Villanueva Intellectual Property Law Reviewer.pdf

Intellectual Property Law Prof. Susan D. Villanueva 2 n d Semester, AY 2011-2012 Katrina Michelle Mancao Sp eci al t han k s to K a rich i Sa n tos for hel pi n g m e c omp let e m y no tes , a nd to M a rie E strel la a n d Di Bo n ill a fo r sh ari ng thei r correc t a n s w ers to o ur hw J

 

Contents  

I.  

INTRODUCTION  

1  

II.  

CONSTITUTION  

2  

III.  

INTERNATIONAL  CONVENTIONS  

3  

IV.  

CIVIL  CODE  

5  

V.  

COPYRIGHT  AND  RELATED  RIGHTS  

6  

VI.  

LAW  ON  TRADEMARKS,  TRADENAMES  AND  SERVICE  MARKS  

VII.  

LAW  ON  PATENTS  

   

I.

63   126  

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Introduction  

  Justin  Hughes,   The   Philosophy   of   Intellectual   Property,  

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77  Geo.  L.J.  287  (1988)    

-­‐

Marshall   A.   Leaffer,   Protecting   United   States   Intellectual   Property   Abroad:   Toward   a   New   Multilateralism,  76  Iowa  L.  Rev.  273  (1991)     A.   Samuel   Oddi,   The   International   Patent   System   and   Third  World  Development,  1987  Duke  L.  J.  831  (1987)     Michael   A.   Heller   and   Rebecca   Eisenberg,   Can   Patents   Deter   Innovation?   The   Anti-­‐commons   in   Biomedical   Research,  280  Science  698  (1998)  

-­‐

  24  November  2011   Intellectual  Property:   -­‐ It   is   a   form   of   property.   (Note   that   under   the   Civil   Code,   intellectual   creation   is   one   of   the   modes  of  acquiring  ownership.)   -­‐ It  is  an  intangible  property  right  that  belongs  to   the  creator.  

It   is   separate   and   distinct   from   the   thing   created.   o Thus,   it   can   be   subject   to   a   separate   contract.   Rules  for  IP  are  different  from  rules  governing   traditional  property.   What’s  the  point  of  granting  IP?   o IP   is   an   incentive   system   designed   to   encourage   individuals   to   create,   to   invent,  to  innovate.     o BUT   the   higher   purpose   of   IP   is   to   improve   the   lives   of   the   public.   It   operates   on   the   assumption   that   everyone   would   benefit   from   the   creation   of   more   works.   Thus,   IP   is   granted   under   the   “beneficial   to   the   people”  clause  of  the  Constitution.   IP,   however,   can   be   in   conflict   with   public   access.   It   grants   a   form   of   monopoly   that   restricts   people’s   access   to   something.   Thus,   IP   Law  must  be  balanced  with  a  strong   competition  law.  

  TRIPS   –   it   is   mandatory   to   those   who   would   like   to   enter   or   join   the   WTO   to   agree   to   this   Agreement.    

Katrina Michelle Mancao   their   intellectual   property   and   creations,   particularly   when  beneficial  to  the  people,  for  such  period  as  may  be   provided  by  law.     ARTS  AND  CULTURE  

II. Constitution   ARTICLE  XII,  SECTION  6.   The   use   of   property   bears   a   social   function,   and   all   economic  agents  shall  contribute  to  the  common  good.   Individuals   and   private   groups,   including   corporations,   cooperatives,   and   similar   collective   organizations,   shall   have   the   right   to   own,   establish,   and   operate   economic   enterprises,  subject  to  the  duty  of  the  State  to  promote   distributive   justice   and   to   intervene   when   the   common   good  so  demands.    

SECTION  14.     The  State  shall  foster  the  preservation,  enrichment,  and   dynamic   evolution   of   a   Filipino   national   culture   based   on   the   principle   of   unity   in   diversity   in   a   climate   of   free   artistic  and  intellectual  expression.    

ARTICLE  XII,  SECTION  14.  

SECTION  15.    

The   sustained   development   of   a   reservoir   of   national   talents   consisting   of   Filipino   scientists,   entrepreneurs,   professionals,   managers,   high-­‐level   technical   manpower   and   skilled   workers   and   craftsmen   in   all   fields   shall   be   promoted   by   the   State.   The   State   shall   encourage   appropriate  technology  and  regulate  its  transfer  for  the   national   benefit.   The   practice   of   all   professions   in   the   Philippines   shall   be   limited   to   Filipino   citizens,   save   in   cases  prescribed  by  law.    

Arts   and   letters   shall   enjoy   the   patronage   of   the   State.   The   State   shall   conserve,   promote,   and   popularize   the   nation's  historical  and  cultural  heritage  and  resources,  as   well  as  artistic  creations.    

SECTION  16.     All   the   country's   artistic   and   historic   wealth   constitutes   the  cultural  treasure  of  the  nation  and  shall  be  under  the   protection   of   the   State   which   may   regulate   its   disposition.    

ARTICLE  XIV,  SECTIONS  10  TO  18.  

SECTION  17.    

  SCIENCE  AND  TECHNOLOGY  

The  State  shall  recognize,  respect,  and  protect  the  rights   of   indigenous   cultural   communities   to   preserve   and   develop  their  cultures,  traditions,  and  institutions.  It  shall   consider  these  rights  in  the  formulation  of  national  plans   and  policies.    

SECTION  10.     Science   and   technology   are   essential   for   national   development   and   progress.   The   State   shall   give   priority   to  research  and  development,  invention,  innovation,  and   their   utilization;   and   to   science   and   technology   education,   training,   and   services.   It   shall   support   indigenous,   appropriate,   and   self-­‐reliant   scientific   and   technological   capabilities,   and   their   application   to   the   country's  productive  systems  and  national  life.    

SECTION  18.     The   State   shall   ensure   equal   access   to   cultural   opportunities  through  the  educational  system,  public  or   private   cultural   entities,   scholarships,   grants   and   other   incentives,   and   community   cultural   centers,   and   other   public  venues.     The   State   shall   encourage   and   support   researches   and   studies  on  the  arts  and  culture.     08  December  2011     Note   that   under   the   Constitution   (Section   11,   Article   XIV),   there   are   “other   forms   of   incentives”   granted   to   encourage   innovation   and   creation.   Why   is   it   still   necessary   to   have   IP   laws   despite   the   presence   of   this   clause  in  the  Constitution?   -­‐ We  are  obligated  by  the  TRIPS,  as  a  signatory  to   it,  to  pass  laws  that  will  protect  IP.     What   makes   the   IP   system   more   superior   (than   the   mere   granting  of  awards)?  What  makes  it  more  sustainable?   -­‐ Term  and  duration  of  the  benefit.  They  may  be   enjoyed  for  a  longer  period  of  time.   -­‐ IP  System  is  more  sustainable  because  the  rules  

SECTION  11.     The   Congress   may   provide   for   incentives,   including   tax   deductions,   to   encourage   private   participation   in   programs   of   basic   and   applied   scientific   research.   Scholarships,   grants-­‐in-­‐aid,   or   other   forms   of   incentives   shall   be   provided   to   deserving   science   students,   researchers,   scientists,   inventors,   technologists,   and   specially  gifted  citizens.    

SECTION  12.     The   State   shall   regulate   the   transfer   and   promote   the   adaptation   of   technology   from   all   sources   for   the   national   benefit.   It   shall   encourage   the   widest   participation   of   private   groups,   local   governments,   and   community-­‐based   organizations   in   the   generation   and   utilization  of  science  and  technology.    

SECTION  13.     The   State   shall   protect   and   secure   the   exclusive   rights   of   scientists,   inventors,   artists,   and   other   gifted   citizens   to  

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Intellectual Property Law in   placed   and   the   standards   of   protection   are   objective   and   open.   The   rights   granted   under   the   IP   system   attached   even   when   the   work   produced   is   not   good   in   the   subjective   sense   at   the   time   it   was   granted   (note   that   standards   change).  

III.

International  Conventions  

  It  is  important  to  know  about  the  conventions   because   the   States   are   mandated   to   amend   their  laws  to  comply  with  it.      

  It   is   possible   for   2   forms   of   IP   to   protect   a   single  work.   -­‐ e.g.   Winnie   the   Pooh   and   Friends   –   protected   by   trademark   and   copyright.      

A. Berne   Convention   for   the   Protection   of   Literary   and   Artistic   Works   as   revised  in  Brussels  (Brussels  Act)   It  was  concluded  in  1886.    

B. Paris   Convention   for   the   Protection   of   Industrial   Property   Rights   (Paris   Convention)   The   Paris   Convention   was   concluded   in   1883.   It   covers   industrial   property   in   its   broadest   sense   including   patents,   trademarks,   industrial   design,   utility   models   (sometimes   called   “little   patents”),   tradenames,   geographical   indications,   and   methods   of   unfair   competition.  (Catindig)    

C.

International   Convention   for   the   Protection   of   Performers,   Producers   of   Phonograms   and   Broadcasting   Organizations  (Rome  Convention)  

It  was  concluded  in  1961.    

D. Convention   Establishing   the   World   Intellectual  Property  Organization    

E.

Budapest   Treaty  on  the  International   Recognition   of   the   Deposit   of   Microorganisms   for   the   Purposes   of   Patent  Procedure  

Concluded   in   1977,   this   Treaty   requires   a   Contracting   State,   which   allows   or   requires   the   deposit   of   microorganisms   for   purposes   of   patent   procedure,   to   recognize,   for   such   purposes,   the   deposit   of   a   microorganism   with   any   “international   depositary   authority.”      

F.

Agreement  on   Trade  Related  Aspects   of   Intellectual   Property,   Including   Trade   in   Counterfeit   Goods   of   the   General   Agreement   in   Tariffs   and   Trade  

 

TANADA  V.  ANGARA  (1997)   Relevant  issue:  4th  issue   Petitioners   aver   that   paragraph   1,   Article   34   of   the   General  Provisions  and  Basic  Principles  of  the  Agreement  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   on  Trade-­‐Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights   (TRIPS)  intrudes  on  the  power  of  the  Supreme  Court  to   promulgate   rules   concerning   pleading,   practice   and   procedures.     To   understand   the   scope   and   meaning   of   Article   34,   TRIPS,  it  will  be  fruitful  to  restate  its  full  text  as  follows:     “Article  34.  Process  Patents:  Burden  of  Proof     1.   For   the   purposes   of   civil   proceedings   in   respect   of   the   infringement   of   the   rights   of   the   owner   referred   to   in   paragraph   1(b)   of   Article   28,  if  the  subject  matter  of  a  patent  is  a  process   for  obtaining  a  product,  the  judicial  authorities   shall   have   the   authority   to   order   the   defendant   to   prove   that   the   process   to   obtain   an   identical   product  is  different  from  the  patented  process.     Therefore,   Members   shall   provide,   in   at   least   one   of   the   following   circumstances,   that   any   identical   product   when   produced   without   the   consent   of   the   patent   owner   shall,   in   the   absence   of   proof   to   the   contrary,   be   deemed   to   have   been   obtained   by   the   patented   process:     (a)   if   the   product   obtained   by   the   patented  process  is  new;     (b)   if   there   is   a   substantial   likelihood   that   the   identical   product   was   made   by   the   process   and   the   owner   of   the   patent   has   been   unable   through   reasonable   efforts   to   determine   the   process  actually  used.     2.  Any  Member  shall  be  free  to  provide  that  the   burden   of   proof   indicated   in   paragraph   1   shall   be   on   the   alleged   infringer   only   if   the   condition   referred   to   in   subparagraph   (a)   is   fulfilled   or   only   if   the   condition   referred   to   in   subparagraph  (b)  is  fulfilled.     3.  In  the  adduction  of  proof  to  the  contrary,  the   legitimate  interests  of  defendants  in  protecting   their   manufacturing   and   business   secrets   shall   be  taken  into  account.”     From   the   above,   a   WTO   Member   is   required   to   provide   a   rule   of   disputable   (note   the   words   “in   the   absence   of   proof   to   the   contrary”)   presumption   that   a   product   shown  to  be  identical  to  one  produced  with  the  use  of  a   patented   process   shall   be   deemed   to   have   been   obtained  by  the  (illegal)  use  of  the  said  patented  process,   (1)   where   such   product   obtained   by   the   patented   product   is   new,   or   (2)   where   there   is   “substantial   likelihood”   that   the   identical   product   was   made   with   the   use   of   the   said   patented   process   but   the   owner   of   the  

patent   could   not   determine   the   exact   process   used   in   obtaining  such  identical  product.    Hence,  the  “burden  of   proof”   contemplated   by   Article   34   should   actually   be   understood  as  the  duty  of  the  alleged  patent  infringer  to   overthrow   such   presumption.       Such   burden,   properly   understood,  actually  refers  to  the  “burden  of  evidence”     (burden  of  going  forward)  placed  on  the  producer  of  the   identical  (or  fake)  product  to  show  that  his  product  was   produced  without  the  use  of  the  patented  process.     The   foregoing   notwithstanding,   the   patent   owner   still   has   the   “burden   of   proof”   since,   regardless   of   the   presumption   provided   under   paragraph   1   of   Article   34,   such   owner   still   has   to   introduce   evidence   of   the   existence  of  the  alleged  identical  product,  the  fact  that  it   is   “identical”   to   the   genuine   one   produced   by   the   patented   process   and   the   fact   of   “newness”   of   the   genuine   product   or   the   fact   of   “substantial   likelihood”   that   the   identical   product   was   made   by   the   patented   process.     The   foregoing   should   really   present   no   problem   in   changing   the   rules   of   evidence   as   the   present   law   on   the   subject,   Republic   Act   No.   165,   as   amended,   otherwise   known   as   the   Patent   Law,   provides   a   similar   presumption  in  cases  of  infringement  of  patented  design   or  utility  model,  thus:     “SEC.   60.   Infringement.   -­‐   Infringement   of   a   design   patent   or   of   a   patent   for   utility   model   shall   consist   in   unauthorized   copying   of   the   patented   design   or   utility   model   for   the   purpose   of   trade   or   industry   in   the   article   or   product   and   in   the   making,   using   or   selling   of   the   article   or   product   copying   the   patented   design   or   utility   model.     Identity   or   substantial   identity   with   the   patented   design   or   utility   model   shall   constitute   evidence   of   copying.”   (underscoring  supplied)     Moreover,   it   should   be   noted   that   the   requirement   of   Article   34   to   provide   a   disputable   presumption   applies   only  if  (1)  the  product  obtained  by  the  patented  process   is   NEW   or   (2)   there   is   a   substantial   likelihood   that   the   identical   product   was   made   by   the   process   and   the   process   owner   has   not   been   able   through   reasonable   effort   to   determine   the   process   used.     Where   either   of   these   two   provisos   does   not   obtain,   members   shall   be   free   to   determine   the   appropriate   method   of   implementing   the   provisions   of   TRIPS   within   their   own   internal  systems  and  processes.     By   and   large,   the   arguments   adduced   in   connection   with   our   disposition   of   the   third   issue   -­‐-­‐   derogation   of   legislative   power   -­‐   will   apply   to   this   fourth   issue   also.     Suffice   it   to   say   that   the   reciprocity   clause   more   than   justifies   such   intrusion,   if   any   actually   exists.     Besides,   Article   34   does   not   contain   an   unreasonable   burden,  

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Intellectual Property Law consistent   as   it   is   with   due   process   and   the   concept   of   adversarial   dispute   settlement   inherent   in   our   judicial   system.     So   too,   since   the   Philippine   is   a   signatory   to   most   international   conventions   on   patents,   trademarks   and   copyrights,   the   adjustment   in   legislation   and   rules   of   procedure  will  not  be  substantial.    

ARTICLE  723.     Letters  and  other  private  communications  in  writing  are   owned   by   the   person   to   whom   they   are   addressed   and   delivered,  but  they  cannot  be  published  or  disseminated   without  the  consent  of  the  writer  or  his  heirs.  However,   the   court   may   authorize   their   publication   or   dissemination   if   the   public   good   or   the   interest   of   justice   so  requires.    

G. Patent  Cooperation  Treaty  

ARTICLE  724.    

  Question:   Was   it   the   right   time   to   enter   it   in   2001?    

Special  laws  govern  copyright  and  patent.    

 

A  trade-­‐mark  or  trade-­‐name  duly  registered  in  the  proper   government  bureau  or  office  is  owned  by  and  pertains  to   the   person,   corporation,   or   firm   registering   the   same,   subject  to  the  provisions  of  special  laws.    

ARTICLE  520.    

IV. Civil  Code   ARTICLE  712.  ★   Ownership  is  acquired  by  occupation  and  by  intellectual   creation.     Ownership   and   other   real   rights   over   property   are   acquired  and  transmitted  by  law,  by  donation,  by  testate   and  intestate  succession,  and  in  consequence  of  certain   contracts,  by  tradition.     They  may  also  be  acquired  by  means  of  prescription.    

ARTICLE  521.     The   goodwill   of   a   business   is   property,   and   may   be   transferred   together   with   the   right   to   use   the   name   under  which  the  business  is  conducted.    

ARTICLE  522.     Trade-­‐marks   and   trade-­‐names   are   governed   by   special   laws.      

ARTICLE  721.     By   intellectual   creation,   the   following   persons   acquire   ownership:     (1)   The   author   with   regard   to   his   literary,   dramatic,   historical,  legal,  philosophical,  scientific  or  other  work;     (2)  The  composer;  as  to  his  musical  composition;     (3)  The  painter,  sculptor,  or  other  artist,  with  respect  to   the  product  of  his  art;     (4)  The  scientist  or  technologist  or  any  other  person  with   regard  to  his  discovery  or  invention.    

Differences   between   trademarks  and  patent   KHO  V.  COURT  OF  APPEALS  (2002)   •

copyright,  

Refresher:   Elidad   C.   Kho,   doing   business   under   the   name   of   KEC   Cosmetics  Laboratory,  alleged  that  she  is  the  registered   owner   of   the   copyrights   Chin   Chun   Su   and   Oval   Facial   Cream  Container/Case,  and  that  she  has  the  patent  rights   on   Chin   Chun   Su   &   Device   and   Chin   Chun   Su   for   medicated   cream.   Petitioner   likewise   alleged   that   respondent  Summerville  General  Merchandising  and  Co.   advertised   and   sold   petitioner's   cream   and   products   under   the   brand   name   Chin   Chun   Su   in   similar   containers   that   petitioner   uses,   thereby   misleading   the   public   and   resulting   in   the   decline   in   the   petitioner's   sales   and   income.     The   respondents,   on   the   other   hand,   alleged   as   their   defense  that  Summerville  is  the  exclusive  and  authorized   importer,   re-­‐packer   and   distributor   of   Chin   Chun   Su   products   manufactured   by   Shun   Yi   Factory   of   Taiwan;   that   the   said   Taiwanese   manufacturing   company   authorized   Summerville   to   register   its   trade   name   Chin   Chun   Su   Medicated   Cream   with   the   Philippine   Patent   Office   and   other   appropriate   governmental   agencies;   that   KEC   Cosmetics   Laboratory   of   the   petitioner   obtained   the   copyrights   through   misrepresentation   and   falsification;   and,   that   the   authority   of   Quintin   Cheng,  

ARTICLE  722.     The   author   and   the   composer,   mentioned   in   Nos.   1   and   2   of   the   preceding   article,   shall   have   the   ownership   of   their  creations  even  before  the  publication  of  the  same.   Once   their   works   are   published,   their   rights   are   governed  by  the  Copyright  laws.     The  painter,  sculptor  or  other  artist  shall  have  dominion   over  the  product  of  his  art  even  before  it  is  copyrighted.     The   scientist   or   technologist   has   the   ownership   of   his   discovery  or  invention  even  before  it  is  patented.    

   

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   assignee   of   the   patent   registration   certificate,   to   distribute   and   market   Chin   Chun   Su   products   in   the   Philippines   had   already   been   terminated   by   the   said   Taiwanese  Manufacturing  Company.     Issue:   Whether   the   copyright   and   patent   over   the   name   and   container   of   a   beauty   cream   product   would   entitle   the   registrant   to   the   use   and   ownership   over   the   same   to   the  exclusion  of  others.     Doctrine:   Trademark,   copyright   and   patents   are   different   intellectual  property  rights  that  cannot  be  interchanged   with  one  another.     Ø A   trademark   is   any   visible   sign   capable   of   distinguishing   the   goods   (trademark)   or   services   (service   mark)   of   an   enterprise   and   shall  include  a  stamped  or  marked  container  of   goods.     Ø In   relation   thereto,   a   trade   name   means   the   name   or   designation   identifying   or   distinguishing  an  enterprise.     Ø Meanwhile,   the   scope   of   a   copyright   is   confined   to   literary   and   artistic   works   which   are  original  intellectual  creations  in  the  literary   and   artistic   domain   protected   from   the   moment  of  their  creation.     Ø Patentable  inventions,  on  the  other  hand,  refer   to   any   technical   solution   of   a   problem   in   any   field   of   human   activity   which   is   new,   involves   an  inventive  step  and  is  industrially  applicable.     Petitioner   has   no   right   to   support   her   claim   for   the   exclusive  use  of  the  subject  trade  name  and  its  container.   The   name   and   container   of   a   beauty   cream   product   are   proper   subjects   of   a   trademark   inasmuch   as   the   same   falls  squarely  within  its  definition.  In  order  to  be  entitled   to   exclusively   use   the   same   in   the   sale   of   the   beauty   cream  product,  the  user  must  sufficiently  prove  that  she   registered   or   used   it   before   anybody   else   did.   The   petitioner’s   copyright   and   patent   registration   of   the   name  and  container  would  not  guarantee  her  the  right  to   the  exclusive  use  of  the  same  for  the  reason  that  they  are   not   appropriate   subjects   of   the   said   intellectual   rights.   Consequently,   a   preliminary   injunction   order   cannot   be   issued  for  the  reason  that  the  petitioner  has  not  proven   that   she   has   a   clear   right   over   the   said   name   and   container   to   the   exclusion   of   others,   not   having   proven   that  she  has  registered  a  trademark  thereto  or  used  the   same  before  anyone  did.    

V.

Copyright  and  Related  Rights  

 

A. Legislative   history   of   the   law   on   Copyright  and  Related  rights   1. Spanish  Law  on  Intellectual   Property   2. US  Copyright  Law   3. Act  3134  (Copyright  Law)   4. Presidential   Decree   No.   49   (took   effect   on   27   December  1972)   5. Presidential   Decree   No.   1988  (amended  by  PD  49  b y   inserting  Section  56)   6. RA   8293   –   Intellectual   Property  Code  (took  effect   on  01  January  1998)     The  Philippines  its  one  of  the  first  developing   countries  to  amend  its  laws.    

B. Law  on  Copyright   SECTION  241.  EFFECTIVITY.  –     This  Act  shall  take  effect  on  1  January  1998.    

SECTION  239.  REPEALS.   239.3.   The   provisions   of   this   Act   shall   apply   to   works   in   which   copyright   protection   obtained   prior   to   the   effectivity   of   this   Act   is   subsisting:   Provided,   That   the   application   of   this   Act   shall   not   result   in   the   diminution   of  such  protection.      

SECTION  236.  PRESERVATION  OF  EXISTING  RIGHTS.  –     Nothing   herein   shall   adversely   affect   the   rights   on   the   enforcement   of   rights   in   patents,   utility   models,   industrial   designs,   marks   and   works,   acquired   in   good   faith  prior  to  the  effective  date  of  this  Act.    

1.

Definition  of  Copyright   SECTION  177.  COPYRIGHT  OR  ECONOMIC  RIGHTS.  –     Subject   to   the   provisions   of   Chapter   VIII,   copyright   or   economic   rights   shall   consist   of   the   exclusive   right   to   carry  out,  authorize  or  prevent  the  following  acts:     177.1.  Reproduction  of  the  work  or  substantial  portion  of   the  work;     177.2.  Dramatization,  translation,  adaptation,  abridgment,   arrangement  or  other  transformation  of  the  work;    

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Intellectual Property Law 177.3.  The  first  public  distribution  of  the  original  and  each   copy   of   the   work   by   sale   or   other   forms   of   transfer   of   ownership;     177.4.  Rental  of  the  original  or  a  copy  of  an  audiovisual  or   cinematographic   work,   a   work   embodied   in   a   sound   recording,   a   computer   program,   a   compilation   of   data   and   other   materials   or   a   musical   work   in   graphic   form,   irrespective  of  the  ownership  of  the  original  or  the  copy   which  is  the  subject  of  the  rental;       177.5.  Public  display  of  the  original  or  a  copy  of  the  work;     177.6.  Public  performance  of  the  work;  and     177.7.  Other  communication  to  the  public  of  the  work.    

RULE  12,  COPYRIGHT  SAFEGUARDS  AND  REGULATIONS   DEFINITION  OF  TERMS   SECTION  1.  FIRST  PUBLIC  DISTRIBUTION  OF  WORK.   An  exclusive  right  of  first  distribution  of  work  includes  all   acts  involving  distribution,  specifically  including  the  first   importation   of   an   original   and   each   copy   of   the   work   into  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines.    

2.

Standard   for   Copyright   Protection   SECTION  172.  LITERARY  AND  ARTISTIC  WORKS.  –     172.1.   Literary   and   artistic   works,   hereinafter   referred   to   as   "works",   are   original   intellectual   creations   in   the   literary  and  artistic  domain  protected  from  the  moment   of  their  creation  and  shall  include  in  particular:     (a)   Books,   pamphlets,   articles   and   other   writings;     (b)  Periodicals  and  newspapers;     (c)  Lectures,  sermons,  addresses,  dissertations   prepared   for   oral   delivery,   whether   or   not   reduced  in  writing  or  other  material  form;     (d)  Letters;     (e)   Dramatic   or   dramatico-­‐musical   compositions;   choreographic   works   or   entertainment  in  dumb  shows;     (f)   Musical   compositions,   with   or   without   words;     (g)   Works   of   drawing,   painting,   architecture,   sculpture,   engraving,   lithography   or   other   works   of   art;   models   or   designs   for   works   of   art1;     (h)   Original   ornamental   designs   or   models   for   articles   of   manufacture,   whether   or   not   registrable   as   an   industrial   design,   and   other   works  of  applied  art;     (i)   Illustrations,   maps,   plans,   sketches,   charts   and   three-­‐dimensional   works   relative   to   geography,   topography,   architecture   or   science;     (j)   Drawings   or   plastic   works   of   a   scientific   or   technical  character;    

RULE  2,  COPYRIGHT  SAFEGUARDS  AND  REGULATIONS   DEFINITION  OF  TERMS   For   the   purpose   of   these   Copyright   Safeguards   and   Regulations,  the  following  terms  are  herein  defined:   x  x  x   Copyright   is   a   right   granted   by   statute   to   the   author   or   originator   of   literary,   scholarly,   scientific,   or   artistic   productions,   including   computer  programs.  A  copyright  gives  him  the   legal   right   to   determine   how   the   work   is   used   and  to  obtain  economic  benefits  from  the  work.   For   example,   the   owner   of   a   copyright   for   a   book   or   a   piece   of   software   has   the   exclusive   rights  to  use,  copy,  distribute,  and  sell  copies  of   the   work,   including   later   editions   or   versions   of   the   work.   If   another   person   improperly   uses   material   covered   by   a   copyright,   the   copyright   owner  can  obtain  legal  relief   x  x  x    

RULE  11,  COPYRIGHT  SAFEGUARDS  AND  REGULATIONS   DEFINITION  OF  TERMS   SECTION   1.   COMMUNICATION   TO   THE   PUBLIC   OF   COPYRIGHTED   WORKS.   “Communication  to  the  public”  or  “communicate  to  the   public,”   also   includes   point-­‐to-­‐point   transmission   of   a   work,   including   video   on   demand,   and   providing   access   to   an   electronic   retrieval   system,   such   as   computer   databases,  servers,  or  similar  electronic  storage  devices.   Broadcasting,   rebroadcasting,   retransmission   by   cable,   and   broadcast   and   retransmission   by   satellite   are   all   acts   of  “communication  to  the  public”  within  the  meaning  of   the  IPC.    

                                                                                                                                                        1

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 “Works  of  applied  art”  à  artistic  creation  with  utilitarian  value  

Katrina Michelle Mancao   (k)   Photographic   works   including   works   produced   by   a   process   analogous   to   photography;  lantern  slides;     (l)   Audiovisual   works   and   cinematographic   works   and   works   produced   by   a   process   analogous   to   cinematography   or   any   process   for  making  audio-­‐visual  recordings;     (m)  Pictorial  illustrations  and  advertisements;     (n)  Computer  programs2;  and     (o)   Other   literary,   scholarly,   scientific   and   artistic  works.  

Doctrine:   A   person   to   be   entitled   to   a   copyright   must   be   the   original   creator   of   the   work.   He   must   have   created   it   by   his   own   skill,   labor   and   judgment   without   directly   copying   or   evasively   imitating   the   work   of   another.   The   grant   of   preliminary   injunction   in   a   case   rests   on   the   sound   discretion   of   the   court   with   the   caveat   that   it   should  be  made  with  extreme  caution.  Its  grant  depends   chiefly   on   the   extent   of   doubt   on   the   validity   of   the   copyright,   existence   of   infringement,   and   the   damages   sustained   by   such   infringement.   In   our   view,   the   copies   of  the  certificates  of  copyright  registered  in  the  name  of   Ceroilfood   Shandong   sufficiently   raise   reasonable   doubt.   With  such  a  doubt  preliminary  injunction  is  unavailing.    

  172.2.   Works   are   protected   by   the   sole   fact   of   their   creation,   irrespective   of   their   mode   or   form   of   expression,   as   well   as   of   their   content,   quality   and   purpose.      

SAMBAR  V.  LEVI  STRAUSS  (2002)   Refresher:   On   28   September   1987,   Levi   Strauss   &   Co.   and   Levi   Strauss   (Phil.),   Inc.   demanded   that   CVS   Garment   Enterprises   (CVSGE)   desist   from   using   their   stitched   arcuate   design   on   the   Europress   jeans   which   CVSGE   advertised  in  Manila  Bulletin.     Atty.   Benjamin   Gruba,   counsel   of   CVSGE,   replied   that   the   arcuate   design   on   the   back   pockets   of   Europress   jeans   was   different   from   the   design   on   the   back   pockets   of   Levi’s   jeans.     He   further   asserted   that   his   client   had   a   copyright  on  the  design  it  was  using.     Thereafter,  private  respondents  filed  a  complaint  against   Sambar,   doing   business   under   the   name   and   style   of   CVSGE.     Private   respondents   also   impleaded   the   Director   of  the  National  Library.     Levi   Strauss   and   Co.   (LS&Co.),   an   internationally   known   clothing   manufacturer,   owns   the   arcuate   design   trademark   which   was   registered   under   U.S.   Trademark   Registration  No.  404,  248  on  November  16,  1943,  and  in   the   Principal   Register   of   trademarks   with   the   Philippine   Patent  Office  under  Certificate  of  Registration  No.  20240   issued   on   October   8,   1973;   that   through   a   Trademark   Technical   Data   and   Technical   Assistance   Agreement   with   Levi   Strauss   (Phil.)   Inc.   (LSPI)   in   1972,   LS&Co.   granted   LSPI   a   non-­‐exclusive   license   to   use   the   arcuate   trademark   in   its   manufacture   and   sale   of   Levi’s   pants,   jackets  and  shirts  in  the  Philippines;  that  in  1983,  LS&Co.   also   appointed   LSPI   as   its   agent   and   attorney-­‐in-­‐fact   to   protect   its   trademark   in   the   Philippines;   and   that   sometime  in  1987,  CVSGIC  and  Venancio  Sambar,  without   the  consent  and  authority  of  private  respondents  and  in   infringement   and   unfair   competition,   sold   and   advertised,   and   despite   demands   to   cease   and   desist,   continued   to   manufacture,   sell   and   advertise   denim   pants   under   the   brand   name   “Europress”   with   back   pockets   bearing   a   design   similar   to   the   arcuate   trademark   of   private   respondents,   thereby   causing   confusion   on   the   buying   public,   prejudicial   to   private   respondents’  goodwill  and  property  right.  

CHING  KIAN  CHUAN  V.  CA  (2001)   Refresher:   Petitioner  Wilson  Ong  Ching  Kian  Chuan  (“Ong”)  imports   vermicelli   from   China   National   Cereals   Oils   and   Foodstuffs   Import   and   Export   Corporation,   based   in   Beijing,   China,   under   the   firm   name   C.K.C.   Trading.   He   repacks  it  in  cellophane  wrappers  with  a  design  of  two-­‐ dragons   and   the   TOWER   trademark   on   the   uppermost   portion.   Ong   acquired   a   Certificate   of   Copyright   Registration  from  the  National  Library  on  June  9,  1993  on   the  said  design.     Ong   discovered   that   private   respondent   Lorenzo   Tan   repacked   his   vermicelli   he   imports   from   the   same   company   but   based   in   Qingdao,   China   in   a   "nearly"   identical   wrapper.   On   September   16,   1993,   Ong   filed   against   Tan   a   verified   complaint   for   infringement   of   copyright   with   damages   and   prayer   for   temporary   restraining   order   or   writ   of   preliminary   injunction   with   the   Regional   Trial   Court   in   Quezon   City.   Ong   alleged   that   he   was   the   holder   of   a   Certificate   of   Copyright   Registration  over  the  cellophane  wrapper  with  the  two-­‐ dragon  design,  and  that  Tan  used  an  identical  wrapper  in   his  business.  In  his  prayer  for  a  preliminary  injunction  in   addition   to   damages,   he   asked   that   Tan   be   restrained   from  using  the  wrapper.  He  said  he  would  post  a  bond  to   guarantee   the   payment   of   damages   resulting   from   the   issuance  of  the  writ  of  preliminary  injunction.                                                                                                                                                               2

 Class   notes:   This   is   the   outcome   of   the   lobbying   in   the   US.   At   that   time,   technology   was   not   as   advanced.   They   were   concerned   more   on   DURATION   (copyright   protection   is   for   50   years!).   They   found   out   later   that   duration   is   not   important   in   computer   programs   because   they   are   immediately   replaced   or   upgraded.  

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Intellectual Property Law   Doctrine:   To  be  entitled  to  copyright,  the  thing  being  copyrighted   must  be  original,  created  by  the  author  through  his  own   skill,   labor   and   judgment,   without   directly   copying   or   evasively  imitating  the  work  of  another.    

3.

He  has  a  right  to  determine  whether  it  shall  be  published   at   all,   and   if   published,   when,   where,   by   whom,   and   in   what   form.   This   exclusive   right   is   confined   to   the   first   publication.  When  once  published,  it  is  dedicated  to  the   public,  and  the  author  loses  the  exclusive  right  to  control   subsequent   publication   by   others,   unless   the   work   is   placed  under  the  protection  of  the  copyright  law.     Remarks:  Decided  under  the  old  law.    

When  does  Copyright  vest?  

 

SANTOS  V.  MCCULLOUGH  PRINTING  CO.  (1964)  

FILIPINO  SOCIETY  OF  COMPOSERS  V.  BENJAMIN  TAN  (1987)  

Refresher:   The   complaint   alleges   that   plaintiff   Mauro   Malang   Santos  designed  for  former  Ambassador  Felino  Neri,  for   his   personal   Christmas   Card   greetings   for   the   year   1959   (Rural   Christmas   time   scene),   the   artistic   motif   in   question.   The   following   year   the   defendant   McCullough   Printing  Company,  without  the  knowledge  and  authority   of   plaintiff,   displayed   the   very   design   in   its   album   of   Christmas  cards  and  offered  it  for  sale,  for  a  price.     Doctrine:   Paragraph  33  of  Patent  Office  Administrative  Order  No.  3   (as   amended   dated   September   18,   1947)   entitled   "Rules   of  Practice  in  the  Philippines  Patent  Office  relating  to  the   Registration  of  Copyright  Claims"  promulgated  pursuant   to   Republic   Act   165,   provides,   among   others,   that   an   intellectual  creation  should  be  copyrighted  30  days  after   its   publication,   if   made   in   Manila,   or   within   60   day's   if   made   elsewhere,   failure   of   which   renders   such   creation   public   property.   In   the   case   at   bar,   even   as   of   this   moment,  there  is  no  copyright  for  the  design  in  question.   We   are   not   also   prepared   to   accept   the   contention   of   appellant  that  the  publication  of  the  design  was  a  limited   one,   or   that   there   was   an   understanding   that   only   Ambassador  Neri  should,  have  absolute  right  to  use  the   same.  In  the  first  place,  if  such  were  the  condition  then   Ambassador  Neri  would  be  the  aggrieved  party,  and  not   the   appellant.   In   the   second   place,   if   there   was   such   a   limited   publication   or   prohibition,   the   same   was   not   shown  on  the  face  of  the  design.  When  the  purpose  is  a   limited  publication,  but  the  effect  is  general  publication,   irrevocable   rights   thereupon   become   vested   in   the   public,   in   consequence   of   which   enforcement   of   the   restriction  becomes  impossible.     It   has   been   held   that   the   effect   of   offering   for   sale   a   dress,  for  example  manufactured  in  accordance  with  an   original   design   which   is   not   protected   by   either   a   copyright   or   a   patent,   is   to   divest   the   owner   of   his   common   law   rights   therein   by   virtue   of   the   publication   of   a   'copy'   and   thereafter   anyone   is   free   to   copy   the   design   or   the   dress.   When   Ambassador   Neri   distributed   800   copies   of   the   design   in   controversy,   the   plaintiff   lost   control   of   his   design   and   the   necessary   implication   was   that   there   had   been   a   general   publication,   there   having   been   no   showing   of   a   clear   indication   that   a   limited   publication   was   intended.   The   author   of   a   literary   composition   has   a   light   to   the   first   publication   thereof.  

Refresher:     Plaintiff-­‐appellant   is   a   non-­‐profit   association   of   authors,   composers   and   publishers   duly   organized   under   the   Corporation   Law   of   the   Philippines   and   registered   with   the   Securities   and   Exchange   Commission.   Said   association  is  the  owner  of  certain  musical  compositions   among   which   are   the   songs   entitled:   "Dahil   Sa   Iyo",   "Sapagkat   Ikaw   Ay   Akin,"   "Sapagkat   Kami   Ay   Tao   Lamang"  and  "The  Nearness  Of  You."     On  the  other  hand,  defendant-­‐appellee  is  the  operator  of   a   restaurant   known   as   "Alex   Soda   Foundation   and   Restaurant"   where   a   combo   with   professional   singers,   hired  to  play  and  sing  musical  compositions  to  entertain   and  amuse  customers  therein,  were  playing  and  singing   the   above-­‐mentioned   compositions   without   any   license   or   permission   from   the   appellant   to   play   or   sing   the   same.   Accordingly,   appellant   demanded   from   the   appellee   payment   of   the   necessary   license   fee   for   the   playing   and   singing   of   aforesaid   compositions   but   the   demand  was  ignored.     Hence,  on  November  7,  1967,  appellant  filed  a  complaint   with   the   lower   court   for   infringement   of   copyright   against   defendant-­‐appellee   for   allowing   the   playing   in   defendant-­‐appellee's   restaurant   of   said   songs   copyrighted  in  the  name  of  the  former.     Issue:  Whether  or  not  the  playing  and  signing  of  musical   compositions   which   have   been   copyrighted   under   the   provisions   of   the   Copyright   Law   (Act   3134)   inside   the   establishment   of   the   defendant-­‐appellee   constitute   a   public   performance   for   profit   within   the   meaning   and   contemplation   of   the   Copyright   Law   of   the   Philippines;   and   assuming   that   there   were   indeed   public   performances  for  profit,  whether  or  not  appellee  can  be   held  liable  therefor.       Doctrine:   There  were  "public  performances  for  profit.  "     The  word  "perform"  as  used  in  the  Act  has  been  applied   to   "one   who   plays   a   musical   composition   on   a   piano,   thereby   producing   in   the   air   sound   waves   which   are   heard   as   music   ...   and   if   the   instrument   he   plays   on   is   a   piano   plus   a   broadcasting   apparatus,   so   that   waves   are  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   thrown   out,   not   only   upon   the   air,   but   upon   the   other,   then  also  he  is  performing  the  musical  composition."       In  relation  thereto,  it  has  been  held  that  "The  playing  of   music   in   dine   and   dance   establishment   which   was   paid   for   by   the   public   in   purchases   of   food   and   drink   constituted   "performance   for   profit"   within   a   Copyright   Law."  Thus,  it  has  been  explained  that  while  it  is  possible   in  such  establishments  for  the  patrons  to  purchase  their   food  and  drinks  and  at  the  same  time  dance  to  the  music   of   the   orchestra,   the   music   is   furnished   and   used   by   the   orchestra   for   the   purpose   of   inducing   the   public   to   patronize   the   establishment   and   pay   for   the   entertainment   in   the   purchase   of   food   and   drinks.   The   defendant  conducts  his  place  of  business  for  profit,  and   it   is   public;   and   the   music   is   performed   for   profit.   In   a   similar  case,  the  Court  ruled  that  "The  Performance  in  a   restaurant  or  hotel  dining  room,  by  persons  employed  by   the  proprietor,  of  a  copyrighted  musical  composition,  for   the   entertainment   of   patrons,   without   charge   for   admission   to   hear   it,   infringes   the   exclusive   right   of   the   owner  of  the  copyright."     In   delivering   the   opinion   of   the   Court   in   said   two   cases,   Justice  Holmes  elaborated  thus:     If   the   rights   under   the   copyright   are   infringed   only   by   a   performance   where   money   is   taken   at   the   door,   they   are   very   imperfectly   protected.   Performances   not   different   in   kind   from   those   of   the   defendants   could   be   given   that   might   compete  with  and  even  destroy  the  success  of   the   monopoly   that   the   law   intends   the   plaintiffs   to   have.   It   is   enough   to   say   that   there   is  no  need  to  construe  the  statute  so  narrowly.   The   defendants'   performances   are   not   eleemosynary.  They  are  part  of  a  total  for  which   the   public   pays,   and   the   fact   that   the   price   of   the   whole   is   attributed   to   a   particular   item   which   those   present   are   expected   to   order   is   not   important.   It   is   true   that   the   music   is   not   the   sole   object,   but   neither   is   the   food,   which   probably  could  be  got  cheaper  elsewhere.  The   object   is   a   repast   in   surroundings   that   to   people  having  limited  power  of  conversation  or   disliking   the   rival   noise,   give   a   luxurious   pleasure   not   to   be   had   from   eating   a   silent   meal.  If  music  did  not  pay,  it  would  be  given  up.   If   it   pays,   it   pays   out   of   the   public's   pocket.   Whether   it   pays   or   not,   the   purpose   of   employing  it  is  profit,  and  that  is  enough.       In  the  case  at  bar,  it  is  admitted  that  the  patrons  of  the   restaurant   in   question   pay   only   for   the   food   and   drinks   and   apparently   not   for   listening   to   the   music.   As   found   by  the  trial  court,  the  music  provided  is  for  the  purpose  of   entertaining  and  amusing  the  customers  in  order  to  make   the   establishment   more   attractive   and   desirable.   It   will  

be   noted   that   for   the   playing   and   singing   the   musical   compositions   involved,   the   combo   was   paid   as   independent  contractors  by  the  appellant.  It  is  therefore   obvious  that  the  expenses  entailed  thereby  are  added  to   the   overhead   of   the   restaurant   which   are   either   eventually  charged  in  the  price  of  the  food  and  drinks  or   to  the  overall  total  of  additional  income  produced  by  the   bigger   volume   of   business   which   the   entertainment   was   programmed   to   attract.   Consequently,   it   is   beyond   question   that   the   playing   and   singing   of   the   combo   in   defendant-­‐appellee's   restaurant   constituted   performance   for   profit   contemplated   by   the   Copyright   Law.     Nevertheless,   appellee   cannot   be   said   to   have   infringed   upon   the   Copyright   Law.   Appellee's   allegation   that   the   composers   of   the   contested   musical   compositions   waived   their   right   in   favor   of   the   general   public   when   they   allowed   their   intellectual   creations   to   become   property   of   the   public   domain   before   applying   for   the   corresponding  copyrights  for  the  same  is  correct.     The   Supreme   Court   has   ruled   that   "Paragraph   33   of   Patent   Office   Administrative   Order   No.   3   entitled   'Rules   of  Practice  in  the  Philippines  Patent  Office  relating  to  the   Registration  of  Copyright  Claims'  promulgated  pursuant   to  Republic  Act  165,  provides  among  other  things  that  an   intellectual  creation  should  be  copyrighted  30  days  after   its   publication,   if   made   in   Manila,   or   within   the   60   days   if   made   elsewhere,   failure   of   which   renders   such   creation   public  property."  Indeed,  if  the  general  public  has  made   use   of   the   object   sought   to   be   copyrighted   for   30   days   prior   to   the   copyright   application   the   law   deems   the   object   to   have   been   donated   to   the   public   domain   and   the  same  can  no  longer  be  copyrighted.    

SECTION   2,   PD   49   (DECREE   ON   THE   PROTECTION   OF   INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY)   The   Rights   granted   by   this   Decree   shall,   from   the   moment   of   creation,   subsist   with   respect   to   any   of   the   following  classes  of  works:     (A)   Books,   including   composite   and   encyclopedic   works,   manuscripts,   directories,   and  gazetteers;     (B)   Periodicals,   including   pamphlets   and   newspapers;     (C)  Lectures,  sermons,  addresses,  dissertations   prepared  for  oral  delivery;     (D)  Letters;     (E)   Dramatic   or   dramatico-­‐musical   compositions;   choreographic   works   and   entertainments   in   dumb   shows,   the   acting   form  of  which  is  fixed  in  writing  or  otherwise;  

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Intellectual Property Law   (F)   Musical   compositions,   with   or   without   words;     (G)   Works   of   drawing,   painting,   architecture,   sculpture,   engraving,   lithography,   and   other   works   of   art;   models   or   designs   for   works   of   art;     (H)  Reproductions  of  a  work  of  art;     (I)   Original   ornamental   designs   or   models   for   articles   of   manufacture,   whether   or   not   patentable,  and  other  works  of  applied  art;     (J)  Maps,  plans,  sketches,  and  charts;     (K)  Drawings,  or  plastic  works  of  a  scientific  or   technical  character;     (L)   Photographic   works   and   works   produced   by   a   process   analogous   to   photography;   lantern  slides;     (M)   Cinematographic   works   and   works   produced   by   a   process   analogous   to   cinematography   or   any   process   for   making   audio-­‐visual  recordings;     (N)  Computer  programs;     (O)   Prints,   pictorial,   illustration,   advertising   copies,  labels,  tags,  and  box  wraps;     (P)   Dramatization,   translations,   adaptations,   abridgements,   arrangements   and   other   alterations  of  literary,  musical  or  artistic  works   or   of   works   of   the   Philippine   Government   as   herein   defined,   which   shall   be   protected   as   provided  in  Section  8  of  this  Decree.     (Q)   Collection   of   literary,   scholarly,   or   artistic   works   or   of   works   referred   to   in   Section   9   of   this   Decree   which   by   reason   of   the   selection   and   arrangement   of   their   contents   constitute   intellectual  creations,  the  same  to  be  protected   as   such   in   accordance   with   Section   8   of   this   Decree.     (R)   Other   literary,   scholarly,   scientific   and   artistic  works.  

protection   in   the   country   of   origin   of   the   work.   Consequently,   apart   from   the   provisions   of   this   Convention,   the   extent   of   protection,   as   well   as   the   means   of   redress   afforded   to   the   author   to   protect   his   rights,   shall   be   governed   exclusively   by   the   laws   of   the   country  where  protection  is  claimed.    

SECTION  172  AND  172.2,  SUPRA    

RULE   7,   SECTIONS   2-­‐4,   COPYRIGHT   SAFEGUARDS   AND   REGULATIONS   SECTION   2.   EFFECTS   OF   REGISTRATION   AND   DEPOSIT   OF   WORK.   —     The   registration   and   deposit   of   the   work   is   purely   for   recording   the   date   of   registration   and   deposit   of   the   work   and   shall   not   be   conclusive   as   to   copyright   ownership  or  the  term  of  copyrights  or  the  rights  of  the   copyright  owner,  including  neighboring  rights.       SECTION  3.  EFFECT  OF  NON-­‐REGISTRATION  AND  D EPOSIT.  —     If,   within   three   (3)   weeks   after   receipt   by   the   copyright   owner  of  a  written  demand  from  TNL  and/or  SCL3  for  the   deposit  of  a  work  listed  in  Rule  5  Sec.  4  of  this  SAR,  the   required   copies   are   not   delivered   and   the   fee   for   registration  and  deposit  is  not  paid,  the  copyright  owner,   his   assignee,   or   his   agent   shall   be   liable   to   pay   a   fine   equivalent  to  the  required  fee  per  month  of  delay  and  to   pay  to  TNL  and  SCL  the  amount  of  the  retail  price  of  the   best  edition  of  the  work.     SECTION  4.  OTHER  LAWS.  —     Upon   issuance   of   a   certificate   of   deposit,   the   copyright   owner  shall  be  exempt  from  making  additional  deposits   of  the  work  with  TNL  or  the  SCL  under  other  laws.    

4.

Scope  of  Copyright  

 

ARTICLE   2,   BERNE   CONVENTION   FOR   THE   PROTECTION   OF   LITERARY  AND  ARTISTIC  WORKS   Protected  Works:   1.  “Literary  and  artistic  works”;     2.  Possible  requirement  of  fixation;     3.  Derivative  works;   4.  Official  texts;     5.  Collections;     6.   Obligation   to   protect;   beneficiaries   of   protection;   7.  Works  of  applied  art  and  industrial  designs;     8.  News     (1)   The   expression   “literary   and   artistic   works”   shall   include   every   production   in   the   literary,   scientific   and   artistic   domain,   whatever   may   be   the   mode   or   form   of  

 

ARTICLE   5(2),   BERNE   CONVENTION   FOR   THE   PROTECTION   OF  LITERARY  AND  ARTISTIC  W ORKS   RIGHTS  GUARANTEED   (2)  The  enjoyment  and  the  exercise  of  these  rights  shall   not   be   subject   to   any   formality;   such   enjoyment   and   such   exercise   shall   be   independent   of   the   existence   of  

                                                                                                                                                        3

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 TNL  –  The  National  Library;  SCL  –  Library  of  the  Supreme  Court  

Katrina Michelle Mancao   its   expression,   such   as   books,   pamphlets   and   other   writings;   lectures,   addresses,   sermons   and   other   works   of   the   same   nature;   dramatic   or   dramatico-­‐musical   works;   choreographic   works   and   entertainments   in   dumb   show;   musical   compositions   with   or   without   words;   cinematographic   works   to   which   are   assimilated   works   expressed   by   a   process   analogous   to   cinematography;   works   of   drawing,   painting,   architecture,   sculpture,   engraving   and   lithography;   photographic   works   to   which   are   assimilated   works   expressed   by   a   process   analogous   to   photography;   works  of  applied  art;  illustrations,  maps,  plans,  sketches   and   three-­‐dimensional   works   relative   to   geography,   topography,  architecture  or  science.     (2)   It   shall,   however,   be   a   matter   for   legislation   in   the   countries  of  the  Union  to  prescribe  that  works  in  general   or   any   specified   categories   of   works   shall   not   be   protected  unless  they  have  been  fixed  in  some  material   form.     (3)  Translations,  adaptations,  arrangements  of  music  and   other   alterations   of   a   literary   or   artistic   work   shall   be   protected   as   original   works   without   prejudice   to   the   copyright  in  the  original  work.     (4)  It  shall  be  a  matter  for  legislation  in  the  countries  of   the  Union  to  determine  the  protection  to  be  granted  to   official   texts   of   a   legislative,   administrative   and   legal   nature,  and  to  official  translations  of  such  texts.     (5)   Collections   of   literary   or   artistic   works   such   as   encyclopaedias  and  anthologies  which,  by  reason  of  the   selection   and   arrangement   of   their   contents,   constitute   intellectual  creations  shall  be  protected  as  such,  without   prejudice  to  the  copyright  in  each  of  the  works  forming   part  of  such  collections.     (6)   The   works   mentioned   in   this   Article   shall   enjoy   protection   in   all   countries   of   the   Union.   This   protection   shall   operate   for   the   benefit   of   the   author   and   his   successors  in  title.     (7)   Subject   to   the   provisions   of   Article   7(4)   of   this   Convention,   it   shall   be   a   matter   for   legislation   in   the   countries   of   the   Union   to   determine   the   extent   of   the   application   of   their   laws   to   works   of   applied   art   and   industrial   designs   and   models,   as   well   as   the   conditions   under   which   such   works,   designs   and   models   shall   be   protected.   Works   protected   in   the   country   of   origin   solely  as  designs  and  models  shall  be  entitled  in  another   country  of  the  Union  only  to  such  special  protection  as  is   granted  in  that  country  to  designs  and  models;  however,   if   no   such   special   protection   is   granted   in   that   country,   such  works  shall  be  protected  as  artistic  works.    

(8)   The   protection   of   this   Convention   shall   not   apply   to   news   of   the   day   or   to   miscellaneous   facts   having   the   character  of  mere  items  of  press  information.    

SECTION  172  AND  172.2,  SUPRA  (ON  ORIGINAL  WORKS)    

SECTION  173.  DERIVATIVE  W ORKS.  –     173.1.   The   following   derivative   works   shall   also   be   protected  by  copyright:     (a)   Dramatizations,   translations,   adaptations,   abridgments,   arrangements,   and   other   alterations  of  literary  or  artistic  works;  and     (b)   Collections   of   literary,   scholarly   or   artistic   works,   and   compilations   of   data   and   other   materials   which   are   original   by   reason   of   the   selection   or   coordination   or   arrangement   of   their  contents.     173.2.   The  works  referred  to  in  paragraphs  (a)  and  (b)   of   Subsection   173.1   shall   be   protected   as   new   works:   Provided   however,   That   such   new   work   shall   not   affect   the   force   of   any   subsisting   copyright   upon   the   original   works  employed  or  any  part  thereof,  or  be  construed  to   imply   any   right   to   such   use   of   the   original   works,   or   to   secure  or  extend  copyright  in  such  original  works.    

SECTION  174.  PUBLISHED  EDITION  OF  WORK.  –     In   addition   to   the   right   to   publish   granted   by   the   author,   his  heirs,  or  assigns,  the  publisher  shall  have  a  copyright   consisting   merely   of   the   right   of   reproduction   of   the   typographical   arrangement   of   the   published   edition   of   the  work.      

SECTION  175.  UNPROTECTED  SUBJECT  MATTER.  –     Notwithstanding   the   provisions   of   Sections   172   and   173,   no   protection   shall   extend,   under   this   law,   to   any   idea,   procedure,   system,   method   or   operation,   concept,   principle,  discovery  or  mere  data  as  such,  even  if  they  are   expressed,  explained,  illustrated  or  embodied  in  a  work;   news   of   the   day   and   other   miscellaneous   facts   having   the  character  of  mere  items  of  press  information;  or  any   official  text  of  a  legislative,  administrative  or  legal  nature,   as  well  as  any  official  translation  thereof.    

SECTION  176.  WORKS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT.  –     176.1.   No   copyright   shall   subsist   in   any   work   of   the   Government  of  the  Philippines.  However,  prior  approval   of  the  government  agency  or  office  wherein  the  work  is   created  shall  be  necessary  for  exploitation  of  such  work   for   profit.   Such   agency   or   office   may,   among   other   things,   impose   as   a   condition   the   payment   of   royalties.   No  prior  approval  or  conditions  shall  be  required  for  the   use   of   any   purpose   of   statutes,   rules   and   regulations,   and   speeches,   lectures,   sermons,   addresses,   and  

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Intellectual Property Law dissertations,  pronounced,  read  or  rendered  in  courts  of   justice,   before   administrative   agencies,   in   deliberative   assemblies  and  in  meetings  of  public  character.     176.2.   The   author   of   speeches,   lectures,   sermons,   addresses,   and   dissertations   mentioned   in   the   preceding   paragraphs   shall   have   the   exclusive   right   of   making   a   collection  of  his  works.       176.3.   Notwithstanding   the   foregoing   provisions,   the   Government   is   not   precluded   from   receiving   and   holding   copyrights   transferred   to   it   by   assignment,   bequest   or   otherwise;   nor   shall   publication   or   republication   by   the   Government  in  a  public  document  of  any  work  in  which   copyright  is  subsisting  be  taken  to  cause  any  abridgment   or   annulment   of   the   copyright   or   to   authorize   any   use   or   appropriation   of   such   work   without   the   consent   of   the   copyright  owner.      

Copyright,   in   the   strict   sense   of   the   term,   is   purely   a   statutory  right.  It  is  a  new  or  independent  right  granted   by   the   statute,   and   not   simply   a   pre-­‐existing   right   regulated     by   the   statute.     Being   a   statutory   grant,   the   rights   are   only   such   as   the   statute   confers,   and   may   be   obtained   and   enjoyed   only   with   respect   to   the   subjects   and   by   the   persons,   and   on   terms   and   conditions   specified  in  the  statute.     Since   copyright   in   published   works   is   purely   a   statutory   creation,   a   copyright   may   be   obtained   only   for   a   work   falling  within  the  statutory  enumeration  or  description.     Regardless   of   the   historical   viewpoint,   it   is   authoritatively   settled   in   the   United   States   that   there   is   no  copyright  except    that    which    is    both    created    and   secured  by  act  of  Congress.     P.D.   No.   49,   §2,   in   enumerating   what   are   subject   to   copyright,   refers   to   finished   works   and   not   to   concepts.     The   copyright   does   not   extend   to   an   idea,   procedure,   process,  system,  method  of  operation,  concept,  principle,   or   discovery,   regardless   of   the   form   in   which   it   is   described,   explained,   illustrated,   or   embodied   in   such   work.   In   fact,   Section   175   of   the   Intellectual   Property   Code   expressly   excluded   these   as   protected   subject   matter.       What   then   is   the   subject   matter   of   petitioners’   copyright?     This   Court   is   of   the   opinion   that   petitioner   BJPI’s   copyright   covers   audio-­‐visual   recordings   of   each   episode   of   Rhoda   and   Me,   as   falling   within   the   class   of   works  mentioned  in  P.D.  49,  §2(M),  to  wit:     Cinematographic   works   and   works   produced   by   a   process   analogous   to   cinematography   or   any  process  for  making  audio-­‐visual  recordings;     The  copyright  does  not  extend  to  the  general  concept  or   format  of  its  dating  game  show.  Accordingly,  by  the  very   nature   of   the   subject   of   petitioner   BJPI’s   copyright,   the   investigating  prosecutor  should  have  the  opportunity  to   compare  the  videotapes  of  the  two  shows.     Mere  description  by  words  of  the  general  format  of  the   two  dating  game  shows  is  insufficient;  the  presentation   of   the   master   videotape   in   evidence   was   indispensable   to   the   determination   of   the   existence   of   probable   cause.     As  aptly  observed  by  respondent  Secretary  of  Justice:     A   television   show   includes   more   than   mere   words   can   describe   because   it   involves   a   whole   spectrum   of   visuals   and   effects,   video   and   audio,   such   that   no   similarity   or   dissimilarity   may   be   found   by   merely   describing   the   general   copyright/format  of  both  dating  game  shows.    

JOAQUIN,  JR.  V.  DRILON  (1999)   Refresher:   Petitioner   BJ   Productions,   Inc.   (BJPI)   is   the   holder/grantee   of   Certificate   of   Copyright   No.   M922,   dated  January  28,  1971,  of  Rhoda  and  Me,  a  dating  game   show  aired  from  1970  to  1977.       On   June   28,   1973,   petitioner   BJPI   submitted   to   the   National   Library   an   addendum   to   its   certificate   of   copyright   specifying   the   show’s   format   and   style   of   presentation.     On   July   14,   1991,   while   watching   television,   petitioner   Francisco   Joaquin,   Jr.,   president   of   BJPI,   saw   on   RPN   Channel   9   an   episode   of  It’s   a   Date,   which   was   produced   by  IXL  Productions,  Inc.  (IXL).  On  July  18,  1991,  he  wrote   a  letter  to  private  respondent  Gabriel  M.  Zosa,  president   and   general   manager   of   IXL,   informing   Zosa   that   BJPI   had   a   copyright   to   Rhoda   and   Me   and   demanding   that   IXL   discontinue   airing   It’s   a   Date,   because   the   latter’s   game   format   was   substantially   the   same   as   the   former.   The   substance   of   the   television   productions   of   the   complainant’s   “RHODA   AND   ME”   and   Zosa’s   “IT’S   A   DATE”   is   that   two   matches   are   made   between   a   male   and   a   female,   both   single,   and   the   two   couples   are   treated   to   a   night   or   two   of   dining   and/or   dancing   at   the   expense   of   the   show.     The   major   concepts   of   both   shows   is   the   same.   Any   difference   appear   mere   variations  of  the  major  concepts.     Doctrine:   To  begin  with,  the  format  of  a  show  is  not  copyrightable.   The   format   or   mechanics   of   a   television   show   is   not   included   in   the   list   of   protected   works   in   §2   of   P.D.   No.   49,  nor  in  §172  of  the  Intellectual  Property  Code.  For  this   reason,   the   protection   afforded   by   the   law   cannot   be   extended  to  cover  them.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   license   its   white   pages   listings   to   Feist   for   a   directory   covering   11   different   telephone   service   areas,   Feist   extracted   the   listings   it   needed   from   Rural's   directory   without   Rural's   consent.  Although  Feist  altered  many  of   Rural's   listings,   several   were   identical   to   listings   in   Rural's   white   pages.   The   District   Court   granted   summary   judgment   to   Rural   in   its   copyright   infringement   suit,   holding   that   telephone   directories   are   copyrightable.   The  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed.     Doctrine:   Rural's   white   pages   are   not   entitled   to   copyright,   and   therefore   Feist's   use   of   them   does   not   constitute   infringement.       Article   I,   §   8,   cl.   8,   of   the   Constitution   mandates   originality   as   a   prerequisite   for   copyright   protection.   The   constitutional   requirement   necessitates   independent   creation  plus  a  modicum  of  creativity.  Since  facts  do  not   owe   their   origin   to   an   act   of   authorship,   they   are   not   original,   and   thus   are   not   copyrightable.   Although   a   compilation   of   facts   may   possess   the   requisite   originality   because   the   author   typically   chooses   which   facts   to   include,  in  what  order  to  place  them,  and  how  to  arrange   the   data   so   that   readers   may   use   them   effectively,   copyright   protection   extends   only   to   those   components   of   the   work   that   are   original   to   the   author,   not   to   the   facts   themselves.   This   fact/expression   dichotomy   severely   limits   the   scope   of   protection   in   fact-­‐based   works.       The   Copyright   Act   of   1976   and   its   predecessor,   the   Copyright   Act   of   1909,   leave   no   doubt   that   originality   is   the  touchstone  of  copyright  protection  in  directories  and   other   fact-­‐based   works.   The   1976   Act   explains   that   copyright   extends   to   "original   works   of   authorship,"   17   U.S.C.   §   102(a),   and   that   there   can   be   no   copyright   in   facts,  §  102(b).     A   compilation   is   not   copyrightable   per   se,   but   is   copyrightable   only   if   its   facts   have   been   "selected,   coordinated,   or   arranged   in   such   a   way   that   the   resulting   work   as   a   whole   constitutes   an   original   work   of   authorship.   Thus,   the   statute   envisions   that   some   ways   of   selecting,   coordinating,   and   arranging   data   are   not   sufficiently  original  to  trigger  copyright  protection.  Even   a  compilation  that  is  copyrightable  receives  only  limited   protection,   for   the   copyright   does   not   extend   to   facts   contained  in  the  compilation.  Lower  courts  that  adopted   a   "sweat   of   the   brow"   or   "industrious   collection"   test   -­‐-­‐   which   extended   a   compilation's   copyright   protection   beyond   selection   and   arrangement   to   the   facts   themselves   –   misconstrued   the   1909   Act   and   eschewed   the  fundamental  axiom  of  copyright  law  that  no  one  may   copyright  facts  or  ideas.       Rural's   white   pages   do   not   meet   the   constitutional   or   statutory   requirements   for   copyright   protection.   While  

UNITED   FEATURE   SYNDICATE,   INC.   V.   MUNSINGWEAR   CREATION  MANUFACTURING  COMPANY  (1989)   Refresher:   This   case   arose   from   petition   filed   by   petitioner   for   the   cancellation   of   the   registration   of   trademark   CHARLIE   BROWN   (Registration   No.   SR.   4224)   in   the   name   of   respondent   MUNSINGWEAR   in   Inter   Partes   Case   No.   1350   entitled   "United   Feature   Syndicate,   Inc.   v.   Munsingwear   Creation   Mfg.   Co.",   with   the   Philippine   Patent  Office  alleging  that  petitioner  is  damaged  by  the   registration   of   the   trademark   CHARLIE   BROWN   of   T-­‐ Shirts   under   Class   25   with   the   Registration   No.   SR-­‐4224   dated   September   12,   1979   in   the   name   of   Munsingwear   Creation   Manufacturing   Co.,   Inc.,   on   the   following   grounds:   (1)   that   respondent   was   not   entitled   to   the   registration   of   the   mark   CHARLIE   BROWN,   &   DEVICE   at   the  time  of  application  for  registration;  (2)  that  CHARLIE   BROWN  is  a  character  creation  or  a  pictorial  illustration,   the   copyright   to   which   is   exclusively   owned   worldwide   by   the   petitioner;   (3)   that   as   the   owner   of   the   pictorial   illustration   CHARLIE   BROWN,   petitioner   has   since   1950   and   continuously   up   to   the   present,   used   and   reproduced   the   same   to   the   exclusion   of   others;   (4)   that   the   respondent-­‐registrant   has   no   bona   fide   use   of   the   trademark   in   commerce   in   the   Philippines   prior   to   its   application  for  registration.     Doctrine:   Since   the   name   "CHARLIE   BROWN"   and   its   pictorial   representation  were  covered  by  a  copyright  registration   way   back   in   1950,   the   same   are   entitled   to   protection   under  PD  No.  49.     Aside   from   its   copyright   registration,   petitioner   is   also   the   owner   of   several   trademark   registrations   and   application   for   the   name   and   likeness   of   "CHARLIE   BROWN"   which   is   the   duly   registered   trademark   and   copyright   of   petitioner   United   Feature   Syndicate   Inc.   as   early   as   1957   and   additionally   also   as   TV   SPECIALS   featuring  the  “PEANUTS”  characters  “CHARLIE  BROWN.”    

FEIST   PUBLICATIONS,   INC.   V.   RURAL   TELEPHONE   SERVICE   CO.  (1991)   Refresher:   Respondent   Rural   Telephone   Service   Company   is   a   certified   public   utility   providing   telephone   service   to   several   communities   in   Kansas.   Pursuant   to   state   regulation,  Rural  publishes  a  typical  telephone  directory,   consisting   of   white   pages   and   yellow   pages.   It   obtains   data   for   the   directory   from   subscribers,   who   must   provide   their   names   and   addresses   to   obtain   telephone   service.       Petitioner   Feist   Publications,   Inc.,   is   a   publishing   company   that   specializes   in   area-­‐wide   telephone   directories   covering   a   much   larger   geographic   range   than   directories   such   as   Rural's.   When   Rural   refused   to  

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Intellectual Property Law Rural   has   a   valid   copyright   in   the   directory   as   a   whole   because  it  contains  some  forward  text  and  some  original   material   in   the   yellow   pages,   there   is   nothing   original   in   Rural's   white   pages.   The   raw   data   are   uncopyrightable   facts,  and  the  way  in  which  Rural  selected,  coordinated,   and   arranged   those   facts   is   not   original   in   any   way.   Rural's  selection  of  listings  -­‐-­‐   subscribers'  names,  towns,   and   telephone   numbers   -­‐-­‐   could   not   be   more   obvious,   and   lacks   the   modicum   of   creativity   necessary   to   transform  mere  selection  into  copyrightable  expression.   In  fact,  it  is  plausible  to  conclude  that  Rural  did  not  truly   "select"  to  publish  its  subscribers'  names  and  telephone   numbers,   since   it   was   required   to   do   so   by   state   law.   Moreover,   there   is   nothing   remotely   creative   about   arranging   names   alphabetically   in   a   white   pages   directory.   It   is   an   age-­‐old   practice,   firmly   rooted   in   tradition   and   so   commonplace   that   it   has   come   to   be   expected  as  a  matter  of  course.       Remarks:  US  case.    

5.

the   person   who   so   commissioned   the   work   shall   have   ownership   of   the   work,   but   the   copyright   thereto   shall   remain   with   the   creator,   unless   there   is   a   written   stipulation  to  the  contrary;     178.5.   In   the   case   of   audiovisual   work,   the   copyright   shall   belong   to   the   producer,   the   author   of   the   scenario,   the   composer  of  the  music,  the  film  director,  and  the  author   of   the   work   so   adapted.   However,   subject   to   contrary   or   other   stipulations   among   the   creators,   the   producer   shall  exercise  the  copyright  to  an  extent  required  for  the   exhibition   of   the   work   in   any   manner,   except   for   the   right   to   collect   performing   license   fees   for   the   performance   of   musical   compositions,   with   or   without   words,  which  are  incorporated  into  the  work;  and     178.6.  In  respect  of  letters,  the  copyright  shall  belong  to   the  writer  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Article  723  of  the   Civil  Code.      

SECTION   179.   ANONYMOUS   AND   PSEUDONYMOUS   WORKS.   –  

Who  owns  Copyright?  

 

For  purposes  of  this  Act,  the  publishers  shall  be  deemed   to   represent   the   authors   of   articles   and   other   writings   published   without   the   names   of   the   authors   or   under   pseudonyms,   unless   the   contrary   appears,   or   the   pseudonyms   or   adopted   name   leaves   no   doubt   as   to   the   author's   identity,   or   if   the   author   of   the   anonymous   works  discloses  his  identity.      

SECTION  178.  RULES  ON  COPYRIGHT  OWNERSHIP.  –     Copyright  ownership  shall  be  governed  by  the  following   rules:     178.1.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  section,  in  the  case   of   original   literary   and   artistic   works,   copyright   shall   belong  to  the  author  of  the  work;     178.2.   In   the   case   of   works   of   joint   authorship,   the   co-­‐ authors  shall  be  the  original  owners  of  the  copyright  and   in   the   absence   of   agreement,   their   rights   shall   be   governed   by   the   rules   on   co-­‐ownership.   If,   however,   a   work   of   joint   authorship   consists   of   parts   that   can   be   used   separately   and   the   author   of   each   part   can   be   identified,   the   author   of   each   part   shall   be   the   original   owner  of  the  copyright  in  the  part  that  he  has  created;     178.3.   In   the   case   of   work   created   by   an   author   during   and  in  the  course  of  his  employment,  the  copyright  shall   belong  to:     (a)  The  employee,  if  the  creation  of  the  object   of   copyright   is   not   a   part   of   his   regular   duties   even   if   the   employee   uses   the   time,   facilities   and  materials  of  the  employer.     (b)   The   employer,   if   the   work   is   the   result   of   the   performance   of   his   regularly-­‐assigned   duties,   unless   there   is   an   agreement,   express   or  implied,  to  the  contrary.     178.4.   In   the   case   of   a   work   commissioned   by   a   person   other  than  an  employer  of  the  author  and  who  pays  for   it   and   the   work   is   made   in   pursuance   of   the   commission,  

SECTION  174.  PUBLISHED  EDITION  OF  WORK.  –     In   addition   to   the   right   to   publish   granted   by   the   author,   his  heirs,  or  assigns,  the  publisher  shall  have  a  copyright   consisting   merely   of   the   right   of   reproduction   of   the   typographical   arrangement   of   the   published   edition   of   the  work.    

ARTICLE  722,  CIVIL  C ODE.     The   author   and   the   composer,   mentioned   in   Nos.   1   and   2   of   the   preceding   article,   shall   have   the   ownership   of   their  creations  even  before  the  publication  of  the  same.   Once   their   works   are   published,   their   rights   are   governed  by  the  Copyright  laws.     The  painter,  sculptor  or  other  artist  shall  have  dominion   over  the  product  of  his  art  even  before  it  is  copyrighted.     The   scientist   or   technologist   has   the   ownership   of   his   discovery  or  invention  even  before  it  is  patented.      

ARTICLE  723,  CIVIL  CODE.     Letters  and  other  private  communications  in  writing  are   owned   by   the   person   to   whom   they   are   addressed   and   delivered,  but  they  cannot  be  published  or  disseminated   without  the  consent  of  the  writer  or  his  heirs.  However,   the   court   may   authorize   their   publication   or  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   dissemination   if   the   public   good   or   the   interest   of   justice   so  requires.      

  (5)   The   term   of   protection   subsequent   to   the   death   of   the  author  and  the  terms  provided  by  paragraphs  (2),  (3)   and  (4)  shall  run  from  the  date  of  death  or  of  the  event   referred   to   in   those   paragraphs,   but   such   terms   shall   always  be  deemed  to  begin  on  the  first  of  January  of  the   year  following  the  death  or  such  event.     (6)   The   countries   of   the   Union   may   grant   a   term   of   protection  in  excess  of  those  provided  by  the  preceding   paragraphs.     (7)  Those  countries  of  the  Union  bound  by  the  Rome  Act   of   this   Convention   which   grant,   in   their   national   legislation   in   force   at   the   time   of   signature   of   the   present   Act,   shorter   terms   of   protection   than   those   provided  for  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  shall  have  the   right  to  maintain  such  terms  when  ratifying  or  acceding   to  the  present  Act.     (8)   In   any   case,   the   term   shall   be   governed   by   the   legislation   of   the   country   where   protection   is   claimed;   however,  unless  the  legislation  of  that  country  otherwise   provides,   the   term   shall   not   exceed   the   term   fixed   in   the   country  of  origin  of  the  work.    

ARTICLE  520,  CIVIL  CODE.     A  trade-­‐mark  or  trade-­‐name  duly  registered  in  the  proper   government  bureau  or  office  is  owned  by  and  pertains  to   the   person,   corporation,   or   firm   registering   the   same,   subject  to  the  provisions  of  special  laws.    

6.

Duration  of  Copyright  

 

ARTICLE   7,   BERNE   CONVENTION   FOR   THE   PROTECTION   OF   LITERARY  AND  ARTISTIC  WORKS   TERM  OF  PROTECTION:   1.  Generally;     2.  For  cinematographic  works;     3.  For  anonymous  and  pseudonymous  works;   4.  For  photographic  works  and  works  of  applied   art;     5.  Starting  date  of  computation;   6.  Longer  terms;     7.  Shorter  terms;     8.  Applicable  law;  “comparison”  of  terms     (1)   The   term   of   protection   granted   by   this   Convention   shall   be   the   life   of   the   author   and   fifty   years   after   his   death.     (2)  However,  in  the  case  of  cinematographic  works,  the   countries   of   the   Union   may   provide   that   the   term   of   protection   shall   expire   fifty   years   after   the   work   has   been   made   available   to   the   public   with   the   consent   of   the   author,   or,   failing   such   an   event   within   fifty   years   from   the   making   of   such   a   work,   fifty   years   after   the   making.     (3)   In   the   case   of   anonymous   or   pseudonymous   works,   the   term   of   protection   granted   by   this   Convention   shall   expire  fifty  years  after  the  work  has  been  lawfully  made   available   to   the   public.   However,   when   the   pseudonym   adopted  by  the  author  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  his  identity,   the   term   of   protection   shall   be   that   provided   in   paragraph   (1).   If   the   author   of   an   anonymous   or   pseudonymous   work   discloses   his   identity   during   the   above-­‐mentioned   period,   the   term   of   protection   applicable   shall   be   that   provided   in   paragraph   (1).   The   countries   of   the   Union   shall   not   be   required   to   protect   anonymous   or   pseudonymous   works   in   respect   of   which   it   is   reasonable   to   presume   that   their   author   has   been   dead  for  fifty  years.     (4)  It  shall  be  a  matter  for  legislation  in  the  countries  of   the   Union   to   determine   the   term   of   protection   of   photographic   works   and   that   of   works   of   applied   art   in   so   far   as   they   are   protected   as   artistic   works;   however,   this   term   shall   last   at   least   until   the   end   of   a   period   of   twenty-­‐five  years  from  the  making  of  such  a  work.  

ARTICLE   7BIS,   BERNE   CONVENTION   FOR   THE   PROTECTION   OF  LITERARY  AND  ARTISTIC  W ORKS   TERM  OF  PROTECTION  FOR  WORKS  OF  JOINT  AUTHORSHIP     The   provisions   of   the   preceding   Article   shall   also   apply   in   the  case  of  a  work  of  joint  authorship,  provided  that  the   terms   measured   from   the   death   of   the   author   shall   be   calculated  from  the  death  of  the  last  surviving  author.    

SECTION  213.  TERM  OF  PROTECTION.  –     213.1.   Subject   to   the   provisions   of   Subsections   213.2   to   213.5,  the  copyright  in  works  under  Sections  172  and  173   shall   be   protected   during   the   life   of   the   author   and   for   fifty   (50)   years   after   his   death.   This   rule   also   applies   to   posthumous  works.       213.2.  In  case  of  works  of  joint  authorship,  the  economic   rights   shall   be   protected   during   the   life   of   the   last   surviving  author  and  for  fifty  (50)  years  after  his  death.       213.3.   In   case   of   anonymous   or   pseudonymous   works,   the  copyright  shall  be  protected  for  fifty  (50)  years  from   the  date  on  which  the  work  was  first  lawfully  published:   Provided,   That   where,   before   the   expiration   of   the   said   period,   the   author's   identity   is   revealed   or   is   no   longer   in   doubt,  the  provisions  of  Subsections  213.1.  and  213.2  shall   apply,   as   the   case   may   be:   Provided,   further,   That   such   works   if   not   published   before   shall   be   protected   for   fifty   (50)  years  counted  from  the  making  of  the  work.    

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Intellectual Property Law Government   or   any   of   its   subdivisions   and   instrumentalities,   including   government-­‐owned   or   controlled   corporations   as   a   part   of   his   regularly   prescribed  official  duties.    

213.4.   In   case   of   works   of   applied   art   the   protection   shall   be  for  a  period  of  twenty-­‐five  (25)  years  from  the  date  of   making.     213.5.  In  case  of  photographic  works,  the  protection  shall   be  for  fifty  (50)  years  from  publication  of  the  work  and,   if  unpublished,  fifty  (50)  years  from  the  making.       213.6.   In   case   of   audio-­‐visual   works   including   those   produced   by   process   analogous   to   photography   or   any   process   for   making   audio-­‐visual   recordings,   the   term   shall   be   fifty   (50)   years   from   date   of   publication   and,   if   unpublished,  from  the  date  of  making.    

SECTION  184.  LIMITATIONS  ON  COPYRIGHT.  –     184.1.   Notwithstanding   the   provisions   of   Chapter   V,   the   following   acts   shall   not   constitute   infringement   of   copyright:     (a)   The   recitation   or   performance   of   a   work,   once   it   has   been   lawfully   made   accessible   to   the  public,  if  done  privately  and  free  of  charge   or   if   made   strictly   for   a   charitable   or   religious   institution  or  society;       (b)  The  making  of  quotations  from  a  published   work   if   they   are   compatible   with   fair   use   and   only   to   the   extent   justified   for   the   purpose,   including   quotations   from   newspaper   articles   and  periodicals  in  the  form  of  press  summaries:   Provided,  That  the  source  and  the  name  of  the   author,   if   appearing   on   the   work,   are   mentioned;       (c)   The   reproduction   or   communication   to   the   public   by   mass   media   of   articles   on   current   political,   social,   economic,   scientific   or   religious   topic,   lectures,   addresses   and   other   works   of   the   same   nature,   which   are   delivered   in   public   if  such  use  is  for  information  purposes  and  has   not   been   expressly   reserved:   Provided,   That   the  source  is  clearly  indicated;       (d)   The   reproduction   and   communication   to   the  public  of  literary,  scientific  or  artistic  works   as   part   of   reports   of   current   events   by   means   of   photography,   cinematography   or   broadcasting   to   the   extent   necessary   for   the   purpose;       (e)   The   inclusion   of   a   work   in   a   publication,   broadcast,   or   other   communication   to   the   public,  sound  recording  or  film,  if  such  inclusion   is   made   by   way   of   illustration   for   teaching   purposes   and   is   compatible   with   fair   use:   Provided,   That   the   source   and   of   the   name   of   the   author,   if   appearing   in   the   work,   are   mentioned;     (f)  The  recording  made  in  schools,  universities,   or  educational  institutions  of  a  work  included  in   a   broadcast   for   the   use   of   such   schools,   universities   or   educational   institutions:   Provided,  That  such  recording  must  be  deleted   within   a   reasonable   period   after   they   were   first   broadcast:   Provided,   further,   That   such   recording   may   not   be   made   from   audiovisual  

SECTION  214.  CALCULATION  OF  TERM.  –     The   term   of   protection   subsequent   to   the   death   of   the   author  provided  in  the  preceding  Section  shall  run  from   the   date   of   his   death   or   of   publication,   but   such   terms   shall   always   be   deemed   to   begin   on   the   first   day   of   January  of  the  year  following  the  event  which  gave  rise   to  them.      

7.

Limitations  on  Copyright  

 

SECTION  176.  WORKS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT.  –     176.1.   No   copyright   shall   subsist   in   any   work   of   the   Government  of  the  Philippines.  However,  prior  approval   of  the  government  agency  or  office  wherein  the  work  is   created  shall  be  necessary  for  exploitation  of  such  work   for   profit.   Such   agency   or   office   may,   among   other   things,   impose   as   a   condition   the   payment   of   royalties.   No  prior  approval  or  conditions  shall  be  required  for  the   use   of   any   purpose   of   statutes,   rules   and   regulations,   and   speeches,   lectures,   sermons,   addresses,   and   dissertations,  pronounced,  read  or  rendered  in  courts  of   justice,   before   administrative   agencies,   in   deliberative   assemblies  and  in  meetings  of  public  character.     176.2.   The   author   of   speeches,   lectures,   sermons,   addresses,   and   dissertations   mentioned   in   the   preceding   paragraphs   shall   have   the   exclusive   right   of   making   a   collection  of  his  works.       176.3.   Notwithstanding   the   foregoing   provisions,   the   Government   is   not   precluded   from   receiving   and   holding   copyrights   transferred   to   it   by   assignment,   bequest   or   otherwise;   nor   shall   publication   or   republication   by   the   Government  in  a  public  document  of  any  work  in  which   copyright  is  subsisting  be  taken  to  cause  any  abridgment   or   annulment   of   the   copyright   or   to  authorize   any   use   or   appropriation   of   such   work   without   the   consent   of   the   copyright  owner.     SECTION  171.11.     A   "WORK   OF   THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES"   is   a   work   created   by   an   officer   or   employee   of   the   Philippine  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   works   which   are   part   of   the   general   cinema   repertoire   of   feature   films   except   for   brief   excerpts  of  the  work;     (g)   The   making   of   ephemeral   recordings   by   a   broadcasting  organization  by  means  of  its  own   facilities  and  for  use  in  its  own  broadcast;     (h)   The   use   made   of   a   work   by   or   under   the   direction  or  control  of  the  Government,  by  the   National  Library  or  by  educational,  scientific  or   professional   institutions   where   such   use   is   in   the   public   interest   and   is   compatible   with   fair   use;     (i)   The   public   performance   or   the   communication   to   the   public   of   a   work,   in   a   place   where   no   admission   fee   is   charged   in   respect   of   such   public   performance   or   communication,   by   a   club   or   institution   for   charitable   or   educational   purpose   only,   whose   aim  is  not  profit  making,  subject  to  such  other   limitations   as   may   be   provided   in   the   Regulations;     (j)   Public   display   of   the   original   or   a   copy   of   the   work   not   made   by   means   of   a   film,   slide,   television   image   or   otherwise   on   screen   or   by   means  of  any  other  device  or  process:  Provided,   That   either   the   work   has   been   published,   or,   that  the  original  or  the  copy  displayed  has  been   sold,   given   away   or   otherwise   transferred   to   another   person   by   the   author   or   his   successor   in  title;  and     (k)  Any  use  made  of  a  work  for  the  purpose  of   any   judicial   proceedings   or   for   the   giving   of   professional  advice  by  a  legal  practitioner.  

whether   the   use   made   of   a   work   in   any   particular   case   is   fair  use,  the  factors  to  be  considered  shall  include:     (a)   The   purpose   and   character   of   the   use,   including   whether   such   use   is   of   a   commercial   nature   or   is   for   non-­‐profit   educational   purposes;     (b)  The  nature  of  the  copyrighted  work;     (c)   The   amount   and   substantiality   of   the   portion   used   in   relation   to   the   copyrighted   work  as  a  whole;  and     (d)   The   effect   of   the   use   upon   the   potential   market  for  or  value  of  the  copyrighted  work.     185.2.   The   fact   that   a   work   is   unpublished   shall   not   by   itself  bar  a  finding  of  fair  use  if  such  finding  is  made  upon   consideration  of  all  the  above  factors.    

SECTION  186.  WORK  OF  ARCHITECTURE.  –     Copyright  in  a  work  of  architecture  shall  include  the  right   to   control   the   erection   of   any   building   which   reproduces   the   whole   or   a   substantial   part   of   the   work   either   in   its   original   form   or   in   any   form   recognizably   derived   from   the   original:   Provided,   That   the   copyright   in   any   such   work   shall   not   include   the   right   to   control   the   reconstruction   or   rehabilitation   in   the   same   style   as   the   original  of  a  building  to  which  that  copyright  relates.      

SECTION  187.  REPRODUCTION  OF  PUBLISHED  WORK.  –     187.1.   Notwithstanding   the   provision   of   Section   177,   and   subject   to   the   provisions   of   Subsection   187.2,   the   private   reproduction  of  a  published  work  in  a  single  copy,  where   the   reproduction   is   made   by   a   natural   person   exclusively   for   research   and   private   study,   shall   be   permitted,   without   the   authorization   of   the   owner   of   copyright   in   the  work.     187.2.   The   permission   granted   under   Subsection   187.1   shall  not  extend  to  the  reproduction  of:     (a)   A   work   of   architecture   in   the   form   of   building  or  other  construction;     (b)  An  entire  book,  or  a  substantial  part  thereof,   or   of   a   musical   work   in   graphic   form   by   reprographic  means;     (c)  A  compilation  of  data  and  other  materials;     (d)  A  computer  program  except  as  provided  in   Section  189;  and     (e)   Any   work   in   cases   where   reproduction   would   unreasonably   conflict   with   a   normal  

  184.2.  The  provisions  of  this  section  shall  be  interpreted   in   such   a   way   as   to   allow   the   work   to   be   used   in   a   manner   which   does   not   conflict   with   the   normal   exploitation   of   the   work   and   does   not   unreasonably   prejudice  the  right  holder's  legitimate  interests.4    

SECTION  185.  FAIR  USE  OF  A  COPYRIGHTED  WORK.  –     185.1.   The   fair   use   of   a   copyrighted   work   for   criticism,   comment,   news   reporting,   teaching   including   multiple   copies   for   classroom   use,   scholarship,   research,   and   similar   purposes   is   not   an   infringement   of   copyright.   Decompilation,   which   is   understood   here   to   be   the   reproduction   of   the   code   and   translation   of   the   forms   of   the  computer  program  to  achieve  the  inter-­‐operability  of   an  independently  created  computer  program  with  other   programs   may   also   constitute   fair   use.   In   determining                                                                                                                                                           4

 IMPORTANT  NOTE:  184.1  must  be  read  with  184.2.  

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Intellectual Property Law

 

exploitation   of   the   work   or   would   otherwise   unreasonably  prejudice  the  legitimate  interests   of  the  author.    

and   to   the   extent,   for   which   the   computer   program  has  been  obtained;  and     (b)  Archival  purposes,  and,  for  the  replacement   of   the   lawfully   owned   copy   of   the   computer   program  in  the  event  that  the  lawfully  obtained   copy   of   the   computer   program   is   lost,   destroyed  or  rendered  unusable.  

SECTION  188.  REPROGRAPHIC  REPRODUCTION  BY  LIBRARIES.   –   188.1.   Notwithstanding   the   provisions   of   Subsection   177.6,   any   library   or   archive   whose   activities   are   not   for   profit   may,   without   the   authorization   of   the   author   of   copyright   owner,   make   a   single   copy   of   the   work   by   reprographic  reproduction:     (a)   Where   the   work   by   reason   of   its   fragile   character  or  rarity  cannot  be  lent  to  user  in  its   original  form;     (b)   Where   the   works   are   isolated   articles   contained  in  composite  works  or  brief  portions   of  other  published  works  and  the  reproduction   is   necessary   to   supply   them,   when   this   is   considered   expedient,   to   persons   requesting   their   loan   for   purposes   of   research   or   study   instead   of   lending   the   volumes   or   booklets   which  contain  them;  and     (c)   Where   the   making   of   such   a   copy   is   in   order   to  preserve  and,  if  necessary  in  the  event  that  it   is  lost,  destroyed  or  rendered  unusable,  replace   a   copy,   or   to   replace,   in   the   permanent   collection  of  another  similar  library  or  archive,  a   copy   which   has   been   lost,   destroyed   or   rendered   unusable   and   copies   are   not   available   with  the  publisher.     188.2.  Notwithstanding  the  above  provisions,  it  shall  not   be  permissible  to  produce  a  volume  of  a  work  published   in  several  volumes  or  to  produce  missing  tomes  or  pages   of  magazines  or  similar  works,  unless  the  volume,  tome   or  part  is  out  of  stock:  Provided,  That  every  library  which,   by   law,   is   entitled   to   receive   copies   of   a   printed   work,   shall   be   entitled,   when   special   reasons   so   require,   to   reproduce   a   copy   of   a   published   work   which   is   considered   necessary   for   the   collection   of   the   library   but   which  is  out  of  stock.    

  189.2.   No   copy   or   adaptation   mentioned   in   this   Section   shall   be   used   for   any   purpose   other   than   the   ones   determined   in   this   Section,   and   any   such   copy   or   adaptation   shall   be   destroyed   in   the   event   that   continued   possession   of   the   copy   of   the   computer   program  ceases  to  be  lawful.     189.3.   This  provision  shall  be  without  prejudice  to  the   application  of  Section  185  whenever  appropriate.    

SECTION  190.  IMPORTATION  FOR  PERSONAL  PURPOSES.  –     190.1.  Notwithstanding  the  provision  of  Subsection  177.6,   but  subject  to  the  limitation  under  the  Subsection  185.2,   the  importation  of  a  copy  of  a  work  by  an  individual  for   his   personal   purposes   shall   be   permitted   without   the   authorization   of   the   author   of,   or   other   owner   of   copyright   in,   the   work   under   the   following   circumstances:     (a)   When   copies   of   the   work   are   not   available   in  the  Philippines  and:     (i)  Not  more  than  one  (1)  copy  at  one   time  is  imported  for  strictly  individual   use  only;  or     (ii)  The  importation  is  by  authority  of   and   for   the   use   of   the   Philippine   Government;  or     (iii)  The  importation,  consisting  of  not   more   than   three   (3)   such   copies   or   likenesses   in   any   one   invoice,   is   not   for   sale   but   for   the   use   only   of   any   religious,   charitable,   or   educational   society   or   institution   duly   incorporated   or   registered,   or   is   for   the   encouragement   of   the   fine   arts,   or   for   any   state   school,   college,   university,  or  free  public  library  in  the   Philippines.     (b)   When   such   copies   form   parts   of   libraries   and  personal  baggage  belonging  to  persons  or   families  arriving  from  foreign  countries  and  are   not   intended   for   sale:   Provided,   That   such   copies  do  not  exceed  three  (3).    

SECTION  189.  REPRODUCTION  OF  COMPUTER  PROGRAM.  –     189.1.  Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  Section  177,  the   reproduction  in  one  (1)  back-­‐up  copy  or  adaptation  of  a   computer   program   shall   be   permitted,   without   the   authorization   of   the   author   of,   or   other   owner   of   copyright   in,   a   computer   program,   by   the   lawful   owner   of   that   computer   program:   Provided,   That   the   copy   or   adaptation  is  necessary  for:     (a)   The   use   of   the   computer   program   in   conjunction   with   a   computer   for   the   purpose,  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   190.2.   Copies   imported   as   allowed   by   this   Section   may   not   lawfully   be   used   in   any   way   to   violate   the   rights   of   owner   the   copyright   or   annul   or   limit   the   protection   secured   by   this   Act,   and   such   unlawful   use   shall   be   deemed   an   infringement   and   shall   be   punishable   as   such   without  prejudice  to  the  proprietor's  right  of  action.     190.3.  Subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  Finance,   the   Commissioner   of   Customs   is   hereby   empowered   to   make   rules   and   regulations   for   preventing   the   importation   of   articles   the   importation   of   which   is   prohibited   under   this   Section   and   under   treaties   and   conventions   to   which   the   Philippines   may   be   a   party   and   for  seizing  and  condemning  and  disposing  of  the  same  in   case  they  are  discovered  after  they  have  been  imported.    

SECTION   2.   USE   IN   JUDICIAL   PROCEEDINGS   OR   BY   LEGAL   PRACTITIONERS.  —     Without   prejudice   to   other   exceptions   to   protection,   the   use   of   copyrighted   works   as   provided   in   the   IPC   “for   the   giving   of   professional   advise   by   a   legal   practitioner”   is   limited  to  those  uses  directly  connected  to  the  rendering   of   legal   advice   with   respect   to   such   works,   or   to   individuals,   institutions,   events   or   circumstances   to   which   the   creation   of   exploitation   of   such   works   are   directly   related.   This   exception   does   not   apply   to   the   exercise   of   exclusive   rights   of   copyright   owners   in   legal   research   materials,   legal-­‐related   computer   software,   legal-­‐related  online  material,  or  the  other  works  utilized   in  the  practice  of  law  on  a  regular  basis.       SECTION  3.  USES  COMPATIBLE  WITH  FAIR  USE.  —     To   determine   whether   use   of   a   copyrighted   work   is   “compatible   with   fair   use,”   the   criteria   set   forth   in   Sec.   185  of  the  IPC  shall  be  applied.       SECTION   4.   FAIR   USE   AND   DECOMPILATION   OF   COMPUTER   SOFTWARE.  —     An   act   of   decompilation   of   software   may   qualify   for   analysis  under  the  fair  use  provisions  if  it  meets  all  of  the   criteria  set  out  in  the  IPC,  viz:     (a)   It   consist   only   of   the   reproduction   of   code   and   translation   of   the   forms   of   a   computer   program;     (b)   The   reproduction   and   translation   are   indispensable   to   obtain   information,   such   that   information   can   be   obtained   in   no   other   way   than  through  decompilation;     (c)   The   information   is   necessary   in   order   to   achieve   interoperability   (i.e.,   interoperability   cannot   be   achieved   without   obtaining   the   information   and   without   using   decompilation   to  obtain  it)  ;  and     (d)   The   interoperability   that   is   sought   is   between   the   decompiled   program   and   an   independently  created  computer  program  (i.e.,   a  computer  program  that  was  created  prior  to   and  without  reference  to  the  decompilation).       If   the   above   criteria   are   satisfied,   then   the   fair   use   factors   set   forth   in   the   IPC   can   be   applied   in   order   to   decide   whether   or   not   the   decompilation,   in   the   particular  circumstances  involved,  constitutes  a  fair  use.   The   fact   that   a   use   is   decompilation   (as   defined   by   the   statutory  criteria)  creates  no  presumption  that  the  use  is   fair.          

RULE   14   –   LIMITATIONS   ON   COPYRIGHT,   COPYRIGHT   SAFEGUARDS  AND  REGULATIONS     SECTION   1.   PUBLIC   PERFORMANCE   OR   COMMUNICATION   TO   THE   PUBLIC  OF  WORK  BY  NON-­‐PROFIT  INSTITUTION.  —     The   public   performance   or   the   communication   to   the   public   of   a   work,   in   a   place   where   no   admission   fee   is   charged   in   respect   of   such   public   performance   or   communication,  by  a  club  or  institution  for  charitable  or   educational   purposes   only,   whose   aim   is   not   profit-­‐ making,   shall   not   constitute   infringement   of   copyright,   if:     (a)   The   works   are   limited   to   non-­‐dramatic   literary   works   and   non-­‐copyrighted   musical   compositions,   and   do   not   include   audiovisual   works  or  computer  programs;     (b)   The   clubs   or   institutions   to   which   this   subsection   applies   are   limited   to   those   organized   exclusively   for   charitable   or   educational   purposes;   and   if   the   following   conditions  are  satisfied:     (i)   No   fee   or   compensation   is   paid   to   any   performers,   promoters   or   organizers  of  the  public  performance;     (ii)   There   is   no   direct   or   indirect   admission   charge   to   the   place   where   the  performance  occurs;  and     (iii)   Admission   to   the   performance   is   restricted  to  persons  who  are,  and  for   at   least   the   preceding   thirty   days   have   been,   members   in   good   standing  of  the  club  or  the  institution   for   whose   charitable   or   education   purposes   the   performance   is   being   carried  out.    

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Intellectual Property Law publication  of  the  article  "we  reserved  all  rights,"  which   was  legally  equivalent  to  a  notice  "that  their  publication   is   reserved."   To   give   that   paragraph   any   other   construction  would  eliminate,  take  from  it,  and  wipe  out,   the   words   "that   their   publication   is   reserved,"   and   this   court  has  no  legal  right  to  do  that.  It  was  contended  that   this   construction   would   nullify   the   use   and   value   of   the   whole   Copyright   Law,   but   it   will   be   noted   that   this   exception   is   specifically   confined   and   limited   to   "news   items   editorial   paragraphs,   and   articles   in   periodicals,"   and   hence   could   not   be   made   to   apply   to   any   other   provisions   of   the   Copyright   Law.   It   will   also   be   noted   that  in  the  instant  case,  the  defendant  had  the  legal  right   to  publish  the  article  in  question  by  giving  "the  source  of   the  reproduction."  The  plaintiff  bought  and  paid  for  the   article  and  published  it  with  the  notice  that  "we  reserve   all   rights,"   and   the   defendant   published   the   article   in   question   without   citing   "the   source   of   the   reproduction,"   and   for   aught   that   appeared   in   his   paper,   the  article  was  purchase  and  paid  for  by  the  defendant.     We   are   clearly   of   the   opinion   that   the   language   in   question   in   the   Copyright   Law   of   the   Philippine   Islands,   which   is   not   found   in   the   Copyright   Law   of   the   United   States,   was   inserted   for   a   specific   purpose,   and   it   was   intended   to   prohibit   the   doing   of   the   very   thing   which   the   defendant   did   in   this   case;   otherwise,   the   use   of   all   of   those   words   is   a   nullity.   This   construction   does   not   least  impair  the  Copyright  Law,  except  as  to  "news  items,   editorial   paragraphs,   and   articles   in   periodicals,"   and   it   protects   an   enterprising   newspaper   or   magazine   that   invests   its   money   and   pays   for   the   right   to   publish   an   original   article,   and   that   was   the   reason   why   the   Legislature  saw  fit  to  use  the  language  in  question.     Ma’am  comment  on  the  case:  This  is  erroneous!!!    

SECTION  5.  EFFECT  ON  VALUE  OF  THE  WORK.  —     The  effect  of  the  use  upon  the  value  of  the  copyrighted   work   shall   also   constitute   a   limitation   on   fair   use   of   works,   particularly   whenever   their   reproduction   will   affect   their   usefulness,   reliability,   and   validity   such   as   psychological   tests   and   others   of   similar   nature.   Reproduction   of   these   works   shall,   therefore,   need   prior   authority  of  the  copyright  owner.       SECTION   6.   REPRODUCTION  OR   COMMUNICATION   TO   THE   PUBLIC   BY  MASS  M EDIA  OF  ARTICLES,  LECTURE,  ETC.  —     The   reproduction   or   communication   to   the   public   by   mass   media   of   articles,   such   as   those   publish   in   newspapers   or   periodicals   on   current   political,   social,   economic,   scientific,   or   religious   topics,   as   well   as   lectures,  addresses,  and  other  works  of  the  same  nature,   which   are   delivered   in   public,   shall   not   constitute   infringement   of   copyright   if   such   use   is   for   information   purposes  and  has  not  been  expressly  reserved:  Provided,   that   the   source   is   clearly   indicated   and   that   the   use   of   the   work   should   not   unreasonably   prejudice   the   right   holder’s  legitimate  interests.    

FILIPINO   SOCIETY  OF   COMPOSERS  V.  BENJAMIN  TAN  (1987),   SUPRA    

PHILIPPINE   EDUCATION   CO.   V.   SOTTO   AND   ALINDADA   (1929)   Refresher:   The   True   Story   of   Mrs.   Rizal,   written   by   Prof.   Craig,   published   by   Petitioner   in   Philippine   Education   Magazine.   It  was  alleged  that  Respondent  reproduced  the  same  in   The   Independent,   without   the   Petitioner’s   permission.   Applicable  law  is  Act  No.  3134.     Doctrine:   Analyzing   the   language   used,   it   says,   first,   that   such   news   items,   editorial   paragraphs,   and   articles   in   periodicals   may   be   reproduced,   unless   they   contain   a   notice  that  their  publication  is  reserved,  or,  second,  that   may  also  be  reproduced,  unless  they  contain  a  notice  of   copyright.   But   in   either   event,   the   law   specifically   provides   that   "the   source   of   the   reproduction   or   original   reproduced  shall  be  cited,"  and  is  not  confined  or  limited   to   case   in   which   there   is   "a   notice   of   copyright,"   and   specifically   says   that   in   either   event   "the   source   of   the   reproduction   or   original   reproduced   shall   be   cited."   To   give   this   section   any   other   construction   would   be   to   nullify,   eliminate   and   take   from   the   paragraph   the   words   "they  contain  a  notice  that  their  publication  is  reserved,"   and   to   say   that   the   Legislature   never   intended   to   say   what   it   did   say.   This   court   must   construe   the   language   found  in  the  act.       In  the  instant  case,  the  plaintiff  did  not  give  notice  of  its   copyright,   for   the   simple   reason   that   it   did   not   have   a   copyright,   but   it   did   notify   the   defendant   that   in   the  

SONY   CORPORATION   OF   AMERICA   V.   UNIVERSAL   STUDIOS,   INC.  (1983)   Refresher:   Petitioner   Sony   Corp.   manufactures   home   video   tape   recorders   (VTR's),   and   markets   them   through   retail   establishments,  some  of  which  are  also  petitioners.       Respondents   own   the   copyrights   on   some   of   the   television   programs   that   are   broadcast   on   the   public   airwaves.       Respondents   brought   an   action   against   petitioners   in   Federal   District   Court,   alleging   that   VTR   consumers   had   been  recording  some  of  respondents'  copyrighted  works   that   had   been   exhibited   on   commercially   sponsored   television   and   thereby   infringed   respondents'   copyrights,   and   further   that   petitioners   were   liable   for   such   copyright   infringement   because   of   their   marketing   of   the   VTR's.   Respondents   sought   money   damages,   an   equitable  accounting  of  profits,  and  an  injunction  against   the  manufacture  and  marketing  of  the  VTR's.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao     The   District   Court   denied   respondents   all   relief,   holding   that   noncommercial   home   use   recording   of   material   broadcast   over   the   public   airwaves   was   a   fair   use   of   copyrighted   works   and   did   not   constitute   copyright   infringement,   and   that   petitioners   could   not   be   held   liable  as  contributory  infringers  even  if  the  home  use  of  a   VTR   was   considered   an   infringing   use.   The   Court   of   Appeals   reversed,   holding   petitioners   liable   for   contributory   infringement   and   ordering   the   District   Court  to  fashion  appropriate  relief.     Doctrine:   The   sale   of   the   VTR's   to   the   general   public   does   not   constitute   contributory   infringement   of   respondents'   copyrights.     The   protection   given   to   copyrights   is   wholly   statutory,   and,  in  a  case  like  this,  in  which  Congress  has  not  plainly   marked   the   course   to   be   followed   by   the   judiciary,   this   Court   must   be   circumspect   in   construing   the   scope   of   rights  created  by  a  statute  that  never  contemplated  such   a   calculus   of   interests.   Any   individual   may   reproduce   a   copyrighted  work  for  a  "fair  use";  the  copyright  owner   does  not  possess  the  exclusive  right  to  such  a  use.       Petitioner  is  not  a  “contributory  infringer.”  Kalem  Co.  v.   Harper   Brothers   does   not   support   respondents'   novel   theory   that   supplying   the   "means"   to   accomplish   an   infringing  activity  and  encouraging  that  activity  through   advertisement   are   sufficient   to   establish   liability   for   copyright   infringement.   This   case   does   not   fall   in   the   category  of  those  in  which  it  is  manifestly  just  to  impose   vicarious   liability   because   the   "contributory"   infringer   was  in  a  position  to  control  the  use  of  copyrighted  works   by   others   and   had   authorized   the   use   without   permission   from   the   copyright   owner.   Here,   the   only   contact   between   petitioners   and   the   users   of   the   VTR's   occurred   at   the   moment   of   sale.   And   there   is   no   precedent   for   imposing   vicarious   liability   on   the   theory   that   petitioners   sold   the   VTR's   with   constructive   knowledge   that   their   customers   might   use   the   equipment  to  make  unauthorized  copies  of  copyrighted   material.  The   sale   of   copying   equipment,   like   the   sale   of   other   articles   of   commerce,   does   not   constitute   contributory  infringement  if  the  product  is  widely  used   for   legitimate,   unobjectionable   purposes,   or,   indeed,   is   merely  capable  of  substantial  noninfringing  uses.     The  record  and  the  District  Court's  findings  show:       (1)   that   there   is   a   significant   likelihood   that   substantial   numbers   of   copyright   holders   who   license   their   works   for   broadcast   on   free   television   would   not   object   to   having   their   broadcast  time-­‐shifted  by  private  viewers  (i.  e.,   recorded  at  a  time  when  the  VTR  owner  cannot  

view  the  broadcast  so  that  it  can  be  watched  at   a  later  time);  and       (2)  that  there  is  no  likelihood  that  time-­‐shifting   would  cause  nonminimal  harm  to  the  potential   market   for,   or   the   value   of,   respondents'   copyrighted  works.       The   VTR's   are   therefore   capable   of   substantial   noninfringing  uses.  Private,  noncommercial  time-­‐shifting   in   the   home   satisfies   this   standard   of   noninfringing   uses   both   because   respondents   have   no   right   to   prevent   other   copyright  holders  from  authorizing  such  time-­‐shifting  for   their  programs,  and  because  the  District  Court's  findings   reveal   that   even   the   unauthorized   home   time-­‐shifting   of   respondents'  programs  is  legitimate  fair  use.     Remarks:  US  Case.    

HARPER  &  ROW,  PUBLISHERS,  INC.  V.  NATION  ENTERPRISES   (1985)   Refresher:   In   1977,   former   President   Ford   contracted   with   petitioners  to  publish  his  as  yet  unwritten  memoirs.  The   agreement  gave  petitioners  the  exclusive  first  serial  right   to   license   prepublication   excerpts.   Two   years   later,   as   the   memoirs   were   nearing   completion,   petitioners,   as   the   copyright   holders,   negotiated   a   prepublication   licensing   agreement   with   Time   Magazine   under   which   Time  agreed  to  pay  $25,000  ($12,500  in  advance  and  the   balance   at   publication)   in   exchange   for   the   right   to   excerpt   7,500   words   from   Mr.   Ford's   account   of   his   pardon   of   former   President   Nixon.   Shortly   before   the   Time  article's  scheduled  release,  an  unauthorized  source   provided   The   Nation   Magazine   with   the   unpublished   Ford  manuscript.  Working  directly  from  this  manuscript,   an  editor  of  The  Nation  produced  a  2,250-­‐word  article,  at   least   300   to   400   words   of   which   consisted   of   verbatim   quotes   of   copyrighted   expression   taken   from   the   manuscript.  It  was  timed  to  "scoop"  the  Time  article.  As   a   result   of   the   publication   of   The   Nation's   article,   Time   canceled   its   article   and   refused   to   pay   the   remaining   $12,500   to   petitioners.   Petitioners   then   brought   suit   in   Federal   District   Court   against   respondent   publishers   of   The   Nation,   alleging,   inter   alia,   violations   of   the   Copyright  Act  (Act).  The  District  Court  held   that   the   Ford   memoirs   were   protected   by   copyright   at   the   time   of   The   Nation   publication   and   that   respondents'   use   of   the   copyrighted   material   constituted   an   infringement   under   the   Act,   and   the   court   awarded   actual   damages   of   $12,500.   The   Court   of   Appeals   reversed,   holding   that   The   Nation's  publication  of  the  300  to  400  words  it  identified   as   copyrightable   expression   was   sanctioned   as   a   "fair   use"   of   the   copyrighted   material   under   107   of   the   Act.   Section  107  provides  that  notwithstanding  the  provisions   of   106   giving   a   copyright   owner   the   exclusive   right   to   reproduce   the   copyrighted   work   and   to   prepare  

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Intellectual Property Law derivative  works  based  on  the  copyrighted  work,  the  fair   use   of   a   copyrighted   work   for   purposes   such   as   comment   and   news   reporting   is   not   an   infringement   of   copyright.   Section   107   further   provides   that   in   determining   whether   the   use   was   fair   the   factors   to   be   considered   shall   include:   (1)   the   purpose   and   character   of   the   use;   (2)   the   nature   of   the   copyrighted   work;   (3)   the   substantiality   of   the   portion   used   in   relation   to   the   copyrighted   work   as   a   whole;   and   (4)   the   effect   on   the   potential  market  for  or  value  of  the  copyrighted  work.     Doctrine:   The   Nation's   article   was   not   a   "fair   use"   sanctioned   by   107.     In   using   generous   verbatim   excerpts   of   Mr.   Ford's   unpublished   expression   to   lend   authenticity   to   its   account   of   the   forthcoming   memoirs,   The   Nation   effectively   arrogated   to   itself   the   right   of   first   publication,  an  important  marketable  subsidiary  right.     Though   the   right   of   first   publication,   like   other   rights   enumerated  in  106,  is  expressly  made  subject  to  the  fair   use   provisions   of   107,   fair   use   analysis   must   always   be   tailored   to   the   individual   case.   The   nature   of   the   interest   at  stake  is  highly  relevant  to  whether  a  given  use  is  fair.   The   unpublished   nature   of   a   work   is   a   key,   though   not   necessarily   determinative,   factor   tending   to   negate   a   defense   of   fair   use.   And   under   ordinary   circumstances,   the   author's   right   to   control   the   first   public   appearance   of   his   undisseminated   expression   will   outweigh   a   claim   of  fair  use.     In  view  of  the  First  Amendment's  protections  embodied   in   the   Act's   distinction   between   copyrightable   expression  and  uncopyrightable  facts  and  ideas,  and  the   latitude   for   scholarship   and   comment   traditionally   afforded   by   fair   use,   there   is   no   warrant   for   expanding,   as   respondents   contend   should   be   done,   the   fair   use   doctrine  to  what  amounts  to  a  public  figure  exception  to   copyright.   Whether   verbatim   copying   from   a   public   figure's   manuscript   in   a   given   case   is   or   is   not   fair   must   be  judged  according  to  the  traditional  equities  of  fair  use.       Taking   into   account   the   FOUR   FACTORS   enumerated   in   107  as  especially  relevant  in  determining  fair  use,  leads  to   the  conclusion  that  the  use  in  question  here  was  not  fair.       (i)   The   fact   that   news   reporting   was   the   general   purpose   of   The   Nation's   use   is   simply   one   factor.   While   The   Nation   had   every   right   to   be  the  first  to  publish  the  information,  it  went   beyond   simply   reporting   uncopyrightable   information   and   actively   sought   to   exploit   the   headline   value   of   its   infringement,   making   a   "news   event"   out   of   its   unauthorized   first   publication.   The   fact   that   the   publication   was   commercial   as   opposed   to   nonprofit   is   a  

separate   factor   tending   to   weigh   against   a   finding   of   fair   use.   Fair   use   presupposes   good   faith.   The   Nation's   unauthorized   use   of   the   undisseminated   manuscript   had   not   merely   the   incidental   effect   but   the   intended   purpose   of   supplanting   the   copyright   holders'   commercially  valuable  right  of  first  publication.       (ii)   While   there   may   be   a   greater   need   to   disseminate   works   of   fact   than   works   of   fiction,   The   Nation's   taking   of   copyrighted   expression   exceeded   that   necessary   to   disseminate   the   facts   and   infringed   the   copyright   holders'   interests  in  confidentiality  and  creative  control   over  the  first  public  appearance  of  the  work.       (iii)   Although   the   verbatim   quotes   in   question   were   an   insubstantial   portion   of   the   Ford   manuscript,   they   qualitatively   embodied   Mr.   Ford's   distinctive   expression   and   played   a   key   role  in  the  infringing  article.       (iv)   As   to   the   effect   of   The   Nation's   article   on   the   market   for   the   copyrighted   work,   Time's   cancellation   of   its   projected   article   and   its   refusal  to  pay  $12,500  were  the  direct  effect  of   the   infringing   publication.   Once   a   copyright   holder   establishes   a   causal   connection   between  the  infringement  and  loss  of  revenue,   the  burden  shifts  to  the  infringer  to  show  that   the   damage   would   have   occurred   had   there   been  no  taking  of  copyrighted  expression.       Petitioners   established   a   prima   facie   case   of   actual   damage   that   respondents   failed   to   rebut.   More   important,   to   negate   a   claim   of   fair   use   it   need   only   be   shown   that   if   the   challenged   use   should   become   widespread,   it   would   adversely   affect   the   potential   market   for   the   copyrighted   work.   Here,   The   Nation's   liberal   use   of   verbatim   excerpts   posed   substantial   potential   for   damage   to   the   marketability   of   first   serialization  rights  in  the  copyrighted  work.     Remarks:  US  Case    

ANN   BARTOW,   EDUCATIONAL   FAIR   USE   IN   COPYRIGHT:   RECLAIMING  THE  RIGHT  TO  PHOTOCOPY  FREELY  (1998)   The   doctrine   of   fair   use   was   codified   in   §   107   of   the   Copyright  Act  of  1976,  which  states  in  pertinent  part:     The  fair  use  of  a  copyrighted  work,  including  such  use  by   reproduction  in  copies  or  phonorecords  or  by  any  other   means  specified  [in  §§  106  and  106A],  for  purposes  such   as   criticism,   comment,   news   reporting,   teaching   (including   multiple   copies   for   classroom   use),   scholarship,   or   research,   is   not   an   infringement   of   copyright.   In   determining   whether   the   use   made   of   a  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   work  in  any  particular  case  is  a  fair  use  the  factors  to  be   considered  shall  include-­‐     (1)   the   purpose   and   character   of   the   use,   including   whether   such   use   is   of   a   commercial   nature  or  is  for  nonprofit  educational  purposes;     (2)  the  nature  of  the  copyrighted  work;     (3)   the   amount   and   substantiality   of   the   portion   used   in   relation   to   the   copyrighted   work  as  a  whole;  and     (4)   the   effect   of   the   use   upon   the   potential   market  for  or  value  of  the  copyrighted  work.     The  omissions  from  §  107  are  immediately  apparent.  Fair   use   is   not   defined,   and   no   guidance   is   offered   with   respect   to   an   ordering   of   priorities   in   the   application   of   the  four  articulated  factors  to  be  considered.     Fair  use  has  been  called  an  equitable  rule  of  reason  with   no  real  definition.  Fair  use  is,  however,  widely  recognized   as   a   doctrine   under   which   a   copyrighted   work   can   be   used   without   permission   from,   or   even   against   the   express   wishes   of   the   copyright   owner,   in   certain   circumstances.   Fair   use   doctrine   embodies   a   policy   against  freighting  ideas  and  information  with  proprietary   rights.   Although   one   of   the   bedrock   principles   of   copyright   law   is   that   only   the   expression   of   ideas   is   copyrightable,   and   not   the   ideas   that   are   expressed,   as   a   practical   matter   it   is   often   very   difficult   to   separate   the   two.   If,   for   example,   a   unique   idea   is   expressed   in   a   highly   original,   copyrighted   book,   unless   one   is   prepared   to   "re-­‐express"   the   idea,   thereby   rewriting   the   tome   in   one's  own  words  (and  preferably  in  a  manner  that  does   not   induce   the   book's   author   to   sue   for   copyright   infringement,   while   still   retaining   the   "essence"   of   whatever   makes   the   work   unique   and   valuable),   monopolistic  control  over  the  idea  contained  in  the  work   is   essentially   ceded   to   the   work's   copyright   owner.   Though  ideas  are  part  of  the  public  domain,  one  requires   words   ("expression")   to   convey   them.   When   an   idea   is   complex,  it  will  be  onerous,  if  not  impossible,  for  another   person   to   communicate   using   other   words   without   slanting   or   shading   underlying   concepts.   Preservation   and   accurate   transmission   of   an   elaborate   original   idea   compel  use  of  intact,  original  expression.     The   Copyright   Act   does   not   bestow   absolute   exclusive   rights   upon   a   copyright   owner,   but   rather   confers   a   limited  monopoly  with  respect  to  use  of  the  copyrighted   work.   A   copyright   is   intangible   (or   "intellectual")   property   that   is   vested   with   a   public   interest,   intended   to   achieve   an   "important   public   purpose."   There   is   a   societal   bargain   implicit   in   the   copyright   law.   Copyright   owners   are   given   tools   in   the   form   of   exclusive   rights   with  which  to  exploit  creative  endeavors  financially,  but   this   gift   is   conditioned   upon   an   understanding   that   the   ultimate  goal  of  copyrights  is  to  maximize  the  number  of   creative  works  available  to  the  public,  and  not  to  benefit  

individual   copyright   owners.   Alternatively   expressed,   "copyright   is   a   bargain   between   the   public   and   publishers,   in   which   the   public   consents   to   restrict   its   rights   as   a   kind   of   bribe   to   publishers."   To   effectuate   this   bargain,   copyrights   should   be   no   more   restrictive   than  is  necessary  to  create  incentives  for  the  promotion   of   knowledge   and   learning.   Where   public   interests   conflict   with   those   of   copyright   owners,   the   public   interests  should  prevail.     Fair  use  therefore  represents  an  amplitude  of  control  that   is   withheld   from   a   copyright   owner   when   a   grant   of   copyright   is   made,   rather   than   a   right   or   privilege   copyright   owners   earn   or   acquire   that   is   subsequently   "taken."   Fair   use   is   the   "only   limitation   on   copyright   that   applies   to   all   rights   of   the   copyright   owner   and   to   all   copyrighted  works."     The  public's  statutorily  circumscribed  right  to  the  fair  use   of   copyrighted   works   can   be   justified   in   several   ways.   Fair   use   access   to   copyrighted   works   may   be   grounded   in   recognition   that   no   newly   created,   copyrighted   work   can   be   truly   original.   All   authors   are   consciously   or   unconsciously,   directly   or   indirectly   exposed   to,   informed   and   inspired   by   the   earlier   works   and   thoughts   of   others,   and   are   therefore   obligated   to   contribute   "free  samples"  from  their  own  works  to  the  marketplace   of  ideas.  In  this  construction,  fair  use  functions  almost  as   a  tax  or  fee  that  is  levied  upon  individual  copyright  works   for   the   common   welfare,   and   justified   by   the   copyright   owner's  consumption  of  common  or  public  knowledge.     Fair   use   may   also   be   perceived   as   a   tax   perhaps   paid   as   partial   reparation   for   the   costs   to   society   of   the   "copyright   infrastructure"   comprised   of   the   Copyright   Office,   the   federal   court   system   (which   has   subject   matter   jurisdiction   over   copyrights),   law   enforcement   agencies,   and   other   governmental   entities   dedicated   to   delineating,   allocating,   and   protecting   copyrights.   Fair   use   thus   functions   as   a   burden   on   intellectual   property   that   reciprocally   accompanies   the   benefits   provided   by   the  copyright  infrastructure.     Fair   use   can   also   be   viewed   as   somewhat   similar   to   an   easement.   The   recent   publisher-­‐propelled   rush   to   expand   the   scope   of   copyright   protections   has   been   aptly   analogized   to   "a   land   grab   the   likes   of   which   we   have   not   seen   since   the   Government   opened   up   the   Northwest   Territory   for   settlement."   Fair   use   may   be   seen   as   society's   easement   across   "servient"   creative   works.   Under   this   construction   authors   create   and   publish   new   works   subject   to   the   burden   of   fair   use,   and   should  consider  the  possible  impact  of  the  doctrine  just   as   a   landowner   would   factor   in   the   ramifications   of   an   easement   when   deciding   whether   and   how   to   develop   land.   Unlike   the   typical   effect   of   an   easement   on   land,   however,   an   easement   doesn't   necessarily   burden   or   devalue   intellectual   property.   A   book   can   be   equally  

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Intellectual Property Law valuable   to   each   in   a   series   of   new   readers   no   matter   how   many   times   it   is   read,   with   no   diminution   in   the   quality   of   the   work.   As   Thomas   Jefferson   stated:   "He   who   receives   an   idea   from   me,   receives   instructions   himself   without   lessening   mine;   as   he   who   lights   his   taper   at   mine,   receives   light   without   darkening   me."  Fair   users   don't   erode   the   desirability   of   a   work,   and   may   actually   augment   royalty   generating   demand   for   it   by   increasing  its  visibility  or  elevating  its  prominence.     Fair   use   has   also   been   justified   as   a   response   to   market   failure,   based   on   the   premise   that   the   public   ought   to   have  free  access  to  information  and  ideas  manifested  in   copyrighted   works   which   could   not   be   purchased   with   reasonable   ease   or   efficiency.   Under   this   notion   of   fair   use,   the   availability   of   a   work   or   portion   thereof   has   an   inverse  relationship  with  the  prospective  scope  of  its  fair   usability.   The   scope   of   fair   use   would   therefore   be   broader  with  respect  to  a  book  that  was  out  of  print,  and   narrower   for   a   book   that   was   inexpensive   and   widely   distributed.   Where   there   was   no   market   failure,   there   could  be  no  fair  use.     The   idea   that   there   was   a   fair   use   right   to   use   a   copyrighted   work   without   the   copyright   owner's   permission   was   first   raised   in   1841   in   Folsom   v.   Marsh.   The   plaintiffs   in   this   case   owned   a   copyright   in   a   multivolume   autobiography   of   George   Washington,   which  defendants  were  accused  of  infringing  when  they   copied  353  pages  of  the  treatise.  Though  this  sounds  like   an   appallingly   extensive   appropriation,   it   actually   amounted   to   less   than   6%   of   the   original   lengthy   work.   Defendant's   fair   use   claim   failed   because   the   court   concluded   that   the   most   important   parts   of   the   work   had   been   copied   in   an   attempt   to   supplant   uses   (and   presumably   purchases)   of   the   original   work.   In   Folsom,   Justice   Story   articulated   the   underpinnings   of   the   modern  test  of  fair  use,  subsequently  incorporated  into  §   107   of   the   Copyright   Act,   which   comprised   a   review   of   "the   nature   and   objects   of   the   selections   made,   the   quantity   and   value   of   the   materials   used,   and   the   degree   in  which  the  use  may  prejudice  the  sale,  or  diminish  the   profits,   or   supersede   the   objects,   of   the   original   work."   Justice   Story   was   most   concerned   about   the   market   effect   of   the   accused   infringing   usage,   presaging   the   extensive   (though   misdirected)   focus   by   modern   courts   on   the   profitability   implications   of   nonpermissive   uses   asserted  to  be  fair.     It   has   been   argued   that   rather   than   being   "a   typical   statutory   provision   representing   Congress's   creation   of   new   law   and   establishment   of   rules   for   the   courts   to   apply   [§   107]   is   instead   a   direction   to   the   courts   to   continue  to  develop  the  common  law."  Under  this  view,   §  107  is  not  a  codification  of  the  doctrine  of  fair  use,  but   rather   "statutory   recognition   of   a   judge-­‐made   rule   of   reason."  One  commentator  has  referred  to  fair  use  as  a   "paradigmatic   "catch-­‐all',"   and   asserted   that   "the  

doctrine  has  no  crisp  outlines,  no  precise  standards,  and   no  obvious  center  or  core.  Its  flexibility  allows  judges  to   adjust   the   contours   of   copyright   protection   to   fit   individual   circumstances   as   they   arise,   in   the   true   common   law   tradition."   In   any   event,   though   §   107   has   not   been   legislatively   altered   with   respect   to   the   fair   use   of  published  works  since  it  went  into  effect  in  1978,  the   scope   of   fair   use   that   it   delineates   has   been   steadily   shrinking.     SECTION  107'S  FOUR-­‐PART  TEST     Section   107   sets   out   a   non-­‐exhaustive   list   of   factors   a   court   must   consider   when   deciding   whether   non-­‐ permissive  utilization  of  a  copy-­‐righted  work  is  "fair  use."   In   the   context   of   educational   photocopying,   §   107's   four-­‐ part   test   was   intended   to   be   the   arbiter   of   fair   use   for   photocopying.       1.   "The   purpose   and   character   of   the   use   including   whether   such   use   is   of   a   commercial   nature   or   is   for   nonprofit  educational  purposes:"     If   the   reproduction   is   made   for   profit,   with   commercial   gain  as  its  primary  goal,  it  is  unlikely  to  fall  within  the  fair   use  doctrine.  The  phrase  "including  whether  such  use  is   of   a   commercial   nature   or   is   for   nonprofit   educational   purposes"   was   added   to   this   first   prong   of   §   107's   four-­‐ part   fair   use   test   by   the   House   Judiciary   Committee   shortly   before   passage   of   the   Copyright   Act   of   1976   "in   order   to   mollify   educators   who   had   lobbied   unsuccessfully   for   an   across-­‐the-­‐board   exemption   for   nonprofit   educational   uses."   While   it   would   seem   obvious  that  the  purpose  and  character  of  photocopying   multiple   copies   for   classroom   use   is   educational   and   nonprofit   in   nature,   courts   have   held   that   educational   copying   by   a   commercial   photocopy   business   was   a   commercial   undertaking   because   the   actual   photocopying   of   work   selected   by   educators   was   performed  by  for-­‐profit  vendors.     2.  "The  nature  of  the  copyrighted  work:"     In   applying   this   prong   of   the   fair   use   test,   courts   have   considered   the   originality,   informative   nature,   intended   use,   and   availability   of   the   work.   In   an   educational   context,  courts  are  less  likely  to  find  fair  use  where  text   books   and   other   materials   prepared   for   educational   markets  are  copied  than  when  works  created  for  general   public  distribution  are  reproduced  for  classroom  use.     Additionally,  in  part  because  facts  cannot  by  copyrighted,   use   of   informational   works   is   more   likely   to   be   considered   fair   than   use   of   creative   works.   Courts   sometimes  have  difficulty  classifying  a  copyrighted  work   as   distinctly   informational   or   distinctly   creative.   For   example,  on  one  occasion  the  Ninth  Circuit  decided  that   it  could  not  categorize  a  cake  decorating  booklet  which   had   both   informational   and   creative   aspects.   As   one   observer   uncharitably   put   it,   "If   cake   decorating  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   booklets  can  stump  the  Ninth  Circuit,  then  the  ability  of   courts   to   classify   more   complicated   materials   photocopied  by  educators  and  scholars  at  universities  is   doubtful."     3.  "The  amount  and  substantiality  of  the  portion  used  in   relation  to  the  copyrighted  work  as  a  whole:"     Photocopying   small   excerpts   of   a   copyrighted   work   for   educational   purposes   is   more   likely   to   appear   fair   than   photocopying  large  portions  of  an  article  or  book.  Once   the   quantities   set   out   in   the   Guidelines   are   exceeded,   there   is   no   bright   line   number   of   pages   or   percentage   of   a   work   one   can   confidently   assume   will   be   deemed   fair   or  unfair.  If  the  amount  of  copying  is  substantial  enough,   some   courts   will   not   find   fair   use   regardless   of   the   outcome  of  the  other  test  factors.     In   addition   to   doing   a   quantitative   assessment,   courts   will  also  do  a  qualitative  assessment  of  the  portion  of  the   work  that  was  reproduced.  Photocopying  the  "heart"  or   critical   parts   of   a   work   may   be   deemed   unfair   even   if   the   number   of   pages   or   actual   percentage   of   the   work   copied   is   insubstantial.   When   a   work   is   excerpted   for   educational  usage,  the  very  fact  that  certain  portions  of   a  work  are  chosen  by  a  faculty  member  will  probably  be   sufficient  to  implicate  them  as  "critical  parts,"  which  will   weigh  against  a  finding  of  fair  use.     4.   "The   effect   of   the   use   upon   the   potential   market   for   or   value  of  the  copyrighted  work:"     This   factor   echoes   aspects   of   the   second   and   third   factors,  as  both  the  nature  of  the  work  and  the  amount   and   substantiality   copied   will   be   partially   determinative   of   whether   a   copyright   owner   has   been   economically   injured.  Market  effect  has  been  called  "undoubtedly  the   single   most   important   element   of   fair   use"   by   the   Supreme   Court   in   a   non-­‐educational   context.   However,   the   exact   extent   of   its   preeminence   among   §   107's   four   factors  has  not  been  delineated.    

eventually   became   the   working   draft   of   the   decision.       She   said   that,   for   most   parts,   she   did   her   research   electronically.     For   international   materials,   she   sourced   these   mainly   from   Westlaw,   an   online   research   service   for   legal   and   law-­‐related   materials   to   which   the   Court   subscribes.         In   the   old   days,   the   common   practice   was   that   after   a   Justice   would   have   assigned   a   case   for   study   and   report,   the   researcher   would   source   his   materials   mostly   from   available   law   books   and   published   articles   on   print.     When   he   found   a   relevant   item   in   a   book,   whether   for   one  side  of  the  issue  or  for  the  other,  he  would  place  a   strip   of   paper   marker   on   the   appropriate   page,   pencil   mark   the   item,   and   place   the   book   on   his   desk   where   other   relevant   books   would   have   piled   up.     He   would   later  paraphrase  or  copy  the  marked  out  passages  from   some   of   these   books   as   he   typed   his   manuscript   on   a   manual  typewriter.    This  occasion  would  give  him  a  clear   opportunity   to   attribute   the   materials   used   to   their   authors  or  sources.         With   the   advent   of   computers,   however,   as   Justice   Del   Castillo’s   researcher   also   explained,   most   legal   references,   including   the   collection   of   decisions   of   the   Court,   are   found   in   electronic   diskettes   or   in   internet   websites   that   offer   virtual   libraries   of   books   and   articles.     Here,   as   the   researcher   found   items   that   were   relevant   to  her  assignment,  she  downloaded  or  copied  them  into   her   “main   manuscript,”   a   smorgasbord   plate   of   materials   that   she   thought   she   might   need.     The   researcher’s  technique  in  this  case  is  not  too  far  different   from  that  employed  by  a  carpenter.    The  carpenter  first   gets   the   pieces   of   lumber   he   would   need,   choosing   the   kinds  and  sizes  suitable  to  the  object  he  has  in  mind,  say   a  table.    When  ready,  he  would  measure  out  the  portions   he   needs,   cut   them   out   of   the   pieces   of   lumber   he   had   collected,   and   construct   his   table.     He   would   get   rid   of   the  scraps.           Here,  Justice  Del  Castillo’s  researcher  did  just  that.    She   electronically   “cut”   relevant   materials   from   books   and   journals   in   the   Westlaw   website   and   “pasted”   these   to   a   “main   manuscript”   in   her   computer   that   contained   the   issues   for   discussion   in   her   proposed   report   to   the   Justice.     She   used   the   Microsoft   Word   program.   Later,   after   she   decided   on   the   general   shape   that   her   report   would   take,   she   began   pruning   from   that   manuscript   those  materials  that  did  not  fit,  changing  the  positions  in   the  general  scheme  of  those  that  remained,  and  adding   and   deleting   paragraphs,   sentences,   and   words   as   her   continuing  discussions  with  Justice  Del  Castillo,  her  chief   editor,   demanded.     Parenthetically,   this   is   the   standard   scheme   that   computer-­‐literate   court   researchers   use   everyday  in  their  work.       Justice   Del   Castillo’s   researcher   showed   the   Committee   the   early   drafts   of   her   report   in   the   Vinuya   case   and  

IN   THE   MATTER   OF   THE   CHARGES   OF   PLAGIARISM,   ETC.   AGAINST   ASSOCIATE   JUSTICE   MARIANO   C.   DEL   CASTILLO   (2010)   Court  decision:   Petitioners   point   out   that   the   Vinuya   decision   lifted   passages   from   Tams’   book,   Enforcing   Erga   Omnes   Obligations  in  International  Law  (2006)  and  used  them  in   Footnote   69   with   what   the   author   thought   was   a   mere   generic  reference.    But,  although  Tams  himself  may  have   believed   that   the   footnoting   in   this   case   was   not   “an   appropriate   form   of   referencing,”   Unless   amply   explained,   the   above   lifting   from   the   works   of   Ellis   and   Criddle-­‐Descent   could   be   construed   as   plagiarism.     But   one   of   Justice   Del   Castillo’s   researchers,   a   court-­‐ employed   attorney,   explained   how   she   accidentally   deleted   the   attributions,   originally   planted   in   the   beginning   drafts   of   her   report   to   him,   which   report  

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Intellectual Property Law these   included   the   passages   lifted   from   the   separate   articles   of   Criddle-­‐Descent   and   of   Ellis   with   proper   attributions   to   these   authors.     But,   as   it   happened,   in   the   course   of   editing   and   cleaning   up   her   draft,   the   researcher   accidentally   deleted   the   attributions.     She   and   petitioners   cannot   deny   that   the   decision   did   attribute   the   source   or   sources   of   such   passages.     Justice   Del   Castillo   did   not   pass   off   Tams’   work   as   his   own.     The   Justice   primarily   attributed   the   ideas   embodied   in   the   passages  to  Bruno  Simma,  whom  Tams  himself  credited   for   them.     Still,   Footnote   69   mentioned,   apart   from   Simma,  Tams’  article  as  another  source  of  those  ideas.         The   Court   believes   that   whether   or   not   the   footnote   is   sufficiently   detailed,   so   as   to   satisfy   the   footnoting   standards   of   counsel   for   petitioners   is   not   an   ethical   matter   but   one   concerning   clarity   of   writing.     The   statement  “See  Tams,  Enforcing  Obligations  Erga  Omnes   in  International  Law  (2005)”  in  the  Vinuya  decision  is  an   attribution   no   matter   if   Tams   thought   that   it   gave   him   somewhat  less  credit  than  he  deserved.    Such  attribution   altogether   negates   the   idea   that   Justice   Del   Castillo   passed  off  the  challenged  passages  as  his  own.             That   it   would   have   been   better   had   Justice   Del   Castillo   used   the   introductory   phrase   “cited   in”   rather   than   the   phrase   “See”   would   make   a   case   of   mere   inadvertent   slip   in   attribution   rather   than   a   case   of   “manifest   intellectual   theft   and   outright   plagiarism.”   If   the   Justice’s   citations   were   imprecise,   it   would   just   be   a   case   of  bad  footnoting  rather  than  one  of  theft  or  deceit.    If  it   were   otherwise,   many   would   be   target   of   abuse   for   every   editorial   error,   for   every   mistake   in   citing   pagination,  and  for  every  technical  detail  of  form.     Notably,   neither   Justice   Del   Castillo   nor   his   researcher   had   a   motive   or   reason   for   omitting   attribution   for   the   lifted   passages   to   Criddle-­‐Descent   or   to   Ellis.     The   latter   authors  are  highly  respected  professors  of  international   law.     The   law   journals   that   published   their   works   have   exceptional   reputations.     It   did   not   make   sense   to   intentionally  omit  attribution  to  these  authors  when  the   decision   cites   an   abundance   of   other   sources.     Citing   these   authors   as   the   sources   of   the   lifted   passages   would   enhance   rather   than   diminish   their   informative   value.     Both   Justice   Del   Castillo   and   his   researcher   gain   nothing  from  the  omission.    Thus,  the  failure  to  mention   the   works   of   Criddle-­‐Decent   and   Ellis   was   unquestionably  due  to  inadvertence  or  pure  oversight.       Petitioners   of   course   insist   that   intent   is   not   material   in   committing  plagiarism  since  all  that  a  writer  has  to  do,  to   avoid   the   charge,   is   to   enclose   lifted   portions   with   quotation   marks   and   acknowledge   the   sources   from   which   these   were   taken.   Petitioners   point   out   that   the   Court   should   apply   to   this   case   the   ruling   in   University   of   the  Philippines  Board  of  Regents  v.  Court  of  Appeals  and   Arokiaswamy   William   Margaret   Celine.   They   argue   that  

standards   on   plagiarism   in   the   academe   should   apply   with  more  force  to  the  judiciary.             But  petitioners’  theory  ignores  the  fact  that  plagiarism  is   essentially   a   form   of   fraud   where   intent   to   deceive   is   inherent.     Their   theory   provides   no   room   for   errors   in   research,   an   unrealistic   position   considering   that   there   is   hardly   any   substantial   written   work   in   any   field   of   discipline  that  is  free  of  any  mistake.    The  theory  places   an   automatic   universal   curse   even   on   errors   that,   as   in   this  case,  have  reasonable  and  logical  explanations.       Indeed,   the   8th   edition   of   Black’s   Law   Dictionary   defines   plagiarism   as   the   “deliberate   and   knowing   presentation   of  another  person's  original  ideas  or  creative  expressions   as  one's  own.”  Thus,  plagiarism  presupposes  intent  and   a   deliberate,   conscious   effort   to   steal   another’s   work   and  pass  it  off  as  one’s  own.         Besides,  the  Court  said  nothing  in  U.P.  Board  of  Regents   that   would   indicate   that   an   intent   to   pass   off   another’s   work   as   one’s   own   is   not   required   in   plagiarism.     The   Court   merely   affirmed   the   academic   freedom   of   a   university  to  withdraw  a  master’s  degree  that  a  student   obtained   based   on   evidence   that   she   misappropriated   the  work  of  others,  passing  them  off  as  her  own.    This  is   not   the   case   here   since,   as   already   stated,   Justice   Del   Castillo   actually   imputed   the   borrowed   passages   to   others.    

IN   THE   MATTER   OF   THE   CHARGES   OF   PLAGIARISM,   ETC.   AGAINST   ASSOCIATE   JUSTICE   MARIANO   C.   DEL   CASTILLO   (2011)   Court  decision:   Mainly,   petitioners   claim   that   the   Court   has   by   its   decision   legalized   or   approved   of   the   commission   of   plagiarism   in   the   Philippines.     This   claim   is   absurd.     The   Court,   like   everyone   else,   condemns   plagiarism   as   the   world  in  general  understands  and  uses  the  term.         Plagiarism,  a  term  not  defined  by  statute,  has  a  popular   or  common  definition.    To  plagiarize,  says  Webster,  is  “to   steal   and   pass   off   as   one’s   own”   the   ideas   or   words   of   another.     Stealing   implies   malicious   taking.     Black’s   Law   Dictionary,   the   world’s   leading   English   law   dictionary   quoted  by  the  Court  in  its  decision,  defines  plagiarism  as   the   “deliberate   and   knowing   presentation   of   another   person's   original   ideas   or   creative   expressions   as   one’s   own.”   The   presentation   of   another   person’s   ideas   as   one’s  own  must  be  deliberate  or  premeditated—a  taking   with  ill  intent.       There   is   no   commonly-­‐used   dictionary   in   the   world   that   embraces   in   the   meaning   of   plagiarism   errors   in   attribution  by  mere  accident  or  in  good  faith.         Certain   educational   institutions   of   course   assume   different   norms   in   its   application.     For   instance,   the  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   Loyola   Schools   Code   of   Academic   Integrity   ordains   that   “plagiarism   is   identified   not   through   intent   but   through   the   act   itself.     The   objective   act   of   falsely   attributing   to   one’s   self   what   is   not   one’s   work,   whether   intentional   or   out   of   neglect,   is   sufficient   to   conclude   that   plagiarism   has   occurred.     Students   who   plead   ignorance   or   appeal   to  lack  of  malice  are  not  excused.”       But   the   Court’s   decision   in   the   present   case   does   not   set   aside  such  norm.    The  decision  makes  this  clear,  thus:       To   paraphrase   Bast   and   Samuels,   while   the   academic   publishing   model   is   based   on   the   originality   of   the   writer’s   thesis,   the   judicial   system  is  based  on  the  doctrine  of  stare  decisis,   which   encourages   courts   to   cite   historical   legal   data,   precedents,   and   related   studies   in   their   decisions.     The   judge   is   not   expected   to   produce   original   scholarship   in   every   respect.     The  strength  of  a  decision  lies  in  the  soundness   and  general  acceptance  of  the  precedents  and   long  held  legal  opinions  it  draws  from.     Original  scholarship  is  highly  valued  in  the  academe  and   rightly  so.    A  college  thesis,  for  instance,  should  contain   dissertations   embodying   results   of   original   research,   substantiating  a  specific  view.  This  must  be  so  since  the   writing   is   intended   to   earn   for   the   student   an   academic   degree,   honor,   or   distinction.     He   earns   no   credit   nor   deserves   it   who   takes   the   research   of   others,   copies   their   dissertations,   and   proclaims   these   as   his   own.     There   should   be   no   question   that   a   cheat   deserves   neither  reward  nor  sympathy.       But   the   policy   adopted   by   schools   of   disregarding   the   element   of   malicious   intent   found   in   dictionaries   is   evidently   more   in   the   nature   of   establishing   what   evidence   is   sufficient   to   prove   the   commission   of   such   dishonest   conduct   than   in   rewriting   the   meaning   of   plagiarism.        Since  it  would  be  easy  enough  for  a  student   to   plead   ignorance   or   lack   of   malice   even   as   he   has   copied   the   work   of   others,   certain   schools   have   adopted   the  policy  of  treating  the  mere  presence  of  such  copied   work   in   his   paper   sufficient   objective   evidence   of   plagiarism.    Surely,  however,  if  on  its  face  the  student’s   work   shows   as   a   whole   that   he   has   but   committed   an   obvious  mistake  or  a  clerical  error  in  one  of  hundreds  of   citations   in   his   thesis,   the   school   will   not   be   so   unreasonable  as  to  cancel  his  diploma.       In   contrast,   decisions   of   courts   are   not   written   to   earn   merit,   accolade,   or   prize   as   an   original   piece   of   work   or   art.     Deciding   disputes   is   a   service   rendered   by   the   government  for  the  public  good.    Judges  issue  decisions   to   resolve   everyday   conflicts   involving   people   of   flesh   and   blood   who  ache  for  speedy  justice  or  juridical  beings   which  have  rights  and  obligations  in  law  that  need  to  be   protected.    The  interest  of  society  in  written  decisions  is  

not  that  they  are  originally  crafted  but  that  they  are  fair   and   correct   in   the   context   of   the   particular   disputes   involved.      Justice,  not  originality,  form,  and  style,  is  the   object  of  every  decision  of  a  court  of  law.         There  is  a  basic  reason  for  individual  judges  of  whatever   level  of  courts,  including  the  Supreme  Court,  not  to  use   original   or   unique   language   when   reinstating   the   laws   involved  in  the  cases  they  decide.    Their  duty  is  to  apply   the  laws  as  these  are  written.    But  laws  include,  under  the   doctrine   of   stare   decisis,   judicial   interpretations   of   such   laws   as   are   applied   to   specific   situations.     Under   this   doctrine,   Courts   are   “to   stand   by   precedent   and   not   to   disturb  settled  point.”  Once  the  Court  has  “laid  down  a   principle  of  law  as  applicable  to  a  certain  state  of  facts,  it   will   adhere   to   that   principle,   and   apply   it   to   all   future   cases,   where   facts   are   substantially   the   same;   regardless   of  whether  the  parties  or  property  are  the  same.”       And   because   judicial   precedents   are   not   always   clearly   delineated,   they   are   quite   often   entangled   in   apparent   inconsistencies   or   even   in   contradictions,   prompting   experts   in   the   law   to   build   up   regarding   such   matters   a   large   body   of   commentaries   or   annotations   that,   in   themselves,   often   become   part   of   legal   writings   upon   which   lawyers   and   judges   draw   materials   for   their   theories  or  solutions  in  particular  cases.    And,  because  of   the   need   to   be   precise   and   correct,   judges   and   practitioners   alike,   by   practice   and   tradition,   usually   lift   passages   from   such   precedents   and   writings,   at   times   omitting,   without   malicious   intent,   attributions   to   the   originators.     Is   this   dishonest?     No.     Duncan   Webb,   writing   for   the   International   Bar   Association   puts   it   succinctly.     When   practicing  lawyers  (which  include  judges)  write  about  the   law,  they  effectively  place  their  ideas,  their  language,  and   their   work   in   the   public   domain,   to   be   affirmed,   adopted,   criticized,   or   rejected.     Being   in   the   public   domain,   other   lawyers   can   thus   freely   use   these   without   fear   of   committing  some  wrong  or  incurring  some  liability.    Thus:       The   tendency   to   copy   in   law   is   readily   explicable.     In   law   accuracy   of   words   is   everything.    Legal  disputes  often  centre  round   the   way   in   which   obligations   have   been   expressed   in   legal   documents   and   how   the   facts   of   the   real   world   fit   the   meaning   of   the   words   in   which   the   obligation   is   contained.     This,   in   conjunction   with   the   risk-­‐aversion   of   lawyers  means  that  refuge  will  often  be  sought   in  articulations  that  have  been  tried  and  tested.     In  a  sense  therefore  the  community  of  lawyers   have   together   contributed   to   this   body   of   knowledge,   language,   and   expression   which   is   common   property   and   may   be   utilized,   developed  and  bettered  by  anyone.      

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Intellectual Property Law The   implicit   right   of   judges   to   use   legal   materials   regarded  as  belonging  to  the  public  domain  is  not  unique   to   the   Philippines.     As   Joyce   C.   George,   whom   Justice   Maria   Lourdes   Sereno   cites   in   her   dissenting   opinion,   observed  in  her  Judicial  Opinion  Writing  Handbook:       A   judge   writing   to   resolve   a   dispute,   whether   trial  or  appellate,  is  exempted  from  a  charge  of   plagiarism  even  if  ideas,  words  or  phrases  from   a   law   review   article,   novel   thoughts   published   in  a  legal  periodical  or  language  from  a  party’s   brief  are  used  without  giving  attribution.    Thus   judges   are   free   to   use   whatever   sources   they   deem   appropriate   to   resolve   the   matter   before   them,  without  fear  of  reprisal.    This  exemption   applies   to   judicial   writings   intended   to   decide   cases  for  two  reasons:  the  judge  is  not  writing   a   literary   work   and,   more   importantly,   the   purpose   of   the   writing   is   to   resolve   a   dispute.     As   a   result,   judges   adjudicating   cases   are   not   subject  to  a  claim  of  legal  plagiarism.       If   the   Court   were   to   inquire   into   the   issue   of   plagiarism   respecting   its   past   decisions   from   the   time   of   Chief   Justice  Cayetano  S.  Arellano  to  the  present,  it  is  likely  to   discover   that   it   has   not   on   occasion   acknowledged   the   originators  of  passages  and  views  found  in  its  decisions.     These  omissions  are  true  for  many  of  the  decisions  that   have   been   penned   and   are   being   penned   daily   by   magistrates   from   the   Court   of   Appeals,   the   Sandiganbayan,   the   Court   of   Tax   Appeals,   the   Regional   Trial   Courts   nationwide   and   with   them,   the   municipal   trial   courts   and   other   first   level   courts.     Never   in   the   judiciary’s  more  than  100  years  of  history  has  the  lack  of   attribution  been  regarded  and  demeaned  as  plagiarism.         This  is  not  to  say  that  the  magistrates  of  our  courts  are   mere   copycats.     They   are   not.     Their   decisions   analyze   the  often  conflicting  facts  of  each  case  and  sort  out  the   relevant  from  the  irrelevant.    They  identify  and  formulate   the  issue  or  issues  that  need  to  be  resolved  and  evaluate   each   of   the   laws,   rulings,   principles,   or   authorities   that   the  parties  to  the  case  invoke.    The  decisions  then  draw   their  apt  conclusions  regarding  whether  or  not  such  laws,   rulings,   principles,   or   authorities   apply   to   the   particular   cases  before  the  Court.    These  efforts,  reduced  in  writing,   are   the   product   of   the   judges’   creativity.     It   is   here— actually   the   substance   of   their   decisions—that   their   genius,   originality,   and   honest   labor   can   be   found,   of   which  they  should  be  proud.       In  Vinuya,  Justice  Del  Castillo  examined  and  summarized   the  facts  as  seen  by  the  opposing  sides  in  a  way  that  no   one   has   ever   done.     He   identified   and   formulated   the   core  of  the  issues  that  the  parties  raised.    And  when  he   had   done   this,   he   discussed   the   state   of   the   law   relevant   to   their   resolution.     It   was   here   that   he   drew   materials   from  various  sources,  including  the  three  foreign  authors  

cited   in   the   charges   against   him.     He   compared   the   divergent   views   these   present   as   they   developed   in   history.     He   then   explained   why   the   Court   must   reject   some  views  in  light  of  the  peculiar  facts  of  the  case  and   applied  those  that  suit  such  facts.  Finally,  he  drew  from   his  discussions  of  the  facts  and  the  law  the  right  solution   to  the  dispute  in  the  case.    On  the  whole,  his  work  was   original.    He  had  but  done  an  honest  work.             The  Court  will  not,  therefore,  consistent  with  established   practice   in   the   Philippines   and   elsewhere,   dare   permit   the   filing   of   actions   to   annul   the   decisions   promulgated   by  its  judges  or  expose  them  to  charges  of  plagiarism  for   honest  work  done.       This   rule   should   apply   to   practicing   lawyers   as   well.     Counsels   for   the   petitioners,   like   all   lawyers   handling   cases  before  courts  and  administrative  tribunals,  cannot   object   to   this.     Although   as   a   rule   they   receive   compensation   for   every   pleading   or   paper   they   file   in   court  or  for  every  opinion  they  render  to  clients,  lawyers   also  need  to  strive  for  technical  accuracy  in  their  writings.     They   should   not   be   exposed   to   charges   of   plagiarism   in   what   they   write   so   long   as   they   do   not   depart,   as   officers   of   the   court,   from   the   objective   of   assisting   the   Court   in   the  administration  of  justice.       As  Duncan  Webb  said:       In  presenting  legal  argument  most  lawyers  will   have   recourse   to   either   previous   decisions   of   the  courts,  frequently  lifting  whole  sections  of   a   judge’s   words   to   lend   weight   to   a   particular   point   either   with   or   without   attribution.     The   words   of   scholars   are   also   sometimes   given   weight,   depending   on   reputation.     Some   encyclopaedic   works   are   given   particular   authority.     In   England   this   place   is   given   to   Halsbury’s   Laws   of   England   which   is   widely   considered  authoritative.    A  lawyer  can  do  little   better   than   to   frame   an   argument   or   claim   to   fit  with  the  articulation  of  the  law  in  Halsbury’s.     While   in   many   cases   the   very   purpose   of   the   citation  is  to  claim  the  authority  of  the  author,   this   is   not   always   the   case.     Frequently   commentary  or  dicta  of  lesser  standing  will  be   adopted   by   legal   authors,   largely   without   attribution.       x  x  x  x       The  converse  point  is  that  originality  in  the  law   is   viewed   with   skepticism.     It   is   only   the   arrogant  fool  or  the  truly  gifted  who  will  depart   entirely   from   the   established   template   and   reformulate  an  existing  idea  in  the  belief  that  in   doing  so  they  will  improve  it.    While  over  time   incremental   changes   occur,   the   wholesale  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   abandonment   of   established   expression   is   generally  considered  foolhardy.  

8.

Transfer  of  Copyright  

 

    The   Court   probably   should   not   have   entertained   at   all   the   charges   of   plagiarism   against   Justice   Del   Castillo,   coming   from   the   losing   party.     But   it   is   a   case   of   first   impression   and   petitioners,   joined   by   some   faculty   members   of   the   University   of   the   Philippines   school   of   law,   have   unfairly   maligned   him   with   the   charges   of   plagiarism,  twisting  of  cited  materials,  and  gross  neglect   for  failing  to  attribute  lifted  passages  from  three  foreign   authors.     These   charges   as   already   stated   are   false,   applying   the   meaning   of   plagiarism   as   the   world   in   general  knows  it.         True,  Justice  Del  Castillo  failed  to  attribute  to  the  foreign   authors   materials   that   he   lifted   from   their   works   and   used   in   writing   the   decision   for   the   Court   in   the   Vinuya   case.    But,  as  the  Court  said,  the  evidence  as  found  by  its   Ethics   Committee   shows   that   the   attribution   to   these   authors  appeared  in  the  beginning  drafts  of  the  decision.     Unfortunately,   as   testified   to   by   a   highly   qualified   and   experienced  court-­‐employed  researcher,  she  accidentally   deleted   the   same   at   the   time   she   was   cleaning   up   the   final   draft.     The   Court   believed   her   since,   among   other   reasons,  she  had  no  motive  for  omitting  the  attribution.     The  foreign  authors  concerned,  like  the  dozens  of  other   sources  she  cited  in  her  research,  had  high  reputations  in   international  law.       Notably,   those   foreign   authors   expressly   attributed   the   controversial   passages   found   in   their   works   to   earlier   writings   by   others.     The   authors   concerned   were   not   themselves   the   originators.     As   it   happened,   although   the   ponencia   of   Justice   Del   Castillo   accidentally   deleted   the   attribution   to   them,   there   remained   in   the   final   draft   of  the  decision  attributions  of  the  same  passages  to  the   earlier   writings   from   which   those   authors   borrowed   their  ideas  in  the  first  place.    In  short,  with  the  remaining   attributions   after   the   erroneous   clean-­‐up,   the   passages   as  it  finally  appeared  in  the  Vinuya  decision  still  showed   on   their   face   that   the   lifted   ideas   did   not   belong   to   Justice  Del  Castillo  but  to  others.    He  did  not  pass  them   off  as  his  own.           With   our   ruling,   the   Court   need   not   dwell   long   on   petitioners’   allegations   that   Justice   Del   Castillo   had   also   committed   plagiarism   in   writing   for   the   Court   his   decision   in   another   case,   Ang   Ladlad   v.   Commission   on   Elections.   Petitioners   are   nit-­‐picking.     Upon   close   examination   and   as   Justice   Del   Castillo   amply   demonstrated   in   his   comment   to   the   motion   for   reconsideration,  he  in  fact  made  attributions  to  passages   in   such   decision   that   he   borrowed   from   his   sources   although  they  at  times  suffered  in  formatting  lapses.    

SECTION  180.  RIGHTS  OF  ASSIGNEE.  –     180.1.  The  copyright  may  be  assigned  in  whole  or  in  part.   Within   the   scope   of   the   assignment,   the   assignee   is   entitled  to  all  the  rights  and  remedies  which  the  assignor   had  with  respect  to  the  copyright.     180.2.   The   copyright   is   not   deemed   assigned   inter   vivos   in  whole  or  in  part  unless  there  is  a  written  indication  of   such  intention.     180.3.   The   submission   of   a   literary,   photographic   or   artistic  work  to  a  newspaper,  magazine  or  periodical  for   publication   shall   constitute   only   a   license   to   make   a   single   publication   unless   a   greater   right   is   expressly   granted.   If   two   (2)   or   more   persons   jointly   own   a   copyright  or  any  part  thereof,  neither  of  the  owners  shall   be   entitled   to   grant   licenses   without   the   prior   written   consent  of  the  other  owner  or  owners.    

SECTION  181.  COPYRIGHT  AND  MATERIAL  OBJECT.  –     The   copyright   is   distinct   from   the   property   in   the   material   object   subject   to   it.   Consequently,   the   transfer   or  assignment  of  the  copyright  shall  not  itself  constitute   a   transfer   of   the   material   object.   Nor   shall   a   transfer   or   assignment  of  the  sole  copy  or  of  one  or  several  copies   of   the   work   imply   transfer   or   assignment   of   the   copyright.      

SECTION  182.  FILING  OF  ASSIGNMENT  OR  LICENSE.  –     An   assignment   or   exclusive   license   may   be   filed   in   duplicate  with  the  National  Library  upon  payment  of  the   prescribed   fee   for   registration   in   books   and   records   kept   for   the   purpose.   Upon   recording,   a   copy   of   the   instrument   shall   be   returned   to   the   sender   with   a   notation  of  the  fact  of  record.  Notice  of  the  record  shall   be  published  in  the  IPO  Gazette.      

SECTION  183.  DESIGNATION  OF  SOCIETY.  –     The   copyright   owners   or   their   heirs   may   designate   a   society   of   artists,   writers   or   composers   to   enforce   their   economic  rights  and  moral  rights  on  their  behalf.      

SECTION  4.2.     The   term   "TECHNOLOGY   TRANSFER   ARRANGEMENTS"   refers   to   contracts   or   agreements   involving   the   transfer   of   systematic   knowledge   for   the   manufacture   of   a   product,   the   application   of   a   process,   or   rendering   of   a   service   including   management   contracts;   and   the   transfer,   assignment   or   licensing   of   all   forms   of   intellectual   property   rights,   including   licensing   of   computer   software   except   computer   software   developed   for   mass   market.    

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Intellectual Property Law conditions   or   to   initiate   research   and   development   programs  in  connection  with  new  products,  processes  or   equipment;     87.13.   Those   which   prevent   the   licensee   from   adapting   the   imported   technology   to   local   conditions,   or   introducing   innovation   to   it,   as   long   as   it   does   not   impair   the  quality  standards  prescribed  by  the  licensor;     87.14.   Those  which  exempt  the  licensor  for  liability  for   non-­‐fulfilment   of   his   responsibilities   under   the   technology   transfer   arrangement   and/or   liability   arising   from   third   party   suits   brought   about   by   the   use   of   the   licensed  product  or  the  licensed  technology;  and     87.15.   Other  clauses  with  equivalent  effects.      

SECTION  87.  PROHIBITED  CLAUSES.  –     Except   in   cases   under   Section   91,   the   following   provisions   shall   be   deemed   prima   facie   to   have   an   adverse  effect  on  competition  and  trade:     87.1.   Those   which   impose   upon   the   licensee   the   obligation  to  acquire  from  a  specific  source  capital  goods,   intermediate   products,   raw   materials,   and   other   technologies,   or   of   permanently   employing   personnel   indicated  by  the  licensor;     87.2.   Those   pursuant   to   which   the   licensor   reserves   the   right   to   fix   the   sale   or   resale   prices   of   the   products   manufactured  on  the  basis  of  the  license;     87.3.   Those   that   contain   restrictions   regarding   the   volume  and  structure  of  production;     87.4.   Those   that   prohibit   the   use   of   competitive   technologies   in   a   non-­‐exclusive   technology   transfer   agreement;     87.5.   Those   that   establish   a   full   or   partial   purchase   option  in  favor  of  the  licensor;     87.6.  Those  that  obligate  the  licensee  to  transfer  for  free   to   the   licensor   the   inventions   or   improvements   that   may   be  obtained  through  the  use  of  the  licensed  technology;     87.7.   Those   that   require   payment   of   royalties   to   the   owners  of  patents  for  patents  which  are  not  used;     87.8.   Those   that   prohibit   the   licensee   to   export   the   licensed  product  unless  justified  for  the  protection  of  the   legitimate   interest   of   the   licensor   such   as   exports   to   countries   where   exclusive   licenses   to   manufacture   and/or   distribute   the   licensed   product(s)   have   already   been  granted;     87.9.   Those   which   restrict   the   use   of   the   technology   supplied   after   the   expiration   of   the   technology   transfer   arrangement,  except  in  cases  of  early  termination  of  the   technology   transfer   arrangement   due   to   reason(s)   attributable  to  the  licensee;     87.10.   Those  which  require  payments  for  patents  and   other   industrial   property   rights   after   their   expiration,   termination  arrangement;     87.11.   Those   which   require   that   the   technology   recipient   shall   not   contest   the   validity   of   any   of   the   patents  of  the  technology  supplier;     87.12.   Those   which   restrict   the   research   and   development   activities   of   the   licensee   designed   to   absorb   and   adapt   the   transferred   technology   to   local  

SECTION  88.  MANDATORY  PROVISIONS.  –     The   following   provisions   shall   be   included   in   voluntary   license  contracts:     88.1.   That   the   laws   of   the   Philippines   shall   govern   the   interpretation  of  the  same  and  in  the  event  of  litigation,   the   venue   shall   be   the   proper   court   in   the   place   where   the  licensee  has  its  principal  office;     88.2.   Continued   access   to   improvements   in   techniques   and   processes   related   to   the   technology   shall   be   made   available   during   the   period   of   the   technology   transfer   arrangement;     88.3.   In   the   event   the   technology   transfer   arrangement   shall  provide  for  arbitration,  the  Procedure  of  Arbitration   of   the   Arbitration   Law   of   the   Philippines   or   the   Arbitration   Rules   of   the   United   Nations   Commission   on   International   Trade   Law   (UNCITRAL)   or   the   Rules   of   Conciliation   and   Arbitration   of   the   International   Chamber  of  Commerce  (ICC)  shall  apply  and  the  venue  of   arbitration   shall   be   the   Philippines   or   any   neutral   country;  and     88.4.  The  Philippine  taxes  on  all  payments  relating  to  the   technology   transfer   arrangement   shall   be   borne   by   the   licensor.      

SECTION   92.   NON-­‐REGISTRATION   WITH   THE   DOCUMENTATION,   INFORMATION   AND   TECHNOLOGY   TRANSFER  BUREAU .  –     Technology   transfer   arrangements   that   conform   with   the   provisions   of   Sections   86   and   87   need   not   be   registered   with   the   Documentation,   Information   and   Technology  Transfer  Bureau.  Non-­‐conformance  with  any   of   the   provisions   of   Sections   87   and   88,   however,   shall   automatically   render   the   technology   transfer   arrangement   unenforceable,   unless   said   technology   transfer   arrangement   is   approved   and   registered   with  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   the   Documentation,   Information   and   Technology   Transfer   Bureau   under   the   provisions   of   Section   91   on   exceptional  cases.    

SECTION  228.  PUBLIC  RECORDS.  –     The   section   or   division   of   the   National   Library   and   the   Supreme   Court   Library   charged   with   receiving   copies   and   instruments   deposited   and   with   keeping   records   required   under   this   Act   and   everything   in   it   shall   be   opened  to  public  inspection.  The  Director  of  the  National   Library   is   empowered   to   issue   such   safeguards   and   regulations   as   may   be   necessary   to   implement   this   Section  and  other  provisions  of  this  Act.    

SECTION  237.  NOTIFICATION  ON  BERNE  APPENDIX.  –     The   Philippines   shall   by   proper   compliance   with   the   requirements  set  forth  under  the  Appendix  of  the  Berne   Convention   (Paris   Act,   1971)   avail   itself   of   the   special   provisions   regarding   developing   countries,   including   provisions   for   licenses   grantable   by   competent   authority   under  the  Appendix.    

9.

SECTION  229.  COPYRIGHT  DIVISION;  FEES.  –     The   Copyright   Section   of   the   National   Library   shall   be   classified   as   a   Division   upon   the   effectivity   of   this   Act.   The  National  Library  shall  have  the  power  to  collect,  for   the  discharge  of  its  services  under  this  Act,  such  fees  as   may   be   promulgated   by   it   from   time   to   time   subject   to   the  approval  of  the  Department  Head.      

Deposit   of   Copyrightable   Materials  

 

SECTION   191.   REGISTRATION  AND   DEPOSIT  WITH   NATIONAL   LIBRARY  AND  THE  SUPREME  COURT  LIBRARY.  –     After   the   first   public   dissemination   of   performance   by   authority  of  the  copyright  owner  of  a  work  falling  under   Subsections  172.1,  172.2  and  172.3  of  this  Act,  there  shall,   for   the   purpose   of   completing   the   records   of   the   National   Library   and   the   Supreme   Court   Library,   within   three  (3)  weeks,  be  registered  and  deposited  with  it,  by   personal  delivery  or  by  registered  mail  two  (2)  complete   copies  or  reproductions  of  the  work  in  such  form  as  the   directors   of   said   libraries   may   prescribe.   A   certificate   of   deposit   shall   be   issued   for   which   the   prescribed   fee   shall   be   collected   and   the   copyright   owner   shall   be   exempt   from   making   additional   deposit   of   the   works   with   the   National   Library   and   the   Supreme   Court   Library   under   other  laws.  If,  within  three  (3)  weeks  after  receipt  by  the   copyright   owner   of   a   written   demand   from   the   directors   for   such   deposit,   the   required   copies   or   reproductions   are   not   delivered   and   the   fee   is   not   paid,   the   copyright   owner   shall   be   liable   to   pay   a   fine   equivalent   to   the   required   fee   per   month   of   delay   and   to   pay   to   the   National   Library   and   the   Supreme   Court   Library   the   amount  of  the  retail  price  of  the  best  edition  of  the  work.   Only   the   above   mentioned   classes   of   work   shall   be   accepted   for   deposit   by   the   National   Library   and   the   Supreme  Court  Library.    

RULE   5   -­‐   REGISTRATION   AND   DEPOSIT   OF   WORK,   COPYRIGHT  SAFEGUARDS  AND  REGULATIONS   SECTION  1.  WHO  MAY  APPLY.  —     The   owner   or   assignee   of   the   copyright   or   his   duly   authorized   agent   or   representative,   may   apply   for   a   certificate   of   registration   and   deposit   of   the   work:   Provided,  That  if  an  author  could  not  claim  the  benefit  of   copyright  protection,  his  assignee  or  agent  cannot  claim   it.   If   the   applicant   is   not   the   owner   or   author   or   assignee   of  the  work,  he  shall  be  required  to  submit  his  authority   to  apply.     An   assignee   is   a   person   to   whom   an   author   may   assign   copyright  in  whole  or  in  part.  The  assignee  is  entitled  to   all   the   rights   and   remedies   which   the   assignor   has   with   respect  to  the  copyright.     Although  no  copyright  should  subsist  in  any  work  of  the   government,   any   employee   may   claim   it   by   submitting   for   registration   any   work   that   has   been   created   during   the  time  of  his  regularly  prescribed  official  duties.     SECTION  2.  IDENTIFICATION  OF  AUTHOR  OR  AUTHORS.  —     An  application  for  copyright  certificate  shall  identify  the   author   or   authors,   as   far   as   practicable,   without   prejudice   to   the   provisions   of   Sections   171.2   and   179   of   the  IPC.     SECTION  3.  NON-­‐RESIDENT  APPLICANT.  —     A   non-­‐resident   applicant   shall   appoint   a   resident   agent,   by   special   power   of   attorney   (SPA),   who   shall   be   authorized   to   pursue   the   copyright   application   for   his/her/its  behalf  with  TNL  and/or  the  SCL  and  to  receive   service   of   notice   or   other   legal   process   relating   to   the   application   and   the   copyright.   In   the   event   of   death,   absence   or   incapacity   of   the   resident   agent,   the   applicant   shall   appoint   a   new   resident   agent,   by   SPA  

SECTION  192.  NOTICE  OF  COPYRIGHT.  –     Each   copy   of   a   work   published   or   offered   for   sale   may   contain   a   notice   bearing   the   name   of   the   copyright   owner,  and  the  year  of  its  first  publication,  and,  in  copies   produced   after   the   creator's   death,   the   year   of   such   death.    

SECTION   227.   OWNERSHIP  OF   DEPOSIT  AND   INSTRUMENTS.   –     All  copies  deposited  and  instruments  in  writing  filed  with   the   National   Library   and   the   Supreme   Court   Library   in   accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Act  shall  become   the  property  of  the  Government.      

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Intellectual Property Law with   revocation   of   the   prior   SPA,   and   file   notice   and   a   copy  thereof  with  TNL  and/or  the  SCL.     SECTION  4.  WORKS  THAT  SHALL  BE  REGISTERED  AND  DEPOSITED.   —     Two  (2)  copies  or  reproductions  of  the  following  classes   of  works,  and  transfers  and  assignments  related  thereto,   shall   be   registered   and   deposited   with   TNL   Copyright   Division  and  another  two  (2)  copies  with  the  SCL:     • Books,  pamphlets,  articles  and  other  writings;   • Periodicals  and  newspapers;   • Lectures,   sermons,   addresses,   dissertations   prepared   for   oral   delivery   whether   or   not   reduced  in  writing  or  other  material  form;   • Letters;   • Musical  compositions  with  or  without  words.     SECTION  5.  REPLICAS  AND  PICTURES.  —     For   practical   purposes,   only   replicas   and   pictures   of   the   following   classes   of   works,   shall   be   registered   and   deposited  with  TNL  Copyright  Division:     • Works   of   drawing,   painting,   architecture,   sculpture,   engraving,   lithography   or   other   works   of   art,   models   or   designs   for   works   of   art;   • Original   ornamental   designs   or   models   for   articles   of   manufacture,   whether   or   not   registerable   as   an   industrial   design,   and   other   works  of  applied  art;   • Illustrations,   maps,   plans,   sketches,   charts   and   three-­‐dimensional  works  relative  to  geography,   topography,  architecture  or  science;   • Drawings   or   plastic   works   of   a   scientific   or   technical  character.       SECTION   6.   WORKS   THAT   MAY   BE   REGISTERED   AND   DEPOSITED.   —     The  following  works  may  be  registered  and  deposited:   • Dramatic   or   dramatic-­‐musical   compositions,   choreographic   works   or   entertainment   in   shows;   • Photographic   works   including   works   produced   by   a   process   analogous   to   photography,   lantern  slides;   • Audiovisual   works   and   cinematographic   works   and   works   produced   by   a   process   analogous   to   cinematography   or   any   process   for   making   audio-­‐visual  recordings;   • Pictorial  illustrations  and  advertisements;   • Computer  programs;   • Other   literary,   scholarly,   scientific   and   artistic   works;   • Sound  recordings;   • Broadcast  recordings.      

SECTION  7.  When  to  Register  and  Deposit.  —     The   registration   and   deposit   of   copies   or   reproductions   of  the  work  or  works,  using  the  prescribed  form,  shall  be   made   personally   or   by   registered   mail   within   three   (3)   weeks  after  the  first  public  dissemination  or  publication   as  authorized  by  the  author.     08  and  15  December  2011   COPYRIGHT   What  is  copyright?   -­‐ It   is   a   bundle   of   rights   enumerated   in   Section   177.     Why  is  copyright  called  an  “economic  right”?     -­‐ Because   the   purpose   of   the   establishment   of   the  right  is  to  allow  the  author  or  originator  of   the   work   to   maximize   the   value   that   can   be   derived  from  the  work.     -­‐ How   does   it   allow   the   copyright   owner   to   maximize  the  value  of  the  work?   o By   allowing   him   to   assign   his   rights,   grant  licenses  for  the  use  of  the  work,   etc.,   thus   allowing   him   to   get   royalties  from  the  work.     Beauty   of   copyright:   Duration.   It   protects   the   owner   during  his  lifetime  +  50  years  after  death.     Standard  of  copyright  protection:  Originality.   -­‐ “Original”   means   it   is   the   product   of   one’s   skill,   labor/employment   -­‐ Work   does   not   need   to   be   groundbreaking   or   revolutionary.   -­‐ What   it   merely   requires   is   that   the   work   is   your   own.  This  is  an  incredibly  low  standard!     Why  is  the  standard  so  low?     -­‐ To   remain   very   objective.   Having   subjective   standards   will   erode   the   IP   system   =   if   every   new   work   that   challenges   the   status   quo   will   not   be   protected,   no   one   might   challenge   the   status  quo.   -­‐ Thus,   IP   should   not   look   into   the   substance   of   the  work.  (See  Section  172.2)   -­‐ Consequence  of  the  low  standard:  It  is  hard  to   prove   infringement.   To   prove   infringement,   you  have  to  prove  ACCESS  and  COPYING.     3  things  covered  by  IP:   1. Traditional  works  –  literary  and  artistic  works   2. Derivative  works  –  translation   3. Published  works     Issue:   Can   a   work   that   was   transformed   without   the   consent  of  the  original  creator  be  considered  as  original   and  be  protected?   -­‐ It   can   be   understood   that   the   derivative   work   should  be  AUTHORIZED.  (See  173.2)  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   -­‐

BUT:  Ideas  are  too  important  to  be  kept  in  the   private  domain.  If  done,  you  are  increasing  the   cost   for   the   creation   of   the   work.   Thus,   the   la   protects   NOT   the   underlying   idea   by   the   EXPRESSION   of   the   idea.   Ideas   are   basic   building   blocks.   If   you   allow   the   monopoly   of   idea  through  copyright,  you  would  increase  the   cost   for   further   work   and   this   may   lead   to   stagnation.   Remember,   the   primary   purpose   of   IP   is   really   the   advancement   of   art   and   literature,   and   this   won’t   be   achieved   if   you   monopolized   the   fundamental   building   blocks   of  these,  i.e.  the  ideas.   o Reconcile   this   with   Section   173.1(b)   à   data   is   NOT   protected,   but   the   COMPILATIONS   of   data   are   protected?   o Note  that  in  Feist  (which  is  a  US  case,   thus   merely   persuasive),   the   standard   of   protection   for   compilation   à   modicum  of  creativity.  It  required  the   compilation   to   be   original   by   reason   of   their   selection   or   arrangement.   There   must   be   something   unusual   or   exceptional   with   the   collection   of   data.  

-­‐

b.

If   not   registered,   buy   only   the  thing.   Post-­‐PD49   à   Were   all   the   rights   assigned  to  one  person?  

  Ownership  of  copyright  by  the  government:   -­‐ GR:  Government  cannot  acquire  copyright.     -­‐ However,  if  somebody  would  exploit  the  work   for   profit,   there   must   be   prior   approval   from   the   government   agency   or   office   where   the   work  is  created.   -­‐ Exception   to   the   prior   approval   requirement   exception:  176.3     Ma’am  is  a  government  employee.  Are  her  oral  lectures   protected  by  copyright?   -­‐ Yes.  Copyright  protects  the  work  regardless  of   its  form.   -­‐ What  right  does  she  have?   o 176.2.   She   has   the   exclusive   right   to   reproduces,  etc.     Ownership  of  copyright:   -­‐ GR:  Author  of  the  work   -­‐ If  more  than  1  author:     o Apply  their  contract  if  there  is  any.   o If   no   contract:   apply   the   rules   on   co-­‐ ownership     If  the  work  is  made  by  an  employee:   -­‐ Test:   Whether   the   work   is   part   of   the   employee’s  regularly-­‐assigned  duties:   o If   Yes:   the   work   is   owned   by   the   employer.   o If   No:   the   work   is   owned   by   the   employee.   -­‐ Note:  See  178.3     o 178.3(b)   expressly   allows   the   employer   and   the   employee   to   have   an  agreement  to  the  contrary     o 178.3(a)   does   not   have   a   similar   proviso   o the   difference   in   treatment   implies   that   an   agreement   to   make   the   employer   own   the   work   in   instances   where   the   employee   created   something   and   such   is   not   a   part   of   his   regularly   assigned   duties   is   PROHIBITED.     § But   Ma’am   also   said   that   you  can  still  argue  the  other   way.     If  the  work  is  created  by  commission:   -­‐ Work:   owned   by   the   person   who   commissioned  it   -­‐ Copyright:  owned  by  the  creator   o UNLESS   there   is   a   contract   to   the  

  When  does  copyright  vests?   -­‐ Under   the   IP   Code:   from   the   moment   of   creation   (we   follow   the   principle   of   automatic   protection  under  the  Berne  Convention)   -­‐ The   principle   of   automatic   protection   was   followed  since  1972  under  PD49.   o Under   PD   49,   the   copyright   owner   can   still   sue   the   infringer   even   if   the   former  failed  to  deposit  the  material.   The   only   effect   of   failure   to   register   is   that   the   copyright   owner   won’t   be   allowed   to   obtain   damages   from   the   defendant.   -­‐ Prior   to   that:   Under   Act   3134,   registration   and   deposit  were  needed  to  vest  copyright.   o Reglamentary   period   for   registration:   30  days  from  creation.   o Effect  of  failure  to  register  within  that   period:   it   may   be   the   basis   for   questioning  the  copyright   o Santos  v.  McCullough  Printing:  failure   to   deposit   the   copyrighted   material   made   the   material   part   of   the   public   domain.   -­‐ PD   49   was   actually   a   revolutionary   piece   of   legislation!     So,  for  due  diligence  investigation:   1. Ask  when  the  work  was  created.   2. If:   a. Pre-­‐PD49  à  Was  it  registered  or  not?  

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Intellectual Property Law contrary     If  the  work  is  a  letter:   -­‐ Letter:  owned  by  the  recipient   -­‐ Copyright:  owned  by  the  writer     Duration  of  copyright:  lifetime  +  50  years  after  death   -­‐ Copyright  is  best  for  works  with  long  shelf  life.   -­‐ Note   calculation   for   the   period   after   death:   begins   on   January   1   of   the   year   following   the   death     o Why?  For  easier  computation   -­‐ After   the   expiration   of   the   period,   the   work   becomes   part   of   the   public   domain   à   why   classic  works  are  significantly  cheaper!     05  January  2012   Limitations   on   copyright   (exception   to   the   exclusive   right  given  to  holder):   1. Section   184   (limitations   of   copyright),   176   (works  of  the  government)   2. Exceptions  for  certain  works:  library   3. Fair  use     Q:   Showing   of   Harry   Potter,   done   by   the   Religious   Society   of   Mary,   for   P50.   Is   the   Religious   Society   of   Mary   liable?   -­‐ No!  184.1(a)  embodies  2  exceptions:   1. Privately  and  free  of  charge;  OR   2. Charitable   or   religious   institution/society   -­‐ BUT   the   showing   must   be   done   AFTER   the   first   publication  of  the  work.   -­‐ Follow-­‐up   question:   What   if   they   show   the   movie   all   over   the   Philippines,   are   they   now   liable?   o Yes!   See   184.2.   The   act   must   not   unreasonably   prejudice   the   right   holder’s  legitimate  interests.   o ALWAYS   READ   184.1   IN   CONJUNCTION  WITH  184.2     184.1  (b)  –  drawing  from  work  of  others   -­‐ Conditions:   o Work  has  been  published   o Compatible  with  fair  use   o Only   to   the   extent   justified   for   the   purpose   o Attribution!     184.1(c)  –  exception  for  mass  media   -­‐ Conditions:   o Delivered  in  public   o For  information  purposes   o No  “all  rights  reserved”  in  the  article   o Attribution      

184.1(i)  v.  184.1(a)   184.1(i)   “The   public   performance   or   the   communication   to   the  public  of  a  work,  in  a   place   where   no   admission   fee   is   charged   in   respect   of   such   public   performance   or   communication,  by  a  club   or   institution   for   charitable   or   educational   purpose  only,  whose  aim   is   not   profit   making,   subject   to   such   other   limitations   as   may   be   provided   in   the   Regulations”   BOTH  must  be  present:   1. Educational/   charitable  purpose   2. Free  of  charge  

184.1(a)   “The   recitation   or   performance   of   a   work,   once   it   has   been   lawfully   made   accessible   to   the   public,   if   done   privately   and   free   of   charge   or   if   made   strictly   for   a   charitable   or   religious   institution  or  society”  

Only   EITHER   of   the   2   is   required:   1. Religious/   charitable   institution   2. Free   of   charge   and   private  

  Filipino   Society   of   Composers   v.   Tan:   Standard   used   by   the   court   to   determine   whether   the   performance   was   done   free   or   charge   or   not   à   whether   or   not   it   is   designed   to   induce   more   business.   Plus   costs   already   included  in  other  costs.     Philippine  Educ.  Co.  v.  Sotto:  Erroneous  case!  There  was   no   copyright   on   the   material   but   with   an   “all   rights   reserved”  clause.     -­‐ Ma’am:   If   no   copyright,   what   rights   were   reserved?   “All   rights   reserved”   applicable   only   for  copyrighted  works.     Del  Castillo  cases:   -­‐ 1st  Court:  No  intent  on  the  part  of  Del  Castillo  to   plagiarize.   o Ma’am:   Intent   shouldn't   be   required   in  special  laws!  (malum  prohibitum)   -­‐ 2nd   Court:   Court   made   a   distinction   between   the   standards   of   an   academic   institution   and   the  standards  for  members  of  the  bar.   o Acad:  Higher  standards   o Bar:  Lower  standards  –  stare  decisis   o Ma’am:   184.1(k)   was   extended!   They   rewrote   the   IP   Coe!   Court,   in   effect,   said   lawyers   and   justices   were   exempted   from   the   application   of   the   IP   Code.   They   did   not   even   bother   with  184.2!     Other  exceptions:   1. Work  of  architecture   2. Reproduction  of  published  work  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   Old  law  (PD49)  =  complete  exception   granted  to  natural  person   o Now  =  subject  to  certain  conditions.   o IP  Code  abolished  PD  285   For  libraries   Importation   -­‐ No   express   prohibition   of   parallel   importation  

rights  are  assigned.  

o

3. 4.

 

12  January  2012     Deposit   -­‐ Not  a  requirement  for  the  vesting  of  copyright.   -­‐ Where  made:  TNL  and  SCL   o Note   that   the   IPO   and   the   SCL   now   has  a  Memorandum  of  Agreement.   -­‐ Office   is   exercising   a   purely   ministerial   function.     -­‐ Certificate  of  deposit   o Legally  does  not  mean  anything.   o It   is   merely   a   proof   of   the   fact   of   deposit   o Can   establish   that   as   of   the   date   of   deposit,   work   was   already   created.   Thus,   may   help   establish   that   the   depositor   is   not   an   appropriator   but   the  creator  of  the  work.   o With  respect  to  third  person  who  may   want  to  deal  with  the  depositor:  may   impress   upon   the   third   person   that   the   depositor   is   the   right   person   to   deal  with.   § Philippines   is   a   formalistic   society.   § This  may  reduce  transaction   costs.   § Removes   lingering   doubt   about  copyright.   -­‐ Fine  for  failure  to  deposit  –  kicks  in  only  AFTER   a  demand   -­‐ Why  require  a  deposit?     o Public   interest   =   promote   availability   of   information   to   the   public   by   making   it   available   in   the   National   Library   (so   that   there   is   a   public   repository   of   these   works  of  art)      

  FAIR  USE:   -­‐ Drawn  from  US  jurisprudence   -­‐ Harper  &  Row  case:   o Factors  of  fair  use:   § Purpose   of   use   –   for   commercial   purpose   à   presumption   that   use   is   not   fair   § Nature   of   work   –   unpublished  à  unfair  use   § Amount  and  substantiality  –   measured   by   quality,   not   quantity  (heart  of  work)   § Effect   on   the   market   –   MOST  IMPORTANT  factor   -­‐ Q:  Did  we  completely  adopt  the  US  concept  of   fair  use?   o Not  really.   § 185.2   –   fact   that   work   is   unpublished…   § 185.1   –   did   not   establish   a   hierarchy   among   the   4   factors   § commercial…   -­‐ Sony  Corp.  v.  Universal  Studios:  very  important   case   o The  ruling  in  this  case  is  still  standard.   § Standard:   capable   of   single,   non-­‐infringing   use   =   no   infringement.   § In  this  case,  time  shifting  is  a   substantial,   non-­‐infringing   use.   o No  contributory  infringement.     Transfer  of  copyright:   -­‐ Must  be  written.  Oral  assignment  is  invalid.   -­‐ Purpose  of  the  requirement  =  protect  rights  of   the   creator.   To   ensure   that   the   copyright   owner   knows   exactly   what   he/she   is   giving   away.     Assignment  v.  License   Assignment   License   Transfer   of   ownership   of   Limited.   Only   permission   right  =  ceding  right   to   use.   Right   remains   with  the  copyright  owner   who   may   declare   conditions   with   which  

10. Infringement    

a.

Definition  

  Ballantine’s   Law   Dictionary:   It   is   a   violation   of   a   right;   an   encroachment.    

b.

Remedies  

 

SECTION   221.   POINTS  OF   ATTACHMENT  FOR   WORKS  UNDER   SECTIONS  172  AND  173.  –     221.1.   The   protection   afforded   by   this   Act   to   copyrightable   works   under   Sections   172   and   173   shall   apply  to:  

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Intellectual Property Law   (a)   Works   of   authors   who   are   nationals   of,   or   have   their   habitual   residence   in,   the   Philippines;     (b)   Audio-­‐visual   works   the   producer   of   which   has   his   headquarters   or   habitual   residence   in   the  Philippines;   (c)   Works   of   architecture   erected   in   the   Philippines   or   other   artistic   works   incorporated   in   a   building   or   other   structure   located   in   the   Philippines;     (d)  Works  first  published  in  the  Philippines;  and     (e)   Works   first   published   in   another   country   but   also   published   in   the   Philippines   within   thirty   days,   irrespective   of   the   nationality   or   residence  of  the  authors.  

 

223.2.   Sound   recordings   that   were   first   published  in  the  Philippines.    

SECTION   224.   POINTS   OF   ATTACHMENT   FOR   BROADCASTS.   –     224.1.   The   provisions   of   this   Act   on   the   protection   of   broadcasts  shall  apply  to:     (a)   Broadcasts   of   broadcasting   organizations   the   headquarters   of   which   are   situated   in   the   Philippines;  and     (b)   Broadcasts   transmitted   from   transmitters   situated  in  the  Philippines.     224.2.   The   provisions   of   this   Act   shall   also   apply   to   performers   who,   and   to   producers   of   sound   recordings   and   broadcasting   organizations   which,   are   to   be   protected   by   virtue   of   and   in   accordance   with   any   international   convention   or   other   international   agreement  to  which  the  Philippines  is  a  party.    

  221.2.  The  provisions  of  this  Act  shall  also  apply  to  works   that   are   to   be   protected   by   virtue   of   and   in   accordance   with  any  international  convention  or  other  international   agreement  to  which  the  Philippines  is  a  party.    

SECTION   3.   INTERNATIONAL   RECIPROCITY.  –    

SECTION   222.   POINTS   OF   ATTACHMENT   FOR   PERFORMERS.   –    

CONVENTIONS  

AND  

Any  person  who  is  a  national  or  who  is  domiciled  or  has  a   real   and   effective   industrial   establishment   in   a   country   which  is  a  party  to  any  convention,  treaty  or  agreement   relating   to   intellectual   property   rights   or   the   repression   of   unfair   competition,   to   which   the   Philippines   is   also   a   party,   or   extends   reciprocal   rights   to   nationals   of   the   Philippines   by   law,   shall   be   entitled   to   benefits   to   the   extent  necessary  to  give  effect  to  any  provision  of  such   convention,   treaty   or   reciprocal   law,   in   addition   to   the   rights   to   which   any   owner   of   an   intellectual   property   right  is  otherwise  entitled  by  this  Act.      

The   provisions   of   this   Act   on   the   protection   of   performers  shall  apply  to:     222.1.   Performers   who   are   nationals   of   the   Philippines;     222.2.  Performers  who  are  not  nationals  of  the   Philippines  but  whose  performances:     (a)  Take  place  in  the  Philippines;  or     (b)   Are   incorporated   in   sound   recordings   that   are   protected   under   this  Act;  or     (c)   Which   has   not   been   fixed   in   sound   recording   but   are   carried   by   broadcast   qualifying   for   protection   under  this  Act.      

SECTION  10.2.     (a)   Exercise   original   jurisdiction   in   administrative   complaints   for   violations   of   laws   involving   intellectual   property   rights:   Provided,   That   its   jurisdiction   is   limited   to  complaints  where  the  total  damages  claimed  are  not   less   than   Two   hundred   thousand   pesos   (P200,000):   Provided   further,   That   availment   of   the   provisional   remedies   may   be   granted   in   accordance   with   the   Rules   of   Court.   The   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   shall   have   the   power   to   hold   and   punish   for   contempt   all   those   who   disregard   orders   or   writs   issued   in   the   course   of   the   proceedings.       (b)   After   formal   investigation,   the   Director   for   Legal   Affairs   may   impose   one   (1)   or   more   of   the   following   administrative  penalties:     (i)   The   issuance   of   a   cease   and   desist   order   which   shall   specify   the   acts   that   the   respondent   shall   cease   and   desist   from   and   shall  require  him  to  submit  a  compliance  report  

SECTION   223.   POINTS   OF   ATTACHMENT   FOR   SOUND   RECORDINGS.  –     The   provisions   of   this   Act   on   the   protection   of   sound   recordings  shall  apply  to:     223.1.  Sound  recordings  the  producers  of  which   are  nationals  of  the  Philippines;  and    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   within   a   reasonable   time   which   shall   be   fixed   in   the  order;     (ii)  The  acceptance  of  a  voluntary  assurance  of   compliance   or   discontinuance   as   may   be   imposed.   Such   voluntary   assurance   may   include  one  or  more  of  the  following:  

(vi)   The   cancellation   of   any   permit,   license,   authority,  or  registration  which  may  have  been   granted  by  the  Office,  or  the  suspension  of  the   validity   thereof   for   such   period   of   time   as   the   Director  of  Legal  Affairs  may  deem  reasonable   which  shall  not  exceed  one  (1)  year;     (vii)   The   withholding   of   any   permit,   license,   authority,   or   registration   which   is   being   secured  by  the  respondent  from  the  Office;     (viii)  The  assessment  of  damages;     (ix)  Censure;  and     (x)  Other  analogous  penalties  or  sanctions.  

 

 

(1)   An   assurance   to   comply   with   the   provisions   of   the   intellectual   property   law  violated;     (2)   An   assurance   to   refrain   from   engaging   in   unlawful   and   unfair   acts   and   practices   subject   of   the   formal   investigation;     (3)   An   assurance   to   recall,   replace,   repair,   or   refund   the   money   value   of   defective   goods   distributed   in   commerce;  and     (4)   An   assurance   to   reimburse   the   complainant   the   expenses   and   costs   incurred   in   prosecuting   the   case   in   the  Bureau  of  Legal  Affairs.     The  Director  of  Legal  Affairs  may  also   require   the   respondent   to   submit   periodic  compliance  reports  and  file  a   bond   to   guarantee   compliance   of   his   undertaking;  

 

SECTION  216.  REMEDIES  FOR  INFRINGEMENT.  –     216.1.  Any  person  infringing  a  right  protected  under  this   law  shall  be  liable:     (a)   To   an   injunction   restraining   such   infringement.   The   court   may   also   order   the   defendant   to   desist   from   an   infringement,   among   others,   to   prevent   the   entry   into   the   channels  of  commerce  of  imported  goods  that   involve   an   infringement,   immediately   after   customs  clearance  of  such  goods.     (b)   Pay   to   the   copyright   proprietor   or   his   assigns  or  heirs  such  actual  damages,  including   legal  costs  and  other  expenses,  as  he  may  have   incurred  due  to  the  infringement  as  well  as  the   profits   the   infringer   may   have   made   due   to   such   infringement,   and   in   proving   profits   the   plaintiff   shall   be   required   to   prove   sales   only   and   the   defendant   shall   be   required   to   prove   every   element   of   cost   which   he   claims,   or,   in   lieu   of   actual   damages   and   profits,   such   damages  which  to  the  court  shall  appear  to  be   just  and  shall  not  be  regarded  as  penalty.     (c)   Deliver   under   oath,   for   impounding   during   the   pendency   of   the   action,   upon   such   terms   and   conditions   as   the   court   may   prescribe,   sales  invoices  and  other  documents  evidencing   sales,  all  articles  and  their  packaging  alleged  to   infringe  a  copyright  and  implements  for  making   them.     (d)   Deliver   under   oath   for   destruction   without   any   compensation   all   infringing   copies   or   devices,   as   well   as   all   plates,   molds,   or   other   means  for  making  such  infringing  copies  as  the   court  may  order.     (e)   Such   other   terms   and   conditions,   including   the  payment  of  moral  and  exemplary  damages,  

(iii)   The   condemnation   or   seizure   of   products   which   are   subject   of   the   offense.   The   goods   seized   hereunder   shall   be   disposed   of   in   such   manner  as  may  be  deemed  appropriate  by  the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs,   such   as   by   sale,   donation  to  distressed  local  governments  or  to   charitable   or   relief   institutions,   exportation,   recycling  into  other  goods,  or  any  combination   thereof,   under   such   guidelines   as   he   may   provide;     (iv)  The  forfeiture  of  paraphernalia  and  all  real   and  personal  properties  which  have  been  used   in  the  commission  of  the  offense;     (v)   The   imposition   of   administrative   fines   in   such   amount   as   deemed   reasonable   by   the   Director  of  Legal  Affairs,  which  shall  in  no  case   be   less   than   Five   thousand   pesos   (P5,000)   nor   more   than   One   hundred   fifty   thousand   pesos   (P150,000).   In   addition,   an   additional   fine   of   not   more   than   One   thousand   pesos   (P1,000)   shall   be   imposed   for   each   day   of   continuing   violation;    

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Intellectual Property Law which   the   court   may   deem   proper,   wise   and   equitable   and   the   destruction   of   infringing   copies   of   the   work   even   in   the   event   of   acquittal  in  a  criminal  case.  

(c)  Trade  exhibit  of  the  article  in  public,  shall  be   guilty   of   an   offense   and   shall   be   liable   on   conviction   to   imprisonment   and   fine   as   above   mentioned.  

  216.2.  In  an  infringement  action,  the  court   shall   also   have   the   power   to   order   the   seizure   and   impounding   of   any   article   which   may   serve   as   evidence   in   the   court   proceedings.      

 

SECTION  218.  AFFIDAVIT  EVIDENCE.  –     218.1.   In   an   action   under   this   Chapter,   an   affidavit   made   before   a   notary   public   by   or   on   behalf   of   the   owner   of   the   copyright   in   any   work   or   other   subject   matter   and   stating  that:     (a)   At   the   time   specified   therein,   copyright   subsisted  in  the  work  or  other  subject  matter;     (b)   He   or   the   person   named   therein   is   the   owner  of  the  copyright;  and     (c)   The   copy   of   the   work   or   other   subject   matter  annexed  thereto  is  a  true  copy  thereof,   shall   be   admitted   in   evidence   in   any   proceedings   for   an   offense   under   this   Chapter   and   shall   be   prima   facie   proof   of   the   matters   therein  stated  until  the  contrary  is  proved,  and   the   court   before   which   such   affidavit   is   produced   shall   assume   that   the   affidavit   was   made   by   or   on   behalf   of   the   owner   of   the   copyright.     218.2.  In  an  action  under  this  Chapter:     (a)   Copyright   shall   be   presumed   to   subsist   in   the  work  or  other  subject  matter  to  which  the   action  relates  if  the  defendant  does  not  put  in   issue   the   question   whether   copyright   subsists   in  the  work  or  other  subject  matter;  and     (b)   Where   the   subsistence   of   the   copyright   is   established,   the   plaintiff   shall   be   presumed   to   be  the  owner  of  the  copyright  if  he  claims  to  be   the  owner  of  the  copyright  and  the  defendant   does   not   put   in   issue   the   question   of   his   ownership.     (c)   Where   the   defendant,   without   good   faith,   puts   in   issue   the   questions   of   whether   copyright   subsists   in   a   work   or   other   subject   matter   to   which   the   action   relates,   or   the   ownership   of   copyright   in   such   work   or   subject   matter,  thereby  occasioning  unnecessary  costs   or   delay   in   the   proceedings,   the   court   may   direct   that   any   costs   to   the   defendant   in   respect   of   the   action   shall   not   be   allowed   by   him   and   that   any   costs   occasioned   by   the   defendant  to  other  parties  shall  be  paid  by  him   to  such  other  parties.      

SECTION  217.  CRIMINAL  PENALTIES.  –     217.1.   Any   person   infringing   any   right   secured   by   provisions  of  Part  IV  of  this  Act  or  aiding  or  abetting  such   infringement  shall  be  guilty  of  a  crime  punishable  by:     (a)   Imprisonment   of   one   (1)   year   to   three   (3)   years   plus   a   fine   ranging   from   Fifty   thousand   pesos  (P50,000)  to  One  hundred  fifty  thousand   pesos  (P150,000)  for  the  first  offense.     (b)  Imprisonment  of  three  (3)  years  and  one  (1)   day   to   six   (6)   years   plus   a   fine   ranging   from   One   hundred   fifty   thousand   pesos   (P150,000)   to  Five  hundred  thousand  pesos  (P500,000)  for   the  second  offense.     (c)   Imprisonment   of   six   (6)   years   and   one   (1)   day   to   nine   (9)   years   plus   a   fine   ranging   from   five   hundred   thousand   pesos   (P500,000)   to   One   million   five   hundred   thousand   pesos   (P1,500,000)   for   the   third   and   subsequent   offenses.     (d)   In   all   cases,   subsidiary   imprisonment   in   cases  of  insolvency.     217.2.   In   determining   the   number   of   years   of   imprisonment   and   the   amount   of   fine,   the   court   shall   consider   the   value   of   the   infringing   materials   that   the   defendant   has   produced   or   manufactured   and   the   damage  that  the  copyright  owner  has  suffered  by  reason   of  the  infringement.     217.3.   Any   person   who   at   the   time   when   copyright   subsists  in  a  work  has  in  his  possession  an  article  which   he  knows,  or  ought  to  know,  to  be  an  infringing  copy  of   the  work  for  the  purpose  of:     (a)   Selling,   letting   for   hire,   or   by   way   of   trade   offering   or   exposing   for   sale,   or   hire,   the   article;     (b)  Distributing  the  article  for  purpose  of  trade,   or  for  any  other  purpose  to  an  extent  that  will   prejudice   the   rights   of   the   copyright   owner   in   the  work;  or    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   the   Philippines,   Article   50   of   the   Agreement   on   Trade   Related   Aspects   of   Intellectual   Property   Rights,   otherwise   known   as   TRIPS   and   other   related   laws   and   international  conventions.       SECTION  2.  THE  WRIT  OF  SEARCH  AND  SEIZURE.  –     Where  any  delay  is  likely  to  cause  irreparable  harm  to  the   intellectual   property   right   holder   or   where   there   is   demonstrable   risk   of   evidence   being   destroyed,   the   intellectual   property   right   holder   or   his   duly   authorized   representative  in  a  pending  civil  action  for  infringement   or   who   intends   to   commence   such   an   action   may   apply   ex  parte  for  the  issuance  of  a  writ  of  search  and  seizure   directing   the   alleged   infringing   defendant   or   expected   adverse   party   to   admit   into   his   premises   the   persons   named  in  the  order  and  to  allow  the  search,  inspection,   copying,  photographing,  audio  and  audiovisual  recording   or   seizure   of   any   document   and   article   specified   in   the   order.       SECTION  3.  WHERE  APPLICATION  FILED.  –     The   application   shall   be   filed   with   any   of   the   Regional   Trial   Courts   of   the   judicial   region   designated   to   try   violations  of  intellectual  property  rights  stationed  at  the   place  where  the  alleged  violation  occurred  or  is  to  occur,   or   the   place   to   be   searched,   at   the   election   of   the   applicant:  Provided,  however,  that  where  the  complaint   for   infringement   has   already   been   filed,   the   application   shall  be  made  in  the  court  where  the  case  is  pending.       SECTION  4.  VERIFIED  APPLICATION  AND  AFFIDAVITS.  –     The  applicant  shall  file  a  verified  application  alleging  the   ground   upon   which   it   is   based   and   the   specific   description   and   location   of   the   documents   and   articles   to   be   searched,   inspected,   copied   or   seized   and   their   value.   It   shall   also   state   the   name   applicant,   his   representative,   witnesses   and   counsel   who   will   attend   the   search   in   the   event   that   the   application   is   granted.   The   application   shall   be   supported   by   affidavits   of   witnesses   who   personally   know   the   facts   and   by   the   authenticated  or  certified  documents.       The   application   shall   contain   a   certification   against   forum   shopping   as   prescribed   by   Section   5,   Rule   7   of   the   1997  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure.       The   applicant   shall   undertake   in   his   application   that   he   will   not   use   any   of   the   documents,   articles   or   information   obtained   by   reason   of   the   search   and   seizure   for   any   purpose   other   than   in   the   action   in   which   the  writ  is  issued.       SECTION  5.  EXAMINATION  OF  APPLICANT;  RECORD;  CONFIDENTIALITY   OF  PROCEEDINGS.  –     The   application   shall   be   acted   upon   within   twenty-­‐four   (24)  hours  from  its  filing.  The  judge  must,  before  issuing   the  writ,  examine  in  the  form  of  searching  questions  and  

SECTION  219.  PRESUMPTION  OF  AUTHORSHIP.  –     219.1.   The   natural   person   whose   name   is   indicated   on   a   work   in   the   usual   manner   as   the   author   shall,   in   the   absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary,  be  presumed  to  be  the   author   of   the   work.   This   provision   shall   be   applicable   even   if   the   name   is   a   pseudonym,   where   the   pseudonym   leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the  identity  of  the  author.     219.2.   The   person   or   body   corporate   whose   name   appears  on  a  audio-­‐visual  work  in  the  usual  manner  shall,   in  the  absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary,  be  presumed  to   be  the  maker  of  said  work.      

SECTION  220.  INTERNATIONAL  REGISTRATION  OF  WORKS.  –     A   statement   concerning   a   work,   recorded   in   an   international  register  in  accordance  with  an  international   treaty  to  which  the  Philippines  is  or  may  become  a  party,   shall   be   construed   as   true   until   the   contrary   is   proved   except:     220.1.   Where   the   statement   cannot   be   valid   under   this   Act   or   any   other   law   concerning   intellectual  property.     220.2.   Where   the   statement   is   contradicted   by   another   statement   recorded   in   the   international  register.    

SECTION  225.  JURISDICTION.  –     Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  Subsection  7.1(c),   actions   under   this   Act   shall   be   cognizable   by   the   courts   with  appropriate  jurisdiction  under  existing  law.    

SECTION  226.  DAMAGES.  –     No  damages  may  be  recovered  under  this  Act  after  four   (4)  years  from  the  time  the  cause  of  action  arose.      

SECTION  231.  REVERSE  RECIPROCITY  OF  FOREIGN  LAWS.  –     Any   condition,   restriction,   limitation,   diminution,   requirement,   penalty   or   any   similar   burden   imposed   by   the   law   of   a   foreign   country   on   a   Philippine   national   seeking  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  in  that   country,  shall  reciprocally  be  enforceable  upon  nationals   of  said  country,  within  Philippine  jurisdiction.      

RULE   ON   SEARCH   AND   SEIZURE   IN   CIVIL   ACTIONS   FOR   INFRINGEMENT  OF  INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  RIGHTS     SECTION  1.  COVERAGE.  –     This   Rule   shall   govern   the   provisional   seizure   and   impounding   of   documents   and   articles   in   pending   and   intended   civil   actions   for   the   purpose   of   preventing   infringement  and  preserving  relevant  evidence  in  regard   to   alleged   infringement   under   Republic   Act   No.   8293,   otherwise   known   as   the   Intellectual   Property   Code   of  

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Intellectual Property Law answers,   in   writing   an   under   oath   or   affirmation,   the   applicant   and   the   witnesses   he   may   produce   on   facts   personally   known   to   them.   The   examination   of   the   applicant   and   his   witnesses   shall   be   recorded.   Their   sworn  statements  and  their  affidavits  shall  form  part  of   the  record  of  the  case.       The  hearing  on  the  application  for  the  writ  shall  be  held   in   the   chambers   of   the   judge.   Court   personnel   shall   maintain   the   confidentiality   of   the   application   proceeding.       The   court   may   require   the   applicant   to   give   other   information   necessary   for   the   identification   of   the   articles   and   documents   to   be   searched,   inspected,   copied   or   seized   and   the   premises   to   be   searched.   Where   feasible,   it   may   direct   the   applicant   to   submit   copies  and  photographs  of  the  documents  or  articles  to   be  seized  and  impounded.       SECTION  6.  GROUNDS  FOR  THE  ISSUANCE  OF  THE  ORDER.  –     Before   the   Order   can   be   issued,   the   evidence   proffered   by   the   applicant   and   personally   evaluated   by   the   judge   must  show  that:       (a)   the   applicant   is   the   right   holder   or   his   duly   authorized  representative;       (b)   there   is   probable   cause   to   believe   that   the   applicant’s  right  is  being  infringed  or  that  such   infringement   is   imminent   and   there   is   a   prima   facie   case   for   final   relief   against   the   alleged   infringing   defendant   or   expected   adverse   party;       (c)   damage,   potential   or   actual,   likely   to   be   caused  to  the  applicant  is  irreparable;       (d)  there  is  demonstrable  risk  of  evidence  that   the   alleged   infringing   defendant   or   expected   adverse  party  may  destroy,  hide  or  remove  the   documents   or   articles   before   any   application   inter  partes  can  be  made;  and       (e)   the   documents   and   articles   to   be   seized   constitute   evidence   of   the   alleged   infringing   defendant’s   or   expected   adverse   party’s   infringing  activity  or  that  they  infringe  upon  the   intellectual   property   right   of   the   applicant   or   that   they   are   used   or   intended   to   be   used   as   means   of   infringing   the   applicant’s   intellectual   property  right.     SECTION  7.  WHEN  WRIT  MAY  ISSUE.  –     If   the   judge   is   satisfied   with   the   proof   of   facts   upon   which   the   application   is   based,   he   shall   issue   the   writ   requiring  the  search,  inspection  or  copying  of  the  subject   documents   or   articles   or   commanding   the   sheriff   to   take  

them  into  his  custody  subject  to  the  control  of  the  court.   The   enforcement   of   the   writ   shall   be   supervised   by   an   independent  Commissioner  to  be  appointed  by  the  court.       SECTION  8.  CONTENTS  OF  THE  WRIT.  –     The  writ  shall  contain  the  following:       (a)  an  order  to  the  alleged  infringing  defendant,   expected   adverse   party   or   to   the   person   who   appears   to   be   in   charge   or   in   control   of   the   premises   or   residing   or   working   therein   to   permit  the  persons  named  in  the  writ  to  enter   into   the   premises   for   the   purpose   of   searching,   inspecting,   copying,   or   removing   from   the   premises  and  transferring  to  the  custody  of  the   sheriff   and   subject   to   the   control   of   the   court   the  subject  documents  and  articles;       (b)  an  order  to  the  alleged  infringing  defendant,   expected   adverse   party   or   to   the   person   in   charge   or   in   control   of   the   premises   to   disclose   to   the   sheriff   serving   the   writ   the   location   of   the  documents  and  articles  subject  of  the  writ.       (c)  the  period  when  the  writ  shall  be  enforced   which   in   no   case   shall   be   more   than   ten   (10)   days  from  the  date  of  issuance  by  the  court.       (d)   the   names   of   the   applicant   or   his   agent   or   representative  and  the  Commissioner  who  shall   supervise  the  enforcement  of  the  writ;  and       (e)   other   terms   and   conditions   that   will   insure   the   proper   execution   of   the   writ   with   due   regard   to   the   rights   of   the   alleged   infringing   defendant  or  expected  adverse  party.     It  shall  also  contain  a  warning  that  violation  of  any  of  the   terms   and   conditions   of   the   writ   shall   constitute   contempt  of  court.       SECTION  9.  BOND  AND  ITS  CONDITIONS.  –     The   applicant   shall   be   required   to   post   a   cash   bond,   surety   bond   or   other   equivalent   security   executed   in   favor   of   the   defendant   or   expected   adverse   party   in   a   reasonable   amount   to   be   fixed   by   the   court   in   its   order   granting  the  issuance  of  a  writ  of  search  and  seizure.  The   bond   shall   be   conditioned   on   the   undertaking   of   the   applicant   that   he   will   pay   all   the   costs   which   may   be   adjudged  to  defendant  or  expected  adverse  party  and  all   damages   which   the   latter   may   sustain   by   reason   of   the   issuance  of  the  writ.       SECTION  10.  WHEN  WRIT  SHALL  BE  SERVED .  –     The   writ   shall   be   served   only   on   weekdays   and   from   8   o'clock   in   the   morning   to   5   o'clock   in   the   afternoon.   However,  the  court  may  direct  that  the  writ  be  served  on  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   any   day   and   any   time   for   compelling   reasons   stated   in   the  application  and  duly  proved.       SECTION  11.  TO  WHOM  WRIT  SHALL  BE  SERVED.  –     The   writ   shall   be   served   on   the   alleged   infringing   defendant   or   expected   adverse   party   in   the   place   to   be   searched.       If   the   alleged   infringing   defendant   or   expected   adverse   party  cannot  be  found  in  the  premises,  the  writ  shall  be   served  on  his  agent  or  representative.  In  the  absence  of   an   agent   or   representative,   it   shall   be   served   on   the   person   in   charge   or   in   control   of   the   premises,   or   residing  or  working  therein  who  is  of  sufficient  age  and   discretion.  If  such  person  is  absent,  the  sheriff  or  proper   officer   shall   post   the   papers   on   the   premises   and   proceed  with  the  enforcement  of  the  writ.       SECTION  12.  COMMISSIONER,  DUTIES,  QUALIFICATIONS  AND  FEES.  –     The   enforcement   of   the   writ   shall   be   supervised   by   the   independent   Commissioner   appointed   by   the   court   in   the  performance  of  his  duty,  the  Commissioner  shall:       (a)   give   impartial   advice   to   the   alleged   infringing   defendant,   expected   adverse   party   or   to   the   person   in   charge   of   the   premises   to   be  searched  as  to  the  meaning  and  coverage  of   the  writ.     (b)  attempt  to  achieve  agreement  on  a  suitable   search  procedure       (c)   assess   what   documents   or   articles   come   within  the  terms  of  the  writ       (d)   ensure   the   accuracy   of   the   list   of   documents   and   articles   searched,   inspected,   copied  or  seized  by  the  sheriff;       (e)   prepare   his   own   report   on   the   search   and   seizure  and  verify  and  sign  the  return  prepared   by  the  sheriff,  and       (f)   generally,   assist   in   the   proper   execution   of   the  writ.     The   Commissioner   shall   be   a   member   of   the   Philippine   Bar   and   of   proven   competence,   integrity   and   probity.   He   shall   receive   such   reasonable   compensation   as   may   be   determined  by  the  court  which  can  be  charged  as  cost  of   suit.       SECTION   13.   SEARCH   TO   BE   CONDUCTED   IN   THE   PRESENCE   OF   DEFENDANT,   HIS   REPRESENTATIVE,   PERSON   IN   CHARGE   OF   THE   PREMISES,  OR  WITNESSES.  –     The   premises   may   not   be   searched   except   in   the   presence   of   the   alleged   infringing   defendant,   expected   adverse   party   or   his   representative   or   the   person   in  

charge   or   in   control   of   the   premises   or   residing   or   working   therein   who   shall   be   given   the   opportunity   to   read   the   writ   before   its   enforcement   and   seek   its   interpretation   from   the   Commissioner.   In   the   absence   of   the   latter,   two   persons   of   sufficient   age   and   discretion   residing  in  the  nearest  locality.       SECTION   14.   MANNER   OF   SEARCH   AND   SEIZURE;   DUTIES   OF   THE   SHERIFF.  –     Upon   service   of   the   writ   in   accordance   with   section   11   hereof,   the   sheriff,   under   the   supervision   of   the   Commissioner,   shall   search   for   the   documents   and   articles   specified   in   the   writ,   and   take   them   in   his   custody  subject  to  the  control  of  the  court.       If   the   subject   articles   are   not   capable   of   manual   delivery,   the  sheriff  shall  attach  to  them  a  tag  or  label  stating  the   fact   of   seizure   and   warning   all   persons   from   tampering   with  them.       The   sheriff   shall,   in   the   presence   of   the   applicant   or   his   representative,   and   under   the   supervision   of   the   Commissioner,   prepare   a   detailed   list   of   the   seized   documents  and  articles.  He  shall  give  an  accurate  copy  of   the   same   to   the   alleged   infringing   defendant,   expected   adverse   party,   his   agent   or   representative,   to   the   person   in   charge   or   in   control   of   the   premises   or   residing   or   working   therein   in   whose   presence   the   search   and   seizure   were   made.   In   the   absence   of   the   person   in   charge   or   in   control   of   the   premises   or   residing   or   working   therein,   the   sheriff   must,   in   the   presence   of   at   least   two   witnesses   of   sufficient   age   and   discretion   residing  in  the  same  locality,  leave  a  copy  of  the  receipt   in   the   place   in   which   he   found   the   seized   property.   Where   no   witnesses   are   available   in   the   same   locality,   the  copy  of  the  receipt  shall  be  left  by  the  sheriff  in  the   presence   of   two   witnesses   residing   in   the   nearest   locality   The   applicant   or   his   representative   and   the   Commissioner  shall  also  be  given  a  copy  of  the  receipt.       After  the  sheriff  has  taken  possession  of  the  documents   and   articles,   he   shall   deliver   them   to   a   bonded   warehouse   or   government   warehouse   for   safekeeping.   The   applicant   or   his   representative   shall   be   allowed   access   to   said   materials   for   the   purpose   of   examining   them.       The   applicant   shall   be   responsible   for   the   necessary   expenses  incurred  in  the  seizure  and  safekeeping  of  the   documents   and   articles   in   a   bonded   warehouse   or   government  warehouse.         SECTION  15.  USE  OF  REASONABLE  FORCE  TO  EFFECT  WRIT.  –     The   sheriff,   if   refused   admittance   to   the   premises   after   giving   notice   of   his   purpose   and   authority   or   in   the   absence  of  the  alleged  infringing  defendant  or  expected   adverse   party,   his   agent   or   representative,   or   person   in   charge   or   in   control   of   the   premises   or   residing   or  

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Intellectual Property Law working   therein   who   is   of   sufficient   age   and   discretion,   may   use   reasonable   force   to   gain   entry   to   the   premises   or   any   part   of   the   building   or   anything   therein,   to   enforce   the   writ   or   to   liberate   himself   or   any   person   lawfully  aiding  him  when  unlawfully  detained  therein.       SECTION   16.   SEIZURE   OF   COMPUTER   DISKS   OR   OTHER   STORAGE   DEVICES.  –     The   seizure   of   a   computer   disk   or   any   storage   device   may  be  executed  in  any  of  the  following  manner:       (a)  by  the  physical  taking  thereof,       (b)   by   copying   its   contents   in   suitable   device   or   disk  provided  by  the  applicant;  or       (c)   by   printing   out   the   contents   of   the   disk   or   device  with  the  use  of  a  printer.     When   the   computer   disks   or   storage   device   cannot   be   readily   removed   from   the   computer   to   which   they   are   fitted,   the   sheriff   may   take   the   subject   computer   from   the   custody   of   the   alleged   infringing   defendant,   expected   adverse   party   or   person   in   charge   or   in   control   of  the  premises  or  residing  or  working  therein.         SECTION  17.  SHERIFF’S  RETURN.  –     The  sheriff  who  executed  the  writ  shall,  within  three  (3)   days   from   its   enforcement,   make   a   verified   return   to   the   court   which   issued   the   writ.   The   return   shall   contain   a   full   statement   of   the   proceedings   under   the   writ   and   a   complete   inventory   of   the   documents   and   articles   searched,   inspected   or   copied   or   seized   and   impounded,   with   copies   served   on   the   applicant,   the   defendant   or   expected  adverse  party  and  the  Commissioner.       If   not   all   of   the   documents   and   articles   enumerated   in   the  order  and  writ  were  seized,  the  sheriff  shall  so  report   to   the   court   and   state   the   reasons   therefor.   All   objections   of   the   defendant   expected   adverse   party   or   person   in   charge   of   the   premises   on   the   manner   and   regularity  of  the  service  of  the  writ  shall  be  included  by   the  sheriff  in  his  return.         SECTION   18.   DISCHARGE  OF  WRIT  BY   THE  DEFENDANT   OR  EXPECTED   ADVERSE  PARTY.  –     Without  waiting  for  the  return  to  be  filed  by  the  sheriff,   the   defendant,   expected   adverse   party   or   the   party   whose   property   has   been   searched,   inspected,   copied   or   seized  may  file  a  motion  with  the  court  which  issued  the   writ   for   its   discharge   with   prayer   for   the   return   of   the   documents  and  articles  seized.       The   writ   may   be   discharged   on   any   of   the   following   grounds:       (a)   that   the   writ   was   improperly   or   irregularly   issued,  or  excessively  enforced;    

  (b)  that  the  bond  is  insufficient;       (c)   that   the   safeguards   provided   in   the   writ   have   been   violated   by   the   applicant   or   the   sheriff;  or       (d)   that   the   documents   and   articles   seized   are   not   infringing   copies   or   means   for   making   the   materials   alleged   to   infringe   the   intellectual   property  right  of  the  applicant.     The   writ   may   be   discharged   in   a   summary   hearing   by   the   court   after   notice   to   the   applicant,   the   sheriff   and   the   Commissioner.       If   the   court   finds   that   the   bond   is   insufficient,   it   shall   order   a   new   bond   to   be   filed   by   the   applicant   within   a   reasonable  time.  The  discharge  of  the  writ  based  on  the   insufficiency   of   the   bond   may   only   be   made   if   the   applicant   fails   to   post   the   new   bond   within   the   period   fixed  by  the  court.       SECTION  19.  PROCEEDINGS  ON  RETURN.  –     Five  (5)  days  after  issuance  of  the  writ,  the  issuing  judge   shall   ascertain   if   the   writ   has   not   been   served   or   the   return  has  been  made  by  the  sheriff.  If  the  writ  was  not   served   or   no   return   was   made,   it   shall   summon   the   sheriff   and   the   applicant   to   whom   the   writ   was   issued   and  require  them  to  explain  why  the  writ  was  not  served   or  why  no  return  has  been  filed  as  the  case  may  be.  If  the   return  has  been  made,  the  judge  shall,  after  notice  to  the   applicant,   the   alleged   infringing   defendant   or   expected   adverse   party,   the   sheriff   and   the   Commissioner,   ascertain   whether   the   provisions   of   this   Rule   and   applicable  laws  have  been  complied  with.       SECTION  20.  FAILURE  TO  FILE  COMPLAINT.  –     The  writ  shall  also,  upon  motion  of  the  expected  adverse   party,  be  set  aside  and  the  seized  documents  and  articles   returned   to   the   expected   adverse   party   if   no   case   is   filed   with  the  appropriate  court  or  authority  within  thirty-­‐one   (31)  calendar  days  from  the  date  of  issuance  of  the  writ.       SECTION  21.  CLAIM  FOR  DAMAGES.  –     When   the   writ   is   discharged   on   any   of   the   grounds   provided  in  this  Rule,  or  where  it  is  found  after  trial  that   there   has   been   no   infringement   or   threat   of   infringement   of   an   intellectual   property   right,   the   court   upon   motion   of   the   alleged   infringing   defendant   or   expected  adverse  and  after  due  hearing,  shall  order  the   applicant   to   compensate   the   defendant   or   expected   adverse  party  upon  the  cash  bond,  surety  bond  or  other   equivalent   security   for   any   injury   or   damage   the   latter   suffered   by   the   issuance   and   enforcement   of   the   writ.   Should   the   damages   exceed   the   amount   of   the   bond,   the   applicant   shall   be   liable   for   the   payment   of   the   excess.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao     When   a   complaint   is   already   filed   in   court,   the   motion   shall   be   filed   with   the   same   court   during   the   trial   or   before  appeal  is  perfected  or  before  judgment  becomes   executory,  with  due  notice  to  the  applicant  setting  forth   the  facts  showing  the  defendant’s  right  to  damages  and   amount  thereof.  The  award  of  damages  shall  be  included   in  the  judgment  in  the  main  case.       Where   no   complaint   is   filed   against   the   expected   adverse   party,   the   motion   shall   be   filed   with   the   court   which  issued  the  writ.  In  such  a  case,  the  court  shall  set   the   motion   for   summary   hearing   and   immediately   determine   the   expected   adverse   party’s   right   to   damages.       A   judgment   in   favor   of   the   applicant   in   its   principal   claim   should   not   necessarily   bar   the   alleged   infringing   defendant   from   recovering   damages   where   he   suffered   losses   by   reasons   of   the   wrongful   issuance   or   enforcement  of  the  writ.       The   damages   provided   f   or   in   this   section   shall   be   independent   from   the   damages   claimed   by   the   defendant  in  his  counterclaim       SECTION  22.  JUDGMENT.  –     If   it   appears   after   trial   that   the   seized   documents   and   articles   are   bound   to   infringe   the   intellectual   property   right  of  the  applicant  or  that  they  constitute  the  means   the   means   for   the   production   of   infringing   goods,   the   court   shall   order   their   destruction   or   donation   to   charitable,   educational   or   religious   institutions   with   the   prohibition  against  bringing  the  same  in  to  the  channels   of  commerce.  In  the  latter  case,  infringing  trademarks  or   trade  names  found  on  labels,  tags  and  other  portions  of   the   infringing   materials   shall   be   removed   or   defaced   before   the   donation.   In   no   case   shall   the   infringing   materials  be  returned  to  the  defendant.       If   the   court   finds   no   infringement,   the   seized   material   shall  be  immediately  returned  to  the  defendant.       SECTION   23.   DIRECT   FILING,   PROVISIONAL   DOCKETING  AND  DEPOSIT   OF  PRESCRIBED  FILING  FEE.  –     The   Regional   Trial   Courts   specially   designated   to   try   violations   of   intellectual   property   rights   shall   keep   a   distinct   and   separate   logbook   for   writs   of   search   and   seizure.   The   application   for   a   writ   of   search   and   seizure   filed   directly   with   the   said   courts   shall   be   given   a   provisional   docket   number.   The   prescribed   filing   fee   shall   be   deposited   with   the   branch   clerk   of   court   and   properly   receipted   for   and   transmitted   to   the   Clerk   of   Court  within  twenty-­‐four  (24)  hours  from  issuance  of  the   order   granting   or   denying   the   application   for   said   writ.   If   a  formal  complaint  is  filed  thereafter,  the  Clerk  of  Court   may  make  a  reassessment  of  the  filing  fee.      

  SECTION  24.  SEPARATE  LOGBOOK.  –     In   every   court,   there   shall   be   a   logbook   under   the   custody  of  the  Clerk  of  Court  wherein  shall  be  docketed   and   entered   within   twenty-­‐four   (24)   hours   after   the   issuance   or   denial   of   the   writ   search   and   seizure,   the   filing   of   such   application   and   other   particulars   thereof.   All   the   subsequent   proceedings   concerning   the   writ   of   search   and   seizure   shall   be   faithfully   recorded   in   the   separate  logbook.       SECTION  25.  EFFECT  OF  VIOLATION.  –     A   violation   of   any   of   the   terms   and   conditions   of   the   order   and   the   writ   of   search   and   seizure   or   any   provision   of  the  Rule  shall  constitute  contempt  of  court.       SECTION  26.  WRIT  NOT  A  BAR  TO  OTHER  MEASURES.  –     The   availment   of   the   writ   of   search   and   seizure   under   this   Rule   shall   not   prevent   the   applicant   from   resorting   to   other   provisional   measures   or   remedies   provided   in   existing  laws  and  procedural  rules.       SECTION  27.  EFFECTIVITY.  –     This   Rule   shall   take   effect   on   February   15,   2002   after   its   publication  in  two  (2)  newspapers  of  general  circulation   not  later  than  January  30,  2002.        

RE:   CONSOLIDATION   OF   INTELLECTUAL   PROPERTY   COURTS   WITH   COMMERCIAL   COURTS   [A.M.   NO .   03-­‐03-­‐03-­‐SC   2003-­‐06-­‐17]     RESOLUTION     WHEREAS,  to  implement  the  provisions  of  Section  5.2  of   Republic  Act  No.  8799  (The  Securities  Regulation  Code),   and   in   the   interest   of   a   speedy   and   efficient   administration  of  justice,  the  Supreme  Court  en  banc,  in   the  (a)  Resolution  dated  21  November  2000  (Annex  1),  4   July  2001  (Annex  1-­‐a),  12  November  2002  (Annex  1-­‐b),  and   9  July  2002  (Annex  1-­‐c),  all  issued  in  A.M.  No.  00-­‐11-­‐03-­‐SC;   (b)   Resolution   dated   27   August   2001   in   A.M.   No.   01-­‐5-­‐298   RTC   (Annex   2);   and   (c)   Resolution   dated   8   July   2002   in   A.M.  No.  01-­‐12-­‐656-­‐RTC  (Annex  3),  resolved  to  designate   certain   branches   of   the   Regional   Trial   Courts   to   try   and   decide   cases   formerly   cognizable   by   the   Securities   and   Exchange  Commission;     WHEREAS,   pursuant   to   the   same   Resolution,   sixty-­‐five   (65)   Regional   Trial   Courts,   distributed   in   all   regions   (NCJR  and  Regions  1-­‐12),  were  designated  as  SEC  courts   ("SEC   Courts"),   which   courts   have   presently   a   total   of   812  pending  SEC  cases  (see  Annex  6,  Table);     WHEREAS,   in   A.O   No.   113-­‐95,   dated   2   October   1995,   as   amended   by   A.O.   No.   104-­‐96,   dated   21   October   1996,   the   Regional   Trial   Courts   in   the   National   Capital   Region   and   Regions   3,   4,   6,   7,   9,   10   and   11,   with-­‐twenty   seven   (27)  

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Intellectual Property Law judges,  were  specially  designated  to  try  and  decide  cases   for   violations   of   Intellectual   Property   Rights   (Annex   4),   and   to   ensure   the   speedy   disposition   of   cases   involving   violations   of   intellectual   property   rights   under   the   Intellectual   Property   Code   (Rep.   Act   No.   8293),   the   Supreme   Court   en   banc,   in   A.M.   No.   02-­‐1-­‐11-­‐   SC,   dated   February   19,   2002,   designated   the   Regional   Trial   Courts   in   Regions   1,   2,   5,   8   and   12,   with   a   total   of   seven   (7)   judges,   and   Branch   24   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Manila  with  one  (1)  judge,  as  Special  Intellectual  Property   Courts  ("Special  IP  Courts")  (Annex  5)     WHEREAS,  pursuant  to  A.M.  No.  02-­‐1-­‐11  SC  and  A.O.  No.   113-­‐95,   these   Special   IP   Courts   have   a   total   caseload   of   503  cases.  Of  this  number  434  IP  cases  are  pending  in  the   NCJR  (Annex  6,  Table);     WHEREAS,   since   the   establishment   of   Special   IP   Courts   (except   for   the   Special   IP   Courts   in   Manila),   15   designated  courts,  in  Regions  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9  and  12   have   zero   (0)   IP   cases,   and   do   not   warrant   their   continued   designations   as   Intellectual   Property   Courts   (Annex  7,  Table);     WHEREAS,  intellectual  property  cases  are  commercial  in   nature;     WHEREAS,   to   streamline   the   court   structure   and   to   promote   expediency   and   efficiency   in   handling   such   special  cases,  the  jurisdiction  to  hear  and  decide  IPC  and   SEC  cases  are  best  consolidated  in  one  court;     NOW,  THEREFORE,  the  Court  Resolves:       1. The   Regional   Courts   previously   designated   as   SEC   Courts   through   the:   (a)   Resolutions   of   this   Court   dated  21  November  2000,  4  July  2001,  12  November  2002,   and   9   July   2002,   all   issued   in   A.M.   No.   00-­‐11-­‐03-­‐SC,   (b)   Resolution   dated   27   August   2001   in   A.M.   No.   01-­‐5-­‐298-­‐ RTC;   and   (c)   Resolution   dated   8   July   2002   in   A.M.   No.   01-­‐ 12-­‐656-­‐RTC   are   hereby   DESIGNATED   and   shall   be   CALLED   as   Special   Commercial   Courts   to   try   and   decide   cases   involving  violations  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  which   fall   within   their   jurisdiction   and   those   cases   formerly   cognizable  by  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission;     2. The  designation  of  Intellectual  Property  Courts   under   Administrative   Order   No.   113-­‐95   dated   2   October   1995,   as   amended   by   Administrative   Order   No.   104-­‐96   dated   21   October   1996   and   Resolution   dated   19   February   2002  in  A.M.  No.  02-­‐1-­‐11-­‐SC,  is  hereby  revoked.  However,   the   Regional   Trial   Court,   Branch   24,   Manila   is   hereby   designated  as  an  additional  Special  Commercial  Court  in   the  City  of  Manila;     3. Upon   the   effectivity   of   this   Resolution,   all   IP   cases   shall   be   transferred   to   the   designated   Special   Commercial  Courts  except  those  which  have  undergone  

the   pretrial   stage   in   civil   cases   or   those   where   any   of   the   accused  has  been  arraigned  in  criminal  cases  which  shall   be  retained  by  the  court  previously  assigned  to  try  them;     4. The   Special   Commercial   Courts   shall   have   jurisdiction   over   cases   arising   within   their   respective   territorial  jurisdiction  with  respect  to  the  National  Capital   Judicial  Region  and  within  the  respective  provinces  with   respect   to   the   First   to   Twelfth   Judicial   Regions.   Thus,   cases  shall  be  filed  in  the  Office  of  the  Clerk  of  Court  in   the  official  station  of  the  designated  Special  Commercial   Court;     5. In   the   event   of   inhibition   of   the   judge   of   a   designated   Special   Commercial   Court,   the   following   guidelines  shall  be  observed:  (a)  where  there  is  only  one   (1)   Special   Commercial   Court,   the   case   shall   be   raffled   among   the   other   judges   in   the   station;   (b)   where   there   are   two   (2)   Special   Commercial   Courts   in   the   station,   the   Executive   Judge   shall   immediately   assign   the   case   to   the   other   Special   Commercial   Court;   and   (c)   in   case   of   inhibition   of   both   judges   of   the   Special   Commercial   Courts,   the   Executive   Judge   shall   raffle   the   case   among   the  judges  in  the  station;  and     6. In   order   to   ensure   a   just   and   equitable   distribution  of  cases,  the  designated  Special  Commercial   Courts  shall  continue  to  participate  in  the  raffles  of  other   cases.   Provided,   however,   that   the   Executive   Judge   concerned  shall  adopt  a  procedure  whereby  every  IP  and   SEC  case  assigned  to  a  Special  Commercial  Court  should   be   considered   a   case   raffled   to   it   and   duly   credited   to   such  court.     This  Resolution  shall  take  effect  on  1  July  2003  and  shall   be   published   in   two   (2)   newspapers   of   general   circulation.     17  June  2003    

20TH  CENTURY  FOX  FILM  CORP.  V.  CA,  BARRETO,  SAGULLO,   LEDESMA  (1988)   Refresher:   In   a   letter-­‐complaint   dated   August   26,   1985,   petitioner   20th   Century   Fox   Film   Corporation   through   counsel   sought   the   NBI’s   assistance   in   the   conduct   of   searches   and   seizures   in   connection   with   the   latter's   anti-­‐film   piracy   campaign.   Specifically,   the   letter-­‐complaint   alleged   that   certain   videotape   outlets   all   over   Metro   Manila   are   engaged   in   the   unauthorized   sale   and   renting   out   of   copyrighted   films   in   videotape   form   which   constitute  a  flagrant  violation  of  PD  49.     Acting   on   the   letter-­‐complaint,   the   NBI   conducted   surveillance   and   investigation   of   the   outlets   pinpointed   by   the   petitioner   and   subsequently   filed   3   applications   for   search   warrants   against   the   video   outlets   owned   by   the  private  respondents.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao     On   September   4,   1985,   the   lower   court   issued   the   desired  search  warrants.     Armed   with   the   search   warrants,   the   NBI   accompanied   by   the   petitioner's   agents,   raided   the   video   outlets   and   seized   the   items   described   therein.   An   inventory   of   the   items   seized   was   made   and   left   with   the   private   respondents.   However,   the   lower   court   subsequently   lifted  the  search  warrants  issued.     Issue:  whether  or  not  the  judge  properly  lifted  the  search   warrants   he   issued   earlier   upon   the   application   of   the   National   Bureau   of   Investigation   on   the   basis   of   the   complaint  filed  by  the  petitioner.     Held:     The   presentation   of   the   master   tapes   of   the   copyrighted   films  from  which  the  pirated  films  were  allegedly  copied,   was   necessary   for   the   validity   of   search   warrants   against   those  who  have  in  their  possession  the  pirated  films.  The   petitioner's  argument  to  the  effect  that  the  presentation   of  the  master  tapes  at  the  time  of  application  may  not  be   necessary  as  these  would  be  merely  evidentiary  in  nature   and   not   determinative   of   whether   or   not   a   probable   cause   exists   to   justify   the   issuance   of   the   search   warrants   is   not   meritorious.   The   court   cannot   presume   that   duplicate   or   copied   tapes   were   necessarily   reproduced  from  master  tapes  that  it  owns.     The   application   for   search   warrants   was   directed   against   video   tape   outlets   which   allegedly   were   engaged   in   the   unauthorized   sale   and   renting   out   of   copyrighted   films   belonging  to  the  petitioner  pursuant  to  P.D.  49.     The  essence  of  a  copyright  infringement  is  the  similarity   or  at  least  substantial  similarity  of  the  purported  pirated   works   to   the   copyrighted   work.   Hence,   the   applicant   must   present   to   the   court   the   copyrighted   films   to   compare  them  with  the  purchased  evidence  of  the  video   tapes   allegedly   pirated   to   determine   whether   the   latter   is   an   unauthorized   reproduction   of   the   former.   This   linkage  of  the  copyrighted  films  to  the  pirated  films  must   be   established   to   satisfy   the   requirements   of   probable   cause.   Mere   allegations   as   to   the   existence   of   the   copyrighted  films  cannot  serve  as  basis  for  the  issuance   of  a  search  warrant.    

  Acting   on   the   applications,   then   RTC   Judge   Maria   Alicia   M.   Austria   conducted   a   joint   hearing   during   which   she   made   a   personal   examination   of   the   applicant   and   his   witnesses.   Finding   just   and   probable   cause   for   granting   the   application   at   the   time,   Judge   Austria   issued   the   corresponding   Search   Warrants   numbered   95,   96,   and   97.     Doctrine:   It  is  not  correct  to  say  that  "the  basic  fact"  to  be  proven   to  establish  probable  cause  in  the  instant  cases  is  not  the   "unauthorized   transfer"   of   a   motion   picture   that   has   been   recorded   but   the   "sale,   lease,   or   distribution   of   pirated  video  tapes  of  copyrighted  films."     In   applying   for   the   search   warrants   the   NBI   charged   violation  of  the  entire  provisions  of  Section  56  of  P.D.  No.   49  as  amended  by  P.D.  No.  1988.  This  included  not  only   the   sale,   lease   or   distribution   of   pirated   tapes   but   also   the   transfer   or   causing   to   be   transferred   of   any   sound   recording  or  motion  picture  or  other  audio  visual  work.     But   even   assuming,   as   appellants   argue,   that   only   the   sale,   lease,   or   distribution   of   pirated   video   tapes   is   involved,  the  fact  remains  that  there  is  need  to  establish   probable   cause   that   the   tapes   being   sold,   leased   or   distributed   are   pirated   tapes,   hence   the   issue   reverts   back  to  the  question  of  whether  there  was  unauthorized   transfer,   directly   or   indirectly,   of   a   sound   recording   or   motion  picture  or  other  audio  visual  work  that  has  been   recorded.    

COLUMBIA  PICTURES,  INC.,  ET  AL.  V.  CA  (1996)   Refresher:   Complainants   thru   counsel   lodged   a   formal   complaint   with   the   NBI   for   violation   of   PD   49,   as   amended,   and   sought   its   assistance   in   their   anti-­‐film   piracy   drive.     Agents   of   the   NBI   and   private   researchers   made   discreet   surveillance   on   various   video   establishments   in   Metro   Manila  including  Sunshine  Home  Video  Inc.  (Sunshine  for   brevity),  owned  and  operated  by  Danilo  A.  Pelindario.     NBI   Senior   Agent   Lauro   C.   Reyes   applied   for   a   search   warrant   with   the   court   a   quo   against   Sunshine   seeking   the   seizure,   among   others,   of   pirated   video   tapes   of   copyrighted  films  all  of  which  were  enumerated  in  a  list   attached   to   the   application;   and,   television   sets,   video   cassettes   and/or   laser   disc   recordings   equipment   and   other   machines   and   paraphernalia   used   or   intended   to   be   used   in   the   unlawful   exhibition,   showing,   reproduction,   sale,   lease   or   disposition   of   videograms   tapes  in  the  premises  above  described.       Main   issue:   Retroactive   application   to   the   present   controversy   of   the   ruling   in   20th   Century   Fox   Film   Corporation  vs.  Court  of  Appeals,  et  al.,  promulgated  on   August  19,  1988,  that  for  the  determination  of  probable  

COLUMBIA  PICTURES,  INC.,  ET  AL.  V.  CA  (1994)   Refresher:   On   07   April   1988,   the   NBI,   through   its   Agent   Lauro   C.   Reyes,  filed  with  the  Pasig  RTC  3  applications  for  search   warrant   against   private   respondents   Tube   Video   Enterprises   and   Edward   C.   Cham,   the   Blooming   Rose   Tape  Center  and  Ma.  Jajorie  T.  Uy,  and  the  Video  Channel   and   Lydia   Nabong,   charging   said   respondents   with   violation   of   Section   56   of   PD   49,   as   amended   by   P.D.   No.   1988.  

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Intellectual Property Law cause   to   support   the   issuance   of   a   search   warrant   in   copyright   infringement   cases   involving   videograms,   the   production   of   the   master   tape   for   comparison   with   the   allegedly  pirated  copies  is  necessary.     Doctrine:   Mindful  as  we  are  of  the  ramifications  of  the  doctrine  of   stare   decisis   and   the   rudiments   of   fair   play,   it   is   our   considered  view  that  the  20th  Century  Fox  ruling  cannot   be  retroactively  applied  to  the  instant  case  to  justify  the   quashal  of  Search  Warrant  No.  87-­‐053.    Herein  petitioners’   consistent   position   that   the   order   of   the   lower   court   of   September   5,   1988   denying   therein   defendants’   motion   to   lift   the   order   of   search   warrant   was   properly   issued,   there  having  been  satisfactory  compliance  with  the  then   prevailing  standards  under  the  law  for  determination  of   probable   cause,   is   indeed   well   taken.     The   lower   court   could   not   possibly   have   expected   more   evidence   from   petitioners  in  their  application  for  a  search  warrant  other   than   what   the   law   and   jurisprudence,   then   existing   and   judicially   accepted,   required   with   respect   to   the   finding   of  probable  cause.    

done  after  the  ten-­‐year   period   has   lapsed   —   since   1960   and   1964   were   both   leap   years   and   the   case   was   thus   filed   two   (2)   days   too   late.   Since   this   case   was   filed   on   September   3,   1965,   it   was   filed   one   day   too   late;   considering   that   the   730th   day   fell   on   September   2,   1965   —  the  year  1964  being  a  leap  year.    

LAKTAW  V.  PAGLINAWAN  (1918)   Refresher:   In  the  complaint  presented  in  the  Court  of  First  Instance   of   the   City   of   Manila   on   February   20,   1915,   it   was   alleged:   (1)   That   the   plaintiff   was,   according   to   the   laws   regulating   literary   properties,   the   registered   owner   and   author   of   a   literary   work   entitled   Diccionario   Hispano-­‐ Tagalog   (Spanish-­‐Tagalog   Dictionary)   published   in   the   City   of   Manila   in   1889   by   the   printing   establishment   La   Opinion,   and   a   copy   of   which   was   attached   to   the   complaint,   as   Exhibit   A;   (2)   that   the   defendant,   without   the   consent   of   the   plaintiff,   reproduced   said   literary   work,  improperly  copied  the  greater  part  thereof  in  the   work   published   by   him   and   entitled   Diccionariong   Kastila-­‐Tagalog   (Spanish-­‐Tagalog   Dictionary),   a   copy   of   which   was   also   attached   to   the   complaint   as   Exhibit   B;   (3)  that  said  act  of  the  defendant,  which  is  a  violation  of   article   7   of   the   Law   of   January   10,   1879,   on   Intellectual   Property,   caused   irreparable   injuries   to   the   plaintiff,   who   was  surprised  when,  on  publishing  his  new  work  entitled   Diccionario   Tagalog-­‐Hispano   (Tagalog-­‐Spanish   Dictionary)   he   learned   of   the   fact,   and   (4)   that   the   damages  occasioned  to  the  plaintiff  by  the  publication  of   defendant's   work   amounted   to   $10,000.   The   plaintiff   therefore   prayed   the   court   to   order   the   defendant   to   withdraw   from   sale   all   stock   of   the   work   herein   identified   as   Exhibit   B   and   to   pay   the   plaintiff   the   sum   of   $10,000,  with  costs.     Doctrine:   In   the   judgment   appealed   from,   the   court   gives   one   to   understand  that  the  reproduction  of  another's  dictionary   without   the   owner's   consent   does   not   constitute   a   violation   of   the   Law   of   Intellectual   Property   for   the   court's   idea   of   a   dictionary   is   stated   in   the   decision   itself,   as  follows:     Dictionaries   have   to   be   made   with   the   aid   of   others,   and   they   are   improved   by   the   increase   of   words.   What   may   be   said   of   a   pasture   ground   may   be   said   also   of   a   dictionary,   i.   e.,   that  it  should  be  common  property  for  all  who   may   desire   to   write   a   new   dictionary,   and   the   defendant   has   come   to   this   pasture   ground   and   taken   whatever   he   needed   from   it   in   the   exercise  of  a  perfect  right.     Such   idea   is   very   erroneous,   especially   in   relation   to   the   Law   of   Intellectual   Property.   Danvilla   y   Collado   the   author   of   the   Law   of   January   10,   1879,   on   Intellectual   Property,   which   was   discussed   and   approved   in   the  

PEOPLE  V.  RAMOS  (1978)   Refresher:   Soccorro   Ramos,   as   the   proprietor   aid   general   manager   of   the   National   Book   Store,   as   enterprise   engaged   in   the   business   of   publishing,   selling   and   distributing   books,   was   charged   with   copyright   infringement   for   willfully   and  illegally  selling  and  distributing  spurious  and  pirated   copies   of   the   high   school   textbook,   entitled   General   Science  Today  for  Philippine  School,  First  Year,  by  Gilam,   Van  Houten  and  Cornista,  which  was  duly  copyrighted  by   the   Phoenix   Publishing   House,   Inc.,   and   was   being   distributed  exclusively  by  its  sister  corporation,  Alemar's   or  Sibal  and  Sons,  Inc.  The  alleged  act  happened  on  July   –   September   1963.   The   criminal   cases   were   filed   on   September  1965.     Issue:  Whether  or  not  the  extra  day  in  the  leap  year,  1964   should  be  taken  into  consideration  in  the  computation  of   the   two-­‐year   period   of   prescription   provided   in   Section   24  of  the  copyright  law.     Held:   Resolution   of   this   issue   hinges,   in   turn,   on   whether   February   28,   and   29   of   a   leap   year,   1964,   should   be   counted  as  one  day,  as  proposed  by  the  prosecution;  or   as  separate  days,  as  alleged  by  the  defense.     This  issue  which  was  in  1965  still  undetermined  is  now  a   settled  matter.  It  was  held  in  1969  in  Namarco  vs.  Tuazon     that  February  28  and  29  of  a  leap  year  should  be  counted   as   separate   days   in   computing   periods   of   prescription.   Thus,   this   Court,   speaking   thru   former   Chief   Justice   Roberto   Concepcion,   held   that   where   the   prescriptive   period   was   supposed   to   commence   on   December   21,   1955,  the  filing  of  the  action  on  December  21,  1965,  was  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   Spanish   Cortes,   in   his   work   entitled   La   Propiedad   Intelectual   (page   362,   1st   ed.)   states   with   respect   to   dictionaries  and  in  relation  to  article  7  of  said  law:     The  protection  of  the  law  cannot  be  denied  to   the   author   of   a   dictionary,   for   although   words   are   not   the   property   of   anybody,   their   definitions,   the   example   that   explain   their   sense,   and   the   manner   of   expressing   their   different   meanings,   may   constitute   a   special   work.   On   this   point,   the   correctional   court   of   the   Seine   held,   on   August   16,   1864,   that   a   dictionary   constitutes   property,   although   some   of   the   words   therein   are   explained   by   mere   definitions   expressed   in   a   few   lines   and   sanctioned   by   usage,   provided   that   the   greater   part  of  the  other  words  contain  new  meanings;   new   meanings   which   evidently   may   only   belonged   to   the   first   person   who   published   them.     In   addition   to   what   has   been   said,   according   to   article   428   of   the   Civil   Code,   the   author   of   a   literary,   scientific,   or   artistic   work,   has   the   right   to   exploit   it   and   dispose   thereof   at   will.   In   relation   to   this   right,   there   exists   the   exclusive  right  of  the  author,  who  is  the  absolute  owner   of  his  own  work,  to  produce  it,  according  to  article  2  of   the   Law   of   January   10,   1879,   and   consequently,   nobody   may   reproduce   it,   without   his   permission,   not   even   to   annotate   or   add   something   to   it,   or   to   improve   any   edition   thereof,   according   to   article   7   of   said   law.   Manresa,   in   his   commentaries   on   article   429   of   the   Civil   Code   (vol.   3,   p.   633,   3d   ed.)   says   that   the   concrete   statement   of   the   right   to   literary   properties   is   found   in   the   legal   doctrine   according   to   which   nobody   may   reproduce   another   person's   work,   without   the   consent   of   his   owner,   or   even   to   annotate   or   add   something   to   it   or   to   improve   any   edition   thereof.   And   on   page   616   of   said  volume,  Manresa  says  the  following:     He   who   writes   a   book,   or   carves   a   statue,   or   makes   an   invention,   has   the   absolute   right   to   reproduce   or   sell   it,   just   as   the   owner   of   land   has  the  absolute  right  to  sell  it  or  its  fruits.  But   while   the   owner   of   land,   by   selling   it   and   its   fruits,   perhaps   fully   realizes   all   its   economic   value,   by   receiving   its   benefits   and   utilities,   which  are  presented,  for  example,  by  the  price,   on  the  other  hand  the  author  of   a  book,  statue   or  invention,  does  not  reap  all  the  benefits  and   advantages  of  his  own  property  by  disposing  of   it,  for  the  most  important  form  of  realizing  the   economic   advantages   of   a   book,   statue   or   invention,   consists   in   the   right   to   reproduce   it   in   similar   or   like   copies,   everyone   of   which   serves  to  give  to  the  person  reproducing  them   all  the  conditions  which  the  original  requires  in   order   to   give   the   author   the   full   enjoyment  

thereof.   If   the   author   of   a   book,   after   its   publication,   cannot   prevent   its   reproduction   by   any   person   who   may   want   to   reproduce   it,   then  the  property  right  granted  him  is  reduced   to   a   very   insignificant   thing   and   the   effort   made   in   the   production   of   the   book   is   no   way   rewarded.     Indeed   the   property   right   recognized   and   protected   by   the   Law   of   January   10,   1879,   on   Intellectual   Property,   would  be  illusory  if,  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  said  law  is   no   longer   in   force   as   a   consequence   of   the   change   of   sovereignty   in   these   Islands,   the   author   of   a   work,   who   has  the  exclusive  right  to  reproduce  it,  could  not  prevent   another   person   from   so   doing   without   his   consent,   and   could   not   enforce   this   right   through   the   courts   of   justice   in  order  to  prosecute  the  violator  of  this  legal  provision   and   the   defrauder   or   usurper   of   his   right,   for   he   could   not   obtain   the   full   enjoyment   of   the   book   or   other   work,   and   his   property   right   thereto,   which   is   recognized   by   law,   would   be   reduced,   as   Manresa   says,   to   an   insignificant  thing,  if  he  should  have  no  more  right  than   that  of  selling  his  work.    

HABANA,   CINCO   AND   FERNANDO   V.   ROBLES   AND   GOODWILL  TRADING  CO.,  INC.  (1999)   Refresher:   Petitioners   are   authors   and   copyright   owners   of   duly   issued   certificates   of   copyright   registration   covering   their  published  works,  produced  through  their  combined   resources   and   efforts,   entitled   COLLEGE   ENGLISH   FOR   TODAY  (CET  for  brevity),  Books  1  and  2,  and  WORKBOOK   FOR  COLLEGE  FRESHMAN  ENGLISH,  Series  1.     Respondent   Felicidad   Robles   and   Goodwill   Trading   Co.,   Inc.   are   the   author/publisher   and   distributor/seller   of   another  published  work  entitled  “DEVELOPING  ENGLISH   PROFICIENCY”   (DEP   for   brevity),   Books   1   and   2   (1985   edition)  which  book  was  covered  by  copyrights  issued  to   them.     In   the   course   of   revising   their   published   works,   petitioners   scouted   and   looked   around   various   bookstores  to  check  on  other  textbooks  dealing  with  the   same   subject   matter.   By   chance   they   came   upon   the   book   of   respondent   Robles   and   upon   perusal   of   said   book   they   were   surprised   to   see   that   the   book   was   strikingly  similar  to  the  contents,  scheme  of  presentation,   illustrations  and  illustrative  examples  in  their  own  book,   CET.     After   an   itemized   examination   and   comparison   of   the   two   books   (CET   and   DEP),   petitioners   found   that   several   pages   of   the   respondent’s   book   are   similar,   if   not   all   together   a   copy   of   petitioners’   book,   which   is   a   case   of   plagiarism  and  copyright  infringement.    

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Intellectual Property Law Respondent   Robles   denied   the   allegations   of   plagiarism   and   copying   that   petitioners   claimed.     Respondent   stressed   that   (1)   the   book   DEP   is   the   product   of   her   independent   researches,   studies   and   experiences,   and   was   not   a   copy   of   any   existing   valid   copyrighted   book;   (2)   DEP   followed   the   scope   and   sequence   or   syllabus   which   are   common   to   all   English   grammar   writers   as   recommended   by   the   Association   of   Philippine   Colleges   of  Arts  and  Sciences  (APCAS),  so  any  similarity  between   the   respondents   book   and   that   of   the   petitioners   was   due  to  the  orientation  of  the  authors  to  both  works  and   standards   and   syllabus;   and   (3)   the   similarities   may   be   due   to   the   authors’   exercise   of   the   “right   to   fair   use   of   copyrighted  materials,  as  guides.”     Doctrine:   We   believe   that   respondent   Robles’   act   of   lifting   from   the   book   of   petitioners   substantial   portions   of   discussions   and   examples,   and   her   failure   to   acknowledge  the  same  in  her  book  is  an  infringement  of   petitioners’  copyrights.     When   is   there   a   substantial   reproduction   of   a   book?     It   does   not   necessarily   require   that   the   entire   copyrighted   work,  or  even  a  large  portion  of  it,  be  copied.    If  so  much   is   taken   that   the   value   of   the   original   work   is   substantially   diminished,   there   is   an   infringement   of   copyright   and   to   an   injurious   extent,   the   work   is   appropriated.     In  determining  the  question  of  infringement,  the  amount   of   matter   copied   from   the   copyrighted   work   is   an   important   consideration.     To   constitute   infringement,   it   is   not   necessary   that   the   whole   or   even   a   large   portion   of  the  work  shall  have  been  copied.    If  so  much  is  taken   that   the   value   of   the   original   is   sensibly   diminished,   or   the  labors  of  the  original  author  are  substantially  and  to   an   injurious   extent   appropriated   by   another,   that   is   sufficient  in  point  of  law  to  constitute  piracy.     The   essence   of   intellectual   piracy   should   be   essayed   in   conceptual  terms  in  order  to  underscore  its  gravity  by  an   appropriate   understanding   thereof.     Infringement   of   a   copyright   is   a   trespass   on   a   private   domain   owned   and   occupied  by  the  owner  of  the  copyright,  and,  therefore,   protected   by   law,   and   infringement   of   copyright,   or   piracy,   which   is   a   synonymous   term   in   this   connection,   consists   in   the   doing   by   any   person,   without   the   consent   of  the  owner  of  the  copyright,  of  anything  the  sole  right   to  do  which  is  conferred  by  statute  on  the  owner  of  the   copyright.     The   respondents’   claim   that   the   copied   portions   of   the   book   CET   are   also   found   in   foreign   books   and   other   grammar   books,   and   that   the   similarity   between   her   style   and   that   of   petitioners   can   not   be   avoided   since   they   come   from   the   same   background   and   orientation  

may  be  true.    However,  in  this  jurisdiction  under  Sec  184   of  Republic  Act  8293  it  is  provided  that:     Limitations   on   Copyright.   Notwithstanding   the   provisions  of  Chapter  V,  the  following  shall  not   constitute  infringement  of  copyright:     x  x  x  x       (c)  The  making  of  quotations  from  a  published   work   if   they   are   compatible   with   fair   use   and   only   to   the   extent   justified   for   the   purpose,   including   quotations   from   newspaper   articles   and  periodicals  in  the  form  of  press  summaries:     Provided,  That  the  source  and  the  name  of  the   author,   if   appearing   on   the   work,   are   mentioned.     A  copy  of  a  piracy  is  an  infringement  of  the  original,  and   it   is   no   defense   that   the   pirate,   in   such   cases,   did   not   know  whether  or  not  he  was  infringing  any  copyright;  he   at   least   knew   that   what   he   was   copying   was   not   his,   and   he  copied  at  his  peril.     The   next   question   to   resolve   is   to   what   extent   can   copying   be   injurious   to   the   author   of   the   book   being   copied.   Is   it   enough   that   there   are   similarities   in   some   sections  of  the  books  or  large  segments  of  the  books  are   the  same?     In   cases   of   infringement,   copying   alone   is   not   what   is   prohibited.     The   copying   must   produce   an     “injurious   effect”.     Here,   the   injury   consists   in   that   respondent   Robles  lifted  from  petitioners’  book  materials  that  were   the   result   of   the   latter’s   research   work   and   compilation   and  misrepresented  them  as  her  own.    She  circulated  the   book   DEP   for   commercial   use   and   did   not   acknowledge   petitioners  as  her  source.     Hence,   there   is   a   clear   case   of   appropriation   of   copyrighted  work  for  her  benefit  that  respondent  Robles   committed.     Petitioners’   work   as   authors   is   the   product   of  their  long  and  assiduous  research  and  for  another  to   represent   it   as   her   own   is   injury   enough.     In   copyrighting   books   the   purpose   is   to   give   protection   to   the   intellectual  product  of  an  author.    This  is  precisely  what   the  law  on  copyright  protected,  under  Section  184.1  (b).     Quotations  from  a  published  work  if  they  are  compatible   with   fair   use   and   only   to   the   extent   justified   by   the   purpose,   including   quotations   from   newspaper   articles   and   periodicals   in   the   form   of   press   summaries   are   allowed   provided   that   the   source   and   the   name   of   the   author,  if  appearing  on  the  work,  are  mentioned.     In   the   case   at   bar,   the   least   that   respondent   Robles   could   have   done   was   to   acknowledge   petitioners   Habana  et.  al.  as  the  source  of  the  portions  of  DEP.    The   final   product   of   an   author’s   toil   is   her   book.     To   allow  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   another   to   copy   the   book   without   appropriate   acknowledgment  is  injury  enough.    

the  terms  thereof.    In  his  reply  dated  February  17,  1986,   Vergara   protested   the   unilateral   action   of   SMI,   saying   it   was   without   basis.     In   the   same   letter,   he   pushed   for   the   signing  of  the  contract  for  SM  Cubao.     Two  years  later,  Metro  Industrial  Services,  the  company   formerly   contracted   by   Pearl   and   Dean   to   fabricate   its   display   units,   offered   to   construct   light   boxes   for   Shoemart’s  chain  of  stores.    SMI  approved  the  proposal   and  ten  (10)  light  boxes  were  subsequently  fabricated  by   Metro   Industrial   for   SMI.     After   its   contract   with   Metro   Industrial   was   terminated,   SMI   engaged   the   services   of   EYD  Rainbow  Advertising  Corporation  to  make  the  light   boxes.     Some   300   units   were   fabricated   in   1991.     These   were  delivered  on  a  staggered  basis  and  installed  at  SM   Megamall  and  SM  City.     Sometime  in  1989,  Pearl  and  Dean,  received  reports  that   exact   copies   of   its   light   boxes   were   installed   at   SM   City   and   in   the   fastfood   section   of   SM   Cubao.     Upon   investigation,  Pearl  and  Dean  found  out  that  aside  from   the  two  (2)  reported  SM  branches,  light  boxes  similar  to   those   it   manufactures   were   also   installed   in   two   (2)   other   SM   stores.     It   further   discovered   that   defendant-­‐ appellant  North  Edsa  Marketing  Inc.  (NEMI),  through  its   marketing  arm,  Prime  Spots  Marketing  Services,  was  set   up   primarily   to   sell   advertising   space   in   lighted   display   units  located  in  SMI’s  different  branches.    Pearl  and  Dean   noted  that  NEMI  is  a  sister  company  of  SMI.     Doctrine:   On  copyright  infringement:   Petitioner’s  application  for  a  copyright  certificate  clearly   stated   that   it   was   for   a   class   “O”   work   under   Section   2(O)   of   PD   49   (The   Intellectual   Property   Decree)   which   was   the   statute   then   prevailing.     Said   Section   2   expressly   enumerated  the  works  subject  to  copyright:     (O)   Prints,   pictorial   illustrations,   advertising   copies,  labels,  tags,  and  box  wraps;     Although   petitioner’s   copyright   certificate   was   entitled   “Advertising   Display   Units”   (which   depicted   the   box-­‐ type   electrical   devices),   its   claim   of   copyright   infringement  cannot  be  sustained.     Copyright,   in   the   strict   sense   of   the   term,   is   purely   a   statutory  right.    Being  a  mere  statutory  grant,  the  rights   are   limited   to   what   the   statute   confers.     It   may   be   obtained   and   enjoyed   only   with   respect   to   the   subjects   and   by   the   persons,   and   on   terms   and   conditions   specified   in   the   statute.   Accordingly,   it   can   cover   only   the   works   falling   within   the   statutory   enumeration   or   description.     P  &  D  secured  its  copyright  under  the  classification  class   “O”   work.     This   being   so,   petitioner’s   copyright   protection   extended   only   to   the   technical   drawings   and  

JOAQUIN   AND   BJ   PRODUCTIONS,   INC.   V.   DRILON,   ET   AL.   (1999),  SUPRA   Refresher:   Rhoda  and  Me  and  It’s  a  Date  dating  game  show.     Doctrine:   P.D.   No.   49,   2,   in   enumerating   what   are   subject   to   copyright,  refers  to  finished  works  and  not  to  concepts.   The   copyright   does   not   extend   to   an   idea,   procedure,   process,  system,  method  of  operation,  concept,  principle,   or   discovery,   regardless   of   the   form   in   which   it   is   described,   explained,   illustrated,   or   embodied   in   such   work.    

PEARL  &  DEAN  (PHIL),  INC.  V.  SHOEMART,  INC.  AND  NORTH   EDSA  MARKETING,  INC.  (2003)   Refresher:   Plaintiff-­‐appellant   Pearl   and   Dean   (Phil.),   Inc.   is   a   corporation   engaged   in   the   manufacture   of   advertising   display   units   simply   referred   to   as   light   boxes.     These   units   utilize   specially   printed   posters   sandwiched   between  plastic  sheets  and  illuminated  with  back  lights.     Pearl   and   Dean   was   able   to   secure   a   Certificate   of   Copyright  Registration  dated  January  20,  1981  over  these   illuminated   display   units.     The   advertising   light   boxes   were  marketed  under  the  trademark  “Poster  Ads”.    The   application   for   registration   of   the   trademark   was   filed   with  the  Bureau  of  Patents,  Trademarks  and  Technology   Transfer   on   June   20,   1983,   but   was   approved   only   on   September   12,   1988,   per   Registration   No.   41165.     From   1981   to   about   1988,   Pearl   and   Dean   employed   the   services   of   Metro   Industrial   Services   to   manufacture   its   advertising  displays.     Sometime   in   1985,   Pearl   and   Dean   negotiated   with   defendant-­‐appellant   Shoemart,   Inc.   (SMI)   for   the   lease   and  installation  of  the  light  boxes  in  SM  City  North  Edsa.     Since   SM   City   North   Edsa   was   under   construction   at   that   time,   SMI   offered   as   an   alternative,   SM   Makati   and   SM   Cubao,  to  which  Pearl  and  Dean  agreed.    On  September   11,   1985,   Pearl   and   Dean’s   General   Manager,   Rodolfo   Vergara,   submitted   for   signature   the   contracts   covering   SM   Cubao   and   SM   Makati   to   SMI’s   Advertising   Promotions   and   Publicity   Division   Manager,   Ramonlito   Abano.    Only  the  contract  for  SM  Makati,  however,  was   returned   signed.     On   October   4,   1985,   Vergara   wrote   Abano  inquiring  about  the  other  contract  and  reminding   him   that   their   agreement   for   installation   of   light   boxes   was   not   only   for   its   SM   Makati   branch,   but   also   for   SM   Cubao.    SMI  did  not  bother  to  reply.     Instead,   in   a   letter   dated   January   14,   1986,   SMI’s   house   counsel   informed   Pearl   and   Dean   that   it   was   rescinding   the   contract   for   SM   Makati   due   to   non-­‐performance   of  

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Intellectual Property Law not  to  the  light  box  itself  because  the  latter  was  not  at  all   in   the   category   of   “prints,   pictorial   illustrations,   advertising   copies,   labels,   tags   and   box   wraps.”     Stated   otherwise,   even   as   we   find   that   P   &   D   indeed   owned   a   valid  copyright,  the  same  could  have  referred  only  to  the   technical   drawings   within   the   category   of   “pictorial   illustrations.”    It  could  not  have  possibly  stretched  out  to   include  the  underlying  light  box.    The  strict  application  of   the   law’s   enumeration   in   Section   2   prevents   us   from   giving   petitioner   even   a   little   leeway,   that   is,   even   if   its   copyright   certificate   was   entitled   “Advertising   Display   Units.”    What  the  law  does  not  include,  it  excludes,  and   for   the   good   reason:   the   light   box   was   not   a   literary   or   artistic   piece   which   could   be   copyrighted   under   the   copyright   law.     And   no   less   clearly,   neither   could   the   lack   of   statutory   authority   to   make   the   light   box   copyrightable   be   remedied   by   the   simplistic   act   of   entitling  the  copyright  certificate  issued  by  the  National   Library  as  “Advertising  Display  Units.”     On  unfair  competition:   By   the   nature   of   things,   there   can   be   no   unfair   competition   under   the   law   on   copyrights   although   it   is   applicable  to  disputes  over  the  use  of  trademarks.  Even   a   name   or   phrase   incapable   of   appropriation   as   a   trademark  or  tradename  may,  by  long  and  exclusive  use   by   a   business   (such   that   the   name   or   phrase   becomes   associated   with   the   business   or   product   in   the   mind   of   the  purchasing  public),  be  entitled  to  protection  against   unfair   competition.   In   this   case,   there   was   no   evidence   that  P  &  D’s  use  of  “Poster  Ads”  was  distinctive  or  well-­‐ known.   As   noted   by   the   Court   of   Appeals,   petitioner’s   expert  witnesses  himself  had  testified  that  “  ‘Poster  Ads’   was  too  generic  a  name.  So  it  was  difficult  to  identify  it   with   any   company,   honestly   speaking.”   This   crucial   admission   by   its   own   expert   witness   that   “Poster   Ads”   could  not  be  associated  with  P  &  D  showed  that,  in  the   mind   of   the   public,   the   goods   and   services   carrying   the   trademark   “Poster   Ads”   could   not   be   distinguished   from   the  goods  and  services  of  other  entities.     12  January  2012     Infringement   -­‐ Violation   of   the   rights   exclusively   granted   by   law  to  the  copyright  owner.   -­‐ Exception:   o Fair  use   o Limitations  to  copyright     Remedies:   1. Civil   2. Criminal   3. Administrative     NOTE:   SC   issued   a   circular   à   IP   case   shall   be   filed   in   courts  designated  as  commercial  courts    

Issue:  Validity  of  the  rule?     -­‐ Q:   If   you   were   a   commercial   court   judge   hearing   a   criminal   case   (1st   offense)   and   a   motion   to   quash   was   filed   by,   how   would   you   uphold  your  jurisdiction?   o Note:   BP   129,   jurisdiction   for   the   1st   offense  is  lodged  in  the  MTC     HW  Answer  (Marie  Estrella)   Jurisdiction  over  the  subject  matter  of  a  case  is   conferred   by   law   and   is   determined   by   the   allegations   of   the   complaint,   irrespective   of   whether   the   plaintiff   is   entitled   to   all   or   some   of  the  claims  asserted  therein.  (Intestate  Estate   of  Alexander  Ty  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  356  SCRA   661)   What   determines   the   jurisdiction   of   the   court   in   criminal   cases   is   the   extent   of   the   penalty   which   the   law   imposes   for   the   misdemeanor,  crime  or  violation  charged  in  the   complaint.   (People   vs.   Fajardo,   49   Phil.,   206,   210)     With   the   penal   provisions   of   the   Intellectual   Property   Code,   we   are   baffled   with   issue,   “ Which  court  has  jurisdiction.”  The  provision   of  the  Code  on  jurisdiction  is  not  any  much  help   either.  It  simply  provides  that  without  prejudice   to   the   provisions   of   Subsection   7.1(c),   actions   under  this  Act  shall  be  cognizable  by  the  courts   with   appropriate   jurisdiction   under   existing   law.   The   existing   law   conferring   jurisdiction   to   our  courts  is  Batas  Pambansa  Blg.  129  (BP  129),   or   the   Judiciary   Reorganization   Act   of   1980.   Under   Section   32   of   BP   129,   Municipal   Trial   Courts   (MTC)   shall   have   exclusive   original   jurisdiction   over   all   offenses   punishable   with   imprisonment   not   exceeding   six   (6)   years   irrespective   of   the   amount   of   fine,   and   regardless   of   all   other   impossible   of   accessory   penalties.   Taking   only   this   into   consideration,   we   are   led   to   conclude   that   with   the   first   and   second   offenses,   the   MTC   has   jurisdiction.   However,   we   also   know   that   all   IP   cases   are   heard   by   the   Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC)   acting   as   Special   Commercial   Court.   (A.M.   N0.   03-­‐03-­‐ 03-­‐SC,  JULY  01,  2003)     To   reconcile   the   seeming   conflict,   I   think   it   is   also   useful   to   refer   to   Section   23   of   BP   129   which  enables  the  Supreme  Court  to  designate   certain   branches   of   the   Regional   Trial   Courts   to   handle   exclusively   criminal   cases,   juvenile   and   domestic   cases,   agrarian   cases,   urban   land   reform   cases   which   do   not   fall   under   the   jurisdiction   of   quasi-­‐judicial   bodies   and   agencies  and/or  such  other  special  cases  as  the   Supreme   Court   may   determine   in   the   interest   of   a   speedy   and   efficient   administration   of  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   justice.   With   this   provision,   the   Supreme   Court,   to   streamline   and   promote   expediency   and   efficiency,  designated  the  Regional  Trial  Courts,   as   Special   Commercial   Courts   to   exclusively   hear  IP  cases.     I  think,  in  the  construction  of  laws  such  as  the   one   before   us,   we   are   enjoined   to   read   and   construe   them   together   and   try   to   reconcile   them.  In  this  case,  I  think  we  can  reconcile  the   IPC   and   BP   129   by   construing   that   IPC   is   a   special  law  and,  as  such,  is  an  exception  to  the   general   rule   that   jurisdiction   is   determined   by   the  extent  of  the  penalty  the  law  imposes.  We   can  also  use  the  interpretation  that  the  general   law  yields  to  the  special  law.     Lastly,  taking  into  consideration  the  purpose  of   BP   129,   which   I   think   is   to   ultimately   promote   justice,   expediency   and   efficiency,   the   designation   of   the   RTC   as   Special   Commercial   Courts  works  to  towards  this  end.      

nationwide     Criminal  penalties   -­‐ No  accessories/  accomplices   o It  is  a  special  law   -­‐ Infringer  and  those  who  aids  and  abets  =  same   penalty   -­‐ Note:   the   law   does   not   have   a   definition   of   “aiding  or  abetting”  =  quite  broad     Issue:  Can  a  consumer  be  liable  for  aiding  or  abetting?     HW  Answer  (Katrina  Mancao):   The   buyer   of   products   that   infringe   on   the   copyright  of  another  may  not  be  held  liable  for   aiding  and  abetting.     Section   217.1   of   the   Intellectual   Property   Code   makes   any   person   aiding   or   abetting   an   infringement   criminally   liable.   The   law,   however,  does  not  define  what  actions  may  be   considered   as   aiding   or   abetting.   Unlike   the   other   acts   of   infringement,   this   provision   is   vague,   and   thus   calls   for   an   application   of   the   rule   on   statutory   construction.   On   this   issue,   I   propose   that   the   provision   be   construed   liberally  in  favor  of  the  buyers.     The  act  of  aiding  and  abetting  an  infringement   imposes   a   criminal   liability   upon   the   person   charged   with   the   offense.   The   first   offense   alone   merits   an   imprisonment   of   1   year   to   3   years,   plus   a   fine   ranging   from   P50,000.00   to   P150,000.00.   I   believe   that   the   gravity   the   law   placed   on   the   offense,   and   the   excessiveness   of  the  penalty  and  fines  imposed  on  it  calls  for   the   application   of   the   legal   maxim   nullum   crimen,  nulla  poena  sine  lege.  There  is  no  crime   when   there   is   no   law   punishing   it.   To   be   punishable,   the   act   must   be   clearly   defined   by   the  legislature  as  a  criminal  act.  The  Intellectual   Property  Code  does  not  explicitly  define  aiding   or  abetting.  Neither  does  it  punish  mere  buying   or   possession   of   an   infringing   material.   The   absence   of   any   intention   by   the   legislature   to   punish   the   buyers   of   an   infringing   material   makes  it  not  punishable  under  our  jurisdiction.     Moreover,  punishing  the  act  violates  Article  III,   Section  14,  paragraph  1  of  the  1987  Constitution   which   states,   “No   person   shall   be   held   to   answer   for   a   criminal   offense   without   due   process  of  law.”  The  constitutional  right  to  due   process   requires   that   the   law   accord   people   fair   notice   of   which   conduct   to   avoid.   Otherwise,   the   law   may   be   said   to   undermine   due   process   in   two   respects:   (1)   in   failing   to   accord   persons   fair   notice   of   the   conduct   to  

  Civil  Remedies:   1. Injunction  –  this  is  a  critical  provisional  remedy   so  that  the  infringing  activity  stops   2. Damages   –   plaintiff   is   only   required   to   prove   gross  sales   o If  gross  sales  was  not  proved  –  court   is  given  leeway   3. Impounding   4. Destruction   5. Other  damages     Criminal  remedy:   -­‐ Why   is   this   more   effective   than   civil   and   administrative  remedies?   o Because   of   the   notoriety   of   criminal   cases   à   defendant   has   reputation   concerns;   moreover,   people   value   liberty     How  do  you  best  initiate  case  against  infringers?   -­‐ By  obtaining  a  search  warrant.   o Timeliness     o Ex  parte  (no  notice)   o No  premature  disclosure  of  the  fact     -­‐ Search  and  seizure  in  civil  actions   o Ma’am:   Dangerous   to   constitutional   rights.   It   is   very   much   similar   to   a   criminal  search  warrant.   § Differences:     • Bond  requirement   • Independent   commissioner   o Where  do  you  apply?   § Metro  Manila   § Writs   are   imposable  

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Intellectual Property Law avoid,  and  (2)  in  giving  law  enforcers  unbridled   discretion   in   implementing   the   provisions   of   the   law.   The   provision   on   aiding   and   abetting   does   just   that.   In   failing   to   define   or   describe   acts   that   may   be   considered   as   falling   within   the  provision,  it  does  not  reasonably  notify  the   public  that  mere  buying  of  infringing  material  is   criminally   punishable.   It   does   not,   therefore,   afford  them  with  the  opportunity  to  stop  doing   the  act  to  avoid  criminal  liability.     HW  Answer  (Marie  Estrella):   It   is   an   elementary   rule   of   statutory   construction   that   penal   laws   are   strictly   construed   against   the   State   and   liberally   in   favor   of   the   accused.   (People   vs   Subido,   66   SCRA   545)     Penal   statutes   cannot   be   enlarged   or   extended   by   intendment,   implication,   or   any   equitable   consideration.   (People   vs   Garcia,   85   Phil.  651)     Section   217   of   the   Intellectual   property   Code   (IPC)  of  the  Philippines  provides:     Art.   217-­‐217.1.   Any   person   infringing   any   right   secured   by   provisions   of   Part   IV   of   this   Act   or   aiding   or   abetting   such   infringement   shall   be   guilty  of  a  crime  punishable  by:     (a)   Imprisonment   of   one   (1)   year  to  three  (3)  years  plus  a   fine   ranging   from   fifty   thousand   pesos   (P50,000)   to   one   hundred   and   fifty   thousand   pesos   (P150,000)   for  the  first  offense.     (b)   Imprisonment   of   three   (3)   years   and   one   (1)   day   to   six   (6)   years   plus   a   fine   ranging   from   one   hundred   and   fifty   thousand   pesos   (P150,000)   to   five   hundred   thousand   pesos   (P500,000)   for  the  second  offense.     (c)   Imprisonment   of   six   (6)   years  and  one  (1)  day  to  nine   (9)  years  plus  a  fine  ranging   from  five  hundred  thousand   pesos   (P500,000)   to   one   million   five   hundred   thousand   pesos   (P1,500,000)   for   the   third   and  subsequent  offenses.     (d)   In   all   cases,   subsidiary  

imprisonment   in   cases   of   insolvency.     217.2.   In   determining   the   number   of   years   of   imprisonment   and   the   amount   of   fine,   the   court   shall   consider   the   value   of   the   infringing   materials   that   the   defendant   has   produced   or   manufactured   and   the   damage   that   the   copyright   owner   has   suffered   by   reason   of   the   infringement.     217.3.   Any   person   who   at   the   time   when  copyright  subsists  in  a  work  has   in   his   possession   an   article   which   he   knows,   or   ought   to   know,   to   be   an   infringing   copy   of   the   work   for   the   purpose  of:     (a)   Selling,   letting   for   hire,   or   by   way   of   trade,   offering   or  exposing  for  sale,  or  hire,   the  article;     (b)   Distributing   the   article   for   purpose   of   trade   or   for   any   other   purpose   to   an   extent   that   will   prejudice   the   rights   of   the   copyright   owner  in  the  work;  or     (c)   Trade   exhibit   of   the   article   in   public,   shall   be   guilty   of   an   offense   and   shall   be   liable   on   conviction   to  imprisonment  and  fine  as   above  mentioned.     Certainly,   Section   217   punishes   acts   that   infringe   or   aids   or   abets   the   infringement   of   copyright   as   provided   in   the   chapter   on   copyright.    There   is   no   dispute   as   to   the   definition   of   infringement,   that   is,   to   directly   violate   the   rights   of   the   copyright   owner   as   provided   in   the   law.     Anyone   violating   any   of   the   rights   provided   in   Section   177,   and   other   sections,   of   the   IPC   is   liable   for   infringement.     There   is   no   question   as   to   the   culpability  of  direct  infringers.    However,  there   is   a   quandary   as   to   what   constitutes   “ aiding   and  abetting” .     There   seems   no   established   legal   definition   of   aiding   and   abetting.     The   phrase,   commonly   used   in   criminal   prosecution,   connotes   the   commission   of   a   crime   without   direct   involvement.     The  phrase  was  first  used  during  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   the   Nuremberg   trial   in   pinning   liability   on   the   officers   and   directors   of   a   company   that   manufactured  the  gas  used  by  the  Nazis  in  the  

cannot   interpret   the   law   to   include   acts  which  it  does  not  penalize.     Copyright  ALLOWS  parallel  creation.  Standard   only  is  originality.  To  prove  infringement,  you   must  prove  ACCESS  +  COPYING.    

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annihilation   of   the   Jews .      In   aiding   and   abetting,   a   person   does   not   actually   and   directly   performs   the   acts   constitutive   of   the   crime   but   however   is   instrumental   in   its   commission   because   without   him,   the   crime   would  not  have  been  possible.       In   the   field   of   Intellectual   Property,   we   learn   of   the  concept  “ contributory  infringement” .     In   the   case   of   Sony   Corp.   vs   Universal   City   Studios,  contributory  infringement  was  used  in   referring   to   the   act   of   selling   a   machine   which   for   the   absolute   purpose   of   committing   infringing   acts.     In   this   sense,   contributory   infringement   reflects   the   same   premise   in   aiding   and   abetting.     The   person   who   sells   the   machine,   although   he   does   not   do   the   actual   reproduction  of  copyrighted  materials,  is  guilty   of  contributory  infringement.       Aiding   and   abetting   presupposes   that   the   person   charged   has   actual   or   constructive   knowledge   that   his   or   her   actions   are   likely   to   facilitate  infringement  by  another,  and  that  he  

 

C.

Related  Rights  

 

1.

Moral  Rights  

 

ARTICLE  6BIS.     Moral  Rights:     1.   To   claim   authorship;   to   object   to   certain   modifications  and  other  derogatory  actions;     2.  After  the  author's  death;     3.  Means  of  redress     (1)   Independently   of   the   author's   economic   rights,   and   even  after  the  transfer  of  the  said  rights,  the  author  shall   have   the   right   to   claim   authorship   of   the   work   and   to   object  to  any  distortion,  mutilation  or  other  modification   of,   or   other   derogatory   action   in   relation   to,   the   said   work,   which   would   be   prejudicial   to   his   honor   or   reputation.     (2)   The   rights   granted   to   the   author   in   accordance   with   the   preceding   paragraph   shall,   after   his   death,   be   maintained,   at   least   until   the   expiry   of   the   economic   rights,   and   shall   be   exercisable   by   the   persons   or   institutions   authorized   by   the   legislation   of   the   country   where   protection   is   claimed.   However,   those   countries   whose  legislation,  at  the  moment  of  their  ratification  of   or   accession   to   this   Act,   does   not   provide   for   the   protection  after  the  death  of  the  author  of  all  the  rights   set   out   in   the   preceding   paragraph   may   provide   that   some   of   these   rights   may,   after   his   death,   cease   to   be   maintained.     (3)   The   means   of   redress   for   safeguarding   the   rights   granted   by   this   Article   shall   be   governed   by   the   legislation  of  the  country  where  protection  is  claimed.    

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materially  contributes  to  the  infringement .       In   all   the   above   definitions   of   aiding   and   abetting,  and  contributory  negligence,  there  is   a   positive   act,   although   not   directly   infringing,   that   contributes   to   the   ultimate   act   of   infringement.     This   positive   act   makes   the   infringement   possible.     Conversely,   without   the   positive   act   of   the   contributory   infringer,   the   infringement   would   not   have   been   committed.     This   is   not   the   case   with   the   purchasers   of   pirated   DVDs.     The   act   of   the   purchasers   in   buying   the   DVDs   is   not   necessary.     The   infringement   would   be   committed   even   without   them   and   their   patronage.    Having  said  this,  the  purchasers  of   pirated   DVDs   or   other   copyrighted   materials   cannot   be   held   criminally   liable.     The   IPC   provisions   are   clear.     It   criminalizes   infringement   and   the   acts   of   aiding   and   abetting   its   commission.     It   does   not   penalize   the   purchase   of   infringing   materials.     We  

SECTION  193.  SCOPE  OF  MORAL  RIGHTS.  –     The   author   of   a   work   shall,   independently   of   the   economic   rights   in   Section   177   or   the   grant   of   an   assignment   or   license   with   respect   to   such   right,   have   the  right:     193.1.   To   require   that   the   authorship   of   the   works   be   attributed   to   him,   in   particular,   the   right   that   his   name,   as   far   as   practicable,   be   indicated   in   a   prominent   way   on   the   copies,   and   in   connection   with   the   public   use   of   his   work;    

                                                                                                                                                        5

 Prof.  Harry  Roque.  “Ampatuan  Victims  vs  Arroyo,”  blog  entry   from   http://harryroque.com/tag/aiding-­‐and-­‐abetting/,   last   accessed  January  20,  2012.   6

 Mark   Bartholomew.   “Contributory   Infringers   and   Good   Samaritans,”   electronic   copy   from   http://ssrn.com/abstract=1276286,   last   accessed   January   20,   2012.  

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Intellectual Property Law 193.2.   To   make   any   alterations   of   his   work   prior   to,  or  to  withhold  it  from  publication;     193.3.  To  object  to  any  distortion,  mutilation  or   other   modification   of,   or   other   derogatory   action   in   relation   to,   his   work   which   would   be   prejudicial  to  his  honor  or  reputation;  and     193.4.   To   restrain   the   use   of   his   name   with   respect  to  any  work  not  of  his  own  creation  or   in  a  distorted  version  of  his  work.    

SECTION  198.  TERM  OF  MORAL  RIGHTS.  –     198.1.  The  rights  of  an  author  under  this  chapter  shall  last   during  the  lifetime  of  the  author  and  for  fifty  (50)  years   after  his  death  and  shall  not  be  assignable  or  subject  to   license.   The   person   or   persons   to   be   charged   with   the   posthumous  enforcement  of  these  rights  shall  be  named   in   writing   to   be   filed   with   the   National   Library.   In   default   of   such   person   or   persons,   such   enforcement   shall   devolve  upon  either  the  author's  heirs,  and  in  default  of   the  heirs,  the  Director  of  the  National  Library.     198.2.  For  purposes  of  this  Section,  "Person"  shall  mean   any   individual,   partnership,   corporation,   association,   or   society.   The   Director   of   the   National   Library   may   prescribe  reasonable  fees  to  be  charged  for  his  services   in  the  application  of  provisions  of  this  Section.      

 

SECTION  194.  BREACH  OF  CONTRACT.  –     An  author  cannot  be  compelled  to  perform  his  contract   to   create   a   work   or   for   the   publication   of   his   work   already  in  existence.  However,  he  may  be  held  liable  for   damages  for  breach  of  such  contract.      

SECTION  199.  ENFORCEMENT  REMEDIES.  –    

SECTION  195.  WAIVER  OF  MORAL  RIGHTS.  –    

Violation   of   any   of   the   rights   conferred   by   this   Chapter   shall  entitle  those  charged  with  their  enforcement  to  the   same  rights  and  remedies  available  to  a  copyright  owner.   In  addition,  damages  which  may  be  availed  of  under  the   Civil  Code  may  also  be  recovered.  Any  damage  recovered   after   the   creator's   death   shall   be   held   in   trust   for   and   remitted   to   his   heirs,   and   in   default   of   the   heirs,   shall   belong  to  the  government.      

An   author   may   waive   his   rights   mentioned   in   Section   193   by  a  written  instrument,  but  no  such  waiver  shall  be  valid   where  its  effects  is  to  permit  another:     195.1.   To   use   the   name   of   the   author,   or   the   title   of   his   work,   or   otherwise   to   make   use   of   his   reputation   with   respect   to   any   version   or   adaptation   of   his   work   which,   because   of   alterations  therein,  would  substantially  tend  to   injure   the   literary   or   artistic   reputation   of   another  author;  or     195.2.   To   use   the   name   of   the   author   with   respect  to  a  work  he  did  not  create.      

2.

Right   to   Proceeds   in   Subsequent   Transfers     (Droit   De   Suite   or   Follow   Up  Rights)  

 

SECTION  200.  SALE  OR  LEASE  OF  W ORK.  –     In   every   sale   or   lease   of   an   original   work   of   painting   or   sculpture   or   of   the   original   manuscript   of   a   writer   or   composer,   subsequent   to   the   first   disposition   thereof   by   the   author,   the   author   or   his   heirs   shall   have   an   inalienable   right   to   participate   in   the   gross   proceeds   of   the  sale  or  lease  to  the  extent  of  five  percent  (5%).  This   right  shall  exist  during  the  lifetime  of  the  author  and  for   fifty  (50)  years  after  his  death.      

SECTION  196.  CONTRIBUTION  TO  COLLECTIVE  WORK.  –     When   an   author   contributes   to   a   collective   work,   his   right   to   have   his   contribution   attributed   to   him   is   deemed  waived  unless  he  expressly  reserves  it.      

SECTION   197.   EDITING,   ARRANGING   AND   ADAPTATION   OF   WORK.  –     In   the   absence   of   a   contrary   stipulation   at   the   time   an   author   licenses   or   permits   another   to   use   his   work,   the   necessary  editing,  arranging  or  adaptation  of  such  work,   for   publication,   broadcast,   use   in   a   motion   picture,   dramatization,   or   mechanical   or   electrical   reproduction   in   accordance   with   the   reasonable   and   customary   standards   or   requirements   of   the   medium   in   which   the   work   is   to   be   used,   shall   not   be   deemed   to   contravene   the   author's   rights   secured   by   this   chapter.   Nor   shall   complete   destruction   of   a   work   unconditionally   transferred   by   the   author   be   deemed   to   violate   such   rights.    

SECTION  201.  WORKS  NOT  COVERED.  –     The   provisions   of   this   Chapter   shall   not   apply   to   prints,   etchings,   engravings,   works   of   applied   art,   or   works   of   similar   kind   wherein   the   author   primarily   derives   gain   from  the  proceeds  of  reproductions.      

3.

Neighboring  Rights  

 

SECTION  202.  DEFINITIONS.  –     For   the   purpose   of   this   Act,   the   following   terms   shall   have  the  following  meanings:    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   Sections   203,   208   and   209   shall   not   apply   where   the   acts   referred  to  in  those  Sections  are  related  to:     212.1.   The   use   by   a   natural   person   exclusively   for  his  own  personal  purposes;     212.2.   Using   short   excerpts   for   reporting   current  events;     212.3.  Use  solely  for  the  purpose  of  teaching  or   for  scientific  research;  and     212.4.   Fair   use   of   the   broadcast   subject   to   the   conditions  under  Section  185.      

202.1.   "PERFORMERS"   are   actors,   singers,   musicians,   dancers,   and   other   persons   who   act,   sing,   declaim,   play   in,   interpret,   or   otherwise   perform   literary   and   artistic   work;     202.2.   "SOUND   RECORDING"   means   the   fixation   of   the   sounds   of   a   performance   or   of   other   sounds,   or   representation   of   sound,   other   than   in   the   form   of   a   fixation   incorporated   in   a   cinematographic   or   other   audiovisual  work;     202.3.   An   "AUDIOVISUAL   WORK   OR   FIXATION"   is   a   work   that   consists   of   a   series   of   related   images   which   impart   the   impression   of   motion,   with   or   without   accompanying   sounds,   susceptible   of   being   made   visible   and,   where   accompanied   by   sounds,   susceptible   of   being   made   audible;     202.4.   "FIXATION"   means   the   embodiment   of   sounds,   or   of   the   representations   thereof,   from   which   they   can   be   perceived,   reproduced   or   communicated   through   a   device;     202.5.   "PRODUCER  OF  A  SOUND  RECORDING"  means  the  person,   or  the  legal  entity,  who  or  which  takes  the  initiative  and   has  the  responsibility  for  the  first  fixation  of  the  sounds   of   a   performance   or   other   sounds,   or   the   representation   of  sounds;     202.6.   "PUBLICATION   OF   A   FIXED   PERFORMANCE   OR   A   SOUND   RECORDING"   means   the   offering   of   copies   of   the   fixed   performance   or   the   sound   recording   to   the   public,   with   the   consent   of   the   right   holder:   Provided,   That   copies   are  offered  to  the  public  in  reasonable  quality;     202.7.   "BROADCASTING"   means   the   transmission   by   wireless   means   for   the   public   reception   of   sounds   or   of   images  or  of  representations  thereof;  such  transmission   by   satellite   is   also   "broadcasting"   where   the   means   for   decrypting   are   provided   to   the   public   by   the   broadcasting  organization  or  with  its  consent;     202.8.   "BROADCASTING  ORGANIZATION"  shall  include  a  natural   person  or  a  juridical  entity  duly  authorized  to  engage  in   broadcasting;  and     202.9   "COMMUNICATION  TO  THE  PUBLIC  OF  A  PERFORMANCE  OR  A   SOUND  RECORDING"   means   the   transmission   to   the   public,   by   any   medium,   otherwise   than   by   broadcasting,   of   sounds   of   a   performance   or   the   representations   of   sounds   fixed   in   a   sound   recording.   For   purposes   of   Section   209,   "communication   to   the   public"   includes   making  the  sounds  or  representations  of  sounds  fixed  in   a  sound  recording  audible  to  the  public.    

a.

Rights  of  Performers  

 

SECTION  203.  SCOPE  OF  PERFORMERS'  RIGHTS.  –     Subject   to   the   provisions   of   Section   212,   performers   shall   enjoy  the  following  exclusive  rights:     203.1.   As   regards   their   performances,   the   right   of  authorizing:     (a)   The   broadcasting   and   other   communication   to  the  public  of  their  performance;  and     (b)  The  fixation  of  their  unfixed  performance.     203.2.   The   right   of   authorizing   the   direct   or   indirect   reproduction   of   their   performances   fixed   in   sound   recordings,   in   any   manner   or   form;     203.3.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  Section  206,   the   right   of   authorizing   the   first   public   distribution   of   the   original   and   copies   of   their   performance   fixed   in   the   sound   recording   through   sale   or   rental   or   other   forms   of   transfer  of  ownership;     203.4.   The   right   of   authorizing   the   commercial   rental  to  the  public  of  the  original  and  copies  of   their   performances   fixed   in   sound   recordings,   even  after  distribution  of  them  by,  or  pursuant   to  the  authorization  by  the  performer;  and     203.5.   The   right   of   authorizing   the   making   available   to   the   public   of   their   performances   fixed   in   sound   recordings,   by   wire   or   wireless   means,   in   such   a   way   that   members   of   the   public  may  access  them  from  a  place  and  time   individually  chosen  by  them.      

SECTION  204.  MORAL  RIGHTS  OF  PERFORMERS.  –    

SECTION  212.  LIMITATIONS  ON  RIGHTS.  –    

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Intellectual Property Law 204.1.   Independently   of   a   performer's   economic   rights,   the   performer,   shall,   as   regards   his   live   aural   performances  or  performances  fixed  in  sound  recordings,   have  the  right  to  claim  to  be  identified  as  the  performer   of   his   performances,   except   where   the   omission   is   dictated   by   the   manner   of   the   use   of   the   performance,   and   to   object   to   any   distortion,   mutilation   or   other   modification   of   his   performances   that   would   be   prejudicial  to  his  reputation.     204.2.   The   rights   granted   to   a   performer   in   accordance   with  Subsection  203.1  shall  be  maintained  and  exercised   fifty  (50)  years  after  his  death,  by  his  heirs,  and  in  default   of  heirs,  the  government,  where  protection  is  claimed.      

215.2.   In   case   of   broadcasts,   the   term   shall   be   twenty   (20)   years   from   the   date   the   broadcast   took   place.   The   extended   term   shall   be   applied   only   to   old   works   with   subsisting  protection  under  the  prior  law.      

b.

Rights   of   Producers   of  Sound  Recording  

 

SECTION  208.  SCOPE  OF  RIGHT.  –     Subject   to   the   provisions   of   Section   212,   producers   of   sound   recordings   shall   enjoy   the   following   exclusive   rights:     208.1.   The   right   to   authorize   the   direct   or   indirect   reproduction   of   their   sound   recordings,   in   any   manner   or   form;   the   placing   of   these   reproductions   in   the   market   and   the   right   of   rental  or  lending;     208.2.   The   right   to   authorize   the   first   public   distribution   of   the   original   and   copies   of   their   sound   recordings   through   sale   or   rental   or   other  forms  of  transferring  ownership;  and     208.3.   The   right   to   authorize   the   commercial   rental  to  the  public  of  the  original  and  copies  of   their   sound   recordings,   even   after   distribution   by   them   by   or   pursuant   to   authorization   by   the   producer.    

SECTION  205.  LIMITATION  ON  RIGHT.  –     205.1.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  Section  206,  once  the   performer  has  authorized  the  broadcasting  or  fixation  of   his   performance,   the   provisions   of   Sections   203   shall   have  no  further  application.     205.2.  The  provisions  of  Section  184  and  Section  185  shall   apply  mutatis  mutandis  to  performers.      

SECTION   206.   ADDITIONAL   REMUNERATION   FOR   SUBSEQUENT  COMMUNICATIONS  OR  BROADCASTS.  –     Unless   otherwise   provided   in   the   contract,   in   every   communication   to   the   public   or   broadcast   of   a   performance   subsequent   to   the   first   communication   or   broadcast  thereof  by  the  broadcasting  organization,  the   performer   shall   be   entitled   to   an   additional   remuneration   equivalent   to   at   least   five   percent   (5%)   of   the  original  compensation  he  or  she  received  for  the  first   communication  or  broadcast.    

SECTION  209.  COMMUNICATION  TO  THE  PUBLIC.  –     If   a   sound   recording   published   for   commercial   purposes,   or   a   reproduction   of   such   sound   recording,   is   used   directly  for  broadcasting  or  for  other  communication  to   the  public,  or  is  publicly  performed  with  the  intention  of   making   and   enhancing   profit,   a   single   equitable   remuneration   for   the   performer   or   performers,   and   the   producer   of   the   sound   recording   shall   be   paid   by   the   user   to   both   the   performers   and   the   producer,   who,   in   the  absence  of  any  agreement  shall  share  equally.    

SECTION  207.  CONTRACT  TERMS.  –     Nothing   in   this   Chapter   shall   be   construed   to   deprive   performers   of   the   right   to   agree   by   contracts   on   terms   and  conditions  more  favorable  for  them  in  respect  of  any   use  of  their  performance.    

SECTION   215.   TERM   OF   PROTECTION   FOR   PERFORMERS,   PRODUCERS  AND  BROADCASTING  ORGANIZATIONS.  –    

SECTION  210.  LIMITATION  OF  RIGHT.  –     Sections  184  and  185  shall  apply  mutatis  mutandis  to  the   producer  of  sound  recordings.      

215.1.  The  rights  granted  to  performers  and  producers  of   sound  recordings  under  this  law  shall  expire:     (a)   For   performances   not   incorporated   in   recordings,  fifty  (50)  years  from  the  end  of  the   year  in  which  the  performance  took  place;  and     (b)   For   sound   or   image   and   sound   recordings   and   for   performances   incorporated   therein,   fifty   (50)   years   from   the   end   of   the   year   in   which  the  recording  took  place.    

SECTION   215.   TERM   OF   PROTECTION   FOR   PERFORMERS,   PRODUCERS  AND  BROADCASTING  ORGANIZATIONS.  –     215.1.  The  rights  granted  to  performers  and  producers  of   sound  recordings  under  this  law  shall  expire:     (a)   For   performances   not   incorporated   in   recordings,  fifty  (50)  years  from  the  end  of  the   year  in  which  the  performance  took  place;  and     (b)   For   sound   or   image   and   sound   recordings   and   for   performances   incorporated  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   therein,   fifty   (50)   years   from   the   end   of   the   year  in  which  the  recording  took  place.  

digital   direct-­‐to-­‐home   (DTH)   television   via   satellite   to   its   subscribers   all   over   the   Philippines.   Herein   individual   respondents  are  members  of  PMSI’s  Board  of  Directors.     PMSI  was  granted  a  legislative  franchise  under  RA  86305   on  May  7,  1998  and  was  given  a  Provisional  Authority  by   the   National   Telecommunications   Commission   (NTC)   on   February   1,   2000   to   install,   operate   and   maintain   a   nationwide   DTH   satellite   service.   When   it   commenced   operations,  it  offered  as  part  of  its  program  line-­‐up  ABS-­‐ CBN  Channels  2  and  23,  NBN,  Channel  4,  ABC  Channel  5,   GMA   Channel   7,   RPN   Channel   9,   and   IBC   Channel   13,   together  with  other  paid  premium  program  channels.     However,  on  April  25,  2001,  ABS-­‐CBN  demanded  for  PMSI   to  cease  and  desist  from  rebroadcasting  Channels  2  and   23.   On   April   27,   2001,   PMSI   replied   that   the   rebroadcasting   was   in   accordance   with   the   authority   granted   it   by   NTC   and   its   obligation   under   NTC   Memorandum  Circular  No.  4-­‐08-­‐88,  Section  6.2  of  which   requires   all   cable   television   system   operators   operating   in   a   community   within   Grade   “A”   or   “B”   contours   to   carry   the   television   signals   of   the   authorized   television   broadcast  stations.     ABS-­‐CBN   contends   that   PMSI’s   unauthorized   rebroadcasting   of   Channels   2   and   23   is   an   infringement   of   its   broadcasting   rights   and   copyright   under   the   Intellectual  Property  Code  (IP  Code);  that  Memorandum   Circular   No.   04-­‐08-­‐88   excludes   DTH   satellite   television   operators;   that   the   Court   of   Appeals’   interpretation   of   the  must-­‐carry  rule  violates  Section  9  of  Article  III  of  the   Constitution  because  it  allows  the  taking  of  property  for   public  use  without  payment  of  just  compensation.     Respondents,   on   the   other   hand,   argue   that   PMSI’s   rebroadcasting   of   Channels   2   and   23   is   sanctioned   by   Memorandum  Circular  No.  04-­‐08-­‐88;  that  the  must-­‐carry   rule   under   the   Memorandum   Circular   is   a   valid   exercise   of  police  power;  and  that  the  Court  of  Appeals  correctly   dismissed  CA-­‐G.R.  SP  No.  90762  since  it  found  no  need  to   exercise  its  power  of  contempt.     Doctrine:   Section  202.7  of  the  IP  Code  defines  broadcasting  as  “the   transmission  by  wireless  means  for  the  public  reception   of   sounds   or   of   images   or   of   representations   thereof;   such   transmission   by   satellite   is   also   ‘broadcasting’   where   the   means   for   decrypting   are   provided   to   the   public   by   the   broadcasting   organization   or   with   its   consent.”     On   the   other   hand,   rebroadcasting   as   defined   in   Article   3(g)   of   the   International   Convention   for   the   Protection   of   Performers,   Producers   of   Phonograms   and   Broadcasting   Organizations,   otherwise   known   as   the   1961   Rome   Convention,   of   which   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines   is   a   signatory,   is   “the   simultaneous  

  215.2.   In  case  of  broadcasts,  the  term  shall  be  twenty   (20)   years   from   the   date   the   broadcast   took   place.   The   extended   term   shall   be   applied   only   to   old   works   with   subsisting  protection  under  the  prior  law.    

c.

Rights   Broadcasting   Organizations  

of  

 

SECTION  211.  SCOPE  OF  RIGHT.  –     Subject   to   the   provisions   of   Section   212,   broadcasting   organizations   shall   enjoy   the   exclusive   right   to   carry   out,   authorize  or  prevent  any  of  the  following  acts:     211.1.   The   rebroadcasting   of   their   broadcasts;     211.2.   The   recording   in   any   manner,   including   the   making   of   films   or   the   use   of   video  tape,  of  their  broadcasts  for  the  purpose   of   communication   to   the   public   of   television   broadcasts  of  the  same;  and     211.3.   The   use   of   such   records   for   fresh   transmissions  or  for  fresh  recording.    

SUBSECTION  215.2.     In   case   of   broadcasts,   the   term   shall   be   twenty   (20)   years   from   the   date   the   broadcast   took   place.   The   extended   term   shall   be   applied   only   to   old   works   with   subsisting  protection  under  the  prior  law.    

ABS-­‐CBN   BROADCASTING   COMMUNICATION  V.   PHILIPPINE   MULTIMEDIA  SYSTEM,  ET  AL.  (2009)   Refresher:   ABS-­‐CBN   is   licensed   to   engage   in   television   and   radio   broadcasting.   It   broadcasts   television   programs   by   wireless   means   to   Metro   Manila   and   nearby   provinces,   and  by  satellite  to  provincial  stations  through  Channel  2   on   Very   High   Frequency   (VHF)   and   Channel   23   on   Ultra   High   Frequency   (UHF).   The   programs   aired   over   Channels   2   and   23   are   either   produced   by   ABS-­‐CBN   or   purchased  from  or  licensed  by  other  producers.     ABS-­‐CBN   also   owns   regional   television   stations   which   pattern  their  programming  in  accordance  with  perceived   demands  of  the  region.  Thus,  television  programs  shown   in  Metro  Manila  and  nearby  provinces  are  not  necessarily   shown  in  other  provinces.     Respondent   Philippine   Multi-­‐Media   System,   Inc.   (PMSI)   is  the  operator  of  Dream  Broadcasting  System.  It  delivers  

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Intellectual Property Law broadcasting   by   one   broadcasting   organization   of   the   broadcast  of  another  broadcasting  organization.”     Under   the   Rome   Convention,   rebroadcasting   is   “the   simultaneous   broadcasting   by   one   broadcasting   organization   of   the   broadcast   of   another   broadcasting   organization.”   The   Working   Paper   prepared   by   the   Secretariat  of  the  Standing  Committee  on  Copyright  and   Related   Rights   defines   broadcasting   organizations   as   “entities   that   take   the   financial   and   editorial   responsibility  for  the  selection  and  arrangement  of,  and     investment  in,  the  transmitted  content.” Evidently,  PMSI   would  not  qualify  as  a  broadcasting  organization  because   it   does   not   have   the   aforementioned   responsibilities   imposed   upon   broadcasting   organizations,   such   as   ABS-­‐ CBN.     ABS-­‐CBN   creates   and   transmits   its   own   signals;   PMSI   merely   carries   such   signals   which   the   viewers   receive   in   its   unaltered   form.   PMSI   does   not   produce,   select,   or   determine  the  programs  to  be  shown  in  Channels  2  and  23.   Likewise,   it   does   not   pass   itself   off   as   the   origin   or   author   of   such   programs.   Insofar   as   Channels   2   and   23   are   concerned,   PMSI   merely   retransmits   the   same   in   accordance   with   Memorandum   Circular   04-­‐08-­‐88.   With   regard   to   its   premium   channels,   it   buys   the   channels   from  content  providers  and  transmits  on  an  as-­‐is  basis  to   its  viewers.  Clearly,  PMSI  does  not  perform  the  functions   of   a   broadcasting   organization;   thus,   it   cannot   be   said   that  it  is  engaged  in  rebroadcasting  Channels  2  and  23.     The  Director-­‐General  of  the  IPO  and  the  Court  of  Appeals   also  correctly  found  that  PMSI’s  services  are  similar  to  a   cable  television  system  because  the  services  it  renders  fall   under   cable   “retransmission,”   as   described   in   the   Working  Paper,  to  wit:     (G)  Cable  Retransmission     47.   When   a   radio   or   television   program   is   being   broadcast,   it   can   be   retransmitted   to   new   audiences   by   means   of   cable   or   wire.   In   the   early   days   of   cable   television,   it   was   mainly   used  to  improve  signal  reception,  particularly  in   so-­‐called   “shadow   zones,”   or   to   distribute   the   signals  in  large  buildings  or  building  complexes.   With   improvements   in   technology,   cable   operators   now   often   receive   signals   from   satellites   before   retransmitting   them   in   an   unaltered   form   to   their   subscribers   through   cable.     48.   In   principle,   cable   retransmission   can   be   either   simultaneous   with   the   broadcast   over-­‐ the-­‐air   or   delayed   (deferred   transmission)   on   the   basis   of   a   fixation   or   a   reproduction   of   a   fixation.  Furthermore,  they  might  be  unaltered   or  altered,  for  example  through  replacement  of  

commercials,   etc.   In   general,   however,   the   term   “retransmission”   seems   to   be   reserved   for   such   transmissions   which   are   both   simultaneous  and  unaltered.     49.  The  Rome  Convention  does  not  grant  rights   against   unauthorized   cable   retransmission.   Without   such   a   right,   cable   operators   can   retransmit  both  domestic  and  foreign  over  the   air   broadcasts   simultaneously   to   their   subscribers   without   permission   from   the   broadcasting   organizations   or   other   rightholders   and   without   obligation   to   pay   remuneration.     Thus,   while   the   Rome   Convention   gives   broadcasting   organizations   the   right   to   authorize   or   prohibit   the   rebroadcasting   of   its   broadcast,   however,   this   protection  does  not  extend  to  cable  retransmission.  The   retransmission   of   ABS-­‐CBN’s   signals   by   PMSI   –   which   functions   essentially   as   a   cable   television   –   does   not   therefore   constitute   rebroadcasting   in   violation   of   the   former’s  intellectual  property  rights  under  the  IP  Code.     It   must   be   emphasized   that   the   law   on   copyright   is   not   absolute.  The  IP  Code  provides  that:     Sec.  184.  Limitations  on  Copyright.  -­‐   184.1.   Notwithstanding   the   provisions   of   Chapter   V,   the   following   acts   shall   not   constitute  infringement  of  copyright:   x  x  x  x   (h)   The   use   made   of   a   work   by   or   under   the   direction  or  control  of  the  Government,  by  the   National  Library  or  by  educational,  scientific  or   professional   institutions   where   such   use   is   in   the   public   interest   and   is   compatible   with   fair   use;     The  carriage  of  ABS-­‐CBN’s  signals  by  virtue  of  the  must-­‐ carry  rule  in  Memorandum  Circular  No.  04-­‐08-­‐88  is  under   the  direction  and  control  of  the  government  though  the   NTC   which   is   vested   with   exclusive   jurisdiction   to   supervise,  regulate  and  control  telecommunications  and   broadcast   services/facilities   in   the   Philippines.   The   imposition   of   the   must-­‐carry   rule   is   within   the   NTC’s   power   to   promulgate   rules   and   regulations,   as   public   safety   and   interest   may   require,   to   encourage   a   larger   and   more   effective   use   of   communications,   radio   and   television   broadcasting   facilities,   and   to   maintain   effective   competition   among   private   entities   in   these   activities   whenever   the   Commission   finds   it   reasonably   feasible.       PD   285.   Authorizing   the   Compulsory   Licensing   or   Reprinting   of   Educational,   Scientific   or   Cultural   Books   and   Materials   as   a   Temporary   or   Emergency   Measure  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   Whenever  the  Prices  thereof  become  so  Exorbitant  as  to   be  Detrimental  to  the  National  Interest     WHEREAS,   the   spiralling   of   prices   of   educational,   scientific   or   cultural   books   and   materials   has   reached   very  serious  proportion;     WHEREAS,   it   is   in   the   national   interest   that   such   books   and   materials   be   made   available   to   everybody   at   the   least  cost;  and     WHEREAS,   this   can   be   achieved   by   the   compulsory   licensing   and   reprinting   of   both   domestic   and   foreign   educational,   scientific   or   cultural   books   and   materials,   as   a   temporary   or   emergency   measure,   whenever   their   prices  become  exorbitant;     NOW,  THEREFORE,  I,  FERDINAND  E.  MARCOS,  President   of  the  Philippines,  by  virtue  of  the  powers  vested  in  me   by   the   Constitution   as   Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief   of   all   the   Armed   Forces   of   the   Philippines,   and   pursuant   to   Proclamation   No.   1081   dated   September   21,   1972,   and   General  Order  No.  1  dated  September  22,  1972,  do  hereby   order  and  decree  as  follows:     SECTION   1.   Whenever   the   price   of   any   educational,   scientific   or   cultural   book,   pamphlet   and   other   written   materials,   whether   of   domestic   or   foreign   origin,   has   become   so   exorbitant   as   to   be   detrimental   to   the   national   interest,   as   determined   and   declared   by   a   committee  composed  of  the  Secretary  of  Education  and   Culture,  such  book,  pamphlet  or  written  material  may  be   reprinted  by  the  Government  or  by  any  private  printer  or   printers  for  a  limited  period  and  only  for  the  purpose  of   making   the   same   available   to   the   people   at   reasonable   cost.     SECTION  2.  The  reprinted  books,  pamphlets  and  materials   shall   bear   proper   acknowledgment   of   the   source,   authorship,   copyright   proprietors   and   past   printers,   if   known,   as   well   as   the   names   and   addresses   of   the   reprinter   or   reprinters.   If   abbreviated   or   edited   in   any   manner,   such   fact   shall   be   stated   be   stated.   The   following   inscription   shall   also   appear   on   the   covers   thereof:   "Export   of   this   Book   or   material   from   the   Philippines   is   punishable   by   law."   The   export   of   such   reprints  under  any  circumstance  is  hereby  prohibited.     SECTION  3.  The  reprinting  of  the  above  books,  pamphlets   and   materials   shall   be   subject   to   the   condition   that   the   reprinter   shall   pay,   in   local   currency,   a   royalty   of   three   per   centum   (3%)   of   the   gross   selling   price,   if   so   demanded   by   the   authors,   publishers   or   copyright   proprietors   concerned,   whoever   is   legally   entitled   thereto:   Provided,   That   in   the   case   of   non-­‐resident   authors,   publishers   or   copyright   proprietors,   the   payment   of   the   royalties   shall   be   made   only   to   them  

personally   in   the   Philippines   or   their   respective   representative  or  branch  offices  in  the  Philippines.     SECTION   4.   Any   person,   natural   or   judicial,   who   shall   violate   the   provisions   of   this   Decree   shall,   upon   conviction  thereof,  be  punished  by  imprisonment  of  not   less   than   Five   Thousand   Pesos   nor   more   than   two   Ten   Thousand  Pesos.  If  the  violation  is  committed  by  a  firm,   company   or   corporation,   the   manager   or   person   in   charge  of  the  management  of  the  business  thereof  shall   be   responsible   thereof.   Books   and   materials   printed   or   published   or   exported   in   violation   of   this   Decree   shall   be   immediately   confiscated   and   the   establishment   that   printed  or  published  or  exported  them  shall  forthwith  be   closed  and  its  operation  discontinued.     SECTION  5.  The  Committee  herein  named  shall  promulgate   rules   and   regulations   for   the   implementation   of   this   Degree.     SECTION  6.   This   Decree   shall   take   effect   immediately,   the   provisions  of  any  law,  decree,  executive  order,  treaty  or   executive  agreement  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.     Done  in  the  City  of  Manila,  this  3rd  day  of  September,  in   the   year   of   Our   Lord,   nineteen   hundred   and   seventy-­‐ three.     Remarks:  Repealed  by  the  IP  Code.     SECTION  239.1.     All   Acts   and   parts   of   Acts   inconsistent   herewith,   more   particularly   Republic   Act   No.   165,   as   amended;   Republic   Act   No.   166,   as   amended;   and   Articles   188   and   189   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code;   Presidential   Decree   No.   49,   including   Presidential   Decree   No.   285,   as   amended,   are   hereby  repealed.     26  January  2012     RELATED  RIGHTS   -­‐ Separate  and  independent  from  copyright     MORAL  RIGHTS     -­‐ Consists  of  (193.1,  193.2,  193.3,  193.4)   o Right  to  attribution   o Right  to  integrity  of  work   -­‐ Separate  from  economic  rights   -­‐ Personal  to  the  author   -­‐ Retained   by   the   author   despite   assignment   of   the  copyright.   -­‐ Not  assignable/  subject  to  license  (198.1)   o BUT  the  same  may  be  waived!   § Subject  to  exceptions   -­‐ Illustration:  Producer  obtained  the  copyright  of   the   work.   Such   does   not   include   the   assignment  of  moral  rights.  

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Intellectual Property Law   What  is  the  point  of  giving  moral  right?   -­‐ To   protect   the   author   à   preserve   how   the   author  is  represented  to  the  public.   -­‐ The  work  is  the  representation  of  the  author  –   how  the  author  is  represented  to  the  world.     Can  you  compel  the  author  to  write?   -­‐ No.  See  Section  194.  Your  remedy  is  to  ask  for   damages.     Is  destruction  of  the  work  allowed?   -­‐ Yes,  only  if  the  destruction  is  COMPLETE.   -­‐ Incomplete  destruction  is  not  allowed.   -­‐ Why?   In   complete   destruction,   there   would   be   no   misrepresentation   of   the   author   to   the   public.   The   purpose   of   the   law   is   to   prevent   misrepresentation   of   the   author   to   the   public.   If   purpose   of   the   law   ceases   to   exist,   no   need   for  the  application  of  the  law.     Term   of   moral   right:   Lifetime   of   the   author   +   50   years   after  death  (same  as  copyright)   -­‐ Note   the   persons   charged   with   posthumous   enforcement   of   the   right   is   enumerated   in   Section  198.1   o Those  named  by  the  author  in  writing,   o In   default   of   the   former,   author’s   heirs   o In  default  of  the  heirs,  Director  of  TNL     FOLLOW-­‐UP  RIGHTS  (SECTION  200)   -­‐ Of   French   origin,   adopted   because   of   the   Convention   -­‐ Applicable  to  specific  class  only:   o Painting   o Sculpture   o Original   manuscript   (of   a   writer   or   composer)   -­‐ Ratio:   These   works   appreciate   in   value.   Thus,   the   purpose   of   the   law   is   to   allow   the   creator   to   participate   in   the   appreciation   in   value   of   their  works.   -­‐ Basis:  Gross  proceeds.   -­‐ Problem   with   these   rights:   Enforcement   (how   do  you  enforce  these?)   o We  have  no  registry  system  for  these   works;  thus,  no  way  to  monitor  it.     NEIGHBORING  RIGHTS:   -­‐ Granted  to:   o Performers   o Producers  of  sound  recording   o Broadcasting  corporations   -­‐ Performers:   o Defined  in  Section  202.1   o Some   performers   are   better   off   than   others.  How?  

Right   of   all   performers   in   general   –   Section   203.1   ONLY   § Right   of   those   whose   performances   are   fixed   in   sound   recordings   –   Section   203.1   +   203.2,   203.3,   203.4,   203.5   o Why  not  include  other  works?   § Ma’am:   It   is   not   financially   feasible   to   apportion   all   rights   to   all   performers   in   audiovisual   works   because   these   are   collaborative   works.   o But  can  other  performers  demand  the   rights  in  203.2-­‐203.5?   § YES.   Section   207   allows   the   parties   to   agree   for   better   terms.   The   law   does   not   provide  for  ceilings.   Producers   of   sound   recording   and   Broadcasting  organization   o Can  they  also  claim  copyright?    Yes.   o When  can  they  claim  copyright?   § The   work   is   original,   they   produced   content   itself,   and   such   is   created   by   their   employees  in  the  exercise  of   their  functions.  OR   § Commissioned   work   AND   the   copyright   is   vested   in   them   by   the   contract   with   the  author  of  work.   o Independent   of   copyright,   they   also   have  other  rights.   o Why   give   them   copyright   and   other   rights?   § Because   it   is   possible   that   they   do   not   own   the   copyright   of   the   work   that   they  produced.  Thus,  if  they   do   not   own   the   copyrights,   they   can   at   least   invoke   other  rights.   §

-­‐

  Issue:  Why  would  copyright  infringement  be  the  better   right   to   be   invoked   by   a   broadcasting   organization   against  a  cable  operator  based  in  Lanao  rather  than  the   rights  of  a  broadcasting  organization  under  Chapter  XIV   of   the   IP   Code?   What   is   the   LEGAL   risk   if   the   broadcasting   organization   applies   for   a   search   warrant   on  the  basis  of  the  rights  of  a  broadcasting  organization   under  chapter  XIV?       HW  Answer  (Di  Bonilla):   The   search   warrant   is   susceptible   to   being   quashed  for  failure  to  establish  probable  cause  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   for   violation   of   the   rights   of   a   broadcasting   organization.   First,   as   emphasized   in   the   case   of   ABS-­‐CBN   vs.   PMMI,   the   Rome   Convention   defines   rebroadcasting   as   the   “the   simultaneous   broadcasting   by   one   broadcasting   organization   of   the   broadcast   of   another   broadcasting   organization.”   For   there   to   be   rebroadcasting,   the   alleged   rebroadcaster   must   be   a   broadcasting   organization.   However,   the   Lanao   cable   operator   does   not   meet   the   definition   of   broadcasting  organizations,  which  according  to   the  foregoing  case,    are  “entities  that  take  the   financial   and   editorial   responsibility   for   the   selection   and   arrangement   of,   and   investment   in,   the   transmitted   content.”   The   Lanao   cable   operator   does   not   select,   arrange   or   invest   in   the   content   it   transmits.   It   only   transmits   but   does   not   take   financial   and   editorial   responsibility   for   the   content.     It   is   HBO   that   creates,  selects,  arranges  and  transmits  its  own   channel   to   its   distributors   in   whole   -­‐   including   movies   it   has   been   licensed   to   show   and   its   own   originally   created   miniseries.   It   is   part   of   the   package   it   offers   and   paid   for   by   its   distributors.   On   the   other   hand,   the   Lanao   cable   operator   only   carries   the   signals   of   HBO   in  its  unchanged  form.  it  does  not  perform  the   functions   of   a   broadcasting   organization   so   that   it   cannot   be   said   to   be   engaged   in   rebroadcasting  of  HBO's  broadcasts.     Second,   the   Lanao   cable   operator   is   not   engaged   in   broadcasting.     As   a   cable   television,   it  is  engaged  in  mere  cable  retransmission.  The   right   of   broadcasting   organizations   against   rebroadcasting  without  their  consent  does  not   cover  cable  retransmission  which,  according  to   the   same   ABSCBN   case,   is   a   mere   simultaneous   and   unaltered   transmission   by   a   cable   television   through   wire   or   cable.   Sec.   202.7   of   the   IP   Code   defines   broadcasting   as     "the   transmission   by   wireless   means   for   the   public   reception   of   sounds   or   of   images   or   of   representations   thereof;   such   transmission   by   satellite   is   also   "broadcasting"   where   the   means   for   decrypting   are   provided   to   the   public  by  the  broadcasting  organization  or  with   its   consent."   Thus,   the   Lanao   cable   television   operator   which   transmits   through   wire   or   cables  is  not  broadcasting  because  the  latter  is   limited   to   transmission   by   wireless   and   by   satellite.   Also,   Lanao's   transmission   is   not   for   the   public   reception   in   general   but   only  for  its  subscribers.     Finally,   since   any   violation   of   the   rights   of   a   broadcasting  

organization   entitles   the   latter   to   the   same   criminal   remedies,   among   others,   in   case   of   infringement   of   copyright,   the   same   rights   must   be   construed   strictly   against   the   State.   Thus,   these   rights   and   the   corresponding   criminal  violations  thereof  must  not  be  deemed   to   include   acts   which   do   not   clearly   and   explicitly   fall   under   them.   Criminal   acts   must   not  be  deemed  to  exist  by  implication.    

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Intellectual Property Law VI.

industrial   designs,   marks   and   works,   acquired   in   good   faith  prior  to  the  effective  date  of  this  Act.    

Law   on   Trademarks,   Tradenames   and   Service  Marks  

 

SECTION  241.  EFFECTIVITY.  –    

A. Legislative  History  

This  Act  shall  take  effect  on  1  January  1998.    

 

REPUBLIC  ACT  166  

B. Definition  of  Trademarks  

An  Act  to  Provide  for  the  Registration  and  Protection  of   Trade-­‐marks,   Trade-­‐names   and   Service-­‐marks,   defining   Unfair   Competition   and   False   Marking   and   Providing   Remedies  against  the  Same,  and  for  Other  Purposes     -­‐ Took  effect  20  June  1947    

 

SECTION   121.1.   "MARK"  means  any  visible  sign  capable  of   distinguishing  the  goods  (trademark)  or  services  (service   mark)   of   an   enterprise   and   shall   include   a   stamped   or   marked  container  of  goods     DISTILLERIA  WASHINGTON,  INC.  V.  CA  (1996)  

SECTION  239.  REPEALS.  –    

Refresher:   La  Tondeña  Distillers,  Inc.  (LTDI)  filed  a  case  for  manual   delivery   with   dmages   against   Distilleria   Washington.   LTDI,   under   a   claim   of   ownership,   sought   to   seize   from   Distilleria   Washington   18,157   empty   "350   c.c.   white   flint   bottles"   bearing   the   blown-­‐in   marks   of   "La   Tondeña   Inc."  and  "Ginebra  San  Miguel."       LTDI   asserted   that,   being   the   owner   and   registrant   of   the  bottles,  it  was  entitled  to  the  protection  so  extended   by   Republic   Act   ("R.A.")   No.   623,   as   amended,   notwithstanding   its   sale   of   the   Ginebra   San   Miguel   gin   product  contained  in  said  bottles.     Washington   countered   that   R.A.   No.   623,   invoked   by   LTDI,   should   not   apply   to   gin,   an   alcoholic   beverage   which   is   unlike   that   of   "soda   water,   mineral   or   aerated   water,   ciders,   milks,   cream,   or   other   lawful   beverages"   mentioned  in  the  law,  and  that,  in  any  case,  ownership  of   the   bottles   should,   considering   the   attendant   facts   and   circumstances,  be  held  lawfully  transferred  to  the  buyers   upon  the  sale  of  the  gin  and  containers  at  a  single  price.     Doctrine:   The   case   before   us   goes   beyond   just   seeking   to   have   such  use  stopped  but  it  so  takes  on  even  the  ownership   issue   as   well.  Parenthetically,  petitioner  is  not  here  being   charged   with   a   violation   of   Section   2   of   R.A.   No.   623   or   of   the   Trademark   Law.   The   instant   suit   is   one   for   replevin   (manual   delivery)   where   the   claimant   must   be   able   to   show  convincingly  that  he  is  either  the  owner  or  clearly   entitled   to   the   possession   of   the   object   sought   to   be   recovered.   Replevin   is   a   possessory   action   the   gist   of   which   focuses   on   the   right   of   possession   that,   in   turn,   is   dependent  on  a  legal  basis  that,  not  infrequently,  looks  to   the  ownership  of  the  object  sought  to  be  replevied.     It  is  to  be  pointed  out  that  a  trademark  refers  to  a   word,   name,   symbol,   emblem,   sign   or   device   or   any   combination  thereof  adopted  and  used  by  a  merchant  to   identify,   and   distinguish   from   others,   his   goods   of   commerce.   It   is   basically   an   intellectual   creation   that   is   susceptible   to   ownership   and,   consistently   therewith,  

239.1.   All   Acts   and   parts   of   Acts   inconsistent   herewith,   more   particularly   Republic   Act   No.   165,   as   amended;   Republic   Act   No.   166,   as   amended;   and   Articles   188   and   189   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code;   Presidential   Decree   No.   49,   including   Presidential   Decree   No.   285,   as   amended,   are  hereby  repealed.     239.2.  Marks  registered  under  Republic  Act  No.  166  shall   remain   in   force   but   shall   be   deemed   to   have   been   granted   under   this   Act   and   shall   be   due   for   renewal   within  the  period  provided  for  under  this  Act  and,  upon   renewal   shall   be   reclassified   in   accordance   with   the   International   Classification.   Trade   names   and   marks   registered   in   the   Supplemental   Register   under   Republic   Act   No.   166   shall   remain   in   force   but   shall   no   longer   be   subject  to  renewal.     239.3.   The   provisions   of   this   Act   shall   apply   to   works   in   which   copyright   protection   obtained   prior   to   the   effectivity   of   this   Act   is   subsisting:   Provided,   That   the   application   of   this   Act   shall   not   result   in   the   diminution   of  such  protection.    

SECTION  235.2.     All  applications  for  registration  of  marks  or  trade  names   pending   in   the   Bureau   of   Patents,   Trademarks   and   Technology  Transfer  at  the  effective  date  of  this  Act  may   be   amended,   if   practicable   to   bring   them   under   the   provisions   of   this   Act.   The   prosecution   of   such   applications   so   amended   and   the   grant   of   registrations   thereon  shall  be  proceeded  with  in  accordance  with  the   provisions  of  this  Act.  If  such  amendments  are  not  made,   the   prosecution   of   said   applications   shall   be   proceeded   with   and   registrations   thereon   granted   in   accordance   with   the   Acts   under   which   said   applications   were   filed,   and   said   Acts   are   hereby   continued   in   force   to   this   extent   for   this   purpose   only,   notwithstanding   the   foregoing  general  repeal  thereof.    

SECTION  236.  PRESERVATION  OF  EXISTING  RIGHTS.  –     Nothing   herein   shall   adversely   affect   the   rights   on   the   enforcement   of   rights   in   patents,   utility   models,  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   gives   rise   to   its   own   elements   of   jus   posidendi,   jus   utendi,   jus   fruendi,   jus   disponendi,   and   jus   abutendi,   along   with   the   applicable   jus   lex,   comprising   that   ownership.   The   incorporeal  right,  however,  is  distinct  from  the  property   in   the   material   object   subject   to   it.   Ownership   in   one   does   not   necessarily   vest   ownership   in   the   other.   Thus,   the   transfer   or   assignment   of   the   intellectual   property   will   not   necessarily   constitute   a   conveyance   of   the   thing   it  covers,  nor  would  a  conveyance  of  the  latter  imply  the   transfer  or  assignment  of  the  intellectual  right.       R.A.   No.   623   evidently   does   not   disallow   the   sale   or   transfer   of   ownership   of   the   marked   bottles   or   containers.  In  fact,  the  contrary  is  implicit  in  the  law;  thus   —     Sec.   5.   No   action   shall   be   brought   under   this   Act   against   any   person   to   whom   the   registered   manufacturer,  bottler  or  seller,  has  transferred   by   way   of   sale,   any   of   the   containers   herein   referred   to,   but   the   sale   of   the   beverage   contained   in   the   said   containers   shall   not   include   the   sale   of   the   containers   unless   specifically  so  provided.     Sec.   6.   The   provisions   of   this   Act   shall   not   be   interpreted  as  prohibiting  the  use  of  bottles  as   containers   for   "sisi,"   "bagoong,"   "patis,"   and   similar  native  products.     Scarcely   disputed   are   certain   and   specific   industry   practices   in   the   sale   of   gin:   The   manufacturer   sells   the   product   in   marked   containers,   through   dealers,   to   the   public   in   supermarkets,   grocery   shops,   retail   stores   and   other   sales   outlets.   The   buyer   takes   the   item;   he   is   neither   required   to   return   the   bottle   nor   required   to   make  a  deposit  to  assure  its  return  to  the  seller.  He  could   return  the  bottle  and  get  a  refund.  A  number  of  bottles   at   times   find   their   way   to   commercial   users.   It   cannot   be   gainsaid   that   ownership   of   the   containers   does   pass   on   to  the  consumer  albeit  subject  to  the  statutory  limitation   on   the   use   of   the   registered   containers   and   to   the   trademark   right   of   the   registrant.   The   statement   in   Section   5   of   R.A.   623   to   the   effect   that   the   "sale   of   beverage   contained   in   the   said   containers   shall   not   include   the   sale   of   the   containers   unless   specifically   so   provided"   is   not   a   rule   of   proscription.   It   is   a   rule   of   construction  that,  in  keeping  with  the  spirit  and  intent  of   the   law,   establishes   at   best   a   presumption   (of   non-­‐ conveyance   of   the   container)   and   which   by   no   means   can   be   taken   to   be   either   interdictive   or   conclusive   in   character.   Upon   the   other   hand,   LTDI's   sales   invoice,   stipulating   that   the   "sale   does   not   include   the   bottles   with   the   blown-­‐in   marks   of   ownership   of   La   Tondeña   Distillers,"   cannot   affect   those   who   are   not   privies   thereto.      

C.

Functions  of  Trademarks  

 

ANG  V.  TEODORO  (1942)   Refresher:   Trademark  involved:  “Ang  Tibay”   Toribo  Teodoro  –  used  it  for  slippers,  shoes,  and  indoor   baseballs   since   1910.   Registered   it   as   trademark   in   1915,   as  trade-­‐name  in  1933.     Ana   L.   Ang   –   registered   the   trademark   for   pants   and   shirts  in  1932.     Doctrine:   We   find   it   necessary   to   go   into   the   etymology   and   meaning  of  the  Tagalog  words  "Ang  Tibay"  to  determine   whether   they   are   a   descriptive   term,   i.e.,   whether   they   relate  to  the  quality  or  description  of  the  merchandise  to   which  respondent  has  applied  them  as  a  trademark.       The   word   "ang"   is   a   definite   article   meaning   "the"   in   English.  It  is  also  used  as  an  adverb,  a  contraction  of  the   word   "anong"   (what   or   how).   For   instance,   instead   of   saying,  "Anong  ganda!"  ("How  beautiful!"),  we  ordinarily   say,   "Ang   ganda!"   Tibay   is   a   root   word   from   which   are   derived   the   verb   magpatibay   (to   strenghten;   the   nouns   pagkamatibay   (strength,   durability),   katibayan   (proof,   support,   strength),   katibay-­‐tibayan   (superior   strength);   and   the   adjectives   matibay   (strong,   durable,   lasting),   napakatibay   (very   strong),   kasintibay   or   magkasintibay   (as   strong   as,   or   of   equal   strength).   The   phrase   "Ang   Tibay"   is   an   exclamation   denoting   administration   of   strength   or   durability.   For   instance,   one   who   tries   hard   but  fails  to  break  an  object  exclaims,  "Ang  tibay!"  (How   strong!")   It   may   also   be   used   in   a   sentence   thus,   "Ang   tibay   ng   sapatos   mo!"   (How   durable   your   shoes   are!")   The   phrase   "ang   tibay"   is   never   used   adjectively   to   define   or   describe   an   object.   One   does   not   say,   "ang   tibay   sapatos"   or   "sapatos   ang   tibay"   is   never   used   adjectively   to   define   or   describe   an   object.   One   does   not   say,  "ang  tibay  sapatos"  or  "sapatos  ang  tibay"  to  mean   "durable   shoes,"   but   "matibay   na   sapatos"   or   "sapatos   na  matibay."     From   all   of   this   we   deduce   that   "Ang   Tibay"   is   not   a   descriptive   term   within   the   meaning   of   the   Trade-­‐Mark   Law   but   rather   a   fanciful   or   coined   phrase   which   may   properly   and   legally   be   appropriated   as   a   trademark   or   trade-­‐name.   In   this   connection   we   do   not   fail   to   note   that   when   the   petitioner   herself   took   the   trouble   and   expense   of   securing   the   registration   of   these   same   words   as   a   trademark   of   her   products   she   or   her   attorney   as   well   as   the   Director   of   Commerce   was   undoubtedly   convinced   that   said   words   (Ang   Tibay)   were   not   a   descriptive   term   and   hence   could   be   legally   used   and   validly   registered   as   a   trade-­‐mark.   It   seems   stultifying  and  puerile  for  her  now  to  contend  otherwise,   suggestive   of   the   story   of   sour   grapes.   Counsel   for   the   petitioner   says   that   the   function   of   a   trademark   is   to  

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Intellectual Property Law point   distinctively,   either   by   its   own   meaning   or   by   association,   to   the   origin   or   ownership   of   the   wares   to   which   it   is   applied.   That   is   correct,   and   we   find   that   "Ang   Tibay,"  as  used  by  the  respondent  to  designate  his  wares,   had   exactly   performed   that   function   for   twenty-­‐two   years  before  the  petitioner  adopted  it  as  a  trade-­‐mark  in   her   own   business.   Ang   Tibay   shoes   and   slippers   are,   by   association,   known   throughout   the   Philippines   as   products   of   the   Ang   Tibay   factory   owned   and   operated   by  the  respondent  Toribio  Teodoro.    

  Barbizon   Corporation   –   NY   corp.   =   opposed   the   application.     Escobar  later  assigned  all  her  rights  and  interest  over  the   trademark   to   petitioner   Pribhdas   J.   Mirpuri   who,   under   his   firm   name   then,   the   "Bonito   Enterprises,"   was   the   sole   and   exclusive   distributor   of   Escobar's   "Barbizon"   products.     Doctrine:   In   Philippine   jurisprudence,   the   function   of   a   trademark   is   to   point   out   distinctly   the   origin   or   ownership   of   the   goods   to   which   it   is   affixed;   to   secure   to   him,   who   has   been  instrumental  in  bringing  into  the  market  a  superior   article  of  merchandise,  the  fruit  of  his  industry  and  skill;   to  assure  the  public  that  they  are  procuring  the  genuine   article;   to   prevent   fraud   and   imposition;   and   to   protect   the   manufacturer   against   substitution   and   sale   of   an   inferior  and  different  article  as  his  product.     Modern   authorities   on   trademark   law   view   trademarks   as  performing  three  distinct  functions:     (1)   they   indicate   origin   or   ownership   of   the   articles  to  which  they  are  attached;     (2)  they  guarantee  that  those  articles  come  up   to  a  certain  standard  of  quality;  and     (3)  they  advertise  the  articles  they  symbolize.     Symbols   have   been   used   to   identify   the   ownership   or   origin   of   articles   for   several   centuries.   As   early   as   5,000   B.C.,   markings   on   pottery   have   been   found   by   archaeologists.   Cave   drawings   in   southwestern   Europe   show  bison  with  symbols  on  their  flanks.  Archaeological   discoveries   of   ancient   Greek   and   Roman   inscriptions   on   sculptural   works,   paintings,   vases,   precious   stones,   glassworks,   bricks,   etc.   reveal   some   features   which   are   thought   to   be   marks   or   symbols.   These   marks   were   affixed   by   the   creator   or   maker   of   the   article,   or   by   public   authorities   as   indicators   for   the   payment   of   tax,   for   disclosing   state   monopoly,   or   devices   for   the   settlement   of   accounts   between   an   entrepreneur   and   his  workmen.     In  the  Middle  Ages,  the  use  of  many  kinds  of  marks  on  a   variety   of   goods   was   commonplace.   Fifteenth   century   England  saw  the  compulsory  use  of  identifying  marks  in   certain   trades.   There   were   the   baker's   mark   on   bread,   bottlemaker's   marks,   smith's   marks,   tanner's   marks,   watermarks  on  paper,  etc.  Every  guild  had  its  own  mark   and   every   master   belonging   to   it   had   a   special   mark   of   his   own.   The   marks   were   not   trademarks   but   police   marks  compulsorily  imposed  by  the  sovereign  to  let  the   public   know   that   the   goods   were   not   "foreign"   goods   smuggled  into  an  area  where  the  guild  had  a  monopoly,   as   well   as   to   aid   in   tracing   defective   work   or   poor   craftsmanship   to   the   artisan.   For   a   similar   reason,   merchants  also  used  merchants'  marks.  Merchants  dealt  

ETEPHA,   A.G.   V.   DIRECTOR   OF   PATENTS   AND   WESTMONT   PHARMACEUTICALS,  INC.  (1966)   Refresher:   Westmont   Pharmaceuticals,   Inc.   –   NY   Corp.   =   sought   to   register   “Atussin”   in   1959   on   its   "medicinal   preparation   of   expectorant   antihistaminic,   bronchodilator   sedative,   ascorbic   acid   (Vitamin   C)   used   in   the   treatment   of   cough".     Etepha,   A.   G.   –   Liechtenstein   corp.   =   objected   to   the   registration  on  the  ground  that  “Atussin”  is  similar  to  its   trademark   “Pertussin”   that   they   used   on   a   preparation   for  the  treatment  of  coughs.     Doctrine:   The   objects   of   a   trademark   are   "to   point   out   distinctly   the   origin   or   ownership   of   the   articles   to   which   it   is   affixed,   to   secure   to   him   who   has   been   instrumental   in   bringing   into   market   a   superior   article   or   merchandise   the   fruit   of   his   industry   and   skill,   and   to   prevent   fraud   and  imposition."     Confusion  is  likely  between  trademarks,  however,  only  if   their   over-­‐all   presentations   in   any   of   the   particulars   of   sound,   appearance,   or   meaning   are   such   as   would   lead   the  purchasing  public  into  believing  that  the  products  to   which   the   marks   are   applied   emanated   from   the   same   source.   In   testing   this   issue,   fixed   legal   rules   exist   —   if   not   in   harmony,   certainly   in   abundance   —   but,   in   the   final  analysis,  the  application  of  these  rules  in  any  given   situation   necessarily   reflects   a   matter   of   individual   judgment   largely   predicated   on   opinion.   There   is,   however,   and   can   be   no   disagreement   with   the   rule   that   the   purchaser   is   confused,   if   at   all,   by   the   marks   as   a   whole.    

MIRPURI   V.   CA,   DIRECTOR   OF   PATENTS   AND   BARBIZON   CORP.  (1999)   Refresher:   Trademark  in  issue  =  “Barbizon”     Lolita   Escobar   (predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest   of   Mirpuiri)   =   sought   to   register   “Barbizon”   for   use   in   brassieres   and   ladies   undergarments.   Escobar   alleged   that   she   had   been   manufacturing   and   selling   these   products   under   the  firm  name  "L  &  BM  Commercial"  since  March  3,  1970.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   in   goods   acquired   from   many   sources   and   the   marks   enabled   them   to   identify   and   reclaim   their   goods   upon   recovery  after  shipwreck  or  piracy.     With   constant   use,   the   mark   acquired   popularity   and   became   voluntarily   adopted.   It   was   not   intended   to   create   or   continue   monopoly   but   to   give   the   customer   an   index   or   guarantee   of   quality.   It   was   in   the   late   18th   century  when  the  industrial  revolution  gave  rise  to  mass   production  and  distribution  of  consumer  goods  that  the   mark  became  an  important  instrumentality  of  trade  and   commerce.   By   this   time,   trademarks   did   not   merely   identify   the   goods;   they   also   indicated   the   goods   to   be   of   satisfactory   quality,   and   thereby   stimulated   further   purchases   by   the   consuming   public.   Eventually,   they   came  to  symbolize  the  goodwill  and  business  reputation   of  the  owner  of  the  product  and  became  a  property  right   protected   by   law.   The   common   law   developed   the   doctrine   of   trademarks   and   tradenames   "to   prevent   a   person   from   palming   off   his   goods   as   another's,   from   getting   another's   business   or   injuring   his   reputation   by   unfair   means,   and,   from   defrauding   the   public."   Subsequently,   England   and   the   United   States   enacted   national   legislation   on   trademarks   as   part   of   the   law   regulating   unfair   trade.   It   became   the   right   of   the   trademark   owner   to   exclude   others   from   the   use   of   his   mark,   or   of   a   confusingly   similar   mark   where   confusion   resulted   in   diversion   of   trade   or   financial   injury.   At   the   same   time,   the   trademark   served   as   a   warning   against   the   imitation   or   faking   of   products   to   prevent   the   imposition  of  fraud  upon  the  public.     Today,   the   trademark   is   not   merely   a   symbol   of   origin   and  goodwill;  it  is  often  the   most   effective   agent   for   the   actual   creation   and   protection   of   goodwill.   It   imprints   upon   the   public   mind   an   anonymous   and   impersonal   guaranty   of   satisfaction,   creating   a   desire   for   further   satisfaction.   In   other   words,   the   mark   actually   sells   the   goods.  The  mark  has  become  the  "silent  salesman,"  the   conduit   through   which   direct   contact   between   the   trademark   owner   and   the   consumer   is   assured.   It   has   invaded   popular   culture   in   ways   never   anticipated   that   it   has   become   a   more   convincing   selling   point   than   even   the  quality  of  the  article  to  which  it  refers.  In  the  last  half   century,   the   unparalleled   growth   of   industry   and   the   rapid   development   of   communications   technology   have   enabled   trademarks,   tradenames   and   other   distinctive   signs  of  a  product  to  penetrate  regions  where  the  owner   does  not  actually  manufacture  or  sell  the  product  itself.   Goodwill  is  no  longer  confined  to  the  territory  of  actual   market   penetration;   it   extends   to   zones   where   the   marked   article   has   been   fixed   in   the   public   mind   through   advertising.  Whether  in  the  print,  broadcast  or  electronic   communications   medium,   particularly   on   the   Internet,   advertising  has  paved  the  way  for  growth  and  expansion   of  the  product  by  creating  and  earning  a  reputation  that   crosses   over   borders,   virtually   turning   the   whole   world   into  one  vast  marketplace.  

 

D. How  are  trademarks  acquired?    

SECTION  122.  HOW  MARKS  ARE  ACQUIRED.  –     The   rights   in   a   mark   shall   be   acquired   through   registration   made   validly   in   accordance   with   the   provisions  of  this  law.     NOTE:  

RA   166,   SECTION   2-­‐A.   OWNERSHIP   OF   TRADE-­‐MARKS,   TRADE-­‐NAMES  AND  SERVICE-­‐MARKS,  HOW  ACQUIRED.  –     Anyone   who   lawfully   produces   or   deals   in   merchandise   of   any   kind   or   who   engages   in   any   lawful   business,   or   who   renders   an   lawful   service   in   commerce,   by   actual   use  thereof  in  manufacture  or  trade,  in  business,  and  in   the   service   rendered,   may   appropriate   to   his   exclusive   use   a   trade-­‐mark,   trade-­‐name,   or   a   service-­‐mark   not   so   appropriated   by   another,   to   distinguish   his   merchandise,   business   or   service   from   the   merchandise,   business   or   service   of   others.   The   ownership   or   possession   of   a   trade-­‐mark,   trade-­‐name,   service-­‐mark,   heretofore   or   hereafter  appropriated,  as  in  this  section  provided,  shall   be   recognized   and   protected   in   the   same   manner   and   to   the   same   extent   as   are   other   property   rights   known   to   the  laws.    

UNNO   COMMERCIAL   ENTERPRISES   V.   GENERAL   MILLING   CORPORATION  (1983)   Refresher:   Trademark  in  issue:  "All  Montana"   General  Milling  =  used  it  on  wheat  flour  in  the  Philippines   since  1955   Unno   Commercial   =   (prior)   registrant   of   the   mark   since   1962,  allegedly  started  using  the  mark  since  1956     Doctrine:   The  right  to  register  trademark  is  based  on  ownership.   When   the   applicant   is   not   the   owner   of   the   trademark   being   applied   for,   he   has   no   right   to   apply   for   the   registration  of  the  same.  Under  the  Trademark  Law  only   the   owner   of   the   trademark,   trade   name   or   service   mark   used   to   distinguish   his   goods,   business   or   service   from   the   goods,   business   or   service   of   others   is   entitled   to   register  the  same.     The   term   owner   does   NOT   include   the   importer   of   the   goods  bearing  the  trademark,  trade  name,  service  mark,   or   other   mark   of   ownership,   UNLESS   such   importer   is   actually   the   owner   thereof   in   the   country   from   which   the   goods   are   imported.   A   LOCAL   IMPORTER,   however,   may   make   application   for   the   registration   of   a   foreign   trademark,   trade   name   or   service   mark   if   he   is   duly   authorized   by   the   actual   owner   of   the   name   or   other   mark   of   ownership.   A   mere   distributor   of   the   merchandise   covered   by   the   TM   cannot   apply   for   the   registration  of  the  TM.  

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Intellectual Property Law   Thus,   this   Court,   has   on   several   occasions   ruled   that   where  the  applicant's  alleged  ownership  is  not  shown  in   any   notarial   document   and   the   applicant   appears   to   be   merely   an   importer   or   distributor   of   the   merchandise   covered   by   said   trademark,   its   application   cannot   be   granted.     Ownership   of   a   trademark   is   not   acquired   by   the   mere   fact  of  registration  alone.     Registration   merely   creates   a   prima   facie   presumption   of   the   validity   of   the   registration,   of   the   registrant's   ownership   of   the   trademark  and  of  the  exclusive  right  to  the  use  thereof.   Registration   does   not   perfect   a   trademark   right.   As   conceded   itself   by   petitioner,   evidence   may   be   presented   to   overcome   the   presumption.   Prior   use   by   one   will   controvert   a   claim   of   legal   appropriation,   by   subsequent  users.    

of  the  name  in  advertisements,  circulars,  price  lists,  and   on  signs  and  stationery.     The   Paris   Convention   for   the   Protection   of   Industrial   Property  does  not  automatically  exclude  all  countries  of   the   world   which   have   signed   it   from   using   a   tradename   which  happens  to  be  used  in  one  country.  To  illustrate  -­‐   If   a   taxicab   or   bus   company   in   a   town   in   the   United   Kingdom  or  India  happens  to  use  the  tradename  "Rapid   Transportation",   it   does   not   necessarily   follow   that   "Rapid"   can   no   longer   be   registered   in   Uganda,   Fiji,   or   the  Philippines.     Indeed,   the   Philippines   is   a   signatory   to   this   Treaty   and,   hence,   we   must   honor   our   obligation   thereunder   on   matters  concerning  internationally  known  or  well  known   marks.   However,   this   Treaty   provision   clearly   indicated   the   conditions   which   must   exist   before   any   trademark   owner   can   claim   and   be   afforded   rights   such   as   the   Petitioner  herein  seeks  and  those  conditions  are  that:     a)   the   mark   must   be   internationally   known   or   well  known;     b)  the  subject  of  the  right  must  be  a  trademark,   not  a  patent  or  copyright  or  anything  else;     c)   the   mark   must   be   for   use   in   the   same   or   similar  kinds  of  goods;  and     d)   the   person   claiming   must   be   the   owner   of   the  mark    

KABUSHI  KAISHA   ISETAN  V.   IAC  AND  ISETANN  DEPT.  STORE   (1991)   Refresher:   Trademark  in  issue:  “Isetan”   Kabushi   Kaisha   Isetan   –   Japan   Corp.,   sought   to   cancel   Isetann’s  registration   Isetann   Dept.   Store   –   domestic   corp.,   registrant   of   “Isetann  Dept.  Store”     Doctrine:   A   fundamental   principle   of   Philippine   Trademark   Law   is   that   actual   use   in   commerce   in   the   Philippines   is   a   pre-­‐ requisite   to   the   acquisition   of   ownership   over   a   trademark   or   a   tradename.   Adoption   alone   of   a   trademark   would   not   give   exclusive   right   thereto.   Such   right  grows  out  of  their  actual  use.  Adoption  is  not  use.   One   way   make   advertisements,   issue   circulars,   give   out   price   lists   on   certain   goods;   but   these   alone   would   not   give   exclusive   right   of   use.   For   trademark   is   a   creation   of   use.   The   underlying   reason   for   all   these   is   that   purchasers   have   come   to   understand   the   mark   as   indicating   the   origin   of   the   wares.   Flowing   from   this   is   the  trader's  right  to  protection  in  the  trade  he  has  built   up   and   the   goodwill   he   has   accumulated   from   use   of   the   trademark.     The   records   show   that   the   petitioner   has   never   conducted   any   business   in   the   Philippines.   It   has   never   promoted  its  tradename  or  trademark  in  the  Philippines.   It  has  absolutely  no  business  goodwill  in  the  Philippines.   It  is  unknown  to  Filipinos  except  the  very  few  who  may   have  noticed  it  while  travelling  abroad.  It  has  never  paid   a   single   centavo   of   tax   to   the   Philippine   government.   Under  the  law,  it  has  no  right  to  the  remedy  it  seeks.     The   mere   origination   or   adoption   of   a   particular   tradename   without   actual   use   thereof   in   the   market   is   insufficient   to   give   any   exclusive   right   to   its   use,   even   though  such  adoption  is  publicly  declared,  such  as  by  use  

PHILIP   MORRIS   V.   CA   AND   FORTUNE   TOBACCO   CORP.   (1993)   Refresher:   Trademark  in  issue  =  “Mark”   Philip   Morris   =   Virginia   corp.   not   doing   business   in   the   Philippines.   Fortune  Tobacco  =  domestic  corp.     Doctrine:   A  foreign  corporation  not  doing  business  in  the  PH  may   have   the   right   to   sue   before   PH   courts   but   existing   adjective   axioms   require   that   qualifying   circumstances   necessary   for   the   assertion   of   such   right   should   first   be   affirmatively  pleaded.       Foreign   corporation   not   engaged   in   business   in   the   PH   may   maintain   a   cause   of   action   for   infringement   primarily  because  of  Sec.  21-­‐A  of  TM  Law  when  the  legal   standing  to  sue  is  alleged.       Our   municipal   law   on   TM   regarding   the   requirement   of   actual   use   in   the   PH   must   subordinate   an   international   agreement   inasmuch   as   the   apparent   clash   is   being   decided   by   a   municipal   tribunal.   Withal,   the   fact   that   international  law  has  been  made  part  of  law  of  the  land  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   does   not   by   any   means   imply   the   primacy   of   international   law   over   national   law   in   the   municipal   sphere.  Under  the  doctrine  of  incorporation  as  applied  in   most   countries,   rules   of   international   law   are   given   a   standing   equal,   not   superior   to   the   national   legislative   enactments.       A  foreign  corporation  may  have  the  personal  to  file  a  suit   for   infringement   BUT   it   may   not   necessarily   be   entitled   to   protection   due   to   absence   of   actual   use   of   the   emblem  in  the  local  market.      

Developers  Group  of  Companies,  Inc.  =  claim  ownership   of   the   logo   and   the   mark   that   they   used   for   their   restaurant   business.   They   had   the   mark   registered   in   1983.     Kuok   family   owns   and   operates   a   chain   of   hotels   since   1962.     Doctrine:   Under   the   provisions   of   the   former   trademark   law,   RA   166,  as  amended,  which  was  in  effect  up  to  December  31,   1997,   hence,   the   law   in   force   at   the   time   of   respondent's   application   for   registration   of   trademark,   the   root   of   ownership   of   a   trademark   is   actual   use   in   commerce.   Section   2   of   said   law   requires   that   before   a   trademark   can   be   registered,   it   must   have   been   actually   used   in   commerce   and   service   for   not   less   than   two   months   in   the  Philippines  prior  to  the  filing  of  an  application  for  its   registration.     Registration,   without   more,   does   not   confer   upon   the   registrant   an   absolute   right   to   the   registered   mark.   The   certificate   of   registration   is   merely   a   prima   facie   proof   that  the  registrant  is  the  owner  of  the  registered  mark   or   trade   name.  Evidence  of  prior  and  continuous  use  of   the   mark   or   trade   name   by   another   can   overcome   the   presumptive   ownership   of   the   registrant   and   may   very   well   entitle   the   former   to   be   declared   owner   in   an   appropriate  case.     Among   the   effects   of   registration   of   a   mark,   as   catalogued  by  the  Court  in  Lorenzana  v.  Macagba,  are:     1.   Registration   in   the   Principal   Register   gives   rise   to   a   presumption   of   the   validity   of   the   registration,   the   registrant's   ownership   of   the   mark,  and  his  right  to  the  exclusive  use  thereof.   x  x  x     2.   Registration   in   the   Principal   Register   is   limited   to   the   actual   owner   of   the   trademark   and   proceedings   therein   pass   on   the   issue   of   ownership,   which   may   be   contested   through   opposition   or   interference   proceedings,   or,   after  registration,  in  a  petition  for  cancellation.   xxx     Ownership  of  a  mark  or  trade  name  may  be  acquired  not   necessarily   by   registration   but   by   adoption   and   use   in   trade   or   commerce.   As   between   actual   use   of   a   mark   without   registration,   and   registration   of   the   mark   without   actual   use   thereof,   the   former   prevails   over   the   latter.  For  a  rule  widely  accepted  and  firmly  entrenched,   because   it   has   come   down   through   the   years,   is   that   actual   use   in   commerce   or   business   is   a   pre-­‐requisite   to   the  acquisition  of  the  right  of  ownership.    

PHILIP  MORRIS  V.  FORTUNE  TOBACCO  CORP.  (2006)   Doctrine:   Foreign   corporation   may   not   successfully   sue   on   the   basis  alone  of  their  respective  certificates  of  registration   of   TM,   for   as   far   as   a   condition   to   the   availment   of   the   rights   and   privileges   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   their   TM   in   this   country,   they   ought   to   show   proof   that,   on   top   of   the   PH   registration,   their   country   grants   substantially   similar   rights  and  privileges  to  Filipino  citizens  pursuant  to  Sec.   21-­‐A  of  RA  166.       Members   of   the   Paris   Union   are   not   automatically   entitled   protection   of   TM   in   this   country,   absent   actual   use  of  the  marks  in  the  local  commerce  and  trade.  True,   the   PH   adherence   to   Paris   Convention   effectively   obligates  the  country  to  honor  and  enforce  its  provisions   as   regards   the   protection   of   industrial   property   of   foreign   nationals   in   this   country.   However,   any   protection   accorded   has   to   be   made   subject   to   the   limitations  of  PH  laws.       The   registration   of   TM   cannot   be   deemed   conclusive   as   to   the   actual   use   of   such   TM   in   local   commerce.   As   it   were,   registration   does   not   confer   upon   the   registrant   an  absolute  right  to  the  registered  mark.  The  certificate   of   registration   merely   constitutes   prima   facie   evidence   that   the   registrant   is   the   owner   of   the   registered   mark.   Evidence   of   non-­‐usage   of   the   mark   rebuts   the   presumption   of   TM   ownership,   as   what   happened   here   when  petitioners  no  less  admitted  not  doing  business  in   this  country.       Registration  in  the  PH  of  TM  does  not  ipso  facto  convey   an   absolute   right   or   exclusive   ownership   thereof.   The   registration  of  TM  unaccompanied  by  actual  use  thereof   in  the  country  accords  the  registrant  only  the  standing  to   sue   for   infringement   in   the   PH   courts.   Entitlement   to   protection   of   such   TM   in   the   country   is   entirely   a   different  matter.      

SHANGRI-­‐LA  INTERNATIONAL  HOTEL  MANAGEMENT,  LTD.  V.   DEVELOPERS  GROUP  OF  COMPANIES,  INC.  (2006)   Refresher:   Trademark  in  issue:  “Shangri-­‐la”  and  the  “S”  logo  

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Intellectual Property Law While  the  present  law  on  trademarks  has  dispensed  with   the   requirement   of   prior   actual   use   at   the   time   of   registration,   the   law   in   force   at   the   time   of   registration   must   be   applied,   and   thereunder   it   was   held   that   as   a   condition   precedent   to   registration   of   trademark,   trade   name   or   service   mark,   the   same   must   have   been   in   actual   use   in   the   Philippines   before   the   filing   of   the   application   for   registration.   Trademark   is   a   creation   of   use   and   therefore   actual   use   is   a   pre-­‐requisite   to   exclusive   ownership   and   its   registration   with   the   Philippine   Patent   Office   is   a   mere   administrative   confirmation  of  the  existence  of  such  right.     By   itself,   registration   is   not   a   mode   of   acquiring   ownership.   When   the   applicant   is   not   the   owner   of   the   trademark   being   applied   for,   he   has   no   right   to   apply   for   registration   of   the   same.   Registration   merely   creates   a   prima  facie  presumption  of  the  validity  of  the  registration,   of  the  registrant's  ownership  of  the  trademark  and  of  the   exclusive   right   to   the   use   thereof.   Such   presumption,   just   like   the   presumptive   regularity   in   the   performance   of   official   functions,   is   rebuttable   and   must   give   way   to   evidence  to  the  contrary.    

or   the   name,   signature,   or   portrait   of   a   deceased   President   of   the   Philippines,   during   the   life   of   his   widow,   if  any,  except  by  written  consent  of  the  widow;     (d)   Is   identical   with   a   registered   mark   belonging   to   a   different   proprietor   or   a   mark   with   an   earlier   filing   or   priority  date,  in  respect  of:     (i)  The  same  goods  or  services,  or     (ii)  Closely  related  goods  or  services,  or     (iii)  If  it  nearly  resembles  such  a  mark  as  to  be   likely  to  deceive  or  cause  confusion;     (e)   Is   identical   with,   or   confusingly   similar   to,   or   constitutes   a   translation   of   a   mark   which   is   considered   by   the   competent   authority   of   the   Philippines   to   be   well-­‐ known  internationally  and  in  the  Philippines,  whether  or   not   it   is   registered   here,   as   being   already   the   mark   of   a   person   other   than   the   applicant   for   registration,   and   used  for  identical  or  similar  goods  or  services:  Provided,   That   in   determining   whether   a   mark   is   well-­‐known,   account  shall  be  taken  of  the  knowledge  of  the  relevant   sector   of   the   public,   rather   than   of   the   public   at   large,   including   knowledge   in   the   Philippines   which   has   been   obtained  as  a  result  of  the  promotion  of  the  mark;     (f)   Is   identical   with,   or   confusingly   similar   to,   or   constitutes   a   translation   of   a   mark   considered   well-­‐ known   in   accordance   with   the   preceding   paragraph,   which   is   registered   in   the   Philippines   with   respect   to   goods   or   services   which   are   not   similar   to   those   with   respect   to   which   registration   is   applied   for:   Provided,   That   use   of   the   mark   in   relation   to   those   goods   or   services   would   indicate   a   connection   between   those   goods  or  services,  and  the  owner  of  the  registered  mark:   Provided  further,  That  the  interests  of  the  owner  of  the   registered  mark  are  likely  to  be  damaged  by  such  use;     (g)   Is   likely   to   mislead   the   public,   particularly   as   to   the   nature,   quality,   characteristics   or   geographical   origin   of   the  goods  or  services;     (h)  Consists  exclusively  of  signs  that  are  generic  for  the   goods  or  services  that  they  seek  to  identify;     (i)   Consists   exclusively   of   signs   or   of   indications   that   have  become  customary  or  usual  to  designate  the  goods   or   services   in   everyday   language   or   in   bona   fide   and   established  trade  practice;     (j)  Consists  exclusively  of  signs  or  of  indications  that  may   serve   in   trade   to   designate   the   kind,   quality,   quantity,   intended   purpose,   value,   geographical   origin,   time   or   production  of  the  goods  or  rendering  of  the  services,  or   other  characteristics  of  the  goods  or  services;    

SHANGRI-­‐LA  INTERNATIONAL  HOTEL  MANAGEMENT,  LTD.  V.   DEVELOPERS  GROUP  OF  COMPANIES,  INC.  (2007)   Court  decision:   The   interpretation   of   Republic   Act   No.   166   in   the   Decision   does   not   in   any   way   diminish   the   protection   afforded   to   valid   trademark   registrations   made   under   said   law.   It   was   glaringly   obvious,   however,   from   the   testimony   of   movant’s   own   witness   that   DGCI’s   registration   of   the   subject   mark   and   logo   was   void   due   to   the   existence   of   bad   faith   and   the   absence   of   the   requisite  2-­‐month  prior  use.    

E.

Standard  for  registrability  

  Distinctiveness.    

F.

What  marks  may  be  registered?  

 

SECTION  123.  REGISTRABILITY.  –     123.1.  A  mark  cannot  be  registered  if  it:     (a)  Consists  of  immoral,  deceptive  or  scandalous  matter,   or   matter   which   may   disparage   or   falsely   suggest   a   connection   with   persons,   living   or   dead,   institutions,   beliefs,  or  national  symbols,  or  bring  them  into  contempt   or  disrepute;     (b)  Consists  of  the  flag  or  coat  of  arms  or  other  insignia   of  the  Philippines  or  any  of  its  political  subdivisions,  or  of   any  foreign  nation,  or  any  simulation  thereof;     (c)   Consists   of   a   name,   portrait   or   signature   identifying   a   particular  living  individual  except  by  his  written  consent,  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   (k)   Consists   of   shapes   that   may   be   necessitated   by   technical   factors   or   by   the   nature   of   the   goods   themselves  or  factors  that  affect  their  intrinsic  value;     (l)   Consists   of   color   alone,   unless   defined   by   a   given   form;  or     (m)  Is  contrary  to  public  order  or  morality.     123.2.   As   regards   signs   or   devices   mentioned   in   paragraphs   (j),   (k),   and   (l),   nothing   shall   prevent   the   registration  of  any  such  sign  or  device  which  has  become   distinctive   in   relation   to   the   goods   for   which   registration   is  requested  as  a  result  of  the  use  that  have  been  made   of   it   in   commerce   in   the   Philippines.   The   Office   may   accept   as   prima   facie   evidence   that   the   mark   has   become   distinctive,   as   used   in   connection   with   the   applicant's   goods   or   services   in   commerce,   proof   of   substantially   exclusive   and   continuous   use   thereof   by   the  applicant  in  commerce  in  the  Philippines  for  five  (5)   years   before   the   date   on   which   the   claim   of   distinctiveness  is  made.     123.3.   The   nature   of   the   goods   to   which   the   mark   is   applied  will  not  constitute  an  obstacle  to  registration.    

CIA  GENERAL  DE  TOBACCO  V.  AHLAMBRA  CIGAR  (1916)   Court  descision:   Where  plaintiff’s  registered  TN  is  “La  Flor  de  la  Isabela”   which   it   uses   by   way   of   advertisements,   signs   over   the   place  of  business,  upon  letter  heads  and  in  other  ways  to   furnish   the   public   a   method   of   distinguishing   the   plaintiff’s  business,  and  sends  its  manufactured  products   into   the   market   with   such   TN   upon   them,   the   plaintiff   acquire  no  trade-­‐name  rights  in  the  single  word  “Isabela”   where   it   is   not   claimed   that   the   use   of   the   word   “Isabela”   is   an   infringement   of   the   trade-­‐name   “La   Flor   de   la   Isabela.”     “Isabela”   is   a   name,   quality   or   description   of   the   merchandise   in   connectin   with   which   the   word   is   used,   or   the   geographical   place   of   its   production   and   origin,   and   the   statute   provides   that   such   a   name   cannot   be   appropriated  as  a  trademark  or  a  trade-­‐name.    

ANG  TIBAY  V.  TEODORO,  SUPRA   Court  decision:   "Ang   Tibay"   is   not   a   descriptive   term   within   the   meaning   of   the   Trade-­‐Mark   Law   but   rather   a   fanciful   or   coined   phrase   which   may   properly   and   legally   be   appropriated   as  a  trademark  or  trade-­‐name.    

ETEPHA  V.  DIRECTOR  OF  PATENTS,  SUPRA  

ARCE  SONS  V.  SELECTA  BISCUITS  (1961)  

Court  decision:   Tussin   is   merely   descriptive;   it   is   generic;   it   furnishes   to   the   buyer   no   indication   of   the   origin   of   the   goods;   it   is   open   for   appropriation   by   anyone.   It   is   accordingly   barred   from   registration   as   a   trademark.   But   while   “Tussin”   by   itself   cannot   thus   be   used   exclusively   to   identify  one’s  goods,  it  may  properly  become  the  subject   of   a   trademark   by   “combination   with   another   word   or   phrase."    

Court  decision:   The   word   “Selecta”   may   be   an   ordinary   or   common   word   in   the   sense   that   it   may   be   used   or   employed   by   anyone  in  promoting  his  business  or  enterprise  BUT  once   adopted   or   coined   in   connection   with   one’s   business   as   an   emblem   or   sign   to   characterize   its   products,   or   as   a   badge   of   authenticity,   it   may   acquire   a   secondary   meaning  as  to  be  exclusively  associated  with  its  products   and  business.       “DOCTRINE   OF   SECONDARY   MEANING”   a   word   or   phrase   originally   incapable   of   exclusive   appropriation   with   reference   to   an   article   on   the   market   because   geographically   or   otherwise   descriptive,   might   nevertheless   have   been   used   so   long   and   so   exclusively   by  one  producer  with  reference  to  his  article  that,  in  that   trade   and   to   that   branch   of   the   purchasing   public,   the   word   or   phrase   has   come   to   mean   that   the   article   was   his  product.       The  word  “Selecta”  may  be  placed  at  par  with  the  words   “Ang  Tibay”  which  this  Court  has  considered  not  merely   as   descriptive   term   within   the   meaning   of   the   TM   Law   but  as  “fanciful”  or  “coined  phrase”  or  a  trademark.    

BAXTER  V.  ZUASUA  (1905)   Refresher:   “Agua   de   Kananga”   and   “Kananga   Superior”   are   toilet   waters   produced   by   two   competing   companies.   Baxter   acquired  right  to  use  TM  of  Agua  de  Kananga.  Kananga  is   a  flower.       Doctrine:   IF   the   goods   in   question   had   really   nothing   to   do   with   the  said  flower,  then  it  was  not  lawful  for  the  plaintiffs  to   sell   them   to   the   public   under   the   name   of   “Agua   de   Kananga”   because   the   people   might   be   deceived   as   to   the  nature  of  the  goods,  taking  for  “Kananga”  an  article   which   as   a   matter   of   fact,   had   nothing   to   do   with   the   said  flower.       The   names   and   denominations   generally   used   in   commerce   to   designate   the   class   of   goods   or   merchandise  cannot  be  the  subject  of  a  trademark.    

KABUSHI  KAISHA  ISETAN  V.  IAC,  SUPRA   Court  decision:   It  might  be  pertinent  at  this  point  to  stress  that  what  is   involved   in   this   case   is   not   so   much   a   trademark   as   a   tradename.   Isetann   Department   Store,   Inc.   is   the   name  

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Intellectual Property Law of   a   store   and   not   of   product   sold   in   various   parts   of   the   country.   This   case   must   be   differentiated   from   cases   involving   products   bearing   such   familiar   names   as   "colgate",   "Singer".   "Toyota",   or   "Sony"   where   the   products   are   marketed   widely   in   the   Philippines.   There   is   not   product   with   the   name   "Isetann"   popularized   with   that   brand   name   in   the   Philippines.   Unless   one   goes   to   the  store  called  Isetann  in  Manila,  he  would  never  know   what   the   name   means.   Similarly,   until   a   Filipino   buyer   steps  inside  a  store  called  "Isetan"  in  Tokyo  or  Hongkong,   that  name  would  be  completely  alien  to  him.  The  records   show  that  among  Filipinos,  the  name  cannot  claim  to  be   internationally  well-­‐known.    

this   ground   alone,   Fredco’s   registration   of   the   mark   "Harvard"  should  have  been  disallowed.       “Harvard”   is   a   well-­‐known   name   and   mark   not   only   in   the   United   States   but   also   internationally,   including   the   Philippines.   The   mark   "Harvard"   is   rated   as   one   of   the   most  famous  marks  in  the  world.  It  has  been  registered   in  at  least  50  countries.  It  has  been  used  and  promoted   extensively   in   numerous   publications   worldwide.   It   has   established  a  considerable  goodwill  worldwide  since  the   founding  of  Harvard  University  more  than  350  years  ago.   It   is   easily   recognizable   as   the   trade   name   and   mark   of   Harvard  University  of  Cambridge,  Massachusetts,  U.S.A.,   internationally  known  as  one  of  the  leading  educational   institutions   in   the   world.   As   such,   even   before   Harvard   University   applied   for   registration   of   the   mark   "Harvard"   in   the   Philippines,   the   mark   was   already   protected   under   Article  6bis  and  Article  8  of  the  Paris  Convention.  Again,   even   without   applying   the   Paris   Convention,   Harvard   University  can  invoke  Section  4(a)  of  R.A.  No.  166  which   prohibits   the   registration   of   a   mark   "which   may   disparage   or   falsely   suggest   a   connection   with   persons,   living  or  dead,  institutions,  beliefs  x  x  x."     02  February  2012     DEFINITION  OF  “TRADEMARK”     -­‐ Scent  and  aural  cannot  be  trademarks  because   Phil  law  on  visible  signs     FUNCTIONS  OF  A  TRADEMARK     -­‐ Traditional   purpose   –   Point   out   the   source   of   goods  or  services.     o This   began   when   artisans   decided   to   put   mark   on   their   goods   to   indicate   who   made   the   goods,   where   the   good  were  made.     -­‐ Why   should   trademarks   be   recognized   and   protected?     o To   encourage   the   enterprise   to   invest   in   the   creation   of   durable   goods   through   the   guaranty   that   if   they   continue   to   bring   goods   in   such   market,   their   identity   is   protected,   their   market   is   secured   because   no   other   person   can   appropriate   their   marks.  If  the  enterprise  invest  in  their   services   and   it   acquires   goodwill,   the   goodwill   will   be   preserved   because   no  other  person  allowed  to  make  use   of   its   mark   that   would   undermine   your  integrity  in  the  market.     o In   turn,   the   public   will   benefit   from   the  creation  of  superior  goods.   -­‐ Current   purpose   changed   –   Trademark   has   evolved   with   centuries   of   use.   Because   the   marketplace   has   become   global,   trademarks   has   evolved   from   mere   source   indicators,   to  

ASIA  BREWERY  V.  CA  (1933)   Court  decision:   The   fact   that   the   words   “pale   pilsen”   are   part   of   ABI’s   trademark   does   not   constitute   an   infringement   of   SMC’s   trademark  (San  Miguel  Pale  Pilsen)  for  “pale  pilsen”  are   generic   words   descriptive   of   the   color   (pale),   of   a   strong   type   of   beer   (pilsen)   which   is   a   light   bohemian   beer   with   a  strong  hops  flavor  that  originated  in  the  City  of  Pilsen   in   Czechoslovakia   and   became   famous   in   the   Middle   Ages.   “Pilsen”   is   primarily   geographically   descriptive   word,   hence,   non-­‐registrabel   and   not   appropriable   by   any  beer  manufacturer.    

EMERALD  GARMENT   MANUFACTURING  V.   CA  AND  H.D.  LEE   CO.,  INC.  (1995)   Refresher:   H.D.   Lee   Co.   =   a   Delaware   corp.,   owner   of   the   “Lee”   trademark     Emerald   Garment   Manufacturing   =   domestic   corp.,   registrant   of   “Stylistic   Mr.   Lee”   trademark   used   on   skirts,   jeans,   blouses,   socks,   briefs,   jackets,   jogging   suits,   dresses,  shorts,  shirts  and  lingerie  under  Class  25.     Court  decision:   "LEE"   is   primarily   a   surname.   Private   respondent   cannot,   therefore,   acquire   exclusive   ownership   over   and   singular   use  of  said  term.  It  has  been  held  that  a  personal  name   or   surname   may   not   be   monopolized   as   a   trademark   or   tradename   as   against   others   of   the   same   name   or   surname.   For   in   the   absence   of   contract,   fraud,   or   estoppel,   any   man   may   use   his   name   or   surname   in   all   legitimate   ways.   Thus,   "Wellington"   is   a   surname,   and   its   first  user  has  no  cause  of  action  against  the  junior  user  of   "Wellington"  as  it  is  incapable  of  exclusive  appropriation.    

FREDCO   MANUFACTURING   CORP.   V.   PRESIDENT   AND   FELLOWS  OF  HARVARD  COLLEGE  (2011)   Court  decision:   Fredco’s   use   of   the   mark   “Harvard,”   coupled   with   its   claimed   origin   in   Cambridge,   Massachusetts,   obviously   suggests  a  false  connection  with  Harvard  University.  On  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   serving   very   critical   functions   especially   in   a   crowded  marketplace.     o Associative  quality  for  luxury  brands  –   because   of   a   particular   trademark,   consumers   would   choose   to   buy   the   product  because  they  want  to  belong   to  a  particular  class.   § Mark   is   associated   with   a   particular   class   or   lifestyle.   People   wearing   a   brand   (if   genuine)   belong   to   a   special   class  of  people.   § When   a   mark   creates   a   certain   kind   of   image,   it   can   make   consumers  want  it.   § It   creates   a   segment   of   the   population.   Without   the   consumers   realizing   it,   they   buy   not  just  the  product  but  also  the   lifestyle.   o Bearer  of  information  –  it  is  the  heart   of  a  business.   § It   bears   information   that   such   thing   was   created   by   the   manufacturer.   o It  is  the  hear  of  the  business.   § It   has   a   direct   effect   on   the   company’s   profits;   whether   the   company   that   will   flourish   or   become  bankrupt.     § Strength   of   the   mark   dictates   the  premium  of  the  price.   § Trademark   has   become   an   asset   of   the   company.   It   is   hard   to   distinguish   between   it   and   a   business.  If  the  company  loses  its   right   to   a   trademark,   it   also   loses   the  business.   § Note:   As   an   asset,   you   can   sell   the   trademark   independently   of   the  business.   • Ex:   Volkswagen   and   BMW   bid   for   the   trademark   of   Rolls-­‐Royce.   Volkswagen   won   the   bidding.   Why   did   they   want   to   acquire   the   trademark?   Because   it   is   very   difficult   to   build   a   brand.   Unfortunately,   the   car   companies   did   not   do   a   due   diligence   investigation.   They   did   not   realize   that   the   trademark   did   not   belong   to   the   car   company.   The   trademark  belonged  to  Aero   Engine.   What   Volkswagen   bought   was   the   factory.   Thus,   it   can   build   Rolls-­‐

Royce  but  not  call  it  as  such.   Later,   BMW   acquired   the   mark   from   Aero   Engine.   BMW   gave   Volkswagen   a   year  to  use  its  mark.  

  How  are  marks  acquired?   -­‐ Now  (under  the  IPC):  Through  registration.   -­‐ Previously:  Through  actual  use.   -­‐ Because   of   this   shift/change   in   the   basis   of   ownership   over   trademarks,   it   presents   a   host   of  interesting  transitional  problems:     o Under   old   law,   the   owner   of   the   mark   was  prior  user  in  Philippine  commerce   (Unno   Commercial   Enterprises   vs.   General   Milling).   First   user/entity   who   used  it  in  commerce  owns  the  mark.     o NOTE:   Under   the   old   law,   local   applicants   were   required   to   use   the   mark   for   at   least   2   months   prior   to   the   filing   of   the   application.   If   you   want   to   file,   you   must   have   used   the   mark   2   months   prior   to   filing   of   application.     § It’s  a  very  risky  undertaking  à  To   own   the   mark,   one   has   to   build   the   business   and   spend   for   investments,   put   up   store,   incorporate,  hire  accountant  and   signage   maker,   and   do   your   marketing  materials.  Since  one  is   required   to   have   used   mark   for   at   least   2   month   prior   to   the   filing   of   application,   for   2   months,  you’re  taking  a  risk  that   somebody   else   might   use   your   mark.   In   the   meantime,   you   already   have   spent   your   money   and  sunk  in  the  cost.     § That   was   the   requirement   because   under   the   law,   actual   use  was  the  basis  of  ownership.     o Why  change  the  law?     § Because   the   Philippines   became   a   party   to   the   Paris   Convention.   It   required   us   to   adhere   to   the   “national  treatment”  principle.       Kabushi  Kaisha  Isetan  v  IAC     -­‐ Case   between   a   local   registrant   and   a   foreign   non-­‐user.   -­‐ Local  user  prevailed  because  the  old  law  based   ownership   of   the   trademark   on   actual   use.   Since   there   was   no   actual   use   for   Kabushi   Kaisha   in   the   PH,   there   was   no   goodwill   to   be   protected.   -­‐ BUT   the   Court   recognized   an   exception   à   Under   the   Paris   Convention,   States   are  

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Intellectual Property Law required  to  recognize  well-­‐known  trademark.   o Exception  has  following  elements:   1. the  mark  must  be  internationally   known  or  well  known;   2. the   subject   of   the   mark   must   be   a  trademark;   3. the   mark   must   be   for   use   in   the   same  or  similar  kinds  of  goods;   4. the  person  claiming  must  be  the   owner  of  the  mark.   Kabushi  Kaisha  was  not  able  to  prove  the    

ONLY   EXCEPTION:   internationally   well-­‐known  mark   The   only   way   a   prior   registrant   user   will   not   prevail  is  if  use  was  subsequent  to  the  filing  of   the  application.     o

•

  NOW  à  Registration  is  the  basis  of  ownership.   -­‐ Under   IPC,   are   you   required   to   make   use   of   mark  prior  to  filing  of  application?  No.       Standard  of  registerability:  Distinctiveness.     WHAT  MARKS  MAY  NOT  BE  REGISTERED?   -­‐ Basically,   Section   123   IPC   is   an   enumeration   of   marks  that  are  not  distinctive;  i.e.  Incapable  of   pointing  our  source  of  goods  or  services.       Deceptive   -­‐ Cannot   be   distinctive   because   suggests   a   false   connection.     -­‐ E.g.  Jose  Rizal  Shoes     Flag/  Coat  of  arms   -­‐ Paris   Convention   makes   obligation   not   to   allow   registration   of   flags   or   national   symbols.   They   are  outside  commerce  of  men.     o Everyone   can   make   use   of   the   mark   to   indicate   origin   but   it   cannot   be   a   trademark.    It  cannot  be  appropriated   by   manufacturer   at   the   expense   of   the  rest.     -­‐ BUT:   There   are   certain   countries   that   have   acquired   a   certain   reputation   for   producing   goods   of   superior   quality.   Companies   based   here   could   use   the   country’s   flag,   not   as   trademark,   but   as   an   indicia   of   the   country   of   origin  of  the  goods.   o E.g.   Switzerland.   Swiss   have   strong   laws  about  who  can  use  the  mark.  To   be   able   to   use   the   flag,   the   Swiss   company   must   be   able   to   meet   a   certain   quality,   and   undergo   quality   control.  The  Swiss  government  wants   to   ensure   that   those   who   use   Swiss   flags  would  maintain  the  standard  so   that   their   reputation   of   producing   superior  goods  will  be  maintained.       Name,  portrait  or  signature  identifying  a  particular  living   individual   -­‐ If   a   famous   doctor’s   name   is   being   used   in   relation   to   cosmetic   products,   will   the   trademark  be  allowed?     o Yes,   if   done   with   the   consent   of   the   doctor.   -­‐ If   the   person   has   died,   what   will   you   do   to   make  use  of  the  name,  etc?   o Get  heirs’  consent.  

-­‐   RECAP:   GR:  First  user  (Established  in  the  law  and  Unno)   EXCEPTION:   First   user   who   did   not   use   in   PH   commerce     EXCEPTION   TO   THE   EXCEPTION:   First   user,   unregistered   and   not   used   in   PH   Commerce   AND   internationally   well-­‐ known   (e.g.   Kabushi   Kaisha)   –   Applying  Paris  Convention     Philip  Morris  cases   -­‐ Between   a   registrant   non-­‐user   vs.   non-­‐ registrant   user   of   the   mark   in   the   Philippine   commerce?     o The   user   prevails   because   ownership   of  trademark  is  on  the  basis  of  use  in   the  Philippine  commerce.  While  Philip   Morris   was   registrant,   it   did   not   make   use  of  the  same.       Shangrila  v.  DGCI   -­‐ Case  between  a  registrant  user  (the  restaurant)   and  the  hotel  that  wants  to  come  in.   -­‐ The   Hotel   prevailed   and   restaurant’s   registration  was  cancelled.  Why?   o Evidence   showed   that   there   was   no   actual   use   prior   to   the   filing   of   application.   There   was   a   violation   of   the  requirements  the  RA  166,  thus  the   registration   was   not   a   valid   registration.     o You   may   be   the   registrant   and   prior   user  BUT  if  you  failed  to  comply  with   requirement   of   actual   use   before   filing   of   application,   you   will   lose   the   registration   because   the   registration   will  be  invalid.       The  foregoing  were  cases  decided  under  a  different  law   (RA  166)  –  PRIOR  to  the  passage  of  the  IP  Code.    Thus:   • Prior   use   was   the   basis   of   ownership   of   the   trademark.     • Prior  user  in  Philippine  commerce  shall  own  the   trademark.   • Prior  user  in  Philippine  commerce  will  prevail  as   against  a  registrant  non-­‐user.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao     Identical   with   a   registered   mark,   or   a   mark   with   an   earlier  filing/priority  date   -­‐ Very  important  because  this  indicated  the  shift.     -­‐ “Likely   to   deceive/cause   confusion”   means   you   don’t   even   have   to   prove   actual   confusion   for   as  long  as  there  is  likelihood  of  confusion.     -­‐ This   shows   to   you   that   our   TM   regime   has   shifted  to  a  first-­‐to-­‐file   system  because  a  mere   application   with   an   earlier   filing   date   can   prevent   subsequent   application   for   the   same   or  confusingly  similar  mark  subsequently  filed.     o It’s   very   critical   now   to   file   an   application   ASAP   because   owner   of   mark   with   earlier   filing   date   would   prevail  as  against  the  owner  of  a  mark   with  a  later  filing  date.  Time  is  critical   and  essential.       Well-­‐known  mark  (123.1e  and  123.1f)   -­‐ E   and   F   both   deal   with   WELL-­‐KNOWN   MARK   locally  and  internationally.     -­‐ What’s  the  difference  between  the  two?     o Under   E:   speaks   about   well-­‐known   mark  WON  registered   o Under   F:   speaks   about   registered   well-­‐known  mark.     -­‐ What’s   the   difference   in   terms   of   scope   of   protection?     o E:   protected   only   against   use   for   identical  or  similar  goods  or  services.   o F:   protected   also   as   against   use   for   goods  or  services  not  similar  to  those   with   respect   to   which   registration   is   applied  for.   -­‐ The   foregoing   illustrated   why   registration   in   the   Philippines   of   a   well-­‐known   mark   is   still   practical   à   scope   of   protection   after   registration  would  be  broader:     o They   could   oppose   the   filing   of   applications   for   the   same   or   confusingly   similar   mark   even   for   goods/services   that   are   dissimilar   if   you  had  registered  in  the  PH.   -­‐ In   short,   it   appears   that   under   the   IPC,   only   registered   internationally   well-­‐known   mark   in   the   Philippines   can   oppose   on   the   ground   of   dilution.     o On   the   other   hand,   an   unregistered   well-­‐known   mark   cannot   raise   dilution.   The   scope   of   protection   for   an   unregistered   well-­‐known   mark   is   limited  to  similar  or  identical  goods  or   services.       Can  mislead  the  public   -­‐ Because  it’s  misleading,  therefore,  it  cannot  be   descriptive.    

  Generic   -­‐ E.g.  shoes,  bags,  damit,  blusa,  pantalon,  radyo.     -­‐ They   refer   to   the   goods/services   themselves.   Therefore,   nobody   can   monopolize   or   appropriate   them,   it   cannot   be   acquired   by   anyone.     o If   you   allow   somebody   to   exclusively   use   them,   it   would   be   to   the   detriment   of   everyone   else.   Imagine,   you   can   no   longer   sell   bags   because   bags  have  become  a  trademark!     Become   customary   or   usual   to   designate   the   goods   or   services  in  everyday  language   -­‐ This   refers   to   the   phenomena   called   “genericide”   à   marks   that   used   to   be   distinctive  lose  their  distinctiveness  because  of   popularity  of  the  mark.     -­‐ The   downside   of   being   a   strong   mark   that   people   stop   referring   to   the   generic   term   of   good/services   but   actually   use   the   trademark   as  generic  term.     -­‐ E.g.  “Kodak”  in  Ph;  Xerox;  Sunkist   -­‐ Xerox  and  Kodak  are  arbitrary   trademarks;  i.e.   they   were   just   coined   by   the   manufacturers/   they  never  existed  before.   o In   the   realm   of   trademarks,   arbitrary   marks   should   be   entitled   to   the   strongest  protection.   o The   Philippines   seem   to   defy   that.   The   more   arbitrary   the   trademark   is,   the  more  we  think  we  have  license  to   use  them.  (ex.  Colgate,  Frigidaire)   -­‐ Other  trademarks  that  have  fallen  in  the  public   domain  –  escalator;  elevator;  nylon;  thermos   o Owners   of   these   didn’t   work   hard   enough   to   prevent   the   falling   into   public  domain  of  their  trademarks.     -­‐ What’s   the   best   evidence   to   prove   that   the   mark   has   become   generic,   a   victim   of   genericide,   has   lost   its   distinctiveness   and   therefore,  may  be  cancelled?     o Existence   of   the   word   in   the   dictionary.   § Existence   in   the   dictionary   means   it   forms   part   of   the   lexicon.     § Companies   spend   a   great   deal   for   service   watch   to   check   US   dictionaries   to   make   sure   that   well-­‐known  marks  have  not  been   incorporated  in  the  dictionary       Characteristics  of  the  goods  or  services   -­‐ Also  known  as  “descriptive  marks”   -­‐ Being   merely   descriptive,   they   do   not   help   in   pointing  out  the  source  or  origin  of  the  good.  

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Intellectual Property Law   Contrary  to  public  order  or  morality     RECAP:   GR:   The   foregoing   cannot   be   registered   because   they   do   not  meet  the  standards  of  distinctiveness.       EXCEPTION:   Certain   marks   may   be   registered   provided  they  acquired  secondary  meaning.       What  are  these  marks  that  may  be  registered?     1. Descriptive  marks   2. Shapes   3. Colors     While   not   registrable   at   first   instance   because   they   are   deemed   non-­‐distinctive,   they   may   be   registered   provided  they  have  acquired  secondary  meaning.       What  is  “SECONDARY  MEANING”?     -­‐ Originally  not  distinctive  but  through  its  use  by   relevant  public  has  become  distinctive.   -­‐ Under   the   old   law   (RA   166)   à   proprietor   can   use   the   supplemental   register   to   support   the   claim   that   the   term   has   acquired   secondary   meaning.     o Now,   there   is   no   supplemental   register.   Propritor   would   have   to   convince   IPO   that   while   your   mark   may   be   descriptive,   shapes,   colors,   he   has   exclusively   and   continuously   used  it  for  at  5  years  à  the  mark  has   acquired   a   secondary   meaning   that   would  now  entitle  him  to  register.       Choice  of  trademark  is  very  critical  to  any  business.  If  the   proprietor   makes   a   mistake   and   uses   a   non-­‐registrable   TM,  there  is  really  an  economic  impact  on  the  business.     -­‐ Proprietor  should  be  careful  not  to  use  generic   terms  as  the  same  cannot  be  registered.  If  the   proprietor   has   acquired   goodwill   for   a   generic   term,   he   cannot   prevent   other   people   from   using   it   à   generic   term   is   always   in   the   public   domain.   o “Kamiseta”   and   “Bayo”   (which   is   Ilonggo   for   clothes)   are   NOT   registrable   under   the   IPC.     § They   are,   however,   registrable   under   the   old  law.    

G. Application  for  registration    

1.

Application  

 

SECTION   3.   INTERNATIONAL   RECIPROCITY.  –  

CONVENTIONS  

AND  

Any  person  who  is  a  national  or  who  is  domiciled  or  has   a  real  and  effective  industrial  establishment  in  a  country   which  is  a  party  to  any  convention,  treaty  or  agreement   relating   to   intellectual   property   rights   or   the   repression   of   unfair   competition,   to   which   the   Philippines   is   also   a   party,   or   extends   reciprocal   rights   to   nationals   of   the   Philippines   by   law,   shall   be   entitled   to   benefits   to   the   extent  necessary  to  give  effect  to  any  provision  of  such   convention,   treaty   or   reciprocal   law,   IN   ADDITION   to   the   rights   to   which   any   owner   of   an   intellectual   property   right  is  otherwise  entitled  by  this  Act.    

SECTION  124.  REQUIREMENTS  OF  APPLICATION.  –     124.1.   The   application   for   the   registration   of   the   mark   shall   be   in   Filipino   or   in   English   and   shall   contain   the   following:     (a)  A  request  for  registration;     (b)  The  name  and  address  of  the  applicant;     (c)   The   name   of   a   State   of   which   the   applicant   is   a   national   or   where   he   has   domicile;   and   the   name   of   a   State   in   which   the   applicant   has   a   real   and   effective   industrial  or  commercial  establishment,  if  any;     (d)  Where  the  applicant  is  a  juridical  entity,  the  law  under   which  it  is  organized  and  existing;     (e)  The  appointment  of  an  agent  or  representative,  if  the   applicant  is  not  domiciled  in  the  Philippines;     (f)   Where   the   applicant   claims   the   priority   of   an   earlier   application,  an  indication  of:     i)   The   name   of   the   State   with   whose   national   office   the   earlier   application   was   filed   or   if   filed   with  an  office  other  than  a  national  office,  the   name  of  that  office,     ii)   The   date   on   which   the   earlier   application   was  filed,  and     iii)   Where   available,   the   application   number   of   the  earlier  application;     (g)   Where   the   applicant   claims   color   as   a   distinctive   feature  of  the  mark,  a  statement  to  that  effect  as  well  as   the   name   or   names   of   the   color   or   colors   claimed   and   an   indication,   in   respect   of   each   color,   of   the   principal   parts   of  the  mark  which  are  in  that  color;  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao     (h)   Where   the   mark   is   a   three-­‐dimensional   mark,   a   statement  to  that  effect;     (i)  One  or  more  reproductions  of  the  mark,  as  prescribed   in  the  Regulations;     (j)  A  transliteration  or  translation  of  the  mark  or  of  some   parts  of  the  mark,  as  prescribed  in  the  Regulations;     (k)   The   names   of   the   goods   or   services   for   which   the   registration   is   sought,   grouped   according   to   the   classes   of   the   Nice   Classification,   together   with   the   number   of   the  class  of  the  said  Classification  to  which  each  group  of   goods  or  services  belongs;  and     (l)   A   signature   by,   or   other   self-­‐identification   of,   the   applicant  or  his  representative.     124.2.   The   applicant   or   the   registrant   shall   file   a   declaration   of   actual   use   of   the   mark   with   evidence   to   that  effect,  as  prescribed  by  the  Regulations  within  three   (3)   years   from   the   filing   date   of   the   application.   Otherwise,   the   application   shall   be   refused   or   the   mark   shall  be  removed  from  the  Register  by  the  Director.     124.3.   One   (1)   application   may   relate   to   several   goods   and/or  services,  whether  they  belong  to  one  (1)  class  or   to  several  classes  of  the  Nice  Classification.     124.4.   If   during   the   examination   of   the   application,   the   Office   finds   factual   basis   to   reasonably   doubt   the   veracity  of  any  indication  or  element  in  the  application,  it   may   require   the   applicant   to   submit   sufficient   evidence   to  remove  the  doubt.      

became   distinctive   of   the   applicant's   or   owner's   goods,   business  or  services.      

SECTION   128.   SINGLE   REGISTRATION   FOR   GOODS   AND/OR   SERVICES.  –     Where   goods   and/or   services   belonging   to   several   classes   of   the   Nice   Classification   have   been   included   in   one  (1)  application,  such  an  application  shall  result  in  one   registration.    

SECTION   130.   SIGNATURE   AND   OTHER   MEANS   OF   SELF-­‐ IDENTIFICATION.  –     130.1.   Where   a   signature   is   required,   the   Office   shall   accept:     (a)  A  hand-­‐written  signature;  or     (b)  The  use  of  other  forms  of  signature,  such  as  a  printed   or   stamped   signature,   or   the   use   of   a   seal   instead   of   a   hand-­‐written   signature:   Provided,   That   where   a   seal   is   used,   it   should   be   accompanied   by   an   indication   in   letters  of  the  name  of  the  signatory.     130.2.   The   Office   shall   accept   communications   to   it   by   telecopier,   or   by   electronic   means   subject   to   the   conditions  or  requirements  that  will  be  prescribed  by  the   Regulations.   When   communications   are   made   by   telefacsimile,   the   reproduction   of   the   signature,   or   the   reproduction  of  the  seal  together  with,  where  required,   the   indication   in   letters   of   the   name   of   the   natural   person   whose   seal   is   used,   appears.   The   original   communications   must   be   received   by   the   Office   within   thirty  (30)  days  from  date  of  receipt  of  the  telefacsimile.     130.3.   No   attestation,   notarization,   authentication,   legalization   or   other   certification   of   any   signature   or   other   means   of   self-­‐identification   referred   to   in   the   preceding   paragraphs,   will   be   required,   except,   where   the  signature  concerns  the  surrender  of  a  registration.    

SECTION  125.  REPRESENTATION;  ADDRESS  FOR  SERVICE.  –     If   the   applicant   is   not   domiciled   or   has   no   real   and   effective  commercial  establishment  in  the  Philippines,  he   shall   designate   by   a   written   document   filed   in   the   Office,   the  name  and  address  of  a  Philippine  resident  who  may   be   served   notices   or   process   in   proceedings   affecting   the   mark.   Such   notices   or   services   may   be   served   upon   the   person   so   designated   by   leaving   a   copy   thereof   at   the  address  specified  in  the  last  designation  filed.  If  the   person   so   designated   cannot   be   found   at   the   address   given   in   the   last   designation,   such   notice   or   process   may   be  served  upon  the  Director.      

SECTION  131.  PRIORITY  RIGHT.  –     131.1.   An   application   for   registration   of   a   mark   filed   in   the   Philippines   by   a   person   referred   to   in   Section   3,   and   who   previously  duly  filed  an  application  for  registration  of  the   same  mark  in  one  of  those  countries,  shall  be  considered   as   filed   as   of   the   day   the   application   was   first   filed   in   the   foreign  country.     131.2.   No   registration   of   a   mark   in   the   Philippines   by   a   person   described   in   this   section   shall   be   granted   until   such  mark  has  been  registered  in  the  country  of  origin  of   the  applicant.     131.3.  Nothing  in  this  section  shall  entitle  the  owner  of  a   registration   granted   under   this   section   to   sue   for   acts   committed   prior   to   the   date   on   which   his   mark   was  

SECTION  126.  DISCLAIMERS.  –     The   Office   may   allow   or   require   the   applicant   to   disclaim   an  unregistrable  component  of  an  otherwise  registrable   mark  but  such  disclaimer  shall  not  prejudice  or  affect  the   applicant's   or   owner's   rights   then   existing   or   thereafter   arising  in  the  disclaimed  matter,  nor  such  shall  disclaimer   prejudice   or   affect   the   applicant's   or   owner's   right   on   another  application  of  later  date  if  the  disclaimed  matter  

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Intellectual Property Law registered   in   this   country:   Provided,   That,   notwithstanding   the   foregoing,   the   owner   of   a   well-­‐ known   mark   as   defined   in   Section   123.1(e)   of   this   Act,   that  is  not  registered  in  the  Philippines,  may,  against  an   identical   or   confusingly   similar   mark,   oppose   its   registration,   or   petition   the   cancellation   of   its   registration   or   sue   for   unfair   competition,   without   prejudice  to  availing  himself  of  other  remedies  provided   for  under  the  law.     131.4.  In  like  manner  and  subject  to  the  same  conditions   and  requirements,  the  right  provided  in  this  section  may   be  based  upon  a  subsequent  regularly  filed  application  in   the   same   foreign   country:   Provided,   That   any   foreign   application  filed  prior  to  such  subsequent  application  has   been   withdrawn,   abandoned,   or   otherwise   disposed   of,   without   having   been   laid   open   to   public   inspection   and   without   leaving   any   rights   outstanding,   and   has   not   served,  nor  thereafter  shall  serve,  as  a  basis  for  claiming   a  right  of  priority.     SECTION  239.2.  Marks  registered  under  Republic  Act  No.   166   shall   remain   in   force   but   shall   be   deemed   to   have   been  granted  under  this  Act  and  shall  be  due  for  renewal   within  the  period  provided  for  under  this  Act  and,  upon   renewal   shall   be   reclassified   in   accordance   with   the   International   Classification.   Trade   names   and   marks   registered   in   the   Supplemental   Register   under   Republic   Act   No.   166   shall   remain   in   force   but   shall   no   longer   be   subject  to  renewal.    

2.

SECTION  132.  APPLICATION  NUMBER  AND  FILING  DATE.  –     132.1.   The   Office   shall   examine   whether   the   application   satisfies  the  requirements  for  the  grant  of  a  filing  date  as   provided   in   Section   127   and   Regulations   relating   thereto.   If  the  application  does  not  satisfy  the  filing  requirements,   the   Office   shall   notify   the   applicant   who   shall   within   a   period  fixed  by  the  Regulations  complete  or  correct  the   application   as   required,   otherwise,   the   application   shall   be  considered  withdrawn.     132.2.  Once  an  application  meets  the  filing  requirements   of   Section   127,   it   shall   be   numbered   in   the   sequential   order,   and   the   applicant   shall   be   informed   of   the   application  number  and  the  filing  date  of  the  application   will  be  deemed  to  have  been  abandoned.     What’s   the   difference   between   “filing   date”   and   a   “priority  date”?       FILING   DATE   -­‐   date   you   actually   filed   the   application,   PROVIDED   you   met   all   the   minimum   requirements   under   Sec.  127.     The   IPO   enforces   this   strictly,   if   inadvertently   the   duty   officer   of   the   day   of   IPO   gave   you   a   filing   date   but   it   turns   out   that   you   did   not   submit   the   list   of   goods   and   services,   when   the   application   is   referred   to   trademark   examiner,  the  trademark  examiner  will  examine  and  if  he   discovers   that   you   did   not   comply   with   the   minimum   requirement,   the   TE   will   revoke   your   filing   date.   Pag   nirevoke   niya,   he   will   send   communication   that   you   forgot   one   requirement.   Only   when   you   submit   list   of   goods   and   services   that   you   will   be   given   another   filing   date.   Pati   application   number   mo   mawawala.   In   the   meantime,   if   somebody   else   files   and   application   for   same   or   confusingly   similar   mark,   lagot   ka   na.   Because   your   filing   date   is   only   when   you   complied   with   the   minimum   requirement.   It   takes   about   6   to   8   months   before   it   is   assigned   to   an   examiner.   So   there   is   a   high   probability   that   within   those   8   months   somebody   else   filed   an   application   and   because   that   application   meets   the  minimum  requirement,  it  would  have  an  earlier  filing   date.   As   between   you   with   revoked   filing   date   and   somebody   earlier   filing   date,   the   latter   will   prevail.   Yours   has   been   revoked,   so   critical.   Filing   date   is   date   you   actually   filed   provided   you   met   the   minimum   requirements  under  127.     PRIORITY   DATE   -­‐   date   when   you   filed   a   foreign   application  for  the  same  mark  in  another  country,  a  Paris   Convention  country  or  TRIPS  country.  Then  you  filed  the   application  in  the  Ph  within  6  months,  you  can  claim  the   earlier  foreign  filing  date  as  your  filing  date  in  the  Ph.  So   the  law  will  deem  your  application  filed  as  of  that  date  of   filing  of  the  foreign  application.  BUT  in  order  for  you  to   avail   of   foreign   priority   date,   you   must   have   filed   the   Philippine  application  within  6  months  from  the  time  you   filed  the  foreign  application.      

Assignment   of   Application   Number  and  Filing  Date  

 

SECTION  127.  FILING  DATE.  –     127.1.  Requirements.  –     The   filing   date   of   an   application   shall   be   the   date   on   which   the   Office   received   the   following   indications   and   elements  in  English  or  Filipino:     (a)   An   express   or   implicit   indication   that   the   registration  of  a  mark  is  sought;     (b)  The  identity  of  the  applicant;     (c)   Indications   sufficient   to   contact   the   applicant  or  his  representative,  if  any;     (d)   A   reproduction   of   the   mark   whose   registration  is  sought;  and     (e)   The   list   of   the   goods   or   services   for   which   the  registration  is  sought.     127.2.  No  filing  date  shall  be  accorded  until  the  required   fee  is  paid.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   the   mark   as   defined   in   Section   121   is   registrable   under   Section  123.     133.2.  Where  the  Office  finds  that  the  conditions  referred   to  in  Subsection  133.1  are  fulfilled,  it  shall  upon  payment   of  the  prescribed  fee,  forthwith  cause  the  application,  as   filed,  to  be  published  in  the  prescribed  manner.     133.3.   If   after   the   examination,   the   applicant   is   not   entitled   to   registration   for   any   reason,   the   Office   shall   advise   the   applicant   thereof   and   the   reasons   therefor.   The   applicant   shall   have   a   period   of   four   (4)   months   in   which  to  reply  or  amend  his  application,  which  shall  then   be   re-­‐examined.   The   Regulations   shall   determine   the   procedure   for   the   re-­‐examination   or   revival   of   an   application   as   well   as   the   appeal   to   the   Director   of   Trademarks  from  any  final  action  by  the  Examiner.     133.4.   An   abandoned   application   may   be   revived   as   a   pending   application   within   three   (3)   months   from   the   date  of  abandonment,  upon  good  cause  shown  and  the   payment  of  the  required  fee.     133.5.   The   final   decision   of   refusal   of   the   Director   of   Trademarks   shall   be   appealable   to   the   Director   General   in   accordance   with   the   procedure   fixed   by   the   Regulations.    

NB   Under   IP   Code   Sec   131,   there   is   no   6   months   limitation.  This  is  an  error  on  the  part  of  the  drafters  of   IPC   because   priority   date   is   actually   a   convention   obligation   (Paris   Convention).   Under   which   there   is   6   mos  limitation  to  avail  of  priority  date.  Since  every  other   country  in  the  world  subjects  6-­‐mo  period,  and  because   of   reciprocity,   why   would   we   adapt   a   longer   period   to   claim  priority  date?  That  seems  to  be  the  effect  because   of  131  which  failed  to  reproduce  the  6  months  limitation   under  the  Paris  Convention.     -­‐ But   what   the   IPO   did   was   to   issue   an   administrative   circular   that   clarifies   priority   right   can   only   be   claimed   if   the   Philippine   application  is  filed  within  6  months.     -­‐ Basis  for  that:     a. Follow   basic   principles   of   reciprocity:   Why   should   we   give   foreign   countries   who   only   limit   to   6mos   the   right   to   claim   priority   date   more   rights?   Why   construe   IPC   to   be   limitless?   That   would   be   contrary   to   national   interest.     b. Convention   obligation:   The   domestic   law   provision   that   implements   the   international   treaty   obligation   should   be   read   in   conjunction   with   international   treaty.   So   only   within   6   months.       NOTE:  Priority  dates  are  important  because  as   between   an   earlier   filing   date   and   an   earlier   priority   date,   the   priority  date  prevails.     E.g.  Jances  files  application  in  the  PH  on  01  Mar  2012,  to   comply   with   minimum   requirements   of   Sec.   127.   Earla   filed   application   for   the   same   mark   or   similar   goods/services   and   she   filed   it   on   12   Mar   2012   BUT   she   earlier   filed   in   SG   an   application   dated   15   Feb   2012.   When   Earla  made  a  claim  on  the  basis  of  that  foreign  application,   a  priority  date  of  15  Feb  2012,  who  would  prevail?  Jances  or   Earla?     Earla!   Although   filing   date   is   later,   she   has   a   claim   of   priority.   The   law   will   deem   Earla’s   application   to   have   been   filed   as   of   15   Feb   2012   (date   she   filed   SG   application)   for   as   long   as   she   complies   with   the   requirements  for  a  claim  of  priority,  namely,     • Within  6  months  from  application     • Certified  copy  of  the  application  and   English  translation   • Submission  of  foreign  registration  

SECTION  126.  DISCLAIMERS.  –     The   Office   may   allow   or   require   the   applicant   to   disclaim   an  unregistrable  component  of  an  otherwise  registrable   mark  but  such  disclaimer  shall  not  prejudice  or  affect  the   applicant's   or   owner's   rights   then   existing   or   thereafter   arising  in  the  disclaimed  matter,  nor  such  shall  disclaimer   prejudice   or   affect   the   applicant's   or   owner's   right   on   another  application  of  later  date  if  the  disclaimed  matter   became   distinctive   of   the   applicant's   or   owner's   goods,   business  or  services.      

SECTION  129.  DIVISION  OF  APPLICATION.  –     Any   application   referring   to   several   goods   or   services,   hereafter  referred  to  as  the  "initial  application,"  may  be   divided   by   the   applicant   into   two   (2)   or   more   applications,   hereafter   referred   to   as   the   "divisional   applications,"  by  distributing  among  the  latter  the  goods   or   services   referred   to   in   the   initial   application.   The   divisional   applications   shall   preserve   the   filing   date   of   the   initial   application   or   the   benefit   of   the   right   of   priority.     Examination   consists   of   a   determination   of   compliance   with   the   formal   and   substantive   (WON   the   mark   is   registrable)   requirements   of  registration.      

 

3.

Examination  

 

SECTION  133.  EXAMINATION  AND  PUBLICATION.  –     133.1.  Once  the  application  meets  the  filing  requirements   of   Section   127,   the   Office   shall   examine   whether   the   application   meets   the   requirements   of   Section   124   and  

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Intellectual Property Law 4.

Evidence   received   by   the   Philippine   Patent   Office   showed   that   Bata   shoes   made   by   Gerbec   and   Hrdina   of   Czechoslovakia   were   sold   in   the   Philippines   prior   to   World  War  II.  Some  shoes  made  by  Bata  of  Canada  were   perhaps  also  sold  in  the  Philippines  until  1948.  However,   the   trademark   BATA   was   never   registered   in   the   Philippines   by   any   foreign   entity.   Under   the   circumstances,  it  was  concluded  that  opposer  has,  to  all   intents   and   purposes,   technically   abandoned   its   trademark  BATA  in  the  Philippines.     Upon  the  other  hand,  the  Philippine  Patent  Office  found   that   New   Olympian   Rubber   Products   Co.,   Inc.   has   overwhelmingly  and  convincingly  established  its  right  to   the   trademark   BATA   and   consequently,   its   use   and   registration  in  its  favor.  There  is  no  gainsaying  the  truth   that   the   respondent   has   spent   a   considerable   amount   of   money   and   effort   in   popularizing   the   trademark   BATA   for   shoes   in   the   Philippines   through   the   advertising   media   since   it   was   lawfully   used   in   commerce   on   July   1,   1970.   It   can   not   be   denied,   therefore,   that   it   is   the   respondent-­‐applicant's   expense   that   created   the   enormous   goodwill   of   the   trademark   BATA   in   the   Philippines   and   not   the   opposer   as   claimed   in   its   opposition   to   the   registration   of   the   BATA   mark   by   the   respondent.     PPO   dismissed   the   opposition   and   ordered   the   registration   of   Bata   in   favor   of   New   Olympian   Rubber   Products  Co.     Doctrine:   The  Court  was  satisfied  from  the  evidence  that  any  slight   goodwill   generated   by   the   Czechoslovakian   product   during   the   Commonwealth   years   was   completely   abandoned  and  lost  in  the  more  than  35  years  that  have   passed  since  the  liberation  of  Manila  from  the  Japanese   troops.     New   Olympian   has   reproduced   excerpts   from   the   testimonies   of   the   opposer-­‐appellant's   witnesses   to   prove  that  the  opposer-­‐appellant  was  never  a  user  of  the   trademark  BATA  either  before  or  after  the  war,  that  the   appellant   is   not   the   successor-­‐in-­‐interest   of   Gerbec   and   Hrdina   who   were   not   is   representatives   or   agents,   and   could   not   have   passed   any   rights   to   the   appellant,   that   there   was   no   privity   of   interest   between   the   Czechoslovakian   owner   and   the   Canadian   appellant   and   that   the   Czechoslovakian   trademark   has   been   abandoned  in  Czechoslovakia.    

Publication  

 

SECTION   133.2.   Where   the   Office   finds   that   the   conditions  referred  to  in  Subsection  133.1  are  fulfilled,  it   shall   upon   payment   of   the   prescribed   fee,   forthwith   cause   the   application,   as   filed,   to   be   published   in   the   prescribed  manner.     5.

Opposition  

 

SECTION  134.  OPPOSITION.  –     Any  person  who  believes  that  he  would  be  damaged  by   the   registration   of   a   mark   may,   upon   payment   of   the   required   fee   and   within   thirty   (30)   days   after   the   publication   referred   to   in   Subsection   133.2,   file   with   the   Office  an  opposition  to  the  application.  Such  opposition   shall  be  in  writing  and  verified  by  the  oppositor  or  by  any   person   on   his   behalf   who   knows   the   facts,   and   shall   specify   the   grounds   on   which   it   is   based   and   include   a   statement  of  the  facts  relied  upon.  Copies  of  certificates   of  registration  of  marks  registered  in  other  countries  or   other   supporting   documents   mentioned   in   the   opposition   shall   be   filed   therewith,   together   with   the   translation  in  English,  if  not  in  the  English  language.  For   good   cause   shown   and   upon   payment   of   the   required   surcharge,   the   time   for   filing   an   opposition   may   be   extended   by   the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs,   who   shall   notify   the   applicant   of   such   extension.   The   Regulations   shall   fix   the   maximum   period   of   time   within   which   to   file   the  opposition.    

SECTION  135.  NOTICE  AND  HEARING.  –     Upon   the   filing   of   an   opposition,   the   Office   shall   serve   notice   of   the   filing   on   the   applicant,   and   of   the   date   of   the   hearing   thereof   upon   the   applicant   and   the   oppositor  and  all  other  persons  having  any  right,  title  or   interest   in   the   mark   covered   by   the   application,   as   appear  of  record  in  the  Office.    

BATA   INDUSTRIES   V.   CA   AND   NEW   OLYMPIAN   RUBBER   PRODUCTS  CO.  (1982)   Refresher:   New   Olympian   Rubber   Products   Co.   wanted   to   register   BATA   for   casual   rubber   shoes   that   it   has   allegedly   used   since   1   July   1970.   Bata   Industries,   Ltd.,   a   Canadian   corporation,   opposed   the   same   on   the   ground   that   it   owns,  and  has  not  abandoned,  the  trademark  BATA.     The  parties  stipulated  to  the  following:   1.   Bata   Industries,   Ltd.   has   no   license   to   do   business   in   the  Philippines;   2.   It   is   not   presently   selling   footwear   under   the   trademark  BATA  in  the  Philippines;  and   3.  It  has  no  licensing  agreement  with  any  local  entity  or   firm  to  sell  its  products  in  the  Philippines.    

MIRPURI  V.  CA  (1999),  SUPRA   Refresher:   Trademark  involved  in  this  case:  "Barbizon"     Relevant   issue:   Res   judicata   in   2   oppositions   filed   by   the   Private  respondent.   Opposition  No.  1  à  IPC  No.  686:  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao     (a)  "confusing  similarity"  of  its  trademark  with   that  of  Escobar's;     (b)   that   the   registration   of   Escobar's   similar   trademark   will   cause   damage   to   private   respondent's  business  reputation  and  goodwill;   and     (c)   that   Escobar's   use   of   the   trademark   amounts   to   an   unlawful   appropriation   of   a   mark   previously   used   in   the   Philippines   which   act   is   penalized   under   Section   4   (d)   of   the   Trademark  Law.  

IPC   No.   2049   raised   the   issue   of   ownership   of   the   trademark,   the   first   registration   and   use   of   the   trademark  in  the  United  States  and  other  countries,  and   the   international   recognition   and   reputation   of   the   trademark   established   by   extensive   use   and   advertisement   of   private   respondent's   products   for   over   forty   years   here   and   abroad.   These   are   different   from   the  issues  of  confusing  similarity  and  damage  in  IPC  No.   686.  The  issue  of  prior  use  may  have  been  raised  in  IPC  No.   686   but   this   claim   was   limited   to   prior   use   in   the   Philippines   only.   Prior   use   in   IPC   No.   2049   stems   from   private  respondent's  claim  as  originator  of  the  word  and   symbol  "Barbizon,"  as  the  first  and  registered  user  of  the   mark  attached  to  its  products  which  have  been  sold  and   advertised   worldwide   for   a   considerable   number   of   years   prior   to   petitioner's   first   application   for   registration   of   her   trademark   in   the   Philippines.   Indeed,   these   are   substantial   allegations   that   raised   new   issues   and   necessarily   gave   private   respondent   a   new   cause   of   action.   Res   judicata   does   not   apply   to   rights,   claims   or   demands,   although   growing   out   of   the   same   subject   matter,   which   constitute   separate   or   distinct   causes   of   action  and  were  not  put  in  issue  in  the  former  action.     Respondent   corporation   also   introduced   in   the   second   case   a   fact   that   did   not   exist   at   the   time   the   first   case   was  filed  and  terminated.  The  cancellation  of  petitioner's   certificate  of  registration  for  failure  to  file  the  affidavit  of   use  arose  only  after  IPC  No.  686.  It  did  not  and  could  not   have   occurred   in   the   first   case,   and   this   gave   respondent   another   cause   to   oppose   the   second   application.   Res   judicata   extends   only   to   facts   and   conditions   as   they   existed   at   the   time   judgment   was   rendered   and   to   the   legal   rights   and   relations   of   the   parties   fixed   by   the   facts   so  determined.  When  new  facts  or  conditions  intervene   before   the   second   suit,   furnishing   a   new   basis   for   the   claims   and   defenses   of   the   parties,   the   issues   are   no   longer   the   same,   and   the   former   judgment   cannot   be   pleaded  as  a  bar  to  the  subsequent  action.     It   is   also   noted   that   the   oppositions   in   the   first   and   second   cases   are   based   on   different   laws.   The   opposition   in   IPC   No.   686   was   based   on   specific   provisions   of   the   Trademark   Law,   i.e.,   Section   4   (d)   on   confusing   similarity   of   trademarks   and   Section   8   on   the   requisite   damage   to   file   an   opposition   to   a   petition   for   registration.  The  opposition  in  IPC  No.  2049  invoked  the   Paris   Convention,   particularly   Article   6bis   thereof,   E.O.   No.  913  and  the  two  Memoranda  of  the  Minister  of  Trade   and  Industry.  This  opposition  also  invoked  Article  189  of   the   Revised   Penal   Code   which   is   a   statute   totally   different   from   the   Trademark   Law.   Causes   of   action   which   are   distinct   and   independent   from   each   other,   although   arising   out   of   the   same   contract,   transaction,   or  state  of  facts,  may  be  sued  on  separately,  recovery  on   one   being   no   bar   to   subsequent   actions   on   others.   The   mere   fact   that   the   same   relief   is   sought   in   the   subsequent   action   will   not   render   the   judgment   in   the  

  Opposition  No.  2  à  IPC  No.  2049:     (a)   as   early   as   1933,   it   adopted   the   word   "BARBIZON"  as  trademark  on  its  products  such   as   robes,   pajamas,   lingerie,   nightgowns   and   slips;     (b)   that   the   trademark   "BARBIZON"   was   registered   with   the   United   States   Patent   Office   in   1934   and   1949;   and   that   variations   of   the   same   trademark,   i.e.,   "BARBIZON"   with   Bee   design   and   "BARBIZON"   with   the   representation   of   a   woman   were   also   registered   with   the   U.S.   Patent   Office   in   1961   and  1976;     (c)   that   these   marks   have   been   in   use   in   the   Philippines   and   in   many   countries   all   over   the   world  for  over  forty  years.  "Barbizon"  products   have   been   advertised   in   international   publications   and   the   marks   registered   in   36   countries  worldwide;     (d)   Escobar's   registration   of   the   similar   trademark   "BARBIZON"   in   1974   was   based   on   fraud;   and   this   fraudulent   registration   was   cancelled   in   1979,   stripping   Escobar   of   whatsoever  right  she  had  to  the  said  mark;     (e)   Private   respondent's   trademark   is   entitled   to   protection   as   a   well-­‐known   mark   under   Article   6bis   of   the   Paris   Convention,   Executive   Order  No.  913,  and  the  two  Memoranda  dated   November  20,  1980  and  October  25,  1983  of  the   Minister   of   Trade   and   Industry   to   the   Director   of  Patents;     (f)   Escobar's   trademark   is   identical   to   private   respondent's   and   its   use   on   the   same   class   of   goods  as  the  latter's  amounts  to  a  violation  of   the   Trademark   Law   and   Article   189   of   the   Revised  Penal  Code.    

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Intellectual Property Law prior  action  operative  as  res  judicata,  such  as  where  the   two   actions   are   based   on   different   statutes.   Res   judicata   therefore   does   not   apply   to   the   instant   case   and   respondent  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  err  in  so  ruling.     Intellectual   and   industrial   property   rights   cases   are   not   simple   property   cases.   Trademarks   deal   with   the   psychological   function   of   symbols   and   the   effect   of   these  symbols  on  the  public  at  large.  Trademarks  play  a   significant   role   in   communication,   commerce   and   trade,   and   serve   valuable   and   interrelated   business   functions,   both   nationally   and   internationally.   For   this   reason,   all   agreements  concerning  industrial  property,  like  those  on   trademarks   and   tradenames,   are   intimately   connected   with   economic   development.   Industrial   property   encourages  investments  in  new  ideas  and  inventions  and   stimulates  creative  efforts  for  the  satisfaction  of  human   needs.   They   speed   up   transfer   of   technology   and   industrialization,   and   thereby   bring   about   social   and   economic   progress.   These   advantages   have   been   acknowledged   by   the   Philippine   government   itself.   The   Intellectual   Property   Code   of   the   Philippines   declares   that   "an   effective   intellectual   and   industrial   property   system   is   vital   to   the   development   of   domestic   and   creative   activity,   facilitates   transfer   of   technology,   it   attracts  foreign  investments,  and  ensures  market  access   for   our   products."   The   Intellectual   Property   Code   took   effect   on   January   1,   1998   and   by   its   express   provision,   repealed   the   Trademark   Law,   the   Patent   Law,   Articles   188   and   189   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code,   the   Decree   on   Intellectual   Property,   and   the   Decree   on   Compulsory   Reprinting  of  Foreign  Textbooks.  The  Code  was  enacted   to   strengthen   the   intellectual   and   industrial   property   system   in   the   Philippines   as   mandated   by   the   country's   accession   to   the   Agreement   Establishing   the   World   Trade  Organization  (WTO).     The  law  does  not  require  the  oppositor  be  a  TM  owner,   so   long   as   he   will   sustain   damage   by   the   registration,  he  may  oppose.    

SECTION   137.   REGISTRATION  OF   MARK  AND   ISSUANCE  OF  A   CERTIFICATE  TO  THE  OWNER  OR  HIS  ASSIGNEE.  –     137.1.   The   Office   shall   maintain   a   Register   in   which   shall   be   registered   marks,   numbered   in   the   order   of   their   registration,  and  all  transactions  in  respect  of  each  mark,   required  to  be  recorded  by  virtue  of  this  law.     137.2.   The   registration   of   a   mark   shall   include   a   reproduction  of  the  mark  and  shall  mention:  its  number;   the  name  and  address  of  the  registered  owner  and,  if  the   registered   owner's   address   is   outside   the   country,   his   address   for   service   within   the   country;   the   dates   of   application   and   registration;   if   priority   is   claimed,   an   indication   of   this   fact,   and   the   number,   date   and   country   of  the  application,  basis  of  the  priority  claims;  the  list  of   goods   or   services   in   respect   of   which   registration   has   been   granted,   with   the   indication   of   the   corresponding   class   or   classes;   and   such   other   data   as   the   Regulations   may  prescribe  from  time  to  time.     137.3.   A   certificate   of   registration   of   a   mark   may   be   issued   to   the   assignee   of   the   applicant:   Provided,   That   the   assignment   is   recorded   in   the   Office.   In   case   of   a   change   of   ownership,   the   Office   shall   at   the   written   request  signed  by  the  owner,  or  his  representative,  or  by   the  new  owner,  or  his  representative  and  upon  a  proper   showing   and   the   payment   of   the   prescribed   fee,   issue   to   such  assignee  a  new  certificate  of  registration  of  the  said   mark   in   the   name   of   such   assignee,   and   for   the   unexpired  part  of  the  original  period.     137.4.   The   Office   shall   record   any   change   of   address,   or   address   for   service,   which   shall   be   notified   to   it   by   the   registered  owner.     137.5.  In  the  absence  of  any  provision  to  the  contrary  in   this   Act,   communications   to   be   made   to   the   registered   owner  by  virtue  of  this  Act  shall  be  sent  to  him  at  his  last   recorded   address   and,   at   the   same,   at   his   last   recorded   address  for  service.    

 

6.

Issuance  and  Publication  of   Certificate  

SECTION  138.  CERTIFICATES  OF  REGISTRATION.  –     A  certificate  of  registration  of  a  mark  shall  be  prima  facie   evidence   of   the   validity   of   the   registration,   the   registrant's   ownership   of   the   mark,   and   of   the   registrant's  exclusive  right  to  use  the  same  in  connection   with   the   goods   or   services   and   those   that   are   related   thereto  specified  in  the  certificate.      

 

SECTION   136.   ISSUANCE  AND  PUBLICATION  OF   CERTIFICATE.   –     When   the   period   for   filing   the   opposition   has   expired,   or   when  the  Director  of  Legal  Affairs  shall  have  denied  the   opposition,  the  Office  upon  payment  of  the  required  fee,   shall   issue   the   certificate   of   registration.   Upon   issuance   of   a   certificate   of   registration,   notice   thereof   making   reference   to   the   publication   of   the   application   shall   be   published  in  the  IPO  Gazette.      

SECTION   139.   PUBLICATION   OF   REGISTERED   MARKS;   INSPECTION  OF  REGISTER.  –     139.1.  The  Office  shall  publish,  in  the  form  and  within  the   period  fixed  by  the  Regulations,  the  marks  registered,  in   the   order   of   their   registration,   reproducing   all   the   particulars  referred  to  in  Subsection  137.2.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   139.2.   Marks   registered   at   the   Office   may   be   inspected   free  of  charge  and  any  person  may  obtain  copies  thereof   at   his   own   expense.   This   provision   shall   also   be   applicable   to   transactions   recorded   in   respect   of   any   registered  mark.    

when   IPO   agrees   to   accept   non-­‐use   are   very   rare   and   exceptional.  It  must  be  factors  beyond  your  control.     • Bankrupt?   Financial   circumstance   not   an   acceptable  ground     • Independent  of  your  will:     o Constitutional   prohibition   for   broadcasting   network.   IPO   accepted   it   so   the   mark   is   still   registered,   not   struck  down  for  use.     o Government  restriction/regulation       • Within   1st   year   from   5th   anniversary   of   mark:   file   declaration   of   actual   use   to   show   that   you   are   still   using   the  mark   • 10  years:  file  petition  for  renewal      

SECTION  144.  CLASSIFICATION  OF  GOODS  AND  SERVICES.  –     144.1.   Each   registration,   and   any   publication   of   the   Office   which  concerns  an  application  or  registration  effected  by   the   Office   shall   indicate   the   goods   or   services   by   their   names,   grouped   according   to   the   classes   of   the   Nice   Classification,   and   each   group   shall   be   preceded   by   the   number   of   the   class   of   that   Classification   to   which   that   group   of   goods   or   services   belongs,   presented   in   the   order  of  the  classes  of  the  said  Classification.     144.2.  Goods  or  services  may  not  be  considered  as  being   similar  or  dissimilar  to  each  other  on  the  ground  that,  in   any  registration  or  publication  by  the  Office,  they  appear   in  different  classes  of  the  Nice  Classification.     SECTION  4.2.     The   term   "TECHNOLOGY   TRANSFER   ARRANGEMENTS"   refers   to   contracts   or   agreements   involving   the   transfer   of   systematic   knowledge   for   the   manufacture   of   a   product,   the   application   of   a   process,   or   rendering   of   a   service   including   management   contracts;   and   the   transfer,   assignment   or   licensing   of   all   forms   of   intellectual   property   rights,   including   licensing   of   computer   software   except   computer   software   developed   for   mass   market.    

7.

8.

Voluntary   Cancellation   of   Certificate  

 

SECTION   140.   CANCELLATION   UPON   APPLICATION   BY   REGISTRANT;   AMENDMENT   OR   DISCLAIMER   OF   REGISTRATION.  –     Upon  application  of  the  registrant,  the  Office  may  permit   any   registration   to   be   surrendered   for   cancellation,   and   upon   cancellation   the   appropriate   entry   shall   be   made   in   the   records   of   the   Office.   Upon   application   of   the   registrant  and  payment  of  the  prescribed  fee,  the  Office   for   good   cause   may   permit   any   registration   to   be   amended  or  to  be  disclaimed  in  part:  Provided,  That  the   amendment   or   disclaimer   does   not   alter   materially   the   character   of   the   mark.   Appropriate   entry   shall   be   made   in   the   records   of   the   Office   upon   the   certificate   of   registration   or,   if   said   certificate   is   lost   or   destroyed,   upon  a  certified  copy  thereto.    

Duration  of  Certificate  

 

SECTION  145.  DURATION.  –     A   certificate   of   registration   shall   remain   in   force   for   ten   (10)   years:   Provided,   That   the   registrant   shall   file   a   declaration  of  actual  use  and  evidence  to  that  effect,  or   shall   show   valid   reasons   based   on   the   existence   of   obstacles  to  such  use,  as  prescribed  by  the  Regulations,   within   one   (1)   year   from   the   fifth   anniversary   of   the   date   of  the  registration  of  the  mark.  Otherwise,  the  mark  shall   be  removed  from  the  Register  by  the  Office.     Marks   acquired   under   RA   166   have   a   20-­‐year   duration   until   expiration.   Once   it   expires,   the   mark   can   only   be   renewed  for  a  period  of  10  years.     Why   require   use   from   a   conceptual   basis?   Warehousing   of   trademarks   is   not   allowed.   What’s   the   point   of   protecting   trademarks   if   not   use   for   contributing   the   GDP,  pay  taxes,  hire  people,  no  economic  activity  at  all.     • There  is  single  6mon  extension  to  make  use  of   the  mark.       Can   you   file   declaration   of   non-­‐use?   Yes,   but   the   instances  

9.

Correction  of  Mistakes  

 

SECTION   142.   CORRECTION   OF   MISTAKES   MADE   BY   THE   OFFICE.  –    Whenever   a   material   mistake   in   a   registration   incurred   through  the  fault  of  the  Office  is  clearly  disclosed  by  the   records   of   the   Office,   a   certificate   stating   the   fact   and   nature   of   such   mistake   shall   be   issued   without   charge,   recorded  and  a  printed  copy  thereof  shall  be  attached  to   each   printed   copy   of   the   registration.   Such   corrected   registration  shall  thereafter  have  the  same  effect  as  the   original  certificate;  or  in  the  discretion  of  the  Director  of   the   Administrative,   Financial   and   Human   Resource   Development   Service   Bureau   a   new   certificate   of   registration   may   be   issued   without   charge.   All   certificates   of   correction   heretofore   issued   in   accordance  with  the  Regulations  and  the  registration  to   which   they   are   attached   shall   have   the   same   force   and   effect  as  if  such  certificates  and  their  issuance  had  been   authorized  by  this  Act.  

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146.4.   An   applicant   for   renewal   not   domiciled   in   the   Philippines   shall   be   subject   to   and   comply   with   the   requirements  of  this  Act.       Can  a  trademark  registration  be  in  perpetuity  forever  and   ever?   Copyright   can   be   lifetime.   Yes.   For   as   long   as   you   keep   renewing   the   mark.   A   trademark   can   be   forever   for   as   long  as   6   mos   prior   to   10th   year   anniversary   of   registration,   you   file   petition   for   renewal   which   is   granted   as   a   matter   of   course.   The   cycle   goes   on   and   on.        

SECTION   143.   CORRECTION   OF   MISTAKES   MADE   BY   APPLICANT.  –   Whenever   a   mistake   is   made   in   a   registration   and   such   mistake   occurred   in   good   faith   through   the   fault   of   the   applicant,   the   Office   may   issue   a   certificate   upon   the   payment   of   the   prescribed   fee:   Provided,   That   the   correction   does   not   involve   any   change   in   the   registration  that  requires  republication  of  the  mark.      

10. Renewal    

SECTION  146.  RENEWAL.  –    

H. Rights  conferred  

146.1.   A   certificate   of   registration   may   be   renewed   for   periods  of  ten  (10)  years  at  its  expiration  upon  payment   of   the   prescribed   fee   and   upon   filing   of   a   request.   The   request  shall  contain  the  following  indications:     (a)  An  indication  that  renewal  is  sought;     (b)   The   name   and   address   of   the   registrant   or   his   successor-­‐in-­‐interest,   hereafter   referred   to   as  the  "right  holder";     (c)  The  registration  number  of  the  registration   concerned;     (d)   The   filing   date   of   the   application   which   resulted   in   the   registration   concerned   to   be   renewed;     (e)   Where   the   right   holder   has   a   representative,   the  name  and  address  of  that  representative;     (f)   The   names   of   the   recorded   goods   or   services   for   which   the   renewal   is   requested   or   the   names   of   the   recorded   goods   or   services   for   which   the   renewal   is   not   requested,   grouped   according   to   the   classes   of   the   Nice   Classification   to   which   that   group   of   goods   or   services  belongs  and  presented  in  the  order  of   the  classes  of  the  said  Classification;  and     (g)   A   signature   by   the   right   holder   or   his   representative.     146.2.  Such  request  shall  be  in  Filipino  or  English  and  may   be   made   at   any   time   within   six   (6)   months   before   the   expiration   of   the   period   for   which   the   registration   was   issued   or   renewed,   or   it   may   be   made   within   six   (6)   months   after   such   expiration   on   payment   of   the   additional  fee  herein  prescribed.     146.3.   If   the   Office   refuses   to   renew   the   registration,   it   shall   notify   the   registrant   of   his   refusal   and   the   reasons   therefor.    

 

SECTION  147.  RIGHTS  CONFERRED.  –     147.1.*   Except   in   cases   of   importation   of   drugs   and   medicines   allowed   under   Section   72.1   of   this   Act   and   of   off-­‐patent   drugs   and   medicines,   the   owner   of   a   registered  mark  shall  have  the  exclusive  right  to  prevent   all   third   parties   not   having   the   owner's   consent   from   using   in   the   course   of   trade   identical   or   similar   signs   or   containers   for   goods   or   services   which   are   identical   or   similar   to   those   in   respect   of   which   the   trademark   is   registered   where   such   use   would   result   in   a   likelihood   of   confusion.   In   case   of   the   use   of   an   identical   sign   for   identical  goods  or  services,  a  likelihood  of  confusion  shall   be  presumed.     There   shall   be   no   infringement   of   trademarks   or   tradenames   of   imported   or   sold   patented   drugs   and   medicines  allowed  under  Section  72.1  of  this  Act,  as  well   as   imported   or   sold   off-­‐patent   drugs   and   medicines:   Provided,   That,   said   drugs   and   medicines   bear   the   registered   marks   that   have   not   been   tampered,   unlawfully   modified,   or   infringed   upon,   under   Section   155  of  this  Code.     147.2.   The   exclusive   right   of   the   owner   of   a   well-­‐known   mark  defined  in  Subsection  123.1(e)**  which  is  registered   in   the   Philippines,   shall   extend   to   goods   and   services   which   are   not   similar   to   those   in   respect   of   which   the   mark   is   registered:   Provided,   That   use   of   that   mark   in                                                                                                                                                          

*

 As  amended  by  RA  9502  –  Universally  Accessible  Cheaper  and   Quality  Medicines  Act  of  2008   **

  Section   123.1.   A   mark   cannot   be   registered   if:   (e)   Is   identical   with,   or   confusingly   similar   to,   or   constitutes   a   translation   of   a   mark   which   is   considered   by   the   competent   authority   of   the   Philippines   to   be   well-­‐known   internationally   and   in   the   Philippines,  whether  or  not  it  is  registered  here,  as  being  already   the   mark   of   a   person   other   than   the   applicant   for   registration,   and   used   for   identical   or   similar   goods   or   services:   Provided,   That   in   determining   whether   a   mark   is   well-­‐known,   account   shall   be   taken   of   the   knowledge   of   the   relevant   sector   of   the   public,  rather  than  of  the  public  at  large,  including  knowledge  in   the   Philippines   which   has   been   obtained   as   a   result   of   the   promotion  of  the  mark  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   relation   to   those   goods   or   services   would   indicate   a   connection   between   those   goods   or   services   and   the   owner  of  the  registered  mark:  Provided  further,  That  the   interests   of   the   owner   of   the   registered   mark   are   likely   to  be  damaged  by  such  use.    

87.2.   Those   pursuant   to   which   the   licensor   reserves   the   right   to   fix   the   sale   or   resale   prices   of   the   products   manufactured  on  the  basis  of  the  license;     87.3.   Those   that   contain   restrictions   regarding   the   volume  and  structure  of  production;     87.4.   Those   that   prohibit   the   use   of   competitive   technologies   in   a   non-­‐exclusive   technology   transfer   agreement;     87.5.   Those   that   establish   a   full   or   partial   purchase   option  in  favor  of  the  licensor;     87.6.  Those  that  obligate  the  licensee  to  transfer  for  free   to   the   licensor   the   inventions   or   improvements   that   may   be  obtained  through  the  use  of  the  licensed  technology;     87.7.   Those   that   require   payment   of   royalties   to   the   owners  of  patents  for  patents  which  are  not  used;     87.8.   Those   that   prohibit   the   licensee   to   export   the   licensed  product  unless  justified  for  the  protection  of  the   legitimate   interest   of   the   licensor   such   as   exports   to   countries   where   exclusive   licenses   to   manufacture   and/or   distribute   the   licensed   product(s)   have   already   been  granted;     87.9.   Those   which   restrict   the   use   of   the   technology   supplied   after   the   expiration   of   the   technology   transfer   arrangement,  except  in  cases  of  early  termination  of  the   technology   transfer   arrangement   due   to   reason(s)   attributable  to  the  licensee;     87.10.   Those  which  require  payments  for  patents  and   other   industrial   property   rights   after   their   expiration,   termination  arrangement;     87.11.   Those   which   require   that   the   technology   recipient   shall   not   contest   the   validity   of   any   of   the   patents  of  the  technology  supplier;     87.12.   Those   which   restrict   the   research   and   development   activities   of   the   licensee   designed   to   absorb   and   adapt   the   transferred   technology   to   local   conditions   or   to   initiate   research   and   development   programs  in  connection  with  new  products,  processes  or   equipment;     87.13.   Those   which   prevent   the   licensee   from   adapting   the   imported   technology   to   local   conditions,   or   introducing   innovation   to   it,   as   long   as   it   does   not   impair   the  quality  standards  prescribed  by  the  licensor;     87.14.   Those  which  exempt  the  licensor  for  liability  for   non-­‐fulfillment   of   his   responsibilities   under   the  

SECTION   148.   USE   OF   INDICATIONS   BY   THIRD   PARTIES   FOR   PURPOSES   OTHER   THAN   THOSE   FOR   WHICH   THE   MARK   IS   USED.  –   Registration   of   the   mark   shall   not   confer   on   the   registered  owner  the  right  to  preclude  third  parties  from   using   bona   fide   their   names,   addresses,   pseudonyms,   a   geographical   name,   or   exact   indications   concerning   the   kind,   quality,   quantity,   destination,   value,   place   of   origin,   or   time   of   production   or   of   supply,   of   their   goods   or   services:   Provided,   That   such   use   is   confined   to   the   purposes   of   mere   identification   or   information   and   cannot  mislead  the  public  as  to  the  source  of  the  goods   or  services.    

SECTION  4.2.**    

The   term   "TECHNOLOGY   TRANSFER   ARRANGEMENTS"   refers   to   contracts   or   agreements   involving   the   transfer   of   systematic   knowledge   for   the   manufacture   of   a   product,   the   application   of   a   process,   or   rendering   of   a   service   including   management   contracts;   and   the   transfer,   assignment   or   licensing   of   all   forms   of   intellectual   property   rights,   including   licensing   of   computer   software   except   computer   software   developed   for   mass   market.    

SECTION  87.  PROHIBITED  CLAUSES.  –     Except   in   cases   under   Section   91 7 ,   the   following   provisions   shall   be   deemed   prima   facie   to   have   an   adverse  effect  on  competition  and  trade:     87.1.   Those   which   impose   upon   the   licensee   the   obligation  to  acquire  from  a  specific  source  capital  goods,   intermediate   products,   raw   materials,   and   other   technologies,   or   of   permanently   employing   personnel   indicated  by  the  licensor;    

                                                                                                                                                       

**

 Relate  to  Sections  87,  88,  92  

7

 Section   91.   Exceptional   Cases.   -­‐   In   exceptional   or   meritorious   cases   where   substantial   benefits   will   accrue   to   the   economy,   such   as   high   technology   content,   increase   in   foreign   exchange   earnings,   employment   generation,   regional   dispersal   of   industries   and/or  substitution  with  or  use   of   local   raw   materials,   or   in   the   case   of   Board   of   Investments,   registered   companies   with   pioneer   status,   exemption   from   any   of   the   above   requirements   may   be   allowed   by   the   Documentation,   Information   and   Technology   Transfer   Bureau   after   evaluation   thereof  on  a  case  by  case  basis.  

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Intellectual Property Law technology   transfer   arrangement   and/or   liability   arising   from   third   party   suits   brought   about   by   the   use   of   the   licensed  product  or  the  licensed  technology;  and     87.15.   Other  clauses  with  equivalent  effects.    

149.2.   Such  assignment  or  transfer  shall,  however,  be   null   and   void   if   it   is   liable   to   mislead   the   public,   particularly  as  regards  the  nature,  source,  manufacturing   process,   characteristics,   or   suitability   for   their   purpose,   of  the  goods  or  services  to  which  the  mark  is  applied.     149.3.   The   assignment   of   the   application   for   registration   of   a   mark,   or   of   its   registration,   shall   be   in   writing   and   require   the   signatures   of   the   contracting   parties.   Transfers   by   mergers   or   other   forms   of   succession   may   be   made   by   any   document   supporting   such  transfer.     149.4.   Assignments   and   transfers   of   registrations   of   marks  shall  be  recorded  at  the  Office  on  payment  of  the   prescribed  fee;  assignment  and  transfers  of  applications   for   registration   shall,   on   payment   of   the   same   fee,   be   provisionally   recorded,   and   the   mark,   when   registered,   shall  be  in  the  name  of  the  assignee  or  transferee.     149.5.   Assignments  and  transfers  shall  have  no  effect   against  third  parties  until  they  are  recorded  at  the  Office.    

SECTION  88.  MANDATORY  PROVISIONS.  –     The   following   provisions   shall   be   included   in   voluntary   license  contracts:     88.1.   That   the   laws   of   the   Philippines   shall   govern   the   interpretation  of  the  same  and  in  the  event  of  litigation,   the   venue   shall   be   the   proper   court   in   the   place   where   the  licensee  has  its  principal  office;     88.2.   Continued   access   to   improvements   in   techniques   and   processes   related   to   the   technology   shall   be   made   available   during   the   period   of   the   technology   transfer   arrangement;     88.3.   In   the   event   the   technology   transfer   arrangement   shall  provide  for  arbitration,  the  Procedure  of  Arbitration   of   the   Arbitration   Law   of   the   Philippines   or   the   Arbitration   Rules   of   the   United   Nations   Commission   on   International   Trade   Law   (UNCITRAL)   or   the   Rules   of   Conciliation   and   Arbitration   of   the   International   Chamber  of  Commerce  (ICC)  shall  apply  and  the  venue  of   arbitration   shall   be   the   Philippines   or   any   neutral   country;  and     88.4.  The  Philippine  taxes  on  all  payments  relating  to  the   technology   transfer   arrangement   shall   be   borne   by   the   licensor.    

SECTION  150.  LICENSE  CONTRACTS.  –     150.1.  Any  license  contract  concerning  the  registration  of   a   mark,   or   an   application   therefor,   shall   provide   for   effective   control   by   the   licensor   of   the   quality   of   the   goods   or   services   of   the   licensee   in   connection   with   which  the  mark  is  used.  If  the  license  contract  does  not   provide  for  such  quality  control,  or  if  such  quality  control   is   not   effectively   carried   out,   the   license   contract   shall   not  be  valid.     150.2.   A   license   contract   shall   be   submitted   to   the   Office  which  shall  keep  its  contents  confidential  but  shall   record   it   and   publish   a   reference   thereto.   A   license   contract   shall   have   no   effect   against   third   parties   until   such   recording   is   effected.   The   Regulations   shall   fix   the   procedure  for  the  recording  of  the  license  contract.    

SECTION   92.   NON-­‐REGISTRATION   WITH   THE   DOCUMENTATION,   INFORMATION   AND   TECHNOLOGY   TRANSFER  BUREAU .  –    Technology   transfer   arrangements   that   conform   with   the   provisions   of   Sections   86   and   87   need   not   be   registered   with   the   Documentation,   Information   and   Technology  Transfer  Bureau.  Non-­‐conformance  with  any   of   the   provisions   of   Sections   87   and   88,   however,   shall   automatically   render   the   technology   transfer   arrangement   unenforceable,   unless   said   technology   transfer   arrangement   is   approved   and   registered   with   the   Documentation,   Information   and   Technology   Transfer   Bureau   under   the   provisions   of   Section   91   on   exceptional  cases.    

SECTION   149.   ASSIGNMENT   AND   APPLICATION  AND  REGISTRATION.  –    

TRANSFER  

SECTION  231.  REVERSE  RECIPROCITY  OF  FOREIGN  LAWS.  –     Any   condition,   restriction,   limitation,   diminution,   requirement,   penalty   or   any   similar   burden   imposed   by   the   law   of   a   foreign   country   on   a   Philippine   national   seeking  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  in  that   country,  shall  reciprocally  be  enforceable  upon  nationals   of  said  country,  within  Philippine  jurisdiction.    

OF  

149.1.   An   application   for   registration   of   a   mark,   or   its   registration,   may   be   assigned   or   transferred   with   or   without  the  transfer  of  the  business  using  the  mark.      

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   and   advertisements   of   the   originator   of   said   mark,   to   convey   to   the   public   a   false   impression   of   some   supposed  connection  between  the  manufacturer  of  the   article  sold  under  the  original  mark  and  the  new  articles   being  tendered  to  the  public  under  the  same  or  similar   mark.   As   trade   has   developed   and   commercial   changes   have   come   about,   the   law   of   unfair   competition   has   expanded  to  keep  pace  with  the  times  and  the  element   of   strict   competition   in   itself   has   ceased   to   be   the   determining  factor.  The  owner  of  a  trade-­‐mark  or  trade-­‐ name   has   a   property   right   in   which   he   is   entitled   to   protection,  since  there  is  damage  to  him  from  confusion   of   reputation   or   goodwill   in   the   mind   of   the   public   as   well  as  from  confusion  of  goods.  The  modern  trend  is  to   give   emphasis   to   the   unfairness   of   the   acts   and   to   classify  and  treat  the  issue  as  a  fraud.    

Is   there   infringement   even   if   the   goods   are   non-­‐ competing?    

ANG  V.  TEODORO  (1942),  SUPRA   Refresher:   “Ang   Tibay”   used   for   slippers;   tried   to   be   registered  for  pants  and  shirts.     Doctrine:   This   fundamental   change   in   attitude   first   manifested   itself   in   the   year   1915-­‐1917.   Until   about   then,   the   courts   had  proceeded  on  the  theory  that  the  same  trade-­‐mark,   used   on   un-­‐like   goods,   could   not   cause   confusion   in   trade   and   that,   therefore,   there   could   be   no   objection   to   the  use  and  registration  of  a  well-­‐known  mark  by  a  third   party  for  a  different  class  of  goods.  Since  1916  however,   a  growing  sentiment  began  to  arise  that  in  the  selection   of   a   famous   mark   by   a   third   party,   there   was   generally   the   hidden   intention   to   "have   a   free   ride"   on   the   trade-­‐ mark  owner's  reputation  and  good  will.     In  the  present  state  of  development  of  the  law  on  Trade-­‐ Marks,  Unfair  Competition,  and  Unfair  Trading,  the  TEST   employed   by   the   courts   to   determine   whether   noncompeting  goods  are  or  are  not  of  the  same  class  is   confusion  as  to  the  origin  of  the  goods  of  the  second  user.   Although   two   noncompeting   articles   may   be   classified   under  two  different  classes  by  the  Patent  Office  because   they   are   deemed   not   to   possess   the   same   descriptive   properties,   they   would,   nevertheless,   be   held   by   the   courts   to   belong   to   the   same   class   if   the   simultaneous   use   on   them   of   identical   or   closely   similar   trade-­‐marks   would   be   likely   to   cause   confusion   as   to   the   origin,   or   personal  source,  of  the  second  user's  goods.  They  would   be  considered  as  not  falling  under  the  same  class  only  if   they   are   so   dissimilar   or   so   foreign   to   each   other   as   to   make  it  unlikely  that  the  purchaser  would  think  the  first   user  made  the  second  user's  goods.     Such   construction   of   the   law   is   induced   by   cogent   reasons   of   equity   and   fair   dealing.   The   courts   have   come   to  realize  that  there  can  be  unfair  competition  or  unfair   trading   even   if   the   goods   are   non-­‐competing,   and   that   such   unfair   trading   can   cause   INJURY   OR   DAMAGE   TO   THE   FIRST   USER   of   a   given   trade-­‐mark,   first,   by   prevention   of   the   natural   expansion   of   his   business   and,   second,  by  having  his  business  reputation  confused  with   and   put   at   the   mercy   of   the   second   user.   Then   noncompetitive  products  are  sold  under  the  same  mark,   the   gradual   whittling   away   or   dispersion   of   the   identity   and  hold  upon  the  public  mind  of  the  mark  created  by  its   first  user,  inevitably  results.  The  original  owner  is  entitled   to  the  preservation  of  the  valuable  link  between  him  and   the  public  that  has  been  created  by  his  ingenuity  and  the   merit   of   his   wares   or   services.   Experience   has   demonstrated   that   when   a   well-­‐known   trade-­‐mark   is   adopted   by   another   even   for   a   totally   different   class   of   goods,   it   is   done   to   get   the   benefit   of   the   reputation  

CHUA  CHE  V.  PHILIPPINE  PATENT  OFFICE    (1965)   Refresher:   “X-­‐7”   previously   used   as   a   brand   of   toilet   articles  was  being  registered  for  soap.     Doctrine:   Registration   of   a   trademark   should   be   refused   in   cases   where   there   is   a   likelihood   of   confusion,   mistake,   or   deception,   even   though   the   goods   fall   into   different   categories.   The   products   of   appellee   are   common   household   items   nowadays,   in   the   same   manner   as   laundry   soap.   The   likelihood   of   purchasers   to   associate   those   products   to   a   common   origin   is   not   far-­‐fetched.   Both   from   the   standpoint   of   priority   of   use   and   for   the   protection  of  the  buying  public  and,  of  course,  appellee's   rights   to   the   trademark   "X-­‐7",   it   becomes   manifest   that   the   registration   of   said   trademark   in   favor   of   applicant-­‐ appellant  should  be  denied.    

STA.  ANA  V.  MALIWAT  (1968)   Refresher:   Maliwat   wanted   to   register   the   trademark   FLORMANN,   which   is   used   on   shirts,   pants,   jackets   and   shoes   for   ladies,   men,   and   children.   Sta.   Ana   filed   an   application   for   the   registration   of   the   tradename   FLORMEN   SHOE   MANUFACTURERS,   which   he'll   use   for   manufacturing  ladies'  and  children's  shoes.     Doctrine:   Modern  law  recognizes  that  the  protection  to  which  the   owner   of   a   trademark   mark   is   entitled   is   not   limited   to   guarding   his   goods   or   business   from   actual   market   competition   with   identical   or   similar   products   of   the   parties,   but   extends   to   all   cases   in   which   the   use   by   a   junior   appropriator   of   a  trademark  or  tradename  is  likely   to   lead   to   a   confusion   of   source,   as   where   prospective   purchasers   would   be   misled   into   thinking   that   the   complaining   party   has   extended   his   business   into   the   field   or   is   in   any   way   connected   with   the   activities   of   the   infringer;   or   when   it   forestalls   the   normal   potential   expansion  of  his  business.    

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Intellectual Property Law Mere   dissimilarity   of   goods   should   not   preclude   relief   where   the   junior   user's   goods   are   not   too   different   or   remote  from  any  that  the  owner  would  be  likely  to  make   or  sell;  and  in  the  present  case,  wearing  apparel  is  not  so   far  removed  from  shoes  as  to  preclude  relief.    

be  injured  by  any  subsequent  appropriation  or  imitation   by  others,  and  the  public  will  not  be  deceived.    

ESSO  STANDARD  EASTERN,  INC.  V.  CA  (1982)   Refresher:   “Esso”   is   used   by   Esso   Standard   for   its   petroleum   products.   Private   respondent   (United   Cigarette  Corp.)  wanted  to  use  it  for  its  cigarettes.     Doctrine:   The  law  defines  infringement  as  the  use  without  consent   of   the   trademark   owner   of   any   "reproduction,   counterfeit,   copy   or   colorable   limitation   of   any   registered   mark   or   tradename   in   connection   with   the   sale,   offering   for   sale,   or   advertising   of   any   goods,   business   or   services   on   or   in   connection   with   which   such   use  is  likely  to  cause  confusion  or  mistake  or  to  deceive   purchasers   or   others   as   to   the   source   or   origin   of   such   goods   or   services,   or   Identity   of   such   business;   or   reproduce,   counterfeit,   copy   or   colorably   imitate   any   such   mark   or   tradename   and   apply   such   reproduction,   counterfeit,  copy  or  colorable  limitation  to  labels,  signs,   prints,   packages,   wrappers,   receptacles   or   advertisements   intended   to   be   used   upon   or   in   connection   with   such   goods,   business   or   services."   Implicit   in   this   definition   is   the   concept   that   the   goods   must   be   so   related   that   there   is   a   likelihood   either   of   confusion   of   goods   or   business.   But   likelihood   of   confusion   is   a   relative   concept;   to   be   determined   only   according   to   the   particular,   and   sometimes   peculiar,   circumstances   of   each   case.   It   is   unquestionably   true   that,   as   stated   in   Coburn   vs.   Puritan   Mills,   Inc.   "In   trademark   cases,   even   more   than   in   other   litigation,   precedent   must  be  studied  in  the  light  of  the  facts  of  the  particular   case.     It  is  undisputed  that  the  goods  on  which  petitioner  uses   the   trademark   ESSO,   petroleum   products,   and   the   product   of   respondent,   cigarettes,   are   non-­‐competing.   But   as   to   whether   trademark   infringement   exists   depends   for   the   most   part   upon   whether   or   not   the   goods  are  so  related  that  the  public  may  be,  or  is  actually,   deceived  and  misled  that  they  came  from  the  same  maker   or   manufacturer.   For   non-­‐competing   goods   may   be   those  which,  though  they  are  not  in  actual  competition,   are  so  related  to  each  other  that  it  might  reasonably  be   assumed   that   they   originate   from   one   manufacturer.   Non-­‐competing   goods   may   also   be   those   which,   being   entirely   unrelated,   could   not   reasonably   be   assumed   to   have   a   common   source.   In   the   former   case   of   related   goods,   confusion   of   business   could   arise   out   of   the   use   of  similar  marks;  in  the  latter  case  of  non-­‐related  goods,   it   could   not.   The   vast   majority   of   courts   today   follow   the   modern  theory  or  concept  of  "related  goods"  which  the   Court   has   likewise   adopted   and   uniformly   recognized   and  applied.     Goods  are  related  when  they  belong  to  the  same  class  or   have   the   same   descriptive   properties;   when   they   possess  

PHILIPPINE  REFINING  COMPANY  V.  NG  SAM  (1982)   Refresher:   “Camia”   was   used   by   Philippine   Refining   Sugar  for  its  lard,  butter,  cooking  oil,  and  soap.  Ng  Sam   wanted  to  register  it  for  its  ham.     Doctrine:   A   rudimentary   precept   in   trademark   protection   is   that   "the   right   to   a   trademark   is   a   limited   one,   in   the   sense   that   others   may   use   the   same   mark   on   unrelated   goods."   Thus,   as   pronounced   by   the   United   States   Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of   American   Foundries   vs.   Robertson,   "the  mere  fact  that  one  person  has  adopted  and  used  a   trademark   on   his   goods   does   not   prevent   the   adoption   and   use   of   the   same   trademark   by   others   on   articles   of   a   different  description."     Such   restricted   right   over   a   trademark   is   likewise   reflected   in   our   Trademark   law.   Under   Section   4(d)   of   the  law,  registration  of  a  trademark  which  so  resembles   another   already   registered   or   in   use   should   be   denied,   where   to   allow   such   registration   could   likely   result   in   confusion,   mistake   or   deception   to   the   consumers.   Conversely,   where   no   confusion   is   likely   to   arise,   as   in   this  case,  registration  of  a  similar  or  even  Identical  mark   may  be  allowed.     The   term   "CAMIA"   is   descriptive   of   a   whole   genus   of   garden  plants  with  fragrant  white  flowers.  Some  people   call  the  "CAMIA"  the  "white  ginger  plant"  because  of  its   tuberous  roots,  while  children  refer  to  it  as  the  butterfly   flower  because  of  its  shape.  Being  a  generic  and  common   term,  its  appropriation  as  a  trademark,  albeit  in  a  fanciful   manner   in   that   it   bears   no   relation   to   the   product   it   Identifies,   is   valid.   However,   the   degree   of   exclusiveness   accorded  to  each  user  is  closely  restricted.     A   trademark   is   designed   to   Identify   the   user.   But   it   should   be   so   distinctive   and   sufficiently   original   as   to   enable  those  who  come  into  contact  with  it  to  recognize   instantly  the  Identity  of  the  user.  "  It  must  be  affirmative   and   definite,   significant   and   distinctive,   capable   to   indicate  origin."     It   is   evident   that   "CAMIA"   as   a   trademark   is   far   from   being  distinctive.  By  itself,  it  does  not  Identify  petitioner   as   the   manufacturer   or   producer   of   the   goods   upon   which   said   mark   is   used,   as   contra-­‐distinguished   to   trademarks  derived  from  coined  words  such  as  "Rolex",   "Kodak"   or   "Kotex".   It   has   been   held   that   if  a  mark  is  so   commonplace   that   it   cannot   be   readily   distinguished   from   others,   then   it   is   apparent   that   it   cannot   Identify   a   particular  business;  and  he  who  first  adopted  it  cannot  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   deodorant,   talcum   powder,   and   toilet   soap.   Thereafter,   respondent   court,   through   Justice   Gopengco   with   Justices   Patajo   and   Racela,   Jr.   concurring,   was   initially   persuaded   by   petitioner's   plea   for   reversal   directed   against   the   permission   granted   by   the   Director   of   Patents,   but   the   decision   of   the   Second   Special   Cases   Division   handed   down   on   April   29,   1983   was   later   reconsidered  in  favor  of  herein  private  respondent.     Doctrine:   Having   thus   reviewed   the   laws   applicable   to   the   case   before  Us,  it  is  not  difficult  to  discern  from  the  foregoing   statutory   enactments   that   private   respondent   may   be   permitted   to   register   the   trademark   "BRUTE"   for   briefs   produced   by   it   notwithstanding   petitioner's   vehement   protestations  of  unfair  dealings  in  marketing  its  own  set   of  items  which  are  limited  to:  after-­‐shave  lotion,  shaving   cream,  deodorant,  talcum  powder  and  toilet  soap.  In  as   much  as  petitioner  has  not  ventured  in  the  production  of   briefs,   an   item   which   is   not   listed   in   its   certificate   of   registration,   petitioner   can   not   and   should   not   be   allowed   to   feign   that   private   respondent   had   invaded   petitioner's  exclusive  domain.  To  be  sure,  it  is  significant   that   petitioner   failed   to   annex   in   its   Brief   the   so-­‐called   "eloquent   proof   that   petitioner   indeed   intended   to   expand  its  mark  "BRUT"  to  other  goods."    Even  then,  a   mere   application   by   petitioner   in   this   aspect   does   not   suffice   and   may   not   vest   an   exclusive   right   in   its   favor   that   can   ordinarily   be   protected   by   the   Trademark   Law.   In  short,  paraphrasing  Section  20  of  the  Trademark  Law   as   applied   to   the   documentary   evidence   adduced   by   petitioner,   the   certificate   of   registration   issued   by   the   Director   of   Patents   can   confer   upon   petitioner   the   exclusive   right   to   use   its   own   symbol   only   to   those   goods   specified   in   the   certificate,   subject   to   any   conditions  and  limitations  stated  therein.       How   do   We   now   reconcile   the   apparent   conflict   between   Section   4(d)   which   was   relied   upon   by   Justice   JBL  Reyes  in  the  Sta.  Ana  case  and  Section  20?  It  would   seem  that  Section  4(d)  does  not  require  that  the  goods   manufactured   by   the   second   user   be   related   to   the   goods   produced   by   the   senior   user   while   Section   20   limits  the  exclusive  right  of  the  senior  user  only  to  those   goods  specified  in  the  certificate  of  registration.  But  the   rule   has   been   laid   down   that   the   clause   which   comes   later   shall   be   given   paramount   significance   over   an   anterior  proviso  upon  the  presumption  that  it  expresses   the  latest  and  dominant  purpose.     It   ineluctably   follows   that   Section   20   is   controlling   and,   therefore,  private  respondent  can  appropriate  its  symbol   for   the   briefs   it   manufactures   because   as   aptly   remarked   by   Justice   Sanchez   in   Sterling   Products   International   Inc.   vs.  Farbenfabriken  Bayer:     Really,   if   the   certificate   of   registration   were   to   be   deemed  as  including  goods  not  specified  therein,  then  a  

the   same   physical   attributes   or   essential   characteristics   with   reference   to   their   form,   composition,   texture   or   quality.  They  may  also  be  related  because  they  serve  the   same  purpose  or  are  sold  in  grocery  stores.     In   the   situation   before   us,   the   goods   are   obviously   different   from   each   other   with   "absolutely   no   iota   of   similitude"   as   stressed   in   respondent   court's   judgment.   They  are  so  foreign  to  each  other  as  to  make  it  unlikely   that   purchasers   would   think   that   petitioner   is   the   manufacturer   of   respondent's   goods.   The   mere   fact   that   one   person   has   adopted   and   used   a   trademark   on   his   goods   does   not   prevent   the   adoption   and   use   of   the   same   trademark   by   others   on   unrelated   articles   of   a   different  kind.     Although   petitioner's   products   are   numerous,   they   are   of  the  same  class  or  line  of  merchandise  which  are  non-­‐ competing   with   respondent's   product   of   cigarettes,   which   as   pointed   out   in   the   appealed   judgment   is   beyond   petitioner's   "zone   of   potential   or   natural   and   logical  expansion."  When  a  trademark  is  used  by  a  party   for   a   product   in   which   the   other   party   does   not   deal,   the   use   of   the   same   trademark   on   the   latter's   product   cannot  be  validly  objected  to.     Another   factor   that   shows   that   the   goods   involved   are   non-­‐competitive  and  non-­‐related  is  the  appellate  court's   finding   that   they   flow   through   different   channels   of   trade,  thus:  "The  products  of  each  party  move  along  and   are  disposed  through  different  channels  of  distribution.    

HICKOK  MANUFACTURING  CO.  V.  CA  (1982)   Refresher:   Petitioner:  diverse  articles  of  men's  wear  such  as  wallets,   belts  and  men's  briefs     Respondent:  shoes     Doctrine:   It  is  established  doctrine,  as  held  in  the  above-­‐cited  cases,   that   "emphasis   should   be   on   the   similarity   of   the   products  involved  and  not  on  the  arbitrary  classification   or   general   description   of   their   properties   or   characteristics"  and  that  "the  mere  fact  that  one  person   has   adopted   and   used   a   trademark   on   his   goods   does   not  prevent  the  adoption  and  use  of  the  same  trademark   by  others  on  unrelated  articles  of  a  different  kind."    

FABERGE  V.  IAC  (1992)   Refresher:   The   Director   of   Patents   authorized   herein   private   respondent   Co   Beng   Kay   to   register   the   trademark   "BRUTE"   for   the   briefs   manufactured   and   sold   by   his   Corporation  in  the  domestic  market  vis-­‐a-­‐vis  petitioner's   opposition  grounded  on  similarity  of  said  trademark  with   petitioner's   own   symbol   "BRUT"   which   it   previously   registered   for   after   shave   lotion,   shaving   cream,  

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Intellectual Property Law situation   may   arise   whereby   an   applicant   may   be   tempted   to   register   a   trademark   on   any   and   all   goods   which   his   mind   may   conceive   even   if   he   had   never   intended   to   use   the   trademark   for   the   said   goods.   We   believe   that   such   omnibus   registration   is   not   contemplated  by  our  Trademark  Law.    

attributes   or   essential   characteristics   with   reference   to   their   form,   composition,   texture   or   quality.   They   may   also  be  related  because  they  serve  the  same  purpose  or   are  sold  in  grocery  stores.    

PEARL  &  DEAN  (PHIL.),  INC.  V.  SHOEMART,  SUPRA   Refresher:   Light  boxes     Doctrine:   On  trademark  infringement:   The   certificate   of   registration   issued   by   the   Director   of   Patents   can   confer   the   exclusive   right   to   use   its   own   symbol   only   to   those   goods   specified   in   the   certificate,   subject  to  any  conditions  and  limitations  specified  in  the   certificate.  One  who  has  adopted  and  used  a  trademark   on   his   goods   does   not   prevent   the   adoption   and   use   of   the  same  trademark  by  others  for  products  which  are  of   a  different  description.     Moreover,   the   failure   of   P   &   D   to   secure   a   trademark   registration   for   specific   use   on   the   light   boxes   meant   that   there   could   not   have   been   any   trademark   infringement  since  registration  was  an  essential  element   thereof.    

CANON  KABUSHIKI  V.  CA  (2000)   Refresher:   Private   respondent   NSR   Rubber   Corporation   (private  respondent)  filed  an  application  for  registration   of  the  mark  CANON  for  sandals.     Doctrine:   We   find   the   arguments   of   petitioner   to   be   unmeritorious.   Ordinarily,  the  ownership  of  a  trademark  or  tradename  is   a  property  right  that  the  owner  is  entitled  to  protect  as   mandated   by   the   Trademark   Law.   However,   when   a   trademark  is  used  by  a  party  for  a  product  in  which  the   other   party   does   not   deal,   the   use   of   the   same   trademark   on   the   latter's   product   cannot   be   validly   objected  to.     Herein  petitioner  has  not  made  known  that  it  intends  to   venture   into   the   business   of   producing   sandals.   This   is   clearly   shown   in   its   Trademark   Principal   Register   where   the  products  of  the  said  petitioner  had  been  clearly  and   specifically   described   as   "Chemical   products,   dyestuffs,   pigments,   toner   developing   preparation,   shoe   polisher,   polishing   agent".   It   would   be   taxing   one's   credibility   to   aver  at  this  point  that  the  production  of  sandals  could  be   considered   as   a   possible   "natural   or   normal   expansion"   of  its  business  operation.     The   likelihood   of   confusion   of   goods   or   business   is   a   relative   concept,   to   be   determined   only   according   to   the   particular,   and   sometimes   peculiar,   circumstances   of   each  case.16  Indeed,  in  trademark  law  cases,  even  more   than  in  other  litigation,  precedent  must  be  studied  in  the   light   of   the   facts   of   the   particular   case.   Contrary   to   petitioner's  supposition,  the  facts  of  this  case  will  show   that   the   cases   of   Sta.   Ana   vs.   Maliwat,   Ang   vs.   Teodoro   and   Converse   Rubber   Corporation   vs.   Universal   Rubber   Products,   Inc.   are   hardly   in   point.   The   just   cited   cases   involved   goods   that   were   confusingly   similar,   if   not   identical,  as  in  the  case  of  Converse  Rubber  Corporation   vs.   Universal   Rubber   Products,   Inc.   Here,   the   products   involved   are   so   unrelated   that   the   public   will   not   be   misled   that   there   is   the   slightest   nexus   between   petitioner  and  the  goods  of  private  respondent.     In  cases  of  confusion  of  business  or  origin,  the  question   that   usually   arises   is   whether   the   respective   goods   or   services   of   the   senior   user   and   the   junior   user   are   so   related  as  to  likely  cause  confusion  of  business  or  origin,   and   thereby   render   the   trademark   or   tradenames   confusingly  similar.  Goods  are  related  when  they  belong   to   the   same   class   or   have   the   same   descriptive   properties;   when   they   possess   the   same   physical  

246  CORPORATION  V.  DAWAY  (2003)   Refresher:   246  Corporation:  Rolex  Music  Lounge     Doctrine:   Under   the   old   Trademark   Law15   where   the   goods   for   which   the   identical   marks   are   used   are   unrelated,   there   can  be  no  likelihood  of  confusion  and  there  is  therefore   no   infringement   in   the   use   by   the   junior   user   of   the   registered   mark   on   the   entirely   different   goods.   This   ruling,   however,   has   been   to   some   extent,   modified   by   Section   123.1(f)   of   the   Intellectual   Property   Code   (Republic  Act  No.  8293),  which  took  effect  on  January  1,   1998.  The  said  section  reads:     Sec.   123.   Registrability.   –   123.1.   A   mark   cannot   be  registered  if  it:     x  x  x                      x  x  x                      x  x  x     (f)   Is   identical   with,   or   confusingly   similar   to,   or   constitutes   a   translation   of   a   mark   considered   well-­‐known   in   accordance   with   the   preceding   paragraph,   which   is   registered   in   the   Philippines   with   respect   to   goods   or   services   which   are   not   similar   to   those   with   respect   to   which  registration  is  applied  for:  Provided,  That   use   of   the   mark   in   relation   to   those   goods   or   services   would   indicate   a   connection   between   those  goods  or  services,  and  the  owner  of  the   registered   mark:   Provided,   further,   That   the  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   interest   of   the   owner   of   the   registered   mark   are  likely  to  be  damaged  by  such  use;    

(k)  the  outcome  of  litigations  dealing   with  the  issue  of  whether  the  mark  is   a  well-­‐known  mark;  and     (l)   the   presence   of   absence   of   identical   or   similar   marks   validly   registered   for   or   used   on   identical   or   similar   goods   or   services   and   owned   by   persons   other   than   the   person   claiming  that  his  mark  is  a  well-­‐known   mark.  

  A  junior  user  of  a  well-­‐known  mark  on  goods  or  services   which   are   not   similar   to   the   goods   or   services,   and   are   therefore  unrelated,  to  those  specified  in  the  certificate   of  registration  of  the  well-­‐known  mark  is  precluded  from   using   the   same   on   the   entirely   unrelated   goods   or   services,  subject  to  the  following  REQUISITES,  to  wit:     1.   The   mark   is   well-­‐known   internationally   and   in   the   Philippines.   Under   Rule   102   of   the   Rules   and  Regulations  on  Trademarks,  Service  Marks,   Trade   Names   and   Marked   or   Stamped   Containers,   in   determining   whether   a   mark   is   well   known,   the   following   criteria   or   any   combination   thereof   may   be   taken   into   account:     (a)   the   duration,   extent   and   geographical   area   of   any   use   of   the   mark,   in   particular,   the   duration,   extent   and   geographical   area   of   any   promotion   of   the   mark,   including   advertising   or   publicity   and   presentation,   at   fairs   or   exhibitions,   of   the   goods   and/or   services   to   which   the  mark  applies;     (b)   the   market   share   in   the   Philippines   and   in   other   countries,   of   the   goods   and/or   services   to   which   the  mark  applies;     (c)   the   degree   of   the   inherent   or   acquired  distinction  of  the  mark;     (d)   the   quality-­‐image   or   reputation   acquired  by  the  mark;     (e)  the  extent  to  which  the  mark  has   been  registered  in  the  world;     (f)   the   exclusivity   of   the   registration   attained  by  the  mark  in  the  world;     (g)  the  extent  to  which  the  mark  has   been  used  in  the  world;     (h)   the   exclusivity   of   use   attained   by   the  mark  in  the  world;     (i)  the  commercial  value  attributed  to   the  mark  in  the  world;     (j)   the   record   of   successful   protection   of  the  rights  in  the  mark;    

  2.   The   use   of   the   well-­‐known   mark   on   the   entirely   unrelated   goods   or   services   would   indicate   a   connection   between   such   unrelated   goods   or   services   and   those   goods   or   services   specified  in  the  certificate  of  registration  in  the   well   known   mark.   This   requirement   refers   to   the  likelihood  of  confusion  of  origin  or  business   or   some   business   connection   or   relationship   between   the   registrant   and   the   user   of   the   mark.     3.  The  interests  of  the  owner  of  the  well-­‐known   mark  are  likely  to  be  damaged.  For  instance,  if   the   registrant   will   be   precluded   from   expanding  its  business  to  those  unrelated  good   or  services,  or  if  the  interests  of  the  registrant   of   the   well-­‐known   mark   will   be   damaged   because   of   the   inferior   quality   of   the   good   or   services  of  the  user.     Section   123.1(f)   is   clearly   in   point   because   the   Music   Lounge  of  petitioner  is  entirely  unrelated  to  respondents’   business   involving   watches,   clocks,   bracelets,   etc.   However,  the  Court  cannot  yet  resolve  the  merits  of  the   present   controversy   considering   that   the   requisites   for   the   application   of   Section   123.1(f),   which   constitute   the   kernel   issue   at   bar,   clearly   require   determination   facts   of   which   need   to   be   resolved   at   the   trial   court.   The   existence   or   absence   of   these   requisites   should   be   addressed   in   a   full-­‐blown   hearing   and   not   on   a   mere   preliminary   hearing.   The   respondent   must   be   given   ample  opportunity  to  prove  its  claim,  and  the  petitioner   to  debunk  the  same.    

SOCIETE  DES  PRODUITS  NESTLE  V.  CA  (2001)   Refresher:   CFC   Corporation   (Respondent):   “Flavor   Master”   for   coffee     Nestle:  “Master  Roast”  and  “Master  Blend”  for  coffee     Doctrine:   The   protection   of   trade-­‐marks   is   the   law’s   recognition   of   the   psychological   function   of   symbols.   If   it   is   true   that   we   live   by   symbols,   it   is   no   less   true   that   we   purchase   goods   by   them.   A   trade-­‐mark   is   a   merchandising   short-­‐

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Intellectual Property Law cut  which  induces  a  purchaser  to  select  what  he  wants,   or  what  he  has  been  led  to  believe  he  wants.  The  owner   of   a   mark   exploits   this   human   propensity   by   making   every   effort   to   impregnate   the   atmosphere   of   the   market   with   the   drawing   power   of   a   congenial   symbol.   Whatever  the  means  employed,  the  aim  is  the  same  -­‐-­‐-­‐  to   convey   through   the   mark,   in   the   minds   of   potential   customers,  the  desirability  of  the  commodity  upon  which   it   appears.   Once   this   is   attained,   the   trade-­‐mark   owner   has   something   of   value.   If   another   poaches   upon   the   commercial   magnetism   of   the   symbol   he   has   created,   the  owner  can  obtain  legal  redress.     Colorable   imitation   denotes   such   a   close   or   ingenious   imitation  as  to  be  calculated  to  deceive  ordinary  persons,   or   such   a   resemblance   to   the   original   as   to   deceive   an   ordinary   purchaser   giving   such   attention   as   a   purchaser   usually   gives,   as   to   cause   him   to   purchase   the   one   supposing  it  to  be  the  other.  In  determining  if  colorable   imitation   exists,   jurisprudence   has   developed   two   kinds   of   tests   -­‐   the   Dominancy   Test   and   the   Holistic   Test.   The   test   of   dominancy   focuses   on   the   similarity   of   the   prevalent   features   of   the   competing   trademarks   which   might  cause  confusion  or  deception  and  thus  constitute   infringement.   On   the   other   side   of   the   spectrum,   the   holistic   test   mandates   that   the   entirety   of   the   marks   in   question   must   be   considered   in   determining   confusing   similarity.     Nestle   points   out   that   the   dominancy   test   should   have   been  applied  to  determine  whether  there  is  a  confusing   similarity   between   CFC’s   FLAVOR   MASTER   and   Nestle’s   MASTER  ROAST  and  MASTER  BLEND.     We  agree.     As   the   Court   of   Appeals   itself   has   stated,   "[t]he   determination   of   whether   two   trademarks   are   indeed   confusingly  similar  must  be  taken  from  the  viewpoint  of   the   ordinary   purchasers   who   are,   in   general,   undiscerningly  rash  in  buying  the  more  common  and  less   expensive   household   products   like   coffee,   and   are   therefore  less  inclined  to  closely  examine  specific  details   of   similarities   and   dissimilarities   between   competing   products."     The   basis   for   the   Court   of   Appeals’   application   of   the   totality  or  holistic  test  is  the  "ordinary  purchaser"  buying   the   product   under   "normally   prevalent   conditions   in   trade"   and   the   attention   such   products   normally   elicit   from   said   ordinary   purchaser.   An   ordinary   purchaser   or   buyer   does   not   usually   make   such   scrutiny   nor   does   he   usually   have   the   time   to   do   so.   The   average   shopper   is   usually  in  a  hurry  and  does  not  inspect  every  product  on   the  shelf  as  if  he  were  browsing  in  a  library.     The   Court   of   Appeals   held   that   the   test   to   be   applied   should   be   the   totality   or   holistic   test   reasoning,   since  

what   is   of   paramount   consideration   is   the   ordinary   purchaser   who   is,   in   general,   undiscerningly   rash   in   buying  the  more  common  and  less  expensive  household   products   like   coffee,   and   is   therefore   less   inclined   to   closely   examine   specific   details   of   similarities   and   dissimilarities  between  competing  products.     This   Court   cannot   agree   with   the   above   reasoning.   If   the   ordinary   purchaser   is   "undiscerningly   rash"   in   buying   such   common   and   inexpensive   household   products   as   instant   coffee,   and   would   therefore   be   "less   inclined   to   closely   examine   specific   details   of   similarities   and   dissimilarities"   between   the   two   competing   products,   then  it  would  be  less  likely  for  the  ordinary  purchaser  to   notice  that  CFC’s  trademark  FLAVOR  MASTER  carries  the   colors  orange  and  mocha  while  that  of  Nestle’s  uses  red   and   brown.   The   application   of   the   totality   or   holistic   test   is   improper   since   the   ordinary   purchaser   would   not   be   inclined   to   notice   the   specific   features,   similarities   or   dissimilarities,   considering   that   the   product   is   an   inexpensive  and  common  household  item.     It   must   be   emphasized   that   the   products   bearing   the   trademarks   in   question   are   "inexpensive   and   common"   household  items  bought  off  the  shelf  by  "undiscerningly   rash"   purchasers.   As   such,   if   the   ordinary   purchaser   is   "undiscerningly   rash",   then  he  would  not  have  the  time   nor   the   inclination   to   make   a   keen   and   perceptive   examination   of   the   physical   discrepancies   in   the   trademarks   of   the   products   in   order   to   exercise   his   choice.     While   this   Court   agrees   with   the   Court   of   Appeals’   detailed   enumeration   of   differences   between   the   respective   trademarks   of   the   two   coffee   products,   this   Court   cannot   agree   that   totality   test   is   the   one   applicable   in   this   case.   Rather,   this   Court   believes   that   the   dominancy   test   is   more   suitable   to   this   case   in   light   of  its  peculiar  factual  milieu.     Moreover,   the   totality   or   holistic   test   is   contrary   to   the   elementary   postulate   of   the   law   on   trademarks   and   unfair   competition   that   confusing   similarity   is   to   be   determined   on   the   basis   of   visual,   aural,   connotative   comparisons  and  overall  impressions  engendered  by  the   marks   in   controversy   as   they   are   encountered   in   the   realities   of   the   marketplace.   The   totality   or   holistic   test   only   relies   on   visual   comparison   between   two   trademarks   whereas   the   dominancy   test   relies   not   only   on   the   visual   but   also   on   the   aural   and   connotative   comparisons   and   overall   impressions   between   the   two   trademarks.     For  this  reason,  this  Court  agrees  with  the  BPTTT  when  it   applied  the  test  of  dominancy  and  held  that:     From   the   evidence   at   hand,   it   is   sufficiently   established   that   the   word   MASTER   is   the   dominant   feature   of  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   opposer’s  mark.  The  word  MASTER  is  printed  across  the   middle   portion   of   the   label   in   bold   letters   almost   twice   the   size   of   the   printed   word   ROAST.   Further,   the   word   MASTER   has   always   been   given   emphasis   in   the   TV   and   radio   commercials   and   other   advertisements   made   in   promoting   the   product.   This   can   be   gleaned   from   the   fact   that   Robert   Jaworski   and   Atty.   Ric   Puno   Jr..,   the   personalities  engaged  to  promote  the  product,  are  given   the   titles   Master   of   the   Game   and   Master   of   the   Talk   Show,   respectively.   In   due   time,   because   of   these   advertising   schemes   the   mind   of   the   buying   public   had   come   to   learn   to   associate   the   word   MASTER   with   the   opposer’s  goods.     x  x  x.  It  is  the  observation  of  this  Office  that  much  of  the   dominance   which   the   word   MASTER   has   acquired   through   Opposer’s   advertising   schemes   is   carried   over   when   the   same   is   incorporated   into   respondent-­‐ applicant’s   trademark   FLAVOR   MASTER.   Thus,   when   one   looks   at   the   label   bearing   the   trademark   FLAVOR   MASTER   (Exh.   4)   one’s   attention   is   easily   attracted   to   the  word  MASTER,  rather  than  to  the  dissimilarities  that   exist.   Therefore,   the   possibility   of   confusion   as   to   the   goods   which   bear   the   competing   marks   or   as   to   the   origins  thereof  is  not  farfetched.  x  x  x.     In  addition,  the  word  "MASTER"  is  neither  a  generic  nor   a   descriptive   term.   As   such,   said   term   can   not   be   invalidated  as  a  trademark  and,  therefore,  may  be  legally   protected.   Generic   terms   are   those   which   constitute   "the   common   descriptive   name   of   an   article   or   substance,"   or   comprise   the   "genus   of   which   the   particular   product   is   a   species,"   or   are   "commonly   used   as  the  name  or  description  of  a  kind  of  goods,"  or  "imply   reference   to   every   member   of   a   genus   and   the   exclusion   of  individuating  characters,"  or  "refer  to  the  basic  nature   of   the   wares   or   services   provided   rather   than   to   the   more   idiosyncratic   characteristics   of   a   particular   product,"   and   are   not   legally   protectable.   On   the   other   hand,   a   term   is   descriptive   and   therefore   invalid   as   a   trademark   if,   as   understood   in   its   normal   and   natural   sense,   it   "forthwith   conveys   the   characteristics,   functions,   qualities   or   ingredients   of   a   product   to   one   who  has  never  seen  it  and  does  not  know  what  it  is,"  or   "if   it   forthwith   conveys   an   immediate   idea   of   the   ingredients,  qualities  or  characteristics  of  the  goods,"  or   if  it  clearly  denotes  what  goods  or  services  are  provided   in   such   a   way   that   the   consumer   does   not   have   to   exercise  powers  of  perception  or  imagination.     Rather,  the  term  "MASTER"  is  a  suggestive  term  brought   about   by   the   advertising   scheme   of   Nestle.   Suggestive   terms  are  those  which,  in  the  phraseology  of  one  court,   require  "imagination,  thought  and  perception  to  reach  a   conclusion   as   to   the   nature   of   the   goods."   Such   terms,   "which   subtly   connote   something   about   the   product,"   are   eligible   for   protection   in   the   absence   of   secondary   meaning.   While   suggestive   marks   are   capable   of  

shedding  "some  light"  upon  certain  characteristics  of  the   goods   or   services   in   dispute,   they   nevertheless   involve   "an   element   of   incongruity,"   "figurativeness,"   or   "   imaginative  effort  on  the  part  of  the  observer."    

LEVI  STRAUSS  V.  CLINTON  APPARELLE  (2005)   Refresher:   The   Complaint   alleged   that   LS   &   Co.,   a   foreign   corporation   duly   organized   and   existing   under   the   laws   of   the   State   of   Delaware,   U.S.A.,   and   engaged   in   the   apparel   business,   is   the   owner   by   prior   adoption   and   use   since   1986   of   the   internationally   famous   "Dockers   and   Design"   trademark.   This   ownership   is   evidenced   by   its   valid   and   existing   registrations   in   various   member   countries   of   the   Paris   Convention.   In   the   Philippines,   it   has   a   Certificate   of   Registration   No.   46619   in   the   Principal   Register   for   use   of   said   trademark   on   pants,   shirts,   blouses,   skirts,   shorts,   sweatshirts   and   jackets   under  Class  25.     The   "Dockers   and   Design"   trademark   was   first   used   in   the  Philippines  in  or  about  May  1988,  by  LSPI,  a  domestic   corporation   engaged   in   the   manufacture,   sale   and   distribution   of   various   products   bearing   trademarks   owned   by   LS   &   Co.   To   date,   LSPI   continues   to   manufacture   and   sell   Dockers   Pants   with   the   "Dockers   and  Design"  trademark.     LS   &   Co.   and   LSPI   further   alleged   that   they   discovered   the   presence   in   the   local   market   of   jeans   under   the   brand   name   "Paddocks"   using   a   device   which   is   substantially,   if   not   exactly,   similar   to   the   "Dockers   and   Design"  trademark  owned  by  and  registered  in  the  name   of   LS   &   Co.,   without   its   consent.   Based   on   their   information   and   belief,   they   added,   Clinton   Apparelle   manufactured   and   continues   to   manufacture   such   "Paddocks"  jeans  and  other  apparel.     Doctrine:   Petitioners   anchor   their   legal   right   to   "Dockers   and   Design"   trademark   on   the   Certificate   of   Registration   issued   in   their   favor   by   the   Bureau   of   Patents,   Trademarks   and   Technology   Transfer.*   According   to   Section   138   of   Republic   Act   No.   8293,42   this   Certificate   of   Registration   is   prima   facie   evidence   of   the   validity   of   the   registration,   the   registrant’s   ownership   of   the   mark   and  of  the  exclusive  right  to  use  the  same  in  connection   with   the   goods   or   services   and   those   that   are   related   thereto   specified   in   the   certificate.   Section   147.1   of   said   law  likewise  grants  the  owner  of  the  registered  mark  the   exclusive  right  to  prevent  all  third  parties  not  having  the   owner’s   consent   from   using   in   the   course   of   trade   identical  or  similar  signs  for  goods  or  services  which  are   identical   or   similar   to   those   in   respect   of   which   the   trademark  is  registered  if  such  use  results  in  a  likelihood   of  confusion.    

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Intellectual Property Law However,   attention   should   be   given   to   the   fact   that   petitioners’   registered   trademark   consists   of   two   elements:   (1)   the   word   mark   "Dockers"   and   (2)   the   wing-­‐ shaped   design   or   logo.   Notably,   there   is   only   one   registration   for   both   features   of   the   trademark   giving   the   impression   that   the   two   should   be   considered   as   a   single   unit.   Clinton   Apparelle’s   trademark,   on   the   other   hand,   uses   the   "Paddocks"   word   mark   on   top   of   a   logo   which   according   to   petitioners   is   a   slavish   imitation   of   the   "Dockers"   design.   The   two   trademarks   apparently   differ   in   their   word   marks   ("Dockers"   and   "Paddocks"),   but   again   according   to   petitioners,   they   employ   similar   or  identical  logos.  It  could  thus  be  said  that  respondent   only   "appropriates"   petitioners’   logo   and   not   the   word   mark  "Dockers";  it  uses  only  a  portion  of  the  registered   trademark  and  not  the  whole.     Given   the   single   registration   of   the   trademark   "Dockers   and   Design"   and   considering   that   respondent   only   uses   the   assailed   device   but   a   different   word   mark,   the   right   to   prevent   the   latter   from   using   the   challenged   "Paddocks"  device  is  far  from  clear.  Stated  otherwise,  it   is   not   evident   whether   the   single   registration   of   the   trademark   "Dockers   and   Design"   confers   on   the   owner   the   right   to   prevent   the   use   of   a   fraction   thereof   in   the   course   of   trade.   It   is   also   unclear   whether   the   use   without  the  owner’s  consent  of  a  portion  of  a  trademark   registered   in   its   entirety   constitutes   material   or   substantial  invasion  of  the  owner’s  right.     It  is  likewise  not  settled  whether  the  wing-­‐shaped  logo,   as   opposed   to   the   word   mark,   is   the   dominant   or   central   feature   of   petitioners’   trademark—the   feature   that   prevails   or   is   retained   in   the   minds   of   the   public—an   imitation  of  which  creates  the  likelihood  of  deceiving  the   public   and   constitutes   trademark   infringement.   In   sum,   there   are   vital   matters   which   have   yet   and   may   only   be   established  through  a  full-­‐blown  trial.     From   the   above   discussion,   we   find   that   petitioners’   right   to   injunctive   relief   has   not   been   clearly   and   unmistakably   demonstrated.   The   right   has   yet   to   be   determined.   Petitioners   also   failed   to   show   proof   that   there  is  material  and  substantial  invasion  of  their  right  to   warrant  the  issuance  of  an  injunctive  writ.  Neither  were   petitioners   able   to   show   any   urgent   and   permanent   necessity  for  the  writ  to  prevent  serious  damage.     Trademark   dilution   is   the   lessening   of   the   capacity   of   a   famous   mark   to   identify   and   distinguish   goods   or   services,   regardless   of   the   presence   or   absence   of:   (1)   competition  between  the  owner  of  the  famous  mark  and   other   parties;   or   (2)   likelihood   of   confusion,   mistake   or   deception.   Subject   to   the   principles   of   equity,   the   owner   of   a   famous   mark   is   entitled   to   an   injunction   "against   another  person’s  commercial  use  in  commerce  of  a  mark   or   trade   name,   if   such   use   begins   after   the   mark   has   become   famous   and   causes   dilution   of   the   distinctive  

quality  of  the  mark."  This  is  intended  to  protect  famous   marks  from  subsequent  uses  that  blur  distinctiveness  of   the  mark  or  tarnish  or  disparage  it.     Based   on   the   foregoing,   to   be   eligible   for   protection   from   dilution,   there   has   to   be   a   finding   that:   (1)   the   trademark   sought   to   be   protected   is   famous   and   distinctive;  (2)  the  use  by  respondent  of  "Paddocks  and   Design"   began   after   the   petitioners’   mark   became   famous;   and   (3)   such   subsequent   use   defames   petitioners’   mark.   In   the   case   at   bar,   petitioners   have   yet   to  establish  whether  "Dockers  and  Design"  has  acquired   a  strong  degree  of  distinctiveness  and  whether  the  other   two   elements   are   present   for   their   cause   to   fall   within   the   ambit   of   the   invoked   protection.   The   Trends   MBL   Survey   Report   which   petitioners   presented   in   a   bid   to   establish   that   there   was   confusing   similarity   between   two  marks  is  not  sufficient  proof  of  any  dilution  that  the   trial  court  must  enjoin.    

RA   166,  SECTION   20.  CERTIFICATE  OF  REGISTRATION  PRIMA   FACIE  EVIDENCE  O F  VALIDITY.  –     A  certificate  of  registration  of  a  mark  or  trade-­‐name  shall   be   prima   facie   evidence   of   the   validity   of   the   registration,   the   registrant's   ownership   of   the   mark   or   trade-­‐name,   and   of   the   registrant's   exclusive   right   to   use  the  same  in  connection  with  the  goods,  business  or   services   specified   in   the   certificate,   subject   to   any   conditions  and  limitations  stated  therein.    

SECTION  138.  CERTIFICATES  OF  REGISTRATION.  –     A  certificate  of  registration  of  a  mark  shall  be  prima  facie   evidence   of   the   validity   of   the   registration,   the   registrant's   ownership   of   the   mark,   and   of   the   registrant's   exclusive   right   to   use   the   same   in   connection   with   the   goods   or   services   and   THOSE   THAT   ARE  RELATED  THERETO  specified  in  the  certificate.     Question:   Was   Faberge   v.   IAC   (215   SCRA   316)   the   controlling   precedent   under   RA   166?   State   reasons   for   your   answer.   Research   the   cases   cited   in   your   syllabus   on  "Is  there  infringement  if  goods  are  not  competing?"   section  of  your  syllabus.     HW  Answer  (Di  Bonilla):   No,   Faberge   v.   IAC   was   not   the   controlling   precedent   under   RA   166.   Since   Faberge   pronounced   that   Sec.   20   is   controlling   over   Sec   4(d),     it   effectively   reversed   earlier   decisions   which  merely  used  the  "likelihood  of  confusion,   deception   or   mistake"   standard   and   which   did   not   require   similarity   between   the   goods   or   articles  to  which  the  mark  was  being  applied.       Faberge  held  that  the  statement  of  the  Court  in   the   case   of   Sta.   Ana   vs.   Maliwat   that   Sec   4(d)   of   RA   166   does   not   require   that   the   subject  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   articles   possess   the   same   descriptive   property   or   fall   in   the   same   category   and   that   dissimilarity  will  not  preclude  relief  if  the  junior   user's   goods   are   not   remote   from   any   other   product  which  the  first  user  would  likely  make   or   sell   cannot   prevail   over   the   positive   requirement   of   Sec.   20   of   the   same   law   that   only   those   specified   in   the   certificate   of   registration   are   protected.   Effectively   then,   the   Supreme  Court  in  the  Faberge  case  reversed  its   earlier  ruling  in  Sta.  Ana  and  other  cases  which   merely   relied   on   the     "likelihood   of   confusion,   deception   or   mistake"   standard   and   which   did   not   require   similarity   between   the   goods   or   articles.   This   was   done   with   the   Supreme   Court   not   sitting   en   banc,   in   violation   of   the   Constitution   which   requires   the   Supreme   Court   to   be   sitting   en   banc   in   order   to   reverse   an   earlier   doctrine   enunciated   by   it   (Art.   VIII,   Sec.   3(3)).  

use   the   mark   in   connection   with   the   goods,   business   or   services   specified   in   the   certificate   is  merely  prima  facie  and  is  thus  rebuttable.     Third,   the   present   IP   Code   enumerates   the   rights  of  the  owner  of  a  registered  mark  under   Sec.   147.   Subsection   147.1   grants   the   trademark   owner   the   “exclusive   right   to   prevent   all   third   parties   not   having   the   owner's   consent   from   using  in  the  course  of  trade  identical  or  similar   signs  or  containers  for  goods  or  services  which   are   identical   or   similar   to   those   in   respect   of   which   the   trademark   is   registered   where   such   use   would   result   in   a   likelihood   of   confusion.”   In   other   words,   the   protection   granted   by   law   to   a   trademark   owner   extends   to   goods   or   services   which   are   only   SIMILAR   to   those   in   respect  of  which  the  mark  is  registered.     Furthermore,   Subsection   147.2   also   recognizes   the   protection   as   applicable   even   to   goods   and   services   NOT   SIMILAR   to   those   in   respect   of   which   the   mark   is   registered   in   the   case   of   an   internationally   well   known   mark   which   is   registered   in   the   Philippines   provided   that   the   use   would   indicate   a   connection   between   the   goods   or   services   and   the   owner   of   the   registered   mark   and   the   interests   of   the   owner   or   the   registered   mark   are   likely   to   be   damaged  by  such  use.    

  Question:  Is  the  Faberge  case  still  good  law  under  the  IP   Code?  State  the  reasons  for  your  answer.     HW  Answer  (Di  Bonilla)   No,   Faberge   vs.   IAC   is   no   longer   good   law   under  the  IP  Code.  First,  the  present  law  (under   Sec.  138)  now  includes  related  goods,  to  wit:  A   certificate   of   registration   of   a   mark   shall   be   prima   facie   evidence   of   the   validity   of   the   registration,   the   registrant's   ownership   of   the   mark,  and  of  the  registrant's  exclusive  right  to   use   the   same   in   connection   with   the   goods   or   services   and   those   that   are   related   thereto   specified  in  the  certificate.  (emphasis  supplied)     This   provision   adds   related   goods   or   services   specified  in  the  certificate,  compared  to  Sec.  20   of  the  old  IP  law  which  states  that:  A  certificate   of  registration  of  a  mark  or  trade-­‐name  shall  be   prima   facie   evidence   of   the   validity   of   the   registration,   the   registrant's   ownership   of   the   mark   or   trade-­‐name,   and   of   the   registrant's   exclusive   right   to   use   the   same   in   connection   with   the   goods,   business   or   services   specified   in  the  certificate,  subject  to  any  conditions  and   limitations  stated  therein.     The  addition  of  the  phrase  “and  those  that  are   related   thereto”   should   be   given   its   significance.     Second,  Faberge  relied  heavily  upon  Sec.  20  of   RA  166,  which  did  not  even  define  the  rights  of   a  trademark  owner  but  merely  established  the   prima  facie  evidentiary  value  of  a  certificate  of   registration.   The   evidentiary   value   of   the   certificate    as  the  registrant's  exclusive  right  to  

  Issue  of  parallel  importation    

YU  V.  CA  AND  UNISIA  MERCHANDISING  CO.  (1993)   Doctrine:  To  Our  mind,  the  right  to  perform  an  exclusive   distributorship   agreement   and   to   reap   the   profits   resulting   from   such   performance   are   proprietary   rights   which   a   party   may   protect   which   may   otherwise   not   be   diminished,   nay,   rendered   illusory   by   the   expedient   act   of   utilizing   or   interposing   a   person   or   firm   to   obtain   goods   from   the   supplier   to   defeat   the   very   purpose   for   which   the   exclusive   distributorship   was   conceptualized,   at  the  expense  of  the  sole  authorized  distributor.     RIGHTS  CONFERRED:   -­‐ Under   the   IP   Code,   we   have   shifted   to   the   REGISTRATION  as  the  basis  of  ownership   o registration   is   the   source   of   right   –   major   change  in  the  IP  Code  (Jan.  1,  1998)   o prior   to   IP   Code   –   use   was   the   basis   of   ownership  of  tm  (RA  166)   § Prior  user  can  trump  the  rights  of   a  registrant   o Who   would   prevail   between   the   prior   user   before   Jan.   1,   1998   (since   1980),   but   neglected  to  file  registration,  and  another  

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entity   (registrant)   who   has   registered   its   trademark  before  the  prior  user?   § Prior   user   would   prevail.   Section   236  –     § Ma’am:   this   is   a   grey   area   because  it  was  brought  about  by   the  transition   • Right   has   been   vested   prior   to   the   effectivity   of   the   IP   Code.   Such   vested   right   cannot   be   impaired   by   the   IP  Code.   Rights  of  the  Registrant:   o Right   to   prevent   others   from   using   your   mark,   or   a   confusingly   similar   mark,   in   respect  to  goods  and  services   § Actual  confusion  is  not  required.   What   is   required   is   a   likelihood   of  confusion.   • Used   for   the   very   same   goods   or   services   =   presumption   that   there   is   a   likelihood  of  confusion.   § Problem:   • Senior   registrant:   Cosmetics   and  toiletries   • Junior  registrant:  Pesticides   • Question:  Competing?   • Answer:   o Note   the   IPO   ruling:   if   the   goods   the   same   to   the   same   class,   even   if   not   identical   =   subsequent   registration   is   NOT   allowed   § “International   class”  =  based  on  a   Treaty   § major   factor   to   determine   if   they   are   similar   =   CLASSIFICATION   o Should   not   be   allowed   even  if  not  in  the  same   class.   The   business,   goodwill,   image   and   reputation   of   the   senior   registrant   may   be   damaged.   It   will   cause  dilution.   § Buyers  might  think   that   the   origin   of   the   junior   registrant’s   product   is   the   senior   registrant.   Thus,   they   might  

§

§

§

§

§

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be   using   the   same   harmful  chemicals.   o Dilution   introduces   confusion   to   the   market.   (term   coined   in   Ang  Tibay  v.  Teodoro)   § Junior   registrant’s   use   of   the   mark   may   undermine   the  strength  of  the   senior   registrant’s   mark.  It  might  also   confuse   the   consuming  public.   Question:   Would   an   ordinary   registrant   be   able   to   claim   protection   from   dilution   under   Section  147?   • Answer:   Depends   on   how  “similar”  would  be   defined.   Existing   jurisprudence   provide   for  factors.   Question:   Why   aren’t   ordinary   registrants   not   accorded   protection   against   use   by   dissimilar  goods?  Why  are  there  2   different  rules?   • Obligation  to  recognize   well-­‐known   marks   is   a   treaty  obligation.   o Ma’am:   But   the   treaty   does   not   require   broader   protection.   • Note:   “Well-­‐known”   –   under   the   IP   Code,   internationally   AND   locally   Ma’am:   Our   law   does   not   sufficiently   protect   locally-­‐ established   brands.   à   From   a   policy   perspective,   we   should   protect   local   brands,   because   it   contributes   to   our   national   economy.   Ma’am:   For   local   brands,   you   should   focus   your   arguments   in   similarity.   Argue   that   it   is   broad   enough   to   cover   the   junior   goods.   Then   argue   the   “trademark   dilution”   doctrine   from  jurisprudence.  You  can  also   argue   on   the   reasonable   scope   of  expansion.   Ma’am:   Being   “well-­‐known”   internationally   is   difficult   to   prove.   There   are   several   factors  

Katrina Michelle Mancao  

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that   should   be   shown.   Note   enumeration   in   246   Corporation   v.  Daway.   Aside:   Article   8,   Sec.   3,   Constitution   –   on   setting   aside  decision.  (Important  in  arguing  that  Faberge  is   not  the  prevailing  ruling  under  RA  166)   o Under   RA   166,   the   prevailing   doctrine   is   provided   in   Chua   Che   and   Sta.   Ana   cases   (en   banc   decisions).   The   goods   need   not   be  similar.   o Subsequent   cases   (Philippine   Refining,   Esso,   Hickok)   decided   by   division   –   goods   must  be  competing.   o Faberge   –   an   extraordinary   case,   which   is   also   decided   by   division   –   goods   must   be   specifically   identified   in   the   certificate   of   registration   (relying   on   Section   20   of   the   old  law).   § Ma’am:   But   Section   20   does   not   deal   with   the   scope   of   protection.   It   only   stated   that   the   certificate   of   registration   shall  be  a  prima  facie  evidence  of   tm  ownership.   • This   ruling   requires   applicant  to  apply  for  a   lot   of   goods,   and   applicant  must  also  use   the   same   mark   for   the   products   enumerated   therein.     § But   this   case   found   its   way   in   Canon   Kabushiki   and   Pearl   &   Dean   cases,   giving   the   impression   that   it   is   the   prevailing  ruling.   • Canon   and   Pearl   &   Dean   were   decided   after   the   IP   Code,   but   involved   facts   occurring   prior   to   the   effectivity   of   the   IP   Code.   § Faberge   is   no   longer   effective   under   the   IP   Code.   There   is   now   a   change   in   the   phraseology   of   the   similar   provision   –   Section   138   under   the   IP   Code.   Furthermore,   Section   147   was   clear   in   defining   the   scope   of   protection  under  the  IP  Code.   o 246  Corporation  –  recognized  the  changed   in  phraseology.   Illustration   of   dilution:   Seiko   watch   and   Seiko   wallet   à   The   two   have   different   markets.   Because   of   the   use  of  Seiko  wallet,  Seiko  watch  lost  its  aspirational   value.   What   about   a   well-­‐known   mark   that   is   not  

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registered?  Not  protected  against  dilution.   o Ma’am:   But   easy   way   out   is   invoking   Levi   Strauss  by  Justice  Tinga.   Issue   of   Parallel   importation:   Does   a   registrant   have   the   right   to   prevent   the   importation   of   genuine   goods  by  third  parties?  NO.   o Note   the   strategy   of   pharmaceutical   companies   –   entering   into   licensing   agreements.  This  is  a  tax  saving  strategy.   o The   IP   Code   did   not   give   a   trademark   registrant   the   exclusive   right   to   import   (they  do  not  have  the  right  given  to  patent   holders).   Importation   of   genuine   goods   manufactured  elsewhere  is  not  prohibited   from  entering  the  Philippines.   o NOW:  Cheaper  Medicines  Act     o Yu  v.  CA  –  not  about  trademark  law.  This  is   about   contract   law.   Injunction   was   issued   because   the   other   party   fraudulently   misled  the  trademark  owner    à  the  Court   used   third   party   contractual   tort.   Thus,   this   may   not   be   used   to   argue   that   trademark  owner  has  the  right  to  prevent   parallel  importation.   o Ma’am:   Recourse   of   the   exclusive   distributor   should   be   against   the   trademark   owner.   It’s   hard   to   go   against   the  parallel  importer  because  it  is  not  privy   to   the   exclusive   distributorship   agreement.   Thus,   make   sure   that   the   agreement   allows   the   exclusive   distributor   to   go   against   the   trademark   owner,   or  at  least  to  ask  compensation   for  any  parallel  importation.    

 

I.

Remedies  

 

SECTION   3.   INTERNATIONAL   RECIPROCITY.  –  

CONVENTIONS  

AND  

Any  person  who  is  a  national  or  who  is  domiciled  or  has   a  real  and  effective  industrial  establishment  in  a  country   which  is  a  party  to  any  convention,  treaty  or  agreement   relating   to   intellectual   property   rights   or   the   repression   of   unfair   competition,   to   which   the   Philippines   is   also   a   party,   or   extends   reciprocal   rights   to   nationals   of   the   Philippines   by   law,   shall   be   entitled   to   benefits   to   the   extent  necessary  to  give  effect  to  any  provision  of  such   convention,   treaty   or   reciprocal   law,   IN   ADDITION   to   the   rights   to   which   any   owner   of   an   intellectual   property   right  is  otherwise  entitled  by  this  Act.    

SECTION   160.   RIGHT  OF   FOREIGN   CORPORATION  TO   SUE  IN   TRADEMARK  OR  SERVICE  MARK  ENFORCEMENT  ACTION.  –     Any   foreign   national   or   juridical   person   who   meets   the   requirements   of   Section   3   of   this   Act   and   does   not   engage   in   business   in   the   Philippines  may  bring  a  CIVIL  

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or   ADMINISTRATIVE   action   hereunder   for   opposition,   cancellation,   infringement,   unfair   competition,   or   false   designation   of   origin   and   false   description,   whether   or   not  it  is  licensed  to  do  business  in  the  Philippines  under   existing  laws.    

SECTION  231.  REVERSE  RECIPROCITY  OF  FOREIGN  LAWS.  –     Any   condition,   restriction,   limitation,   diminution,   requirement,   penalty   or   any   similar   burden   imposed   by   the   law   of   a   foreign   country   on   a   Philippine   national   seeking  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  in  that   country,  shall  reciprocally  be  enforceable  upon  nationals   of  said  country,  within  Philippine  jurisdiction.    

LEVITON  INDUSTRIES  V.  SALVADOR  (1982)   Doctrine:   We   agree   with   petitioners   that   respondent   Leviton   Marketing  Co.,  Inc.  had  failed  to  allege  the  essential  facts   bearing  upon  its  capacity  to  sue  before  Philippine  courts.   Private   respondent's   action   is   squarely   founded   on   Section  21-­‐A  of  Republic  Act  No.  166,  as  amended,  which   we  quote:     Sec.   21-­‐A.   Any   foreign   corporation   or   juristic   person   to   which   a   mark   or   tradename   has   been   registered   or   assigned   under   this   Act   may   bring   an   action   hereunder   for   infringement,   for   unfair   competition,   or   false   designation   of   origin   and   false   description,   whether   or   not  it  has  been  licensed  to  do  business  in  the  Philippines   under   Act   numbered   Fourteen   Hundred   and   Fifty-­‐Nine,   as   amended,   otherwise   known   as   the   Corporation   Law,   at   the   time   it   brings   the   complaint;   Provided,   That   the   country   of   which   the   said   foreign   corporation   or   juristic   person  is  a  citizen,  or  in  which  it  is  domiciled,  by  treaty,   convention  or  law,  grants  a  similar  privilege  to  corporate   or  juristic  persons  of  the  Philippines.  (As  amended  by  R.A.   No.  638)     Undoubtedly,   the   foregoing   section   grants   to   a   foreign   corporation,   whether   or   not   licensed   to   do   business   in   the   Philippines,   the   right   to   seek   redress   for   unfair   competition  before  Philippine  courts.  But  the  said  law  is   not  without  qualifications.  Its  literal  tenor  indicates  as  a   condition  sine  qua  non  the  registration  of  the  trade  mark   of   the   suing   foreign   corporation   with   the   Philippine   Patent   Office   or,   in   the   least,   that   it   be   an   asignee   of   such   registered   trademark.   The   said   section   further   requires   that   the   country,   of   which   the   plaintiff   foreign   corporation   or   juristic   person   is   a   citizen   or   domicilliary,   grants   to   Filipino   corporations   or   juristic   entities   the   same   reciprocal   treatment,   either   thru   treaty,   convention  or  law,     All   that   is   alleged   in   private   respondent's   complaint   is   that  it  is  a  foreign  corporation.  Such  bare  averment  not   only   fails   to   comply   with   the   requirements   imposed   by   the   aforesaid   Section   21-­‐A   but   violates   as   well   the   directive   of   Section   4,   Rule   8   of   the   Rules   of   Court   that  

PUMA  V.  IAC  (1988)   Refresher:   The  petitioner,  a  foreign  corporation  duly  organized  and   existing   under   the   laws   of   the   Federal   Republic   of   Germany  and  the  manufacturer  and  producer  of  "PUMA   PRODUCTS,"  filed  a  complaint  for  infringement  of  patent   or  trademark  with  a  prayer  for  the  issuance  of  a  writ  of   preliminary   injunction   against   the   private   respondent   before  the  Regional  Trial  Court  of  Makati.     Doctrine:   The   Petitioner   may   still   bring   the   action.   Court   quoted   the  decision  in  La  Chemise  Lacoste  v.  Fernandez  (infra).     Petitioner   maintains   that   it   has   substantially   complied   with   the   requirements   of   Section   21-­‐A   of   Republic   Act   R.A.   No.   166,   as   amended.   According   to   the   petitioner,   its   complaint   specifically   alleged   that   it   is   not   doing   business   in   the   Philippines   and   is   suing   under   the   said   Republic   Act;   that   Section   21-­‐A   thereof   provides   that   "the   country   of   which   the   said   corporation   or   juristic   person  is  a  citizen,  or  in  which  it  is  domiciled,  by  treaty,   convention  or  law,  grants  a  similar  privilege  to  corporate   or   juristic   persons   of   the   Philippines"   but   does   not   mandatorily   require   that   such   reciprocity   between   the   Federal   Republic   of   Germany   and   the   Philippines   be   pleaded;  that  such  reciprocity  arrangement  is  embodied   in   and   supplied   by   the   Union   Convention   for   the   Protection   of   Industrial   Property   Paris   Convention)   to   which   both   the   Philippines   and   Federal   Republic   of   Germany   are   signatories   and   that   since   the   Paris   Convention   is   a   treaty   which,   pursuant   to   our   Constitution,   forms   part   of   the   law   of   the   land,   our   courts   are   bound   to   take   judicial   notice   of   such   treaty,   and,   consequently,   this   fact   need   not   be   averred   in   the   complaint.  The  Court  agreed.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   Corporation   The   latter   is   an   independent   entity   which   buys   and   then   markets   not   only   products   of   the   petitioner  but  also  many  other  products  bearing  equally   well-­‐known   and   established   trademarks   and   tradenames.   in   other   words,   Rustan   is   not   a   mere   agent   or   conduit   of   the  petitioner.     The   rules   and   regulations   promulgated   by   the   Board   of   Investments   pursuant   to   its   rule-­‐making   power   under   Presidential   Decree   No.   1789,   otherwise   known   as   the   Omnibus   Investment   Code,   support   a   finding   that   the   petitioner   is   not   doing   business   in   the   Philippines.   Rule   I,   Sec.   1   (g)   of   said   rules   and   regulations   defines   "doing   business"  as  one"  which  includes,  inter  alia:     (1)   A   foreign   firm   which   does   business   through   middlemen   acting   on   their   own   names,   such   as   indentors,   commercial   brokers   or   commission   merchants,   shall   not   be   deemed   doing   business   in   the   Philippines.   But   such   indentors,   commercial   brokers   or   commission   merchants   shall   be   the   ones   deemed   to   be   doing  business  in  the  Philippines.     (2)   Appointing   a   representative   or   distributor   who   is   domiciled   in   the   Philippines,   unless  said  representative  or  distributor  has  an   independent   status,   i.e.,   it   transacts   business   in   its   name   and   for   its   account,   and   not   in   the   name   or   for   the   account   of   a   principal   Thus,   where  a  foreign  firm  is  represented  by  a  person   or   local   company   which   does   not   act   in   its   name   but   in   the   name   of   the   foreign   firm   the   latter  is  doing  business  in  the  Philippines.     Applying   the   above   provisions   to   the   facts   of   this   case,   we   find   and   conclude   that   the   petitioner   is   not   doing   business   in   the   Philippines.   Rustan   is   actually   a   middleman   acting   and   transacting   business   in   its   own   name  and  or  its  own  account  and  not  in  the  name  or  for   the  account  of  the  petitioner.     But  even  assuming  the  truth  of  the  private  respondent's   allegation   that   the   petitioner   failed   to   allege   material   facts   in   its   petition   relative   to   capacity   to   sue,   the   petitioner   may   still   maintain   the   present   suit   against   respondent   Hemandas.   As   early   as   1927,   this   Court   was,   and   it   still   is,   of   the   view   that   a   foreign   corporation   not   doing  business  in  the  Philippines  needs  no  license  to  sue   before   Philippine   courts   for   infringement   of   trademark   and   unfair   competition.   Thus,   in   Western   Equipment   and   Supply   Co.   v.   Reyes   (51   Phil.   115),   this   Court   held   that   a   foreign   corporation   which   has   never   done   any   business   in   the   Philippines   and   which   is   unlicensed   and   unregistered   to   do   business   here,   but   is   widely   and   favorably   known   in   the   Philippines   through   the   use   therein   of   its   products   bearing   its   corporate   and   tradename,  has  a  legal  right  to  maintain  an  action  in  the  

LA  CHEMISE  LACOSTE  V.  FERNANDEZ  (1984)   Doctrine:   Hemandas   argues   in   his   comment   on   the   petition   for   certiorari  that  the  petitioner  being  a  foreign  corporation   failed   to   allege   essential   facts   bearing   upon   its   capacity   to  sue  before  Philippine  courts.  He  states  that  not  only  is   the  petitioner  not  doing  business  in  the  Philippines  but  it   also  is  not  licensed  to  do  business  in  the  Philippines.  He   also   cites   the   case   of   Leviton   Industries   v.   Salvador   to   support   his   contention   The   Leviton   case,   however,   involved   a   complaint   for   unfair   competition   under   Section  21-­‐A  of  Republic  Act  No.  166  which  provides:     Sec.  21  —  A.  Any  foreign  corporation  or  juristic   person  to  which  a  mark  or  tradename  has  been   registered  or  assigned  under  this  Act  may  bring   an   action   hereunder   for   infringement,   for   unfair   competition,   or   false   designation   of   origin   and   false   description,   whether   or   not   it   has   been   licensed   to   do   business   in   the   Philippines   under   Act   numbered   Fourteen   Hundred   and   Fifty-­‐Nine,   as   amended,   otherwise   known   as   the   Corporation   Law,   at   the  time  it  brings  the  complaint;  Provided,  That   the   country   of   which   the   said   foreign   corporation   or   juristic   person   is   a   citizen,   or   in   which   it   is   domiciled,   by   treaty,   convention   or   law,   grants   a   similar   privilege   to   corporate   or   juristic  persons  of  the  Philippines.     We   held   that   it   was   not   enough   for   Leviton,   a   foreign   corporation  organized  and  existing  under  the  laws  of  the   State   of   New   York,   United   States   of   America,   to   merely   allege   that   it   is   a   foreign   corporation.   It   averred   in   Paragraph   2   of   its   complaint   that   its   action   was   being   filed   under   the   provisions   of   Section   21-­‐A   of   Republic   Act   No.   166,   as   amended.   Compliance   with   the   requirements   imposed   by   the   abovecited   provision   was   necessary   because   Section   21-­‐A   of   Republic   Act   No.   166   having   explicitly   laid   down   certain   conditions   in   a   specific   proviso,   the   same   must   be   expressly   averred   before   a   successful   prosecution   may   ensue.   It   is   therefore,   necessary   for   the   foreign   corporation   to   comply   with   these   requirements   or   aver   why   it   should   be   exempted   from  them,  if  such  was  the  case.  The  foreign  corporation   may   have   the   right   to   sue   before   Philippine   courts,   but   our   rules   on   pleadings   require   that   the   qualifying   circumstances   necessary   for   the   assertion   of   such   right   should  first  be  affirmatively  pleaded.     In   contradistinction,   the   present   case   involves   a   complaint   for   violation   of   Article   189   of   the   Revised   Penal  Code.  The  Leviton  case  is  not  applicable.     In  the  present  case,  however,  the  petitioner  is  a  foreign   corporation   not   doing   business   in   the   Philippines.   The   marketing   of   its   products   in   the   Philippines   is   done   through   an   exclusive   distributor,   Rustan   Commercial  

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Intellectual Property Law Philippines   to   restrain   the   residents   and   inhabitants   thereof   from   organizing   a   corporation   therein   bearing   the   same   name   as   the   foreign   corporation,   when   it   appears   that   they   have   personal   knowledge   of   the   existence   of   such   a   foreign   corporation,   and   it   is   apparent   that   the   purpose   of   the   proposed   domestic   corporation   is   to   deal   and   trade   in   the   same   goods   as   those  of  the  foreign  corporation.     We  further  held:     That   company   is   not   here   seeking   to   enforce   any   legal   or   control   rights   arising   from,   or   growing   out   of,   any   business   which   it   has   transacted   in   the   Philippine   Islands.   The   sole   purpose   of   the   action   is   to   protect   its   reputation,   its   corporate   name,   its   goodwill,   whenever   that   reputation,   corporate   name   or   goodwill   have,   through   the   natural   development   of   its   trade,   established   themselves.'   And   it   contends   that   its   rights   to   the   use   of   its   corporate   and   trade   name   is   a   property   right,   a   right   in   rem,   which   it   may   assert  and  protect  against  all  the  world,  in  any   of  the  courts  of  the  world-­‐even  in  jurisdictions   where   it   does   not   transact   business-­‐just   the   same   as   it   may   protect   its   tangible   property,   real   or   personal,   against   trespass,   or   conversion.   That   point   is   sustained   by   the   authorities,   and   is   well   stated   in   Hanover   Star   Mining   Co.   v.   Allen   and   Wheeler   Co.   in   which   the  syllabus  says,  “Since  it  is  the  trade  and  not   the  mark  that  is  to  be  protected,  a  trade-­‐mark   acknowledges   no   territorial   boundaries   of   municipalities  or  states  or  nations,  but  extends   to   every   market   where   the   trader's   goods   have   become  known  and  Identified  by  the  use  of  the   mark.”     Our   recognizing   the   capacity   of   the   petitioner   to   sue   is   not   by   any   means   novel   or   precedent   setting.   Our   jurisprudence   is   replete   with   cases   illustrating   instances   when   foreign   corporations   not   doing   business   in   the   Philippines   may   nonetheless   sue   in   our   courts.   In   East   Board   Navigation   Ltd,   v.   Ysmael   and   Co.,   Inc.,   we   recognized   a   right   of   foreign   corporation   to   sue   on   isolated   transactions.   In   General   Garments   Corp.   v.   Director   of   Patents,   we   sustained   the   right   of   Puritan   Sportswear   Corp.,   a   foreign   corporation   not   licensed   to   do   and   not   doing   business   in   the   Philippines,   to   file   a   petition   for   cancellation   of   a   trademark   before   the   Patent  Office.     In   upholding   the   right   of   the   petitioner   to   maintain   the   present  suit  before  our  courts  for  unfair  competition  or   infringement  of  trademarks  of  a  foreign  corporation,  we   are   moreover   recognizing   our   duties   and   the   rights   of   foreign   states   under   the   Paris   Convention   for   the  

Protection  of  Industrial  Property  to  which  the  Philippines   and   France   are   parties.   We   are   simply   interpreting   and   enforcing   a   solemn   international   commitment   of   the   Philippines  embodied  in  a  multilateral  treaty  to  which  we   are  a  party  and  which  we  entered  into  because  it  is  in  our   national  interest  to  do  so.     REMEDIES   1) Administrative   a. Opposition   b. Cancellation   c. Intellectual   Property   right   Violation   (IPV   –   new  to  IP  Code)   d. Customs:   Border   enforcement   (for   counterfeit  goods)   2) Criminal   a. Infringement   b. Unfair  competition   c. False  designation  of  origin   d. Section   162   –   no   specific   criminal   remedy,   but  you  can  file  for  perjury   3) Civil   a. Infringement   b. Unfair  competition   c. False  designation  of  origin   d. False   or   fraudulent   declaration   (most   useless)     Who   has   the   remedy?   All   persons   who   satisfies   the   requisite  in  Section  3.   -­‐ Plead   capacity   to   sue.   Otherwise,   petition   will   be  vulnerable  to  a  Motion  to  Dismiss.   -­‐ Easiest:  Allege  that  it  is  a  domiciliary  of  a  state   that   is   a   party   to   a   Convention   or   Treaty   with   the  Philippines.  This  is  easier  because  then,  the   court  can  take  judicial  notice.   -­‐ If  foreign  corporation  not  registered  BUT  doing   business  in  the  Philippines,  no  remedy.  General   rule   in   Corporation   Code   applies.   Foreign   corporation  not  given  a  remedy.     Note:   Causes   of   action   in   criminal   and   civil   remedies   may   also   be   filed   as   IPV.   IPV   is   broad   enough   to   cover   infringement,   unfair   competition,   false   designation   of   origin,   false   or  fraudulent  declaration.    

1.

Administrative  

 

a.

Cancellation   proceedings  

 

SECTION  151.  CANCELLATION.  -­‐     151.1.   A   PETITION   TO   CANCEL   a   registration   of   a   mark   under   this   Act   may   be   filed   with   the   Bureau   of   Legal   Affairs   by   any   person   who   believes   that   he   is   or   will   be  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   damaged  by  the  registration  of  a  mark  under  this  Act  as   follows:     (a)   Within   five   (5)   years   from   the   date   of   the   registration  of  the  mark  under  this  Act.     (b)   AT  ANY  TIME,  if  the  registered  mark  becomes   the   generic   name   for   the   goods   or   services,  or  a  portion   thereof,   for   which   it   is   registered,   or   has   been   abandoned,   or   its   registration   was   obtained   fraudulently  or  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  or   if   the   registered   mark   is   being   used   by,   or   with   the   permission   of,   the   registrant   so   as   to   misrepresent   the   source  of  the  goods  or  services  on  or  in  connection  with   which  the  mark  is  used.  If  the  registered  mark  becomes   the   generic   name   for   less   than   all   of   the   goods   or   services  for  which  it  is  registered,  a  petition  to  cancel  the   registration  for  only  those  goods  or  services  may  be  filed.   A   registered   mark   shall   not   be   deemed   to   be   the   generic   name   of   goods   or   services   solely   because   such   mark   is   also   used   as   a   name   of   or   to   identify   a   unique   product   or   service.   The   primary  significance  of  the  registered  mark   to   the   relevant   public  rather  than  purchaser  motivation   shall   be   the   TEST   FOR   DETERMINING   WHETHER   THE   REGISTERED   MARK   HAS  BECOME   THE   GENERIC  name  of   goods   or   services   on   or   in   connection   with   which   it   has   been  used.     (c)   At   any   time,   if   the   registered   owner   of   the   mark   without   legitimate   reason   fails   to   use   the   mark   within   the   Philippines,   or   to   cause   it   to   be   used   in   the   Philippines   by   virtue   of   a   license   during   an   uninterrupted  period  of  three  (3)  years  or  longer.     151.2.   Notwithstanding   the   foregoing   provisions,   the   court   or   the   administrative   agency   vested   with   jurisdiction  to  hear  and  adjudicate  any  action  to  enforce   the   rights   to   a   registered   mark   shall   likewise   exercise   jurisdiction  to  determine  whether  the  registration  of  said   mark  may  be  cancelled  in  accordance  with  this  Act.  The   filing   of   a   suit   to   enforce   the   registered   mark   with   the   proper  court  or  agency  shall  exclude  any  other  court  or   agency  from  assuming  jurisdiction  over  a  subsequently   filed   petition   to   cancel   the   same   mark.   On   the   other   hand,   the   earlier   filing   of   petition   to   cancel   the   mark   with   the   Bureau   of   Legal   Affairs   shall   not   constitute   a   prejudicial   question   that   must   be   resolved   before   an   action   to   enforce   the   rights   to   same   registered   mark   may  be  decided.    

152.2.   The   use   of   the   mark   in   a   form   different   from   the  form  in  which  it  is  registered,  which  does  not  alter  its   distinctive   character,   shall   not   be   ground   for   cancellation   or   removal   of   the   mark   and   shall   not   diminish  the  protection  granted  to  the  mark.     152.3.   The   use   of   a   mark   in   connection   with   one   or   more   of   the   goods   or   services   belonging   to   the   class   in   respect  of  which  the  mark  is  registered  shall  prevent  its   cancellation   or   removal   in   respect   of   all   other   goods   or   services  of  the  same  class.     152.4.   The  use   of   a   mark   by   a   company   related   with   the   registrant   or   applicant   shall   inure   to   the   latter's   benefit,   and   such   use   shall   not   affect   the   validity   of   such   mark  or  of  its  registration:  PROVIDED,  That  such  mark  is   not  used  in  such  manner  as  to  deceive  the  public.  If  use   of   a   mark   by   a   person   is   controlled   by   the   registrant   or   applicant   with   respect   to   the   nature   and   quality   of   the   goods  or  services,  such  use  shall  inure  to  the  benefit  of   the  registrant  or  applicant.    

SECTION   153.   REQUIREMENTS   OF   PETITION;   NOTICE   AND   HEARING.  –     Insofar   as   applicable,   the   petition   for   cancellation   shall   be   in   the   same   form   as   that   provided   in   Section   1348   hereof,   and   notice   and   hearing   shall   be   as   provided   in   Section  1359  hereof.    

SECTION  154.  CANCELLATION  OF  REGISTRATION.  –     If   the   Bureau   of   Legal   Affairs   finds   that   a   case   for   cancellation   has   been   made   out,   it   shall   order   the   cancellation   of   the   registration.   When   the   order   or   judgment  BECOMES  FINAL,  any  right  conferred  by  such   registration   upon   the   registrant   or   any   person   in   interest   of   record   shall   terminate.  Notice  of  cancellation   shall  be  published  in  the  IPO  Gazette.                                                                                                                                                            

8  Section   134.   Opposition.   –   x   x   x   Such   opposition   shall   be   in   writing   and   verified   by   the   oppositor   or   by   any   person   on   his   behalf   who   knows   the   facts,   and   shall   specify   the   grounds   on   which   it   is   based   and   include   a   statement   of   the   facts   relied   upon.   Copies   of   certificates   of   registration   of   marks   registered   in  other  countries  or  other  supporting  documents  mentioned  in   the   opposition   shall   be   filed   therewith,   together   with   the   translation   in   English,   if   not   in   the   English   language.   For   good   cause  shown  and  upon  payment  of  the  required  surcharge,  the   time  for  filing  an  opposition  may  be  extended  by  the  Director  of   Legal   Affairs,   who   shall   notify   the   applicant   of   such   extension.   The   Regulations   shall   fix   the   maximum   period   of   time   within   which  to  file  the  opposition.   9  Section   135.   Notice   and   Hearing.   -­‐   Upon   the   filing   of   an   opposition,   the   Office   shall   serve   notice   of   the   filing   on   the   applicant,   and   of   the   date   of   the   hearing   thereof   upon   the   applicant   and   the   oppositor   and   all   other   persons   having   any   right,  title  or  interest  in  the  mark  covered  by  the  application,  as   appear  of  record  in  the  Office.  

SECTION  152.  NON-­‐USE  OF  A  MARK  WHEN  EXCUSED.  –     152.1.   Non-­‐use   of   a   mark   may   be   excused   if   caused   by   circumstances   arising   independently   of   the   will   of   the   trademark  owner.  LACK  OF  FUNDS  shall  not  excuse  non-­‐ use  of  a  mark.    

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Intellectual Property Law brassiere,   does   not   affect   its   registrability   as   a   trademark.”     There   being   no   evidence   of   use   of   the   mark   by   others   before  1932,  or  that  appellee  abandoned  use  thereof,  the   registration   of   the   mark   was   made   in   accordance   with   the   Trademark   Law.   Granting   that   appellant   used   the   mark   when   appellee   stopped   using   it   during   the   period   of   time   that   the   Government   imposed   restrictions   on   importation   of   respondent's   brassiere   bearing   the   trademark,   such   temporary   non-­‐use   did   not   affect   the   rights   of   appellee   because   it   was   occasioned   by   government   restrictions   and   was   not   permanent,   intentional,  and  voluntary.     To   work   an   abandonment,   the   disuse   must   be   permanent   and   not   ephemeral;   it   must   be   intentional   and   voluntary,   and   not   involuntary   or   even   compulsory.   There   must   be   a   thorough-­‐going   discontinuance   of   any   trade-­‐ mark  use  of  the  mark  in  question.     The   use   of   the   trademark   by   other   manufacturers   did   not   indicate   an   intention   on   the   part   of   appellee   to   abandon  it.     Non-­‐use   because   of   legal   restrictions   is   not   evidence   of   an   intent   to   abandon.   Non-­‐use   of   their   ancient   trade-­‐ mark   and   the   adoption   of   new   marks   by   the   Carthusian   Monks   after   they   had   been   compelled   to   leave   France   was   consistent   with   an   intention   to   retain   their   right   to   use   their   old   mark.   Abandonment   will   not   be   inferred   from   a   disuse   over   a   period   of   years   occasioned   by   statutory  restrictions  on  the  name  of  liquor.    

SECTION   230.   EQUITABLE   PRINCIPLES   TO   GOVERN   PROCEEDINGS.  –     In  all  inter  partes  proceedings  in  the  Office  under  this  Act,   the   equitable   principles   of   laches,   estoppel,   and   acquiescence   where   applicable,   may   be   considered   and   applied.    

SECTION  232.2.   Unless   expressly   provided   in   this   Act   or   other   statutes,   appeals  from  decisions  of  administrative  officials  shall  be   provided  in  the  Regulations.    

ROMERO  V.  MAIDEN  FORM  BRASSIERE  CO.  (1964)   Refresher:   Maiden   Form   filed   an   application   for   registration   of   the   trademark  "Adagio"  for  the  brassieres  manufactured  by   it   with   the   Director   of   Patents.   In   its   application,   respondent   company   alleged   that   said   trademark   was   first  used  by  it  in  the  United  States  on  October  26,  1937,   and   in   the   Philippines   on   August   31,   1946;   that   it   had   been   continuously   used   by   it   in   trade   in,   or   with   the   Philippines   for   over   10   years;   that   said   trademark   "is   on   the  date  of  this  application,  actually  used  by  respondent   company  on  the  following  goods,  classified  according  to   the  official  classification  of  goods  (Rule  82)   -­‐   Brassieres,   Class   40";   and   that   said   trademark   is   applied   or   affixed   by  respondent  to  the  goods  by  placing  thereon  a  woven   label  on  which  the  trademark  is  shown.     Petitioner   filed   with   the   Director   a   petition   for   cancellation  of  the  trademark  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  a   common  descriptive  name  of  an  article  or  substance  on   which   the   patent   has   expired.   Petitioner   alleged   that   said   trademark   has   not   become   distinctive   of   respondent   company's   goods   or   business;   that   it   has   been  used  by  respondent  company  to  classify  the  goods   (the  brassieres)  manufactured  by  it,  in  the  same  manner   as   petitioner   uses   the   same;   that   said   trademark   has   been   used   by   petitioner   for   almost   6   years;   that   it   has   become   a   common   descriptive   name;   and   that   it   is   not   registered   in   accordance   with   the   requirements   of   Section  37(a),  Chapter  XI  of  Republic  Act  No.  166.     Doctrine:   The   evidence   shows   that   the   trademark   "Adagio"   is   a   musical  term,  which  means  slowly  or  in  an  easy  manner,   and  was  used  as  a  trademark  by  the  owners  thereof  (the   Rosenthals  of  Maiden  Form  Co.,  New  York)  because  they   are  musically  inclined.  Being  a  musical  term,  it  is  used  in   an  arbitrary  (fanciful)  sense  as  a  trademark  for  brassieres   manufactured   by   respondent   company.   It   also   appears   that   respondent   company   has,   likewise,   adopted   other   musical   terms   such   as   "Etude",   "Chansonette",   "Prelude",  "Over-­‐ture",  and  "Concerto",  to  identify,  as  a   trademark,  the  different  styles  or  types  of  its  brassieres.   As   respondent   Director   pointed   out,   "the   fact   that   said   mark   is   used   also   to   designate   a   particular   style   of  

PHILIPPINE   NUT   INDUSTRY   V.   STANDARD   BRANDS,   INC.   (1975)   Refresher:   Philippine   Nut,   a   domestic   corporation,   obtained   from   the  Patent  office  a  certificate  of  registration  covering  the   trademark   "Philippine   Planters   Cordial   Peanuts,"   the   label  used  on  its  product  of  salted  peanuts.     Standard   Brands,   a   foreign   corporation,   filed   a   case   for   the   cancellation   of   Philippine   Nut's   certificate   of   registration   on   the   ground   that   such   trademark   closely   resembles,   and   is   confusingly   similar   to   its   trademark   "Planters  Cocktail  Peanuts."     Issue  1:   The   first   argument   advanced   by   petitioner   which   We   believe   goes   to   the   core   of   the   matter   in   litigation   is   that   the   Director   of   Patents   erred   in   holding   that   the   dominant   portion   of   the   label   of   Standard   Brands   in   its   cans   of   salted   peanuts   consists   of   the   word   PLANTERS   which  has  been  used  in  the  label  of  Philippine  Nut  for  its   own   product.   According   to   petitioner,   PLANTERS   cannot   be   considered   as   the   dominant   feature   of   the  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   trademarks   in   question   because   it   is   a   mere   descriptive   term,   an   ordinary   word   which   is   defined   in   Webster   International   Dictionary   as   "one   who   or   that   which   plants  or  sows,  a  farmer  or  an  agriculturist."     Held:   We   find   the   argument   without   merit.   While   it   is   true   that   PLANTERS  is  an  ordinary  word,  nevertheless  it  is  used  in   the  labels  not  to  describe  the  nature  of  the  product,  but   to   project   the   source   or   origin   of   the   salted   peanuts   contained   in   the   cans.   The   word   PLANTERS   printed   across  the  upper  portion  of  the  label  in  bold  letters  easily   attracts   and   catches   the   eye   of   the   ordinary   consumer   and   it   is   that   word   and   none   other   that   sticks   in   his   mind   when  he  thinks  of  salted  peanuts.     In  cases  of  this  nature  there  can  be  no  better  evidence   as  to  what  is  the  dominant  feature  of  a  label  and  as   to   whether  there  is  a  confusing  similarity  in  the  contesting   trademarks   than   the   labels   themselves.   A   visual   and   graphic   presentation   of   the   labels   will   constitute   the   best  argument  for  one  or  the  other.     It   is   true   that   there   are   other   words   used   such   as   "Cordial"   in   petitioner's   can   and   "Cocktail"   in   Standard   Brands',  which  are  also  prominently  displayed,  but  these   words   are   mere   adjectives   describing   the   type   of   peanuts   in   the   labeled   containers   and   are   not   sufficient   to   warn   the   unwary   customer   that   the   two   products   come   form   distinct   sources.   As   a   whole   it   is   the   word   PLANTERS   which   draws   the   attention   of   the   buyer   and   leads  him  to  conclude  that  the  salted  peanuts  contained   in   the   two   cans   originate   from   one   and   the   same   manufacturer.   In   fact,   when   a   housewife   sends   her   housemaid  to  the  market  to  buy  canned  salted  peanuts,   she  will  describe  the  brand  she  wants  by  using  the  word   PLANTERS  and  not  "Cordial"  nor  "Cocktail".     Issue  2:*   What  is  next  submitted  by  petitioner  is  that  it  was  error   for   respondent   Director   to   have   enjoined   it   from   using   PLANTERS  in  the  absence  of  evidence  showing  that  the   term   has   acquired   secondary   meaning.   Petitioner,   invoking   American   jurisprudence,   asserts   that   the   first   user   of   a   tradename   composed   of   common   words   is   given  no  special  preference  unless  it  is  shown  that  such   words   have   acquired   secondary   meaning,   and   this,   respondent   Standard   Brands   failed   to   do   when   no   evidence  was  presented  to  establish  that  fact.     Held:   This   Court   held   that   the   doctrine   is   to   the   effect   that   a   word   or   phrase   originally   incapable   of   exclusive   appropriation  with  reference  to  an  article  on  the  market,   because   geographically   or   otherwise   descriptive,   might   nevertheless   have   been   used   so   long   and   so   exclusively   by  one  producer  with  reference  to  his  article  that,  in  that   trade   and   to   that   branch   of   the   purchasing   public,   the  

word   or   phrase   has   come   to   mean   that   the   article   was   his  product.     The  applicability  of  the  doctrine  of  secondary  meaning  to   the   situation   now   before   Us   is   appropriate   because   there  is  oral  and  documentary  evidence  showing  that  the   word  PLANTERS  has  been  used  by  and  closely  associated   with  Standard  Brands  for  its  canned  salted  peanuts  since   1938   in   this   country.   Not   only   is   that   fact   admitted   by   petitioner   in   the   amended   stipulation   of   facts,   but   the   matter   has   been   established   by   testimonial   and   documentary   evidence   consisting   of   invoices   covering   the  sale  of  "PLANTERS  cocktail  peanuts".  In  other  words,   there   is   evidence   to   show   that   the   term   PLANTERS   has   become   a   distinctive   mark   or   symbol   insofar   as   salted   peanuts   are   concerned,   and   by   priority   of   use   dating   as   far   back   as   1938,   respondent   Standard   Brands   has   acquired   a   preferential   right   to   its   adoption   as   its   trademark   warranting   protection   against   its   usurpation   by  another.  Ubi  jus  ibi  remedium.  Where  there  is  a  right   there   is   a   remedy.   Standard   Brands   has   shown   the   existence   of   a   property   right   and   respondent   Director,   has  afforded  the  remedy.     Still   on   this   point,   petitioner   contends   that   Standard   Brands'  use  of  the  trademark  PLANTERS  was  interrupted   during   the   Japanese   occupation   and   in   fact   was   discontinued   when   the   importation   of   peanuts   was   prohibited   by   Central   Bank   regulations   effective   July   1,   1953,   hence   it   cannot   be   presumed   that   it   has   acquired   a   secondary   meaning.   We   hold   otherwise.   Respondent   Director   correctly   applied   the   rule   that   non-­‐use   of   a   trademark   on   an   article   of   merchandize   due   to   legal   restrictions   or   circumstances   beyond   one's   control   is   not   to  be  considered  as  an  abandonment.    

ANCHOR  TRADING  CO.  V.  DIRECTOR  OF  PATENTS  (1956)   Doctrine:   The   principal   legal   issue   here   is   whether   or   not   the   failure   of   the   respondent-­‐appellee   to   register   his   opposition   to   the   petition   for   registration   in   due   time   estops   him   from   asking   for   the   cancellation   of   the   certificate   of   registration   issued   in   favor   of   the   petitioner-­‐appellant.  The  issue  should  be  resolved  in  the   negative.   The   only   consequence   resulting   from   a   late   filing   of   an   opposition   to   any   application   for   registration   of   a   trademark   is   the   oppositor’s   relinquishment  of  the  privilege  given  to  him  by  laws  to   object  to  such  registration,  but  such  cannot  prevent  him   from   asking   later   for   its   cancellation   when   there   are   good  grounds  justifying  it.    

THE  C LOROX  CO.  V.  DIRECTOR  OF  PATENTS  (1967)   Refresher:   On   April   7,   1959,   respondent   Go   Siu   Gian   filed   with   the   Patent   Office   an   application   for   registration   of   the   trademark  "OLDROX,"  with  an  accompanying  statement   that  he  is  a  citizen  of  China,  residing  and  doing  business  

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Intellectual Property Law in   the   Philippines   at   838   Folgueras   St.,   Manila;   that   he   has   adopted   the   trademark   "OLDROX"   for   his   goods   (whitening   agent   for   bleaching)   in   trade   and   commerce   in   the   country;   and   that   said   trademark,   shown   on   printed  labels  affixed  to  the  goods,  or  to  the  containers   thereof,   has   been   used   by   him   since   February   1,   1959.   The   application   was   allowed   and   published   in   the   issue   of   the   Official   Gazette   dated   April   25,   1960,   which   was   released  for  circulation  on  August  22,  1960.     On   September   21   of   the   same   year,   or   within   30   days   from  the  date  of  its  publication  in  the  Official  Gazette,  an   unverified  opposition  to  the  application  was  filed  by  the   law   firm   Lichauco,   Picazo   and   Agcaoili   in   behalf   of   the   Clorox  Company,  herein  petitioner.     Doctrine:   The  rule  is  well  settled  that  courts  may  vacate  judgments   and   grant   new   trials   or   enter   new   judgments   on   the   grounds  of  error  in  fact  or  in  law.  They  have  no  power,  of   course,   to   vacate   judgments   after   they   have   become   final,  in  the  sense  that  the  party  in  whose  favor  they  are   rendered   is   entitled   as   of   right,   to   have   execution   thereon,   but   prior   thereto,   the   courts   have   plenary   control   over   the   proceedings   including   the   judgment,   and   in   the   exercise   of   a   sound   judicial   discretion,   may   take  such  proper  action  in  this  regard  as  truth  and  justice   may   require.   The   order   of   herein   respondent   dismissing   the   opposition   of   petitioner   to   the   registration   of   the   trademark   in   question   may   amount   to   considerable   injustice   to   the   opposer   Clorox   Company,   the   order   having   been   entered   not   upon   the   merits   of   the   controversy;   and   the   possibility   of   such   serious   consequences  necessitates  a  careful  examination  of  the   grounds   upon   which   it   requests   that   the   order   be   set   aside.   It   must   be   remembered   that   the   only   discretion   conferred   upon   officers   is   a   legal   discretion,   and   when   anything  is  left  to   any  officer  to  be  done  according  to  his   discretion,   the   law   intends   it   to   be   done   with   a   sound   discretion   and   according   to   law.   And   when,   as   in   this   case,   the   allegation   of   the   pleading   clearly   show   circumstances   constituting   mistake   and   excusable   negligence   which   are   grounds   for   a   motion   for   reconsideration   of   the   order   in   question,   a   dismissal   of   the   motion   and   a   denial   of   the   relief   sought   upon   the   flimsy   excuse   that   the   same   was   filed   as   a   petition   for   relief,  will  amount  to  an  abuse  of  that  discretion.  Neither   may   we   consider   the   argument   of   herein   respondent   that   the   petitioner   is   not   totally   deprived   of   its   right   to   question   the   registration   of   the   trademark   in   question   because   it   may   still   pursue   a   cancellation   proceeding   under   Sections   17   to   19   of   Republic   Act   No.   166,   and   Rules   191   to   197   of   the   Rules   of   Practice   in   Trademark   Cases.   The   opposition   to   a   registration   and   the   petition   for   cancellation   are   alternative   proceedings   which   a   party  may  avail  of  according  to  his  purposes,  needs,  and   predicaments,   and   herein   petitioner   has   the   right   to  

choose  which  remedy  it  deems  best  for  the  protection  of   its  rights.    

WOLVERINE   WORLDWIDE,   INC.   V.   CA   AND   LOLITO   CRUZ   (1989)   Refresher:   On   February   8,   1984,   the   petitioner,   a   foreign   corporation  organized  and  existing  under  the  laws  of  the   United   States,   brought   a   petition   before   the   Philippine   Patent   Office,   docketed   as   Inter   Partes   Case   No.   1807,   for   the   cancellation   of   Certificate   of   Registration   No.   24986-­‐B   of   the   trademark   HUSH   PUPPIES   and   DOG   DEVICE   issued   to   the   private   respondent,   a   Filipino   citizen.     In  support  of  its  petition  for  cancellation,  the  petitioner   alleged,   inter   alia,   that   it   is   the   registrant   of   the   internationally   known   trademark   HUSH   PUPPIES   and   the   DEVICE   of   a   Dog   in   the   United   States   and   in   other   countries  which  are  members  of  the  Paris  Convention  for   the  Protection  of  Industrial  Property;  that  the  goods  sold   by  the  private  respondent,  on  the  one  hand,  and  by  the   petitioner,   on   the   other   hand,   belong   to   the   same   class   such   that   the   private   respondent's   use   of   the   same   trademark  in  the  Philippines  (which  is  a  member  of  said   Paris   Convention)   in   connection   with   the   goods   he   sells   constitutes   an   act   of   unfair   competition,   as   denied   in   the   Paris  Convention.     Subsequently,  the  private  respondent  moved  to  dismiss   the  petition  on  the  ground  of  res  judicata,  averring  that   in  1973,  or  more  than  ten  years  before  this  petition  (Inter   Partes  Case  No.  1807)  was  filed,  the  same  petitioner  filed   two   petitions   for   cancellation   (Inter   Partes   Cases   Nos.   700   and   701)   and   was   a   party   to   an   interference   proceeding   (Inter   Partes   Case   No.   709),   all   of   which   involved   the   trademark   HUSH   PUPPIES   and   DEVICE,   before   the   Philippine   Patent   Office.   The   Director   of   Patents  had  ruled  in  all  three  inter  parties  cases  in  favor   of   Ramon   Angeles,   the   private   respondent's   predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest,  to  wit:     WHEREFORE,   for   all   the   foregoing   considerations,     1.   The   petitions   seeking   cancellation   of   Registration   Nos.   SR-­‐1099   and   SR-­‐1526,   respectively,   are   both   denied   and   accordingly   DISMISSED;     2.   Respondent-­‐Registrant/Junior   Party-­‐ Applicant,   Roman   Angeles,   is   hereby   adjudged   as  the  prior  user  and  adopter  of  the  trademark   HUSH  PUPPIES  &  DEVICE,  under  Appl.  Serial  No.   17174,   and   therefore,   the   same   given   due   course;  and    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   3.   Registration   No.   14969   of   Dexter   Sales   Company,   assignor   to   Wolverine   Worldwide,   Inc.,   covering   the   trademark   HUSH   PUPPIES   &   Representation   of   a   Dogie   Head,   is   hereby   CANCELLED.  

Between  the  earlier  petitions  and  the  present  one  there   is   substantial   identity   of   parties,   subject   matter,   and   cause  of  action.     The   petitioner   in   all   of   these   cases   is   Wolverine   Worldwide,  Inc.  The  respondent-­‐registrant  in  this  case  is   the  assignee  of  Randelson  Agro-­‐Industrial  Development,   Inc.  (formerly  known  as  Randelson  Shoes,  Inc.)  which  in   turn,   acquired   its   right   from   Ramon   Angeles,   the   original   respondents-­‐registrant.     As  regards  the  subject  matter,  all  of  these  cases  refer  to   the   cancellation   of   registration   of   the   trademark   HUSH   PUPPIES  and  DEVICE  of  a  Dog.     Finally,   there   is   identity   of   cause   of   action,   which   is   the   alleged   wrongful   or   erroneous   registration   of   the   trademark.    

  Doctrine:   The  Court  has  repeatedly  held  that  for  a  judgment  to  be   a  bar  to  a  subsequent  case,  the  following  requisites  must   concur:   (1)   it   must   be   a   final   judgment;   (2)   the   court   which   rendered   it   had   jurisdiction   over   the   subject   matter  and  the  parties;  (3)  it  must  be  a  judgment  on  the   merits;  and  (4)  there  must  be  Identity  between  the  two   cases,   as   to   parties,   —   subject   matter,   and   cause   of   action.     Contrary   to   the   petitioner's   assertion,   the   judgment   in   Inter  Partes  Cases  Nos.  700,  701,  and  709  had  long  since   become   final   and   executory.   That   Sec.   17   of   Republic   Act   166,   also   known   as   the   Trademark   Law,   allows   the   cancellation   of   a   registered   trademark   is   not   a   valid   premise   for   the   petitioner's   proposition   that   a   decision   granting   registration   of   a   trademark   cannot   be   imbued   with   the   character   of   absolute   finality   as   is   required   in   res   judicata.   A   judgment   or   order   is   final,   as   to   give   it   the   authority  of  res  judicata,  if  it  can  no  longer  be  modified   by  the  court  issuing  it  or  by  any  other  court.  In  the  case   at   bar,   the   decision   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   affirming   that  of  the  Director  of  Patents,  in  the  cancellation  cases   filed   in   1973,   was   never   appealed   to   us.   Consequently,   when  the  period  to  appeal  from  the  Court  of  Appeals  to   this   Court   lapsed,   with   no   appeal   having   been   perfected,   the   foregoing   judgment   denying   cancellation   of   registration   in   the   name   of   private   respondent's   predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest   but   ordering   cancellation   of   registration  in  the  name  of  the  petitioner's  predecessor-­‐ in-­‐interest,  became  the  settled  law  in  the  case.     It   must   be   stressed   anew   that,   generally,   the   fundamental  principle  of  res  judicata  applies  to  all  cases   and   proceedings   in   whatever   form   they   may   be.   We   now   expressly   affirm   that   this   principle   applies,   in   the   appropriate   cases,   to   proceedings   for   cancellation   of   trademarks   before   the   Philippine   Patent   Office   (now   Bureau   of   Patents,   Trademarks   and   Technology   Transfer).     Undoubtedly,  final  decisions,  orders,  and  resolutions,  of   the   Director   of   Patents   are   clothed   with   a   judicial   character  as  they  are,  in  fact,  reviewable  by  the  Court  of   Appeals  and  by  us.     The  subject  judgment  is  undeniably  on  the  merits  of  the   case,  rendered  after  both  parties  and  actually  submitted   their  evidence.    

SHANGRILA  V.  CA  (1999)   Court  decision:   The   earlier   institution   of   an   inter   partes   case   for   cancellation  of  a  registered  service  mark  and  device/logo   with   BPTTT   cannot   effectively   bar   the   subsequent   filing   of  an  infringement  case  by  the  registrant.       REASON:   The   certificate   of   registration   upon   which   the   infringement   case   is   based   remains   valid   and   subsisting   as  long  as  it  has  not  been  cancelled  by  the  Bureau  or  by   an   infringement   court.   As   such,   the   registration   continues   as   prima   facie   evidence   of   the   validity   of   registration,   registrant’s   ownership   of   the   mark   and   tradename  and  of  the  registrant’s  exclusive  right  to  use   the   same   in   connection   with   the   goods,   business   or   services  specified  in  the  certificate.       In   the   same   light   that   the   infringement   case   can   and   should   proceed   independently   from   the   cancellation   case   with   the   Bureau   so   as   to   afford   the   owner   of   certificates   of   registration   redress   and   injunctive   reliefs,   so   must   the   cancellation   with   the   BPTTT   continue   independently   from   the   infringement   case   so   as   to   determine  whether  a  registered  mark  may  ultimately  be   cancelled.       To  provide  a  judicious  resolution  of  the  issues,  the  Court   finds   it   apropos   to   order   the   suspension   of   the   proceedings   before   the   Bureau   pending   final   determination  of  the  infringement  case,  where  the  issue   of  validity  of  the  registration  of  the  subject  TM  and  logo   in  the  name  of  Developers  group  was  passed  upon.       With   the   decision   of   the   RTC   upholding   the   validity   of   registration  of  the  service  mark  “Shangri-­‐La”  and  S  logo   in   the   name   of   Developers   Group,   the   cancellation   case   filed   with   the   Bureau   becomes   moot.   To   allow   the   Bureau  to  proceed  with  the  cancellation  case  would  lead  

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Intellectual Property Law to   a   possible   result   contradictory   to   what   the   RTC   has   rendered,  albeit  the  same  is  on  appeal.      

voluntary   assurance   may   include   one   or   more   of   the   following:     (1)   An   assurance   to   comply   with   the   provisions   of   the   intellectual   property   law   violated;     (2)   An   assurance   to   refrain   from   engaging   in   unlawful   and   unfair   acts   and   practices  subject  of  the  formal  investigation;     (3)   An  assurance  to  recall,  replace,  repair,   or   refund   the   money   value   of   defective   goods   distributed  in  commerce;  and     (4)   An   assurance   to   reimburse   the   complainant  the  expenses  and  costs  incurred  in   prosecuting   the   case   in   the   Bureau   of   Legal   Affairs.     The   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   may   also   require   the   respondent   to   submit   periodic   compliance   reports   and   file   a   bond   to   guarantee   compliance  of  his  undertaking;     (iii)   The   condemnation   or   seizure   of   products   which   are   subject   of   the   offense.   The   goods   seized   hereunder  shall  be  disposed  of  in  such  manner  as  may  be   deemed   appropriate   by   the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs,   such   as   by   sale,   donation   to   distressed   local   governments   or   to   charitable   or   relief   institutions,   exportation,   recycling   into   other   goods,   or   any   combination   thereof,   under   such   guidelines   as   he   may   provide;     (iv)   The   forfeiture   of   paraphernalia   and   all   real   and   personal   properties   which   have   been   used   in   the   commission  of  the  offense;     (v)   The   imposition   of   administrative   fines   in   such   amount   as   deemed   reasonable   by   the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs,   which   shall   in   no   case   be   less   than   Five   thousand   pesos   (P5,000)   nor   more   than   One   hundred   fifty   thousand   pesos   (P150,000).   In   addition,   an   additional   fine   of   not   more   than   One   thousand   pesos   (P1,000)   shall   be  imposed  for  each  day  of  continuing  violation;     (vi)   The   cancellation   of   any   permit,   license,   authority,  or  registration  which  may  have  been  granted   by   the   Office,   or   the   suspension   of   the   validity   thereof   for   such   period   of   time   as   the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   may   deem   reasonable   which   shall   not   exceed   one   (1)   year;     (vii)   The   withholding   of   any   permit,   license,   authority,   or   registration  which  is  being  secured  by  the   respondent  from  the  Office;    

SUPERIOR   COMMERCIAL   ENTERPRISES   V.   KUNNAN   ENTERPRISES  (2010)   Refresher:   Sec.   22   RA   166   provides   that   only   a   registrant   can   file   a   case   for   infringement.   Corollary   to   this,   Sec.   19   RA   166   provides   that   nay   right   conferred   upon   the   registration   under   the   provision   of   RA   166   terminates   when   the   judgment  or  order  of  cancellation  has  become  final.       Hence,   the   cancellation   of   a   registration   of   TM   has   the   effect   of   depriving   the   registrant   of   protection   from   infringement   the   moment   judgment   or   order   of   cancellation  has  become  final.       In  trademark  infringement,  title  to  TM  is  indispensable  to   a   valid   cause   of   action   and   such   title   is   shown   by   its   certificate  of  registration.       In   the   absence   of   any   inequitable   conduct   on   the   part   of   the  manufacturer,  an  exclusive  distributor  who  employs   the  TM  of  the  manufacturer  does  not  acquire  proprietary   rights   of   the   manufacturer   and   a   registration   of   the   TM   by   the   distributor   as   such   belongs   to   the   manufacturer,   provided   the   fiduciary   relationship   does   not   terminate   before  application  for  registration  is  filed.    

b.

Intellectual   property   rights  violations  

 

SECTION  10.2.  THE  BUREAU  OF  LEGAL  AFFAIRS   (a)   Exercise   original   jurisdiction   in   administrative   complaints   for   violations   of   laws   involving   intellectual   property   rights:   Provided,   That   its   jurisdiction   is   limited   to  complaints  where  the  total  damages  claimed  are  not   less   than   Two   hundred   thousand   pesos   (P200,000):   Provided   further,   That   availment   of   the   provisional   remedies   may   be   granted   in   accordance   with   the   Rules   of   Court.   The   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   shall   have   the   power   to   hold   and   punish   for   contempt   all   those   who   disregard   orders   or   writs   issued   in   the   course   of   the   proceedings.       (b)   After   formal   investigation,   the   Director   for   Legal   Affairs   may   impose   one   (1)   or   more   of   the   following  administrative  penalties:     (i)   The   issuance   of   a   cease  and  desist  order   which   shall  specify  the  acts  that  the  respondent  shall  cease  and   desist   from   and   shall   require   him   to   submit   a   compliance   report   within   a   reasonable   time   which   shall   be   fixed   in   the  order;     (ii)   The   acceptance   of   a   voluntary   assurance   of   compliance  or  discontinuance  as  may  be  imposed.  Such  

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The  assessment  of  damages;  

Court  of  Appeals  held  that  BLA  did  not  have  jurisdiction   over   the   complaint   for   unfair   competition,   as   jurisdiction   is   vested   in   the   regular   courts.   The   Supreme   Court   disagreed  with  the  Court  of  Appeals.     Section   10   of   the   Intellectual   Property   Code   specifically   identifies  the  functions  of  the  Bureau  of  Legal  Affairs.     Unquestionably,  petitioner’s  complaint,  which  seeks  the   cancellation   of   the   disputed   mark   in   the   name   of   respondent   Sehwani,   Incorporated,   and   damages   for   violation  of  petitioner’s  intellectual  property  rights,  falls   within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  IPO  Director  of  Legal  Affairs.     The  Intellectual  Property  Code  also  expressly  recognizes   the   appellate   jurisdiction   of   the   IPO   Director   General   over   the   decisions   of   the   IPO   Director   of   Legal   Affairs,   to   wit:     Section   7.   The   Director   General   and   Deputies   Director   General.   7.1   Fuctions.–The   Director   General   shall   exercise   the   following   powers   and  functions:     x  x  x  x     b)   Exercise   exclusive   appellate   jurisdiction   over   all   decisions   rendered   by   the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs,  the  Director  of  Patents,  the  Director  of   Trademarks,   and   the   Director   of   Documentation,   Information   and   Technology   Transfer   Bureau.   The   decisions   of   the   Director   General   in   the   exercise   of   his   appellate   jurisdiction   in   respect   of   the   decisions   of   the   Director   of   Patents,   and   the   Director   of   Trademarks  shall  be  appealable  to  the  Court  of   Appeals  in  accordance  with  the  Rules  of  Court;   and   those   in   respect   of   the   decisions   of   the   Director   of   Documentation,   Information   and   Technology   Transfer   Bureau   shall   be   appealable   to   the   Secretary   of   Trade   and   Industry;     The  Court  of  Appeals  erroneously  reasoned  that  Section   10(a)  of  the  Intellectual  Property  Code,  conferring  upon   the   BLA-­‐IPO   jurisdiction   over   administrative   complaints   for  violations  of  intellectual  property  rights,  is  a  general   provision,   over   which   the   specific   provision   of   Section   163   of   the   same   Code,   found   under   Part   III   thereof   particularly   governing   trademarks,   service   marks,   and   tradenames,   must   prevail.   Proceeding   therefrom,   the   Court   of   Appeals   incorrectly   concluded   that   all   actions   involving   trademarks,   including   charges   of   unfair   competition,   are   under   the   exclusive   jurisdiction   of   civil   courts.     Such  interpretation  is  not  supported  by  the  provisions  of   the  Intellectual  Property  Code.  While  Section  163  thereof  

Censure;  and   Other  analogous  penalties  or  sanctions.  

SECTION  232.  APPEALS.  –     232.1.   Appeals   from   decisions   of   regular   courts   shall   be   governed   by   the   Rules   of   Court.   Unless   restrained   by   a   higher   court,   the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   shall   be   executory   even   pending   appeal   under   such   terms   and   conditions  as  the  court  may  prescribe.     232.2.   Unless   expressly   provided   in   this   Act   or   other   statutes,   appeals   from   decisions   of   administrative   officials  shall  be  provided  in  the  Regulations.    

IN-­‐N-­‐OUT  BURGER,  INC.  V.  SEHWANI  (2008)   Refresher:   Petitioner   IN-­‐N-­‐OUT   BURGER,   INC.,   a   business   entity   incorporated  under  the  laws  of  California,  United  States   (US)  of  America,  which  is  a  signatory  to  the  Convention   of   Paris   on   Protection   of   Industrial   Property   and   the   Agreement   on   Trade   Related   Aspects   of   Intellectual   Property  Rights  (TRIPS).    Petitioner  is  engaged  mainly  in   the   restaurant   business,   but   it   has   never   engaged   in   business  in  the  Philippines.     Respondents   Sehwani,   Incorporated   and   Benita   Frites,   Inc.  are  corporations  organized  in  the  Philippines.     On   2   June   1997,   petitioner   filed   trademark   and   service   mark  applications  with  the  Bureau  of  Trademarks  (BOT)   of   the   IPO   for   "IN-­‐N-­‐OUT"   and   "IN-­‐N-­‐OUT   Burger   &   Arrow   Design."     Petitioner   later   found   out,   through   the   Official   Action   Papers   issued   by   the     IPO   on   31   May   2000,   that   respondent   Sehwani,   Incorporated   had   already   obtained   Trademark   Registration   for   the   mark   "IN   N   OUT  (the  inside  of  the  letter  "O"  formed  like  a  star)."  By   virtue   of   a   licensing   agreement,   Benita   Frites,   Inc.   was   able  to  use  the  registered  mark  of  respondent  Sehwani,   Incorporated.     Petitioner   eventually   filed   on   4   June   2001   before   the   Bureau   of   Legal   Affairs   (BLA)   of   the   IPO   an   administrative   complaint   against   respondents   for   unfair   competition   and   cancellation   of   trademark   registration.     Petitioner  averred  in  its  complaint  that  it  is  the  owner  of   the  trade  name  IN-­‐N-­‐OUT  and  the  following  trademarks:   (1)   "IN-­‐N-­‐OUT";   (2)   "IN-­‐N-­‐OUT   Burger   &   Arrow   Design";   and  (3)  "IN-­‐N-­‐OUT  Burger  Logo."    These  trademarks  are   registered   with   the   Trademark   Office   of   the   US   and   in   various   parts   of   the   world,   are   internationally   well-­‐ known,  and  have  become  distinctive  of  its  business  and   goods  through  its  long  and  exclusive  commercial  use.     Doctrine:  (jurisdiction  of  the  Bureau  of  Legal  Affairs)  

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Intellectual Property Law vests   in   civil   courts   jurisdiction   over   cases   of   unfair   competition,   nothing   in   the   said   section   states   that   the   regular   courts   have   sole   jurisdiction   over   unfair   competition   cases,   to   the   exclusion   of   administrative   bodies.  On  the  contrary,  Sections  160  and  170,  which  are   also   found   under   Part   III   of   the   Intellectual   Property   Code,  recognize  the  concurrent  jurisdiction  of  civil  courts   and   the   IPO   over   unfair   competition   cases.   These   two   provisions  read:     Section   160.   Right   of   Foreign   Corporation   to   Sue   in   Trademark   or   Service   Mark   Enforcement   Action.–Any  foreign  national  or  juridical  person   who   meets   the   requirements   of   Section   3   of   this   Act   and   does   not   engage   in   business   in   the   Philippines   may   bring   a   civil   or   administrative   action   hereunder   for   opposition,   cancellation,   infringement,   unfair   competition,   or   false   designation   of   origin   and   false   description,   whether   or   not   it   is   licensed   to   do   business   in   the  Philippines  under  existing  laws.     x  x  x  x     Section  170.   Penalties.–Independent   of   the   civil   and  administrative  sanctions  imposed  by  law,  a   criminal  penalty  of  imprisonment  from  two  (2)   years   to   five   (5)   years   and   a   fine   ranging   from   Fifty   thousand   pesos   (P50,000)   to   Two   hundred   thousand   pesos   (P200,000),   shall   be   imposed   on   any   person   who   is   found   guilty   of   committing   any   of   the   acts   mentioned   in   Section  155,  Section168,  and  Subsection169.1.     Based   on   the   foregoing   discussion,   the   IPO   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   had   jurisdiction   to   decide   the   petitioner’s   administrative   case   against   respondents   and   the   IPO   Director   General   had   exclusive   jurisdiction   over   the   appeal   of   the   judgment   of   the   IPO   Director   of   Legal   Affairs.    

c.

Prohibition   importation  

officers   of   the   customs   service   in   enforcing   this   prohibition,   any   person   who   is   entitled   to   the   benefits   of   this   Act,   may   require   that   his   name   and   residence,   and   the   name   of   the   locality   in   which   his   goods   are   manufactured,   a   copy   of   the   certificate   of   registration   of   his   mark   or   trade   name,   to   be   recorded   in   books   which   shall   be   kept   for   this   purpose   in   the   Bureau   of   Customs,   under   such   regulations   as   the   Collector   of   Customs   with   the   approval   of   the   Secretary   of   Finance   shall   prescribe,   and   may   furnish   to   the   said   Bureau   facsimiles  of  his  name,  the  name  of  the  locality  in  which   his   goods   are   manufactured,   or   his   registered   mark   or   trade   name,   and   thereupon   the   Collector   of   Customs   shall   cause   one   (1)   or   more   copies   of   the   same   to   be   transmitted   to   each   collector   or   to   other   proper   officer   of  the  Bureau  of  Customs.     ADMINISTRATIVE  REMEDIES   Opposition     -­‐ Who   can   file:   Any   person   who   falls   under   Section  3.   -­‐ When:   -­‐ Remedy:   Denial   of   application.   No   other   remedies.     Cancellation  (Section  151)   -­‐ Who   can   file:   Any   person   who   falls   under   Section  3.   -­‐ When:  After  the  mark  has  been  registered.   o From  the  point  of  view  of  when  to  file   a  petition  à  easier  to  file  cancellation   than  opposition.   o From   the   point   of   view   of   burden   of   proof   à   easier   to   file   opposition.   No   prima   facie   presumptions   of   (1)   validity   of   registration,   (2)   ownership   of  mark,  and  (3)  exclusive  right  to  use   mark   as   conferred   upon   the   registrant   by   Section   138.   In   opposition,   all   the   petitioner   has   to   prove  is  damage.   § Ma’am:   Why   does   Section   138   only   give   prima   facie   presumption   if   registration   confers   the   right   upon   the   registrant   (i.e.   registration   is   the   basis   of   ownership)?   Because   registration   is   not   a   perfect   process.   Under   the   law,   what   actually   confers   ownership   is   a   registration   validly   obtained,   not   just   any   kind   of   registration.   Thus,   a   person   can   attack   the   registration   as   invalid.   There’s   always   a   possibility   that   the   IPO   made   a   mistake.  

of  

 

SECTION   166.   GOODS   BEARING   INFRINGING   MARKS   OR   TRADE  NAMES.  –     No  article  of  imported  merchandise  which  shall  copy  or   simulate   the   name   of   any   domestic   product,   or   manufacturer,  or  dealer,  or  which  shall  copy  or  simulate   a   mark   registered   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   this  Act,  or  shall  bear  a  mark  or  trade  name   calculated   to   induce   the   public   to   believe   that   the   article   is   manufactured   in   the   Philippines,   or   that   it   is   manufactured   in   any   foreign   country   or   locality   other   than   the   country   or   locality   where   it   is   in   fact   manufactured,   shall   be   admitted   to   entry   at   any   customhouse   of   the   Philippines.   In   order   to   aid   the  

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advertising   of   any   goods   or   services   including   other   preparatory  steps  necessary  to  carry  out  the  sale  of  any   goods   or   services   on   or   in   connection   with   which   such   use  is  likely  to  cause  confusion,  or  to  cause  mistake,  or  to   deceive;  or     155.2.   Reproduce,   counterfeit,   copy   or   colorably   imitate  a  registered  mark  or  a  dominant  feature  thereof   and   apply   such   reproduction,   counterfeit,   copy   or   colorable   imitation   to   labels,   signs,   prints,   packages,   wrappers,  receptacles  or  advertisements  intended  to  be   used   in   commerce   upon   or   in   connection   with   the   sale,   offering  for  sale,  distribution,  or  advertising  of  goods  or   services   on   or   in   connection   with   which   such   use   is   likely   to   cause   confusion,   or   to   cause   mistake,   or   to   deceive,   shall   be   liable   in   a   civil   action   for   infringement   by   the   registrant   for   the   remedies   hereinafter   set   forth:   Provided,   That   the   infringement   takes   place   at   the   moment  any  of  the  acts  stated  in  Subsection  155.1  or  this   subsection   are   committed   REGARDLESS   OF   WHETHER   THERE  IS  ACTUAL  SALE  OF  GOODS  OR  SERVICES  USING   THE  INFRINGING  MATERIAL.      

Remedy:   Cancellation   of   the   registration.   No   other  remedy.   Grounds  (does  not  prescribe):   o Generic  name   § Test:  primary  significance  to   the  relevant  public   o Abandonment   § Requisites   (as   enumerated   in  Romero  v.  Maiden  Form):   VIP   • Voluntary   • Intentional     • Permanent   o Registration   was   obtained   fraudulently   o Misrepresents   the   source   of   the   goods   and   services   in   connection   with  which  the  marks  was  used   o Non-­‐use   of   the   mark   for   an   uninterrupted  period  of  3  years     § Circumstances  which  excuse   non-­‐use  of  trademark:     Inter  partes  proceeding  –  expedited,  based  on   documents.   When   you   file   petition,   attach   all   exhibits.  

SECTION   156.   ACTIONS,   AND   DAMAGES   AND   INJUNCTION   FOR  INFRINGEMENT.  –    

  Intellectual  property  violation  (Section  10.2)   -­‐ Who   can   file:   Any   person   who   falls   within   Section  3.     -­‐ Venue:  Bureau  of  Legal  Affairs  (BLA)   o As  long  as  the  amount  claimed  is  not   LESS  than  P200,000.00   o It   has   the   power   of   the   courts,   PLUS   more.   Except   that   this   “more”   has   not  really  been  exercised.   -­‐ Advantage  of  filing  in  the  BLA  à  you  are  more   likely   to   obtained   a   resolution   at   an   earlier   time.  Also,  no  venue  restrictions  here.  You  can   file   in   the   BLA   regardless   of   where   the  parties  are  located.   o But   BLA   only   works   if   the   respondent   is   a   legitimate   business.    

156.1.   The   owner   of   a   registered   mark   may   recover   damages   from   any   person   who   infringes   his   rights,   and   the   measure   of   the   damages   suffered   shall   be   either  the   reasonable   profit   which   the   complaining   party   would   have  made,  had  the  defendant  not  infringed  his  rights,   OR   the   profit   which   the   defendant   actually   made   out   of   the   infringement,   or   in   the   event   such   measure   of   damages   cannot   be   readily   ascertained   with   reasonable   certainty,   then   the   court   may   award   as   damages   a   reasonable  percentage  based  upon  the  amount  of  gross   sales   of   the   defendant   or   the   value   of   the   services   in   connection   with   which   the   mark   or   trade   name   was   used   in  the  infringement  of  the  rights  of  the  complaining   party.       156.2.   On   application   of   the   complainant,   the   court   may   impound   during   the   pendency   of   the   action,   sales   invoices  and  other  documents  evidencing  sales.       156.3.   In   cases   where   actual   intent   to   mislead   the   public   or   to   defraud   the   complainant   is   shown,   in   the   discretion  of  the  court,  the  damages  may  be  DOUBLED.       156.4.   The   complainant,   upon   proper   showing,   may   also  be  granted  injunction.      

 

2.

Civil  

 

a.

Infringement  

 

SECTION  155.  REMEDIES;  INFRINGEMENT.  –     Any   person   who   shall,   without   the   consent   of   the   owner   of  the  registered  mark:     155.1.   Use  in  commerce  any  reproduction,  counterfeit,   copy,   or   colorable   imitation   of   a   registered   mark   or   the   same   container   or   a   dominant   feature   thereof   in   connection   with   the   sale,   offering   for   sale,   distribution,  

SECTION   157.   POWER   OF   COURT   TO   ORDER   INFRINGING   MATERIAL  DESTROYED.  –     157.1   In   any   action   arising   under   this   Act,   in   which   a   violation   of   any   right   of   the   owner   of   the   registered   mark   is   established,   the   court   may   order   that   goods  

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Intellectual Property Law found  to  be  infringing  be,  without  compensation  of  any   sort,   disposed   of   outside   the   channels   of   commerce   in   such  a  manner  as  to  avoid  any  harm  caused  to  the  right   holder,   or   destroyed;   and   all   labels,   signs,   prints,   packages,   wrappers,   receptacles   and   advertisements   in   the  possession  of  the  defendant,  bearing  the  registered   mark   or   trade   name   or   any   reproduction,   counterfeit,   copy   or   colorable   imitation   thereof,   all   plates,   molds,   matrices   and   other   means   of   making   the   same,   shall   be   delivered  up  and  destroyed.     157.2.   In   regard   to   counterfeit   goods,   the   simple   removal   of   the   trademark   affixed   shall   not   be   sufficient   other   than   in   exceptional   cases   which   shall   be   determined  by  the  Regulations,  to  permit  the  release  of   the  goods  into  the  channels  of  commerce.      

limited  to  an  injunction  against  the  presentation  of  such   advertising   matter  in  future  issues  of  such  newspapers,   magazines,   or   other   similar   periodicals   or   in   future   transmissions   of   such   electronic   communications.   The   limitations   of   this   subparagraph   shall   apply   only   to   innocent   infringers:   Provided,   That   SUCH   INJUNCTIVE   RELIEF   SHALL   NOT   BE   AVAILABLE   to   the   owner   of   the   right  infringed  with  respect  to  an  issue  of  a  newspaper,   magazine,   or   other   similar   periodical   or   an   electronic   communication   containing   infringing   matter   where   restraining  the  dissemination  of  such  infringing  matter   in   any   particular   issue   of   such   periodical   or   in   an   electronic   communication   would   delay   the   delivery   of   such   issue   or   transmission   of   such   electronic   communication  is  customarily  conducted  in  accordance   with   the   sound   business   practice,   and   not   due   to   any   method   or   device   adopted   to   evade   this   section   or   to   prevent   or   delay   the   issuance   of   an   injunction   or   restraining  order  with  respect  to  such  infringing  matter;   and     159.4.   There   shall   be   no   infringement   of   trademarks   or   tradenames   of   imported   or   sold   drugs   and   medicines   allowed   under   Section   72.1   of   this   Act,   as   well   as   imported   or   sold   off-­‐patent   drugs   and   medicines:   Provided,   That   said   drugs   and   medicines   bear   the   registered   marks   that   have   not   been   tampered,   unlawfully  modified,  or  infringed  upon  as  defined  under   Section  155  of  this  Code.    

SECTION  158.  DAMAGES;  REQUIREMENT  OF  NOTICE.  –     In  any  suit  for  infringement,  the  owner  of  the  registered   mark  shall  not  be  entitled  to  recover  profits  or  damages   unless   the   acts   have   been   committed   with   knowledge   that   such   imitation   is   likely   to   cause   confusion,   or   to   cause   mistake,   or   to   deceive.   Such   knowledge   is   PRESUMED  if  the  registrant  gives  notice  that  his  mark  is   registered   by   displaying   with   the   mark   the   words   '"Registered   Mark"   or   the   letter   R   within   a   circle   or   if   the   defendant   had   otherwise   actual   notice   of   the   registration.      

SECTION  159.   LIMITATIONS  TO  ACTIONS  FOR  INFRINGEMENT.   –    

SECTION   161.   AUTHORITY   TO   DETERMINE   RIGHT   TO   REGISTRATION.  –    

Notwithstanding   any   other   provision   of   this   Act,   the   remedies   given   to   the   owner   of   a   right   infringed   under   this  Act  shall  be  limited  as  follows:     159.1.   Notwithstanding   the   provisions   of   Section   155   hereof,   a   registered   mark   shall   have   no   effect   against   any  person  who,  in  good  faith,  before  the  filing  date  or   the   priority   date,   was   using   the   mark   for   the   purposes   of   his   business   or   enterprise:   Provided,   That   his   right   may   only   be   transferred   or   assigned   together   with   his   enterprise  or  business  or  with  that  part  of  his  enterprise   or  business  in  which  the  mark  is  used.     159.2.   Where  an  infringer  who  is  engaged  solely  in  the   business   of   printing   the   mark   or   other   infringing   materials  for  others  is  an  innocent   infringer,  the  owner   of   the   right   infringed   shall   be   entitled   as   against   such   infringer  only  to  an  injunction  against  future  printing.     159.3.   Where   the   infringement   complained   of   is   contained   in   or   is   part   of   paid   advertisement   in   a   newspaper,  magazine,  or  other  similar  periodical  or  in  an   electronic  communication,  the  remedies  of  the  owner  of   the   right   infringed   as   against   the   publisher   or   distributor   of   such   newspaper,   magazine,   or   other   similar   periodical   or   electronic   communication   shall   be  

In   any   action   involving   a   registered   mark,   the   COURT   may   determine   the   right   to   registration,   order   the   cancellation   of   a   registration,   in   whole   or   in   part,   and   otherwise   rectify   the   register   with   respect   to   the   registration  of  any  party  to  the  action  in  the  exercise  of   this.   Judgment   and   orders   shall   be   certified  by  the  court   to   the   Director,   who   shall   make   appropriate   entry   upon   the   records   of   the   Bureau,   and   shall   be   controlled   thereby.    

SECTION  163.  JURISDICTION  OF  COURT.  –     All   actions   under   Sections   150,   155,   164,   and   166   to   169   shall   be   BROUGHT   BEFORE   THE   PROPER   COURTS   with   appropriate  jurisdiction  under  existing  laws.    

SECTION   164.   NOTICE   OF   FILING   SUIT   GIVEN   TO   THE   DIRECTOR.  –   It   shall   be   the   duty   of   the   clerks   of   such   courts   within   one   (1)   month   after   the   filing   of   any   action,   suit,   or   proceeding   involving   a   mark   registered   under   the   provisions   of   this   Act,   to   notify   the   Director   in   writing   setting   forth:   the   names   and   addresses   of   the   litigants   and   designating   the   number   of   the   registration   or   registrations   and   within   one   (1)   month   after   the   judgment   is   entered   or   an   appeal   is   taken,   the   clerk   of  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   court   shall   give   notice   thereof   to   the   Office,   and   the   latter   shall   endorse   the   same   upon   the   filewrapper   of   the   said   registration   or   registrations   and   incorporate   the   same  as  a  part  of  the  contents  of  said  filewrapper.    

same   trademark   by   others   on   unrelated   articles   of   a   different   kind.   Although   petitioner's   products   are   numerous,   they   are   of   the   same   class   or   line   of   merchandise   which   are   non-­‐competing   with   respondent's  product  of  cigarettes,  which  as  pointed  out   in  the  appealed  judgment  is  beyond  petitioner's  "zone  of   potential   or   natural   and   logical   expansion"   21   When   a   trademark  is  used  by  a  party  for  a  product  in  which  the   other   party   does   not   deal,   the   use   of   the   same   trademark   on   the   latter's   product   cannot   be   validly   objected  to.       Another   factor   that   shows   that   the   goods   involved   are   non-­‐competitive  and  non-­‐related  is  the  appellate  court's   finding   that   they   flow   through   different   channels   of   trade,  thus:  "The  products  of  each  party  move  along  and   are   disposed   through   different   channels   of   distribution.   The   petitioner's   products   are   distributed   principally   through   gasoline   service   and   lubrication   stations,   automotive   shops   and   hardware   stores.   On   the   other   hand,   the   respondent's   cigarettes   are   sold   in   sari-­‐sari   stores,   grocery   stores,   and   other   small   distributor   outlets.   Respondent's   cigarettes   are   even   peddled   in   the   streets  while  petitioner's  'gasul'  burners  are  not.  Finally,   there  is  a  marked  distinction  between  oil  and  tobacco,  as   well   as   between   petroleum   and   cigarettes.   Evidently,   in   kind   and   nature   the   products   of   respondent   and   of   petitioner  are  poles  apart."    

SECTION  232.  APPEALS.  -­‐     232.1.   Appeals   from   decisions   of   regular   courts   shall   be   governed   by   the   Rules   of   Court.   Unless   restrained   by   a   higher   court,   the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   shall   be   executory   even   pending   appeal   under   such   terms   and   conditions  as  the  court  may  prescribe.     232.2.   Unless   expressly   provided   in   this   Act   or   other   statutes,   appeals   from   decisions   of   administrative   officials  shall  be  provided  in  the  Regulations.    

ETEPHA  V.  DIRECTOR  OF  PATENTS  (1966),  SUPRA   Refresher:   Atussin  and  Pertussin     Doctrine:   In   the   solution   of   a   trademark   infringement   problem,   regard  too  should  be  given  to  the  class  of  persons  who   buy   the   particular   product   and   the   circumstances   ordinarily   attendant   to   its   acquisition.   The   medicinal   preparation  clothed  with  the  trademarks  in  question,  are   unlike  articles  of  everyday  use  such  as  candies,  ice  cream,   milk,   soft   drinks   and   the   like   which   may   be   freely   obtained  by  anyone,  anytime,  anywhere.  Petitioner's  and   respondent's  products  are  to  be  dispensed  upon  medical   prescription.   The   respective   labels   say   so.   An   intending   buyer   must   have   to   go   first   to   a   licensed   doctor   of   medicine;   he   receives   instructions   as   to   what   to   purchase;   he   reads   the   doctor's   prescription;   he   knows   what   he   is   to   buy.   He   is   not   of   the   incautious,   unwary,   unobservant   or   unsuspecting   type;   he   examines   the   product   sold   to   him;   he   checks   to   find   out   whether   it   conforms   to   the   medical   prescription.   The   common   trade  channel  is  the  pharmacy  or  the  drugstore.  Similarly,   the   pharmacist   or   druggist   verifies   the   medicine   sold.   The   margin   of   error   in   the   acquisition   of   one   for   the   other  is  quite  remote.    

FRUIT  OF  THE  LOOM  V.  CA  AND  GENERAL  GARMENTS  CORP.   (1984)   Refresher:   Respondent:   “Fruit   for   Eve”   –   women’s   panties   and   pajamas     Petitioner:   “Fruit   of   the   Loom”   –   men’s,   women’s   and   children’s  underwear     The   main   issue   involved   in   this   case   is   whether   or   not   private   respondent's   trademark   FRUIT   FOR   EVE   and   its   hang   tag   are   confusingly   similar   to   petitioner's   trademark  FRUIT  OF  THE  LOOM  and  its  hang  tag  so  as  to   constitute   an   infringement   of   the   latter's   trademark   rights  and  justify  the  cancellation  of  the  former.     Doctrine:   In   determining   whether   the   trademarks   are   confusingly   similar,   a   comparison   of   the   words   is   not   the   only   determinant   factor.   The   trademarks   in   their   entirety   as   they  appear  in  their  respective  labels  or  hang  tags  must   also  be  considered  in  relation  to  the  goods  to  which  they   are   attached.   The   discerning   eye   of   the   observer   must   focus   not   only   on   the   predominant   words   but   also   on   the  other  features  appearing  in  both  labels  in  order  that   he   may   draw   his   conclusion   whether   one   is   confusingly   similar  to  the  other.    

ESSO   STANDARD   EASTERN,   INC.   V.   CA   AND   UNITED   CIGARETTES    (1982)   Refresher:   “Esso”  on  petroleum  and  cigarette  products     Doctrine:   In   the   situation   before   us,   the   goods   are   obviously   different   from   each   other   with   "absolutely   no   iota   of   similitude"   as   stressed   in   respondent   court's   judgment.   They  are  so  foreign  to  each  other  as  to  make  it  unlikely   that   purchasers   would   think   that   petitioner   is   the   manufacturer   of   respondent's   goods.   The   mere   fact   that   one   person   has   adopted   and   used   a   trademark   on   his   goods   does   not   prevent   the   adoption   and   use   of   the  

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Intellectual Property Law WE   hold   that   the   trademarks   FRUIT   OF   THE   LOOM   and   FRUIT   FOR   EVE   do   not   resemble   each   other   as   to   confuse   or   deceive   an   ordinary   purchaser.   The   ordinary   purchaser   must   be   thought   of   as   having,   and   credited   with,   at   least   a   modicum   of   intelligence   to   be   able   to   see   the  obvious  differences  between  the  two  trademarks  in   question.   Furthermore,   We   believe   that   a   person   who   buys  petitioner's  products  and  starts  to  have  a  liking  for   it,   will   not   get   confused   and   reach   out   for   private   respondent's   products   when   she   goes   to   a   garment   store.    

may   be   dissipated   as   soon   as   the   court   assumes   to   analyze  carefully  the  respective  features  of  the  mark.     It   has   also   been   held   that   it   is   not   the   function   of   the   court  in  cases  of  infringement  and  unfair  competition  to   educate  purchasers  but  rather  to  take  their  carelessness   for   granted,   and   to   be   ever   conscious   of   the   fact   that   marks   need   not   be   identical.   A   confusing   similarity   will   justify   the   intervention   of   equity.   The   judge   must   also   be   aware   of   the   fact   that   usually   a   defendant   in   cases   of   infringement   does   not   normally   copy   but   makes   only   colorable   changes.   Well   has   it   been   said   that   the   most   successful  form  of  copying  is  to  employ  enough  points  of   similarity   to   confuse   the   public   with   enough   points   of   difference  to  confuse  the  courts.    

DEL   MONTE   CORP.   AND   PHIL.   PACKING   CORP.   V.   CA   AND   SUNSHINE  SAUCE  MANUFACTURING  INDUSTRIES  (1990)   Doctrine:   It   has   been   correctly   held   that   side-­‐by-­‐side   comparison   is   not  the  final  test  of  similarity.  Such  comparison  requires   a  careful  scrutiny  to  determine  in  what  points  the  labels   of   the   products   differ,   as   was   done   by   the   trial   judge.   The   ordinary   buyer   does   not   usually   make   such   scrutiny   nor  does  he  usually  have  the  time  to  do  so.  The  average   shopper  is  usually  in  a  hurry  and  does  not  inspect  every   product  on  the  shelf  as  if  he  were  browsing  in  a  library.   Where   the   housewife   has   to   return   home   as   soon   as   possible   to   her   baby   or   the   working   woman   has   to   make   quick   purchases   during   her   off   hours,   she   is   apt   to   be   confused   by   similar   labels   even   if   they   do   have   minute   differences.   The   male   shopper   is   worse   as   he   usually   does  not  bother  about  such  distinctions.       The   question   is   not   whether   the   two   articles   are   distinguishable   by   their   label   when   set   side   by   side   but   whether  the  general  confusion  made  by  the  article  upon   the  eye  of  the  casual  purchaser  who  is  unsuspicious  and   off  his  guard,  is  such  as  to  likely  result  in  his  confounding   it   with   the   original.   As   observed   in   several   cases,   the   general   impression   of   the   ordinary   purchaser,   buying   under   the   normally   prevalent   conditions   in   trade   and   giving   the   attention   such   purchasers   usually   give   in   buying  that  class  of  goods  is  the  touchstone.     It   has   been   held   that   in   making   purchases,   the   consumer   must  depend  upon  his  recollection  of  the  appearance  of   the   product   which   he   intends   to   purchase.   The   buyer   having   in   mind   the   mark/label   of   the   respondent   must   rely   upon   his   memory   of   the   petitioner's   mark.   Unlike   the   judge   who   has   ample   time   to   minutely   examine   the   labels  in  question  in  the  comfort  of  his  sala,  the  ordinary   shopper  does  not  enjoy  the  same  opportunity.     A  number  of  courts  have  held  that  to  determine  whether   a   trademark   has   been   infringed,   we   must   consider   the   mark   as   a   whole   and   not   as   dissected.   If   the   buyer   is   deceived,  it  is  attributable  to  the  marks  as  a  totality,  not   usually   to   any   part   of   it.   The   court   therefore   should   be   guided   by   its   first   impression,   for   a   buyer   acts   quickly   and   is   governed   by   a   casual   glance,   the   value   of   which  

ASIA  BREWERY,  INC.  V.  CA  AND  SAN  MIGUEL  CORP.   (1993),   SUPRA   Court  held:   Only   registered   trade   marks,   trade   names   and   service   marks   are   protected   against   infringement   or   unauthorized   use   by   another   or   others.   The   use   of   someone   else's   registered   trademark,   trade   name   or   service   mark   is   unauthorized,   hence,   actionable,   if   it   is   done  "without  the  consent  of  the  registrant."     Infringement   is   determined   by   the   "test   of   dominancy"   rather   than   by   differences   or   variations   in   the   details   of   one   trademark   and   of   another.   It   has   been   consistently   held  that  the  question  of  infringement  of  a  trademark  is   to  be  determined  by  the  test  of  dominancy.  Similarity  in   size,  form  and  color,  while  relevant,  is  not  conclusive.  If   the  competing  trademark  contains  the  main  or  essential   or   dominant   features   of   another,   and   confusion   and   deception   is   likely   to   result,   infringement   takes   place.   Duplication   or   imitation   is   not   necessary;   nor   it   is   necessary   that   the   infringing   label   should   suggest   an   effort   to   imitate.   The   question   at   issue   in   cases   of   infringement   of   trademarks   is   whether   the   use   of   the   marks   involved   would   be   likely   to   cause   confusion   or   mistakes  in  the  mind  of  the  public  or  deceive  purchasers.     The  universal  test  question  is  whether  the  public  is  likely   to   be   deceived.   Nothing   less   than   conduct   tending   to   pass  off  one  man's  goods  or  business  as  that  of  another   will   constitute   unfair   competition.   Actual   or   probable   deception  and  confusion  on  the  part  of  the  customers  by   reason  of  defendant's  practices  must  always  appear.    

CONRAD   AND   CO.   V.   CA,   FITRITE   INC.   AND   VICTORIA   BISCUITS  CO.  (1995)   Refresher:   Trademark  in  question  =  “Sunshine”     Doctrine:   Whether   CONRAD's   acts   of   importing,   selling   and   distributing   biscuits,   cookies   and   other   food   items  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   bearing   said   registered   "SUNSHINE"   trademark   in   the   Philippines   without   the   consent   of   its   registrant   (FITRITE)   constitute   infringement   thereof   in   contemplation   of   Sec.   22   of   Republic   Act   No.   166,   as   amended.   Under   Sec.   22,   the   elements   that   constitute   infringement   are   simply   (1)   the   use   by   any   person,   without   the   consent   of   the   registrant,   (2)   of   any   registered   mark   or   trade-­‐name   in   connection   with   the   sale,   business   or   services,   among   other   things,   bearing   such  registered  mark  or  trade-­‐name.       Thus,   having   the   exclusive   right   over   said   trademark,   FITRITE   should   be   protected   in   the   use   thereof;   and   considering   that   it   is   apparent   from   the   record   that   the   invasion   of   the   right   FITRITE   sought   to   protect   is   material   and   substantial;   that   such   right   of   FITRITE   is   clear   and   unmistakable;   and   that   there   is   an   urgent   necessity   to   prevent   serious   damage   to   FITRITE's   business   interest,   goodwill   and   profit,   thus   under   the   authority   of   Sec.   23   of   said   Republic   Act   No.   166,   as   amended,  a  preliminary  injunction  may  be  issued  in  favor   of  FITRITE  to  maintain  the  status  quo  pending  trial  of  the   action   a   quo   on   the   merits   without   prejudice   to   the   suspension   of   such   action   if   the   aforesaid   cancellation   proceeding  before  the  BPTTT  has  not  been  concluded.    

  As  its  title  implies,  the  test  of  dominancy  focuses  on  the   similarity   of   the   prevalent   features   of   the   competing   trademarks   which   might   cause   confusion   or   deception   and  thus  constitutes  infringement.     On   the   other   side   of   the   spectrum,   the   holistic   test   mandates   that   the   entirety   of   the   marks   in   question   must  be  considered  in  determining  confusing  similarity.     Applying   the   foregoing   tenets   to   the   present   controversy   and   taking   into   account   the   factual   circumstances   of   this   case,   we   considered   the   trademarks  involved  as  a  whole  and  rule  that  petitioner's   "STYLISTIC  MR.  LEE"  is  not  confusingly  similar  to  private   respondent's  "LEE"  trademark.     Petitioner's  trademark  is  the  whole  "STYLISTIC  MR.  LEE."   Although   on   its   label   the   word   "LEE"   is   prominent,   the   trademark   should   be   considered   as   a   whole   and   not   piecemeal.   The   dissimilarities   between   the   two   marks   become   conspicuous,   noticeable   and   substantial   enough   to  matter  especially  in  the  light  of  the  following  variables   that  must  be  factored  in.     First,  the  products  involved  in  the  case  at  bar  are,  in  the   main,  various  kinds  of  jeans.  These  are  not  your  ordinary   household  items  like  catsup,  soysauce  or  soap  which  are   of   minimal   cost.   Maong   pants   or   jeans   are   not   inexpensive.   Accordingly,   the   casual   buyer   is   predisposed   to   be   more   cautious   and   discriminating   in   and   would   prefer   to   mull   over   his   purchase.   Confusion   and  deception,  then,  is  less  likely.       Second,   like   his   beer,   the   average   Filipino   consumer   generally   buys   his   jeans   by   brand.   He   does   not   ask   the   sales   clerk   for   generic   jeans   but   for,   say,   a   Levis,   Guess,   Wrangler   or   even   an   Armani.   He   is,   therefore,   more   or   less  knowledgeable  and  familiar  with  his  preference  and   will  not  easily  be  distracted.     Finally,   in   line   with   the   foregoing   discussions,   more   credit  should  be  given  to  the  "ordinary  purchaser."  Cast   in   this   particular   controversy,   the   ordinary   purchaser   is   not   the   "completely   unwary   consumer"   but   is   the   "ordinarily   intelligent   buyer"   considering   the   type   of   product  involved.     The  definition  laid   down   in   Dy   Buncio   v.   Tan   Tiao  Bok  is   better   suited   to   the   present   case.   There,   the   "ordinary   purchaser"   was   defined   as   one   "accustomed   to   buy,   and   therefore   to   some   extent   familiar   with,   the   goods   in   question.  The  test  of  fraudulent  simulation  is  to  be  found   in   the   likelihood   of   the   deception   of   some   persons   in   some   measure   acquainted   with   an   established   design   and   desirous   of   purchasing   the   commodity   with   which   that  design  has  been  associated.  The  test  is  not  found  in   the   deception,   or   the   possibility   of   deception,   of   the  

EMERALD   GARMENT   MANUFACTURING   V.   CA   (1995),   SUPRA   Refresher:   “Stylistics  Mr.  Lee”  and  “Lee”     Doctrine:   The   essential   element   of   infringement   is   colorable   imitation.   This   term   has   been   defined   as   "such   a   close   or   ingenious   imitation   as   to   be   calculated   to   deceive   ordinary   purchasers,   or   such   resemblance   of   the   infringing  mark  to  the  original  as  to  deceive  an  ordinary   purchaser   giving   such   attention   as   a   purchaser   usually   gives,  and  to  cause  him  to  purchase  the  one  supposing  it   to  be  the  other."     Colorable   imitation   does   not   mean   such   similitude   as   amounts   to   identity.   Nor   does   it   require   that   all   the   details   be   literally   copied.   Colorable   imitation   refers   to   such  similarity  in  form,  content,  words,  sound,  meaning,   special   arrangement,   or   general   appearance   of   the   trademark  or  tradename  with  that  of  the  other  mark  or   tradename   in   their   over-­‐all   presentation   or   in   their   essential,   substantive   and   distinctive   parts   as   would   likely  mislead  or  confuse  persons  in  the  ordinary  course   of  purchasing  the  genuine  article.     In   determining   whether   colorable   imitation   exists,   jurisprudence   has   developed   TWO   KINDS   OF   TESTS   —   the  Dominancy  Test  applied  in  Asia  Brewery,  Inc.  v.  Court   of   Appeals   and   other   cases   and   the   Holistic   Test   developed  in  Del  Monte  Corporation  v.  Court  of  Appeals   and  its  proponent  cases.    

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Intellectual Property Law person  who  knows  nothing  about  the  design  which  has   been   counterfeited,   and   who   must   be   indifferent   between  that  and  the  other.  The  simulation,  in  order  to   be   objectionable,   must   be   such   as   appears   likely   to   mislead   the   ordinary   intelligent   buyer   who   has   a   need   to   supply   and   is   familiar   with   the   article   that   he   seeks   to   purchase."    

infringement.     On   the   other   side   of   the   spectrum,   the   holistic   test   mandates   that   the   entirety   of   the   marks   in   question   must   be   considered   in   determining   confusing   similarity.     As   this   Court   has   often   declared,   each   case   must   be   studied  according  to  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  each   case.     That   is   the   reason   why   in   trademark   cases,   jurisprudential   precedents   should   be   applied   only   to   a   case  if  they  are  specifically  in  point.     In  the  case  at  bar,  other  than  the  fact  that  both  Nestle’s   and   CFC’s   products   are   inexpensive   and   common   household  items,  the  similarity  ends  there.    What  is  being   questioned   here   is   the   use   by   CFC   of   the   trademark   MASTER.     In   view   of   the   difficulty   of   applying   jurisprudential  precedents  to  trademark  cases  due  to  the   peculiarity   of   each   case,   judicial   fora   should   not   readily   apply  a  certain  test  or  standard  just  because  of  seeming   similarities.    As  this  Court  has  pointed  above,  there  could   be   more   telling   differences   than   similarities   as   to   make   a   jurisprudential  precedent  inapplicable.     Nestle   points   out   that   the   dominancy   test   should   have   been  applied  to  determine  whether  there  is  a  confusing   similarity   between   CFC’s   FLAVOR   MASTER   and   Nestle’s   MASTER  ROAST  and  MASTER  BLEND.     We  agree.     It   must   be   emphasized   that   the   products   bearing   the   trademarks   in   question   are   “inexpensive   and   common”   household  items  bought  off  the  shelf  by  “undiscerningly   rash”   purchasers.     As   such,   if   the   ordinary   purchaser   is   “undiscerningly  rash”,  then  he  would  not  have  the  time   nor   the   inclination   to   make   a   keen   and   perceptive   examination   of   the   physical   discrepancies   in   the   trademarks   of   the   products   in   order   to   exercise   his   choice.     While   this   Court   agrees   with   the   Court   of   Appeals’   detailed   enumeration   of   differences   between   the   respective   trademarks   of   the   two   coffee   products,   this   Court   cannot   agree   that   totality   test   is   the   one   applicable   in   this   case.     Rather,   this   Court   believes   that   the   dominancy   test   is   more   suitable   to   this   case   in   light   of  its  peculiar  factual  milieu.     Moreover,   the   totality   or   holistic   test   is   contrary   to   the   elementary   postulate   of   the   law   on   trademarks   and   unfair   competition   that   confusing   similarity   is   to   be   determined   on   the   basis   of   visual,   aural,   connotative   comparisons  and  overall  impressions  engendered  by  the   marks   in   controversy   as   they   are   encountered   in   the   realities   of   the   marketplace.   The   totality   or   holistic   test   only   relies   on   visual   comparison   between   two   trademarks   whereas   the   dominancy   test   relies   not   only   on   the   visual   but   also   on   the   aural   and   connotative  

AMIGO  V.  CLUETT  PEABODY  (2001)   Refresher:   “Gold  Top”  and  “Gold  Toe”  mark  on  socks.     Court  decision:   In   the   present   case,   a   resort   to   either   the   Dominancy   Test   or   the   Holistic   Test   shows   that   colorable   imitation   exists   between   respondent’s   “Gold   Toe”   and   petitioner’s   “Gold   Top.”   A   glance   at   petitioner’s   mark   shows  that  it  definitely  has  a  lot  of  similarities  and  in  fact   looks   like   a   combination   of   the   trademark   and   devices   that   respondent   has   already   registered;   namely,   “Gold   Toe,”   the   representation   of   a   sock   with   a   magnifying   glass,  the  “Gold  Toe”  representation  and  “linenized.”     Admittedly,   there   are   some   minor   differences   between   the  two  sets  of  marks.    The  similarities,  however,  are  of   such   degree,   number   and   quality   that   the   overall   impression   given   is   that   the   two   brands   of   socks   are   deceptively   the   same,   or   at   least   very   similar   to   each   another.     An   examination   of   the   products   in   question   shows   that   their   dominant   features   are   gold   checkered   lines   against   a   predominantly   black   background   and   a   representation   of   a   sock   with   a   magnifying   glass.     In   addition,   both   products   use   the   same   type   of   lettering.     Both   also   include   a   representation   of   a   man’s   foot   wearing   a   sock   and   the   word   “linenized”   with   arrows   printed   on   the   label.     Lastly,   the   names   of   the   brands   are   similar  -­‐-­‐   “Gold  Top”  and  “Gold  Toe.”    Moreover,  it  must   also   be   considered   that   petitioner   and   respondent   are   engaged  in  the  same  line  of  business.    

SOCIETES  DES  PRODUITS  NESTLE  V.  CA  (2001),  SUPRA   Court  decision:   Under   Section   36   of   Republic   Act   165   (Patent   Law),   the   Director   of   Patents   is   authorized,   in   case   the   parties   failed   to   submit   a   licensing   agreement,   to   fix   the   terms   and  conditions  of  the  license.     Colorable   imitation   denotes   such   a   close   or   ingenious   imitation  as  to  be  calculated  to  deceive  ordinary  persons,   or   such   a   resemblance   to   the   original   as   to   deceive   an   ordinary   purchaser   giving   such   attention   as   a   purchaser   usually   gives,   as   to   cause   him   to   purchase   the   one   supposing  it  to  be  the  other.  In  determining  if  colorable   imitation   exists,   jurisprudence   has   developed   two   kinds   of   tests   -­‐   the   Dominancy   Test   and   the   Holistic   Test.   The   test   of   dominancy   focuses   on   the   similarity   of   the   prevalent   features   of   the   competing   trademarks   which   might  cause  confusion  or  deception  and  thus  constitute  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   comparisons   and   overall   impressions   between   the   two   trademarks.    

in  which  case  defendant’s  goods  are  then  bought  as  the   plaintiff’s   and   its   poor   quality   reflects   badly   on   the   plaintiff’s  reputation.    The  other  is  “confusion  of  business”   wherein   the   goods   of   the   parties   are   different   but   the   defendant’s  product  can  reasonably  (though  mistakenly)   be   assumed   to   originate   from   the   plaintiff,   thus   deceiving   the   public   into   believing   that   there   is   some   connection   between   the   plaintiff   and   defendant   which,   in  fact,  does  not  exist.     In   determining   the   likelihood   of   confusion,   the   Court   must  consider:     [a]  the  resemblance  between  the  trademarks;     [b]   the   similarity   of   the   goods   to   which   the   trademarks  are  attached;     [c]  the  likely  effect  on  the  purchaser  and     [d]  the  registrant’s  express  or  implied  consent   and  other  fair  and  equitable  considerations.     Whether   a   trademark   causes   confusion   and   is   likely   to   deceive   the   public   hinges   on   “colorable   imitation”   which   has   been   defined   as   “such   similarity   in   form,   content,  words,  sound,  meaning,  special  arrangement  or   general   appearance   of   the   trademark   or   tradename   in   their   overall   presentation   or   in   their   essential   and   substantive   and   distinctive   parts   as   would   likely   mislead   or   confuse   persons   in   the   ordinary   course   of   purchasing   the  genuine  article.”     Jurisprudence   has   developed  TWO   TESTS   in   determining   similarity   and   likelihood   of   confusion   in   trademark   resemblance   -­‐   the   Dominancy   Test   and   the   Holistic   or   Totality  Test.     The   Dominancy   Test   focuses   on   the   similarity   of   the   prevalent   features   of   the   competing   trademarks   which   might   cause   confusion   or   deception,   and   thus   infringement.     If   the   competing   trademark   contains   the   main,   essential   or   dominant   features   of   another,   and   confusion   or   deception   is   likely   to   result,   infringement   takes  place.  Duplication  or  imitation  is  not  necessary;  nor   is   it   necessary   that   the   infringing   label   should   suggest   an   effort  to  imitate.  The  question  is  whether  the  use  of  the   marks  involved  is  likely  to  cause  confusion  or  mistake  in   the  mind  of  the  public  or  deceive  purchasers.     On   the   other   hand,   the   Holistic   Test   requires   that   the   entirety   of   the   marks   in   question   be   considered   in   resolving   confusing   similarity.     Comparison   of   words   is   not   the   only   determining   factor.     The   trademarks   in   their   entirety  as  they  appear  in  their  respective  labels  or  hang   tags  must  also  be  considered  in  relation  to  the  goods  to   which   they   are   attached.     The   discerning   eye   of   the   observer  must  focus  not  only  on  the  predominant  words   but  also  on  the  other  features  appearing  in  both  labels  in   order   that   he   may   draw   his   conclusion   whether   one   is   confusingly  similar  to  the  other.    

MIGHTY  CORP.  V.  E.  &  J.  GALLO  WINERY  (2004)   Court  decision:   Although   the   laws   on   trademark   infringement   and   unfair   competition   have   a   common   conception   at   their   root,   that  is,  a  person  shall  not  be  permitted  to  misrepresent   his   goods   or   his   business   as   the   goods   or   business   of   another,   the   law   on   unfair   competition   is   broader   and   more  inclusive  than  the  law  on  trademark  infringement.     The   latter   is   more   limited   but   it   recognizes   a   more   exclusive  right  derived  from  the  trademark  adoption  and   registration   by   the   person   whose   goods   or   business   is   first  associated  with  it.    The  law  on  trademarks  is  thus  a   specialized   subject   distinct   from   the   law   on   unfair   competition,   although   the   two   subjects   are   entwined   with   each   other   and   are   dealt   with   together   in   the   Trademark  Law  (now,  both  are  covered  by  the  IP  Code).     Hence,   even   if   one   fails   to   establish   his   exclusive   property   right   to   a   trademark,   he   may   still   obtain   relief   on   the   ground   of   his   competitor’s   unfairness   or   fraud.     Conduct  constitutes  unfair  competition  if  the  effect  is  to   pass   off   on   the   public   the   goods   of   one   man   as   the   goods  of  another.    It  is  not  necessary  that  any  particular   means  should  be  used  to  this  end.     Trademark  infringement  v.  Unfair  competition:     (1)   Infringement   of   trademark   is   the   unauthorized   use   of   a   trademark,   whereas   unfair   competition   is   the   passing   off   of   one's   goods  as  those  of  another.     (2)   In   infringement   of   trademark   fraudulent   intent   is   unnecessary,   whereas   in   unfair   competition  fraudulent  intent  is  essential.     (3)   In   infringement   of   trademark   the   prior   registration   of   the   trademark   is   a   prerequisite   to   the   action,   whereas   in   unfair   competition   registration  is  not  necessary.     A  crucial  issue  in  any  trademark  infringement  case  is  the   likelihood   of   confusion,   mistake   or   deceit   as   to   the   identity,  source  or  origin  of  the  goods  or  identity  of  the   business   as   a   consequence   of   using   a   certain   mark.     Likelihood   of   confusion   is   admittedly   a   relative   term,   to   be   determined   rigidly   according   to   the   particular   (and   sometimes   peculiar)   circumstances   of   each   case.     Thus,   in  trademark  cases,  more  than  in  other  kinds  of  litigation,   precedents   must   be   studied   in   the   light   of   each   particular  case.     There   are   TWO   TYPES   OF   CONFUSION   IN   TRADEMARK   INFRINGEMENT.    The  first  is  “confusion  of  goods”  when   an   otherwise   prudent   purchaser   is   induced   to   purchase   one   product   in   the   belief   that   he   is   purchasing   another,  

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Intellectual Property Law In   comparing   the   resemblance   or   colorable   imitation   of   marks,  various  factors  have  been  considered,  such  as  the   dominant   color,   style,   size,   form,   meaning   of   letters,   words,   designs   and   emblems   used,   the   likelihood   of   deception   of   the   mark   or   name's   tendency   to   confuse   and  the  commercial  impression  likely  to  be  conveyed  by   the  trademarks  if  used  in  conjunction  with  the  respective   goods  of  the  parties.    

confusion   of   business   remains,   since   the   low-­‐income   group   might   be   led   to   believe   that   the   “Big   Mak”   hamburgers   are   the   low-­‐end   hamburgers   marketed   by   petitioners.    After  all,  petitioners  have  the  exclusive  right   to   use   the   “Big   Mac”   mark.         On   the   other   hand,   respondents   would   benefit   by   associating   their   low-­‐end   hamburgers,   through   the   use   of   the   “Big   Mak”   mark,   with   petitioners’   high-­‐end   “Big   Mac”   hamburgers,   leading   to   likelihood   of   confusion   in   the   identity   of   business.     The   registered   trademark   owner   may   use   his   mark   on   the   same   or   similar   products,   in   different   segments   of   the   market,   and   at   different   price   levels   depending   on   variations   of   the   products   for   specific   segments   of   the   market.     The   Court   has   recognized   that   the   registered   trademark   owner   enjoys   protection   in   product   and   market  areas  that  are  the  normal  potential  expansion  of   his  business.    Thus,  the  Court  has  declared:       Modern   law   recognizes   that   the   protection   to   which   the   owner   of   a   trademark   is   entitled   is   not   limited   to   guarding   his   goods   or   business   from   actual   market   competition   with   identical   or   similar   products   of   the   parties,   but   extends   to   all   cases   in   which   the   use   by   a   junior   appropriator   of   a   trade-­‐mark   or   trade-­‐name   is   likely  to  lead  to  a  confusion  of  source,  as  where   prospective   purchasers   would   be   misled   into   thinking   that   the   complaining   party   has   extended  his  business  into  the  field  or  is  in  any   way   connected   with   the   activities   of   the   infringer;   or   when   it   forestalls   the   normal   potential  expansion  of  his  business.     Test  to  determine  likelihood  of  confusion:   This   Court,   however,   has   relied   on   the   dominancy   test   rather   than   the   holistic   test.   The   dominancy   test   considers  the  dominant  features  in  the  competing  marks   in   determining   whether   they   are   confusingly   similar.       Under   the   dominancy   test,   courts   give   greater   weight   to   the   similarity   of   the   appearance   of   the   product   arising   from   the   adoption   of   the   dominant   features   of   the   registered   mark,   disregarding   minor   differences.   Courts   will   consider   more   the   aural   and   visual   impressions   created   by   the   marks   in   the   public   mind,   giving   little   weight   to   factors   like   prices,   quality,   sales   outlets   and   market  segments.       The   test   of   dominancy   is   now   explicitly   incorporated   into   law   in   Section   155.1   of   the   Intellectual   Property   Code   which   defines   infringement   as   the   “colorable   imitation   of   a   registered   mark   xxx   or   a   dominant   feature   thereof.”    

MCDONALD’S  CORP  V.  L.C.  BIG  MAK  (2004)   Court  decision:   To   establish   trademark   infringement,   the   following   elements  must  be  shown:     (1)  the  validity  of  plaintiff’s  mark;     (2)  the  plaintiff’s  ownership  of  the  mark;  and     (3)   the   use   of   the   mark   or   its   colorable   imitation   by   the   alleged   infringer   results   in   “likelihood  of  confusion.”       Of   these,   it   is   the   element   of   likelihood   of   confusion   that   is  the  gravamen  of  trademark  infringement.     Section   22   covers   two   types   of   confusion   arising   from   the   use   of   similar   or   colorable   imitation   marks,   namely,   confusion   of   goods   (product   confusion)   and   confusion   of  business  (source  or  origin  confusion).     In   confusion   of   goods,   the   ordinarily   prudent   purchaser   would  be  induced  to  purchase  one  product  in  the  belief   that   he   was   purchasing   the   other.   In   confusion   of   business,  though  the  goods  of  the  parties  are  different,   the   defendant’s   product   is   such   as   might   reasonably   be   assumed   to   originate   with   the   plaintiff,   and   the   public   would  then  be  deceived  either  into  that  belief  or  into  the   belief   that   there   is   some   connection   between   the   plaintiff   and   defendant   which,   in   fact,   does   not   exist.   Thus,   while   there   is   confusion   of   goods   when   the   products   are   competing,   confusion   of   business   exists   when   the   products   are   non-­‐competing   but   related   enough  to  produce  confusion  of  affiliation.     Petitioners  claim  that  respondents’  use  of  the  “Big  Mak”   mark   on   respondents’   hamburgers   results   in   confusion   of   goods,   particularly   with   respect   to   petitioners’   hamburgers  labeled  “Big  Mac.”  Since  respondents  used   the  “Big  Mak”  mark  on  the  same  goods,  i.e.  hamburger   sandwiches,   that   petitioners’   “Big   Mac”   mark   is   used,   trademark  infringement  through  confusion  of  goods  is  a   proper   issue   in   this   case.   Respondents   also   admit   that   their   business   includes   selling   hamburger   sandwiches,   the   same   food   product   that   petitioners   sell   using   the   “Big   Mac”   mark.   Thus,   trademark   infringement   through   confusion  of  business  is  also  a  proper  issue  in  this  case.         Respondents   assert   that   their   “Big   Mak”   hamburgers   cater   mainly   to   the   low-­‐income   group   while   petitioners’   “Big   Mac”   hamburgers   cater   to   the   middle   and   upper   income   groups.       Even   if   this   is   true,   the   likelihood   of  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   In   contrast,   the   Holistic   or   Totality   Test   necessitates   a   consideration  of  the  entirety  of  the  marks  as  applied  to   the   products,   including   the   labels   and   packaging,   in   determining   confusing   similarity.   The   discerning   eye   of   the   observer   must   focus   not   only   on   the   predominant   words,   but   also   on   the   other   features   appearing   on   both   labels   so   that   the   observer   may   draw   conclusion   on   whether  one  is  confusingly  similar  to  the  other.     Relative  to  the  question  on  confusion  of  marks  and  trade   names,   jurisprudence   has   noted   2   types   of   confusion,   viz.:   (1)   confusion   of   goods   (product   confusion),   where   the   ordinarily   prudent   purchaser   would   be   induced   to   purchase   one   product   in   the   belief   that   he   was   purchasing   the   other;   and   (2)   confusion   of   business   (source  or  origin  confusion),  where,  although  the  goods   of   the   parties   are   different,   the   product,   the   mark   of   which  registration  is  applied  for  by  one  party,  is  such  as   might   reasonably   be   assumed   to   originate   with   the   registrant   of   an   earlier   product,   and   the   public   would   then   be   deceived   either   into   that   belief   or   into   the   belief   that  there  is  some  connection  between  the  two  parties,   though  inexistent.     Applying   the   Dominancy   Test   to   the   case   at   bar,   this   Court   finds   that   the   use   of   the   stylized   "S"   by   respondent   in   its   Strong   rubber   shoes   infringes   on   the   mark  already  registered  by  petitioner  with  the  IPO.  While   it  is  undisputed  that  petitioner's  stylized  "S"  is  within  an   oval   design,   to   this   Court's   mind,   the   dominant   feature   of  the  trademark  is  the  stylized  "S,"  as  it  is  precisely  the   stylized   "S"   which   catches   the   eye   of   the   purchaser.     Thus,  even  if  respondent  did  not  use  an  oval  design,  the   mere   fact   that   it   used   the   same   stylized   "S",   the   same   being   the   dominant   feature   of   petitioner's   trademark,   already   constitutes   infringement   under   the   Dominancy   Test.     Withal,   the   protection   of   trademarks   as   intellectual   property   is   intended   not   only   to   preserve   the   goodwill   and  reputation  of  the  business  established  on  the  goods   bearing   the   mark   through   actual   use   over   a   period   of   time,   but   also   to   safeguard   the   public   as   consumers   against  confusion  on  these  goods.     Cases  on  bottles  and  containers    

MCDONALD’S  CORP.  V.  MACJOY  FASTFOOD  CORP.  (2007)   Court  decision:   Essentially,  the  issue  here  is  whether  there  is  a  confusing   similarity   between   the   MCDONALD’S   marks   of   the   petitioner   and   the   respondent’s   “MACJOY   &   DEVICE”   trademark   when   applied   to   Classes   29   and   30   of   the   International   Classification   of   Goods,   i.e.,   food   and   ingredients  of  food.       In   determining   similarity   and   likelihood   of   confusion,   jurisprudence   has   developed   two   tests,   the   dominancy   test   and   the   holistic   test.   The   dominancy   test   focuses   on   the  similarity  of  the  prevalent  features  of  the  competing   trademarks  that  might  cause  confusion  or  deception.  In   contrast,   the   holistic   test   requires   the   court   to   consider   the   entirety   of   the   marks   as   applied   to   the   products,   including   the   labels   and   packaging,   in   determining   confusing  similarity.  Under  the  latter  test,  a  comparison   of  the  words  is  not  the  only  determinant  factor.       In   trademark   cases,   particularly   in   ascertaining   whether   one   trademark   is   confusingly   similar   to   another,   no   set   rules   can   be   deduced   because   each   case   must   be   decided   on   its   merits.   In   such   cases,   even   more   than   in   any   other   litigation,   precedent   must   be   studied   in   the   light  of  the  facts  of  the  particular  case.  That  is  the  reason   why   in   trademark   cases,   jurisprudential   precedents   should   be   applied   only   to   a   case   if   they   are   specifically   in   point.         While   we   agree   with   the   CA’s   detailed   enumeration   of   differences  between  the  2  competing  trademarks  herein   involved,  we  believe  that  the  holistic  test  is  not  the  one   applicable   in   this   case,   the   dominancy   test   being   the   one   more   suitable.   In   recent   cases   with   a   similar   factual   milieu   as   here,   the   Court   has   consistently   used   and   applied   the   dominancy   test   in   determining   confusing   similarity  or  likelihood  of  confusion  between  competing   trademarks.    

SKETCHERS  V.  INTERPACIFIC  INDUSTRIAL  TRADING  (2011)   Court  decision:   The   essential   element   of   infringement   under   R.A.   No.   8293   is   that   the   infringing   mark   is   likely   to   cause   confusion.   In   determining   similarity   and   likelihood   of   confusion,   jurisprudence   has   developed   tests   –   the   Dominancy   Test   and   the   Holistic   or   Totality   Test.   The   Dominancy   Test   focuses   on   the   similarity   of   the   prevalent   or   dominant   features   of   the   competing   trademarks   that   might   cause   confusion,   mistake,   and   deception   in   the   mind   of   the   purchasing   public.   Duplication   or   imitation   is   not   necessary;   neither   is   it   required  that  the  mark  sought  to  be  registered  suggests   an   effort   to   imitate.   Given   more   consideration   are   the   aural   and   visual   impressions   created   by   the   marks   on   the   buyers   of   goods,   giving   little   weight   to   factors   like   prices,   quality,  sales  outlets,  and  market  segments.    

CAGAYAN  VALLEY  ENTERPRISES  V  CA  (1989)   Court  decision:   RA   623   extends   protection   to   qualified   manufacturer   who   successfully   registered   with   the   PPO   its   duly   stamped   or   marked   bottles,   boxes,   casks,   and   other   similar   containers.   It   merely   requires   that   bottles,   in   order  to  be  eligible  for  registration  must  be  stamped  or   marked   with   the   names   of   their   manufacturers   or   the   names   of   their   principals   or   products   or   other   marks   of   ownership.   No   drawings   or   labels   are   required   but   instead,  two  photos  of  the  container,  duly  signed  by  the  

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Intellectual Property Law applicant,   showing   clearly   and   legibly   the   names   and   other  marks  of  ownership  sought  to  be  registered  and  a   bottle   showing   the   name   or   other   mark   of   ownership,   irremovably  stamped  or  marked  shall  be  submitted.       Hard   liquor,   although   regulated,   is   not   probity   by   law,   hence  it  is  within  the  purview  and  coverage  of  RA  623.      

to   the   backyard,   cottage   and   small-­‐scale   manufacturers   of  indigenous  native  products  such  as  patis,  sisi  and  toyo   who   do   not   have   the   capital   to   buy   brand   new   bottles   as   containers   nor   afford   to   pass   the   added   cost   to   the   majority   of   the   poor   Filipinos   who   use   the   products   as   their  daily  condiments  or  viands.      

DISTILLERIA  WASHINGTON  V  CA  (1996)  

 

b.

Court  decision:   RA   623   extends   TM   protection   in   the   use   of   containers   duly  registered  with  the  PPO.  The  mere  use  of  registered   bottles  or  containers  without  the  written  consent  of  the   manufacturer   is   prohibited.   Only   exceptions:   usage   as   container   for   sisi,   bagoong,   patis   and   similar   native   products.       RA   623   does   not   disallow   the   sale   or   transfer   of   ownership  of  the  marked  bottles  or  containers.       While   it   may   be   unwarranted   for   the   registrant   to   simply   seize   the   empty   containers   from   one   engaged   in   the   unauthorized   use   of   said   containers,   it   would   be   legally   absurd   to   still   allow   the   latter   to   recover   possession   thereof—the   practical   and   feasible   alternative   is   to   merely  require  the  payment  of  just  compensation  to  the   latter.      

Unfair  competition  

SECTION   168.   UNFAIR   COMPETITION,   RIGHTS,   REGULATION   AND  REMEDIES.  –     168.1.   A   person   who   has   identified   in   the   mind   of   the   public   the   goods   he   manufactures   or   deals   in,   his   business   or   services   from   those   of   others,   whether   or   not  a  registered  mark  is  employed,  has  a  property  right   in   the   goodwill   of   the   said   goods,   business   or   services   so   identified,   which   will   be   protected   in   the   same   manner  as  other  property  rights.     168.2.   Any   person   who   shall   employ  deception   or   any   other   means   contrary   to   good   faith   by   which   he   shall   pass  off  the  goods  manufactured  by  him  or  in  which  he   deals,   or   his   business,   or   services   for   those   of   the   one   having   established   such   goodwill,   or   who   shall   commit   any  acts  calculated  to  produce  said  result,  shall  be  guilty   of   unfair   competition,   and   shall   be   subject   to   an   action   therefor.     168.3.   In   particular,   and   without   in   any   way   limiting   the   scope   of   protection   against   unfair   competition,   the   following  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  unfair  competition:     (a)   Any   person,   who   is   selling   his   goods   and   gives   them   the   general   appearance   of   goods   of   another   manufacturer   or   dealer,   either   as   to   the   goods   themselves   or   in   the   wrapping   of   the   packages   in   which   they   are   contained,  or  the  devices  or  words  thereon,  or   in  any  other  feature  of  their  appearance,  which   would   be   likely   to   influence   purchasers   to   believe   that   the   goods   offered   are   those   of   a   manufacturer   or   dealer,   other   than   the   actual   manufacturer   or   dealer,   or   who   otherwise   clothes   the   goods   with   such   appearance   as   shall   deceive   the   public   and   defraud   another   of   his   legitimate   trade,   or   any   subsequent   vendor   of   such   goods   or   any   agent   of   any   vendor   engaged   in   selling   such   goods   with   a   like  purpose;     (b)   Any   person   who   by   any   artifice,   or   device,   or   who   employs   any   other   means   calculated   to   induce   the   false   belief   that   such   person  is  offering  the  services  of  another   who   has   identified   such   services   in   the   mind   of   the   public;  or    

DISTILLERIA  WASHINGTON  V.  LA  TONDEÑA  (1997)   Court  decision:   It   is   implied   that   Section   2   and   3   of   RA   623   apply   only   when   the   registered   manufacturer,   bottler   or   seller   retain   ownership   of   the   bottles   and   when   the   bottles   have  been  transferred  by  way  of  sale,  Section  5  applies,   thereby   precluding   the   institution   of   any   action   under   Sections  2  and  3.       The   transferee   of   the   marked   bottles   transferred   by   way   of   sale   is   allowed   to   enjoy   all   the   rights   of   an   owner   in   regard   to   such   bottles.   What   is   proscribed   is   the   use   of   bottles   in   infringement   of   another’s   trademark   or   incorporeal  rights.       Where  the  marked  bottles  are  transferred  by  way  of  sale,   the   registered   owner   relinquishes   all   its   proprietary   rights   over   the   bottles   in   favor   of   the   person   who   obtains  them  in  due  course.      

TWIN  ACE  HOLDINGS  V.  CA  (1997)   Court  decision:   Registered  containers  of  hard  liquor  (rhum,  gin,  brandy,   and  the  like)  are  protected  by  RA  623.       RA   623   was   meant   to   protect   the   intellectual   property   rights   fo   the   registrants   of   the   containers   and   prevent   unfair  trade  practices  and  fraud  on  the  public.  HOWEVER,   the  exemption  granted  under  the  same  law  was  deemed   extremely  necessary  to  provide  assistance  and  incentive  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   circumstances   of   the   case.   The   affidavit   of   a   former   employee   of   Universal   attesting   to   the   illegal   sale   and   manufacture   of   “Spalding”   balls   and   seized   “Spalding”   products   and   instruments   from   Universal’s   factory   was   sufficient  prima  facie  evidence  to  warrant  prosecution  of   private  respondents.       That  a  corporation  other  than  the  certified  owner  of  the   TM   is   engaged   in   the   unauthorized   manufacture   of   products   bearing   the   same   TM   engenders   a   reasonable   belief   that   a   criminal   offense   for   unfair   competition   is   being  committed.       To   hold   that   the   act   of   selling   is   an   indispensable   element   of   the   crime   of   unfair   competition   is   illogical   because  if  the  law  punishes  the  seller  of  imitation  goods,   then   with   more   reason   should   the   law   penalize   the   manufacturer.        

(c)   Any  person  who  shall  make  any  false   statement   in   the   course   of   trade   or   who   shall   commit  any  other  act  contrary  to  good  faith  of   a   nature   calculated   to   discredit   the   goods,   business  or  services  of  another.     168.4.   The   remedies   provided   by   Sections   15610,   15711   and  16112  shall  apply  mutatis  mutandis.      

SECTION  232.  APPEALS.  –     232.1.   Appeals   from   decisions   of   regular   courts   shall   be   governed   by   the   Rules   of   Court.   Unless   restrained   by   a   higher   court,   the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   shall   be   executory   even   pending   appeal   under   such   terms   and   conditions  as  the  court  may  prescribe.     232.2.   Unless   expressly   provided   in   this   Act   or   other   statutes,   appeals   from   decisions   of   administrative   officials  shall  be  provided  in  the  Regulations.     Difference   between   infringement   and   unfair  

UNIVERSAL   RUBBER   PRODUCTS   V.   CA,   CONVERSE   RUBBER   CORPORATION,  EDWARSON  MANUFACTURING  CO.  (1984)   Court  decision:   General  rule:  On  obtaining  an  injunction  for  infringement   of   a   TM,   complainant   is   entitled   to   an   accounting   and   recovery  of  defendant’s  profits  on  the  goods  sold  under   the  TM  as  part  of  his  property  right.  This  rule  applies  also   in  cases  of  unfair  competition.       In  such  case,  the  infringer  or  unfair  trader  is  required  in   equity  to  account  for  and  yield  up  his  gains  on  a  principle   analogous   to   that   which   charges   as   trustee   with   the   profits   acquired   by   the   wrongful   use   of   the   property   of   the   cestui   que   trust   and   defendant’s   profits   are   regarded   as   an   equitable   measure   of   the   compensation   plaintiff   should  receive  for  the  past  harm  suffered  by  him.       In   recovering   the   loss   suffered   by   the   aggrieved   party   due  to  “unfair  competition,”  Sec.  23  of  RA  166  grants  the   complainant  three  options  within  which  to  ascertain  the   amount  of  damages  recoverable  either     [1]   reasonable   profit   with   the   complaining   party   would   have   made,   had   the   defendant   not   infringed   his   said   rights   [2]   profit   which   the   defendant   actually   made   out   the   infringement     [3]   the   court   may   award   as   damages   a   reasonable   percentage   based   upon   the   amount   of   gross   sales   of   the   defendant  of  the  value  of  the  services  in  connection  with   which   the   mark   or   tradename   was   issued   in   the   infringement  of  the  rights  of  the  complaining  party.       Nature  of  complaint  of  unfair  competition:  it’s  basically   a  suit  for  “injunction  and  damages”  because…   -­‐   Injunction:   for   the   purpose   of   enjoining   the   unlawful   competitor   from   proceeding   further   with   the   unlawful   competition    

competition    

DEL   MONTE   CORPORATION   V.   CA   AND   SUNSHINE   SAUCE   (1990)   Court  decision:   Distinctions   between   infringement   of   TM   and   unfair   competition.     INFRINGEMENT   UNFAIR  COMPETITION   Unauthorized  use  of  a  TM   Passing  off  of  one’s  goods   as  those  of  another   Intent  is  unnecessary   Fraudulent   intent   is   necessary   Prior   registration   of   the   Registration   is   not   TM  is  a  prerequisite  to  the   necessary   action     Lower   court   and   CA   dismissed   Del   Monte’s   complaint   against   Sunshine   Suace   for   infringement   of   TM   and   unfair   competition   because   of   Del   Monte’s   failure   to   establish   defendant’s   malice   or   bad   faith,   which   was   an   essential   element   of   infringement   of   TM   or   unfair   competition.   SC   reversed   the   lower   courts’   ruling   and   found   Sunshine   guilty   of   both   infringement   (logo   was   confusingly   similar)   and   unfair   competition   (refilling   of   Del  Monte’s  bottles  with  their  own  product).      

PRO   LINE   SPORTS   CENTER   V.   CA,   UNIVERSAL   ATHLETICS   INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTS  INC,  AND  MONICO  SEHWANI  (1997)   Court  decision:   The   existence   of   probable   cause   for   unfair   competition   by   Universal   is   derivable   from   the   facts   and                                                                                                                                                           10

 For  infringement    For  destroying  the  material   12  For  cancelation  of  registration   11

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Intellectual Property Law -­‐   Damages:   to   allow   the   aggrieved   party   to   recover   the   damage   he   has   suffered   by   virtue   of   the   said   unlawful   competition.       To   determine   the   amount   of   damages   allowable   only   after   final   determination   of   the   unfair   competition   case   would   render   nugatory   the   right   of   the   complainant   under  Sec.  23  RA  166  but  would  be  a  repetitious  process   causing  only  unnecessary  delay.      

SOLID   TRIANGLE   SALES   CORPORATION   V.   SHERIFF   OF   RTC   QC    (2001)   Court  decision:   Sanly  Corporation  did  not  pass  off  the  subject  goods  as   that   of   another.   Indeed,   it   admits   that   the   goods   are   genuine   Mitsubishi   photographic   paper,   which   it   purchased   from   a   supplier   in   HK.   Petitioner   alleges   that   private  respondents  “made  it  appear  that  they  were  duly   authorized   to   sell   or   distribute   Mitsubishi   Photo   Paper   in   the   PH.”   Assuming   this   act   constitutes   a   crime,   there   is   no  proof  to  establish  such  allegation.      

CONVERSE  RUBBER   CORPORATION  V.  JACINTO  RUBBER  AND   PLASTIC  CO  (1980)   Court  decision:   The   shoes   manufactured   by   defendants   (Custombuilt)   contained   practically   all   the   features   of   those   of   the   plaintiff   (Chuck   Taylors),   except   for   the   respective   brands,   of   course.   The   respective   designs,   shapes,   colors   of   the   ankle   patches,   the   bands,   the   toe   patch   and   the   soles  of  the  two  products  are  exactly  the  same  such  that   at  a  distance  of  few  meters,  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish   Custombuilt   from   Chuck   Taylor.   These   elements   are   more   than   sufficient   to   serve   as   basis   for   a   charge   of   unfair   competition.   Even   if   not   all   the   details   just   mentioned  were  identical,  with  the  general  appearances   alone   of   the   two   products,   any   ordinary   or   even   perhaps   even   a   not   too   perceptive   and   discriminating   customer   could   be   deceived,   and   therefore,   Custombuilt   could   easily  be  passed  off  for  Chuck  Taylor.       The  statute  on  unfair  competition  extends  protection  to   the   goodwill   of   the   manufacturer/dealer.   It   is   not   required  that:   Goodwill   sought   to   be   protected   in   an   action   for   unfair   competition   must   have   been   established   in   an   actual   competitive  situation.   Deception  or  other  means  contrary  to  good  faith  or  any   acts  calculated  to  pass  off  other  goods  for  those  of  one   who   has   established   good   will   must   have   been   committed  in  an  actual  competitive  situation.      

SONY   COMPUTER   ENTERTAINMENT   V.   SUPERGREEN,   INC.   (2007)   Court  decision:   Sony  filed  complaint  with  the  NBI  against  Supergreen  for   reproduction    and  distribution  of  counterfeit  Playstation   console   and   game   software.   Manufacture   is   in   Cavite   and   distribution   is   in   Mandaluyong.   Search   warrant   was   issued  by  Manila  RTC.  Supergreen  moved  for  quashal  of   the  search  warrants.       Court  upheld  the  warrants  for  Mandaluyong  because  it  is   within  the  judicial  region  of  Manila.       Where   a   person’s   imitation   of   the   general   appearance   of   another   person’s   goods   was   done   allegedly   in   Cavite   but   is  sold  the  goods  in  Metro  Manila,  the  alleged  acts  would   constitute   a   transitory   or   continuing   offense.   The   instant   cause   involves   a   transitory   or   continuing   offense   of   unfair  competition  under  Sec.  168  of  RA  8293.      

SEHWANI,   INC   AND   BENITA’S   FRIES,   INC   V.   IN-­‐N-­‐OUT   BURGER,  INC  (2007)   Court  decision:   The   question   of   WON   a   trademark   is   well-­‐known   is   factual  in  nature,  involving  as  it  does  the  appreciation  of   evidence  adduced  before  the  BLA-­‐IPO.       Section   151   (b)   of   RA   8293   specifically   provides   that   a   petition   to   cancel   the   registration   of   a   mark   which   is   registered   contrary   to   the   provisions   thereof,   or   which   is   used  to  misrepresent  the  source  of  the  goods  or  services   may   be   filed   anytime.   Laches   may   not   prevail   against   a   specific   provision   of   law,   since   equity,   which   has   been   defined   as   “justice   outside   legality”   is   applied   in   the   absence   of   and   not   against   statutory   law   or   rules   of   procedure.      

ASIA  BREWERY  V.  CA  (1993)   Court  decision:   In   resolving   cases   of   infringement   and   unfair   competition,   courts   should   take   into   consideration   several   factors   which   would   affect   its   conclusion.   E.g.   age,   training   and   education   of   the   usual   purchaser,   the   nature   and   cost   of   the   article,   whether   the   article   is   bought   for   immediate   consumption   and   also   the   conditions  under  which  it  is  usually  purchased.       The   ruling   in   Del   Monte   should   not   be   applied   here   because   of   the   consideration   of   the   aforementioned   factors.   Beer   is   not   usually   picked   up   from   a   store   shelf   but   ordered   by   brand   by   the   beer   drinker   himself   from   the  storekeeper  or  waiter  in  a  pub  or  restaurant.      

COCA-­‐COLA  V.  GOMEZ  (2008)   Court  decision:   Unfair   competition   previously   defined   in   PH   jurisprudence   in   relation   with   RA   166   and   Articles   188   and   189   of   RPC   is   now   covered   by   Section   168   IPC   as   this   Code  has  expressly  repealed  RA  165,  RA  166  and  Articles   188   and   189   of   the   RPC.   The   law   does   not   cover   every  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   unfair  act  committed  in  the  course  of  business,  it  covers   only   acts   characterized   by   “deception   or   any   other   means   contrary   to   good   faith”   in   the   passing   off   of   goods   and   services   as   those   of   another   or   who   has   established   goodwill   in   relation   with   these   goods   or   services   or   any   other   act   calculated   to   produce   the   same   result.     Under  Sec.  168  of  RA  8293,  [1]  deception,  [2]  passing  off   and   [3]   fraud   upon   the   public   are   still   the   key   elements   that  must  be  present  for  unfair  competition  to  exist.       “True  test  of  unfair  competition”  –  whether  the  acts  of   defendant   are   such   as   calculated   to   deceive   the   ordinary   buyer   making   his   purchases   under   the   ordinary   conditions  which  prevail  in  the  particular  trade  to  which   the  controversy  relates.       Re  hoarding  (collection  of  the  petitioner’s  empty  bottles   so  that  they  can  be  withdrawn  from  circulation,  and  thus   impede   the   circulation   of   the   petitioner’s   bottled   products)     à   The   critical   question   is   not   the   intrinsic   unfairness   of   the   act   of   hoarding—what   is   critical   for   purposes   of   Sec.   168   (3)   is   to   determine   if   the   hoarding,   as   charged,   is   “of   a   nature   calculated   to   discredit   the   goods,   business   or   services”  of  another.       Given  the  IPC’s  specific  focus,     FIRST   TEST   [that   should   be   made   when   question   arises   on   whether   a   matter   is   covered   by   the   Code]   -­‐   to   ask   if   it   refers  to  an  IP  right  as  defined  in  the  Code   SECOND  TEST  –  if  a  disputed  matter  does  not  expressly   refer   to   an   IP   right   as   defined   above,   is   whether   it   falls   under   the   general   “unfair   competition”   concept   and   definition  under  Sections  168.1  and  168.2  of  the  IPC       Hoarding   of   a   competitor’s   product   does   not   fall   within   the   coverage   of   the   IPC   and   of   Sec.   168   in   particular.   It   does   not   relate   to   any   patent,   TM,   trade   name   or   service   that   the   respondents   have   invaded,   intruded   into   or   used   without   proper   authority   from   the   petitioner   nor   are  the  respondents  alleged  to  have  fraudulently  passed   of   their   products   or   services   as   those   of   the   petitioner.       Hoarding   for   purposes   of   destruction   is   closer   to   RA   623’s   provision   (which   has   not   been   expressly   repealed   by  RA  8293).       • Hoarding   is   not   within   purview   of   unfair   competition;   there   could   be   no   probable   cause.   Does   not   cover   unfair   act,   only   the   deception   and   contrary  to  good  faith.     • Must  be  calculated  to  discredit     • Adverse  reputational  impact  on  the  business.       • Obiter:  in  order  for  unfair  competition  committed,  it   must   be   related   to   intellectual   property.   It’s   not   just   passing  off,  it’s  broader  than  that.  Objective  is  really  

•

to   protect   the   property   rights   of   the   business.     Bottle   is   very   critical,   that’   the   most   expensive  component.    

 

SUPERIOR   COMMERCIAL   ENTERPRISES   V.   KUNNAN   ENTERPRISES  LTD  (2010)   Court  decision:   There   can   be   trademark   infringement   without   unfair   competition,  such  as  when  the  infringer  discloses  on  the   labels   containing   the   mark   that   he   manufactures   the   goods,   thus   preventing   the   public   from   being   deceived   that  the  goods  originate  from  the  TM  owner.       INFRINGEMENT:     Elements  of  trademark  infringement:     1) Validity  of  the  plaintiff’s  mark   2) Plaintiff’s  ownership  of  the  mark   3) Use   of   the   mark   or   its   colorable   imitation   by   the   alleged   infringer   results   in   “likelihood   or   confusion”     UNFAIR   COMPETITION:   passing   off   (or   palming   off)   or   attempting   to   pass   off   upon   the   public   of   the   goods   or   business   of   one   person   as   the   goods   or   business   of   another   with   the   end   and   probable   effect   of   deceive   the   public.     Elements  of  unfair  competition:     1) confusing   similarity   in   the   general   appearance   of  goods   2) intent   to   deceive   the   public   and   defraud   a   competitor    

c.

Action   for   false   or   fraudulent   declaration  

 

SECTION   162.   ACTION   FOR   FALSE   OR   FRAUDULENT   DECLARATION.  –     Any   person   who   shall   procure   registration   in   the   Office   of   a   mark   by   a   false   or   fraudulent   declaration   or   representation,   whether   oral   or   in   writing,   or   by   any   false  means,   shall   be   liable   in   a   civil   action   by   any   person   injured   thereby   for   any   damages   sustained   in   consequence  thereof      

SECTION  163.  JURISDICTION  OF  COURT.  –     All   actions   under   Sections   150,   155,   164,   and   166   to   169   shall   be   brought   before   the   proper   courts   with   appropriate  jurisdiction  under  existing  laws.      

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Intellectual Property Law 169.2.   Any  goods  marked  or  labelled  in  contravention   of   the   provisions   of   this   Section   shall   not   be   imported   into   the   Philippines   or   admitted   entry   at   any   customhouse  of  the  Philippines.  The  owner,  importer,  or   consignee   of   goods   refused   entry   at   any   customhouse   under   this   section   may   have   any   recourse   under   the   customs  revenue  laws  or  may  have  the  remedy  given  by   this  Act  in  cases  involving  goods  refused  entry  or  seized.    

SECTION   164.   NOTICE   OF   FILING   SUIT   GIVEN   TO   THE   DIRECTOR.  –     It   shall   be   the   duty   of   the   clerks   of   such   courts   within   one   (1)   month   after   the   filing   of   any   action,   suit,   or   proceeding   involving   a   mark   registered   under   the   provisions   of   this   Act,   to   notify   the   Director   in   writing   setting   forth:   the   names   and   addresses   of   the   litigants   and   designating   the   number   of   the   registration   or   registrations   and   within   one   (1)   month   after   the   judgment   is   entered   or   an   appeal   is   taken,   the   clerk   of   court   shall   give   notice   thereof   to   the   Office,   and   the   latter   shall   endorse   the   same   upon   the   filewrapper   of   the   said   registration   or   registrations   and   incorporate   the   same  as  a  part  of  the  contents  of  said  filewrapper.      

SECTION  232.  APPEALS.  –     232.1.   Appeals   from   decisions   of   regular   courts   shall   be   governed   by   the   Rules   of   Court.   Unless   restrained   by   a   higher   court,   the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   shall   be   executory   even   pending   appeal   under   such   terms   and   conditions  as  the  court  may  prescribe.     232.2.   Unless   expressly   provided   in   this   Act   or   other   statutes,   appeals   from   decisions   of   administrative   officials  shall  be  provided  in  the  Regulations.     CIVIL  REMEDIES   -­‐ Venue:  Commercial  courts     CRIMINAL  REMEDIES   -­‐ Venue:  Commercial  courts     CAUSES  OF  ACTION:   Infringement  v.  Unfair  Competition     Infringement   Unfair   Competition   Definition   Unauthorized   use   Passing   off   of   of  the  trademark   one’s   goods   as   goods  of  another   Registration   Required   NOT   required   –   that’s   why   it's   the   last  resort   Fraudulent   Not  required   Required  –  harder   intent   to  prove   Wrongful   Use   of   mark   Damaged   good   act   without  consent   will   of   the   business     Ma’am:   Thus,   better   remedy   is   infringement.   Unfair   competition  is  resorted  to  only  after  infringement  failed   (if   applicable).   Infringement   may   be   proved   upon   showing  certificate  of  registration.       Question:   Why   do   we   still   have   the   remedy   of   unfair   competition   if   registration   is   the   basis   of   the   right?   To   give  a  remedy  to  persons  with  well-­‐known  mark  but  are   not  registered  in  the  Philippines.     Basis   of   unfair   competition:   Protection   of   the   goodwill   of  the  business,  which  is  a  property  right.     Section   168.3’s   enumeration   –   merely   illustrative.   168.3   states   “without   in   any   way   limiting   the   scope   of  

SECTION  232.  APPEALS.  –     232.1.   Appeals   from   decisions   of   regular   courts   shall   be   governed   by   the   Rules   of   Court.   Unless   restrained   by   a   higher   court,   the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   shall   be   executory   even   pending   appeal   under   such   terms   and   conditions  as  the  court  may  prescribe.     232.2.   Unless   expressly   provided   in   this   Act   or   other   statutes,   appeals   from   decisions   of   administrative   officials  shall  be  provided  in  the  Regulations.    

d.

Action   for   false   declaration  of  origin  

 

SECTION   169.   FALSE   DESIGNATIONS   OF   ORIGIN;   FALSE   DESCRIPTION  OR  REPRESENTATION.  –     169.1.   Any   person   who,   on   or   in   connection   with   any   goods   or   services,   or   any   container   for   goods,   uses   in   commerce   any   word,   term,   name,   symbol,   or   device,   or   any   combination   thereof,   or   any   false   designation   of   origin,  false  or  misleading  description  of  fact,  or  false  or   misleading  representation  of  fact,  which:     (a)   Is   likely   to   cause   confusion,   or   to   cause   mistake,   or   to   deceive   as   to   the   affiliation,   connection,   or   association   of   such   person  with  another  person,  or  as  to  the  origin,   sponsorship,   or   approval   of   his   or   her   goods,   services,   or   commercial   activities   by   another   person;  or     (b)   In   commercial   advertising   or   promotion,   misrepresents   the   nature,   characteristics,   qualities,   or   geographic   origin   of   his   or   her   or   another   person's   goods,   services,   or   commercial   activities,   shall   be   liable   to   a   civil   action   for   damages   and   injunction   provided   in   Sections   156   and   157   of   this  Act  by  any  person  who  believes  that  he  or   she  is  or  is  likely  to  be  damaged  by  such  act.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   protection  against  unfair  competition.”     Note:   Includes   a   false   statement   in   the   course   of   trade   calculated  to  discredit  the  goods,  business  or  services  of   another.  à  Spreading  rumors  about  the  competitor.     Coca   Cola   case   à   hoarding   does   not   fall   within   the   purview   of   unfair   competition.   Unfair   competition   does   not  cover  every  act  unfair  to  the  business.   Ma’am:   Note   the   obiter,   which   states   that   for   there   to   be   unfair   competition,   the   act   must   be   related  to  IP.     Infringement   and   unfair   competition   are   based   on   CONFUSING   SIMILARITY   between   goods,   business,   or   service.     Tests:   1. Dominancy   test   –   does   not   require   that   every   element   be   similar.   Requires   only   that   the   dominant   element   be   similar.   Most   strict   test.   More  often  than  not,  plaintiff  will  win.     2. Holistic  test  –  requires  a  side-­‐by-­‐side  comparison   of   the   goods.   Also   not   limited   to   the   visual   similarities   and   differences,   includes   a   consideration   of   how   the   products   are   presented.   Most   lenient   test.   More   often   than   not,  defendant  will  win.     Del   Monte   case   à   did   not   specify   how   to   determine   which  test  to  use,  but  according  to  Ma’am,  it  provides  a   rational   explanation.   According   to   the   Court,   for   ordinary,   everyday,   inexpensive   goods,   the   test   to   be   applied   is   the   dominancy   test,   because   buyers   do   not   usually  scrutinize  inexpensive  goods.  On  the  other  hand,   for   expensive   goods,   the   test   to   be   applied   is   the   holistic   test,   because   buyers   usually   take   the   time   to   scrutinize   the  products  before  buying.     Ma’am:   The   guidelines   as   to   what   test   to   apply   are   not   clear-­‐cut.   The   courts   are   actually   given   wide   latitude   of   discretion   to   choose   which   test   to   apply.   It   would   depend  on  the  court’s  appreciation  of  the  facts  and  the   circumstances  of  each  case.       Note:   McDonald’s   case,   SC   held   that   dominancy   test   should  be  applied  because  it  has  legal  basis.       UNFAIR  COMPETITION:   Elements:   1. Confusing  similarity   2. Fraudulent  intent     Solid   Triangle   case*   à   no   unfair   competition   because   the   goods   were   genuine.   Other   party   was   a   parallel   importer  of  genuine  products.    

FALSE  OR  FRAUDULENT  DECLARATION:   Ma’am:   This   is   the   most   superfluous   provision.   Only   a   civil  remedy,  no  criminal  aspect  because  not  included  in   Section   170.   Thus,   it   should   not   be   used   as   an   independent   cause   of   action.   It   may   be   used   only   as   an   alternate  cause  of  action.     FALSE   DESIGNATION   OF   ORIGIN   OR   FALSE   DESCRIPTION:   Ma’am:   Example   –   In-­‐n-­‐Out   Burger   claiming   the  same  as  the  foreign  business.      

3.

Criminal  

 

SECTION  170.  PENALTIES.  –     Independent   of   the   civil   and   administrative   sanctions   imposed  by  law,  a  criminal  penalty  of  imprisonment  from   TWO   (2)   YEARS   TO   FIVE   (5)   YEARS   and   a   fine   ranging   from   Fifty   thousand   pesos   (P50,000)   to   Two   hundred   thousand   pesos(P200,000),   shall   be   imposed   on   any   person  who  is  found  guilty  of  committing  any  of  the  acts   mentioned   in   Section   155   (Infringement),   Section   168   (Unfair   competition)   and   Subsection   169.1   (False   designation  of  origin).    

SY  V.  CA  (1982)   Court  decision:   Where  the  accused  was  charged  with  unfair  competition,   but   the   TC,   being   of   the   opinion   that   the   crime   is   infringement   of   TM,   neither   acquitted   nor   found   the   accused  guilty  but  ordered  the  filing  of  a  new  and  proper   information,  there  can  be  no  double  jeopardy.       There   can   be   no   double   jeopardy   where   there   was   neither   acquittal   nor   conviction,   but   merely   an   order   to   file  a  new  information  for  the  correct  offense.       A   new   preliminary   investigation   is   not   called   for   where   court   orders   filing   of   correct   information   involving   a   cognate   offense   (unfair   competition   to   infringement   of   TM).      

SAMSON  V.  JUDGE  DAWAY  (2004)   Court  decision:   Which  court  has  jurisdiction  over  criminal  and  civil  cases   for  violation  of  intellectual  property  rights?  Regional  Trial   Courts     Sec.   163   of   IPC   states   that   actions   (both   civil   and   criminal)   under   Sec.   150,   155,   164,   166,   167,   168   and   169   shall   be   brought   before   proper   courts   with   appropriate   jurisdiction   “under   existing   laws.”   The   existing   law   referred  to  in  Sec.  163  is  Sec.  27  of  RA  166.       RA   166   is   not   repealed   by   RA   8293   because   of   the   wording   of   the   repealing   clause   in   239.1   wherein   it   mentioned  “parts  of  Acts”  and  “inconsistent  therewith.”  

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Intellectual Property Law The   use   of   such   phrases   only   mean   that   the   repeal   pertains   only   to   provisions   which   are   repugnant   or   not   susceptible  of  harmonization  with  RA  8293.      

CONVERSE   RUBBER   CORPORATION   V.   UNIVERSAL   RUBBER   PRODUCTS  (1987)   Court  decision:   WON   the   respondent’s   partial   appropriation   of   petitioner’s  corporate  name  is  of  such  character  that  it  is   calculated  to  deceive  or  confuse  the  public  to  the  injury   of  the  petitioner  to  which  the  name  belongs?       A   tradename   is   any   individual   name   or   surname,   firm   name,   device   or   word   used   by   manufacturers,   industrialists,   merchants   and   others   to   identify   their   businesses,  vocations  or  occupations.  As  the  tradename   refers   to   the   business   and   its   goodwill,   the   trademark   refers  to  the  goods.       There   is   a   basic   similarity   between   the   tradenames   “Universal  Converse  and  Device”  and  “Converse  Rubber   Corporation”   as   in   both   names   CONVERSE   is   the   dominant   word   and   both   parties   engaged   in   similar   business.       A  tradename  may  not  be  similar  to  a  corporate  name.  –  A   corporation  is  entitled  to  the  cancellation  of  a  mark  that   is   confusingly   similar   to   its   corporate   name.     Appropriation   by   another   of   the   dominant   part   of   a   corporate  name  is  an  infringement.       The  determinative  factor  in  ascertaining  whether  or  not   marks   are   confusingly   similar   to   each   other   is   “not   whether   the   challenged   mark   would   actually   cause   confusion   or   deception   of   the   purchasers   but   whether   use  of  such  mark  would  likely  cause  confusion  or  mistake   on  the  party  of  the  buying  public.”       The  risk  of  damage  is  not  limited  to  a  possible  confusion   of  goods  but  also  includes  confusion  of  reputation  if  the   public   could   reasonably   assume   that   the   goods   of   the   parties  originated  from  the  same  source.       Converse   Rubber   Corporation   has   already   earned   a   business   reputation   in   this   country   which   should   be   protected.    

YAO,  SR.  V.  PEOPLE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  (2007)   Court  decision:   Corporation   owned   by   Yao   family   were   allegedly   engaged   in   unlawful   refilling   and   selling   of   LPG   tanks   owned   by   Shell   and   Petron.   A   search   warrant   was   issued   against   their   store   by   virtue   of   NBI   seized   several   cylindrical   LPG   tanks.   Yao   family   demands   return   of   the   items   seized   by   the   raiding   team   considering   that   no   action   for   infringement   has   been   filed   against   them   or   their   corporation,   invoking   Sec.   20   of   AM   02-­‐01-­‐06-­‐SC     which  provides  that:       Sec.   20.   Failure   to   file   complaint.   –   The   writ   shall   also,   upon   motion   of   the   expected   adverse   party,   be   set   aside   and   the   seized   documents   and   articles   returned   to   the   expected   adverse   party   if   no   case   is   filed   with   the   appropriate   court   or   authority   within   31   calendar   days     from   the   date   of   the   issuance   of   the  writ.       AM   02-­‐1-­‐06-­‐SC   is   not   applicable   in   the   present   case   because   it   governs   only   searches   and   seizures   in   civil   actions   for   infringement   of   intellectual   property   rights.   The   offense   complained   of   herein   is   for   a   criminal   violation  of  Sec.  155  in  relation  Sec.  170  of  RA  8293.       Samson  v.  Daway  case  à  justified  the  jurisdiction  of  the   RTC  on  the  basis  of  RA  166,  in  connection  with  IP  Code’s   repealing  clause.   Ma’am:   RA   166   was   resurrected!   But   actually,   since   the   IP   Code   was   a   codification   effort,   there  was  actually  an  intent  to  repeal  the  entire   Code.     Better  resolution  would  have  been  that  the  SC   has  a  delegated  power  under  BP  129  .     Ownership   and   search   warrant   validity.   Ownership   is   not   material.   Truck   was   seized   and  even  if  it  did  not  belong,  as  long  as  it  is   found   in   crime   scene.   Ownership   would   not   matter.      

J.

2.  

SECTION  165.1.    

Tradenames  

A   name   or   designation   may   not   be   used   as   a   trade   name   if   by   its   nature   or   the   use   to   which   such   name   or   designation  may  be  put,  it  is  contrary  to  public  order  or   morals   and   if,   in   particular,   it   is   liable   to   deceive   trade   circles   or   the   public   as   to   the   nature   of   the   enterprise   identified  by  that  name.    

 

1.

Definition  

 

SECTION  121.3.  

What  may  not  be  used  as  a   tradename?  

 

"TRADE  NAME"  means  the  name  or  designation  identifying   or  distinguishing  an  enterprise    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   3.

This   principle   proceeds   upon   the   theory   that   it   is   fraud   on   the   corporation   which   has   acquired   a   right   to   that   name   and   perhaps   carried   on   its   business   thereunder   that   another   should   attempt   to   use   the   same   name   or   the  same  name  with  a  slight  variation  in  such  a  way  as  to   induce  persons  to  deal  with  it  in  the  belief  that  they  are   dealing   with   the   corporation   which   has   given   a   reputation  to  the  name.      

Rights   of   the   tradename   owner  

 

SECTION  165.2.   (a)   Notwithstanding   any   laws   or   regulations   providing   for   any   obligation   to   register   trade   names,   such   names   shall  be  protected,  even  prior  to  or  without  registration,   against  any  unlawful  act  committed  by  third  parties.     (b)  In  particular,  any  subsequent  use  of  the  trade  name   by   a   third   party,   whether   as   a   trade   name   or   a   mark   or   collective  mark,  or  any  such  use  of  a  similar  trade  name   or   mark,   likely   to   mislead   the   public,   shall   be   deemed   unlawful.    

ARMCO  STEEL  CORPORATION  V.  SEC  (1987)   Court  decision:   A   trademark   is   entitled   to   protection   in   the   use   thereof   in   the   Philippines.   The   owner   has   the   right   to   the   exclusive  use  and  enjoyment  of  the  term.       Armco   Steel-­‐Philippines   and   Armco   Steel-­‐Ohio   have   not   only   identical   name   but   also   a   similarity   in   line   of   business.   People   who   are   buying   and   using   products   bearing  the  TM  Armco  might  be  led  to  believe  that  such   products   are   manufactured   by   the   respondent,   when   in   fact,  they  might  actually  be  produced  by  the  petitioners.   Thus,   the   goodwill   that   should   grow   and   inure   to   the   benefit   of   the   petitioners   could   be   impaired   and   prejudiced  by  the  continued  use  of  the  same  term  by  the   respondent.      

SECTION  165.3.   The   remedies   provided   for   in   Sections   153   to   156   and   Sections  166  and  167  shall  apply  mutatis  mutandis.    

SECTION  165.4.   Any   change   in   the   ownership   of   a   trade   name   shall   be   made  with  the  transfer  of  the  enterprise  or  part  thereof   identified   by   that   name.   The   provisions   of   Subsections   149.2  to  149.4  shall  apply  mutatis  mutandis.    

WESTERN  EQUIPMENT  &  SUPPLY  CO  V.  REYES  (1927)  

PHILIPS  EXPORT  V.  CA  (1992)  

Court  decision:   An   unregistered   foreign   corporation   which   has   not   personally   transacted   in   the   PH   but   which   has   acquired   valuable   goodwill   and   high   reputation   therein   through   the   sale   by   importers   and   the   extensive   use   within   the   territory   of   its   products   bearing   either   its   corporate   name  or  TM  has  a  legal  right  to  restrain  an  officer  of  the   government,   who   has   full   knowledge   of   those   facts,   from   issuing   a   certificate   of   incorporation   to   residents   of   the  PH  who  are  attempting  to  organize  a  corporation  for   the   purpose   of   pirating   the   corporate   name   of   the   foreign   corporation   and   of   engaging   in   the   same   business,   for   the   purpose   of   making   the   public   believe   that  the  goods  which  it  proposes  to  sell  are  the  goods  of   the   foreign   corporation   and   of   defrauding   it   and   its   local   dealers  of  their  legitimate  trade.       The   purpose   of   such   a   suit   is   to   protect   its   reputation,   corporate   name   and   goodwill   which   have   been   established  through  the  natural  development  of  its  trade   over   a   long   period   of   years,   in   the   doing   of   which   it   does   not   seek   to   enforce   any   legal   or   contract   rights   arising   from   or   growing   out   of   any   business   which   it   has   transacted  in  the  Ph.       Under   such   state   of   facts,   the   right   to   the   use   of   the   corporate  and  trade  name  of  the  foreign  corporation  is  a   property   right,   a   right   in   rem,   which   it   may   assert   and   protect   in   any   of   the   courts   of   the   world   even   in   countries   where   it   does   not   personally   transact   any   business.  

Court  decision:   A   corporation’s   right   to   use   its   corporate   and   trade   name   is   a   property   right,   a   right   in   rem   which   it   may   assert  and  protect  against  the  world  in  the  same  manner   as   it   may   protect   its   tangible   property,   real   or   personal   against  trespass  or  conversion.  It  is  regarded  to  a  certain   extent,   as   a   property   right   and   one   which   cannot   be   impaired   or   defeated   by   subsequent   appropriation   by   another  corporation  in  the  same  field.       GR   as   to   corporation:   Each   corporation   must   have   a   name   by   which   it   is   to   sue   and   be   sued   and   do   all   legal   acts.  A  corporation  can  no  more  use  a  corporate  name  in   violation   of   the   right   of   others   than   an   individual   can   use   his   name   legally   acquired   so   as   to   mislead   the   public   and   injure  another.       The  right  to  the  exclusive  use  of  a  corporate  name  with   freedom   from   infringement   by   similarity   is   determined   with  priority  of  adoption.       In   determining   the   existence   of   confusing   similarity   in   corporate  name,  the  test  is  whether  the  similar  is  such  as   to   mislead   a   person   using   ordinary   care   and   discrimination.       A   corporation   has   an   exclusive   right   to   the   use   of   its   name   which   may   be   protected   by   injunction   upon   a   principle   similar   to   that   upon   which   persons   are   protected   in   the   use   of   trademarks   and   tradenames.   à  

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Intellectual Property Law   It  is  the  trade  and  not  the  mark  that  is  to  be  protected,   and   a   TM   does   not   acknowledge   any   territorial   boundaries,   but   extends   to   every   market   where   the   trader’s  goods  have  become  known  and  identified  by  the   use  of  the  mark.      

licensed   by,   or   sourced   from,   Harvard   University   without   the  latter's  consent.     TRADE  NAME:   Old  law:  Trademark  same  as  trade  name.   IP  Code:  Trade  name  is  different.     Trade   name   is   a   name   or   designation   identifying   an   enterprise.     Differences   in   treatment   between   trademark   and   trade   name:   -­‐ REGISTRATION   –   Under   the   IP   Code,   registration   is   not   required   to   acquire   protection   of   trade   name.   The   basis   of   protection  is  prior  use  in  Philippine  commerce.   You   can   set   this   up   against   the   trademark   owner.  (Note  168.3)     -­‐ REMEDIES   AVAILABLE   –   Note   the   problem   with  non-­‐registration  of  trade  name:  There  is  a   limitation   of   remedy   available   to   the   trade   name   owner.     Trade   name   owner   does   not   have   criminal   remedy.   Only   civil   and   administrative.       -­‐ ASSIGNABILITY   –   Trade   name   is   NOT   separate   to   the   business.   Trade   name   may   be   transferred   only   with   the   transfer   of   the   business.   Trademark   or   service   mark   may   be   assigned  independently  of  the  business.     SERVICE  MARK:  Trademark  used  in  services.      

FREDCO  MANUFACTURING   CORPORATION  V  PRESIDENT  AND   FELLOWS  OF  HARVARD  COLLEGE  (2011)   Court  decision:   Article  8  of  the  Paris  Convention  has  been  incorporated   in  Section  37  of  R.A.  No.  166,  as  follows:     Article   8,   Paris   Convention   -­‐-­‐   A   trade   name   shall   be   protected   in   all   the   countries   of   the   Union   without   the   obligation   of   filing   or   registration,   whether  or  not  it  forms  part  of  a  trademark.     Section  37,  RA  166.  Rights   of   foreign   registrants.   -­‐-­‐   Persons   who   are   nationals   of,   domiciled   in,   or   have   a   bona   fide   or   effective   business   or   commercial  establishment  in  any  foreign  country,   which  is  a  party  to  any  international  convention  or   treaty   relating   to   marks   or   trade-­‐names,   or   the   repression   of   unfair   competition   to   which   the   Philippines   may   be   a   party,   shall   be   entitled   to   the   benefits   and   subject   to   the   provisions   of   this   Act   to   the   extent   and   under   the   conditions   essential   to  give  effect  to  any  such  convention  and  treaties   so   long   as   the   Philippines   shall   continue   to   be   a   party   thereto,   except   as   provided   in   the   following   paragraphs  of  this  section.       xxxx     Trade-­‐names   of   persons   described   in   the   first   paragraph   of   this   section   shall   be   protected   without   the   obligation   of   filing   or   registration   whether  or  not  they  form  parts  of  marks.   xxxx  

K. Collective  Marks    

1.

Definition  

 

SECTION  121.2.  

  Thus,   under   Philippine   law,   a   trade   name   of   a   national   of   a   State   that   is   a   party   to   the   Paris   Convention,   whether   or   not   the   trade   name   forms   part   of   a   trademark,   is   protected   “without   the   obligation   of   filing   or   registration.”     “Harvard”   is   the   trade   name   of   the   world   famous   Harvard  University,  and  it  is  also  a  trademark  of  Harvard   University.   Under   Article   8   of   the   Paris   Convention,   as   well   as   Section   37   of   R.A.   No.   166,   Harvard   University   is   entitled  to  protection  in  the  Philippines  of  its  trade  name   "Harvard"  even  without  registration  of  such  trade  name   in  the  Philippines.  This  means  that  no  educational  entity   in   the   Philippines   can   use   the   trade   name   "Harvard"   without  the  consent  of  Harvard  University.  Likewise,  no   entity  in  the  Philippines  can  claim,  expressly  or  impliedly   through   the   use   of   the   name   and   mark   "Harvard,"   that   its   products   or   services   are   authorized,   approved,   or  

"COLLECTIVE   MARK"   means   any   visible   sign   designated   as   such   in   the   application   for   registration   and   capable   of   distinguishing   the   origin   or   any   other   common   characteristic,   including   the   quality   of   goods   or   services   of   different   enterprises   which   use   the   sign   under   the   control  of  the  registered  owner  of  the  collective  mark    

SECTION  167.  COLLECTIVE  MARKS.  –     167.1.  Subject  to  Subsections  167.2  and  167.3,  Sections  122   to   164   and   166   shall   apply   to   collective   marks,   except   that   references   therein   to   "mark"   shall   be   read   as   "collective  mark".     167.2.  (a)  An   application   for   registration   of   a   collective   mark   shall   designate   the   mark   as   a   collective   mark   and   shall  be  accompanied  by  a  copy  of  the  agreement,  if  any,   governing  the  use  of  the  collective  mark.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   (b)   The   registered   owner   of   a   collective   mark   shall   notify   the   Director   of   any   changes   made   in   respect   of   the   agreement  referred  to  in  paragraph  (a).     167.3.   In   addition   to   the   grounds   provided   in   Section   149,   the   Court   shall   cancel   the   registration   of   a   collective   mark   if   the   person   requesting   the   cancellation   proves   that   only   the   registered   owner  uses  the  mark,  or  that  he   uses   or   permits   its   use   in   contravention   of   the   agreements   referred   to   in   Subsection   166.2   or   that   he   uses   or   permits   its   use   in   a   manner   liable   to   deceive   trade   circles   or   the   public   as   to   the   origin   or   any   other   common   characteristics   of   the   goods   or   services   concerned.     167.4.   The   registration   of   a   collective   mark,   or   an   application  therefor  shall  not  be  the  subject  of  a  license   contract.     COLLECTIVE  MARK   Mark   designed   to   be   used   by   parties   other   than   the   registrant.   This   is   usually   used   by   cooperatives.   The   owner   of   the   mark   is   the   one   who   registers,   but   the   members   of   the   cooperative   are   the   ones   who   use   it.   The  registrant  only  holds  it.  But  anyone  who  qualifies  to   be  a  member  (or  meets  the  standard  of  the  agreement)   may  use  the  collective  mark.     In  Canada,  this  is  used  to  protect  the  products   of  indigenous  communities.     In  the  Philippines,  it  has  not  been  used.    

VII.

Law  on  Patents  

  PATENTS   This   field   gives   rise   to   serious   issues   on   access.   Unlike   copyright   that   has   a   very   low   standard,   patent   is   very   exclusionary.   Under   patents,   a   parallel   invention   is   not   allowed.   Patent   is   a   monopoly.   Patent   owner   is   given   exclusive  right  to  import.     Patents   are   costly   to   the   society.   Issuance   of   patent   means   that   the   state   allows   the   patent   holder   to   maximize   the   economic   value   of   the   invention   to   the   exclusion   of   everybody   else.   Thus,   for   patents   to   work,   the  state  must  ensure  that  it  is  given  only  to  the  one  who   deserves  it.     In  the  Philippines,  the  patent  system  is  identified  as  the   major   cause   of   the   high   prices   in   medicines.   Philippines   are   among   the   states   that   has   the   highest   patent   standards,  even  before  it  was  required  to  do  so.       Philippines   also   did   not   adopt   the   flexibilities   under   the   TRIPS   Agreement.   For   example,   under   the   TRIPS,   the   country   is   allowed   to   adopt   any   exhaustion   principle   it   chooses.  A  country  may  use  the  international  exhaustion   principle.  The  Philippines,  however,  decided  to  adopt  the   domestic  exhaustion  principle.     Purpose   of   the   patent   –   to   promote   the   advancement   of   technology.  It  was  established  as  an  incentive  system  to   encourage   innovation.   But   the   ultimate   objective   is   to   reward  the  public.     KINDS  OF  PATENTS:   1. Invention   2. Utility  model   3. Industrial  design   4. Layout  circuits  –  it  was  designed  to  encourage  semi-­‐ conductor   companies   to   invest   in   the   Philippines   (but  as  of  date,  no  registration  for  this).     STANDARDS  OF  PATENT  PROTECTION:   -­‐ Key  to  effective  patent  protection.   -­‐ Note:   Different   rules   apply   to   different   countries.   You   might   have   to   consider   this   in   advising  clients  on  registration.     1. Novelty   -­‐ Not  part  of  prior  art.  Prior  art  is  anything  made   available  on  any  part  of  the  world.   -­‐ Anything   found   in   the   public   domain   is   not   novel   part.   Anything   also   part   of   prior   application  is  part  of  prior  art.   -­‐ Philippine   law   exception   –   1   year   of   non-­‐ prejudicial  disclosure.     2. Inventiveness   -­‐ Anything   that   is   not   obvious   to   a   person   skilled  

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Intellectual Property Law in  the  art.   “Person   skilled   in   the   art”   has   no   uniform   definition.   Here   in   the   Philippines,   definition   is   textbook.   In   some   countries,   term   limited   to   those  with  doctorate  degree.   “Evergreening   of   a   patent”   –   attempt   to   prolong   the   patent   monopoly   by   changing  one  element.  

-­‐

-­‐

  3.

SECTION  236.  PRESERVATION  OF  EXISTING  RIGHTS.  –     Nothing   herein   shall   adversely   affect   the   rights   on   the   enforcement   of   rights   in   patents,   utility   models,   industrial   designs,   marks   and   works,   acquired   in   good   faith  prior  to  the  effective  date  of  this  Act.      

RA   9502   -­‐   UNIVERSALLY   ACCESSIBLE   CHEAPER   AND   QUALITY  MEDICINES  ACT  OF  2008     -­‐

Industrial  applicability   -­‐ Has  some  use.    

  SECTION  47.  SEPARABILITY  CLAUSE.  –     Any  portion  or  provision  of  this  Act  that  may  be  declared   unconstitutional   or   invalid   shall   not   have   the   effect   of   nullifying  other  portions  and  provisions  hereof  as  long  as   such  remaining  portion  or  provision  can  still  subsist  and   be  given  effect  in  their  entirety.     SECTION  48.  REPEALING  CLAUSE.  –     All   laws,   decrees,   executive   orders,   proclamations   and   administrative   regulations   or   parts   thereof   inconsistent   herewith  are  hereby  repealed  or  modified  accordingly.     SECTION  49.  EFFECTIVITY  CLAUSE.  –     This   Act   shall   take   effect   fifteen   (15)   days   after   its   publication  in  at  least  two  (2)  national  papers  of  general   circulation.    

    Invention     Utility   model   Industrial   design   Layout   circuit  

Novelty  

Inventiveness  

Industrial   Applicability  

ü  

ü  

ü  

ü  

û  

ü  

ü  

û  

û  

ü  

(originality)  

 

 

 

A. Legislative  history    

REPUBLIC   ACT   165   -­‐   AN   ACT   CREATING   A   PATENT   OFFICE,   PRESCRIBING   ITS   POWERS   AND   DUTIES,   REGULATING   THE   ISSUANCE   OF   PATENTS,   AND   APPROPRIATING   FUNDS   THEREFOR   -­‐

amended   certain   provision   of   the   Intellectual   Property  Code  

B. Definition  

Took  effect  on  20  June  1947  

  “The   right   of   monopoly   secured   by   statute   to   those   who   invent  or  discover  new  and  useful  devices  and  processes.   The  exclusive  right  of  manufacture,  sale,  or  use  secured   by   statute   to   one   who   invents   or   discovers   a   new   and   useful  device  or  process.”  (US  Dictionary)    

 

SECTION  239.  REPEALS.  –     239.1.   All   Acts   and   parts   of   Acts   inconsistent   herewith,   more   particularly   Republic   Act   No.   165,   as   amended;   Republic   Act   No.   166,   as   amended;   and   Articles   188   and   189   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code;   Presidential   Decree   No.   49,   including   Presidential   Decree   No.   285,   as   amended,   are  hereby  repealed.    

C.

Purpose  

 

MANZANO  V.  CA  (1997)  

SECTION   235.   APPLICATIONS   PENDING   ON   EFFECTIVE   DATE   OF  ACT.  –    

Court  decision:   The   primary   purpose   of   the   patent   system   is   not   the   reward  of  the  individual  but  the  advancement  of  the  arts   and   sciences.   The   function   of   a   patent   is   to   add   to   the   sum  of  useful  knowledge  and  one  of  the  purposes  of  the   patent   system   is   to   encourage   dissemination   of   information   concerning   discoveries   and   inventions.   This   is   a   matter   which   is   properly   within   the   competence   of   the   Patent   Office   the   official   action   of   which   has   the   presumption   of   correctness   and   may   not   be   interfered   with   in   the   absence   of   new   evidence   carrying   thorough   conviction   that   the   Office   has   erred.   Since   the   Patent   Office   is   an   expert   body   preeminently   qualified   to   determine   questions   of   patentability,   its   findings   must   be   accepted   if   they   are   consistent   with   the   evidence,   with   doubts   as   to   patentability   resolved   in   favor   of   the   Patent  Office.  

235.1.  All  applications  for  patents  pending  in  the  Bureau   of  Patents,  Trademarks  and  Technology  Transfer  shall  be   proceeded   with   and   patents   thereon   granted   in   accordance   with   the   Acts   under   which   said   applications   were   filed,   and   said   Acts   are   hereby   continued   to   be   enforced,   to   this   extent   and   for   this   purpose   only,   notwithstanding   the   foregoing   general   repeal   thereof:   Provided,   That   applications   for   utility   models   or   industrial   designs   pending   at   the   effective   date   of   this   Act,   shall   be   proceeded   with   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   this   Act,   unless   the   applicants   elect   to   prosecute   said   applications   in   accordance   with   the   Acts   under  which  they  were  filed.    

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advances   in   technology   and   design,   in   return   for   the   exclusive   right   to   practice   the   invention   for  a  number  of  years.    The  inventor  may  keep   his   invention   secret   and   reap   its   fruits   indefinitely.     In   consideration   of   its   disclosure   and  the  consequent  benefit  to  the  community,   the  patent  is  granted.    An  exclusive  enjoyment   is   guaranteed   him   for   17   years,   but   upon   the   expiration  of  that  period,  the  knowledge  of  the   invention   inures   to   the   people,   who   are   thus   enabled  to  practice  it  and  profit  by  its  use.”  

PEARL  &  DEAN  (PHIL.),  INC.  V.  SHOEMART,  SUPRA   Refresher:   Light  boxes     Doctrine:   On  patent  infringement:   For  some  reason  or  another,  petitioner  never  secured  a   patent   for   the   light   boxes.     It   therefore   acquired   no   patent  rights  which  could  have  protected  its  invention,  if   in   fact   it   really   was.     And   because   it   had   no   patent,   petitioner   could   not   legally   prevent   anyone   from   manufacturing   or   commercially   using   the   contraption.     In   Creser   Precision   Systems,   Inc.   vs.   Court   of   Appeals,   we   held  that  “there  can  be  no  infringement  of  a  patent  until   a   patent   has   been   issued,   since   whatever   right   one   has   to   the  invention  covered  by  the  patent  arises  alone  from  the   grant  of  patent.  An  inventor  has  no  common  law  right  to   a   monopoly   of   his   invention.   He   has   the   right   to   make   use   of   and   vend   his   invention,   but   if   he   voluntarily   discloses   it,   such   as   by   offering   it   for   sale,   the   world   is   free  to  copy  and  use  it  with  impunity.    A  patent,  however,   gives   the   inventor   the   right   to   exclude   all   others.     As   a   patentee,   he   has   the   exclusive   right   of   making,   selling   or   using  the  invention.  On  the  assumption  that  petitioner’s   advertising   units   were   patentable   inventions,   petitioner   revealed   them   fully   to   the   public   by   submitting   the   engineering  drawings  thereof  to  the  National  Library.     To  be  able  to  effectively  and  legally  preclude  others  from   copying   and   profiting   from   the   invention,   a   patent   is   a   primordial  requirement.    No  patent,  no  protection.    The   ultimate  goal  of  a  patent  system  is  to  bring  new  designs   and   technologies   into   the   public   domain   through   disclosure.   Ideas,   once   disclosed   to   the   public   without   the   protection   of   a   valid   patent,   are   subject   to   appropriation  without  significant  restraint.     On   one   side   of   the   coin   is   the   public   which   will   benefit   from   new   ideas;   on   the   other   are   the   inventors   who   must  be  protected.    As  held  in  Bauer  &  Cie  vs.  O’Donnel,   “The   act   secured   to   the   inventor   the   exclusive   right   to   make   use,   and   vend   the   thing   patented,   and   consequently   to   prevent   others   from   exercising   like   privileges   without   the   consent   of   the   patentee.     It   was   passed   for   the   purpose   of   encouraging   useful   invention   and   promoting   new   and   useful   inventions   by   the   protection  and  stimulation  given  to  inventive  genius,  and   was   intended   to   secure   to   the   public,   after   the   lapse   of   the   exclusive   privileges   granted   the   benefit   of   such   inventions  and  improvements.”     The  law  attempts  to  strike  an  ideal  balance  between  the   two  interests:     “The   patent   system   thus   embodies   a   carefully   crafted   bargain   for   encouraging   the   creation   and   disclosure   of   new   useful   and   non-­‐obvious  

  The   patent   law   has   a   three-­‐fold   purpose:   “first,   patent   law   seeks   to   foster   and   reward   invention;   second,   it   promotes   disclosures   of   inventions   to   stimulate   further   innovation   and   to   permit   the   public   to   practice   the   invention   once   the   patent   expires;   third,   the   stringent   requirements   for   patent   protection   seek   to   ensure   that   ideas  in  the  public  domain  remain  there  for  the  free  use   of  the  public.”     It  is  only  after  an  exhaustive  examination  by  the  patent   office   that   a   patent   is   issued.     Such   an   in-­‐depth   investigation   is   required   because   “in   rewarding   a   useful   invention,   the   rights   and   welfare   of   the   community   must   be  fairly  dealt  with  and  effectively  guarded.    To  that  end,   the   prerequisites   to   obtaining   a   patent   are   strictly   observed  and  when  a  patent  is  issued,  the  limitations  on   its  exercise  are  equally  strictly  enforced.    To  begin  with,  a   genuine   invention   or   discovery   must   be   demonstrated   lest   in   the   constant   demand   for   new   appliances,   the   heavy  hand  of  tribute  be  laid  on  each  slight  technological   advance  in  art.”     There   is   no   such   scrutiny   in   the   case   of   copyrights   nor   any   notice   published   before   its   grant   to   the   effect   that   a   person   is   claiming   the   creation   of   a   work.     The   law   confers  the  copyright  from  the  moment  of  creation  and   the  copyright  certificate  is  issued  upon  registration  with   the  National  Library  of  a  sworn  ex-­‐parte  claim  of  creation.    

D. What  are  patentable?    

1.

Inventions  

 

SECTION  21.  PATENTABLE  INVENTIONS.  –     Any  technical  solution  of  a  problem  in  any  field  of  human   activity   which   is   new,   involves   an   inventive   step   and   is   industrially   applicable   shall   be   Patentable.   It   may   be,   or   may  relate  to,  a  product,  or  process,  or  an  improvement   of  any  of  the  foregoing.    

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MAGUAN  V.  CA  (1986)   Refresher:   Patent  for  powder  puff  (in  cosmetics)     Doctrine:   It   has   been   repeatedly   held   that   an   invention   must   possess   the   essential   elements   of   novelty   ,   originality   and   precedence   and   for   the   patentee   to   be   entitled   to   protection,   the   invention   must   be   new   to   the   world.   Accordingly,   a   single   instance   of   public   use   of   the   invention   by   a   patentee   for   more   than   two   years   (now   for   more   than   one   year   only   under   Sec.   9   of   the   Patent   Law)   before   the   date   of   his   application   for   his   patent,   will  be  fatal  to,  the  validity  of  the  patent  when  issued.     It   will   be   noted   that   the   validity   of   petitioner's   patents   is   in   question   for   want   of   novelty.   Private   respondent   contends  that  powder  puffs  Identical  in  appearance  with   that   covered   by   petitioner's   patents   existed   and   were   publicly   known   and   used   as   early   as   1963   long   before   petitioner   was   issued   the   patents   in   question.   As   correctly   observed   by   respondent   Court   of   Appeals,   "since   sufficient   proofs   have   been   introduced   in   evidence  showing  a  fair  question  of  the  invalidity  of  the   patents   issued   for   such   models,   it   is   but   right   that   the   evidence   be   looked   into,   evaluated   and   determined   on   the   merits   so   that   the   matter   of   whether   the   patents   issued  were  in  fact  valid  or  not  may  be  resolved."     All   these   notwithstanding,   the   trial   court   nonetheless   issued   the   writ   of   preliminary   injunction   which   under   the   circumstances  should  be  denied.     For   failure   to   determine   first   the   validity   of   the   patents   before   aforesaid   issuance   of   the   writ,   the   trial   court   failed   to   satisfy   the   two   requisites   necessary   if   an   injunction   is   to   issue,   namely:   the   existence   of   the   right   to  be  protected  and  the  violation  of  said  right.    

 

SECTION  23.  NOVELTY.  –     An  invention  shall  not  be  considered  new  if  it  forms  part   of  a  prior  art.      

SECTION  24.  PRIOR  ART.  –     Prior  art  shall  consist  of:     24.1.   Everything   which   has   been   made   available   to  the  public  anywhere  in  the  world,  before  the   filing  date  or  the  priority  date  of  the  application   claiming  the  invention;  and     24.2.  The  whole  contents  of  an  application  for  a   patent,   utility   model,   or   industrial   design   registration,   published   in   accordance   with   this   Act,   filed   or   effective   in   the   Philippines,   with   a   filing   or   priority   date   that   is   earlier   than   the   filing   or   priority   date   of   the   application:   Provided,  That  the  application  which  has  validly   claimed  the  filing  date  of  an  earlier  application   under   Section   31   of   this   Act,   shall   be   prior   art   with   effect   as   of   the   filing   date   of   such   earlier   application:   Provided   further,   That   the   applicant   or   the   inventor   identified   in   both   applications  are  not  one  and  the  same.    

SECTION  25.  NON-­‐PREJUDICIAL  DISCLOSURE.  –     25.1.   The   disclosure   of   information   contained   in   the   application  during  the  twelve  (12)  months  preceding  the   filing  date  or  the  priority  date  of  the  application  shall  not   prejudice  the  applicant  on  the  ground  of  lack  of  novelty   if  such  disclosure  was  made  by:     (a)  The  inventor;     (b)   A   patent   office   and   the   information   was   contained  (a)  in  another  application  filed  by  the   inventor  and  should  not  have  been  disclosed  by   the  office,  or  (b)  in  an  application  filed  without   the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the  inventor  by  a   third   party   which   obtained   the   information   directly  or  indirectly  from  the  inventor;  or     (c)   A   third   party   which   obtained   the   information   directly   or   indirectly   from   the   inventor.     25.2.  For  the  purposes  of  Subsection  25.1,  "inventor"  also   means  any  person  who,  at  the  filing  date  of  application,   had  the  right  to  the  patent.      

VARGAS  V.  F.M.  YAPTICO  &  CO.  (1919)   Refresher:   Adjustable  plow.     Court  decision:   When   a   patent   is   sought   to   be   enforced,   "the   question   of   invention,   novelty,   or   prior   use,   and   each   of   them,   are   open   to   judicial   examination."   The   burden   of   proof   to   substantiate  a  charge  of  infringement  is  with  the  plaintiff.   Where,   however,   the   plaintiff   introduces   the   patent   in   evidence,   if   it   is   in   due   form,   it   affords   a   prima   facie   presumption  of  its  correctness  and  validity.  The  decision   of  the  Commissioner  of  Patents  in  granting  the  patent  is   always   presumed   to   be   correct.   The   burden   then   shifts   to   the   defendant   to   overcome   by   competent   evidence   this   legal   presumption.   With   all   due   respect,   therefore,   for   the   critical   and   expert   examination   of   the   invention   by   the   United   States   Patent   Office,   the   question   of   the   validity   of   the   patent   is   one   for   judicial   determination,  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   and   since   a   patent   has   been   submitted,   the   exact   question   is   whether   the   defendant   has   assumed   the   burden  of  proof  as  to  anyone  of  his  defenses.     On  the  facts,  we  think  the  testimony  shows  such  a  public   use   of   the   Vargas   plow   as   to   render   the   patent   invalid.   For   more   than   two   years   before   the   application   for   the   original  letters  patent,  or  before  July  22,  1908,  there  was,   by  the  consent  and  allowance  of  Vargas,  a  public  use  of   the  invention  covered  by  them.    

came   into   existence.   It   may   also   be   noted   that   Adrian   de   Icsiar  applied  for  a  patent  on  an  invention  which  resulted   in   the   rejection   by   the   United   States   Patent   Office   of   the   plaintiffs'   original   application   for   a   patent   on   the   so   called  "spindle"  or  conical  drum  which  was  then  in  actual   use  in  the  Dringman  and  Icsiar  hemp  stripping  machines.    

b.

Inventiveness  

 

SECTION  26.  INVENTIVE  STEP.  –     26.1.   An   invention   involves   an   inventive   step   if,   having   regard   to   prior   art,   it   is   not   obvious   to   a   person   skilled   in   the   art   at   the   time   of   the   filing   date   or   priority   date   of   the  application  claiming  the  invention.     26.2.   In   the   case   of   drugs   and   medicines,   there   is   no   inventive   step   if   the   invention   results   from   the   mere   discovery   of   a   new   form   or   new   property   of   a   known   substance  which  does  not  result  in  the  enhancement  of   the   known   efficacy   of   that   substance,   or   the   mere   discovery   of   any   new   property   or   new   use   for   a   known   substance,   or   the   mere   use   of   a   known   process   unless   such   known   process   results   in   a   new   product   that   employs  at  least  one  new  reactant.    

VARGAS  V.  CHUA  (1933)   Court  decision:   We   have   carefully   examined   all   the   plows   presented   as   exhibits   as   well   as   the   designs   of   those   covered   by   the   patent,   and   we   are   convinced   that   no   substantial   difference   exists   between   the   plow,   Exhibit   F,   and   the   plow,   Exhibit   3-­‐Chua   which   was   originally   patented   by   the   appellee,   Vargas.   The   only   difference   noted   by   us   is   the   suppression   of   the   bolt   and   the   three   holes   on   the   metal  strap  attached  to  the  handle  bar.  These  holes  and   bolt   with   its   nut   were   suppressed   in   Exhibit   F   in   which   the   beam   is   movable   as   in   the   original   plow.   The   members   of   this   court,   with   the   plows   in   view,   arrived   at   the   conclusion   that   not   only   is   there   no   fundamental   difference  between  the  two  plows  but  no  improvement   whatever   has   been   made   on   the   latest   model,   for   the   same   working   and   movement   of   the   beam   existed   in   the   original   model   with   the   advantage,   perhaps,   that   its   graduation   could   be   carried   through   with   more   certainty   by  the  use  of  the  bolt  which  as  has  already  been  stated,   was  adjustable  and  movable.     In   view   of   the   foregoing,   we   are   firmly   convinced   that   the  appellee  is  not  entitled  to  the  protection  he  seeks  for   the   simple   reason   that   his   plow,   Exhibit   F,   does   not   constitute   an   invention   in   the   legal   sense,   and   because,   according   to   the   evidence,   the   same   type   of   plows   had   been   manufactured   in   this   country   and   had   been   in   use   in  many  parts  of  the  Philippine  Archipelago,  especially  in   the   Province   of   Iloilo,   long   before   he   obtained   his   last   patent.    

AGUAS  V.  DE  LEON  (1982)   Court  decision:   The   records   disclose   that   de   Leon's   process   is   an   improvement  of  the  old  process  of  tile  making.  The  tiles   produced   from   de   Leon's   process   are   suitable   for   construction   and   ornamentation,   which   previously   had   not   been   achieved   by   tiles   made   out   of   the   old   process   of   tile   making.   De   Leon's   invention   has   therefore   brought  about  a  new  and  useful  kind  of  tile.  The  old  type   of  tiles  were  usually  intended  for  floors  although  there  is   nothing   to   prevent   one   from   using   them   for   walling   purposes.   These   tiles   are   neither   artistic   nor   ornamental.   They  are  heavy  and  massive.     The   respondent's   improvement   is   indeed   inventive   and   goes   beyond   the   exercise   of   mechanical   skill.   He   has   introduced  a  new  kind  of  tile  for  a  new  purpose.  He  has   improved   the   old   method   of   making   tiles   and   pre-­‐cast   articles   which   were   not   satisfactory   because   of   an   intolerable   number   of   breakages,   especially   if   deep   engravings   are   made   on   the   tile.   He   has   overcome   the   problem   of   producing   decorative   tiles   with   deep   engraving,   but   with   sufficient   durability.   Durability   inspite  of  the  thinness  and  lightness  of  the  tile,  is  assured,   provided   that   a   certain   critical   depth   is   maintained   in   relation  to  the  dimensions  of  the  tile.    

FRANK  V.  KOSUYAMA  (1933)   Court  decision:   We  agree  with  the  trial  court  that,  strictly  speaking,  the   hemp   stripping   machine   of   the   plaintiffs   does   not   constitute   an   invention   on   the   ground   that   it   lacks   the   elements  of  novelty,  originality  and  precedence.  In  fact,   before   the   plaintiffs   herein   obtained   their   patent,   they   themselves   had   already   publicly   used   the   same   kind   of   machine   for   some   months,   at   least,   and,   various   other   machines,   having   in   general,   the   same   characteristics   and   important   parts   as   that   of   the   said   plaintiffs,   were   known   in   the   Province   of   Davao.   Machines   known   as   Molo,   Riesgo,   Crumb,   Icsiar,   Browne   and   McFie   were   already   known   in   that   locality   and   used   by   the   owners   of   hemp   plantations   before   the   machine   of   the   plaintiffs  

MANZANO  V.  CA  (1997),  SUPRA   Court  decision:   The   element   of   novelty   is   an   essential   requisite   of   the   patentability   of   an   invention   or   discovery.   If   a   device   or   process   has   been   known   or   used   by   others   prior   to   its  

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Intellectual Property Law invention   or   discovery   by   the   applicant,   an   application   for   a   patent   therefor   should   be   denied;   and   if   the   application   has   been   granted,   the   court,   in   a   judicial   proceeding  in  which  the  validity  of  the  patent  is  drawn  in   question,   will   hold   it   void   and   ineffective.   It   has   been   repeatedly   held   that   an   invention   must   possess   the   essential  elements  of  novelty,  originality  and  precedence,   and   for   the   patentee   to   be   entitled   to   the   protection   the   invention  must  be  new  to  the  world.     In   issuing   Letters   Patent   No.   UM-­‐4609   to   Melecia   Madolaria   for   an   "LPG   Burner"   on   22   July   1981,   the   Philippine   Patent   Office   found   her   invention   novel   and   patentable.   The   issuance   of   such   patent   creates   a   presumption   which   yields   only   to   clear   and   cogent   evidence   that   the   patentee   was   the   original   and   first   inventor.   The   burden   of   proving   want   of   novelty   is   on   him  who  avers  it  and  the  burden  is  a  heavy  one  which  is   met   only   by   clear   and   satisfactory   proof   which   overcomes  every  reasonable  doubt.    

c.

  113.2.   Industrial   designs   dictated   essentially   by   technical   or   functional   considerations   to   obtain   a   technical   result   or   those   that   are   contrary   to   public   order,   health   or   morals  shall  not  be  protected.    

4.

REPUBLIC   ACT   9150   -­‐   AN   ACT   PROVIDING   FOR   THE   PROTECTION   OF   LAYOUT-­‐DESIGNS   (TOPOGRAPHIES)   OF   INTEGRATED   CIRCUITS,   AMENDING   FOR   THE   PURPOSE   OF   CERTAIN   SECTIONS   OF   RA   8293,   OTHERWISE   KNOWN   AS   THE  IPC   SECTION   1.   Sections   112,113,114,116,117,118,119   and   120   under  Chapter  XIII  of  R.  A.  No.  8293  are  hereby  amended   to  read  as  follows:     CHAPTER  XIII   INDUSTRIAL  DESIGN  AND  LAYOUT-­‐DESIGNS   (TOPOGRAPHIES)  OF  INTEGRATED  CIRCUITS     SEC.  112.    DEFINITION  OF  TERMS:     1.   An   Industrial   Design   is   any   composition   of   lines   or   colors   or   any   three-­‐   dimensional   form,   whether  or  not  associated  with  lines  or  colors:   Provided,  That  such  composition  or  form  gives   a   special   appearance   to   and   can   serve   as   pattern  for  an  industrial  product  or  handicraft;     2.   Integrated   Circuit   means   a   product,   in   its   final   form,   or   an   intermediate   form,   in   which   the  elements,  at  least  one  of  which  is  an  active   element,   and   some   or   all   of   the   interconnections   are   integrally   formed   in   and/or   on   a   piece   of   material,   and   which   is   intended   to   perform   an   electronic   function;   and     3.   Layout-­‐Design   is   synonymous   with   'Topography'   and   means   the   three-­‐dimensional   disposition,   however   expressed,   of   the   elements,   at   least   one   of   which   is   an   active   element,   and   of   some   or   all   of   the   interconnections   of   an   integrated   circuit,   or   such   a   three-­‐dimensional   disposition   prepared   for   an   integrated   circuit   intended   for   manufacture."     SEC.  113.  SUBSTANTIVE  CONDITIONS  FOR  PROTECTION.  –   113.1.  Only  industrial  designs  that  are  new  or  ornamental   shall  benefit  from  protection  under  this  Act.    

Industrial   application  

SECTION  27.  INDUSTRIAL  APPLICABILITY.  –     An   invention   that   can   be   produced   and   used   in   any   industry  shall  be  industrially  applicable.    

Utility  model  

 

SECTION   109.   SPECIAL   PROVISIONS   RELATING   TO   UTILITY   MODELS.  –     109.1.     (a)   An   invention   qualifies   for   registration   as   a   utility   model   if   it   is   new   and   industrially   applicable.     (b)   Section   21,   "Patentable   Inventions",   shall   apply   except   the   reference   to   inventive   step   as   a  condition  of  protection.    

3.

–   of  

 

 

2.

Lay-­‐out   designs   Topographies   Integrated  Circuits  

Industrial  designs  

 

SECTION  112.  DEFINITION  OF  INDUSTRIAL  DESIGN.  –     An  industrial  design  is  any  composition  of  lines  or  colors   or   any   three-­‐dimensional   form,   whether   or   not   associated-­‐with   lines   or   colors:   Provided,   That   such   composition   or   form   gives   a   special   appearance   to   and   can   serve   as   pattern   for   an   industrial   product   or   handicraft.      

SECTION   113.   SUBSTANTIVE   CONDITIONS   FOR   PROTECTION.   –     113.1.  Only  industrial  designs  that  are  new  or  original  shall   benefit  from  protection  under  this  Act.  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   113.2.   Industrial   designs   dictated   essentially   by   technical   or   functional   considerations   to   obtain   a   technical   result   or   those   that   are   contrary   to   public   order,   health   or   morals  shall  not  be  protected.     113.3.   Only   layout-­‐designs   of   integrated   circuits   that   are   original   shall   benefit   from   protection   under   this   Act.   A   layout-­‐design  shall  be  considered  original  if  it  is  the  result   of   its   creator's   own   intellectual   effort   and   is   not   commonplace   among   creators   of   layout-­‐designs   and   manufacturers   of   integrated   circuits   at   the   time   of   its   creation.     113.4.   A   layout-­‐design   consisting   of   a   combination   of   elements   and   interconnections   that   are   commonplace   shall   be   protected   only   if   the   combination,   taken   as   a   whole,  is  original.     SEC.  114.  CONTENTS  OF  THE  APPLICATION.  –     114.1.   Every   application   for   registration   of   an   industrial   design  or  layout-­‐design  shall  contain:      (a)   A   request   for   registration   of   the   industrial   design  or  layout-­‐design;      (b)  Information  identifying  the  applicant;      (c)   An   indication   of   the   kind   of   article   of   manufacture   or   handicraft   to   which   the   industrial   design   or   layout-­‐design   shall   be   applied:      (d)   A   representation   of   the   article   of   manufacture  or  handicraft  by  way  of  drawings,   photographs   or   adequate   graphic   representation   of   the   industrial   design   or   of   the   layout-­‐design   as   applied   to   the   article   of   manufacture   or   handicraft   which   clearly   and   fully   discloses   those   features   for   which   protection  is  claimed;  and      (e)   The   name   and   address   of   the   creator,   or   where   the   applicant   is   not   the   creator,   a   statement   indicating   the   origin   of   the   right   to   the   industrial   design   or   layout-­‐design   registration.       114.2.   The   application   may   be   accompanied   by   a   specimen   of   the   article   embodying   the   industrial   design   or   layout-­‐design   and   shall   be   subject   to   the   payment   of   the  prescribed  fee.     SEC.  116.  EXAMINATION.  –     116.1.  The  Office  shall  accord  as  the  filing  date  the  date  of   receipt   of   the   application   containing   indications   allowing   the   identity   of   the   applicant   to   be   established   and   a   representation   of   the   article   embodying   the   industrial  

design  or  the  layout-­‐design  or  a  pictorial  representation   thereof.     116.2.   If   the   application   does   not   meet   these   requirements,   the   filing   date   should   be   that   date   when   all   the   elements   specified   in   Sec.   114   are   filed   or   the   mistakes   corrected.   Otherwise,   if   the   requirements   are   not   complied   within   the   prescribed   period,   the   application  shall  be  considered  withdrawn.     116.3   After   the   application   has   been   accorded   a   filing   date   and   the   required   fees   paid   on   time,   the   applicant   shall  comply  with  the  requirements  of  Sec.  114  within  the   prescribed   period,   otherwise   the   application   shall   be   considered  withdrawn.     116.4.   The   Office   shall   examine   whether   the   industrial   design   or   layout-­‐design   complies   with   requirements   of   Sec.  112  (Definitions)  and  Sec.  113  (Substantive  Conditions   for  Protection).     SEC.  117.  REGISTRATION.  –     117.1.  Where  the  Office  finds  that  the  conditions  referred   to   in   Sec.   113   are   fulfilled,   it   shall   order   that   registration   be   effected   in   the   industrial   design   or   layout-­‐design   register   and   cause   the   issuance   of   an   industrial   design   or   layout-­‐design   certificate   of   registration;   otherwise,   it   shall  refuse  the  application.     117.2.   The   form   and   contents   of   an   industrial   design   or   layout-­‐design   certificate   shall   be   established   by   the   Regulations:  Provided,  That  the  name  and  address  of  the   creator  shall  be  mentioned  in  every  case.     117.3.   Registration   shall   be   published   in   the   form   and   within  the  period  fixed  by  the  Regulations.     117.4.  The  Office  shall  record  in  the  register  any  change  in   the  identity  of  the  proprietor  of  the  industrial  design  or   layout-­‐design   or   his   representative,   if   proof   thereof   is   furnished   to   it.   A   fee   shall   be   paid,   with   the   request   to   record  the  change  in  the  identity  of  the  proprietor.  If  the   fee  is  not  paid,  the  request  shall  be  deemed  not  to  have   been   filed.   In   such   case,   the   former   proprietor   and   the   former   representative   shall   remain   subject   to   the   rights   and  obligations  as  provided  in  this  Act.     117.5.   Anyone   may   inspect   the   Register   and   the   files   of   registered   industrial   designs   or   layout-­‐designs   including   files  of  cancellation  proceedings.     SEC.   118.   THE   TERM   OF   INDUSTRIAL   DESIGN   OR   LAYOUT-­‐DESIGN   REGISTRATION.  –     118.1.  The  registration  of  an  industrial  design  shall  be  for   a   period   of   five   (5)   years   from   the   filing   date   of   the   application.    

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Intellectual Property Law 118.2.   The   registration   of   an   industrial   design   may   be   renewed  for  not  more  than  two  (2)  consecutive  periods   of  five  (5)  years  each,  by  paying  the  renewal  fee.     118.3.   The   renewal   fee   shall   be   paid   within   twelve   (12)   months   preceding   the   expiration   of   the   period   of   registration.   However,   a   grace   period   of   six   (6)   months   shall   be   granted   for   payment   of   the   fees   after   such   expiration,  upon  payment  of  a  surcharge.     118.4.   The   Regulations   shall   fix   the   amount   of   renewal   fee,  the  surcharge  and  other  requirements  regarding  the   recording  of  renewals  of  registration.     118.5.   Registration   of   a   layout-­‐design   shall   be   valid   for   a   period   often   (10)   years,   without   renewal,   and   such   validity  to  be  counted  from  the  date  of  commencement   of   the   protection   accorded   to   the   layout-­‐design.   The   protection   of   a   layout-­‐design   under   this   Act   shall   commence:     a)   on   the   date   of   the   first   commercial   exploitation,   anywhere   in   the   world,   of   the   layout-­‐design   by   or   with   the   consent   of   the   right   holder:   Provided,   That   an   application   for   registration   is   filed   with   the   Intellectual   Property  Office  within  two  (2)  years  from  such   date  of  first  commercial  exploitation;  or     b)   on   the   filing   date   accorded   to   the   application   for   the   registration   of   the   layout-­‐   design   if   the   layout-­‐design   has   not   been   previously  exploited  commercially  anywhere  in   the  world.     SEC.  119.  APPLICATION  OF  OTHER  SECTIONS  AND  CHAPTERS.  –   119.1.   The   following   provisions   relating   to   patents   shall   apply   mutatis   mutandis   to   an   industrial   design   registration:     SECTION  21  –  Novelty;     SECTION   24   –   Prior   art:   Provided,   That   the   disclosure  is  contained  in  printed  documents  or   in  any  tangible  form;     SECTION  25  –  Non-­‐prejudicial  Disclosure;       SECTION  28  –  Right  to  a  Patent;       SECTION  29  –  First  to  File  Rule;     SECTION   30   –   Inventions   Created   Pursuant   to   a   Commission;     SECTION   31   -­‐   Right   of   Priority:   Provided,   That   the   application   for   industrial   design   shall   be   filed   within   six   (6)   months   from   the   earliest  

filing   date   of   the   corresponding   foreign   application;     SECTION   33   –   Appointment   of   Agent   or   Representative;     SECTION  51  –  Refusal  of  the  Application;     SECTIONS   56   to   60   –   Surrender,   Correction   of   and  Changes  in  Patent;     CHAPTER   VII   –   Remedies   of   a   Person   with   a   Right  to  Patent;     Chapter   VIII   –   Rights   of   Patentees   and   Infringement  of  Patents;  and     Chapter   XI   –   Assignment   and   Transmission   of   Rights.     119.2.   If   the   essential   elements   of   an   industrial   design   which   is   the   subject   of   an   application   have   been   obtained   from   the   creation   of   another   person   without   his   consent,   protection   under   this   Chapter   cannot   be   invoked  against  the  injured  party.     119.3.   The   following   provisions   relating   to   patents   shall   apply   mutatis   mutandis   to   a   layout-­‐design   of   integrated   circuits  registration:     SECTION  28  –  Right  to  a  Patent;       SECTION  29  –  First  to  File  Rule;     SECTION   30   –   Inventions   Created   Pursuant   to   a   Commission;     SECTION   33   –   Appointment   of   Agent   or   Representative;     SECTION  56  –  Surrender  of  Patent;     SECTION   57   –   Correction   of   Mistakes   of   the   Office;     SECTION   58   –   Correction   of   Mistakes   in   the   Application;     SECTION  59  –  Changes  in  Patents;     SECTION   60   –   Form   and   Publication   of   Amendment;     Chapter  VII  –  Remedies  of  a  Person  with  a  Right   to  Patent;     Chapter   VIII   –   Rights   of   Patentees   and   Infringement   of   Patents:   Provided,   That   the  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   layout-­‐design   rights   and   limitation   of   layout-­‐ design  rights  provided  hereunder  shall  govern;     Chapter  X  –  Compulsory  Licensing;     Chapter   XI   –   Assignment   and   Transmission   of   Rights.  

may   perform   any   of   the   said   acts   only   with   respect  to  the  stock  on  hand  or  ordered  before   such  time  and  shall  be  liable  to  pay  to  the  right   holder   a   sum   equivalent   to   at   least   5%   of   net   sales  or  such  other  reasonable  royalty  as  would   be  payable  under  a  freely  negotiated  license  in   respect  of  such  layout-­‐design;  or     (5)   Where   the   act   is   performed   in   respect   of   an   identical  layout-­‐design  which  is  original  and  has   been  created  independently  by  a  third  party.  

  119.4.  Rights  Conferred  to  the  Owner  of  a  Layout-­‐Design   Registration.  –  The  owner  of  a  layout-­‐design  registration   shall  enjoy  the  following  rights:      (1)   to   reproduce,   whether   by   incorporation   in   an   integrated   circuit   or   otherwise,   the   registered   layout-­‐design   in   its   entirety   or   any   part  thereof,  except  the  act  of  reproducing  any   part   that   does   not   comply   with   the   requirement  of  originality;  and      (2)   to   sell   or   otherwise   distribute   for   commercial   purposes   the   registered   layout-­‐ design,   an   article   or   an   integrated   circuit   in   which   the   registered   layout-­‐design   is   incorporated.     119.5.   Limitations   of   Layout   Rights.   -­‐   The   owner   of   a   layout   design   has   no   right   to   prevent   third   parties   from   reproducing   selling   or   otherwise   distributing   for   commercial  purposes  the  registered  layout-­‐design  in  the   following  circumstances:     (1)   Reproduction   of   the   registered   layout-­‐ design   for   private   purposes   or   for   the   sole   purpose   of   evaluation,   analysis,   research   or   teaching;     (2)   Where   the   act   is   performed   in   respect   of   a   layout-­‐design   created   on   the   basis   of   such   analysis   or   evaluation   and   which   is   itself   original  in  the  meaning  as  provided  herein;     (3)  Where  the  act  is  performed  in  respect  of  a   registered   layout-­‐design,   or   in   respect   of   an   integrated  circuit  in  which  such  a  layout-­‐design   is   incorporated,   that   has   been   put   on   the   market   by   or   with   the   consent   of   the   right   holder;     (4)  In  respect  of  an  integrated  circuit  where  the   person  performing  or  ordering  such  an  act  did   not   know   and   had   no   reasonable   ground   to   know   when   acquiring   the   integrated   circuit   or   the   article   incorporating   such   an   integrated   circuit,   that   it   incorporated   an   unlawfully   reproduced   layout-­‐design:   Provided,   however,   That   after   the   time   that   such   person   has   received   sufficient   notice   that   the   layout-­‐ design  was  unlawfully  reproduced,  that  person  

  SEC.  120.  CANCELLATION  OF  DESIGN  REGISTRATION.  –     120.1.  At  any  time  during  the  term  of  the  industrial  design   registration,   any   person   upon   payment   of   the   required   fee,   may   petition   the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   to   cancel   the  industrial  design  on  any  of  the  following  grounds:     (a)  If  the  subject  matter  of  the  industrial  design   is  not  registerable  within  the  terms  of  Sections   112  and  113;     (b)  If  the  subject  matter  is  not  new;  or     (c)  If  the  subject  matter  of  the  industrial  design   extends  beyond  the  content  of  the  application   as  originally  filed.     120.2.  Where  the  grounds  for  cancellation  relate  to  a  part   of  the  industrial  design,  cancellation  may  be  effected  to   such  extent  only.  The  restriction  may  be  effected  in  the   form   of   an   alteration   of   the   effected   features   of   the   design.     120.3.   Grounds   for   Cancellation   of   Layout-­‐Design   of   Integrated  Circuits.  -­‐   Any  interested  person  may  petition   that   the   registration   of   a   layout-­‐design   be   cancelled   on   the  ground  that:     (i)   the   layout-­‐design   is   not   protectable   under   this  Act;     (ii)   the   right   holder   is   not   entitled   to   protection   under  this  Act;  or     (iii)   where   the   application   for   registration   of   the   layout-­‐design,   was   not   filed   within   two   (2)   years   from   its   first   commercial   exploitation   anywhere  in  the  world.     Where  the  grounds  for  cancellation  are  established  with   respect   only   to   a   part   of   the   layout-­‐design,   only   the   corresponding  part  of  the  registration  shall  be  cancelled.     Any  cancelled  layout-­‐design  registration  or  part  thereof,   shall   be   regarded   as   null   and   void   from   the   beginning   and   may   be   expunged   from   the   records   of   the   Intellectual   Property   Office.   Reference   to   all   cancelled  

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Intellectual Property Law layout-­‐design   registration   shall   be   published   in   the   IPO   Gazette.     SEC.  2.  IMPLEMENTING  RULES  AND  REGULATIONS.  –     The   Intellectual   Property   Office   may   issue   Regulations   prescribing   details   for   the   implementation   of   this   law.   The   Regulations   may,   in   particular,   provide   for   the   payment  of  fees  in  connection  with  applications  for  the   registration   of   layout-­‐designs   of   integrated   circuits   and   matters   related   thereto,   including   Administrative   Instructions   relating   to   the   procedures   and   other   functions  of  the  responsible  unit  duly  designated  by  the   Director  General.     SEC.  3.  APPLICABILITY.  –     The  provisions  of  this  Act  shall  apply  to  layout-­‐designs  of   integrated   circuits   that   were   commercially   exploited   anywhere   in   the   world   from   and   after   January   1998   provided  they  meet  the  conditions  for  protection  under   this  Act.     SEC.  4.  REPEALING  CLAUSE.  –     All   acts   and   parts   of   acts   inconsistent   herewith   are   hereby  repealed  or  amended  accordingly.     SEC.  5.  SEPARABILITY  CLAUSE.  –     If   any   provision   of   this   Act   or   the   application   of   such   provision   to   any   circumstance   is   held   invalid,   the   remainder  of  this  Act  shall  not  be  affected  thereby.     SEC.  6.  EFFECTIVITY.  –     This   Act   shall   take   effect   fifteen   (15)   days   after   its   publication  in  two  (2)  newspapers  of  general  circulation.    

E.

22.2.  Schemes,  rules  and  methods  of  performing  mental   acts,  playing  games  or  doing  business,  and  programs  for   computers;     22.3.   Methods   for   treatment   of   the   human   or   animal   body   by   surgery   or   therapy   and   diagnostic   methods   practiced   on   the   human   or   animal   body.   This   provision   shall   not   apply   to   products   and   composition   for   use   in   any  of  these  methods;     22.4.   Plant   varieties   or   animal   breeds   or   essentially   biological  process  for  the  production  of  plants  or  animals.   This   provision   shall   not   apply   to   micro-­‐organisms   and   non-­‐biological  and  microbiological  processes.     Provisions   under   this   subsection   shall   not   preclude   Congress   to   consider   the   enactment   of   a   law   providing   sui   generis   protection   of   plant   varieties   and   animal   breeds   and   a   system   of   community   intellectual   rights   protection:     22.5.  Aesthetic  creations;  and     22.6.   Anything   which   is   contrary   to   public   order   or   morality.    

UNDER  RA  165  (OLD  PATENT  LAW):   SECTION  8.  INVENTIONS  NOT  PATENTABLE.  –     An   invention   shall   not   be   patentable   if   it   is   contrary   to   public  order  or  morals,  or  to  public  health  or  welfare,  or   if   it   constitutes   a   mere   idea,   scientific   principle   or   abstract   theorem   not   embodied   in   an   invention   as   specified   in   section   seven   hereof,   or   any   process   not   directed   to   the   making   or   improving   of   a   commercial   product.     SECTION  9.  INVENTION  NOT  CONSIDERED  NEW  OR  PATENTABLE.  –     An   invention   shall   not   be   considered   new   or   capable   of   being  patented  if  it  was  known  or  used  by  others  in  the   Philippines  before  the  invention  thereof  by  the  inventor   named  in  an  application  for  patent  for  the  invention;  or  if   it  was  patented  or  described  in  any  printed  publication  in   the   Philippines   or   any   foreign   country   more   than   one   year  before  the  application  for  a  patent  therefor;  or  if  it   had   been   in   public   use   or   on   sale   in   the   Philippines   for   more   than   one   year   before   the   application   for   a   patent   therefor;   or   if   it   is   the   subject   matter   of   a   validly   issued   patent  in  the  Philippines  granted  on  an  application  filed   before  the  filing  of  the  application  for  patent  therefor.     SECTION  74.  PENALTY  FOR  FALSE  MARKING.  –     Any  person  who  falsely  represents  or  indicates  that  any   device,   article   or   product   made   or   sold   by   him   is   patented,   or   is   the   subject   of   a   registered   design,   by   making   or   having   on   the   device,   article   or   product,   or   on   their   containers   or   packages,   or   using   in   advertising   or   displays   used   in   connection   with   them,   or   with   any  

What  are  not  patentable?  

 

SEC.  22.  NON-­‐PATENTABLE  INVENTIONS.  –     The  following  shall  be  excluded  from  patent  protection:     22.1.   Discoveries,   scientific   theories   and   mathematical   methods,   and   in   the   case   of   drugs   and   medicines,   the   mere   discovery   of   a   new   form   or   new   property   of   a   known   substance   which   does   not   result   in   the   enhancement   of   the   known   efficacy   of   that   substance,   or   the   mere   discovery   of   any   new   property   or   new   use   for   a   known   substance,   or   the   mere   use   of   a   known   process   unless   such   known   process   results   in   a   new   product  that  employs  at  least  one  new  reactant.     For   the   purpose   of   this   clause,   salts,   esters,   ethers,   polymorphs,   metabolites,   pure   form,   particle   size,   isomers,  mixtures  of  isomers,  complexes,  combinations,   and   other   derivatives   of   a   known   substance   shall   be   considered  to  be  the  same  substance,  unless  they  differ   significantly  in  properties  with  regard  to  efficacy;    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   process,   words   expressing   or   implying   that   the   device,   article,   product   or   process   is   patented   or   registered,   shall   be   subject   to   a   fine   of   not   less   than   one   hundred   pesos   nor   more   than   one   thousand   pesos,   or   imprisonment   for   not   less   than   one   month   nor   more   than   one   year,   or   both,   in   the   discretion   of   the   court.   Actions  hereunder  shall  prescribe  in  two  years.    

property   which   is   possessed   by   no   naturally   occurring   bacteria.   A   patent   examiner's   rejection   of   the   patent   application's  claims  for  the  new  bacteria  was  affirmed  by   the   Patent   Office   Board   of   Appeals   on   the   ground   that   living   things   are   not   patentable   subject   matter   under   §   101.  The  Court  of  Customs  and  Patent  Appeals  reversed,   concluding  that  the  fact  that  micro-­‐organisms  are  alive  is   without   legal   significance   for   purposes   of   the   patent   law.   Court  decision:   A   live,   human-­‐made   micro-­‐organism   is   patentable   subject   matter   under   §   101.   Respondent's   micro-­‐ organism   constitutes   a   "manufacture"   or   "composition   of  matter"  within  that  statute.       In  choosing  such  expansive  terms  as  "manufacture"  and   "composition   of   matter,"   modified   by   the   comprehensive   "any,"   Congress   contemplated   that   the   patent   laws   should   be   given   wide   scope,   and   the   relevant   legislative   history   also   supports   a   broad   construction.  While  laws  of  nature,  physical  phenomena,   and  abstract  ideas  are  not  patentable,  respondent's  claim   is  not  to  a  hitherto  unknown  natural  phenomenon,  but  to   a  non-­‐naturally  occurring  manufacture  or  composition  of   matter   -­‐-­‐   a   product   of   human   ingenuity   "having   a   distinctive  name,  character  and  use."       The   passage   of   the   1930   Plant   Patent   Act,   which   afforded   patent   protection   to   certain   asexually   reproduced   plants,   and   the   1970   Plant   Variety   Protection   Act,   which   authorized   protection   for   certain   sexually   reproduced   plants   but   excluded   bacteria   from   its   protection,   does   not   evidence   congressional   understanding   that   the   terms   "manufacture"   or   "composition   of   matter"   in   §   101   do   not   include   living   things.     Nor   does   the   fact   that   genetic   technology   was   unforeseen   when   Congress   enacted   §   101   require   the   conclusion   that   micro-­‐organisms   cannot   qualify   as   patentable   subject   matter   until   Congress   expressly   authorizes   such   protection.   The   unambiguous   language   of   §   101   fairly   embraces   respondent's   invention.   Arguments   against   patentability   under   §   101,   based   on   potential   hazards   that   may   be   generated   by   genetic   research,   should   be   addressed   to   the   Congress   and   the   Executive,  not  to  the  Judiciary.     Remarks:  US  Case    

UNDER  THE  TRIPS  AGREEMENT:   ARTICLE  27,  PATENTABLE  SUBJECT  MATTER.     1.   Subject   to   the   provisions   of   paragraphs   2   and   3,   patents   shall   be   available   for   any   inventions,   whether   products   or   processes,   in   all   fields   of   technology,   provided   that   they   are   new,   involve   an   inventive   step   and   are   capable   of   industrial   application.   (5)   Subject   to   paragraph  4  of  Article  65,  paragraph  8  of  Article  70  and   paragraph   3   of   this   Article,   patents   shall   be   available   and   patent  rights  enjoyable  without  discrimination  as  to  the   place   of   invention,   the   field   of   technology   and   whether   products  are  imported  or  locally  produced.     2.   Members   may   exclude   from   patentability   inventions,   the   prevention   within   their   territory   of   the   commercial   exploitation  of  which  is  necessary  to  protect  ordre  public   or  morality,  including  to  protect  human,  animal  or  plant   life   or   health   or   to   avoid   serious   prejudice   to   the   environment,   provided   that   such   exclusion   is   not   made   merely   because   the   exploitation   is   prohibited   by   their   law.     3.  Members  may  also  exclude  from  patentability:     (a)   diagnostic,   therapeutic   and   surgical   methods   for   the   treatment   of   humans   or   animals;     (b)   plants   and   animals   other   than   micro-­‐ organisms,  and  essentially  biological  processes   for   the   production   of   plants   or   animals   other   than   non-­‐biological   and   microbiological   processes.   However,   Members   shall   provide   for   the   protection   of   plant   varieties   either   by   patents  or  by  an  effective  sui  generis  system  or   by   any   combination   thereof.   The   provisions   of   this  subparagraph  shall  be  reviewed  four  years   after   the   date   of   entry   into   force   of   the   WTO   Agreement.    

RA  9168  –  PHILIPPINE  PLANT  VARIETY  PROTECTION  ACT  OF   2002  

DIAMOND  V.  CHAKRABARTY,  447  US  303  (1980)   Refresher:   Title  35  U.S.C.  §  101  provides  for  the  issuance  of  a  patent   to   a   person   who   invents   or   discovers   "any"   new   and   useful   "manufacture"   or   "composition   of   matter."   Respondent   filed   a   patent   application   relating   to   his   invention   of   a   human-­‐made,   genetically   engineered   bacterium   capable   of   breaking   down   crude   oil,   a  

SECTION  2.  STATEMENT  OF  POLICIES.  –     a)   The   State   recognizes   that   an   effective   intellectual  property  system  in  general  and  the   development  of  new  plant  variety  in  particular   is  vital  in  attaining  food  security  for  the  country.  

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Intellectual Property Law To   this   end,   it   shall   protect   and   secure   the   exclusive   rights   of   breeders   with   respect   to   their   new   plant   variety   particularly   when   beneficial   to   the   people   for   such   periods   as   provided  for  in  this  Act.     b)   The   use   of   intellectual   property   bears   a   socioeconomic  function.  To  this  end,  the  State   shall   promote   the   diffusion   of   technology   and   information   for   the   promotion   of   national   development   and   progress   for   the   common   good.     c)   The   State   recognizes   the   indispensable   role   of   the   private   sector,   encourages   the   participation   of   private   enterprises   and   provides   incentives   to   needed   investments   in   the  development  of  new  plant  varieties.     d)   The   State   recognizes   that   science   and   technology   are   essential   for   national   development   and   promotes   the   adaptation   of   technology   and   knowledge   from   all   sources   for   the  national  benefit.  The  State  also  recognizes   the   need   to   protect   and   secure   the   exclusive   rights   of   scientists   and   other   gifted   citizens   to   their  intellectual  property  and  creations.     e)   The   State,   while   recognizing   intellectual   property  rights  in  the  field  of  agriculture,  does   so   in   a   manner   supportive   of   and   not   inconsistent   with   its   obligation   to   maintain   a   healthful   ecology   in   accord   with   the   rhythm   and  harmony  of  nature.  

(4)  years  or,  in  the  case  of  vines  or  tress,  more   than  six  (6)  years  before  the  date  of  filing  of  an   application  for  Plant  Variety  Protection.  

  However,  the  requirement  of  novelty  provided  for  in  this   Act   shall   not   apply   to   varieties   sold,   offered   for   sale   or   disposed  of  to  others  for  a  period  of  five  (5)  years  before   the   approval   of   this   Act.   Provided,   That   application   for   PVP   shall   be   filed   within   one   (1)   year   from   the   approval   of  this  act.     SECTION   6.   DISTINCTNESS.   -­‐   A   variety   shall   be   deemed   distinct   if   it   is   clearly   distinguishable   from   any   commonly   known   variety.   The   filing   of   an   application   for   the   granting  of  a  plant  variety  protection  or  for  the  entering   of   a   new   variety   in   an   official   register   of   variety   in   the   Philippines  or  in  any  country,  shall  render  the  said  variety   a  matter  of  public  knowledge  from  the  date  of  the  said   application:   Provided,   That   the   application   leads   to   the   granting   of   a   Certificate   of   Plant   Variety   Protection   or   the   entering   of   the   said   other   variety   in   the   official   register  of  variety  as  the  case  may  be.     SECTION   7.   UNIFORMITY.   -­‐   The   variety   shall   be   deemed   uniform   if,   subject   to   the   variation   that   may   be   expected   from   the   particular   features   of   its   propagation,   it   is   sufficiently  uniform  in  its  relevant  characteristics.     SECTION  8.  STABILITY.  -­‐   The   variety   shall   be   deemed   stable   if   its   relevant   characteristics   remain   unchanged   after   repeated   propagation   or,   in   the   case   of   a   particular   cycle   of  propagation,  at  the  end  of  each  such  cycle.     SECTION  17.  ENTITLEMENT.  -­‐   Any   breeder,   with   respect   to   the   variety   developed,   may   apply   for   a   plant   variety   developed,  may  apply  for  a  plant  variety  protection  and   obtain   a   Certificate   of   Plant   Variety   Protection   upon   compliance  with  the  requirements  of  this  Act.     SECTION  18.   CO-­‐OWNERSHIP  OF  THE  RIGHT.   -­‐   If   two   (2)   or   more   persons   contribute   to   the   development   of   a   new   plant   variety,   all   of   them   shall   be   named   in   the   Certificate   of   Plant   Variety   Protection   and   shall   be   entitled   to   such   rights   as   agreed   upon   in   writing   or   in   the   absence   thereof,  the  rights  in  proportion  to  their  contribution  in   the  development  of  plant  variety.     SECTION   19.   EMPLOYEE-­‐EMPLOYER   RELATIONSHIP.   -­‐   in   case   an   employee   develops   a   plant   variety   in   the   course   of   his   employment  as  a  result  of  the  performance  of  his  regular   duty,   the   plant   variety   protection   shall   belong   to   the   employer,   unless   there   is   a   written   stipulation   to   the   contrary.     SECTION  20.  FIRST  TO   FILE  RULE.  -­‐  If  two  (2)  or  more  persons   develop   a   new   plant   variety   separately   and   independently   of   each   other,   the   Certificate   of   Plant  

  SECTION  4.  The  Certificate  of  Plant  Variety  Protection  shall   be  granted  for  varieties  that  are:     a)  New;     b)  Distinct;     c)  Uniform;  and     d)  Stable.     SECTION  5.  NEWNESS.  -­‐   A   variety   shall   be   deemed   new   if   the   propagating  or  harvested  material  of  the  variety  has  not   been   sold,   offered   for   sale   or   otherwise   disposed   of   to   others,   by   or   with   the   consent   of   the   breeder,   for   purposes  of  exploitation  of  the  variety;     a)  In  the  Philippines  for  more  than  one  (1)  year   before   the   date   of   filing   of   an   application   for   plant  variety  protection;  or     b)  In  other  countries  or  territories  in  which  the   application   has   been   filed,   for   more   than   four  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   Variety   Protection   shall   belong   to   the   person   who   files   the  application  first.  In  case  two  (2)  or  more  persons  file   an  application  for  the  same  plant  variety,  the  right  shall   be   granted   to   the   person   who   has   the   earliest   filing   date   or  priority  date.     SECTION  21.  PRIORITY  DATE.  -­‐  Any   application   for   a   Certificate   of   Plant   Variety   Protection   previously   filed   by   a   breeder   in   another   country,   which   by   treaty,   convention   or   law   affords   similar   privileges   to   Filipino   citizens,   shall   be   considered   as   filed   locally   as   of   the   date   of   filing   of   the   foreign  application:  Provided,  That:     a)   The   local   application   expressly   claims   priority;     b)   It   is   filed   within   twelve   (12)   months   from   the   filing   date   of   the   earliest   foreign   application;   and     c)  The  applicant  submits,  within  six  (6)  months   from   the   filing   of   the   local   application,   authenticated   copies   of   documents   which   constitute   the   foreign   application,   samples   or   other  evidence  showing  that  the  variety  which   is   being   applied   for   protection   is   the   same   variety   which   has   been   applied   for   protection   in  a  foreign  country.     SECTION  22.  FOREIGN  NATIONALS.  -­‐   For   purposes   of   this   Act,   a   person   shall   be   considered   a   national   of   a   foreign   country  if  he  is  a  citizen  of  such  country  according  to  its   laws,  a  natural  person  residing  therein,  or  is  a  legal  entity   whose  office  is  registered  in  such  foreign  country.     SECTION   23.   NATIONAL   TREATMENT.   -­‐   Any   application   filed   locally   for   a   Certificate   of   Plant   Variety   Protection   previously   granted   to   a   breeder   in   another   country,   which   by   treaty,   convention   or   law   affords   similar   privileges  to  Filipino  citizens,  shall  be  issued  a  Certificate   of   Plant   Variety   Protection   upon   payment   of   dues   and   compliance   to   all   the   provisions   of   this   Act.   This   Act   shall   also   apply   to   the   nationals   of   foreign   countries   that   are   members  of  intergovernmental  organizations  or  party  to   any   multilateral   agreement   or   convention   concerning   the   granting   of   intellectual   property   protection   to   plant   varieties.     SECTION   33.   TERM  OF   PROTECTION.   -­‐   For   trees   and   vines,   the   period  of  protection  shall  be  twenty-­‐five  (25)  years  from   the   date   of   the   grant   of   the   Certificate   of   Plant   Variety   Protection  and  twenty  (20)  years  from  the  said  date  for   all   other   types   of   plants,   unless   declared   void   ab   initio   or   cancelled  otherwise,  as  provided  under  Section  61  and  62,   respectively  of  this  Act.    

SECTION  36.  RIGHTS  OF  HOLDERS  OF  PLANT  VARIETY  PROTECTION.  -­‐   In   respect   of   the   propagating   materials,   holders   of   a   Certificate  of  Plant  Variety  Protection  shall  have  the  right   to  authorize  any  of  the  following  acts:     a)  Production  or  reproduction;     b)   Conditioning   for   the   purpose   of   propagation;     c)  Offering  for  sale;     d)  Selling  or  other  marketing;     e)  Exporting;     f)  Importing;  and     g)  Stocking  for  any  purpose  mentioned  above.     SECTION   37.   THE   HOLDER   MAY   MAKE   HIS   AUTHORIZATION   SUBJECT   TO  CONDITIONS  AND  L IMITATIONS.     SECTION   47.   WHAT   CONSTITUTES   INFRINGEMENT.   -­‐   Except   as   otherwise  provided  in  this  Act,  any  person  who  without   being  entitled  to  do  so,  performs  the  following  acts:     a)  Sell  the  novel  variety,  or  offer  it  or  expose  it   for  sale,  deliver  it,  ship  it,  consign  it,  exchange   it,   or   solicit   an   offer   to   buy   it,   or   any   other   transfer  of  title  or  possession  of  it;  or     b)   Import   the   novel   variety   into,   or   export   it   from,  the  Philippines;  or     c)  Sexually  multiply  the  novel  variety  as  a  step   in   marketing   (for   growing   purposes)   the   variety;  or     d)   Use   the   novel   variety   in   producing   (as   distinguished   from   developing)   a   hybrid   or   different  variety  therefrom;  or     e)   Use   seed   which   had   been   marked   "unauthorized   propagation   prohibited"   or   "unauthorized   seed   multiplication   prohibited"   or   progeny   thereof   to   propagate   the   novel   variety;  or     f)   Dispense   the   novel   variety   to   another,   in   a   form  which  can  be  propagated,  without  notice   as   to   being   a   protected   variety   under   which   it   was  received;  or     g)   Fails   to   use   a   variety   denomination   the   use   of  which  is  obligatory  under  Section  15;  or    

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Intellectual Property Law h)   Perform   any   of   the   foregoing   acts   even   in   instances   in   which   the   novel   variety   is   multiplied   other   than   sexually,   except   in   pursuance  of  a  valid  Philippine  plant  patent;  or     i)   Instigate   or   actively   induce   performance   of   any  foregoing  acts,  may  be  sued  by  the  holder,   who   may   also   avail   of   all   such   relief   as   are   available   in   any   proceeding   involving   infringements  of  other  proprietary  rights.  

taken  without  their  free  and  prior  informed  consent  or  in   violation  of  their  laws,  traditions  and  customs.     SEC.   34.   RIGHT   TO   INDIGENOUS   KNOWLEDGE   SYSTEMS   AND   PRACTICES   AND   TO   D EVELOP   OWN   SCIENCES   AND   TECHNOLOGIES.-­‐   ICCs/IPs   are   entitled   to   the   recognition   of   the   full   ownership   and   control   and   protection   of   their   cultural   and   intellectual   rights.   They   shall   have   the   right   to   special   measures   to   control,   develop   and   protect   their   sciences,   technologies   and   cultural   manifestations,   including   human   and   other   genetic   resources,   seeds,   including   derivatives   of   these   resources,   traditional   medicines   and   health   practices,   vital   medicinal   plants,   animals   and   minerals,   indigenous   knowledge   systems   and  practices,  knowledge  of  the  properties  of  fauna  and   flora,   oral   traditions,   literature,   designs,   and   visual   and   performing  arts.    

  SECTION   48.   WHERE  TO   COMMENCE   ACTION.   -­‐   Any   holder   may   petition   the   proper   regional   trial   court   for   infringement   of  his  plant  variety  protection  as  defined  in  this  Act.     SECTION   49.   PRESUMPTION   OF   VALIDITY.   -­‐   Certificate   of   Plant   Variety   Protection   shall   be   presumed   valid   and   the   burden  of  proof  of  their  invalidity  shall  rest  on  the  party   assailing  them.     SECTION   50.   DEFENSES   AGAINST   INFRINGEMENT   CHARGES.   -­‐   The   following   shall   be   valid   defenses   against   infringement   charges:     a)  Non-­‐infringement;     b)   The   plant   variety   does   not   possess   at   the   time   of   its   application   criterion   of   novelty   or   distinctness;     c)   The   alleged   infringement   was   performed   under   a   right   adverse   to   it,   prior   to   the   notice   of  infringement;  and/or     d)   Other   defenses   that   are   made   available   under  this  Act.     SECTION  55.  PRESCRIPTION.  -­‐  No  recovery  of  damages  for  any   infringement  case  shall  prosper  when  the  cause  of  action   has   reached   more   than   six   (6)   years   from   the   time   the   alleged  infringement  case  was  committed.     SECTION   56.   CRIMINAL   PENALTY.   -­‐   Any   person   who   violates   any   of   the   rights   of   the   holder   provided   for   in   this   Act   may  also  suffer  the  penalty  of  imprisonment  of  not  less   than   three   (3)   years   but   not   more   than   six   (6)   years   and/or   a   fine   of   up   to   three   (3)   times   the   profit   derived   by   virtue   of   the   infringement   but   in   no   case   should   be   less  than  One  Hundred  Thousand  pesos  (P100,000.00).    

F.

Ownership  of  patent  

 

SECTION  28.  RIGHT  TO  A  PATENT.  –     The   right   to   a   patent   belongs   to   the   inventor,   his   heirs,   or   assigns.   When   two   (2)   or   more   persons   have   jointly   made  an  invention,  the  right  to  a  patent  shall  belong  to   them  jointly.    

SECTION  29.  FIRST  TO  FILE  RULE.  –     If   two   (2)   or   more   persons   have   made   the   invention   separately  and  independently  of  each  other,  the  right  to   the   patent   shall   belong   to   the   person   who   filed   an   application   for   such   invention,   or   where   two   or   more   applications   are   filed   for   the   same   invention,   to   the   applicant  who  has  the  earliest  filing  date  or,  the  earliest   priority  date.    

SECTION   30.   INVENTIONS   CREATED   PURSUANT   TO   A   COMMISSION.  –     30.1.   The   person   who   commissions   the   work   shall   own   the  patent,  unless  otherwise  provided  in  the  contract.     30.2.   In   case   the   employee   made   the   invention   in   the   course   of   his   employment   contract,   the   patent   shall   belong  to:     (a)  The  employee,  if  the  inventive  activity  is  not   a   part   of   his   regular   duties   even   if   the   employee   uses   the   time,   facilities   and   materials   of  the  employer.     (b)   The   employer,   if   the   invention   is   the   result   of   the   performance   of   his   regularly-­‐assigned   duties,   unless   there   is   an   agreement,   express   or  implied,  to  the  contrary.    

RA  8371  –  INDIGENOUS  PEOPLES  RIGHTS  ACT  OF  1997   SEC.   32.   COMMUNITY   INTELLECTUAL   RIGHTS.-­‐   ICCs/IPs   have   the   right   to   practice   and   revitalize   their   own   cultural   traditions   and   customs.   The   State   shall   preserve,   protect   and   develop   the   past,   present   and   future   manifestations   of  their  cultures  as  well  as  the  right  to  the  restitution  of   cultural,   intellectual,   religious,   and   spiritual   property  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   SECTION   67.   PATENT   APPLICATION   BY   PERSONS   NOT   HAVING  THE  RIGHT  TO  A  PATENT.  .  –    

G. Regular  application  for  patent    

1.

67.1.  If  a  person  referred  to  in  Section  29  other  than  the   applicant,   is   declared   by   final   court   order   or   decision   as   having   the   right   to   the   patent,   such   person   may,   within   three  (3)  months  after  the  decision  has  become  final:     (a)   Prosecute   the   application   as   his   own   application  in  place  of  the  applicant;     (b)   File   a   new   patent   application   in   respect   of   the  same  invention;     (c)  Request  that  the  application  be  refused;  or     (d)   Seek   cancellation   of   the   patent,   if   one   has   already  been  issued.     67.2.   The   provisions   of   Subsection   38.2   shall   apply   mutatis   mutandis   to   a   new   application   filed   under   Subsection  67.  1(b).    

Who  may  apply?  

 

SECTION  28.  RIGHT  TO  A  PATENT.  –     The   right   to   a   patent   belongs   to   the   inventor,   his   heirs,   or   assigns.   When   two   (2)   or   more   persons   have   jointly   made  an  invention,  the  right  to  a  patent  shall  belong  to   them  jointly.    

SECTION  29.  FIRST  TO  FILE  RULE.  –     If   two   (2)   or   more   persons   have   made   the   invention   separately  and  independently  of  each  other,  the  right  to   the   patent   shall   belong   to   the   person   who   filed   an   application   for   such   invention,   or   where   two   or   more   applications   are   filed   for   the   same   invention,   to   the   applicant  who  has  the  earliest  filing  date  or,  the  earliest   priority  date.    

SECTION   30.   INVENTIONS   CREATED   PURSUANT   TO   A   COMMISSION.  –     30.1.   The   person   who   commissions   the   work   shall   own   the  patent,  unless  otherwise  provided  in  the  contract.     30.2.   In   case   the   employee   made   the   invention   in   the   course   of   his   employment   contract,   the   patent   shall   belong  to:     (a)  The  employee,  if  the  inventive  activity  is  not   a   part   of   his   regular   duties   even   if   the   employee   uses   the   time,   facilities   and   materials   of  the  employer.     (b)   The   employer,   if   the   invention   is   the   result   of   the   performance   of   his   regularly-­‐assigned   duties,   unless   there   is   an   agreement,   express   or  implied,  to  the  contrary.    

SECTION   68.   REMEDIES   OF   THE   TRUE   AND   ACTUAL   INVENTOR.  –     If  a  person,  who  was  deprived  of  the  patent  without  his   consent   or   through   fraud   is   declared   by   final   court   order   or  decision  to  be  the  true  and  actual  inventor,  the  court   shall   order   for   his   substitution   as   patentee,   or   at   the   option  of  the  true  inventor,  cancel  the  patent,  and  award   actual  and  other  damages  in  his  favor  if  warranted  by  the   circumstances.    

SECTION  69.  PUBLICATION  OF  THE  COURT  ORDER.  –     The  court  shall  furnish  the  Office  a  copy  of  the  order  or   decision  referred  to  in  Sections  67  and  68,  which  shall  be   published   in   the   IPO   Gazette   within   three   (3)   months   from   the   date   such   order   or   decision   became   final   and   executory,   and   shall   be   recorded   in   the   register   of   the   Office.      

SECTION   68.   REMEDIES   OF   THE   TRUE   AND   ACTUAL   INVENTOR.  –    

SECTION  70.  TIME  TO  FILE  ACTION  IN  COURT.  –    

If  a  person,  who  was  deprived  of  the  patent  without  his   consent   or   through   fraud   is   declared   by   final   court   order   or  decision  to  be  the  true  and  actual  inventor,  the  court   shall   order   for   his   substitution   as   patentee,   or   at   the   option  of  the  true  inventor,  cancel  the  patent,  and  award   actual  and  other  damages  in  his  favor  if  warranted  by  the   circumstances.    

The  actions  indicated  in  Sections  67  and  68  shall  be  filed   within  one  (1)  year  from  the  date  of  publication  made  in   accordance  with  Sections  44  and  51,  respectively.    

SECTION  236.  PRESERVATION  OF  EXISTING  RIGHTS.  –     Nothing   herein   shall   adversely   affect   the   rights   on   the   enforcement   of   rights   in   patents,   utility   models,   industrial   designs,   marks   and   works,   acquired   in   good   faith  prior  to  the  effective  date  of  this  Act.    

SECTION   3.   INTERNATIONAL   RECIPROCITY.  –    

CONVENTIONS  

AND  

Any  person  who  is  a  national  or  who  is  domiciled  or  has  a   real   and   effective   industrial   establishment   in   a   country   which  is  a  party  to  any  convention,  treaty  or  agreement   relating   to   intellectual   property   rights   or   the   repression   of   unfair   competition,   to   which   the   Philippines   is   also   a  

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Intellectual Property Law party,   or   extends   reciprocal   rights   to   nationals   of   the   Philippines   by   law,   shall   be   entitled   to   benefits   to   the   extent  necessary  to  give  effect  to  any  provision  of  such   convention,   treaty   or   reciprocal   law,   in   addition   to   the   rights   to   which   any   owner   of   an   intellectual   property   right  is  otherwise  entitled  by  this  Act.    

(c)   Drawings   necessary   for   the   understanding   of  the  invention;     (d)  One  or  more  claims;  and     (e)  An  abstract.     32.2.   No   patent   may   be   granted   unless   the   application   identifies   the   inventor.   If   the   applicant   is   not   the   inventor,   the   Office   may   require   him   to   submit   said   authority.      

SECTION  231.  REVERSE  RECIPROCITY  OF  FOREIGN  LAWS.  –     Any   condition,   restriction,   limitation,   diminution,   requirement,   penalty   or   any   similar   burden   imposed   by   the   law   of   a   foreign   country   on   a   Philippine   national   seeking  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  in  that   country,  shall  reciprocally  be  enforceable  upon  nationals   of  said  country,  within  Philippine  jurisdiction.      

SECTION  33.  APPOINTMENT  OF  AGENT  OR  REPRESENTATIVE.   –     An   applicant   who   is   not   a   resident   of   the   Philippines   must   appoint   and   maintain   a   resident   agent   or   representative   in   the   Philippines   upon   whom   notice   or   process   for   judicial   or   administrative   procedure   relating   to   the   application   for   patent   or   the   patent   may   be   served.    

SECTION   235.   APPLICATIONS   PENDING   ON   EFFECTIVE   DATE   OF  ACT.  –     235.1.  All  applications  for  patents  pending  in  the  Bureau   of  Patents,  Trademarks  and  Technology  Transfer  shall  be   proceeded   with   and   patents   thereon   granted   in   accordance   with   the   Acts   under   which   said   applications   were   filed,   and   said   Acts   are   hereby   continued   to   be   enforced,   to   this   extent   and   for   this   purpose   only,   notwithstanding   the   foregoing   general   repeal   thereof:   Provided,   That   applications   for   utility   models   or   industrial   designs   pending   at   the   effective   date   of   this   Act,   shall   be   proceeded   with   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   this   Act,   unless   the   applicants   elect   to   prosecute   said   applications   in   accordance   with   the   Acts   under  which  they  were  filed.     235.2.   All   applications   for   registration   of   marks   or   trade   names   pending   in   the   Bureau   of   Patents,   Trademarks   and   Technology   Transfer   at   the   effective   date   of   this   Act   may  be  amended,  if  practicable  to  bring  them  under  the   provisions   of   this   Act.   The   prosecution   of   such   applications   so   amended   and   the   grant   of   registrations   thereon  shall  be  proceeded  with  in  accordance  with  the   provisions  of  this  Act.  If  such  amendments  are  not  made,   the   prosecution   of   said   applications   shall   be   proceeded   with   and   registrations   thereon   granted   in   accordance   with   the   Acts   under   which   said   applications   were   filed,   and   said   Acts   are   hereby   continued   in   force   to   this   extent   for   this   purpose   only,   notwithstanding   the   foregoing  general  repeal  thereof.    

2.

SECTION  34.  THE  REQUEST.  –     The  request  shall  contain  a  petition  for  the  grant  of  the   patent,   the   name   and   other   data   of   the   applicant,   the   inventor  and  the  agent  and  the  title  of  the  invention.      

SECTION   35.   DISCLOSURE   AND   DESCRIPTION   OF   THE   INVENTION.  –     35.1.   D ISCLOSURE.   -­‐   The   application   shall   disclose   the   invention   in   a   manner   sufficiently   clear   and   complete   for   it  to  be  carried  out  by  a  person  skilled  in  the  art.  Where   the  application  concerns  a  microbiological  process  or  the   product   thereof   and   involves   the   use   of   a   micro-­‐ organism   which   cannot   be   sufficiently   disclosed   in   the   application  in  such  a  way  as  to  enable  the  invention  to  be   carried   out   by   a   person   skilled   in   the   art,   and   such   material   is   not   available   to   the   public,   the   application   shall  be  supplemented  by  a  deposit  of  such  material  with   an  international  depository  institution.     35.2.   DESCRIPTION.   -­‐   The   Regulations   shall   prescribe   the   contents   of   the   description   and   the   order   of   presentation.      

SECTION  36.  THE  CLAIMS.  –    

Application  

36.1.  The  application  shall  contain  one  (1)  or  more  claims   which   shall   define   the   matter   for   which   protection   is   sought.   Each   claim   shall   be   clear   and   concise,   and   shall   be  supported  by  the  description.     36.2.   The   Regulations   shall   prescribe   the   manner   of   the   presentation  of  claims.      

 

SECTION  32.  THE  APPLICATION.  –     32.1.  The  patent  application  shall  be  in  Filipino  or  English   and  shall  contain  the  following:     (a)  A  request  for  the  grant  of  a  patent;     (b)  A  description  of  the  invention;    

SECTION  37.  THE  ABSTRACT.  –     The   abstract   shall   consist   of   a   concise   summary   of   the   disclosure   of   the   invention   as   contained   in   the  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   description,  claims  and  drawings  in  preferably  not  more   than  one  hundred  fifty  (150)  words.  It  must  be  drafted   in   a   way   which   allows   the   clear   understanding   of   the   technical   problem,   the   gist   of   the   solution   of   that   problem  through  the  invention,  and  the  principal  use  or   uses   of   the   invention.   The   abstract   shall   merely   serve   for   technical  information.      

SECTION   108.   APPLICABILITY   OF   PROVISIONS   RELATING   TO   PATENTS.  –     108.1.   Subject   to   Section   109,   the   provisions   governing   patents   shall   apply,   mutatis   mutandis,   to   the   registration   of  utility  models.     108.2.  Where  the  right  to  a  patent  conflicts  with  the  right   to   a   utility   model   registration   in   the   case   referred   to   in   Section   29,   the   said   provision   shall   apply   as   if   the   word   "patent"   were   replaced   by   the   words   "patent   or   utility   model  registration".    

SECTION  38.  UNITY  OF  INVENTION.  –     38.1.  The  application  shall  relate  to  one  invention  only  or   to   a   group   of   inventions   forming   a   single   general   inventive  concept.     38.2.   If   several   independent   inventions   which   do   not   form   a   single   general   inventive   concept   are   claimed   in   one   application,   the   Director   may   require   that   the   application   be   restricted   to   a   single   invention.   A   later   application   filed   for   an   invention   divided   out   shall   be   considered  as  having  been  filed  on  the  same  day  as  the   first   application:   Provided,   That   the   later   application   is   filed   within   four   (4)   months   after   the   requirement   to   divide   becomes   final   or   within   such   additional   time,   not   exceeding   four   (4)   months,   as   may   be   granted:   Provided   further,   That   each   divisional   application   shall   not   go   beyond  the  disclosure  in  the  initial  application.     38.3.   The   fact   that   a   patent   has   been   granted   on   an   application  that  did  not  comply  with  the  requirement  of   unity   of   invention   shall   not   be   a   ground   to   cancel   the   patent.    

SECTION   109.   SPECIAL   PROVISIONS   RELATING   TO   UTILITY   MODELS.  -­‐   109.2.   Sections   43   to   49   shall   not   apply   in   the   case   of   applications  for  registration  of  a  utility  model.    

Industrial  Design   SECTION  114.  CONTENTS  OF  THE  APPLICATION.  –     114.1.   Every   application   for   registration   of   an   industrial   design  shall  contain:     (a)   A   request   for   registration   of   the   industrial   design;     (b)  Information  identifying  the  applicant;     (c)   An   indication   of   the   kind   of   article   of   manufacture  or  handicraft  to  which  the  design   shall  be  applied;     (d)   A   representation   of   the   article   of   manufacture  or  handicraft  by  way  of  drawings,   photographs   or   other   adequate   graphic   representation   of   the   design   as   applied   to   the   article   of   manufacture   or   handicraft   which   clearly   and   fully   discloses   those   features   for   which  design  protection  is  claimed;  and     (e)   The   name   and   address   of   the   creator,   or   where   the   applicant   is   not   the   creator,   a   statement   indicating   the   origin   of   the   right   to   the  industrial  design  registration.     114.2.   The   application   may   be   accompanied   by   a   specimen   of   the   article   embodying   the   industrial   design   and  shall  be  subject  to  the  payment  of  the  prescribed  fee.    

SECTION   39.   INFORMATION   CONCERNING   CORRESPONDING   FOREIGN  APPLICATION  FOR  PATENTS.  –     The   applicant   shall,   at   the   request   of   the   Director,   furnish  him  with  the  date  and  number  of  any  application   for   a   patent   filed   by   him   abroad,   hereafter   referred   to   as   the   "foreign   application,"   relating   to   the   same   or   essentially   the   same   invention   as   that   claimed   in   the   application   filed   with   the   Office   and   other   documents   relating  to  the  foreign  application.      

SECTION  8.  THE  BUREAU  OF  PATENTS.  –     The  Bureau  of  Patents  shall  have  the  following  functions:     8.1.   Search   and   examination   of   patent   applications   and   the  grant  of  patents;     8.2.   Registration   of   utility   models,   industrial   designs,   and   integrated  circuits;  and     8.3.   Conduct   studies   and   researches   in   the   field   of   patents   in   order   to   assist   the   Director   General   in   formulating   policies   on   the   administration   and   examination  of  patents.      

SECTION   115.   SEVERAL   INDUSTRIAL   DESIGNS   IN   ONE   APPLICATION.  –     Two   (2)   or   more   industrial   designs   may   be   the   subject   of   the   same   application:   Provided,   That   they   relate   to   the   same   sub-­‐class   of   the   International   Classification   or   to   the  same  set  or  composition  of  articles.      

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are  received.  If  the  deficiencies  are  not  remedied  within   the   prescribed   time   limit,   the   application   shall   be   considered  withdrawn.    

Priority  date  

 

SECTION  31.  RIGHT  OF  PRIORITY.  .  –     An   application   for   patent   filed   by   any   person   who   has   previously   applied   for   the   same   invention   in   another   country   which   by   treaty,   convention,   or   law   affords   similar   privileges   to   Filipino   citizens,   shall   be   considered   as   filed   as   of   the   date   of   filing   the   foreign   application:   Provided,  That:  (a)  the  local  application  expressly  claims   priority;  (b)  it  is  filed  within  twelve  (12)  months  from  the   date   the   earliest   foreign   application   was   filed;   and   (c)   a   certified  copy  of  the  foreign  application  together  with  an   English   translation   is   filed   within   six   (6)   months   from   the   date  of  filing  in  the  Philippines.    

SECTION  116.  EXAMINATION.  –     116.1.  The  Office  shall  accord  as  the  filing  date  the  date  of   receipt   of   the   application   containing   indications   allowing   the   identity   of   the   applicant   to   be   established   and   a   representation   of   the   article   embodying   the   industrial   design  or  a  pictorial  representation  thereof.     116.2.   If   the   application   does   not   meet   these   requirements  the  filing  date  should  be  that  date  when  all   the   elements   specified   in   Section   105   are   filed   or   the   mistakes   corrected.   Otherwise   if   the   requirements   are   not   complied   within   the   prescribed   period,   the   application  shall  be  considered  withdrawn.     116.3.   After   the   application   has   been   accorded   a   filing   date   and   the   required   fees   paid   on   time,   the   applicant   shall  comply  with  the  requirements  of  Section  114  within   the  prescribed  period,  otherwise  the  application  shall  be   considered  withdrawn.     116.4.   The   Office   shall   examine   whether   the   industrial   design   complies   with   requirements   of   Section   112   and   Subsections  113.2  and  113.3.      

BOOTHE  V.  DIRECTOR  OF  PATENTS  (1980)   Court  decision:   Under  the  Revised  Rules  of  Practice  in  Patent  Cases,  it  is   imperative   that   the   application   be   complete   in   order   that   it  may  be  accepted.  It  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  Letters   Patent   that   the   specifications   be   full,   definite,   and   specific.  The  purpose  of  requiring  a  definite  and  accurate   description   of   the   process   is   to   apprise   the   public   of   what  the  patentee  claims  as  his  invention,  to  inform  the   Courts  as  to  what  they  are  called  upon  to  construe,  and   to   convey   to   competing   manufacturers   and   dealers   information  of  exactly  what  they  are  bound  to  avoid.    

4.

Filing  date  

5.

 

Formality  examination  

 

SECTION  40.  FILING  DATE  REQUIREMENTS.  –    

SECTION  42.  FORMALITY  EXAMINATION.  –    

40.1.   The   filing   date   of   a   patent   application   shall   be   the   date   of   receipt   by   the   Office   of   at   least   the   following   elements:     (a)   An   express   or   implicit   indication   that   a   Philippine  patent  is  sought;     (b)  Information  identifying  the  applicant;  and     (c)   Description   of   the   invention   and   one   (1)   or   more  claims  in  Filipino  or  English.     40.2.  If  any  of  these  elements  is  not  submitted  within  the   period   set   by   the   Regulations,   the   application   shall   be   considered  withdrawn.      

42.1.   After   the   patent   application   has   been   accorded   a   filing  date  and  the  required  fees  have  been  paid  on  time   in   accordance   with   the   Regulations,   the   applicant   shall   comply   with   the   formal   requirements   specified   by   Section   32   and   the   Regulations   within   the   prescribed   period,   otherwise   the   application   shall   be   considered   withdrawn.     42.2.  The  Regulations  shall  determine  the  procedure  for   the   re-­‐examination   and   revival   of   an   application   as   well   as   the   appeal   to   the   Director   of   Patents   from   any   final   action  by  the  examiner.    

6.

Classification  and  search  

 

SECTION  43.  CLASSIFICATION  AND  SEARCH.  –    

SECTION  41.  ACCORDING  A  FILING  DATE.  –    

An   application   that   has   complied   with   the   formal   requirements  shall  be  classified  and  a  search  conducted   to  determine  the  prior  art.    

The  Office  shall  examine  whether  the  patent  application   satisfies  the  requirements  for  the  grant  of  date  of  filing   as   provided   in   Section   40   hereof.   If   the   date   of   filing   cannot   be   accorded,   the   applicant   shall   be   given   an   opportunity   to   correct   the   deficiencies   in   accordance   with   the   implementing   Regulations.   If   the   application   does  not  contain  all  the  elements  indicated  in  Section  40,   the  filing  date  should  be  that  date  when  all  the  elements  

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Confidentiality   publication  

before  

10. Observation   parties  

 

by  

third  

 

SECTION  45.  CONFIDENTIALITY  BEFORE  PUBLICATION.  –    

SECTION  47.  OBSERVATION  BY  THIRD  PARTIES.  –    

A  patent  application,  which  has  not  yet  been  published,   and   all   related   documents,   shall   not   be   made   available   for  inspection  without  the  consent  of  the  applicant.    

Following   the   publication   of   the   patent   application,   any   person   may   present   observations   in   writing   concerning   the   patentability   of   the   invention.   Such   observations   shall   be   communicated   to   the   applicant   who   may   comment   on   them.   The   Office   shall   acknowledge   and   put   such   observations   and   comment   in   the   file   of   the   application  to  which  it  relates.    

8.

Publication   application  

of  

patent  

 

SECTION  44.  PUBLICATION  OF  PATENT  APPLICATION.  –    

11. Request   for   substantive   examination  

44.1.   The   patent   application   shall   be   published   in   the   IPO   Gazette  together  with  a  search  document  established  by   or   on   behalf   of   the   Office   citing   any   documents   that   reflect   prior   art,   after   the   expiration   of   eighteen   (18)   months  from  the  filing  date  or  priority  date.     44.2.   After   publication   of   a   patent   application,   any   interested  party  may  inspect  the  application  documents   filed  with  the  Office.     44.3.   The   Director   General   subject   to   the   approval   of   the   Secretary  of  Trade  and  Industry,  may  prohibit  or  restrict   the  publication  of  an  application,  if  in  his  opinion,  to  do   so   would   be   prejudicial   to   the   national   security   and   interests  of  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines.    

9.

 

SECTION  48.  REQUEST  FOR  SUBSTANTIVE  EXAMINATION.  –     48.1.   The   application   shall   be   deemed   withdrawn   unless   within   six   (6)   months   from   the   date   of   publication   under   Section   41,   a   written   request   to   determine   whether   a   patent  application  meets  the  requirements  of  Sections  21   to  27  and  Sections  32  to  39  and  the  fees  have  been  paid   on  time.     48.2.  Withdrawal  of  the  request  for  examination  shall  be   irrevocable  and  shall  not  authorize  the  refund  of  any  fee.    

12. Amendment    

Rights   conferred   by   a   patent  application  

SECTION  49.  AMENDMENT  OF  APPLICATION.  –     An   applicant   may   amend   the   patent   application   during   examination:   Provided,   That   such   amendment   shall   not   include   new   matter   outside   the   scope   of   the   disclosure   contained  in  the  application  as  filed.      

 

SECTION   46.   RIGHTS   CONFERRED   BY   A   PATENT   APPLICATION  AFTER  PUBLICATION.  –     The   applicant   shall   have   all   the   rights   of   a   patentee   under   Section   76   against   any   person   who,   without   his   authorization,   exercised   any   of   the   rights   conferred   under   Section   71   of   this   Act   in   relation   to   the   invention   claimed  in  the  published  patent  application,  as  if  a  patent   had  been  granted  for  that  invention:  Provided,  That  the   said  person  had:     46.1.   Actual   knowledge   that   the   invention   that   he   was   using  was  the  subject  matter  of  a  published  application;   or     46.2.  Received  written  notice  that  the  invention  that  he   was   using   was   the   subject   matter   of   a   published   application   being   identified   in   the   said   notice   by   its   serial   number:  Provided,  That  the  action  may  not  be  filed  until   after  the  grant  of  a  patent  on  the  published  application   and   within   four   (4)   years   from   the   commission   of   the   acts  complained  of.    

13. Conversion      

SECTION   110.   CONVERSION   OF   PATENT   APPLICATIONS   OR   APPLICATIONS  FOR  UTILITY  MODEL  REGISTRATION.  –     110.1.   At   any   time   before   the   grant   or   refusal   of   a   patent,   an   applicant   for   a   patent   may,   upon   payment   of   the   prescribed   fee,   convert   his   application   into   an   application   for   registration   of   a   utility   model,   which   shall   be   accorded   the   filing   date   of   the   initial   application.   An   application  may  be  converted  only  once.     110.2.  At  any  time  before  the  grant  or  refusal  of  a  utility   model   registration,   an   applicant   for   a   utility   model   registration   may,   upon   payment   of   the   prescribed   fee,   convert   his   application   into   a   patent   application,   which   shall  be  accorded  the  filing  date  of  the  initial  application.    

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Intellectual Property Law Property  Code  of  the  Philippines,  the  following  rules  on   PCT  applications  are  hereby  promulgated:       PART  I.   GENERAL  PROVISIONS     RULE  1.  TITLE.  -­‐  These  rules  shall  be  known  as  the  Philippine   Rules  on  PCT  Applications  or  “PRo-­‐PCT”.     RULE   2.   D EFINITIONS.   -­‐   Unless   otherwise   specified,   the   following   terms   and   acronyms   shall   be   understood   as   follows:     (a)     “Administrative   Instructions”   means   that   body   of   instructions   for   operating   under   the   Patent   Cooperation   Treaty   referred   to   in   PCT   Rule  89;     (b)     “designated   Office”   means   a   national   patent   office   or   intergovernmental   organization   of   or   acting   for   the   State   designated  by  the  applicant  under  Chapter  I  of   the  Treaty;     (c)     “designated   State”   refers   to   the   State   in   which  protection  for  the  invention  is  desired  on   the   basis   of   the   international   application   and   which   is   designated   under   Chapter   I   of   the   Treaty;     (d)   “Director   General”   means   the   Head   of   the   Intellectual  Property  Office  of  the  Philippines;   (e)   “elected   Office”   means   a   national   patent   office   or   intergovernmental   organization   of   or   acting   for   the   State   elected   by   the   applicant   under  Chapter  II  of  the  Treaty;     (f)     “elected   State”   refers   to   the   State   in   which   protection   for   the   invention   is   desired   on   the   basis  of  the  international  application  and  which   has   been   elected   under   Chapter   II   of   the   Treaty;     (g)    “IB”  and  “International  Bureau”  mean  the   International   Bureau   of   the   World   Intellectual   Property   Organization   as   referred   to   in   PCT   Article  2(xix);     (h)     “International   Application”   and   “PCT   Application”   mean   an   application   filed   under   the  Treaty;     (i)    “International  Searching  Authority”  or  “ISA”   and   “International   Preliminary   Examining   Authority”   or   “IPEA”   mean   a   national   patent   office   or   intergovernmental   organization   as   appointed   under   the   Treaty   which   processes  

SECTION   111.   PROHIBITION   AGAINST   FILING   OF   PARALLEL   APPLICATIONS.  –     An   applicant   may   not   file   two   (2)   applications   for   the   same   subject,   one   for   utility   model   registration   and   the   other   for   the   grant   of   a   patent   whether   simultaneously   or  consecutively.    

H. Philippine  Rules  on  PCT  Applications     WHEREAS,   the   State   recognizes   that   an   effective   industrial  property  system  is  vital  to  the  development  of   domestic   creativity,   facilitates   transfer   of   technology,   attracts  foreign  investments  and  ensures  market  access   for  our  products;       WHEREAS,   it   is   the   policy   of   the   State   to   streamline   administrative   procedures   in   granting   patents   and   enhance  the  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights   in  the  Philippines;     WHEREAS,   Senate   Resolution   No.   74   dated   05   February   2001   was   passed   whereby   the   Philippines   ratified   the   Patent  Cooperation  Treaty  (PCT);       WHEREAS,   since   1978,   the   PCT   system   has   offered   investors   and   industry   an   advantageous   route   for   obtaining   patent   protection   internationally;   aims   to   facilitate   procedures   for   obtaining   legal   protection   for   inventions   and   disseminate   technical   information;   seeks   to   simplify   and   to   render   more   effective   and   more   economical   –   in   the   interest   of   the   applicants   and   the   patent   offices   –   previously   established   means   of   applying   in   several   countries   for   patent   protection   for   invention;   would   substantially   benefit   Philippine   patent   agents   and   industry   from   the   filing   in   the   Philippines   of   international  applications  under  the  PCT;     WHEREAS,  in  accordance  with  Article  63  of  the  PCT,  the   Treaty   shall   enter   into   force   with   respect   to   the   Philippines,   three   (3)   months   after   the   date   on   which   it   has   deposited   its   Instrument   of   Accession   with   the   Director   General   of   the   World   Intellectual   Property   Organization  (WIPO);       WHEREAS,   the   Philippines   deposited   its   Instrument   of   Accession   with   the   Director   General   of   the   WIPO   on   17   May   2001;   and,   therefore,   the   PCT   entered   into   effect   with  respect  to  the  Philippines  on  17  August  2001;       WHEREAS,   there   is   a   need   to   guide   applicants,   patent   attorneys/agents,   and   other   interested   parties   in   the   Philippines  on  the  PCT  and  its  rules  and  regulations;     NOW,   THEREFORE,   pursuant   to   Senate   Resolution   No.   74  dated  05  February  2001,  the  provisions  of  the  Patent   Cooperation   Treaty   and   the   Regulations   thereunder,   Republic   Act   No.   8293   also   known   as   the   Intellectual  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   international   applications   as   prescribed   by   the   Treaty  and  PCT  Regulations;     (j)     “IP   Code”   means   Republic   Act   No.   8293   otherwise   known   as   the   Intellectual   Property   Code  of  the  Philippines;     (k)     “IPO”   or   “Office”   means   the   Intellectual   Property  Office  of  the  Philippines;     (l)     “IPO   Fee   Structure”   means   the   rules   and   regulations   establishing   the   fees   and   charges   of   the   Intellectual   Property   Office   of   the   Philippines;     (m)     “PCT”   and   “Treaty”   mean   the   Patent   Cooperation  Treaty;     (n)     “PCT-­‐EASY”   means   the   software   made   available   by   the   International   Bureau   for   facilitating  the  preparation  of  the  request  part   of   an   international   application,   and   printing   thereof,   for   filing   together   with   a   computer   diskette   prepared   using   that   software,   containing  a  copy  in  electronic  form  of  the  data   contained  in  the  request  and  of  the  abstract;     (o)    “PCT  Regulations”  means  the  set  of  rules,   referred   to   in   PCT   Article   58   and   annexed   to   the  Treaty  referred  to  as  the  Regulations  Under   the  PCT;     (p)     “Priority   Date”   for   the   purposes   of   computing  time  limits  under  the  PCT  is  defined   in  PCT  Article  2(xi)  as  follows:     (i)  where  the  international  application   contains   a   priority   claim   under   PCT   Article   8,   the   filing   date   of   the   application   whose   priority   is   so   claimed;   (ii)   where   the   international   application   contains   several   priority   claims   under   PCT   Article   8,   the   filing   date   of   the   earliest   application   whose   priority  is  so  claimed;     (iii)   where   the   international   application   does   not   contain   any   priority  claim  under  PCT  Article  8,  the   international   filing   date   of   such   application;     (q)    “Receiving  Office”  means  a  national  patent   office   or   intergovernmental   organization   with   which   the   international   application   has   been   filed;  

Other  terms  and  expressions  not  defined  in  this  rule  are   to   be   taken   in   the   sense   of   the   Treaty   and   PCT   Regulations.     RULE  3.   APPLICATION  OF  THE   PCT  AND  PCT  REGULATIONS.  –  In  all   matters   not   specifically   provided   for   under   these   Rules,   the   provisions   of   the   Treaty,   PCT   Regulations   and   PCT   Administrative   Instructionsshall   apply   in   the   processing   of   an   international   application   during   the   international   phase   of   the   application.   In   the   event   of   conflict   between   these   Rules   and   those   of   the   PCT,   the   provisions  of  the  latter  shall  apply.       The   international   phase   covers   the   period   from   the   filing   of   the   application   in   accordance   with   the   PCT   until   the   application  enters  the  national  phase.       RULE  4.  EFFECT  OF  AN  INTERNATIONAL  APPLICATION.  –     4.1.   An   international   application   designating   the   Philippines   for   the   purposes   of   obtaining   a   national   patent   or   a   utility   model,   which   has   been   accorded   an   international   filing   date   in   accordance   with   the   Treaty   and   PCT   regulations,   shall   have   the   effect   of   a   national   application   for   a   patent   or   utility   model,   respectively,   regularly  filed  with  the  Intellectual  Property  Office  as  of   the   international   filing   date,   which   date   shall   be   considered  to  be  the  actual  filing  date  in  the  Philippines.       4.2.   Subject   to   Review   by   the   IPO   under   Rule   37,   an   international  application  designating  the  Philippines  that   is  withdrawn  or  considered  withdrawn  under  the  Treaty   and   PCT   Regulations,   before   the   applicant   has   entered   the  national  phase  in  the  Philippines  as  provided  in  Part  3   of   these   Rules,   that   international   application   is   likewise   withdrawn  or  considered  withdrawn  in  the  Philippines.       RULE   5.   SEEKING   TWO   (2)   KINDS   OF   PROTECTION;   PROHIBITION   AGAINST  FILING  OF   PARALLEL  APPLICATIONS.  -­‐  In  respect  of  the   Philippines  as  a  designated  or  elected  State,  an  applicant   cannot   seek   two   (2)   kinds   of   protection   for   the   same   subject,   one   for   utility   model   registration   and   the   other   for   the   grant   of   a   patent   whether   simultaneously   or   consecutively.       RULE   6.   DELIVERY   SERVICE.   –   Where   the   applicant   sends   a   document   or   letter   through   mail   and   that   document   or   letter   is   lost   or   reaches   the   IPO   after   the   expiration   of   the   applicable   time   limit   under   the   Treaty   and   PCT   Regulations   and   these   Rules,   PCT   Rules   82.1(a)   to   (c)   shall   apply   provided   that   the   delivery   service   used   is   registered  mail  by  a  postal  authority.     RULE   7.  APPOINTMENT  OF  RESIDENT  AGENT  OR  REPRESENTATIVE.   –   (a)  An  applicant  who  is  not  a  resident  of  the  Philippines   shall   appoint   and   maintain   an   agent   or   representative   residing   in   the   Philippines   upon   whom   notices   or   processes   for   judicial   or   administrative   procedure   may  

 

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Intellectual Property Law be   served   relating   to   the   international   application   filed   with   the   IPO   as   a   receiving,   designated   or   elected   Office.   An   applicant   who   is   a   resident   of   the   Philippines   may   likewise  appoint  and  maintain  an  agent  or  representative   residing  in  the  Philippines  for  the  same  purpose.  The  list   of   registered   resident   agents   or   representatives   is   available  in  the  IPO  website.     (b)   Where   the   international   application   is   filed   with   the   IPO   as   a   receiving   Office,   the   appointment   of   an   agent   must   be   effected   in   the   Request   form,   signed   by   all   applicants,   or   in   a   separate   power   of   attorney   submitted   to   the   IPO   where   the   Request   form   is   signed   by   the   appointed   agent   in   accordance   with   PCT   Rule   90.4.   The   separate  power  of  attorney  does  not  require  legalization   or  notarization.     (c)   For   purposes   of   the   procedure   before   the   IPO   as   a   designated   or   elected   Office,   the   manner   of   appointing   an   agent   or   representative   shall   comply   with   the   requirements   prescribed   in   the   implementing   rules   and   regulations  of  the  IP  Code.     PART  II.   INTERNATIONAL  PHASE     RULE  8.  THE  IPO  AS  A  RECEIVING  OFFICE.  –     8.1.   The   IPO   shall   act   as   a   Receiving   Office   only   for   applicants   who   are   residents   or   nationals   of   the   Philippines.       8.2.   The   IPO,   when   acting   as   a   Receiving   Office,   will   be   identified  by  the  full  title  “Philippine  Receiving  Office”  or   by  the  abbreviation  “RO/PH.”     8.3.   Without   prejudice   to   the   national   security   and   interests  of  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines,  the  IPO  shall   perform   all   acts   connected   with   the   discharge   of   duties   of   a   Receiving   Office   under   the   Treaty   and   PCT   Regulations.   The   functions   of   the   IPO   as   a   Receiving   Office  include:     (1)   According   of   international   filing   dates   to   international   applications   fulfilling   the   requirements   of   PCT   Article   11(1)   and   in   particular,  PCT  Rule  20;     (2)   Checking   that   international   applications   meet   the   standards   for   format   and   content   of   PCT  Article  14(1)  and  in  particular,  PCT  Rules  9,   26,  29.1,  37,  38,  91,  and  portions  of  PCT  Rules  3   through  11;       (3)  Assessing,  collecting,  and  transmitting  fees   due  for  processing  international  applications;       (4)   Transmitting   the   record   and   search   copies   to  the  IB  and  ISA,  respectively;  and  

  (5)   Transmitting   the   international   application   to   the   IB   for   processing,   where   the   IPO   is   not   the   competent   Receiving   Office   as   defined   under  PCT  Rule  19.     RULE   9.   INTERNATIONAL   SEARCH   AND   INTERNATIONAL   SEARCHING   AUTHORITY.  –     9.1.  An  international  application  shall  be  the  subject  of  an   international  search,  which  shall  be  carried  out  by  an  ISA.   The   objective   of   the   international   search   is   to   discover   relevant  prior  art.     9.2.   The   Director   General   shall   specify   one   or   more   competent   ISAs   for   international   applications   filed   with   the   IPO   and,   subject   to   any   required   acceptance   or   compliance   with   applicable   requirements,   the   IPO   shall   publish  in  its  website  a  list  of  those  competent  ISAs.       9.3.  The  applicant  shall,  in  his  Request  Form,  indicate  his   choice  of  the  competent  ISA.       RULE   10.   INTERNATIONAL   PRELIMINARY   EXAMINATION   AND   INTERNATIONAL  PRELIMINARY  EXAMINING  AUTHORITY.  –     10.1.   An   international   application   may   be   the   subject   of   an   international   preliminary   examination   which   shall   be   carried  out  by  an  IPEA.     10.2.   The   objective   of   the   international   preliminary   examination   is   to   formulate   a   preliminary   and   non-­‐ binding   opinion   on   the   questions   whether   the   claimed   invention   appears   to   be   novel,   to   involve   an   inventive   step  (to  be  non-­‐obvious)  and  to  be  industrially  applicable.       10.3.   The   Director   General   shall   specify   one   or   more   competent   IPEAs   for   international   applications   filed   with   the   IPO   and,   subject   to   any   required   acceptance   or   compliance   with   applicable   requirements,   the   IPO   shall   publish  in  its  website  a  list  of  those  competent  IPEAs.       10.4  Where  there  are  two  or  more  competent  IPEAs  for   applications  filed  with  the  IPO,  the  applicant  shall,  in  his   Demand  Form,  indicate  his  choice  of  the  competent  IPEA.     RULE   11.   LANGUAGE   PRESCRIBED   BY   THE   RECEIVING   O FFICE.   –   The   language  accepted  by  the  Philippines  receiving  Office  for   the   filing   of   international   application   is   Filipino   or   English,   provided   that   it   is   sufficient   that   the   description   and   claims   be   in   Filipino   or   English   for   the   purposes   of   according   an   international   filing   date   under   PCT   Article   11(1).     RULE12.     TRANSLATION   FOR   THE   PURPOSES   OF   INTERNATIONAL   SEARCH.  –     (a)   Where   the   international   application   is   filed   in   Filipino,   the   applicant   shall,   within   one   (1)   month   from   the   date   of   receipt   of   the   international   application   by   the   IPO,  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   furnish   to   the   Office   a   translation   of   the   international   application  into  English  in  accordance  with  PCT  Rule  12.3   (a)  and  (b).     (b)   If   the   Engish   translation   is   not   furnished   within   the   time  limit  under  paragraph  (a),  the  Office  shall  invite  the   applicant  to  furnish  it  within  one  (1)  month  from  the  date   of  invitation  or  two  (2)  months  from  the  date  of  receipt   of   the   international   application   by   the   IPO,   whichever   expires  later.     (c)   If   the   applicant   does   not   furnish   the   English   translation   within   the   applicable   time   limit   under   paragraph   (b),   the   international   application   shall   be   considered  withdrawn  and  the  IPO  as  a  receiving  Office   shall  so  declare  in  accordance  with  PCT  Rule  12.3(d).     (d)   The   IPO   shall   promptly   furnish   the   IB   and   the   ISA   a   copy  of  the  English  translation.     RULE  13.  D OCUMENTS  AND  CORRESPONDENCE.  –     (a)  Any  paper  submitted  by  the  applicant,  other  than  the   international   application   itself,   must,   if   not   itself   in   the   form   of   a   letter,   be   accompanied   by   a   letter   identifying   the  international  application  to  which  it  relates  and  must   be  signed  by  the  applicant.       (b)   Correspondence   intended   for   the   applicant   shall   be   sent  to  the  agent  appointed  under  Rule  7.     RULE   14.   KEEPING  OF   RECORDS  AND   FILES.   -­‐   The   IPO   shall   keep   the   records   relating   to   the   international   application   or   purported   international   application   for   at   least   (ten)   10   years   from   the   international   filing   date   or,   where   no   international   filing   date   is   accorded,   from   the   date   of   receipt  of  the  purported  application.       RULE   15.   THE   INTERNATIONAL   APPLICATION.   -­‐   An   international   application  shall  contain  a  request,  a  description,  one  or   more   claims,   one   or   more   drawings   (where   required),   and  an  abstract.       RULE   16.   THE   REQUEST.   -­‐   The   request   shall   be   made   in   accordance   with   PCT   Rules   3   and   4.     Copies   of   the   Request  form  are  available  at  the  IPO.     The   Request   Form   may   be   made   using   PCT-­‐EASY   software   made   available   by   the   IB,   in   which   case,   the   applicant   is   required   to   submit   the   Request   as   a   computer   print-­‐out   together   with   a   computer   diskette   containing   a   copy   of   the   electronic   form   of   the   data   contained   in   the   Request   and   of   the   abstract   prepared   using  that  software.     RULE   17.   THE   DESCRIPTION.   –     The   description   shall   disclose   the  invention  in  a  manner  sufficiently  clear  and  complete  

for  the  invention  to  be  carried  out  by  a  person  skilled  in   the  art.     The   requirements   as   to   the   format   and   content   of   the   description  are  set  forth,  in  particular,  in  PCT  Rules  5,  9,   10,   and   11,   and   Section   204   of   the   PCT   Administrative   Instructions.     RULE   18.   THE   CLAIMS.   -­‐   The   claim   or   claims   shall   define   the   matter   for   which   protection   is   sought.   Claims   shall   be   clear   and   concise.   They   shall   be   fully   supported   by   the   description.       The  requirements  as  to  the  format  and  content  of  claims   are  set  forth,  in  particular,  in  PCT  Rules  6,  9,  10,  and  11.     RULE  19.  THE  D RAWINGS.  -­‐   Drawings   which   are   necessary   for   the   understanding   of   the   invention   must   be   part   of   the   international   application   as   originally   filed   in   order   to   maintain  the  international  filing  date  during  the  national   stage.   If   drawings   are   referred   to   in   the   international   application  but  they  are  missing  upon  filing,  the  IPO  shall   give   the   applicant   thirty   (30)   days   from   the   date   of   receipt   of   the   international   application   to   submit   the   drawings.  If  the  missing  drawings  are  received  within  the   thirty-­‐day  period,  the  international  filing  date  shall  be  the   date   on   which   such   drawings   are   received.   If   such   drawings   are   not   timely   received,   all   references   to   drawings   in   the   international   application   shall   be   considered  non-­‐existent.     The   physical   requirements   for   drawings   are   set   forth   in   PCT  Rule  11.3.     RULE   20.   THE   ABSTRACT.   -­‐   The   abstract   shall   merely   serve   for  technical  information.  Lack  of  an  abstract  upon  filing   of   an   international   application   will   not   affect   the   granting   of   a   filing   date.   If   the   abstract   is   missing,   the   IPO   shall   invite   the   applicant   to   submit   the   same   within   one   (1)   month   from   the   date   of   the   invitation   and   the   IPO  shall  notify  the  ISA  accordingly.     The   requirements   as   to   the   format   and   content   of   the   abstract  are  set  forth  in  PCT  Rule  8.     RULE   21.   PRIORITY   CLAIM.   –   Any   declaration   referred   to   in   Article   8(1)   (“priority   claim”)   shall   be   indicated   in   the   Request  Form  as  set  forth  in  PCT  Rule  4.10.     Any   correction   or   addition   on   the   priority   claim   shall   be   made  in  accordance  with  PCT  Rule  26bis.     RULE  22.  PHYSICAL  REQUIREMENTS.  –     22.1.   An   international   application   and   each   of   the   documents   that   may   be   referred   to   in   the   checklist   of   the  Request  Form  shall  be  filed  in  one  (1)  copy  only.      

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Intellectual Property Law 22.2.   All   sheets   of   the   international   application   must   be   on  A4  size  paper  (29.7  cm  x  21  cm)  which  shall  be  flexible,   strong,  white,  smooth,  non-­‐shiny,  and  durable.     22.3.  In  order  to  facilitate  processing  of  the  international   applications,   attention   of   applicants   is   directed   to   the   other  physical  requirements  for  international  application   which  are  set  forth  in  PCT  Rule  11  and  Section  207  of  the   PCT  Administrative  Instructions.     RULE  23.  WHO  MAY  FILE  AN  INTERNATIONAL  APPLICATION.  –     A   resident   or   national   of   the   Philippines   may   file   an   international   application.   If   there   are   two   or   more   applicants,   the   right   to   file   an   international   application   shall   exist   if   at   least   one   of   them   is   a   resident   or   national   of  the  Philippines.     RULE  24.  WHERE  TO  FILE  AN  INTERNATIONAL  APPLICATION.  –     24.1.  A  resident  or  national  of  the  Philippines  may  file  an   international  application  with  the  IPO  or  the  IB.     24.2.   An   international   application   may   be   filed   directly   with   the   IPO   or   through   registered   mail   by   postal   authority.     RULE   25.   ACCORDING   OF   INTERNATIONAL   FILING   D ATE   AND   ITS   EFFECT.  –     25.1.   The   IPO,   as   the   competent   receiving   Office,   shall   accord   as   the   international   filing   date   the   date   of   receipt   of   the   international   application,   provided   that,   at   the   time  of  receipt:     (1)   at   least   one   applicant   is   a   resident   or   national   of   the   Philippines;chan   robles   virtual   law  library     (2)  the  international  application  is  in  the  Filipino   or  English  language;  andchan  robles  virtual  law   library     (3)   the   international   application   contains   at   least  the  following  elements:chan  robles  virtual   law  library       (i)   an   indication   that   it   is   intended   as   an  international  application;     (ii)   the   designation   of   at   least   one   Contracting  State;     (iii)  the  name  of  the  applicant;     (iv)   a   part   which   on   the   face   of   it   appears  to  be  a  description;  and     (v)   a   part   which   on   the   face   of   it   appears  to  be  a  claim  or  claims.    

25.2.  If  the  IPO  finds  that  the  applicant  or  not  one  of  the   applicants   is   a   resident   or   national   of   the   Philippines   or   that   the   language   is   neither   Filipino   nor   English,   the   international   application   shall   be   treated   and   transmitted   to   the   IB   in   accordance   with   PCT   Rule   19.4,   subject  to  payment  of  the  transmittal  fee  under  PCT  Rule   14.     25.3.   If   the   IPO   finds   that   the   international   application   did   not,   at   the   time   of   receipt,   contain   the   elements   listed  in  Rule  25.1  item  (3),  it  shall  invite  the  applicant  to   file   the   required   correction   within   thirty   (30)   days   from   the  date  of  the  invitation.  If  the  applicant  complies  with   the   invitation,   the   IPO   shall   accord   as   the   international   filing   date   the   date   of   receipt   of   the   required   correction.   If  the  applicant  does  not  comply  with  the  invitation,  the   IPO   shall   promptly   in   accordance   with   PCT   Rule   20.7(i)   notify   the   applicant   that   his   application   is   not   and   will   not   be   treated   as   an   international   application   and   shall   indicate  the  reasons  therefor.     RULE   26.   TRANSMITTAL   OF   THE   INTERNATIONAL   APPLICATION.   –   26.1.   The   IPO   shall   transmit   the   “record   copy”   of   the   international   application   to   the   IB   in   accordance   with   PCT  Rule  22.       26.2.   The   IPO   shall   transmit   the   “search   copy”   of   the   international   application   to   the   competent   ISA   after   payment   of   the   search   fee   by   the   applicant   in   accordance  with  PCT  Rule  23.     26.3.   The   Director   General   may   prohibit   or   restrict   the   transmittal   of   an   application,   if   in   his   opinion,   to   do   so   would   be   prejudicial   to   the   national   security   and   interests  of  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines.  The  Director   General   may   apply   other   measures,   as   provided   under   PCT   Article   27(8),   that   will   not   prevent   the   transmittal   of   the   record   copy   and   search   copy   but   will   restrict   the   contents  of  the  transmittals.     RULE  27.  THE  INTERNATIONAL  PUBLICATION  AND  ITS  EFFECT.  –     27.1.  In  accordance  with  PCT  Article  21  and  PCT  Rule  48,   the   IB   shall   publish   the   international   application   promptly   after   the   expiration   of   eighteen   (18)   months   from   the   priority   date   of   the   application.   However,   the   applicant   may   ask   the   IB   to   publish   his   international   application   any   time   before   the   expiration   of   eighteen   (18)   months   from   the   priority   date   in   accordance   with   PCT  Rule  48.4.     27.2.   In   accordance   with   PCT   Article   29(1),   as   far   as   the   protection   of   any   rights   of   the   applicant   under   Section   46   of   the   IP   Code   in   the   Philippines   is   concerned,   the   international   publication   in   English   of   an   international   application  shall  have  the  same  effect  as  a  publication  in   the  IPO  Gazette  under  Section  44  of  the  IP  Code  and  its   implementing  rules  and  regulations  provided  that  notice   of   the   international   publication   and   copy   of   the  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   international   application   has   been   transmitted   by   the   applicant   to   the   actual   unauthorized   user   of   the   invention   claimed   in   the   international   application   pursuant  to  Sec.  46.2  of  the  IP  Code.         27.3.   If   the   language   in   which   the   international   publication   has   been   effected   is   a   language   other   than   English,   the   protection   of   any   right   of   the   applicant   under   Section   46   of   the   IP   Code   in   the   Philippines   shall   be   applicable   only   from   such   time   as   a   translation   into   English   has   been   published   in   the   IPO   Gazette   under   Section  44  of  the  IP  Code  and  its  implementing  rules  and   regulations,   and,   such   translation   into   English   has   been   transmitted  by  the  applicant  to  the  actual  unauthorized   user   of   the   invention   claimed   in   the   international   application  pursuant  to  Section  46.2  of  the  IP  Code.       27.4.   Where   the   international   publication   has   been   effected,   on   the   request   of   the   applicant,   before   the   expiration  of  eighteen  (18)  months  from  the  priority  date,   the  rights  provided  for  under  Sec.  46  of  the  IP  Code  shall   be   applicable   only   from   the   expiration   of   eighteen   (18)   months   from   the   priority   date   subject   to   the   conditions   mentioned  in  the  preceding  paragraphs.     RULE   28.   DEMAND   FOR   INTERNATIONAL   PRELIMINARY   EXAMINATION.  –       28.1.   On   filing   of   a   demand   under   PCT   Article   31,   the   international   application   shall   be   the   subject   of   an   international  preliminary  examination.     28.2.   The   demand   for   international   preliminary   examination   shall   be   filed   directly   by   the   applicant   with   the   competent   IPEA   prior   to   the   expiration   of   the   nineteenth  (19th)  month  from  the  priority  date.       28.3.   The   demand   shall   indicate   the   States   in   which   the   applicant   intends   to   use   the   results   of   the   international   preliminary  examination.     28.4.  In  accordance  with  PCT  Article  31  and  PCT  Rules  57   and   58,   the   demand   shall   be   subject   to   the   payment   by   the  applicant  of  the  prescribed  fees  directly  to  the  IPEA   within   one   (1)   month   from   the   date   on   which   the   demand  was  submitted.       Copies  of  the  Demand  Form  are  available  at  the  IPO.     RULE   29.   MANNER  OF   MAKING   CORRECTIONS.   –   Any   correction   offered  to  the  IPO  as  a  receiving  Office  may  be  stated  in   a  letter  addressed  to  the  IPO  if  the  correction  is  of  such  a   nature   that   it   can   be   transferred   from   the   letter   to   the   record   copy   without   adversely   affecting   the   clarity   and   the   direct   reproducibility   of   the   sheet   on   to   which   the   correction   is   to   be   transferred;   otherwise,   the   applicant   shall  be  required  to  submit  the  missing  requirement  or  a   replacement   sheet   containing   the   correction  

accompanied   by   a   letter   indicating   the   differences   between  the  replaced  sheet  and  the  replacement  sheet.       RULE   30.   DELAYS   IN   MEETING   TIME   LIMITS.   Delays   in   meeting   time   limits   during   international   processing   of   international   applications   may   only   be   excused   as   provided  in  PCT  Rule  82.     RULE   31.   RECORDING  OF   CHANGES.   -­‐   Before   the   expiration   of   the   time   limit   referred   to   in   PCT   Articles   22(1)   and   39(1)(a),   the   IPO   may   receive   from   the   applicant   a   request   for   the   recording   of   a   change   in   the   person,   name,   residence,   nationality   or   address   of   the   applicant   or   a   change   in   the   person,   name   or   address   of   the   inventor,   the   agent   or   the   common   representative.   The   IPO   shall   notify   the   IB   of   the   request   for   recording   a   change.       RULE   32.     WITHDRAWALS.   -­‐   The   IPO   may   receive   from   the   applicant   notice   of   withdrawal   of   the   international   application,   any   designation,   or   priority   claims   in   accordance  with  PCT  Rule  90bis(1),  90bis(2),  90bis(3).     Withdrawal   of   a   demand   or   any   election   shall   be   made   directly  to  the  IB  in  accordance  with  PCT  Rule  90bis.4.     RULE   33.   CERTIFIED   COPIES   OF   THE   INTERNATIONAL   APPLICATION   AND  PRIORITY  DOCUMENT.  –     (a)   The   applicant   may   request   the   IPO   to   prepare   a   certified  copy  of  the  international  application  as  filed  and   of   any   corrections   thereto   upon   payment   of   the   appropriate  fee.       (b)  Where  the  priority  document  is  issued  by  the  IPO,  the   applicant  may,  pursuant  to  PCT  Rule  17.1(b),  request  the   IPO  to  prepare  and  transmit  the  priority  document  to  the   IB.  Such  request  shall  be  made  not  later  than  sixteen  (16)   months   after   the   priority   date   and   shall   be   subject   to   payment  of  a  fee.     PART  III.   NATIONAL  PHASE     RULE  34.  THE  IPO  AS  A  DESIGNATED  OR  ELECTED  OFFICE.  –     34.1.  The  IPO  will  act  as  the  Designated  or  Elected  Office   for  international  applications  in  which  the  Philippines  has   been  designated  or  elected.       34.2.   The   IPO,   when   acting   as   a   Designated   or   Elected   Office   during   international   processing   will   be   identified   by   the   full   title   “Philippine   Designated   Office”   or   by   abbreviation   “DO/PH”   and   “Philippine   Elected   Office”   or   by  abbreviation  “EO/PH.”     34.3.   The   major   functions   of   the   IPO   in   respect   to   international   applications   in   which   the   Philippines   has   been  designated  or  elected,  shall  include:  

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with   the   IP   Code   and   its   implementing   rules   and   regulations.     RULE   36.  ENTRY   INTO  THE   NATIONAL   PHASE  OF  AN  INTERNATIONAL   APPLICATION   CLAIMING   THE   PRIORITY   OF   AN   EARLIER   PHILIPPINE   NATIONAL  APPLICATION.  Within  one  (1)  month  from  the  date   of   entry   into   the   national   phase   of   an   international   application   claiming   the   priority   of   an   earlier   Philippine   national  application,  the  IPO  shall  invite  the  applicant  to   elect   only   one   (1)   application   for   further   prosecution   within   two   (2)   months   from   the   date   of   the   invitation,   or   within  a  longer  period  which  the  IPO  may  allow  but  not   to   exceed   six   (6)   months   from   the   date   of   entry   into   the   national  phase.     RULE  37.  REVIEW  BY  IPO  AS  A  D ESIGNATED  OFFICE.  –     (a)   Where   the   receiving   Office   other   than   the   IPO   has   refused   to   accord   an   international   filing   date   to   an   international   application   designating   the   Philippines   or   has   declared   that   the   international   application   is   considered   withdrawn   either   generally   or   as   to   the   Philippines,   or   where   the   IB   has   made   a   finding   under   PCT   Article   12(3)   that   the   international   application   is   considered   withdrawn   because   it   has   not   received   the   record   copy   within   the   prescribed   time   limit,   the   applicant   may   request   review   of   the   matter   by   the   IPO   provided   the   requirements   of   and   the   time   limit   specified  by  the  Treaty  and  PCT  regulations  as  well  as  the   requirements  for  entry  into  national  phase  in  these  Rules   are  complied  with.     (b)  Where  the   refusal,   declaration   or   finding   mentioned   in   paragraph   (a)   was   the   result   of   an   error   or   omission   on   the   part   of   the   receiving   Office   or   that   the   finding   was  the  result  of  an  error  or  omission  on  the  part  of  the   IB,   the   IPO   as   a   designated   Office   may   treat   the   international  application  as  if  such  error  or  omission  has   not  occurred.     RULE  38.    TIME  LIMIT  TO  SUBMIT  THE  PRIORITY  DOCUMENT.  –     38.1.   The   priority   claim   of   an   international   application   designating   or   electing   the   Philippines   shall   not   be   disregarded   by   IPO,   where   the   priority   document   is   received   by   the   IB   not   later   than   sixteen   (16)   months   after   the   priority   date   in   accordance   with   PCT   Rule   17.1   (a)  and  (b).     38.2.  If  the  priority  document  is  not  submitted  to  the  IB   within   sixteen   (16)   months   after   the   priority   date   in   accordance  with  PCT  Rule  17.1  (a)  and  (b),  the  applicant   may   submit   to   the   IPO   a   certification   from   the   national   Office   concerned   stating   the   following   data   regarding   the  application  the  priority  of  which  is  claimed:  name  of   the  applicant,  filing  date,  application  number  and  title  of   the   application.   The   certification,   and   its   English   translation   if   not   in   English,   together   with   payment   of   the   fee   for   extension   of   time   to   submit   priority   document  and  the  surcharge  for  late  payment  provided  

(1)   Receiving   various   notifications   throughout   the  international  phase;  and     (2)   Accepting   for   national   phase   examination   international   applications   which   comply   with   Part  3  of  these  Rules.  

  RULE  35.  ENTRY  INTO  NATIONAL  PHASE.  –     (a)  An  international  application  enters  the  national  phase   when   the   applicant   furnishes   IPO   a   copy   of   the   international   application   in   English   (unless   already   transmitted  by  the  IB),  or,  if  the  application  was  filed  in   another   language,   its   English   translation   not   later   than   thirty   (30)   months   from   the   priority   date   based   on   PCT   Article  22  (1)  and  PCT  Article  39  (1)  (a).     Subject  to  the  payment  of  an  extension  fee  for  late  entry   equal   to   fifty   percent   (50%)   of   the   filing   fee   prescribed   in   the  IPO  Fee  Structure,  the  entry  into  the  national  phase   may  be  extended  by  one  (1)  month.     (b)  The  filing  fee  prescribed  in  the  IPO  fee  structure  shall   be   paid   within   one   (1)   month   from   the   date   of   entry   into   the   national   phase;   provided   that   an   international   application   which   claims   the   priority   of   an   earlier   Philippine   national   application   shall   be   exempt   from   payment  of  the  filing  fee.If  the  applicant  fails  to  pay  the   filing   fee   as   herein   provided,   the   application   shall   be   deemed  withdrawn  in  the  Philippines.       (c)   The   translation   of   the   international   application,   as   filed,   referred   to   in   paragraph   (a)   shall   include   a   translation  into  English  of:     (1)  the  description;     (2)  the  claims  as  filed  and,  where  applicable,  as   amended  under  PCT  Article  19;     (3)  any  text  matter  of  the  drawings;     (4)  the  abstract;  and     (5)   where   applicable,   amendments   to   the   description,   claims   or   drawings   under   PCT   Article   34,   as   contained   in   the   annexes   to   the   international  preliminary  examination  report.       If   the   translation   of   the   amendments   under   PCT   Article   19  or  PCT  Article  34,  as  the  case  may  be,  is  not  included,   those  amendments  will  be  considered  cancelled.     (d)   During   the   national   phase,   and   at   anytime   before   a   patent   is   granted   or   refused   on   the   international   application,   the   applicant   may   present   amendments   to   the   specification,   claims   and   drawings   in   accordance  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   for  in  the  IPO  Fee  Structure,  shall  be  submitted  within  six   (6)   months   from   the   date   of   entry   of   the   international   application   into   the   national   phase   without   need   of   notice.  The  certification  and  its  English  translation  if  not   in   English   do   not   require   legalization.   Failure   of   the   applicant   to   comply   with   this   rule   shall   be   ground   to   disregard  the  priority  claim.     38.3  Where  the  validity  of  the  priority  claim  is  relevant  to   the  determination  of  whether  the  invention  concerned  is   patentable,   the   applicant   shall   be   required   to   submit   the   English  translation  of  the  priority  document.     RULE  39.  PROCEDURE  FOR  GRANT  OF  PATENT.  –     An   international   application   that   has   entered   the   national   phase   shall   be   governed   by   the   applicable   provisions   under   Republic   Act   No.   8293   and   its   implementing   rules   and   regulations   and   the   applicable   provisions   of   the   Treaty,   PCT   Regulations,   and   PCT   Administrative  Instructions.     RULE  40.  APPLICATION  OF  THE  IPO  FEE  STRUCTURE.  –     The   IPO   Fee   Structure   shall   apply   after   entry   into   the   national   phase   of   the   international   application   provided   that:     (a)   an   international   application   which   validly   claims   the   priority   of   an   earlier   Philippine   national   application   shall   be   exempt   from   payment   of   fees   that   were   already   paid   in   connection  with  that  earlier  Philippine  national   application;     (b)  the  due  date  for  payment  of  the  first  annual   fee   shall   be   computed   from   the   date   of   the   international   publication   regardless   of   the   language  of  publication;  and     (c)   the   international   application   shall   be   deemed   withdrawn   if   the   substantive   examination   fee   is   not   paid   within   six   (6)   months  from  the  date  of  entry  into  the  national   phase.   The   applicant   may   use   a   form   for   payment  prescribed  by  IPO  for  this  purpose.       PART  III.   FEES  DURING  INTERNATIONAL  PHASE     RULE   41.   FEES   TO   BE   COLLECTED   BY   THE   IPO.   –   The   following   fees  shall  be  collected  by  the  IPO:     41.1.   Fees   for   the   benefit   of   the   IPO.   The   type   and   amount  of  fees  for  the  benefit  of  the  IPO  are:     Ref.   Code   901  

Type  of  Fee   Transmittal  Fee  PCT  Rule   14  

902   903  

904  

905   906  

907  

Priority  Document   Fee  PCT  Rule  17.1(b)   Fee  for  Transmitting   Priority  Document  PCT   Rule  17.1(b)   Confirmation  Fee   PCT  Rules  4.9(c)  and   15.5(a)  

Late  Payment  Fee  PCT   Rule  16bis.2(a)(ii)   Certified  Copy  of  the   International  Application   Fee  PCT  Rule  20.9   Transmittal  Fee  PCT  Rule   19.4  

500.00   1,750.00  

Fifty  (50%)  of  the  sum   of  designation  fees   under  PCT  Rule  15.5  in   Philippine  currency  at   the  prevailing  rate  of   exchange  at  the  time   the  payment  is  due   3,500.00   500.00  

3,500.00  

  41.2.  Fees  for  the  benefit  of  the  IB  (International  Fee)     The   amount   of   the   basic   fee   referred   to   in   PCT   Rule   15.1(i),  the  designation  fee  referred  to  in  PCT  Rule  15.1(ii)   for   any   designation   made   under   PCT   Rule   4.9(a),   and   the   designation   fee   referred   to   in   PCT   Rule   15.5   for   any   designation   made   under   PCT   Rule   4.9(b)   and   confirmed   under  PCT  Rule  4.9(c),  are  published  in  the  PCT  Gazette   and  are  available  at  the  IPO.       41.3.   Fee   for   the   benefit   of   the   ISA   (Search   Fee)chan   robles  virtual  law  library     The  amount  of  the  search  fee  referred  to  in  PCT  Rule  16.1   of   the   competent   ISA   or   ISAs   for   the   Philippines   is   published  in  the  PCT  Gazette.     RULE   42.   D UE   DATES   AND   EXTENSION   OF   TIME   LIMITS   FOR   PAYMENT  OF   FEES   COLLECTED  BY   IPO.   –   All   fees   must   be   paid   on   or   before   the   due   date   prescribed   in   the   PCT   Regulations  and  these  Rules.       42.1.  The  transmittal  fee,  basic  fee  and  search  fee  shall  be   paid  by  the  applicant  within  one  (1)  month  from  the  date   of  receipt  by  the  IPO  of  the  international  application;         42.2.   The   designation   fee   for   any   designation   made   under  PCT  Rule  4.9(a)  shall  be  paid  within  a  time  limit  of:     (a)  one  (1)  year  from  the  priority  date,  or     (b)   one   (1)   month   from   the   date   of   receipt   of   the  international  application  if  that  one-­‐month   period  expires  later  than  one  (1)  year  from  the   priority  date;       42.3.   Where   the   fees   due   under   this   rule   have   not   been   paid,  or  that  the  amount  paid  is  insufficient  to  cover  the   total   amount   due,   the   IPO   shall   invite   the   applicant   to   pay  the  required  fees  together  with  the  late  payment  fee  

Amount(Philippine   Peso)   3,500.00  

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Intellectual Property Law within  one  (1)  month  without  extension  of  time  from  the   date  of  invitation;     42.4.   The   designation   fee   under   PCT   Rule   15.5   for   any   designation   made   under   PCT   Rule   4.9(b)   and   confirmed   under   PCT   Rule   4.9(c),   together   with   the   confirmation   fee  under  PCT  Rule  15.5,  shall  be  paid  within  fifteen  (15)   months  from  the  priority  date.     RULE   43.   FEES   FOR   THE   BENEFIT   OF   IPO;   FORM,   MANNER   AND   CURRENCY  OF  PAYMENT.  –     (a)  All  fees  for  the  benefit  of  the  IPO  shall  be  paid  in  cash,   money   order,   bank   drafts   and/or   checks   in   Philippine   currency.  In  case  of  cash  payment,  the  date  of  receipt  is   the  date  on  which  the  full  amount  due  was  paid  in  cash.   In   case   of   money   order,   check   or   bank   draft   payment,   the   date   of   receipt   of   the   money   order,   check   or   bank   draft  will  be  the  date  of  presentment  provided  that  the   same   is   honored   upon   first   presentment   and   provided   that  the  payment  covers  the  full  amount  due.     (b)   Payment   shall   be   made   to   the   IPO   Cashier   during   regular   working   days   and   business   hours   from   Monday   to  Friday,  8:00  a.m.  to  12:00  noon  and  from  1:00  p.m.  to   5:00  p.m.     RULE   44.   FEES  FOR   THE   BENEFIT  OF   IB  AND   ISA;   FORM,   MANNER   AND  CURRENCY  OF  PAYMENT.  –     44.1   All   fees   for   the   benefit   of   the   IB   and   the   ISA   collected  by  IPO  as  receiving  Office  shall  be  paid  to  IPO   in  the  currency  or  any  of  the  currencies,  if  more  than  one,   specified  by  the  IB  or  the  ISA  as  the  case  may  be,  in  the   form  of  cash  or  bank  draft.  In  case  of  cash  payment,  the   date  of  receipt  is  the  date  on  which  the  full  amount  due   was  paid  in  cash.  In  case  of  bank  draft  payment,  the  date   of   receipt   of   the   bank   draft   will   be   the   date   of   presentment   provided   that   the   same   is   honored   upon   first  presentment  and  provided  further  that  the  payment   covers   the   full   amount   due.   Payment   shall   be   made   to   the   IPO   Cashier   during   regular   working   days   and   business   hours   from   Monday   to   Friday,   8:00   a.m.   to   12:00  noon  and  from  1:00  p.m.  to  5:00  p.m.     44.2.   Where   the   international   application   incurs   an   additional  fee  other  than  the  search  fee  under  PCT  Rule   16,  the  applicant  shall  pay  directly  to  the  ISA  such  other   fees   required   by   the   ISA   in   the   currency,   form   and   manner  prescribed  by  it.     44.3.   The   Schedules   of   Fees   of   the   IB   and   ISAs   are   published  in  the  PCT  Gazette  and  are  available  at  the  IPO.     Rule   45.   Fees   Payable   to   the   IPEA.   -­‐   The   international   preliminary  examination  fee  and  the  handling  fee  under   PCT   Rule   58   shall   be   paid   directly   to   the   IPEA   in   the   currency,  form  and  manner  prescribed  by  it.    

Other  fees  due  to  the  IPEA  in  accordance  with  the  Treaty   and  PCT  Regulations  shall  be  paid  directly  to  the  IPEA  in   the  currency,  form  and  manner  prescribed  by  it.     The  Schedules  of  Fees  of  the  IPEAs  are  published  in  the   PCT  Gazette  and  are  available  at  the  IPO.     RULE  46.  REFUNDS.  –     46.1   The   IPO   shall   refund   the   international   fee   to   the   applicant  in  accordance  with  PCT  Rule  15.6:     (a)   if   the   IPO   has   found   that   the   international   filing   date   cannot   be   accorded   in   accordance   with  PCT  Article  11(1);     (b)   if,   before   the   transmittal   of   the   record   copy   to   the   IB,   the   international   application   is   withdrawn  or  considered  withdrawn;  or     (c)   if,   due   to   prescriptions   concerning   the   national   security,   the   international   application   is  not  treated  as  such.     46.2.  The  IPO  shall  refund  the  search  fee  to  the  applicant   in  accordance  with  PCT  Rule  16.2:     (a)   if   the   IPO   has   found   that   the   international   filing   date   cannot   be   accorded   in   accordance   with  PCT  Article  11(1);     (b)   if,   before   the   transmittal   of   the   search   copy   to   the   ISA,   the   international   application   is   withdrawn  or  considered  withdrawn;  or     (c)   if,   due   to   prescriptions   concerning   the   national   security,   the   international   application   is  not  treated  as  such.     RULE  47.    REDUCTION  IN  FEES.  –  An  applicant  may  be  entitled   to   a   reduction   in   fees   provided   that   the   requirements,   as   specified   by   the   IB   and   Authorities   under   the   Treaty   granting  such  reduction  in  fees,  are  fully  satisfied  and/or   duly  complied  with.     RULE   48.   SEPARABILITY   CLAUSE.   –   If   any   provision   in   these   Rules   or   application   of   such   provision   to   any   circumstance   is   held   invalid,   the   remainder   of   these   Rules  shall  not  be  affected.     RULE   49.   FILING   OF   CERTIFIED   COPIES.   –   Mr.   Eduardo   Joson,   Records  Officer  II,  is  hereby  directed  to  immediately  file   three   (3)   certified   copies   of   these   Rules   with   the   University   of   the   Philippines   Law   Center,   and,   one   (1)   certified  copy  each  with  the  Office  of  the  President,  the   Senate  of  the  Philippines,  the  House  of  Representatives,   the   Supreme   Court   of   the   Philippines,   and   the   National   Library.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   patentee,   he   has   the   exclusive   right   of   making,   selling   or   using  the  invention.  On  the  assumption  that  petitioner’s   advertising   units   were   patentable   inventions,   petitioner   revealed   them   fully   to   the   public   by   submitting   the   engineering  drawings  thereof  to  the  National  Library.     To  be  able  to  effectively  and  legally  preclude  others  from   copying   and   profiting   from   the   invention,   a   patent   is   a   primordial   requirement.     No   patent,   no   protection.   The   ultimate  goal  of  a  patent  system  is  to  bring  new  designs   and   technologies   into   the   public   domain   through   disclosure.   Ideas,   once   disclosed   to   the   public   without   the   protection   of   a   valid   patent,   are   subject   to   appropriation  without  significant  restraint.     On   one   side   of   the   coin   is   the   public   which   will   benefit   from   new   ideas;   on   the   other   are   the   inventors   who   must   be   protected.   The   act   secured   to   the   inventor   the   exclusive  right  to  make  use,  and  vend  the  thing  patented,   and  consequently  to  prevent  others  from  exercising  like   privileges   without   the   consent   of   the   patentee.     It   was   passed   for   the   purpose   of   encouraging   useful   invention   and   promoting   new   and   useful   inventions   by   the   protection  and  stimulation  given  to  inventive  genius,  and   was   intended   to   secure   to   the   public,   after   the   lapse   of   the   exclusive   privileges   granted   the   benefit   of   such   inventions  and  improvements.     The  law  attempts  to  strike  an  ideal  balance  between  the   two  interests:     “The   patent   system   thus   embodies   a   carefully   crafted   bargain   for   encouraging   the   creation   and   disclosure   of   new   useful   and   non-­‐obvious   advances   in   technology   and   design,   in   return   for   the   exclusive   right   to   practice   the   invention   for  a  number  of  years.    The  inventor  may  keep   his   invention   secret   and   reap   its   fruits   indefinitely.     In   consideration   of   its   disclosure   and  the  consequent  benefit  to  the  community,   the  patent  is  granted.    An  exclusive  enjoyment   is   guaranteed   him   for   17   years,   but   upon   the   expiration  of  that  period,  the  knowledge  of  the   invention   inures   to   the   people,   who   are   thus   enabled  to  practice  it  and  profit  by  its  use.”     The   patent   law   has   a   three-­‐fold   purpose:   “first,   patent   law   seeks   to   foster   and   reward   invention;   second,   it   promotes   disclosures   of   inventions   to   stimulate   further   innovation   and   to   permit   the   public   to   practice   the   invention   once   the   patent   expires;   third,   the   stringent   requirements   for   patent   protection   seek   to   ensure   that   ideas   in   the   public   domain   remain   there   for   the   free   use   of  the  public.”     It  is  only  after  an  exhaustive  examination  by  the  patent   office   that   a   patent   is   issued.     Such   an   in-­‐depth   investigation   is   required   because   in   rewarding   a   useful  

RULE   50.   EFFECTIVITY.   –   Without   prejudice   to   the   performance   by   the   IPO   of   its   functions   as   a   receiving   Office,   designated   Office   or   elected   Office   under   the   Treaty,   from   and   as   of   the   entering   into   effect   of   the   Treaty   with   respect   to   the   Philippines   on   17   August   2001,   these   Rules   shall   take   effect   on   October   22,   2001   after   publication   in   a   newspaper   of   general   circulation   in   the   Philippines  on  October  4,  2001.    

I.

Issuance  or  Refusal  of  Patents  

 

SECTION  50.  GRANT  OF  PATENT.  –     50.1.   If   the   application   meets   the   requirements   of   this   Act,   the   Office   shall   grant   the   patent:   Provided,   That   all   the  fees  are  paid  on  time.     50.2.   If   the   required   fees   for   grant   and   printing   are   not   paid   in   due   time,   the   application   shall   be   deemed   to   be   withdrawn.     50.3.   A   patent   shall   take   effect   on   the   date   of   the   publication  of  the  grant  of  the  patent  in  the  IPO  Gazette.    

SECTION  51.  REFUSAL  OF  THE  APPLICATION.  –     51.1.   The   final   order   of   refusal   of   the   examiner   to   grant   the   patent   shall   be   appealable   to   the   Director   in   accordance  with  this  Act.     51.2.  The  Regulations  shall  provide  for  the  procedure  by   which   an   appeal   from   the   order   of   refusal   from   the   Director  shall  be  undertaken.    

SECTION  53.  CONTENTS  OF  PATENT.  –     The  patent  shall  be  issued  in  the  name  of  the  Republic  of   the  Philippines  under  the  seal  of  the  Office  and  shall  be   signed  by  the  Director,  and  registered  together  with  the   description,   claims,   and   drawings,   if   any,   in   books   and   records  of  the  Office.    

PEARL  &  DEAN  V.  SHOEMART  (2003),  SUPRA   Court  decision:   For  some  reason  or  another,  petitioner  never  secured  a   patent   for   the   light   boxes.     It   therefore   acquired   no   patent  rights  which  could  have  protected  its  invention,  if   in   fact   it   really   was.     And   because   it   had   no   patent,   petitioner   could   not   legally   prevent   anyone   from   manufacturing   or   commercially   using   the   contraption.   There  can  be  no  infringement  of  a  patent  until  a  patent   has   been   issued,   since   whatever   right   one   has   to   the   invention   covered   by   the   patent   arises   alone   from   the   grant  of  patent.  An  inventor  has  no  common  law  right  to   a   monopoly   of   his   invention.   He   has   the   right   to   make   use   of   and   vend   his   invention,   but   if   he   voluntarily   discloses   it,   such   as   by   offering   it   for   sale,   the   world   is   free  to  copy  and  use  it  with  impunity.    A  patent,  however,   gives   the   inventor   the   right   to   exclude   all   others.     As   a  

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Intellectual Property Law invention,  the  rights  and  welfare  of  the  community  must   be   fairly   dealt   with   and   effectively   guarded.     To   that   end,   the   prerequisites   to   obtaining   a   patent   are   strictly   observed  and  when  a  patent  is  issued,  the  limitations  on   its  exercise  are  equally  strictly  enforced.    To  begin  with,  a   genuine   invention   or   discovery   must   be   demonstrated   lest   in   the   constant   demand   for   new   appliances,   the   heavy  hand  of  tribute  be  laid  on  each  slight  technological   advance  in  art.     There   is   no   such   scrutiny   in   the   case   of   copyrights   nor   any   notice   published   before   its   grant   to   the   effect   that   a   person   is   claiming   the   creation   of   a   work.     The   law   confers  the  copyright  from  the  moment  of  creation  and   the  copyright  certificate  is  issued  upon  registration  with   the  National  Library  of  a  sworn  ex-­‐parte  claim  of  creation.     Therefore,   not   having   gone   through   the   arduous   examination   for   patents,   the   petitioner   cannot   exclude   others  from  the  manufacture,  sale  or  commercial  use  of   the   light   boxes   on   the   sole   basis   of   its   copyright   certificate  over  the  technical  drawings.     Stated   otherwise,   what   petitioner   seeks   is   exclusivity   without   any   opportunity   for   the   patent   office   (IPO)   to   scrutinize   the   light   box’s   eligibility   as   a   patentable   invention.    The  irony  here  is  that,  had  petitioner  secured   a   patent   instead,   its   exclusivity   would   have   been   for   17   years   only.     But   through   the   simplified   procedure   of   copyright-­‐registration   with   the   National   Library   —   without   undergoing   the   rigor   of   defending   the   patentability   of   its   invention   before   the   IPO   and   the   public  —  the  petitioner  would  be  protected  for  50  years.     This   situation   could   not   have   been   the   intention   of   the   law.     In   the   oft-­‐cited   case   of   Baker   vs.   Selden,   the   United   States   Supreme   Court   held   that   only   the   expression   of   an  idea  is  protected  by  copyright,  not  the  idea  itself.    In   that   case,   the   plaintiff   held   the   copyright   of   a   book   which   expounded   on   a   new   accounting   system   he   had   developed.     The   publication   illustrated   blank   forms   of   ledgers   utilized   in   such   a   system.     The   defendant   reproduced   forms   similar   to   those   illustrated   in   the   plaintiff’s   copyrighted   book.     The   US   Supreme   Court   ruled  that:     “There   is   no   doubt   that   a   work   on   the   subject   of   book-­‐keeping,   though   only   explanatory   of   well   known   systems,   may   be   the   subject   of   a   copyright;  but,  then,  it  is  claimed  only  as  a  book.   x   x   x.     But   there   is   a   clear   distinction   between   the   books,   as   such,   and   the   art,   which   it   is,   intended   to   illustrate.     The   mere   statement   of   the   proposition   is   so   evident   that   it   requires   hardly   any   argument   to   support   it.     The   same   distinction   may   be   predicated   of   every   other   art   as   well   as   that   of   bookkeeping.     A   treatise  

on   the   composition   and   use   of   medicines,   be   they  old  or  new;  on  the  construction  and  use  of   ploughs   or   watches   or   churns;   or   on   the   mixture   and   application   of   colors   for   painting   or   dyeing;   or   on   the   mode   of   drawing   lines   to   produce   the   effect   of   perspective,   would   be   the   subject   of   copyright;   but   no   one   would   contend   that   the   copyright   of   the   treatise   would   give   the   exclusive   right   to   the   art   or   manufacture  described  therein.      The  copyright   of   the   book,   if   not   pirated   from   other   works,   would  be  valid  without  regard  to  the  novelty  or   want   of   novelty   of   its   subject   matter.     The   novelty   of   the   art   or   thing   described   or   explained  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  validity  of   the   copyright.     To   give   to   the   author   of   the   book   an   exclusive   property   in   the   art   described   therein,  when  no  examination  of  its  novelty  has   ever   been   officially   made,   would   be   a   surprise   and   a   fraud   upon   the   public.     That   is   the   province   of   letters   patent,   not   of   copyright.     The   claim   to   an   invention   of   discovery   of   an   art   or   manufacture   must   be   subjected   to   the   examination   of   the   Patent   Office   before   an   exclusive   right   therein   can   be   obtained;   and   a   patent  from  the  government  can  only  secure  it.     The  difference  between  the  two  things,  letters   patent   and   copyright,   may   be   illustrated   by   reference   to   the   subjects   just   enumerated.     Take   the   case   of   medicines.     Certain   mixtures   are  found  to  be  of  great  value  in  the  healing  art.     If   the   discoverer   writes   and   publishes   a   book   on   the   subject   (as   regular   physicians   generally   do),   he   gains   no   exclusive   right   to   the   manufacture   and   sale   of   the   medicine;   he   gives   that   to   the   public.     If   he   desires   to   acquire   such   exclusive   right,   he   must   obtain   a   patent   for   the   mixture   as   a   new   art,   manufacture   or   composition   of   matter.     He   may   copyright   his   book,   if   he   pleases;   but   that   only   secures   to   him   the   exclusive   right   of   printing   and   publishing  his  book.    So  of  all  other  inventions   or  discoveries.     The   copyright   of   a   book   on   perspective,   no   matter   how   many   drawings   and   illustrations   it   may   contain,   gives   no   exclusive   right   to   the   modes  of  drawing  described,  though  they  may   never   have   been   known   or   used   before.     By   publishing   the   book   without   getting   a   patent   for  the  art,  the  latter  is  given  to  the  public.     Now,   whilst   no   one   has   a   right   to   print   or   publish   his   book,   or   any   material   part   thereof,   as   a   book   intended   to   convey   instruction   in   the   art,   any   person   may   practice   and   use   the   art   itself   which   he   has   described   and   illustrated  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   therein.    The  use  of  the  art  is  a  totally  different   thing   from   a   publication   of   the   book   explaining   it.     The   copyright   of   a   book   on   bookkeeping   cannot  secure  the  exclusive  right  to  make,  sell   and   use   account   books   prepared   upon   the   plan   set  forth  in  such  book.    Whether  the  art  might   or  might  not  have  been  patented,  is  a  question,   which   is   not   before   us.     It   was   not   patented,   and   is   open   and   free   to   the   use   of   the   public.     And,  of  course,  in  using  the  art,  the  ruled  lines   and   headings   of   accounts   must   necessarily   be   used  as  incident  to  it.     The  plausibility  of  the  claim  put  forward  by  the   complainant   in   this   case   arises   from   a   confusion   of   ideas   produced   by   the   peculiar   nature  of  the  art  described  in  the  books,  which   have   been   made   the   subject   of   copyright.     In   describing   the   art,   the   illustrations   and   diagrams   employed   happened   to   correspond   more   closely   than   usual   with   the   actual   work   performed   by   the   operator   who   uses   the   art.     The   description   of   the   art   in   a   book,   though   entitled   to   the   benefit   of   copyright,   lays   no   foundation   for   an   exclusive   claim   to   the   art   itself.     The   object   of   the   one   is   explanation;   the   object  of  the  other  is  use.    The  former  may  be   secured   by   copyright.     The   latter   can   only   be   secured,   if   it   can   be   secured   at   all,   by   letters   patent.”    

three  (3)  months  before  the  due  date.  The  obligation  to   pay   the   annual   fees   shall   terminate   should   the   application  be  withdrawn,  refused,  or  cancelled.     55.2.  If  the  annual  fee  is  not  paid,  the  patent  application   shall  be  deemed  withdrawn  or  the  patent  considered  as   lapsed   from   the   day   following   the   expiration   of   the   period   within   which   the   annual   fees   were   due.   A   notice   that  the  application  is  deemed  withdrawn  or  the  lapse  of   a   patent   for   non-­‐payment   of   any   annual   fee   shall   be   published   in   the   IPO   Gazette   and   the   lapse   shall   be   recorded  in  the  Register  of  the  Office.     55.3.   A   grace   period   of   six   (6)   months   shall   be   granted   for  the  payment  of  the  annual  fee,  upon  payment  of  the   prescribed  surcharge  for  delayed  payment.    

M. Surrender,   Amendment  

SECTION  56.  SURRENDER  OF  PATENT.  –     56.1.   The   owner   of   the   patent,   with   the   consent   of   all   persons   having   grants   or   licenses   or   other   right,   title   or   interest   in   and   to   the   patent   and   the   invention   covered   thereby,   which   have   been   recorded   in   the   Office,   may   surrender  his  patent  or  any  claim  or  claims  forming  part   thereof  to  the  Office  for  cancellation.     56.2.   A   person   may   give   notice   to   the   Office   of   his   opposition   to   the   surrender   of   a   patent   under   this   section,   and   if   he   does   so,   the   Bureau   shall   notify   the   proprietor  of  the  patent  and  determine  the  question.     56.3.   If   the   Office   is   satisfied   that   the   patent   may   properly  be  surrendered,  he  may  accept  the  offer  and,  as   from  the  day  when  notice  of  his  acceptance  is  published   in   the   IPO   Gazette,   the   patent   shall   cease   to   have   effect,   but   no   action   for   infringement   shall   lie   and   no   right   compensation   shall   accrue   for   any   use   of   the   patented   invention   before   that   day   for   the   services   of   the   government.      

Publication  upon  Grant  of  Patents  

 

SECTION  52.  PUBLICATION  UPON  GRANT  OF  PATENT.  –     52.1.   The   grant   of   the   patent   together   with   other   related   information  shall  be  published  in  the  IPO  Gazette  within   the  time  prescribed  by  the  Regulations.     52.2.   Any   interested   party   may   inspect   the   complete   description,   claims,   and   drawings   of   the   patent   on   file   with  the  Office.      

K. Term  of  Patent  

SECTION  57.  CORRECTION  OF  MISTAKES  OF  THE  OFFICE.  –    

 

The  Director  shall  have  the  power  to  correct,  without  fee,   any   mistake   in   a   patent   incurred   through   the   fault   of   the   Office   when   clearly   disclosed   in   the   records   thereof,   to   make  the  patent  conform  to  the  records.    

SECTION  54.  TERM  OF  PATENT.  –     The   term   of   a   patent   shall   be   twenty   (20)   years   from   the   filing  date  of  the  application.    

L.

and  

 

 

J.

Correction  

Annual  Fees  

SECTION  58.  CORRECTION  OF  MISTAKE  IN  THE   APPLICATION.   –    

 

SECTION  55.  ANNUAL  FEES.  –    

On   request   of   any   interested   person   and   payment   of   the   prescribed  fee,  the  Director  is  authorized  to  correct  any   mistake   in   a   patent   of   a   formal   and   clerical   nature,   not   incurred  through  the  fault  of  the  Office.    

55.1.   To   maintain   the   patent   application   or   patent,   an   annual   fee   shall   be   paid   upon   the   expiration   of   four   (4)   years   from   the   date   the   application   was   published   pursuant  to  Section  44  hereof,  and  on  each  subsequent   anniversary   of   such   date.   Payment   may   be   made   within  

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Intellectual Property Law complete  for  it  to  be  carried  out  by  any  person   skilled  in  the  art;  or     (c)   That   the   patent   is   contrary   to   public   order   or  morality.  

SECTION  59.  CHANGES  IN  PATENTS.  –     59.1.   The   owner   of   a   patent   shall   have   the   right   to   request   the   Bureau   to   make   the   changes   in   the   patent   in   order  to:     (a)  Limit  the  extent  of  the  protection  conferred   by  it;     (b)   Correct   obvious   mistakes   or   to   correct   clerical  errors;  and     (c)  Correct  mistakes  or  errors,  other  than  those   referred   to   in   letter   (b),   made   in   good   faith:   Provided,   That   where   the   change   would   result   in   a   broadening   of   the   extent   of   protection   conferred   by   the   patent,   no   request   may   be   made  after  the  expiration  of  two  (2)  years  from   the  grant  of  a  patent  and  the  change  shall  not   affect   the   rights   of   any   third   party   which   has   relied  on  the  patent,  as  published.     59.2.   No   change   in   the   patent   shall   be   permitted   under   this   section,   where   the   change   would   result   in   the   disclosure   contained   in   the   patent   going   beyond   the   disclosure  contained  in  the  application  filed.     59.3.   If,   and   to   the   extent   to   which   the   Office   changes   the   patent   according   to   this   section,   it   shall   publish   the   same.      

  61.2.  Where  the  grounds  for  cancellation  relate  to  some   of   the   claims   or   parts   of   the   claim,   cancellation   may   be   effected  to  such  extent  only.    

SECTION   82.   PATENT   FOUND   INVALID   MAY   BE   CANCELLED.   –     In   an   action   for   infringement,   if   the   court   shall   find   the   patent  or  any  claim  to  be  invalid,  it  shall  cancel  the  same,   and  the  Director  of  Legal  Affairs  upon  receipt  of  the  final   judgment   of   cancellation   by   the   court,   shall   record   that   fact  in  the  register  of  the  Office  and  shall  publish  a  notice   to  that  effect  in  the  IPO  Gazette.    

SECTION   109.   SPECIAL   PROVISIONS   RELATING   TO   UTILITY   MODELS.  -­‐     109.4.  In  proceedings  under  Sections  61  to  64,  the  utility   model   registration   shall   be   canceled   on   the   following   grounds:     (a)  That  the  claimed  invention  does  not  qualify   for  registration  as  a  utility  model  and  does  not   meet   the   requirements   of   registrability,   in   particular   having   regard   to   Subsection   109.1   and  Sections  22,  23,  24  and  27;     (b)   That   the   description   and   the   claims   do   not   comply  with  the  prescribed  requirements;     (c)   That   any   drawing   which   is   necessary   for   the   understanding   of   the   invention   has   not   been   furnished;     (d)   That   the   owner   of   the   utility   model   registration  is  not  the  inventor  or  his  successor   in  title.    

SECTION  60.  FORM  AND  PUBLICATION  OF  AMENDMENT.  –     An   amendment   or   correction   of   a   patent   shall   be   accomplished   by   a   certificate   of   such   amendment   or   correction,   authenticated   by   the   seal   of   the   Office   and   signed   by   the   Director,   which   certificate   shall   be   attached   to   the   patent.   Notice   of   such   amendment   or   correction   shall   be   published   in   the   IPO   Gazette   and   copies   of   the   patent   kept   or   furnished   by   the   Office   shall   include   a   copy   of   the   certificate   of   amendment   or   correction.      

N. Cancellation    

1.

SECTION  120.  CANCELLATION  OF  DESIGN  REGISTRATION.  –    

Grounds  

120.1.  At  any  time  during  the  term  of  the  industrial  design   registration,   any   person   upon   payment   of   the   required   fee,   may   petition   the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   to   cancel   the  industrial  design  on  any  of  the  following  grounds:     (a)  If  the  subject  matter  of  the  industrial  design   is   not   registrable   within   the   terms   of   Sections   112  and  113;     (b)  If  the  subject  matter  is  not  new;  or     (c)  If  the  subject  matter  of  the  industrial  design   extends  beyond  the  content  of  the  application   as  originally  filed.  

 

SECTION  61.  CANCELLATION  OF  PATENTS.  –     61.1.   Any   interested   person   may,   upon   payment   of   the   required   fee,   petition   to   cancel   the   patent   or   any   claim   thereof,   or   parts   of   the   claim,   on   any   of   the   following   grounds:     (a)  That  what  is  claimed  as  the  invention  is  not   new  or  Patentable;     (b)   That   the   patent   does   not   disclose   the   invention   in   a   manner   sufficiently   clear   and  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao     120.2.  Where  the  grounds  for  cancellation  relate  to  a  part   of  the  industrial  design,  cancellation  may  be  effected  to   such  extent  only.  The  restriction  may  be  effected  in  the   form   of   an   alteration   of   the   effected   features   of   the   design.    

2.

65.3.   If   the   fee   for   the   printing   of   a   new   patent   is   not   paid  in  due  time,  the  patent  should  be  revoked.     65.4.   If   the   patent   is   amended   under   Subsection   65.2   hereof,   the   Bureau   shall,   at   the   same   time   as   it   publishes   the   mention   of   the   cancellation   decision,   publish   the   abstract,   representative   claims   and   drawings   indicating   clearly  what  the  amendments  consist  of.      

Proceedings  

 

SECTION   66.   EFFECT   OF   CANCELLATION   OF   PATENT   OR   CLAIM.  –    

SECTION  62.  REQUIREMENT  OF  THE  PETITION.  –     The   petition   for   cancellation   shall   be   in   writing,   verified   by   the   petitioner   or   by   any   person   in   his   behalf   who   knows   the   facts,   specify   the   grounds   upon   which   it   is   based,  include  a  statement  of  the  facts  to  be  relied  upon,   and   filed   with   the   Office.   Copies   of   printed   publications   or   of   patents   of   other   countries,   and   other   supporting   documents   mentioned   in   the   petition   shall   be   attached   thereto,   together   with   the   translation   thereof   in   English,   if  not  in  the  English  language.    

The   rights   conferred   by   the   patent   or   any   specified   claim   or   claims   cancelled   shall   terminate.   Notice   of   the   cancellation  shall  be  published  in  the  IPO  Gazette.  Unless   restrained  by  the  Director  General,  the  decision  or  order   to   cancel   by   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   shall   be   immediately  executory  even  pending  appeal.    

SECTION   230.   EQUITABLE   PRINCIPLES   TO   GOVERN   PROCEEDINGS.  –    

SECTION  63.  NOTICE  OF  HEARING.  –    

In  all  inter  partes  proceedings  in  the  Office  under  this  Act,   the   equitable   principles   of   laches,   estoppel,   and   acquiescence   where   applicable,   may   be   considered   and   applied.    

Upon  filing  of  a  petition  for  cancellation,  the  Director  of   Legal   Affairs   shall   forthwith   serve   notice   of   the   filing   thereof   upon   the   patentee   and   all   persons   having   grants   or   licenses,   or   any   other   right,   title  or   interest   in   and   to   the   patent   and   the   invention   covered   thereby,   as   appears  of  record  in  the  Office,  and  of  notice  of  the  date   of   hearing   thereon   on   such   persons   and   the   petitioner.   Notice   of   the   filing   of   the   petition   shall   be   published   in   the  IPO  Gazette.    

O. Rights  of  Patentee    

1.

Section  71  

 

SECTION  71.  RIGHTS  CONFERRED  BY  PATENT.  –    

SECTION  64.  COMMITTEE  OF  THREE.  –    

71.1.   A   patent   shall   confer   on   its   owner   the   following   exclusive  rights:     (a)   Where   the   subject   matter   of   a   patent   is   a   product,   to   restrain,   prohibit   and   prevent   any   unauthorized   person   or   entity   from   making,   using,   offering   for   sale,   selling   or   importing   that  product;     (b)   Where   the   subject   matter   of   a   patent   is   a   process,   to   restrain,   prevent   or   prohibit   any   unauthorized   person   or   entity   from   using   the   process,   and   from   manufacturing,   dealing   in,   using,   selling   or   offering   for   sale,   or   importing   any  product  obtained  directly  or  indirectly  from   such  process.     71.2.   Patent   owners   shall   also   have   the   right   to   assign,   or   transfer   by   succession   the   patent,   and   to   conclude   licensing  contracts  for  the  same.    

In   cases   involving   highly   technical   issues,   on   motion   of   any   party,   the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   may   order   that   the   petition   be   heard   and   decided   by   a   committee   composed   of   the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   as   chairman   and   two   (2)   members   who   have   the   experience   or   expertise  in  the  field  of  technology  to  which  the  patent   sought   to   be   cancelled   relates.   The   decision   of   the   committee  shall  be  appealable  to  the  Director  General.      

SECTION  65.  CANCELLATION  OF  THE  PATENT.  –     65.1.   If   the   Committee   finds   that   a   case   for   cancellation   has   been   proved,   it   shall   order   the   patent   or   any   specified  claim  or  claims  thereof  cancelled.     65.2.   If   the   Committee   finds   that,   taking   into   consideration   the   amendment   made   by   the   patentee   during  the  cancellation  proceedings,  the  patent  and  the   invention   to   which   it   relates   meet   the   requirement   of   this   Act,   it   may   decide   to   maintain   the   patent   as   amended:   Provided,   That   the   fee   for   printing   of   a   new   patent   is   paid   within   the   time   limit   prescribed   in   the   Regulations.    

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Intellectual Property Law the   original   patent   holder   from   unfair   commercial   use   provided   in   Article   39.3   of   the   Agreement   on   Trade-­‐ Related   Aspects   of   Intellectual   Property   Rights   (TRIPS   Agreement),   the   Intellectual   Property   Office,   in   consultation  with  the  appropriate  government  agencies,   shall   issue   the   appropriate   rules   and   regulations   necessary   therein   not   later   than   one   hundred   twenty   (120)  days  after  the  enactment  of  this  law;     72.5.   Where   the   act   consists   of   the   preparation   for   individual   cases,   in   a   pharmacy   or   by   a   medical   professional,  of  a  medicine  in  accordance  with  a  medical   presciption  or  acts  concerning  the  medicine  so  prepared;   and     72.6.   Where   the   invention   is   used   in   any   ship,   vessel,   aircraft,  or  land  vehicle  of  any  other  country  entering  the   territory   of   the   Philippines   temporarily   or   accidentally":   Provided,   That   such   invention   is     used   exclusively   for   the   needs  of  the  ship,  vessel,  aircraft,  or  land  vehicle  and  not   used  for  the  manufacturing  of  anything  to  be  sold  within   the  Philippines.    

PARKE   DAVIS   &   CO.   V.   DOCTOR ’S   PHARMACEUTICALS   (1983)   Court  decision:   An   8%   royalty   rate   on   net   sales   is   reasonable   in   a   developing   country   like   the   PH,   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   a   giant   foreign   licensors  of  pharmaceutical  products.  It  is  in  fact  midway   between   the   rates   in   Canada   and   Norway.   Liberal   treatment   should   be   afforded   to   local   industry   for   as   reasoned   out   by   the   company,   “it   is   so   difficult   to   compete  with  the  industrial  giants  of  the  drug  industry,   among  them  being  the  petitioner  herein,  that  it  always  is   necessary   that   the   local   drug   companies   should   sell   at   much  lower  than  the  prices  of  said  foreign  drug  entities.”     Foreign  product  licensor  can  later  on  ask  for  an  increase   in   percentage   rate   of   royalty   fixed   by   the   Director   of   Patents  if  local  sales  of  licensee  should  increase.    

SECTION  72.  LIMITATIONS  OF  PATENT  RIGHTS.  –     The   owner   of   a   patent   has   no   right   to   prevent   third   parties   from   performing,   without   his   authorization,   the   acts   referred   to   in   Section   71   hereof   in   the   following   circumstances:     72.1.   Using   a   patented   product   which   has   been   put   on   the   market   in   the   Philippines   by   the   owner   of   the   product,   or   with   his   express   consent,   insofar   as   such   use   is   performed   after   that   product   has   been   so   put   on   the   said   market:   Provided,   That,   with   regard   to   drugs   and   medicines,   the   limitation   on   patent   rights   shall   apply   after   a   drug   or   medicine   has   been   introduced   in   the   Philippines   or   anywhere   else   in   the   world   by   the   patent   owner,  or  by  any  party  authorized  to  use  the  invention:   Provided,   further,   That   the   right   to   import   the   drugs   and   medicines  contemplated  in  this  section  shall  be  available   to  any  government  agency  or  any  private  third  party;     72.2.   Where   the   act   is   done   privately   and   on   a   non-­‐ commercial   scale   or   for   a   non-­‐commercial   purpose:   Provided,   That   it   does   not   significantly   prejudice   the   economic  interests  of  the  owner  of  the  patent;     72.3.   Where   the   act   consists   of   making   or   using   exclusively   for   experimental   use   of   the   invention   for   scientific   purposes   or   educational   purposes   and   such   other   activities   directly   related   to   such   scientific   or   educational  experimental  use;     72.4.   In   the   case   of   drugs   and   medicines,   where   the   act   includes   testing,   using,   making   or   selling   the   invention   including   any   data   related   thereto,   solely   for   purposes   reasonably   related   to   the   development   and   submission   of  information  and  issuance  of  approvals  by  government   regulatory   agencies   required   under   any   law   of   the   Philippines   or   of   another   country   that   regulates   the   manufacture,   construction,   use   or   sale   of   any   product:   Provided,  That,  in  order  to  protect  the  data  submitted  by  

SECTION  73.  PRIOR  USER.  –     73.1.   Notwithstanding   Section   72   hereof,   any   prior   user,   who,   in   good   faith   was   using   the   invention   or   has   undertaken   serious   preparations   to   use   the   invention   in   his   enterprise   or   business,   before   the   filing   date   or   priority   date   of   the   application   on   which   a   patent   is   granted,  shall  have  the  right  to  continue  the  use  thereof   as   envisaged   in   such   preparations   within   the   territory   where  the  patent  produces  its  effect.     73.2.   The  right  of  the  prior  user  may  only  be  transferred   or   assigned   together   with   his   enterprise   or   business,   or   with  that  part  of  his  enterprise  or  business  in  which  the   use  or  preparations  for  use  have  been  made.    

SECTION  74.  USE  OF  INVENTION  BY  GOVERNMENT.  –     74.1.  A  Government  agency  or  third  person  authorized  by   the  Government  may  exploit  the  invention  even  without   agreement  of  the  patent  owner  where:     (a)   The   public   interest,   in   particular,   national   security,   nutrition,   health   or   the   development   of   other   sectors,   as   determined   by   the   appropriate   agency   of   the   government,   so   requires;  or     (b)   A   judicial   or   administrative   body   has   determined  that  the  manner  of  exploitation,  by   the  owner  of  the  patent  or  his  licensee,  is  anti-­‐ competitive;  or     (c)  In  the  case  of  drugs  and  medicines,  there  is   a  national  emergenvy  or  other  circumstance  of  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   extreme   urgency   requiring   the   use   of   the   invention;  or     (d)  In  the  case  of  drugs  and  medicines,  there  is   public  non-­‐commercial  use  of  the  patent  by  the   patentee,  without  satisfactory  reason;  or     (e)   In   the   case   of   drugs   and   medicines,   the   demand   for   the   patented   article   in   the   Philippines   is   not   being   met   to   an   adequate   extent  and  on  reasonable  terms,  as  determined   by  the  Secretary  of  the  Department  of  Health.  

exploitation,   which   shall   be   immediately   executory.     74.3.   All   cases   arising   from   the   implementation   of   this   provision  shall  be  cognizable  by  courts  with  appropriate   jurisdiction  provided  by  law.     No   court,   except   the   Supreme   Court   of   the   Philippines,   shall   issue   any   temporary   restraining   order   or   preliminary  injunction  or  such  other  provisional  remedies   that  will  prevent  its  immediate  execution.     74.4.   The   Intellectual   Property   Office   (IPO),   in   consultation  with  the  appropriate  government  agencies,   shall   issue   the   appropriate   implementing   rules   and   regulations   for   the   use   or   exploitation   of   patented   inventions   as   contemplated   in   this   section   within   one   hundred   twenty   (120)   days   after   the   effectivity   of   this   law.    

  74.2.   Unless   otherwise   provided   herein,   the   use   by   the   Government,   or   third   person   authorized   by   the   Government   shall   be   subject,   where   applicable,   to   the   following  provisions:     (a)  In  situations  of  national  emergency  or  other   circumstances  of  extreme  urgency  as  provided   under  Section  74.1  (c),  the  right  holder  shall  be   notified  as  soon  as  reasonably  practicable;     (b)   In   the   case   of   public   non-­‐commercial   use   of   the   patent   by   the   patentee,   without   satisfactory   reason,   as   provided   under   Section   74.1   (d),   the   right   holder   shall   be   informed   promptly:   Provided,   That,   the   Government   or   third   person   authorized   by   the   Government,   without  making  a  patent  search,  knows  or  has   demonstrable   ground   to   know   that   a   valid   patent   is   or   will   be   used   by   or   for   the   Government;     (c)  If  the  demand  for  the  patented  article  in  the   Philippines   is   not   being   met   to   an   adequate   extent   ad   on   reasonable   terms   as   provided   under  Section  74.1  (e),  the  right  holder  shall  be   informed  promptly;     (d)   The   scope   and   duration   of   such   use   shall   be   limited   to   the   purpose   for   which   it   was   authorized;     (e)  Such  use  shall  be  non-­‐exclusive;     (f)   The   right   holder   shall   be   paid   adequate   remuneration   in   the   circumstances   of   each   case,  taking  into  account  the  economic  value  of   the  authorization;  and     (g)   The   existence   of   a   national   emergency   or   other   circumstances   of   extreme   urgency,   referred   to   under   Section   74.1   (c),   shall   be   subject   to   the   determination   of   the   President   of   the   Philippines   for   the   purpose   of   determining   the   need   for   such   use   or   other  

SECTION  231.  REVERSE  RECIPROCITY  OF  FOREIGN  LAWS.  –     Any   condition,   restriction,   limitation,   diminution,   requirement,   penalty   or   any   similar   burden   imposed   by   the   law   of   a   foreign   country   on   a   Philippine   national   seeking  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  in  that   country,  shall  reciprocally  be  enforceable  upon  nationals   of  said  country,  within  Philippine  jurisdiction.    

TRIPS   AGREEMENT   (AGREEMENT   ON   TRADE-­‐RELATED   ASPECTS  OF   INTELLECTUAL   PROPERTY   RIGHTS),   ARTICLE   6.   EXHAUSTION  –     For   the   purposes   of   dispute   settlement   under   this   Agreement,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Articles  3  and  4   nothing   in   this   Agreement   shall   be   used   to   address   the   issue  of  the  exhaustion  of  intellectual  property  rights.    

2.

Action   for   infringement   (Literal  and  Equivalent)  

 

VARGAS  V.  F.M.  YAPTICO  (1919),  SUPRA   Court  decision:   When   a   patent   is   sought   to   be   enforced,   "the   question   of   invention,   novelty,   or   prior   use,   and   each   of   them,   are   open   to   judicial   examination."   The   burden   of   proof   to   substantiate  a  charge  of  infringement  is  with  the  plaintiff.   Where,   however,   the   plaintiff   introduces   the   patent   in   evidence,   if   it   is   in   due   form,   it   affords   a   prima   facie   presumption  of  its  correctness  and  validity.  The  decision   of  the  Commissioner  of  Patents  in  granting  the  patent  is   always   presumed   to   be   correct.   The   burden   then   shifts   to   the   defendant   to   overcome   by   competent   evidence   this   legal   presumption.   With   all   due   respect,   therefore,   for   the   critical   and   expert   examination   of   the   invention   by   the   United   States   Patent   Office,   the   question   of   the   validity   of   the   patent   is   one   for   judicial   determination,   and   since   a   patent   has   been   submitted,   the   exact  

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Intellectual Property Law question   is   whether   the   defendant   has   assumed   the   burden  of  proof  as  to  anyone  of  his  defenses.     As   herein   before   stated,   the   defendant   relies   on   three   special   defenses.   One   such   defense,   on   which   the   judgment   of   the   lower   court   is   principally   grounded,   and   to   which   appellant   devotes   the   major   portion   of   his   vigorous   argument,   concerns   the   element   of   novelty,   invention,   or   discovery,   that   gives   existence   to   the   right   to   a   patent.   On   this   point   the   trial   court   reached   the   conclusion   that   "the   patented   plow   of   the   plaintiff,   Exhibit  D,  is  not  different  from  the  native  plow,  Exhibit  2,   except  in  the  material,  in  the  form,  in  the  weight  and  the   grade  of  the  result,  the  said  differences  giving  it  neither   a   new   function   nor   a   new   result   distinct   from   the   function   and   the   result   obtained   from   the   native   plow;   consequently,   its   production   does   not   presuppose   the   exercise   of   the   inventive   faculty   but   merely   of   mechanical  skill,  which  does  not  give  a  right  to  a  patent   of   an   invention   under   the   provisions   of   the   Patent   Law."   In  thus  finding,  the  court  may  have  been  right,  since  the   Vargas  plow  does  not  appear  to  be  such  a  "combination"   as   contains   a   novel   assemblage   of   parts   exhibiting   invention.       A   second   line   of   defense   relates   to   the   fact   that   defendant   has   never   made   a   complete   Vargas   plow,   but   only   points,   shares,   shoes,   and   heel   pieces,   to   serve   as   repairs.  Defendant's  contention  is,  that  in  common  with   other   foundries,   he   has   for   years   cast   large   numbers   of   plow   points   and   shares   suitable   for   use   either   on   the   native  wooden  plow,  or  on  the  Vargas  plow.  A  difference   has   long   been   recognized   between   repairing   and   reconstructing  a  machine.  If,  for  instance,  partial  injuries,   whether  they  occur  from  accident  or  from  wear  and  tear,   to   a   machine   for   agricultural   purposes,   are   made   this   is   only  re-­‐fitting  the  machine  for  use,  and  thus  permissible.   Even   under   the   more   rigorous   doctrine   of   Leeds   &   Catlin   Co.   vs.   Victor   Talking   Machine   Co.,   it   may   be   possible   that   all   the   defendant   has   done   is   to   manufacture   and   sell  isolated  parts  to  be  used  to  replace  worn-­‐out  parts.     The   third   defense   is,   that   under   the   provisions   of   the   statute,   an   inventor's   creation   must   not   have   been   in   public   use   or   on   sale   in   the   United   States   (and   the   Philippine   Islands)   for   more   than   two   years   prior   to   his   application.  Without,  therefore,  committing  ourselves  as   to   the   first   two   defenses,   we   propose   to   base   our   decision   on   the   one   just   suggested   as   more   easily   disposing   of   the   case.   We   do   so   with   full   consciousness   of   the   doubt   which   arose   in   the   mind   of   the   trial   court,   but  with  the  belief  that  since  it  has  been  shown  that  the   invention   was   used   in   public   at   Iloilo   by   others   than   Vargas,   the   inventor,   more   than   two   years   before   the   application  for  the  patent,  the  patent  is  invalid.    

FRANK  V.  BENITO  (1928)   Court  decision:   The   burden   of   proof   to   substantiate   a   charge   of   infringement   is   with   the   plaintiff.   Where,   however,   the   plaintiff  introduces  the  patent  in  evidence,  if  it  is  in  due   form,   it   affords   a   prima   facie   presumption   of   its   correctness   and   validity.   The   decision   of   the   Commissioner  of  Patents  in  granting  the  patent  is  always   presumed   to   be   correct.   The   burden   the   shifts   to   the   defendant   to   overcome   by   competent   evidence   this   legal  presumption.    

FRANK  V.  KOSUYAMA  (1933),  SUPRA   Refresher:   Defendant  was  charged  with  infringing  upon  the  patent   rights   of   the   plaintiff   by   manufacturing   and   selling   machines   similar   to   the   ones   covered   by   plaintiff’s   patent.  Plaintiff,  in  his  complaint,  described  the  machine   as  having  a  “spindle.”  When  he  amended  his  complaint,   he  omitted  such  feature.     Court  decision:   Court  found  that  the  plaintiff’s  invention  shouldn’t  have   been   protected   by   a   patent   for   its   failure   to   satisfy   the   novelty   condition.   However,   since   the   action   was   initiated   by   the   plaintiff   (for   infringement,   against   the   defendant),  and  the  defendant  did  not  file  a  cross-­‐claim   against  the  plaintiff,  the  Court  did  not  deem  it  proper  to   cancel  the  patent  of  the  plaintiff.  However,  it  ruled  that   the  defendant  is  not  liable  for  infringement.    

G.  SELL  V.  YAP    JUE  (1909)   Refresher:   Petitioner   Gsell,   had   previously   secured   a   decree   of   permanent   injunction   against   the   respondent,   Yap-­‐Jue   prohibiting   the   latter   from   infringing   upon   Gsell's   patented   process   for   manufacturing   curved   cane   handles  for  walking  sticks,  parasols,  and  umbrellas.     The  injunction  described  the  process  as  involving  the  use   of  a  lamp  or  blow-­‐  pipe  fed  with  petroleum  or  mineral  oil.   The  heat  generated  thereby  was  necessary  to  make  the   canes   pliable   enough   that   they   could   be   worked   into   the   desired  curvature.     After  the  injunction  issued,  however,  Yap-­‐Jue  continued   to   use   substantially   the   same   procedure   patented   by   Gsell,  with  the  exception  of  the  use  of  a  lamp  fueled  by   alcohol  instead  of  petroleum  or  mineral  oil.     Court  held:   No   one   infringes   a   patent   for   a   combination   who   does   not  employ  all  of  the  ingredients  of  the  combination;  but   if   he   employs   all   the   ingredients,   or   adopts   mere   formal   alterations,   or   substitutes,   for   one   ingredient   another   which   was   well   known   at   the   date   of   the   patent   as   a   proper   substitute   for   the   one   withdrawn,   and   which  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   performs   substantially   the   same   function   as   the   one   withdrawn,  he  does  infringe.       Bona   fide   inventors   of   a   combination   are   as   much   entitled   to   equivalents   as   the   inventors   other   patentable   improvements;   by   which   is   meant   that   a   patentee   in   such   a   case   may   substitute   another   ingredient   for   any   one  of  the  ingredients  of  his  invention,  if  the  ingredient   substituted   performs   the   same   function   as   the   one   omitted   and   as   well   known   at   the   date   of   his   patent   as   a   proper   substitute   for   the   one   omitted   in   the   patented   combination.   Apply   that   rule   and   it   is   clear   that   an   alteration   in   a   patented   combination   which   merely   substitutes   another   old   ingredient   for   one   of   the   ingredients   in   the   patented   combination,   is   an   infringement  of  the  patent,  if  the  substitute  performs  the   same   function   and   was   well   known   at   the   date   of   the   patent  as  a  proper  substitute  for  the  omitted  ingredient.     Mere   formal   alterations   in   a   combination   in   letters   patent  are  no  defense  to  the  charge  of  infringement  and   the  withdrawal  of  one  ingredient  from  the  same  and  the   substitution   of   another   which   was   well   known   at   the   date   of   the   patent   as   a   proper   substitute   for   the   one   withdrawn   is   a   mere   formal   alteration   of   the   combination   if   the   ingredient   substituted   performs   substantially  the  same  function  as  the  one  withdrawn.     Bona   fide   inventors   of   a   combination   are   as   much   entitled   to   suppress   every   other   combination   of   the   same   ingredients   to   produce   the   same   result,   not   substantially  different  from  what  they  have  invented  and   caused  to  be  patented  as  to  any  other  class  of  inventors.   All   alike   have   the   right   to   suppress   every   colorable   invasion   of   that   which   is   secured   to   them   by   letters   patent.     A  claim  for  the  particular  means  and  mode  of  operation   described   in   the   specification   extends,   by   operation   of   law,   to   the   equivalent   of   such   means   not   equivalent   simply  because  the  same  result  is  thereby  produced  but   equivalent   as   being   substantially   the   same   device   in   structure,  arrangement  and  mode  of  operation.     An   equivalent   device   is   such   as   a   mechanic   of   ordinary   skill   in   construction   of   similar   machinery,   having   the   forms,   specifications   and   machine   before   him,   could   substitute   in   the   place   of   the   mechanism   described   without  the  exercise  of  the  inventive  faculty.       All  the  elements  of  the  invention  in  this  case  are  old,  and   the  rule  in  such  cases,  as  before  explained,  undoubtedly   is   that   a   purpose   can   not   invoke   the   doctrine   of   equivalents   to   suppress   all   other   improvements   of   the   old   machine,   but   he   is   entitled   to   treat   everyone   as   an   infringer   who   makes,   uses,   or   vends   his   patented   improvement   without   any   other   change   than   the   employment  of  a  substitute  for  one  of  its  elements,  well  

known   as   such   at   the   date   of   his   invention,   and   which   any   constructor   acquainted   with   the   art   will   know   how   to  comply.  The  reason  for  the  qualification  of  the  rule  as   stated  is,  that  such  change  that  is,  the  mere  substitution   of   a   well-­‐   known   element   for   another   where   it   appears   that  the  substituted  element  was  well  known  as  a  usual   substitute  for  the  element  left  out  is  merely  a  formal  one,   and   nothing   better   than   a   colorable   evasion   of   the   patent.    

MAGUAN  V.  CA,  SUPRA   Court  decision:   It   will   be   noted   that   the   validity   of   petitioner's   patents   is   in   question   for   want   of   novelty.   Private   respondent   contends  that  powder  puffs  Identical  in  appearance  with   that   covered   by   petitioner's   patents   existed   and   were   publicly   known   and   used   as   early   as   1963   long   before   petitioner   was   issued   the   patents   in   question.   As   correctly   observed   by   respondent   Court   of   Appeals,   "since   sufficient   proofs   have   been   introduced   in   evidence  showing  a  fair  question  of  the  invalidity  of  the   patents   issued   for   such   models,   it   is   but   right   that   the   evidence   be   looked   into,   evaluated   and   determined   on   the   merits   so   that   the   matter   of   whether   the   patents   issued  were  in  fact  valid  or  not  may  be  resolved."    

GODINES  V.  CA  (1993)   Doctrine:   Tests  have  been  established  to  determine  infringement.   These  are:   (a)  literal  infringement;  and     (b)  the  doctrine  of  equivalents.       In   using   LITERAL   INFRINGEMENT   as   a   test,   resort   must   be  had,  in  the  first  instance,  to  the  words  of  the  claim.  If   accused   matter   clearly   falls   within   the   claim,   infringement   is   made   out   and   that   is   the   end   of   it.   To   determine   whether   the   particular   item   falls   within   the   literal   meaning   of   the   patent   claims,   the   court   must   juxtapose   the   claims   of   the   patent   and   the   accused   product   within   the   overall   context   of   the   claims   and   specifications,   to   determine   whether   there   is   exact   identity  of  all  material  elements.     Recognizing   that   the   logical   fallback   position   of   one   in   the   place   of   defendant   is   to   aver   that   his   product   is   different   from   the   patented   one,   courts   have   adopted   the   DOCTRINE   OF   EQUIVALENTS   which   recognizes   that   minor   modifications   in   a   patented   invention   are   sufficient   to   put   the   item   beyond   the   scope   of   literal   infringement.   Thus,   according   to   this   doctrine,   "an   infringement   also   occurs   when   a   device   appropriates   a   prior   invention   by   incorporating   its   innovative   concept   and,   albeit   with   some   modification   and   change,   performs   substantially  the  same  function  in  substantially  the  same   way  to  achieve  substantially  the  same  result."  The  reason   for   the   doctrine   of   equivalents   is   that   to   permit   the   imitation   of   a   patented   invention   which   does   not   copy  

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Intellectual Property Law any   literal   detail   would   be   to   convert   the   protection   of   the   patent   grant   into   a   hollow   and   useless   thing.   Such   imitation  would  leave  room  for  —  indeed  encourage  —   the   unscrupulous   copyist   to   make   unimportant   and   insubstantial   changes   and   substitutions   in   the   patent   which,   though   adding   nothing,   would   be   enough   to   take   the   copied   matter   outside   the   claim,   and   hence   outside   the  reach  of  the  law.      

Doctrine:   The  burden  of  proof  to  substantiate  a  charge  for  patent   infringement   rests   on   the   plaintiff.   In   the   case   at   bar,   petitioner’s   evidence   consists   primarily   of   its   Letters   Patent   No.   14561,   and   the   testimony   of   Dr.   Orinion,   its   general  manager  in  the  Philippines  for  its  Animal  Health   Products   Division,   by   which   it   sought   to   show   that   its   patent   for   the   compound   methyl   5   propylthio-­‐2-­‐ benzimidazole   carbamate   also   covers   the   substance   Albendazole.     From   a   reading   of   the   9   claims   of   Letters   Patent   No.   14561   in   relation   to   the   other   portions   thereof,   no   mention  is  made  of  the  compound  Albendazole.     All  that   the   claims   disclose   are:     the   covered   invention,   that   is,   the   compound   methyl   5   propylthio-­‐2-­‐benzimidazole   carbamate;   the   compound’s   being   anthelmintic   but   nontoxic   for   animals   or   its   ability   to   destroy   parasites   without   harming   the   host   animals;   and   the   patented   methods,   compositions   or   preparations   involving   the   compound  to  maximize  its  efficacy  against  certain  kinds   of  parasites  infecting  specified  animals.     When  the  language  of  its  claims  is  clear  and  distinct,  the   patentee  is  bound  thereby  and  may  not  claim  anything   beyond   them.   And   so   are   the   courts   bound   which   may   not   add   to   or   detract   from   the   claims   matters   not   expressed   or   necessarily   implied,   nor   may   they   enlarge   the  patent  beyond  the  scope  of  that  which  the  inventor   claimed   and   the   patent   office   allowed,   even   if   the   patentee   may   have   been   entitled   to   something   more   than  the  words  it  had  chosen  would  include.     It   bears   stressing   that   the   mere   absence   of   the   word   Albendazole   in   Letters   Patent   No.   14561   is   not   determinative   of   Albendazole’s   non-­‐inclusion   in   the   claims  of  the  patent.     While  Albendazole  is  admittedly  a   chemical  compound  that  exists  by  a  name  different  from   that  covered  in  petitioner’s  letters  patent,  the  language   of   Letter   Patent   No.   14561   fails   to   yield   anything   at   all   regarding   Albendazole.     And   no   extrinsic   evidence   had   been   adduced   to   prove   that   Albendazole   inheres   in   petitioner’s   patent   in   spite   of   its   omission   therefrom   or   that   the   meaning   of   the   claims   of   the   patent   embraces   the  same.   While   petitioner   concedes   that   the   mere   literal   wordings   of   its   patent   cannot   establish   private   respondent’s   infringement,  it  urges  this  Court  to  apply  the  doctrine  of   equivalents.     The   DOCTRINE   OF   EQUIVALENTS   provides   that   an   infringement  also  takes  place  when  a  device  appropriates   a  prior  invention  by  incorporating  its  innovative  concept   and,   although   with   some   modification   and   change,   performs  substantially  the  same  function  in  substantially   the   same   way   to   achieve   substantially   the   same   result.   Yet   again,   a   scrutiny   of   petitioner’s   evidence   fails   to   convince   this   Court   of   the   substantial   sameness   of  

DEL  ROSARIO  V.  CA  (1996)   Doctrine:   It   is   elementary   that   a   patent   may   be   infringed   where   the   essential   or   substantial   features   of   the   patented   invention   are   taken   or   appropriated,   or   the   device,   machine   or   other   subject   matter   alleged   to   infringe   is   substantially   identical   with   the   patented   invention.     In   order   to   infringe   a   patent,   a   machine   or   device   must   perform   the   same   function,   or   accomplish   the   same   result   by   identical   or   substantially   identical   means   and   the   principle   or   mode   of   operation   must   be   substantially   the  same.    

SMITH  KLINE  V.  CA  (2003)   Refresher:   Smith   Kline   Beckman   Corp.,   a   Pennsylvanian   corp.,   filed   before   the   Philippine   Patent   Office   an   application   for   patent   over   an   invention   entitled   “Methods   and   Compositions   for   Producing   Biphasic   Parasiticide   Activity   Using   Methyl   5   Propylthio-­‐2-­‐Benzimidazole   Carbamate.”   Letters   Patent   was   issued   for   the   same   for   a   term   of   17   years.     The   letters   patent   provides   in   its   claims   that   the   patented   invention   consisted   of   a   new   compound   named   methyl   5   propylthio-­‐2-­‐benzimidazole   carbamate   and   the   methods   or   compositions   utilizing   the   compound   as   an   active   ingredient   in   fighting   infections   caused   by   gastrointestinal   parasites   and   lungworms   in   animals   such   as   swine,   sheep,   cattle,   goats,   horses,   and   even  pet  animals.     Tryco   Pharma   Corporation   (private   respondent)   is   a   domestic  corporation  that  manufactures,  distributes  and   sells  veterinary  products  including  Impregon,  a  drug  that   has   Albendazole   for   its   active   ingredient   and   is   claimed   to   be   effective   against   gastro-­‐intestinal   roundworms,   lungworms,  tapeworms  and  fluke  infestation  in  carabaos,   cattle  and  goats.     Smith   Kline   sued   Tryco   Pharma   for   infringement.   Petitioner  argues  that  under  the  doctrine  of  equivalents   for   determining   patent   infringement,   Albendazole,   the   active   ingredient   it   alleges   was   appropriated   by   private   respondent   for   its   drug   Impregon,   is   substantially   the   same  as  methyl  5  propylthio-­‐2-­‐benzimidazole  carbamate   covered   by   its   patent   since   both   of   them   are   meant   to   combat  worm  or  parasite  infestation  in  animals.    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   petitioner’s   patented   compound   and   Albendazole.     While  both  compounds  have  the  effect  of   neutralizing   parasites   in   animals,   identity   of   result   does   not  amount  to  infringement  of  patent  unless  Albendazole   operates   in   substantially   the   same   way   or   by   substantially  the  same  means  as  the  patented  compound,   even  though  it  performs  the  same  function  and  achieves   the  same  result.  In  other  words,  the  principle  or  mode  of   operation  must  be  the  same  or  substantially  the  same.     The   doctrine   of   equivalents   thus   requires   satisfaction   of   the  function-­‐means-­‐and-­‐result  test,  the  patentee  having   the   burden   to   show   that   all   three   components   of   such   equivalency  test  are  met.    

a.

patented  product  or  of  a  product  produced  because  of  a   patented  process  knowing  it  to  be  especially  adopted  for   infringing   the   patented   invention   and   not   suitable   for   substantial   non-­‐infringing   use   shall   be   liable   as   a   contributory   infringer   and   shall   be   jointly   and   severally   liable  with  the  infringer.    

SECTION   75.   EXTENT  OF  PROTECTION  AND   INTERPRETATION   OF  CLAIMS.  –     75.1.   The   extent   of   protection   conferred   by   the   patent   shall   be   determined   by   the   claims,   which   are   to   be   interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  description  and  drawings.     75.2.   For   the   purpose   of   determining   the   extent   of   protection  conferred  by  the  patent,  due  account  shall  be   taken  of  elements  which  are  equivalent  to  the  elements   expressed   in   the   claims,   so   that   a   claim   shall   be   considered   to   cover   not   only   all   the   elements   as   expressed  therein,  but  also  equivalents.    

Civil  action  

 

SECTION  76.  CIVIL  ACTION  FOR  INFRINGEMENT.  –     76.1.   The   making,   using,   offering   for   sale,   selling,   or   importing   a   patented   product   or   a   product   obtained   directly   or   indirectly   from   a   patented   process,   or   the   use   of   a   patented   process   without   the   authorization   of   the   patentee   constitutes   patent   infringement:   Provided,   That,   this   shall   not   apply   to   instances   covered   by   Sections   72.1   and   72.4   (Limitations   of   Patent   Rights);   Section   74   (Use   of   Invention   by   Government);   Section   93.6   (Compulsory   Licensing);   and   Section   93-­‐A   (Procedures  on  Issuance  of  a  Special  Compulsory  License   under  the  TRIPS  Agreement)  of  this  Code.     76.2.  Any  patentee,  or  anyone  possessing  any  right,  title   or   interest   in   and   to   the   patented   invention,   whose   rights   have   been   infringed,   may   bring   a   civil   action   before  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  to  recover  from   the   infringer   such   damages   sustained   thereby,   plus   attorney's   fees   and   other   expenses   of   litigation,   and   to   secure  an  injunction  for  the  protection  of  his  rights.     76.3.  If  the  damages  are  inadequate  or  cannot  be  readily   ascertained   with   reasonable   certainty,   the   court   may   award   by   way   of   damages   a   sum   equivalent   to   reasonable  royalty.     76.4.   The   court   may,   according   to   the   circumstances   of   the   case,   award   damages   in   a   sum   above   the   amount   found   as   actual   damages   sustained:   Provided,   That   the   award   does   not   exceed   three   (3)   times   the   amount   of   such  actual  damages.     76.5.   The   court   may,   in   its   discretion,   order   that   the   infringing   goods,   materials   and   implements   predominantly   used   in   the   infringement   be   disposed   of   outside  the  channels  of  commerce  or  destroyed,  without   compensation.     76.6.  Anyone  who  actively  induces  the  infringement  of  a   patent   or   provides   the   infringer   with   a   component   of   a  

b.

Criminal  action    

 

SECTION   84.   CRIMINAL   ACTION   FOR   REPETITION   OF   INFRINGEMENT.  –     If  infringement  is  repeated  by  the  infringer  or  by  anyone   in   connivance   with   him   after   finality   of   the   judgment   of   the   court   against   the   infringer,   the   offenders   shall,   without   prejudice   to   the   institution   of   a   civil   action   for   damages,   be   criminally   liable   therefor   and,   upon   conviction,   shall   suffer   imprisonment   for   the   period   of   not  less  than  six  (6)  months  but  not  more  than  three  (3)   years   and/or   a   fine   of   not   less   than   One   hundred   thousand   pesos   (P100,000)   but   not   more   than   Three   hundred  thousand  pesos  (P300,000),  at  the  discretion  of   the   court.   The   criminal   action   herein   provided   shall   prescribe   in   three   (3)   years   from   date   of   the   commission   of  the  crime.    

c.

Administrative  

 

SECTION  10.2,  SUPRA   -­‐

Jurisdiction  of  the  Director  of  Legal  Affairs  

 

d.

Who  can  file?  

 

SECTION   77.   INFRINGEMENT   ACTION   BY   A   FOREIGN   NATIONAL.  –   Any   foreign   national   or   juridical   entity   who   meets   the   requirements   of   Section   3   and   not   engaged   in   business   in   the   Philippines,   to   which   a   patent   has   been   granted   or   assigned   under   this   Act,   may   bring   an   action   for   infringement   of   patent,   whether   or   not   it   is   licensed   to   do  business  in  the  Philippines  under  existing  law.    

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Intellectual Property Law CRESER  PRECISION  SYSTEM,  INC.  V.  CA  (1998)  

SECTION  80.  DAMAGES,  REQUIREMENT  OF  NOTICE.  –    

Court  decision:   Section   42   of   R.A.   165,   otherwise   known   as   the   Patent   Law,  explicitly  provides:     SECTION.   42.   Civil   action   for   infringement.   –   Any   patentee,   or   anyone   possessing   any   right,   title   or   interest   in   and   to   the   patented   invention,   whose   rights   have   been   infringed,   may  bring  a  civil  action  before  the  proper  Court   of   First   Instance   (now   Regional   Trial   court),   to   recover   from   the   infringer   damages   sustained   by   reason   of   the   infringement   and   to   secure   an   injunction  for  the  protection  of  his  right.       Under   the   aforequoted   law,   only   the   patentee   or   his   successors-­‐in-­‐interest   may   file   an   action   for   infringement.   The  phrase  “anyone  possessing  any  right,  title  or  interest   in  and  to  the  patented  invention”  upon  which  petitioner   maintains   its   present   suit,   refers   only   to   the   patentee’s   successors-­‐in-­‐interest,   assignees   or   grantees   since   actions  for  infringement  of  patent  may  be  brought  in  the   name   of   the   person   or   persons   interested,   whether   as   patentee,   assignees   or   grantees,   of   the   exclusive   right.   Moreover,  there  can  be  no  infringement  of  a  patent  until   a   patent   has   been   issued,   since   whatever   right   one   has   to   the   invention   covered   by   the   patent   arises   alone   from   the  grant  of  patent.  In  short,  a  person  or  entity  who  has   not   been   granted   letters   patent   over   an   invention   and   has   not   acquired   any   right   or   title   thereto   either   as   assignee   or   as   licensee,   has   no   cause   of   action   for   infringement   because   the   right   to   maintain   an   infringement  suit  depends  on  the  existence  of  the  patent.    

Damages   cannot   be   recovered   for   acts   of   infringement   committed   before   the   infringer   had   known,   or   had   reasonable   grounds   to   know   of   the   patent.   It   is   presumed   that   the   infringer   had   known   of   the   patent   if   on  the  patented  product,  or  on  the  container  or  package   in   which   the   article   is   supplied   to   the   public,   or   on   the   advertising  material  relating  to  the  patented  product  or   process,   are   placed   the   words   "Philippine   Patent"   with   the  number  of  the  patent.    

e.

g.

Defenses   in   Action   for  Infringement  

 

SECTION  81.  DEFENSES  IN  ACTION  FOR  INFRINGEMENT.  –     In  an  action  for  infringement,  the  defendant,  in  addition   to   other   defenses   available   to   him,   may   show   the   invalidity   of   the   patent,   or   any   claim   thereof,   on   any   of   the   grounds   on   which   a   petition   of   cancellation   can   be   brought  under  Section  61  hereof.    

h.

Patent   Found   Invalid   may  be  Cancelled  

 

SECTION   82.   PATENT   FOUND   INVALID   MAY   BE   CANCELLED.   –     In   an   action   for   infringement,   if   the   court   shall   find   the   patent  or  any  claim  to  be  invalid,  it  shall  cancel  the  same,   and  the  Director  of  Legal  Affairs  upon  receipt  of  the  final   judgment   of   cancellation   by   the   court,   shall   record   that   fact  in  the  register  of  the  Office  and  shall  publish  a  notice   to  that  effect  in  the  IPO  Gazette.    

Presumptions  

i.

 

Assessors  

SECTION  78.  PROCESS  PATENTS;  BURDEN  OF  PROOF.  –    

 

If   the   subject   matter   of   a   patent   is   a   process   for   obtaining   a   product,   any   identical   product   shall   be   presumed   to   have   been   obtained   through   the   use   of   the   patented   process   if   the   product   is   new   or   there   is   substantial   likelihood   that   the   identical   product   was   made   by   the   process   and   the   owner   of   the   patent   has   been   unable   despite   reasonable   efforts,   to   determine   the   process   actually   used.   In   ordering   the   defendant   to   prove  that  the  process  to  obtain  the  identical  product  is   different   from   the   patented   process,   the   court   shall   adopt   measures   to   protect,   as   far   as   practicable,   his   manufacturing  and  business  secrets.    

83.1.  Two  (2)  or  more  assessors  may  be  appointed  by  the   court.  The  assessors  shall  be  possessed  of  the  necessary   scientific   and   technical   knowledge   required   by   the   subject   matter   in   litigation.   Either   party   may   challenge   the  fitness  of  any  assessor  proposed  for  appointment.     83.2.   Each   assessor   shall   receive   a   compensation   in   an   amount   to   be   fixed   by   the   court   and   advanced   by   the   complaining  party,  which  shall  be  awarded  as  part  of  his   costs  should  he  prevail  in  the  action.    

f.

SECTION  83.  ASSESSOR  IN  INFRINGEMENT  ACTION.  –    

3.

Damages    

Licensing    

 

 

a.

SECTION  79.  LIMITATION  OF  ACTION  FOR  DAMAGES.  –    

Voluntary  

 

No   damages   can   be   recovered   for   acts   of   infringement   committed   more   than   four   (4)   years   before   the   institution  of  the  action  for  infringement.    

SECTION  85.  VOLUNTARY  LICENSE  CONTRACT.  –     To   encourage   the   transfer   and   dissemination   of   technology,   prevent   or   control   practices   and   conditions  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   that   may   in   particular   cases   constitute   an   abuse   of   intellectual   property   rights   having   an   adverse   effect   on   competition   and   trade,   all   technology   transfer   arrangements   shall   comply   with   the   provisions   of   this   Chapter.    

arrangement,  except  in  cases  of  early  termination  of  the   technology   transfer   arrangement   due   to   reason(s)   attributable  to  the  licensee;     87.10.   Those   which   require   payments   for   patents   and   other   industrial   property   rights   after   their   expiration,   termination  arrangement;     87.11.  Those  which  require  that  the  technology  recipient   shall   not   contest   the   validity   of   any   of   the   patents   of   the   technology  supplier;     87.12.   Those   which   restrict   the   research   and   development   activities   of   the   licensee   designed   to   absorb   and   adapt   the   transferred   technology   to   local   conditions   or   to   initiate   research   and   development   programs  in  connection  with  new  products,  processes  or   equipment;     87.13.   Those   which   prevent   the   licensee   from   adapting   the   imported   technology   to   local   conditions,   or   introducing   innovation   to   it,   as   long   as   it   does   not   impair   the  quality  standards  prescribed  by  the  licensor;     87.14.   Those   which   exempt   the   licensor   for   liability   for   non-­‐fulfilment   of   his   responsibilities   under   the   technology   transfer   arrangement   and/or   liability   arising   from   third   party   suits   brought   about   by   the   use   of   the   licensed  product  or  the  licensed  technology;  and     87.15.  Other  clauses  with  equivalent  effects.    

SECTION   86.   JURISDICTION   TO   SETTLE   DISPUTES   ON   ROYALTIES.  –     The   Director   of   the   Documentation,   Information   and   Technology   Transfer   Bureau   shall   exercise   quasi-­‐judicial   jurisdiction   in   the   settlement   of   disputes   between   parties   to   a   technology   transfer   arrangement   arising   from  technology  transfer  payments,  including  the  fixing   of  appropriate  amount  or  rate  of  royalty.    

SECTION  87.  PROHIBITED  CLAUSES.  –     Except   in   cases   under   Section   91,   the   following   provisions   shall   be   deemed   prima   facie   to   have   an   adverse  effect  on  competition  and  trade:     87.1.   Those   which   impose   upon   the   licensee   the   obligation  to  acquire  from  a  specific  source  capital  goods,   intermediate   products,   raw   materials,   and   other   technologies,   or   of   permanently   employing   personnel   indicated  by  the  licensor;     87.2.   Those   pursuant   to   which   the   licensor   reserves   the   right   to   fix   the   sale   or   resale   prices   of   the   products   manufactured  on  the  basis  of  the  license;     87.3.   Those   that   contain   restrictions   regarding   the   volume  and  structure  of  production;     87.4.   Those   that   prohibit   the   use   of   competitive   technologies   in   a   non-­‐exclusive   technology   transfer   agreement;     87.5.   Those   that   establish   a   full   or   partial   purchase   option  in  favor  of  the  licensor;     87.6.  Those  that  obligate  the  licensee  to  transfer  for  free   to   the   licensor   the   inventions   or   improvements   that   may   be  obtained  through  the  use  of  the  licensed  technology;     87.7.   Those   that   require   payment   of   royalties   to   the   owners  of  patents  for  patents  which  are  not  used;     87.8.   Those   that   prohibit   the   licensee   to   export   the   licensed  product  unless  justified  for  the  protection  of  the   legitimate   interest   of   the   licensor   such   as   exports   to   countries   where   exclusive   licenses   to   manufacture   and/or   distribute   the   licensed   product(s)   have   already   been  granted;     87.9.   Those   which   restrict   the   use   of   the   technology   supplied   after   the   expiration   of   the   technology   transfer  

SECTION  88.  MANDATORY  PROVISIONS.  –     The   following   provisions   shall   be   included   in   voluntary   license  contracts:     88.1.   That   the   laws   of   the   Philippines   shall   govern   the   interpretation  of  the  same  and  in  the  event  of  litigation,   the   venue   shall   be   the   proper   court   in   the   place   where   the  licensee  has  its  principal  office;     88.2.   Continued   access   to   improvements   in   techniques   and   processes   related   to   the   technology   shall   be   made   available   during   the   period   of   the   technology   transfer   arrangement;     88.3.   In   the   event   the   technology   transfer   arrangement   shall  provide  for  arbitration,  the  Procedure  of  Arbitration   of   the   Arbitration   Law   of   the   Philippines   or   the   Arbitration   Rules   of   the   United   Nations   Commission   on   International   Trade   Law   (UNCITRAL)   or   the   Rules   of   Conciliation   and   Arbitration   of   the   International   Chamber  of  Commerce  (ICC)  shall  apply  and  the  venue  of   arbitration   shall   be   the   Philippines   or   any   neutral   country;  and    

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Intellectual Property Law 88.4.  The  Philippine  taxes  on  all  payments  relating  to  the   technology   transfer   arrangement   shall   be   borne   by   the   licensor.      

93.2.   Where   the   public   interest,   in   particular,   national   security,   nutrition,   health   or   the   development   of   other   vital   sectors   of   the   national   economy   as   determined   by   the  appropriate  agency  of  the  Government,  so  requires;   or     93.3.   Where   a   judicial   or   administrative   body   has   determined   that   the   manner   of   exploitation   by   the   owner  of  the  patent  or  his  licensee  is  anti-­‐competitive;  or   "93.4.  In  case  of  public  non-­‐commercial  use  of  the  patent   by  the  patentee,  without  satisfactory  reason;     93.5.  If  the  patented  invention  is  not  being  worked  in  the   Philippines   on   a   commercial   scale,   although   capable   of   being   worked,   without   satisfactory   reason:   Provided,   That   the   importation   of   the   patented   article   shall   constitute  working  or  using  the  patent;  and     93.6.   Where   the   demand   for   patented   drugs   and   medicines  is  not  being  met  to  an  adequate  extent  and  on   reasonable   terms,   as   determined   by   the   Secretary   of   the   Department  of  Health.    

SECTION  89.  RIGHTS  OF  LICENSOR.  –     In   the   absence   of   any   provision   to   the   contrary   in   the   technology  transfer  arrangement,  the  grant  of  a  license   shall   not   prevent   the   licensor   from   granting   further   licenses   to   third   person   nor   from   exploiting   the   subject   matter  of  the  technology  transfer  arrangement  himself.    

SECTION  90.  RIGHTS  OF  LICENSEE.  –     The   licensee   shall   be   entitled   to   exploit   the   subject   matter   of   the   technology   transfer   arrangement   during   the  whole  term  of  the  technology  transfer  arrangement.    

SECTION  91.  EXCEPTIONAL  CASES.  –     In   exceptional   or   meritorious   cases   where   substantial   benefits   will   accrue   to   the   economy,   such   as   high   technology   content,   increase   in   foreign   exchange   earnings,   employment   generation,   regional   dispersal   of   industries   and/or   substitution   with   or   use   of   local   raw   materials,   or   in   the   case   of   Board   of   Investments,   registered   companies   with   pioneer   status,   exemption   from  any  of  the  above  requirements  may  be  allowed  by   the   Documentation,   Information   and   Technology   Transfer   Bureau   after   evaluation   thereof   on   a   case   by   case  basis.    

SECTION   93-­‐A.   PROCEDURES   ON   ISSUANCE   OF   A   SPECIAL   COMPULSORY  LICENSE  UNDER  THE  TRIPS  AGREEMENT.  –     93-­‐A.1.   The   Director   General   of   the   Intellectual   Property   Office,   upon   the   written   recommendation   of   the   Secretary  of  the  Department  of  Health,  shall,  upon  filing   of   a   petition,   grant   a   special   compulsory   license   for   the   importation   of   patented   drugs   and   medicines.   The   special   compulsory   license   for   the   importation   contemplated  under  this  provision  shall  be  an  additional   special  alternative  procedure  to  ensure  access  to  quality   affordable  medicines  and  shall  be  primarily  for  domestic   consumption:   Provided,   That   adequate   remuneration   shall  be  paid  to  the  patent  owner  either  by  the  exporting   or   importing   country.   The   compulsory   license   shall   also   contain   a   provision   directing   the   grantee   the   license   to   exercise   reasonable   measures   to   prevent   the   re-­‐ exportation   of   the   products   imported   under   this   provision.     The   grant   of   a   special   compulsory   license   under   this   provision   shall   be   an   exception   to   Sections   100.4   and   100.6  of  Republic  Act  No.  8293  and  shall  be  immediately   executory.     No   court,   except   the   Supreme   Court   of   the   Philippines,   shall   issue   any   temporary   restraining   order   or   preliminary  injunction  or  such  other  provisional  remedies   that   will   prevent   the   grant   of   the   special   compulsory   license.     93-­‐A.2.   A   compulsory   license   shall   also   be   available   for   the   manufacture   and   export   of   drugs   and   medicines   to   any   country   having   insufficient   or   no   manufacturing   capacity   in   the   pharmaceutical   sector   to   address   public  

SECTION   92.   NON-­‐REGISTRATION   WITH   THE   DOCUMENTATION,   INFORMATION   AND   TECHNOLOGY   TRANSFER  BUREAU .  –     Technology   transfer   arrangements   that   conform   with   the   provisions   of   Sections   86   and   87   need   not   be   registered   with   the   Documentation,   Information   and   Technology  Transfer  Bureau.  Non-­‐conformance  with  any   of   the   provisions   of   Sections   87   and   88,   however,   shall   automatically   render   the   technology   transfer   arrangement   unenforceable,   unless   said   technology   transfer   arrangement   is   approved   and   registered   with   the   Documentation,   Information   and   Technology   Transfer   Bureau   under   the   provisions   of   Section   91   on   exceptional  cases.    

b.

Compulsory  

 

SECTION  93.  GROUNDS  FOR  COMPULSORY  LICENSING.  –     The   Director   General   of   the   Intellectual   Property   Office   may  grant  a  license  to  exploit  a  patented  invention,  even   without  the  agreement  of  the  patent  owner,  in  favor  of   any   person   who   has   shown   his   capability   to   exploit   the   invention,  under  any  of  the  following  circumstances:     93.1.   National   emergency   or   other   circumstances   of   extreme  urgency;    

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   health   problems:   Provided,   That,   a   compulsory   license   has   been   granted   by   such   country   or   such   country   has,   by   notification   or   otherwise,   allowed   importation   into   its   jurisdiction   of   the   patented   drugs   and   medicines   from   the  Philippines  in  compliance  with  the  TRIPS  Agreement.     93-­‐A.3.   The   right   to   grant   a   special   compulsory   license   under  this  section  shall  not  limit  or  prejudice  the  rights,   obligations   and   flexibilities   provided   under   the   TRIPS   Agreement   and   under   Philippine   laws,   particularly   Section   72.1   and   Section   74   of   the   Intellectual   Property   Code,   as   amended   under   this   Act.   It   is   also   without   prejudice   to   the   extent   to   which   drugs   and   medicines   produced  under  a  compulsory  license  can  be  exported  as   allowed  in  the  TRIPS  Agreement  and  applicable  laws.    

  95.3.   In   situations   of   national   emergency   or   other   circumstances   of   extreme   urgency,   the   right   holder   shall   be  notified  as  soon  as  reasonably  practicable.     95.4.   In   the   case   of   public   non-­‐commercial   use,   where   the  government  or  contractor,  without  making  a  patent   search,   knows   or   has   demonstrable   grounds   to   know   that   a   valid   patent   is   or   will   be   used   by   or   for   the   government,  the  right  holder  shall  be  informed  promptly.     95.5.   Where   the   demand   for   the   patented   drugs   and   medicines   in   the   Philippines   is   not   being   met   to   an   adequate   extent   and   on   reasonable   terms,   as   determined   by   the   Secretary   of   the   Department   of   Health,  the  right  holder  shall  be  informed  promptly.    

SECTION   94.   PERIOD   FOR   FILING   A   PETITION   FOR   A   COMPULSORY  LICENSE.  –    

SECTION   96.   COMPULSORY   LICENSING   OF   PATENTS   INVOLVING  SEMI-­‐CONDUCTOR  TECHNOLOGY.  –    

94.1.   A   compulsory   license   may   not   be   applied   for   on   the   ground   stated   in   Subsection   93.5   before   the   expiration   of  a  period  of  four  (4)  years  from  the  date  of  filing  of  the   application  or  three  (3)  years  from  the  date  of  the  patent   whichever  period  expires  last.     94.2.   A   compulsory   license   which   is   applied   for   on   any   of   the  grounds  stated  in  Subsections  93.2,  93.3,  93.4,  and       93.6  and  Section  97  may  be  applied  for  at  any  time  after   the  grant  of  the  patent.    

In  the  case  of  compulsory  licensing  of  patents  involving   semi-­‐conductor   technology,   the   license   may   only   be   granted   in   case   of   public   non-­‐commercial   use   or   to   remedy   a   practice   determined   after   judicial   or   administrative  process  to  be  anti-­‐competitive.      

SECTION   97.   COMPULSORY   LICENSE   BASED   ON   INTERDEPENDENCE  OF  PATENTS.  –     If  the  invention  protected  by  a  patent,  hereafter  referred   to  as  the  "second  patent,"  within  the  country  cannot  be   worked   without   infringing   another   patent,   hereafter   referred   to   as   the   "first   patent,"   granted   on   a   prior   application   or   benefiting   from   an   earlier   priority,   a   compulsory  license  may  be  granted  to  the  owner  of  the   second   patent   to   the   extent   necessary   for   the   working   of  his  invention,  subject  to  the  following  conditions:     97.1.  The  invention  claimed  in  the  second  patent  involves   an   important   technical   advance   of   considerable   economic  significance  in  relation  to  the  first  patent;     97.2.  The  owner  of  the  first  patent  shall  be  entitled  to  a   cross-­‐license   on   reasonable   terms   to   use   the   invention   claimed  in  the  second  patent;     97.3.   The   use   authorized   in   respect   of   the   first   patent   shall   be   non-­‐assignable   except   with   the   assignment   of   the  second  patent;  and     97.4.   The   terms   and   conditions   of   Sections   95,   96   and   98   to  100  of  this  Act.      

SECTION   95.   REQUIREMENT   TO   OBTAIN   A   LICENSE   ON   REASONABLE  COMMERCIAL  TERMS.  –     95.1.  The  license  will  only  be  granted  after  the  petitioner   has   made   efforts   to   obtain   authorization   from   the   patent   owner   on   reasonable   commercial   terms   and   conditions   but   such   efforts   have   not   been   successful   within  a  reasonable  period  of  time.     95.2.   The   requirement   under   Subsection   95.1   shall   not   apply  in  any  of  the  following  cases:     (a)   Where   the   petition   for   compulsory   license   seeks   to   remedy   a   practice   determined   after   judicial   or   administrative   process   to   be   anti-­‐ competitive;     (b)  In  situations  of  national  emergency  or  other   circumstances  of  extreme  urgency;     (c)  In  cases  of  public  non-­‐commercial  use;  and     (d)   In   cases   where   the   demand   for   the   patented   drugs   and   medicines   in   the   Philippines   is   not   being   met   to   an   adequate   extent  and  on  reasonable  terms,  as  determined   by  the  Secretary  of  the  Department  of  Health.  

SECTION  98.  FORM  AND  CONTENTS  OF  PETITION.  –     The  petition  for  compulsory  licensing  must  be  in  writing,   verified   by   the   petitioner   and   accompanied   by   payment   of   the   required   filing   fee.   It   shall   contain   the   name   and  

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Intellectual Property Law address   of   the   petitioner   as   well   as   those   of   the   respondents,  the  number  and  date  of  issue  of  the  patent   in   connection   with   which   compulsory   license   is   sought,   the  name  of  the  patentee,  the  title  of  the  invention,  the   statutory   grounds   upon   which   compulsory   license   is   sought,   the   ultimate   facts   constituting   the   petitioner's   cause  of  action,  and  the  relief  prayed  for.    

100.6.  The  patentee  shall  be  paid  adequate  remuneration   taking   into   account   the   economic   value   of   the   grant   or   authorization,  except  that  in  cases  where  the  license  was   granted   to   remedy   a   practice   which   was   determined   after   judicial   or   administrative   process,   to   be   anti-­‐ competitive,   the   need   to   correct   the   anti-­‐competitive   practice  may  be  taken  into  account  in  fixing  the  amount   of  remuneration.      

SECTION  99.  NOTICE  OF  HEARING.  –    

SECTION  101.  AMENDMENT,  CANCELLATION,  SURRENDER  OF   COMPULSORY  LICENSE.  –    

99.1.   Upon   filing   of   a   petition,   the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   shall   forthwith   serve   notice   of   the   filing   thereof   upon  the  patent  owner  and  all  persons  having  grants  or   licenses,  or  any  other  right,  title  or  interest  in  and  to  the   patent   and   invention   covered   thereby   as   appears   of   record   in   the   Office,   and   of   notice   of   the   date   of   hearing   thereon,   on   such   persons   and   petitioner.   The   resident   agent   or   representative   appointed   in   accordance   with   Section   33   hereof,   shall   be   bound   to   accept   service   of   notice  of  the  filing  of  the  petition  within  the  meaning  of   this  Section.     99.2.   In   every   case,   the   notice   shall   be   published   by   the   said  Office  in  a  newspaper  of  general  circulation,  once  a   week   for   three   (3)   consecutive   weeks   and   once   in   the   IPO  Gazette  at  applicant's  expense.    

101.1.   Upon   the   request   of   the   patentee   or   the   licensee,   the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   may   amend   the   decision   granting   the   compulsory   license,   upon   proper   showing   of   new   facts   or   circumstances   justifying   such   amendment.     101.2.   Upon   the   request   of   the   patentee,   the   said   Director  may  cancel  the  compulsory  license:     (a)   If   the   ground   for   the   grant   of   the   compulsory   license   no   longer   exists   and   is   unlikely  to  recur;     (b)  If  the  licensee  has  neither  begun  to  supply   the   domestic   market   nor   made   serious   preparation  therefor;     (c)   If   the   licensee   has   not   complied   with   the   prescribed  terms  of  the  license;     101.3.  The  licensee  may  surrender  the  license  by  a  written   declaration  submitted  to  the  Office.     101.4.   The   said   Director   shall   cause   the   amendment,   surrender,   or   cancellation   in   the   Register,   notify   the   patentee,   and/or   the   licensee,   and   cause   notice   thereof   to  be  published  in  the  IPO  Gazette.    

SECTION   100.   TERMS   AND   CONDITIONS   OF   COMPULSORY   LICENSE.  –     The   basic   terms   and   conditions   including   the   rate   of   royalties   of   a   compulsory   license   shall   be   fixed   by   the   Director   of   Legal   Affairs   subject   to   the   following   conditions:     100.1.   The   scope   and   duration   of   such   license   shall   be   limited  to  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  authorized;     100.2.  The  license  shall  be  non-­‐exclusive;     100.3.   The   license   shall   be   non-­‐assignable,   except   with   that   part   of   the   enterprise   or   business   with   which   the   invention  is  being  exploited;     100.4.   Use   of   the   subject   matter   of   the   license   shall   be   devoted   predominantly   for   the   supply   of   the   Philippine   market:   Provided,   That   this   limitation   shall   not   apply   where   the   grant   of   the   license   is   based   on   the   ground   that   the   patentee's   manner   of   exploiting   the   patent   is   determined   by   judicial   or   administrative   process,   to   be   anti-­‐competitive.     100.5.   The   license   may   be   terminated   upon   proper   showing   that   circumstances   which   led   to   its   grant   have   ceased  to  exist  and  are  unlikely  to  recur:  Provided,  That   adequate   protection   shall   be   afforded   to   the   legitimate   interest  of  the  licensee;  and    

SECTION  102.  LICENSEE'S  EXEMPTION  FROM  LIABILITY.  –     Any   person   who   works   a   patented   product,   substance   and/or   process   under   a   license   granted   under   this   Chapter,  shall  be  free  from  any  liability  for  infringement:   Provided  however,  That  in  the  case  of  voluntary  licensing,   no   collusion   with   the   licensor   is   proven.   This   is   without   prejudice   to   the   right   of   the   rightful   owner   of   the   patent   to   recover   from   the   licensor   whatever   he   may   have   received  as  royalties  under  the  license.    

PRICE  V.  UNITED  LABORATORIES  (1988)   Court  decision:   Price   is   owner-­‐assignee   of   Phil   Patent   No.   13540   for   a   pharmaceutical   compound   used   for   anti-­‐ulcer.   Respondent   UniLab   filed   in   the   PPO   a   petition   for   the   issuance   of   compulsory   license   to   use   the   patented   compound   in   its   own   brands   of   medicines   and   to   sell,  

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Katrina Michelle Mancao   distribute   or   otherwise   dispose   of   such   med   or   pharmaceutical   preparation   in   the   country.   After   hearing,   PPO   granted   UniLab   compulsory   license   subject   to   10   terms  and  conditions.       WON  Director’s  unilateral  determination  of  the  terms  and   conditions  of  the  compulsory  license  without  affording  the   parties   an   opportunity   to   negotiate   the   terms   and   conditions  freely  and  by  themselves  is  valid?     Director   of   Patents   authorized   to   fix   the   terms   and   conditions   of   the   compulsory   license.   -­‐   The   terms   and   conditions   of   the   compulsory   license   were   fixed   by   the   Director   of   Patents   after   a   hearing   and   careful   consideration   of   the   evidence   of   the   parties   and   in   default  of  an  agreement  between  them  as  to  the  terms   of  the  license.  This  he  is  authorized  to  do  under  Section   36  of  Republic  Act  No.  165.       In   any   event,   since   the   petitioner   Price   will   still   be   paid   royalties   on   the   sales   of   any   products   the   licensee   may   manufacture  using  any  or  all  of  the  patented  compounds,   the   petitioner   cannot   complain   of   a   deprivation   of   property  rights  without  just  compensation.    

SMITH   KLINE   V.   CA   &   DANLEX   RESEARCH   LABORATORIES   INC.  (2001)   Refresher:   Also   on   Cimetidine.   This   time   BPTTT   granted   compulsory   license  to  Danlex.       Court  decision:   The   grant   of   the   compulsory   license   satisfies   the   requirements  of  Sec.  34  of  Patent  Law.   [1]   More   than   ten   years   have   passed   since   the   patent   for   Cimetidine  was  issued  to  petitioner  and  its  predecessors-­‐ in-­‐interest   [2]   The   compulsory   license   applied   for   by   private   respondent   is   for   the   use,   manufacture   and   sale   of   a   medicinal  product   [3]   Both   the   appellate   court   and   the   BPTTT   found   that   private  respondent  had  the  capability  to  work  Cimetidine   or   to   make   use   thereof   in   the   manufacture   of   a   useful   product.     There   is   no   basis   for   the   allegation   that   the   grant   of   compulsory   license   to   private   respondent   results   in   the   deprivation   of   petitioner’s   property   without   just   compensation.   Even   if   other   entities   like   private   respondent   are   subsequently   allowed   to   manufacture,   use   and   sell   the   patented   invention   by   virtue   of   a   compulsory   license,   petitioner   as   owner   of   the   patent   would   still   receive   remuneration   for   the   use   of   such   product  in  the  form  of  royalties.     The   rate   of   2.5%   of   net   wholesale   price   fixed   by   the   Director   of   the   BPTTT   is   not   unreasonable,   inadequate   and  is  in  fact,  in  accord  with  the  Patent  Law.  Reasons:     -­‐ The   compulsory   license   awarded   to   private   respondent   consists   only   of   the   bare   right   to   use  the  patented  invention  in  the  manufacture   of   another   product,   without   any   technical   assistance  from  the  licensor.   -­‐ Identical  royalty  rates  have  been  prescribed  by   the   Director   of   the   BPTTT   in   numerous   patent   cases.    

SMITH   KLINE  V.   CA,   BPTTT  &   DOCTORS  PHARMACEUTICAL     (1997)   Refresher:   Smith   Kline   owns   patent   for   Cimetidine.   Doctors   Pharm   filed   petition   for   compulsory   licensing   with   BPTTT   for   authorization  to  manufacture  its  own  brand  of  medicine   from   the   drug   Cimetidine   and   to   market   the   resulting   product   in   the   PH.   BPTTT   granted   the   petition.   Smith   Kline  cries  foul.       Court  decision:   SC   upheld   the   BPTTT   grant   of   compulsory   license.   Section   A   (2)   of   Paris   Convention   R.A.   No.   165   unequivocally   and   explicitly   respects   the   right   of   member   countries   to   adopt   legislative   measures   to   provide  for  the  grant  of  compulsory  licenses  to  prevent   abuses   which   might   result   from   the   exercise   of   the   exclusive  rights  conferred  by  the  patent.       Section   34   of   R.A.   No.   165,   even   if   the   Act   was   enacted   prior  to  the  Philippines'  adhesion  to  the  Convention,  fits   well  within  the  aforequoted  provisions  of  Article  5  of  the   Paris   Convention.   In   the   explanatory   note   of   Bill   No.   1156   which   eventually   became   R.A.   No.   165,   the   legislative   intent  in  the  grant  of  a  compulsory  license  was  not  only   to   afford   others   an   opportunity   to   provide   the   public   with   the   quantity   of   the   patented   product,   but   also   to   prevent  the  growth  of  monopolies.       Certainly,   the   growth   of   monopolies   was   among   the   abuses   which   Section   A,   Article   5   of   the   Convention   foresaw,   and   which   our   Congress   likewise   wished   to   prevent  in  enacting  R.A.  No.  165.    

4.

Right   to   Transfer   and   Assign  

 

SECTION  4.2.     The   term   "TECHNOLOGY   TRANSFER   ARRANGEMENTS"   refers   to   contracts   or   agreements   involving   the   transfer   of   systematic   knowledge   for   the   manufacture   of   a   product,   the   application   of   a   process,   or   rendering   of   a   service   including   management   contracts;   and   the   transfer,   assignment   or   licensing   of   all   forms   of   intellectual   property   rights,   including   licensing   of   computer   software   except   computer   software   developed   for   mass   market.    

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Intellectual Property Law however,   That   neither   of   the   joint   owners   shall   be   entitled   to   grant   licenses   or   to   assign   his   right,   title   or   interest  or  part  thereof  without  the  consent  of  the  other   owner  or  owners,  or  without  proportionally  dividing  the   proceeds  with  such  other  owner  or  owners.  (Sec.  54,  R.A.   No.  165)    

SECTION  103.  TRANSMISSION  OF  RIGHTS.  –     103.1.   Patents   or   applications   for   patents   and   invention   to  which  they  relate,  shall  be  protected  in  the  same  way   as  the  rights  of  other  property  under  the  Civil  Code.     103.2.  Inventions  and  any  right,  title  or  interest  in  and  to   patents   and   inventions   covered   thereby,   may   be   assigned   or   transmitted   by   inheritance   or   bequest   or   may  be  the  subject  of  a  license  contract.    

SEE  SECTIONS  85-­‐92,  SUPRA  (ON  VOLUNTARY  LICENSING).    

ALBANA  V.  DIRECTOR  OF  PATENTS  (1953)   Court  decision:   Assignment   of   patents   and   inventions   covered   thereby   may  be  recorded  in  the  books  and  records  and  kept  for   the  purpose  in  the  Patent  Office  if  presented  in  due  form.   BUT   where   a   person   other   than   the   inventor   files   a   motion   with   the   Director   of   Patents   praying   that   the   applicant-­‐inventor   be   compelled   to   sign   the   contract   executed   by   a   co-­‐applicant-­‐inventor  and  both  applicant-­‐ inventors   to   acknowledge   it   before   a   notary   public   as   well  as  another  document  which  refers  to  the  minutes  of   a   meeting   of   the   organizers   of   the   manufacturing   corporation,  and  then  to  have  both  documents  recorded   in   the   Patent   Office   and   in   the   office   of   the   registrar   of   deeds,   the   Director   of   Patents   has   no   power   and   authority   to   compel   the   applicant-­‐inventors   to   do   what   the  movant  is  asking  them  to  do.       What  the  movant  asks  the  Director  of  Patents  to  do  for   him  is  essentially  a  judicial  function  which  would  require   the   determination   of   finding   by   a   court   of   competent   jurisdiction   as   to   whether   there   was   a   meeting   of   the   minds   of   the   contracting   parties   before   it   could   compel   any  of  them  to  perform  what  the  movant  prays  the  court   to  order  him  to  do.  

SECTION  104.  ASSIGNMENT  OF  INVENTIONS.  –   An  assignment  may  be  of  the  entire  right,  title  or  interest   in  and  to  the  patent  and  the  invention  covered  thereby,   or   of   an   undivided   share   of   the   entire   patent   and   invention,   in   which   event   the   parties   become   joint   owners   thereof.   An   assignment   may   be   limited   to   a   specified  territory.      

SECTION  105.  FORM  OF  ASSIGNMENT.  –     The   assignment   must   be   in   writing,   acknowledged   before   a   notary   public   or   other   officer   authorized   to   administer   oath   or   perform   notarial   acts,   and   certified   under   the   hand   and   official   seal   of   the   notary   or   such   other  officer.      

SECTION  106.  RECORDING.  –     106.1.   The   Office   shall   record   assignments,   licenses   and   other   instruments   relating   to   the   transmission   of   any   right,  title  or  interest  in  and  to  inventions,  and  patents  or   application  for  patents  or  inventions  to  which  they  relate,   which   are   presented   in   due   form   to   the   Office   for   registration,  in  books  and  records  kept  for  the  purpose.   The   original   documents   together   with   a   signed   duplicate   thereof  shall  be  filed,  and  the  contents  thereof  should  be   kept   confidential.   If   the   original   is   not   available,   an   authenticated   copy   thereof   in   duplicate   may   be   filed.   Upon   recording,   the   Office   shall   retain   the   duplicate,   return  the  original  or  the  authenticated  copy  to  the  party   who  filed  the  same  and  notice  of  the  recording  shall  be   published  in  the  IPO  Gazette.     106.2.   Such   instruments   shall   be   void   as   against   any   subsequent   purchaser   or   mortgagee   for   valuable   consideration   and   without   notice,   unless,   it   is   so   recorded  in  the  Office,  within  three  (3)  months  from  the   date   of   said   instrument,   or   prior   to   the   subsequent   purchase  or  mortgage.    

SECTION  107.  RIGHTS  OF  JOINT  OWNERS.  –     If  two  (2)  or  more  persons  jointly  own  a  patent  and  the   invention  covered  thereby,  either  by  the  issuance  of  the   patent  in  their  joint  favor  or  by  reason  of  the  assignment   of   an   undivided   share   in  the   patent   and   invention   or   by   reason   of   the   succession   in   title   to   such   share,   each   of   the  joint  owners  shall  be  entitled  to  personally  make,  use,   sell,   or   import   the   invention   for   his   own   profit:   Provided,  

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