risk of casualties and fratricide is increased. c. Soldiers have an instinctive tendency to bunch during night operations, increasing individual and collective vulnerability. d. The characteristics of built-up areas at night-time and in reduced visibility can be disorientating. Target identification and indication is difficult at night and may result in indiscriminate engagement and loss of fire discipline. NIGHT VISION DEVICES (NVD) 13. The characteristics of built-up areas may degrade NVDs and sights. Both operators and commanders must allow for the degradation of their own systems whilst attempting to utilise the impact on the enemy's systems to their own advantage. a. Most built-up areas will have electric power, street lights and building lights. These can cause a "white out" on image intensification devices. b. The chance that fires will be burning in the area of operations is high. This will potentially cause problems for both light intensification and thermal devices. c. Subterranean areas and the interiors of buildings will not have ambient light if the power is off. Passive II require an artificial light source2 to provide enough ambient light for the devices to work. d. The many reflective surfaces found in built-up areas may cause false images, especially for laser range finders and laser target designators. e.

Dust, smoke and fog degrades the performance of thermal imaging devices.

f. Weapons flashes within enclosed areas appear much brighter than by day. Soldiers can lose their night vision and light intensification devices can be overloaded. g. Flares, mortar and artillery illumination and spotlights (visible light or infrared) can be used to blind enemy NVDs or to artificially illuminate the battlefield. FEATURES OF URBAN OPERATIONS AT NIGHT 14. General. Before conducting any urban operations at night the commander should balance the risks and complexity of such operations against the requirements of the mission. Rehearsals will be important; sound command and control measures can reduce mistakes and casualties. Specific points to note are:

2

Such as infrared.

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a. Soldiers should clear buildings and rooms using the same techniques they use during daylight to reduce confusion. The soldiers should be practised and confident in techniques and equipment. b. Movement will be slower. The problems of night-time target acquisition, clearing buildings, and command, control and communication at night may cause significant delay. Commanders should allocate sufficient time to achieve their planning, preparation and mission. c. NVD should be made available to every single soldier involved in urban operations at night. White light should be used with caution since it might benefit the enemy. 15. Fratricide. The key to avoiding fratricide is good training and a high level of situational awareness. Other considerations include: a. Fire Support Control Measures should be clearly defined by the use of obvious features on the ground, such as motorways, railway lines, overpasses, distinct buildings, and rivers. b.

Fire control and movement should similarly be tightly controlled.

c. Cleared rooms and buildings should be clearly marked to identify cleared areas to friendly troops. The use of cylumes can be particularly effective. d. Visible markers (for example glint tape or thermal strips) can be attached to individual soldiers and buildings. e.

Safe routes between and through buildings should be marked.

f.

Indirect fire and close air support needs careful co-ordination.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 16. In principal, the provision of CSS for night operations differs little from day-time operations. The following points require particular attention: a. Night-time provides the best opportunity for troops for the maintenance and repair of weapons and equipment. CSS operations may perforce be carried out principally at night-time and commanders should plan on periods of enforced rest for soldiers during the day to allow for effective administration at night. b. Casualty collection may be significantly more difficult at night-time. Clear methods for marking any casualties must be established before the start of the operation. Commanders should allow for sufficient time for the movement of casualties and the marking of evacuation routes. c. Collection and control of PWs may require more manpower at night. Additional personnel should be nominated before the start of the operation.

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d. CSS relies on the movement of vehicles. Apart from normal night discipline for vehicle movement, the allocation of additional NVD to vehicle crews and detailed route marking may be necessary. 17. Operations in the dense human terrain of the urban environment can be different at night-time. The civilian population may be subject to curfew; there may not the same opportunity fore the enemy to mingle amongst the civilian population nor the immediate possibility, for example, of spontaneous civilian reaction or civil unrest. There may be a greater opportunity for aggressive and kinetic response to enemy activity.

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CHAPTER 13 THE USE OF OBSTACLES IN URBAN OPERATIONS SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION 1.

This chapter is intended to give an overview of obstacles and how they might be used. It provides the all arms commander with an insight into what obstacles he might face in the assault and how he might use obstacles in defence. Further detail and advice will be available from the brigade close support engineer regiment1. 2. In the contemporary operating environment and for the foreseeable future, possibly even in major combat operations, UK forces will wish to minimise permanent damage to urban environments and avoid killing or injuring the local population. Whether assaulting into or operating within an urban area we must assume that much of the indigenous population will remain. Causing damage to enhance our own manoeuvre or to deny adversary manoeuvre may well be counter-productive, attracting adverse media, losing the consent of the people or even causing humanitarian problems and displacing the population. Furthermore, the UK may well need to repair any damage in order to win the consent of the people thus adding to the workload. As such, it is unlikely that UK forces would use demolitions, or other destructive methods of making obstacles, lay mines/boobytraps or use methods that could injure or kill. Non-lethal barriers, probably pre-fabricated and relatively easy to move (with plant equipment if necessary), will be the preferred method of denying adversary manoeuvre. 3. Conversely, adversaries may not operate under the same constraints so UK forces need to be aware of the possible threats from mines, booby traps and other lethal and nonlethal systems. This chapter is intended to give an overview of obstacles and how they might be used. 4. Both man-made and natural obstacles are used extensively in urban operations to allow the defender to canalize the enemy, impede his movement and disrupt his attack. Obstacles are designed to prevent movement by personnel, separate infantry from tanks and slow or stop armour/other vehicles. The UK will not use AP mines as these have been banned under international law. The use of AT mines by UK forces will be subject to ROE and it is unlikely that their use will be widespread. SECTION 2 - LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL OBSTACLES 5. Obstacles may be constructed using pre-fabricated concrete sections to create walls, other pre-fabricated or equipment systems, barbed wire, knife rests etc. Depending on the nature of the operation, they may incorporate anti-tank mines or other explosive hazards and, when few constraints are imposed, could be created with craters, building rubble or destroyed vehicles. All obstacles should be covered by fire and view.

1

Useful references include ME Vol 2, Filed Engineering – Pam 3 Obstacles, Pam 5 Minelaying

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Fig C-13-1 The Use of Obstacles in Streets a. Buildings. Obstacles in buildings are constructed to deny covered routes or positions to the enemy. They can be developed by destroying the building with explosives or flame, constructing wire obstacles within the building, or preparing the building as a trap (with explosives or flame to be fired after the enemy has occupied it). b. Dead Space. Obstacles in these areas are designed to inflict casualties and restrict infantry movement in areas that are concealed from observation and protected from direct fire. c. Underground Systems. Exits from underground systems that could provide adversaries with advantageous positions within or behind the defence must be denied.

Fig C-13-2 Underground Obstacles SECTION 3 - MINES 5. General. Anti-tank mines may be used individually to reinforce other barriers but are normally used in quantity to form minefields. In the context of urban operations they would usually be used on the approaches, rather than within an urban area. They can be laid where no natural obstacle exists, but are more effective when laid to strengthen other obstacles. They should always be sited to fit the overall tactical plan and form part of the Issue 4: Oct 09

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combined arms obstacle integration plan. It is only by dominating a minefield and preventing interference with it that the defenders can rely on it as an obstacle; it must be under observation and preferably covered by direct fire, though indirect fire may suffice. The location of mines must be correctly recorded. 6. Considerations for the use of Mines in Urban Areas. Many of the factors and principles normally considered in the siting and design of minefields in rural areas have to be adapted in order to be fully effective within the urban environment. Vehicular movement is far more restricted in a built up area where channelling is often unavoidable and the selected route of a vehicle more predictable. Fields of fire will be reduced requiring greater use of mines in denying dead ground to the enemy. Concealment of mines will also become more difficult and different techniques will need to be employed if the mines are to be successfully deployed. There are four types of minefield. Due to the many limiting factors, large tactical minefields do not normally have a place in the urban battlefield. The remaining 3 types of minefield can all be used to great effect. a. Tactical. A minefield which is part of a formation obstacle plan, the aim of which will normally be to break up the enemy's advance, deflect him into a killing area or delay him to give the anti-tank weapons better targets. They are usually laid mechanically by engineers and are of a considerable size, often being several kilometres in length and many hundreds of metres in depth. b. Protective. These are for the close in protection of a defensive position or installation and their laying is an all arms responsibility. They are usually laid by hand and play an important part in enhancing the effectiveness of a defended locality in a built up area. c. Nuisance. These are laid by engineers or assault pioneers. They are used in an effort to delay and disorganise the enemy and to hinder his use of an area or route. This is the type of minefield most likely to be encountered in the urban environment. d. Phoney. An area free of live mines that is usually fenced and marked as a minefield with the object of deceiving the enemy. When used effectively they can impose similar delays as the real thing as the enemy will treat it in the same way as a live minefield. Phoney minefields also enable friendly forces freedom of manoeuvre (for example a counter attack through a phoney minefield). SECTION 4 - DEMOLITIONS 7. The use of demolitions on offensive or defensive operations in urban terrain is likely to be far more common than during operations in open, natural terrain. Demolitions should be carried out by engineers or assault pioneers. However, if engineers are involved in higher priority tasks, the preparation of mousehole charges, breaching of walls and destruction of buildings may be accomplished by infantry assault pioneers. When assaulting or clearing a built-up area, demolitions will enable the commander to create an avenue of approach through buildings. The creation of mouse holes provides the safest method of moving between rooms and floors

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SECTION 5 - BOOBY TRAPS 8. General. Booby traps have been employed over the years to prevent forces from freely moving into certain areas and restricting their actions once they get there. The military aims of a booby trap are: a.

Restrict enemy movement.

b.

Create casualties.

c.

Stretch medical resources.

d.

Lower morale.

e.

Create confusion and uncertainty.

f.

Deny comfort and facilities to the enemy.

All of these points help to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy. A small well motivated booby trap/sabotage team can create havoc. Unfortunately most armies use these tactics and whilst the UK Army controls its deployment of booby traps, many adversaries may deploy them at random. With no records kept, no knowledge of devices used, often the first indication of devices is when you take your first casualty. Always assume booby traps have been deployed until proved otherwise. 9. Offensive Operations. During raids, delay charges may be used to cause damage and casualties and also to create confusion. Traps may be left behind to delay a counterattack. 10. Defensive Operations. In addition to their use with nuisance mines on likely lines of approach for men and vehicles, booby traps may be laid in advance of an enemy interspersed amongst tactical obstacles, for instance minefields, wire fences and roadblocks, to impede infantry and prevent detailed reconnaissance and attempted neutralization. Within built up areas traps may be laid where platoons are likely to have RVs, such as empty buildings, and also areas likely to be used as fire positions. 11. Delay Operations. Booby traps are a particularly valuable weapon to withdrawing troops as they will slow down any pursuit by inflicting casualties and instilling caution into their movements. Traps will be laid in much the same way as nuisance mines, being sited in locations which will deny the enemy the use of buildings, approach routes and attractive harbour areas. The presence of booby traps will make troops wary and they are likely to treat many harmless situations with extreme caution thereby reducing the rate of advance unduly. 12. Detection. The detection of enemy booby traps and the reduction of casualties from them is largely a matter of discipline and training. Knowledge of the subject must be combined with keen eyesight and a suspicious mind. Every soldier needs to learn to look for the signs of unusual activity which will warn of traps, such as absence of people, battery wrappings, wire clippings, loose floorboards etc.

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13. Laying. Booby traps and anti-lift devices may only be employed on the orders of the formation commander. If authorised, booby traps should only be laid by Royal Engineers and infantry assault pioneers. 14. Recording. Units setting booby traps are responsible for recording them. It is essential that accurate records be kept so that traps may be recovered should friendly troops be required to move to the area. Records should be kept at Divisional HQ which is responsible for informing neighbouring units of the location of booby traps. 15. Marking. Booby traps are to be marked as soon as they are encountered in an effort to warn troops and prevent casualties. Signs should, whenever possible, be fixed above ground and in a prominent place to avoid confusion. Policy and method of marking will be decided by the appropriate commander. It will usually be the same as a mine marking sign (NATO mine triangle). 16. Clearance. Although the responsibility for detection and clearance of traps rests primarily with the Royal Engineers and assault pioneers, other arms are required to maintain detachments trained for the work for the immediate protection of the unit. 17. Traps. In offensive operations all arms must be prepared to accept the danger arising from traps and Royal Engineers should, if possible, accompany the detailed reconnaissance to discover the existence of traps. Even where time and personnel are not available to clear the traps, dangerous sites should be marked for the benefit of other troops.

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ABBREVIATIONS

1BW 2IC

1st Battalion, The Black Watch Second-in-Command

‘A’ Vehicle AA ABCA AD AFV AFM AIF AH AO AOP APFSDS APC APDS` AR ASM Avn

Armoured Vehicle Avenue of Approach American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Air Defence Armoured Fighting Vehicle Army Field Manual Anti-Iraqi Forces Attack Helicopter Area of Operations Air Observation Posts Armour Piercing, Fin Stabilised, Discarding Sabot Armoured Personnel Carrier Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (US) Armored Reconnaissance Anti-Structure Munition Aviation

BAE BC BCU BE BEMA BG BGE BIC BMP

Battlefield Area Evaluation (RA) Battery Commander Battery Coolant Unit Base Ejecting Bulk Earth Moving Attachment Battlegroup Battlegroup Engineer Break-In Charge Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (Боевая Машина Пехоты - Fighting Vehicle of Infantry)

C2 C3 C4IRM

Command and Control Command, Control, Communications Medical Command, Control, Communication, Computerisation, Information, Recording and Management and Medical Logistics. Combat Air Patrol Combat Aid Post Cartridge Close Air Support Casualty Evacuation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Close Combat Attack Collateral Damage Estimate Charge Demolition Cutting Commando Casualty Exchange Point Counter-Intelligence Combined Information Data Network Exchange

CAP CAP Cart CAS CASEVAC CBRN CCA CDE CDLC Cdo CEP CI CIDNE

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CIMIC CLP CLU CM CNO CO COH COIN COP Coy CP CPERS CR CS CSM CSS CTA CVR(T) CVR(T) CWS Cylume

Civil Military Co-operation Combat Logistic Patrol Command Launch Unit Centimetre Computer Network Operation Commanding Officer Coalition Operations Handbook Counter Insurgency (US) Combat Outpost Company Command Post Captured Personnel Combat Recovery Close Support Company Sergeant-Major Combat Service Support Closed Telescope Ammunition Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked Crew-Served Weapon Sight Fluorescent Light Marker

DA DAS DD Det Cord DF DF DfID DHC DS DSO

Direct Attack Defensive Aids Suites Delay Deep Detonation Cord Direct Fire Defensive Fire Department for International Development Deployed Health Care (DHC) Delay Shallow Decision Support Overlay

EBW ECM EEO EHLS EIH EMOE EO EOD ERW ES

Enhanced Blast Weapon Electronic Counter Measures Emplaced Explosive Ordnance Emergency Helicopter Landing Site Environmental and Industrial Hazard Explosive Method of Entry Electro-Optical Exploded Ordnance Disposal Explosive Remnants of War Equipment Support

FAC FFD FIBUA Fig FLOT FMV FOO

Forward Air Controller First Field Dressing Fighting in Built Up Areas Figure Forward Line, Own Troops Full Motion Video (RA) Forward Observation Officer

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FP FPF FPM FR FRT FSC FST FTB Fwd AE

Force Protection Final Protective Fire Force Provost Marshal Formation Reconnaissance Forward Repair Team Fire Support Centre Fire Support Team Follow-Through Bomb Forward Aero-Medical Evacuation

G2 GC GBAD GCS GEOINT GM GMG GMLRS GPMG GPMG (SF) GPS GR

General (Staff Operations) Two (Intelligence) Geneva Convention Ground Based Air Defence Ground Control Station Geospatial Intelligence) Guided Missile Grenade Machine Gun Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems General Purpose Machine Gun General Purpose Machine Gun (Sustained Fire) Global Positioning System Grid Reference

HE HEDP HESH HLS HMNVS HN HQ HUMINT HVTL

High Explosive High Explosive (Dual Purpose) High Explosive (Squash Head) Helicopter Landing Site Head Mounted Night Vision System Host Nation Headquarters Human Intelligence High Value Target List

ICP ICRC ID IED IFF IFV II Illum IMINT IPE IPB IR ISR IST ISTAR IT

Intelligence Collection Plan International Committee of the Red Cross Identification Improvised Explosive Device Identification (Friend of Foe) Infantry Fighting Vehicle Image Intensifier Illumination Imagery Intelligence Individual Protection Equipment Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Infra-Red Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Intimate Support Team Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance Information Technology

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JARIC JDAM JDP JF JIC JOA JRIC JSP JWP

Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre Joint Direct Attack Munition Joint Doctrine Publication Joint Force Joint Intelligence Cell Joint Area of Operations Joint Reconnaissance Intelligence Cell Joint Service Publication Joint Warfare Publication

KG KLE

Kilogram Key Leader Engagement

LAW LCAD LEGAD LM LMG LO LOAC LofC LM LOO LOS LSM LSW LTD LWT

Light Anti-Tank Weapon Lightweight Chemical Agent Detector Legal Advisor Light Manoeuvre Light Machine Gun Liaison Officer Law of Armed Conflict Line of Communication Loitering Munition Line of Operation Line of Sight Last Safe Moment Light Support Weapon Laser Target Designator Light Wheeled Tractor

MACE MANPAD MASINT MBT MC MCAD MD MDA MEDEVAC MERT MFC ML MM MNF-I MO MPS MSR MWT

Military Assistance to Civil Effect Man-Pack Air Defence Missile System Measurement and Signature Intelligence Main Battle Tank Mobility Corridor Manportable Chemical Agent Detector Most Dangerous (COA) Main Defensive Area Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC Medical Emergency Response Team Mortar Fire Controller Most Likely (COA) Millimetre Multinational Force - Information Modus Operandi Military Provost Service Main Supply Route Medium Wheeled Tractor

NATO NEQ NGO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Net Explosive Quality Non-Governmental Organisation

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NGS NLAW NOE NVD

Naval Gunfire Support New Light Anti-Tank Weapon Nap of the Earth Night Vision Device

OAS OC Off Ops OGD OP OPCOM OPCON Ops OPSEC OS OSCE OSINT OTS

Offensive Air Support Officer Commanding Offensive Operations Other Government Department Observation Post Operational Command Operational Control Operations Operations Security Offensive Support Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Open-source intelligence Over-fly Target Attack

Pam PAR PD PE PH PHC PHEC PHF PHO PID PIR Pl Sgt PM PPP PREE PRR PSO Psyops PW

Pamphlet Population at Risk Point Detonating Plastic Explosive Prisoner Handling Primary Health Care Pre Hospital Emergency Care Prisoner Handling Force Prisoner Handling Organisation Positive Identification Priority Intelligence Requirements Platoon Sergeant Provost Marshal Presence, Posture and Profile Plan Review Execute Evaluate Personal Role Radio Peace Support Operation Psychological Operations Prisoner of War

QRF

Quick Reaction Force

RAP RE Recce REME RF RGJ RM RMO RMP ROE

Regimental Aid Post Royal Engineers Reconnaissance Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Radar Frequency Royal Green Jackets Royal Marines Regimental Medical Officer Royal Military Police Rules of Engagement

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RP RPG RPO-A RShG-1 RUSI RV

Red Phosphorous Rocket Propelled Grenade (Russia) Schmel Rocket Launcher (РПО-А Шмель) (" Bumblebee" ) (Russia) Assault Rocket-Propelled Grenade Royal United Services Institute Rendezvous

SA SA SA80 SAL SAM SEAD Ser SF SF SH SIB SIGINT SMK SOHB SOI SOP SSA SP Pol SSR STAP STIC SVR

Situational awareness Small Arms Small Arms 80 (UK Army Rifle) Semi-Active Laser Surface to Air Missile Suppression of Enemy Air Defence Serial Security Force Special Forces Support Helicopter Special Investigation Branch Signals Intelligence Smoke (UK Army) Staff Officers’ Handbook Standing Operational Instructions Standing Operational Procedures Shared Situational Awareness Services’ Personnel Policy Support to Security Sector Reform Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan Sniper Thermal Imaging Capability Secure Voice Rebroadcast

TACOM TACSAT TAR TCM TE TI TI TIH TriM TQ TTPs

Tactical Command Tactical Satellite Tactical Air Reconnaissance Thermal Camouflage Material Threat Evaluation Thermal Imagery Threat Integration Toxic Industrial Hazard Trauma Risk Management Tactical Questioning Tactics, Techniques, Procedures

UAV UCM UDT UGL UGV UHF UK UN US

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Urban Camouflage Material User Data Terminals Under-Slung Grenade Launcher Unmanned Ground Vehicle Ultra High Frequency United Kingdom United Nations United States

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UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force USMC United States Marine Corps UXO Unexploded Ordnance VBIED VCP VHF

Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Vehicle Check Point Very High Frequency

Wks Gp RE Works Group Royal Engineers WP White Phosphorous

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