13th Fighter Command In World War Ii 'air Combat Over Guadalcanal And The Solomon

13TH FIGHTER COMMAND IN WORLD

WAR II

Air Combat over Guadalcanal and tne Solomons

th

13 Fighter Command in World War II Air Combat over Guadalcanal and the Solomons

William Wolf

Schiffer Military History Atglen, PA

Dedication I dedicate this book to my new friends in the 13 th Fighter Command, the 347'h and 18 th Fighter Group Associations, and to myoId friends with the Death Rattlers, VMF-323. These men-boys at the time-gave up their youth and sometimes their lives in a struggle that was truly appreciated and supported by all the American people at the time. We, the next generations, also owe these men of the "Greatest Generation" recognition and respect for their sacrifice.

Book Design by Ian Robertson. Copyright © 2004 by William Wolf. Library of Congress Control Number: 2004105244 All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or used in any forms or by any means - graphic, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or information storage and retrieval systems - without written permission from the copyright holder. Printed in China. ISBN: 0-7643-2067-X We are interested in hearing from authors with book ideas on related topics.

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Contents

Acknowledgments Preface Foreword by Col. Bill Harris Part One: Prelude, On the Way to the South Pacific Chapter I: Introduction Chapter 2: Background of the Components of the 13 1h Fighter Command Part Two: Guadalcanal Chapter I: Guadalcanal Background and Japanese Invasion Chapter 2: August 1942 Chapter 3: September 1942 Chapter 4: October 1942 Chapter 5: November 1942 Chapter 6: December 1942 Chapter 7: January 1943 Chapter 8: February 1943 Chapter 9: March 1943, Summary and Assessment , of the Battle for Guadalcanal Chapter I0: Statistics, Assessing the Guadalcanal Air Campaign Part Three: Central Solomons Chapter I: Status of the Air War 1943 Chapter 2: February 1943 Continued Chapter 3: Russell Islands (Operation CLeansLate) to March Chapter 4: March 1943 Chapter 5: Mission to the Shortlands, 29 March 1943 by James Lansdale ; Chapter 6: CartwheeL Chapter 7: Apri I 1943 Chapter 8: Yamamoto Mission 18 April 1943 Mission Prolog The Definitive Account of the Yamamoto Mission by James Lansdale Mission Epilogue Controversy Second Yamamoto Mission Association (SYMA) Dr. Charles Darby's Forensic Examination of the Yamamoto Bomber Wreckage A Final Word Chapter 9: April 1943 Continued Chapter 10: May 1943 Chapter II: June 1943

6 7 8

Chapter 12: New Georgia Campaign, 21 June-26 August, Operation "ToenaiLs" Chapter 13: July 1943 Chapter 14: August 1943 Chapter 15: Assessment of the New Georgia Campaign

178 193 203 207

10 II

20 21 42 53 73 90 99 107 III 113

116 117 119 121 123 127 130 137 137 142 147 149 154 160 162 163 166 169

Part Four: Northern Solomons Chapter 1: BougainvilJe Campaign, Preparation October 1943 Chapter 2: September 1943 Chapter 3: Bougainville Campaign, 27 October25 November Chapter 4: Conclusions of the Bougainville Operation Part Five: Reduction of Rabaul Chapter l: Phase One, Prelude: October-November 1943 Chapter 2: December 1943 Chapter 3: Rabaul Phase Two, January 1944 Chapter 4: February 1944, Not the End by Any Means Chapter 5: The "Milk Runs" Begin Chapter 6: March 1944 Chapter 7: April 1944 Chapter 8: May 1944, The End for All Intents and Purposes

209 213 218 230

232 234 238 250 256 258 260 263

Part Six: Beyond Rabaul: A Summing Up Part Seven: Appendices Fighters of the 13'h Fighter Command Lockheed P-38 Lightning Flying the P-38 Lightning by Bill Harris Bell P-39/P-400 Airacobra Flying the P-39 Airacobra by Paul Bechtel Flying the P-400 Airacobra by John "Tommy" Thompson Curtiss P-40 "Hawks" Flying the P-40 by Stan Palmer 13'h Fighter Command Aces Squadron Aces Aces' Biographies Group and Squadron Commanders 13'h Fighter Command Squadron Victories Color Profiles Abbreviations Fighter Director Codes Bibliography and Sources Index - Personnel in text and captions (in bold)

270 271 272 273 274 275 276 279 279 280 294 295 304 321 323 324 328

Acknowledgments

This book could not have been completed without the help of my good friend of 15 years, Jim Lansdale. Jim is a diligent historian and researcher, and an acknowledged expert on Japanese air operations in the Pacific during World War II, and the Yamamoto mission of 18 April 1943, in particular. Over the years he has collected microfilm, documents, photos, and interviews with members of the 13 th Fighter Command and the Yamamoto Mission. For the thirty years Jim has been an extremely busy science teacher and a science department chairman at Pine Crest Preparatory School in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and over the years has not had the time to utilize the materials he has collected. Meanwhile, I retired from dentistry 17 years ago and have collected 14,000 books and magazines, thousands of feet of microfilm, and thousands of photographs on World War II. Over the past four years I have had the time to make use of my collection and have written three books for Schiffer Publishing: Death Rattlers: Marine Squadron VMF-323 Over Okinawa; Victory Roll: American Fighter Pilot and Aircraft in World War 2 and American labos in the MTO & ETO: American Fighter-Bombers in World War 2. For this book Jim has graciously lent me his microfilm collection of the histories of each of the squadrons of the 13 th FC and over a hundred of his photographs so that the unheralded account of these courageous pilots and personnel could be finally be told. Also, he has contributed the story of the 29 March 1943 mission to the Shortlands and his expert elucidation of the controversial Yamamoto mission of 18 April 1943 when the Betty bomber carrying Admiral Yamamoto was shot down, changing the course of the war in the Pacific. Jim's analysis of this mission using contemporary records and the forensic examination and photographs of the Yamamoto Betty wreckage by Dr. Charles Darby will hopefully finally put an end to this ongoing controversy and give Rex Barber his due as the pilot who shot down Yamamoto. Also, I would like to acknowledge the invaluable help given me by Col. Doug Canning, Capt. Stan Palmer, and Col. Bill Harris during this project. Jim would like to acknowledge the late Col. Rex Barber and Maj.Gen. Bob Petit for their friendship and help over the years. Jim is especially indebted to Doug Canning, who is a close personal friend and the ramrod of the 347 th Fighter Group Association.

Over the years I have collected 1,000s of photographs from various sources. On trips to the U.S. Air Force Museum, Dayton, Ohio, the USAF collection at the Albert Simpson facility, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and the Fernwood Photographic Depository I brought my camera, copy stand, and hundreds of rolls of film and copied 1,000s of photos. I have copied a multitude of photos from the microfilm in my collection. I also have been lent private photo collections that I have copied and acknowledge Doug Canning, Stan Palmer, Grant Smith, George Chandler, and Bill Harris for use of their personal collections for this book. Additional thanks for interviews and correspondence can be found in the bibliography section at the end of tpe book. Jim thanks Carroll V. Glines for use of the Wayne Shipp diagrams from his book Attack On Yamamoto, and George Chandler for his untiring work for the SYMA (Second Yamamoto Mission Association), as well as for the use of their Yamamoto Mission website material. Again I wish to thank my wife, Nancy, for her support and allowing me to put time into my writing and collecting. And also for not complaining about having my World War II collection stored in our enclosed and air-conditioned three-car garage while her car sits out in the torrid Arizona sun. Jim, too, owes his wife, Carol, thanks for her support in his projects.

Author Bill Wolf (left) with friend and book contributor Jim Lansdale.

6

Preface

America was forced into World War II with a grave defeat at Pearl Harbor, but six months later at the Battle of Midway the U.S. Navy sunk four Japanese aircraft carriers. Midway has been called the decisive battle of the Pacific war, but it was the first savage American battle at Guadalcanal and then the equally bloody battles up the Solomon chain, New Georgia, and Bougainville that paved the way not only for the Pacific victory, but for those in Africa, Italy, and then continental Europe. A defeat in the South Pacific would have been a serious setback to U.S. global strategic plans, and the Japanese realized that they had to win not only the battle, but also the war there. They committed thousands of troops on the Tokyo Express to reinforce Guadalcanal, sent battleships, cruisers, and destroyers down the Slot, and flew hundreds of aircraft from Rabaul and the Northern Solomons to drive out the Americans. In the air the Marines rightfully garnered the lion's share of the credit, but the Army Air Force played an important but largely unacknowledged role. Over Rabaul, MacArthur's Army Air Force under Gen. George Kenney received the major credit for the defeat of the Japanese air forces there while the 13 th Fighter Command soldiered on. The units of the 13 th Fighter Command were called the Jungle Air Force and the Cactus Air Force, but they were and are the Unknown Air Force.

7

Foreword

History books have described in great detail the critical Marine Corps victories at Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and New Georgia on the ground and in the air. Names of Marine aces such as Joe Foss and Pappy Boyington are well known, and their F4F Wildcats and the F4U Corsairs are famous as Zero killers. But untold is the contribution of the squadrons of the Army Air Force and the 13 th Fighter Command during this time. At Guadalcanal the first AAF units were equipped with inferior aircraft, such as the P-400 and P39, that could not even climb to the altitude where the Japanese were flying. Our disgruntled Army pilots were ordered to escort Marine dive-bombers and to fly close air support missions against Japanese troops, ships, barges, and installations. They did this with good results while living under awful conditions on Guadalcanal, fighting malaria, constant rain, and Japanese air, naval, and artHlery attacks. Finally, the better P-40 and P-38 fighters were sent to the squadrons of the 13 th Fighter Command and took on the Japanese with improved results. But it was the Marine pilots who were scrambled to meet and dogfight the Japs and added to their victory totals, while Army pilots concentrated on flying as fighter-bombers and bomber escorts, putting these obligations above personal victory totals. Later, when New Georgia, Bougainville, and Rabaul were attacked, Marine F4U Corsairs and the P-38s of the 5th Army Air Force, with pilots like Dick Bong, ran up big victory numbers and got all the newsprint. But at the same time the P-40s of the 44th Fighter Squadron and the P-38s of my 339 th Fighter Squadron began to knock down Jap Zeros and bombers with regularity, but without much credit. Bob Westbrook and Cotes worth Head with the 44 th and Murray Shubin and I with the 339 th got ten or more Japanese while escorting our B-24s and B-25s and protecting our bases on Guadalcanal and the Central Solomons. Throughout the war in the Pacific the 13 th Fighter Command took a back seat to the Marines, Navy, and the 5th Air Force in personnel, equipment, supply, operations, and publicity. Dr. Wolf's book, 13th Fighter Command in World War II, should finally bring to light the 13 th Fighter Command's significant contributions to winning the air war in the South Pacific. Col. Bill Harris (April 2003)

8

Part One Prelude: On the Way to the South Pacific

1 Introduction

Although the 13 th Air Force (l3AF) and its components-the 13 Bomber Command (13BC) and 13 1h Fighter Command (l3FC)-were not founded until January 1943, their origins went back to the beginning of the Pacific war. Units that were later part of the 13AF were sent to the Pacific earlier to help stop the Japanese advance toward the New Hebrides and New Caledonia, and to protect the Allied supply line between American and Australia. The Army Air Force precursor units of the 13AF were posted to a theater commanded by the Navy and fought by the Marines, and were never truly autonomous. The AAF fighter units came under the operational control of Marine Aircraft Wing One (MAW-I) once they arrived at Guadalcanal. The early histories of the fighter groups of the 13 th Air Force were connected to the establishment of defensive air bases to protect the supply route from Hawaii to Australia. Five islands had been chosen to base the air units of "Task Force Five Islands." These islands and their assigned Pursuit (fighter) Squadrons were Fiji (70PS), Canton (68PS), Christmas (l2PS), ew Caledonia (67PS), and Palmyra (69PS). Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold directed that the

equipment and personnel of these squadrons be given priority for their shipment to their assigned bases. New Caledonia, New Zealand, New Guinea, and southeastern Australia were to be the hubs of the island supply route defense as advanced air and naval bases. The U.S. Navy was so concerned that the Japanese would attack New Caledonia that on 22 January 1942 Brig.Gen. Alexander Patch was assigned as commander of the New Caledonia Task Force (the future Americal Division) to protect the island. The concern was not without merit, as the Japanese had planned to invade it after taking Midway. The ground forces arrived on 12 March, and the 67PS three days later. By 17 March Fiji, Christmas, and New Caledonia had one squadron with 25 fighters in place, and soon all the islands would have aircraft on them, including bomber squadrons on New Caledonia. As there were no enemy bases within range of American medium bombers or fighters, before the Guadalcanal offensive Army Air Force units in the South Pacific flew in a solely defensive capacity. Their missions were sea searches to prevent Japanese surprise attacks on the major bases on the islands along the U.S.Australia supply line.

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2 Background of the Components of the 13th Fighter Command

44th Fighter Squadron: "Vampires" The 44 th Fighter Squadron, then called the 44 th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor), was constituted on 22 November 1940 and activated on 1 January 1941 at Wheeler Field, Hawaii, under the command of a Second Lieutenant (A.C. Newton) as part of the 18 th Pursuit Group. Newton was replaced two weeks later by Capt. J.L. HoHner, who served until 27 February when Capt. K.P. Bergquist replaced him. By mid-year the squadron consisted of nine officers and 126 enlisted men and was flying the P-40. Capt. A.R: Kingham took over on 3 October and was succeeded by lLt. J.S. McBride on 7 November, and the squadron moved to Bellows Field for gunnery practice. On 7 December 1941 the squadron was at Bellows and escaped the initial Japanese attack that destroyed the P-40s at

Wheeler. The Wheeler pilots jumped into their autos and sped the 20 miles to Bellows, where the squadron's P-40s were being armed. At 0855 2Lt. George Whiteman taxied out in his P-40 as the field was attacked by six Zeros. When he lifted off the end of the runway a Jap Zero got on his tail; Whiteman tried to pull up but was shot down and killed. Meanwhile, 2Lt. Hans Christiansen was taxiing when a Zero strafed his Warhawk, causing it to go out of control and crash into the underbrush at the end of the field, killing him. Next lLt. Samuel Bishop was able to take off and was turning at 400 feet over the ocean when he was shot down and crash-landed into the sea off Oahu. Bishop suffered a leg wound but was able to swim ashore. The Japanese attack ended before any other 44 th pilots could get off the ground and destroyed seven of the remaining nine P-40s at Bellows.

13th AIR FORCE TACTICAL UNIT H I S T O R Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

GROUPS 11th BG

5th BG

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347th FG

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SQUADRONS 26th BS 42nd BS 9Bth BS 43t,tBS 23rd BS 31,t BS 72nd as 394th BS 370th BS 371st BS 372 nd as 424th BS 69th BS 70th BS 75thBS 100th BS 390 th BS 868th BS

1945 1943 1944 J F M AMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJA

8-17- To 7th Air Force 8-17- To 7th Air Force 6-17- To 7fhAir\Force 8-17- To 7th Air Force

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II The ground crews worked overtime to salvage damaged planes and soon had over 90 in flying condition. These were augmented by several P-40Ds and Es from the States, divided about evenly between Wheeler and Bellows. On 12 December the 441h moved back to Wheeler and flew patrols looking for an anticipated Japanese invasion. The patrols themselves were uneventful, but the nervous, trigger-happy U.S. Navy AA gunners could not always be trusted to hold their fire as the pilots approached their bases. On 20 December the squadron-17 officers and 127 enlisted men still under lLt. J.S. McBride (who would continue as CO until 23 August 1943)-moved to Kaneohe NAS for further training and then returned to Wheeler on 25 January 1942. On 22 May the 441h was redesignated the 44 th Fighter Squadron of the 181h Fighter Group, and a month later moved back to Bellows Field. In August a number of new pilots joined the squadron, many from Class 42-G, including the future 13 lh Fighter Command top ace, Robert Westbrook (20 victories) and third-ranking ace, Coteswoth Head (14 victories). On 23 August the squadron was reorganized with Capt. E.W. Stewart taking command, but for only three weeks, as the squadron was again in flux. There was a transfer of enlisted men from squadrons of the 181h and 15 1h Fighter Groups, and the activation of the 339FS took 441h personnel, who were quickly dispatched by aircraft carrier to Canton Island on 1 September. On 9 September squadron command was stabilized with the assignment of Maj. Kermit Tyler, who would remain until 24 May 1943. At this time there were 38 officers and 180 enlisted men, with five first lieutenants as flight leaders to lead and train newly arrived inexperienced second lieutenants from Class 42G. Combat reports from Guadalcanal

pointed out that most of the combat there occurred at 20,000 feet plus, so high altitude training was emphasized. On 20 October the 44 th was transferred from the 18FG to the 318FG of the 71h Air Force. However, on that day all its new pilots and principal ground crew were transferred from Oahu to Toutonta, New Caledonia, by LB30s, where they were attached to the 339FS of the 347FG to reluctantly train in the P-39. The remaining ground echelon left Hawaii on 23 October via freighter, and the squadron's PAOs were loaded on the aircraft tender Kittyhawk. After an arduous month long voyage, the squadron arrived at Havannah Harbor, Elfate, while the P40s arrived at Espiritu Santo. The Warhawks were in crates and, once assembled, the squadron pilots left Toutonta and picked them up and flew to a strip under construction at Quion Hill on Efate, in the southern New Hebrides. The strip was located in a semi-jungle area, and although only 4,500 of its 7,000 feet were finished it was enough to land fighters. The men were housed in tents in a coconut grove, and after their supplies and gear were unloaded it had to be transported 13 miles over difficult jungle roads. The 12FS was also based on Efate, and was chosen over the 44FS for combat on Guadalcanal, as it was thought to be more experienced and was equipped with P-39s that were already flying there. On 1 December the squadron was transferred from the 318FG, 7AF to become a separate unit, assigned to no Air Force, no wing, and no grouponly the South Pacific Area. Because of this command situation and the remoteness of Quoin (pronounced 'Coin') Hill, supplies were scarce and facilities primitive. It was a two-day round trip by truck to bring in supplies over a winding, hilly, often-muddy road from the seaport village of Vila, 30 miles away. The squadron was finally moved to Guadalcanal on 29 January as part of the new 13 th Air Force. ' Insignia: A bat's head with leering expression, black with yellow and red detail, between two wings, expanded and inverted, red with black ribs.

70 th Fighter Squadron: "White Knights" The unit was constituted on 14 December 1940 as the 70 lh Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) and activated on 1 January 1941 at Hamilton Field, CA. On 5 December 1941 the 70PS sailed from San Fran-

44th Fighter Squadron Insignia. (USAF)

12

Mechanics and ground crew trying to assemble crated P-39s in the Fijis. Note crates in the background and mechanic near the tail scratching his head, either from the insects or in puzzlement. (USAF)

Part One, Chapter 2 - Background of the Components of the 13th Fighter Command

Assembled P-39 patrolling over Nandi, Fijis. (Canning)

cisco headed for the Philippines, but returned to Hawaii after the attack on Pearl Harbor. After the New Year the 70 th left Hawaii and arrived at Suva, Viti Levu Island, in the Fiji Islands on 29 January. The squadron had sailed for 22 days and didn't know where they were when they arrived. The islands were strategically located on the Allied convoy route to Australia, New Zealand, and the South Pacific, and were a base for ferrying bombers south. Before the war the air route to Australia and the Philippines was via Hawaii, Midway, Wake, Rabaul, Port Moresby, and Darwin on the northern Australian coast. With the loss of Wake and Rabaul, a route via Hawaii, Christmas Island, Fiji, and New Caledonia to Brisbane was established in November 1941. The attack on Pearl Harbor caused the development of another, more northerly route in early 1942 running from Hawaii to Palmyra Island to Canton Island to Samoa to Fiji to New Caledonia to Australia. The British administered the Fijis, and at the end of 1941 New Zealand airdrome construction battalions had built an airbase at Nausori, near Suva. The airdrome was completed at the end of the first week in January, but was not an all-weather base. American and New Zealand engineers under the Hawaiian Department were then assigned to build another airbase at Nandi that was ready for operations at the start of July 1942 for the Royal New Zealand Air Forces's (RNZAF) one and a half squadrons of Hudsons and a squadron of seaplanes, as well as the U.S. 70 th Bombardment Squadron's B-26s (M). The 70PS under Maj. Henry Viccellio had arrived at Suva, and when they debarked they saw 25 crated P-39s that they did not know were aboard. The men and aircraft were shipped 20 miles inland to an abandoned sugar plantation named Latoka, where the fighters were assembled. The ten "older" pilots (those from earlier 41 classes!) led by Capt. William Sharpsteen tested and were the first to fly each of the newly assembled Airacobras. The squadron was assigned to the 3,000-

Officer's quarters. (Canning)

Mess hall (Canning)

70th Fighter Squadron insignia. (USAF)

13

13 th Fighter Command in World War II foot Nausori grass strip and was flying patrols over the islands at the end of February 1943. They moved over the mountains on the other side of the island to the 5,000-foot Nandi strip that was operated by the RNZAF. The older pilots checked out the younger pilots. In mid-September 15 pilots were transferred to the 67FS at New Caledonia. The 70PS was redesignated as the 70 th Fighter Squadron on 15 May 1942. On 1 January 1943 it became part of the 347FG at Nandi, Fiji, under Capt. Richard Rivers. Insignia: White knight in armor on the back of a galloping white horse with yellow orange wings. The knight is holding a lance in the form of a large, jagged yellow orange lightning bolt. The figure is on an ultramarine blue circle with a yellow orange border edged in black. (Note: the first 70FS insignia was a white knight chess piece superimposed over a black and white chess boaTd but was not approved) 67 th Fighter Squadron: "Game Cocks" The 67 th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) was constituted on 20 November 1940 and activated on 15 January 1941 when they had been formed from the personnel from the 1Sl Pursuit Group as part of the 58PG at Selfridge Field, MI. The squadron moved to Baton Rouge, LA, on 6 October 1942. The 67PS and 68PS were some of the initial AAC elements to arrive in Australia. After arriving by train from Louisiana the 67PS left New York on 20 January on an uncomfortable, crowded transport with an inadequate water supply. They transited through the Panama Canal and landed at Melbourne on 26 February. Just before their departure for New Caledonia the squadron was supplemented by 15 pilots who had about 50 hours in the P-40. Three of these pilots were Captains-James Bruce, Thomas Christian, and Thomas Hubbard-who had served in bomber and pursuit units in the Philippines. On 7 March they left for the French colony of New Caledonia, where the Free French governed the island with American backing after deposing the Vichy French governor in early 1942. The 44 officers and 200 enlisted men of the 67PS arrived at Noumea Harbor on 15 March with 45 P-400s and two P-39s waiting for

Officers' Quarters, 67FS atTontouta, New Caledonia, Although primitive, the conditions there were much better than at Guadalcanal a few weeks later. (Lansdale/347FGA)

14

"Pair of Dice:' an obvious play on words, Patsy flight was named after Patsy Field, New Caledonia, (Lansdale/Canning)

them, but in 47 five-ton crates! The fighters had been aboard the HMS Athena and were destined for the East Indies; when these islands fell to the Japanese the Athena was recalled to Melbourne. The fighters were then allocated to the 67PS, which had been assigned to Tontouta, 35 miles northwest of Noumea. The French initially built the 6,000-foot strip at Tontouta in 1936, and in early 1942 the Australians added another 4,000-foot strip. In April the U.S. 811 th Engineer Aviation Battalion completely renovated and expanded the French field and added 750 feet to the Australian field. They built an extensive complex of hardstands, taxiways, and parking areas, along with erecting many hangars, warehouses, and machine shops. By November 1943 $1.45 million was invested in Tontouta, an astronomical figure for the time. The five-ton crated aircraft had to be hauled over the "Little Burma Road"-a winding, hairpin road from Noumea to Tontouta-by the one and only truck and trailer available, which transported one crate every eight hours.-When the crates were opened instructions for P39 D, F, and K were included, but none for the 45 P-400s that were the P-39 export version that the RAF had rejected and returned to sender. None of the mechanics was familiar with the fighter, and only two of its pilots, Lts. Dale Brannon and John Thompson, had ever flown it. Assembly tools were not included in the crates, and simple maintenance tools had to be used. An assembly line was set up in the open, and the goal was "From crate to flying in one day." Floodlights were set up, but the local insects were so voracious that the night shift was discontinued. The men assembled 30 fighters in 29 days, and with the belated help of the 65 th Materiel Squadron 11 more fighters were assembled. No spare parts were shipped, and future spare parts came from cannibalizing accidents at Tontouta

Part One, Chapter 2 - Background of the Components of the 13th Fighter Command

Shark's mouth artist, cum pilot, Peter Childress and "Chuck" (a dog named after 67FS Adjutant, Charles Allard) at Patsy Field in July 1942. Childress began to paint the design to alleviate boredom oftraining and waiting to get into combat. (Lansdale/347FGA)

and later Guadalcanal. The first P-400 was completed and ready on 28 March. Pilots and groundcrew gathered to watch as now Captain Dale Brannon successfully tested their assembly skills. Although most of the Squadron's pilots had only recently graduated from flying schools in the States and had little time in any fighter aircraft, they checked out on the P-400 with only one accident. An inexperienced pilot tried to go around after a misjudged landing attempt and the engine torque put him through the trees along the runway, but he was able to walk away from the crash uninjured, and the maintenance department now had more spare parts. After a few pilots had been checked out in the fighter the Squadron began patrolling over the island. The pilots were disappointed in the P400 and found it to be second-rate at best. The instruments were of poor quality, calibrated in the Metric System, and often a fighter did not have a complete set of instruments in operation. Spare parts remained a problem throughout the entire South Pacific campaign, and there was one P-400 aptly named "Resurrection" that was almost entirely made up of spare parts and would fly from its days at Tontouta and into the Guadalcanal air battles. Resurrection (number 13) led an interesting life. She started out as acheck out aircraft and survived numerous hard landings, until one day she was landed on her belly, destroying the prop and a wing. She was pounced on for spare parts, but soon it was decided to recommission the fighter. When she was repaired a wing and some replaced fuselage panels had the mottled RAF camouflage, while the other wing and parts of the fuselage were U.S. Army olive green. A blade from another prop joined the two original undamaged blades. Even in a factory prop balancing is an art, but the 67 th mechanics drilled holes in the "new" blade and poured lead in until the prop spun without vibration. It took a while for all the Resurrection s cannibalized instruments to be replaced. Conditions at Tontouta would be an introduction to those the 67 th would find on Guadalcanal. Hot, humid tropical sun interrupted by sudden, tor-

rential rains, followed by flooding and swarms of mosquitoes. The enlisted men slept under shelter halves, and the 44 officers in a small farmhouse. Because of the fear of Japanese air attacks it was decided that the three developed fields on the island would be easy targets, and small dispersal fields would be needed. A suitable cow pasture was found mid-island, and a work crew was detailed to develop it. In April it was ready and was named "Patsy," after its telephone code name. No grading was done on the field to preserve its natural camouflage, and the surrounding low mountains and rough runways made takeoffs and landings tricky. The original inhabitants, cows and horses, learned to move away from the succulent grass when they heard approaching aircraft! In May another three fields were developed. One, on the opposite side of the island at Thio, was nicknamed "Shoebox" because of its shape; it was surrounded on two sides by low mountains. Another, "Dustbowl," named for its blinding dust on takeoff and landing, was built in the middle of a desolate area. The third was Dumbea, and also was located in the mountains and was plagued by a slow, chronically wet runway. Flights of ten fighters each operated from these three fields, with Tontouta acting as base HQ. Aircraft and engines wore out, and there were many accidents that were met by ground crews and pilots anxious to "salvage" parts and instruments needed for their aircraft. The squadron had no tow targets to practice gunnery, and there was an exchange of pilots from Marine VMF-2l2 on Efate. Twelve 67 th pilots flew 325 miles across the sea to Efate, and for three weeks and took gunnery training from the Marines. Besides training and patrolling, the 67 th was responsible for refueling and servicing the heavy bombers fen'ying through New Caledonia and providing food and shelter for their crews. During this time at New Caledonia nine Patsy Flight PAOOs were adorned with noses painted in shark's mouth design, fashioned after the American Volunteer Group's PAOs Flying Tiger motif. Peter Childress was the instigator of the design at Patsy Field, where he said, "there wasn't much

15

13th Fighter Command in World War II

67 th Fighter squadron insignia. (USAF)

to do between the long, tedious patrols searching for a never to come Japanese invasion." He hand-painted them with paint scrounged from the Navy stores. The tails of the Dumbea P-400s were painted with a pair of dice on a blue cloud, a play on words for the "paradise" they lived in, The Dustbowl aircraft had their spinners painted red. Many cockpit doors were painted with the squadron "Fighting Cock" design developed and donated by Walt Disney. Once the pilots were assigned individual aircraft a competition grew to place personal names on the cowlings of their fighters: "Cicero Kid," "Plastered Bastard," "Hot Nuts," "Ginny Lee, the Southern Belle," "Whislin' Britches, " and "Eager Eagle" were a few. Once the squadron arrived at Guadalcanal there would be no time to paint the design on the other fighters. But once the squadron arrived it would be ready for combat when the time came. Insignia: A Walt Disney design. A bad-tempered white gamecock with a red comb and wattles, yellow beak and feet, and a tail with three feathers; orange, yellow, and blue. The cock wears a blur green, light blue green, and black striped turtleneck sweatshirt and brown boxing gloves while standing in front of three red, white, and blue bars.

at Brisbane in early March. They bivouacked at Ascot Race Track, and were then assigned to Amberley Air Field near Ipswich by midmonth. The 68 th mechanics and ground crew assembled crated P400s and a few P-39s, and squadron pilots ferried them to air bases across Australia. On 8 May the 68 th sailed aboard a Dutch transport for Tongatabu, an island in the Tonga group that was 530 miles southeast of Suva. When the squadron arrived the stevedore's union regulations allowed only a limited number of hours for daily unloading. The squadron's ground crews were forced to operate cranes and unload during non-union hours. After unloading, the 25 crated P-40Es had to be hauled miles by truck to their inland,base. There was no hoisting equipment, and a chain block and tackle was improvised over a convenient tree trunk and the back of a 4x4. Through hard work and ingenuity the ground crews assembled the 25 PAGs in 25 days. For the next five months pilots and ground crews were trained. During their long stay the bored crews also painted their P40s with shark's mouths, copying the Flying Tiger motif. The squadron ran short of ammunition and tow targets for gunnery practice in July. Fortunately the carrier, Wasp, came into Tongatabu on its way to Pearl Harbor for refitting after the Battle of the Coral Sea, and left much of its ammunition and'tow targets so the 68 th could continue its training. Training progressed well, and only three pilots were lost in flying accidents. On 3 October the squadron became part of the 347 th Fighter Group under lLt. Stanley Palmer. On 2 November the squadron moved up to Tontouta, New Caledonia, and were attached to the 67 th Fighter squadron. Here the squadron's PAGEs were transferred to a New Zealand squadron, and they checked out in P-39s under veteran Dale Brannon. The first flights of P-39s were flown by attached 68 th pilots to Guadalcanal on 7 November, and the ground echelon sailed there on 23 November. In late December attached pilots of the 68 th flew 12 new P-40Fs that had been recently assembled on a carrier to Espiritu Santo, and flew on to Guadalcanal on Christmas Day 1942. In January 1943 the 347FG became part of the 13AF when it was activated, and Capt. Robert Hubbell became the CO of the 68 th , Insignia: A knight in black armor wearing red gauntlets, boots, and plume, carrying a white lance edged in black in his right hand

Note: The three flights of the 67FS had red spinners, white spinners, or blue spinners, and all had white wing tips. 68 th Fighter Squadron: "Lightning Lancers"

The 68 th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) as part of the 58 th Pursuit Group was constituted on 20 November 1940 and activated on 15 January 1941 at Selfridge Field, MS, and was commanded by lLt. Robert Caldwell. The squadron moved to Baton Rouge, LA, on 6 October 1941, and then to Oakland, CA, on 22 January 1942. The squadron sailed from California on 17 February 1942 and arrived

16

Personal marking "Phoebe" being added to the distinctive shark's mouth squadron markings of the 68FS P-40 (Canning)

Part One, Chapter 2 - Background of the Components of the 131h Fighter Command

68 th Fighter Squadron insignia. (USAF)

and holding a light red spade-shaped shield adorned with a white cross in his other hand. The knight stands on yellow lightning bolts running almost full length on either side from top to bottom of the circular emblem, which is gray blue edged in black and has two black cloud formations on either side of the bottom.

and thankful to be led to Cassidy. Training, consisting mainly of gunnery, combat flying, and dive-bombing, was a daily pilot duty when not on patrols. Shortly after their arrival the squadron's tents were replaced with wooden barracks, and fresh food was shipped in from the States. Despite the perceived primitive conditions at the time, Christmas Island would be remembered as the best of the South Pacific bases the 121h occupied during the war. On IS May 1942 the squadron was redesignated as the 12th Fighter Squadron. In August the Squadron was assigned to the 15FG of the 7AF that was headquartered in Hawaii, and later (30 March 1943) became part of the 18FG of the 13FC. The squadron was scheduled to move on 17 October 1942, but was delayed for several days by the search for World War I ace Eddie Rickenbacker, who was lost and subsequently rescued after a plane crash in the area. On 22 October the squadron left by ship for the staging area on Palmyra Island and transited from there to Noumea, New Caledonia, on I November. But orders were changed and the squadron stopped only briefly at Noumea, and then went on to Efate Island in the New Hebrides in late November 1942. At Efate they were based at Vila, a vacated Marine airstrip, and were housed in the comfort of Quonset Huts. Here they flew mainly escort, patrol, interception, and training missions. However, several pilots were detached to Guadalcanal and flew successful ground support combat missions. On 20 December a group of pilots left for Guadalcanal and was followed by the air echelon and the ground crews on 3 January. On 7 February the remainder of the ground echelon finally arrived at Guadalcanal for a 19-month stay. Insignia: Centered clawed blue fist and wrist with four black claws and one white claw clutching a sword dripping with blood. The circular emblem is bordered in black with the white lettered inscription inside this border: "12th FIGHTER SQDN" located on

The 12th Fighter Squadron: "Dirty Dozen" The 121h Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) was constituted on 20 November 1940 and was activated on 16 January 1941 as part of the 50 th Pursuit Group of the GHQ Air Force at Selfridge Field, MI. After a period of training and station duties they transferred to Key Field, MS, on 3 October 1941. The major supply route from the western United States to Hawaii was routed south to Palmyra/Christmas Islands to Fiji to New Caledonia and terminating at Brisbane on Australia's east coast. This supply route was protected by the 68PS at Tongatabu, Tonga, 70PS at Nousori, Fiji, and the 67PS at Tontouta, New Caledonia. The 12th departed from San Francisco on 31 January 1942, and on 10 February 1942 the 12PS joined the protection of the supply line when it was stationed on Christmas Island, a primitive small piece of hard coral not much above sea level located north of the Equator about 2,200 miles northeast of the Fijis. On arrival the ground crews found their P-39s were in crates and had to be assembled. Despite conditions, the constant threat and rampant rumors of an imminent Japanese invasion kept morale high. The squadron's combat missions from Christmas were escort, patrol, and interception. The escort missions were to aid incoming ferried bombers to find Cassidy Field, which was often difficult to locate. There were continual, monotonous, unproductive patrols that were only broken by the occasional bogie (unidentified aircraft) that invariably turned out to be friendly bombers lost 12th Fighter Squadron insignia. (USAF)

17

13th Fighter Command in World War II top and "DIRTY DOZEN" located on the bottom. The background is yellow with a white cloud surrounding the fist and another white cloud on the bottom with the wrist coming out of it. 339'h Fighter Squadron: "Sunsetters" (sometimes the "Gremlins") The 339th Fighter Squadron was not constituted until 29 September 1942 and was activated on 3 October of that same year on New Caledonia. Its early history will be described later. Insignia: Centered masked, yellow Gremlin in red shorts and pointed boots holding a spiked club in his left hand and riding the backs of two flying American Bald Eagles. The circular emblem has a dark blue background with the eagle's wings and gremlin's pointy ears extending beyond the black-edged circumference.

17 th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron: "Lone Wolves" The original 17 th Photo-Reconnaissance Squadron was constituted on 14 July 1942 and activated on 23 July 1942 at Colorado Springs with lLt. William Ashton as its first CO. The squadron had a convoluted history. On 20 June 1942 the 11 th PRS was redesignated the 12th PRS, which in turn became the 14th PRS on 17 July 1942 under the command of Capt. John Folts. On 1 August the 14th moved to a new air base occupying the old Colorado Springs Municipal Airport with the original 17PRS. In September Capt. John Murray became the 17 th 's CO. By late fall the 17 th was scheduled for overseas duty, but its personnel were not adequately trained, and on 18 October the members of the 17 th and 14th Photo Squadrons were interchanged, not only in name, but the men of the 17 th moved to the barracks recently occupied by the 14th in Colorado for more training as the 14PRS. The new 17 th PRS soon left Colorado by train for California and overseas deployment. They sailed from San Francisco on 3 November and arrived in Noumea, New Caledonia, on

18

17th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron insignia. (USAF)

23 ovember followed by their P-38, F-5 photo recon aircraft. The F-5s arrived aboard ship in crates and were assembled at Magenta Airstrip (a Marine airbase), and then flown into Tontouta Airbase for test flights. The ground personnel left Noumea on 13 January aboard a transport and arrived off Guadalcanal on 17 January. The squadron F-5s would not arrive until 2 February. Insignia: A "big bad" wolf wearing goggles and leather flight helmet, flight jacket, and tongue hanging out with a camera in his left hand a'nd a strip of film in his right. "Lone Wolves" is written on a scroll below the circular patch.

Part Two Guadalcanal

1 Guadalcanal Background and Japanese Invasion

The Japanese captured bases south of the Equator during the first months of 1942. They swept through the Southwest Pacific islands of Borneo, Sumatra, Java, Celebes, and Timor in January and February. On 23 January 1942 they captured the great harbor at Rabaul, New Britain, and soon began building a primary air and naval base there to control the area from New Guinea, New Britain/New Ireland, and the Solomon Island chain. On 8 March the Japanese landed at Lae and Salamaua on New Guinea, which were to become major naval and air bases for the final push to capture that island. At the end of March the Japanese began landing to secure their next target, the Solomon Islands. The Solomons consist of two parallel chains of verdant islands of volcanic origin running northwest-to-southeast with a wide protected channel separating them that would become known as "The Slot." The islands extend 600 miles west to east dipping south 350 miles from their western to eastern end. The northern chain (west to east) is made up of Baku, Bougainville (with Shortland and Ballale to Bougainville's southwest), Choiseul, Santa Isabel, and Malaita, while the southern chain (west to east) consists of Vella Lavella, Kolombangara, New Georgia, Rendova, Vangunu, the Russells, Guadalcanal (with Savo and Tulagi to Guadalcanal's north), and San Cristobal. Rabaul is located approximately 565 miles from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, 300 miles southeast from Bougainville, and 100 miles southeast from New Georgia. At the time the British controlled the Solomon Islands. Guadalcanal is an island measuring 92 miles long (east to west) by 33 miles wide at its widest girth (north to south) for a total of 2,180 square miles. Guadalcanal is typical of the islands in the Solomons chain, with coastal plains cut by numerous streams and rivers and foothills and high volcanic mountains splitting the island's length. The Kavo Mountains with its highest peak (Mt. Popomanasiu, reaching 7,648 feet) are connected by ridges and dominate the center of the island. The island is covered with a hot and humid dense tropical rain forest. A small native population inhabited remote villages on the north coast of the island. The American Lever Brothers Soap Company worked a large coconut plantation near Lunga Point; this was the only developed area on the is-

20

land, and the Japanese made use of it to build their airfield. Very little was known about the island, as there were no current maps or marine charts available for planning the invasion. Aerial recon photos of the island were hurriedly taken by B-17s, but were lost on their way from MacArthur's command. First Marine Intelligence had to rely on sketch maps made from interviews of former islanders and Australian coast watchers, but were so inaccurate as to be almost useless. The beaches on Guadalcanal's northern coast were suitable for amphibious operations, but the area had no harbors, so roadsteads had to be established offshore for the supporting shipping. These anchorages were in the normally calm seas off the north coast known as Skylark Channel, which would later become known as "Iron Bottom Sound" due to the large numbers of ships sunk there. The Japanese began their conquest of the northern Solomons by taking Bonis on Bougainville's northern end and Buka on the southern end of Buka Island, just across the Buka Passage, on 30 March, where they built airfields. Kieta, on Bougainville's northeast central coast, was occupied at the same time, and another airfield was slated to be constructed there. They landed at Faisi in the Shortlands on 31 March to establish a naval base there. On 7 April they landed at Buin on southern Bougainville to establish the BuinFaisi-Tonolei airfield complex. Important air bases were constructed at Kahili, on the southeastern end of the Bougainville mainland, and on nearby Ballale Island off the coast. Other minor float plane bases were established at Giza and Rakata Bay. Once the northern Solomons were secured the Japanese turned their attention to the southern chain. On 3 May Tulagi Island, 20 miles to the north of Guadalcana1 and the seat of the British colonial government, was captured, and its harbor was used as a seaplanes base, and would provide a valuable anchorage. Immediately the Japanese moved on Guadalcana1, and by July were building an airfield near Lunga Point, which had one of the few flat areas suitable for an airfield. The capture of Tulagi and the Lunga airfield, when completed, jeopardized the New Hebrides and New Caledonia, as well as the Allied maritime supply line to Australia, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff became concerned.

2 August 1942

The Joint Chiefs of Staff divided the Pacific into two major areas of operations: the Pacific Ocean Area under Adm. Chester Nimitz, and the Southwest Pacific Area under Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Nimitz was the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, known as CINCPAC. The Pacific Ocean Area was divided into two smaller areas: the Central Pacific and the South Pacific. The South Pacific ran east of the l591h Meridian (below the Equator and east of Australia, including New Zealand, ew Caledonia, Fiji Islands, New Hebrides, and the Eastern Solomons): and the Southwest Pacific ran west of the l59 1h Meridian (below the Equator, including Australia, New Guinea, New Britain, and New Ireland). On 2 July 1942 the Japanese threat to the U.S.-Australia supply line caused Adm. Ernest J. King and Gen. George C. Marshall

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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to order America's first Pacific offensive, with an attack on Tulagi Harbor in the Florida Islands and Guadalcanal. The operation was to be directed by Adm. Chester Nimitz and was code-named Watchtower. The U.S. victory at the Battle of Midway had somewhat restored the balance of naval power, but American shipping to supply an invasion was at a premium. Only the reinforced 1st Marine Division was available for the invasion of Guadalcanal, as other units were tied down as garrisons on the islands along the U.S.-Australian supply route. D-Day was set for 1 August. On 13 April 1942 the South Pacific Theater command (COMSOPAC) had been assigned to VAdm. Robert Ghormley at Noumea, New Caledonia. On his appointment Adm. Ernest King told him "You have a large and important area and a most difficult

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21

13 th Fighter Command in World War 11

Army leaders in the South Pacific in October 1942. Left to right: Brig.Gen. Nathan Twining, Lt.Gen. Millard Harmon and Col. Glen Jamison. (USAF)

VAdm. Robert Ghormley controlled all American ground. air and naval forces in the South Pacific area as well as several New Zealand units and would prove to be a poor selection for the daunting job. (USN)

22

RAdm. John McCain (left) commanded the air units and Maj. Gen.Alexander Vandegrift the landing force for Watch Tower, the invasion of Guadalcanall Tulagi. Here the two are discussing strategy on Guadalcanal outside the "Operations Center" that is nothing more than a large supported tarp. (US Army)

task. I do not have the tools to give you to carry out the task as it should be done." Ghormley controlled all American ground, air, and naval forces in this area, as well as several New Zealand units, and would prove to be a poor selection for the daunting job. The mission of COMSOPAC (Ghormley) was the following: (1) hold the island positions necessary for the security of the line of communications between the U.S. and the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA); (2) support operations of forces in the Southwest and Central Pacific areas; and (3) prepare to launch a major amphibious offensive against positions held by Japan. In order to fulfill these assignments COMSOPAC was given command of all base and local defense forces in the South Pacific. VAdm. Frank Fletcher was to command the naval task force and would prove to be another poor choice. Maj.Gen. Alexander Vandegrift, Commander of the 151 Marine Division, was to prepare and conduct the landings, and would do so admirably. The 1st Marines were not slated for battle until 1943 and only had one minimal failed rehearsal in preparation for the landings. On 20 May control of all land-based air units in the South Pacific (AAC, USN, USMC, and RNZAF). was assigned to Maj.Gen. Millard Harmon, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (COMGENSOPAC). On 7 July the Army appointed Harmon to assume command of all U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA) with headquarters at Noumea in late July. "Miff," as Harmon's close friends knew him, was a veteran pilot who served in World War I, had been the Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces, and was knowledgeable in contemporary strategic and tactical air operations. Harmon was directed to train, supply, and administer all U.S. Army ground and air forces in the South Pacific. Harmon, as the Chief of Air Staff, had a small but very able staff to accompany him to Noumea in the last week in July. Among his air staff were Brig.Gen. Nathan Twining, future CG of the 13 th and 15'h Air Forces and the 20 th Air Force at the end of the war; Lt.Coi. Dean Strother, future commander of the 13 th Fighter Command; and Col. Frank Everest, future commander of the 13 th Air Force Bomber Command. Supply officer of the USAFISPA was Col. Robert Breene, and Col. Glen Jamison

Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942 and Maj. Laurence Sherman were Harmon's G-3 and G-2, respectively. In July 1942 the units the AAF had available in the South Pacific were the lllh Bombardment Group (Heavy) (llBG) under Col. Lavern Saunders and the 67 th Fighter Squadron (67FS) under Capt. Dale Brannon. The llBG had 27 B-17s on New Caledonia and eight others at Nandi on the Fiji Islands. The 67FS had 38 fighters-mostly P-400s and a few P-39s-all on New Caledonia. By mid-July the Solomons Expeditionary Force was created, with the lSI Marine Division commanded by Lt.Gen. Alexander Vandegrift preparing for the attack in New Zealand and then moving to Fiji. Two major naval Task Forces were to participate in the invasion: R.Adm. Leigh Noyes commanded the carrier force, and R.Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner commanded the amphibious force. VAdm. Frank Jack Fletcher on the Saratoga was in command of both Task Forces. Ghormley was the overall commander of Watchtower and was again a dreadful choice, as he was against the plan from its beginning and believed it would not succeed. R.Adm. McCain had control of all Watchtower air units, land and sea-based, with about 100 aircraft under his operational control: 3S B-17s and 22 B-26s on New Caledonia and the Fijis, 38 P39/P-400s of the 67FS at Tontouta, and a few USN and RNZAF aircraft. The No.IS RNZAF squadron had taken 23 P-40s from the AAF's 68FS in October 1942. On 2S July McCain placed the aircraft under his command into seven task groups. One group was made up of the 69BS, the 67FS, the No.IS RNZAF fighter squadron, and two USN PBY Catalinas that were to scout in 400-mile sectors from New Caledonia. A second group consisted of the IIBG

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B-17s that were to scout from between New Caledonia and the northern Solomons and bomb Guadalcanal and Tulagi until D-Day. A third group was the Marine Squadrons, VMF-212 (F4Fs) and VMSB-14. The other four groups consisted of PBY patrol bombers and Marine Observation Squadron 251. McCain relinquished his control of the AAC units, as their wide dispersion and disparate organization would make his direct command of them unworkable, but they remained within McCain's framework for the invasion. The American base at Efate was over 700 miles away from Guadalcanal and was the most malarial island in the South Pacific. McCain was charged with procuring an airfield closer to the invasion, and Efate and was never fully developed to its original intent. Espiritu Santo was chosen, as it was the largest island in the New Hebrides. It was located 200 miles north of Efate, 400 miles north of Noumea, and 500 miles southeast of Guadalcanal, possessed a first-rate harbor, and had a low incidence of malaria. On 12 July detachments of the Fourth Defense Battalion, USN Seabees, and the Army engineers landed on Espiritu Santo to begin construction of an airfield. The Seabees had only been formed on 5 January 1942 under R.Adm. Benjamin Morrell. It selected its recruits from the ranks of civilian building trades ranging in age from 18 to 60. There was a saying at these early bases: "Don't hit a Seabee because he may be your grandfather!" These early Naval Construction B.attalions-"CB" or "Seabee"-battalions were hurriedly formed and largely inadequately equipped and inexperienced units who referred to themselves as "Confused Bastards ('CBs')." The official motto of the Seabees was "Construimus, Batuimu" -"We

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23

13 th Fighter Command in World War II Build, We Fight." By the 28 th an airstrip had been hacked out of the jungle and was ready for Marine fighter aircraft, and in less than a month a bomber field was ready and AAF B-17s began to bomb Guadalcanal from it. Espiritu Santo was developed into the principal advance naval base for the invasion of Guadalcanal, as the Seabees built two comprehensive bomber bases and two fighter bases that were used to stage fighters to Guadalcanal. By early 1943 it was a well-developed base complementing Noumea, ew Caledonia. In late July Marine and Navy forces were assembled in New Zealand for an amphibious assault on Tulagi-Guadalcanal, code named "Cactus-Ringbolt." Guadalcanal was code named "Cactus," and Tulagi was "Ringbolt" (Espiritu Santo was "Buttons," New Caledonia was "Poppy," and Efate was "Roses"). Preliminary invasion air operations were wide-ranging reconnaissance by landbased aircraft. The 69BS and 67FS (both units would later become part of the 13AF) were ordered to search sectors Northwest of Plaines Des Gaiacs on central New Caledonia and out to 400 miles. Plaines des Gaiacs, known as PD.G., was a heavy and medium bomber base from which missions to Guadalcanal were flown until the airfield on Espiritu Santo was built. At the time of the invasion COMAIRSOPAC had only 291 aircraft in the South Pacific. These included: Efate: 18 fighters, 6 scouts, and 16 B-17s New Caledonia: 38 P-400s and P-39s, 16 F4Fs, 3 scouts, 27 B-17s, 10 B-26s, 22 PBYs, and 6 Hudsons (RNZAF) Tontouta: 24 fighters and 6 scouts Fijis: 17 fighters, 9 PBYs, 8 B-17s, 12 B-26s, and 24 RNZAF bombers and patrols planes (mostly obsolete types as the Singapore and Vincent). Samoa: 18 fighters, 10 scouts, and 17 scout bombers. On 7 August there were two Marine air squadrons available: VMF-212 under Lt.Col. Joseph Bauer; and a long-range F4F photographic squadron (VMO-251) under Lt.Col. John Hart. Both squadrons were based at Espiritu Santo, too far away to provide any direct support for the landings. In the late June invasion planning Adm. Nimitz guaranteed McCain four Marine squadrons, two fighter and two dive-bomber, from Col. William Wallace's MAG-

23. The forward echelon, a F4F fighter squadron (VMF-223) under Capt. John Smith and a SBD dive-bomber squadron (VMSB-232) under Maj. Richard Mangrum were scheduled to be flown off a carrier to Guadalcanal, but their pilots were not carrier qualified. During July the pilots were trained intensively to carrier qualify at Ewa, Hawaii, and boarded the carrier Long Island on 2 August, headed for Guadalcanal. The rear echelon squadrons, VMF-224 under Capt. Robert Galer and VMSB231 under Maj. Leo Smith, sailed from Hawaii on 15 August on the Kitty Hawk and Hammondsport. The task force rendezvoused on 26 July southwest Qf the Fijis, while the landing force practiced maneuvers and support operations with the carrier force and then refueled. On 31 July Adm. Turner's amphibious force left Fiji for the Solomons. The 19,000 Marine troops were divided into two forces: Lt.Gen. Alexander Vandegrift landing on "X" Guadalcanal; and those of Brig.Gen. William Rupertus landing on "Y" Tulagi. USN F4F Wildcats provided air cover off the carriers Saratoga and Enterprise, along with land-based aircraft of COMAIRSOPAC. The invasion was also supported by B17Es of the IlBG that had arrived from Hawaii on the New Hebrides on 20 July. In the week before the invasion-31 July to 7 Augustthe llBG flew 56 bombing sorties and 22 search sorties, flying 710 miles from Villa airfield, Efate, to Guadalcanal and Tulagi/Gavutu. The invasion task force moved under radio silence and was covered by overcast weather, and at 0600-0630 on the morning of 7 August arrived, undetected, 15 miles west of Cape Esperance, ready to land on Tulagi and Guadalcanal. The Guadalcanal amphibious landings were to go into shore at Beach Red, a point between Koli Point and L'unga Point. The 1st Marine amphibious force waited offshore, and after the preliminary naval bombardment and carrier aircraft strikes ended they went ashore first on Florida and Tulagi Islands, and then Guadalcanal, east of Lunga Point, without opposition. Carrier aircraft from the Saratoga and Enterprise flew over the landings but received only a few requests from ground troops for air strikes. Pre-invasion estimates put the Japanese garrison at 6,000 to 7,000 troops, but only 600 troops and 1,500 Korean laborers were encountered, and all quickly escaped into the surrounding hills and jungles. Stiff resistance was met on Tulagi and Gavutu, across Skylark Channel, but was subdued after several days of heavy fighting.

The medium Betty Rikko bomber units earned their nickname,"One shot Ronsons:' due to their extreme fiammability. The Mitsubishi bombers were forced to fiy at higher altitudes, 25,000 feet or more, over Guadalcanal to escape the American fighters and AA fire and while safer the higher altitudes produced less accurate bombing resutts. (Lansdale)

24

Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942 By sundown on Guadalcanal the Marines had moved nearly two miles inland and 2,000 troops were on shore. The landings were not totally unopposed, as on the afternoon of the invasion the Japanese sent 24 bombers in two waves from Adm. Sadayoshi Yamada's 25 th Air Flotilla to disrupt the landings. At 1100 a coast watcher reported 18 bombers heading south on their way to Guadalcanal. A short time later a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) coast watcher reported the formation. At 1320 the first wave of 18 twin-engine Betty bombers escorted by Zero fighters from Rabaul arrived to attack the invasion forces and shipping. Eighteen F4Fs and 16 SBDs from VF-6 off the Enterprise, and VF5 off the Saratoga were sent up in the first air battle between U.S. carrier aircraft and land-based Japanese Zeros and bombers of the war. This Japanese wave lost seven Bettys (plus two damaged) and two Zeros (plus two damaged). At 1400 another wave of 12 enemy dive-bombers surprised American invasion shipping and damaged the destroyer Mugford, the first of many ships hit off Guadalcanal, killing 22 crew. The F4Fs ofVF-5 and VF-6 shot down II of the 12 bombers and two Zeros. At 1500 the second formation of Val divebombers attacked and three bombers were shot down. This attack did no damage, but caused the transports to lift anchor to evade the attacks and to lose important unloading time. It was in this air battle that Japanese ace Saburo Sakai was permanently blinded in one eye and would not fly combat for almost two years. For the day the Japanese lost 25 aircraft, but half of the available F4Fs (nine) and one SBD were lost. ' Late the next morning the Japanese sent their remaining 23 Bettys with a Zero escort to attack invasion shipping again. The Japanese force broke through the Navy's air cover to attack the shipping, losing four bombers and two Zeros to the Navy Wildcats. The transport George F Elliott was sunk when a Zero damaged by AA fire crashed into it. A Japanese torpedo damaged the destroyer Jarvis, which steamed toward New Caledonia for repairs but never reached Noumea, losing all hands. Naval AA fire was extremely effective and took their toll of II Bettys and one Zero, while landbased AA claimed two Bettys (a questionable loss total according to post-war Japanese figures). The Japanese lost 17 of 25 bombers and 125 crewmen, which was to be the largest single loss of Japanese land-based bombers in the Guadalcanal campaign. The Betty Rikko units were earning their nickname "One shot Ronsons," due to their extreme flammability, as they were not armored and lacked self-sealing fuel tanks. After these losses the Mitsubishi bombers were forced to fly at higher altitudes over Guadalcanal-25,000 feet or more-to escape the American fighters and AA fire, and while safer produced less accurate bombing results. On D+ I, the 8th, Gen. Vandegrift's 1st Marines crossed the Lunga River and captured Kokum Village, and by 1600 the airfield was also taken. A large amount of Japanese supplies and equipment were captured at the field, but much of it was damaged by gratuitous destruction by Marine troops moving into the area, and their actions would deprive the occupiers of scarce supplies in the future. By the evening of the 8th Adm. Fletcher had lost 21 fighters of his 99 in both combat and accidents, was running low on fuel, and the Japanese air attacks had made him nervous. Immediately Fletcher requested Ghormley's consent to withdraw his two carriers.

Ghormley agreed, and before dawn the Air Support Force sailed to the south, leaving the remaining amphibious force dangerously exposed to air and naval attack. When amphibious commander Adm. Turner learned of Fletcher's request he met with Vandegrift that midnight to discuss the situation. Turner informed the Marine commander that he would also reluctantly be forced to withdraw his transports and covering warships the next afternoon, despite being scheduled to remain until 11 August. Turner's withdrawal would leave the Marines with some of their troops and half of their supplies and equipment remaining on the departing transports. These confrontations between Turner and Vandegrift only increased the theater's problems, as Turner, who was Vandegrift's superior, attempted to control the land campaign to the Marine general's chagrin. Vandegrift wanted complete tactical control and finally, after his continual appeals through the chain of command, it took the personal intervention of President Roosevelt to put him in control of the situation on land. For his heroic action on Guadalcanal Vandegrift would be awarded the Navy Cross and Medal of Honor. By midnight on 8/9 August the entire Tulagi area and the Guadalcanal beachhead and ailfield from Kokum to Koli Point were secured. The Japanese galTison of 1,500 men at Tulagi had been wiped out for the minimal loss of 248 casualties. The Guadalcanal invasion cost only a few casualties, a destroyer, and a transport. Aircraft losses from the three carriers were high but acceptable at 21 of 99 aircraft.

Battle of Savo Island: 9 August 1942 Before Turner's amphibious/transport force could withdraw a Japanese seaplane launched from a cruiser dropped flares over the American anchorage at 0130 on 9 August. A Japanese naval force of five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and a destroyer had been assembled at Rabaul and sailed down the Slot and slipped in close to the amphibious force on both sides of Savo Island. During the Battle of Savo Island the Japanese were able to fire and launch torpedoes at will under the light of airdropped flares and searchlights. The Allied naval force of five heavy cruisers and six destroyers protecting the transports were surprised, and four cruisers-the Astoria, Quincy, and Vincennes, and the Australian Canberra-were sunk, and the cruiser Chicago and the destroyer Ralph Talbot damaged. The Japanese only sustained damage to two heavy cruisers, but the Japanese commander, R.Adm. Gunichi Mikawa, decided to withdraw to the northwest before attacking the transports. He was low on torpedoes and needed to regroup his force in order to attack the transports, and that would put him into daylight and perhaps in range of Fletcher's non-existent American carrier aircraft that he did not know had left. The Japanese Navy had achieved complete surprise and dealt a severe defeat against a larger and well prepared Allied naval force. The battle was the first night battle off Guadalcanal involving only surface ships. The Japanese had the naval initiati ve in the area, and they favored darkness, the element of surprise, and short-range combat so as to make use of their superior torpedoes and torpedo tactics. The Battle of Savo was to set the precedent for the naval battles off Guadalcanal for the next IS months. Fletcher and Ghormley's decision to withdraw the carrier force is controversial even to this day and left the Marines on Guadalcanal

25

13 th Fighter Command in World War Il 1~'r--_----c~=-

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Henderson Field Area. (USN)

The Japanese airiield at Lunga just prior to the invasion. The taxiway to the main runway and the circular revetments are clearly evident as is the "Pagoda" in the center left of the photo. (USMC)

livid, also to this day. The reasons given for the withdrawal were questionable. The carriers were refueled before leaving Fiji, and aircraft losses had been in the acceptable range. After the withdrawal, Ghormley decided that he would not risk his carrier task force until there were protecting aircraft and gasoline supplies based on Guadalcanal. He stationed the carriers far to the south in position to attack only priority Japanese targets and protect his lines of communication to New Caledonia. The situation made the cautious Ghormley into the indecisive Ghormley, who did not leave his shipboard offic~ at Noumea for a month. Ghormley considered the invasion a lost cause and continued to do so until Halsey relieved him in October. General of the Air Force H.H. Arnold also declined to send more contemporary aircraft to Guadalcanal because he felt they would be lost if the Japanese recaptured the island. Maj.Gen. Harmon was concerned that the establishment of an airbase, that was the priority of the landings, would now not be met, and pressed for a concerted air and sea offensive to achieve this end. Mean-

Henderson looking southwest from Lengo Channel across the lIu (Tenaru) River and coconut plantations with Mt. Austen to the south. (USN)

After its capture the "Pagoda" was used as the airiield's operations center housing the ground-to-air radio network. (USMC)

26

Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942

A captured Japanese roller that was very useful in rebuilding Henderson, especially after Fletcher withdrew his transports with most of the Seabee construction equipment on board. (US Army)

while, the only air forces covering the invasion were R.Adm. McCain's land-based bombers and scouting units that continued as a reconnaissance force. Despite the loss of the majority of their protecting warships the night before, Turner's transports continued to unload into the afternoon ofthe 9'\ when they lifted anchor and headed for Noumea before the Japanese could return that night. The 10,900 Marines on Guadalcanal and the 7,500 on Tulagi, already without air or naval cover, and now with less than half of their 60 days of supplies, felt they had been deserted. Undaunted, the Marines consolidated their five-mile beachhead, drove two miles inland, and set up a defensive perimeter. A critical loss was that there was no barbed wire available. Anti-aircraft protection was inadequate, as many AA guns, including the five-inch coastal AA guns and radar, were still aboard the fleeing transports. The 3rd Defense Battalion placed searchlights, a90mm AA battery, and 58 small caliber automatic AA guns around the airfield. Vandegrift's first priority, the primary objective of the invasion, was to repair the nearly completed Japanese airfield on the grassy Lunga Plain. The Japanese had built hangars, machine shops, a control tower, and an operations center nicknamed "The Pagoda." Vandegrift ordered the airfield to be operational in two days. The llBG had heavily bombed the field, but the pt Marine Engineer Battalion easily repaired the 2,600-foot Japanese runway by filling in the bomb craters. The lighter Japanese aircraft could have used this grass runway, as they did not need a hard surface or long runway. Heavier American aircraft would require the field to be extended 1,200 to 3,800 feet with crushed coral rock that was rolled and later covered with Marston Steel Matting. The Marine engineer's equipment was still on Turner's transports, and even shovels were in short supply. Fortunately there was a surprising amount of captured supplies and serviceable Japanese equipment left intact on the airfield. There were 34 trucks, four tractors, three gasoline cement mixers, six gasoline rollers, and 150,000 gallons of65 octane automotive gasoline to fuel them. Also there was 600

The improvement of Henderson continued into mid-I 944. It was converted into a bomber field with lengthened and widened runways and additional taxiways and hardstands. (USMC)

tons of cement, 80 tons of reinforcing bars, assorted steel building materials, dynamite, shovels, wheel barrows, and grass mat bags. To extend the runway a large 200-foot shallow gully at the 2,600foot Japanese field's end point had to be filled with about 10,000 cubic yards of dirt and coral. The Japanese engineers did not pay much attention to drainage, and a crown had to be laid over the existing runway without interfering with operations. The first SBDs on the island were equipped with hard rubber tires intended for carrier landings that cut long furrows in the soft runways. A mixture of clay, gravel, and coral was used to fill in the ruts and bomb and shell craters, but left large soft areas. On take offs and landings these soft spots had to be avoided, as mud would be forcefully splashed over the aircraft and into wheel wells, jeopardizing plane and pilot. The west end of the runway had a stand of tall coconut and banyan trees growing at a point where the Plain dropped off toward the Lunga River. Since this was usually the approach end of the field the trees were dynamited, and the new opening allowed a longer and lower approach to the runway. The east end of the field then had a good takeoff view to the west. The Marine engineers built taxiways and revetments, and tried to establish the all-important drainage for the field. Later the 6 th Naval Seabee Battalion landed to augment the Marine engineers. The field was called Lunga Airstrip until the 17 t \ when it was renamed Henderson Field in honor of Maj. Lofton Henderson, who was killed leading a Marine dive-bomber unit over Midway. Once completed, there were two runway conditions on Henderson, dry dust that contaminated engines and made visibility nil, or a quagmire that made take offs and landings harrowing. After five weeks Henderson remained unusable by medium and heavy bombers, and except for the small detachment of 67FS fighters no AAF unit would be based on Cactus until December. Steel matting was not scheduled to be laid until 25 September and would make the field more operational, but once down it would become shrapnel when hit by Japanese bombs and shells. When repairs were made to fill the bomb and shell holes in

27

13 th Fighter Command in World War II

Above: Maj. John Smith was the CO of Marine Fighter Squadron VMF-223 and was credited with 19 victories and awarded the Medal of Honor during his tour there. (USMC)

Right: Lt.Col. Richard Mangrum was the CO ofVMSB-232, the first Marine dive-bomber squadron on Guadalcanal. (USMC)

damaged matting the filling material could never be packed as solidly as before and would become soft and muddy under the new patching matting. Even though the field would not be completed until the 18 th , on the 12th Vandegrift declared the field ready for fighters and divebombers. That day a PBY-SA flown by R.Adm. McCain's aide, Lt. William Sampson, was the first American aircraft to land on Henderson, but it soon left, and for the next week the only aircraft over Guadalcanal were the almost daily Japanese formations of Bettys escorted by Zeros. Supply was a problem for the Americans until air superiority could be achieved. On the 12th Ghormley had approved the movement of Turner's destroyer-transports from Espiritu Santo back to Guadalcanalloaded with bombs, ammunition, gasoline, lubricants, and ground crews. The destroyer-trans-

The Ichiki Regiment suffered heavy casualties that decimated its ranks along the banks of the Ilu (Tenaru) River (USMC)

28

ports moved like fast blockade-runners, arriving off Lunga Point in the late afternoon to offload at night and departing in the morning before regular mid-day Tojo Time air attacks. The Japanese were unable to capitalize on their victory at Savo, as there were no American ships to attack off Lunga. Japanese air raids were minimal, as they lost h~lf of their Rabaul-based aircraft and only sent down a few minor raids and recurrent small late night nuisance raids by one or two aircraft nicknamed "Washing Machine Charlie" or "Louie the Louse." The Japanese continued to attack the field in small air formations and delayed finishing the field by destroying all but one of the six important captured rollers. On the 18 th , the day the entire 3,800 feet of runway was completed, Japanese bombers hit the area with 17 bombs, and three heavy bombs cratered the runway; it took another day of hard labor to fill and roll the craters. Finally, on the afternoon of the 20 th , the escort carrier Long Island, laying 200-miles out, launched 12 Marine SBD Dauntless dive-bombers of Richard Mangrum's VMSB-232 "Red Devils" and 19 F4F-4 fighters of John Smith's VMF-223 of the advanced squadrons of Marine Air Group (MAG) 23. Smith had exchanged eight of his inexperienced pilots for eight of VMF-212's more experienced pilots, and the squadron was assigned air defense immediately after its arrival. The new air force was nicknamed the "Cactus Air Force" after the code name for Guadalcanal, "Cactus." To supply Guadalcanal the Japanese formed what was to be known as the "Tokyo Express." R.Adm. Raizo Tanaka was the intelligent and courageous leader of the Express, which consisted of Destroyer Squadron 2 and destroyer/transports that were old destroyers converted to fast transports. Tanaka's flagship, the light cruiser Jintsu, led the Express and was occasionally strengthened for specific missions with cruisers and additional destroyers. Tanaka's Squadron had trained together, and was particularly pro-

Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942 ficient in night torpedo attacks. The Japanese would load destroyer/ transports with troops and supplies at Rabaul and lay off the central Solomons until late afternoon, when they would sail down the Slot to arrive after dark to disembark and then return safely to the central Solomons to be out of aircraft range by daylight. The Express was difficult to detect even though the Navy had radar. Early naval radar was of the primitive SC type, and the Japanese hid in radar shadows formed by some nearby island. The frequent tropical thunderstorms and rain showers added to the electronic jumble. The dark, cloudy, tropical nights and poor weather hampered visual aerial reconnaissance. The Tokyo Express slipped 1,000 troops ashore under Col. Kiyono Ichiki, who organized an attack on the Marines on the east bank of the Ilu River (mistakenly thought to be the Tenaru). On the 21 SI the Marines became aware of the massing Japanese and withdrew to the west bank and prepared to defend their position. The Japanese mounted a fierce frontal attack and lost 800 men. The sand spit at the mouth of the river was covered with Japanese bodies, and Col. Ichiki was so distraught over the defeat that he committed suicide. The first major battle since the Marines landed was a decisive, morale-building victory, but the Marines lost 35 killed in action (KIA) and 75 wounded (WIA). The newly arrived Marine aviators in single SBDs flew several reconnaissance flights and strafed the shoreline and mouth of the Ilu, but were of little use because the thick jungle prevented effective attacks. After the battle

Capt. Dale Brannon, CO of the 67FS, the first AAF unit to arrive on Guadalcanal. (Brannon)

the SBDs flew ground support sorties to disrupt enemy troops from concentrating for further attacks. Capt. John Smith of VMF-223 led four Wildcats to intercept a small air raid, and lLt. Eugene Trowbridge scored the first Marine victories on Guadalcanal, getting two Zeros, while Smith added one. But two Wildcats were badly damaged and one precious Grumman was written off after a dead stick landing. While on New Caledonia 27 P-400s were fitted with belly tanks for the long flight to Guadalcanal. After several long-legged planning flights around New Caledonia Capt. Dale Brannon was able to estimate flying time, fuel consumption, and engine cruise control settings for a flight to Guadalcanal. Gen. Harmon had planned to transfer three flights of five P-400s each, navigated by a B-17, to Cactus. However, that would leave New Caledonia defense with only 12 P-400s, two P-39s, and two P-43s, so Harmon modified his plans. Two flights were to be sent, the first with five aircraft and the second with nine later. At 1000 on 21 August, five P-400s piloted by Brannon, and Lts. Davis, Erwin, Brzuska, and Fincher, took off from Plaines des Gaiacs, New Caledonia, joined their B-17 escort, and flew 325 miles to Efate in two hours 20 minutes. Then, after a brief stop there flew 180 miles to Espiritu Santo. The next morning their fuel tanks had to be topped off after warm up, as every ounce of fuel would be critical for the final leg to Cactus. They left Espiritu equipped with belly tanks and flew 640 miles to Henderson at 200 feet led by a B-17 navigating above, and followed by another B-17 equipped with rubber rafts to be dropped to any ditching pilots. The flight was flown through intermittent low stratus clouds and mist, and the pilots were happy to have the B-17 mother hen. All five fighters landed safely at Henderson at 1030, 3:45 later, to come under the command of MAG-23 of the 1st Marine Air Wing. The next day Lt. Robert Chilson, with 30 enlisted men of the ground echelon, arrived at Lunga on the transport Fomalhaute that left Noumea on the 17 th • The 67 th was ready for operations, but the conditions at Henderson were abysmal at best. It was a frontline base in every sense of the word. Once the two flights of 15 pilots, 30 ground crew, and 15 P-400s arrived they were assigned to the Marines and relied on the Leathernecks for food, supplies, quarters, and medical care. The ground crew was quartered in an abandoned Japanese hangar at the west end of the field that was close to their aircraft and bomb shelters. Brannon and his pilots were billeted in mudfloored, unscreened tents located between the ocean and airfield in the Lever Brothers Company coconut plantation, which was often flooded and referred to as the "Mosquito Grove." It was said that the mosquitoes on Cactus were so large that one landed at Henderson and was refueled and rearmed by a ground crew before being identified! Even mosquito netting did not help, since if the netting lay too close to the body the "little bastards would work their stingers through the little holes." (Doug Canning) The plentiful mosquitoes were much more than a nuisance and caused malaria, a protozoan disease transmitted by the female anopheles mosquito. "There were so damn many mosquitoes that you couldn't help but to get malaria." (Doug Canning) Once stung, the parasites course the bloodstream to the liver, where they reproduce asexually. The parasite can continue to live in the liver and bloodstream for long periods

29

13 th Fighter Command in World War II

Above: Officers' "lounge." Note the handmade wooden "easy" chairs to the left and right of officer. (Canning) LeftThe pyramidal tents at FighterTwo on Guadalcanal.This is an early photo, as the cots sit on bare ground and wooden floors have not been added. (USAF)

and are able to recur several times, and some Guadalcanal veterans suffered reoccurrences years after the war. Soon the personnel on Guadalcanal were taking a yellow pill every day and twice on Sunday called Atabrine. There was no cure for malaria, and Atabrine did not prevent or cure the disease, but only suppressed its symptoms, just as aspirin suppresses the symptoms of a cold but does not prevent it. A few men were hesitant about taking the drug, as it was rumored to make one sterile, and despite dispensing Atabrine there was a substantial incidence of malaria. A song "Atabrine," sung to the tune of "Tangerine," a popular song of the day, made the rounds on the island: "Atabrine for malaria, That's the pill that keeps the chill away. Try to grin; don't let it scare you, It you start to change color that's OK. You can see what it's done for me, Look! My face is gray; my hands are turning green, But we have to get the Japs on the run And when it's all said and done, We owe it all to Atabrine, we don't mean quinine, We owe it all to Atabrine." Later, Army tests demonstrated the suppressive effectiveness of Atabrine. When the Americal Infantry Division was withdrawn from the fighting on Guadalcanal and returned to Fiji it was taken off the anti -malarial. The incidence of the disease rose from 1,000 cases per 1,000 men per annum to 14,000 cases per 1,000 men per annum within three weeks after discontinuing the drug. Bill Harris (339FS) described having malaria: "I had malaria, and you get a fever and your whole body shakes. You feel like you're freezing and then you're roasting. Then sud-

30

denly it just goes away and you then have to wait for it to recur, weeks and even years later." Before the war a pilot who came down with malaria was hospitalized and not allowed to fly for two years without a reoccurrence. Initially, on Guadalcanal treatment was rest and the continuation of Atabr~ne for a month in the dispensary, and only cases exhibiting a very high fever and reoccun'ing attacks were referred to a hospital administered by the Australians or New Zealanders back in their countries. On Guadalcanal this therapy was immediately forgotten, as the shortage of pilots in the early stages of the war forced flight surgeons to allow many sick and fatigued men to fly combat. Directives were issued for personnel to wear long-sleeved shirts and long pants stuffed inside their socks, especially after sunset, but these were commonly ignored. It was not until mid-1943 that there were sufficient American hospitals, hospital ships, and air ambulances in the theater to treat malaria. Insect repellent and large scale insect control would not come into effect until 1944. Dengue fever, scrub typhus, dysentery, and jungle rot were among the tropical diseases that also plagued the invaders. Dengue was another mosquito-borne disease spread by the Aedes mosquito, which flew in the daytime; malaria was spread by the nocturnal Anopheles. Dengue was rarely fatal and not recurrent, but was much more painful, with every part of the body hurting. Scrub typhus was a mite-borne disease carried by animals that could be fatal and could cause epidemics. Pets and mascots could carry it, and the Army banned them, but to no avail, as the order was ignored. Fortunately there was a shortage of lovable native pets in the South Pacific. Of all the illnesses that plagued personnel in the Pacific the most insidious and costly were the various types of dysentery. Dysentery is a microbial disease that had plagued armies for centuries and was caused by unsanitary conditions. The most common type was amoebic dysentery, which caused constant, watery, and often

Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942 bloody diarrhea that debilitated, made life miserable, and work impossible. Latrines that were primitive open trenches, a bath that was the Lunga River, unsanitary messes and cooking facilities often manned by an asymptomatic carrier, such as a food-handler, could case the rapid spread of the disease. Doug Canning (67FS): "We got dysentery so bad that we couldn't fly anymore and we were sent back to New Caledonia to recover. There was a Frenchman on the other side of the island who had what in later times I would describe as a motel with six or seven cabins. We were sent there to rest and recuperate. It was the most beautiful place I had ever seen, with a big pond surrounded by palm trees. The Frenchman had a daughter who was befriended by our Captain. One morning she walked by wearing his wings and we knew something had transpired the night before! It took us about ten days to become well enough to check out on our new P-38s, and a few weeks later I was back at Guadalcanal." The most prevalent of the jungle maladies was called "jungle rot," and was caused by the chronic Pacific rains and humidity. Doug Canning described it: "We were always wet. Water ran through our tents in the rain and our feet were always wet. The smallest cut could become infected, and the areas between our fingers, toes, armI;lits, and even crotch would become raw. They put some purple tincture (Gentian Violet-author) on it and sent us out to fly. There was really no getting rid of it until we were sent somewhere dry." A misunderstood affliction throughout the war was combat fatigue. Statistics throughout the war show that 20 to 30% of the nonbattle casualties in the 13 th and 5 th Air Forces were lumped under that heading and caused by stress, fatigue, and "psychiatric problems" that were exacerbated by night air raids, ground and naval shelling, living conditions, food and supply shortages, boredom, and the immediacy of possible death. The pilots who came to the Pacific were young men who thought that nothing was going to

Besides the physical hardships endured by the men on the Canal, there was always the specter of death.The price was heavy, as a Marine crew honors a fallen comrade in the cemetery at Henderson. (USMC)

happen to them; that it would be the other guy. When they saw the other guy go down they were secretly happy it was not them. The Flight Surgeon had to deal with ambiguous psychological circumstances for which he was often untrained to identify and treat. Yet, he was responsible not only for the physical, but also the psychological welfare of his squadron. Flight Surgeons found the symptoms of combat fatigue usually did not occur until the airman spent six to eight months in combat. During World War II, especially the early war, it was not common for a man to ask to be taken off combat duty. Often combat fatigue was looked upon as a form of cowardice or personal weakness. Men overcame fear, as they felt the need to prove themselves to their squadron as a dependable and responsible member. The Flight Surgeon was theoretically responsible for the diagnosis and rotation of fatigued aircrew, but in practice the shortage of pilots in the early war portions of squadrons, not individuals, were sent on leave. Everyone wanted to have the Flight Surgeon as a tent mate, as he controlled the medical alcohol that was the only alcohol available to the Air Force on the island. Sam Howie (339FS): 'Three of us-Rex Barber, Joe Moore, and me-shared a tent with the flight surgeon. Because of him we always had plenty of alcohol. We mixed it with canned fruit juice. There was no other alcohol on the island." The Marine cooks provided the meals for the 67 th • Breakfast would usually be served about 0900 depending on the mission schedule, but dawn mission pilots had only coffee for breakfast. Coffee was brewed in a split fuel drum, and the powdered eggs and pancakes were cooked on a griddle made from a piece of armor plate. Lunch and dinner consisted of dehydrated potatoes, the ubiquitous Spam, and a mystery meat-either a form of hash or Australian bully beef-and captured Japanese rice and canned food. John Thompson (67FS): "Japanese canned food was always an adventure, as the labels had come off, but that didn't make much difference, as they were in

The 'Tojo Ice Company" was a Japanese ice-making facility that was captured in tact. (Lansdale)

31

13th Fighter Command in World War II Japanese anyway. But sometimes there were pictures of the food inside. The daily ration of a package of Japanese cigarettes was the saving grace for many men. They were also issued a box of 'pogey bait' (Japanese caramels) once a day. One day, a bombing just before breakfast totally destroyed the kitchen and supply tent, and all the cook's homemade utensils. The 'Tojo Ice Company' was a Japanese ice-making facility that was captured intact, and was a blessing in the tropical heat." Rank and discipline were difficult to maintain in the confused situation and jungle environment of Guadalcanal. Bill Harris (339FS CO): "To the credit of the ranking air officers and other air officers there was no need for spit and polish type discipline. Everyone knew his place and what was right and wrong. There was no need to salute. There was no formality. No one wore rank. No one pulled rank. Don't forget there were 22-year old Captains giving orders to Lieutenants who were only a year younger. It was mostly the flying skill of a CO or pilot that gained him the respect of everyone around him. It was in our (pilots) best interest to be on good terms with our ground crews. I had six crew chiefs during my tours in the Pacific. I kept in contact with all of them after the war until they passed away."

Capt. Bill Harris (left) and ground crew. Harris considered his Crew Chief an important part of his success and kept in touch with after the war. (Harris via Lansdale)

67FS ground crews pose in front of a well worn P-39 or P-400 # I00. (Lansdale)

32

Aircraft servicing facilities were non-existent, and ground crews had to work 14 to 16 hour days with rudimentary equipment and insufficienr tools to maintain the aircraft, leaving them little time to improve their living conditions. Operations on Guadalcanal were dependent on naval transport to bring in fuel and heavy equipment to improve the field. Fueling was a backbreaking task, as fuel had to be hand-pumped out of 55-gallon drums, strained through chamois into 12-quart buckets, and then poured into the aircraft fuel tanks. The bomb supply was adequate, but there were no bomb hoists to move and load them. There were too few ground crews, armorers,

Ground crews on Guadalcanallacked equipment and spare partsThis photo shows them using an improvised wooden log as a hoist while servicing a P39. One of the few things in favor of the P-39 was that it was designed for maintenance under primitive conditions. (USAF)

Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942

Bore-sighting and test firing the cannon of a P-39 at FighterTwo in December 1942.The Marston Matting can be seen in the foreground. By this time there was enough of the steel mat to cover the taxiways. (Palmer)

The "BoneYard" ofthe 68FS Engineering section, located at the end of Fighter Two. Here damaged fighters were repaired or cannibalized for spare parts. (Palmer)

and mechanics, and there were few tools, spare parts, and block and tackle equipment. Only seven armorers were sent to service the first 14 fighters. Guadalcanal weather was typically tropical, with high altitude clouds building up by mid-afternoon and thunder storms occurring by late afternoon and early evening. The storms usually occurred closer to land than out to sea and were locally heavy, but aircraft could generally fly around them. Often the missions sent aircraft to the limits of their fuel, and an unexpected weather front or storm could be deadly, as could navigational errors. The reaction to being caught in bad weather was for the pilot to drop below the clouds and to try to get some visual fix. But flying blind at low altitude could lead to hitting the highlands of a mountain, or even the ocean itself. The advantage of navigation up or down the Slot was that the two chains of islands that made up the Solomons generally ran along the north and south of it toward Guadalcanal, and a pilot could navigate between them. The South Pacific skies were extremely

clear and often made up for poor navigation. Against regulations Cactus air controllers would often turn on radio beacons, radio silence was neglected, and for late arriving flights in darkness the searchlights were turned on. There were usually clouds nearby, and this allowed outclassed fighter and vulnerable dive-bombers a place to run and hide. American aircraft were exceptionally sturdy, and pilots regularly flew through bad weather without the fear of structural damage. Probably as many American losses were due to operational causes as to the Japanese. The sudden torrential equatorial rains were dried to dust by the first three hours of scorching sun the next day. The extent and location of mud and dust depended on drainage. Dust and mud caused a maintenance crisis, as aircraft engines and instruments were complex and unable to cope with the elements sucked into them via aircraft cooling systems on taxiing, takeoff, and landing. It was the nature of the Pacific air war that the air forces would fly from the worst fields, as they were recently captured and closest to the battle. By the time the Seabees and en-

Ground crewman fueling PAOO "Impotient Virgin" of Patsy Flight, which was flown by Lts. Barcley Dillon and Vernon Head. Earlier fuel had to be handpumped from 55-gallon drums and strained through chamois. (Haedtler via Lansdale)

Doug Canning (67FS) in flight garb. Because the PAOO could not climb to over 14,000 feet pilots never became cold in the tropical skies. (Canning)

33

13th Fighter Command in World War II

Typical ground attire at Fighter Two control tower The man on the left is wearing a jumpsuit, while the man on the right is shirtless. Men often cut off the legs of their khaki trousers to make shorts. (USAF)

As the situation became less hectic at Cactus the men had time to relax. Note the two sophisticated lawn chairs and the Japanese mats that were captured by the hundreds. (Canning)

gineers improved the fields the battles had moved on, to be fought from other primitive forward bases that in turn would be improved. The AAF pilots came to Cactus in low top shoes, and the mud was often so deep that before they got into the cockpit they removed them and gave them to the crew chief so as not to make a mess. Pilot officers were supposed to buy their own shoes and coveted the Marines their GI-issue high top boots, and solicited extra pairs from them. Doug Canning (67FS):

Pilots were issued .45 caliber pistols to carry into combat, but the P-38 pilots made it a point to be armed with .38 caliber pistols! Doug Canning stated:

"When we arrived at Guadalcanal we got the Marines to issue us their boots, as our ankle high shoes were too low for the mud and just didn't hold up. The boots were very comfortable, and we wore them throughout our tour until we got back to the States."

Coast watcher Capt. Martin Clemens and his native scouts. The Australian coast watchers located on islands along the Slot were vital to Henderson, as they radioed early warnings of both approaching Japanese aircraft and warshipsThey were also responsible for rescuing and returning numerous downed pilots. (USMC)

34

"You flew in your flight suit, and if you were lucky you would have two. I guess you would call them jumpsuits today. It was good to climb to altitude, as you could finally get cool and you didn't want to come back down. Even though we flew at 20 to 30,000 feet I don't ever remember being cold in my flight suit. When we arrived in Fiji, we had been issued long sleeved shirts and long pants, so we went down to the tailor shop and had the locals make us short-sleeved shirts and short pants. We didn't wear rank because that gave the snipers a chance to identify the officers as targets." The air defense of Henderson was under the control of VMF223 and a single battery of 90mm AA guns and 58 automatic weapons located around the field. Air warning was essential, and a system was established about the time Henderson was available for aircraft. Australian coast watchers and their native scouts were organized into an early warning network extending from Buka, Bougainville, New Georgia, Malaita, Santa Isabel, and on GuadalcanaI. The coast watchers were New Zealand, Australian, or British prewar island residents who had served as civil servants, missionaries, planters, and traders. They were either stranded on or voluntarily returned to these islands to report on the Japanese. Radio reports from these outposts on passing ships and aircraft were their most important contribution, but they also reported on the Japanese air and ground strength, as well as building, geographic, and oceanographic information. The coast watcher on ew Georgia, Donald Kennedy, provided reports on Japanese aircraft flying from Rabaul, and his reports allowed fighter aircraft on Henderson to take off and get to altitude before the bombers reached their target. Coast watchers on Bougainville sent warnings on aircraft taking off from there and those stopping over from RabauI. Henderson's long-range SCR-270 radar would not become operational until September. The coordinated intelligence of reports from the coast watch-

Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942 ers and their scouts, along with daily aircraft patrols, warned of approaching attacks and played an important role in the success of Marine, Navy, and Air Force pilots over the Solomons. After a while the Japanese formations would try to fly a course around islands along the Slot to avoid the coast watchers. A black flag raised over the Pagoda (Allied air ops HQ) indicated an imminent air raid, and Cactus personnel headed for their slit trenches and the coconut logreinforced bomb shelters. Wildcats and PAOOs scrambled to take off two by two through either blinding dust or slogging mud, depending on the weather and time of day, on a runway that was covered with hastily filled bomb and shell craters and rutted by the solid rubber tires of carrier aircraft. Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24/25 August 1942 Henderson Field posed a dangerous threat, and the Japanese sent reinforcements to retake the air base. On 23 August Australian coast watchers reported a large Japanese naval force massing at Rabaul and moving toward Guadalcanal. The Japanese sent four transports, a light cruiser, and four destroyers to land 1,500 troops on the is-

ILt. Deltis Fincher (left) scored the first AAF victory in the South Pacific on 18 November 1942 when he shot down the first of two Zeros while escorting B-17s over Tonolei Harbor on the southern tip of Bougainville. (AAF)

land. Three carriers, eight battleships, four heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and 17 destroyers protected the landing force. The 25 th Japanese Air Flotilla was transferred to Rabaul to provide air cover for the operation. To oppose the landings two naval task forces comprised of a battleship (North Carolina), four cruisers, and ten destroyers, along with the carriers Enterprise and Saratoga, were in position 100 miles southeast of the Solomons. U.S. Navy search planes discovered the enemy fleet, and the stage was set for the airnaval Battle of the Eastern Solomons. The third carrier battle of the war (after the Coral Sea and Midway) began at 1300 on 24 August as the Japanese carrier Ryujo sent up six Kate bombers and 15 Zeros to hit Henderson at Tojo Time. The 67FS crews were working on their PAOOs when they heard aircraft overhead. Capt. Brannon and Lt. Deltis Fincher managed to take off, just evading strafing Zeros, but bombs from the Kate bombers fell almost immediately, preventing other P-400s from taking off. The Marines sent up 14 Wildcats and downed 13 Kates and seven Zeros-probably from the Ryujo-for four fighters lost. Capt. Marion Carl shot down three bombers and a Zero to become an ace (he had a previous victory on 4 June with VMF-221 over Wake Island). Brannon and Fincher came across a lone Zero climbing out of a strafing attack and shared a victory for the first AAF victory in the South Pacific. Meanwhile, at 1620 aircraft from the Saratoga found the carrier Ryujo and sank it with four direct bomb hits and a torpedo hit. At the same time 70 aircraft from the Shokaku and Zuikaku attacked the Enterprise and heavily damaged the carrier with three bomb hits and several near misses. The Enterprise was able to deck land its patrolling aircraft after they had failed to find the Japanese force. But Lt. Turner Caldwell's 11 fuel-starved SBDs had to head to Henderson and land in darkness, where they remained to become part of the "Cactus Air Force" as Flight 300 until 27 September. The Enterprise was forced to retreat for major repairs. B-17s from the llBG out of Espiritu Santo claimed four hits on the crippled Ryujo at 1705, and a hour later four other B-17s led by Maj. Allan Sewart attacked another carrier. The B-17 formation claimed hits on the carrier that were later confirmed as misses, while gunners claimed five Zeros downed. All eight B-17s returned safely to base through heavy rainstorms. IIBG B-17s flying from "Buttons" (Espiritu Santo) were to continue to playa large role against the Japanese in the South Pacific. Unaccountably, that night the major Japanese warships withdrew, but Adm. Raizo Tanaka in his flagship, the cruiser Jintsu, and eight destroyers and destroyer transports of the landing force continued on toward Guadalcanal. At 08-35 on the 25 th 12 Henderson SBDs of Lt.Col. Mangrum's VSB-232, escorted by F4Fs, attacked the transports, sinking one, the 14,000 ton transport (Kinryu Maru), heavily damaging an 8,000 ton transport, and damaging the Jintsu, causing Tanaka to move his flag to a destroyer and withdraw. The Marine aviators landed, and despite being slowly refueled by hand were able to take off just before Tojo Time and avoid becoming sitting ducks on the ground for Japanese bombs. At 1015 eight B17s came upon the veteran Japanese destroyer Mitzuki that was picking up survivors and sank it with three direct hits to close the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.

35

13th Fighter Command in World War 11 That day, the PAOOs were assigned daily sunrise to sunset patrols at 14,000 feet over Henderson. This was the highest altitude at which the fighter was effective. The P-400s were intended for export to the RAF and were equipped with the English high-pressure oxygen system, and no high-pressure oxygen bottles were available in the South Pacific. 67 th pilots could not fly sustained patrols at that altitude without oxygen, and after two hours on patrol the pilots got headaches and became woozy. Even with oxygen the P400 had trouble operating above 16,000 feet, as it was equipped with a two-stage blower and the engine could not get enough air above that altitude and would slog along. "With a belly tank it could climb to 18,000 feet but took 30 minutes to get there, and once it did the only maneuver it could pull off was a dive!" (Doug Canning) After the Japanese had been repelled in their effort to land troops to recapture the island they sent down 16 Bettys and 12 Zeros the next day. The Marines belatedly sent up 12 Wildcats but were unable to intercept them before the Bettys dropped their bombs. The attack set 2,000 gallons of valuable gasoline on fire, and the fire spread to an ammunition dump and exploded two 1,000lb. bombs, causing heavy damage. Once VMF-212 climbed to intercept the Japanese after their bomb run they shot down seven bombers and five escorts for the loss of one Wildcat. For their part in the battle two P-400s had to settle for a reconnaissance mission around the circumference of the island. On the 27 th at 1110 Capt. John "Tommy" Thompson flew in eight more P-400s of "Patsy Flight" from Espiritu Santo navigated by a B-17.' Accompanying him were Lts. Bryan Brown, Peter Childress, Barclay Dillon, Linwood Glazier, Vernon Head, and Keith Wythes. John Thompson: Adm. Raizo Tanaka was to lead a succession of "Tokyo Expresses" down the Slot over the next several months. (USN)

PAOO of the 67FS at Guadalcanal.The PAOO can easily be distinguished by the 12 exhaust stacks located just behind the cockpit door versus the six stacks on the P-39. (USAF)

Airacobra I, later to be returned to the Me as the PAOO.The British version was fitted with an incompatible British high-pressure oxygen system and instruments calibrated in the Metric system. (USAF)

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Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942

A well-worn P-400 being cannibalized at Guadalcanal in january 1943. Note the British marking on its tail and the Solomons native (not a cannibal!) standing by the wing. (USAF)

P-400 of the 67FS "Hawk Eye 1/" being pulled out of the Guadalcanal mud. (USAF)

"As we approached Henderson I looked down and saw the narrow 4,000-foot strip cut in the middle of a large grassy area near the ocean. Bomb and shell craters pockmarked the entire area. There was a grove of coconut trees extending probably 4,000 feet on the oceanside, then there was the grassy area running from the river (Tenaru/Ulu-author) to the east. Thick jungle sprung up immediately on the opposite side of the field."

By this time the Japanese South Pacific strategy was formulated. Their bases on Bougainville, Vella Lavella on Kula Gulf, and Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel were readily supplied from Rabaul and Truk. Men and supplies were loaded onto destroyer/transports and sometimes cruisers from these bases, and made up the "Tokyo Express." The ships hid in the central Solomons in the daytime from searching Allied aircraft from Cactus, and then passed quickly down the Slot at night, landing troops and supplies near Henderson, and concluded their mission by lobbing a few shells on the field. By daylight the Tokyo Express had returned safely to the central Solomons. The Japanese hoped to reinforce the island and drive the Americans back to Australia in a final offensive. But the Japanese were unable to fully control the air and seas around the lower Solomons, and the Tokyo Express became a tenuous supply line. In the meantime, the Japanese sent down almost daily Tojo Time air attacks launched mainly from Kahili airfield on southern

As they landed the pilots were surprised that there was no one around to greet them. Tojo Time was imminent, and the ground crews reluctantly crawled out of their slit trenches and hurriedly refueled the new reinforcements. The tired pilots took off to orbit the eastern end of the island and waited out the raid that never appeared. Lt. Zed Fountain left Espiritu late due to a minor repair, managed to navigate to Cactus, and arrived later that day to put 13 total P-400s on the island.

On 27 August, "Patsy Flight" led by Capt. john "Tommy"Thompson and consisting of Lts. Brown, Childress, Dillon, Glazier, Head, and Wythes landed at Cactus during an air raid alert. Lt. Zed Fountain made it a baker's dozen of P400s on Cactus when he came that afternoon, as he left New Caledonia late due to a mechanical problem. In this photo, Fountain's P-400 No.6 has the original RAF camouflage and clearly shows the RAF serial number, BW 167, located just below the tailplane. (Lansdale/USMC)

67FS pilots (left to right): Linwood Glazier, Barclay Dillon, Zed Fountain, and RB johnston at Tontouta, New Caledonia. (Lansdale/HeadI347FGA)

37

13 th Fighter Command in World War 1I Bougainville. In'egular nightly naval forces made up of warships were sent down the Slot to bombard the field and created a psychological threat when they didn't arrive. Occasionally "Oscar," a submarine, surfaced off Lunga and lobbed a few shells on Henderson or Tulagi. But the main nightly annoyance was the twin-engine bombers named "Washing Machine Charlie" or "Maytag Mike" (the names were interchangeable), or a seaplane named "Louie the Louse." They would fly back and forth and finally drop a few bombs that usually did no physical damage, but interrupted the sleep of the personnel below. The washing machine reference was derived from the sound of their unsynchronized engines. A song became popular to immortalize Charlie: "Douglas, Vaught, Sikorsky, BellAll make planes that sound so swell. But the Japanese, strange as it seems, Make planes that sound like washing machines. There's an isle in the Coral Sea That we took from the Japanese. From it came the story of a guy called 'Maytag Charlie.' Every night at about 10: IS The air raid warning used to scream, Up would go the search light beam And in flew 'Maytag Charlie.' Now this Charlie guy, he flew so high We couldn't score a hit Until one night they set a trapAnd 'Magtag Charlie' bit. He saw a light and he flew down lowThe anti-aircraft guns let go. They heard the blast in TokyoAnd down came 'Maytag CharUe.'" On the 28 th Lt.Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake, commander of the 17 Army on Rabaul, dispatched 3,500 infantry under Maj.Gen. Kiyotake Kawaguchi on four destroyer transports down the Slot in the late afternoon. Two SBDs on recon spotted the force and bombed it without getting any hits, but 11 of Mangrum's SBDs took off from Henderson and hit three of the destroyers only 70 miles off Guadalcanal. They exploded the Asagiri and set the Yugiri on fire. The Shirakumo was brought to a stop, and it had to be towed back to the Shortlands by the undamaged destroyer. The Marines lost one dive-bomber and had averted Japanese reinforcement of the island. On the 29 th at 1000 coast watchers on Bougainville reported 18 Bettys and a Zero escort headed southeast. At 1105 a coast watcher on New Georgia corroborated the sighting. The newly established Henderson radar set up on the northwest corner of the field then picked up the Japanese formation. Ten VMF-223 Marine F4Fs and three flights of four P-400s were scrambled at noon to intercept, while other aircraft on the field took off and flew away to the east to safety until after the attack. The F4Fs and the P-400s climbed to 14,000 feet, where the P-400s stayed and watched helplessly as the th

38

Marine Wildcats continued to climb. The enemy bombers dropped their bombs accurately on the field, but the Marine F4Fs reached them and attacked. The Leathernecks were credited with II victories, six Zeros, and five bombers, with Capt. John Smith getting two bombers to become an ace. All the disheartened AAF pilots could do is watch helplessly as the bombers flew out of range above them, juicy targets for Smith's Marine pilots. The Japanese bombs had found their target, and Henderson was in chaos. The pilots landed on the field, weaving around bomb craters marked by bushes set out by ground crews and through the smoke from the burning grass fields around the runway. Men were on the sides of the runways beating out the grass fires with their blankets, and trucks were hauling dirt to fill up the bomb craters on the runway. Crews unloaded new steel mat from trucks to patch large sections of damaged matting. As the pilots taxied they passed two demolished former Japanese hangars with two wrecked Wildcats burning in Hangar 2 and a SBD burning in Hangar 3. Despite ammunition cooking off and exploding from the burning aircraft, ground crews tried to save the flaming Wildcats by beating them with blankets and pitching dirt on them with shovels, and even their bare hands. Ground crews rolled barrels of gasoline and oil out of the burning storage dump to refuel the arriving aircraft with hand pumps so they would be ready in case there was another attack approaching. That night four Japanese destroyers from the Shortlands landed 450 troops on Taivu Point just after dark. Japanese snipers were an intermittent problem, hiding in trees around the edge of the field and shooting at personnel and aircraft, but they were quickly eliminated by Marine patrols. Officers were urged to remove their insignias, as they were prime sniper targets. John Thompson (67FS): "Snipers were a problem, as they would take pot shots at our aircraft taking off and landing from Henderson. One time we were having lunch when a sniper off in a tree across the field hit our table with a bullet. We all quickly took cover. It wasn't long before we heard gunshots from a Marine patrol shooting the Jap out of his tree." Crew chiefs would take their straw ground mats, blankets, and rifles down to their aircraft to guard against any Japanese infiltrators trying to sabotage the aircraft at night. On 30 August, SBDs reported a Japanese destroyer moving southward toward Guadalcanal. That evening, after four days of combat, of the original 14 P-400s only three remained immediately operational, but mechanics worked feverishly all night to get others into the air. Three Air Force pilots were on standby alert from midnight, sitting in the cool hangars waiting for something to happen, but just before dawn the destroyer slipped in undetected, landed its troops, and was gone. At 0930 Bougainville coast watchers reported 20 single-engine aircraft coming down from Buka Passage, flying to the southeast. At 1130 all Marine and Army CAP aircraft were recalled for refueling to meet the daily Tojo Time. Since the reported aircraft were single-engine it was assumed that a divebombing attack on the shipping in Tulagi Harbor was imminent. At 1105 eight F4Fs and 11 (eight repaired that night) PAOOs took off

Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942 to meet the dive-bombers. One flight, led by Capt. Thomas Christian and made up of Lts. Chilson, Dutton, and Wythes, was sent on CAP over the shipping at Tulagi, particularly the USS Burroughs, which ran aground trying to anchor for the night after unloading troops and supplies off Cactus. Flights led by Captains Brannon and Thompson and followed by Lts. Childress, Dillon, Fincher, Fountain, and Johnston climbed to their customary 14,000 feet, orbiting in clouds, while the Wildcats climbed to 28,000 feet. The dive-bombers turned out to be Zeros from the carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku that were based at Buka airfield in the far western Solomons for refueling. The seven P-400 pilots orbited at 14,000 feet and had been on patrol for about a half hour; they were beginning to feel the effects from the lack of oxygen when they were bounced from behind and below by Zeros that came out of a cloud. The outnumbered Airacobra pilots went into a Lufbery defensive formation. However the Lufbery, while workable against the Luftwaffe Me109s over Europe, was ineffective against the nimble Zero. The Japanese fighter had a short turning radius that permitted it to get inside the defensive circle, flying in the opposite direction. A P-39 or P-40 could not turn tight enough to hit the Zeros, and soon there were more Zeros in the circle than PAOOs. But Marine Wildcats dove to the rescue, and the air battle turned into a disorganized dogfight. The P-400s were no match for the agile Zeros piloted by veteran Imperial Navy pilots, and their only alternative was to dive and duck into a cloud. Once inside the cloud the Army pilots attempted to make an instrument turn and hoped to c~me out on top set to make an attack on a passing Zero. The weather had reduced visibility to 1,000 feet, and Christian's four patrolling Airacobras over TuJagi Harbor decided to return to base. As they headed out of a rainsquall they were attacked by six Zeros. Two pilots, Lts. Robert Chilson and Keith Wythes, were lost and listed MIA. Capt. John Thompson landed with 15 bullet holes in his fighter and one in his shoulder. About an hour later Lt. Peter Childress limped back into camp. He had bailed out of his crippled fighter and: "...as I floated down in my parachute I was worried that I was going to land in Japanese territory. On my way down I was able to get my bearings and landed about two miles from Henderson. I made my way back through a no-man's land encountering a Jap body along the way. As I approached the Marine lines I had to creep past their booby traps and barbed wire, hoping not to be shot by friendly fire. I was able to identify myself and return to the squadron." (Childress) During the CAP over Tulagi, Lt. Dutton's engine malfunctioned and he bailed out. He landed in a grove of tall trees and fell through the branches, and was knocked unconscious. When he came to he was hanging upside down .15 feet above the ground in his parachute harness and covered head to toe by large biting black ants. He cut himself down, stripped off his clothing, and brushed away the vicious ants. Covered by painful bites, he made his way to American lines and was returned by boat across Skylark Channel the next day; he was given two ounces of medical brandy and sent back to combat. Altogether, four P-400s were lost during combat, and six of the seven returning fighters were riddled with bullet holes

and had to be written off for parts. The details of the combat are muddled in the disastrous losses the squadron suffered that day. Original 67 th combat reports claimed four victories and three probables, whileAAF records show two victories (Brannon's). But diligent researcher Frank Olynyk in his USAAF (Pacific Theater) Credits for the Destruction ofEnemy Aircraft in Air-to-Air Combat World War 2 lists five victories and two probables. Capt. Dale Brannon was credited with two of the victories, 2Lt. Barclay Dillon a victory and a probable, 1Lts. Albert Dutton and Richard Johnson a Zero each, and Capt. John Thompson a probable. VMF-223 Marines had another big day, bagging 14 Japanese Zeros, with Capt. John Smith adding four and Capt. Marion Carl adding three to make him a double ace with 11 victories. At 1500 Col. William Wallace, MAG-23 commander, arrived at Henderson with 19 Wildcats of Maj. Robert Galer's VMF-224 and 12 Dauntlesses of Maj. Leo Smith's VMSB-231, navigated by two B-17 escort bombers. A half hour later, with the airfield packed with aircraft, 18 Japanese dive-bombers flying in two large Vs bypassed the vulnerable airfield and attacked the shipping in Tulagi Harbor instead. They sunk the destroyer Calhoun and hit the transport William Ward Burrows that had run aground offTulagi. To add to the day's confusion, two strong earthquakes rocked the island at 1645, but Mother Nature's damage was minor compared to that caused by the Japanese. At 2100 Marine SBDs took off in the darkness to search for three cruisers and two destroyers that shelled the island and landed troops to the east. Rainstorms prevented a successful attack on the ships but caused them to withdraw. At the end of the day Cactus air strength numbered 86 pilots and 64 aircraft: 51 Marine; 10 Navy; and only 3 Air Force. On 2 September the 6th Seabees arrived with five officers, 387 men, and two bulldozers to improve Henderson, and to clear a grass fighter strip one mile to the east. The Seabees used the large quantity of captured Japanese equipment to clear and roll the 4,600 x 300-foot grass strip. They leveled the hummocks and filled in the trenches and foxholes, then rolled the field and cut down the surrounding tall bush to a foot and a half. It was completed on the 9th and was originally called the Fighter Strip, then Fighter One, but would be dubbed the "Cow Pasture" by those who were based on it. At one time in October it served all Cactus aircraft-including

Early view of Fighter One, a grass emergency strip built by the 6th Seabees in case Henderson was shut down There was a barbed wire fence around the field. (USN)

39

13th Fighter Command in World War II

Fighter One with Bloody Ridge in the center background in January 1943. On the left are Marine SBDs, with a PV in the centerforeground and a P-38 on the right. In the background are P-39s (right center), F4Fs (right) and a two C47s (in the distance center). In the foreground is a barbed wire fence (AAF)

B-17s-when Pistol Pete put too many holes in Henderson's runways. By mid-September only a small quantity of Marston steel matting had arrived, and the daily average gasoline reserve on the island could only support air operations for four days. The increased enemy presence on Bougainville, the Bismarcks, and Guadalcanal furnished choice targets for AAF heavy bombers, but the B-17s were forced to remain at Espiritu Santo-some 640 miles awayas they could not stage through Henderson. Once Henderson was ready to handle the bombers they were only able to calTY out infrequent strikes against Japanese shipping in the Buin-Tonalei area, and these were limited by the chronic lack of fuel at Henderson.

An important and unheralded segment of the Cactus Air Force were Navy and Marine SBD units on Guadalcanal. SBD dive-bombing missions from Henderson were often without fighter escort, which could not be spared, and consequently they suffered heavy losses. Four Marine SBD COs were KIA during the campaign. Fighter pilots never really enjoyed escorting SBDs, as they flew at a slow 125 mph and climbed to altitude very slowly, wasting a lot of the waiting escort's fuel. The fighters had to throttle back and weave over a wide area, keeping a look out for each other, the SBDs, and the Japanese. The escorts usually flew above the dive-bombers and close enough to get in between them and any attackers.

The 6th Seabee Battalion on Guadalcanal was instrumental in the air victory; as they kept the field constantly open for operations after heavy Japanese air and naval attacks. (USN)

40

Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942

6th Seabees laying Marston Mat on Henderson. (USN)

Navy SBn Units: Flight 300 was a mixture of eight VS-5 and three VB-6 SBDs off the Enterprise under Lt. Turner Caldwell that landed at Henderson on 24 August. YS-3 was detached from the Saratoga to Espiritu Santo after she was damaged in late August. Lt.Cdr. Louis Kim's SBDs were sent to Henderson from 6 September to 17 October. YS-71 under able CO, Lt.Cdr. John Eldridge. Served on Cactus from 28 September to 7 November after the Wasp was sunk on 15 September. YB-lO off the Enterprise, under Lt.Cdr. James Thomas, served from 13-16 November. YS-lO off the Enterprise, under Lt.Cdr. James Lee, served from 13-16 November

Marine SBn Units: VMSB-232 had 12 SBDs under Lt.Col. Richard Mangrum from 20 August to 13 October. VMSB-231 had 16 SBDs under Maj. Leo Smith (succeeded by Capt. Ruben Iden MIA and then Capt. Elmer Glidden); landed on 30 August and was relieved on 16 October. VMBS-141 had an advance element arrive on 23 September, after which CO Maj. Gordon Bell landed with the largest squadron to operate from Cactus on 5-6 October. The squadron left the island by 19 November. Bell's successor, Lt. W.S. Ashcraft, was KIA on 8 November. VMBS-132, under Maj. Joseph Sailer, arrived on 1 November and left on 9 December without its able leader, who was killed in action on 7 December. VMBS-142 had ten SBDs under Maj. Robert Richard that arrived on 12 November and remained at Henderson into late April 1943. VMBS-141 had the highest pilot casualty rate, as of the original 43 pilots, 27 were KIA and nine were evacuated WIA in five weeks. Three quarters of their pilots contracted malaria (two evacuated). In addition 19 rear gunners were KIA or MIA.

41

3 September 1942

At the start of September General Vandegrift commanded less than 20,000 troops that held a perimeter measuring five and half miles along the north coast, and less than two miles in depth. For the Japanese, the American invasion and its continued presence represented the first stumbling block since they started the war, as far back as the late 1930s in China. The stinging defeat at the Ilu (Tenaru) River on 20121 August and failure of their Navy and Air Forces to dislodge the Marines caused the Japanese to try to save face and increase the tempo of their offensive. The American carrier-based and land-based aircraft and 3rd Defense Battalion and naval AA had taken a large toll, as the Japanese had lost most of their original complement of aircraft on Rabaul and still were unable to gain air supremacy. Distance was in the Americans' favor, as they operated over and near Henderson, and their pilots were able to land many damaged aircraft on the airfield. Also, the Navy and friendly natives were able to rescue and return pilots who ditched or bailed out. The Japanese had to fly 560 miles from Rabaul and 300 miles from southern Bougainville, and could not loiter long over Cactus. The heavy fuel loads needed for the long return trip handicapped air combat for the Zero fighters. Many American combat reports described Japanese aircraft that flamed or exploded because of their large fuel load and unprotected gasoline tanks (a dubious weight savings that gave them extended range). Henderson had received 31 new aircraft by I September, but the Japanese received 36 fighters and 27 bombers that day. Both Harmon and Ghormley had repeatedly requested that Gen. Arnold send the Lockheed P-38 Lightning to the South Pacific, but the success of the impending North African invasion in early November depended on the P-38. The Lightning was the only fighter that was able to cross the Atlantic Ocean to Great Britain and then fly to North Africa, so none could be spared. Adm. Ghormley had also asked MacArthur for P-38s, but MacArthur was under pressure from a threatened Japanese invasion at Port Moresby, New Guinea. He had only 18 P-38s himself and, in turn, asked Ghormley to lend him some of his four aircraft carriers! Neither gave in. One bright spot was the landing of the first transport plane at Guadalcanal on 3 September, carrying 1st MAW commander Brig.Gen. Roy Geiger, who announced that MAG-14, with two combat squadrons and a 42

Maj',Gen. Roy Geiger was a veteran Marine Corps air commander and was the CO of the Ist Marine Air Wing (I MAW) on Guadalcanal on 3 September His command included the Army Air Force and the Navy, and was dubbed the "Cactus Air Force." (USMC)

Part Two, Chapter 3 - September 1942

67FS Patsy Flight P-400 'Whistlin' Bntches" starboard landing gear is being serviced. There is a hydraulic jack supporting the wing and the mechanic is holding the wheel and strut. (Lansdale/347FGA)

67FS P-400 "Impatient Virgin" shows off the distinguishing features of the P400: its tricycle landing gear. 12 exhaust stacks, auto-type door and 20mm cannon that fired through the propeller hub. (Lansdale/347FGA)

service squadron with III officers and 1,116 enlisted men, was to be shipped to the South Pacific. On the 5 th , MAG-25 began operations at Henderson when its first R4D transport landed with 3,000 Ibs of welcome cigarettes and candy and returned carrying wounded. The Japanese would organize air and naval attacks 11 times in September, 16 times in October, and eight times in ,ovember. The Tokyo Express was operating nearly nightly. Beginning in August and increasing in September and. 'early October the Japanese reinforced Guadalcanal by sending Jast destroyer/transports and cruisers down the Slot from the Shortland Islands in the afternoon. By nightfall they would be about 200 miles from Guadalcanal, and then would speed in at night to land as many as 1,000 troops at Cape Esperance. Over the months these fast destroyers, along with larger vessels and barges, were able to land 20,000 troops and supplies. The Marines and AAF had limited night-equipped aircraft to counter the Tokyo Express and the nighttime air raids over the is-

land. Japanese reinforcements were slowly increasing and organizing in the jungle, and it was a matter of time before they were a force in strength ready to drive the lSI Marine Division from their beachhead. The Japanese could pursue this objective as long as their Navy controlled the Southern Solomons. The reluctant U.S. Navy needed to become more aggressive and bring to bear greater force to cause more casualties on the Japanese avy. If this could be accomplished the Japanese, completely reliant on the Tokyo Express to bring in reinforcements, equipment, and supplies, could not organize and deploy a large invasion force to retake the island. Meanwhile, Japanese fighters and bombers from Rabaul and Bougainville took part in Tojo Time at noon and several other times a day, often taking costly losses from the Cactus Air Force. However, it was the almost nightly naval attacks, big guns firing salvo after salvo, that exacted the greatest damage, both materiel and psychological, on the defenders of the island.

A Patsy Flight P-400 (No. 22) carrying a 2501b. bomb. The Marines at Guadalcanal experienced a chronic shortage of artillery ammunition, and the emergence of the P-400 and its heavy firepower and bombs became a welcome sight.The 67th pilots began to refer to themselves as the' 'JagstaffeI: ' a corruption of the Luftwaffe term "Jagdstaffel," which translates in German as "fighter squadron," not fighter-bomber. (Lansdale/Ferguson)

The rough field conditions at Cactus are seen hereThe fragile tricycle landing gear could collapse with disastrous results. (Lansdale/347FGA)

43

13th Fighter Command in World War II After their poor showing, the PAOOs were assigned recon flights, and embalTassingly sent to orbit the safe east end of the island during Tojo Time to wait for the attack to end. The word around the island was "the P-400 was a PAO with a Zero in its tail!" 67FS morale hit low ebb. The Game Cock pilots reluctantly recognized their fighter did not have the performance to be an interceptor, and the air battle of the 30th made it painfully obvious that the P-400 was unable to intercept high-flying Bettys and Zeros. Without oxygen the AAF pilots were unable to climb to the altitudes of the attacking Zeros and Bettys, and even if they were able to reach the Japanese the fighter did not have the perfoITnance there to counter the Betty bomber, much less the Zero. Besides the lack of high altitude performance, the fighter had a low rate of climb, excessive wing loading, and an engine that was very vulnerable to hits to the glycol cooling system. Generals Harmon and Vandegrift found the P-400 unsuitable for operations on Guadalcanal and urged that P38 and P-47 squadrons be sent. Maj. John Smith, commander ofVMF-223, assessed the 67FS in an intelligence report dated 10 November 1942: "The first Army Squadron that came down there with P-400s had some of the finest pilots that I've ever seen, even though they didn't have the best plane in the world. And they were certainly willing to do anything they were asked to do and cooperated well with the Marine officer who was running the show there. The fact that the P-400 didn't get up high enough didn't bother them a great deal; they always wanted to go up every time they had a chance." It did bother the 67 th pilots that their aircraft was not an inter-

ceptor and that they were taken out of combat, but they were eager to fly and fight, and a new assignment would be coming their way. The P-400, known as the Model 14 or Airacobra I, was the P39D-l and D-2 model built for export to the French, who ordered 170 on 30 March 1940. When France fell the British assumed their order and planned on naming the fighter the Caribou, but left the name at Airacobra. The French contract was followed by two British orders of 205 and 300, and Bell built 675. The British flew the

A smoking Japanese bomber plunges to its destruction off Guadalcanal. The bomber was undoubtedly shot down by Marine F4F Wildcats, as the Army P-400s could not reach the altitude the Japanese flew to intercept. (USMC)

44

Airacobra for a limited time in combat and trials and couldn't wait to foist 212 off on the desperate Russians. The USAAC "reclaimed" 179 RAP Airacobras that were renamed the P-400 and sent them to the South Pacific. Most of the P-400s in the Pacific maintained their RAF serial numbers and three-color camouflage, and had the U.S. national insignia painted over the RAF roundels. It can-ied the British high-pressure oxygen system and was armed with the British ordered 20mm Hispano-Suiza Mk 404 (M-l) cannon, while the P-39 had an inferior American 37mm T9 cannon. The six .30 caliber machine guns were replaced by six Browning .303 caliber machine guns. The identifying features of the P-400 vs. P-39C/D were the line of twelve exhaust stacks located below and behind the cockpit door on each side of the P-400, versus the six on the P-39C/D. Also, the 20mm cannon muzzle was longer than the 37mm cannon. The P-400 had the centerline hardpoint that was found on the D models and could carry a 500lb. bomb or jettisonable fuel tank. The Model 14 was equipped with the Allison V-171O-E4 engine that was rated at 60 more horsepower than the P-39C/D Allison. The mixture and the prop control on the PAOO throttle quadrant were reversed from the P-39 (the throttle was the same). In early 1941 a Senate committee headed by Harry S. Truman investigated the nation's preparedness problems and included a report on why the obsolete P-39 was put into mass production and continued in production when more contemporary fighters could be pressed into production. The committee found that Senators pork barreled the continued production of obsolete aircraft built in their districts. Manufacturers justified large orders of Brewster F2As, Curtiss P-40s, and Bell P-39s, as they were available, could be produced in large ,numbers, and could be improved upon. But the fact was this assertion was cOlTect, as the newer and better aircraft-the Lockheed P-38, the Republic P-47, and North American P-51were either in the developmental or prototype stage and not ready for mass production. The P-39 and P-40 truly were all that was readily available in the American fighter arsenal. The AAF had known of the shortcomings of the P-39/P-400 several months before Guadalcanal. In May 1942 Lt.Col. Boyd "Buzz" Wagner, who had scored three victories flying a P-39D for the 5th Fighter Command over ew Guinea, had forwarded a report to Gen. MacArthur on the P-39 and P-40. Wagner's report criticized the fighter's low rate of climb and excessive wing loading, which precluded aerial combat with the Zero, and the vulnerability of its liquid-cooled engine. He also was angered by the P-39's constant gun jamming problems. The .30 caliber wing guns and the 37mm propeller-mounted cannon chronically jammed, and only the two cowl-mounted .50 caliber machine guns could be trusted in combat. He did feel that the P-39 was "10% better than the P-40 in every respect except maneuverability below 18,000 feet." (Fighter Aircraft Report to USAFTA, 21 May 1942). Col. Gordon Seville, the Director of Air Defense, stated emphatically that neither the P39 nor P-40 could perform effectively against the Zero in the SWPA, and the only American fighter that could was the P-38, and asked that they be sent to the Pacific. (Memo, 27 May 1942 to the Chief of Staff) The reason for the P-400/P-39's perfoITnance shortcomings was the absence of a turbocharger. The turbocharger is a mechanism

Part Two, Chapter 3 - September 1942

Crew Chief checks the maintenance log of a P-39 at Cactus. The ground crews did yeoman's work, keeping the aircraft maintained and repaired during the battle for the island. (USAF)

that helps an aircraft engine increase and maintain power output at high altitudes. At the time the P-39 was designed American turbochargers were not dependable, and wind tunnel tests of the design had shown numerous lift and drag problems that were eliminated by deleting the turbocharger. During the 1930s bomber aviation was the vanguard of tactical air combat thinking, and fighter performance expectations did not anticipate that the fighter would regularly fly at high altitude or have to escort bombers. Although Allison could have manufactured the V-I7l 0 engine with a turbocharger, the Army revised Airacobra specifications and eliminated the turbocharger. The move cut costs for Bell, reduced drag, and removed the possibility of technical problems that the installation of a turbocharger may have caused. What remained was a sleek-looking lackluster fighter with virtually no high altitude capabilities, but with good, but unexplored, low altitude qualities that 67FS pilots were about to exploit. The P-400s and P-39s were available in the South Pacific, and 62 more were on their way to the Pacific. The P-39D-2 was armed with one nose-mounted 37mm cannon, two cowl-mounted .50 caliber machine guns (300 rounds per gun), and four wing-mounted .30 caliber machine guns (1,000 rpg). The soon to arrive P-39K-l was stripped of 650 pounds of original equipment, and this im-

proved the Bell fighter's performance, as well as its service ceiling, which theoretically reached 27,000 feet. The 37mm cannon (30 rounds) was to be replaced by a .50 caliber machine gun with 280 rounds of ammunition, but the resulting weight saving and increase in the rate of fire was not worth the time and effort, and the project was dropped. The other armament was the same. The K model was also equipped to carry a 500lb. or auxiliary fuel tank. One third of the P-39s were not stripped and were intended for fighter-bomber use. Meanwhile, the AAC had the P-400 fighter that could not be used as a fighter. Of the 13 Cactus P-400s, four had been shot down, and in a single combat eight had been damaged, and of those six would be eventually written off. Harmon felt that stripping the aircraft of the recommended 1,500 pounds of weight still would not make it a successful high altitude interceptor. The aircraft had good low-altitude performance, good protective armor plate, and a heavy armament of a 20mm cannon, two .50 caliber and four .30 caliber machine guns, and could carry two bombs. The P-400 would become the superlative attack aircraft over Guadalcanal, and the P400/39 would prove itself again in this role as a Lend-Lease aircraft to the Soviets on the Eastern Front against the Germans. On 3 September Maj.Gen. Archibald Vandegrift, Commander of the 1sf Marine Division, advised Lt.Gen. Delos Emmons, Commander of Army Aircraft in the Pacific, that: "P-400s will not be employed further except in extreme emergencies; they are entirely unsuitable for Cactus operations." Harmon asked the Gen. George Marshall for aircraft (e.g. the P-38) that could operate above 20,000 feet: "If we are to maintain the morale and the elan of our fighter pilots, obtain the desired effectiveness of our Army fighter effort, and to avoid losses out of proportion to results obtain, a reasonable proportion of Army fighter units in this area must be equipped with the P-38 or P-47 types." (Harmon to Marshall, 8 September 1942)

But the P-400 did have a role in the Cactus Air Force, and soon it flew its first mission in that new role. During the night of 1 September, two Japanese transports and two destroyers stood off Tasimboko, a village about 20 miles east of Henderson. The Japanese had disembarked a strong garrison of 300 troops and supplies in bad weather that prevented SBDs from flying that night to inter-

"Fancy Nancy" (No.12) was a PAOa of Patsy Flight flown by Lt. Richard Johnston that flew with Brannon's original group on 22 August. Not long after this photo was taken she was caught on the runway and destroyed by strafing Zeros. (Lansdale/USMC)

45

13 th Fighter Command in World War II dict the landings. At 0500 the next morning, Japanese destroyers shelled Henderson and woke every American in the perimeter. At 0600 five P-400s, led by now Major Brannon, and followed by Us. Childress, Davis, Fincher, and Fountain, took off to attack the landings. They found no troops, and only five beached landing craft were spotted. At 0800 four more P-400s, led by Capt. Thompson and followed by Us. Brzuska, Head, and Johnston, took off and dropped their 500lb. bombs on the village and strafed both the landing craft and village. At noon, with Tojo Time forthcoming, the 67 th decided to fly another mission on Tasimboko, rather than to suffer another Japanese bombing attack. They attacked the village, and during their attack the Japanese sent down 18 Bettys escorted by 21 Zeros and attacked Henderson on schedule. The defending Marine fighters of Maj. Robert Galer's VMF-224 shot down five bombers and a Zero, while Smith's VMF-223 got three Zeros. But the Japanese hit the airfield hard, and the returning Americans landed on cratered runways, taxied past a burning hangar, three smoldering SBDs, and burning fuel and ammo dumps. Throughout the next several hours delayed action bombs detonated over the area On 4 September the 67 th had three P-400s operational and 13 pilots to fly them. Aerial reconnaissance disclosed that the Japanese were using Santa Isabel as a staging area for barges and landing craft that carried reinforcements to Guadalcanal, 75 miles to the SSE. At 1440 on the 4t h, Maj. Robert Galer ofVMF-224 led the three P-400s flown by Capt. Thomas Christian and Lts. Brown and Glazier to small coves on Santa Isabel that concealed 34 loaded landing craft ranging from 40 to 70 feet long. The P-400s dove on a group of six boats loaded with men and supplies moving back to safety toward shore. Two were destroyed by two direct hits from 500lb. bombs, and after the bombs were dropped the other boats and landing troops were strafed. At debriefing Galer claimed that 25 landing craft in the area's coves had been destroyed and two machine guns put out of action. The fighters returned safely, some with several bullet holes from small anns fire. To make the day a complete success, bad weather cancelled Tojo Time. During the late night of 5 September the Express, consisting of a light cruiser and two destroyers, came down the Slot and sunk the transports Gregory and Little off Savo Island, and then shelled the

Lt.Vernon Head's P-400 crashed on 8 September attempting to take off on a muddy field carrying a SOOlb. bomb. 67FS Adjutant Charles Allard surveys the damage. (Lansdale/Head/347FGA)

46

island, killing three men. Maj. Brannon and Lt. Fountain left on a dawn patrol, and at 0700 came upon 15 Japanese landing barges bringing troops ashore in daylight. Ten of the barges were about a third of a mile offshore of Levers Pass and Visale on the northwest coast. Brannon radioed the sighting back to Henderson, and the P400s dove low and repeatedly strafed the flotilla until they ran out of ammunition, sinking one barge, damaging several others, and killing many of the troops by gun fire or drowning before they could reach shore. Six Wildcats from VMF-224 joined the P-400s and continued the carnage. One Marine pilot was hit by the heavy small arms fire and crashed into the ocean off the landing be~ches. All fighters taking part in the mission had holes from small arms fire. Two hours later two P-400s, flown by Capt. Thompson and Lt. Fincher, returned to strafe the barges that were unloading supplies onshore, and to destroy the supplies that had been abandoned in the landing craft that had been grounded on the reefs close inshore. Despite the apparent success of these attacks, Japanese records indicate that 5,200 troops had nonetheless landed by 7 September. Despite their new success as fighter-bomber pilots, the 67 th considered themselves fighter pilots, trained for air combat. But during every Tojo Time they were sent out on ground support sorties or to interdict suspected supply and troop concentrations, or to go after targets of opportunity. These missions would put them out of danger from falling bombs and marauding Zeros. Before long the firepower and low-altitude attack capability of the P-400 and the competence of the pilots led to outstanding results that were directly appreciated by the Marine infantry below. Soon 67 th pilots thought maybe the P-400 wasn't so bad after all, and it had a place in the Pacific War. COMAIRSOPAC Chief of Staff Capt. Matt Gardner noted that the P-400 was "tremendously effective in its strafing work." Time and again Gen. Vandegrift sent the once maligned fighter against Japanese strongpoints and asked for more of them. The 67 th morale began to swell. But if the pilots felt better, Harmon was irritated that his Army fighters were put into a secondary role, and he again appealed to Gen. Emmons in Hawaii for P38s and P-47s. The rains in early September made operations from Henderson and reconnaissance patrols difficult. The Japanese took advantage of the poor weather to continue their troop and supply build up near Tasimboko. To interdict the Japanese the Marines planned a raid from Tulagi, landing to the east of the village, attacking their rear, and withdrawing the same day. At 0700, 8 September, Lt.Col. Merritt Edson's 1Sl Marine Raider Battalion landed near Taivu Point to attack Japanese positions at Tasimboko. Maj. Brannon and Us. Childress, Fincher, and Head flew four P-400s in diving, strafing, and bombing attacks to drive the Japanese under cover during the Raider beach landing, and then attacked in front of the advancing Raiders. The Raiders met heavy resistance from a strong rear guard action as they neared their objective. The large main Japanese force of 4,000 troops under Gen. Kiytake Kawaguchi had left the area and was headed for the Marines' defensive perimeter near Henderson. Edson moved toward the village, which was defended by seasoned, well-equipped enemy troops ordered to protect their newly arrived store of arms, ammunition, and supplies that were vital to their offensive. As his force took up positions around

Part Two, Chapter 3 - September 1942 Tasimboko Edson called for a close air strike on huts that he knew were occupied by the enemy. At 0900 the P-400s of Capt. Thompson and Lts. Davis, Glazier, and Johnston attacked to aid the advance, but Edson continued to meet heavy opposition. Edson's Raiders finally routed the Japanese and destroyed their arms and supplies. He called for more air attacks at 1530 to support his Raider's withdrawal. The previous heavy rains and the day's continuous operations had taken their toll on the condition of the airfield, which had become a quagmire. To avoid most of the mud a short take off run had to be made. Maj. Brannon and Lts. Fincher and Head taxied their P-400s out onto the runway loaded with a 500lb. bomb and a full load of fuel and ammunition. Brannon taxied to the end ofthe runway, followed by Head and Fincher. Brannon, with half flaps, stood on the brakes and put the engine in full throttle. He released the brakes and the plane moved slowly forward, swaying and picking up speed, and finally lifted out of the sucking mud into the air. Next Lt. Head tried the same procedure, but his plane, in trying to pick up speed, skidded and soaked the plane with mud as it sloshed through pools of water. His aircraft was running out of runway and Head tried to lift it off, but the plane stalled from the weight of the mud on the wings, hit the ground, fractured the landing gear, broke the fuselage in half, and caught on fire. Head managed to unbuckle his seat beat and scrambled out of the burning wreckage. Fincher managed to take off over Head's burning wreckage. The two pilots covered the Marine withdrawal for two hours, intimidating the Japanese by flying lazy eights over the beach until the Marines were safely in the their landing craft calTying booty such as tinned crab meat and bottles of beer and sake. The pilots landed safely on reserve fuel at 1730 in a muddy spray. The Marines at Tasimboko commended the 67 th for its support of their operation there. They lost only two men and six wounded out of 600 men, and destroyed a large store of vital Japanese supplies that would be needed for Kawakuchi's offensive. Head was burned and bruised and was evacuated to New Caledonia the next day. At nightfall F4Fs were returning late from a long mission. Torches made from sake bottles with wicks were set along the runway, and truck lights lit the touchdown area. The lighting was inadequate, and the first F4F down ground looped and crashed off the side of the deeply rutted runway. During the landings four more Wildcats had to be written off, along with a bulldozer that was hit by a careening Wildcat. At the end of the day there were only 11

F4Fs and two P-400s operational on Henderson. On the 9 th , a F4F crashed on take off and four more were shot down while destroying seven bombers and three Zeros. After the arrival of four F4Fs from Espititu Santo, air strength on the 10th was 11 F4Fs, 22 SBDs, and three P-400s. The Army pilots developed dive-bombing techniques for their P-400s in these initial sorties. The pilots had to learn how to use the aircraft as a dive-bomber, as it had no dive brakes and its terminal velocity was high. They also had to use care when flying the aircraft close to the ground because of its tendency to stall. There was a warning notice on the fighter's instrument panel: "Do not release bomb when the nose angle is 30 degrees up or down or when the air speed exceeds 280mph." This made the dive-bombing too horizontal and slow, exposing the aircraft to enemy ground fire for too long. Pilots found that they were able to release the bomb at 70 degrees and still have it clear the propeller arc if immediate pressure were put on the stick to yank the aircraft away from the falling bomb. Unlike the Navy SBDs that began their dives at 15,000 feet or more, the P-400s began their dives at 5,000 feet and released their bomb just above the jungle at speeds of 300-350mph, then pulled up, weaving over the trees to avoid ground fire. They would then turn to strafe the area they had just bombed. The thick jungle made visual target identification difficult, and Marine units reported enemy targets on map locations and indicated their own positions by setting out panels. Nonetheless, most P-400 bombing and strafing attacks were blind, never actually seeing the enemy. However, when the Marines moved on the enemy position they often found it damaged or destroyed and sUlTounded by dead enemy troops. The Marines at Guadalcanal experienced a chronic shortage of artillery ammunition, and the emergence of the P-400 and its heavy firepower became a welcome sight. The 67 th pilots began to refer to themselves as the "Jagstaffel," a corruption of the Luftwaffe term "Jagdstaffel" which translates in German as "fighter squadron," not fighter-bomber. Maj.Gen. Archie Vandegrift, USMC commander, commended the P-400s: "...their armament and the zeal and training of their pilots enabled them to undertake ground support missions which were to contribute as materially, if not spectacularly, to the defense of Guadalcanal."

A 67FS P-400 had a fiat tire while taxiing; it succumbed to strafing Japanese fighters in September 1942 and had to be written off. Even as a wreck the Airacobra soldiered on as a source of spare parts, and then as a decoy for other strafing Japs. (USAF)

47

13th Fighter Command in World War II

Standing outside a sandbag shelter in the pilot's bivouac at Henderson: Capts. John Thompson (I) and Dale Brannon (2) and Lts. Obermiller (3), Childress (4), and Ryan (5). (Lansdale/Head/347FGA)

Fincher, Glazier, and I retired to our favorite bomb-proof dugout, a little beauty of 12 x 12 feet, with beam frame work that supported three-eighths inch metal plates and hundreds of pounds of sandbags. We felt fairly safe in there. About two minutes before the bombers came over our company in the shelter was increased by a Marine colonel, major, and their driver, who were caught short and had to find shelter. We were crouching in the dugout, puffing on our customary 'Tojo Time' cigarette. Capt. Brannon was standing just outside, watching the bombers overhead. Suddenly he shouted, 'Here they come!' and dived headlong into the dugout. He was in mid-air as the bOlJ1b hit us. I remember a strange sensation of lazily floating in space, no pain, no fright, just a momentary mental attitude of wondering what was happening here. Thinking maybe I was dead. Then suddenly what had happened dawned on me, as I was thrown into the air and plummeted down to earth with tons of dirt, armor plate, and 12 x 12 beams. I beat them all back to the ground and they landed on top of me in the middle of a fresh crater.

Capt. Matt Gardner, R.Adm. McCain's Chief of Staff, stated the P-400 "...was tremendously effective in strafing troops and landing barges." But lessons were learned from these early operations. The P-400 had poor air to ground communications and could not be adequately directed to ground support targets. The squadron arrived with insufficient ground personnel, as only seven armorers had accompanied the original 14 P-400s. In the future each aircraft would have its own crew chief and armorer. Fueling was a problem, as gasoline pumper trucks were unavailable, and each plane did not have its own hand pump to transfer fuel from 55-gallon drums. Spare parts were not shipped with the aircraft and had to be cannibalized from wrecked aircraft. The 67 th continued its ground support missions in mid-September. On the 10th , Lt. Deltis Fincher scored a direct bomb hit on a Japanese radio station on the island. On the return flight Lt. Zed Fountain landed and taxied in, and as he shut down his engine his 20mm cannon fired two rounds into the roof of a hangar. The shells exploded, slightly injuring 67 th pilot Lt. Robert Ferguson. On the 11 th at 0930, Maj. Brannon and Lts. Peter Childress, Zed Fountain, and Vernon Head were assigned to search for a Japanese force that was reported to be five miles east of Henderson. They sighted nothing and moved west to Cape Esperance, but saw nothing but the landing barges they had attacked previously. Capt. Thompson and Lts. Brown, Davis, Fountain, and Johnston went out on patrol before Tojo Time searching for the reported Japanese force. While they were gone 26 Betty bombers and eight Zeros attacked Henderson at 1205. The bombers hit the east side of the field, where Edson's Raiders were digging in, and eleven Marines were killed and 17 injured. A P-400 was destroyed, but a bomb hit next to a dugout sheltering 67 th personnel. Lt. Peter Childress related his participation in the raid: "It was high noon on September 11 th_Tojo Time-the black flag was up at the Pagoda. Due to a shortage of planes, some of the pilots had to take this bombing raid on the ground, and to determine who would fly; they cut for low cards in a very frayed and incomplete deck. Those not winning: Capt. Brannon, and Lts.

48

Lucky Day. Maj. Dale Brannon stands in a bomb crater from a bomb explosion that threw Brannon and several others into the air without serious injury. 12 September /942. (347 th FGA)

Part Two, Chapter 3 - September 1942 The Japanese 1000 pound bomb had hit only five feet away from the entrance of our dugout. It then penetrated the earth and blasted a huge cone of earth at least 25 feet in diameter sky high. Our dugout was part of this crater. The dirt piled up quickly around me and began to engulf me. I had bitter thoughts about being buried alive, ironically, after surviving the blast of the bomb that was almost close enough for me to touch. I felt helpless despair. I was pinned by Mother Earth, immobile, in a slumped standing position. My arms and legs were held fast. Desperately shaking my head, then extending my nose into fresh air, through the dust and smoke I could see other explosions. Then came a deadly silence in which joyously I was aware that I was alive, quickly followed by anxiety and concern about the others. The visions I had in my semi-stupor made me nauseated. Then I heard Fincher, 'Where's Pete? For Christ's sake where's Pete? Here he is.' He started digging like a dog, and after uncovering my left arm he called for help. Some medical corpsmen came. One was pulling on my tin hat and was about to pull my head off, but the chinstrap as well as my neck held on. Another was jabbing my free arm with a morphine shot. I think I got more needle than morphine.

About this time a gang gathered to dig me out. As they crowded around me they packed the dirt down. I felt my chest slowly collapsing and I tried to get them away, but to my amazement I could not speak. One fellow trying to get me free had his knee wedged between my back and the dirt. Finally they interpreted my frantic moans and some of them moved off. During the excavation I was worried about my hands. Once they were free I was told that they were not badly bunged up. With my relief about being alive and all right and the increasing effect of the morphine I felt rather happy as they hauled us off to the hospital in a bumpy truck. I must have been on a morphine jag, as I was humming a ditty when I was admitted. No one was killed or seriously injured." (The Japanese lost six bombers and a Zero during the attack - author) Later that day 30 Marine SBDs patrolling under Lt. T. Caldwell spotted a Japanese heavy cruiser and two destroyers, but only four of the dive-bombers made the attack due to bad weather, and no damage was done. Late that afternoon 24 Wildcats of VF-5 off the Saratoga under Lt. Leroy Simpler landed at Henderson for temporary duty in expectation of the upcoming Japanese offensive. The Saratoga had been torpedoed and withdrew for repairs, leaving VF-

A view of Bloody Ridge, with Henderson Field located as the long open patch just beyondThe ridgelines are denuded and scarred.AAF P-400s were instrumental in the battle, as they flew close support missions, ravaging the attacking Japs. (USMC)

Col. Merritt Edson lead his men in the valiant defense ofthe Ridge that saved Henderson and was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor. (USMC)

49

13 th Fighter Command in World War II 5 at Espiritu Santo. The F4F contingent on Cactus increased two fold, but after five weeks of grinding combat only five of the VF-5 fighters would remain in combat. Previously, Ghormley had steadfastly refused to use carrier-based aircraft from Cactus, but intelligence had detected the presence of a large Japanese naval and military force in the Truk-Palau region, indicating a coordinated attack on Guadalcanal with Rabaul-based aircraft and the newly landed Tokyo Express troops. Later that night these warships bombarded the island. At 0500 on 12 September Maj. Brannon, with a large patch on his chin from his encounter with the Jap bomb the day before, led a scramble that was a false alert, and all P-400s returned by 0830. Tojo Time came at 1100 when 26 Betty bombers escorted by 16 Zeros attacked. Simpler's Navy squadron was thrown into its first combat, along with five of Smith's VMF-223 and six of Galer's VMF-224 Wildcats. The Japanese lost 15 aircraft: four bombers and a Zero to VF-5; six bombers and a Zero to VMF-223; and three bombers to VMF-224. Marine AA fire claimed several bombers that may actually have been air combat victims on their way down. Henderson's radio facility sustained minor damage, and three SBDs

Capt. john Thompson, with Lts. Bryan Brown and Eugene Davis, attacked "Bloody Ridge" and left over 600 japanese dead, allowing Edson's men to retake the Ridge. (Thompson)

50

In the Aftermath of the savage battle for Bloody Ridge on 13/14 September, a Marine infantryman overlooks the foxholes and debris of the battle where Col. Edson's raiders repelled the japanese Kawaguchi Force to save Henderson from being over run. (USMC)

were destroyed on the ground. In the afternoon a Japanese naval force was reported on their way to Guadalcanal, and American intelligence had detected Gen. Kawaguchi's main Japanese force, which had moved inland from Tasimboko. Vandegrift decided to meet Kawaguchi's attack by concentrating his Marines on a ridge connecting open hills about a mile south of the Henderson Field runway. Lt.Col. Merritt Edson's lSI Raider Battalion, reinforced by a parachute battalion, took up forward positions on the ridge and waited for the attack. At midnight on 12/13 September the Japanese made ~ concerted effort to recapture Henderson. A heavy naval bombardment alternated between the beachhead, airfield, and ridge, and was followed by a three-pronged attack on Marine positions. Two of the attacks were repulsed, but the most brutal fighting was on Lunga Ridge, defended by Edson's Raiders, who were driven slowly from the ridge, and by the next morning only the inner perimeter defense kept the Japanese from overrunning Henderson. Throughout the night the field was under mortar and artillery fire, and snipers were firing on personnel on the field. At 0730 on the 14th three P-400s led by Capt. John Thompson, with Lts. Bryan Brown and Eugene Davis, attacked "Bloody Ridge," as it would come to be known. They did not have to fly far to the ridge. After takeoff they only had to circle the field in a wide left turn, climb to a 1,000 feet, and then dive on the ridge from the west at tree top level. From the briefing at the Pagoda, Thompson only knew the relative positions of the 2,000 Japanese troops and Edson's 800 Marines on a rough hand-drawn map. The air action was so close to the airfield that the ground crews watched and heard the battle. The surprised Japanese on and below the sOllthern ridge were marshaling for another attack when the P-400s bombed and strafed them at 25 to 30 feet. The fire from the 20mm cannon and two .50 caliber nose guns and the four .30 caliber machine guns in the wings was devastating. On their second run the Japanese were prepared and the P-400s faced heavy small arms and machine gun fire. Lt. Brown's fighter received a hit in the radiator, and he used his strafing dive speed t9 gain enough altitude to reach the runway before

Part Two, Chapter 3 - September 1942 his engine seized, and he dead sticked in safely. On the next run Thompson's radiator was also hit, and he too used his diving speed to gain altitude to reach the runway and also landed without power. Lt. Davis continued to strafe the ridge until he ran out of ammunition. The attack devastated the Japanese, who suffered over 600 dead on the ridge and allowed a Marine counter attack to retake the ridge from the demoralized enemy, who retreated into the jungle. For their action, Capt. Thompson was awarded the Navy Cross and LIs. Brown and Davis the Silver Star by Generals Vandegrift and Geiger. Geiger told Thompson: "You'll never read it in the papers, but that three PAOO mission of yours (at Bloody Ridge) saved Guadalcanal." When no one was watching Geiger reached under the seat of his jeep and took out a bottle of whiskey and handed it to Thompson, telling him to hide it under his shirt, as he didn't have enough for everyone. (Thompson) The last entry in a dead Japanese infantry officer's diary reflected the outcome of the P-400 attack: "Intensive bombing and strafing followed our unsuccessful attack at dawn, and our efforts to take the field are doomed to failure." At 0700 the American high command becam~ desperate and flew 18 more Wildcats-replacement aircraft for VMF-223 and YMF-224-from the carriers Hornet and Wasp. They headed for Henderson to meet the day's Tojo Time, but unfortunately four were lost on landing or in accidents. During the afternoon additional Saratoga aircraft arrived: Lt.Cdr. Louis Kirn flew in 12 SBDs of YS-3, and Lt. Harold Larson flew in six TBFs ofVT-8. For the day Cactus shot down 11 Japanese (The Marines claimed four bombers and three Zeros and the Navy claimed two bombers and two Zeros) but lost six aircraft. Between 11-13 September Henderson had gained 60 additional aircraft, but on the 12 th Rabaul received 140 aircraft (60 fighters, 72 bombers, and eight reconnaissance planes) of VAdm. Masasato Yamagata's new 26 th Air Flotilla. The grim defeat at Bloody Ridge caused the Japanese to rethink their Guadalcanal counter attack strategy. They had just expended much of the strength they had built up in costly Tokyo Express runs. The Ichiki and Kawaguchi forces squandered on the Ilu River and Bloody Ridge were only a portion of the Japanese forces that Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake, Commander of the Japanese 17 th Army, commanded on Rabaul. The Japanese pulled back and attempted to consolidate their three forces west of Henderson, and the Marines sent out patrols to harass them. From the onset of the Guadalcanal invasion the Japanese had underestimated the strength and will of their American enemy. Their planning was inadequate and unsupported by patrols and reconnaissance, and their attacks were uncoordinated and mrogantly carried out. What they needed were decisive naval battles and heavy reinforcements to retake Guadalcanal-Tulagi. In the meantime they continued frequent air raids, along with the nightly Washing Machine Charlie air raids

and small but ferocious hit and run infantry attacks in the jungle around Henderson. By mid-September, the Tokyo Express arrived on an almost nightly basis and replaced the Bloody Ridge losses and added two infantry regiments. A powerful enemy force was gathering far to the west under the cover of the jungle. Gen. Maseo Murayama was in command ofthe Guadalcanal forces, and by midOctober he mustered 20,000 well-equipped troops supplemented with heavy weapons and artillery. The drawback to the small destroyer/transports of the Tokyo Express was that trucks and tanks could only be shipped in lm'ge transports. In the early morning on 14 September Maj. Brannon and Lts. Childress and Glazier left in a C-47 for Tontouta, and in the late afternoon were replaced by Lts. Albert Farquharson, Robert Ferguson, E. Fernam, and Delton Goerke, who arrived in the first of several recurrent exchanges to relieve pilots from combat. For their heroic actions from 14 August to 14 September, Capt. Dale Brannon and 2Lt. Dellis Fincher were awarded the Silver Star. On 16 September Lts. Brown, Fincher, Fountain, and Johnston returned to Tontouta, and Lts. D. Miller, 1. Morton, and 1. Sawyer arrived from Espiritu Santo in P-400s. A P-400 piloted by Lt. Walsh was lost in a landing accident on Espiritu, and another P-400 piloted by Lt. R. Kaiser had engine problems and remained behind. The Airacobra pilots on Guadalcanal nicknamed each other after the characters in Damon Runyon stories: "Dancing Dan"; "Guinea Mike"; "Harry the Horse"; "Handaxe John"; "Spanish John" (Sawyer); and "Little Isadore" (Patterson). The next day Capt. Thompson checked out his new pilots by bombing and strafing the Japanese front lines and flying interdiction against Japanese supplies and Tokyo Express landing craft. On 19 September they attacked landing craft near Morovovo village on the western end of the island and destroyed two by bombs and two by strafing, and incapacitated the rest by strafing. A strafing run on the village exploded a building containing ammunition in a huge explosion. On the 22 nd five P-400s and Marine SBDs hit newly built huts in the Visale area. A P-400, flown by 2Lt. E. Fernam, was shot down, and S&R was hindered by bad weather. Fernam returned to base in poor health 12 days later and evacuated after being rescued by a coast watcher. On 17 September air strength on Guadalcanal was 63 operational aircraft, of which 36 were recent arrivals from the Navy carriers: 29 F4Fs; 26 SBDs; 5TBFs; and 3 P-400s. Maj.Gen. Ross Rowell, CG of Marine Air Wings Pacific (MAWPac), commented: "What saved Guadalcanal was the loss of so many carriers." Six more Navy TBFs arrived on the 18 th , and two more SBDs and TBFs on the 28 th • During the last half of September Cactus lost two or three planes per day, mostly through weather and accidents, as Japanese attacks were diminished during that fortnight. The loss rate for Marine VMFs for the first 25 days of the Guadalcanal campaign was 57%, which could not be sustained. On 17 September Navy COMINCH Adm. Ernest King sent a memo to Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George Marshall. The memo stated that the grave situation at Guadalcanal: "...made it imperative that the future continuous flow of army fighters be planned at once, irrespective of, and in higher priority than the commitments to any other theater" (e.g. "Europe first" author)

51

13 th Fighter Command in World War II Marshall answered King, saying that Nimitz had the authority to move aircraft in the Pacific and "higher authorities" had assigned TORCH (the invasion of North Africa) the highest priority. The rift between the Army and Navy was widening, and Arnold made a brief visit to the Pacific in late September. He met with Harmon, who gave him a very gloomy report on the meager supplies reaching Guadalcanal and the steady stream of Japanese troops and aircraft moving into the upper Solomons in preparation for a large offensive on Guadalcanal. Arnold maintained that the base facilities in the South Pacific were insufficient to handle anything but what had been allocated to them, and the main problem was one of distribution of aircraft and personnel from Hawaii, which he considered a vast base of supply. As the debate escalated Marshall realized that the entire outcome in the South Pacific depended on the Guadalcanal result. Marshall authorized 27 medium bombers and 133 fighters for the Pacific, with 23 heavy bombers to fly in and 53 additional fighters to be shipped in by water. At the time there were 1,014 air personnel at Cactus: 917 Marine; 64 Navy; and 33 Air Force. Cactus ground forces were also reinforced, as on 18 September a large U.S. Navy convoy debarked in the early morning and embarked before 1800, when the Japanese Navy usually came down the Slot. The Marine garrison was reinforced with 4,262 troops of the fresh 7 th Marine Division, along with food and gasoline. The reinforcements allowed Vandegrift to consolidate his defensive perimeter and consider a minor expansion. During 23-26 September Vandegrift decided to expand his perimeter on the east to the Tenaru River and the west to the Matanikau River, while the southern line was to remain constant, as it was bounded by impenetrable jungle. The 1Sl Battalion of the 7th Marines made a landing on the coast west of Point Cruz, beyond the Matanikau towards Kokumbona, while at the same time Edson's Raiders attacked to the east bank of the Matanikau, hoping to link up with the 1st Battalion. Both forces met unexpected heavy resistance, with the 1st becoming surrounded on a ridge with heavy casualties, and the Raiders were pinned down at Matanikau's east bank. Both forces requested close air support. The 1st Battalion got support from 67 th P-400s and Marine and Navy SBDs, as well as naval gunfire from the destroyer Ballard. Lts. Farquharson, Ferguson, Goerke, Miller, and Morton made numerous strafing at-

52

tacks, clearing a path to the beach. The 1st was then able to fight their way back to the beach and evacuate into their landing craft. The Raiders retreated back to the Henderson perimeter. Between the 15 th and 26 th no Japanese aircraft were shot down near Guadalcanal, as bad weather curtailed operations. During this period the Japanese were reinforcing their depleted Betty units at Rabaul and Kavieng, and withdrew the battered 4 th Kokutai, which had lost 40 crew and 50 aircraft over Guadalcanal and New Guinea. On the 22nd Gen. Roy Geiger answered pilot's complaints about having to take off from the rough and cratered runway at Henderson by taking off from the same runway himself in a SBD and dropping a 1,000lb. bomb on reported troops in the Visale area. On 27 September air combat intensified, as a coast watcher on New Georgia sighted 17 Japanese bombers and 14 escorts, but there were also 12 undetected Zeros patrolling in advance of the main formation to ambush scrambling American fighters. Cactus sent up 34 F4Fs, but the dozen patrolling Zeros did not see them and left the area. Ten VMF-223 and VMF-224 pilots shot down six bombers and two Zeros, and six VF-5 pilots shot down four Zeros, with two of the pilots becoming aces (Ensigns John Wesolowski and Francis Register). All six Wildcats returned with holes, and two pilots were slightly wounded. On the 28 th 27 Bettys and 42 Zeros attacked Henderson, and the bombers were decimated, with 24 of the 27 attacking bombers (and one Zero) shot down; however, as usual, Japanese figures were much less, reporting eight bombers lost and 17 sustaining light to heavy damage. VMF-223 claimed six bombers and the Zero, VMF224 claimed eight bombers (Galer became a double ace with three bombers), an~ VF-5 claimed ten bombers. The large Zero escort was largely ineffective, as many arrived late, were out of position, or did not intercept the American Grummans. Their air losses and battle damage for the past two days caused the Japanese to again rethink their tactics, as the large number of escorts did not prevent the disproportionate destruction of bombers by a smaller force of Wildcats. On the 29 th the Japanese sent nine Bettys down to act as decoys for a 27-plane fighter sweep. The Bettys turned around before reaching Cactus after guiding the fighters to the island, and the Zeros swept in, causing minimal damage, and there was no interceptions or claims. For the next ten days the Japanese cut back their attacks, hoping for a change of fortune once they completed their forward fighter base at Buin and the improved facilities at Buka.

4 October 1942

During the last days of September and first week in October rains soaked Henderson and Fighter One, making the runways a quagmire. On I October there was a hiatus in the rain, and Lts. Farquharson, Jarman, Miller, Morton, and Sawyer took off armed with 100lb. bombs to attack Japanese targets of opportunity to the west. They found a new building at Visale and strafed through heavy ground fire, causing it to blaze from fuel stored inside. On returning to Henderson Lt. Faquharson found that his electrical system was damaged, and he had to crank down his landing gear by hand,

347 th Fighter Group insignia was fashioned aftertheAmericallnfantry Division's insignia, with the lightning flash and Southern Cross. (USAF)

but his flaps could not be lowered. Faquharson tried to hit the very end of the runway to give himself as much runway to slow down on the no-flaps landing. He hit a few feet short of the steel matting into the mud and tore off his landing gear. The fighter skidded along the matting and safely stopped facing the direction of the landing. The three other fighters in the landing pattern were forced to land at Fighter One. During the night of 3/4 October the destroyers of the Tokyo Express were reinforced by the seaplane tender Nisshin, whose size allowed it to land a large number of troops and artillery pieces. The P-400s and SBDs had only limited success against the Express, as it would not come into range until the late afternoon, and poor weather and darkness interfered with missions sent against it. Once landed these troops and equipment, and new storage buildings became targets for the P-400s. The PAOOs and SBDs were not the only aircraft to attack the Japanese in the area. In August and September B-17s of the IIBG flew 299 search missions and 151 bombing missions against Japanese air bases, supply centers, and shipping. By October there were 50 B-17s available in the South Pacific.

Activation of the 347 th Fighter Group The 67 th was a fighter squadron, but had been operating in a larger capacity despite a chronic shortage of aircraft and equipment. It was operating a combat base at Guadalcanal and a home base at Tontouta. From Tontouta the 67 th supplied pilots, ground crew, aircraft and parts, ran a combat school· for newly arrived pilots from the States, provided periodic relief of crew and pilots back from combat, and was responsible for the air defense of New Caledonia. To make matters more difficult for the 67 t \ on 29 September it was divided in two by the Adjunctant General's Office, and from one half the 339FS and the 347FG Headquarters was formed. Capt. John Thompson took command of the stripped 67FS. On 3 October the 347 th Fighter Group was activated with headquarters at Tontouta and had the 6T\ 68 th , 70 th , and the planned 339FS assigned to it. Recently arrived Maj. George McNeese commanded the new group, rather than the more experienced Maj. Dale Brannon, who was to command the 339th. The veteran Cactus pilots thought this to be an

53

13th Fighter Command in World War II

Meeting in the 67FS Operations hut at Guadalcanal. (L-R) Lt. Leland Ramp, Lt. james jarman, and Capt. john Thompson. (USAF)

affront to Brannon, who pilot Doug Canning considered the "Godfather of the 13'h Fighter Command." The 347 HQ staff was made up of eight officers and nine enlisted men of the 67FS. McNeese's new Operations Officer was Philippines veteran Maj. Thomas Christian, and Maj. Thomas Hubbard, who in early 1942 escaped from the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, was to be the group Executive Officer. The formation of the 347'h was inauspicious. The floors and sides of the Headquarter buildings were constructed from empty aircraft crates, and the ceilings were made from stretched

tents. The eight officers were housed in a leased private home of a wealthy farmer. The farm had a caretaker and two servants, along with a small swimming pool. The 347FG and 67FS messed together, as both camps were adjoining and the 347'h did not have adequate personnel for a separate mess. "B" and "c" rations (Spam, Vienna sausages, and corned beef) were all that was available for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Fortunately, the caretaker actually liked Spam and traded the Americans for a few fresh eggs. The disappointed Brannon was assigned as CO to the 339'h Fighter Squadron, the "Sunsetters," which was to be a P-38 squadron. The 339'h had 33 pilots and 102 enlisted men assig!1ed to it, and of these, seven pilots (Canning, Dewey, Holmes, Miller, Faquharson, Goerke, and Morton) and 16 enlisted men had been sent to Guadalcanal. During their first weeks on Cactus, although separation had taken place on paper, distinct squadron 67(h/339'h operations were uncommon because of the shortage of aircraft and pilots. Pilots from different squadrons lived and flew together under one squadron name. 0 P-38s had aITived for the 339'h to fly, and its seven pilots lived with their old friends from the 67FS and flew their P-39s and P-400s. The Japanese had come to fear the "long-nosed fighters," as the Japanese described the Aircobras in their diaries, as the maligned fighter constantly and effectively divebombed and strafed enemy troop concentrations, gun emplacements, and supply lines. At Tontouta the two squadrons lived and flew together, but by 22 October the 339FS was physically separated and operating on its own, with a separate kitchen, mess tent, and squadron supply.

julius "jake" Jacobson was a very good pilot, and for that reason Mitchell chose him as his wing man-to protect his back. (Lansdale)

Canning (left) and Mitchell at Fiji Island, September 1942. Canning credits Mitchell for his training program that enabled the (Canning)

54

Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942 The 339tl1 began flying the P-39, but would transition to the new P38 when it arrived. The 347 tl1 was assigned four squadrons: the 67 t \ the 68 th (stationed on Tonga); the 70 th (stationed on Fiji); and the 339th • All would soon be based at Tontouta and rotate their men and aircraft to the AAF "Cactus Flight" fighter pool. The "new" fighters arriving at Tontouta were P-39s and D-ls, Ls, and Ks. They were assembled, tested, and assigned to individual pilots, who trained in it and took it into combat. At Guadalcanal the P-39s joined the remaining P-400s, which continued in their close support role. The P-39, with better performance, flew close support, but also flew escort missions for Navy and Marine dive-bombers and torpedobombers and joined the F4Fs in scrambles. Doug Canning: "I really enjoyed the P-39. John Mitchell ran the program and trained us, and we got to be pretty good fighter pilots. Mitchell picked the best pilot to be his wingman and Jake Jacobson was picked, which was too bad for Jake. He never got to lead any missions, and he was never able to do much on his own, as he was always watching that Mitchell wouldn't get shot down." Maintenance and Repair Maintenance and repair in the Air Force was divided into four echelons that depended on the type and amount of time necessary to complete it. The first echelon of maintenance was the completion of daily checks to be certain that an aircraft was operational, but did not include any repair work. The second echelon involved easy field repairs and general care of aircraft so that it could participate in daily operations. First and second echelon duties were the responsibility of squadron ground crews, and involved repairs that could be completed within 12 to 36 hours (the time between missions). When the second echelon was unable to repair an aircraft it was sent to a service group to make third echelon repairs. At this time the engineering officer elected to write off or repair the aircraft. Early in the Guadalcanal Campaign, when aircraft replacements were in short supply, aircraft that would have otherwise been written off were repaired. The third echelon involved major repairs,

such as replacement of major parts (e.g. wing and tail assemblies), substantial sheet metal repairs, engine changes, repairs to the electrical and hydraulic systems, propeller repairs, and landing gear repair and replacement. To perform third echelon maintenance, a service group was assigned two service squadrons that consisted of a number of highly skilled personnel: mechanics, electricians, instrument technicians, propeller technicians, sheet metal workers, machinists, and dope and fabric men, etc. After the damage was evaluated the aircraft was assigned to these specialists, who worked as crews for repair. Each service squadron was allocated four trailers to perform the various precision repairs: one was a machine shop; one was an instrument shop; and the other two were supply units. The machine shop planed, shaped, turned, and milled aircraft parts for repair or modification. The instrument shop repaired, calibrated, maintained, or modified the delicate and accurate aircraft instruments. The supply trailers contained and managed spare parts. The four trailers functioned as an efficient and compact unit in the field. Fourth echelon repair was the function of the Air Depot Group that provided supplies of all kinds, not only to the service squadrons, but also for itself, as it set up the procedure and equipment to perform large-scale maintenance functions, assembling, modifying, and repairing aircraft at Tontouta. Tontouta was never a base for tactical units, but was the Air Force's air supply depot administered by the Air Depot Group, which arrived at New Caledonia in late November 1942 and remained there until June 1944 when the Far East Air Service Command undertook the duty. They built a large machine shop capable of performing complete aircraft overhauls and producing parts that were not readily available. Every maintenance function was set up: paint shops; dope and fabric shops; sheet metal shops; and prop shops. Other necessary repair and maintenance facilities were established in a very central large facility. In October, Lt.Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake proceeded with his plans to recapture Guadalcanal, and after its capture would continue on to attack Port Moresby, New Guinea. Despite the massacres of the Ichiki Detachment of 900 men at the Ilu River and then of3,600 men of the Kawaguchi Force at Bloody Ridge, Hyakutake's plan was to attack Guadalcanal by 12 October with the 2nd Sendai Division and the veteran 38 th Division. Rabaul was reinforced with more than 180 naval aircraft, more than three times the number available to the Americans on Guadalcanal. The air base at Buka in the northern Solomons was improved to receive bombers, which would shorten their route to Guadalcanal by 160 miles. The fighter strip at Buin was completed, and 30 Zeros were sent there on 20 October. Naval forces were also increased, as the battleships Haruna, Hiei, Kirishima, and Kongo were sent down t; the Solomons for the first appearance of the Dreadnoughts in the theater. In his message to the 17 th Army Hyakutake stated: "The operation to surround and recapture Guadalcanal will truly decide the fate of the control of the entire Pacific."

The third echelon of repair involved major repairs, such as replacement of major parts (e,g, wing and tail assemblies), substantial sheet metal repairs, engine changes, repairs to the electrical and hydraulic systems, propeller repairs, and landing gear repair and replacement. (Canning)

As the situation in early October worsened Harmon made three suggestions to COMSOPAC: (I) immediate reinforcement by not less than one infantry combat team; (2) strengthen naval forces in the area; and (3) bring in all available airdrome construction per-

55

13 th Fighter Command in World War II sonnel and their equipment. Harmon requested the completion of two all-weather runways and dispersal areas, improved camouflage, and airfield fueling systems and supply so that there would be a constant minimum reserve of a quarter million gallons available. Harmon had implored Ghormley to improve Henderson so that B17s could be based there so they would not have to fly 700 miles from Espiritu Santo, as once based at Cactus the Flying Fortresses could begin operations against the Buin-Tonolei-Buka area to attack and disrupt enemy air operations. By the beginning of October the Tokyo Express had used darkness and consummate proficiency to land over 20,000 troops by destroyer and barge. Again, destroyers carrying up to 1,000 troops each would leave the Shortlands-Faisi area during the afternoon, and by 1800, just before sunset, it would be just out of the 200 mile range of Guadalcanal dive-bombers. Cactus sent out some very unsuccessful SBD night attacks, losing several planes in the darkness. The destroyers would then race down the Slot and arrive off Guadalcanal at about midnight to unload troops across the Matanikau River, about ten miles west of Henderson. The unloading of troops was usually coordinated with Washing Machine Charlie or the naval shelling of the field. The unloading took two or three hours, and then the Express raced out of the range of Henderson dive-bombers and Army fighter-bombers before sunrise. Dive-bombers were successful against the Express on only one day. On 5 October Lt.Cdr. Louis Kim led a mixed group of nine VS-3 and VMSB-141 SBDs against six destroyers. They claimed to have sunk one and possibly

sunk another, but the actuality was major damage to two destroyers from near misses. On the 9th Gen. Hyakutake arrived at Guadalcanal via the Express to take personal command of the recapture of the island. Feating a Japanese invasion of Ndeni Island in the Santa Cruz Islands, 335 miles to the southeast of Henderson, Adm. Ghormley, supported by Adm. Turner, was pressing for their occupation. However, Generals Harmon and Vandegrift were openly against the diversion of any forces from the precarious situation at Guadalcanal. Ghormley held a conference with Turner and Harmon on 6 October announcing his intention to proceed with the Ndeni oper:ation, but agreed with Harmon to send reinforcements to Cactus at once. On the 13 th the 164th Infantry regiment of the Americal Division based in New Caledonia was transferred to the island, and Edson's Raiders were evacuated for a well-deserved rest. With the 164th on hand, Vandegrift decided again to move his western perimeter to the east bank of the Matanikau River to keep Japanese artillery out of range of Henderson. On 7-9 October, elements of the 2 nd , 5 th , and 7 th Marines attacked and, unlike the unsuccessful September attack, succeeded, as the main Japanese forces were located far to the west, near Kokumbona and Tassafaronga. Only about 150 Japanese resisted at the mouth ofthe river and were surrounded and wiped out by the 5 th Marines. Further upriver, the 7 th Marines and the 3rd Battalion of the 2 nd Marines forced a crossing in heavy rains and then attacked toward the coast at Point Cruz. They fought their way through thick jungle, sporadically trapping

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56

Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942

Maj.Gen. Roy Geiger (left) meets with his ace, Maj. Joe Foss, who tied World War I ace Eddie Rickenbacker's record of 26 victories and was awarded the Medal of Honor (USMC)

The first of the great Marine aviators at Cactus (L-R): Maj. John Smith, Lt.Col. Richard Mangrum, and Capt. Marion Carl. (USMC)

large enemy units in ravines, calling in artillery and SBD and P400 close air support directed from the ground to decimate the trapped enemy. The threat of the new Japanese offensive supported by naval units gathering at Rabaul caused the Marines to again withdraw back to the defensive perimeter. The Japanese offensive intended to move east of the Matanikau River in order to bring Henderson back under artillery fire. Meanwhile, the 67 th continuously patrolled the area west of the river and bombed and strafed anything that looked suspicious with their remaining P-400s and newly arrived P-39s. By early October air operations at Cactus were at a low point. On 1 October Cactus aircraft numbered 58 aircraft (34 F4Fs, 16 SBDs, 5 TBFs, and 3 P-400s), and two days later the figure dropped to 49. The Marine squadrons had been on the island since 20 August and were war-weary and depleted. Six pilots of John Smith's VMF-223 had been killed or wounded, and Galer's VMF-224 was only slightly better off. Both Smith and Galer had been forced to bailout of damaged fighters on 2 October but both were rescued. Each of the great air leaders would be awarded the Medal of Honor for his exploits on Cactus. The 67FS had received sporadic replacements and managed to keep their P-400s flying on bombing and strafing missions. On 8 October the squadron received 11 new P-

39s, and on the 9th VMF-121 under Maj. Leonard "Duke" Davis arrived with 24 F4Fs. Davis' XO was Capt. Joe Foss, who would later tie Eddie Rickenbacker for America's Ace of Aces with 26 victories and be awarded the Medal of Honor. On the 16 th , VMF223 under Capt. John Smith was relieved after it had scored 111 1/ 2 victories, 19 by Smith, who was the highest-scoring American fighter pilot in the war to date. Capt. Marion Carl followed Smith with 16.5 victories, and seven other Marine pilots became aces. Of the VMSB-232 SBD pilots, only commander Lt.Col. Richard Mangrum was miraculously un~cathed, as out of the rest of his pilots seven were killed, four wounded, and the remainder were hospitalized for disease and fatigue. Four rear seat gunners were killed and one wounded. After the low point of 49 aircraft on the 3rd , the number increased to 61 on the 7 t\ and 96 with the arrival of 11 P39s on the 8th and the 24 F4Fs ofVMF-121 on the 9'h. On the 8'h 11 pilots flew new P-39s into Guadalcanal. Eight of the pilots had been transferred from the 70FS that was part of the new 347FG. The plan was for the new P-39s to fly off Fighter One with the Wildcats, while the P-400s were to continue flying ground support from Henderson. But Vandegrift was so pleased with the P400s in their close air support role that he diverted the P-39s to that role, particularly after it was found that they also could not reach

70FS (August I 942).Top (L-R): Hendrix, Cosart, Gorham, Robinson, W. Williams (CO), Stevens, Harris, Schindler, and Houseworth. Middle (L-R): Johnson, Petit, Lanphier, Debernardie, McKulla, Barnes, Rivers, Buck, Barber, and Williams. Front (L-R): Daggitt, Fiedler, Dunbar, Hendrix, Topoll, Vargas, Holloway, Frame, Kuntz, and Koenig. (Lansdale/347th FGA)

57

13th Fighter Command in World War II

67 th Fighter Squadron "Fighting Cocks" pose on P-400 "Hell's Bells." Sitting on Wing (L-R) Albert Faquharson (no shirt), james Jarman (cap), Jerome Sawyer (t-shirt), and james Campbell. Near cockpit: F.Williams (Pith helmet) and A. Fitzgerald (cap/shirtless)-both were armorers. Front: (L-R) F. Fjelstad, George Dewey, Leland Ramp (leaning on wing behind Dewey), Besby Holmes (dark Jacket holding door),james Morton (cap holding door), Delton Goerke (cap behind Morton), Douglas Canning (holding door/hand on hip), Robert Kerstetter Oust behind Goerke shoulder), G. Headtler; and D. Miller. (Lansdale/ Canning)

V.Adm. Jinichi Kusaka was the C-in-C japanese Southeast Area Fleet and the I Ith Air Fleet when he arrived at Rabaul on 8 October 1942. (USMC)

Betty bomber of the 705th Naval Air Group being prepared for a missionThe Betty medium bomber was the mainstay of the japanese bomber force and took heavy losses. (Lansdale)

58

Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942 the altitude of the Japanese bombers and fighters. The new fighters arrived with the standard red circle painted out of the white star of the national insignia, as the red ball could be confused for a Japanese "meatball' insignia. VAdm. Jinichi Kusaka had arrived on Rabaul on 8 October as the C-in-C of the Southeastern Fleet, and found 156 operational aircraft (77 Zeros, 62 Bettys, and 17 assorted aircraft). These aircraft were operating with the 25 1h Air Flotilla under R.Adm. Yamada Sadayoshi, the 61h Air Flotilla under VAdm. Yamagata Seigo, and the 1st Air Flotilla under R.Adm. Ichimaru Rinosuke. The 25 1h Air Flotilla consisted of the Tinain Air Group (36 Zeros and six recon aircraft), 2nd Air group (16 Zeros and five Vals), Toko Air Group (six flying boats), and an advanced detachment of the 6th Air Group (25 Zeros). The 26 1h Wing consisted of the Kisarazu Air Group (15 Bettys), the MisawaAir Group (12 Bettys), and the TakaoAir Group Detachment (19 Bettys). The 21 SI Air Group consisted of the Kanoya Air Group (16 Bettys). On the 91\ after heavy rains during the night, six P-400s flown by Lts. Holmes, Kerstetter, Kaiser, Morton, Patterson, and Sawyer were scheduled for a mission to bomb and strafe the Kokumbona area from 0545 to 0700. However, Lt. Holmes' fighter got two flat tires while taxiing, Lt. Sawyer's aircraft hit a muddy hole and broke

off the nose wheel, and Lt. Kaiser's engine ran rough and he aborted. The remaining three P-400s dropped their bombs and strafed the area in front of the Marine perimeter. At 0845 three P-400s were scheduled for another mission, and Maj. Thomas Hubbard with Lts. Kaiser and Stern taxied for take off. Lt. Kaiser's aircraft built up a heavy accumulation of mud under its wheels and ground to a stop. Fearing he would damage the gear Kaiser shut down, while the other two aircraft managed to take off and attack the Japanese. At 1100, with the field drying under the hot sun, a flight of rearmed and refueled P-400s took off, flown by Lts. Holmes, Kaiser, Miller, and Sawyer. All were able to lift off and dropped bombs and strafed the area between Matanikau and Kokumbona. The targets could not be seen from the air, and ground-to-air radio and signal panels directed the attack. The flight returned at 1200 just as the black attack alert flag was flying and aircraft were being dispersed around the field, but the Japanese bombers did not attack the field. The P400s were rearmed and refueled, and between 1410 and 1500 Maj. Hubbard and Lts. Canning and Ramp bombed and blindly strafed Japanese troop concentrations west of Point Cruz. The Marines below directed the attacks and reported that they had been very effective. Canning described their technique: "The landscape on Guadalcanal was a series of parallel ridges, their tops covered by brown grass and separated by deep ravines covered in heavy jungle, where the Japs would hide. The Marines would mark the ridge top where they were sitting with three panels, and anything beyond that point was fair game. We didn't learn until later that our bombs would hit the tree canopy and explode there, causing little damage. The Marines reported that the .30 and .50 caliber fire could be effective if concentrated on a target we actually saw or were accurately directed to, but most of the time we just dropped bombs and fired into the jungle. One effective method of finding the Japs was to takeoff at sunrise and catch them when they were cooking breakfast. At that time of the day there was no wind, and the smoke from their fires rose directly up, giving away their position so we could accurately hit their camps. It didn't take long for the Japs to figure out what we were doing and start phony fires to throw us off."

Lee Ramp of the 67FS was an effective journeyman ground support and strafing pilot. (Canning)

On the night of 8/9 October the Nisshin again joined the Tokyo Express to land heavy equipment on Guadalcanal. Before sunrise the next morning nine Marine SBDs of VS-71 under John Eldridge took off to attack the withdrawing Japanese shipping at first light. They were followed at 0545 by three·P-39s and four P-400s from Henderson led by Capts. John Mitchell and William Sharpsteen, and followed by Lts. Farron, Gillon, Jacobson, Purnell, and Shaw to escort the SBDs. Lt. Jacobson returned after three-quarters of an hour with a defective belly tank. Five destroyers and a cruiser were spotted withdrawing 150 miles from Guadalcanal in the New Georgia Channel. The naval force had been attacked the night before and the cruiser was smoking, and the destroyers were screening as the SBDs attacked. They made several hits on the ships but were interrupted by five Zeros and fi ve float planes. The Airacobras were flying at 12,000 feet when they spotted the enemy float planes below them and peeled off to attack. Capt. Mitchell, flying a P-39,

59

13 th Fighter Command in World War II

Mitchell and Gillon.

On 9 October Capt. John Mitchell scored the first of his eight I 3AF victories and the first ofthe 339FS' 163 victories ofWWlI when he downed a floatplane. (Mitchell)

dove on a biplane from behind and 3,000 feet above and hit the agile but fragile float Zero with his cannon, blowing it to pieces. Mitchell's 37mm cannon jammed, as did his .50 caliber machine guns, and he was unable to take advantage of downing other good targets. Lt. William Shaw dove into a head on attack from 8,000 feet. The Jap never wavered, and Shaw had to veer off after hitting the Zero with both his cannon and machine guns, causing it to fall into a spin. Shaw's aircraft was hit in the prop by small caliber 7.7mm bullets but kept flying. Lt. Farran was flying under Shaw's spinning victim and finished it off when all his guns jammed and he left the battle. Capt. Sharpsteen dove from 5,000 feet and missed a .50 caliber full-deflection shot. He came around for a head on attack and all his guns jammed. As the Japanese plane approached the American plane was hit several times. A shell penetrated the windscreen and cut Sharpsteen's face and hands. Lt. Purnell in a P400 hit a Japanese plane with his .50 caliber guns, as his 20mm jammed. The bullets blew pieces off of the enemy, but Purnell had to break off his attack before he could see the fate of his quarry, but was credited with a victory. Lt. Oscar Gillon made three head-on passes and undershot his target each time, and all his guns jammed

60

on the third pass and he left the battle. The Japanese shipping escaped with slight damage. The 339FS had scored its first aerial victories of the 163 it would score during the war. The pilots cursed the chronic gun jamming that deprived them of more victories that day. Late that afternoon, the P-39s took part in two more missions carrying 100lb. incendiaries and GP bombs. Capt. Mitchell and Lts. Banfield, Dews, Dinn, Farron, Gillon, Jacobson, Purnell, Shaw, and Stem hit the Marovovo area beyond Cape Esperance directed by Marine forward observers. For his action that day Shaw was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC). The next day the P-39s flew two missions up to New Georgia as an escort for SBDs on shipping attacks. By 11 October both sides wished to bring the battle for Guada1canal to a conclusion. The Japanese sent down 101 aircraft in two attack waves. The first wave consisted of 18 Zeros and nine Bettys, and the second wave consisted of 29 Zeros and 45 Betty bombers to knock out Henderson. The first wave turned back at the Russell Islands. At 1220 Henderson radar picked up the second formation at 140 miles out. The three P-400s flew their customary

Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942

On II October, I Lt. Howard Stern became the first 339 th KIA when he bailed out at low altitude and his chute did not open. (Canning)

ground support missions, while nine P-39s of the 339FS were scrambled with 39 F4Fs (8 fromVF-5, 15 from VMF-121, and 16 from a mixed VMF-223 and 224 formation). The P-39s climbed to 19,000 feet when oxygen failure relegated them to watching the Japanese formations that were engaged by VMF-224 Wildcats, which shot down four Zeros and seven bombers. Heavy cloud prevented VF-5 and VMF-121 from contacting the enemy, but also prevented the Japanese from completing their mission. Several bombers trying to escape from the fight descended and Capt. William Sharpsteen and Lt. Robert Rist of the 339FS each shot one down. 1Lt. Howard Stern became the first 339th KIA when he bailed out at low altitude and his chute did not open. Battle of Cape Esperance, 11/12 October 1942 The naval task force under R.Adm. Norman Scott had protected the convoy that brought in the 164th Infantry, and afterward were assigned to disrupt Japanese supply and reinforcements coming down from Rabaul and the northern Solomons (e.g. Tokyo Express).

Scott commanded the light cruisers Boise and Helena and heavy cruisers Salt Lake City and San Francisco, as well as the destroyers Buchanan, Duncan, Farenholt, Laffey, and McCalla, which were loitering off the coast of Rennell Island, out of range of Japanese air reconnaissance but within five hours of Savo. There were two other task forces in the lower Solomons: one was a carrier group led by the Hornet, and another group led by the battleship Washington. The Express was ready to come down the Slot with six destroyers and the seaplane tenders Nisshin and Chitose, supported by R.Adm. Aritomo Goto's three heavy cruisers and two destroyers that were to make a run off Henderson and bombard the area. At 1345 Henderson SBD search planes and B-17s from Espiritu Santo reported two cruisers (actually the seaplane tenders) and six destroyers steaming down the Slot. The afternoon air attacks on Henderson prevented further air recon on the Japanese force, and the Nisshen-Chitose Force was undetected and unloaded its troops, heavy artillery, and supplies and escaped safely back up the Slot. Scott steamed toward Cape Esperence, off the western end of Guadalcanal, and at 2200 was converging on Goto's force in Sealark Channel, moving along the north coast. Scott launched his search float planes, but one from the Salt Lake City crashed and burned in the water some distance from the cruiser. The Japanese thought that the fire was a signal fire from the shore and answered with searchlights. The USN search planes spotted the Japanese ships, and radar contact was made at the same time at ten miles. Scott's force held the classic naval advantage when it crossed the "T" of the oncoming line of Japanese warships. At 2346 the Americans opened fire, and 35 minutes later the Japanese lost their commander, Goto, who was killed on the bridge of his flagship, the Aoba, the heavy cruiser Furutaka, and the destroyer Fabuki. The Aoba was heavily damaged but made it back to Japan for repairs. However, the official U.S. Navy summary at the time reported one Japanese cruiser sunk, one heavily damaged, and four destroyers and a transport sunk. Scott lost the destroyer Duncan, and the Salt Lake City and Farenholt were lightly damaged. The Navy Department had not announced their defeat at Savo and decided now that with this victory at Esperance, the results of the two battles could be announced to the public to soften the Savo debacle. On the 12th the Cactus Air Force had a full schedule to mop up after the naval battle of the night before. The rains of early October and the maximum effort flying schedule made the fields a hazardous morass for operations. The P-400s of the 67FS flew ground support missions, attacking gathering Japanese troops west of the perimeter and newly arrived landing barges between Kokumbona and Tassafaronga. At 0515 eight 339 th P-39s under Capt. John Mitchell and 16 VMF-121 F4Fs under Maj. Duke Davis flew top cover for two divisions of SBDs, five dive-bombers under Lt.Cdr. John Eldridge (VS-71) and 11 under Lt.Col. Albert Cooley, CO of MAG-14. They attacked three destroyers detached from the Nissen-Chotise force to rescue the Goto Force survivors that were retreating up the Slot, north of the Russell Islands. The SBDs were not successful in their first attacks, but later Lt.Cdr. Louis Kirn ofVS-3 with seven SBDs and six TBFs found two destroyers, the Shirayuki and Murakumo, off the coast of New Georgia, and soon the Murakumo was dead in the water due to a TBF torpedo

61

13th Fighter Command in World War II

... ~ . --.-;

On 12 October 1943, the 339'h'S Lt. Oscar Gillon was taking off on his second mission of the day when his wheels became clogged with mud forced up through the Marston matting and covered the wings of his aircraft. As he attempted to lift off, his mud-laden fighter stalled and rolled over, off the left side of the runway. Gillon was pulled from the burning inverted plane by nearby Marines and, though burned, later returned to duty. (Canning)

During the naval shelling of Henderson on 13 October 1942, several overnighting B-17s of the 11BG were so damaged that they were unable to return to Espiritu SantoThis B-17 had a shell explode under its wing, sending shrapnel through wing and fuselage and throwing dirt on its wing. (USAF)

hole in her side. Later in the afternoon a third mission led by Eldridge's 11 SBDs and a lone TBF escorted by four 339FS P-39s and eight VF-5 F4Fs searched for crippled Japanese shipping. Southeast of New Georgia they found a "heavy cruiser surrounded by a light cruiser and two destroyers," that in fact were the disabled destroyer Murakumo surrounded by the destroyers Shirayuki, Natsugumo, and Asagumo, which had also been detached from the Nissen-Chitose Force. The SBDs attacked the Natsugamo, and near misses by seven 1,000lb. bombs tore open her hull, and she sank quickly after the attack. The P-39s and F4Fs continued the attack on the "cruiser" Mukagamo, strafing in the face of heavy AA fire, but did not sink her. The Shirayuki later torpedoed the Muragamo hull to end the battle and to secure the waters around Guadalcanal for the time being. R.Adm. Richmond Turner's reinforcement convoy was able to reach Lunga safely the next morning. The 339,h'S Lt. Oscar Gillon had been taking off on his second mission of the day when his wheels became clogged with mud forced up through the Marston matting and covered the wings of his aircraft. As he attempted to lift off the mud-laden fighter stalled and rolled over, off the left side of the runway. Gillon was pulled from the burning inverted plane by nearby Marines and, though burned, later returned to duty. In the early morning (0530) of the 13'h the 67'h, led by Maj. Hubbard with Lts. Holmes, Patterson, and Sawyer, attacked Japanese landing barges that had been beached during the night at the western end of Guadalcanal. The daily Japanese air strategy again consisted of a double raid of 27 bombers (three aborted) escorted by 18 Zeros in the lead group, and two hours behind, 14 bombers and 18 Zeros. The Japanese hoped that the American fighters would oppose the first group and then the second group would catch them on the ground while rearming and refueling. The coast watcher on New Georgia reported the first Japanese wave at 1115, and Henderson radar picked them up at 1130. Despite the warning the Japanese closed more quickly than expected and were over Lunga

at 1200. Col. Wallace scrambled 42 F4Fs (22 VMF-121, II VMF224, and nine VF-5), six PAOOs, and seven P-39s. The six P-400s struggled to 14,000, and the seven P-39s climbed higher, but their pilots only could watch the exiting Bettys flying away at 24,000 feet. The 42 F4Fs scrambled too late and did not attack in force, and only one bomber was shot down by VF-5 and two Zeros and a bomber by VMF-121. The bombers effectively bombed both airfields, scoring thirteen hits on the runways, destroying a laid-over B-17, damaging 12 planes and blowing up 5,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. The newly arriving 164'11 Infantry Division suffered casualties as it disembarked at Lunga Point. The Seabees rushed out to fill the holes with all available shovels, and even helmets. Radar picked up the second Japanese wave at 1335, and they came at 1400, when the American fighters were being refueled and rearmed. Only 12 F4Fs of VMF-121 scrambled, but were bounced from above by the Zeros as they were climbing. On this mission Capt. Joe Foss shot down a Zero that overran him, but then had his

62

I OSmm and ISOmm artillery of the 4th Japanese Heavy Artillery Field Regiment opened up on Henderson and the shipping off Lunga.The gun(s) were dubbed "Pistol Pete" (and sometimes "Millimeter Mike") by the American troops on the island.The guns fired at irregular periods, usually three or four shells per hour, so that the men thought it was only one gun. (USMC)

Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942 oil cooler shot out and had to make a harrowing crashlanding, heavily bouncing through the dirt and stopping just short of the trees at the end of the runway. Later that afternoon a patrolling SBD, two hundred miles from Guadalcanal, found three transports and three destroyers approaching Guadalcanal at high speed. The transports carried seven infantry battalions, heavy weapons, and tanks of the 17 th Army. These ships, called the High Speed Convoy, were part ofR.Adm. Takama's 4th Destroyer Squadron of six transports and eight destroyers. In the early evening (1800), the newly landed 105mm and ISOmm artillery pieces of the 4 th Japanese Heavy Artillery Field Regiment opened fire. Soon the guns found the range and shelled the infantry positions at Kukum Beach, cratered the west end of the Henderson runway, and the shipping off Lunga, including Adm. Turner's flagship McCawley. The guns fired at irregular periods, usually three or four shells per hour, so that the men thought it was only one gun. The gun(s) was dubbed "Pistol Pete" (and sometimes "Millimeter Mike") by the American troops on the island. The Japanese decided that they would use a battleship bombardment of Lunga/Henderson to facilitate the approach of the High Speed Convoy. Adm. Kurita Takeo's 3rd Battleship Division (the Kongo and Haruna), accompanied by R.Adm. Tanaka's 2nd Destroyer Squadron (the light cruiser Isuzu and nine destroyers), sped toward Guadalcanal. At 0130 Kurita's float plane dropped three colored flares, red over the western end of the runway, white over the Pagoda, and green over the eastern end of the runway. The men rushed for their trenches just as shells began to fall. The Kongo fired special14-inch incendiary shells that disgorged hundreds of fiery cinders. The Haruna was loaded with HE shells, and both battlewagons fired standard AP rounds. For two hours the two battleships lobbed over 973 large caliber shells at the airfield. The thorough bombardment pattern hit the runway and dispersal area, moved on to the personnel bivouac area in the palm grove, and finally to the fuel and ammunition dumps. A 67 th Squadron History described the bombardment: "After midnight it started. First there was the noise of a small plane, a lone one lung Charlie overhead. He dropped three flares; a red one at the west end of the runway, a green one at the east end, and a white one in the middle. We had hardly hit the foxholes before the air was filled with a bedlam of sound: the screaming of shells, the dull roar of cannonading off shore, the whine of shrapnel, the thud of palm trees as they were severed and hit the ground, and the lulls from the big noises, the ceaseless sifting of dirt into the foxholes. We knew we were in for a shelling but we didn't know how bad. The first salvo hit the west side of the field and moved right across it. It was pattern shelling, and the Japs did a thorough job of it. First they plastered the runway and dispersal area, then they started dropping shells in the palm grove where the campsites were. Planes overhead dropped flares intermittently. Sometimes the whole area was bright as day. The shells following trails, like comets, as they whined over the palm trees. A gasoline dump and an ammunition dump were hit and went up in flames. Airplanes were burning all over the field.

And in hundreds of little foxholes in the palm groves and the jungle men were cringing and praying. Once some of the 67 th pilots looked up to see a star shell burst directly above. They knew the next salvo would knock the hell out of them. It did, killing five dive-bomber pilots in a nearby foxhole. The Japanese let up only to cool their guns (14-inch shells, mostly). There was no relief from agonizing fear during these lulls. The men knew there would be more shells, and the next ones would probably be closer. Two of the 67 th pilots with an eye for comfort and style had dug themselves a foxhole big enough to hold two cots. 'We will be below ground level even on the cots,' they explained, 'so nothing can hurt us except a direct hit, and if you get a direct hit nothing matters anyway. So we will just lay there and watch the fireworks go by.' When the first shell came over they rolled off their cots and hugged the ground. Then when the sound stopped they got up and dusted themselves off and reasoned with each other, 'Now, we looked silly this time acting on mechanical impulse. Next time we will just lie still.' Then there was the whine of another shell and both of them hit the ground again .... This ritual was repeated three more times, then they both threw their cots out of the foxhole and hugged the good earth. Past midnight and on and on into the morning the shells came. In the foxholes there were cases of men screaming at God and sobbing for their mothers and gibbering like idiots. It seemed as if the horror would never cease. And there were other cases of unsung heroes who kept up a steady banter of quips and jibes. At 3 AM, October 14th the shelling finally stopped. The battleships pulled away from Lunga Point, as they believed that after pouring such a tonnage of steel and explosive, nothing living could remain." The warships withdrew at 0300 and were followed by a series of formations of two bombers each that dropped bombs until dawn. In a day the Japanese shells and shrapnel had reduced the operational air strength at Henderson by 52 aircraft: from 39 to seven SBDs; 41 to 29 F4Fs; six to two P-39s; and the four P-400s escaped. Fighter One fared somewhat better, as of the 30 Marine Wildcats 18 were flyable. Nearly all the aviation gasoline was on

Marine SBD dive-bomber destroyed during the bombardment by the Japanese battleships Kongo and Hurono during the night of 13 November 1942. The naval bombardment almost put Henderson out of commission. (USMC)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II

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,-_.-........--".... _",. --="

The repair crews at Henderson were organized to quickly repair the Marston. There are two B-17s and two P-39s parked at the upper far right of the photo. (USAF)

fire, and there were 13 large craters in the Marston Matting on the runway. The AP shells that hit the field burrowed deep, but made very narrow, easily filled holes. The bombardment killed 41 Americans; VMBS-14l suffered particularly heavy losses during the bombardment, as it lost its CO, Maj. Gordon Bell, and four pilots. Seven B-17s of the llBG were lying over at Henderson after a long bombing mission over Buka and Tonolei, and two were rendered unflyable by shrapnel. Five Fortresses loaded their ground crews and seven VF-5 pilots and took off for Espiritu Santo in mid-morning, and were followed by a sixth that was quickly repaired and took off on three engines. The bivouac area in the palm trees was littered with fallen trees, fronds, coconuts, and debris from tents and buildings, as the shells burst in the treetops. Shrapnel from the shells shredded the tents and pilots' personal belongings, and the returning pilots had to watch for falling trees and coconuts. At 0500 the Japanese Combined Fleet announced that the American air force on Guadalcanal had been decimated, but at 0540 SBDs took off from Henderson for their morning search and two Marine F4Fs took off from Fighter One for their dawn patrol. Pistol Pete began shelling the field, but the 6th Seabees filled shell craters as quickly as the Japs could make them. Four P-400s were loaded with 100lb. bombs while their pilots waited in nearby foxholes with their parachutes strapped on. Between shell bursts a pilot would make a run for his fighter, and finally the four P-400s (Maj. Hubbard and Lts. Dewey, Morton, and Sawyer) took off to find and destroy "Pete". As the P-400s approached the guns stopped firing, and the Americans were unable to locate them, but strafed newly landed barges and troops. Later, five P-400s (Lts. Dewey, Goerke, Holmes, Kaiser, and Kerstetter) again took off to find "Pete," and again were unsuccessful. The "Pete" search had to be called off to conserve gasoline. The shortage of gasoline restricted more air operations that day, but on the bright side eight new SBDs arrived. The Japanese artillery kept the 6th Seabees busy repairing craters on the runway. Pre-cut sections of Marston Matting and loaded dump trucks were ready to move on any new craters. The Seabees learned from expe-

64

rience how big the typical bomb and shell crater would be and filled their dump trucks accordingly with sand and gravel, then stationed them near the field. Once the air raid was finished or a shell had hit the field the trucks would drive out and fill the crater. These were followed by pneumatic tampers, a section of steel mat was placed, and the crater would vanish in a half hour. Gen. Geiger finally decided that the Pagoda gave the Japanese artillery spotters and bomber crews a too convenient reference point and ordered that it be bulldozed. The radio equipment was transferred to a tunnel, and aviation HQ moved into the trees south of Fighter One. The coast watcher on New Georgia reported enemy aircraft at 0945. f4Fs were scrambled-five from VF-5, 16 from VMF-12l, and four from VMF-224-but the Japanese never arrived, and one F4F of VF-5 ground looped on landing, reducing the Navy fighter strength to four. At ll57 the first wave of another two-prong Japanese attack appeared without warning due to malfunctioning radar. The first wave of 26 bombers, escorted by 18 Zeros, made the attack. Cactus scrambled 25 F4Fs (12 from Foss' VMF-121, nine from Galer's VMF-224, and four from Jensen's VF-5). To clear the field of targets most of the operational SBDs and P-39/400s followed them. Before the Wildcats could gain altitude the Japanese bombers were over Cactus and dropped their bombs on the two airfields, only causing further damage to the wrecked aircraft below and making a few more craters. Neither the Japanese nor Americas suffered any losses in this attack. At 1303 the second wave of 12 bombers, escorted by IS Zeros, arrived, but this time the Wildcats were waiting. Galer's VMF-224 shot down four bombers and three Zeros (Galer got his 14th and final victory), and VF-5 got five bombers (Lt. Hayd~n Jensen claimed two for his sixth and seventh victories). After the air raid Pistol Pete continued to shell the airfields. The Seabees filled crater after crater, but Pistol Pete was firing eight to ten shells per hour, and by afternoon the field was inoperable. Pete hit two F4Fs from VF-5, reducing its operable strength to two. Marine HQ issued the following bleak communique: "We don't know if we can hold the field or not. There's Japanese task force of destroyers, cruisers, and troop transports headed our way. We have enough gasoline left for one mission against them.

Over weeks the Pagoda was much improved from the open-sided Japanese building, but later Maj.Gen.vandegrift had the building demolished, as he felt it was an aiming point for Japanese naval shelling and aerial bombing. (USMC)

Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942 Load your airplanes with bombs and go out with the dive-bombers and hit them. After the gas is gone we'll have to let the ground troops take over. Then your officers and men will attach themselves to some infantry outfit. God luck and good bye." At 1600 SBDs spotted the Tokyo Express 180 miles from Guadalcanal. Four P-39s armed with a 300lb. bomb and two P400s with 100 lb. bombs (piloted by Capt. Sharpsteen and Us. Dinn, Farran, Haedtler, Miller, and Sawyer) took off with four SBDs to find the oncoming Tokyo Express. The formation spotted the Japanese task force off the coast of Santa Isabel. There were six transports in line covered by eight destroyers and cruisers, four on each side. The formation dove safely through heavy AA fire, and Marine SBD 2Lt. J. Waterman of VMSB-141 scored a direct hit on a transport, but no other damage was done to the frantically maneuvering ships. There was no gasoline available for another mission, but someone remembered the two abandoned llBG B-17s and their gasoline was siphoned off. At 1715 Capt. Mitchell and Lts. Farron and Shaw in P-39s, and Us. Barr, Headtler, Holmes, Miller, and Sawyer in PAOOs, all armed with 500lb. bombs, flew with the SBDs to attack the Japanese force, now just off the end of Santa Isabel. Sawyer and Haedtler returned early to base with mechanical problems. Haedtler made a landing after dark, hit a pile of steel matting off the edge of the field, and tore off a wing that killed a Marine field maintenance man, but Haedtler was uninjured. The, SBDs scored two near misses, and all aircraft strafed the ships before returning to base as their ammunition ran out. Lt. Barr was the last pilot to make a firing pass and was thought to have been hit by AA fire and did not return to base. The returning aircraft had to land on Fighter One, as Haedtler's wrecked aircraft was blocking the runway. Barr managed to make it to Russell and returned to Cactus on the 21 st. Geiger desperately needed to reinforce Cactus air strength as soon as possible. During the day, pilots from Lt.Col. Joe Bauer's VMF-212 ferried SBDs from Efate to Espiritu Santo, then rode a transport aircraft back to get their fighters. Just before sunset Lt.Cdr. Raymond Davis of VB-6 flew in eight SBDs. But the situation at Cactus was grave, as the regular Tokyo Express and Takama's High Speed Convoy were about to deliver their troops that night, and there was the threat of another bombardment by battleships supported by light cruisers and destroyers. That night everyone on Guadalcanal hunkered down and waited. At midnight Takama's High Speed Convoy was landing its troops, weapons, and supplies 15 miles away between Tassafaronga and Kokumbona, while the Express, two light cruisers and four transports, landed troops at Cape Esperance. Shortly afterward two heavy Japanese cruisers, the Chokai and Kinugasa, and two destroyers under VAdm. Gunichi Mikawa cruised off Lunga (now called "Sleepless Lagoon" by the Marines) and lobbed 752 eight-inch shells at the airfield. By dawn on the 15'h, the six Japanese transports did not sneak away before light, but blatantly lay offshore west of Kokumbona, hurriedly unloading the last of 10,000 infantry and supplies. The Convoy was protected by destroyers cruising offshore and an umbrella of fighters. Takama had gambled that the naval bombardment had nullified American air power and that the continuing ar-

tillery barrage from Pistol Pete would prevent any surviving aircraft from leaving the field. Actually, there wasn't enough fuel available for the remaining undamaged aircraft at Henderson to do much of anything about this full-fledged invasion. At 0800 two F4Fs of VF-5 took off, climbed to 7,000 feet, and dove into AA fire as they strafed the transports anchored in a line. The Wildcats turned and made a second run, then returned to base chased by a Jap seaplane that they turned on and damaged. The gasoline shortage was reduced when someone remembered a hidden reserve of over 400 drums of fuel. Then by mid-morning, C-47s of the Marine transport squadron VMJ-253 and the AAF 13 th Troop Carrier Squadron began to bring in drums of gasoline from Espiritu Santo. The R4Ds (Marine C-47s) landed and braked to a stop and unloaded quickly, with their engines running, hoping to take off before Pistol Pete found the range. They continued their gasoline nms for a week, while YP boats from Tulagi brought in another 200 drums. Each drum could keep a fighter in the air for an hour. Ground crews worked feverishly to repair damaged aircraft to get them into the air. Everyone pitched in; pilots, ground crew, and any available personnel to help in belting ammunition and rolling the newly delivered gasoline drums for delivery to the dispersal, then transferring the fuel from the drums to the aircraft. It took ten men to load a 500lb. bomb onto a truck that then transported the bombs as close as possible to the aircraft, where they were pushed off and then rolled through the mud and under the belly of the fighter. As many men as could get under each plane lifted the slippery bombs onto the bomb shackles. The three serviceable SBDs were scrambled from Fighter One, but two were destroyed when they hit shell craters in the runway. The P-39s and P-400s took off individually at 0700 and flew for only a few minutes to bomb and strafe the transports that were covered by Zeros and heavy AA fire from the destroyers. When the Airacobras reached the target they tried to ignore the Zeros and flak, dove, and attempted to line up the ship below in the center of their gunsight, then drop the bomb and get out at mast top level to return to Henderson to rearm. The attacks only interrupted the unloading and caused no damage. At 1015 twelve SBDs of VMSB141 and Captains Mitchell and Sharpsteen in P-39s carrying 500lb. bombs, accompanied by P-400s flown by Us. Campbell, Dewey, and Holmes armed with 100lb. bombs, attacked the Convoy. Five VMF-121 F4Fs flew cover. Sharpsteen claimed a probable hit or near miss on a transport and then shot down a Zero that flew in front of his aircraft for his second victory. Sawyer and Holmes also claimed hits on a transport each, burtheir claims were probably wishful thinking. The SBDs lost three pilots. At 1125 Capt. Sharpsteen and Us. Dinn, Farron, Jacobson, and Purnell in P-39s and Us. Dews, Kaiser, Kerstetter, and Sawyer in P-400s attacked the Convoy again. At the same time eleven B-17s of the IlBG from Espiritu Santo joined the attack and scored three hits on a transport. Dinn claimed a possible direct hit on a transport that sunk, but his claim may have been a transport hit by a B-17. Lt. Farron was hit either by AA fire or by a marauding Zero and failed to return to base. In the attack three transports were so extensively damaged that they had to be beached, while the other two beat a hasty retreat. Despite the air attacks the Japanese managed to land 4,500 troops

65

13 th Fighter Command in World War II and their equipment, as well as much of their gasoline and ammunition. That day six more SBDs arrived, and Marine R4Ds flew in enough gasoline so some operations could be carried out the next day. At the end of the day the Marines had lost three F4Fs and three SBDs, and the AAF lost one P-39 (Farron). In a 67 th Fighter Squadron Summary of 13 October 1942, entitled "Comments on Combat on Guadalcanal," the pilots of the squadron gave their views on ground support and anti-shipping attacks. Their observations were based first on advice given to them by Marine SBD pilots and then by their combat experience. They found that anti-shipping attacks should start in a shallow dive from 12,000 to 14,000 feet to about 8,000 to 10,000 feet, where they would trim the aircraft for control and begin their bombing run. The most effective anti-shipping attack was from stern to bow, with the bomb release occurring just as the bow was about to disappear under the nose. Strafing runs were to be made after the dive-bombing attack. That night, just after midnight, the cruisers Myoko and Maya and their destroyer escort came down the Slot and fired over 1,500 eight-inch shells on Henderson for an hour and destroyed several more aircraft. The shelling was short but intense, and the men around Henderson hunkered down in their shelters as the shells exploded around them. Many felt that the Navy had abandoned them and left them unprotected. Morale was at a low point, and scuttlebutt had it that the Japanese were reinforcing the island nightly and that they were in serious danger of being over run. Most of the Japanese troops, equipment, and supplies had reached shore, but the Japanese had placed these newly landed troops and supplies in temporary dumps hidden in the trees near the beaches until they could be moved inland. Over the next several days the mission of the 67 th was to attack these vulnerable troops and supplies. They attacked the Japanese in short hops; taking off, climbing quickly, dive-bombing, pulling up in a turn to come around and strafe the area, and then flying back to base to rearm. Fortunately, with the critical fuel situation, the targets were only a few miles away. These repeated missions took their toll on the pilots and ground crews, who had little sleep and subsisted on short rations of hardtack and cold canned food. Men and aircraft wore out. On one mission the remaining four PAOOs were readied for takeoff. One was armed with a bomb but had only one .30 caliber machine gun working, another carried a bomb and had no guns functioning, and numbers three and four carried no bombs but had most of their guns in service. Records show that combat fatigue forced the evacuation of a number of men back to New Caledonia on the 18 th of the month. After the loss of 13 SBDs destroyed (plus 13 damaged and repaired and ten damaged and requiring major overhaul), five TBDS destroyed (plus three damaged and needing major overhaul), six F4Fs destroyed (plus three damaged and repaired), and four PAOO and P-39s destroyed, the operational strength on Cactus on the 16th was down to 19 SBDs, nine F4Fs, two P-39s, and four P-400s. During the day the six remaining Air Force fighters joined the SBDs and F4Fs in seven bombing and strafing attacks on the Tassafaronga landing sites. That afternoon nine Vals attacked and critically damaged the fuel tanker, McFarland, as it layoff Lunga Point, but not

66

before the tanker had pumped 40,000 gallons of fuel to barges, but unfortunately also had taken 160 wounded aboard for evacuation. As the Japanese Vals were diving on the tanker seven SBDs and 19 F4Fs of VMF-212 under Lt.Coi. Harold Bauer just arrived from Espiritu Santo. With his fuel tanks almost empty Bauer got into action, downing four Vals, and then turned to land and report in to his CO, Gen. Geiger. After losing 27 killed and 28 wounded the McFarland sailed back to Noumea. With the arrival of new pilots the veterans could be sent out for long overdue R&R. The last pilots of Smith's VMF-223, Mangrum's VMSB-232, and Simpler's VF-s left by the 12t \ and Gal~r's VMF224, now under Maj. John Dobbin, left with the last 12 pilots. MAG23 CO William Wallace turned over tactical air command to MAG14. From 20 August to 16 October MAG-23 and its attached units claimed 244 Japanese aircraft destroyed (III.s by VMF-223, 60.5 by VMF-224, 38 by VF-s, and eight by the 67FS; the remainder were by the newly arrived VMF-121 and VMF-212 and by gunners on SBDs and TBFs). Anti-shipping claims were for 28 ships hit, six "seen to sink," and four "believed to have sunk." Japanese records credit six sunk: three transports, two destroyers, and an auxiliary cruiser-transport. MAG-23 lost 22 of its own pilots (three to naval bombardment) and 33 attached Marine, Navy, and Air Force pilots (five to naval gunfire). The KIAIMIA rate would have been much higher if it had not been for the pilot and crew rescues by coast watchers and friendly natives. On the 17th P-39s, PAOOs, and six B-17s attacked the Japanese supply base at Kokumbona. That night the Tokyo Express made its last major foray for a time when four destroyers shelled the two airfields. F~om 18 October the Pistol Pete artillery pieces closed Henderson for five days, and only Fighter One remained operational. To make matters worse, the Marine infantry waiting on the Lunga perimeter were near their physical and mental breaking points. The P-400s were one step from the scrap heap and could no longer undertake long overwater missions, but with heroic maintenance, could accompany P-39s and SBDs on short hop sorties to bomb and strafe Japanese ships, landing boats, troops, and supplies from Matanikau to Cape Esperance. The Japanese AA positions near Kokumbona were proving to be particularly troublesome. On the 21 st Lt. Haedtler knocked out two positions with bombs, and Lt. Dewey destroyed one position. The last 67FS hangar remaining was destroyed by artillery fire, and Capt. Mitchell moved everyone to Fighter One. Lt. Edgar Barr, who was shot down the previous week, managed to swim to the Russell Islands and made contact with a coast watcher, who notified the Navy. He was returned by a PT boat from the Russell Islands with a wrenched back and knee, and was evacuated by a CA7. The new Marine fighter squadrons (VMF-121 and VMF-212) quickly got blooded. On the 17 th , Duke Davis ied eight F4Fs of VMF-121 to intercept Japanese bombers over Kukem Beach, and they shot down eight dive-bombers and two Zero escorts. The next day five F4Fs from VMF-121 and six from VMF-212 shot down six bombers and 15 Zeros over Cactus. Capt. Joe Foss shot down two Zeros and a bomber to become an ace. VMF-121 got two more on the 19 t\ and on the 20 th VMF-121 claimed four Zeros and a dive-bomber, while VMF-212 claimed five Zeros and two dive-

Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942 bombers, and pilots from each squadron shared a dive-bomber. The four-day total was 45 Japanese aircraft destroyed, and the Grummans blunted the Japanese air attacks in preparation for their next big offensive and maintained local air superiority. Among the many problems faced by Nimitz in the South Pacific, the most important was that of leadership. The deteriorating situation on land and sea had made the typically cautious Ghormley into the indecisive Ghormley, who did not leave his shipboard office at Noumea for a month. As the American naval defeats off Guadalcanal continued Ghormley succumbed to debilitating worry and depression. Finally, on the 18 th Ghormley was relieved by VAdm. William "Bull" Halsey as Nimitz, backed by Arnold, finally decided that the precarious situation at Guadalcanal needed a more aggressive and decisive commander whose personality would be able to inspire the beleaguered troops on the island. As early as the mid-I920s Halsey was an advocate of naval aviation, but was unable to qualify as a pilot due to poor vision. He persisted, and finally in 1934 became a qualified pilot at the age of 52. Halsey had carried out Nimitz' directive to carry out carrier attacks on Japa-

nese bases in the Pacific with raids against Kwajalein in February 1942, and followed by raids on the Marshall, Gilbert, Wake, and Marcus Islands. Halsey's appointment was widely hailed by both the Naval command and the men on the ships. Halsey immediately deep-sixed Ghormley's deni plan and committed to a zealous defense of Cactus by air and ground reinforcements. He also sorted out logistics problems and soon increased supply. Halsey's vigor and decisiveness galvanized the beleaguered Marines on Cactus and the sailors in the Slot. For his accomplishments on Guadalcanal Halsey would be promoted to full Admiral on 26 November 1942. Halsey and his Chief of Staff, Capt. Miles Browning, and 15 Staff Officers set up shop on Noumea and took charge of the entire South Pacific (COMSOPAC)-on the ground, the sea, and in the air. Also at this time the continuing Army-Navy aircraft deployment controversy was close to being settled. During the Guadalcanal campaign Harmon had the problem of procuring regular crew and aircraft replacement. His requests were met with the South Pacific low priority "Europe first" rebuttal. Finally the situation at Guadalcanal became so critical that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to

On 20 October Adm. William "Bull" Halsey (right) relieved VAdm. Robert Ghormley (left) as commander of the South Pacific area (COMSOPAC).

Lt.Gen. Millard Harmon. Commander of the U.s. Army Air Forces in the South Pacific Area. (USAFISPA)

(USN)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II

The aftermath of the Japanese air attack. Here a hangar is burning in the background (center); a F4F is damaged and knocked off its wheels on the far left, but a P-400139 remains standing on its tricycle gear on the far right. (USAF)

relent, and on 27 October the JCS accepted a complete schedule of Army-Navy aircraft deployment. The plan called for a minimum of 70 heavy bombers, 52 medium bombers, and 150 fighters to be under the command of Nimitz, but that he assign them to COMSOPAC, as the units were not to be divided. Immediately, Halsey's appointment brought new optimism to theAAF in the South Pacific. Harmon had established his command at Noumea, New Caledonia, even though New Zealand was the authorized HQ for the South Pacific. The move put Harmon's HQjust across the harbor from COMSOPAC HQ stationed on the Argonne. The Japanese senior commander, Lt.Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake, was planning a coordinated three-pronged ground offensive on the American beachhead set tentatively for the 18 th • Lt.Gen. Masao Maruyama would lead the offensive, with his nine infantry battalions assigned to attack the southeast perimeter of Henderson. Maj.Gen. Kiyotake Kawaguchi, leader of the Bloody Ridge attack, was to attack the east perimeter, and Maj.Gen. Yumio Nasu was to attack the west perimeter. Maj.Gen. Tadashi Sumiyoshi was to bring two infantry battalions and a tank company against the Matanikau River line. Sumiyoshi also commanded the majority of Japanese artillery, including the "Petes," and was to shell the perimeter and lead a diversionary attack across the river. Before the attack could begin Maruyama had to cut trails through the jungle to move his force to their jump off points near the airfield. The complacent Japanese did no previous reconnaissance of the forbidding jungle, and this oversight would cost Maruyama. Heavy rains then slowed progress further, damaged communications equipment, and forced the abandonment of heavy weapons that would be needed for suppOlting fire during the attack. The slow-moving Japanese battalions were forced to postpone their assault to the 22 nd , and finally to the 241h , when maximum but separate, uncoordinated attacks, lacking communications and supporting fire, were made. However, air reconnaissance and ground patrols failed to discover the Japanese trail building. On the 23 rd the Japanese sent down a large air fleet to

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attack the American perimeter in preparation for Hyakutake's offensive. The two Marine squadrons sent up 24 F4Fs to intercept and shot down 21 Zeros (ten each by VMF-12l and VMF-212) and one bomber (by VMF-121). Capt. Joe Foss shot down four Zeros to become a double ace with 11 victories. Sumiyoshi continued to be uninformed of the change of plans as to the delay in the start of the offensive to the 24 th • On the 23 rd he began a heavy concentration of artillery fire on the Matanikau perimeter and sent a tank column, followed by infantry, across the sandbar at the mouth of the river towards the Marines in heavy, intermittent rains. The Il lh Marine artillery fired behind the Japanese tanks, decimating the waiting infantry. 75mm guns mounted on U.S. half-tracks knocked out the enemy tanks as they tried to cross the Matanikau, and then the lSI and 2 nd Battalions of the 5 th Marines held back four furious Japanese attacks, mowing down over 2,000 Japanese troops. The rainy weather prevented close air support from Henderson. Sumiyoshi regrouped that evening and launched a dawn attack on

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,-;,-

,... '."

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A Marine SBD Dauntless is totaled by a direct hit during "Tojo Time," the almost daily early afternoon air raids on Cactus. (USMC)

Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942 the Matanikau. At sunrise the P-39s, P-400s, and SBDs began close air support on the Japanese positions just west of the Marine line. At 0645 Lts. Haedtler and Holmes dropped 100lb bombs on enemy troop positions, and then returned to strafe until they were out of ammunition. The numerous air attacks caused the aviation gasoline supply at Henderson to be reduced to nearly empty, while the heavy Marine artillery barrage depleted its stock. C-47s heroically landed in heavy rains on a soggy field to bring in critical gasoline drums and artillery shells. The heavy rains continued and grounded further air support missions late that afternoon, but the Japanese main thrust on the Matanikau had spent itself. The Japanese communications were broken, and the flexible Vandegrift was then able to direct his Marine infantry to deal with each of the other divided, uncoordinated Japanese attacks. October 25 111 was named "Dugout Sunday," as Japanese threw infantry and artillery, air raids, and naval guns of the light cruiser Yura and five destroyers at the troops on the island. Due to the heavy rains of the previous day Henderson was of no help, as it was closed again; Fighter One became a morass, and operations had to wait for the field to dry sufficiently by mid-morning. There were so many Japanese air raids that day that Geiger's war diary states:

At 0800 five Zeros continued to circle Henderson without attacking. Soon nine more Zeros and a medium bomber arrived and circled, apparently waiting to land, thinking the field had been captured by Sumiyoshi. By 0930 the sun had dried the field enough for eight F4Fs of VMF-121 to finally be scrambled, followed by four more from VMF-212. The first F4Fs shot down three Zeros, two more by Foss, and then the VMF-212 Wildcats got three more Zeros and VMF-121 four Zeros. During a later attack at 1430,16 Japanese bombers bombed a line of parked aircraft on Henderson, destroying many of them. These aircraft were boneyard wrecks that had been placed in the open to draw enemy attacks while operational aircraft were dispersed in the trees at the edge of the runway. Again, the two Marine squadrons scrambled and shot down 12 Japanese, seven Zeros, and five bombers. Foss got three Zeros on this mission to become an ace-in-a-day and a triple ace with 16 victories. The Japanese air attacks further damaged the airfields, but the Japanese Navy Air Force lost 22 aircraft-five Bettys and 17 Zeros-losses that spent their ajr reserves. The Cactus Air Force lost three fighters but no pilots, and its operational inventory totaled 11 SBDs, 12 F4Fs, three P-39s, and three P-400s. At 0700 the next day, air reconnaissance and coast watchers reported three enemy destroyers only 35 miles off the Guadalcanal "Enemy fighter planes were over Cactus at irregular intervals coast, and soon they were shelling the beach and sunk two small throughout the daylight hours. Our Grummans were almost con- vessels. Two fighters of the 67'h and two VS-71 SBDs managed to tinuously in the air, landing, refueling, reloading, and taking off slog through the mud and take off, but their strafing attacks on the again, time after time." , ships were ineffective. At 1300 an enemy naval force comprised of the heavy cruiser Yum, three light cruisers (destroyers?), and two destroyers were located 105 mjJes out, and were attacked by five SBDs led by Lt.Cdr. John Eldridge of VS-71. The Yum took a direct hit from Eldridge and was stopped dead in the water. At the same time the P-39s attacked Japanese shipping off Lunga, sinkjng a barge, tug, and patrol craft. At 1420 Lts. Dinn, Purnell, and Jacobson attacked the ships off Florida Island, narrowly missing them with 500lb. bombs. At 1630 the same three lieutenants and Capt. John Mjtchell attacked the ships again, and Jacobson scored a direct hit on the Yum that caused flooding, and she was so badly damaged that she had to be sunk later by her destroyer escort. Near misses bracketed a light cruiser as the warships withdrew. That day the submarine Amberjack moved submerged toward the island and surfaced offshore, bringing thousands of gallons of avjation gasoline in her spare tanks, 100lb. bombs, and 15 badly needed aircraft mechanics and armorers from New Caledonia. On the land, Surniyoshi's premature attack on the 23'd came before Maruyama's forces could cut their way through the jungle to be in position on the south of the perimeter. The Marine troops that had been moved from the south perimeter to reinforce the Matanikau and stop Sumiyoshi were now shifted back by Vandegrift to the south to meet Maruyama. The southern Japanese attack did not have any supporting artillery, as it had been abandoned on the muddy jungle trails, and the attack had to rely on machine guns as its heaviest weapons. At dawn, on the 25 1h , the furious, almost suicidal Japanese attack was launched against the 71h Marines and 1641h Infantry. The Japanese managed to penetrate American lines at sevJulius "Jake" Jacobson scored a direct hit on the Yum that caused flooding, and eral points, but were repulsed and suffered gruesome losses to heavy she was so badly damaged that she had to be later sunk by her destroyer small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. By 0700 Maruyama was forced escort. (Canning)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II to withdraw to regroup his battered troops. After the "Dugout Sunday's" constant heavy land, air, and sea attacks, both the Japanese and Americans were regrouping to attack and defend their positions, respectively. After sunset Maruyama ordered a last desperate frontal attack by wave after wave of fanatical infantry on south Lunga Ridge. The Army 164th Infantry and 5 th and 7 th Marines slaughtered the Japanese, who kept COIning, only to be stopped by American artillery, mortar, small arms fire, and finally by handto-hand combat. A night attack by Col. Oka almost broke through to the airfield, but in the morning of the 26 th the 7 th Marines made a furious counter attack that.drove the Japanese back into the jungle. The 67FS' three old P-400s and two P-39s aided the Marine attack by bombing and strafing the Japanese just south of Fighter One. The Japanese ground attack had finally stopped, as they lost 3,568 troops. The third major Japanese offensive to retake Guadalcanal was concluded, and their plans to capture Henderson and gain air superiority to insure the unimpeded invasion of the island were

Capt. John Mitchell became the 339FS Co. Ranking with his contemporal-ies in the Pacific-the Navy's Thach, Flatley, and O'Hare, and the Marine's Smith and Foss-Mitchell was the ideal Commanding Officer of a fighter squadron in a war zone. He was both a consummate fighter pilot and tactician. He led by example, and trained his men hard to fight and to stay alive. (Mitchell)

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ended. With each attack the Japanese had underestimated their enemy with disastrous results, first with Ichiki's Battalion, then Kawaguchi's Brigade, and now Maruyama's Division. The Japanese had been beaten off on the land, but the total fighter aircraft available to counter them in the air was a precarious 18 aircraft: three out of six P-400s; three of six P-39s; and 12 of 35 F4Fs. There were command changes in the Army Air Forces during the period. On the 24 th Maj. Kermit Tyler, four first Lieutenants, and 19 Second Lieutenants were transferred from the 44FS to duty with the 339FS at Tontouta, with Tyler becoming squadron CO. On the 25 th Maj. Brannon transferred from CO ofthe 339th to tpe 347FG, and Capt. John Mitchell became the 339FS CO. Mitchell's expertise and leadership ranked him with his contemporaries in the Pacific: the Navy's Thach, Flatley, and O'Hare; and the Marine's Smith and Foss. He was the ideal Commanding Officer of a fighter squadron in a war zone, as he was a consummate fighter pilot, tactician, and leader of men. He led by example and trained his men hard to fight and to stay alive. Veteran personnel from the 67FS were mingled new arrivals from training in the States. The training and administrative portion of the new squadron was to be located at Oua Tom, then under construction on the central west coast of ew Caledonia, while the operational portion was at Guadalcanal. Pilots and ground crew were to be rotated in and out of Guadalcanal back to Oua Tom at 25 mission intervals for the pilots, and about every three months for the ground crew.

Battle of Santa Cruz. 26 October 1942 With the new Guadalcanal offensive the Japanese Navy was finally committed to a major action as it gathered its forces from the Mandates. An e~oneous communication stating that Guadalcanal was in Japanese hands sputTed Lt.Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake at Rabaul to send a powerful naval force to strike Guadalcanal. His forces consisted of a Carrier Striking Force under VAdm. Chuichi Nagumo of two carriers (Shokaku and Zuikaku), one light carrier (Zuiho), one heavy cruiser, and seven destroyers; a second force of two battleships (Hiei and Kirishima), three heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, seven destroyers, and 12 submarines; and a Battleship Striking Force under VAdm. Nobutake Kondo of two battleships (Kongo and Haruna), a catTier (Junyo), three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers. Adm. Halsey had to reach deep into his Pacific reserves to meet this large Japanese force. He sent Task Force 16, consisting of the carrier Enterprise, newly repaired from the damage of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, and the new battleship South Dakota from Hawaii to join a heavy and light cruiser and five destroyers under R.Adm. Thomas Kinkaid. This force was to join Task Force 17 under R.Adm. George Murray consisting of the Hornet, two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and six destroyers. The USN force, under the overall control of Kinkaid, was off the Santa Cruz Islands on the 26 th when a B-17 of the 5BG discovered part of the Japanese force east of Malaita. The B-17, flown by Lt. Mario Sesso, shadowed the enemy for 30 minutes before seven Zeros off a carrier attacked it and caused heavy damage. The Fortress beat off the attack and returned to Espiritu Santo to give its report. The Battle of Santa Cruz took place on the 26 th • The results were the sinking of the Hornet and the destroyer Porter. The Enter-

Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942 prise and battleship South Dakota, the cruiser San Juan, and destroyer Smith were damaged. Twenty American planes were lost in combat, and an additional 54 to other causes. The Japanese lost the carrier Shokaku, the light carrier Zuiho, and the cruiser Chikuma, and two destroyers were heavily damaged. They lost over 100 planes, and more importantly, the experienced pilots flying them. After the battle the remaining Japanese carriers and warships steamed slowly off to the north. Japanese commander Nagamo had victory within reach but withdrew, as he felt he had lost too many aircraft to chance a meeting with the American fleet and its carrier aircraft, or to take on land-based aircraft based at the still undefeated beachhead at Guadalcanal. An attack by PBY Black Cats from Espiritu Santo that night may also have influenced his decision, as one damaged a destroyer and nearly missed getting a torpedo hit on the Zuikaku. Following the Battle of Santa Cruz there were no raids on Cactus, and American forces put pressure on the flagging Japanese air bases and ground forces on Guadalcanal. Marine and Air Force aircraft attacked Rakata, the home of "Louie the Louse" seaplanes,

Lt.Wallace Dinn, flying a P-39 carrying IOOlb. bombs, accompanied four SBDs and six F4Fs to fly cove~ then described a dive bombing and strafing attack on the Japanese seaplane base at Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel Island. (Canning)

four times in the next six days, while Air Force and other Marine planes lent ground support on Japanese positions on the island and flew continuous CAP. On the 28 th Capt. John Mitchell and Lts. Wallace Dinn and Jack Jacobson, flying P-39s carrying 100lb. bombs, accompanied four SBDs and six F4Fs to fly cover and then dive bomb and strafe the Japanese seaplane base at Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel Island. The surprise morning attack on enemy installations was made through a 2,500 foot overcast with the SBDs diving first, followed by the P-39s and then the Wildcats. The flights made several runs without opposition. Dinn describes the action: "After dropping our bombs we proceeded to strafe the enemy float planes on the water and blast a few ground installations. Eight enemy planes were reported destroyed, but I saw only six of them get it. We experienced no enemy fire during several runs. When we were pulling up off the target for home I spotted an enemy gasoline dump of about 1,500 gallons well-camouflaged on the beach. I called Capt. Mitchell's attention to my discovery, and he told me to return and strafe the dump if I had any ammunition left. My right .30 caliber wing guns were still firing so I went down. The first burst set a small blaze at one end of the dump. I pulled up and started down on the other end. As I dived I strafed the beach and got in an extra burst at the already damaged float planes. I had to fly along sideways to keep the two live guns on the gasoline dump, and as I pulled up this time I heard a close explosion and my right side went numb. This happened when I was thirty feet off the water and a hundred feet or so from the coconut trees along the shore. Smoke began filling my cockpit, and I saw Prestone running in from the right side. Since I could move my arm without difficulty I figured I wasn't hit badly, if at all. Immediately I chandelled left, away from the enemy. Smoke was boiling into the cockpit, and my breathing was becoming increasingly difficult. The Prestone gauge was against the stop and the oil was heating up like the devil. I tried to call Capt. Mitchell on the radio to give him my position because I knew I would have to bailout soon. I couldn't see any of our planes. When I receives no answer, I knew my radio set had been disabled. My burning ship struggled up to about 2,000 feet, and I spotted two Marine fighters in front of me. I fired tracers in front of them to attract their attention and immediately they turned. One chap, named Watkins, seeing me smoking, pulled up along side. My engine was pounding like hell and giving little power. Since it was low tide there was a wide expanse of white sand below; I started to crash-land but thought better of it when I realized how near I was to the Jap seaplane base. So I figured I would have a better chance of getting away if I bailed out. I pulled the emergency door release, waved to Watkins, and went over the side and seemed to fall in sort of a forward position without tumbling. There was no sensation of falling. Probably I was too excited to notice. Suddenly I realized there was something else I should do-I pulled the ripcord. The ground was coming up at an alarming rate, and I began to wonder how I could land. It was all over in a moment. I came down with a bit of a thud in a little clearing at the foot of a tree in which my chute had tangled. I cut my jungle pack free

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II from my chute, cocked my .45, and started down the hillside." (Air. rons. The 70 th became part of Cactus Flight on 8 October when 11 new P-39s flew into Henderson. Four pilots of the 68 th arrived on 7 Force Magazine March 1943) November as the squadron moved from Tonga to New Caledonia. On 30 October Gen. Vandegrift's Marines began their move to Cactus Flight was under the 67FS until 2 December, when it began to be referred to as the 347 th Fighter Group. Elements of the 67 th , the west supported by the light cruiser Atlanta and four destroyers offshore. By 3 November they had 69 th , 70 th , and 339 th rotated and operated through Cactus Flight as advanced to Point Cruz. That night the Tokyo Express disembarked early as mid-November. These fighter squadrons would not become 1,500 troops to the east of Lunga at Koli Point and stopped the part of the 13 th Fighter Command until January 1943 when the 13FC was formed. Four squadrons of Lt.Col. William Brice's MAG-II Marine offensive. On 4 November the San Francisco, Helena, and Sterett shelled the newly landed arrived at New Caledonia on 30 October and began to send aircraft Japanese, and Marine and Army troops moved to the east the next to Guadalcanal. On 1 November Maj. Joseph Sailer's, SBDs of day to meet the current Japanese threat, and by the 8th had surrounded VMSB-132 began operations from Henderson, and nine pilots of Maj. Paul Fontana's VMF-112 flew in by transport plane the next and neutralized them. At the end of October there were only 29 aircraft on opera- day; the squadron completed its move nine days later. The new tional status in the Cactus Air Force serviced and flown by 1,557 units operated from the new strip at Turtle Bay that had been comMarine and 197 Air Force aviation personnel. After a shamefullack pleted in three days by cutting through brush, filling in trenches, of support President Roosevelt ordered Gen. George Marshall and foxholes, and bomb craters, and then grading and rolling the ground. Adm. Ernest King to immediately send additional troops, ships, On 12 November Maj. Robert Richard's VMSB-142 and three piand aircraft to the Pacific, even if it meant cutting into the "Europe lots from VMF-122 and VMSB-131-the Marine's first TBF torfirst" mentality of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By mid-November the pedo squadron at Cactus-began operations from Turtle Bay. AAF air situation had improved. The 347FG, activated in October with bomber strength in the South Pacific increased to 50 B-17 and 20 the 339FS, had incorporated the 70 th, 69 th , and 67 th fighter squad- B-26s, with 23 more heavy bombers on the way from Hawaii.

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5 November 1942

In early November, at a time when there was a critical shortage of personnel and materiel on the island, Adm. Turner decided to push forward on one of his personal projects, the construction of a secondary airfield at Aola Bay. Despite surveys that precluded the area as an airfield site, Turner nonetheless diverted newly arrived infantry, defense battalions, artillery units, and construction troops that were vitally needed to strengthen perimeter defenses and to improve Henderson and Fighter One. Turner wasted a month before abandoning the project. ' Despite the failure of their 23-25 October offensive the Japanese began to plan for another offensive. Gen. Hyakutake, commander of the 17 th Army on Rabaul, decided to send Lt.Gen. Tadayoshi Sano's division and its heavy equipment to Gaudalcanal in larger troop transports instead of the Tokyo Express. Hyakutake formed the Japanese 8th Area Army, and would personally take it to Guadalcanal and recapture the island from a command post near Kokumbona. Four naval task forces were organized to take the island: two bombardment task forces to shell the American airfields into oblivion; a third for general support; and the fourth to transport troops and equipment. Despite their previous success the Japanese did not wish to commit their carriers and would depend on landbased aircraft and those that could be catapulted from cruisers. Japanese troops remaining on the island after the third defeat were being reorganized west of the perimeter, one force west of Kokumbona and a smaller force east at Koli. Vandegrift decided to strike first while the Japanese were regrouping. He ordered an attack across the Matanikau River to move the perimeter about five miles west and capture the Kokumbona area. He would then move another 15 miles further west to the Poha River to finally put enemy artillery out of range. On I November the American attack began with an artillery barrage across the river by the 11 th Marines and 3rd Defense Battalion, and by naval cruisers shelling the Point Cruz area and westward. P-39s and SBDs attacked Japanese infantry and artillery positions in front of the advance across the Matanikau, while 19 llBG B-J7s from Espiritu Santo bombed Kokumbona. At 0615 Lts. Dewey, Haedtler, Holmes, Jacobson, and Shaw strafed near Point Cruz, and after the B-17s bombed Kokumbona they raked that area

with their guns. Dewey and Jacobson returned early due to mechanical problems with their over-worked aircraft. A second mission flown by Lts. Kerstetter and Patterson attacked artillery positions. A third mission flown by Capt. Mitchell and Lt. Jacobson bombed the Kokumbona area but found that their bombs were duds when they returned to strafe the area. A fourth mission flown by Lts. Dewey, Haedtler, Holmes, and Patterson strafed ahead of the advancing Army and Marine infantry, which was making good headway despite stubborn resistance. The fighters were guided by signal panels at the front indicating where they should bomb and strafe.

Lt.Arnold Patterson takes five in front ofthe P-400 "Whistlin Britches" he shared with Lt. Zed Fountain. (Lansdale/ Haedtler via 347FGA)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II Haedtler left the battle early with jammed guns, and Patterson left with propeller trouble. Lts. Dewey and Holmes bombed and strafed Japanese road movement between Point Cruz and Lukumbona. On the fifth mission Lts. Shaw and Purnell bombed and strafed Kokumbona and reported starting several fires, a few of which exploded, indicating ammunition dumps. Once the initial bombardment was lifted there were several crossings of the Matanikau by the 5th Malines and 164 th Infantry, gaining almost two miles in the first day. The main Japanese resistance at the base of Point Cruz was eliminated by several savage bayonet attacks by the 5 th Marines that killed 350 Japanese. On the 2nd the P-39s and P-400 continued day long close air support, hitting Japanese troop movements, vehicles, artillery, AA positions, bivouac areas, gasoline and ammunition dumps, and landing boats. That day VS-71 lost its resolute leader, Lt.Cdr. John Eldridge, and two Marine lieutenants of VMSB-132 on a volunteer night SBD mission against suspected Japanese warships approaching Guadalcanal. On the 3rd , 164th Infantry and 5 th Marines moved another mile beyond Point Cruz and were within two and half miles of Kokumbona. The 67 th joined in the attack, with P-400s and P-39s flying in pairs carrying 100 and 500lb. bombs. Two bombed the Japanese AA positions at Kokumbona that had made the area dangerous for air attack. Soon aerial reconnaissance discovered that the Japanese had landed troops to the east at Koli Point, near the village of Tetere. To deal with the situation 15 SBDs, one TBF, five P-39s (Capt. Mitchell, Lts. Dews, Jacobson, Purnell, and Shaw), two P-400s (Lts. Dewey and Patterson), and seven F4Fs immediately bombed the reinforcements. They dropped 20 500lb. bombs, 76 100lb. bombs, and a 3251b. depth charge through heavy small arms and small caliber AA fire. To reduce this new threat at Koli Point the 5th Marines and l64 th Infantry closed in on the Japanese attempting to surround them. Four or five two-plane missions a day were flown over the next few days and reached a high of 12 missions. Poor communications and the thick jungle made it difficult to identify the front lines, and there were several friendly fire casualties from strafing aircraft. By 10 November 450 Japanese had been killed by ground troops and air attack at Koli Point. The remainder of their force managed to escape into the jungle, but less than half made the arduous journey to join the defense of Kokumbona. The elimination of the Koli threat permitted the renewal of the American Kokumbona offensive. On 4 November a local boat, "Horton's Schoone/;" arrived at Lunga Point and dropped off five MIA pilots who had been rescued by friendly natives and coast watchers. One of the pilots was Lt. Wallace Dinn, who was hit by AA fire and parachuted into the jungle on the south coast of Santa Isabel Island on 28 October. Dinn came upon a village of friendly natives, one of whom spoke mission school pidgin English. Dinn talked two natives into taking him in a small dugout canoe down the Santa Isabel coast toward Tulagi, 160 miles away. After the first day they transferred to a 20-foot war canoe with four paddlers following the coast. Dinn and his rescuers met perils along the way. Since it was the rainy season they were soaked most of the time. Occasionally, Japanese recon aircraft would fly over and Dinn had to hide in the wet bottom of the canoe. Croco-

diles swam up to the canoe and Dinn fired his .45 to scare them away. A downed Japanese pilot was reported to be on a nearby small island inhabited by nine adult natives and several children. Dinn sent three of his paddlers over to the island in the early morning to surprise and capture the lap while he was eating breakfast. The Jap was captured and bound, and the group continued their voyage with their prisoner. During a driving rainstorm in rough seas the next evening the Jap overturned the canoe and escaped to a nearby island by swimming ashore in the darkness. After a search the Jap was recaptured the next afternoon, and he was carefully bound. The group was faced with crossing 60 miles of open \Y,ater from Santa Isabel to Florida Island, and then on to Tulagi. A large 30foot war canoe with a high pointed bow and stern was procured for the 30-hour trip. The group paddled to the end of Santa Isabel when they were informed that there was a British boat on the other side of the island that could get them to Guadalcanal in an hour and a half. The only problem was they had to cross the 2,000-foot spine of the island. By this time everyone was becoming weak, and the Japanese prisoner refused to walk, but a few jabs with a bayonet persuaded him otherwise. The group struggled across the ridge only

Lt. Frederick Purnell. (Canning)

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Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942

Nakajima A6M2 Rufe floatplane taking off from Rekata Bay. (Lansdale/National Archives)

to find tht:
two float biplanes about to bounce two F4Fs. The Airacobras jettisoned their bombs and went into aerial combat with a chance to have some Rising Sun victory symbols painted on their cowlings. The P-39 pilots shot down three Rufes and two biplane float planes. Lt. Robert Ferguson of the 67FS, Capt. William Shaw, and the briefly rested Lt. Walter Dinn of 339FS claimed the Rufes, while Capt. John Mitchell and Lt. Fred Purnell claimed the biplanes. The victo. ries were the second for Mitchell and Shaw. The Navy TBFs hit a cruiser with two torpedoes and put one into a destroyer, while the SBDs hit another cruiser with a 1,000lb. bomb. VMF-121 shot down 11 float planes (three by Capt. Joe Foss to give him 19 total victories to tie John Smith's USMC record) and lost three of their own, including Foss, who was rescued and returned to base. For the next several days Capt. Mitchell and several of the veteran pilots who were scheduled to be relieved remained to indoctrinate the new pilots. The cadre included: returnees Lts. Ferguson and Jarman; and new Lts. Bauer, Hull, Inciardi, Kellum, McLanahan, Norris, Novak, Ryan, Shambrook, Waldmire, and Williams. To fix a routine, Mitchell had them fly close support missions in the Tassafaronga area. On the 7th Brig.Gen. Roy Geiger was relieved by Brig.Gen. Louis Woods, who had been his chief of staff. The next day Adm. Halsey flew into Guadalcanal from Noumea to get a first hand look at the situation, and was accommodated by a Japanese destroyer that lobbed in a few shells on Cactus during the night. When he returned to headquarters he was given the intelligence estimates of the strength ofthe next Japanese naval offensive. The Japanese naval commitment would be similar to the Battle of Santa Cruz, while Halsey's forces would be minus the sunken Hornet and the Enterprise and South Dakota, which were at Noumea for repairs. The Japanese Army had failed to take Henderson, and the Japanese naval high command felt that too much effort had been expended; naval bombardment alone could knock out the airfield, and then Gen. Hyakutake's reinforcements could land without interference. The Japanese attack on Port Moresby, New Guinea, was postponed so that the 38 th Infantry scheduled to fight there could be landed, along with 3,500 special naval landing force troops, on GuadalcanaI. The landing was to be at Koli Point, east of the American perimeter, causing the Americans to divide their forces. To mount the new offensive the undaunted Japanese marshaled a convoy of 12 heavy transports off Buin-Faisi to carry 13,500 troops, supplies, and heavy artillery for a major effort to drive the Americans off GuadalcanaI. The attack was to be supported by a strong Ilaval force of four battleships, five heavy cruisers, and a large destroyer escort, assembled at Truk and RabauI. All Halsey had to defend were two task forces. Adm. Thomas Kincaid's carrier task force had the tough carrier Enterprise as its nucleus, and was supported by the battleships Washington and South Dakota, two cruisers, and eight destroyers cruising off New Caledonia. Adm. Richard Kelly Turner's task force consisted of three groups. The first group included three transports, one cruiser, and four destroyers under Adm. Norman Scott that were carrying Marines, supplies, and ammunition from Espiritu Santo to Cactus. The second group was a force of five cruisers and ten destroyers operating from Espiritu Santo, commanded by Adm. Daniel

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II

At the end of October. a few partially assembled P-38s had been shipped to the port of Dumbea, New Caledonia, near NoumeaThey were driven through the streets to be quickly completed at the small strip at Magenta Field, then flown 40 miles up to Tontouta to avoid the arduous 30-mile truck drive.There they were flight tested and readied, either for training or combat on Guadalcanal. (Lansdale)

Callaghan. He was charged with protecting the third force of four transports carrying the 182nd Infantry to the island that was commanded by Turner, who left Noumea on the 81h and was joined by Scott and Callaghan. To complicate the situation, COMSOPAC first needed to land reinforcements and supplies on Guadalcanal and then turn to meet the Japanese force. Adm. Turner was in command of the supply situation and accurately predicted the Japanese timetable. The Japanese would send down a land-based air attack on Henderson on the 10th ; a naval bombardment on the night of the llth; a day carrier attack on Henderson on the 12th ; a naval bombardment and landings that night; and an invasion in force on the 13 th . All transports and cargo vessels had to clear of Guadalcanal by the night of the 12th . On the morning of the lllh cargo ships at Guadalcanal were unloaded at Lunga Point to make room for transports from Noumea that would arrive on the morning of the 12lh . The escorts of the transports, commanded by R.Adm. Callaghan, were to defend against any Japanese naval forces that might come down the Slot. The main Japanese naval force had not yet been comrrUtted, and on the 11 th the Enterprise, South Dakota, and Washington sailed from Noumea, COMSOPAC flew land-based aircraft into Henderson, and SBD, TBF, and F4F reinforcements were also flown in. At the end of October a few partially assembled P-38s had been shipped to the port of Dumbea, New Caledonia, near Noumea, and were hauled to a small nearby airstrip called Magenta Field and quickly assembled to avoid the arduous 30 mile truck drive to their base at Tontouta. At Tontouta they were flight tested and readied either for training or combat on Guadalcanal. On 12 November, at 1530, a new aircraft appeared over Cactus for the first time, as Lockheed P-38 Lightnings of the 339FS of the new 347FG landed at Fighter Two. Maj. Dale Brannon led the eight P-38s that included four other pilots who had also been on the inaugural P-400 flight to Cactus on 7 August. Brannon, now recovered from his wounds, left Tontouta at 0700 and routed through Espiritu 3.5 hours later to refuel, then continued to Cactus. As the flight approached Cactus the

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navigation B-17 carrying ground crew for the P-38s had to turn back to San Cristobal, as they received an erroneous radio report that Henderson was under air attack. Once the P-38s based at Cactus Marine personnel serviced them until the AAF ground crews arrived. From this point on, all 347FG squadrons were integrated with Army Cactus Flight operations, flying Airacobras and Lightnings with little squadron identity. However, 347 1h combat logs continued to be designated "The 67 th Fighter Squadron" for some time afterward. For the AAF keeping accurate records was a low priority on Cactus in fall 1942. It was impossible to determine who was flying with which squadron, who was on TDY (temporary duty) to which squadron, and which personnel were at Guadalcanal and which were at New Caledonia. The 339 th P-38s had been diverted in September from Gen. Kenney's 5 th Air Force and transferred to Gen. Harmon's

The 339 th 's P-38s had been diverted in September from Gen. Kenney's 5th Air Force and transferred to Gen. Harmon COMAIRSOPAC at New CaledoniaThe first Lightnings were flown in by ferry pilots, who immediately boarded a transport and flew out. Soon eight more P-38s arrived, flying nonstop from the 5AF at Milne Bay, New Guinea. (Canning)

Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942 COMAIRSOPAC at New Caledonia. Ferry pilots flying non-stop from the 5AF at Milne Bay, New Guinea, brought in two groups of eight Lightnings and immediately boarded transport planes and flew back out. Lockheed sent out a factory representative who stayed briefly, but neither he nor the ferry pilots did much to indoctrinate the ex-Airacobra pilots on their new fighter. The fighters were held at Tontouta, as the Japanese air attacks and naval bombardments on Henderson made it too hazardous to base them there. During October 339 th pilots became more or less self-trained at Tontouta in the new fighter. They were given the pilot's handbook to read, then checked out the cockpit instruments and controls and took off for their first flight. Rex Barber stated that the only training he had in the Lightning were several check out flights at Noumea before he left for combat at Guadalcanal. He reported that it took him ten or so combat missions from Cactus before he became familiar with all the buttons, switches, and toggles.

\

On 12 November 1943 the 67FS carried on with its usual daily close support missions, At 0740, Us, Donald Hansen (pictured) and Kenneth Kellum dropped IOOlb, bombs, then strafed Japanese positions along the Tambelego River. During a low strafing pass, Hansen's wing caught a treetop and his plane cartwheeled into a flaming explosion, (Canning)

On the 11 th at 0530 the transports Betelgeuse, Libra, and Zeilin anchored at Lunga Point and unloaded on schedule, covered by destroyers and cruisers. At 0935 they were attacked by ten Vals with a 12 Zero escort. Several vessels received slight damage, and VMF-121 shot down six Zeros and five dive-bombers, but lost five F4Fs. At 1127 Bettys came over in a high altitude attack. Airacobras of the 67FS and VMF-1l2 F4Fs were sent up to intercept. The P39s struggled and climbed and climbed, and finally ran out of altitude at 24,000 feet and had to watch as the Marine fighters continued to climb and shot down seven Bettys. The Marine victories were bittersweet, as they lost two more F4Fs for a total of seven lost that day. The Japanese air raid disrupted unloading, as the cargo ships had to get under way to evade the attack and the Zeilin was slightly damaged. In other missions that day the P-39s and P-400s strafed enemy landing boats in Doma Cove and near Tassafaronga, and supported Marine artillery fire on Kokumbona. At 1800 the transports were almost unloaded, but had to retire to safety to the east for the night. Adm. Callaghan protected Adm. Turner's transports before midnight, and after midnight Adm. Scott's warships joined Callaghan in the Sealark Channel. On the 12th the status report for aircraft available at Cactus was 26 F4Fs, 23 SBDs, 18 P-39s, no P-400s, and approximately seven P-38s. At 0530 the transports and cargo ships returned and continued unloading two battalions of the 182nd Infantry off Kukum Point. The 67FS carried on with its usual daily close support missions. At 0740 Us. Donald Hansen and Kenneth Kellum dropped 100lb. bombs, then strafed Japanese positions along the Tambelego River. During a low strafing pass Hansen's wing caught a treetop and his plane cartwheeled into a flaming explosion. At 1340 an air raid alert was sounded and the transports stopped unloading and formed into a defensive AA formation. Capt. Joe Foss' Wildcats scrambled into the high clouds, and eight P-39s circled at mid-altitude. At 1405 25 Japanese torpedo-bombers flew in line abreast at low altitude from behind Florida Island covered by eight Zeros to attack shipping off Lunga Point. The Airacobras were notified by radio of the impending attack, and for once the P39s could climb to altitude in time to dive into combat. However, the temperatures at high altitude had cooled their canopies, and as they dove into the warmer, humid lower altitudes their canopies became covered by condensation. Lt. Frank Clark was blinded and plunged to his death in the sea. The P-39 attack surprised the Japanese torpedo bombers, prompting many of them to drop their torpedoes too high, causing them to tumble and sink. Adm. Callaghans' flagship, the cruiser San Francisco, and the destroyer Buchanan were damaged in the attack. The San Francisco was crashed by a Japanese aircraft in the after control station and suffered 30 killed, including the cruiser's XO. Lt. James McLanahan of the 67FS bagged a Zero that was reported to have an elongated cockpit to accommodate a rear seat observer (a misidentified Val). McLanahan hit the plane with a long burst to start it smoking, and then it burst into flames and half-rolled into the ocean. lLt. William Norris of the 70FS got a Val, and lLt. Martin Ryan claimed a Zero. VMF112 shot down six Bettys and four Zeros, while VMF-121 accounted for eight bombers and three escorts, including two Bettys and a Zero by Foss to give him 22 total victories. The Army Air Force's

77

13 th Fighter Command in World War II timely arrival had chased Zeros off the tails of several Marine Wildcats, and Joe Foss and his pilots were waiting on the ground after the battle to thank the P-39 pilots for their help. The air battle cost three more Wildcats and a P-39, further depleting the Cactus Air Force. During the day reconnaissance aircraft had reported a Japanese task force that included two battleships steaming down the Slot. Further to the north another recon plane spotted a convoy of 11 Japanese transports carrying an infantry landing force escorted by 12 destroyers. After unloading almost 6,000 men Turner's transports weighed anchor at 1815 and were escorted by Callaghan and Scott northeast to the safety ofIndispensable Strait, located between eastern Guadalcanal and Malaita Island. The U.S. warships then returned toward Guadalcanal to meet the Japanese task force. First Battle of Guadalcanal 12/13 November 1942 The Japanese began their massive offensive on the night of 12/13 November as their 12 transports paused offshore, waiting VAdm. Hiroaki Abe's force of two battleships (Hiei and Kirishima), a cruiser, and 15 destroyers to bombard Henderson shortly after midnight. This was the first time the Japanese committed battleships in the Solomons, albeit their oldest battlewagons, both launched in 1912. In the darkness R.Adm. Daniel Callaghan's force offive cruisers and eight destroyers passed between the two columns of Japanese warships, and in 36 confused, ferocious minutes the First Battle of Guadalcanal was over. The Japanese battleship Hiei was severely damaged by 85 shells and lost her steering, and two Japanese destroyers were sunk. The U.S. avy lost the cruiser Atlanta, killing R.Adm. Norman Scott. The San Francisco was heavily hit; Callaghan and most of his staff were killed, and the cruiser had to return to the American West Coast for repairs. The cruiser Portland was also heavily damaged and towed first to Sydney, then to California for repairs. The damage to the cruiser Helena was repaired at

Of the 67FS P-400s. only the oldest and most patched up fighter, the venerable "Resurrection," remained undamaged. A IS-inch naval shell had landed under its wing but did not explode, and in a later attack an aerial bomb landed nearby but was a dud. "Resurrection" was truly charmed, as later, when the fighter's Allison engine died, mechanics were able to squeeze the bigger and more powerful engine from a P-39 into it. (Lansdale/Canning)

78

Noumea. Half of the eight USN destroyers were sunk and three damaged. The cruiser Juneau was heavily hit and limped away, only to be hit by a torpedo from the Japanese submarine 1-26 the next morning and blew up, killing all but ten of her 700 men, including the famous five Sullivan brothers. It was a very costly battle for the U.S. Navy, but losses caused both navies to withdraw. One of the newly arrived P-38s was destroyed in the shelling. At dawn on 13 November, while patrolling off Savo Island, six SBDs found the severely damaged Hiei unable to maneuver and escorted by three destroyers. At 0615 a Navy SBD hit the Hiei with a bomb and was followed by a torpedo hit by a VMSB-13J TBF. At 1100 nine detached Enterprise TBFs escorted by six F4Fs of VF10 put three more torpedoes into the tough old battleship, which refused to sink. Later 17 11BG B-17s that left Espiritu at 0500 arrived and flew through heavy AA fire and got a hit and several near misses. Five more Marine and Navy bomber attacks covered by the 67FS followed but could not hit the floundering battleship. Marine Wildcats shot down ten of the Zeros the Japanese sent down from Buin to protect the crippled battleship. As night approached the Hiei had taken five bombs and ten torpedoes, and the crew was finally ordered to scuttle the wreck a few hours later. On the night of 13/14, for 45 minutes after midnight, three cruisers and four destroyers under VAdm. Gunichi Mikawa lobbed over 1,000 HE shells into Henderson and Fighter One and Two, guided by flares dropped by Washing Machine Charlie. Two F4Fs were destroyed and 15 F4Fs and one SBD were damaged, but could be quickly repaired. However, the 67FS bore the brunt of the attack, as of its 16 fighters in commission the day before only the oldest and m~st patched up fighter, the venerable "Resurrection," remained undamaged. During the fighter's stay at Cactus a IS-inch naval shell had landed under its wing but didn't explode, and in a later attack an aerial bomb landed nearby but also was a dud. "Resurrection" was truly charmed, as later, when the fighter's Allison

339FS P-38 at Fighter Two, parked off the Coconut plantation.There is another P-38 in the background and a reveted Marine SBD. (Lansdale/Coley/ 347FGA)

Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942

339FS P-38 at FighterTwoThe Marston matting in the foreground is chewed up and studded with small rocks. There is a B-17 parked in the right background. (Lansdale/Coley/347FGA)

ILt Besby Holmes P-38 # 100 was the oldest Lightning in the 339FS. It is pictured being towed through Noumea, New Caledonia, on their way to Tontouta. (Lansdale/Holmes)

engine died, mechanics were able to squeeze the bigger and more powerful engine from a P-39 into it. That morning after the Japanese attacked ground crews, using parts from those aircraft written off in the attack, quickly put the Airacobras with minor damage back into operational status. None of the eight P-38s that arrived the day before from New Guinea were damaged, nor were the eight that flew in from Espiritu Santo on the 12th • Over tue past several days the total air strength on Cactus had risen to 41 F4Fs, 30 SBDs, 19 TBFs, two P-400s, and 16 P-38s. The 68FS sustained three wounded enlisted men during the shelling for the only casualties it would record during the war. The next morning the Japanese did not send air reconnaissance down to Henderson to check on the results of their attack and disregarded the fact that it had not been neutralized. They ordered their transports that had been waiting in the northern Solomons toward Cactus. At sunrise scout planes from Cactus and long-range patrol

bombers from Button were searching the seas north and west of Guadalcanal. These reconnaissance aircraft discovered Tanaka's transports about 150 miles to the northwest in the Slot and Mikawa's retreating bombardment force about 140 miles south of New Georgia. Since the Japanese task force had no aircraft carriers their landbased aircraft were furnishing air cover by flying in relays. Ground crews at Cactus were busy from before dawn repairing and then refueling and rearming aircraft. They had to roll bombs and gasoline from dumps through mud and around craters. SBDs escorted by F4Fs and P-39s flew mission after mission that day. At 0800 seven SBDs and six TBFs escorted by seven F4Fs took off from Henderson, and the SBDs scored direct hits on the heavy cruiser Maya with 500lb. bombs, while the TBFs hit the heavy cruiser Kinugasa with two torpedoes. At 0915 the SBDs from Henderson hit the Kinugasa with a 500lb. bomb through the #2 turret, and immediately the cruiser took another 500lb. bomb hit and was in

Salvage crew hoists "Tojo's tion. (USAF via Lansdale)

Ground crew prepare Capt Robert Petit's P-38 Lightning "Miss Virginia," No. 147. Petit named the fighter after his fiance, MissVirginia Woodard. Note the I65-gallon auxiliary steel fuel tank in the background (behind the nose wheel). (National Archives via Lansdale)

Fate"

onto a flatbed truck for further cannibaliza-

79

13th Fighter Command in World War II

Neatness doesn't count l Capt. Thomas Lanphier's "Phoebe," with its nose wheel removed and strut resting on a box, and the tire lies under the fighter. The port prop spinner and blade lay on the ground, right foregroundVarious boxes, cans, and drums lay scattered around the plane. The U.S. Navy PBY pilot is posing at FighterTwo. (Canning, 347FGA via Lansdale)

ILt. Doug Canning (70FS) holds the I Ifoot six inch, constant speed, selective pitch Curtiss Electric propeller that used electrical power to adjust the pitch of the blades.The plate at Canning's hip says "Remove brushes before removing propeller." (Canning via Lansdale)

serious difficulty. At 101527 planes off the Enterprise arrived from 250 miles south and hit Mikawa's flagship, the heavy cruiser Chokai, the light cruiser Isuz, and the destroyer Michishio. They scored a near miss on the crippled Kinugasa that ruptured her side plate, causing her to be abandoned before she sunk 15 miles south of Rendova Island. Since the Enterprise had a damaged NO.1 elevator these SBDs landed on Henderson, where they operated for the remainder of the day. A B-17 discovered Tanaka's convoy of 11 transports and 13 destroyers heading toward Guadalcanal and called in Marine and Navy aircraft from Guadalcanal and B-17s from Espiritu Santo. Six of the transports were carrying 11,000 troops of the 38 th Division, while five other cargo ships were transporting 10,000 tons

of supplies and 2,500 elite naval troops. Forty-one planes from the supposedly destroyed Henderson airfield surprised Tanaka, and B17s would be on their way from Espiritu Santo. Just before noon 18 Marine and Navy SBDs and seven TBF bombers, escorted by four Airacobras of the 67FS (AAF mechanics were able to repair three more fighters) and 12 F4Fs, attacked Tanaka's frantically maneuvering four-column convoy. Tanaka had anticipated that Mikawa's cruisers and destroyers would arrive in time to add to his AA defense, but'Mikawa was withdrawing his three damaged cruisers to the Shortlands. Tanaka's destroyers laid a smoke screen and put up a heavy AA barrage. Two Maru transports (Niagara and Canberra) were sunk by torpedoes, and the Sado Maru was crippled by a bomb and headed back to the Shortlands escorted by two destroyers. The Sado Maru had 38 th Division officers aboard, leaving any troops getting ashore without command. SBDs and TBFs made repeated attacks and damaged the Marus throughout the day. At 1245 17 SBDs escorted by fighters sunk the Brisbane Maru, and at 1345 20 more SBDs sunk the Shinanogawa and Arizona Maru. The escorting Japanese destroyers tried to put up an effective AA defense while attempting to rescue thousands of troops at the same time, but were only able to shoot down three bombers. At 1430 15 B-17s from Espiritu dropped 60 bombs on the convoy in two attacks: the first flight hit a transport from 17,000 feet, and the second straddled a seaplane tender from 20,000 feet. At 1530 the Enterprise sent eight SBDs out and found the determined Tanaka heading toward Guadalcanal, and set the Nako Maru on fire. An unescorted group of seven SBDs dropped down to attack and were intercepted by Zeros that shot down three and damaged two others. Tanaka radioed a request to Adm. Kondo for permission to run his remaining four cargo ships aground at Tassafaronga, as there would not be enough time to unload during darkness and then withdraw. The air score for the day was six Zeros shot down for six SBDs and two F4Fs lost for the day. One of the F4Fs that did return was piloted by legendary Marine ace Lt.Col. Joe Bauer, who shot down a Zero

Capt. Robert Petit's "Miss Virginia" displays the "destroyer" sunk on the 29 March 1943 Shortland Mission. It was not discoyered until after the war that the destroyer did not sink and was, in fact, a subchaser that was badly damaged with great loss of life. The aircraft kill markings were Rufes that Petit shot down on 27 February 1943 (He later was credited with one Rufe kill and a probable). (Lansdale)

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Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942

The 14 November attempt of the "Tokyo Express" was costly.Three transports are seen on this photo, two burning in the foreground offTassafaronga Point, and one sunk along the upper right shore, which is also pictured in the photo below with a destroyed landing barge in the foreground. (USMC)

The northwest coast of Guadalcanal was the area of the final battles for the island, and the area of the landings of the Tokyo Express.The even rows of a large coconut plantation are seen in the foreground, and the landmark Cape Esperance is seen in the far background. (USAF)

that day to become a double ace with ten victories and would later be awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. Tanaka had lost six transports and had one damaged and turn back. There are no accurate totals for the number of Japanese troops lost, but over 3,000 had drowned, and of the many rescued by the destroyers the majority were burned or injured. Second Battle of Guadalcanal14/lS November 1942 Later, V.Adm Kondo aboard the Atago moved down the Slot with 14 warships, including the battleship Kirishima, heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, the light cruisers Nagara and Sendai, and nine destroyers. His orders were to wipe out Henderson after R.Adm. Abe failed to do it on the 13 th and V.Adm. Mikawa the night before that. Kondo split his 14 ships into three groups, a bombardment group and two screening groups. Facing him was Task Force 64 under R.Adm. Willis "Ching" Lee in the battleship Washington and accompanied by the battleship South Dakota and four escorting destroyers. The Enterprise had withdrawn after its busy day. Early in the battle the Japanese put the four American destroyers out of

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~ 81

131h Fighter Command in World War II action, sinking three and leaving the battleships virtually unescorted. The South Dakota was heavily damaged by 27 hits but was able to fire back, damaging the Takao and Atago. The Washington's radar picked up the Kirishima, which was shelling the South Dakota. Lee's guns crashed shell after shell into the Japanese battleship, and seven minutes later she left the battle a flaming hulk. The Kirishima and the destroyer Ayanami were sunk in the battle. The South Dakota sustained heavy damage, but refused to sink and sailed to New York for repairs, and would return to the Pacific the next spring. The USN also lost three destroyers, the Preston, Walke, and Benham. Tanaka's destroyers valiantly continued to pick up survivors throughout the night, and then he led his remaining four transports to Tassafaronga to be beached before daylight. As soon as they were beached Tanaka withdrew his crowded destroyers back up the Slot. The Americans had won a costly strategic victory. This was to be the last major Japanese effort to destroy the Cactus airfields and to transport and land a large infantry force and its equipment as reinforcements to mount an offensive on the island. The Japanese Navy no longer had control of the Slot, and Japanese troops on the island were near starvation; and not only battling the Americans, but disease and the jungle. Over the past four days the Japanese had not only lost a battle, but she had lost the Guadalcanal campaign, and eventually the war. The aircraft status summary for the 15th reported the availability of20 of29 F4Fs, II of22 SBDs, all eight TBFs, 13 of 16 P-38s, six of ten P-39s, and no P-400s. An early patrol was scheduled for the morning to search for Tanaka's surviving transports. From their dispersal points on the nearly completed Fighter Two strip, Lt. James Jarman taxied in the darkness followed by Lts. Ferguson, Norris, and Ryan. Jarman proceeded down the runway, leading the flight with his wing lights, and noticed bright flashes. As he turned at the end of the runway he saw the flashes were from Japanese artillery taking aim at the wing lights, and he ordered the other fighters to disperse, shut down, and the pilots were to take cover. Jarman took off alon~ and climbed, and as he turned he saw the silhouette of a large aircraft in the predawn darkness. As he closed in he was met with machine gun fire that passed over his cockpit. He pulled away to the side and could make out the roundels of the Royal New Zealand Air Force on the fuselage of an approaching Lockheed Hudson. Jarman flew off toward Savo Island searching for the surviving transports from the previous night's battle. Looking toward Tassafaronga and Kokumbona he discovered four transports; one was beached and the others were heading toward the beach. Not sure of their identity, he flew in a high-speed turn and descended to 500 feet for an inspection pass through heavy AA and small arms fire that immediately revealed the transports as the enemy. Jarman quickly returned to Henderson to gather his flight and took off to get at the transports first. As they approached Point Cruz they now saw three beached transports, with the last one heading toward shore. Ferguson and Ryan dove and got direct bomb hits on a transport each. Norris got a near miss, and Jarman's bomb did no damage. Ferguson and Ryan turned and strafed with devastating results, and the flight returned to base. After quickly rearming they returned to Cruz Point, and Ryan and Ferguson shared the credit for another transport damaged, hitting the last one to be finally beached. Both

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Ryan and Ferguson would be awarded the DFC for this action. In the next hour, 13 Navy and Marine SBDs and one TBF got seven hits on the three beached transports. At 0900 seven P-39s now in commission flown by Lts. Conrad, Geyer, Kellum, McLanahan, Novak, Waldmire, and Williams hit the fourth transport with two bombs. Three B-26s ofthe newly arrived 70BS hit a transport with a 1,00Olb. bomb and put two 1,000 pounders on small vessels unloading supplies nearby. At 1045, with another P-39 repaired and in service, four pilots (Lts. Jarman, Inciardi, Patterson, and Ryan) attacked the least damaged transport and got a direct hit. Since the skies over the transports were swarming with attacking friendly aircraft, Jarman's flight flew out into Skylark Channeilooking for other targets. The P-39s spotted the bow of a sinking ship and survivors bobbing among the debris in the water. Jarman radioed Henderson for permission to attack and was told to go ahead, as there were no American shipping losses in the area. As the Airacobras turned to make their strafing runs, Henderson fighter control instructed them to hold their fire, as they had just learned of the loss of the four American destroyers the night before. The P-39s flew back to the destroyer Meade that had been shelling the beached transports and flew low over the destroyer, waggling their wings one after another and hoping to lead it out toward the survivors. Finally, after three passes they convinced the Meade to follow and pick up the American survivors floating about 12 miles away. When the Meade arrived it picked up 264 survivors of the Walke and Preston and took them to Tulagi. American air attacks continued during the afternoon despite Pistol Pete shelling the airfield as the aircraft took off and landed. SBDs and TBFs attacked the transports that had been damaged the previous day and were left burning and dead in the water 95 miles from Guadalcanal. One transport was sunk, one was left a burning hulk, and another was sinking as the attacks ended. With the Japanese transports reduced to blazing hulks the air attacks concentrated on the enemy troops and stores that were hurriedly brought ashore from the beached transports, which were poorly camouflaged and were vulnerable targets. The Pistol Petes had continued their harassment of Henderson. Doug Canning (67FS): "During the last week of my tour Pistol Pete got so bad that the guys dug a cave in a hillside, and I slept there on the comfortable sandy floor with my blanket thrown over me. It was a lot better than crouching in a foxhole all night waiting for an artillery shell to hit you." Finally a patrolling SBD located an artillery position and spotted it with a smoke bomb. Lts. Geyer and McLanahan took off and strafed the area around the gun to scatter its crew, and then McLanahan was able to drop a 500lb. bomb within a few feet of the gun. The two then came around and strafed again, with Geyer's bullets blowing up its ammunition stores. At 1530 the Japanese sent 12 Vals and eight Zeros to Henderson, but only two Zeros escaped the Marine fighter scramble. Late in the day two 339FS P38s were sent out to escort the withdrawing battleships South Dakota and Washington back to Noumea, but were turned back by bad weather.

Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942 In the battle both sides had the same objective; to reinforce and supply their position on the island and deny it to the enemy by air and sea. By nightfall the Japanese had been able to land only 2,000 troops, and most were lucky to have their rifles and minimal supplies. Once landed they were tormented by American air power. On the American-held beaches Turner had managed to land most of his troops and supplies before withdrawing. The Japanese Navy lost two battleships, a heavy cruiser, three destroyers, II transports, and 16 Bettys and 25 Zeros that were going to be difficult to replace. The battle for Guada!canal was not over, and the Japanese Army would not withdraw from the island for another two and a half months. On 16 November Maj. John Thompson, 67FS CO, led eight new P-38s to Cactus from Tontouta, with seven of the pilots returning for second tour. On his first tour Thompson's P-400 had been shot up and he was wounded in the shoulder. Lt. Vernon Head had been burned in a take off accident on a muddy field. Lt. Peter Childress had bailed out of his damaged fighter and walked back through the jungle, and had also been buried in a bomb blast and was dug out. Lt. Deltis Fincher also returned after recovering from his wounds. The pilot's they relieved were disappointed to find that their R&R would be spent back at primitive, hot, and humid New Caledonia, rather than Australia and New Zealand. The air reinforcements put the number of aircraft in the Cactus Air Force at 96: 25 F4Fs; 25 SBDs; eight TBFs; and 38 AAF P-39/ 400s and P-38s. The Army aircraft continued their ground attack duties, but the P-39s also supplied escort for SBDs, and the P-38s flew escort missions with B-17s. Even though the squadron had been conceived as a twin-engine unit the 339 Lh had been flying P400s and P-39s, along with their P-38s. But By mid-November the Sunsetters were finally able to realize this intention, as more P-38s had arrived from the States, and pilots checked out and trained in them at New Caledonia. The 3391h had the distinction of being the

first unit to fly the P-38 in the Pacific, but it would not be until midMarch 1943 that the squadron was officially designated as a twinengine unit. On 18 November the Air Force was able to begin offensive operations against Japanese targets in the Central Solomons. The first target was cargo shipping at Tonolei Harbor on the south end of Bougainville Island, as II B-17Fs staging through Guadalcanal were joined by four B-26s in the attack. This was to be the first mission in which fighters would escort bombers all the way to their target. Problems arose from the start, as the Flying Fortresses were based at Henderson and the P-38s at Fighter Two, and the two groups had problems assembling after takeoff. The fighter pilots were assigned to cover the bombers and prevent the usual Japanese frontal attack on the B-17s by picking them off from above as they turned into their attack. The bombers were flying at 12,000 feet, which meant the P-38s had to fly escort at 16,000 feet, an altitude that was too low for the Lightning to be effective. Eight P-38s were flown by Maj. Brannon, 339FS CO, and Capt. Sharpsteen and Lts. Brzuska, Farquharson, Fincher, Goerke, Miller, and Reagh, but soon after take off Miller aborted with engine problems. The P-38s were the only fighters capable of escorting the bombers to their full range to Kahili-Buin, while the P-40s had to wait well short of these targets to cover the bombers on their withdrawal. The lead B-17 was flown by Maj. Allan Sewart, with Col. Laverne Saunders (strike force commander) aboard. The P-38s flew in formation at 16,000 feet over the bomber formation. Although the weather was good enroute, it was cloudy and rainy over the target. As Sewart's B-17 made its bombing run the bombs hung up, and he had to bring his flight of five Fortresses over the target again. The Japanese sent up about 30 fighters; a few were land-based square-wing tip Zeros, but the majority were float biplanes. The Japanese made no attempt to attack the bombers and the P-38s intercepted them. Lt. Grant Reagh, who flew the mission with his right supercharger malfunctioning,

Col. La verne Saunders took control of the severely damaged B-17 whose pilot and co-pilot were killed, made a successful ditching, and was rescued with the rest of the crew. Pictured are South Pacific air leaders (L-R): R.Adm. John "Slew" McCain; Col. La Verne "Blondie" Saunders, CO of the I I BG; and Maj.Gen. Millard "Miff" Harmon, commander of the AAF in the South Pacific.

Lt.Albert Farquharson's Lightning was hit eight times; six machine gun bullets damaged the tail, a 20mm shell drilled through the flap, and another exploded a large hole in his wing. Farquharson had also taken hits while flying the P-39 on I October I942.This P-38 is # 115 "Hod 'V' Unlimited." The "V" inside the round white circle was red and had three dots and a dash underneath.The three dots and dash is "V" in Morse Code and the first four notes of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. (Lansdale)

(USAF)

83

13/h Fighter Command in World War II "pressed a determined attack" and fired on a float plane and claimed a hit the on the top of its cockpit, but left the battle to return to Cactus. For this action Reagh was awarded the Silver Star. Lt. Deltis Fincher shot down two Zeros to become the top AAF fighter pilot in the South Pacific with three victories. Lt. James Obermiller also claimed a Zero. Lt. Farquharson's Lightning was hit eight times: six machine gun bullets damaged the tail; a 20mm shell drilled through the flap; and another exploded a large hole in his wing. The P-38 flight then headed back to Guadalcanal, as they had not been informed of the B-17s having to return for a second run on the target. The B-17s' second run put two direct hits on two cargo ships, but 18 enemy fighters attacked the bomber formation for the next half hour on their return to base. Maj. Sewart and his co-pilot were hit and killed, and Col. Saunders took control of the B-17, which had two engines down and the port wing on fire. Saunders skillfully flew the bomber and ditched it near Vella Lavella. All survivors reached shore in rubber life rafts and were rescued by a PBY the next afternoon. The B-17s claimed a heavy, but probably exaggerated, toll on the attacking enemy fighters with 12 being claimedeight by Sewart's crew. The B-26s also claimed two more Japs.

Capt. John Mitchell and 339 th mascot. "Blackie:' (Canning)

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In a combat report to the G-2 ofUSAFISPA, Group G-2, Capt. George Phillips, stated: "The conclusions drawn are the same as submitted in all previous reports-the P-38 is not an escort fighter, as the plane is too unmaneuverable and blind. The P-38 has not yet been sent out at its proper altitude, and the B-17s are always at poor altitude for the P38. If our pilots had some P-40s or P-S 1s, they could have had a field day over Tonolei and given the Japs a real shellacking." (Report on P-38 Escort Mission to Bougainville, 18 November 1942 dated 20 December 1942) These first P-38 escort missions reiterated the lessons learned in Europe; that the Lockheed fighter could not maneuver with the more agile Luftwaffe Me-109s and FW-190s, nor now with the Japanese Zeros. It had blind spots and was unable to turn with the enemy fighters. To compensate for their deficiencies, a mutually protective formation was devised with flights of four P-38s dispersed in echelon right or left, with a distance of several plane lengths for maneuvering. Each flight leader had a wingman on his port, and the other two P-38s an element leader and his wingman to his right in echelon to the starboard. This wingman was dubbed "tail-end Charlie," as he was the last aircraft in the formation and needed to be (but often was not -author) an experienced pilot, as he was to protect the formation from attack from the rear. There were usually four flights (16 aircraft) in an escort or fighter mission formation. On an escort mission the P-38s were urged to continue their protective formation and only open fire on enemy aircraft entering the formation a~ead. During a fighter mission it was emphasized that once the P-38s were engaged in combat the element (a leader and his protecting wingman) was the smallest fighting unit. The P-38 needed to take advantage of its strengths, either to dive away to safety or turn into the attacker utilizing the fighter's firepower and speed. On the 2S'h, Cactus veteran Capt. John Mitchell, who had three victories in the P-39, replaced Maj. Brannon as 339FS CO. Brannon transferred to 347FG HQ at Tontouta as Group XO. Soon after he arrived Brannon attended a USAFISPA (US. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area) meeting in Noumea, where he was able to brief visiting Gen. H.H. "Hap" Arnold on the very poor performance of the P-39/400 and the problems the P-38 was having with the Zero. Arnold did not believe that the Zero could be effective above 20,000 feet, or that the P-39 and the new P-38 could have the problems that Brannon described. Brannon told Arnold that the B-17s needed to fly their missions above at least 20,000 feet for the P-38s to be an effective escort. The P-38s were at a distinct disadvantage when escorting medium bombers, as they had to drop from high coverabove 20,000 feet-to the Mitchell's or Marauder's much lower operational altitude, where they were inferior to the Zero. In mid-November two 7AF fighter squadrons arrived in the South Pacific. The P-39 equipped 12FS left Christmas Island and arrived at Efate in the ew Hebrides on 19 November, and the P-40 equipped 44FS arrived there from Hawaii on the 22 nd • By the end of the year detachments from both of these squadrons were operating from Guadalcanal with three other squadrons. At the end of

Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942

Panorama overlooking FighterTwo from pilot tents located on a low hill. (Canning)

The pilots' quarters were in tents dug in along the top of the hill on the right from which the above photos were taken. A P-39 is parked at the far right of the runway, and three Marine F4Fs on the adjacent runway. (Canning)

A 68FS PAO parked for maintenance at FighterTwo while a Marine F4F (dot in sky above PAO) flies over the field. A damaged P-38 is being cannibalized in the background (behind fuel truck). (Canning)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II November the 68FS sent a PAO detachment to Guadalcanal, and by 8 December the entire unit was at Fighter Two. A detachment of the 70FS entered operations on 21 December, and the next day the 67FS, which had done yeoman's work during the past months on Guadalcanal, was transferred back to New Caledonia for R&R. At the end of 1942 the 339FS (P-38s), 12FS and 70FS (P-39s), 44FS (PAOs), and the 68FS (P-39s and PAOs) were operating from Guadalcanal. After the Japanese lost their II transports and were only able to land 2,000 troops the American Marine and Army troops on Guadalcanal went on the offensive toward Kokumbona and the Poha River. Brig.Gen. Roy Geiger planned to attack across the Matanikau River, which recon patrols had determined to be undefended. However, Lt.Gen. Haruyoshi Hyakutake, now with about 25,000 troops, was also planning an offensive to advance east from Kokumbona. He planned to take the high ground east of the river as a line of departure and set up artillery positions there. His troops would then take the three American airfields and capture Mt. Austen, which dominated the entire area around Henderson. On the 18 th Geiger sent his 184 th Infantry, backed by the 8 th Marines, across the Matanikau, and the next day the 8 th Marines followed and moved to the base of Point Cruz, where they dug in at noon, as they met stiff resistance and artillery fire. The stalled Americans called in air support to help them hold their newly gained territory. Ground support missions by the 67FS and Marine SBDs broke the Japanese Point Cruz positions, but it was not until the 164th joined in that the attack moved forward. The Army and Marines had to fight across one ravine at a time, and were stopped by heavy fire from Japanese dug in the sides and tops of the ravines. The two armies stopped, facing each other on the high ground between the ravines that made up the Point Cruz Line. Since an attempt to advance would cause heavy casualties the Americans called in air and artillery interdiction to keep the Japanese at bay. Although the American attack stalled until the end of December, it had pre-empted the Japanese attack across the Matanikau. From the 18 th and into mid-December, the Army Cactus Flight flew almost constant close air support, interdiction, and search and destroy missions, first to support Geiger's attack, and then to hold off Hyutake's attack. The term "search and destroy" was credited to Lt. Danforth Miller of the 67FS by Robert Ferguson in his book, Gaudalcanal, The Island of Fire: Reflections of the 347'" Fighter Group (Aero, PA, 1987). The pilots rarely caught sight of the Japanese they were attacking, relying on ground radio directions or ground signal panels. On the 21 st, Lts. Patterson and Tullis on a search and destroy mission spotted about a dozen enemy soldiers camped near a road on the mouth of a small river near the sea. The attack surprised the Japs, who were bombed and strafed, but a 100lb. bomb failed to explode when it hit the middle of the camp. The 67FS flew daily missions, coordinating its support with attacking infantry, and flew continuous air interdiction attacks, hitting anything that moved on the Japanese side of the line. On 23 November Lt. McLanahan bombed and strafed a herd of cattle! The air armaments of choice were the standard machine guns and cannons, as well as demolition, fragmentation, and incendiary bombs. The innovative armorers rigged depth charges that flattened grassy areas

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and served as very effective concussion bombs. Lt. Jim McLanahan devised a bomb called the "Rube Goldberg," which was a belly tank or Navy practice bomb filled with a mixture of gasoline and oil fitted with an incendiary detonator. McLanahan had his doubters until he incinerated thick vegetation, exposing and also scorching a Japanese position. The 67 th Fighter Squadron War Diary (20 November 1942) quotes a pilot's impression of everyday flying: "The 67 th fighters continued to sit and wait for a scramble. Their only work lately has been dawn, dusk, and noonday patrols. Any one of the three patrol assignments is disagreeable. On the dawn shift you arise in the middle of the night, cold and damp from the tropical damp, take off when you still cannot see the far end of the runway, and fly for two hours without breakfast. Cigarettes that you smoke to keep awake fill your stomach full of fuss. On the noonday shift you sweat. The cockpit is oven hot, even if you succeed in stuffing the hot air opening with a towel. The glare from the

Lt. Jim McLanahan devised a bomb called the "Rube Goldberg" that was a belly tank or Navy practice bomb filled with a mixture of gasoline and oil fitted with an incendiary detonator. McLanahan had his doubters until he incinerated thick vegetation, exposing and also scorching aJapanese position.

Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942 sun and altitude makes your eyes sting and gives you a headache. Besides, you have to eat a second chow. On the dusk shift over the harbor, you fly for two hours after everyone is off for the day. You land after dark, and if the field is dusty the landing lights make a false runway 20 feet in the air on top of the dust. You wonder if there has been any beer, and if there has, if any would be left when you get down. Two hours is a long time to sit hunched over in one position. Your empennage gets so sore it aches." On 23 November 1942, as part of a report to 7AF CG, Brig.Gen. Willis Hale, Capt. Robert Hedges, 44FS Intelligence Officer, (Report to Gen.) discussed air tactics: 'Talks with Air Corps, Marine, and Navy Pilots all indicate that individual initiative must be used in fighting the Japs. The most favorable positions must be assumed and followed through. Some prefer the four-ship element, but at times should fly in pairs, and under no circumstance attempt to dogfight with the Japs. One trick was brought out clearly, namely that the Japs themselves will simulate dogfighting among themselves in an effort to get one of our planes to approach when both have attacked, usually out of the sun. It is suicidal to be enticed away from the formation by such Jap methods, and many of our boys have learned that lesson. Our pilots must think at all times and must stay together, or at least with another ship, particularly in the climb. The tighter the formation the more effective the operation. Weaving tactics have been used most effectively by our men, but they are indoctrinated to get into the spot where they can do the most damage. The scissors has not always proved effective over Cactus due to the Jap close formations. Most ofthe Marine and Navy fliers, when attacking a bomber-fighter formation, come down on them, making but one pass and then running away. They converge their sights at 250 yards, aiming at the engine or engines or the gas tanks, and have experienced exceedingly good fortune in bringing down many 97s by concentrating on their engines, which are apparently vulnerable." The important contribution the 67 th Fighter Squadron's close air support operations were overshadowed by the Marine Wildcats, first under Maj. John Smith with 19 victories and Capt. Marion Carl with 16.5 victories, and then by Capt. Joe Foss, who tied Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker's World War I record of 26 victories to become America's Ace of Aces. The Navy dispatches made little mention of the Army's Cactus Flight and the successful and dangerous work they did, especially in its ground attack role. To this day their contribution to the victory on Guadalcanal is virtually unknown and certainly unappreciated, except by the Marine and Army infantry who were there. This snub so irritated MacArthur that during the Philippines Campaign at Leyte in December 1944 his communiquEs did not include the Navy and Marine air operations there. Establishment of the 13 th Air Force and 13 th Fighter Command In late November it was apparent to Lt.Gen. Millard Harmon, COMGENSOPAC (Commanding General in the South Pacific), that something needed to done to increase AAF efficiency without af-

fecting the unity of command embodied in COMAIRSOPAC. To accomplish this, Harmon urged the formation of a new South Pacific air force and submitted his proposals to Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 November for the authorization of the new air force. Harmon argued for directAAF operational control of its aircraft, personnel, and operations within established AAF doctrine. Brig.Gen. Nathan Twining was to be the new air force's proposed commander, and it was to incorporate a bomber and fighter command to be staffed by experienced personnel already in the South Pacific. Harmon proposed a closer coordination with COMAIRSOPAC, as previously it directed all air operations, so that Harmon had no control over AAF units and no AAF air organization existed. AAF combat and service units, training, and supply were under the control of commanders of the various island bases: Canton; Christmas; the Fijis; New Caledonia; and Tongatabu. By mid-December the headquarters and headquarters squadrons were established for the 13 1h Air Force, XIII Bomber Command, and XIII Fighter Command. Harmon realized that the responsibilities of these two Commands would be abridged because of the wide distribution of their units and commands on the various island bases. But under the new air force Harmon would have greater control, and as opportunities arose he could gain even more control. Most of the 13AF personnel needed would have to come from units in the field, as the Joint Chiefs were not going to increase their previously agreed on commitments. The physical administration and housing facilities were being quickly constructed on Espiritu Santo. The Joint Chiefs had committed 70 heavy bombers (47 arrived in the theater by 30 December), 52 medium bombers (26 were in the theater by 30 December), and 150 fighters (158 arrived by 30 December). On Thanksgiving Day the American air forces went on the offensive and attacked the Japanese seaplane base at Rekata Bay on the north end of Santa Isabel Island, 165 miles northwest of Henderson. Rekata Bay was garrisoned by several thousand troops and was the largest seaplane facility in the Solomons. The 67 1h Fighter Squadron War Diary for 26 November 1942 describes this combat: "We were expecting and waiting for an enemy air annada for the simple reason that Tojo seems to delight in cooking up some sort of observance of our holidays. Thanksgiving is no holiday here, of course, and there was no Tojo either. (Charlie came over at 4:30 this morning and shook our foxholes with four bombs, but that's routine now.) Since the Nips didn't see fit to celebrate our Thanksgiving, we did. We gave them bombs and bullets. The recipients of our fireworks were the 3000-odd Nips who maintain a seaplane base, gasoline, and ammunition dumps at Rekata Bay, on the northeastern shore of Santa Isabel Island, 165 miles from here. In the flight were nine SBDs, each carrying a 500-pound bomb and two 100-pound bombs, and 15 of our P-39s carried 100 pounders. The lumbering Navy dive-bombers took off in the late afternoon, and sometime later our faster Army fighters started (piloted by Lts. Bauer, Brewster, McLanahan, Norris, Patton, Ryan, Tullis, Waldmire, Williams, and a few ofthe newly arrived pilots -author). The SBDs headed across to make their bombing runs while we sped back and forth overhead looking for float Zeros. There were

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II none. The sun was just setting with a brilliant red when the first bombs hit. The high mountain ridges in the middle of the island cast a shadow over the harbor, but it was still light enough to see that there were no flying boats on the water. We had been informed that the Nips were ferrying in supplies that very afternoon. With no flying boats to hit, we just bombed and strafed the shore area. After the SBDs finished their business we started down. It was a pretty, although a rather deadly sight, and was more like the Fourth of July than Thanksgiving. All the way down in a dive from 9,000 feet to where we pulled out at about 2,500 feet we fired our guns in salvo. We figured the sight of all that lead coming from our wings would cause a little consternation among the ground gunners and maybe mess up their aim. The tracers from our two .50 calibers and our cannon streaked down in front of us into the palm grove below. It was dark enough to make the tracers show up well. What also showed up were their tracers passing ours and coming right at us-they were shots from the 20mm ground guns. This wasn't so pretty. At the bottom of our dives we released our bombs, then streaked across the water, zigzagging to make it harder for the Nip anti-aircraft. one of us were hit on this mission. We rejoined the formation neatly right above the SBDs and escorted them homeward for several miles, or out of danger, anyway. We couldn't fool around with them too long, because we barely had enough gas to get back as it was. Naturally, in the excitement of getting away we did not line up just right and Bauer, a new arrival from the class of 42-F, was a little surprised and disturbed to find himself in the position of element leader with not one, but two wingmen. 'How about taking the lead, one of you, somebody,' he said over the radio. 'There's a yardbird in this ship.' It was well in the night when we got home. We managed to get all 15 planes down on the fighter strip in the dust and darkness without a single casualty. It was missions such as this that the squadron began taking the war to the enemy. Meanwhile, the Jap fleet was still determined to blast Henderson off the map."

Battle of Tassafaronga 30 November-l December 1942 The Japanese planned to reinforce and supply their troops on Guadalcanal, but vigilant American air reconnaissance discovered that the Tokyo Express was readying another sizable run. To counter the Express, U.S. Navy Task Force 67 commanded by R.Adm. Carlton Wright sailed from Espiritu Santo just before midnight on 29 November. Four heavy cruisers-the New Orleans, Minneapolis (Wright's flagship), Northampton, and Pensacola-the light cruiser Honolulu, and four destroyers arrived off Tulagi-Guadalcanal the next night. The reason for the availability of USN cruisers and destroyers in the South Pacific was that each time a carrier was sunk (the Enterprise, Yorktown, Wasp, and Hornet) or left for repairs (the Saratoga) its escorting warships were released. Adm. Yamamoto held the Japanese Combined Fleet back at Truk, waiting to commit it for a decisive battle. Unknown to Yamamoto was that the USN had only one operational carrier (the Enterprise) that was not completely repaired from her damage at the Battle of Santa Cruz. imitz was withholding his precious carrier back at Noumea. Adm. Raizo Tanaka was ordered to take eight

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destroyers from the Buin anchorage and head north, away from Guadalcanal, to mislead any patrol aircraft. On the 30th a coast watcher at Buin reported that the Japanese destroyers had left the anchorage, and the stage was set for the Battle of Tassafaronga. The alerted Americans sent out an increased number of patrol aircraft from Henderson and eight B-17 s from Espiritu. The welltrained Tanaka destroyer force evaded detection during the daytime of the 30th as it turned back east toward Guadalcanal through the uninhabited islands and reefs east of the Solomons. As Tanaka approached Guadalcanal he was unaware of Task Force 67, and concentrated on getting into position to off-load 24Q floating oil drums that were lashed to the decks of six of his eight ships. The drums contained food, medicine, and ammunition, and were chained together to prevent their dispersal. To carry this cargo the destroyers had to leave their replacement torpedoes and half of their ammunition back at Rabaul. USN radar picked up the Japanese, but their illumination seaplanes were unable to take off from Tulagi because of calm water. The glassy calm water created a kind of surface tension between it and the aircraft's pontoons and prevented separation. The condition had been known for years, and the fix was to have a fast boat create small waves in front of the aircraft so it could take off. This was not done, despite the presence of over a dozen PT-boats in the area. After vacillating for nearly a quarter hour and losing much of the advantage of surprise, R.Adm. Wright ordered his cruisers to open fire and launch their torpedoes. Tanaka, seeing the gun flashes, ordered an immediate course reversal, and all 20 American torpedoes missed, and their shells fell into the vacated ocean. The Japanese picket closest to the Americans opened fire with9ut Tanaka's orders and was smothered by heavy return fire. Tanaka's DDs executed a simultaneous fast night torpedo run that they had practiced for over 18 months. Two long lance torpedoes hit the Minneapolis, and the New Orleans was hit by another torpedo. Both cruisers had their bows blown off and retired from the battle. Soon the Pensacola was hit, losing her aft engine room and three turrets. The Pensacola turned and limped back to Tulagi, leaving only the Honolulu and Northampton to CatTy on the fight. The Northampton was hit by two torpedoes that ruptured her fuel tanks, causing her to catch fire and sink. It was a brilliant victory for Tanaka's inferior destroyer force, but not knowing he no longer had opposition he withdrew before he could off load his supply drums. The Pensacola, Minneapolis, and New Orleans were saved by heroic efforts of their crews, but were damaged so badly that they all were out of action for over a year while undergoing repairs. The Battle of Tassafaronga was another defeat for the U.S. Navy, but as bad as it was, the Navy would soon be reinforced by the return of the carriers Enterprise and Saratoga, the addition of three new 16-inch and two old 14-inch battleships, several new cruisers, and many new destroyers and submarines. The battle was to be the last naval action off Guadalcanal in which major American warships were involved. From this point on the Tokyo Express was engaged by PT boats and the Cactus Air Force. During this time Army Maj. Gen. Alexander Patch's Americal Division relieved Vandegrift's 1st and 5th Marines. Patch, under Halsey's command, was to direct tactical operations, taking over from Adm. Turner, who continued to be responsible for transport of troops and sup-

plies. On 1 December the Americal assumed supply responsibilities, and a week later Americal staff officers were in complete control. Cactus was no longer in danger of being lost from the sea. The biggest changes on the island were in its air component and facilities. Adm. Halsey had been commander of the South Pacific (COMSOPAC) since 20 October 1942, and had named R.Adm. Aubrey Fitchas his air commander (COMAIRSOPAC) on 15 September 1942. Fitch commanded all the air components in the South Pacific, Army, Navy, Marine, and New Zealand. On 15 November, Fitch designated Henderson as a Marine air base with Col. William Fox as its commander. Fox initiated the rebuilding of the entire runway system of Henderson and Fighter Two (Kukum) to improve their drainage. Fighter One would be abandoned because it was totally unusable during any wet weather. The lSI Marine Aviation Engineers relieved the 6[h Seabees on 1 December and were followed by the 2 nd Engineers on 30 January 1943 to improve the air facilities. The coral of Lunga could not be used ,as it was too brittle

and turned to sludge in the rain, and more distant coral had to be hauled in and rolled by Japanese equipment captured three months before. Bundles of Marston matting (named after the location of its first use, Marston, North Carolina) had to be separated and hauled in pieces, as there were no cranes to unload it. Brig.Gen. Louis Woods continued as COMAIR Cactus until 26 December, when Brig.Gen. Francis McCauley, CG of the 2 nd MAW, relieved him. MAG-14 was responsible for the administration of food and housing for Marine, Air Force, and the occasional transient naval units on the island. COMAIR Cactus executed tactical employment of the air units there. On 20 November there were 101 aircraft on the island: 35 F4Fs; 24 SBDs; 8 TBFs; 17 P-38s; 16 P-39s; and 1 P400. By the end of the month there were 188, including 71 F4Fs. EightB-17s of the merged 5[h and 11[h BGs were sent to Guadalcanal to carry out long-range reconnaissance. The AAF sent the 12[h and 70[h Fighter Squadrons in December, and the 339[h FS was receiving more P-38s daily.

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6 December 1942

Torrential tropical rains during the first week of December deluged the Fighter One quarters of Cactus Flight and caused them to evacuate to the Fighter Two strip (also called Kukum Field). The Seabees had constructed the field in a coconut plantation on a narrow coastal plain parallel to the beach and several miles north of Lunga Beach. Fighter Two was located on higher ground and better drained, and its runway was constructed of crushed and rolled coral and covered with steel matting. The pilots continued to be billeted in the pyramidal tents, but cement floors had now been laid and the tents were pitched over them. There was an abundance of wood available for lumber from the surrounding trees, and portable saw mills were shipped to the island to manufacture building materials and tent floors. Unfortunately, most of the surrounding trees were filled with shrapnel from the shellings and bombings and broke many of the saw blades. The pilots were heartened by the promise of Quonset Huts. More service and repair equipment and men had arrived, and increased the aircraft serviceability rate. As in the past, the majority of pilots and enlisted men were based back at New Caledonia, and squadrons conducted training programs there for both the veterans and newly arrived pilots from the States. In midDecember the 339FS had nearly 100 pilots, along with 70 to 80

aircraft at its new facility at Oua Tom. There were often as many pilots from other squadrons also based there. At the same time Henderson was being refurbished with a new runway surface covered with fresh matting and restored taxiways to accommodate Bl7s. Things were looking up at Guadalcanal, but it still wasn't the proverbial bowl of cherries. Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker visited Henderson and wrote in the February 1943 issue of Life magazine: "I spent only one night and a day on the island, but it was enough to make me mad at myself and my people back home for ever thinking what war is. If New Guinea is a hellhole Guadalcanal is ten times more so." The failure of Tanaka to deliver supplies to the beleaguered Japanese 17 th Army necessitated the immediate formation of another naval supply column. On 3 December a new Tokyo Express made up of ten destroyers, seven destroyer/transports, and three escorts was scheduled to come down the Slot and arrive after darkness and under poor weather. The destroyer/transports were again to use the chained drum technique and jettison them offshore. However, a coast watcher and a patrol plane warned of their approach.

P-39 being run up by a mechanic at FighterTwo on Guadalcanal. (Palmer) Operations tent at FighterTwo.lt appears that the pilots are playing cards or dice. (Palmer)

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Part Two, Chapter 6 - December 1942

Waiting for a scramble under an Improvised tarp sunscreen at Fighter Two. (Palmer)

The compasses in the P-39s were notoriously undependable, and due to the weather the pilots had no horizon to fly by. If one strayed off course there was the danger of hitting the mountains on the neighboring island. As they approached Henderson searchlights were switched on, and shafts of light poked through the clouds to guide the planes. Pictured is Lt. Vernon Head inbound over the Russell Islands from a mission to Lambetti Plantation Airdrome, New Georgia, probably in December 1942. (Lansdale/347FGA)

Eight SBDs ofVMSB-142 and seven TBFs ofVMSB-131 escorted by four F4Fs and six P-39s of the 67FS took off at 1730 in clouds and mist with the visibility at one mile to intercept the Express at 160 miles out. The attackers flew west for over an hou;; they reached the limit of their search radius and were ready to return to base when they spotted the wakes of ships through the clouds. The SBDs dove first, and the Japanese ships broke their formation, increased their speed, and frantically dispersed. The haze and mist below the clouds afforded the pilots no visual reference to the location of the ocean's surface, but following the ship's zigzag wakes gave the pilots that reference. After the SBDs attacked through a barrage of AA fire, the P-39s dove and dropped their bombs and rejoined the F4Fs for top cover. The Japanese sent up 12 Rufe float planes from the Shortlands, and the F4Fs turned into their attack. The P-39s were at 8,000 feet and climbing from their bombing attack when they spotted the Rufes. The P-39 pilots knew they were unable to dogfight with the agile float planes and executed a chandelle in formation to climb to 11,000 feet to make a diving attack on them. The float planes turned to meet the Airacobra attack and fired their light caliber machine guns in a determined head-on attack, almost ramming the P-39s, which had to pull sharply away. On passing through the American formation the Japanese then pulled up vertically to give their rear gunners a shot at the American fighters. The P-39s went into another steep chandelle to reach altitude and dived to the attack again. The old jammed gun bugaboo plagued the P-39 pilots again, but four of the ten Rufes shot down that day were shot down by 67FS pilots: two by Lt. Lynwood Glazier and one each by Us. Peter Childress and Zed Fountain. Childress and Glazier were also credited with a probable each. Maj. Nathan Post ofVMF-121 and ILl. Michael Yunck ofVMO-251 were credited with three victories each. One Dauntless was lost in the action. The bombers claimed two "cruisers" sunk and two damaged, but Japanese records

show only the destroyer (Manama) to have sustained slight damaged. Exhaustion, heavy drizzle, then darkness, and finally the concern that they would run out fuel made the return flight harrowing. The compasses in the P-39s were notoriously undependable, and due to the weather the pilots had no horizon to fly by. If a pilot strayed off course there was the danger of hitting the mountains on the neighboring island. The pilots turned on their running lights in an attempt to rendezvous, but everyone was on his own. As they approached Henderson searchlights were switched on, and shafts of light poked through the clouds to guide the planes. All 67FS P39s made it back, but an Avenger and Wildcat were lost on landing. Several days later the 67 th pilots received a shot of whiskey and commendations from Adm. Halsey and Gen. Woods for this action. On the 4 th , Lts. McLanahan and Tullis were on patrol when they detected what appeared to be strings of gasoline drums tied together floating offshore between Tassafaronga and Kokumbona. These were part of the 1,500 chain-linked drums the Japanese had dropped the day before. The lack of Japanese shore personnel and their physical incapacity from near starvation rations prevented the pickup of many drums floating close to shore. The 67 th spent the day shuttling to strafe the drums and then returning to base to rearm. Aided by PT boats, all but 310 drums were sunk before they reached shore. The next day Cactus flight bombed and strafed Japanese dugouts and strong points, slowing the infantry advance along the Point Cruz Line. Interdiction missions were flown against enemy movements and fuel and supply dumps behind enemy lines. On 5 December all Army Air Force units in the South Pacific were informed that on 13 January 1943 they would become part of the 13 th Air Force under Gen. Nathan Twining, headquartered at New Caledonia. During December Cactus Flight, set up by the 67FS, began to be referred to in daily operations as a "detachment of the 347th Fighter Group," and continued to include pilots of all the squadrons of the group.

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II

Above and following: 68 Fighter Squadron P-40s at FighterTwo. (Canning)

The increased heavy American air attacks on Rabaul and the Shortlands caused the Japanese High Command to decide to build larger forward airfields to the east. These bases would put Japanese aircraft within easy bombing distance of the bombers now based at Henderson, and would base their fighters in better position to intercept the American bombers flying west. The fighter strip at Buin, at the southern end of Bougainville, was too small, and the various scattered seaplane bases were inadequate. A forward base was chosen to be built at an abandoned coconut plantation on the southeastern end of New Georgia at Munda Point, about 180 miles from Henderson. A Japanese construction convoy was sent out on 24 November and quickly unloaded, and work was begun under strict camouflage. During early December American patrols flew to Santa Isabel and New Georgia Islands searching for destroyer/transports, barges, and landing boats for the Tokyo Express and the troops and supplies to be loaded on them. Despite these air searches and reconnaissance of this area it was not until 5 December that the first aerial reconnaissance photos by VMD-154 discovered the construction. On the 6th , Lts. Brewster, Kellum, McLanahan, and Patterson flew a patrol to Munda Point to investigate reports that an airfield was being constructed. As they dropped down on the area they found two camouflaged strips under construction and bombed and strafed

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the construction workers and their equipment. It was not until the 12 th that nine SBDs of VMSB-142 attacked Munda's AA positions, runways, and fuel supplies, and from that point Munda airfield came under almost daily attacks. During December, B-17s of the II th and 5'h Bomb Groups attacked the site 21 times. Despite these constant attacks the Japanese persevered and completed the fields; by Christmas Zeros were operating there, and bombers flew in by the end of the year. On the 7 th Marine dive and torpedo bombers led by Maj. Joseph Sailer and escorted by fighters foiled a ten destroyer Express commanded by Capt. Torajiro Sato. The bombers attacked at 1635, just after sunset, and holed the Nowake, which had to be towed to safety by two other destroyers. The remaining seven destroyers were attacked by torpedoes and automatic gunfire from a resolute PI boat attack, and Sato withdrew without releasing his supply drums. The Marines lost "the best dive-bomber pilot in the Pacific," as Joe Sailer's SBD was hit by AA fire from a destroyer he was bombing, and then was picked off by a Zero. Sailer had flown 25 missions and was credited with six hits and three near misses on enemy shipping. Also on the 7th , the remaining detachments of the 68FS arrived by ship from Noumea and became the first complete fighter squadron to based at Guadalcanal. The squadron was based at Fighter

Part Two, Chapter 6 - December 1942 Two and flew P-39s and PAOs on escort missions to the Northern Solomons, as well as tactical missions in support of infantry on Guadalcanal, which was now Army, as the Marines had been withdrawn. On 10 December, 11 B-17s escorted by eight P-38s ofthe 339FS attacked shipping in Tonolei Harbor, Bougainville. The Japanese sent up Zeros late to intercept, and the P-38s, having an altitude advantage, intercepted them on their way up. Five were shot down, one each by: Lts. Edgar Barr, Edwin Brzuska, Douglas Canning, Delton Goerke, and Danford Miller, with an additional Zero claimed by a B-17 gunner and Lt. Grant Reagh claiming a probable. The Flying Fortresses scored three hits on harbor shipping, and all aircraft returned safely to base, but one Lightning returned to base on one engine. On the 16th Capt. John Thompson of the 67FS shot down a Zero on an escort mission to Munda. That night it started to rain, which was not unusual, but instead of stopping after a few minutes the rain continued throughout the night. A bolt oflightning hit the camp and knocked two enlisted men unconscious for several minutes. At dawn there was water everywhere, the tent floors had three inches of water flowing over them, and bedding and clothing were damp. Bill Harris (339FS):

"The pyramidal tents were pretty waterproof and usually did not leak. But like most canvas during a constant rain, if anything touched the sides that area would begin to leak. One night I got up during a rain and accidentally ,touched the side of the tent; it started to leak on to my cot. Luckily there was room in the tent to move it." Clothing placed in parachute bags under their cots was sopping wet, and shoes floated away. The next morning the men had to slog through ankle deep mud to get anywhere. It took longer than usual for the tropical sun to dry things out, but then the men knew it would soon rain again. In the late afternoon of the 11 th Tanaka led 11 destroyers toward the Slot. Before dusk the Express was attacked off New Georgia by 14 SBDs led by Sailer's successor, Maj. Ben Robertshaw. The Marine dive-bombers claimed four destroyers left burning, but Japanese accounts record no hits. However, the Japanese were surprised by an unexpected PT boat attack, as the quick little boats raced onto the scene at 0100 and quickly hit Tanaka's new flagship (Teruzuki) with a torpedo. Tanaka was taken off the stricken vessel, and the Express again retreated without accomplishing its supply mission. This was to be the last Tokyo Express excursion down the

Although the pyramidal tents were fairly waterproof, flooding from torrential rains such as shown soaked everything. (USMC)

The searing tropical sun on a metal wing quickly dried laundry. (USAF)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II

Above: Rutted wet road leading from FighterTwo Camp to the Airstrip. On the right side of the road is the shaving and wash station, with the water tank trailer behind it. Left: Shower time at FighterTwo.The water was brought up to the pilots' bivouac on the ridge by a water trailer pulled by a Jeep. A wobble pump was used to get water into the overhead can. (Palmer)

Slot for a while, as on the 12th , the Japanese naval command ordered a temporary stop because of the coming of the full moon. During this hiatus the Japanese High Command evaluated the situation, and at the end of December decided to evacuate Guadalcanal, which Tanaka had long advocated. On 19 December the 339FS moved its Tontouta base on New Caledonia to Oua Tom, where it was to remain throughout 1943. Oua Tom camp was in a better location than Tontouta, as it was built at the base of a mountain range about 600 feet from the airfield. The base had better drainage, providing better living and operating conditions and fewer mosquitoes. While on R&R from Cactus the pilots and enlisted men worked hard on improving their new base. The pyramidal tents had wooden frames and floors, and the mess hall had a cement floor and rain-proof thatched roof. Supplies from America were more frequent and meals improved. A day room was built with a PX that stocked beer and candy. Of the creature comforts available the latrines had sit down seats and flushing toilets, as well as a central wash stand area for shaving. The wash areas were covered with canvas, corrugated iron, wood, or tarpaper. The washstand was a SO-gallon drum split lengthways, sometimes supplied with pumped cold running water. The showers had hot water supplied from three barrels of water heated by oil and piped to the shower room plumbing. Since water and pumping equipment were in short supply the wasting of water was not tolerated. Posters were hung in washrooms giving a tutorial on the con-ect method of taking a shower, shaving, and brushing teeth. Meanwhile, back at Fighter Two conditions also improved, as tents had wooden floors and mess tents became elaborate affairs, with tables, benches, high pitched roofs, and cement floors. Showers, wash stations, and latrines were ~lso improved. Water was brought up to the pilot's bivouac on the ridge by a water trailer pulled by a jeep. A wobble

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pump was used to get water into the overhead can with holes punched in the bottom to provide a showerhead. On 21 December 11 pilots of the 70FS arrived from Fiji. Capt. Robert Hubbell led seven new P-40F Rolls Royce engined P-40s into Cactu~. lLt. Martin Ryan had to ditch between Espiritu Santo and Guadalcanal when his engine overheated, but was rescued. The 68 th now had more pilots than aircraft. Squadron CO Henry Viccellio asked if anyone wanted to fly the P-38, and three pilots volunteered. This was to prove an ill-fated decision for ILts. Ronald Hilken, Raymond Hine, and Emmett Norris, as all three would be MIA! KIA in the future flying the P-38.

70FS (20 December 1942) First Contingent Fiji. Front (L-R): Daggitt; Dunbar; Cosart; Lanphier; and Hendrix. Rear (L-R): Moore;Topoll;Vicellio; Buck; Barber; Rivers; and Petit. (Lansdale)

Part Two, Chapter 6 - December 1942 25,000 starving and malarial Japanese, who had received minimal supplies from the Tokyo Express and were incapable of mounting a sustained offensive, faced Gen. Patch's Army infantry forces. However, they were determined to fight and die for the Emperor, and were entrenched along a line extending from Point Cruz to Mount Austin in a number of strongpoints. The Japanese had made Mount Austen, which was a series of rocky ridges running west and surrounded by heavy jungle, into a stronghold. It was also a valuable observation point of everything happening inside the Henderson perimeter: the arrival of shipping; the movement of troops; and the transit of aircraft flying toward Japanese bases to the west. To the west of Mount Austen was a series of hills or open crests. The Army gave these hills numbers for reference (e.g. Hill 53), but the most prominent ones were named the Gifu, the Seahorse, and the Galloping Horse. This defense line blocked an American advance to the south and west and posed a continual threat to Henderson. Just as things seemed to settle down a five man Japanese patrol infiltrated Fighter Two on the 12th and set a P-39 and fuel truck on fire, then returned to their lines safely in the confusion. The Land Offensive In preparation for the new American offensive against Mt. Austen, P-39s and SBDs regularly flew sorties against Japanese bivouac and supply dumps in the Kokumbona area. During the infantry attack on Hill 53 American aircraft stepped up their activity. Previous to the attack AAF fighters had been able to isolate the battlefield by cutting off supplies landing on the coast. Army artillery began a half hour bombardment beginning at 0550 that was followed by 12 P-39s and 12 SBDs attacking the hill and its surrounding area for 20 minutes. The P-39s were armed with a 500lb. bomb, and the SBDs carried three depth charges. The initial Army advance after the attack took Hill 53 without heavy resistance. The P39s then attacked Japanese reinforcements moving through the jungle and blew up several ammunition dumps. As often as targets were sighted and called in the P-39s were sent out to attack them. Early in the morning of the 13 t\ two P-39s strafed Japanese troops landed on Kokumbona beach, and five Airacobras hit Vasale later in the day. On the 14 th the P-39s were out all day on sorties, some

using improvised gasoline bombs. On the 15'h the P-39s supplemented B-26s that dropped 82 100lb. bombs on Tassafaronga, and five P-39s dropped depth charges in the Mt. Austen area. The American offensive to take Mount Austen began on the 17 th, but the advance was slow and costly, as the Japanese strongpoints were well dug-in, well camouflaged, and mutually supporting. Numerous close air support missions were called in against the ravines forward of the advancing troops but had little effect. The Japanese defenses had to be dislodged one by one using machine guns and mortars to support infantry using demolition charges, hand grenades, and then hand-to-hand fighting. On the 17 th the Japanese OKA unit was putting up strong resistance in a small pocket in a ravine between Hills 31-27 and 43-44. The area was small and too narrow to safely call in artillery fire before the advancing American battalions. A P-39 squadron was armed with 500lb. depth charges that they dropped in the ravines. The large detonations of the depth charges in the confined area caused heavy enemy casualties, and the infantry was able to overrun the Japanese positions after two days of battle. Mount Austen was not taken until 10 January, and the area was not cleared until the 23'd. The XIV Corps' general offensive to secure the American flank began on 8 January against the Galloping Horse and ended on the llth, and against the Sea Horse on the 10t\ and it was captured on the 14th . The Japanese resistance was fanatical, American casualties were heavy in the savage fighting, and American infantry morale was at its lowest ebb since Bloody Ridge. Finally the flank was secured, and the coastal offensive to the west from Point Cruz could begin on the 13 th . Kokumbona was captured on the 23 rd , and the offensive reached the Poha River on the 25 th . The loss of Kokumbona meant that the Japanese lost their closest good landing beach west of the American airfields, their artillery positions that had constantly shelled the American perimeter, and their main supply routes to the east and south, along with their primary ammunition and materiel dumps. Pilots of the 12FS arrived on Guadalcanal from Efate, New Hebrides, on 20 December, and were to see their first combat after flying an uneventful B-17 escort mission on the 23 rd . The Squadron was led by Maj. Paul Bechtel, who was considered a veteran, havingjoined the Air Force in 1939 after graduating from the University of Wyoming with an engineering degree and earning his wings

Paul Bechtel (3'd right on wing) poses with his pilots and crew, (Bechtel)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II

12FS P-39Ds

"Innocent Imogene" with 12FS insignia (a fist clutching a lightning bolt) on the door. Note the belly auxiliary fuel tank shackles. (Bechtel)

in late March 1940. On 24 December nine SBDs escorted by eight P-39s led by Maj. Bechtel and four F4Fs ofVMF-121 led by their CO, Maj. Donald Yost, attacked Munda airfield. The formation approached Munda at 0800 in clear weather, with the F4Fs providing high cover at 16,000 feet and the AAF flight flying intermediate cover at 12,000 feet for nine Marine SBDs. The dive-bombers were difficult to escort because of their low speed, and the fighters had to weave continually to stay with them. Unknown to American intelligence was that the Japanese had moved 24 Zeros to Munda, and as the Americans arrived they spotted the dust from Zeros taxiing for take off. The SBDs dove to attack the field from 10,000 feet, with the Wildcats abandoning their high cover assignment and following them. The SBD attack caused chaos and destroyed ten Zeros waiting at the end of the runway, while the F4Fs shot up taxiing Zeros and a few in their take off and climbing patterns. Bechtel remained at his assigned intermediate cover position, and once the attack was finished he split his two flights. He sent a flight down to intercept the Zeros that had managed to take off and were now pursuing the Wildcats, while Bechtel remained with his flight at 12,000 feet as top cover. While orbiting, Bechtel spotted about a half dozen Zeros in echelon formation to the west. These Zeros had probably taken offjust before the Americans arrived and were waiting to bounce the SBDs when they climbed back to altitude after their attack. Bechtel's fight was up sun and he turned into them. The Zeros, thinking that Bechtel's flight was another group of Zeros, casually turned, allowing the P-39s to join the formation from the rear. ever trusting his 37mm cannon, Bechtel fired his four wing .30 caliber and two cowl .50 caliber machine guns at a Zero, but did not get any hits. He doubled his deflection and still didn't see any hits, but the Zero quickly began to smoke and lost power.

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Later Bechtel's wingman reported that he had seen the stricken plane break into flames. Bechtel climbed and fired at the next Zero in the formation, getting good hits, but then the Jap formation broke up and the maneuverable Zeros pulled tight turns inside the P-39s. During a filing pass Bechtel heard a frantic call from his wingman, 2Lt. Everett Anglin, informing him to go into immediate evasive maneuvers, as he had a Zero on his tail. The Zeros' tracers followed Bechtel as he tried a tight right tum to escape. His Airacobra went into a stall and spun to the right. The Japanese pilot thought he had hit Bechtel and turned on Anglin, who shot him down. Bechtel recovered from his spin and was alone over Rendova Island. He searched for another plane to follow back to Cactus and saw one about four or five miles off to his left and about 300 to 400 yards higher. As he approached he saw that the plane was another Zero. Again the Zero turned gently and allowed Bechtel to pull up behind him. Bechtel closed to 300 yards and fired a burst, setting the Zero on fire (later confirmed by a ground observer). P-39 pilots of the 12FS had good day, making their first combat claims of the war (four Zeros and two probables). Maj. Bechtel claimed two Zeros and a probable, 2Lt. Anglin shot down one Zero, and Capt. James Baird and lLt. James Lamburth shared a Zero. Another probable was shared by 2Lts. Roger Ames and Joseph Young. A SBD apparently shot down the last Zero. But it was the Marines that took the day again by scoring ten aerial victories after their strafing run, with Maj. Donald Yost getting four and lLt. Kenneth Kirk ofVMO251 three. Earlier in the day Capt. Thomas Lanphier, flying a P-39, got a Zero for the 70FS over Cactus. However this victory could be in error, as there is no mention of it in 70FS records, but the similarly named lLt. James Lamburth shared a victory that day, and Lanphier may have gotten a victory credit. Lanphier, in his unpub-

Part Two, Chapter 6 - December 1942

ILt Joseph Moore. (Canning)

lished self-aggrandizing biography, seems confused, and commingles his missions of 23,24, and 26 December- he credits himself with two Zeros on the 24 th ! That afternoon nine SBDs escorted by four Wildcats and four Airacobras attacked 13 Japanese barges carrying troops and sunk nine, taking a heavy toll on their passengers. A Christmas present for the exhausted pilots of the 67FS and 339FS was R&R. They were flown to Sydney, Australia, in C-47s and spent the next two weeks there (the next leaves would be spent in Auckland, New Zealand). Sections relieved one another every eight weeks, spending nine to 14 days on R&R, and then returned to New Caledonia for further training before returning to combat. During their time on the Canal entertainment and relaxation was provided mainly by motion pictures. At new bases one of the first duties of the Special Service Officers was to set up a movie or picture show, as they were called back then. The first theaters were a simple projection booth, a few logs or bomb fin packing cases to sit on, and an improvised screen from a white sheet or tent side. After a while these theaters evolved into elaborate stages with curtains and wooden seats, and were given names such as the "Tropicana," "Coralcobana," or "Jungle Bijou." Every night was movie night, as one unit showed its movies on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, while a nearby unit would show its movies on Sunday, Tuesday, and Saturday, so there was always a movie to see. Unfortunately, movies were scarce and units often traded, so the same movies were often seen many times by the men. On the 26 th the 70FS sent 14 fighters to accompany four SBDs on a surprise attack on Lambeti Airfield, New Georgia. Most of the enemy aircraft were caught on the ground by the strafing attack and 13 were destroyed, along with gasoline and supplies. Several Zeros took off through the pandemonium, and lLt. Joseph Moore shot one down. On the 28 th lLt. Rex Barber and his wingman, lLt. William Daggitt (70FS) were flying a two-plane P-39 reconnaissance patrol over Munda Point at 9,000 feet when nine Japanese fighters were spotted orbiting at 13,000 feet directly over the airfield. At the same time a Betty ( ell?) bomber was flying below at 1,000 feet making a landing approach on the field. Barber and Daggitt dove on the

bomber, with Daggitt feinting toward the fighters while Barber, in "Diablo," attacked the Betty. As he dove his aircraft seemed sluggish and would not come up to speed. He realized that he had not dropped his belly tank, jettisoned the tank, and continued his dive on the bomber and set its right engine on fire. It continued to fly on until it crashed into the ocean for Barber's first victory. As Barber climbed he saw some aircraft off to his left that he thought were Marine Corsairs. As he closed he discovered that they were Zeros, but the two Jap pilots saw him and high-tailed it back to base. When he returned to Cactus Barber's crew chief told him that it had been reported that he had "bombed" a Japanese bomber. An Australian coast watcher had seen him drop his belly tank before he fired on the enemy aircraft and thought it was a bomb! The Japanese Washing Machine Charlie attacks continued on Guadalcanal with one or more attacks sent each night. Materiel damage was modest and occasionally casualties happened, but the major casualty was the morale of the personnel, whose sleep was interrupted as they spent hours in a foxhole or slit trench waiting out the attacks. On 21 December Maj .Gen. Alexander Patch recommended to Halsey that six night fighters be sent to Cactus. Harmon was given permission to request the night fighters and their GCI (Ground Control Intercept) equipment. The Cactus Director of Air Defense asked for one fixed SCR-588 unit to be sent, but the Navy felt that a mobile unit would be better suited and could supply one within three months from a British unit at New Zealand. So it would not be until March 1943 that night fighters and associated radar would arrive at Guadalcanal. At the end of 1942 Harmon assessed the condition of his air units at Cactus. The P-38s were performing well in their various roles with minimal maintenance problems. They were good bomber escorts when properly utilized (e.g. high cover -author), "excellent" recon aircraft (F-5s), and had "splendid potential" as a "second bomber" (fighter-bomber), but there were only 41 operational in the theater. B-25s were scheduled to operate out of Henderson permanently at the start of 1943, but only the P-38 could provide escort to the range limit of the Mitchell. Harmon reported that the P-38 was at a "terrific disadvantage" in performance when it escorted this medium bomber at its effective combat ceiling or lower. The P-38 did not have sufficient range to escort the B-17s to Rabaul, and advanced bases would have to be captured or built for this to happen. The P-39 continued to do stellar work as a fighter-bomber, but often had to be withheld from that duty over Guadalcanal to keep them in reserve for SBD/TBF escort missions. Harmon's last nine P-40s were doing yeoman duty -but were beginning to wear out. He reported that for the period 1 February 1942 to the end of the year the Japanese lost 388 aircraft (46 bombers, 304 fighters, and 38 others), while his air forces lost 160 (20 bombers of all types, 67 fighters, and 73 others, including those MIA). His report stated that Henderson (Bomber One) was in "fair condition," Fighter One was being regraded for the installation of Marston mat, Fighter Two was almost completely matted, and Bomber Two on Koli Point was still under construction. Despite the improving conditions, the uncontrollable weather kept operations below optimal levels. Attacks were conducted under low ceilings and through rainstorms that limited visibility. Long missions necessitated take offs before

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13th Fighter Command in World War II sunrise and landings after sunset. Bomber escort often required five to six hours flying time with the possibility of meeting Japanese interception. Nightly Washing Machine Charlie/Louie the Louse attacks interrupted sleep and caused morale and physical exhaustion to decline. Harmon also needed replacement crews for Gen. Saunder's 11 th and 5th Bombardment Groups, whose crews were flying 12 hours daily for days at a time. In response to Harmon's recommendations Arnold established a replacement schedule for all personnel who had been in combat for four continuous months. Harmon wanted the replacement of entire units, but the plan called for the replacement of- eight crews per month. Fighter squadron personnel were replaced in partial detachments back to the rear bases on New Caledonia and usually/hopefully to New Zealand. The shuffling of these detached units to and from areas resulted in the mixing of pilots of different fighter squadrons, so that it was almost impossible to determine the composition of a fighter squadron in combat at any time.

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A columnist from Collier's Magazine asked Maj.Gen. Vandegrift what had caused the most Japanese infantry casualties: "This columnist recently asked Major General A.A. ("Archie") Vandegrift, who had led the Marines into the Solomons last August and commanded our forces there during the heavy fighting last fall, what caused the most casualties among Japanese infantry? Machine gun and rifle fire, artillery fire, or dive-bombing? 'We haven't any official statistics,' Vandegrift said, and then turned to his chief of staff, Colonel Gerald Thomas, and asked, 'But how about it, Gerry?' • 'I'd say, definitely, Chief, that ground strafing by airplanes killed the most Japs' Thomas replied. 'American airplanes, firing both .50 caliber machine guns and 37 millimeter cannon, accounted for many of the Nipponese killed at Guadalcanal by aircraft fire while attacking landing barges.'" (Colliers Magazine, March 13, 1943)

7 January 1943

Gen. Hitoshi Imamura diverted the 50,000 troops of his 8th Area Army on Java from a planned attack on New Guinea in December to reinforce Hyakutake's 17 th Army at Rabaul in preparation to recapture Guadalcanal on 1 February 1943. However, on 4 January the Imperial War Council issued an order to evacuate the troops on Guadalcanal ("Operation Ke") and use them to establish a new defensive perimeter in the Munda-Kolombangara region, and to reinforce New Guinea to prevent a defeat there. The evacuation would have to be conducted under increased air support a~d by a reverse Tokyo Express. The Japanese Navy air arm had suffered heavy losses, and the Army would be directed to throw their aircraft into the inferno to aid in the evacuation of their troops. In December about 100 Imperial Japanese Army Air Force aircraft were transferred from Malaya to Rabaul, and the first an'ivals were sent up to intercept B-17s bombing Rabaul. On 5 January B-17s with a mixed P-38 escort from the 339FS and 68FS attacked a cruiser in Tonolei Harbor, off Buin, and were intercepted by 25 Zeros and float planes. Capt. Robert Hubbell, CO of the 68FS, shot down a Zero, and lLt. Emmett Norris claimed a

probable. The 339 th 's Capt. John Mitchell and lLt. Besby Holmes each shot down a float plane. Holmes also claimed two probables. Two P-38s were lost, with lLt. Ronald Hilken crashing north of Vella Lavella and listed MIA/KIA. Hilken was the first ofViccellio's P-38 volunteers to die. lLt. Walter Dinn was shot down for the third time and was last seen descending in flames; he was never found. The 67FS was assigned to conduct searches over three areas: Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and Santa Isabel. The aircraft were to fly low over the coast looking for barges and landing craft, warships, observation and gun positions, enemy bivouacs, and dumps. Two planes on the New Georgia patrol were to fly over the Munda area, and two on the Santa Isabel patrol were to fly over Rekata. Their assignments were to draw anti-aircraft fire from these airfields and determine if it was light or heavy! Along with their search missions the 67 th flew their usual escort missions. On the 6th B-17s escorted by P-38s and P-40s attacked transports near Shortland, and the next day P-39s escorted B-26s in an attack of Rakata Bay. Two B-26s were lost.

Lt. Besby Holmes claimed a floatplane and two probables over Tonolei HarbOe (Holmes)

Mitsubishi FI M I Pete floatplane ofAir Group 958 was easy prey. (Passingham via Lansdale)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II On the 12th the Japanese sent a small force to Henderson and destroyed a P-39 and a fuel truck on Fighter Two. This was a rare occurrence, as at this time the Japanese were usually intercepted before they could close in on Cactus. Only Washing Machine Charlie continued to fly virtually unmolested at night, causing more annoyance than damage. On the 14th , lLt. George Topoll of the 70FS led a morning twoplane patrol over the Rekata Bay area at 10,000 feet. He spotted three Mitsubishi FIMI Pete float planes at 3,000 feet and dove on them through AA fire. Topoll shot down a Pete float plane, and his wingman, 2Lt. Harvey Dunbar, damaged another. Activation of the 13AF and COMAIRSOLS The Joint Chiefs of Staff had authorized Lt.Gen. Millard Harmon, COMGENSOPAC, to form the 13AF, and on 13 January 1943 it was activated at Noumea, New Caledonia, under Maj.Gen. Nathan Twining, who had been Harmon's Chief of Staff. Also activated were the XIII Bomber Command under Col. Harlan McCormick and the XIII Fighter Command under Col. Dean Strother (who would soon become a Brig. General). The new Chief of Staff was Col. Glen Jamison. The staffs of these three commands were very small. On the 21 st Twining moved 13 th HQ to Espiritu Santo, where it remained for a year. AAF units assigned to the 13AF were the 5th and 11 th Bomb Groups (H), the 69 th and 70 th Bomb Squadrons (M), the 347 th Fighter Group, the 12th and 44 th Fighter Squadrons, and the 13 th Troop Carrier Squadron. The 13AF was activated without an air service command, and the administrative and supply of the 13AF would remain under USAFISP. AAF air service units were directly under the control of island commanders, and this system continued until mid-1943, when they were transferred to the XIII Air Service Command. The establishment of the 13AF did not change air operations in the South Pacific, which remained under the control of COMAIRSOPAC. All Harmon could do was emphasize that the

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13 th Air Force was definitely under his command, and that he was to have direct control of administration, supply, movement, and training, along with a firm input on the attention to AAF principles, doctrine, and techniques in the employment of 13AF units. Nonetheless, neither Harmon nor Twining had operational control over their air units, and were only advisors dependent on a good relationship with VAdm. Aubrey Fitch, head of COMAIRSOPAC. Purpose of the 13 th Air Force in relation to proposed objectives: 13 January 1943 to mid-year, 1943: I) Gain air supremacy over the Central Solomons 2) Aid in the achieving ground and sea objectives in the Central Solomons 3) Destroy Japanese supply lines in the Northern Solomons and to the Central Solomons From mid-year 1943 to December 1943: 1) Gain air superiority over the Northern Solomons 2) Neutralize Japanese airfields and installations on New Georgia and Bougainville 3) Support and protect amphibious landings in the Northern Solomons 4) Destroy Japanese supply lines to the BougainvillelNorthern Solomons area December 1943 I) Maintain air superiority over the Northern Solomons 2) Destroy Japanese airfields and installations on New Britain 3) Support amphibious landings in the invasion of New Britain or in out-flanking New Britain The amphibious nature of the war in the Pacific demanded coordination of sea, land, and air components. Well equipped and defended bases had to be established on a series of Pacific islands from which air, land, and naval offensives could be dispatched against enemy's air, land, and naval forces. The primary prerequisite for any offensive was air and naval superiority in the area. The 13AF was to supply land-based air power, in cooperation with Marine, Navy, and later the 5AF air units. Early in the Pacific war the AAF units were under the operational control of the Commander of the South Pacific (COMSOPAC), Adm. Robert Ghormley, a Navy admiral, and R.Adm. Fitch (COMAIRSOPAC), another Navy admiral, who had control of all air units operating in the South Pacific. After Ghormley was relieved operational control ofAAF units was passed to the control of the Marine general, A.A. Vandegrift, commander of Guadalcanal operations. When Brig.Gen. Francis Mulcahy become the Senior Aviator on Guadalcanal on 26 December 1943 he commanded not only his 2MAW, but also all AAF, USN, USMC, and RNZAF units on the island. Fitch continued as COMAIRSOPAC, so there was a need for a centralized, coordinated command. On 16 February 1943 Air Command, Solomons (COMAIRSOLS) was formed under the command of R.Adm. Charles Mason and four staff officers, who took over control of all aircraft on Guadalcanal, with Mulcahy continuing on as its Chief

Part Two, Chapter 7 - January 1943 of Staff using the 2MAW as a framework. The new staff was beset with administrative, supply, and operational problems of its disparate force. On 1 February Lt.Col. Luther Moore, the CO of MAG12, was named Fighter Commander of all fighter aircraft on Guadalcanal, and later on the Russell Islands, and would maintain his control until 25 July. Halsey's rule of "unity of command" gave tactical control of the area to the major air force there (the USMC), but left management of administration, training, and discipline to individual air forces. In each smaller geographic area in the South Pacific the principle of unity applied through the establishment of island air commanders. The most important air commander and, the one most closely connected to the control of the 13AF was R.Adm. Mason, COMAIRSOLS (Commander of the Solomons), who was directly responsible to COMAIRSOPAC. Mason was followed by: R.Adm. Marc Mitscher USN (4 April 1943), Maj.Gen. Nathan Twining AAF (25 July 1943), Maj.Gen. Ralph Mitchell USMC (20 November 1943), and Maj.Gen. Hubert Harmon AAF (IS March 1944). It would not be until 1944 that the 13AF would gain operational control of its fighter and bomber units. Then, in April 1944, its forward units were placed under the Thirteenth Air Task Force under the 5th Air Force Advanced Echelon. On IS June 1944, the 13AF was assigned to the Far East Air Forces, which included the S'h Air Force and was under the command of Lt.Gen. George Kenney, the former Commanding General of the SAP.

SBD and TBF bombers or AAF heavy and medium bombers, or both at once, as Marine bombers often flew bombing missions in coordination with AAF bombers. Almost every Japanese raid on Guadalcanal was met by a mixed group ofArmy, Marine, and sometimes Navy fighters. The tactical units of the 13AF were not utilizing the optimal aircraft for operations in the South Pacific. The 5BG and llBG were using B-17s that were not as suited to flying over the great distances of the theater as were the B-24s. The medium B-26 bombers of the 69BS and 70BS were only beginning to be replaced by the better B-25. Three fighter squadrons were flying obsolete P39s (67 th, 70 th , and 12th ), two were flying nearly obsolete P-40s (68 th and 44 th ), and only the 339 th was equipped with the P-38, which was considered the superlative AAF fighter in the Pacific. Consequently, 13AF bombers were obliged to depend on Marine and Navy fighters for escort and cover or fly without escort. The P-38 was the answer to AAF bomber escort problems, but during two months of combat ending in mid-January just over half had been lost in combat or operationally. Seven more were being transported on a ship that left Hawaii on 6 January. Emmons promised Harmon that beginning in March five P-38s per month would be allocated from production lines to the South Pacific. At a 20% loss rate the 339FS could be maintained at its full 25 aircraft strength. The first combat for the 13 th Air Force came in the -:arly morning of 15 January when 12FS P-39s escorted SBDs to search for

COMAIRSOLS was divided into four subcommands: 13'/' Fighter Command:

13'h Bomber Command:

13'h Strike Command:

13'/' Search Command:

347FG composed of the 67FS (P-39s), 68FS (P-39s and P-40s), 70FS (P-39s), 339FS (P-38s) plus theMFS (P-40s) and 12FS (P-39s), which were on temporary duty. Fighter Command was responsible for air defense, ground support, and escort for air, naval, and some Strike Command operations. 5th and II th Bomb Groups Heavy (B-17s) and 69 th and 70 th Bomb Squadrons Medium (B-26s) carried out attacks on enemy air, naval, and ground forces and installations. Mainly USMC (F4Fs) flying low-level missions against Japanese surface units and airfields. Reconnaissance

Even though the 13AF had administrative control, the consequence of COMAIRSOLS was to deny 13AF HQ of operational control of its tactical units as long as it was in the South Pacific. Throughout the campaign the successive COMAIRSOLS staffs experienced administration, supply, equipment, and doctrinal problems because of its diversity. To its credit COMAIRSOLS coped amazingly well, and overcame these problems thanks to Halsey's "unity of command" principle. A large number of 13AF missions were flown with other COMAIRSOLS units, particularly in the instance of 13AF fighters. 13AF fighters could fly escort for Marine

Lt. Darrrell Cosart posing with the P-39 "Short Stroke."There are three rising Sun victory markings, but Cosart had two victory credits. Probably the other victory credit was by another pilot flying "Short Stroke." (Lansdale)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II Left Capt. Richard Rivers shot down two Petes for his only victories of the war (Canning)

Right: Lt. Phillip Hendrix shot down one iloatplane, his only aerial victory (Canning)

the Tokyo Express off New Georgia and claimed two Zero probabIes (one each by Capt. Cyril Nichols and Lt. Roger Ames). Later that day, during an afternoon bombing mission, a mixed group of P-38, P-39, and P-40 fighters of the 68 th and 70 th Fighter Squadrons escorted a formation of SBDs up the Slot to attack five enemy destroyers of the Tokyo Express about 37 miles southeast of Faisi. As the Americans neared the destroyers the Japanese sent up a large formation ofl2 float planes, mostly Petes, from Rekata Bay to intercept. A flight of four 68FS P-40s took on nine of the attackers and decimated them. Lts. Robert Kennedy, Martin Smith, and Allen Webb each downed two, while Lt. Lloyd Huff became the first AAF pilot in the South Pacific to down three Japanese aircraft in a day. It was to be the squadron's second best day of the war. Two fourplane sections of70FS P-39s led by Capt. Richard Rivers had flown almost to their maximum range to find the destroyers and encountered the float planes. Capt. Rivers got two, and ILts. Darrell Cosart and Phillip Hendrix one each. The B-17s did no damage to the destroyers, but all aircraft returned safely to base. That same day SBDs

Capt. Stan Palmer's P-40 was shot down by a nervous B-1? waist gunner (Palmer)

102

with F4F and P-39 escort attacked a cargo ship off Munda and were intercepted by a dozen Zeros, and seven were shot down by the Wildcats. Elsewhere, VMF-1211ed by Joe Foss and VMO-251 under Lt.Col. John Hart had a good day in two missions, shooting down 20 Japanese aircraft. The American losses for the day were one SBD and five Marine F4F escorts. On the 16th the men of the 17 th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron disembarked from the troopship USS McCawley and came on shore at Lunga Point by barge to set up camp in the coconut grove on the west end of Fighter Two. The photo lab was set up on the Lunga River near Henderson Field using old aircraft crates and other material begged, borrowed, or stolen. The squadron would have to wait until 2 February for their aircraft to arrive. On the 18 th 11 B-17s escorted by two flights of 68FS PAOs on close cover and P-38s on high cover at 30,000 feet were to bomb a cargo ship near Shortland, 285 miles away. Capt. Robert Hubbell led the first 68FS flight and Capt. Stanley Palmer led the other. Because a P-40 had to maintain airspeed at 185mph the seven P40s had to "s" above the B-17s that were flying at 165mph. As they approached the target the P-40s encountered two oblivious Japanese Rufes, with one towing a gunnery target and the other weaving in and out to practice firing runs. ILts. Joseph Lynch and Allen Webb broke out of escort and each shot down a Rufe. The P-40s had been instructed to keep close to the B-17s to provide them forward firepower, as these early B-17s did not have a chin turret. The bombers had just finished their bombing run and were making their customary diving right hand turns to "get the hell out of there" and to elude any lurking Japanese interceptors. The escorts lagged behind after the bombers' quick turn and were to move back to escort position. Capt. Palmer, thinking his flight was right behind him, moved back up to his escort position, and a B-17 nervous waist gunner began to fire on the lone P-40. Palmer's aircraft was hit, his coolant and hydraulics were shot out, and he was forced to bailout

Part Two, Chapter 7 - January 1943 very close to Japanese positions onshore, where he floated in his raft during that late afternoon and night. The next day a PBY "Dumbo" piloted by Lt. G.E. Hoffman was sent out on a S&R mission with P-38 and P-40 escorts to ward off enemy fighters and to suppress Japanese shore fire. Palmer threw out a dye marker that was very fortunately spotted by an alert Capt. William Shaw flying a P-38 for the 339FS. As the PBY was about to set down Hoffman spotted the wakes of two Japanese destroyers about six miles away heading toward Palmer. As Hoffman landed the amphibian the destroyers were five miles away and closing at a mile every two minutes, which Hoffman figured would give him enough time to pick up Palmer. But during the rescue Lt. Joseph Lynch's PAO had engine failure, and he ditched between Palmer and the closing destroyers. Hoffman had to make a quick decision; if he went to pick up the nearby Palmer he could not reach Lynch before the destroyers came into firing range, and if he went for Lynch first he might not have had time to return to pick up Palmer. Hoffman raced the engines and put the PBY into step, pounding along the tops of the waves toward Lynch, who was dragged through the side blister as the destroyers closed to four miles. Hoffman turned the PBY and lumbered across the waves towards Palmer as shells from the destroyers splashed to within a 100 yards of the Dumbo. Palmer was hauled through the blister, and the Dumbo turned and took off with the destroyers less than three miles away; Hoffman's gamble saved the lives of both pilots. Palmer suffered from exposure, and Lynch a black eye and 32 stitches when he hit his gunsight during the ditching. (Palmer narrative) During their Solomon rescue duties the Navy Dumbo squadrons were credited with saving 161 pilots and crews. On 19 January the 44FS left New Caledonia for Cactus with an overnight stop at Espiritu Santo. Maj. Tyler, Capts. Forsythe and Taylor, and Lts. Tarbet, Wheadon, and Westbrook flew their PAOs, while Lts. Byrnes, Matson, and Morrissey flew on one of the navigation B-25s. The next morning at 0630 the six Warhawks and Mitchell bombers left Buttons. Maj. Tyler's PAO's gas cap came off and one of the B-25s developed engine trouble, and both had to return. The other five P-40s and the B-25 landed safely at 1030 at Cactus, where it

Lt. Fred Ploetz of the 68FS shot down a floatplane between Fauro and Shortland Island; he was wounded in the shoulder during the mission, but returned safely to base. (Palmer) (Lansdale/ 347FG Assoc.)

would establish itself with the 339FS as the premier l3'h Fighter Command fighter squadron. On the 20 th the 339FS and 68FS escorted dive-bombers that attacked shipping near the Shortlands. Zeros and float planes attacked the formation between Fauro and Shortland Island at 0815. Capt. Robert Hubbell and Lts. Frederick Ploetz and Martin Smith each shot down float planes. lLt. Kennedy claimed two probables and Hubbell one. Capt. William Shaw became the first 339FS Sunsetter pilot to claim a double victory. lLts. Besby Holmes and Fred Purnell claimed a probable each. Lt. Ploetz of the 68 th was hit in the shoulder by shrapnel from a shell that hit his fighter, but was able to return safely to base. lLt. Emmett Norris became the second 68FS pilot who had volunteered to fly the P-38 to be MIA/ KIA, and only Raymond Hine remained alive. On the nnd, the 44FS flew its first B-17 escort mission when it accompanied nine bombers to Munda. The P-40s of the 44 th flew low cover, while the 339th P-38s flew high cover during the uneventfu13.5-hour round trip mission. After landing the P-40s were immediately refueled, and the 44th took off for a low cover escort for SBDs on a bombing mission on transports. During the mission one of the SBD pilots called out bogies and the P-40s rushed over to find "enemy" P-38s escorting B-26s to Munda. On 23 January six 12FS pilots arrived from Fiji. The American air and naval buildup on Guadalcanal threatened the entire Japanese status in the central and northern Solomons. To prevent the buildup on Guadalcanal the Japanese increased their air attacks on the island. On the 25 th 30 JAAF bombers and fighters approached Guadalcanal and were met by Marine and Air Force fighters. Two Oscars were downed by Marine pilots and two more by 339FS pilots, ILts. Ray Bezner and Besby Holmes. The Japanese formation was turned back, but four defending Marine fighters were lost.

Capt.William Shaw became the first 339FS Sun Setter pilot to claim a double victory. (Canning)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II

12th Fighter Squadron P-39 "Beth" has a 12th FS insignia on the door. The insignia has the lightning bolt held in the clawed fist extending beyond the circle. (LansdaleI347FGA)

12th Fighter Squadron P-39 "Lilly." (LansdaleI347FGA)

On the 26 th the 70FS was on a search and rescue mission for a life raft reported in the vicinity of Choiseul when ILt. Lawrence McKulla's P-39 was shot down just off the coast of Wagina Island. McCulla swam to the small island and was stranded there for 16 days before being picked up by a submarine. McKulla remained aboard the sub until it completed its patrol, and he returned to base several weeks later. On the 27 th the JAAF returned to Cactus with nine Bettys escorted by 30 Zeros. The bombers circled the Russell Islands while the Zeros came in to take on the defending fighters. Eight F4Fs had been scrambled at 0950, followed immediately by six 339FS P-38s led by Capt. John Mitchell. The Wildcats climbed to 20,000 and Lightnings to 30,000 feet to wait to pounce on the incoming Zeros. The P-38s were the first to see the enemy, flying in undisciplined formation, and dove, followed by the Wildcats; soon a wild dogfight began. A Zero came at Capt. Mitchell from the right, and he turned into it and fired, hitting the cockpit. The stricken Zero dove, briefly leveled out, and then crashed into the jungle near Cape Esperance. 2Lt. Ray Bezner also shot a Zero, and 1Lt. Frank Holmes claimed a probable. The 44FS had arrived on 20 January, but was to see its first Jap in combat today. Ten of the squadron's PAOs took off at 1015 and divided into two flights and an element and began to climb, but at 6,000 feet a few of the Zeros broke off from the dogfight above and bounced the first flight. Two PAOs were shot down, but their pilots parachuted safely, landing near the airfield below. Another P-40 was badly damaged, and the pilot crash-landed on Henderson. The P-38s came down after the Zeros and, supported by the second P-40 flight, broke up their attack. The 44 th 's 2Lt. Dale Tarbet hit a Zero that crashed into the Aruligo jungle, and Capt. Kenneth Taylor and ILt. Elmer Wheadon of the 44FS both got a Zero. Wheadon was bounced and hit by numerous bullets (69 holes were counted later), but was able to land safely despite having the fighter written off. Lt. Robert Westbrook's P-40, "Princess Pat, " was hit in the tail, but he escaped by diving, and as he climbed he spotted three Zeros and turned into one. He fired from 10 0' clock,

hitting it in the belly, and it fell off on a wing and began to flame. This would be the first of 20 victories for the top-scoring ace of the 13AF. The last P-40 element, led by Capt. Robert Hubbell from the 68FS, had been held back and had only climbed to 3,000 feet when they were attacked. Hubbell called for his formation to break and turn into the attackers. ILt. Fred Purnell shot down a lagging Zero over Kokumbona, and he and his wingman then followed the homeward-bound Zeros. Purnell got a second Zero near Cape Esperance, causing its pilot to bailout. In the dogfight Capt. Hubbell and Lt. Ralph Moseley were shot down and listed MIA. ILt. Paul Hansen had his Warhawk shot up, losing his hydraulics, and could not lower his landing gear and chose the longer Henderson bomber field to belly-land. As he was coming into Cactus a C-47 was also in its landing approach. Henderson gave Hansen a "no go," but he came

104

-J ()lJ1d,

~. WELGE CaQtain, Air Corps.

Capt. Kenneth Taylor had served with the 47PS/ 15FG at Pearl Harbor as a 2 nd Lieutenant flying P-40s. He and 2Lt. George Welch were the first Americans to intercept the Japanese, and scored America's first aerial victories of the Second World War. (Taylor)

Part Two, Chapter 7 - January 1943 in anyway and skidded safely off the runway before the C-47 touched down. The 339 lh P-38s also chased the Zeros home. The Zeros were flying low over the water and would turn into the Lightning attacks. Lt. Ray Bezner hit a Zero whose pilot bailed for his second victory in three days. Capt. William Shaw, the leader of the second section, despite being unable to release one of his belly tanks, made a pass at a Zero when another Jap turned into him. The first Zero also turned and fired, exploding Shaw's belly tank and fighter in a ball of flame. Flight leader Capt. John Mitchell exacted revenge for Shaw, as he got on the tail of this Zero and shot it down for his second Zero of the day. Lt. N. McDaniel was also lost. The Marine Wildcats scored two victories in the early fighting, but one ran out offuel and had to ditch. The day's totals were ten Zeros for two P40s, two P-38s, a F4F, and two P-4Ds written off after landing. During the dogfight the waiting Japanese bombers flew under Cactus radar and made one ineffective bombing and strafing pass on American troop positions. Capt. Mitchell's first victory of the day gave him five and made him the first of 21 aces of the 13AF. Capt. Kenneth Taylor had served with the 47PS/lSFG at Pearl Harbor as a 2 nd Lieutenant flying P-4Ds. He and 2Lt. George Welch were the first

Americans to intercept the Japanese and scored America's first aerial victories of the Second World War. Taylor was credited with two Kate victories and a probable in his first sortie, and after refueling and rearming he claimed a Val probable after being wounded in the left arm and receiving fragments in his leg. After the war the Inspector General credited Taylor with victories for the two Pearl Harbor probabIes, but the official USAF Historical Study 85 does not credit him with these victories that would have made him an ace. Doug Canning (67FS):

Capt. Robert Hubbell of the 68FS (kneeling) was shot down leading a PAO element for the 44FS. (Palmer)

A released belly tank hit Doug Canning's P-38 rudder and forced him to ditch. (Canning)

"Early belly tanks were crudely made, and the mounts didn't always fit. The mechanics would take cold steel chisels and chisel the mounts to fit. The word we got was if we got into the air and they started to vibrate we should drop them right away, or they would shake your wing off. On a B-24 escort mission my tanks started to vibrate and I pulled away from my formation. First I hit the electrical release and nothing happened. Then I hit the manual and they didn't go. I went into a big dive and pulled back real hard and hit both releases. The tanks released, but one tank hit my right rudder, and now I had a full jam to the right. I was able to maintain

]05

13 th Fighter Command in World War II

Capt. Ray Williams and his Crew Chief, S/Sgt. Williams. (68FS) Canning) Capt. Willie Hull, 68FS. (Lansdale)

straight and level by using differential power. But the question now was if I had enough fuel to make it back. Sure enough, when I was about ten miles from the field it was evident that I wasn't going to get back. Then the question was; do I bailout or ditch into the water? I decided to ditch, but I was using differential power and had quite a bit of speed. Three of the guys had stayed with me and said that I had made quite a big rooster tail as I skidded across the water. Finally, the aircraft slowed down and I got the canopy up, but almost immediately the plane dove toward the bottom. I tried to get out but something was holding me in. I found it was my headset cord and ripped it out of the socket. I guess that I must have been down 80 feet or so because the plane was going down pretty fast. I popped up to the surface, climbed into my life raft, and thought I could paddle the ten miles to shore. The paddles were only about 15 inches long, and it didn't take long for me to decide to wait to be rescued. The boys had radioed my position, and it wasn't too long before a lOa-foot ship came out to pick me up. The whole crew was without shirts, and when I got on board the only guy with a uniform asked me how I was. I said I was a little nervous. He asked if I would like to have a shot. I thought he was a doctor. He took me below and gave me dry Navy dungarees and I got my shot; medicinal whiskey, and then a steak, a Hershey bar, and a Coca Cola. I got back to Fighter Two and flew a mission the next day."

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On the 28 th Lt. Henry Matson of the 44FS shot down a Zero while on an escort over the Slot. On the 29 th the 67FS and 339FS pilots who had been on R&R were rotated back to Guadalcanal, along with two 12FS pilots. All squadrons (67 th, 68 th , 70 th , and 339th) were now represented in Cactus Flight. During the last days of January and into early April the 68FS had numerous command shuffles. On 27 January ILt. Fred Purnell assumed command but was relieved by Capt. Karl Conradi on 5 February, then eight days later he was relieved by Capt. Ray Williams, who was transferred from the 347FG HQ Squadron. Then, two weeks later Williams left for New Caledonia and was replaced by ILt. Paul Hancock. During this period there were no 68 th pilots in combat. Then, on 14 March Capt. William Hull replaced Hancock, and Capt. Stanley Palmer replaced him, in tum, on 3 April. Nearly every night Washing Machine Charlie continued his nightly forays over Henderson, and since there were no night fight fighters available several day fighter pilots volunteered to attempt a night intercept but were denied permission. Finally, on the 29th, Capt. John Mitchell of the 339'h was granted permission to try to intercept Charlie. He took off to patrol shortly before sunrise and waited for the final incoming Charlie of the night. The Betty gave away its position when it dropped its bombs, and Mitchell dove on it and hit it with a long burst. He continued on its tail, and a short burst sent it flaming into the Slot. The Americans on Cactus awakened by Charlie cheered Mitchell's seventh victory.

8 February 1943

On 1 February four P-40s of the 44FS and four P-38s of the 339FS escorted B-17s. All bombers made their bomb runs, but four bombardiers did not jettison and turned to make a second run. Three Fortresses were shot down, as the escorts were unaware of the second run and did not accompany them. At 1630 the Cactus Fighter Director was alerted of a Japanese air and naval attack approaching the area and scrambled SBDs, TBFs, and a flight of 44FS PAOs to escort them. The Japanese vessels were contacted to the north, near Savo Island, and were protected by Zeros. The 44FS flight, led by Maj. Kermit Tyler, consisted of Capt. Kenneth Taylor and Lts. Elmer Wheadon and Robert Westbrook. The PAOs managed to keep the Zeros at bay, but Wheadon's fighter had its stabilizer shot away, and he was hit in the calf by shrapnel from a Japanese 20mm cannon. Wheadon managed to crash-land the fighter at Cactus, totaling it. He was hospitalized, but spent the night in a bomb shelter while the Japanese shelled the base. He was evacuated to New Caledonia to recuperate, but would return to become an ace in July. Capt. Jerome Sawyer of the 67FS shot down a Zero for the only 13FC victory for the day. On 2 February 44FS Lts. Raymond Morrissey, Dale Tarbet, and John Wood were escorting B-17s over Buin on southern Bougainville when they were bounced by 20 Zeros as the bombers were beginning their bombing run. Wood shot down a Zero but was hit in the arm, side, and leg during the fray; he returned to the bomber formation and continued flying escort. Tarbet and Morrissey also shot down a Zero each, and all bombers returned safely to base. All three pilots were awarded the Silver Star for their action that day. The 339FS provided four P-38s for high cover for B-17s bombing shipping in Shortland Harbor. Lt. Besby Holmes got his fourth victory (a Zero), John Mitchell claimed his eighth and last South Pacific victory (a float plane), and Lt. Murray Shubin claimed a Zero for his first of 11 victories. Shubin, called Jim by his squadronmates, named his P-38 Oriole after his fiancE, and gave the name on the cowling a loving ritual tap before each take off and after landing. Wood commented on these escort missions: "It must be remembered that our job was not to shoot down

Zeros. It was to protect the bombers, or whatever it was we were

escorting. On such missions it is a hard rule that we must hold our formation and not let the enemy suck you out for a fight. Ours was a defensive job, and what we got we got in holding these tacticsto get the mission through." Tarbet added: "And it's hell to have to sit there, holding that formation when surrounded by Zeros pecking away at you. You get scared, scared as hell. Your mouth gets dry and you suck up your oxygen as if it's the only thing to hold onto. You want to dive out and get away but you know you can't. Even after you get safely back home you are still scared from the reaction. I couldn't sleep well for two nights. Every time I closed my eyes I saw Zeros flocking around me." (44FS Combat Narratives) On the 2 nd the 17 th Photo Recon Squadron had its F-5 P-38 photo ships fly into Fighter Two and were greeted by their ground personnel, who had arrived two weeks earlier via transport aircraft. When they landed the infantry on Henderson hoped these new fighters were the P-38 night fighter versions sent to knock off "Washing Machine Charlie," but were disappointed when they saw that the fighters were not even armed. Three days later, the l7PRS flew its first sortie when CO Capt. John Murray scouted the southern end of New Georgia. On the 14th the squadron lost its first pilot in combat when 2Lt. Ardell Nord failed to return from a recon sortie. The unit would lose five more pilots during their tour in 1943: 1Lt. John Mancini (22 April); 2Lt. Charles Roberts (9 May); 2Lt. Frederick Baird (2 July); 2Lt. Raymond Petterson (17 August); and 2Lt. James Reed (6 December). Lt. Allan Wekel was forced down off San Isabel, but was rescued by coast watchers and returned to base. The squadron would leave Guadalcanal on 5 October 1944 after 21 months with detachments operating out of Munda (13 October 1943 to 31 January 1944) and Bougainville (11 December 1943 to February 1945). The 17 th PRS History contains a narrative of a Photo Recon pilot's mission from Guadalcanal in 1943: "It's only 0700, but it seems like hours since I took off. Better be getting on that oxygen mask and the last minute check of gauges before I get too high. Down ahead I can see two or three small

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13th Fighter Command in World War 11

The 17PRS flew the unarmed F-5 photo recon version of the P-38.These photos show the two camera ports located in the nose below and behind the number 676. Also note the top-hatted bee holding a camera insignia. (Canning)

islands, all exactly alike in their tangled mass of tropical jungle. The furthest island ahead is the one to worry about. It's 0745, I wonder if! will get there! Gosh, I'm getting cold!. It's getting below zero, and I've still got to go up and up. Better check the gauges again-can't be caught asleep if anything goes wrong. Better start looking around more often, as these Japs don't play for fun. Well I'm getting pretty close, better develop the old rubber neck, because I can expect company out of the sun anytime now. Doesn't seem to be many new ships in the harbor,just a couple of transports riding at anchor and one under steam. The airstrip seems to have been pretty well repaired since last night's working over. If it weren't so darn cold maybe I could write some of this dope down so I could read it when I got back. Oh, Oh! There's five, no, six Zekes at about five thousand feet below me; keep an eye on them. One last look around, then over the target for those ever loving pictures. About time for Ack-Ack to kick up. Oh! Oh! I talked too soon again, here it comes, but a little off to the beam. So far, so good, its all braking upstairs. On with the cameras, because brother I don't want to have to do this job over again. Everything's rolling OK, so just keep her straight down the alley, and we can soon head for home. Those guys with the Ack-Ack are too darn close for comfort now. Cut the cameras and let's be heading for the tall timbers. Wonder where those Zekes are by now? Gotta keep looking around because I'm not home yet, and it could be a very long swim before I'm through. Ten hundred and halfway home going like the breeze. Gee, it's great to be alive."

bombers came along and tried to sneak into the American anchorage at Guadalcanal. They sunk the destroyer DeHaven, but the pilots of VMF-1l2 saved the day. All five dive-bombers were shot down (three by Capt. Robert Fraser) and 17 of the Zeros were shot down (four by ILl. James Percy). P-40s of the 68FS were scrambled but did not make contact. SBDs and TBFs attacked the Japanese convoy at dusk, but were only able to cause heavy damage to one destroyer that was towed back to Shortland. That night another 19 destroyers came in and took off troops; one destroyer was lost to a mine, and t,he rest escaped by sunrise after evacuating several thousand troops. The Americans continued to believe that the Express was on its typical reinforcement and supply mission. The Japanese had moved a large number of troops and the 4th Air Army to Rabaul, and reinforced the Munda airstrip to lead the Americans to the con-

By the end of January U.S. Army troops had captured Kokumbona and neared Tassafaronga, forcing the Japanese into a narrow area around Cape Esperance. On the first day of February 20 destroyers of the Tokyo Express covered by 20 to 30 Zeros from Buin passed down the Slot at 1600; not to bring in reinforcements, but to evacuate Japanese troops from the island. Five enemy dive70FS flight leader, Capt. James Robinson (center), downed two Zeros. (Canning)

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Part Two, Chapter 8 - February 1943

Lt. Jack "Spyder" Bade (44FS) scored his first victory toward becoming a five victory ace. (Canning) ILt.William Fiedler (70FS) shot down a Zero for his second victory toward his five total. (Canning)

elusion that a new offensive was being prepared for Guadalcanal. The U.S. Navy Action Report of 17 April 1943 stated: "Until almost the last moment, it appeared that the Japanese were attempting a major reinforcement effort. Only skill in keeping their plans disguised and bold celebrity in carrying them out enabled the Japanese to withdraw the remnants of the Guadalcanal garrison. Not until organized forces had been evacuated on 8 February did we realize the purpose of their air and naval dispositions; otherwise with the strong forces available to us ashore on Guadalcanal and our powerful fleet in the South Pacific, we might have converted the withdrawal into a disastrous defeat." On 4 February the Tokyo Express-22 destroyers covered by 25 Zeros-came down the Slot to attempt a second evacuation. At two hundred miles out 12 SBDs and 13 TBFs escorted by eight P39s, four P-38s, and 16 F4Fs attacked and disabled one destroyer

and damaged another. Flight leader Capt. James Robinson downed two Zeros, and Lt. William Fiedler was credited with another flying their 70FS P-39s. The F4Fs claimed six Zeros, the TBF gunners two, and the SBD gunners one. One F4F, one SBD, and four TBFs were lost in the action. An hour later 12 SBDS, escorted by ten F4Fs and four 44FS P-40s, attacked the Express and slightly damaged two destroyers. Three Warhawk pilots shot down a Zero each: Lts. Jack "Spyder" Bade (his first victory toward becoming a five victory ace); Henry Matson; and John Wood. Lt. Michael Carter was hit and bailed out, and landed near the Japanese ships; he was listed as the first 44 th MIA. The 67FS flew escort for SBDs and got two probables north of Kolombangara, one each by lLts. ilo Inciardi and Robert Tullis. ILt. Robert Bauer was MIA. The F4Fs downed four Zeros and lost two fighters, while the SBDs claimed two Zeros and had one of their own shot down and another crash land. That night the Japanese made another successful evacuation from Guadalcanal.

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13 th Fighter Command in World War 1I On 7 February the Tokyo Express made the third and last evacuation when it came down the Slot covered by a rain storm and embarked most of the troops remaining on Guadalcanal. The three February Express trips evacuated 11,706 troops, and at 1625 on 9 February all organized Japanese resistance on the island ended and the island was declared secure. Late that afternoon the B-26s of the 69BS became based on the island and were escorted by P-38s and P-39s to bomb the Japanese on Kolombangara Island. On 5 February the 70FS, under Capt. Waldon Williams and lLts. Koenig and Kuntz and 2Lts. Burgess, Clark, Decker, and Gorham, flew their P39s from Fiji to Guadalcanal on what was the longest hop to date for the Airacobra. Guadalcanal became the major base for American airpower in the South Pacific.

Lt. Richard Koenig was part of a group that flew their P-39s from Fiji to Guadalcanal on what was the longest hop to date for the Airacobra. Note the Hell's Angel. a Devil with a halo. on its tail. (Lansdale)

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Summary and Assessment of the Battle for Guadalcanal

With the successful Japanese evacuation, organized resistance on Guadalcanal came to an end on 9 February 1943. Of 60,000 American personnel committed, the Marines had lost 1,207 killed, 2,894 wounded, and the Army 562 KIA and 1,289 WIA, and both forces suffered thousands incapacitated by disease, particularly malaria. U.S. Navy losses were about 4,770 (plus 130 aviator and 49 shipboard Marines). In comparison, the bloody battle for Okinawa, often considered as the U.S. Navy's most costly campaign, caused only slightly more casualties at 4,907 killed or missing. New Zealand and Australia lost 92 naval personnel. The Japanese force of nearly 36,000 men lost 14,800 killed or missing, 9,000 more dead from disease, and 1,000 taken prisoner (almost 12,000 were evacuated). The Imperial Navy lost approximately 3,500 KIA/ MIA. The Allied navies lost two fleet carriers, six heavy and two light cruisers, and 15 destroyers totaling 126,400 tons. The Japanese Navy lost two battleships, a light carrier, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, 11 destroyers, and six submarines totaling 138,000 tons. The Japanese lost 13 transports and one destroyer conversion, while the Allies lost one transport and three destroyer conversions. It was the air war over Guadalcanal that produced the greatest longterm effect on the Pacific war. The shortage of airfields in the central and northern Solomons and the distance to Guadalcanal from Rabaul and Kavieng restricted Japanese air operations. Japanese fighter and bomber crews were only able to mount one six to sevenhour mission per day, and were unable to sustain a daily air offensive in force. Missions were often interrupted or turned back by the unpredictable tropical weather, but more importantly, the Japanese air forces were overextended and were unable to conduct operations in both the Solomons and ew Guinea. When the Japanese . concentrated their air activities in one theater, it gave respite to the Allies in the other. The American build up in Australia and the emergence of the 5AF soon placed more aircraft in the air over New Guinea, further stretching Japanese air capabilities. The IJNAF had lost many aircraft in the attritional air battles around Guadalcanal, and while the Japanese aircraft industry was able to replace these aircraft multiple times during the course of the war, skilled pilots lost could not be replaced. The United States lost 264 aircraft and 420 aircrew casualties: 150 AAF; 140 USMC; and 130 USN. The

Japanese lost about 620 aircraft; aircrew loss figures are difficult to quantify, but their losses were between 900 and 1,600. The 620 Japanese aircraft losses included a large number of Zeros (246 from carriers and the 11 th Air Fleet), and also bombers with multiple crewmen: Vals (91 from carriers and the 11 th Air Fleet); Kates (47 carrier); and Bettys (125 11 th Air Fleet). An additional 77 float planes and 19 flying boats were lost, along with 15 Oscars of the IJAAF (A discussion of Japanese and Allied air losses will be further elaborated in the next chapter.). These losses were from Japan's besttrained and veteran personnel, and so the impact of their loss was more than what mere numbers indicate. At the beginning of the war the IJNAF had 600 experienced carrier pilots, and 175 to 200 of these were lost during the Guadalcanal campaign. The II th Air Fleet lost 125 Betty bombers, along with most of their experienced crews. During the period from the initial American invasion to the end of the Naval Battle for Guadalcanal the Japanese had superiority in total land and sea-based aircraft. The 565-mile distance from Rabaul to Cactus was the major disadvantage for the Japanese air units. It effectively halved the Zero escort force, as the Model 32 did not have sufficient range, and the under-escorted bombers suffered losses. The long distances and the excellent coast watcher organization, complemented by radar, gave the slow climbing Wildcats time to reach an altitude to intercept the Japanese bomber formations and confront the Zero escorts. Japanese operations over this long distance necessarily were predictable and routine, as fuel consumption was a consideration in calculating time over the target and returning back to base, and was the reason for mid-day Tojo Time attacks. Once over Guadalcanal the unarmored Japanese bombers and fighter escorts (without self-sealing fuel tanks) had half of their fuel remaining for the return home, and would end up as fiery explosions or flame into the sea when hit. The long distance caused inordinate wear on the aircraft and eroded the crew's combat effectiveness, and ordinary battle damage could often become fatal, as slightly damaged aircraft were unable to make the long return home. Japanese overconfidence in the impending success of each month's ground attacks on the island caused them to postpone building airfields closer to Guadalcanal. But the Japanese also lacked adequate airfield construction capability. The Marine

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13th Fighter Command in World War II pilots were at a disadvantage to the Zeros in their inferior Wildcats, but Maj. John Smith, learning from Gen. Claire Chennault's experience with the American Volunteer Group earlier in China, developed the high overhead pass, dive, and climb tactic to maximize the sturdy little Grumman's qualities. The Air Force learned that their P-400s and later P-39s were incapable of intercepting the highflying Japanese formations, but went on to do yeoman's work as superlative ground support fighter-bombers that turned the battle at Bloody Ridge and constantly harassed the beleaguered Japanese troops on the island. The Marine Wildcats and then Corsairs would often escort their Marine SBDs and TBFs, but AAF fighters or a mixed group of AAF, USMC, and RNZAF fighters would also often escort these bombers. The B-26 and later B-25 low-level missions were almost always escorted by P-39s, and often later with P38 high cover. The aggressive Marine VMFs were frequently criticized for often leaving their escort position in the bomber formation to run off and shoot down Zeros. The AAF and Navy had few problems or criticism in their maintenance of bomber escort air

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discipline. The RNZAF were always beyond reproach and consistently flew well-coordinated and disciplined missions. While the Japanese naval and air bases at Rabaul were well-developed and equipped and relatively untouched to date by bombing, the American ground crews and support personnel on Guadalcanal worked tirelessly under air and naval bombardment, without adequate tools and equipment, and under the most primitive conditions. The contribution of the ground crews and construction engineers to the victory was important but unheralded. The SBD Dauntless dive-bombers interdicted the Japanese naval movements within 200 miles of the island, restricting Japanese troop reinforcement a~d supply of the island. 67FS Airacobras and Marine SBDs continually harassed the starving and dejected Japanese troops, and restricted their daylight operations on the island. The Battle of Midway was America's first great victory of the Pacific war, beginning the reversal of Japan's naval power; but Guadalcanal forever changed the strategic course of the Pacific war on the land, sea, and in the air, and allowed Allied global strategy to continue as planned at Casablanca.

10 Statistics: Assessing the Guadalcanal Air Campaign

Aircraft Losses During the Guadalcanal Campaign 1 August to 15 November 1942 Japanese 506 11 th Air Fleet 240 Aircraft Type Lost Zeros Vals Bettys Flying Boats Air Combat 95 12 72 11 On the Ground 7 0 o 7 Operational 27 4 5 o Total 106 15 100 19 Carrier Air Groups Aircraft Type Lost Air Combat Shipboard Operational Total

197 Zeros 43 5 33 81

Rear Area Air Force Float planes Other American

66 66 3 480

USMC/USAAF 251 Aircraft Type Lost Air Combat On the Ground Operational Total * includes P-400s

F4F 70 12 33 115

SBD 24 20 22 66

TBF 2 7 7 16

Carrier Air Groups 184 F4F Aircraft Type Lost . Air Combat 31 Shipboard 32 Operational 18 Total 81

SBD 11 30 22 63

TBF 7 10 23 40

Others

45*

Vals 58 0 11 69

*Includes aircraft lost in rear areas (14), observation-type aircraft (30), and 1 B-26 Credit: Figures compiled by Richard Frank (Guadalcanal: A Definitive Account ofthe Landmark Battle) from Japanese Unit Histories and the research of John Lundstrom (The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942) and James Sawruk.

Kates 35 3 9 47

.. P-39* 13 2 4 19

B-17 7 2 9 18

PBY 7 0 10 17

....-

•

Marine infantry inspect the wreckage of a Japanese Emily flying boat beached at Guadalcanal. (USMC)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Japanese Aircraft Figures August to November 1942 (Solomons & New Guinea) Zeros Vals Bettys Float Flying Totals Losses Planes Boats Combat 344 197 125 136 12 814 Operational 238 44 60 61 8 411 Totals 582 241 185 197 20 1,225 From USSBS No. 62 Japanese Air Power (Exhibit D) There is a large divergence in the USSBS figures and those of Frank, Lundstrom, and Sawruk. Richard Frank's 800 page Guadalcanal (Random House, Y, 1990) is one of two definitive accounts of the Guadalcanal Campaign. Frank's book covers all phases of the campaign, while the other, John Lundstrom's The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942 (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1994), is unbelievably minutely researched, and without a doubt the definitive work on the U.S. Navy and Japanese air forces during this time. The USSBS was compiled immediately after the war and was based on interrogations of Japanese officers and incomplete records. The Frankl Lundstrom Japanese figures are undoubtedly much more accurate, as they are based on years of research.

American Losses 16 November 1942 to 9 February 191943 USMC AAF Other F4F 41 P-39 12 7 SBD 31 PAO 10 TBF 10 P-38 6 B-17 9 B-26 4 82 41 7 Total 130 Japanese Losses 16 November 1942 to 9 February 1943 Zeros 59 Vals 7 Bettys 25 Oscars 15 Petes 11 117 + 60*

Total 176

*Added figure as per 11 th Air Fleet Chief of Staff, R.Adm. Munetaka Sakamaki, for period 16 November to 24 December 1942.

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Total Losses 1 August 1942 to 9 February 1943 American 480+ 130=61 0 Japanese 506+176=682 Initially, American operational (non-combat) losses were much higher than Japanese operational losses, as the Americans flew from undeveloped bases, and their pilots had not developed their flying skills and were inexperienced in utilizing these early bases. The Japanese pilots were veterans and operated out of developed bases, either captured and improved Australian bases or newly developed bases built without interference. American air losses w"ere 420 and included l50AAF, 140 Marine, and 130 Navy personnel. Japanese air personnel losses were two to four times higher, as they lost many multi-crew bombers, and a much higher proportion of their aircrews did not survive after being hit in their highly flammable aircraft that did not provide adequate crew protection. The 600 Japanese carrier pilots who took part in the Guadalcanal air campaign had an average of 800 hours of flying and combat time. The Japanese carrier air groups lost about 175-200 of these experienced pilots, and the INAF also lost a substantial number of their Betty bomber crews. The Japanese replacement pilots came into the battle with 250 hours flying experience. USMC aces such as Marion Carl had over 1400 hours in May 1942, and Joe Foss had over 1000 hours when he arrived on Guadalcanal in October. They were the exception rather than the rule. Generally, Marine pilots in John Smith's VMF-223 and Joe Foss' VMF-12l squadrons were commissioned and awarded their wings in early 1942, and were relatively inexperienced, but did have flying time in the F4F Wildcat. The AAF pilots came to the theater with 100-200 hours flying time and little time in combat types, and then were thrown into combat in the inferior P-39s and PAOs. The first two flights of the 68FS that arrived at Guadalcanal on 7 November had a range of 64 to 163 "combat" hours among eight pilots. "Combat" hours meant flying patrols over Tonga to ward off potential Japanese attacks. AAF Squadron CO material was so thin that 1SI Lieutenants were in command of fighter squadrons when they reached the South Pacific. Even the top AAF aces were relatively inexperienced when they arrived. In December 1942 Bob Westbrook came to the theater with 223 hours of training time and 81 hours of pursuit time, and even by mid-1943, ace Bill Harris came into the Solomons with 103 hours of pursuit time out of 326 hours of flying time. At the end of 1942 theAAF had received eight more fighters than the Joint Chiefs of Staff's authorized number of 150. However, there were two-thirds the number of heavy bombers on hand (47 of 72) and half the medium bombers (26 of 52).

Part Three Central Solomons

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1 Status of the Air War 1943

Although Guadalcanal was lost, the Japanese Imperial High Command was not about to lose the rest of the Solomon chain. Rabaul remained the hub of Japanese strength, and they were reinforcing their positions in the central and northern Solomons. The Allied advance up the Solomon chain and the Japanese defense was well suited to land-based aviation, as both sides were short on carrier strength. The Japanese lost four carriers at Midway and were reluctant to jeopardize their remaining carriers. The Enterprise and the damaged Saratoga were the only large American carriers operational, and the new Essex class carriers would not see combat until August 1943. Marine aviation was to be the main fighter air force in the South Pacific, while the 13 th Air Force would furnish one-quatter of the fighter strength, but most of the heavy and medium bomber strength during the remainder of the South Pacific campaign. Since the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal American air missions encountered increased AA defenses over enemy airfields. In January and February photo recon showed increased construction activity on Japanese airfields, primarily taxiways and blastproof revetments. In one month (mid-December to mid-February), the Japanese had doubled dispersal facilities and then increased them another 50% the next month, so that by mid-February they had 245 revetments on New Britain and the Solomons, as compared to 72 in mid-December. American intelligence estimated that the Japanese airfields now were able to shelter more than 450 aircraft. There were no revetments in the Solomons at the end of November 1942, but photo recon now counted 72 revetments: 44 at Munda and Ballale; 18 at Buka; and ten more at Kahili. The Japanese then concentrated on the development and expansion of new and established bases in the central and northern Solomons while continuing to attack Guadalcanal supply areas, installations, and off-shore shipping by air and sea until mid-year. The Japanese held airfields that

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were within the reach of Guadalcanal-based bombers, and conversely within the reach of the Japanese bombers. About 400 miles to the northwest of Guadalcanal at the southern end of Bougainville were the developed airbases in the Buin area. Kahili, completed in September 1942 and enlarged to handle twin-engined bombers, and Kara were on the island's mainland and protected Tonolei Harbor. Shortland and Ballale Island air bases were completed in December 1942 and hard surfaced a year later, were located near Buin, and had satellite fields, AA emplacements, and seaplane moorings. Kieta was located on the central east coast, and Buka was a welldeveloped base at the north end of Bougainville that had an excellent repair facility. Munda airfield, on the southwest coast of New Georgia, was newly built in December. There was a base being slowly constructed at Vila on Kolombangara Island,just to the west of New Georgia, that would be ready in March. The Rakata seaplane base on Santa Isabel was under constant heavy attack from Guadalcanal, and thus was often inoperable. The thrust of the American bomber attacks was in the Buin-Shortlands-Munda area, as at this time Rabaul and Kavieng were out of range of the Guadalcanalbased bombers for any sustained attacks. The obvious eventual objective of the South Pacific campaign was Rabaul, with the immediate objective being the capture of New Georgia. The Munda airfield could not be left to develop, as an airfield based there could cover the movement of Japanese naval forces toward the eastern Solomons and make Cactus more vulnerable. The Americans attacked Munda night and day with every available aircraft that had the range to reach it. American air strength was increased, as the Saratoga's air groups were detached to Henderson for two weeks' duty. Heavy bombers based at Cactus increased their attacks on Japanese merchant and naval shipping around Buin, and Cactus fighters were to provide cover for these bombing operations and local searches.

2 February 1943 Continued

On 12 February a Navy F4U came in for a landing at Fighter, ran out of control, and swerved off the runway, hitting three parked P-38s and bursting into flame. AAF personnel ran over to the flaming Corsair, and S/Sgt. Edwards of the 68FS pulled the Navy pilot out, but was hit in the shoulder by exploding ammunition. Two men were killed and two wounded by ammo that was cooking off during the rescue and fire fighting attempt. On 13 February two bomber formations took off on separate missions to attack shipping in the Shortland-Buin area. ine PB4Ys (Navy B-24s) of VB-lOi were escorted by four 339FS P-38s and 11 Marine F4Us of the newly arrived VMF-I24 under Maj. William Gise. This formation attacked a cargo ship at 1130 without getting any hits, and the Japanese did not engage them. Six B-24s of the also newly arrived 424BS led by Col. Frank Everest were escorted by four P-38s of the 339FS (Lts. Cramer, Lockridge, Morton, and Rist) and seven P-40s of the 44FS. The B-24s bombed a cargo ship from 14,000 feet, getting one hit with a 1,000lb. bomb. On the way to the target three of the Liberators' P-40 escorts had to abort due to engine problems, and two P-38s (Morton and Cramer) also had to abort later offBuin. This left only four P-40s and two P-

38s to protect the Liberators as 45 Japanese fighters scrambled. Japanese AA fire from the shipping below was heavy and accurate, as one B-24 was blown to pieces from a direct hit and another was hit and crashed into the sea in flames. The four remaining B-24s turned to bomb the Japanese shipping as another B-24 was hit and left the formation with its wing and engine on fire. For the next 50 minutes there was a running 150 mile dogfight, and four 44FS pilots claimed a Zero each: Capt. Albert Johnson (and a probable) and Lts. Jack Bade, Raymond MOlTissey, and Robert Westbrook (and a probable). The four Lightning pilots on top cover dove into the fray, and 2Lt. Robert Rist escorted the damaged B-24 that left the formation as it flew toward Choiseul with ten Zeros trying to finish it off. Rist shot down one before he succumbed to the overwhelming odds and was shot down. Rist's efforts had allowed the B-24 to reach the north coast of Choiseul and to ditch successfully. In the battle both Johnson and Morrissey were MINKIA. Bade was awarded the DFC and Westbrook the Silver Star. 2Lt. Lockridge (from the 339FS) also was credited with a Zero, and 2Lt. Thomas Johnson (from the 70FS) was credited with an unidentified aircraft. The remaining three B-24s and two P-40s returned safely to

February 1943 was a slow month for the I3FC, but on the 13th Lts. Jack Bade and Robert Westbrook each shot down a Zero, and Westbrook added a probable. Bade was awarded the DFC and Westbrook the Silver Star for the mission. (Author)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II Guadalcanal, but another P-38 and the two that aborted the mission all ditched on the way home. The tally for the day was seven Japanese aircraft lost and damage to one cargo ship, but the cost was high for the Americans, as they lost three of six B-24s, all four P38s, and two P-40s. Despite the losses of the previous day, on the 14th nine PB4Ys escorted by ten P-38s of the 339FS flying high cover, and 12 F4Us of VMF-124 flying close cover, again attacked the shipping off Shortlands-Buin. The bombers got several hits on a cargo ship and several near misses on two others. As they turned home 30 Zeros from Kahili supported by 15 float planes came up and attacked the Americans. A PB4Y was hit in the cockpit and crashed into the sea off Shortland. Another bomber was hit by AA fire and struggled as far as 12 miles off New Georgia before it had to ditch. The top cover P-38s were divided in two three-plane sections and a fourplane flight when the Zeros attacked. Capt. James Geyer, leading the four-plane flight, shot down two Zeros and a probable, and lLt. William Griffith of this flight splashed another and claimed a probable. Geyer's flight lost two P-38s, and two more P-38s were lost from the three plane sections. Four 339FS pilots were lost: Joseph Frinkenstein; Wellman Huey; John Mulvey; and Donald White. Mulvey ditched and was rescued near Russell Island the next day. A post-war Japanese book described that Huey had bailed out of his P-38 and landed on a Japanese airfield and was severely beaten, probably to death. The Marine Corsairs claimed three Zeros and a

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Pete and lost two of their own, one to a mid-air collision with a Zero. The PB4Y gunners claimed nine Zeros-a very questionable number, as the Japanese records for the day show only three Zeros lost. The totals for the day were a cargo ship sunk, five (or three) Zeros (plus the nine claimed by the PB4Y gunners!), and a Pete on the Japanese side. The Americans lost two PB4Ys, four P-38s, and two F4Us, and the mission was referred to as the "St. Valentine's Day Massacre." Losses of this magnitude could not be sustained for small-scale daylight attacks, and all daylight missions on the Buin area were discontinued until improved fighter escort could be provided. Daylight raids on major Japanese bases were discontinued and night attacks resumed. That day six 12FS pilots were given a respite from combat when they rotated to Fiji on R&R. The heavy bomber offensive over Rabaul and the northern Solomons would need to establish a routine to be successful, with the bombers usually flying at 20,000 feet. Marine F4Us and AAF P-38s and P-40s were finally used to the best advantage of each aircraft. Escorting the bombers were P-40s flying low cover, F4Us flying staggered cover in layers of one or two flights at 20,000 to 30,000 weaving over an area of two to four miles, and the P-38s flying high cover at 30,000 to 34,000 feet. The escorts were to stay with the bombers unless attacked en mass by Japanese fighters. The high altitude F4Us and P-38s would soon establish air superiority over Japanese fighters that they would not relinquish throughout the war.

3 Russell Islands (Operation Cleanslate) to March 1943

Both Halsey and Harmon realized that additional airfields would be essential to initiate operations against New Georgia. The Russell Islands were their choice for these bases, even though they were only 60 miles to the northwest of Henderson. The Russells consisted of two main islands: Pavuvu, the larger island; and Banika, its smaller neighbor to the east. The terrain of Banika was unusual for the Solomons, as it was low and rolling and suitable for airfield development. At 0600 on 21 February Operation Cleanslate began to retake the rest of the Solomons when the 43 rd Infantry Division under Maj.Gen. John Hester made a tactical landing on Banika and Pavuvu Islands. There were no Japanese troops on the Russells, and by the 26 th the 579 th Signal Company set up its SCR 270 radar on Lingata Peninsula on Banika Island and was able to cover nearly 360 degrees, 80 to 90 miles out. The 33 rd Seabees and the 118 th Engineering Battalion began construction at once on Fighter 1 (Sunlight) on Banika. Progress was slowed because of inadequate equipment and personnel, but by 13 April an emergency landing was made by a damaged P-38. Banika had abundant high quality coral to build the 3,100 x ISO-foot strip and associated taxiways and warmup areas, which were completed in early June. The rolled coral strip

Banika had abundant high quality coral to build the 3, I00 x I50-foot strip, associated taxiways, and warm-up areas that were completed in early June. (USN)

was ready for 60 aircraft in late April and was occupied by the 13AF and three squadrons of Marine MAG-21 in time for the opening of the air offensive against New Georgia. The first strip was lengthened to 6,000 feet, and hardstands were constructed to accommodate bombers. In July, at the close of the New Georgia campaign, the Seabees were subjected to Japanese air attacks and helped to man the AA guns. They suffered four dead and several casualties in the attacks. On the 25 th , the 339FS escorted SBDs to Vila, on Kokumbangara Island, and although there was no aerial combat that day, lLt. Grant Reagh was lost to unknown causes. He was seen to bailout off Santa Isabel Island and thorough searches did find him. On the 27 th Lt. Fred Brown was lost in the same area as Reagh as his fighter just nosed over, also for unknown reasons, and dove into the sea. On the 27 th , Capt. John Little of the 44FS claimed a Pete float plane and a probable in a late afternoon engagement close to the northeast tip of Vella Lavella. Capt. Robert Petit of the 70FS shot down a Zero float plane. ILt. Jackson Lewis of the 68FS was shot down during a dogfight over the Shortlands. During the last week in February, for the first time in the Solomons campaign the Japanese inflicted more air losses than they sustained.

Capt. John Little. (Smith)

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13th Fighter Command in World War 11 On the 28 th the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented its plans for the advance toward Rabaul: "Airdromes in southeastern Bougainville are required by South Pacific forces for operations against Rabaul or Kavieng and to support naval striking forces. Such bases exist in the Buin-Faisi area. Enemy airdromes in New Georgia are interspersed between the Guadalcanal bases and the bases in the Buin-Faisi area. Those must be captured or neutralized prior to the assault on the Bougainville bases. Airdromes in the Vitiax Strait area are required to effect this neutralization. Therefore operations against New Georgja are visualized as following the operations to secure airdromes in the Vitiaz area." (JCS: Plan of Operations in the Pacific) In mid-February the llBG was relieved, and by the end of the month relinquished its B-17s to the 5'h Bomb Group's 23'd and 31 st Bomb Squadrons. The 31 st was the first 5BG squadron to operate out of Henderson, conducting night attacks on Lahili, Ballale, Vila, and Munda. The 23BS came to Henderson in April. On 18 March 1943 the B-24 Liberators of370BS and 424BS of the 307BG of the 7AF arrived at Carney Field, the new bomber base on Guadalcanal.

Capt. Robert Petit. (Lansdale)

In mid-February the II BG was relieved, and by the end of the month relinquished its B-17s to the 5'h Bomb Group's Dcd and 3 l;t Bomb Squadrons. The 31" was the first 5BG squadron to operate out of Henderson, conducting night attacks on Lahili, Ballale, Vila, and Munda. (National Archives via Lansdale)

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4 March 1943

In March both sides took a time out from large-scale air operations, as there were only 13 fighter missions consisting of escorts, patrols, and some strike missions. The Japanese opposed these missions only twice. On 3 March the 339FS took part in a search and destroy mission when a coast watcher about ISO miles northeast of Guadalcanal reported Japanese naval vessels moving southeast along the northern shore of Santa Isabel Island, near Rekata Bay. The flight was led by lLt. Robert Petit and his element leader,' lLt. Robert Kertstetter. As they neared Santa Isabel Petit dropped his flight to sea level to approach Rekata Bay from the east so they would not be seen by Japanese troops and shipping located on the north coast of the island. Petit and his wingman, 2Lt. Bill Harris, turned left to approach the targets from the south, while Kertstetter and his wingman turned right to approach from the north; both elements were to attack simultaneously. As they closed the pilots saw that the enemy vessels were two destroyers and two corvettes escorting barges carrying troops and supplies. Petit picked out the nearest corvette, and he and Harris closed at 300mph at mast top level and began to fire their machine guns and cannon at 1,000 yards. They then dropped their delayed-action fused bombs in the water so that they would skip off the surface and hit the corvette at its water line. Once over the vessel they pulled up quickly over the target and jinked and skidded to evade AA fire. One or more of the bombs hit the corvette, and it was engulfed in flames and probably sank. Kertstetter and his wingman attacked a barge loaded with troops and claimed to have sunk it. On 6 March the Japanese renewed their air offensive against the new Russell airfields and Guadalcanal. Four 67FS P-39Ks, flown by flight leader Capt. Jerome Sawyer and 1Lt. Arnold Patterson and two newly arrived pilots (ILls. Wallace McClendon and Isaac Lalonde) were on routine early afternoon patrol over the Russell Islands. Sawyer flew with McClendon on his wing, and second element leader Patterson with Lalonde on his wing. The Henderson fighter director informed Sawyer that fighters there were scrambling to meet a large Japanese attack and their flight was to remain on station. The flight was continuing its patrol when it was advised

that Henderson radar had detected that the enemy formation had divided into a number of smaller groups, several of which had turned to attack the new American installations on the Russells. Sawyer's radio receiver was out and he did not hear this advisory, and did not see the Japanese bombers until they were headed home after bombing. The Val dive-bombers had lost their escorts and were heading toward home full out at 200 feet over the water. Sawyer led the flight into a left echelon turn and made a high side pass gunnery run. Lalonde and McClendon shared a victory and Patterson got another Val and a probable, while Sawyer and Patterson shared another Val. Suddenly about 15 Zeros dove on the P-39s, but the enemy attack was too fast and overshot the Americans. The P-39s turned right into and under the Zeros, and the Japanese never approached closer than 700-800 yards. The P-39s were flying in from the sea, east toward the Russells, with the Zeros trailing them and the Val bombers passing the other way. While they were flying under the Zeros the P-39s had been able to fire on the passing bombers. Patterson and Sawyer's elements fired on a pair of bombers. Sawyer hit one in the right wing root for a victory and then chased the other bomber and got it to smoke. The Val tried a desperate evasive maneuver, circling Baruka Island three times at low altitude. Sawyer radioed Patterson to go around the opposite way to meet him on the other side, but he was unable to make contact. Sawyer followed the bomber at 50 feet, trying to make tight turns with him as he ducked into coves and then flew back out over the reefs. The low altitude prevented the P-39 from making any altitude passes, and the Val's sharp turns kept his rear gunner in good firing position. Finally Sawyer abandoned the chase and returned to base, but not before receiving friendly AA fire from the American base on the Russells. For the day the Americans claimed four Val victories (Sawyer 1.5, Patterson 1.5, and LaLonde and McClendon a half each) and two probables (Sawyer and Patterson), and did not suffer one bullet hole in the fight. On the lOth another Japanese air attack of ten Vals and 12 Zeros came down to hit the Russells in mid-afternoon. The Japanese formation was picked up by radar, and P-39s of the 70FS were scrambled. 2Lt. Frank Clark and 1Lts. Calvin Gorham and William Daggitt scored a Zero each, and Capt. Richard Rivers got a Val.

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II On 11 March the 18FG Headquarters-not its aircraft or personnel-was transferred from the 7AF to the 13AF and was based on Espiritu Santo. On 30 March the 12th and 44'h Fighter Squadrons were assigned to the 18FG, and the 70FS was transferred to it from the 347FG. The 13AF now had two fighter groups (347 1h and 18'h) with three squadrons assigned to each. The 347FG was comprised of the 67 1h , 68 th , and 339 th Fighter Squadrons, and the 18FG of the 12'h, 44'h, and 701h Fighter Squadrons. By mid-April 18FG HQ was moved to Guadalcanal. On 18 March the 339 th was designated a twin-engine squadron, even though a few of its pilots would continue to fly P-39s for several weeks. With experience the American fighter squadron pilots gained confidence that was expressed by 339 1h Fighter Squadron Capt. Bill Harris (Story of the 339/11 Fighter Squadron):

"Up until recently we were fighting against bigger odds and over enemy territory. We were constantly on the defensive because we were escorting bombers. In many engagements we were terrifically outnumbered, sometimes by as much as four enemy planes to our one. Being over enemy territory and enemy-held waters, it was often difficult and even impossible to rescue downed pilots. But there is no question our pilots are better: I'd say two to one over the Japs. And I believe we have superior equipment. If we were flying Zeros we could still lick them." Washing Machine Charlie wasn't the only menace from the sky, as during March 1943 the 13AF lost 72 of 100 days per 100 flying officers to malarial mosquitoes, and it would not be until August that malaria would fall behind combat as the main cause of lost time. Malaria afflicted 788 of 1,000 men per year in the South Pacific in mid-1943. Early in the campaign the lack of adequate housing, anti-malarial drugs, and knowledge of the disease's prevention contributed greatly to malarial infection. Army and Marine morale continued to be low due to the very real perception that everywhere-rear areas or forward bases-the Navy had it better, whether it be food or shelter. The Navy invariably arrived with screened tents with wooden flooring and was the first to house their personnel in Quonset huts. Their kitchens and messes had refrig-

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eration and fresh meats, vegetables, flour, sugar, and the all-important coffee and beer. Their latrines were piped with hot running water and showers. The AAF had to beg, borrow, and often steal from the Navy to even bring their living standards to above the primitive level. Fresh meat was the biggest sore point, which the avy seemed to have daily, whereas the AAF would receive their ration irregularly, only then to have it spoil due to the lack of refrigeration. Many units reported eating Spam every night for two, three, or even four weeks. C-Rations could not maintain the men's health or morale. It seems that today Guadalcanal veterans either like or loathe Spam or Vienna sausages, but there are no veteran_s who told me that they are able to eat the dehydrated vegetables today. Once food supplies could be shipped it came from Australia and New Zealand, and usually the choice fresh meats and vegetables went to the Navy first, as their transports carried it and off~loaded it. However, the Navy readily passed on New Zealand mutton that was detested, and tinned greasy Australian bully beef that was loathed even more. Bill Harris (339FS): "One thing you couldn't imagine living in America was the number of flies there could be in one place. We would try to put food in our mouths with one hand and swat away the flies with the other. They would drive you wild." Everyone on the Canal shared these rations, and all complained that the Navy had a posh tour of duty. But the Marine and Army infantry complained that the "fly boys" had it good, as they fought only several hours a day and then relaxed, eating decent rations at regular hours and sleeping soundly in comfortable tents. Doug Canning agreed: "We did have it a lot better than the infantry, who had to fight and live in the mud and rain in foxholes or shelter halves. They usually ate cold rations when available and were under constant threat of Japanese infantry and artillery attack. They had nothing but our respect." Within a few months the supply situation would improve dramatically.

5 Mission to the Shortlands by James Lansdale

On 29 March the 70FS carried out an important mission that was to be a prelude for the Yamamoto interception three weeks later. James Lansdale extensively researched both missions and interviewed a number of participants, and is an expert on them.

Foreword During late March 1943, Imperial Japanese naval float planes attached to the Eleventh Seaplane Tender Division (No.ll Koku Sentai), consisting of the tenders Kamikawa Maru a';'d Kunikawa Maru, had been making a thorough nuisance of themselves. Known locally as "Louie the Louse," the Mitsubishi Type 0 Observation Seaplanes (FIM), code named Pete, were being used for nocturnal harassment raids. The engine noise and the explosions of the 60-kg bombs dropped by "Louie the Louse" made sleep impossible for the American troops on Guadalcanal and around Henderson Field. On the night of March 23, the Tulagi and Lunga areas were attacked by three float planes followed by a pair, which attacked Tulagi Harbor on the evening of the twenty-fifth. A single raider, off Cape Esperance, carried out another attack the night of the twenty-seventh. Photographic missions flown by Lockheed F-5As of the 17 th Reconnaissance Squadron had pinpointed the FaisiPoporang area in the Shortland Islands as the principal enemy seaplane base in the Solomons. One photograph, taken March 28, revealed 27 float planes at their moorings. Consequently an attack order was issued for ajoint service fighter sweep of the base at daybreak on the twenty-ninth. The force scheduled for the mission consisted of eight Lockheed P38 Lightnings from the 70th Fighter Squadron, USAAF, to be led by Captain Thomas Lanphier, and eight Chance-Vought F-4U-l Corsairs attached to VMF-124, USMC. The circuitous route to be followed by the pilots, the time of take-off, the flight procedures to be followed en-route, and, even the size of the force, would later serve as a model for a more important mission which included some of the same participants. A similar mission was initiated on the morning of April 18, which ended the life of the Commander-InChief of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.

The following account of the mission to the Shortlands was related to me by one of the participating pilots, Major General Robert L. Petit, USAF (Ret.): "For the previous several months we pilots of the 70 th Fighter Squadron had been flying and fighting together in the skies over the Solomons. On March 29, 1943, we took off in our P-38s from Fighter Two on Guadalcanal for a fighter sweep of the Japanese float plane base in the channel between Faisi-Poporang and Shortland (Alu) islands. The departure from base had been scheduled so that a combined force of eight P-38s and eight Marine Corsairs would arrive at the target area at first light, shortly before sumise. After takeoff we promptly formed up in a section of two flights. The Marines ofVMF-124, including Ken Walsh, had also taken off from their base, but they had difficulty in making their rendezvous in the darkness. Captain Tom Lanphier, who was leading our section of eight, circled the area waiting for the Marines to show up. Since they did not appear to be making any progress toward assem-

(L-R) A.J. Buck, HenryViccellio, and Robert Petit, 70th Fighter Squadron circa March 1943. (Buck via Lansdale)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II

(L-R) AJ. Buck, Robert Petit, Rex Barber, and Philip Hendrix. (Lansdale)

bly, Tom struck out independently. En route, my wingman experienced mechanical trouble and turned back. However, one of the Marines (l st Lt. Eben Dale) joined up with us near the Russells and became a part of my flight. Our formation now consisted of Tom's flight of four, with Lt. Rex Barber on his left wing and Lts. Joe Moore and George Topoll on his right; and my flight, with Lts. A.J. Buck and Jim McLanahan to my right and the lone Marine on my left. We flew a few hundred feet above the water in complete radio silence. We did not take a direct course to Faisi-Poporang, but veered out to sea, about fifty miles west of New Georgia Island, then turned north. Maintaining formation in the darkness and beyond sight of land required extreme concentration. Near the Treasury islands we turned northeast toward our target. On our approach we ran into low scud and keeping visual contact with each other became more difficult, even 'though we were coming into a first light or predawn condition. Because we were in and out of clouds and near ajumble of islands at low altitude, it became a very dicey run. Finally, we broke into the clear and, looking around, I realized that Buck and McLanahan had lost us and must have returned to base. Tom quickly oriented himself and set course for Faisi. Our attack force had dwindled from sixteen scheduled to Tom's flight of four and my inter-service element of one Lightning and one Corsair! Quickly our target area came into view and Tom put us into trail formation. I remember looking to my right and seeing a large harbor with many warships and transports at anchor or alongside docks. Also, in the harbor, there were ten or twelve large four-engine seaplanes. To my left was an island covered with a thick growth of trees (Shortland). We paralleled this island for a short time, skimmingjust above the water. We popped up to five.or six hundred feet over land and reversed course. There, in a narrow neck of water, were the moored float planes. We commenced our attack. I was fifth in line. By the time I started my run, three float planes along the left shore were already on fire and others smoking, so I took the planes moored on the opposite shore. 124

Numerous anti-aircraft guns were situated on both sides of the long, narrow channel where the float planes rested. The element of surprise no longer existed. The enemy guns seemed to be zeroing on me for my view on either side was filled with tracers. The effect was somewhat like entering a tunnel with arcing Roman candles flashing over your head. The thought crossed my mind that, normally, ammunition in that type of weapon was loaded with four regular rounds for every tracer and, surely, there were even more rounds heading my way than I could see! But, my mind and sight were now focused on the targets in front of me. I do not recall having fright or any real concern; that came later! Youth and inexperience were in control of my emotions and good fortune was at my side. I walked my rounds into the row of float planes and saw the flashes of the strikes. Completing my attack, I turned to the right and, hugging the treetops of the island, started my exit. I looked back and counted seven burning planes. As we came off the target area and about nine miles south of Shortland (Alu), Tom, Rex, and I all spotted what we thought was a Japanese destroyer. We bore down on the ship, which was broadside to us. Tom, to my right, attacked the stern; I attacked amidships; and Rex, bringing up the rear, attacked the bow. The strafing proceeded in a somewhat uncoordinated manner, but at least we did not shoot each other down! Moore, Topoll, and the Marine made their runs as Tom, Rex, and I regrouped for another attack. We kept in touch by radio and positioned ourselves for each run. After several passes the ship was in obvious trouble. It was listing, smoke was pouring out, and the hatch openings were jammed with sailors. The men topside waited below to escape our machine gun fire, while those bela,,;, waited topside away from the flames and smoke. It does not seem possible that a pilot actively engaged in an attack could see this detail. Yet, this vignette of the sailors struggling in the hatchways is very clear in my mind when many details of other combat missions are fading from memory.

The Japanese "destroyer" being strafed during the Shortlands mission was reported sunk by reconnaissance the next day Although badly damaged,the ship was not sunk, and was subsequently identified as Subchaser No.2B. Rex Barber lost 40 inches of his port wing hitting the radio mast amidships. (USAF via Lansdale)

Part Three, Chapter 5 - Mission to the Shortlands Postscript: For their roles in their attack on the float plane base at Faisi-Poporang, 1st Lt. Benjamin E. Dale, USMC, and 151 Lt. Joseph H. Moore, USAAC, received the Award of the Silver Star. Captains Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr. and Robert L. Petit, and 151 Lt. Rex T. Barber, USMC, received the Oak Leaf Cluster to their previous Award of the Silver Star. 151 Lt. George G. Topoll, USAAC, received his official recognition posthumously. Topoll was killed in his Lightning as he attempted an emergency landing shortly after takeoff for an evening patrol on April 6, 1943. James F. Lansdale, ©2001 LRA Shortlands Mission Footnote: lLt. Sam Howie flew with the 70FS, and was Petit's wingman who turned back with problems with his right engine. Howie:

70th Fighter Squadron the day after the mission to the Shortlands, 29 March 1943. Standing:Joseph Moore;Thomas Lanphier; Eben Dale (VMF-124 USMC): and Robert Petit. Kneeling: HenryViccellio; George Topoll; and Rex Barber. (347FGA via Lansdale)

It was on the last pass that Rex stayed on his firing run a fraction of a second too long. By the time he pulled up, Rex had lost over forty inches of his left wing on the radio mast! We returned to base without further incident. Our last view of the ship was of a vessel spewing smoke from bow to stem with a substantial list. We were informed the next morning that a recon plane had flown over the area and that 'the destroyer had sunk.' After the war, official Japanese records revealed that we had actually attacked Subchaser No.28, not a destroyer, and, although it suffered numerous casualties and had been badly damaged, it had not sunk. On the same day as the mission, ComAirSols Rear Admiral Mitscher issued the following dispatch

"I returned to base alone with my engine feathered. Navigating back to Guadalcanal was easy, as you flew down the Slot, which was lined with islands on the north and south. I came in too hot, ran off the runway, and completely wrecked my aircraft ("Old Ironside" #138-author). One wing was salvageable, and it was used to replace the wing tip on Rex Barber's Lightning that he sheared off during the mission." The month of March had been relatively quiet for Japanese attacks, as their activity was confined to reconnaissance in anticipation of an air offensive and to build up forces for this offensive. 13FC fighters provided continued CAP over the new American positions on the Russells and escorted SBDs and TBFs over Munda Point airfield and the airfield at Vila, Kolombangara; when targets appeared they were sent out on sweeps. The bag of Japanese planes reached an all-campaign low of 16 aircraft, and it would not be until May 1944 that the total would reach that low figure again. Eight of the 16 victories were by P-39s in a swan song for the fighter in the theater. The American bombers continued their attacks on

FIVE LIGHTNINGS ONE CORSAIR ATTACKED FLOAT PLANE BASE FAlSI AT 0620 SETTING FIVE TO SEVEN PLANES ON FIRE. EXCEPTIONALLY HEAVY AA OPENED UP AFTER ATTACK HAD BEEN MADE. ON RETURN OUR PLANES SIGHTED DD NINE MILES SOUTHEAST ALU ISLAND AND MADE REPEATED STRAFING ATTACKS LEAVING SHIP SMOKING. ONE LIGHTNING HAD THREE FEET ONE WING SHEARED OFF BY DD MAST WHICH ADVERSELY AFFECTED NEITHER FLYING QUALITIES NOR LANDING PERFORMANCE THIS PLANE. ALL PLANES RETURNED. (290008): On April 1, we also received an airmail gram from Admiral Halsey, Commander, South Pacific Forces: CONGRATULATIONS ON A NICE FAlSI ROAST WELL DONE. WORTH THE TRIP. REFER TO COMAIRSOLS 290008.

Rex Barber checks out his damaged wingtip that clipped the radio mast of the "destroyer" he strafed. (L-R) Lt. Eben Dale (USMC), Capt. Robert Petit Lt.Joseph Moore, Lt. Rex Barber. Lt. GeorgeTopoll, and Capt.Thomas Lanphier. (Lansdale)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II the Buin area in twos or fours at night because of the lack of fighter escort. Occasionally they saved part of their bomb load to bomb Munda and Vila airfields on the way home. These missions and the SBD/TBF missions made Japanese air operations from these airfields dangerous, and the American attacks on shipping deprived the Japanese garrison on New Georgia of supplies. It became evident that the Japanese would defend the area, and that a major enemy offensive was threatening. 17PRS F-5s flew daily recon missions to keep tabs on Japanese air and shipping movements. They came back with photos showing the building of shelters and revetments that indicated a major build up of aircraft. Recon missions of the Munda to Kavieng area showed that new construction had increased shelter for 461 aircraft. Japanese Betty and Sally bombers could also be based outside Rabaul and Kavieng, as there were 44 blast shelters at Munda and Ballale, 18 at Buka, and ten or more at Kahili. In the spring of 1943 the Guadalcanal code name was changed from "Cactus" to "Mainyard." Conditions there had dramatically improved since the invasion in August. The area around Lunga Point and Henderson had streets paved with crushed coral that were lined with rows of Quonset huts. There was a power plant and a telephone exchange with lines to everywhere in the area. During the summer the 46 Lh and 61 SL Seabees were scheduled to extend Henderson's main runway to 6,400 feet and its width to 150 feet with 75-foot shoulders, and increase the number of hardstands to 250 (54 with revetments). The runway would not be put into operation until 12 October. The huge Ordnance Department and supply dumps were supplied by the scores of cargo and transport ships arriving weekly at the Lunga roadstead. Three hundred aircraft were stationed on the island's four fields. The Seabees were instrumental in securing the Guadalcanal victory, as they kept the airfields there in nearly constant operation from the darkest days in the fall of 1942 onwards. The Seabees had gone from calling themselves "Confused Bastards" to "Sons of Beaches," and by the end of the war they would build 111 bases and house one and a half million men in the Pacific. When the War Department named Gen. Harmon to train and administer all air and ground forces in the South Pacific, it also created the U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISA) under Brig.Gen. Robert Breene, who was to direct operations and administration for South Pacific air units. The 13AF and its precursors encountered a massive service and supply problem when it moved from Espiritu Santo, first to Guadalcanal, then to the Russells, and on up the Solomon chain. First, supplies had to be transported from America to the rear areas of the theater (New Caledonia) and unloaded there. The supplies then had to be transported, usually in steps, to the combat areas. It was the long distances and isolation of the theater that caused the unaccustomed logistical problems that service and supply personnel had to overcome. The theater was one of tropical islands, both large and small, all rainy, hot, and humid, covered with jungle and plagued with tropical diseases. Inevitably, it was at the end of the supply chain, the airdrome squadrons and

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then the personnel in combat, that bore the consequences of these problems. Navy Seabee battalions landed directly after the invading infantry and gouged airstrips out of lush jungle, then built the facilities for living, supply, ordnance, and fuel. Nearly everything needed to be transported by sea except emergency supplies, such as gasoline and medical supplies, that were flown in. Ocean transport was out of the control of the AAF and depended on the Navy. Harmon felt that the insufficiency of airfield facilities on Guadalcanal was due to the Navy's "lack of vigor" in shipping in supplies and materiel, but the Navy did not wish to expose their supply ships to Japanese air and naval attacks. Harmon reminded the Navy that "The point is that it (e.g. supply) was not the consuming thought in every Naval Commander's mind, and the plan did not have as its first and immediate objective the seizure and development of Cactus as an air base. That was something that could follow along." A shipping schedule was impossible, as expected supplies either did not arrive or, once on hand,_ were not unloaded and sat in the holds of ships for weeks and even months before being unloaded. Once the Navy delivered and unloaded the supplies they had to be transported over areas that civilization had barely touched; no railways, no highways, no communications, few roads, and many trails and footpaths. Everything had to be imported, except coral and timber, and even that had to be dragged through dense jungle. Improvisation and manual labor was the byword for the Service Command. Spare and replacement parts were chronically lacking, and parts had to be cannibalized, jury-rigged, or made from scratch. The forward areas always had combat priorities that often replaced items of "creature comfort," such as wooden floors for tents, refrig~ration units, etc. When the 13AF was activated in January 1943 it had no air service command and continued to depend on USAFISPA until it could become self-sustaining. Supply and repair problems were solved piecemeal on a local level. The always better-equipped Navy sometimes helped out in emergencies or when supplies ran low. On 14 April 1943 the XIII Air Force Service Command was formed, and slowly from that point maintenance and supply improved for the 13AF. A noteworthy problem on Guadalcanal was to stock ammunition and bombs for all four services. Initially only one dump was built because of the confined area around Henderson. The Marines controlled the dump, but because of the round-the-clock Japanese air attacks there could be no organized unloading schedule of the cargo ships off Lunga Point. There were no docks at Lunga, and all supplies had to be transferred to small boats for shipment to shore. Contributing to the chaos was the lack of onshore unloading facilities. Supplies had to be hand-loaded into trucks and moved to inland dumps. Soon ammunition and bombs accumulated haphazardly in the dump, and each service had to send a supply officer to procure ordnance for its missions. To compound the confusion, each service was to order its own ordnance through its own supply organization. The results were redundant or insufficient supplies ofvarious types of bombs and ammunition. In March 1943 Lt.Col. w.F. Tinsley (USMC) was assigned to coordinate supply orders and the situation improved.

6 Cartwheel

As the Allies hung on at Guadalcanal and the SWPA, neither Halsey nor MacArthur considered anything other than that as their immediate objective. Finally, as they prepared to fight their way up the Solomon Island chain and along the eastern New Guinea coast, the reduction of the powerful base at Rabaul needed to be addressed. In March Rabaul was the axis of Japanese airbases in the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas. To the west on New Guinea there were major airbases at Wewak, Hollandia, and Mandang, with advanced airstrips being constructed on the Huon Peninsula and at Cape Glossier on New Britain, just across the Vitiaz Strait. The Japanese had airfields in the Admiralty Islands that were used to stage aircraft from New Guinea to Rabaul. Kavieng was also a staging point for aircraft from the west and from Truk, which was another powerful base and home of the Japanese Combined Fleet and its calTiers. Besides the airbases near Rabaul and on the Gazelle Peninsula, to the southeast of New Britain in the Solomons were the important fields of Bougainville. There was Buka at the north end of the Buka Passage, and those at Buin-Kahili and Shortland/ Ballale Island at the other end,just off the south end of Bougainville. The forward airstrips at Vila and Munda in New Georgia were the

Gen. Douglas MacArthur, C-in-C Southwest Pacific Area, and Adm. Chester Nimitz, C-in-C of the Pacific Ocean Areas map out strategy at Brisbane. (U.s.

extent of Japanese air power. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a general directive on 2 July 1942 that gave MacArthur the responsibility for all operations against Rabaul. It was not until late February 1943 that MacArthur's Chief of Staff, Maj.Gen. Richard Sutherland, presented the Elkton Plan to the JSc. By this time the Japanese had strengthened their position in the area, and the plan called for a more cautious advance using increased naval, ground, and air forces. Elkton asked for many more aircraft than the JCS were able (or unwilling) to commit, especially after their "Europe first" declaration at Casablanca. The requirements for heavy bombers in Europe meant that bases closer to the central and northern Solomons for medium bombers would have to be taken. Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands were chosen, but Sutherland maintained that the Huon Peninsula on New Guinea needed to be captured for air operations to proceed against Rabaul. On 23 March the JCS did relent to a small extent and increased each of the two heavy bomber squadrons in the South Pacific from two to four squadrons each; 12 aircraft per squadron, 96 bombers total. The medium bomber group was to be assigned 11 more aircraft to bring their total to 57. However, there would be no increase in fighter aircraft. On 28 March, after a lively debate, the initial South Pacific strategic directive of 2 July 1942 was cancelled, and Elkton was modified. MacArthur was given overall control to direct Elkton, and Halsey would have direct control of the Solomons operations. Airfields at Woodlark and Kiriwina were to be established, and then those on the Huon Peninsula while Halsey invaded New Georgia. The capture of a base on Bougainville and the invasion of western New Britain were to follow. COMSOPAC would directly control all Solomons operations under MacArthur's general directives. On 26 April, after a conference at Blisbane with Adm. Halsey, MacArthur delivered the Elkton plan for the reduction of the Japanese stronghold at Rabaul, now under code name Cartwheel. Rabaul was the apex of a triangle, with two of its legs extending southeast through the Solomons, and the other westward along New Britain. A major step had been accomplished with the capture of Santa Cruz, Tulagi, and Guadalcanal. The plan was to take place in small stages; 13 planned invasions over eight and a half months in the Southwest and South Pacific. The objec-

Army)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II tive of Cartwheel was to move dive-bomber and fighter bases towards Rabaul by either improving current bases or capturing enemy areas without allocating large ground forces. No advance in the Cartwheel plan was to be made beyond the range ofland-based fighters. These forward airfields were to be bases for fighter escorts and dive-bombers that would join long-range heavy bombers in attacking enemy air bases and shipping. The invaded territories were selected for having existing air bases or favorable terrain for new base construction. The American advance was to be along two lines of attack: the capture of Lae, Salamau, and the east coast of New Guinea; and the other up the Solomon chain, with each converging on Rabaul by capturing airfields in steps. For Halsey this meant that the capture of New Georgia would provide air cover for the ensuing landings on Bougainville that would put the Japanese bases at Rabaul and Kavieng in jeopardy. The last major step was the seizure of Rabaul and adjacent positions in New Britain and New Ireland. The first phase in this plan was to neutralize the enemy's air bases and aircraft and naval forces, and to prevent the reinforcement of the objective. After this air and naval superiority was achieved, land forces were to be moved in under air and naval cover. Then the land forces were to consolidate the objective so that friendly aircraft could utilize the captured airfields there to repeat the process up the island chain, and also to bomb Rabaul more easily. MacArthur's immediate goal was the Central Solomons, where New Georgia and the enemy air installations there had to be captured before the drive along the New Guinea coast began. Once New Georgia was taken both lines of attack would mutually converge on Rabaul from the Solomons and ew Guinea, with the aviation component being coordinated by the C-in-C, SWPA, MacArthur, who would manipulate the air forces to areas demanding immediate air support. Early on Halsey, as part of his "unity of command" precept, had asserted that each air commander have complete control over all components of his force, regardless of service or nationality in all matters of administration, supply, movement, and training, but Adm. Fitch had insisted that air units were to be under his tactical control. Despite inevitable narrow mindedness and service fidelities there were ample true leaders in the four air arms (AAF, USMC, USN, and RNZAF) to eventually make COMAIRSOLS an effective fighting force. However, Gen. Harmon had just established the 13AF and did not agree with Fitch as to the suitable control of AAF units. Halsey had Harmon meet with Fitch on 2-3 March to resolve their differences, and Harmon made recommendations. The primary recommendations were for each air service to have combat command of its units, that there should be minimal intrusion of normal combat channels, and that each air force be utilized in the tasks for which they had been organized, equipped, and trained. Harmon particularly wanted his air commanders to be able to advise COMAIRSOLS as to suitable formations, bomb loading, escort, and combat techniques. Fitch accepted Harmon's proposals, and on 11 March COMAIRSOPAC delivered the Air Operation Plan for the Solomon air forces. The plan concluded that the Japanese were now in a defensive position in the Solomons-New BritainNew Guinea area, and that the objective was to inflict maximum damage. The plan assigned three responsibilities on the air forces. 128

The first responsibility was that the destruction of enemy shipping was the most effective use of aircraft, as it would cut enemy bases off from their supplies. The second was for the air forces to attack enemy airbases to reduce enemy air strength, and the last was to support Allied ground operations. The discussion of air control had continued for eight months since the invasion of Guadalcanal, and finally, on until 20 April, the JCS issued a directive to settle the problem of unified command for joint operations. Among the principles set were: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

A single commander was to be named by the JCS on the basis of the task to be performed. Command prerogatives over the joint force to be the same as if the forces were all Army, Navy or Marine. The joint force commander should limit his administrative function to a minimum. Service commanders should handle discipline. Major JCS directives concerning a service were to be sent to the joint force commander. The joint force commander was to be directly assisted by rep resentatives of the components of his force. The joint force commander should function as both as the force commander and as the commander of a component of his force.

It was under these guidelines that the l3AF operated in the Solomons until it left Halsey's command on 15 June 1944 when it was transferred to the Far East Air Forces. Every air operation over Guadalcanal and New Georgia, and later Rabaul and New Britain, involved COMAIRSOLS. Operations of the 13AF were most often identical to prevailing COMAIRSOLS operations. l3AF bombers would fly missions to the same target with Marine and Navy dive-bomber or torpedo bombers, and all were protected by fighters of the four services. XIII Fighter Command was the most disparate and had the most varied duties of the Solomon air commands. It was to intercept Japanese air attacks, fly CAP for naval forces, fly escort for bombers, provide close support for troops, strafe enemy troop and gun positions and shore installations, and fly fighter sweeps. In addition to these duties, Fighter Command was to operate fighter-director units and air warning service units. At this time the South Pacific was the meeting point between MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area and Nimitz' Pacific Ocean Area. There was no disagreement that MacArthur was to direct Cartwheel, but the Navy was careful that Halsey maintain complete control of all naval forces in the South Pacific. Halsey's amphibious operations on New Georgia would be directly menaced by Japanese air bases on Bougainville, New Britain, and Kavieng, and he planned to have these bases nullified. But MacArthur also planned his own offensive on the Huon Gulf, New Guinea, and was concerned that the New Georgia offensive would cause him to dispatch his 5th Air Force to support Halsey in the South Pacific at a time they could not be spared. Halsey did not wish to remain unoccupied, and wanted to continue pressure on the Japanese with his land-based COMAIRSOLS aircraft and be ready to move on New

Part Three, Chapter 6 - Cartwheel

The defeats in the South Pacific and the Southwest Pacific Area forced the Japanese to transfer the majority oftheir carrier pilots from the carriers Hiyo, )unyo, Zuiho, and Zuikoku to Rabaul. Shown are Mitsubishi Model 22 Zero fighters off the carrier Zuikoku at Buin in early 1943. (National Archives)

Georgia and southern Bougainville. Adm. King, the supreme commander of the Pacific, would settle the issue at the end of March. It was felt that the large Japanese land forces defending the area could sustain losses in the impending invasions, but the Japanese Navy, Merchant Marine, and Air Forces could not without weakening the general Japanese strategic plan for conducting the war. Once the Japanese had sustained large enough naval and air losses they would abandon the Solomons and Bismarcks and withdraw to the Japanese mandates as their next line of resistance. To accomplish this objective with minimal losses the initial phase would be to isolate and destroy each objective with Kenney's 5AF and the land-based COMAIRSOLS. In preparation for Halsey's New Georgia offensive there were cargo and transport vessels off Lunga unloading

large quantities of supplies, ammunition, gasoline, and equipment into onshore dumps. These ships and the warships lying offTulagi, across Sealark Channel, offered a fat target for Japanese bombers. The defeats in the South Pacific and the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) forced the Japanese to transfer the majOlity of their carrier pilots from the carriers Hiyo, Junyo, Zuiho, and Zuikaku to Rabaul, along with 96 Zeros and 65 Vals under Admiral Yamamoto. At Rabaul they joined with the 11 th Air Fleet, which had 86 Zeros, 72 Bettys, 27 Vals, and a few torpedo bombers. With this.force Yamamoto hoped to quash Allied naval and air forces and regain the initiative in the Solomons and New Guinea, as well as avenge the defeat at Guadalcanal with a two pronged attack under the code "I-Go Operation. "

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7 April 1943

Japanese I-Go Operation Desperate to slow the Allied advances, the Imperial Japanese Army Command and Admiral Yamamoto planned and set into motion two limited offensive operations in March and April 1943. The first occurred to the west of Rabaul, as on 2 March the Imperial JapaneseArrny conducted an operation intended to strengthen its forces near Lae, New Guinea, by dispatching reinforcements numbering 7,000 troops. The Japanese Army began to transport the 18 th Army Headquarters and the 51 st Army Division by sea from Rabaui. The eight transports and escorting destroyers were caught in the daylight by Allied air forces on open water. For three days the troops suffered thousands of casualties in the resulting attacks, which literally turned the Bismarck Sea red with the blood of the dead and wounded. The Bismarck Sea disaster had demonstrated the growing prowess of Allied air power in New Guinea and the Solomons. Yamamoto sought to neutralize this air power by initiating a second and more intensive offensive aerial operation against Guadalcanal that Yamamoto had designated as "I-Go Sakusen," an operation he would personally command. Martin Caidin made available to James Lansdale a manuscript by Masatake Okumiya that Caidin utilized in his 1956 book Zero! The details ofAdmiral Yamamoto's "I-Go Sakusen" are excellently outlined as written by Commander Okumiya, who served as the air staff officer for Rear Admiral Kakuta Kakuji, C-in-C of the NO.2 Carrier Division. Okumiya wrote: "Admiral Yamamoto personally assumed the command of his air forces in the theater. He established his advanced command headquarters [on 3 April 1943] at Rabaul, intending specifically to direct all air activities toward the destruction of enemy air power in the area. This operation was named "I-Go Sakusen." Admiral Yamamoto established NO.21 Koku Sentai [Air Flotilla] headquarters at Kavieng [Northern New Ireland] under the command of Rear Admiral Rinosuke Ichimaru. He also dispatched 0.26 Koku Sentai to Buin Base [Southern Bougainville] under the command of Rear Admiral Kanae Kosaka. The air groups of No.1 Koku Sentai [CarAdm.lsiroku Yamamoto designated the operation he would personally command as "I-Go Sokusen." (Nakamura via Lansdale)

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Part Three, Chapter 7 - April 1943 rier Division], under Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, flew into RabauI. Also placed at Rabaul was the main body [of aircraft] from No.21 Koku Sentai. The air groups of No.2 Koku Sentai, under the command of Rear Admiral Kakuji Kakuta, remained at Rabaul only when not in action. When attacking Guadalcanal, NO.2 Koku Sentai advanced its headquarters to Ballale Island Base. Admiral Yamamoto had immediately available a total strength of approximately 350 aircraft, including some 190 (189) under the command of Vice Admiral Kusaka (C-in-C of No.Il Air Fleet consisting of Nos.21 and 26 Air Flotillas) as well as, some 160 (150) carrier-based aircraft under the command of Vice Admiral Ozawa. The latter had replaced Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. (Thus, Vice Admiral Ozawa now was C-in-C of the major aircraft carriers of No.3 Fleet, organized into Nos.I and 2 Carrier Divisions). On April 1, 1943, the attack began in full force when our aircraft, in great strength, raided a concentration of enemy ships anchored around GuadalcanaI. On April 11, we attacked enemy ships in Oro Bay and Harvey Bay on the eastern coast of New Guinea. On April 12, our aircraft raided Port Moresby air bases and on April 14, we attacked the Milne Bay air base on southeastern coast of New Guinea as well as enemy ships in the harbor. b Our pilots overestimated the efficiency of the attacks (as revealed by postwar investigations, the Americans had actually suffered less damage than we believed at the time). Our own losses consisted of at least 49 (N.B. actually forty-three confirmed) aircraft shot down or not returned to base (N.B. actually a further eighteen did not return or were written-off), as well as those, which were damaged. Convinced by the reports that the attacks had reduced the effectiveness of the enemy air power and that his original goal of wreaking havoc among the Americans had been achieved, Admiral Yamamoto declared I-Go Sakusen had concluded successfully on April 16. He then ordered the land-based air forces (No.1 1 Air Flotilla) to resume their original operations and he sent the original carrier-based aircraft back to Truk to rejoin their parent carriers (of No.3 Fleet)." Yamamoto began the air offensive in the Solomons on 1 April when he sent 58 Zeros in two fighter sweeps on the Russell's new airstrip at Banika and shipping off GuadalcanaI. At 1023 Russell radar picked up the Japanese formation 125 miles to the west. A CAP was sent over Tulagi and Guadalcanal airfields. Guadalcanal scrambled 28 F4Fs ofVF-27 (land-based at Henderson), eight F4Us ofVMF-124 and VMF-221, and six P-38s of the I2FS to meet the Japanese. At 1100 the first Zekes were intercepted at altitudes ranging from 12,000 to 22,000 feet. The battle lasted for nearly three hours, with the second Japanese wave sneaking in to bomb Russell installations. The F4Fs claimed eight Zeros, and F4Us claimed 11 Zeros for five losses. 2Lt. Kenneth Walsh would claim two Zeros and a Val for the first three of his 21 victories. The I2FS P-38s led by Maj. Paul Bechtel were on patrol at 32,000 feet and met the second Jap wave at 1300. Bechtel saw Zeros dogfighting below, and he dove on a Zero that rolled over in a split-S to escape. Bechtel followed him down and got a good shot at the fleeing enemy. Suddenly his aircraft went out of control, and nothing Bechtel tried seemed to help him get the nose up out of the dive. As he descended

P-38H "Pluto" ofthe 12FS being inspected in a posed photo. Note crew chief (left) sitting in covered sun chair filling out maintenance forms and the standing water under port engine. (USAF)

68FS Pilots: Standing (L-R) Lts M. Smith, R. Moseley, G. Heckert, H. Hulbert, R. Shambrook, M. Ryan, F. Ploetz, and L. Huff. Kneeling (L-R) Lts. R. Nash, W Norris, and Paul Hansen. (Palmer)

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Capt. Leonard Frame.

into heavier air he managed to slowly bring the nose up and finally leveled out at 12,000 feet. Bechtel had flown only two hours in the P-38, and this was his first combat mission since transitioning from the P-39. He had not been briefed about the P-38's notorious compressibility problem at high altitude at speeds above 200mph. After he landed Bechtel was informed that the Zero he had hit had burst into flames for his third victory. Bechtel's wingman, 1Lt. William Smith, also claimed a Zero. One Lightning was lost. But Radio Tokyo claimed that 34 F4Fs, ten P-38s, and three F4Us had been shot down, along with heavy damage to American installations from the bombing.

Darrell Cosart was greatly affected by the death and funeral of George Topol!. (Canning)

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To meet the new Japanese air offensive, on the 2 nd the remaining 31 officers and 168 enlisted men of the 12FS were given two hours notice to embark for Guadakanal on two transports and arrived on the 6th • All equipment left behind was to go to the 68FS, which was scheduled to rotate to that station. On the 6th three contingents of the 68FS left Guadakanal by ship for the Fiji Islands, where it assumed training duties at Narewa Air Field. On the 7th 19 12FS pilots who had been in combat were returned to Fiji, followed by 16 more on the nrd. On 10 April Capts. Lanphier and Petit and Lt. Moore were transferred to the 339FS from the 70FS. A portion of the 70FS was attached to the squadron at Fiji. Here the unit was under the command of Capt. Karl Conradi, who took over from Capt. Palmer, who had only had command for three days. But in the 68FS command musical chairs Conradi was soon replaced by Capt. Ray Williams on 6 May, having held command for a month, which was considered longevity in the 68 th • On 3 April 2Lt. Donald McDonald of the l2FS failed to return while on a routine search mission near Santa Isabel Island. Two days later he was returned to Guadakanal by Savo Island natives, who paddled him across a long stretch of open water. On 6 April, F-5 (P-38) recon aircraft of the 17 PRS discovered a large build up of 114 Japanese aircraft at Kahili and 95 at Ballale, as the day before there were 40 aircraft on Kahili and none on Ballale. Just after noon on the 7 th coast watchers reported large formations of enemy aircraft (67 Vals escorted by 110 Zeros) headed east down the Slot to attack shipping off Koli Point, a convoy near Rua Sura, and the task force at Tulagi. Mainyard scrambled all its available fighters: 36 F4Fs; nine F4Us; a dozen P-38s; 13 P-39s; and six P40s. The Japanese split their formation into smaller flights as they approached. A flight of 70FS P-38s led by Capt. Thomas Lanphier was assigned to high intercept and climbed to 31,000 feet over Cape Esperance in 22 minutes. Capt. Lanphier claimed three Zeros, and Capt. Leonard Frame, 1Lts. Darrell Cosart and Joseph Moore one Zero each. 1Lt. George Topoll was lost during an early evening patro!. His engine malfunctioned after take off, and he tried to come back around to land, but crashed into Tulagi Harbor. Daryl Cosart describes Topoll's funeral in his diary:

I" Lt. George G.Topoll was killed in his Lightning as he attempted an emergency landing shortly after takeoff for an evening patrol on April 6, 1943. (Canning)

Part Three, Chapter 7 - April 1943 "George Topoll's funeral left a strange feeling with me. In the rain. In the open hole of dirt. The burlap sack. And the words from the priest. Really got to me." Lanphier describes his three victories: "I took advantage of our superior altitude to swoop down on a series of flights of three, two, and then another two Zeros.... I slide over, above, and behind the tail Zero of the first three. Coming upon him from almost directly behind, I squeezed off my four .50 caliber machine guns with the forefinger of my right hand and, since I'd had time to think about it in advance, remembered to reach my thumb over and press the button that fired the 20mm cannon in front of me in the nose of my cockpit. The awesome burst of firepower thus poured into my unevading enemy and blew him and his Zero into smithereens. I flew through the debris I had caused and pulled up to come around for another go at the enemy. I had barely completed a 18000 turn when I found myself flying head on at another Zero a mile or so away and closing fast. Over endless nights of dugout chatter about what we pilots might do if we came on with an enemy fighter, we generally agreed it would be best to press resolutely and directly at the enemy, since only from that position could you be sure of getting your firepower into him; conversely, if you pulled up and over him, you'd expose your defenseless belly or head to his gunfire. I don't recall any of us ever having the guts to conjecture out loud what might happen if you ran into an enemy pilot who operated on the same non-dodging

flying his second combat mission in the P-38 after the compressibility problem on the 1st. At 1500 he led 12 P-38s over the western end of Guadalcanal as part of a large scramble. As he reached 14,000 feet a radio transmission informed him that Val dive-bombers were attacking below the clouds. Bechtel led his flight through the clouds but did not see any aircraft at all. He radioed Canal fighter control, which informed him that it had made no radio call about the Vals. Bechtel climbed back through the clouds and into an air battle now raging above. His flight was immediately bounced by Zeros diving from 15,000 feet. Bechtel ushered his outnumbered flight into a Lufbery circle to defend themselves from the swarming Zeros. Bechtel's fighter was hit several times, and a hit banged off the armor plate behind him and slightly wounded his left elbow. As the P-38s circled they escaped one by one by diving. Lt. Joseph Young was hit and bailed out of his flaming fighter. His parachute landed in a tree, and he was rescued by Marine infantry, who cut him down. Bechtel was rejoined by his wingman, lLt. William Smith, and they joined into the dogfight but were soon separated again. Bechtel saw

run.

At about 35,000 feet over Guadalcanal...I was actually faced with the yet unspoken answer. My Nipponese opponent and I were approaching at a combined speed of over 500mph, so I had only a split second or two to decide what to do, other than instinctively to fire full bore at him as he came hurtling toward me. I did, while I otherwise froze with indecision, as I had in the jungle when I met the Japanese kid with the bayonet (yet another Lanphier macho exploit from his biography! -author). This time again the opposition made the move first. The Zero pilot pulled over my head and, as he did so, he took the full power of my four machine guns in his belly and blew apart as he passed over my head. There were several witnesses to this close call, and they brought to earth with them a tale of my apparently macho exploit. I did nothing then, nor have done anything since, until now, to disavow their accolades. I scored my third killing of an enemy that afternoon down around 10,000 feet, when I fell behind a Zero that was chasing an Airacobra. He died without ever suspecting I was behind him, careless in his zeal to kill a comrade of mine." In the initial combat reports American fighter pilots and AA gunners claimed over 100 Japanese aircraft, but air intelligence sorted out the battle and 40 Japanese were claimed. The Marines were credited with 29, and the 13AF claimed 11. 12FS P-38s were led by Maj. Paul Bechtel, who shot down a Zero over Savo Island to become the 12FS top scorer with four victories. Bechtel was

ILt. James McLanahan shot down two Japanese aircraft in P-39s with the 67FS, then claimed a victory and a probable in a 339FS P-38 The popular pilot came up with several innovative ordnance schemes during his time in the South Pacific. (Canning)

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After the 7 April mission Brig.Gen. Dean Strother, 13FC CG, held the first official 13FC awards ceremony on FighterTwo. Here he awards the Distinguished Flying Cross to John Mitchell for scoring eight victories, the tops in his command. (National Archives via Lansdale)

Strother awards the Oak Leaf Cluster to a previous Silver Star to Thomas Lanphier with George McNeese looking on in background for his part in the Shortlands mission of 29 March. (National Archives via Lansdale)

another Zero flying west at his altitude and tried to sneak up on it from behind and slightly below. As he closed he saw another Zero at the same altitude far off to the right. The Zero ahead then did a 180 turn and dove right toward him. Bechtel fired at long range, but the Japanese never fired back and Bechtel had to pull up at the last second to avoid a head-on collision. He looked around for the second Zero but did not find him, but he did see his victim head into the clouds in a vertical dive. At debriefing Bechtel claimed a probable. Several days later a report from a USN destroyer cruising off Savo Island mentioned a Zero crashing into the sea about the same time as Bechtel's probable claim, which was then changed to his fourth victory. Other AAF squadrons scoring were the P-38s of the 339FS. lLt. Rex Barber claimed two Zeros for his second and third victories, and lLt. James McLanahan one Zero. The 70FS lost its CO, Maj. Walden Williams, only one day after he arrived at Guadalcanal. The l2FS lost a P-38, but the pilot was saved.

Rex Barber was awarded an OLC to the Silver Star by Strother for his part in the Shortlands mission. (National Archives via Lansdale)

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Strother awards the DFC to Besby Homes with McNeese looking on (center). (National Archives via Lansdale)

Part Three, Chapter 7 - April 1943

68 th Fighter Squadron PAOs painted with white stripes after being attacked by "friendly" U.S. Navy Fighters (Palmer)

The second phase of "I-Operation" was carried out against U.S. naval and air bases on New Guinea, but the two massive raids achieved only one transport sunk and five American aircraft shot down for the loss of 18 aircraft on II April and 28 the following day. Yamamoto terminated "I-Operation" and returned his remaining pilots and aircraft back to their carriers. The photo shows Yamamoto watching a Zero of the No.2 Carrier Division take off as part of the I-GO Sakusan Operation. (Nakamura via Lansdale)

The Marines ofVMF-213 (1 victory), VMF-2l4 (10 victories), and VMF-22 1 (18 victories) claimed 29 Japanese aircraft-l 7 Zeros and 12 Vals-for the loss of seven F4Fs, with all the pilots saved. Fourteen aircraft failed to make enemy contact, and six aborted and returned to base. The Americans had flown all their bombers off Henderson to orbit the southeastern end of the island in case the Japanese attacked the airfields. lLt. James Swett ofVMF-22l dove on the Vals attacking Tulagi, and ignoring friendly AA fire shot down three diving Vals, then pursued four more across Florida Strait and shot each down. Swett's engine was hit and spewing coolant, but he successfully ditched and was later awarded the Medal of Honor for his seven-victory mission. Despite Swett's success, the Japanese dive-bombers had a successful day, as they sank a 14,500ton tanker (Kanawha), the HMNZS corvette Maa, and severely damaged the destroyer Aaron Ward that sank while under tow. Also that day seven l2FS P-38s and six F4Us flew a sweep over Kokolopi Bay on Vella Lavella and discovered a well-camouflaged AK. The Lightnings attacked first at mast-height and jettisoned their partially filled drop tanks on the AK, dousing it with gasoline. Incendiary shells then set the ship on fire, and it was later confirmed as sunk. The second phase of "I-Go" Operation was carried out against U.S. naval and air bases on New Guinea, but the two massive raids achieved only one transport sunk and five American aircraft shot down for the loss of 18 aircraft on 11 April and 28 on the following day. Yamamoto terminated "I-Operation" and returned his remaining pilots and aircraft back to their carriers. During April the 68FS repainted its PAOs. During a mission over New Georgia the P-40 of Lloyd "Cotton" Huff was attacked by a Navy F4F that continued to pursue him until he neared Fighter Two. Huff landed and immediately jumped into a jeep and rushed over to punch out the Navy pilot, who luckily was not identified. Capt. Stanley Palmer, who had earlier been shot down by a B-17 gunner, asked 68 th CO Lt. Col. Henry Viccellio to allow him to lead a formation of PAOs to buzz the Navy at Fighter Two to show them what a P-40 looked like! Viccellio readily approved. Palmer also

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II requested that the Warhawks be painted in new orange recognition stripes, but only white paint was available. The 68FS PAOs were painted with two vertical white stripes fore and aft of the cockpit, another under the fuselage, diagonal stripes running the length of the wings (top and bottom), and a diagonal stripe on both sides of the tail. On 14 April the XIII Air Force Air Service Command was activated. 13AF HQ was located on Espiritu Santo, where Twining could be near COMAIRSOPAC, but the operational sections of XIII Bomber and XIII Fighter Commands were at Guadalcanal. Bomber Command was based at the new Carney Field, while Fighter Command continued to be based at Fighter Two (Kukum), near Henderson. Kukum had been improved by the 6th Seabees and finished by the 46 th and 61 st Seabees by the beginning of 1943. Carney was built by the 6 th and 14th Seabees at Koli Point, just east of the Nalimbu River. Work started on the 6,500 x l50-foot runway at the end of December 1942. Heavy rain and Japanese air alerts and attacks slowed the work considerably, and in February the 2nd Marine Aviation engineers were brought in to speed up construction. On 21 March the 6NFS began operations there, and on 1 April heavy bomber units flew in for operations. The field was constructed on a poor foundation of nine inches of river gravel overlaid with piercedsteel planking (PSP), and after only two weeks of operations was in poor condition, as the heavily loaded bombers tore up the steel mat. Emergency repairs were made so as not to interfere with daily operations. A second 7,000 x 500-foot bomber runway was begun 300 yards to the northwest in May and was not completed until October. Dispersal of the large numbers of aircraft on these fields was always a problem, and vulnerable to a determined large-scale Japanese bombing and strafing attack. Henderson dispersal was improved, and the early completion of the Russell fields would further relieve the overcrowding situation on Guadalcanal. Twining had two full-strength heavy bomber groups, one medium bomber group, and two reduced strength fighter groups:

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Guadalcanal: HQ 5BG(H): HQ 307BG(H): HQ 42BG(M): HQ 18FG:

Espiritu Santo: 5BG(H): 307BG(H): HQ4PRG:

2 tactical squadrons 2 tactical squadrons 2 tactical squadrons 3 tactical squadrons (P-38 squadrons were on Guadalcanal and New Caledonia for training)

2 tactical squadrons 2 tactical squadrons 18PRS

Efate: 1 fighter squadron New Caledonia: HQ 347FG 1+ fighter squadron 1 bombardment squadron Fiji: 1 fighter squadron 1 bombardment squadron All these units were rotated through Guadalcanal. Twining believed that this widespread dispersal of his units over rear areas was beneficial. The rotated personnel in rear areas could be used for training and indoctrination of newly arrived personnel from the U.S., and for reorganizing units returning from combat. The reason that a large number of aircraft were based away from GuadaIcanal was that there had been only three bases on the island, each with one runway. Planning for air base construction was under the auspices of Halsey's Base Planning Board, but was predominately a Navy board and hence improved Navy facilities.

8 Yamamoto Mission

Mission Prologue The coded message sent on 13 April 1943 by a staff officer for Rear Admiral Jinichi Kusaka, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Imperial Japanese Navy's No. 11 Air Fleet (Southeastern Area), sealed the fate of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. As translated by American cryptographers, it read:

Base). Depart Ballale Base at 1100 in medium attack plane and arrive Buin Base at 1110. Lunch at NO.1 Base Force Headquarters (Senior Staff Officer of No.26 Air Flotilla to be present). Depart Buin Base at 1400 in medium attack plane and arrive Rabaul at 1540.

"C-in-C/ Southeast Area Fleet/Top Secret/13l755 On 18 April, C-in-C Combined Fleet [Admiral Ya~amoto] will visit Ballale Base [RXZ], Shortland Base [RWH], and Buin Base [RXP], in accordance with the following schedule: I) Depart Rabaul [RR] at 0600 in medium attack plane escorted by six fighters. Arrive at Ballale Base at 0800. Proceed [by subchaser] to Shortland Base arriving at 0840 (No.1 Base Force to ready one boat). Depart Shortland Base at 0945 in above [subchaser] and arrive Ballale Base at 1030 (For transportation purposes, have ready an assault boat at Shortland Base and a motor launch at Ballale

Ugaki (left) meets with Yamamoto (left center) aboard the Nagata as two staff officers (Fujii, liaison officer and Watanabe, administrative officer) look on, (SYMA via Lansdale)

Official portrait of Adm, Isuroku Yamamoto, (Pineau via Lansdale)

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Yamamoto seeing fliers of an Imperial Navy unit off at Rabaul as part of Operation I-Go Sokusen. (Nakamura via Lansdale)

Adm. Ugaki (Left, back turned) and Adm.Yamamoto (waving hat) send off a Zero from the No.204 Air Group taking off from a Rabaul field. (Mikesh via Lansdale)

2) At each of the above places the C-in-C will make short tour of inspection and at 0.1 Base Force hospital he will visit the sick and wounded, but current operations should continue. 3) Uniforms will be the uniforms for the day except that each force commander will be in combat attire with decorations. 4) In case of bad weather the trip will be postponed one day."

Southeastern Air Fleet." American intelligence, at that time, was not aware that the commander of the Southeast Area Fleet and its attached air fleet, NO.ll Koku Sentai, were one and the same person, Rear Admiral Kusaka. Kusaka's decoded message was passed to Adm. Chester Nimitz, C-in-C U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Nimitz consulted his chief intelligence officer, Cdr. Edward Layton, as to the possibility of intercepting Yamamoto. Layton thought it was definitely possible and worth the effort, as he considered Yamamoto only second to the Emperor in importance to the Japanese people. Nimitz sent the decrypted Japanese message to Adm. William Halsey for action. Following a flurry of communications between the crypto analysts and various field commanders and parties in Washington, the decision was reached to attempt to kill Yamamoto. U.S. Pacific Fleet C-in-C Admiral William F. "Bull" Halsey's brusque wire message of 14 April said it all, "TALLYHO X LET'S GET THE BASTARD." Nimitz was concerned that the Japanese might suspect that their code had been broken if Yamamoto's flight was intercepted. On the 17 th he sent another message to Halsey:

The background of events leading to the transmission of Kusaka's coded message unfolded many years before. American cryptographers had broken the Japanese codes as early as 1920, and even though the Japanese knew of possible breaks they continued to overconfidently believe their later machine codes were unbreakable. Sometime later American cryptographers broke what was known as the Japanese Admiral's code, which carried delicate political and military information. The Americans continued to refine their code breaking capabilities that led to their remarkable victory at Midway in June 1942. In January 1943 the large Japanese submarine 1-1 was stranded off Guadalcanal by the Royal New Zealand Navy corvette, Kiwi, and codebooks containing the updated codes were captured and sent to American intelligence at Pearl Harbor. By April 1943 this new information was being used to track Yamamoto and his military intentions in the South Pacific. On 3 April 1943 Yamamoto left his flagship, the battleship Musashi, at Truk to fly to Rabaul to personally oversee the execution of I-Go Sakusen. By 13 April Yamamoto had decided to make an impromptu visit and inspection tour of the forward bases in the Shortland Islands and on Southern Bougainville. Following this decision, the area commanders were informed of Yamamoto's itinerary via a coded radio transmission. Japanese radio messages were being routinely monitored and, having knowledge of the Japanese code systems, it was not surprising that Kusaka's message had been intercepted and soon decrypted by American cryptographers. That the message was authored or ordered by Kusaka has now been established. As translated, the coded message stated, "From: C-in-C

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"Believe specific effort worthwhile. Suggest pilots be told coast watcher Rabaul area signaled our sub to the effect unknown highranking officer making a trip to Ballale of some such source. Suggest every effort be made to make operation appear fortuitous. If forces your command have capability shoot down Yamamoto and staff you are hereby authorized to initiate preliminary planning. Our best wishes and high hopes go with those intercepting hunters." Halsey turned the mission planning and selection of crews to Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, Commander Air, Solomons (COMAIRSOL), whose headquarters was located on Guadalcanal. As the planning unfolded, it was decided that Navy fighters did not have adequate range for the proposed mission. The only fighters available to Mitscher were the Army Air Force Lockheed P-38 Lightnings shared by the 347 th and 18 Lh Fighter Groups flying from Fighter

Part Three, Chapter 8 - Yamamoto Mission

Mission survivors pose on the 19th Back Row (L-R) Ames, Graebner; Lanphier; Goerke, Jacobson, Stratton Long, and Anglin. Front Row (L-R) Smith, Canning, Holmes, Barber; Mitchell, Kittel, and Whittaker Not pictured is Raymond Hine, who was MIA on the Mission. Note that Ames is in flight gear; ready to fly another mission as soon as this picture was taken. (Author)

Two. Special 31 O-gallon long-range belly tanks were requisitioned and flown in to give sufficient range. The crew selections were left to the 347'h group commander, Lt. Col. Henry Viccellio, and Lt. Col. Aaron W. Tyer, leader of the 18 th Fighter Group. Eighteen P38s were to take part in the mission, and every pilot eiigible volunteered. Ultimately Mitchell, assisted by Maj. Louis Kittel, chose the pilots. Mitchell divided them into four flights of four aircraft each, plus two spare aircraft. Mitchell would stay with 14 Lightnings at 18,000 to 20,000 feet on high cover to be at altitude to protect against the 50 or more Japanese fighters he expected to come up from Kahili. The fourth flight was designated the "attack" flight and consisted of pilots who, in Mitchell's opinion, were his best "shooters." The 13 th Fighter Command was in the process of reassigning some of the squadrons and pilots into a restructured table of organization. The pilots chosen for the mission had originally been assigned to different squadrons, and it is not always possible to define precisely their true squadron affiliation in April. Some, such as Rex Barber, Raymond Hine, and James McLanahan, had only recently been officially transferred to the 339 th Fighter Squadron. The original eighteen pilots selected for the Yamamoto Mission were:

Second Flight (Attack) Capt. Thomas Lanphier, Jr., 70 th Fighter Squadron, Section Leader 1st Lt. Rex Barber, 339FS, Wingman 1st Lt. Joseph Moore, 70FS, Element Leader 1st Lt. James McLanahan, 339FS, Wingman From the 18 th Fighter Group First Flight (High Cover) Major Louis Kittel, 12FS, Acting CO, Section Leader 2nd Lt. Gordon Whittaker, 12FS, Wingman 1st Lt. Roger Ames,12FS, Element Leader 15t Lt. Lawrence Graebner, 12FS, Wingman Second Flight (High Cover) 1st Lt. Everett Anglin, 12FS, Section Leader 1st Lt. William Smith, 12FS, Wingman 1st Lt. Eldon Stratton, 12FS, Element Leader 1st Lt. Albert Long, 12FS, Wingman The Japanese personnel were: From the 205 th Kokutai IJNAF G4M Betty Bomber #323 7 Crew: Pilot, co-pilot, observer, 2 radio operators, gunner and mechanic 4 Passengers: Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, C-in-C Combined Fleet R.Adm. Rokuro Takata, Chief Surgeon Combined Fleet Cdr. Noburu Fukusaki, Yamamoto aide Cdr. Kurio Toibana, Staff officer Betty bomber #326 7 Crew: Pilot, co-pilot, observer, 2 radio operators, gunner and mechanic 5 Passengers: VAdm. Matome Ugaki, Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet Capt. Motoharu Kitamura, Chief Paymaster Combined Fleet Cdr. Rinji Tomoro, Meteorology officer, Combined Fleet Cdr. Kaoru Imananka, Staff officer Cdr. Suteji Muroi, Staff officer

From the 347 th Fighter Group First Flight (High Cover) Major John Mitchell, 339FS CO, Mission Leader 1st Lt. Julius Jacobson, 339FS, Wingman 1st Lt. Douglas Canning, 339FS, Element Leader 1st Lt. Delton Goerke, 339FS, Wingman Spare Element 15t Lt. Besby Holmes, 339FS, Element Leader 1st Lt. Raymond Hine, 339FS, Wingman

(L-R) Lanphier; Holmes, and Barber (Lansdale)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II

Barber's

P-38 equipped with the special 31 O-gallon belly tank. (Lansdale)

"Old Ironsides," Sam Howie's aircraft that was destroyed on landing on the 29 March 1943 Shortlands mission.The only undamaged part was its left wing, which was salvaged and placed on Barber's P-38. (Lansdale)

From the 204'11 Kokutai 11 AF A6M 6 Zero pilots Chief petty officer Yoshimi Hidaka Lt. Takeshi Morizaki Petty officer 2cl Yasuji Okazaki FIt. Petty Officer Shoichi Sugita FIt. Petty officer Toyomitsu Tsujinoue FIt. Petty Officer Kenji Yanagiya There were two possible methods of attacking Yamamoto, either in the air in the bomber on his way to Ballale, or on the sea on the sub-chaser on his way to the Shortlands. Mitchell candidly admitted he could not recognize a "subchaser from a sub" and was concerned that even if the ship were sunk it did not guarantee that Yamamoto would not survive, escaping in a life boat or life vest. Also, there were at least 75 fighters in the Shortlands that could make things difficult for the low-flying P-38s dive-bombing and strafing the ship. After lengthy discussion and debate, Mitscher decided to have Mitchell make the final decision on the method of the attack, scheduled for the morning of the 18'11. Mitchell chose to attack Yamamoto from the air rather than on the sea. The final details of the flight were made or decided upon by Mitchell, whose only special request was for a "good mariner's compass" from the Navy, because the compasses usually provided in the Lightnings were unreliable. A minor setback occurred when it was found that only half of the 31 O-gallon belly tanks needed for the mission would be supplied. This meant that the Lightnings would each be flying with a normal I65-gallon external tank and the special 31O-gallon tank being flown in that night from Port Moresby. After being briefed on the expected weather and AA and fighter defenses on Bougainville, Mitchell met with intelligence officers Lt. Joseph McGuigan of the Navy and Capt. William Morrison of the Army. Mon'ison had lived in Japan and the Orient for nearly half his life, and told Mitchell that Yamamoto had a life long habit of being exactly on schedule, and assured him that he would continue to do so. Mitchell realized that there always was one of the

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Part Three, Chapter 8 - Yamamoto Mission

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Right: Yamamoto's route over Bougainville and crash site to the NNW of his destination at Ballale. (Canning via Lansdale)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II the flight to fly in loose formation until they turned for the coast of Bougainville. As they were going to fly at 30-50 feet, he cautioned the pilots about the danger of going in due to the loss of depth perception if they stared at the water. There was to be complete radio silence until the target was spotted. Mitchell would signal course changes with hand signals that would be passed on by element leaders. When Admiral Yamamoto departed from the East Airfield (Lakunai) at Rabaul at 0610 18 April 1943 (Tokyo D/T), he became the target in one of the most controversial missions of World War II. In the Foreword of the book by R. Cargill Hall, "Lightning Over Bougainville" (Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington: and London: 1991), Tom D. Crouch wrote:

Looking northwest over Ballale Island, with Molla Point at the upper left of the photo. (USAF via Lansdale)

innumerable glitches, such as weather, mechanical problems, and the like that could postpone or delay Yamamoto's aircraft. Marine Maj. John Condon supplied Mitchell with a strip map with the mission's course and the airspeed, distance, and time computed. Mitchell discounted Condon's figures, as the Marine was not familiar with the characteristics of the P-38, much less the altitude and throttle settings Mitchell needed to use for such a long-range mission. Accuracy and navigation were critical in making such a precise interception. First he estimated Yamamoto's bomber's speed to be 180mph (he wasn't sure if the bomber was to be aNavy G4M Betty or the older Army K-21 Sally, but assumed it would be a Navy Betty since Yamamoto was a Navy Admiral). He computed the P-38's zero wind ground speed under long-range cruise control settings to be 200 mph. He then recalculated the average speed to target as 197mph, taking into consideration the forecast 5-knot wind on the first leg. Also, a direct flight to southern Bougainville meant crossing or flying close to Japanese-held islands and enemy observers on islands along the way up the Slot from Fighter Two. To avoid detection Mitchell replotted the mission's course by flying at least 50 miles offshore of these islands, which meant dead-reckoning over 400 miles over water at 50 feet or less, a prodigious feat of navigation. Mitchell knew Yamamoto's arrival time at Ballale but did not know over which side of Bougainville Yamamoto's bomber would fly. He predicted Yamamoto would fly the direct route from Rabaul down the western coast. The P-38s would make the intercept 40 miles from Kahili Airfield as Yamamoto's bomber was in its let down approach to Ballale. To make the precise intercept at 0930 he divided the route into five sections with takeoff at 0720, allowing IS minutes for form up, after which Mitchell would begin the mission toward Ballale at 0735. It took the ground crews all night to attach and fill the 165-gallon and 31O-gallon fuel tanks. Ammunition was taken from sealed crates; and the 20mm cannon were loaded with HE incendiary shells, and the four .50 caliber machine guns were loaded with a mixture of tracer, API, and ball ammunition. Unfortunately, the P-38s were not equipped with gun cameras at the time. At the pre-takeoff briefing Mitchell instructed

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"The Yamamoto mission is the best-known and most thoroughly studied fighter engagement of the Pacific War. It may well be the most celebrated sortie ever flown by American fighter pilots. The participants, American and Japanese, have been interviewed repeatedly and at length. The action has been dissected from every possible angle. Futile attempts have been made to reduce the chaotic movement of the twenty-four ass0l1ed Lightnings, Zeros, and Bettys to a series of neat lines on paper. Yet, for all that effort we have still not satisfied our curiosity as to precisely what occurred in the air over Bougainville on that morning almost half a century ago."

Death of the Admiral: The Definitive Account of the Yamamoto Mission: 18 April 1943 by James Lansdale After years ,of research and data collection, including interviews with the participants, the "Death of an Admiral" is what I am firmly convinced is an account of precisely what occurred that 18 April morning. In comparing and analyzing the Barber, Lanphier, and Ugaki accounts, the Japanese autopsy report and the fighter interception report, and also the major studies of the mission by Carroll Glines, John Wible, R. Cargill Hall, Richard Kohn, and Burke Davis, there can be no doubt that Rex Barber shot down Yamamoto. Subsequent evidence, testimony, and examination of collaborative records have resulted in the discovery of some errors in detail and/ or conclusions made at the time. The sequence of events, as well as

IIIUJ'rOI,on by SI"gelu NoJ,o'Q

Author's autographs of mission survivors on Shigelu Nohara illustration of Adm.Yamamoto's Betty (#323). (Author/Nohara)

Part Three, Chapter 8 - Yamamoto Mission

Wayne Shipp drawing ofYamamoto shoot down as described by Capt.Thomas Lanphier.

Wayne Shipp drawing of mission shoot down as described by Lt. Rex Barber. (Glines/Shipp via Lansdale)

primary evidence of what occurred to the Yamamoto and Ugaki Bettys, has been taken directly from these contemporary records! Incidentally, I completed this commentary on the sixtieth anniversary of the Yamamoto Mission, 18 April 2003. It was 0710 (local Dff) Easter Sunday 1943 when John Mitchell released the brakes of his P-38 on Fighter 2 to lead seventeen other pilots on the longest aerial interception mission of World War II. Mitchell, in P-38 No.lIO, along with Jacobson in No.144, taxied into position and took off. Trailing Mitchell were Doug Canning, Del Goerke, Besby Holmes in No. 100, and Ray Hine in No.102. Tom Lanphier, in NO.122 "Phoebe," was next with Rex Barber, in 0.147 "Miss Virginia," that had been Bob Petit's Lightning before Petit rotated back to the States after having served two combat tours on Guadalcanal.

Joe Moore taxied forward to the take-off position. Unfortunately Moore's wingman, Jim McLanahan, in No.116 "Lady Luck," was not "lucky!" As McLanahan taxied onto the Marston matting a tire caught a sharp edge of the steel mat and blew out, leaving him stranded off the runway. Lou Kittel's 12th Fighter Squadron's representatives were the last to depart for their four-hundred-mile, minimum altitude mission. Kittel was flying Barber's old No.125 with "Daisy 2nd " chalked on the nose. Barber had damaged the port wing ofNo.125 during an attack on a Japanese subchaser on March 29 t h, but it had been repaired in time for this mission with a wing from the wreckage of Howie's No.138, "Old Ironsides." While forming up, Moore could not get the specially fitted 310gallon external tank to feed. Informing Mitchell of the problem by the use of hand-signals, the disappointed and frustrated Moore turned

Renown aviation artist Roy Grinnell's rendering of Rex Barber shooting down the Yamamoto bomber. Historian James Lansdale had studied the Yamamoto Mission for years and had interviewed Barber, and was instrumental in aiding the artist in making the painting accurate in aircraft markings and combat attitude. (© Roy Grinnell by permission via Lansdale)

The Betty bomber carrying Adm. Ugaki was caught off Moila Point by Holmes and Hine. Barber finished the shoot down and the bomber crashed; Ugaki, his paymaster, and the pilot survived the crash, and Ugaki recorded the incident in his diary. (National Archives via Lansdale)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II

Within seconds after being shot down by Rex Barber, Yamamoto's Betty crashed and burned near the village of Aku on southern Bougainville. (National Archives via Lansdale)

around and headed back to Fighter 2. With McLanahan and Moore gone the attack section now only consisted of two pilots, Lanphier and Barber! Mitchell signaled the two spare pilots, Holmes and Hine, to fill in Lanphier's attack section. Flying at only thirty or forty feet over the water in order to avoid Japanese detection, the sixteen remaining Lightnings followed Mitchell's course,t"265° for 55 minutes; 290° for 27 minutes; 305° for 38 minutes; 20° for 5 minutes." As the Americans passed over the Russell Islands on their first leg, the two Betty bombers were taking off from Vunakanau Airfield on Rabaul and flew seven miles to Lakunai, on New Britain's east coast, to pick up their passengers. Yamamoto's bomber (#323), followed by Ugaki's bomber (#326), took off and was joined by the Zero escort in two elements of three. The bombers would cruise at 7,500 feet and were to be covered by the Zeros flying at 9,000 feet a mile behind in flights of three on either side of the bombers. Mitchell had planned an additional sixteen minutes for climbing to station at the intercept altitude. This was to be followed by a fifth leg of "90 for 21 minutes" if additional search time had been needed. The pilots, still low over the water, were straining to catch a glimpse of Bougainville and turned on their fourth leg. As they approached the ETA the bombers were not seen, and there was a haze and the sun was glaring into their eyes. Mitchell had the formation close up, and his number three, Doug Canning, whose keen vision was legendary, broke the radio silence with a low, almost too calm, message, "Bogeys. Eleven o'clock high." The two Japanese bombers were three miles away, crossing the western tip of Bougainville in close formation at 4,500 feet in a shallow descent toward Ballale. Mitchell was initially concerned when he saw two bombers, as the intercepted message mentioned only one. When he saw the six Zeros in flights ofthree on eitherside ofthe bombers he knew he had Yamamoto. The Zeros dropped their external tanks and headed toward the two P-38s, which were only seconds away from making history. Lanphier's attack section, climbing with the cover sections, fire-walled their engines. Mitchell ordered the dropping of the ex0

144

ternal fuel tanks as the Lightnings rocketed for altitude. As Lanphier and Barber adjusted their course for the interception of the two Betty bombers, Holmes announced he could not drop his tanks. With Hine covering his wing, Holmes turned southeast along the Bougainville coast, repeatedly hitting the drop switch and horsing his Lightning in an attempt to jerk the belly tanks loose. The attack section was, for the second time during the mission, down to only Lanphier and Barber! What happened in the next few minutes to Lanphier and Barber has subsequently led to much debate, controversy, and acrimony. The attack on and victory claim for the Betty bomber carrying Yamamoto is the most contentious aspect of this famous mission. Lanphier and Barber both have claimed this distinction. Contemporary documentation is sparse, but does exist. In the years following the death of Yamamoto, dozens of interviews of the participants, magazine articles, books, and symposia, as well as legal forums, have failed to satisfy the opinions of all parties. What is clear is that the official U.S. Air Force position on this issue has been to rely on their contemporary records. Lanphier's position also was to legitimize and substantiate his claim by relying on the same official records. There are three pel1inent and contemporary documents available for examination that do focus very precise light on the events that transpired at that time. These three essential documents regarding the Yamamoto interception are: A) 13 th Fighter Command's official "Fighter Interception Report" for April 18, 1943. An original typed copy of the four-page "Fighter Interception Report: April 18, 1943," was to have been given to each of the participants. Douglas S. Canning provided the authors with the copies given to him and to wingman Delton C. Goerke. The Goerke copy is one quoted below as "FIR" It is ironic that this report on which Lanphier based his claim throughout the years would be used to establish Barber as the Yamamoto victor. B) The Admiral Ugaki Diary. Admiral Ugaki served as Yamamoto's chief of staff, and Ugaki was on board the second Betty bomber shot down during the Yamamoto Mission. He was severely injured but, after hospitalization, he recovered his health and returned to active duty. Ugaki maintained a personal and detailed diary of his service career. On the first anniversary of the Yamamoto Mission, Ugaki detailed and recorded from memory the events of 18 April 1943. After the war, the Ugaki diary was translated by Chihaya, Masataka, edited by Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, and published as "Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941-1945" (University of Pittsburgh Press, London: 1991). However, for this work, the services of Dr. Kawamoto, Minoru, humanitarian, historian, and linguist, were commissioned in order to provide a more literal, and, hopefully, more precise translation of the Ugaki Diary entries. Dr. Kawamoto, in providing his translation and working from an original copy of the Ugaki Diary, wrote: "There is general criticism (in Japan) that the Ugaki Diary entry for April 18, 1944, is not entirely correct. Memories being frail

Part Three, Chapter 8 - Yamamoto Mission are apt to be fraught with mistakes. However, who else was there to give a first hand account of what happened that morning within one of the two targeted planes and so close to the facts?" (N.B. Italics added). The Dr. Kawamoto translation is quoted herein below as "Ugaki." C) The Official Autopsy Report and Autopsy Record of Admiral

Yamamoto. After the recovery of Yamamoto's remains from the crash site an official autopsy was conducted, and a record of findings reported by Lt. Commander Jisaburo Tabuchi, chief medical officer on No. I Base Unit. After the war Dr. 'Tabuchi operated a clinic in Saidaiji, Okayama Prefecture. Dr. Tabuchi retained copies of the official autopsy report and autopsy record, and provided these copies to Hiroyuki Agawa. Agawa became the noted Yamamoto biographer and published Dr. Tabuchi's report of the Yamamoto autopsy in the book, "The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy" (Kodansha International Ltd., New York: 1979). The findings of the Yamamoto autopsy, which was conducted on 20 April 1943 at Buin Base, are quoted in a following account from "Agawa." The Yamamoto Mission: Based on Contemporary Records Yamamoto's staff boarded the two standard Betty bombers, Nos. 323 and 326, attached to No.705 Kaigun Kokutai (Naval Air Group) at Rabaul's East Airfield, and departed at 0610 (Tokyo D/T). Yamamoto sat in the navigator's seat, immediately behind the pilot on the starboard side of the Betty, call number 323, Mitsubishi serial number 2656. The itinerary had called for Ballale Island Base to be the first landing of Yamamoto's inspection tour. However, the pilot's log for Betty, call number 326, in which Ugaki was riding, records that the scheduled flight was to be from "RRF" (Rabaul Airfield) to "RWP" (Buin Anchorage). The code for Buin Base was "RXP," and the Ballale Base code was "RXZ." It is possible that the use of the letters "RWP" in the pilot's log were used to indicate either or both airfields in the Buin Anchorage area. In any event, both bombers and the six escorting Zero fighters from No.204 Kaigun Kokutai flew a southeasterly course from Rabaul toward the southwestern coast of Bougainville and the Buin base area. Ugaki: "No.2 plane [326] (was) diagonally behind (and) left of No.1 plane [323]. Formation beautiful. At times (I) worried wingtips would touch. (I) could plainly make out the side view of C-in-C sitting in the plane commander's seat [behind the pilot, starboard side]. Also those moving about in the cabin. As the landscape and objects below were being explained, based on aerial map, (I) was able to enjoy a feeling of a good flight. When approaching the west side of Bougainville Island, flying in a straight line at an altitude of seven-eight hundred meters over flat jungle, the plane's captain handed me a piece of paper. It said, 'Scheduled to arrive Ballale at 0745.' Looking at my wristwatch (I noted) it was exactly 0730. 'Another fifteen minutes to go', I reminded myself. Just then, all of a sudden, our plane started to dive, following o. I plane, and dropped down to fifty meters."

FIR: "Radio silence was absolute until Canning's quiet 'Eleven O'clock' announced contact with the enemy. The timing, resulting from Major Mitchell's close control of the flight's speed and unwavering formation maintained, was so exact that the enemy was met on the minute, where a few minutes' delay would have meant complete failure. The Lightnings were at 30 feet, heading in toward the (Bougainville) coast, and (were) just about to begin to get their altitude for the presumed attack. The enemy was sighted in a 'V' about 3 miles distant, proceeding down the Southern coast toward Kihili (sic). The Two (sic) bombers were together, flying at 4500 feet, with two sections-3 Zeros each-1500 feet above them and slightly to the rear. As the enemy force, apparently unaware of enemy opposition, pursued his course, Mitchell led the covering group (twelve Lightnings) in their climb for altitude, ultimately reaching 15-18,000 feet, from which point they stood their protecting vigil. Lanphier led his force parallel to the course of the enemy, flying into them a bit, and indicating 200 MPH in his 35° climb. The P38s actually climbed at 2200 feet per minute. When level with the bombers, and about 2 miles away, Lanphier and Barber dropped their belly tanks and swung in to the attack at 280 MPH indicated. Holmes had difficulty in releasing his tank(s), and Hine remained with him until he could do so. When Lanphier and Barber were within one mile of contact their attack was observed by the enemy. The bombers nosed down, one started a 36000 turn dive, the other going out and away toward the shoreline (south-southwest of the original course). The Zeros dropped their belly tanks and three peeled down in a string to intercept Lanphier." Ugaki: '''What happened?' we all thought. (I) called out, 'What happened?' to the plane's captain, an Air Chief Warrant Officer who was in the aisle. He replied 'It must have been some mistake.' Such a remark proved (our actions to have been) a big mistake, (an) extreme stupidity. Because by this time, the fighter planes covering us, having already detected a group of twenty-four (sic) enemy fighter planes flying southward and then reversing course, made a warning dive toward our medium attack planes. At the same time, No. I plane [323] (had) also detected the enemy planes, and it dived without any time to spare and skimmed over the jungle treetops. So it was learned later. At this time the crew took up battle stations for the first time, cleared their guns, and prepared for firing. For a moment, the wind blowing in and the handling of machine guns and all caused one mixed, disturbing noise. When (our) plane began to drop altitude, an air battle had already developed with our escort fighter planes. The enemy, outnumbering us by four times, closed in mercilessly on the big target, our medium (sized) attack plane." Ugaki explains the actions as described in the Fighter Interception Report as "one (bomber) started a 36000 turn dive," while "the other (bomber was) going out and away toward the shoreline" in the following diary entry.

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13th Fighter Command in World War II Ugaki: "To counter this enemy move, (our) plane [326] made a sudden evasive turn of more than 90 degrees. The plane's captain, his eyes glued to the sky and seeing an enemy plane about to make a dive at us, tapped the shoulder of the chief pilot, directing him to turn left or right. No. I [323] and No.2 planes [326] (had) then separated, No. I plane [323] going toward the right (FIR): "toward the shoreline" or south-southwest) and No 2 [326] toward the left (easterly); the distance between them increased."

feet, so he nosed over and went down to the tree tops after his escaping objective."

FIR: "Barber had gone in with Lanphier on the initial attack. He went for one of the bombers, but its maneuvers caused him to overshoot a little. He whipped back (banking and side slipped), however, and although pursued by Zeros, caught the bomber and destroyed it. When he fired, the tail section flew off, and the bomber (then) turned over on its back and plummeted to the earth."

This one sentence in the official Fighter Interception Report has proven to be the most contentious. Lanphier later el.aborated on this portion of the official report and, in the future, always maintained that he had used a 9000 deflection to bring down this bomber. It is very possible that Lanphier had made an attempt on the Ugaki bomber as it turned back to the south-southwest toward the shoreline. Pursued by Zeros, Barber had previously also turned on the same tract toward the shoreline and the open water. It is pure speculation, but very likely, that it was at this point in the engagement that Lanphier witnessed the crash of the Betty calTying Yamamoto. Lanphier would always maintain that he and he alone deserved credit for this bomber crash in the jungles of Bougainville. According to the official record, written after the testimony of Lanphier and Barber, not one, but two Bettys had apparently crashed and burned near the village ofAku on Bougainville. Today, based on the physical evidence of the wreckage found in the jungle, as well as the verified testimony of the surviving Japanese witnesses, we know beyond any doubt that only one of the two bombers crashed and burned on land that day.

All subsequent accounts agree that Lanphier (on the left side of the attacking element) had made a climbing turn to the left (north by northwest). In so doing, he had gone nose to nose with the three escort Zeros on the seaward side of the formation. Barber, again by all subsequent accounts, had banked hard right, attacking one of the Bettys from the rear. The Betty [323], carrying Yamamoto, was elToneously reported in the Fighter Interception Report as having lost its tail and turning "over on its back" from the Barber attack. Nevertheless, the autopsy report on Yamamoto's body reveals that Barber's bullets, or shrapnel from Barber's fusillade, fired from the Betty's six o'clock position, had struck home. Yamamoto, seated on the starboard side of the Betty's cabin, behind the pilot, and facing forward, was mortally wounded. Agawa: "Yamamoto's body (suffered) wounds about the size of the tip of one's little finger where a machine-gun bullet had entered at the angle of the left lower jaw and emerged at the right, and an entry wound the size of the tip of one's index finger in the center of the left shoulder blade. The latter hole went upward and to the right, but there was no exit wound." Ugak.i: "After making about two evasion moves, (I) worried about No. I [323] plane, looked toward the right. ;Oh God!' Saw No. I plane, at a distance of about 4,000 meters, belching smoke, skimming the jungle top, speed dropping, heading south. 'All's lost' was about all one could think of. (I) pulled toward me the shoulder of Air Staff Officer Muroi, who was standing in the aisle diagonally behind me, and ordered to him 'Look at C-in-C's plane.' It was the last farewell between them and us. All of this 'took only about 20 seconds to happen. (Italics added) At the point Barber had banked right to approach the enemy bomber formation from the rear, Lanphier had turned left into the attacking Zero escort element. FIR: "When he (Lanphier) saw he could not reach the bomber he turned up into the Zeros, exploding the first, and firing into the others as they passed. By this time he (Lanphier) had reached 6,000

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Ugaki: "With the enemy upon us (our) plane [326] again made a sharp turn and lost sight of C-in-C's plane." FIR: "He (Lanphier) came into it broadside-fired his bursts-a wing flew off (sic), and the plane went flaming to the earth."

Ugak.i: "It was irritating to wait for (our) plane to level off; (my) mind filled with anxiety over what (had) happened. Although the natural outcome could be imagined, the next look found no sight of No. I plane [323]; all that met the eye was black smoke rising high in the sky from inside the jungle below. Ah! It is all over!" After Lanphier witnessed the crash of the bomber in the jungle he made a low-level escape toward the south-southeast with Zeros in hot pursuit, eventually escaping to return alone to Fighter 2. After Barber's attack on the Betty inland, as previously recounted, he made a wide swing toward the south-southeast, across the shoreline and over the water along the southern Bougainville coast. Holmes had succeeded in shaking the troublesome belly tank and, along with Hine, turned back toward the north-northeast. Holmes spied the Ugaki bomber, coming their way over the shoreline in a southerly direction. Holmes and Hine began a rear attack on this bomber. Barber, observing this action, swung in behind Holmes and Hine. The combined attacks of Holmes, Hine, and Barber resulted in the crash and destruction of the Ugaki bomber just south of Moila Point. The Zeros hotly contested these attacks. In the process, Barber and Holmes made claims for victories over three Zeros. Unfortunately Ray Hine took hits from a Zero and was last observed low over the water southwest of the Shortland Islands. When Lanphier landed, by all accounts he began to proudly proclaim his victory over Admiral Yamamoto in spite of the fact

Part Three, Chapter 8 - Yamamoto Mission that no one on the mission had any definite knowledge, or confirmation, of the Japanese Admiral's death. Neither did anyone know at the time, with any degree of certainty, which of the bombers had been transporting Yamamoto! When the Fighter Interception Report was written, both Barber's and Lanphier's claims for two bombers over the jungle were confirmed! All had agreed that another Betty [326] had been brought down over the water south of Moila Point. In order to account for the discrepancy within the report between the interception of two Betty bombers and the confirmation of three bomber victories, the Betty carrying Ugaki was described as a "stray bomber" that just happened to be in the area. The seeds for the future controversy had been planted! Mission Epilogue The Americans Barber's P-38, Miss Virginia, had over 100 holes suffering damage from pieces of Yamamoto's stricken bomber, and had its intercooler shot out by the pursuing Zeros. Lanphier's fighter had two bullet holes in its horizontal stabilizer. After attacking the Zeros Holmes, alone and low on fuel, radioed for help. He managed to team up

Crew of Patrol Bomber 6 ofVP-44, who spotted what is thought to be Hine's damaged P-38 after the Yamamoto mission. Charles Marsh is sitting on the hull with his foot on the star. (Edward McKissick via Lansdale)

with Doug Canning, the last man to leave the area, and Canning led the pair back toward Fighter 2. Holmes was short on fuel, so Canning went ahead and buzzed the uncompleted airfield in the Russells. The field had construction equipment and crews working on it, and Canning hoped that they would get off so Holmes could land, but instead they waved at him as he flew over. Canning then came around with his gear and flaps down and buzzed even lower. The Seabees got his point and cleared the runway. Holmes dropped down in front of Canning to make an emergency landing while Canning flew home. When Holmes landed he found that he had less than five gallons of fuel remaining. There was no fuel on the new base, so five-gallon Jerry cans had to be filled from the Allison engines of nearby PT boats. Holmes' fighter was refueled, and late that afternoon he arrived at Fighter 2. Canning, ironically, had been the first to spot Admiral Yamamoto's flight, and he was the last to leave the combat area. In his own words, he "was the quintessential tourist and had maximized this trip!" Holmes reported seeing Ray Hine's aircraft trailing smoke or vapor from the left engine and heading in the general direction of Wilson Strait, southwest of Shortland Island. Hine was the only loss to mar the nearly perfectly executed mission. After intercepting and shooting down the stray (Ugaki) Japanese bomber off Moila Point, Holmes, Barber, and Hine turned for home, but were attacked by Zeros. Holmes shot one down, as did Hine. Maj. John Mitchell reported that Hine's left engine was hit and began to smoke, and he was last seen at 0940, losing altitude four miles north of Shortland Island with three Zeros on his tail (as per Missing Aircrew Report No. 599 of 17 September 1943). On 28 May 1943 COMAIRSOLS called off the search for Hine. A COMAIRSOLS report to the Adjutant General on 9 February 1944 stated, "He (Hine) was not seen to crash. No wreckage of the plane was found." On 18 April a PBY Catalina of Navy Patrol Squadron 44 (VP44) piloted by LtUg) Harry Metke took off from Segond Channel, Espiritu Santo. It was assigned to fly a rescue patrol for an Army Air Force mission of "unknown purpose and destination." VP-44 took off four and a half hours before the P-38s, and on their way

Raymond Hine. (Canning)

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RAdm. Kanae Kosaka (right), CO of the No.26 Air Flotilla, waited in vain for Yamamoto on Kahili. (Nakamura via Lansdale)

The wreckage ofYamamoto's Betty was made into a shrine by the Japanese during the war and remains in the Bougainville jungle to this day: (SYMA via Lansdale)

they were to land off the coast of New Georgia to deliver supplies to coast watchers and pick up a downed airman. As they neared the New Georgia coast at 500 feet they spotted over a dozen P-38s flying below them at wave top level, heading toward the WNW (toward Bougainville). The PBY delivered the supplies and took off to continue its patrol. The Dumbo crew heard radio chatter over the intercom from the P-38 pilots, who were in a furious air battle, and then the Lightning reported that their mission was accomplished and were heading back to base. Metke also set a course back to Espiritu Santo, knowing that the faster P-38s would easily overtake him. AMMlc Charles Marsh was on watch in the waist hatch and saw a damaged P-38 to the starboard, making a wide, sweeping turn about a half-mile away. Marsh reported that at the end of its turn the badly damaged fighter pulled abeam of the PBY, both at about 700 feet altitude. Marsh reported the left engine was stopped and the propeller feathered, and he could see bullet holes in the engine cowling. Metke contacted the P-38 pilot on the radio and asked if he was OK. After a pause the pilot said he thought so. Metke then asked about the other engine, and the pilot replied that it appeared to be OK, and that he had enough fuel to get back to base. Metke told him that if he wanted to ditch the PBY could easily pick him up. The Lightning pilot hesitated and made another sweeping turn about a mile out. He then asked for a compass heading for Guadalcanal and said he thought he could make it back, and then flew off and out of sight. In January 1994, after reading Attack on Yamamoto, Marsh contacted the author, Carroll Glines, describing his memory of the 18 April 1943 VP-44 mission. In July 1994, only a month before his death, Metke stated:

Two Yamamoto mission top cover pilots were KIA within four and a half months. Gordon Whittaker was killed less than two weeks later on a mission over Bougainville, while Eldon Stratton was killed over Vella Lavella on the last day of August. But the enduring American epilogue to the Yamamoto Mission has been the prolonged and often rancorous controversy over who shot down Yamamoto.

"I had no knowledge of the plans to attack Yamamoto, nor of the P-38 squadron that was in the area while we were there. When the news came out about the Yamamoto ambush, I realized it was an amazing coincidence that we were in the area at the time." ("Tales ofthe Solomon Islands Intercept," VP-44 Chronicles, James Mills).

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The Japanese Epilogue At 1430 a Japanese official secret cable reached Rabaul from the C-in-C, Southeast Area Fleet at Buin. The message stated that Yamamoto's aircraft had "encountered and engaged in combat more than a dozen enemy fighters" and had been seen by the Zero escort pilots "to dive at a shallow angle into the jungle eleven nautical miles to the west ofBuin emitting flames." The message went on to inform Rabaul that a rescue party had been sent out to the crash site. A construction crew had also seen an aircraft crash into the jungle and was ordered to proceed toward the crash site. Neither group was able to find the crash by sunset. The search was resumed at dawn and continued without success until dusk, when a construction worker came upon a wreck with "323" on its vertical fin. The Betty's fuselage had broken on impact just forward of the tail assembly, and everything forward of the wings was crushed and burned. Bodies were found lying in the vicinity of the wreck. Yamamoto was found to the left in a stand of trees strapped to his seat, with R.Adm. Takata nearby. On the right side of the wreckage the bodies of Cdr. Toibana and the pilot were found. The next day the bodies were taken to Buin, where Cdr. Gisaburo Tabuchi, Chief Medical Officer of the First Base Unit, performed the autopsy on Yamamoto that was discussed earlier. Afterward the Admiral's body and the others were cremated and the ashes put into boxes. His cremation pit was filled, and two papaya trees, his favorite fruit, were planted on the mound. A shrine was erected, and Japanese naval personnel cared for the graves until the end of the war. Yamamoto's remains were secretly taken back to Rabaul and then

Part Three, Chapter 8 - Yamamoto Mission on to Truk and Yamamoto's flagship, the Musashi. The news of Yamamoto's death was kept from the Japanese public until 21 May, when the Musashi steamed into Tokyo Bay. On 5 June a state funeral was held, with a million people lining the streets as his ashes passed. Yamamoto's ashes were buried next to Adm. Togo, the victor of the great naval Battle of Tsushima against the Russians on 5 June 1905, in which Yamamoto took part a year after graduating from the Japanese Naval Academy and was wounded in action, losing two fingers. A second urn of ashes was given to Yamamoto's wife and was buried alongside his father in a small Buddhist temple. The immediate effect of Yamamoto's death was its impact on Japanese military and civilian morale. It had no effect on the final outcome of the war, which had already turned in the Allies' favor. The talented admiral had already gone down in naval history for his brilliant execution of naval warfare in the first months of the war, and surely if he had lived he would have made better use of his forces than those commanders who followed him, and would have made the victory more costly for the Americans. There were no more Japanese victories after Yamamoto's death. His successor, Adm. Kogo, died in a plane crash off the Philippine coast in March 1944. Adm. Ugaki, who survived the attack, lived until the last day of the war, when he led and died in a fruitless Kamikaze attack on American naval units off Okinawa. Controversy over the Yamamoto Mission It was all over in less than five minutes. One Betty, carrying Admi-

ral Yamamoto, had crashed and burned in the jungles of Bougainville near the village of Aku. Another Betty, with Admiral Ugaki aboard, had crashed in the sea off Moila Point, and several of the escorting Zeros were believed to have been shot down. Major Mitchell radioed "Mission accomplished!" and ordered everyone home. Lanphier and Barber, separated during the melee, individually made their way back. Lanphier was the first of the attack section to return to Fighter 2 and excitedly announced his victories. Roger Ames recalled: "I can still remember how upset I was when Tom Lanphier made his statement over the open mike." According to the Guadakanal approach control director on duty the day of the mission, Lt. Ug) Edward C. Hutcheson, USNR, Lanphier announced over the radio:

Bill Harris, who had not been on the mission, recalled that Lanphier was riding up and down the flight line in ajeep, bragging, "I got him! I got the son of a bitch!" When Holmes returned to Fighter 2 from his fuel stop in the Russells, he discovered that the credit for the destruction of both Betty bombers had been given to Barber and Lanphier. Holmes was furious, as he had also shot down a Betty. Confusion reigned, as none of the pilots were able to confirm each other's victories. The top cover pilots only saw a single column of black smoke rising from the jungle. About the emerging controversy Mitchell said: "I didn't give a damn, we did what we were supposed to do. It didn't make any difference to me who shot the admiral down." Unfortunately, Mitchell didn't conduct a formal debriefing, especially of Barber, Lanphier, and Holmes, which he forever regretted. However, formal debriefings were not SOP until later in the war. Meanwhile, no one questioned the dynamic Lanphier's claim, and he repeated his story to anyone who would listen. Barber, returning to base after Lanphier, also overheard Lanphier's victory statements and, with some initation, asked, "How in the hell do you know you got Yamamoto?" Then, according to Barber, Lanphier called him a "damn liar!" Lanphier's intense response surprised Barber. Said Barber; "I hadn't made a statement. I just asked a question, but he was calling me a 'damn liar' for asking a question." After the mission Mitscher sent a top-secret message to Halsey announcing: "Pop goes the weasel. P-38s led by Major J. William Mitchell USAAF visited Kahili area. About 0930 shot down two bombers escorted by 6 Zeros flying close formation. I other bomber shot down believed on test flight. 3 Zeros added to the score sum total 6. 1 P-38 failed return. April 18 seems to be our day." It appears as though the Holmes claim was now somehow credited as a bomber on a "test flight." The destruction of three bombers was reconfirmed in a later message. April 18 referred to the date of the Doolittle "30 Seconds Over Tokyo" mission on the same date a year earlier in 1942.

Halsey replied to Mitscher: "I got Yamamoto! I got the son of a bitch! He won't dictate peace terms in the White House now!" Just after Lanphier landed he was met by Lt. Joseph Young, who reported: "From the aircraft he claimed victory over Admiral Yamamoto in no uncertain terms. His reaction was astounding to me and appeared to be iuational. He was visibly shaken, but very adamant about his victory." (via George Chandler)

"Congratulations to you and Major Mitchell. Sounds as though one of the ducks in their bag was a peacock." A secret "official" Fighter Interception Report (FIR) was prepared and signed by the intelligence officers who had helped Mitchell prepare the mission, Capt. William Morrison and Lt. Joseph McGuigan. Neither Mitchell, Barber, nor Holmes were consulted. The report was filed on 21 June and forwarded to Halsey. The complete combat portion of the mission was:

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13th Fighter Command in World War II "When Lanphier and Barber were within one mile of contact their attack was observed by the enemy. The bombers nosed down, one started a 360-degree tum dive, the other going out and away toward the shoreline; the Zeros dropped their belly tanks and three peeled down, in a string, to intercept Lanphier. When he saw that he could not reach the bomber he turned up and into the enemy, exploding the first Zero, and firing into the others as they passed. By this time he had reached 6,000 feet, so he nosed over and went down to the treetops after his escaping objective. He came into the bomber broadside and fired his bursts-a wing fell off and the plane went flaming to earth. The Zeros were now pursuing him and had the benefit of altitude. His mission accomplished, he hedgehopped the trees and made desperate maneuvers to escape. He kicked rudder, slipped and skidded, tracers were flying his plane, but finally he outran them. In all the action he had received two 7.7s in his horizontal stabilizer. Barber had gone in with Lanphier on the initial attack. He went for one of the bombers but its maneuvers caused him to overshoot a little. He whipped back, however, and although pursued by Zeros, caught the bomber and destroyed it. When he fired, the tail section flew off, and the bomber turned over on its back and plummeted to earth. By this time, Holmes had been able to drop his tank and with' Hine, who stayed in formation with him, came in to ward off the Zeros who were pursuing Barber. A dogfight ensued, but results were not observed. The flight was on its way outside of the combat area (in the neighborhood of the enemy airbases at Kahili, Ballale, and Shortland-Faisi) when Holmes noticed a stray bomber near Moila Point flying low over the water. He dove on it, his bursts setting it smoking in the left engine; Hine also shot at it, and Barber polished it off with a burst to the fuselage. The bomber exploded; a piece of the plane flew off, cut through his left wing, and knocked out his left inner cooler, and other chunks left paint streaks on his wing, so close was his attack driven home.

The pilots gathered on the 19 th for PR photos and honors for their successful mission. (L-R) Lt. Col. Aaron Tyler (CO 18FG). Lt. Everett Anglin (12FS). Capt. Thomas Lanphier (70FS), Lt. Eldon Stratton (12FS). Maj.Gen. Nathan Twining (CO 13AF), Maj.John Mitchell (CO 339FS) and Lt. Rex Barber (339FS). (Lansdale)

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Holmes, Hine, and Barber returned home, however, Zeros were coming in on Barber's tail and Holmes whipped up and around and shot one down in flames. Another attempt to draw away ended in another dogfight, during which Barber shot down a Zero. During this time Hine's left engine started to smoke, and he was last seen losing altitude south of Shortland Island. It is believed that Hine also accounted for a Zero, as a total of three enemy fighters were seen to fall into the sea during this part of the combat. Holmes eventually ran out of gas and made a successful landing at the Russell Islands, from which he later brought his plane safely back. The damage to the cooling system of Barber's left motor prevented him from pulling more than 30 inches of mercury at low levels and 25 inches at 4/5,000 feet, but despite this limitation to his speed and rate of climb he brought his plane safely home. The success of this extraordinary mission-a 435-mile over water interception by land planes largely over water-was due to in large measure to Major Mitchell...." Halsey forwarded the secret FIR in letter form to Nimitz in Hawaii, who in turn endorsed it and forwarded it to Adm. Ernest King in Washington. Nimitz instructed King not to publicize the top-secret mission, and that Mitchell and his participating pilots would be awarded the "appropriate" awards. Mitscher requested that Mitchell, Lanphier, Barber, Holmes, and Hine be granted the Navy Medal of Honor, and the other participants the Navy Cross. On I May Lt.Gen. Millard Harmon, 13AF CG, sent a letter with the FIR to Gen. Arnold. Thus, the Fighter Interception Report and these follow up messages were to become accepted by Army and Navy as the legitimate official version of the Yamamoto Mission. All three surviving pilots, Barber, Lanphier, and Holmes, were credited with equal victories. Each had received credit for one Betty and one Zero. In addition, Ray Hine was also credited with a Zero kill. From all the documentary evidence now available from both Japanese and American sources, the only Japanese losses for the day in the Buin-Ballale area were the two Betty bombers transporting the Combined Fleet staff. No Zeros had been destroyed. The official kill credits contained in the Fighter Interception Report appeared to placate the pilots in the attack section and, at that time, any ill will over the kill awards appears to have abated. .A few days after the mission, Barber, Lanphier, and Brig.Gen. Dean "Doc" Strother (13AF FC Ops Officer) were given ten days R & R, and they flew to Auckland, New Zealand. During this time, the men played many rounds of golf. During one round Barber asked, "I wonder how they ever got a mission report together to send to higher headquarters?" Barber said Lanphier replied, "Don't worry about it, Rex. I went over to the Ops tent that evening and helped to draft the report and filled in the important details. I also helped write our citations for the Medal of Honor." (via Barber, who also said Strother verified this conversation) It is no wonder that Lanphier persistently referred to the Fighter Interception Report that was declassified in the late 1950s as the official version of the mission in defending his position as the Yamamoto victor throughout the years. Senior AP war correspondent J. Norman Lodge joined the golfing threesome one day. Lodge was able to use this time on the course

Part Three, Chapter 8 - Yamamoto Mission to question the men regarding details of the Yamamoto Mission. Barber and Strother were under the impression that Lodge knew most of what had happened from other sources, and they did not regard his questions as being more than a need to elaborate on some of the details. Lodge wrote his story, in which he stated, "We have every reason to believe it was Yamamoto in one of the bombers." Lodge ended his story with, "Have every reason to believe one of your quail was a peacock and it was Yamamoto who was indeed that peacock." When Lodge submitted his story of the Yamamoto Mission to the U.S. Navy censors for clearance the original made its way to Admiral Halsey. Halsey was enraged at the obvious breakdown of the secrecy with which the Navy had regarded this mission. There was great fear that the Japanese would discover that Naval Intelligence was reading the most secret and sensitive Japanese ciphers. There were probably hundreds of Army, Navy, and Marine personnel in the South Pacific who had heard something about the Yamamoto mission, mostly through ubiquitous military scuttlebutt. The high command had issued orders that the mission was not to be discussed, but many of the men in the area had been transferred and many were returning to the States. The FBI and military investigators watched newspapers and magazines for any disclosure of the mission. Naval intelligence evaluated all intercepted Japanese messages to determine if they suspected that their codes had been deciphered and/or had changed their codes. After Yamamoto had been shot down the Southeast Area Fleet at Rabaul and the Combined Fleet Command were on the line to take the blame. Their first reaction and explanation was that their code had been broken, but the Japanese High Command and their code division thought this was not possible, and that Yamamoto's death was an unfortunate coincidence. After Strother, Barber, and Lanphier returned to Noumea, Admiral Halsey called the three to a conference in which he profanely dressed them down for having revealed such top-secret information to a correspondent (via Barber). Furthermore, Halsey withdrew the Navy's recommendation for the Medal of Honor for the mission participants and downgraded the award to the Navy Cross, and the other participant's Navy Crosses were downgraded to Distinguished Flying Crosses. He also ordered Rear Admiral Mitscher (COMAIRSOL) to conduct a complete investigation of the affair. Admiral Mitscher's report stated that, according to Capt. William Morrison, AAF, only one reference had been made in public regarding the identity of Admiral Yamamoto as the target of the mission. Morrison testified that "a remark, believed to have come from Capt. Lanphier" had been made, and it was: "That son of a bitch won't dictate any peace terms in the White House." Mitscher, in his conclusion to Halsey, wrote, "No evidence has been unearthed which would indicate that any information concerning this strike was passed to newspapermen directly or indirectly." By this time, however, scores of individuals had learned of the "top-secret" mission and, most regretfully, Barber and Lanphier had indeed confirmed to Lodge the details of his story. Lodge's account was also stamped as "top secret," but it became one of the major components in the grist of future controversy.

On 26 May 1943 Mitchell, Barber, Lanphier, Canning, Goerke, Holmes, and Jacobson were ordered to the States. Mitchell and Lanphier were sent to Washington to be interrogated by intelligence units. Both pilots were interviewed by War Department Public Relations, which issued the following release on 17 June: "Captain Lanphier brought down two Japanese bombers on April 18 while participating in a sweep led by Major Mitchell. While the Major climbed with 12 Lightnings to furnish high cover, Capt. Lanphier's flight offour started the attack and brought down a total of six enemy planes." No mention was made of Yamamoto. The release went on to credit Lanphier with seven victories when he had five. On 31 Maya Time magazine article had preceded this press release. There had been a Time correspondent on Guadalcanal, and he obviously had heard the Yamamoto story. Lanphier claims in his biography that the correspondent had interviewed the Yamamoto

An obvious post-mission PR photo of Capt. John Mitchell (right) and Capt. Thomas Lanphier discussing the Yamamoto mission. As the years passed acrimony took the place of the smiles in this picture. (Author)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II pilots, but none, other than Lanphier, remember this interview, so perhaps Lanphier, alone, gave the interview to the Time correspondent? The correspondent passed the story on to the Time Washington bureau, which was able to follow up on the rumors of the mission and piece together the story and the identity of the "hero" who shot down Yamamoto. This issue featured a caricature of Yamamoto on its cover, and an article on page 28 reported his death. The article ended with, "When the name of the man who killed Admiral Yamamoto is released, the U.S. will have a new hero. Said one veteran of the Pacific service: 'The only better news would be a bullet through Hitler.''' Then on page 66 there was a not too subtle article entitled "Heroes, The Younger Generation." The first part of the article described a mission of 16 P-38 fighters flying near Kahili where 12 fighters had climbed for top cover and: "The four near the water bored on, found unexpected game; three Jap bombers waddling home with a heavy cover of Zeros. The bombers lurched frantically for the cover of their own antiaircraft. The Zeros piled into the Lightnings and both top covers swirled in a thundering dogfight. Down below, Lt. Rex T. Barber whipped into a bomber, sawed off its tail with a burst of fire, and knocked off a second as he pulled out of the attack. The squadron commander, lean, black-eyed Capt. Thomas G. Lanphier, tangled with a low-flying Zero, shot it down. He swung away, picked a bomber, shot it down, too. Up above the top cover fight had broken off. A mission had been completed. The squadron whisked back to the Solomons base, wondered if it nailed some Jap bigwig in the bombers." Accompanying the article was a photo of a shirtless macho Lanphier, who was now the squadron commander! No mention was made of Mitchell. Mitchell, Lanphier, Barber, and Holmes received their Navy Crosses later at the bases to which they were assigned. Mitchell and Lanphier then were sent on a tour of AAF basic flying schools to talk with student pilots. Lanphier was not sent back to the Pacific, but was assigned to the Pentagon, where his father had been

Mitchell and Lanphier were sent back to the States on a tour of AAF basic flying schools to talk with student pilots. (Author)

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assigned as a Lt. Colonel after he had been recalled to active duty. The senior Lanphier was a graduate of West Point who had won his wings in World War I and had known AAF generals, including "Hap" Arnold and Jimmie Doolittle, since his WW-I days. Lanphier's father gave his son an entrEe to old friends and public relations people. He made PR flights around the country and was sent to Europe to survey fighter operations there. He was promoted to Major and then to Lt. Colonel at the end of the war. Lanphier was eager to write his account of his part in the mission and his career as a combat pilot. Twice in 1944 he submitted narratives for security review, but it was not until after th.e war that his story was cleared and appeared, along with the War Department's "official" release that credited him with the shoot down. In his biography Lanphier claims that the Air Force had asked him to write his account of the mission for the New York Times. On II September 1945 his three part bylined story appeared in the Times, and a slightly different three part story was picked up by the North American ewspaper Alliance and syndicated to newspapers across the country. Of course, Lanphier's articles portrayed Lanphier as the mission's hero, its leader and planner, and the man who shot down Yamamoto. In the article Lanphier stated that after he shot down the attacking Zero: "I kicked my ship over on its back and looked down for the lead Japanese bomber. It had dived inland. As I hung in the sky I got an impression, off to the east, of a swirl of aircraft against the blue-a single Lightning silhouetted against the light in a swarm of Zeros. That was Barber, having himself a time. The two Zeros that had overshot me showed up again, diving toward Yamamoto's bomber from an angle slightly off to my right. They meant to get me before I got the bomber. It looked from where I sat as if the bomber, the Zeros, and I might all get to the same place at the same time. We very nearly did. The next three or four seconds spelled life or death. I remember getting suddenly very stubborn about making the most of one good shot I had coming up. I fired a long steady burst across the bomber's course of flight, from approximately right angles (italics added). The bomber's right engine, then its right wing (italics added) burst into flame. The two oillushing Zeros saw it, too. They screamed past overhead, unwilling to chance ajungle crash to get me. In that second I realized my impetus would carry me directly behind the Mitsubishi's tail cannon. Just as I moved into range of Yamamoto's bomber and its cannon the bomber's wing tore off. The bomber plunged into the jungle. It exploded. That was the end of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Everyone in top cover had seen the two bombers crash in the jungle in flames. There was no doubt of their complete destruction." Already there were discrepancies in Lanphier's story, some of which would not show up until the bomber's wreckage was examined in 1972 (Darby), 1978 (Kauslick), 1981 (Gwynn-Jones), 1985 (Channon), and 1988 (by Darby again). All these visits to the wreckage confirmed that it had both wings, no tail guns were ever found,

Part Three, Chapter 8 - Yamamoto Mission and the bullets had entered into the rear of the bomber. But on reading Lanphier's article the top cover pilots confirmed that they did not see any aircraft, much less two, crash into the jungle, and only one has ever been found. Maj. Barber was CO of the 27FS in California at the time and was surprised by Lanphier's storie's inaccuracies. Barber asked his CO, ex-Flying Tiger Col. David "Tex" Hill, to call Lanphier at the Pentagon. With Hill listening, Barber told Lanphier that his story and the interception report were inaccurate, and that he better do something about it, fast. Lanphier apologized and told Barber he would set the record straight ASAP. Barber received a letter from Lanphier a few days later saying he was at the Pentagon and was in a position to do something about the Fighter Interception Report, and would have the Navy Cross citations rewritten to clarify the facts of the mission and to give credit to everyone on the mission. Lanphier did nothing, and Barber and Mitchell did not see the interception report until 1950 when it was declassified. A few months later the Army Times published a similar article to the New York Times article, and by the end of July 1946, Col. Mitchell had read enough of the Lanphier versions and wrote to Gen. Spaatz, who was theAAF CG, asking him to clarify the record. Mitchell related his version of the story and asked that Barber also be given credit for shooting down Yamamoto. He emphasized that Barber could just as well have shot down Yamamoto as Lanphier. Mitchell asked Spaatz to set the record straight with some sort of public announcement, but received an equivocal repiy, and there was no review of the mission. Mitchell's position was that no one knew for certain (at that time) which plane Yamamoto was aboard, and thus no one knew who shot him down. Meanwhile Lanphier used every opportunity to relate "his" Yamamoto story, making public appearances introduced as the "man who shot down Yamamoto." He wrote several articles on the subject; including a widely read 1966 article for Reader's Digest entitled "I Shot Down Yamamoto" that was basically a synopsis of the New York Times articles. Lanphier states in his biography that the Air Force asked him to write the Reader's Digest article 21 years after the fact!. In a videotaped interview in the mid-1970s Lanphier related still another version of his story: "I was coming at him from a right angle, which is an impossible angle to shoot at another airplane, it can't be done and let alone with another airplane going a couple of hundred miles an hour and you're going another couple hundred miles per hour. And just to be sure everything was working right I cleared my guns long before I figured 1 would have to shoot, and his right engine started to burn. I hit him. If I would have waited until I was ready I would have been behind him and he would have gotten away Scot-free. But he caught fire and just about the time I got behind him as I was about to pass behind him with his guns still going which was bothering me, he just nosed into the treetops and blew up" (Dead Men's Secret's: The Yamamoto Mission, The History Channel) The pompous Lanphier had problems not only with his Yamamoto story, but also with his victory totals. On 24 December

1942, while flying a P-39 Lanphier claimed a Zero for the 70FS over Guadalcanal. However, this victory seems to be in error, as diligent air combat researcher Dr. Frank Olynyk found no mention of it in 70FS records. As mentioned earlier Lanphier, in his unpublished, self-aggrandizing biography, seems confused and commingles his missions of 23, 24, and 26 December, and he credits himself with two Zeros on the 24 th ! Lanphier also claimed an undocumented victory over Truk while flying on an "intelligence mission" aboard a B-17 out of Fiji in the summer of 1942. The War Department PR release (as briefed by Lanphier!) after the Yamamoto Mission described the B-17 intelligence mission: "Twelve Zeros attacked the bomber and three other B-17s in the flight. Capt. Lanphier seized a waist gun and knocked down one of the attackers. All of the Japanese planes were destroyed." The bomber's crew refused to confirm the victory, but Lanphier claimed it anyway on his aerial resume. Hearing the story Barber asked Lanphier why he went on the B-17 mission, and Lanphier replied that he was patriotic like Barber, but also had another agenda. Barber reported that Lanphier told him that someday he wanted to become the President of the United States and would use his war record to do so, even if it cost his life (via Barber). The obituary for his burial in Arlington National Cemetery, November 1987, stated: "Mr. Lanphier shot down the plane carrying Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto... was credited with downing nine Japanese planes, damaging eight on the ground, and sinking a destroyer." It appears he took credit for four more victories and the unassisted sinking of the Shortland's "destroyer." Lanphier wrote an unpublished biography that provides an insight into his self-promoting, arrogant personality. The chapters are filled with his academic, social, and military achievements, and the dropped names oftop political, entertainment, and sports figures. In the manuscript he maintained that ground victories in the Pacific should be credited toward total victories similar to the ETO procedure, and he often credited himself with these victories. His P-38 Association biography states that he had 17 victories, as he included nine (!) in the air and eight on the ground as total victories. By the mid-1980s Lanphier became more adamant about his Yamamoto victory. During a Smithsonian ational Air and Space Museum speech on 11 April 1985 he called Rex Barber: "...one of the most decorated, one of the most aggressive, effective fighter pilots in the Solomon Islands. He got the staff bomber on the Yamamoto Mission. I got the lead bomber." Lanphier then credited Maj.Gen. John Condon (USMC), who was in the audience, with formulating the mission plan, and did not mention Mitchell! He then repeated his clearing his guns version of his attack and shoot down of the Yamamoto bomber. In the 1980s, as his detractors increased, Lanphier disdained anyone who questioned his version of the Mission, saying:

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13th Fighter Command in World War II "I have always felt the simple facts and records of them were enough for me. I have not-nor intend-to get into a pointless controversy with people trying to rewrite history from the sidelines decades after the fact. For my part, I do not consider as 'official,' historical studies written years after the action by men who were not at the scene of the action. I prefer to base the validity of my account of an operational mission on the official debriefing (the FIR -author) by combat-experienced pilots who were there that day. I'm simply going to cite official record and let it go at that." (Yamamoto Mission, John Wible, Nimitz Foundation, TX, 1988) Lanphier died in a San Diego Veteran's Hospital on Thanksgiving Day 1987. After the war "the man who shot down Yamamoto" had a distinguished career, becoming the Editor of the Idaho Statesman newspaper, VP of Convair Aircraft Co., President of FairbanksMorse, a VP of Raytheon Corp., and was a special assistant to Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington. Lanphier never became President of the United States as he had hoped. He believed he had a chance to become Symington's Vice Presidential running mate in the 1960 Democratic Convention, where the two thought they could become dark horse Democratic Party candidates in the event of a vote split between John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. The controversy did not die with Lanphier. The Second Yamamoto Mission Association (SYMA) In the mid-1950s Japanese records established that two bombers, not three, were lost over Bougainville on 18 April 1943; one was shot down over the jungle and one over the sea. It appeared one of the pilots had fabricated his story. With each telling of the story the antagonism between the participants grew. During the succeeding years many articles, most by Lanphier, and one major book, Burke Davis' Get Yamamoto, were written regarding the Yamamoto Mission. In 1984, an organization was formed to study and document the details, as well as the controversial issues surrounding the Yamamoto Mission. The "Second Yamamoto Mission Association" (SYMA) was founded and led by George T. Chandler, a 339th Fighter Squadron veteran and ace. Chandler believed that a great historical injustice had been perpetrated against a fellow pilot and friend, Rex Barber. SYMA gathered a group of veterans, forensic experts, and historians, whose task became focused on every detail of what factually occurred on 18 April 1943 over Bougainville, and on the innumerable aspects of the victory award controversy. In its effort to get the records in the Office of Air Force History (OAFH) corrected to accurately reflect how and who shot down Yamamoto, SYMA found numerous inconsistencies in the way that the history of the Yamamoto mission had been developed. The following SYMA material recounts the major events surrounding the controversy, provides the basis for a correction of the record, and provides Rex Barber the credit that he is due. It is presented in abstracted form by permission of SYMA and its president. The Yamamoto Interception Report When the pilots returned to Guadalcanal from the fight over Bougainville there was a lot of talk, particularly by Lanphier, and some argument over what had happened, but there was no careful

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debriefing with individual pilots separated and debriefed by intelligence officers or mission leader John Mitchell. The Yamamoto Mission Report has the handwritten signatures "Morrison & McGuigan" as the authors of the report. Early in SYMA's investigation, Rex Barber told George Chandler that the morning after the Yamamoto mission was flown, Tom Lanphier sat down beside Barber and told him that he, Tom Lanphier, had gone to the Navy intelligence office and had written the entire mission report for the intelligence officers. Of all of the combat reports of actions by USAAF fighters in air battles in the Solomons for a few months prior to the Yamamoto mission, none has anything like the explanation in detail that is written up in the combat report about the Yamamoto mission. At the time of the mission report writing, no one had any way of knowing which bomber Admiral Yamamoto was a passenger. Rex Barber said that he attacked a bomber, shot pieces off of the tail, shot into the right engine and then through the fuselage, and into the left engine and back into the right engine, following it down to the treetops. The bomber slowed abruptly and Barber swerved to miss it and, looking back, saw a pillar of smoke from the jungle and the escorting Zeros attacking him. With good luck and very skillful flying he got away from the Zeros and out over the water, and saw a Betty bomber under attack by two P-38s (Besby Holmes and Ray Hine). Barber joined in the attack, the bomber exploded from his gunfire, and he flew through the pieces of the bomber, resulting in substantial damage to his airplane from hitting different pieces. At the Nimitz Yamamoto Retrospective in April 1988, surviving Zero pilot Kenji Yanagiya stated emphatically that all six of the Zeros escorting the bombers returned to Rabaul, and he knew each one of the pilots and not one of them was shot down. Japanese records confirmed that not one of the six escorting Zeros was lost. Yanagiya also stated that the Admiral's aircraft never made a turn, but flew straight towards Buin until it went down in the jungle. The squadron records showed one full credit for a bomber shot down by Rex Barber; one full credit for a bomber shot down by Lanphier; and a half credit each to Barber and Holmes for the one bomber shot down over the water. Because the interception had been made on the basis of intelligence information of Yamamoto's plans that came from our intelligence people having broken the Japanese naval code, it was of utmost importance that the Japanese not discover that their code had been broken. So this mission was not publicized, and it appears that references in the official records were minimized. Post War Aerial Victory Credits After the war Tom Lanphier wrote numerous articles about the mission and claimed that he had shot down the bomber carrying Yamamoto. These articles, written in the same flowery manner as the "mission report," have been provided repeatedly to OAFH, and make clear Lanphier's claim to have shot down Yamamoto, alone and unassisted. In 1969, the original recount on World War II aerial victory credits was begun under the supervision of Dr. Maurer, then Chief of the Historical Studies Branch. The branch was examining Japa-

Part Three, Chapter 8 - Yamamoto Mission nese records as well as American records. Notes from 1969 by Dr. Maurer explain that the credit for the Yamamoto bomber was split between Barber and Lanphier after he and his staff discovered that only one bomber went down in the Bougainville jungle. Subsequent evidence confirmed that there were only two Betty bombers in the Yamamoto flight. Cards prepared for USAF Historical Study #85, "USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft, World War II," seem to be all that is left of the "working papers." Two cards for Lanphier and Barber dated 18 April 1943 suggest that a 1.00 on each card was changed to .50. Apparently, Lanphier and Barber were each given credit for shooting down a bomber over Bougainville, but the credit was split. USAF Historical Study #85 actually appeared in 1978, although the cards for Lanphier and Barber were changed in 1969 when the study was still being compiled. Lanphier objected to the change giving him only half credit for the shoot down of the Yamamoto bomber. He persuaded Brigadier General Michael J. Jackson, USAF, Ret, to petition Dr. Richard H. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History, to have a determination made by the Office ofAir Force History that Lanphier should have 100% of the credit for the shoot down of Yamamoto. Dr. Kohn created a Victory Credit Board (VCB) of Review at the USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL, to reconsider the awarding of victory credits for the destruction of Admiral Yamamoto's airplane on 18 April 1943. This Victory Credit Board of Review met on 22 March 1985, with Mr. R. Cargill Hall, Chief, Research Division, Office of Air Force History, as the Recorder. There were three different versions of the Record of Proceedings as furnished by R. Cargill Hall that are referenced. While all of the Records of Proceedings are similar in their description of the engagement, the reader should pay attention to how the Bibliography of Reference, considered by the VCB, increased as successive Records of Proceedings were written by R. Cargill Hall. The conclusion reached by the VCB of Review includes these significant paragraphs:

"The evidence points to 1st Lt. Barber as the first to fire on Admiral Yamamoto's lead bomber, setting it afire and causing a portion of the tail empennage to fly off. But the burning bomber, in the words ofAdmiral Ugaki, continued to fly under power just above the jungle, losing altitude. Barber's wingman, Captain Lanphier, once disengaged from the Zeros, next struck Yamamoto's bomber broadside, severing a wing. The bomber turned over on its back and plummeted to earth. Barber, on looking back after his pass, saw the airplane fall and understandably presumed it to be the result of his attack. During the heat of ensuing dogfights, 1st Lt. Holmes observed Admiral Ugaki's Betty proceeding southeasterly near Moila Point. Holmes attacked the second bomber, 'setting it smoking in the left engine.' Barber 'polished it off,' pieces of the bomber exploding outward from the impact of the 20mm cannon shells, and some of them striking his fighter. Admiral Ugaki's bomber, however, did not explode in the air as Barber supposed, but rather dove out of control into the sea. Based on the guidelines established by XIII Fighter Command for the awarding of victory credits, credit for the destruction of both bombers is properly shared; the findings of the original USAF Historical Division victory credit team are judged to be accurate and confirmed; the official USAF shared credits will remain unaltered for this engagement. Neither pilot had either a gun camera or independent observer confirmation of what they said they did that day, as was required under 13 th Air Force regulations for aerial victory credits, although Lanphier's statements repeatedly confirm that he observed Barber shoot a bomber down over the jungle."

Yamamoto Mission survivors at the Nimitz Symposium (L-R) Roger Ames, Douglas Canning, KenjiYanagiya, Delton Goerke,JackJacobson, Besby Holmes, and John Mitchell (mission CO) (Canning)

Rex Barber (right) and Kenji Yanagiya at the first Adm. Nimitz Symposium in 1988. Yanagiya was the sole surviving Yamamoto Mission Zero escort pilot. The "Zero" in the photo is an AT-6 Texan configured as a Zero by the Confederate Air Force. (Canning)

Thus, the Air Force disposed of the matter in a mere one hour and forty minutes by again sanctioning the conclusions of the Maurer study and USAF Historical Study #85. Ironically, their conclusions were unsatisfactory to Mitchell, Barber, and Lanphier. At the 1988 Yamamoto Retrospective in Fredericksburg, TX, George Chandler asked Cargill Hall if the Office of Air Force His-

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13th Fighter Command in World War II tory had made any efforts to examine the wreckage of the Yamamoto bomber? It seemed that physical evidence would prove or disprove the inconsistent statements made by the two pilots, i.e., Barber and Lanphier. If the right wing had not been shot off in flight, it would conclusively prove that Lanphier did not attack the Yamamoto airplane. Cargill Hall responded, saying that there had been no effort by the Office of Air Force History to examine the wreckage, and it would be too expensive to do so. George Chandler told him that it would look like a very easy mission for a crash investigating team to fly from Clark Field in the Philippines to the commercial airport in Bougainville, and there. take a helicopter from the mining company and go in to the wreckage. They could then prove what happened or did not happen. Chandler then asked Cargill Hall the direct question: "If I take a team, including a qualified crash investigating engineer, to the wreckage site in Bougainville, will you convene a new Victory Credit Board to review the evidence that we bring?"

Cargill Hall declined to respond to that question. At that moment, Hall knew that both wings were still attached to the Yamamoto bomber as it entered the jungle, and that the left wing was torn off by impact with a tree, and the right wing was immediately adjacent to the fuselage and right engine. Cargill Hall, as Chief of Research for the Office of Air Force History, was professionally dishonest when he did not share with Chandler that he and Dr. Kohn already knew that neither wing of the Yamamoto bomber had been shot off in flight. Of course, it would have been unfair to let SYMA make an expensive trip to the Bougainville jungle to find information that he already knew. But even more damning is the fact that he knew the Yamamoto bomber did not have a wing shot off, and thus he knew that Lanphier could not have attacked the Yamamoto bomber. His only possible motive was that he and Dr. Kohn were determined to preserve the half credit to each pilot, no matter what the physical evidence proved. Was there pressure being brought to bear on Dr. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History, and Cargill Hall, Chief, Research Division, Office of Air Force History, that they should not do anything to change the half credit to each pilot? Or, did they make that decision themselves and stonewall all of the efforts and display of facts by SYMA to prove that Lanphier did not attack the Yamamoto airplane? A group of pilots from the 339th Fighter Squadron, together with a number of interested colleagues like Joe Pruett and his friends in the VFW in Kansas City, decided to form a SOI(C)(3) corporation to accept contributions, make a trip to the jungle, examine the wreckage, and bring detailed information back to the Office of Air Force History. The charter for the Second Yamamoto Mission Association (SYMA) was recorded 29 December 1988. Al Kauslick was an engineer with the copper mine on Bougainville, and interestingly, he was a personal friend of Tom Lanphier. Kauslick told SYMA that he could use the company helicopter to take a party into the jungle and save a full day of walking along a jungle trail. The team was formed and was ready to go when a civil war in Bougainville broke out and the team could not get visas.

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SYMA then started exchanging correspondence with Dr. Richard Kohn, Chief, OAFH, and Cargill Hall. Eugene Monihan and George Chandler made a trip to Washington and met with Dr. Kahn and Hall. They were assured verbally and in Dr. Kohn's letter of? December 1988 and his letter of 17 January 1989 that if credible new evidence were provided, he would convene a new Victory Credit Board of Review. In his letter of 22 March 1989, Dr. Kohn mentioned that in late 1987, after Cargill Hall received an invitation to chair the Survivor's Panel at the Yamamoto Retrospective, and when he discerned that the victory credit issue remained one of keen interest, he endeavored to gather all current information, including pictures of the aircraft wreckage. In early 1988 he showed pictures of the aircraft wreckage to an aeronautical engineer, who advised that the wing that fell ISO feet behind the aircraft was the outer left wing, damaged on the leading edge on impact with the trees, showing its spars bent backwards. (Had the wing separated in flight, the spars would have been bent upwards.) The right wing outer panel lay where that wing burned with the wreckage; apparently it did not detach in flight. Why did this information not cause Dr. Kahn to re-examine the report of the Victory Credit Board of Review? SYMA went to great effort to develop evidence from records other than what was in the Bougainville jungle. At SYMA's request, the famed P-38 pilot, Lefty Gardner, flew his P-38 and duplicated the maneuvers that Lanphier said he had performed. Lefty

FPO Kenji Yanagiya tried vainly to protect his C-in-C and was the only Zero pilot ofYamamoto's escort to survive the war. (Canning via Lansdale)

Part Three, Chapter 8 - Yamamoto Mission Gardner concluded that it was impossible for Lanphier to have done what he said he did-zooming up into the attacking Zeros, then rolling over on his back, dive down, and attack a bomber in the time between his left upward turn and when the Yamamoto plane was down in the jungle. In both a sworn affidavit and a 1975 videotaped interview of Kenji Yanagiya, the only surviving Yamamoto Zero escort pilot, he stated that there were only two Betty bombers, and that: "I saw one P-38 firing into the tail of Admiral Yamamoto's bomber and I saw the Admiral's airplane emitting smoke and flames while one P-38 was directly behind it. I saw the Admiral's airplane descend toward the jungle in an attitude of forced landing within 20 to 30 seconds from when I first saw one P-38 behind the Admiral's airplane firing into it. From the time that I first sighted any of the P38s until the Admiral's airplane was down in the jungle was two minutes or less." Yanagiya said that the Yamamoto bomber proceeded on a straight course towards Buin, so a calculation of Lanphier's overtaking speed showed conclusively that he had not overtaken the Yamamoto airplane in the 20-30 seconds before it was in the jungle as set forth by Yanagiya. It is interesting that Yanagiya also said that it was only approximately two minutes from the time they first saw the P-38s until the Admiral was down in the jungle. Dr. Richard Kohn later manipulated Yanagiya's statements wh~re Yanagiya said that from the time he first saw an attack on the Admiral's airplane until it was down in the jungle was about 20 seconds; he further stated that from the time they first saw the P-38s until the Admiral's plane was down in the jungle was about two minutes. Dr. Kohn, in his attempt to show that there was time for Lanphier to overtake Yamamoto's bomber after Lanphier zoomed up into the Zeros, manipulates the two minutes from first sighting to indicate that there were two minutes for pursuit by Lanphier. This was one of the reasons given by Dr. Kohn for refusing to convene a new Victory Credit Board of Review and let SYMA present the new evidence that it had accumulated.

Barber's Petition for Correction of Records SYMA, representing Rex Barber, next petitioned the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR) for a formal hearing, and an opportunity to present all of the evidence that SYMA had put together. The hearing was held 17-18 October 1991 in Washington, DC. C. Bruce Braswell, Executive Director, AFBCMR, later said that the presentation made by attorney Darrell Kellogg was the best presentation to a Board that he had ever seen. The Air Force Board consisted of Leroy T. Baseman, Chairman, John W. Beach, Herbert H. Kaiser, Ira Kemp, and Dr. Sydell P. Gold. No member of the Board was a pilot or had aviation training or expert knowledge. Chairman Leroy T. Baseman explained to all of those in attendance (i.e., John Mitchell, Rex Barber, Bob Radcliff, George Chandler, and Bill Wisecarver) that the Board would consider every piece of evidence and make a determination of how the Board regarded that evidence (i.e., unanimous, accepted, or rejected; if not unanimous, who voted yeah or nay, the reasons

for their vote, and that everyone would have to vote). TheAFBCMR would make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force. The Secretary of the Air Force was not bound by the recommendation and could make any decision that he felt was warranted. This was set forth under the law that created the Boards for Correction of Military Records of the different services. Apparent!y Dr. Kohn was concerned the AFBCMR would make a finding different from what had been the position of the OAFH under his administration. He wrote an article that was published in the spring 1992 issue of Air Power History that restated his previous position. Was he making an effort to influence the Board? SYMA thought so and objected, and asked Senator Bob Dole to call it to the attention of the Secretary of the Air Force, Donald B. Rice. The following is the exchange of correspondence between Senator Dole and Secretary Rice: "March 24, 1992 Dear Mr. Secretary: I am writing to express my concern about a recent article that the former Chief of Air Force History, Dr. Richard Kohn, published in the Spring, 1992, issue of Air Power History. Dr. Kohn's article gives his personal views of the shoot down of Japanese Admiral Yamamoto in April 1943. Although not present at the Air Force Board of the Correction of Military Records hearing in October 1991, Dr. Kohn dismisses the substantial evidence presented to the Board and disregards the testimony of two eye witnesses and over 200 pages of documents. As the Board is still in deliberation on this matter, I believe Dr. Kohn's timing of this article is extremely unfortunate and may appear as an attempt to influence the Board. I hope that you will ensure that the Board's decision rests on the preponderance of evidence and not external personal views that are contrary to the testimony, documentation and exhaustive investigation that was given in regard to this controversy. Sincerely, Bob Dole United States Senate" Rice's reply to Dole: "March 3 1, 1992 Dear Senator Dole: Thank you for your letter concerning Dr. Richard Kohn's article in Air Power History. I agree that the timing of this article is unfortunate but can assure you the article will not be considered in the deliberations of the Correction Board. The Executive Director of the Board has been in touch with Mr. Bill Wisecarver of your staff and Mr. George Chandler to confirm that Dr. Kohn is no longer the Air Force Historian and is not privy to the Board deliberations. There has been absolutely no ex parte contact between Board members, or Board staff, and Dr. Kohn, nor will there be. Only the evidence of record 157

13th Fighter Command in World War 1I will be considered by the Board in their deliberations.(emphasis added) I appreciate your patience with this case and will inform you as soon as a decision is reached. With regards, Donald B. Rice" It is most interesting that Secretary Rice says, "There has been absolutely no ex parte contact between Board members, or Board staff, and Dr. Kohn, nor will there be. Only the evidence of record will be considered by the Board in their deliberations." And yet SYMA learned in 1998 that board member Herbert H. Kaiser made his own independent investigation, outside of the hearing, and the record of the hearing. He based his negative vote and his scathing criticism of Rex Barber for asking for the hearing on anecdotal evidence that Kaiser gained outside of the hearing, and which Rex Barber and his attorney had no opportunity to examine or refute. It was Kaiser's minority report that was withheld from Barber until long after Secretary Rice had acted to deny Barber's petition. It was discovered by SYMA as a result of an FOIA request in 1999. Secretary Rice delayed his opinion and conclusion until he was leaving office at the end of 1992. Secretary Rice made the decision that the award of half credit to Lanphier and Barber should not be changed. Secretary Rice's decision was dated January 11, 1993. General McPeak, who was the Air Force Chief of Staff at that time, has said that the decision in 1992/1993 was reached by Secretary Rice, not on the merits of the case, but because the Air Staff decided that "too much time had passed, and there was no use trying to change history." The Air Force Board did not perform as Chairman Baseman had said that it would, under his administration as Chairman. He said that there would not be a tie vote because he would cast his vote to break any tie vote. Two members of the Board voted to make the change to award 100% of the credit to Rex Barber; two members, Mr. Kaiser and Dr. Gold, recommended leaving the findings as half credit for each pilot; Chairman Baseman declined to cast the deciding vote. He later said that he thought that he had cast a vote by his characterization of the proceedings. Mr. Kaiser made a long, scathing review of the entire process based on information, as mentioned above, that he gained outside the hearing, and that was not subject to examination by the full Board, or by Rex Barber and his attorney. SYMA, through attorney Dan Hyatt on behalf of Rex Barber, filed in the U.S. District Court in Oregon before Judge Jelderks a petition asking that the Board's decision be set aside because of improper procedures. Judge Je1derks made the decision that Secretary Rice had the absolute authority under the law to make whatever decision he wanted, and Judge Jelderks would not rule on which pilot shot down Yamamoto, but rather ruled that Secretary Rice had the authority to make whatever decision he wished. SYMA, through attorney Dan Hyatt, next appealed Judge Je1derks' decision to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, and the court upheld Judge Jelderks.

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Lanphier's "Smoking Gun" Letter to Doolittle In August 1995, George Chandler received a most interesting letter from author Carroll V. Glines. Glines had moved from Washington to the University of Texas at Dallas to be curator of all of the Jimmy Doolittle papers that had been left to the Doolittle Library at the University. Glines, in examining the Doolittle files, found a copy of a letter that Lanphier had sent to General John P. Condon dated December 15,1984. The key part of the letter to Condon that Glines called to Chandler's attention is the sentence that Lanphier writes about the Yamamoto shoot down, "Rex now opines that he shared in the destruction of Yamamoto's bomber by implying, I gather, that he hit it while it was elsewhere in the air before I shot it into the treetops. The bomber I shot the wing off of was intact from nose to the tip of its tail when I first fired at it, far inland from where Barber had to be at the time, chasing a bomber over the sea." This letter is the "smoking gun" that, in Lanphier's own words, proves that he did not attack the Yamamoto airplane that had already been damaged and set afire by Rex Barber, as set forth in the Victory Credit Board of Review commissioned by Dr. Kohn. The American Fighter Aces Association and Confederate Air Forces Back Barber The American Fighter Aces Association (AFAA) membership is made up of fighter pilots who, in air-to-air combat, shot down five or more enemy airplanes. The Association has a Victory Confirmation Board (VCB) that examines and confirms or rejects claims for aircraft shot down by pilots asking to be a member of the Association, and whose formal military record does not credit them with five or mor~ aerial victories. On 27 March 1997 SYMA, on behalf of Rex Barber, presented all of its evidence and studies regarding the Yamamoto shoot down to theAFAA VCB. The five members of the VCB carefully examined all of the written evidence and questioned Rex Barber very closely. The VCB then made their finding that, without question, Lanphier did not attack the Yamamoto airplane, and that insofar as the AFAA records the VCB recommended that Rex Barber be credited with 100% of the credit for the Yamamoto shoot down. This recommendation of the VCB to the AFAA Board of Directors was duly considered at the next board of directors meeting, and was confirmed as the official position of the Association. In the summer 1998 the General Staff of the Confederate Air Force selected Rex Barber and others to be inducted into the Confederate Air Force Combat Airman Hall of Fame. The General Staff of the CAF carefully examined all of the evidence that SYMA had presented to the AFAA and made the determination that, insofar as the CAF was concerned, Lanphier did not attack the Yamamoto airplane, and Rex Barber was accorded 100% of the credit for the shoot down of Yamamoto for CAF records, and was inducted into the Confederate Air Force Combat Airman Hall of Fame on 1 October 1998 at Midland, TX. Further SYMA Attempts for Barber's Recognition SYMA, in October 1999, petitioned the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records for a new hearing on the basis of the

Part Three, Chapter 8 - Yamamoto Mission new evidence that was not available to the hearing in 1991 and had not been previously considered. At first, the AFBCMR seemed receptive to considering this new evidence. However, a 1 February 2000 letter from Harlan G. Wilder, Chief, General Law Division, JAG, dissuaded them. Largely on the basis of Mr. Wilder's deceptive analysis of Rex Barber's petition, the members of the Board, through their chairman, Rose M. Kirkpatrick, Chief Examiner, AFBCMR, have rejected Rex Barber's petition again. Mr. Wilder deliberately ignored the real issue and he misled the board. Lanphier had acknowledged that he shot at a fully intact airplane. Wilder ignored this and intentionally misled the Board members by arguing that it has always been contended that a wing was not shot off the Yamamoto aircraft (and so there was no new evidence sufficient to wanant a new hearing for Rex Barber). The SYMA rebuttal of Wilder's views seems to have not been considered. On 21 February 2001 George Chandler wrote Mr. Mack Burton, Executive Director, Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records, asking him to review the decision made by the Board and Chairman Rose M. Kirkpatrick, because they did not address the issue of the new evidence that SYMA wanted to present that Lanphier says he attacked an airplane that "... was intact from nose to the tip of its tail when I first fired at it," and thus he cannot have attacked the Yamamoto airplane that Rex Barber had set afire. He further pointed out to Mr. Burton that both Harlan G. Wilder and Rose M. Kirkpatrick had glossed over and not considered the new evidence that SYMA wanted to bring to the Board. In Mack Burton's response of 2 March 2001 he refuses to consider the points in George T. Chandler's letter of 21 February 2001. On 14 March 2001 George Chandler advised Mr. Burton that SYMA would seek an investigation of his office and the misfeasance with which he had administered this petition for a new hearing to examine new evidence. The above caused SYMA to conclude that the Office of Air Force History, for whatever reasons, had felt that it was best public relations for the Air Force to have the credit divided between Lanphier and Barber. The following suggest some critical questions that an impartial investigator should consider when reviewing the entire case: 1) Why were theAVC cards changed in 1969 and no one involved advised until 1978? 2) Why were there three different records of proceedings for the original Victory Credit Board of Review? 3) Dr. Kohn and Cargill Hall knew at the time that SYMA was formally started that it was planning the trip to the Bougainville jungle to examine the wreckage and bring back factual data on which to make an accurate determination of which pilot shot down the airplane. Cargill Hall and Dr. Kohn knew at that time that photographs in their possession showed the left wing was still attached when the Yamamoto airplane entered the jungle, and the right wing is adjacent to the wreckage. They already knew that Lanphier had not attacked the Yamamoto airplane because he said he shot the wing off of the bomber that he attacked. Why did they not come forward with this information? Why were they determined to continue to split the credit?

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

Based on the opinion that nothing SYMA or anyone else could do would change the detennination of Dr. Kohn at the Office of Air Force History, i.e. that he was not going to change his position that the credit should be divided between Lanphier and Barber, SYMA went to the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records. It was and is SYMA's position that a decision by the AFBCMR and the Secretary of the Air Force could compel the OAFH to change its position. Mr. Baseman, Chairman, AFBCMR, writes that he recommended a new Victory Credit Board of Review and at least two of the members of the panel supported that. So, there was a majority of the Board recommending to Secretary Rice that there be a new Victory Credit Board of Review. Who drafted Secretary Rice's decision to keep the credit award equally divided? Did the OAFH or a lawyer named Wilder draft it? Why did Chairman Baseman of the AFBCMR say that every point raised in the hearing, if it was not unanimously accepted by all of the members of the panel, it would have to be voted on and the reasons for their vote recorded? Only evidence presented and questioned at the hearing was to be considered. And yet, when the Board made its decision, Chairman Baseman did not vote, and there were two members in favor of changing the split credit and two members voted to keep it as a split credit. Why did Mr. Baseman not enforce the rules that he set down? Mr. Herbert Kaiser turned in a scathing criticism of Rex Barber for having brought the action to the Board. Most of his criticism was based on information that he gathered outside of the hearing and was not subject to examination by other members of the Board, or by Rex Barber or his attorney. Why did Chairman Baseman not disqualify Mr. Kaiser for violating the rules of procedure for the Board? Why did he allow such a document to be circulated? Why was it part of the package that went to Secretary Rice without any knowledge by Barber? It seems that when a government office, such as the Office of Air Force History, takes a certain position it never wants to admit that it was wrong and change the position in light of irrefutable contrary evidence subsequently discovered. Is this a true description of the Air Force culture? This view is further substantiated by General McPeak's statement that the decision to not change the history was based on the elapsed time since the shoot-down occurred, not the merits of the case. Does the Air Force support the view that historical accuracy should be sacrificed for convenience? Are the review procedures based on new evidence only window dressing? Was the elapsed time argument used to justify the Air Force not admitting that its original position was wrong? Dr. Richard Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History promised SYMA that he would convene a new VCBR if it could present credible new evidence that the previous finding was incorrect. Dr. Kohn made very sure that he could consider the evidence presented was not credible. It is interesting that the American Fighter Aces Victory Confirmation Board and the General Staff of the Confederate Air Force found the evidence to be compelling. Why this dramatically different result from the same facts? 159

13/h Fighter Command in World War Il 9)

Mr. R. Cargill Hall, Chief, Research Division, knew early on that both wings were still attached to the Yamamoto airplane when it entered the jungle. Therefore, he had to know that the division of credit on the basis of Lanphier shooting off the wing of the airplane that he attacked made it impossible for attributing half credit for the shoot down to Lanphier. Why did he not act accordingly? 10) Mr. Mack M. Burton, who is currently the Executive Director of the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records is most culpable for the actions of the present board in not considering the new evidence of Lanphier's 1984 letter, that the airplane he attacked was undamaged in any way. Mr. Burton is responsible for the way in which the board members he selects carefully consider the evidence. They have not done so with regard to Rex Barber's petition based on the Lanphier/Condon letter. Why has he acted so irresponsibly? 11) Mr. Harlan G. Wilder, Chief, General Law Division, JAG, in his letter of 1 February 2000, paragraph 2, deliberately omits the compelling part of the new evidence submitted by Rex Barber and instead focuses on a part of the Lanphier/Condon letter of the wing being shot off which had earlier been considered. The key point of the new evidence is Lanphier's admission that the airplane Lanphier attacked was fully intact from nose to tail. Why does Wilder deliberately leave this out of his recommendation? In paragraph 3 of his 1 February 2000 letter, Wilder provides great detail focusing the attention on the wing being shot off instead of considering the new evidence of Lanphier's statement that the airplane he shot at was intact from nose to tail. Why did Wilder make such a deliberate attempt to obfuscate the substance and quality of Barber's new evidence? 12) Why did Mack Burton not counsel Rose M. Kirkpatrick, Chief Examiner, AFBCMR, and panel members, Mr. Benedict A. Kausa1 IV, Panel Chair, Mrs. Barbara A. Westgate, Panel Member, and Mr. Gregory H. Petkoff, Panel Member, for their careless lack of action to notice how Harlan G. Wilder had disregarded the main point of Barber's petition submitting new evidence? Why did he allow them to focus on the previously considered subject of a wing being shot off? The board members should have been directed to more carefully read the petition and they would have recognized Wilder's deceitful conclusion. Why was the SYMA rebuttal of Wilder apparently ignored? In conclusion, SYMA contends that a careful, independent, review will determine: 1) 2)

3)

OAFH intentionally misled the Secretary of the Air Force. Forces within the Air Force have conducted an intentional effort to deny Rex Barber his due credit or have repeatedly justified the award to Lanphier for something that he did not do, by stonewalling and misstating the basic and incontrovertible facts of this matter. Rex Barber should be granted 100% credit for the shooting down of the Betty Bomber carrying Admiral Yamamoto. Dr. Charles Darby conducted a forensic analysis oftheYamamoto Betty wreckage in 1972 and 1988, Darby found only evidence of bullet strikes from an attack from the rear.The wing is now on display in Japan, (Darby via Lansdale)

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On his fatal flight, Adm. Yamamoto occupied the Betty commander's seat (shown here to the right of the observer's seat). (Nakamura via Lansdale)

age were from the Barber attack position (i.e., from the rear of the Betty bomber). "There were scores of holes. If you want me to guess, 1'd say 150, a couple of hundred, from a few bullet holes. But mainly just shrapnel that has broken off the aircraft; that is molten bullets (and) bits of molten airframe where it's been melted by impact from a shell and has gone through the flak curtain. All of it is from rear to front. There is nothing from any other direction. (Italics added)" Darby concluded:

Dr. Charles Darby's Forensic Examination of the Yamamoto Bomber Wreckage Both Jim Lansdale and I have met with Dr. Charles Darby, a New Zealand resident and geothermal engineer who had traveled throughout the Pacific, searching for aircraft wrecks. Darby stayed with Lansdale on a visit to America, and the two spent considerable time discussing the mission and the wreckage of the bomber. Darby presented Jim with a piece of the bomber that he has kindly shared with me. The official "Transcript of Proceedings" by the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR Docket: 91-02347, October 17-18, 1991) contains the testimony of Dr. Charles Darby regarding his forensic investigations of the wreckage of Admiral Yamamoto's Betty bomber in 1972 and in 1988. Darby's August 1988 expedition to the wreck was a thorough investigation, where he surveyed all parts of the wreckage and the bullet damage. Darby testified that the Betty had landed more or less intact, and that "by no stretch of the imagination, could any large piece of the right wing have disappeared in flight." Furthermore, Darby testified all evidence of shrapnel and bullet holes found on the remaining wreck-

"All visible gunfire and shrapnel damage was caused by bullets entering from immediately behind the bomber through the tail gunner's position and traveling forwards through the fuselage. Only

Yamamoto's seat recovered from his crashed Betty. The fatal wound in Yamamoto's back matched the hole in the back of the seat.The seat is now on display in Japan. (SYMA via Lansdale)

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r Author's "Miss Virginia" replica nose cowling panel that was hand-painted by Gary Velasco. This panel and many others may be purchased from Velasco Enterprises (www.fightingcolors.com). (Author)

Author's piece of the Yamamoto Betty bomber that was taken by OR. Darby during his 1988 examination of the wreckage. (Author)

one possible bullet entry point was seen in the skin, and that was caused by a bullet traveling forwards." The actual seat occupied by Admiral Yamamoto at the time of the attack and in which his dead body was found near the wreckage after the crash is preserved and on display in Japan today. The shrapnel damage to the rear of the seat matches the fatal back-wound reported in the Yamamoto autopsy report. Dr. Darby's physical evidence, provided by his investigation of the wreckage of the Betty bomber that carried Yamamoto, clearly demonstrates a rear attack. Dr. Darby had no agenda but to impartially investigate the Yamamoto wreck, and his conclusion was: "There was no evidence on any remaining wreckage of an attack from the bomber's starboard beam as related in all of Lanphier's accounts."

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A Final Word Official reports, as well as the forensic evidence, all agree on the following points. Admiral Yamamoto was killed in a Betty bomber, which suffered an attack from the rear. Admiral Yamamoto died of wounds produced by projectiles that had entered his body from the rear. Tom Lanphier, himself, confirmed Rex Barber's claim of a rear attack and the subsequent destruction of a Betty bomber over the jungles of Bougainville. Only one Betty bomber, carrying Admiral Yamamoto, crashed in the jungle near the village of Aku, Bougainville, on Sunday, 18 April 1943. The conclusion as to the identity of the true victor over Admiral Yamamoto should be and is evident-Rex Barber! Lanphier (1987), Mitchell (1995), and Barber (2001) all have passed on. But lost in all the turmoil over the years in determining the true Yamamoto victor is John Mitchell's pivotal role in planning and leading the mission. Mitchell did not place himself in the attack flight, even after several members dropped out, and he selflessly stayed on top cover. If it were not for Mitchell there would not have been a Yamamoto shoot down. Mitchell deserved and was unfairly denied the Medal of Honor.

9 April 1943 Continued

The 18th Fighter Group Arrives on Guadalcanal On 17 April the 18 th Fighter Group arrived at Guadalcanal to join the 347FG as the second fighter group in the l3AP. The 18 th was organized on 11 January 1927 at Wheeler Field, Oahu, Hawaii, and was composed of the 6th and 19 th Pursuit Squadrons, whose origins dated back to early World War I Signal Corps Aero Squadrons. The group's history from 1927 to 1941 paralleled that ofWheeler Field, as the Field Commander was also the 18FG Commander. The group departed Wheeler on 6 March on a voyage that stopped at Canton and the Fiji Islands, and arrived at Espiritu Santo on 11 March. The group trained there until 17 April when it was flown to Guadalcanal and became part ofthe new l3AF, along with the 347FG. The 44FS

was stationed at Fighter Two with the 12th and 70th fighter Squadrons. On 14 April the 44th , 12th , and 70th Fighter Squadrons were transferred on paper from the 347FG to the 18FG. Again, although the 44 th was headquartered at Efate, the 70 th at Fiji, and the 12th at Guadalcanal, all three squadrons were pooled with the three 347FG squadrons (67 th, 68 th, and 339 th ), and individual pilots, elements, flights, and squadrons flew combat missions together. Although the AAF had been in the Solomons for nearly seven months, it never had control of its units, as the South Pacific Theater was under Navy control. COMAIRSOLS had the difficult task of melding Army Air Force P-39, P-38, and PAD fighters flying combat with Army heavy B-17s and B-24s and B-26 medium bombers, as well as Marine and Navy SBD and TBF bombers, along with Navy F4Fs, Marine F4Us, and New Zealand PADs.

I 8th Fighter Group insignia. (USAF)

6th Night Fighter Squadron insignia. (USAF)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II Detachment "B" arrives at Guadalcanal From August 1942 the problem of recurring Japanese night harassment continued to be a part of Guadalcanallife. Small numbers of seaplanes from Rekata Bay and Betty bombers from Bougainvillethe "Louie the Louses" and "Washing Machine Charlies"-flew down singly or in pairs nightly at 20,000 to 28,000 feet, making two or three runs over the target every quarter hour. Their raids caused little actual physical damage, but did disrupt the sleep of Mainyard personnel, and caused a loss of efficiency and diminished morale. The men were also exposed to malarial mosquitoes when they left their tents to take cover in foxholes and shelters. The Director of Air Defense on Guadalcanal authorized the use of searchlights, AA guns, and fighter-searchlight teams to counter the Japanese. Several unsuccessful attempts at intercepting Charlie were made, and on 29 January Capt. John Mitchell did shoot down a Charlie, but there were no dedicated night fighters at Guadalcanal. Not having to worry about night fighters, Charlie could fly in the searchlight beam out of AA range. In June 1942 the 6FS of the 18FG was volunteered to become a night fighter squadron by its CO, Maj. James Watt. The squadron was originally trained to defend the Hawaiian night skies flying the P-40B in fighter-searchlight collaboration. Later SCR-270 early warning radar was used to vector the fighter to a position behind the bogie. In December 1942 Maj.Gen. Alexander Patch, who took over for Vandegrift, recommended to Halsey that six night fighters with Ground Control Interception (GCI) equipment be sent to the South Pacific. Maj.Gen. Millard Harmon also sent this request on to Washington. Meanwhile, 25 P-70 "Nighthawk" night fighters that had been converted from the A-20 had arrived in Hawaii in September 1942 to equip the 6NFS, now under CO Capt. Sidney Wharton. The bombers were heavily armed, carrying four 20mm cannons, two .50 cal. forwardfiring machine guns, two .30 cal. machine guns above and aft, and a .50 cal. below and aft. The original British Mark IV AI radar had a horizontal range exactly equal to the absolute altitude of the air-

craft and a vertical range of 3,000 feet above. The P-70 had a speed of 300 mph at 20,000 feet and a combat ceiling of 22,000 feet. The experienced pilots quickly adapted to the new aircraft, but there were no trained radar operators (RIO) or radar mechanics. Enlisted men from the 18 th Fighter Control Squadron at Hickham Field in Hawaii were sent to Radar School at Morrison Field, Florida, and after training were assigned to the 6NFS for further training as a squadron. To meet Harmon's request for night fighters, Lt.Gen. Delos Emmons, Commander of Army Aircraft in the Pacific, divided the 6NFS into two detachments, "A" and "B". Detachment. "B" was assigned six P-70s from the 6NFS, but due to training it was not until 18 February 1943 that the six P-70s and two LB-30s (carrying maintenance personnel and spare parts) left Hawaii bound for Guadalcanal. They arrived on 28 February, losing one aircraft along the way in a rainsquall between Ellis and Suva. While at Espiritu Santo the bomb bay fuel tanks that were needed for the long flight from Hawaii were removed, and the new SCR-540 AI radar equipment was installed. The P-70s sat at Henderson for ten days while waiting for the longer runway at Carney Field to be completed. During the second week in March the Detachment moved to Carney Field. But that was not the major problem facing Detachment "B," as there was no GCI, and the ground radar station had to be constructed. By 25 March GCI "Kiwi" had been completed, and the unit began operations on the 25'h and was on nightly alert. Two crews were on alert every night, one from 1800 to midnight, and the other from midnight to 0600. The Detachment found that the field defense units acted independently, as there was no defense commander to coordinate their efforts. The AA units fired at anything in their range, friend and foe alike, and a no-fly gundefended zone was set up circling ten miles around the field. The P-70s were to orbit and wait to intercept Charlie from 50 miles out and pursue him until they reached the gun-defended zone. At ten miles the night fighters were to break off interception and allow the AA guns to take over, at which time they were to return to their orbiting position and continue patrolling.

9 th Defense Battalion SCR-268 radar on New Georgia. This radar was used for target acquisition, surveillance, and ground-controlled intercepts. (U.S. Army)

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Part Three, Chapter 9 - April 1943 Continued Nighthawks were unable to make contact the first several nights, but on the night of 18/19 April Detachment "B" would score its first victory. A Condition Red was issued at 2000, and after nearly five and half hours in effect Capt. Earl Bennett and his RIO Corp. Edwin Tomlinson took off from Carey Airfield at 0321 for their second sortie of the night. Bennett orbited at 22,000 feet over Savo Island for nearly an hour when searchlights framed a Betty at 0418 as it flew over Henderson. Bennett quickly headed toward the field, but by the time he arrived the Betty had evaded the searchlights. Within half a minute the P-70's A-I radar picked up the Betty on its screen and Bennett followed the beam, soon spotting the Jap's engine exhaust flare. He closed and opened up with his four 20mm cannons and exploded a Washing Machine Charlie while thousands of cheering troops watched the flaming wreckage fall to the ground for the first P-70 kill. Since the Navy controlled Guadalcanal it wanted to award Bennett its Silver Cross for his victory, but so did the Air Force. The two services argued for several weeks, and Bennett never received any Silver Cross decoration. Soon the P-70's faults became apparent. It had a service ceiling of 22,000 feet that was too low, as Japanese bombers flew at higher altitudes, and its low rate of climb required 30-40 minutes to reach that altitude. It had insufficient maximum speed at altitude to catch a Betty bomber! Besides these performance deficiencies the electrical system frequently failed due to overloading, and the AI radar failed to function at high altitudes. The ground radar station personnel were not experienced, and ordered the P~70s out during

periods of poor weather on false alarms that were caused by the weather. By the end of April three more P-70s and their crews arrived at Carney, but the detachment's night fighter record was discouraging. The 75 th and 390th Bomb Squadrons of the 42BG, equipped with B-25s, moved to Noumea on 15 April and were assigned to the 13AF. The 69 th and 70 th Bomb Squadrons were assigned to the 42 nd , as its other two squadrons were left behind in the U.S. and transitioned to the Mitchell bomber. In June the 42 nd moved up to Carney Field on Guadalcanal. The 307 th and 5 th Bomb Groups assumed the burden of bomber operations in April and May. After Yamamoto's death the Japanese air attacks on the Russells and Guadalcanal subsided markedly. 13 th Fighter Command fighters provided bomber escort and attacked Munda, Kolombangara, and Rakata Bay. In the last half of April, COMAIRSOLS Fighter Command conducted 14 strafing missions, hitting barges, anti-aircraft positions, and Japanese troop concentrations at Munda, Vila, and Rekata Bay. On 20 April Capts. Dewey and Sharpsteen and Lts. Fincher, McLanahan, Miller, and Norton were the first 339th pilots returned back to the States. The names of Capts. Mitchell and Lanphier and Lts. Barber, Canning, Goerke, Holmes, and Jacobson were also on the rotation list, but were withdrawn, as they were still in combat at Guadalcanal, and they remained behind despite all being exhausted and ill, suffering with severe dysentery. On 24 April the 44FS began its second tour, leaving Espiritu at 0600 escorted by two B-17s, and arrived at 1010.

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10 May 1943

The Japanese air units were inactive during the first week and, a half of May, and the AAF squadrons flew strafing and patrol missions. At the start of May 49 pilots of the 70FS were ready to leave Ondonga, New Georgia, as their tour was nearly completed. On the their last two days (1-2 May) the squadron flew 29 small missions over Bougainville, dive-bombing and strafing airfields, supply and personnel areas, and roads and bridges. On the 3rd the 68FS arrived to take over from the 70 th • When they arrived at Ondonga the rumors that they had heard for months were true, as four P-38s were sitting on the squadron apron. The pilots, who had grown to love their Airacobras, were less than enthusiastic over what the squadron's historical record, dated 3 June 1943, described as "these twin-engine abortions." But by the end of the month the pilots became convinced that "maybe this is a good ship after all." On 10 May Adm. Mineichi Koga, Yamamoto's successor, transferred 58 Zeros and 49 Bettys from Truk to Rabaul. Three days later, at 1100, a coast watcher on Choiseul alerted Fighter Command of a large Japanese formation flying in toward Cape Esperance. Koga had sent 25 Zeros to escort a reconnaissance bomber down to check out the four airfields on Guadalcanal. Fighter Command scrambled 101 fighters from Guadalcanal and the Russells, the larg-

est scramble ever in the campaign. The Marine Corsairs of VMF124 and VMF-112 shot down 15 Zeros, three by 2Lt. Kenneth Walsh and four by Capt. Archie Donahue, both of whom became aces that day. A 70FS P-38 equipped as a night-fighter piloted by Maj. Louis Kittel was scrambled and shot down a Zero and damaged another. Four F4Us, including VMF-124 CO Capt. William Gise, and the P38 were lost. That night, at 1945, the Japanese sent four Bettys to Guadalcana1, and 1Lt. William Smith (l2FS) destroyed a Betty and damaged another that were framed in searchlight beams. On the night of 18/19 May six Japanese Betty bombers attacked the Russell Islands and Fighter One for three hours, doing little damage. The next night eight or nine were back in four raids and killed 14 and wounded 20, but the P-38s were ready for them. Seven were sent up in four relays so that one was always in position to intercept. Maj. Louis Kittel, of the 70FS and one of the pioneers of visual night interception, took off for a night alert. Kittel orbited at high altitude in a P-38 and, aided by searchlights and undamped enemy exhaust flames, shot down two Japanese bombers. Kittel was awarded the DFC for these voluntary night missions. From 13 May to 23 May he had flown eight missions totaling ten hours, intercepting three enemy bombers and shooting down two. For the

68FS armorers cleaning the guns and maintaining a P-39 at Bougainville. (USAF) 68FS Fighter Two April 1943 (L-R) Lt. Fred Ploetz, Capt. Stan Palmer, Lt. Rollins Snelling, and Capt.Wayne Smith (347FG Intelligence Officer). (Palmer)

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From 13 May to 23 May, Maj. Louis Kittel had flown eight missions, totaling ten hours, intercepting three enemy bombers and shooting down two. Kittel was awarded the DFC for these voluntary night missions. (Canning)

Adm. Mineichi Koga,Yamamoto's successo~ (USN)

remainder of the month the Japanese focused their RabaulBougainville based aircraft on New Guinea. In mid-month Lt.Col. Milton Adams was transferred to the 18FG HQ, and Maj. Thomas Crandall, Squadron Operations Officer, became 70FS CO. On the 5 th , the first contingent of 14 pilots left for Auckland, New Zealand, for leave, and a second group of eight lett on the 15 th . However, orders came down that there would be no further Auckland leaves, and the last group of 14 disappointed pilots stayed at Ondonga. The squadron departed Ondonga on the 26 th, and the AAF terminated its use of the field and moved to Munda, where they would begin operations on 5 June. However, dissension had built up in COMAIRSOPAC between the Army, Navy, and Marine factions as to who was in command and who was to give or take orders. Gen. Harmon (13AF CO) met with Admirals Halsey and Fitch for two days to resolve the situation. On 20 May American fighters attacked camouflaged Japanese barges carrying troops and supplies hidden in the coves on the southern shore of Choiseul Island. The fighters staggered their attacks

from different directions to keep the AA fire to a minimum. A flight of eight P-38s of the 339FS was flying top cover for the mission and was the last to strafe the boats. ILt. Bill Harris approached at 10 degrees to the bow of the first boat, just above the water at 300mph. He was firing all his guns, and as he passed over it his P38 was hit by AA or small arms fire. The temperature gauge on his left engine was rising, and he immediately cut the engine and feathered the prop. Harris spent several anxious hours nursing his "onelegged" fighter back to Fighter Two before he dropped it down for a safe landing. In late May command changes took place. On 21 May Maj. John Evans relieved Maj. John Mitchell as CO of the 339FS. Finally, a month late after being listed to leave with the first returnees on 20 April, Capts. Mitchell and Lanphier and Lts. Barber, Canning, Goerke, Holmes, and Jacobson left for the States. After scoring eight victories Mitchell remained in the States, being promoted to Lt. Colonel on I August 1944, and returned to combat with the 15FG in May 1945, where he scored two more victories flying a P-

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II 51 over Japan. He was then transferred briefly to the 21FG in early July 1945 and got another victory, but returned to the 15FG as its CO. He was promoted to a full Colonel in August 1945. He shot down four MiG-1 5s and damaged two more with the 39FIS, flying the F-86 over Korea to end his combat career with 15 victories. Holmes was promoted to Captain on 27 May and returned to the States. Lanphier went on leave to Australia after the Yamamoto mission and then returned to the States. He flew several missions in Europe in May 1944 to test tactics, was promoted to Major in November 1944, and to Lt. Colonel in February 1945. On 24 May Maj. Kermit Tyler, who had commanded the 44FS since 9 September 1942, was replaced by Maj. John Little. During this period B-25 medium bomber squadrons of the 42BG were assigned to the 13AP. The new 75 th and 390th Bomb Squadrons joined the 69 th and 70 th Bomb Squadrons that were already in the South Pacific and had converted to B-25s from their B26s. The B-25s were put into operation, as they would be more adaptable to the shorter existing runways on the Japanese islands that were scheduled to be captured in the near future. The Mitchells would prove a valuable addition to the 13BC arsenal, as the first B17s and then B-24 heavy bombers required much longer and more heavily constructed runways back at Guadalcanal. The tactical plan was to keep the Japanese aircraft on Kahili, Ballale, Kieta, Munda, Vila, Shortland, Poporang, and Rekata Bay under constant attack so that they could not interfere with the naval buildup for the forthcoming invasions in the Central Solomons. The heavy bombers attacked by night, and the mediums with fighter escort attacked in the day. USN bombers also laid mines in the heavily traveled shipping lanes off Buin, Bougainville. On 22 May the 339FS was flying its first mission of the day, a 12-plane fighter sweep on Kahili airfield. As the P-38s were approaching the target at 23,000 feet, newly arrived pilot Lt. Albert Henke's P-38 inexplicably left the formation and dove vertically into the ocean near Fauro Island. The Japanese sent up no fighters, and the airfield was strafed and bombed. Capt. Leonard Frame (of the 68FS) and Lt. Fred Horne happened upon a Betty and shared a victory flying their P-39s for the 339 th . The next day six Bettys attacked a convoy about 200 miles southeast of Henderson and hit the Niagara with a bomb. The airstrip on the Russells was ready, and was first used on the night of 25/26 May when eight F4Us and eight PAOs remained overnight so they could take part in a sumise strafing attack on the Shortland-Buin seaplane base. On 27 May the pilots of the 68FS that had been on detached service with the 44FS at Efate were transferred to the 70FS. On 4 June the pilots of the 70FS were transferred to the 68FS as the 13FC pilots continued to play "the squadron shuffle." During the third week in May the Japanese were withdrawing their fighters from the Solomons and sending them to Wewak on New Guinea; however, they were maintaining a strong fighter force at Rabaul. Intelligence evidence showed the Japanese to be hard-

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ILt.William Smith (12FS) destroyed a Betty and damaged another that were framed in a searchlight beams. (Canning)

pressed to maintain simultaneous combat and supply commitments to both the Solomons and New Guinea. To exacerbate the Japanese supply situation, mine-laying missions by TBFs aided by diversionary bombing missions by heavy bombers were carried out. After the mine-laying missions were complete the bombing pressure was increased on Bougainville and the Central Solomons by AAF and USN bombers. These missions met little or no enemy air opposition, and 17PRS recon photos showed the lowest enemy fighter count since the start of the Solomons campaign. May operations reports show only 21 enemy aircraft were shot down: 15 by the Marines (on the 13 th ); four by P-38s (three by Kittel); and the shared P-39 victory.

11 June 1943

P·39G Night-Fighters arrive at Guadalcanal Over the three months since their arrival, the P-70s of the 6NFS had scored only one night victory and were found woefully inadequate for the task. On 6 June the squadron began to receive the P38G to be used in close searchlight cooperation interception to augment P-70 night operations. The P-38G was far superior to the P70: it was 30mph faster at altitude; could reach 25,000 feet in 11 minutes as compared to the P-70's 35 minutes; and ~ts operational ceiling was 10,000 feet higher. When an incoming raid was impending with its usual 45-minute warning, Fighter Control was to scramble two P-70s and two P-38s. One P-70 was to climb at maximum speed to 22,000 feet off the eastern end of Santa Isabel Island, and the other to also climb as quickly as possible to maximum ceiling ten miles south of Russell Island and orbit. The two P-38s were to climb at maximum speed to 17,000 and 20,000 feet and orbit around a filtered low-intensity red searchlight one mile from the outer edge of the defended area, about a mile southwest of Fighter Two. When the Japanese reached 60 miles out, Fighter Control was to relinquish control of the orbiting P-70s to GCI Control that was

to vector the nearest P-70 on an interception course toward the bogies. If the P-70 AI picked up the enemy it would be allowed to pursue it across the defended zone without the AA firing. If the P70 did not contact the enemy within ten miles of Lunga Point GCI Control was to direct the P-70 back to its original orbit position. At this point Fighter Control directed the searchlights to illuminate the area, and when a target was illuminated by the radar-controlled searchlights all but three searchlights were turned off, and the P38s were alerted that a target had been lit. The P-38 at 20,000 feet was to fire on any target above 20,000 feet, and the one at 17,000 was to fire on targets below 20,000 feet. The P-38 pilots had no formal night fighter training, and their only specialized piece of equipment was the installation of a red cellophane filter cut from photographic film and placed over the gunsight to cut the glare from the gunsight light, which diminished night vision. The ammunition loading was one armor-piercing, one incendiary, and one tracer. The ideal interception was to pull up behind the target at his speed and watch the distances, as they were difficult to judge at night. All "friendly" AA was to have been alerted not to fire, but

Lt Magnus Francis (44FS). (Smith)

Lt Robert Byrnes (44FS). (National Archives via Lansdale)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II this seldom happened, as the AA gunners continued to fire enthusiastically. If the target was not shot down an interception was attempted by the P-70s directed by GCI on its outgoing course. The P-70s, in addition to their performance difficulties, had arrived with limited spare parts and only a few replacement engines. Engines wore out quickly, as the P-70 needed to climb at full power from take off to orbit point, causing heavy wear and frequent engine changes and overhauls. Its radar was useless above 15,000 feet, as it arced and emitted corona discharges. The aircraft's generators were overloaded, its air-ground radio equipment was easily jammed and intercepted, and the Nighthawk could not carry a full stock of ammunition. The last P-70 night interceptor mission was flown on 20 May. They did continue flying night intruder missions and covering PT Boat missions, but had their secret SCR-540 radar sets removed and more guns, and six bomb racks were added. On 5 June Strike Command put together its first strong daylight attack since the B-24s suffered their heavy mid-February losses. Twelve TBFs fitted with range-extending 50-gallon fuel tanks, and 18 SBDs escorted by 21 Russell-based F4Us ofVMF-1l2 and VMF124 attacked shipping in Buin Harbor at Kahili. A penetration mission of 26 P-40s and six P-38s flew to the target first to clear out any enemy fighters. About 25 Zeros, Rufes, and Daves rose to intercept, but only a few peeled off to meet the Army planes. The P40s of the 44FS shot down two Zeros, one each by Lts. Robert Byrnes and Magnus Francis. lLt. Ralph Sooter was MIA. The Corsairs shot down 12 Japanese; four by VMF-124 and the rest by VMF-1l2. Bomber gunners claimed three. The bombers were successful that day, as they scored bomb hits on two corvettes and a cargo ship; all were burning as they left the scene. Two SBDs and two TBFs were lost, but Lt. Jack Bade of the 44FS prevented further bomber losses. As he was leaving to return home, Bade saw ten Japanese aircraft attacking four friendly unescorted bombers near Shortland Island. Bade's P-40 had been shot up, its guns jammed, and he had sustained a head wound. Nonetheless, Bade

Lt. Jack Bade was returning home when he saw ten japanese aircraft attacking four friendly unescorted bombers near Shortland Island. Bade's PAO, "Destitute Prostitute," had been shot up, its guns jammed, and he had sustained a head wound. Nonetheless, Bade flew weaving scissors maneuvers and repeatedly turned into any attacker, and was able to bluff long enough to have the japanese run low on fuel and turn back to base near Vella Lavella. Bade was only awarded the Air Medal for his heroic action. (USAF)

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Capt. Bob Westbrook (44FS) had movie star good looks. Here he poses with his crew chief after his two Zero victories on 7 june 1943. (Author)

flew weaving scissors maneuvers and repeatedly turned into any attacker, and was able to bluff long enough to have the Japanese run low on fuel and have to turn back to base near Vella LaveJla. Bade was only awarded the Air Medal for his heroic action. On 6 June P-38s and PAOs strafed gun emplacements on Choiseul. The 70FS had to abort their first combat mission flying their new P-38s on 5 June, but two days later 16 took off from Munda at 1030, each carrying twelve 20lb. fragmentation bombs. The aircraft rendezvoused over Barakoma at 1100 at 14,000 feet with a flight, of four planes to act as spares. One aircraft developed ignition problems and was replaced by a spare, and it returned to Munda accompanied by the other three spares. The three flights continued to the primary target, but it was closed in by weather, so they continued to the southwest and dropped their bombs on Kokona Plantation from an altitude of 7,000 to 9,000 feet at 1132 with unobserved results. The flights rejoined and flew back to Munda, landing at 1218. Training and transition in the P-38 continued over the next several days, and by the 14th the last of the P-39s that had served the 70 th so well were gone-but the 68FS still flew the Airacobra. After their loss of 18 aircraft on 13 May the Japanese left the American airfields in the southern Solomons alone, even though they had 279 aircraft available: 98 fighters and 32 bombers on Kahili; 96 fighters and one bomber on Ballale; 36 and six on Buka; plus ten float planes at their Shortland anchorages. However, on 7 June the Japanese began a week of large aerial assaults from Rabaul with 40 to 50 Zeros flying down the Slot, where they were met near the Russell Islands by Allied fighters. Fighter Command sent over 100 fighters up to intercept, including 12 PAOs of the 44FS and nine P38s of the 339FS. Thefighters orbited over the Russells at 25-27,000 feet waiting in ambush. A flight of three P-38s of 2Lts. Murray Shubin, Bill Harris, and Robert Tucker (of the 339FS) orbited twice not seeing the enemy, and flew off to the west towards Buraku Island, where they ran into an ongoing dogfight at 18,000 feet. A group of RNZAF P-40s had formed a defensive Lufbery circle, and soon six New Zealanders were shot down. The three Sunsetters

Part Three, Chapter 11 - June 1943 dove into the attack, and Shubin put two long bursts into a Zero on the tail of a RNZAF P-40. Tucker made a head on attack and shot some pieces off a Zero for a probable. Harris, flying "Hattie," drew a bead on a Jap who pulled his fighter up violently to the left and out of his line of fire. Harris thought the Jap was going to continue to pull away so he turned as sharply as possible. But as he did the Zero turned back sharply to the right, and Harris was about to collide with him. Harris made an instinctive snap full deflection shot into the Zero's right side, sending it down in flames. Harris had yanked his fighter up to avoid a collision and immediately saw a Zero on the tail of another RNZAF P-40. Harris snapped off another deflection shot, and the Zero exploded into a ball of flames. During the battle Harris' engine was hit and the supercharger was destroyed, and he had to return to base with his first two victories after being shut out during his first tour. After his first tour Harris had been sent back to New Caledonia at the end of March and was hospitalized for fungus in both ears and a cyst in his eye. The Japanese lost 23 Zeros shot down: eight by VMF-1l2 (six by F4Us and two by F4Fs); four by New Zealand's 15 th Squadron; and 11 by the AAF. The 44FS had scored eight victories (and five probables): two victories each by ILts. Henry Matson and James Parker; one each by lLts. Carl Newlander and Jack Bade; and two by Maj. Robert Westbrook. Westbrook picked his second victim off the tail of a P-39 and expended all his ammunition. He was returning to base when he saw a Zero on the tail of a P-38, and Westbrook made a run on the Zero, which took the bluff and turned home. Parker lost his flight and mingled with the other aircraft in the combat. At the top of a chandelle at 17,000 feet he saw a Zero climb from below and pass in front of him. Parker hit the Zero, and it began to smoke and lose altitude. He followed the heavily smoking Jap down through a thin layer of overcast and pulled up at 2,000 feet. lLt. Jack Bade destroyed a Zero that was on the tail of a P-38 and took a snap shot at another Zero trailing a P-38, getting a few hits for a probable. Newlander spotted a parachute with Zeros closing in on it. He flew to the rescue; his .50s started a fire on one and he followed it down, firing on it until the Jap was completely ablaze. ILts. Douglas Curry, Robert Holman, and William Cargill, and 2Lt. Charles Sackett claimed probables. The Americans lost four F4Us and ILt. Henry Matson's P-40. In a dogfight Matson had made two firing passes on a Zero without a hit, but on a third pass he exploded it but was attacked by another Zero. He turned into him and scored on a deadly single burst of machine gun fire at close range. Matson was so close that when he pulled up his prop shredded the flaming ;'ing of the Zero. His P-40 caught fire, and despite burns to his head and hands Matson was able to release his seat belt and bailout of his burning Warhawk at 18,000 feet. As he drifted down in his parachute he was attacked by three Zeros. Matson tried to bluff the Japanese into thinking he, too, was Japanese by bowing, saluting, and waving, and was successful, as the Zero pilots waved and left. Matson landed in the water, inflated his rubber dinghy, and injected himself with morphine. Fortunately he was found by a crash boat two hours later and returned to the Russells. On the 10 t h, four Betty bombers were reported by a coast watcher on Choiseul flying down the Slot to attack five transports escorted by six destroyers heading from Espiritu Santo to

Guadalcanal. With the advanced warning Fighter Command laid a trap and sent four F4Us (VMF-124) to orbit between Malaita and Santa Isabel and four P-38s (339FS) to orbit Ndai Island. The Marines spotted the Bettys flying off the northeast coast of Malaita. The Japanese broke off, and the Corsairs chased the swift bombers and shot down three. 2Lt. Floyd White of the 12FS, flying a P-38 for the 339FS, dispatched the remaining bomber over Ndai Island. An early morning bombing raid on Vila was scheduled for the B24s. An approaching storm front over Vangunu Island turned back the bombers and their mixed Marine F4U and 339 th P-38 escorts. The bombers turned toward Munda, which was their secondary target, and were able to avoid the storm and bombed the target without Japanese air opposition, but encountered heavy AA fire. The 339 th P-38s had been in the air for 3:20, and after returning to base were refueled and spent another 2: 15 patrolling over the Russells. As soon as they landed at dusk the fighter director sent them back up, as there was a warning of a possible Japanese attack in the early evening. The patrol was recalled after half an hour as it encountered the leading edge of the storm front and had to land in heavy wind and rain. It had been another long day for the long-legged P38s. In the late morning of the 12th approximately 40-50 Zeros came down to the Russells on a fighter sweep toward Vella Lavella and 91 Allied fighters were sent up to intercept them. First to make contact were seven 14FS RNZAF P-40s, four P-40s of the 44FS, and one P-39 of the 68FS at 1048. The Kiwi pilots downed six Zeros and the AAF three. Capt. Robert Westbrook of the 44FS became an ace with his fifth victory as he put a long burst into a Zero that crashed into the sea. His wingman, lLt. Robert Byrnes, did his wingman duty by shooting a Zero off Westbrook's tail. lLt. Henry Matson recovered from his wounds in the air battle five days earlier and shot down a Zero for his third victory. 68FS P-39 pilots lLt. Robert Fetch and ILt. William Fiedler got single victory claims, as did lLts. Samuel Barnes and Charles Harris. The 339FS was led by Maj. Louis Kittel and Capt. Cyril Nichols, followed by Lts. Harris, Pedro, Honaker, and Webber. Lt. Henry Pedro aborted early with engine trouble and was followed by Maj. Kittel, whose supercharger malfunctioned and was escorted back to base by his wingman, Bill Harris. The remaining P-38s flew to 26,000 feet and intercepted the Zeros. lLt. William Honaker had to put 400 rounds into a stubborn Zero for a victory. The Allied total was 34 victories: six for the RNZAF; eight for theAAF; six Zeros for VMF-121; and 14 Zekes for the Navy's land-based VF-ll (that including five Zekes for LtUg) Vernon Graham, the Navy's first land-based ace). VF-ll, the Sundowners, under CO Lt.Cdr. Charles White, were intended to fly their F4Fs off the Hornet, but the carrier's loss at Santa Cruz caused the squadron to be land-based on Guadalcanal from May to July 1943, where they would score 56 victories and have two new aces (Graham and LtUg) Charles Stimpson with six victories). The losses for the day were five F4Fs (but only one pilot) and a RNZAF pilot. Despite the loss of more than 50 aircraft in a week the Japanese air strength was at its highest levels since March. 17PRS photos showed 49 fighters and five dive-bombers on Kahili, 254 on Rabaul's airfields, and that Buka was "loaded with aircraft." Just

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13th Fighter Command in World War 11

I7PRS photos showed 49 fighters and five divebombers on Kahili. (USAF via Lansdale)

after noon on 16 June, a coast watcher on Vella Lavella reported 38 Zeros flying to the southwest. Another report followed from a coast watcher on Kolombangara that 50 Vals and 30 more Zero escorts were on their way to attack U.S. cargo ships and destroyers off Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The usual route the Japanese flew took them north of the Russells, but this time their route was to the south, and Marine F4Us were scrambled from the Russells but failed to make any contact. At 1310 Fighter Command scrambled 16 aircraft to fly CAP over shipping, and by 1345 they declared a Condition Red and finally scrambled a total of 104 fighters between 1310 and 1400. Thirty more Japanese dive-bombers escorted by Zeros came in at 15,000 feet over Beaufort Bay toward the shipping off Guadalcanal. The defending force included 12 P-38s, 21 P-40s, and eight P-39Ds. The 12 339FS P-38s were piloted by: first flight lLt. William Griffith, mission leader, followed by Pedro, Bezner, and Webber; second flight lLt. Murray Shubin (flight leader), followed by Rake, Harris, and Van Bibber; and third flight Capt. John McGinn (flight leader), followed by Hoyle, Sylvester, and Lawrence. These Lightnings were the first to scramble and climbed to 27,000 feet. The first Japanese Zero formation came in over Beaufort Bay and

Despite the loss of more than 50 aircraft in a week, Japanese air strength was at its highest levels since MarchThere were 254 aircraft-mostly Zeros-on Rabaul. (Nakamura via Lansdale)

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was met at 1347 by the three P-38 flights. lLt. Griffin's engine malfunctioned and he aborted and was escorted back to base by Lt. Webber, while the other element dropped back. 2Lt. Munay Shubin and his wingman, 2Lt. Erwin Rake, spotted about 50 Zeros 15 miles from the west end of Guadalcanal at about 23,000 feet. Shubin, who had a 4,000-foot altitude advantage, stated in his debriefing report: "We made an initial attack-the four of us-breaking into the rear cover of 10 to 15 Zeros. We opened fire, pulled up, and began a period of combat. Following my initial burst and a long burst into a Zero peeling up, and knocking down the surprised Zero, which tried to half roll at the last minute. I moved my fire quickly ahead and downed a second Zero. I saw 5 or 6 planes going down, 4 of which were flamers, of which two were mine." Element leader 2Lt. Bill Harris and his wingman, 2Lt. Charles Van Bibber, followed and were to the rear and right of Shubin and Rake as two Zeros got on Shubin's and Rake's tails. Harris banked to his left and pulled up and fired on the Zero on Lt. Rake's tail and set it on fire. Van Bibber flew past Harris and knocked down the second Zero and cleared Shubin and Rake, who headed toward Savo Island. Again Hanis and Van Bibber followed and scared off an approaching Zero that banked away. Harris swept back to his right and saw that the Zero that had just banked away had rolled over on his back and was about to make another pass on Shubin. Harris pulled up and fired his .50s but they jammed, and he quickly hit his 20mm cannon button and blasted the Zero, which began to burn, then turned over and dove vertically into the sea. Rake's Lightning had been hit, Van Bibber was running low on fuel, and Harris' guns were malfunctioning, so the three returned to base together. Shubin was alone in "Oriole II" and followed the dogfight as it passed over the Guadalcanal toward Savo and Cape Esperence. Shubin reported: "I continued combat with four or five of them, gradually working over toward the Esperance-Savo area about 40 miles away. In the ensuing 40 minutes I was in constant contact with five Zeros

Part Three, Chapter 11 - June 1943

Lt. Murray Shubin became the I3AF's first "Ace-in-a-Day." Adm. Halsey was so impressed by Shubin's feat that he had the pilot brought aboard his command ship and personally congratulated him with the Distinguished Service Cross (Author)

Shubin and his crew celebrate his great day by stenciling his five Rising Suns on "Oriole" (Author)

who seemed determined as hell to get me. Taking advantage of the speed and climb of the P-38, I made a pass at their tail end Charlie, getting a good burst into the area behind the cockpit. The Zero turned on its back, hung for a moment, and did the first half of a split-ess. That was the last of him. Number one probable. Following the long burst into this number one aircraft I continued a steep spiral dive to the right, getting a full-deflection shot at the last Zero in a string of four that were making a tight climbing chandelle to maneuver behind and under me. Eventually the airplane slowed up remarkably. Evidently my lead was too great. He started to climb with his buddies, but evidently had no power, and changing his mind, he slipped into a vertical turn and peeled off going down-apparently under control except for his engine. That was number two probable. By that time the other three were well on my tail and firing like hell. My speed was about 350 miles per hour from the spiral dive. I pulled out and up to the left into the sun in a fast, gentle climbing turn. With a l,OOO-foot advantage now in altitude a Zero turned into me. I dove slightly, trying to turn him enough to get a head-on burst. I fired but missed, going over him. I tried getting a burst at the last in the string as I went by, but the last one saw me firing at his leader and I peeled off out of my sights. I fired but couldn't even get a lead on him. I climbed again toward the sun; the three of them had gotten together and were maneuvering for altitude, as I was. This occurred three times. Each time when I got above and to the rear I made a pass to the most rearward Zero. Twice I did this, and each time when I got within good range the last Zero saw me in time and split-essed before I could get a lead on him. More misses. In the meantime, number one and number two Zeros naturally turned into me, took a blast and dove. Again I climbed and maneuvered into position. This time I resolved not to get too much altitude and made a rear quarter pass with reduced speed and shallow dive, so I could really nose over and get lead on the bastard as he split-essed. I did this, and he took too long staying on his back, because I really shoved my nose down and got a good lead and reduced it, slashing back toward him, right across his belly and fuselage angularly with the tracers. My cannon was gone at this time. He was smoking and still on his back when I passed over him. I never saw him again. That was probable number three. The other two had advantageously worked to my tail, with altitude, too. And they were really firing-seemed like tracers were all around me. Uncomfortable as hell, -I dove until I outran them. I pulled out and climbed in the direction of Savo Island. The two had climbed, after I had gotten away, in the direction of Tulagi, where they orbited. I climbed some more and then started to pass toward their orbit. I fired at long distance and with lots of lead at the rearmost, which was about 100 yards from the first. The tracers went over and he saw me in plenty of time to split-ess safely and go down, evidently home. The number one man was left, and he was on the diametric opposite of the orbit in a right hand turn. He was turning into me, and I fired a continued long burst, gradually bringing it back into him in a frontal attack. My tracers raked across his engine, but no

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II damage was apparent. I immediately pulled up and racked around, almost blacking out. The Zero pilot continued on a straight line and I went into pursuit, finally getting into gun range a few miles east of Savo. P-40s and P-38s were milling around below. I joined on the Zero and started firing from the rear above. My tracers were behind, but as I got closer I led him more, and there were hits just back of the pilot on top of the fuselage and in front of the tail. Strangely enough, the Zero continued straight for a while and then started a steep forward dive instead of a split-ess. I watched and shoved my nose as far forward as possible. He was diving straight as I passed over. I pulled out, leveled up, and turned to catch sight, but I could see nothing. My altitude was 11,000 feet. That was probable number four. When Col. Aaron Tyler, my group CO, told me that Capt. F.P. Mueller, G Company, 35 th Infantry, witnessed, through binoculars, the Esperance-Savo part of the long battle and definitely established that I had shot down three of the five Zeros, it made me feel damn good to know that I has sent five Tojos to the showers and given the sixth joker an afternoon he probably won't tell his grandchildren about."

Zero flying north and continued after it for a few minutes. Byrnes finally caught it and hit it with a long burst, then followed it through a sharp turn and hit it with another burst, neither of which seemed to do any damage. Gladen then got into the fray: "As I let the nose forward, I saw that a Zero had rolled out of his left turn, and I immediately hopped on him, giving him a long burst. He started to smoke and go down in a left-hand diving turn. This cinched the meat for my P-40, and I poured another long burst into him. He started burning and I pulled out. The Zero went down between Savo and Lunga Point." Byrnes saw another Zero, and he put a long, close-range burst into it and it exploded. He maneuvered to clear his tail when he saw a Zero making a hard left turn in front of him. Byrnes fired an instantaneous burst and smoked the Jap, who crashed into the sea. Gladen was climbing for altitude and came across a Zero flying off to the right:

Shubin became the 13AF's first "Ace-in-a-Day" and definitely had something to tell his grandchildren. Adm. Halsey was so impressed by Shubin's feat that he had the pilot brought aboard his command ship and personally congratulated him with the Distinguished Service Cross. 1Lt. William Griffith, with 2Lt. Donald Webber on his wing, was forced to abort because oil pressure on one engine dropped. Webber climbed to 25,000 feet, had difficulty dropping his belly tank, and became separated from the rest of his flight. As he turned toward Cape Esperance he came upon six to eight Vals below him. As he was diving on the Vals he saw a Zero on the tail of a P-40 and shot it down with a high frontal pass. Capt. John McGinn and 2Lt. Robert Sylvester of the third flight each shot down a Zero to give the 339th 11 victories for the day without a loss. As Harris was in his landing approach a Zero strafed his beloved "Hattie." Harris landed safely, but was so angry that he jumped out of his damaged P-38 and commandeered another Lightning and started down the runway to get revenge, but blew a tire. "Hattie" was a prolific and lucky fighter aircraft, as it accounted for 15 victories and four probables while being flown by Harris. After Harris rotated out the repaired Hattie was assigned to lLt. Truman Barnes, who became an ace with five victories while flying her, and she was credited with one final victory when lLt. Donald Stewart downed a Zero flying her on 2 February. Much of the credit for her success should be given to her Crew Chief, S/Sgt. Charles Chapman. (via Harris) The PAOs of the 44FS were on CAP at 23,000 feet over the shipping when 30 Vals and 30 Zeros came in to attack. Henderson reported bogies coming in at 15,000 feet from the south. lLt. Robert Byrnes led his flight, followed by wingman 2Lt. Cy Gladen, element leader 1Lt. Dale Tarbet, and 2Lt. Mack Bunderson. The Lightnings executed turning dives looking for the Zeros, and at 15,000 feet they first saw bombs exploding on the water below and then spotted aircraft. Byrnes and his wingman, Gladen, started after the bombers but met several Zeros first. They chased after a lit. Cy Gladen describes his first two victories on 16 June. (Author)

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Part Three, Chapter 11 - June 1943 "I pulled up into a turn and another Zero was off to my right. I got in a good shot and undoubtedly hit him; he was going much faster than I was, and he rolled out and flew straight away from me. By this time he was about 400 yards away. Most of my guns had stopped firing, and I shot at him with my two remaining guns. My tracers seemed to be hitting him. He was smoking and I continued firing. I exhausted all my ammunition and continued on the Zero's tail until I began gaining speed on him. I saw that his left wing was burning and puffs of white smoke were coming out. His right wing was badly shot up. I flew up beside the plane and saw the pilot. I couldn't tell whether he was alive or not, but he seemed to be slumped over. He was going down rapidly and he passed into a cloud. I turned back and landed to get more ammunition, but by that time there was no longer a fight close by." lLt. Dale Tarbet encountered a Zero in a vertical bank coming toward him and fired a deflection shot at 350 yards. As he pulled up in an abrupt left chandelle he saw the Zero spiraling down in flames. He then dove on another Zero that was turning into him and fired a short burst without observable results. Tarbet's wingman, 2Lt. Mack Bunderson, was climbing in a left turn and had a Zero make a head on pass at him. He fired a long burst and the Zero started to smoke; it kept closing and exploded as it passed by. A second Zero flew in front of Bunderson, passing to the right in a shallow dive. He followed, slowly closed, and got good 30-degree deflection shot from the rear. The cockpit flashed and the Jap fighter, along with its dead pilot, snapped over on its back, smoked, and crashed into the sea. The second flight had been orbiting between Savo and Henderson at 23,000 feet. 2Lt. Robert Holman had mechanical problems and was unable to maintain altitude; he was trailed down and covered by his wingman, lLt. Jack Bade. The two pilots saw a Zero and both got a short burst at it when they spotted about 20 Zeros and about the same number offriendly fighters tangling in the distance. As Bade was climbing he got a short deflection shot that smoked a Zero. Holman got solid belly hits on a Zero that was rolling away

Lt. Cotesworth Head (center) with his CO, Capt John Little (left). and ILt Dale Tarbet (right). (Author)

from him, which caught fire and went down. Holman began to climb and a Zero came in for a beam attack to his left. He turned quickly but could not get the shot. The Bade/Holman element, led by Capt. John Voss and his wingman, 2Lt. William Cargill, dove but lost sight of the bombers below and made no contact. The third 44 th flight was orbiting at 10,000 feet east of Fighter One when Flight Leader, lLt. Cotesworth Head, spotted the Val dive-bombers in a shallow glide from the southwest and moving towards the American shipping. He dove on them and quickly shot one down from 1,000 feet. He then chandelled to the right to 6,000 feet and met more Vals and Zeros. He chased a dive-bomber and fired at 600 yards as tracers stllited to fly past his cockpit and then hit his fighter. He broke off his attack as fire erupted from the enemy bomber's wing root. The Zero was still on his tail, and Head chopped the throttle and skidded, hoping the Zero would over run. When it flew past he pulled up and chased after it, firing his 50 caliber machine guns until they were out of ammunition and forcing the Zero to crash into the ocean. Head returned to base with 12 holes in his P40 and the first three of his 14 victories. The second element leader, lLt. John Wood, attacked a Val from behind and killed the rear gunner, then literally shot the tail off the dive-bomber. Wood's wingman, lLt. Joseph "Jumpin" Joe" Lesicka, destroyed another Val with several short bursts for his first victory toward becoming an ace. Lt. John Tedder closed in on a Zero from the side, and a F4F closed from the other side. Neither saw the other, and they collided; both crashed and were KIA. Capt. William Norris ofthe 70FS led the fourth 44FS flight of P-40s consisting of lLt. Frank Gaunt, 2Lt. Wallace Jennings, and 2Lt. Harold Dreckman, at 9,000 feet over Henderson, where they intercepted Vals. Norris' combat report was blunt and brief: "Contact at 9,000 feet over Henderson. Dive-bombers started to dive. Shot at them all the way, got a smoker (black). Shortly after Lt. Jennings got a dive-bomber I got another good shot into another dive-bomber that went into the water. Rolled over and shot him in. Was shot at when he broke off, 150 feet off the water. Hit with 20mm shell. Shot off part of left aileron and elevator. Shot in both legs, left arm, and hand. Landing gear wouldn't work, made a belly landing on Fighter Strip No.2." Nonis' wingman, Wallace Jennings, finished off the Val Norris had hit. Jennings was hit in the right arm by 7.7mm bullets but was able to land his fighter safely. lLt. Frank Gaunt lived up to his nickname, "Wildman," as he went after three flights of Vals escorted by three flights of Zeros-60 planes total. He followed a Val down in its attack dive and exploded it, then over took another Val and set it on fire and into the water for his first two of eight victories. The last two P-40s to take off were flown by lLts. Lucien "Bob" Shuler and Douglas Curry, who were able to get into the fray. The two pilots climbed to 9,000 feet over Henderson Field and saw two Vals release their bombs. Shuler fired at one but was out of range; he continued to follow it, getting hits that caused it to crash into the water for his first of seven victories. Shuler had a Zero on his tail but was able to shake it and continue to make two more ineffective passes on the Vals. Curry had dived with his leader and also claimed a Val before his guns jammed. The 44 th had its

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II

I Lt. joseph "jumpin" joe" Lesicka destroyed another Val with several short bursts for his first victory toward becoming an ace. (Smith)

best day of the war, claiming 19 victories plus one by Norris for one loss (lLt. John Tedder). P-39s of the 68FS were hovering over shipping and intercepted the Japanese attack. The first flight, led by 1Lt. Charles Harris, knocked down four Zekes: two by Harris, and one each by Lts. Thomas Clark and Robert Fetch. The second flight, led by Capt. Leonard Frame of the 70FS, got two Japs: a Zero for Frame, and a Val (and a damaged Val) for 1Lt. Richard Kent. The last six P-39s of the 68FS took off at 1400. One Airacobra returned early when it was damaged by a Zero, but the others became engaged in a running dogfight ranging from Fighter One to Koli Point. 1Lt. William Fiedler became the only P-39 ace in World War II when he downed two Va1s with only his .30 caliber wing guns operating. 2Lt. Frank Clark splashed a Zero, and 1Lt. William Wells set a Val on fire-it finally crashed in flames into the ocean with its rear gunner firing on the pursuing Wells all the way down. Wells downed another Val soon afterward. The 68 th had its best day of the war, as it claimed six Zeros (one by Frame (70FS) flying with the squadron) and five Vals.

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I Lt. Robert Shuler fired at one, but was out of range; he continued to follow it, getting hits that sent it into the water for his first of seven victories. (Author)

The hour and a half air battle was the largest and most successful in the South Pacific to that time, with 74 of the 104 fighters getting into combat. At 1430 what was left of the Japanese force was heading back home. The Japanese lost so many aircraft that Adm. Mitscher declared it was "... hard to believe, but this was a Roman holiday on Jap airplanes." (Fighter Command War Diary, 19 June 1943). The 13FC had claimed a record 42 aircraft for the day. The RNZAF F4Us claimed five Zeros, USN VF-11 F4Fs claimed 15 Zeros and 16 Vals (four by Lt.Ug) Charles Stimpson), and the USMCVMF-121 and VMF-124 destroyed three Zeros. U.S. Navy AAgunners below claimed 16 enemy aircraft and shore-based AA one, but this seems to be an inflated claim, as it probably included Japanese aircraft shot down by fighters. the day's total was 81 Japanese aircraft destroyed by fighters for the loss of a P-40, three Navy VF-11 F4Fs, and a VMF-122 F4U. Although American shipping had been warned and was underway and maneuvering when the Japanese attacked, three ships were damaged and one merchant ship and a barge were finally forced to beach off Lunga to save them before they could sink. Navy shipboard losses were 25 killed, 29 wounded, and 22 missing.

Part Three, Chapter 11 - June 1943 Unlike the pilots, the "ground pounders"-ground crews, mechanics, armorers, ordnance men, cooks, et aI-worked steadily month after month, seven days a week, and often for long hours without going on leave. They endured the same heat, humidity, nightly visits from Washing Machine Charlie, bad food, boredom, and tropical diseases as the flying personnel. Flying officers could look forward to more or less regular rotation to New Zealand or back to the relatively more comfortable rear areas at New Caledonia or both. To the enlisted man it appeared that it would be years before he would go on leave. From spring 1943 the l3AF had a definite morale problem that got chronically worse. The number of mandays lost finally reached a high of 24,232 man-days lost, and only 219 were combat related. Efficiency declined, and the accident rate rose for pilots who spent more than six weeks in combat. The result of fatigue in enlisted men was not as easy to demonstrate. Operating a combat aircraft was not only stressful, but also was mentally and physically demanding. The efficiency of air officers was severely diminished by stress and fatigue, and it was imperative that the pilot could look forward to and was granted regular leaves. The ideal situation was to give entire squadrons leave, but in practice, when a squadron was based in a forward area, its replacements were two or three flights that were detached from its own squadron, or detachments of another in a rear area. The relieved pilots were then sent on leave, hopefully first to New Zealand, and from there sent to the rear-usually New Caledonia-for further rest and training. At the end of June lLts. Bill Harris and William Griffith and 2Lts. Murray Shubin, Erwin Rake, Donald Webber, and Henry Pedro ended their second tour of combat and were sent to Auckland, New Zealand, for R&R.

21t. Frank Clark (l), Ilt.William Fiedler (top/cap), IltTruman Barnes (middle) and Ilt.William Wells (R) (Author)

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12 New Georgia Campaign .21 June-26 August, Operation Toenails

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had determined that the capture of northwestern New Guinea and the occupation of the Solomons, New Georgia, and then southern Bougainville were the immediate objectives of Cartwheel. The final objectives were to be the capture of Kavieng, the cutting of seaborn communications to Rabaul, the destruction of its airpower, and then the two-pronged invasion of New Britain. After Cartwheel was concluded the Admiralties could then be put under intensive air attack in preparation for their invasion. The Casablanca Conference of January 1943 set the grand strategy of World War II, continuing with the "Europe first" edict requiring the unconditional surrender of Germany and Italy. But concurrent with the major European undertaking the JCS directed that there was to be continuous pressure put on the Japanese. Each Pacific operation was to threaten or cut their lines of communications and capture positions from which successive operations could be launched on the way towards Japan. The Guadalcanal campaign, while proclaimed in the Press as the frrstAmerican offensive, quickly became a defensive battle because of the lack of support from Washington. Only after the island was nearly lost did the JCS commit sufficient men and supplies to make the battle the major turning point of the war in the Pacific. New Georgia and then Bougainville were slated to be the next large-scale land, sea, and air offensives in the South Pacific to be reduced on the way to Japan. The Japanese strategy for ew Georgia had changed it from a base for the recapture of Guadalcanal to a major strongpoint in the delaying defense of the Solomons while their Lae-Salamaua-New BritainBougainville defense line was being reinforced. The successful invasion of Bougainville, which was to be the final phase of the Solomons' campaign, was dependent on adequate air cover. But since the nearest major base was on Guadalcanal, this air cover could not be provided, as the COMSOPAC did not have air superiority. The air distances were too long to the Central Solomons to furnish adequate cover, and the Navy did not wish to expose its valuable carriers in securing air superiority. The obvious answer was the invasion of New Georgia and the capture of the airfield at Munda. Initially the Japanese used the area as a staging point to supply their troops on Guadalcanal. After their defeat in November 1942 the Japanese began to build their airbase near

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Munda Point, on the southwest coast of New Georgia Island, in an area that was impossible to invade from the sea. The Japanese occupied Munda on 13 November and moved a construction battalion there on the 21 st . On 3 December air recon photos showed the possibility of two short parallel strips under construction under naturaljungle camouflage. The Japanese cut no trees, but photos found piles of loose dirt and coral under the tree canopy. Two days later the Japanese had extended their field to 2,000 feet, and on the 9th uprooted the trees and removed them to complete it. Munda airfield then became the most attacked target in the Solomons, but despite these attacks it became operational on the 17 th with a 4,500foot runway. The Japanese sent an advanced echelon of24 aircraft to the new strip, but all were destroyed or badly damaged within a week. The airfield had been easily constructed, and it was also easily repaired. The American air attacks could not disable the field for more than two days at a time, but were sufficient to prevent the Japanese from using it for major operations. After completing Munda in December the Japanese began construction on another airstrip at Vila Plantation, on the southern shore of adjacent Kolombangara

Vila Air Field on Kolombangara Island. just to the west of New Georgia, would be ready for operations in March. However, poor Japanese planning built the strip on ground so swampy that land-based aircraft could not operate on it, although a seaplane base operated in the waters nearby. (MF)

Part Three, Chapter 12 - New Georgia Campaign, 21 June-26 August, Operation Toenails

Fighter Two in June 1943, revetment area. The Skylark channel, or"lron Bottom Sound," lies just through the trees. (USAF)

Island. The Japanese did not try to conceal the construction and were bombed daily, but the strip was completed. The appearance of this second strip made the capture of the Kolombangara of vital concern. However, poor Japanese planning built Vila on ground so swampy that land-based aircraft could not operate on it, although a seaplane base operated in the waters nearby. The New Georgia campaign was to take place in two phases: the first phase was the landings on the islands of Rendova, New Georgia, Vangunu, and Arundel, while the second phase was the invasion of Vella Lavella six weeks later. The New Georgia operation (21 June to 26August) was code-named Operation "Toenails." The New Georgia Group is made up of 12 major islands and many smaller islands separated by shallow coral-surrounded lagoons and narrow stretches of open water measuring 40 miles wide by 150 miles long. New Georgia is the major island (45 miles long by 20 miles wide), and is covered by dense, ominous jungle covering rugged terrain that leads to the steep conical volcanic mountains in the interior. Blanche Channel separates New Georgia from Rendova and Tetipari on the south, and Vanagunu and Gutukai Islands lay at the eastern end. Kolombangara is a circular island that is basically a 5,450-foot mountain that protrudes from the ocean and is separated by Kula Gulf from the west coast of New Georgia. Just south of Kolombangara and west of Munda Point, separated by a very narrow channel, are the smaller islands ofArundel, Wanawana, and Baaga. Vella Lavella and Ganongga Islands lay to the far west of Kolombangara, with Gizo Island laying between in the Giza Strait. By July there were two fighter and two bomber airfields on Guadalcanal. Henderson was the base for all light and some heavy bombers, and most of the short-range search planes. Carney was the base for heavy and medium bombers and long-range search planes. Fighter One was the main fighter base for Navy and Marine fighters, while Fighter Two based the Army Air Force and New Zealand fighter units. Bulk gasoline storage had been improved with the addition of an underwater pipeline from tankers moored off Koli Point to a tank farm at Koli and a smaller one at Lunga. Two fields on the Russell Islands augmented the four Guadalcanal fields. The Russell's orth Field was a 4,200-foot strip supporting light bombers and fighters-operational on 30 June-and South Field was a 3,100 foot fighter base. From his headquarters in Noumea Halsey had overall command of the invasion of New Georgia. He designated three task

forces. R.Adm. Aaron Merrill was to command the covering task force (TU 36.2.1) of four cruisers and four destroyers to provide surface protection and fire support. R.Adm. Kelly Turner was to command the amphibious task force (TF-31), with Maj.Gen. John Hester, CG of the 43 rd Infantry Division, who was in command of the ground forces (New Georgia Occupation Force). VAdm. Aubrey Fitch of COMAIRSOPAC commanded Task Force 33, and his deputy, R.Adm. Marc Mitscher, had tactical command of the landbased aircraft based on Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands. Mitscher had 455 aircraft available on 30 June, L-Day: 213 fighters; 170 medium bombers; and 72 heavy bombers and search aircraft. On 18 June COMAIRSOPAC Fitch ordered all his air units to commence operations for the New Georgia landings. Air searches from Guadalcanal were to cover a radius from 270 to 310 degrees to prevent the approach of Japanese naval forces, and bombers were to intensify their attacks on enemy bases on New Georgia and Bougainville. The 17PRS was to closely monitor enemy aircraft and shipping concentrations at Buka and near the southern end of Bougainville. Adm. Turner requested attacks on airfields at Munda, Ballale, Kahili, Kieta, and Vila, as well as attacks on Japanese shipping around Munda and Bougainville beginning on L-Day minus S. All air units were ordered to attack enemy shipping at every opportunity. The fighters were given the Herculean task of providing air cover for all the forces in the Guadalcanal and New Georgia areas and all the shipping, particularly the transports sailing to and from these two regions. Once the invasion task force was moving and then after the troops were landed the fighters were to maintain air cover over them. To directly control the strategic air operations for the invasion of New Georgia, Adm. Fitch had moved from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal five days before the invasion. A new command was established, Headquarters, New Georgia Air Force (COMAIR New Georgia). It was made up of personnel of the Forward Echelon, 2MAW under Brig.Gen. Francis Mulcahy (USMC), and was attached to the New Georgia Occupation Force. After take off all aircraft flying to the New Georgia area were to come under the control of COMAIR New Georgia, which would control all direct air support of ground operations in the Central Solomons. Four air liaison parties were assigned to link ground and air forces. There were two parties on Rendova and one each on Segi and Wickham. Each party was made up of an air liaison officer and two radio men,

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II whose responsibility it was to recommend to the local ground unit commander the suitability of the target and what amount of air power would be required for an air attack. COMAIR New Georgia would approve, disapprove, or modify the plan. Forward area fighter control was under the control of two COMAIR New Georgia fighter director groups. At the start of New Georgia operations Group 2 from the Navy's Argus 11 was to be stationed on a destroyer until it was relieved by Group 1, after which it would move onto Rendova to become a back-up fighter director group.

Operation "Chronicle" 30 June 1942, the Seizure of Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands The New Georgia operation was to be coordinated with MacArthur's seizure of the Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands in the Coral Sea off the southeastern end of New Guinea on 30 June, which was also DDay for the landings on Rendova. TF 7 under R.Adm. Daniel Barbey was to land mixed American and Australian troops, and Kenney's 5AF was to attack targets in the Northern Solomons, ew Ireland, and eastern New Britain areas to support the invasion. The landings were unopposed, and airstrip construction was begun immediately. Woodlark construction progressed quickly, and on 14 July it was operational with a 150 x 3,000-foot runway, and by 23 July the first fighters arrived. Kiriwina construction was slowed by rain and the poor condition of the previously used construction equipment. The strip was operational in late July, and on 18 August the first 5FC units arrived. In late May the 67FS had been sent on detached duty to the 5FC and had flown from New Caledonia to Espiritu, to Guadalcanal, and then to Milne Bay, New Guinea, arriving there with 25 P-39 Ds and Ks. During its time at Milne Bay it had a large number of operational accidents, as the 24 original aircraft were reduced to 14 during 30 May to 24 June. On 23 July, 26 P-39s of the 67 th moved to muddy Woodlark Island after it had participated in the unopposed landings there in late June. Their stay saw little combat, but here, too, the 67 th suffered above average operational losses. On 17 August a P-38 temporarily based at Woodlark crashed into parked P-39s and destroyed five and damaged two more. Two days later 67 th CO Maj. Hecht was killed while leading a simulated strafing attack on a PT boat. Capt. Collins temporarily took over the squadron, but was relieved by Lt.Col. John Wilson of the 5FC on the 24 th • On 28 August Capt. Joseph Berkow shot down a twinengine Dinah east of Woodlark Island for the squadron's only victory during the Woodlark stay. Berkow won the $250 pot that was

The 17PRS continued to supply intelligence on Japanese air strength on their air fields. (USAF via Lansdale)

put up for the first victory. By the end of August the squadron had lost nine more aircraft, but had gained invaluable training and experience in scrambles and interceptions. The Japanese sent over "Boresight Boris" on nighttime raids, but the bogey flew too high and was never intercepted. From 13 May to 25 October the squadron lost 21 of 40 aircraft and five men. No offensive air operations were flown from Woodlark, as AIRSOLS commanders seemed to lose interest in it as soon as it was completed. The Japanese had 40,000 troops in the Solomons, of which 8,000 to 10,000 were on New Georgia, with about 3,000 of these in the Munda area. The Japanese had the advantage of shorter supply lines from their Bougainville bases and had had time to construct strong defensive positions. On 26 June COMSOPAC intelligence, aided by the 17PRS, estimated that there were 380 enemy aircraft in New Britain and the Solomons: 190 fighters; 121 Betty bombers; 23 Val dive-bombers; 41 seaplanes; and five float biplanes. The bulk of these aircraft were based at Rabaul (190 fighters and Betty bombers), with Ballale basing 50 fighters and Bettys. There were another 98 aircraft on New Guinea that could be flown in if needed. The Japanese New Georgia/Bougainville area airfields were located at Munda, Vila, Buka, Kahili, Ballale, and Kieta, along with seaplane bases at Shortland-Faisi, Rekata Bay, and Soraken. New Britain Island had fields at Lakunai (Rabaul), Keravat, Vanakanau,

The Japanese did not have many Aichi D3A2Vai dive bombers in the Solomons. (Lambert via Lansdale)

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Part Three, Chapter 12 - New Georgia Campaign, 21 June-26 August, Operation Toenails

Segi Point Airstrip.The Seabees began construction on the airstrip immediately after the Marines captured the area. It was completed in a record I I days, despite I4 inches of rain falling during the time (USMC)

Rapopo, and Tobera. There was a large base at Kavieng on the northwest end of New Ireland, plus the seaplane base at Rabaul. COMAIRSOPAC had 455 combat aircraft available. In preparation for the invasion AAF heavy bombers attacked Buin, Kahili, Ballale, and Poporang, USMC SBDs and TBFs hit Munda, Vila, and Rekata Bay, andAAF medium bombers and Marine TBFs flew low-altitude anti-shipping searches and attacks in the Slot. Rendova landings: 30 June 1943 Halsey planned to land on Rendova and New Georgia simultaneously, but intelligence indicated that the Japanese might land on Segi Point beforehand. On the night of 21/22 June Marine Raiders and Army troops landed unopposed on Segi Point on the southeastern tip of New Georgia. The next day a survey team of the 47 th Seabees came ashore, followed by Acorn 7 (a well-trained and highly qualified Seabee unit) and two 103 rd Infantry Companies that immediately began the construction of an airstrip. A record 11 days of rain totaling 14 inches slowed airstrip and road construction. The soil in the area was clay, and the rains made it very difficult to work

in the resulting sticky quagmire, but the strip was cleared and graded, two taxiways and several dispersal areas were built, AA defenses established, and limited operations were able to commence. By working day and night through the rain and almost continuous Japanese air attacks the 3,300 x 150-foot runway was completed by 18 July. Early on 30 June the South Pacific Amphibious Force landed Army troops and the 24 th Seabee battalion on the north side of Rendova Island, just across the narrow Blanche Channel from Munda. Fighters had provided close cover for the Amphibious Force when it leftKoli Point at 1630 on the 29 th • The invasion was shrouded by darkness and heavy rain clouds that precluded Japanese or American air activity. Rendova landings were unopposed, and the Seabees built roads and artillery positions to bombard Munda Point on Bougainville Island, across the Blanche Channel. Landings were also made that day at Wickham Anchorage on Vangunu Island, just east of the southern end of New Georgia. The next night the Marines landed at Viru Harbor. The landings at Viru and Wickham would protect Allied supply lines and provide staging areas for the New Georgia operations. Once the troops had landed the AAF was assigned to fly task force directed CAP as part of a constant 32-plane patrol to protect invasion shipping in Rendova Harbor and the troops and supplies as they were moved onshore on 30 June. The routine of the "Rendova Patrol" was to send 32 fighters over the landing area at 0700 and maintain this number in relays until 1630, when 16 fighters remained for the final half-hour of patrol. Each new patrol would relieve the one on station by visual contact. Once on station the fighters orbited "Vega," the Rendova radar station, in a ten-mile circle stacked at various altitudes, with flights exchanging positions to conserve oxygen. To maintain this 32-plane patrol 96 fighters were required, which left 80 to 100 aircraft available for other duties. The Rendova Patrol alleviated the situation somewhat by providing air cover for SBD and TBF attacks on Munda and nearby Vila. The long distance from Rendova to the airstrips on the Russells (120 miles) and to Guadalcanal (180 miles) made escort relays more difficult, especially in periods of bad weather. During the period there was chronic bad weather, and Harmon's heavy bombers had to postpone their bombing to neutralize the airstrips on Bougainville. The weather over the Rabaul airstrips was also poor, and there was no photo recon during the first week of the invasion. Kenney was only able to send a few 5AF bombing missions up from New Guinea, and there was not one 13AF heavy bomber over the area until 4 July. When the weather cleared there were not enough Allied fighters available for bomber escort due to maintaining the Rendova Patrol. If the weather had been better the Bougainville airstrips could have been neutralized. Despite the poor weather, at D+9 the score would be 190 Japanese lost for the cost of 32 Allied aircraft. As expected, the Japanese responded to the American offensive at Redova with a huge air offensive. At 064816 fighters of the first Rendova Patrol were overhead, under the control of Argus 11, which was located on a destroyer. This was the first fighter director operation of its kind and needed to be improvised, as conditions demanded. The Navy controllers wanted to relocate Argus and make their radar interceptions at least five miles out from the destroyer

A44FS P-40 aids the Rendova landings. (USAF)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II screen so that the incoming Japanese aircraft could not sneak in behind the nearby mountains out of radar detection. That morning there was three to five cloud layers limiting visibility, and so the 32 plane CAP was stacked 16 at 10,000 feet, eight at 15,000 to 20,000 feet, and the remaining eight at 5,000 feet. The first wave of Zeros came down from Rabaul at 0925 and was met by the Marine CAP flown by 16 F4Us and 16 F4Fs of VMF-121. The Marines shot down 16 Zeros with four probables. Things were quiet for the next four hours as the transports finished unloading and were about to return to Guadalcanal. The next wave of attackers (torpedo-can'ying Bettys escorted by Zeros) came down at 1435 and attacked the amphibious force shipping. The Bettys circled, trying to hide against the landmass, and then dove in at high speed and low altitude to drop their torpedoes at 1,500-foot range. VMF-221 was on CAP and decimated the formation, with 14 Bettys destroyed, six probables, and one damaged, and four Zeros destroyed, four probables, and one damaged. The Japanese did succeed in torpedoing and damaging the transport McCawley, the invasion flagship that was later mistakenly sunk by U.S. Navy PT boats, which put nine torpedoes in her. A torpedo hit the destroyer Farenholt but it was a dud. VMF-122 came onto the scene near the end of the combat and claimed three Zeros destroyed and two probables, along with three Bettys downed. VMF-213 also joined in the fray and added II Zeros and one probable, with ILt. Wilbur Thomas getting his first four victories ofthe 18 1/2 he would score during the war. The next wave of Bettys escorted by Zeros arrived over the MundalLambeti Plantation area at 1600 and was met by Navy F4Fs ofVF-21 that had been land-based on Guadalcanal since May. Lt.Cdr. Charles "Whitey" Ostrum's F4Fs butchered 12 Bettys (two probables) and 17 Zeros (one probable), losing four Wildcats. At 1715 over 30 Rufes, Daves, and Vals attacked and were contested by 16 44FS PAOs (some flown by 70FS pilots). Eleven float planes were downed that day for the loss of one PAO (lLt. Lucien Shuler ran out of fuel and ditched off southern New Georgia and was picked up by destroyer and returned to Guadalcanal). ILt. Jack Bade destroyed a float plane to become an ace, and Capt. Harry Walters OOFS) downed three more. Other victorious pilots were Lt. Cotesworth Head with 1.5 (lLt. Robert Krohn shared Head's other half victory), 2Lt. Carl Hay, ILts. Joseph Lesicka and Bruce Macklin with one each, and Captains John Voss and Wade Harper OOFS) with one each. After a half hour the 44 th was joined by VMF213, which added nine more float planes. Total air victories for the day were a record 101: the 11 by the 44FS PAOs; 58 by F4Us; 30 by F4Fs; and two by TBFs for a loss of 14 aircraft and seven pilots. 339FS pilot Lt. William Rankin was killed when his P-38 crashed on take offfrom Fighter Two. To avoid taxiing, the 68FS decided to wait on the opposite end of the runway until four flights of P-38s took off. This was made necessary, because the P-39 had a bad reputation for overheating during even short taxi times. The pilots got out of their hot cockpits and sat on the wings of their aircraft, watching the P-38s. Rankin's P-38 had some kind of problem on takeoff and rolled over at liftoff, crashing into the P-39s and killing William Fiedler, America's only P-39 ace. COMAIR New Georgia air controllers newly landed on Rendova had problems establishing themselves on the island, as 182

the heavy rains that had made the area a sea of mud. A radio truck equipped with a SCR-299 set made its first contact with Guadalcanal at 1500. Group I fighter director station had put its SCR-602 25mile range radar set in place in anticipation of taking over for the Argus II fighter director aboard a destroyer that was scheduled to leave. On I July at 102012 Vals and 18 Zeros returned to attack shipping. They were met by eight P-40s of the 44FS, eight No.14 Squadron New Zealand P-40s, and a mixed bag of eight Navy F4Fs from VF-21, VF-27, and VF-28 land-based on Guadalcanal. VF-28 served off the Chenago in June and July and claimed 10 vict9ries under Lt.Cdr. J.1. Bandy. VF-21 came to Guadalcanal in May and continued to fly there into July under Lt.Cdr. Charles "Whitey" Ostrum, claiming 27 more victories (one ace, Lt. Ross Torkelson, KIA 7/22/ 43, with six victories) after their 30-victory day on 30 June. VF-27 operated from Guadalcanal from March to July, except for a short stint aboard the Suwannee in June. They would score six victories in their April deployment and six more in July under CO Lt.Cdr. J.T. Fitzpatrick. Capt. Robert Westbrook led the 44 th 's first flight of IUs. Magnus Francis, James Parker, and Carl Newlander, and the second flight consisted of ILts. Elmer Wheadon (flight leader), Charles Sacket, Douglas Currey, and Robert Holman. The second flight was on patrol at 5,000 feet covering the shipping in Rendova Harbor, while Westbrook's flight was at 16,500 feet. Westbrook tally-hoed 10 to 12 Val dive-bombers and about IS Zero escorts coming in at 21,000 feet off the west coast of Rendova Island. The flight dropped its belly tanks and quickly climbed, and as it closed, the Vals dove and Westbrook warned Wheadon's flight below. As they approached the bombers Westbrook's cockpit fogged over and he overshot the

I Lt. Elmer "Doc" Wheadon points out his five, ace-in-a-day victories as his contribution to the 44FS scoreboard. (Wheadon)

Part Three, Chapter 12 - New Georgia Campaign, 21 June-26 August, Operation Toenails enemy formation. He then pulled up in a wing over and tried to wipe off the windscreen and canopy. Once he cleared away the mist he saw the bombers below, but all were either in flames or engaged by a PAO. Westbrook's wingman, James Parker, had his Allison engine fail, and he was forced to bailout. As Westbrook called his tally-ho Wheadon saw a formation of about ten dive-bombers at 12 o'clock and 7,000 feet peeling off to attack shipping. After they had dropped their bombs at low altitude the P-40s caught the Vals from behind. lLt. Wheadon's flight got behind a string of nine Vals. Wheadon sighted the No.3 Val and fired for victory No.1. He turned continuously to the right and blew up his second victim just above the water. He climbed slightly to the left and joined a PAO and F4F that were chasing the scattered Vals. A Val pulled up directly in front of Wheadon at 45-degrees, and he downed it with a long burst for victory No.3. He then turned right and saw another Val turning away from a F4F, firing at it from very long range. As the Val passed by Wheadon hit the length of its fuselage with his .50 calibers for another shoot down. Wheadon heard calls from the Westbrook flight on his radio that there were Zeros above, and he joined the fight and expended his ammunition, getting one for his fifth victory of the day. Two weeks after Murray Shubin had accomplished the feat Wheadon had become the second ace-in-a-day for the 13FC. Wheadon left the fight but was fired on from long range and quickly headed for a nearby rain squall behind three fleeing Wildcats and another P-40. Wheadon hastily

I Lt. Magnus Francis scored 3.5 victories in the battle, but ended the day by bailing out and being picked up by a PBY (Smith)

maneuvered by rotating the stick with both hands and kicking the rudders from side to side. He almost stalled and fell off on a wing as he entered into the protection of the clouds. After the Vals dropped their bombs, Sacket closed from behind and burned one Val and was closing on a second when Currey closed in front of him and exploded it. Sacket saw another Val heading off toward Munda and chased after him. He had a 1,000 foot altitude advantage and easily closed and fired 200 rounds in two bursts into the Val, causing fires in both wing roots, and the stricken bomber glided into the ocean. Sacket was only 180 feet off the water and began to climb when he was attacked by a Zero at about 1,500 feet. Sacket managed to slip and skid away, but at 4,000 feet he pushed over and a Zero appeared directly in front of him. Sacket fired at only 50 yards and couldn't miss hitting the Jap's wings and fuselage. The enemy fighter fell off into a 45-degree dive into the ocean for his third victory of the day. Sacket joined Wheadon, and the two PAOs scissored to discouraged· several Zero attacks before they started their return to Guadalcanal. While Westbrook was clearing his windshield, lLt. Magnus Francis rolled over and dove to attack; he got on the tail of a Val and fired at 20 degrees and 150 yards, causing it to catch fire and explode. Rolling out of this attack, Francis got on the tail of a Hap fighter and exploded it for his second quick victory of the day. Francis rejoined with Lt. Newlander, and they turned back into the dive-bomber attack. Francis attacked a dive-bomber, making a 180, and got a long burst from about 200 yards and 25 degrees deflection. A F4F was making a firing run at the same Val from the opposite side, and Francis split the victory with the Navy pilot. Francis rejoined Newlander, who was on the tail of a Zero, and Newlander flamed it. Soon Newlander was attacked from above and had his left elevator shot up. A Zero appeared in front of Francis, and he took a snap shot, causing some damage, and then continued to follow Newlander down, both being chased by Zeros from behind and above. They evaded the Zeros, but Newlander was unable to climb in his damaged fighter and Francis stayed with him, chasing Zeros away for the next five to ten minutes. A Zero got on Francis' tail, but he was too low to do anything to evade. The too eager enemy pilot overshot and turned back into Francis, and the two fighters closed head-on. Francis got in two bursts at 250 yards and the Zero began to smoke and then rolled over on his back and crashed into the water. Francis returned to protect Newlander, and five minutes later was hit by a cannon shell that exploded against his cockpit armor plate. His rudder cables were destroyed, and shrapnel cut his left eye and bruised his j aw and face, and the concussion caused his nose to bleed. The Zero continued his attack and got small caliber machine bullet hits that blew up the PAO's ammunition box. Francis was only 500 feet off the water and flying at 180mph and thought he had enough speed to pull up to 800 feet to bailout, but was unable to do so. He then rolled the fatally damaged aircraft over to one side and rolled out of the cockpit and bounced out off the wing and immediately pulled the ripcord. The Zero that had been attacking Newlander came in and strafed Francis, putting holes in his chute. As the Zero was coming around to strafe him again a Navy F4F appeared and shot it down. When Francis was floating down, only 100 feet above the water a second Zero tried to strafe him but

183

13 th Fighter Command in World War Il was chased off. He released his chute when he was about 20 feet off the water, and it landed about 75-100 feet away. Since it contained his raft and survival gear he swam toward it. As he swam he was strafed from behind by a Zero and ducked under the water to escape. When he surfaced the Wildcats again had chased away his tormentors. The three and a half victories that day would be his last and leave Francis one half victory short of becoming an ace. Once he had cleared his windshield Westbrook began looking for his wingman, James Parker, but came upon a Zero and shot it down. He joined a F4F and dove to attack another Zero without getting any hits. After he pulled up and leveled off he attacked another Zero head-on, taking it away from a F4F that was making an attack on it. Gaining his seventh victory, Westbrook joined Sacket and Wheadon and returned to base, despairing that he had lost all three pilots of his flight. Francis had landed about four miles off shore and started swimming, but when he got to within two miles of shore strong winds and heavy rain fell for an hour, pushing him to six miles off shore. He continued a futile swim for about an hour and half when his Mae West life vest began to lose pressure. After all his exertion Francis was too weak to even reinflate it, but fortunately at the same time a PBY Dumbo found him. It landed and taxied in the

rough seas and returned him to Florida Island. When he returned Francis reported that just before he was shot down he had seen Newlander's crippled fighter losing altitude with its rudders and elevators shot away. Newlander was listed as MIA. Parker returned to base after being picked up by a destroyer. The 44 th claimed 11.5 Zeros and four Vals for the loss of three P-40s (Parker, Francis, and Newlander) and one pilot (Newlander). The RNZAF P-40s claimed seven Zeros, and the USN four Vals, a Zero, and three probables. The Japanese dive-bombers scored no hits on Rendova shipping. On the 2nd the Japanese finally had some success against the Rendova landings. Allied CAP had been directed by ~"alsey to return to Guadalcanal due to worsening weather that was closing the airstrips there. At the same time Rendova SCR-602 radar went down for ten minutes for generator maintenance. Five minutes later, at 1330, 18-25 Bettys with a Zero escort sneaked in, hidden by a cloud bank and a hill, and dropped 50 bombs on the LSTs that were unloading on the beaches. The raid caused the heaviest casualties of anyone raid in the South Pacific, killing 59 and wounding 77 without any loss to the attackers. That afternoon, at 1420 the Japanese tried to repeat the attack with 50 Zeros, but they were intercepted by two flights of Marine VMF-12l F4Us. The Corsairs shot down six of the escorting Zeros, losing three of their own, but two pilots were rescued.

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Part Three, Chapter 12 - New Georgia Campaign, 21 June-26 August, Operation Toenails New Georgia Landings, 3 July 1943 On 3 July 43 rd Division Army troops from Rendova crossed over the narrow channel to Zarana Beach on New Georgia, six miles east of Munda. On 4/5 July Marine and Army troops landed at Rice Anchorage on the opposite side of New Georgia, across from Vila, to begin an advance across the island toward Munda. All ground forces were in position to converge on Munda airfield, but it would not be captured until 4 August. The Japanese reacted quickly to the invasion, as they sent 40 Zeros over Rendova on a fighter sweep. They were intercepted by 16 339FS P-38s that were patrolling over Rendova in two flights of eight led by 2Lt. George Chandler and ILl. James Hoyle. Chandler's flight was orbiting on station at 15,000 feet and was ordered to climb to 25,000 feet. As they climbed they spotted 30 fighters diving out of the clouds. The Lightnings dropped their belly tanks and attacked. Chandler and 2Lt. Thomas Walker, both of whom would become future aces (five and six victories, respectively), got their first victories of the war. Meanwhile, Hoyle's flight was climbing for altitude and scissoring for mutual protection when they were bounced by about 40 Zeros. In the hit-and-run dogfight Hoyle and lLt. Ray Bezner destroyed a Zero each, while 2Ll. Harry Andrews and ILl. Earl Conrad shared a victory credit. Three pilots (Us. Richard Baker, Robert Sylvester, and Howard Silvers) failed to return in weather that turned bad. Speculation was

that they probably became lost and ran out of gas, then crashed into the sea. On the 4th , at 1410 18 Betty (Sally?) bombers flew past Rendova and then turned back to attack from the east, while their 20 Zero escort turned south to attack the 24 Navy VF-2l and VF-28 fighters on patrol ten miles south ofthe island. The American AA batteries were particularly effective, as they claimed 12 (overstated?) Japs for the day. VF-2l claimed five Zeros and VF-28 two Zeros-another bad day for the Japs. On 5 July lLt. John Wood, lLt. Cotesworth Head, ILl. Theo Jennings, and lLt. Douglas Currey each led a 44FS P-40 flight on a patrol over Rendova. Wood's flight (IUs. Robert Krohn, Harold Dreckman, and 2Lt. Ehrmann) was instructed to climb to 20,000 feet to investigate a reported bogie. As they got to 18,000 feet they sighted 16 Zeros a few thousand feet below. The Zeros crossed over and climbed for a head-on pass, and Wood ordered his flight to go into a Lufbery defensive circle that temporarily confused the Japanese, who circled above them. The short-turning Zeros always had the advantage in attacking a Lufbery, and the P-40s had no choice but to break away and stay in elements to keep the Japanese from getting on anyone's tail for long. Wood's wingman, Ehrmann, was on his first combat mission and lost Wood, and Dreckman's wingman, Krohn, had his engine holed by a Zero and bailed out.

2Lt. George Chandler got his first victory of the war on his way to becoming a five victory ace. (Chandler)

Lt. Earl Conrad ofthe 339FS poses with his P-38 "Sweet Lips." (Chandler)

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131h Fighter Command in World War II Wood took Dreckman as his new wingman and they played hide and seek in the clouds, trying to sneak up on the Zeros. The two caught up with the Zeros, but one turned into the two Americans and made a head-on pass. The 12.50 calibers of the two Warhawks shredded the Zero and the two shared the victory. A Zero came in from below to get on Wood's tail. The Zero fired at very close range, but Wood managed to skid away without damage. Theo Jennings and Wallace Jennings climbed to intercept reported Bettys, but Zeros made overhead passes on them and then flew into the sun. Wallace Jennings caught one with a short burst as it was pulling up and his lucky shot scored; the Zero flaming immediately. Meanwhile, in Currey's flight, IUs. Grant Smith and Charles Sacket were climbing to 14,000 feet at 150mph with their belly tanks attached. Sacket sighted four Zeros making a high speed attack below and they dropped their tanks, half-rolled, and dove, pulling out at 10,000 feet. The Zeros turned into their attack, and a 20mm shell hit Smith's rudder; he retreated back to base. Sacket pulled out of his dive and had a Zero pull up from under and pass to his right. The surprised Sacket forced a snap shot but missed, and followed Smith home. Head's flight climbed, and at 10,000 feet saw Japs above that were

diving on them to attack. Head's PAO was hit by a 20mm in the wing root, and his flight joined Wood's flight in their Lutbery and broke away from the confused Japs. The weather cleared over southern New Britain on 5 July, and nine B-24s finally flew up to Buin, but found no shipping and diverted to Ballale and Munda. This attacked marked the beginning of day and night raids by B-17s and B-24s flying to Bougainville to destroy installations and airfields there. B-25s of the 42BG also initiated their low-level harassment of Japanese shipping and bombing and strafing on ground targets on Bougainville and Kolombangara. On the night of 5/6 July the New Georgia run of the Tokyo Express, consisting of seven troop-carrying destroyers and three regular destroyers under R.Adm. Teruo Akiyama, was intercepted by four cruisers and four destroyers ofR.Adm. Walden Ainsworth's Task Force 36.1 in Kula Gulf, between New Georgia and Kolombangara. In the battle of Kula Gulf the Japanese lost Adm. Akiyama, two destroyers definitely sunk, and one damaged for the loss of the cruiser Helena. It was during this battle that future PresidentJohn Kennedy's PT-109 was cut in two by a Japanese destroyer.

A Zero's 20mm shell hit I Lt. Grant Smith's rudder, and he retreated safely back to base. (Smith)

Looking north from Ballale Island Airfield toward Kahili Airfield (upper right). Ballale was the major Japanese bomber base in the Bougainville area. (USAF via Lansdale)

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Part Three, Chapter 12 - New Georgia Campaign, 21 June-26 August, Operation Toenails The next day the 339FS was assigned to fly high cover for B25s that were to find and sink the destroyer damaged the night before, and then to search for Helena survivors and to provide air cover for any rescue operations. In the pre-dawn four P-38s led by lLt. George Chandler and followed by his wingman, 2Lt. Earl Conrad, took off, circled the field once, and formed up to fly to a rendezvous with the Mitchells. As they closed on the rendezvous point the weather was clear with unlimited visibility, and the flight could see the B-25s bombing and then strafing a grounded destroyer (Nagatsuki) at mast top level. The Jap destroyer had been finished off by the time the P-38s arrived, and the bombers headed for Vella Lavella to hunt for any enemy shipping that might be foolhardy enough to be caught in the daylight. As the B-25s neared Vella Lavella and turned toward American shipping and troops landing at Munda they saw three patrol boats followed by Zeros headed toward the landing area. Intelligence had briefed the pilots that any ships moving into this area would be Japanese, and the Lightnings dove on the Zeros to protect the B-25s that were diving on the patrol boats. Just as the B-25s began their attack, Chandler identified the "Zeros" as Navy F4F Wildcats and the patrol boats as USN PT Boats! At that time the only communication was between similar service aircraft, so there wasn't any way for the P-38s to contact the Navy F4Fs or PT Boats, and the Mitchells sank one of the PT Boats and the PTs shot down a bomber. The unfortunate episode was another occasional breakdown in intelligence and communications that led to friendly fire incidents. By 7 July there were SCR-270 radar sets in operation on Rendova, Segi Point, and Viru Harbor. These sets increased the early warning range, but surrounding mountainous islands created voids in the radar net. To compensate for these gaps fighter aircraft were orbited over them for visual surveillance. The Japs continued their long-term practice of sending down single-plane or small flights of aircraft at night. These aircraft would usually be sent more for psychological harassment and stay out ofAArange, but often would

swoop in for one quick bomb run. By the 7 th the Japanese had sent down 11 raids in force, plus a few small attacks, and with the exception of 2 July the Rendova Patrol response had been extremely successful, with 169 victories coupled with an additional 22 over Japanese bases. On the morning of the 7 t, \ 17 PRS photos showed Buna and Kahili to base 71 Zeros, 16 Vals, and five Betty bombers, and Ballale based 21 more'Bettys. COMAIRSOLS had problems committing enough fighters to patrol the area, in addition to patrolling Guadalcanal and the Russells, and the shipping running between New Georgia and Guadalcanal. To mount fighter sweeps on Japanese airbases air protection over shipping was sacrificed, and the Rendova Patrol was reduced from 32 to 24 aircraft. On 9 July Harmon only had 29 P-38s in operation, and he and Twining desperately wanted a P-38 group of 75 aircraft and a 35plane reserve by I September. Their argument to Gen. Arnold was that to support amphibious landings in the Solomons and to neutralize Japanese bases heavy bombers needed adequate fighter escort to prevent exorbitant bomber losses. To accomplish this it was necessary to provide air cover to as much as 210 miles ahead of the existing airfields, and only the long-range Lightnings could provide this. From 1 to 28 June an average of 58 AAF fighters based on Guadalcanal had flown nearly 3,000 hours with a loss (combat and operational) of nine aircraft, during which time they had destroyed 60 Japanese aircraft. In the eight days of the New Georgia operation (29 June to 6 July), an average of 76 fighters had flown just over 2,500 hours and lost 15 aircraft for the destruction of 27.5 Japanese aircraft. The 27.5 total, while low in contrast to the 169 total Japanese losses (to all services) for the period, were attributable to P-38s flying high cover and bomber escort missions that generally kept them out of combat. Also, the AAF P-38s flew local defense over Guadalcanal and the Russells, which were now seldom attacked. Arnold had allocated most of his P-38s and F-5s to the North African Theater, but informed Harmon that 17 were being prepared for immediate shipment, along with 30 more promised for the July shipment.

"Whislin' Britches" was probably the only P-400 to survive the Guadalcanal Campaign.The name for the fighter came from an impeller blowout. It was soon to be sent to the States for display, as its access panels are taped to protect it from the elements. Pictured are 67FS officers (L-R): Maj. G. Phillips, Maj. Allard, and Maj. A Price (USAF)

P-39Q of the 67FS at Segi Point in mid-December 1943. P-39s had a high accident rate on Segi and were replaced by Marine and Navy carrier-type aircraft that were more capable of short landings and take offs. The P-39 name appears to be "Vivionny." (USAF)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II On 9 July the 43 rd Division began its advance on Munda when it opened its attack along the Barike River against 4,000 Japanese troops. The Japanese had short supply lines and strong, well-concealed, mutually supporting defensive positions that were manned by well-equipped, well-fed troops who were willing to die for their Emperor. During the Guadalcanal ground campaign the jungles were divided by high ridges separated by ravines, rivers, and streams, and grassy open areas that allowed the PAOO/39s an opportunity to identify a target through landmarks and allowed some safety boundaries from friendly troops. The New Georgian terrain was the Japanese' greatest ally, as the very dense jungle covered the low intersecting ridges, leaving no landmarks. Maneuver and mutual support on land was impossible and equalized the battle for the Japanese, who were inferior in number and equipment. Artillery and air support were handicapped by the impenetrable jungle in any bid to cooperate with the slow and cautiously advancing troops. Direct air support was under the operational control of COMAIR New Georgia, which established air liaison parties with the infantry. Because neither air liaison units on the ground nor observers in spotter planes were able to locate enemy positions it soon was determined that dependable close air support was impracticable, as the dense jungle made the location of an enemy target impossible. Friendly advancing troops only located a target when they were too close to it for safe air support to come down. When the daily advance was measured at 500 to 1,000 feet it was not feasible to fall back to allow air support to do its job safely. The lack of reliable maps was another problem. Smoke shells for target marking were used with some success, but undependable ground to air radio communication often interfered. The two-prong advance toward the Munda airfield was slow, and Japanese resistance was heavier than predicted. On the 13 th the impatient Halsey put Harmon in charge of ground operations. Harmon went to New Georgia, and on the 15 th relieved Maj.Gen. John Hester from command of the ground forces and appointed Maj.Gen. Oscar Griswold. The Segi Airfield was only 40 miles from Munda and was intended to relieve fighters from flying the long distance from Guadalcanal and the Russells. Unfortunately, the length of the peninsula it was built on limited the length of the runway and was too short for the P-39s intended to land there. It also was slippery when it was wet, which was often, and its approaches were obstructed by wooded hills. The accident rate at Segi was high, and the P-39s had to be replaced by Marine and Navy carrier-type aircraft that were more capable of short landings and take offs. Segi did offer damaged and fuel-starved AAF aircraft a place to land, rather than trying to fly another 80 miles east to the Russells. The fighters flying from Segi escorted American bombers and scrambled to intercept the Japanese bombers on their way to attack American infantry and the anchorage at Rendova. From 7 to 11 July the weather interfered with operations on both sides, but the Japanese continued to fly, and the American CAPs intercepted daily raids of Betty bombers escorted by Zeros. On the 7th the Marine VMFs knocked down ten Zeros and six Bettys in three raids: three Zeros by VMF-121 at noon; three Zeros by VMF-221 at 1350; and six Bettys and four Zeros by VMF-122 at 1430. On 9 July Lt. Robert Butler of the 68FS shot down a Zero on

188

Rendova Patrol. On 11 July the Marines shot down 12 Japanese (VMF-221 four Zeros and three Bettys, and five Zeros by VMF213) in an afternoon raid. 339FS pilots were flying eight P-39s of the 68FS on a scheduled patrol over Rendova Harbor when they were directed by the fighter controller to fly north over Rice Anchorage and Kula Gulf. At 1450 at 13,000 feet they were bounced by 20 Zeros. The timid Zeros made only one pass and high-tailed it home. lLt. Edward Whitman shot down a Zero, but was hit and forced to bailout. Whitman's parachute hung up in ajungle tree on New Georgia, and while climbing down he fell and broke his arm. Using his compass he began to trek toward Kula Gulf, evading Japanese patrols by ducking into the heavy jungle. Two days later he joined with two survivors of a Navy destroyer that had been sunk during the Battle of Kula Gulf on the night of 5/6 July. The three evaders found a life raft and paddled out on Kula Gulf, where a Marine F4U sighted them and pointed them toward U.S. lines. A few hours later they beached and were rescued by members of the 1st Marine Raider Battalion who were fighting nearby. The initial landings on New Georgia were helped immeasurably by close air support. Soon the infantry's push inland through the thick jungles of northern New Georgia to take Munda Airfield became a wearing and costly process. The dense jungle cover made it impossible for fighters to find enemy targets for close air support and interdiction missions. Bombers were called in to carpet bomb large areas to take out any possible targets in the path of the advancing infantry. The Japanese continued to send down bombers and fighters to interdict the American Navy and Army from making more inroads in the north and central Solomons. Many 13FC fighter missjons in July were bomber escort, close support, and Guadalcanal CAP, and the fighter pilots did not have an opportunity to run up their victory totals. On 12 July the 44FS flew Rendova Patrol and engaged ten Zeros at 10,000 feet. The Japanese came in at 7,000 feet and climbed to meet the eight P-40s. Three pilots of the 44FS claimed a Zero each: Capt. Frank Gaunt; lLt. Joseph Lesicka; and FlO Andrew Murray. Over New Georgia, 2Lt. William Ehrenmann had a 20mm shell explode in his cockpit, wounding him in the leg. Ehrenmann crash-landed and spent two days and a night on a log floating down a stream that flowed through Japanese occupied territory. Despite

Combat photo taken from Kokorana Island of Japanese bombers attacking Munda Airfield in the early morning of I 2 July 1943. (US Army)

Part Three, Chapter 12 - New Georgia Campaign, 21 June-26 August, Operation Toenails his serious wounds he made it to the American-held beachhead and was returned by air to Tulagi for medical care, then evacuated to the States. The Rendova patrol played an important part in the successful unloading of almost 29,000 troops and personnel, along with over 30,000 tons of food, fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. USN Combat Narratives X: Southeast Area Naval Operations, Part 2 states: "The success of the Rendova Patrol in warding off Japanese attacks is attested by the fact that during the entire operation (Julyauthor) only three hits were registered on our ships by bombing and torpedo plane attacks and only one horizontal bombing attack reached the objective during daylight hours." During the night of 12/13 July, continuing to anticipate that Kolombangara was to be invaded, the Japanese tried to run the Tokyo Express from Rabaul to supply their besieged troops in the

ILt. Harold Dreckman. (Smith)

Vila-Stanmore area. The Japanese sent five destroyers and four destroyer transports under R.Adm. Shunji Izaki in his flagship, the old light cruiser Jintsu, which VAdm. Tanaka had used in the first Express runs. R.Adm. Walden Ainsworth led Task Force 36.1, made up of four cruisers and ten destroyers, up from Tulagi to meet Izaki. Again the Navy took heavy losses, as a destroyer was sunk and the cruisers St. Louis, Honolulu, and HMNZS Leander were heavily damaged. The Japanese lost the Jintsu, and their destroyers were prevented from supplying Kolombangara. The Japanese sent down Zeros that were intercepted by a US patrol from VF-2I and VF28, which shot down eight enemy fighters. The Tokyo Express reinforcement attempts of 5/6, and now on 12/13 July, were costly to Halsey, but both attempts were prevented from landing supplies. The Japanese could no longer use Kula Gulf to reinforce Munda and Vila, and now they would have to send ships and barges all the way around Vella Lavella to the west side of Kolombangara. The P-39s of the 68FS were particularly adept at barge hunting. ILl. Richard Kent described barge hunting tactics:

I Lt. joseph Lesicka was the third I 3FC ace-in-a-day after Murray Shubin (16 june) and ElmerWheadon (I july). Many reports credit a Marine F4U with sharing Lesicka's Betty victory, but later he was awarded full credit. (USAF)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II "In aerial combat I never used the cannon because its trajectory was much different from that of the six machine guns. I used the cannon while strafing ships or enemy land positions. It was highly effective against Japanese landing craft. One well-aimed cannon shot would not sink the landing craft, but would clear the craft of soldiers because of the landing craft construction-a welded, round-bottom job similar to a bathtub. The ricochet effect of the cannon was devastating." ("Flying the P-39 Airacobra, " What Were They Like to Fly? Vol. 1) On 14 July seven 390BS B-25Cs escorted by 18 PAOs sank one ship and set fire to a cargo ship off Kolombangara. Two 339FS pilots (Us. Morris Pace and Daniel Wolterding) flying P-39s were MIA when they became separated from their flight while on CAP over Rendova. On 15 July the Japanese sent down their largest air attack since 16 June, as 27 Bettys escorted by 40-50 Zeros attacked shipping and troops on western New Georgia. The 44FS sent up two flights led by 1Lt. Frank Gaunt, but only seven P-40 pilots entered the battle, as one pilot turned back with engine trouble. VF21 reported the Japanese formation over Kolombangara Island and the 44FS climbed toward the area, and at 16,000 feet sighted the bombers and Zeros at 1430 over Vella LaVella. Gaunt met two Zeros and fired with no effect. 1Lt. Harold Dreckman moved in on one Zero as it was at the top of a loop and cut it down. 2Lt. Richard Wheeler was following Dreckman and flamed a Zero as it chandelled to the left. Another Zero was then attacked by 1Lt. Joseph Lesicka, who describes his combat on this day: "Took off with seven P-40s on Rendova Patrol from Guadalcanal at approx. 1245. Arriving on station Vega base reported a large number of enemy aircraft approaching. We were ordered to 20,000 feet, but at about 16,000 feet we saw the first enemy planes. Made our contact. On my first pass I shot down a Zero, and it blew up. Picked up a torpedo bomber (Kate -author), over ran on my first pass, but had smoked it. I turned and picked him up again and blew him up on my second run. Then I made a pass on a Betty bomber and set his right engine on fire. A F4U also made a pass on the bomber. I turned and made a second pass-blew his right wing off and he went down. Then attacked two Zeros on the tail of a P40, setting both on fire, and they went into the drink. On the second Zero I had only one gun firing, and he burned just as I was out of ammo. Then stayed in combat, making passes at Zeros who would turn and run, as they were scared of our six .50 cals. We finally flew out of danger. Being short of fuel we had to land at the Russell Islands to refuel and then back to the Canal. My plane received six bullet holes." (Correspondence: Lesicka, 1986) The victory made Lesicka the third 13FC ace-in-a-day after Murray Shubin (16 June) and Elmer Wheadon (1 July). Many reports credit the Marine F4U with sharing Lesicka's Betty victory, but later he was awarded full credit. ILt. Frank Gaunt looked over toward his wingman, FlO Andrew Murray, and saw a Zero on his tail. Gaunt quickly turned and shot it down, but too late to save Murray, who went down on fire. The battle turned into a 20 minute running dogfight Iowan the water along the Giso coast, involving six P-40s and a lone Marine

190

F4U, all mutually protecting one another. 2Lt. Robert Robb closed ana Zero and shot it down. Two Zeros came out of the clouds, and 2Lt. Richard Wheeler pulled up and hit one in the belly for his second victory. In a head-on pass Gaunt shot a Zero off the tail of a squadron PAO, but almost collided with the Jap as he fired. Another Zero then dove and flew in front of Gaunt, who fired and sent it into the sea for victory number three for the day to make him an ace with six victories. 1Lt.Carl Hay shot down a Zero but wasted most of his ammunition, as his gun camera switch malfunctioned and fired his guns instead. Hay's P-40 was hit, but he continued flying toward home. Gaunt and the other PAOs were eitper low or out of ammunition and flying at full throttle on the water, chased by two Zeros making high side rear passes. The P-40s under attack would go into a skid, while the others would sweep back and forth to chase off the Zeros. Wheeler was out of ammunition and only SO feet above the water after his second victory, and was desperately looking for PAOs to join and saw three about two or three miles away as three Zeros were closing on him. Despite being out of ammunition, 2Lt. Robb flew to Wheeler's aid and dove on the Zeros, and his bluff drove them away. The PAOs continued this mutual protection on the way home until the Japanese ran Iowan fuel and turned back to base. The PAOs landed either at Segi Point, the Russells, or Fighter Two as their fuel ran out. The Allies sent up 44 fighters that shot down 48 Japanese aircraft for the loss of three of their own. Besides the 13 44FS victories, VMF-I22 shot down IS (ten Zeros and five Bettys) and VMF-213 claimed 16 (ten Bettys and six Zeros), while VF-21 shot down four Zeros. The Japanese again used the Americans' lack of night fighter capability to send aircraft, mostly float planes, over Rendova several times a night. The Japanese planes would stay out of AA range for several hours and then make a bombing run on the beachhead

ILt. Frank Gaunt shot down three Zeros for the day to make him an ace with six total victories. (Gaunt)

Part Three, Chapter 12 - New Georgia Campaign, 21 June-26 August, Operation Toenails before leaving. The troops below, already miserable in the humid jungle and mud, lost hours of sleep waiting in their trenches. After the withdrawal of their P-70s the 6NFS had no P-38s of their own and had to rei y on other units for the loan of the aircraft. The 6NFS pilots had no P-38 time, and were checked out in the fighter after only four hours. The first 6NFS kill occurred on 12 July when lLt. Ralph Tuttle shot down a Betty over the Russell Islands. On the 15 th the Japanese began nightly air patrols of three to five aircraft between eastern Choiseul and Visu Visu Point, and as far east as Guadalcanal. The flights flew over Rendova and ew Georgia and continued for the next several days to keep the troops there under almost constant nightly Red Alerts. Japanese flights would show up on radar, but they would flyaway without attacking. On the 17 th the 6NFS sent up a P-38 from Fighter Two, and lLt. James Harrell downed a Betty. Despite these occasional victories the Red Alerts continued, as on the night of 19/20 July seven were sounded on New Georgia.

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AAF B-24s and the newly arrived B-25s, along with Marine SBDs and TBFs, were increasing the tempo of their attacks after the poor weather of the previous days had given the Japanese shipping and bases to the northwest (Buin, Kahili, Ballale, and Buka) a brief respite. On 17 July, at 0925, 71 SBDs and TBFs and seven B24s escorted by 114 fighters were to attack shipping in Kahili Harbor, on southern Bougainville, which was heavily defended by fighters and AA. Ten P-38s of the 339FS, led by Maj. John Evans, provided high cover for the B-24s at 22,000 feet, while the P-40s flew low cover. The Japanese sent up 40 fighters from Kahili and had the altitude advantage when they dove to break up the bomber formation. The 339th scored six Zeros, with 2Lt. Ben King getting two and 2Lt. Glen Hart, Capt. Harry Jordon, lLt. Webster Kincaid, and Capt. John McGinn one each. The Marines had a big day, with 41 victories in the morning missions over Kahili. VMF-213 got 12 Zeros and two float planes over Tonolei Harbor, VMF-121 got six Zeros over Kahili Airfield, VMF-221 got five Zeros over Moila Point, and VMF-122 and VMFcl12 each got 6.5 Zeros. USN VB11 claimed three Zeros over Kahili. The Japs lost 50 aircraft: 47 Zeros and three float planes. Five aircraft did not return, including the P-38s of 2Lt. Benjamin King and ILt. James. King had shot a Zero off the tail of Capt. Jordon, his element leader, and was then shot down by two Zeros and was listed MIA for two months before being rescued. King's cockpit had been hit, destroying the instrument panel, armored glass windshield, and side windows. Hits were scored on the wing roots, and two and a half feet of the left wing was shot off. Both engines were hit, with a radiator cover and housing shot away. King dove away to momentary safety and was again bounced by two Zeros that caused more damage before King found refuge in a cloud. King's engines expired, and he opted to make a water landing between the Shortlands and Treasury Island. After pancaking in he scrambled out of his sinking Lightning, and as he held onto the wing a Zero came in to strafe him, grazing his head just above his right ear and cutting offhis helmet. With bullets spurting through the water around him, he hung on as the fighter sunk 25 feet. Finally, with his lungs bursting for air, he let go, and as he surfaced he saw his inflated raft and the Zeros flying away. He swam to the raft, and as he got in he was strafed again. He overturned the raft and swam away under water, holding his breath as long as he could. When he surfaced he saw the Jap fighter flying off and climbed back into his raft. After paddling for several days he beached on Mono Island, in the Treasury Group. Here he met a mission-educated native named John Heaven who spoke English. The native took King to a nearby cave, where he was already hiding three TBF crew of from the Japs. After waiting for six weeks, King learned that the Allies had captured Vella Lavella, and he and the TDF crew were given a boat and began paddling 50 miles toward Vella Lavella. After six days in the boat a PBY Dumbo on patrol picked them up. The target for the day on 18 July was Kahili Airfield and Buin Harbor, about 340 miles northwest of Guadalcanal. The largest escort so far in the war (134 fighters) rendezvoused with 35 SBDs and TBFs and 21 B-24s. Some of the fighters of the Rendova Patrol had to be withdrawn to reach this escort figure. Three P-40 flights from the 44FS led by Capt. Harry Walters (of the 70FS) and 1Lts.

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II Bruce Macklin and Lucien Shuler escorted the 21 B-24s. At 0930 15 Liberators bombed Kahili Airfield through limited visibility, getting hits on the runway and revetments, and the other six set fire to a large cargo ship at Buin. The SBDs and TBFs attacked shipping in the harbor, sinking a cargo ship and damaging two destroyers and a transport. About 30 Zeros in two groups made quick, unsuccessful long-range passes on the bombers and disappeared before any P-40s could get in good shooting position. The Zeros climbed away and were attacked by top cover Marine F4Us ofVMF213, who got eight, while Navy VF-27 got five and VF-26 got eight. VF-26 had alternately flown off the Sangamon and Guadalcanal during June and July, and was credited with 11 victories under Lt.Cdr. John Curtis. The American losses that day were heavy: six F4Fs; three F4Us; and a TBF (only one pilot was rescued). Despite the heavy Japanese aircraft losses of the 17 th and 18 th , reconnaissance by the 17PRS showed 70 Japanese planes on Kahili the next day, and then 163 (109 on Kahili) on all Solomon airfields on July 24 th • The photos also showed the possible construction of an airstrip at Bonis Plantation, on the south side of Buka Passage, and another at Tenekow Plantation, south of Numa Numa, on Bougainville's east coast. On the 21 st, 40-50 Zeros covered 15 divebombers on an attack on shipping in Rendova. The Japanese timed the attack to come at 1710, to take advantage of the departure of the Rendova Patrol at 1700. The Japanese hit a LST but lost three escorts to VF-21, that had been moved to Segi Point airstrip in anticipation of a twilight attack. AAF heavy bombers continued to have difficulty in hitting enemy shipping, scoring only occasional lucky hits, but that was to change. On 22 July reconnaissance discovered shipping off the south end of Bougainville, and Strike Command sent out 18 TBFs, 16 SBDs, and seven B-24s covered by 120 fighters. The B-24s hit a destroyer with a 500lb. bomb, and the SBDs and TBFs sank a seaplane tender. VF-21 F4Fs shot five Zeros but lost three Wildcats. The raid marked the end of Buin as a safe haven for Japanese shipping. On 25 July the 44FS had two flights on patrol over MundaRendova. The Japanese sent down 30-40 Val dive-bombers escorted by about 30 Zeros at 0930. Capt. John Voss was leading a flight, and as his patrol was near its end, he was notified that bogies were approaching about 65 miles out. Voss remained on station, gained altitude, and dove out of the sun on 12-15 Zeros east of Lambetti Plantation. He and FlO John Cosgrove attacked a Zero and shared a victory. Voss then flew off to attack two more Zeros and hit another, but did not see it go down and was credited with a damaged. He joined another P-40 at 5,000 feet near Munda and flew toward Rendova. There they saw several Zeros flying in close formation, except for one straggler, who Voss attacked from behind and emptied his guns on for the victory. The 68FS P-39s flew a patrol in the Munda-Rendova area and came upon some Zeros, and 1Lt. Edward Kobbeman and 2Lt. Howard Cleveland (of the 70FS) each got a Zero. 2Lt. Bernard Fleming of the 339FS was flying for the 68FS as tail-end Charlie in a formation of eight P-38s that were diving into an attack on Zeros over New Georgia. A Zero passed in front of him and he fired at point blank range without apparent effect. He followed the diving Zero and fired as it was about two 192

Kahili was a major Japanese base located on the southern end ofBougainvilie Island and the object of constantAmerican air attacks. (Nakamura via Lansdale)

hundred yards above the ocean. His bullets hit the Zero's wing tanks and it exploded as it hit the ocean. Suddenly one of Fleming's engines cut out and caught fire. He was too low to bailout and tried to use his diving speed to gain some altitude. As he tried to climb out of the cockpit he was strafed by a Zero and was hit in the left leg. When he bailed out he struck the tailboom of his fighter and broke both legs. He was able to open his chute and was picked up by natives, who took him to their village. The next day they carried him on a litter to the American lines. On this day VF-21 claimed eight Zeros for 57 victories over the Solomons. On the 25 th an AAF general took command of COMAIRSOLS for the first time, as Gen. Twining took over from Adm. Mitscher. Since its inception the 13AF was a training and administrative air force that had to relinquish operational control over its aircraft in the combat areas. The 13AF supplied men and aircraft to COMAIRSOL, which had more than doubled its air strength from the beginning of April from 235 to 539 aircraft, and the daily average of fighter strength increased from 108 in February to 281 in July. Since the Rendova landings on 30 June, COMAIRSOLS' combat totals were impressive, claiming 316 Japanese aircraft (63.5 for the 13FC: 44FS: 41.5; 339FS 11; 70FS 5; 68FS 4; and two by the 6NFS) for the loss of 71 aircraft and 40 pilots (11 AAF)). As the first AAF commander of Solomons air units, Twining's own staff of 70 officers and 200 men accompanied him to COMAIRSOLS. His Chief of Staff was Capt. Charles Cox (USN), his Strike Commander was Col. David 0' eill (USMC), Bomber Command went to Col. William Metheny (AAF), and Fighter Command to Brig.Gen. Dean Strother (AAF). Brig.Gen. Ray Owens was left at Espiritu Santo, as Deputy Air Force Commander of the 13AF. Both Metheny (13BC) and Strother (13FC) retained their respective commands in the 13AF. Maj. Paul Bechtel was transferred from fighter pilot duties to Fighter Command of Operations (COMAIRSOLS) in July and was in charge of intelligence, particularly from coast watchers. Twining found his new command to be on the verge of exhaustion, and the fighter force was the worst off. Twining's first step was to withdraw the P-38s back to a training area and kept only a few as F5 photo recon aircraft. His plan was to build a new P-38 unit and train pilots to handle the fighter properly, and to commit the unit to combat by 1 September.

13 August 1943

During the final week of the ew Georgia campaign, the Japanese sent small formations against shipping at Rendova that were largely unproductive, except on I August, when a Val dive-bomber hit a flotilla of moored PT boats. On 1 August 10 44FS P-40s escorted avy SBDs and TBFs on an afternoon raid to Kahili AF. On the way back five of the P-40s ran low on gas and had to leave the Navy bombers early. On their return the Warhawks were attacked from behind by 25 to 30 Zeros at 1,500 feet over Giso Island. The Zeros dove in three groups and shot up the P-40s. lLt. Lucien Shuler described the mission: "Being low on gas on the return trip from a strike on Kahili airdrome with TBFs and SBDs, my flight and two more P-40s left the formation south of Vella Lavella Island and headed for Segi landing strip. We were attacked from the rear and above by 25-30 Zeros. Our altitude was about 1,500 feet, which was the bottom of the clouds, and our airspeed was about 170mph. The Zeros shot down Lt. (Ralph) Imberg on the first pass and crippled three other planes. I scissored with Lt. (Harold) Dreckman and met a Zeke in a head-on pass. Lt. (John) Price said he saw the Zero hit the water.

Lt. Ralph Imberg was shot down by Zeros. (Smith)

Lt. Kaspar Njus' plane was shot up badly, as he counted 27 holes in his aircraft when he landed, but he escaped with minor injuries. (Smith)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II We continued scissoring to protect each other's tails and made a running fight out of it. The Zeros continued to follow us a few miles farther but soon left us. Lt. (Martell) Glommen had to make a crash landing at Segi but was not hurt. Lt. Price was slightly injured in the eye from a 20mm explosion. Lt. (Kaspar) Njus' plane was shot up badly; he counted 27 holes in his aircraft when he landed, and he had minor injuries. Lt. Price and myself landed safely at the Russells." (Correspondence: Lucien and Barbara Shuler, April 1991 ) During August the 339FS was nearly out of action, with only a few P-38s serviceable, and the night fighters were flying these. On 1 August all 339 th enlisted men were returned to New Caledonia, and by 14 August all but six of the pilots were back there (those pilots who remained flew P-39s with the 68FS). This was the first time since its inception that the squadron's pilots and enlisted men were together in one place. New pilots and enlisted men were arriving from the States to bring the squadron up to the Table of Organizational strength. Experienced combat pilots were training the new pilots, so when the squadron went back into combat its flight and element leaders would be experienced pilots leading the newly trained pilots. New Caledonia was not a safe haven, as on 6 July Lt. Earl Wagoner was killed in a flying accident, and in mid-August Lt. William Honaker was also killed in a flying accident. Bill Harris again used his leave to recuperate. He was in Auckland during July recovering from malaria and having 15 cysts removed from his head. On 30 August Maj. Henry Lawrence became 339FS CO, succeeding Maj. John Evans, who was assigned to the 347FG as its XO. Lawrence brought with him a new batch of P-38 pilots trained in Hawaii. The newly arrived pilots included: Anderson; Andrews; Barker; Chapman; Fincher; Hart; Hoffman; Kincaid; King; Restifo; Rutledge; Ryan; Seaman; Shank; Smith; Starmer; Studley; and Walker. Lawrence lacked combat experience and instituted the twosection system to take advantage of the experienced pilots in his new command. He named Capt. Bill Harris to lead Section 1, and on alternate days he or Capt. George Chandler was to be Section 2 leader. On 14 September, 347FG HQ ordered 35 pilots and 58 enlisted men of the 339 th to be attached to the 70FS of the 18FG for bivouac and supplies when they returned to Guadalcanal. Lawrence, like the previous 339th COs, Dale Brannon, John Mitchell, and John Evans, proved to be a very able combat leader. Capt. George Chandler gives credit to the capable Sunsetter COs:

ILt. Lucien Shulec (Author)

"Our commanding officers deserve the real credit for our record. They trained us so that teamwork became instinctive and automatic. Major Lawrence may not have any planes to his credit, but that doesn't mean he couldn't have as many or more than any of us. Instead, he relinquished a record of planes shot down to direct our aerial movements. He was like a quarterback in football who never carries the ball, but knows better than any other player what plays to call to bring home the bacon. Major Lawrence was on practically every mission, flying right into combat with us, and he was

ILt., George Chandler (339FS) standing in the cockpit of P-38G "Velma G," summer 1943. (Chandler)

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Part Three, Chapter 13 - August 1943 always the center of the teamwork. We operated out from him like the spokes around a hub, and we saved our bombers and shot down a lot of the enemy." (Story of the 339111 Fighter Squadron) During this time 347'h Fighter Group Intelligence Officer Maj. Coleman Wortham was the subject of 339FS pilots' radio conversations. Wortham was fondly nicknamed "Belly Tank" due to his rotund shape, and the pilot's conversations mentioned his nickname and his intelligence duties. Several days later Radio Tokyo announced another exaggerated great Japanese aerial victory over the Americans in the South Pacific with the ending comment: "Wonder what 'Old Bell Tank' thinks of that?" On 4 August the last fighter combat occurred over Munda. The 44FS scrambled nine PAOs to intercept two dozen Zeros over Redova. ILt. Lucien Shuler was leading a flight at 12,000 feet and met the Zeros, which dispersed as the Americans approached. Shuler's flight peeled off behind the Zeros below them. Shuler described the combat: "I picked out one that had passed under us in a dive. I thought at first he might be a dive-bomber, but later saw he was a Zero. Firing a few bursts in the dive, I really got him as he pulled out. I let him have another burst, and as I pulled out I saw him hit the beach and explode. Using my speed, I gained back my altitude and was back in the fight. I leveled off and found a Zero in my sights. A long burst from my guns caused him to flame and explode in mid-air. Turning to the left, I found myself in a similar position as before; another Zero appeared at close range. I opened fire and saw my tracers converging into the Nip. His wings began to rock and he fell off into a vertical roll. I followed him down, firing all the way. The plane, blazing from the cockpit, came out of the roll and went into a slight dive. The canopy came off and the pilot stood up with one leg on the wing and the other inside the plane. Pulling the parachute ripcord before he left the plane, both plane and chute went down in flames. As I turned into the fourth Zero that passed about 500 feet above me; I closed in and opened fire. Although I seemed to have been getting hits, the Zero didn't seem to want to burn, but I continued firing until his left wing and cockpit flamed."

scattered in all directions when the PAOs attacked." (Correspondence: Lucien and Barbara Shuler, April 1991) Some readers may be offended that Shuler would fire on the helpless Japanese pilot who was trying to escape his doomed fighter, but it was routine for the Japanese to fire on American airman floating helplessly in parachutes. After the war the Japanese attributed this practice to their Bushido warrior code that revered the cult of death. The code did not allow the wan-ior to give clemency to an enemy who decided to save his own life and forsake an honorable and sacred death. However, it is difficult to determine the extent of the influence of this wan-ior code on a Japanese pilot's actions as opposed to the circumstance and frustration of the battle when he had seen the hon-ific losses suffered by his squadron at the hands of the Americans. Sam Howie (339FS): "There was a Jap pilot who crash-landed near Guadalcanal and was taken prisoner. We treated him well and even let him sit in a P38. But he was closely guarded by MPs, not because he would do anything, but because a paddlefoot (ground crew -author) who hadn't seen much combat might try to kill him." That day lLt. Cotesworth Head led a flight, but as they climbed to 25,000 feet his wingman and his element leader's wingman had to return to base. As Head and element leader, ILt. Robert Robb, joined and climbed they saw five Zeros at 2,000 feet above. A Zero attacked first and holed Robb's fighter, and he reacted by evading with a controlled spin. Head followed Robb down to 4,000 feet and was joined by ILt. Grant Smith's third flight. The formation climbed and immediately came upon 20 Zeros flying aimlessly between 6,000 and 12,000 feet. One Zero carelessly flew in front of Head, and he had an easy shot and flamed it to become an ace with his fifth victory. Head continued to attack the unorganized Japanese but without result, as they ran from the combat. The PAOs reformed over Rendova and came upon 20 more Zeros milling around below at 6-7,000 feet, evidently strafing American troops on Munda. The PAOs dove, and Lt. Robb put two bursts into a hardy Zero that finally broke into flames with his third burst. Head fired on several

Shuler rejoined other P-40s and saw a Marine F4U rocket past, followed by three other aircraft. He thought they were all Corsairs, but focusing he saw the others were Zeros and got on the tail of the last Zero and fired, but only two of his guns had ammunition, and they stopped in the middle of the burst. The lucky Zero broke off, as did the other Jap chasing the Marine fighter. Shuler joined the Marine flight to return to Segi as an ace with six total victories. In his post mission debriefing Shuler commented: "The quality of the Jap pilots was the poorest of any I had encountered. In many instances they took no evasive action under fire, and they flew as though completely bewildered. All their passes were made singly with no semblance of any formation. Their groups

Munda Field, New Georgia, shortly after its capture in August 1943. In the foreground is a Zeke 32 off the carrier Hiya. (USN)

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131h Fighter Command in World War II

Setting up on Munda Air Field.There is a sick bay on the left protected by sand bag{ a tent used as on office in the center, and in the right foreground and to the rear of the tent the frame of a Quonset hut is being put together (USMC)

more Zeros but could not get any to smoke, but a F4U came in and flamed one of his quarry. A Zero chased by two Corsairs came directly toward Head and he gave it a long burst, and was again frustrated when he saw no results. The Corsairs from VMF-214 were credited with three victories and two probables in the combat. Harmon had relieved Brig.Gen. John Hester from ground command and named Maj.Gen. Griswold to replace him on 15 July. From that point on the ground advance moved somewhat more rapidly with the help of reinforcements from Guadalcanal. Daily missions flown by Marine SBDs and AAF B-25s greatly aided the advance by saturating the immediate area with bombs before the advance. Munda airfield was finally captured on 4 August, and on 5 August all resistance in the area ceased. As soon as MundaAirfield was secured the immediate responsibility was to defend and restore it. The damage to taxiways and runways from air and naval bombardment had been less than expected, and thus it could be made operational earlier than expected. The 73 rd Navy Seabees and the 828 1h Engineer Battalion began work on the 61h and were joined on the 9 th by Acorn 8, which controlled field operations. The engineers regraded and resurfaced the 3,000 x ISO-foot Japanese runway, built taxiways and hardstands, and had it open for operations for 48 aircraft by the 13 th • The coral around Munda was abundant and of

excellent quality, and unlike Carney Field on Guadalcanal was able to bear very heavy operational use. Night work was attempted under lights, but nightly rains, Japanese harassing air and sniper attacks, and inoperable early warning radar limited and finally closed down nighttime construction. Fighter cover was immediately provided, but despite Kahili being only a short distance away and the basing of hundreds of aircraft in the Rabaul-Kavieng-Bougainville area, the Japanese did not make one effective attack against the airfield. Attacks on the 10th and 13 lh were turned back before reaching the airfield. On the afternoon of the 13 lh , two P-40s of the 44FS landed at Munda and remained overnight to become the first operational aircraft to use the field. Munda gave the Allies a base to provide air cover for the next invasions and was within 400 miles of Rabaul-180 miles closer than Fighter Two on Guadalcanal-and was just about half way between Guadalcanal and the primary targets at Kahili. Communications and transportation were lacking, the maintenance crews were inexperienced, and spare parts and tools were limited. Brig.Gen. Mulcahy flew into Munda from Rendova on the 14th and officially opened the COMAIR New Georgia command post with Fighter Control, Operations, Intelligence, and Communications sections. The responsibilities of COMAIR New Georgia were:

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44FS PAO landing at Munda Field, New Georgia, on 14 August, just after its capture and repair (USAF)

196

Munda in late 1943 looking toward the Pacific. There are three RNZAF Venturas in the foreground, with a B-25 flanked by two P-70s to their right and a P-39 Just beyond them. Across the runway three Marine F4Us are parked by a service tent, and a PBY is parked across from them. (USAF)

Part Three, Chapter 13 - August 1943 (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

provide escorts for COMAIRSOLS bomber missions provide CAP for shipping locate and destroy enemy barges strafe Bougainville airfields provide recon and artillery spotting missions defend forward bases.

Enemy artillery shelled the area intermittently and was not silenced until the 19'h, when Baanga Island across the way was subdued. Within several weeks the air traffic at Munda surpassed that of any other Allied field in the entire South Pacific. The Engineers and Seabees quickly improved the field, widening taxiways and building aprons. In October the average daily arrival/departure rate was about 400. By mid-October the runways were ready for bomber operations, and by December the runway was lengthened to 8,000 feet. The main disadvantage of the field was a 200-300 foot hill that prevented take off to the ENE. Despite the adverse prevailing winds, heavy bombers, even with maximum loads, would often prefer to take off over the water to avoid the hill. On Ondonga Island, near Munda Point, the 82nd and 37'h Seabees constructed an air and naval base. The island was covered by dense jungle and mud bogs that had to be excavated down to solid coral and then refilled with crushed coral. Construction of the 4,500 x 200-foot strip was completed in 25 days despite the terrain, air attacks, and Japanese shelling from nearby Kolombangara Island. The Navy's prolific VF-17 Corsair squadron, under Lt.Cdr. Tom Blackburn, used the base in time for the Bougainville campaign, as did RNZAF 15 Squadron PAOs. After establishing its headquarters at Munda and then after opening Barakoma on Vella Lavella, COMAIR New Georgia had problems in coordinating and operating fighter direction centers due to unreliable communications. The reasons were inadequately trained personnel, inadequate equipment, and inadequate radar. Radar in the South Pacific had always experienced problems, mainly due to: inexperienced and poorly trained operators and fighter directors, but lack of spare parts that often made many of the sets

On Ondonga Island, near Munda Point, the 82nd and an air and naval base. (USAF)

37'h Seabees constructed

inoperative, terrain factors causing radar shadows, communication, and poor coverage by some sets handicapped the entire radar net operation. On 17 August the Japanese hit one of the main radar sets with a direct bomb hit to further complicate matters. On the night of the 6'h the Japanese Navy sent four destroyers with troops aboard and two destroyer escorts to reinforce New Georgia. Two USN destroyer divisions intercepted the Japanese and sank three of the enemy and damaged a fourth without a loss. These losses during the Battle of Vella Gulf would cause the Japanese to consider withdrawal from Kolombangara and Vila. During the last half of 1943 and into 1944 l3BC bomb groups (the 307'h and 5'h) would station two of their squadrons in forward areas on operations and two on reserve in the rear, with these available for major missions calling for all available aircrew and aircraft. The 371" and 3n nd BS of the 307BG moved from Hawaii to Espiritu Santo in June and moved to Guadalcanal in August, while the other two BS, the 3nnd and 4241h , went off ops and would return in October. The 5BG's 23 rd and nnd FS left operations, and the 31 Sl and 394'h moved up to Guadalcanal. The 42BG's B-25s with

I Lt. Joseph Lesicka got his ninth and last victory of the war on 7 August during a routine patrol. (Smith)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II the 70 th and 75 th BSs moved forward, and its 100th and 390th went into reserve. During this period 13FC fighters escorted the 13 Bomber Command's BGs to attack airfields in the Bougainville area. On 7 August the 44FS sent out two flights on a routine patrol over the Rendova-Munda area. As the patrol orbited at 20,000 feet the weather closed in and they descended to 14,000 feet, when they were informed that bogies were closing from the south. They circled and soon spotted IS Zeros coming in at 18,000 feet. The P-40s dropped their belly tanks and hid in nearby clouds to wait for the Zeros. The scattered enemy fighters approached haphazardly and circled down, and were soon below the Americans, who then pounced. lLt. Bruce Macklin attacked the leading Zero head-on, but the Jap escaped with a quick roll. Macklin moved on the next Zero, again head-on, at point blank range. His .50 caliber bullets tore pieces out of the canopy and he continued to fire, joined by lLt. Frank Radzuikinas, who shared the victory. Also scoring victories were ILt. Joseph Lesicka, who got his ninth and last victory of the war, and lLt. Herbert Shafer of the 70FS, who was flying

with the 44 th that day. On 10 August, after his big day the previous week, 1Lt. Lucien Shuler of the 44FS downed a Zero for his seventh and last victory. Shuler described the mission: "My flight was operating out of Segi Airdrome on New Georgia Island. In the mid-afternoon we were scrambled to cover the Rendova Island and Munda area. Bogies were coming in. My flight was the first to become airborne and the first on station. We were flying stripped P-40Ms. After calling in 'on station,' I tried to pick up another flight to operate with, but was unable to find one at the altitude at which I was stationed, which was about 10,000 feet. I started climbing in the direction of someplace I presumed to be friendly, but when I got closer I saw that they were Zeros. There were about 20 in a group. We immediately did a 180-degree turn to get out from under them. They began coming down on us in strings, but all pulled back up except one. He pressed the attack from the rear on my second element. I turned into him, met him head-on, and he turned to the right and pulled straight up. I followed him,

ILt. Lucien Shuler of the 44FS downed a Zero for his seventh and last victory during a scramble over the Munda/Rendova area. (Shuler) ILt. Grant Smith was listed MIA Smith had bailed out and after walking four days and then being transported by canoe was picked up by a PBY and returned to Guadalcanal. (Smith)

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Part Three, Chapter 13 - August 1943 firing all the way up. I burned him when he tried to pull over in a loop. That was the only contact we made, as they pulled out and went home." (Correspondence: Lucien and Barbara Shuler, April 1991) On 12 August 16 307BG B-24s and nine Liberators of the 3IBS of the 5BG escorted by eight 44FS P-40s and 22 F4Us ofVMF-124 bombed Kahili. The bombers cratered the runways with 520 1000b. bombs and destroyed 20 aircraft on the ground. Turning back to base, the bombers were attacked by about 30 Zeros over Ballale, and FlO John Cosgrove (70FS) downed a Zero. The Marine F4Us claimed six Zeros, including two by ILt. Kenneth Walsh, who became a double ace. A Corsair pilot reported that he saw a P-40 being chased by four Zeros at 15~000 feet over Choiseul Island. When noses were counted back at base ILt. Grant Smith was listed MIA. Smith had bailed out and landed in the trees in the middle of the island. Using his chute pack compass he walked north for four days to avoid the Japanese, who were based and supplied by barges on the south coast. He walked along ridges, and on the third day came upon a large river that led to the sea. He followed the beach east and met some nati ves who transported him by canoe 30 miles to the east, where he was picked up by a PBY and returned to Guadalcanal. On the 13 th ILt. Cotesworth Head was leading two flights on an early morning patrol over Munda. Their relief was late and the PAOs were running low on fuel, so Head decided to land on the new Munda strip to refuel at 0900. The 13 th was to be the official opening of the field, with a fly-in of Marine Corsairs scheduled at 1000. As the Marine Brass was preparing for the opening ceremony Head's PAOs circled and were the first aircraft to land there. The P40s were quickly refueled and were ordered to conduct a sweep over Kolombangara for the first mission off the new strip. The living conditions on Munda were primitive, especially for the ground crews who were based there. The crews often had to work on the aircraft after dark, as the fighters would not land until dusk and stay the night. Capt. Bill Harris gave credit to the ground crews of the 339 1h Fighter Squadron: "Another chap who is often overlooked is the groundman. We're plenty proud of ours in our squadron-ground officers and enlisted men alike. They have done an excellent job of housing and feeding us to keep us in tip-top aerial combat shape, of briefing us and giving us the latest operations, and were necessary for the success of our missions and for keeping our planes in commission. If the planes aren't in commission, they aren't any good to the pilots. The pilots are grounded! For months our groundmen faced the most trying conditions. We had few planes and practically no replacements. Old planes had to be kept in operation. Despite the fact they were in the air at all hours, despite the fact some were shot up almost beyond repair, despite the fact they had to work day and night, and despite the fact that when they had a chance to sleep enemy bombing kept them awake, our groundmen came through. With a shortage of parts, they

made their own. They stripped wrecked planes-even used lots of Jap parts. On one of my last trips I was pretty badly shot up, had more than 30 holes in my ship. But within 24 hours my crew chief, SISgt. 'Chappie' Chapman, had her ready for take off, and I flew on another mission confident my plane was ready for anything." (Story of the 339'" Fighter Squadron) On the 13 th the Japanese sent two Bettys down to Guadalcanal at dusk. They turned on their running lights and managed to enter the returning B-24s' landing pattern. One broke off and dove to torpedo and sink the transport John Penn. The second Betty followed, but American AA gunners sent up a furious barrage that downed both Bettys. Unfortunately, they also hit the B-24 of 5BG CO Lt.Coi. Marion Unruh, whose Liberator lost its hydraulics and an engine, but the CO managed to land it on one wheel. The Japanese sent down another Betty intruder, and the 6NFS "Black Spiders" sent up a P-38 piloted by Capt. Emerson Baker aided by radar-directed searchlights to intercept. The searchlight teams enveloped the Betty, but Baker could only damage it before it escaped the light cone. The next night two more Bettys were back. At 2040 Lt. James Harrell was scrambled from the Russells and climbed to orbit at 22,000 feet for a half-hour. Searchlights caught a Betty in their beam at 20,000 feet and Harrell dove, and three minutes later closed from behind and below and fired rounds from his P-38's nose guns into the Jap's wing root. The bomber caught fire and dove into the ocean for Harrell's second night victory. Later that night, at 0 110 2Lt. Henry Meigs shot down a Betty southwest of Fighter Two for his first victory towards becoming an ace. After the mission Meigs stated: "The attack proved to be just as simple as it appeared from the ground. As soon as the radar-directed searchlight picked out a target, the rest of them focused on it and illuminated it clearly." (Meigs: Correspondence) The Invasion of Vella Lavella 15 August 1943 The Allied High Command needed to reconsider their South Pacific strategy. The Japanese tactic of using only a few thousand troops sited in a defense depth to cause unacceptable casualties could undermine the will to fight. Adm. Theodore Wilkinson, a keen naval strategist, had advocated bypassing the strongest Japanese held islands and then isolating them by land, air, and sea, leaving them to "wither on the vine." Kolombangara, with a garrison of 10,000 well dug-in troops, had been the next target of Cartwheel. Photo recon and intelligence verified that the Vila area on Kolombangara could not be developed into an adequate airbase, as the Japanese airfield there was built on a poor site and poorly drained. Therefore Halsey and Harmon decided to bypass this strong Japanese base. In July a reconnaissance team was put on Vella Lavella and reported that the island had adequate landing beaches, there were only about 250 enemy troops, and the southern end had sufficient drainage and bivouac areas to build an airfield. On 15 August troops of the Northern Landing Force (NLF) made an amphibious landing at

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13th Fighter Command in World War II Barakoma, on the southeast coast of Vella Lavella. The Japanese sent down four determined air attacks, but all were driven off by COMAIRSOLS, as aircraft from Munda were able to provide continuous daylight air cover of the beaches, which would have been more difficult from Guadalcanal and Segi. The NLF met minor opposition on the island, and soon the 58 th Seabees built an airstrip at Barakoma. Roads had to be cut and facilities constructed before the airstrip could be started. The 4,000 x 200-foot strip was ready for its first aircraft on 24 September and was used thereafter for shuttle and staging flights. The new strip on Vella Lavella forced the Japanese to abandon all its airfields in the central Solomons, with the exception of the seaplane base at Rekata Bay. Also, the invasion of Vella Lavella forced the Japanese to evacuate or lose its troops on Kolombangara. Their evacuation met with heavy losses when PT boats attacked their barges. This was the first bypass operation of the Pacific war, except for Kiska, when Attu was invaded. The Japanese airfield at Kahili was only 90 miles away from Vella Lavella, and during D-Day the Japanese sent down Vals and Zeros on 121 sorties on Barakoma Beach. They did only minor damage and lost 17 aircraft to Allied CAP (the 44FS, Marine VMFs-123, 124, and -214, and the RNZAF) based at Segi and Munda. The 44FS had two flights on CAP at 10,000 feet over the landings when bogies were called in. The first flight of P-40s saw six dive-bombers in the distance, but the New Zealanders shot down all but one as they approached. The surviving Jap was pounced on by the entire P-40 flight and was shot down. After the flight landed the pilots cut cards for the victory, and 1Lt. William Kester drew the high card. The second 44FS flight was led by ILt. Frank Gaunt, joined by ILls. John Cox and Robert Robb and 2Lt. Robert McGown. A lone F4U came in from somewhere and flew on Cox's wing, and soon a lone Zero was seen flying in across the island. The flight attacked, but the Zero momentarily evaded by making "S" turns. Cox found himself on the tail of the Zero and fired. Only his right outboard gun fired bullets, but effectively, as they hit the cockpit. The Zero pulled up, rolled over, and crashed into the beach on Boga Island. More Zeros joined the battle, and ILt. Gaunt shot one down (his

seventh victory) and got hits on another for a probable. McGown claimed another probable. The action was expensive for the squadron, as Robb was MIA (his wrecked plane was later found by coast watchers), and Gaunt made a belly landing when his hydraulics were shot out and his gear would not extend. Gaunt was not injured, and his fighter could be repaired. Four l2FS P-39s on CAP over Vella Lavella in the late afternoon got one Zero claimed by Capt. Cyril Nichols. Nichols lost two feet of the wingtip of his P-39 when he rammed the Zero he had just blown up. The Marine VMFs had another big day, shooting down 24 aircraft (16 Zeros and nine Vals): seven by VMF-123; 13 by VMF-124 (including three by ace Ken Walsh); three by VMF-214; and one by VMF-215. The three VMF-214 victories were scored at the end of the day when 20 Japanese aircraft were returning to Kahili and were ambushed and attacked in their landing patterns. An additional seven aircraft were destroyed on the ground. Initially COMAIR New Georgia had planned to base 24 fighters on both Munda and Segi, but this figure was doubled for the large missions of the 15 th • This increase was repeated when necessary, but the additional aircraft were always returned to the Russells or Guadalcanal before dark. The landings at Barakoma, on Vella Lavell a, called for a continuous 32-plane CAP over the landing force, but by the second day it was possible to only maintain a 12plane CAP over the beachhead from dawn to dusk. At night the Japanese hit Barakoma regularly with float planes and dive-bombers. During the next two weeks the Marine VMFs continued scoring air victories as the AAF squadrons flew bomber escort, interdiction, and close missions without much opposition, and only claimed one aerial victory. On the 28 th Capt. Joseph Berkow of the 67FS shot down a Dinah at 0838 east of Woodlark Island. On the 26 th the 70FS flew a B-24 escort mission to Kahili, and 2Lt. Joseph Hill was listed as MIA. After the 15 th poor weather forced Twining to curtail his air offensive, but the Japanese continued to fly down to Barakoma to hit the choice LST targets lined up along the beach unloading supplies for the new air base being constructed. From the 19 th to the 21 st there were 11 raids, and there were six more on the 24 th • By the end of the month there were 101 Condition Reds and 62 enemy attacks, but "friendly" missions were responsible for several false alarms. The defense of Barakoma was the responsibility of Marine Corsairs. On the 21 Sl the firstJapanese attack of the day on Barakoma came at 0945 and was intercepted by VMF-124 F4Us that shot down three Vals and a Zero. The second attack followed almost immediately (15 minutes later), and was met by VMF-2l5 and VMF-123, which shot down five Zeros, and at 1515 their final attack cost the Japs four more Zeros for 13 losses for the day. The Japanese continued their attacks on the 23 rd without doing serious damage, but lost five Zeros and four Tonys. The Tonys were new to the campaign, as the Japanese Army Air Force entered the air battle with this fast, inline-engined fighter. On the 24 th VMF-123 scored seven Zero and two Val victories, and VMF-124 two Zero victories over Kolombangara. On the 25 th VMF-215 got four Zekes over Vella Lavella. On the 26 th nine Zeros and three Tonys were shot down by VMF-215 (7) and VMF-214 (5). There was a four-day lull until the ILt. Frank Gaunt is shown with "The Twerp" after he made a successful belly 30th , when the Japanese sent a force down in the late afternoon to landing when his hydraulics were shot out and his gear would not extend. (Gaunt)

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Part Three, Chapter 13 - August 1943

A 17 PRS F-5 photo of Japanese barges camouflaged by foliage hidden along the shore of Bogen Bay, New Britain, in July 1943. The Japanese used these barges to move troops and supplies at night, moving from one island to the next before daylight. when they would be vulnerable to marauding American fighters (USAF)

harassed them during the day. The Mitchells usually roamed in pairs, or sometimes in larger formations escorted by fighters, looking for targets to strafe and bomb in the barge lanes or hidden in bays or creeks. In August 42BG B-25s flew nine anti-barge missions and sunk 17. Fighters were encouraged to strafe barges after leaving their CAP patrols, and P-39s with their heavy nose cannon and machine guns were particularly effective against the barges. On 18 August the pressure from the American air attacks caused the Japanese to evacuate their troops on Kolombaranga to Bougainville. They sent about 25 barges carrying 400 men and escorted by four destroyers from Buin to Vella Lavella to establish a barge base for the evacuation. A trap was set by Adm. Theodore Wilkinson's four destroyers of TG 31.2 to attack the barge base and the evacuation, but his plan was poorly executed, and R.Adm. Matsuji Ijuin escaped, losing only six barges in the night battle off Horaniu on Vella Lavella. In August Kahili was within easy reach ofthe fighters on Munda and COMAIR New Georgia sent F4Us and P-39s out as often as possible to attack the base at treetop level. On 30 August 27 B-24s escorted by 12 12FS P-39s (flown by 121h and 68 1h FS pilots), eight

strafe and bomb the area. The Japanese lost 14 more Zeros, eight to VMF-124. On take off lLt. Ken Walsh had engine trouble and returned to Munda to pick up another fighter. He rejoined his squadron in a dogfight against 50 or more Zeros and shot down four for his 17-20Ih and last victories in the Solomons. His aircraft was so badly shot up he had to make a dead stick landing in the water off Vella Lavella and would be awarded the Medal of Honor for the day's battle. As the air battles raged over Barakoma the construction of its airfield continued, and even before the strip was finished fighter pilots in damaged aircraft made landings on the field. Some 22 pilots and aircrew were saved in emergency landings before the strip was officially declared operational. While the Marines were defending Barakoma and Vella Lavella, AAF medium and light bombers and their escorts were searching for barges that were critical to supplying enemy outposts east of Buin, as the Japanese had lost 50 destroyers and had 10-12 more in repair, The Japanese used local labor and the abundant wood available in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indochina to build barges known as "Daihatsus." The Japanese were able to move heavier shipping from Rabaul to Buka and then down the east or west coast of Bougainville to Buin, or directly from Rabaul to Buin, but this route was mainly used by warships. But movement east of Buin and into the Slot was a dangerous undertaking, as the debacle in Kula Gulf on 5/6 July had shown. The Japanese used groups of various shallow draft barges to move reinforcements and supplies down from Buin southeast to Timbala Bay, on the north coast of Vella Lavella. The barges would unload their cargo at the various plantations on Vella Lavella, or continue along its west coast and through the Gizo and Wilson Straits to Kolombangara. Choiseul, Kakasa, and Sagigai were busy barge staging areas. A barge convoy would hug the coast, and when attacked it would quickly scatter and take shelter in small bays, or head up small creeks or rivers and camouflage themselves with foliage. PT boats hunted the barges at night, and Marine SBDs and TBFs and AAF B-25s and fighters FlO Cecil Moore. (Canning)

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131h Fighter Command in World War II 44FS PADs, four RNZAF PADs, and 12 F4Us attacked Kahili. Only nine of the P-39s, two 44FS PADs, the four New Zealanders, and a dozen Corsairs reached the target. The Japanese had 40 Zeros waiting for the Allied strike. The Corsairs hit the Zeros first and broke up their coordinated attack. Two 68FS pilots flying P-39s with the 12FS each downed a Zero (I Lt. Andrew Capa and 2Lt. Roy Fowler). Fowler's fighter was hit during his head-on firing pass at the Zero and began to smoke and burn. Fowler bailed out over Vella Lavella, but fractured his leg as he hit the tail plane of the Airacobra on the way out. He was rescued by natives and survived. The P-39 of Capt. Eldon Stratton of the 12FS· was hit by AA fire at Kahili, and then he and his wingman, FlO Cecil Moore, were attacked by Zeros as they turned for home. Stratton exploded one of his attackers but was hit from behind by another Zero, sustaining more damage to his aircraft. Moore shot this Zero off Stratton's tail, but both were bounced by more Zeros. Moore tried to drive the Zeros away from the crippled Stratton and shot one down. But the Zeros continued swarming around Stratton's crippled P-39, and soon it was on fire and dove into the ocean. On the 31 st four 44FS PADs led by Capt. Robert Byrnes (with lLt. Cy Gladen, lLt. Robert Fox, and FlO Rex Byers) took off from Segi at 0740 and were on CAP over Barakoma Harbor, on Vella Lavella. After nearly an hour on patrol at 7,000 feet the flight was informed of bogies coming in from the northeast. lLt. Gladen saw two Vals coming in down sun from the east to make an attack on three ships in the harbor. The PADs peeled off and caught the seven dive-bombers after they finished their bombing run. Byrnes chased after two Vals along Vella Lavella's east coast and made two passes, but over ran his target each time due to excessive speed. One Val turned inland and Byrnes followed it and hit it with a good deflection shot that killed the rear gunner. Not wanting to over run his target again, Byrnes scissored behind the Val and fired on each pass on the rear. The Val slowly lost altitude, and as Byrnes pulled alongside he saw that the rear gunner was dead and the pilot was slumped over the controls. As he was watching the Val die, a Zero, all guns firing, attacked from above. Byrnes turned into the attacker and its bullets just missed his tail, and he dove to escape. Byrnes headed back to the sea and came upon another Val and hit it with a good deflection shot from the left. Byrnes cut his throttle and continued to fire from behind to silence the rear gunner and knock off the Val. He fired until he was out of ammo and pulled away before he saw the result of his attack; he was credited with a probable. The victory made Byrnes an ace. Meanwhile, lLt. Gladen attacked the leading Val and it smoked but did not burn. Two Vals turned toward Kolombangara, and Gladen and his wingman, lLt. Fox, chased after the other five that were flying in line abreast. The two AAF pilots closed on the Vals, which took no evasive maneuvers, and fired on one after another; soon all were damaged but somehow

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~~

Capt. Robert Byrnes (left) and ILt. Cy Gladen sit in front of the 44FS scoreboard in mid-June I943.Justto Gladen's left is a "In Memoriam"to nine lost 44 th squadron members. (Gladen)

kept on flying. On his second pass Gladen finally flamed one that exploded when it hit the water. He closed on another that smoked heavily after several bursts and exploded as it hit the water. He then went after one of the Vals that turned inland and hit it, killing the pilot, and it crashed into the jungle for his third victory of the day (and last victory of the war) to become an ace. As he was pulling away a Zero made a diving pass but overshot, and pulled up in a chandelle, turned over on his back, and began a high-side pass on Gladen and peppered his PAD. Wingman Fox had remained on post throughout ~he combat and climbed up and over his leader; he got a belly shot on the Zero to claim a damaged Zero to go with his Val probable. When Gladen landed his Warhawk was covered with oil, filled with bullet holes, and had only six rounds of ammunition remaining. Gladen credits his wingman, lLt. Bob Fox, with saving his life that day: "After downing my last Val I was low, slow, and out of ammunition, and couldn't see because my P-40 was covered with oil from a damaged Val. Before I knew it I had a Zero on my tail shooting darts through my Warhawk. Good ole 'Red' Fox flamed him and saved my day." (Note: Fox was killed on 23 December 1943 when his engine exploded on take off from Treasury Island) The Japanese used bad weather during the month to their advantage to sneak in from their nearby Kahili base 108 times with 319 aircraft during the first month. These raids on Barakoma did little damage and cost the Japanese heavily. During the week 19-26 August they lost 43 fighters, five dive-bombers, and a float plane for the Allied loss of a lone F4U.

14 September 1943

In September 1943 Maj. Paul Bechtel, who had four victories with the l2FS, was serving as Operations Officer for the COMAIRSOL staff at Guadalcanal. As a staff officer he had a problem fulfilling his monthly flying time, as did fellow staff member and good friend, Marine ace Maj. Donald Yost. To get enough hours he and Yost flew F4U Corsairs ofVMF-124 on a B-24 escort mission to Kahili on 2 September. The mission was uneventful except for AA fire. Bechtel described the action: "Don and I, in the rear and off to the side of the bomber formation, had pulled well apart and were flying essentially abreast so as to cover each other's tail. Don was on the outside ofthe formation, and we had just flown through a bunch of flak bursts when I saw a Zero coming up fast, low, and behind. He was all alone, and apparently was intent on knocking off Don. I called Don as I was beginning to turn to the right, but apparently he didn't hear me or notice me trying to scissor, as he just kept flying straight ahead. I had no choice but to flip over to the left and take a long lead on the Jap and fire a long burst at him, hoping that my tracers would scare him away. I didn't accomplish my goal, but somehow I was even more successful in shooting off two large pieces of his tail. He lost control and rolled over and went down. When we landed Don was unaware of the Zero, but several of the mission B-24 crews saw the Zero crash into the sea at the end of the mission. After checking times and the debriefs I was given credit for the victory. It was my fifth confirmed Japanese aircraft destroyed, and I think that I am the only"Air Force pilot to shoot down a Jap plane while flying a Marine fighter." (Bechtel correspondence) On the 3rd the 44FS put up 11 P-39s for an escort of27 B-24s to Vila, and lLt. Mack Bunderson was awarded the Silver Star for his heroism. During the mission the bomber formation was attacked by Zeros, and Bunderson and his squadronmates made several passes at the attackers; soon Bunderson was the only American fighter around. On his way back from the target he received a call from a crippled bomber for help. Bunderson turned back alone and was attacked by the fi ve Zeros that were attacking the bomber. Bunderson turned into them but suffered for it: damage to his controls; a bullet

through his left wrist, paralyzing his arm; and a piece of shrapnel in his left eye, which he later lost. Fortunately, the Zeros left the area and Bunderson, his plane and person badly injured, flew toward Munda without a compass, semi-conscious and fainting several times on the way. He was unable to bailout due to his paralyzed arm and had difficulty seeing, but he was able to make an incredible crash landing at Segi. On the 6 th , seven P-39s of the 12th and 68 th Fighter Squadrons strafed a radar station on Morgusiai Island and were attacked by 25 Zeros. FlO John Workman claimed a Zero, and FlO Buell Payne and Lt. Andrew Capa shared another one, but neither pilot returned to base and were MIA/KIA. On 14 September, at 0950 24 P-40s left Fighter Two-two flights from the 44FS and four New Zealand flights-to escort nine B-24s. After rendezvousing near Choisul Island the American flights flew high cover, and the New Zealanders flew intermediate and close cover as the formation headed for Kahili Airfield. Capt. Robert Byrnes' P-40 developed engine trouble and his radio call for support for his return to base was misinterpreted; his entire flight left the formation to return to base instead of only his wingman and himself. This mistake left only Capt. Elmer Wheadon's flight for high cover. Wheadon was unaware of the return of Byrnes' flight until the bombers made their sharp right turn for a direct west to east bomb run on Kahili. As Wheadon led his flight above the nearest bombers to the right he expected to see Byrnes' flight scissor over to the left. Before Wheadon could adjust his flight a Zero dove from above and got under the bombers; Wheadon and his wingman, lLt. Andrew Borders, peeled off and dove after the Zero, but lost him and immediately climbed in a chandelle just under the bombers at 20,000 feet. Wheadon's P-40 could climb no higher, as it probably had been hit by AA fire, and the two pilots remained with the B-24s. A Zero attacked from 8 o'clock, and the two turned to the left into the attacker head-on. Wheadon hit the Zero but stalled his fighter, went into a spin, and could not see the results. While in his spin, Wheadon lost Borders and tried to climb back up to the bombers, but was bounced by individual Zeros in uncoordinated attacks from all sectors. He turned into each attack, nearly stalling out several times, but managed to survive. Two Zeros attacked from

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II the front on each side above, and Wheadon chose the one on the left and hit it hard; it flamed and hit the water just off the Kahili airstrip for his seventh and last victory. The other Zero escaped, and Wheadon was alone with another Zero closing in the distance from the left rear. Wheadon tried to escape and climb to catch up with the bombers. The Jap fired as he chased Wheadon past the Fauro Islands, but was still too far out of range to do any damage. The Jap was closing the distance, and Wheadon could only reopen the gap by diving slightly. The Japanese was not tricked into diving with the P-40, as he knew the American would have to pull up soon and then would come into firing range. Every time Wheadon pulled up the Zero fired, but was just out of range each time. Eventually Wheadon got close enough to the bombers that their gunners could protect him and the Jap turned home. When Wheadon landed he found that both wings and his left horizontal stabilizer had holes in them, and two guns were not operating. 1Lt. Charles Sacket did not return and was listed as MIA. New Zealand pilots reported a bail out between Fauro and Bougainville, and that the parachuting pilot had been strafed by the Japanese. 2Lt. Darrell Jordon was KIA when his plane crashed into the water as he came in for a landing at Segi.

On the 15 t \ just before noon over Ballale Island 12FS pilot 1Lt. Perry Wells downed a Zero and shared another with 1Lt. Robert Mein for their only victories of the war. These would be the last victories for the 12FS for six months, and the squadron's last major aerial combat of the war (on 16 March 1944 1Lt. Francis Cheney shared a 0.5 Dinah over Vunakanau AID for the last l2FS score of the war). Navy squadron VF-40, the "Wild Boars," was new to the area, and scored two victories on this day and one on the previous day. VF-40 was deployed to Guadalcanal in September and scored six victories while there, two on the 15 th , and four on the 16th • On the 16 th the 44FS was searching for a downed pilot northwest of Vella Lavella, and the flight of P-40s came upon a single float plane. 2Lt. Cecil Taylor of the 70FS downed the Rufe at 1600. During the month pilots of the 70FS were attached to the 44 'h • On the 18 'h the 44FS was flying cover for USN barges sailing from Segi to Vella Lavella. Two Zeros attacked and were intercepted by lLt. Cotesworth Head (44FS), who downed one, and 2Lt. David Works of the 70FS (attached to the 44 th ) got the second. In mid-September 13AF heavy and medium bombers hit the Kara-Kahili-Ballale airbases. On the 14'h six B-24 and B-25 missions were sent, and the Japanese airbases sustained their heaviest bombing attacks of the war. For the next three days the bombers dropped 122.5 tons on Balla1e, 97 tons on Kahili, and 18 tons on Buka, and destroyed over 50 aircraft on these fields.

Detachment "B"/6NFS Officially the 6NFS had been returned to the 7AF on 15 September, but the personnel and aircraft continued to operate as Detachment "B" ight Fighter Squadron as an independent unit under the 13AF at Guadalcanal until November. On 21 September Maj. Gen. Nathan Twining, 13AF eG, personally awarded 2Lt. Henry Meigs the Silver Star for an impressive sortie over Guadalcanal. On the night of 20121 September the Japanese sent six Betty bombers of the 702 Kokutai from Rabaul to attack Guadalcanal. His citation reads: "...during the early morning hours of 21 September 19430when the first of a force of enemy attacking a Solomons Island base came within range, 2Lt. Meigs proceeded to the attack. Despite the fact that intense heavy anti-aircraft fire was bei ng accurately directed at the enemy by our batteries, 2Lt. Meigs pressed his attack home in the face of this anti-aircraft fire and return fire from the enemy aircraft. In the initial phase of his attack he silenced the fire of the enemy tail gunner. His second assault on this plane resulted in its destruction. However, the enemy gunner scored a hit on the elevator of his airplane and, although 2Lt. Meigs knew he had been hit, he did not know the extent of the damage. During the final stages of his encounter with the first enemy bomber a second came within range. 2Lt. Meigs' gallant disregard of the combined dangers from the fire of enemy planes, friendly anti-aircraft fire, high-speed maneuvers at night, and possible structural failure of his damaged airplane, was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service." ILt. Perry Wells was credited with a Zero and a shared Zero for his only claims of the war and the last victories for the 12FS for six months. (Canning)

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Part Three, Chapter 14 - September 1943 Meigs' personal account (Correspondence for American Fighter Aces Association Album, 1991) differs from the hurriedly written citation: "I was scrambled (in a P-38 -author) when ground radar picked up two bogies at about 25,000 feet heading south. I climbed off shore to altitude and turned inland to see a Betty framed by the searchlights. All our 90mm AA guns were filling the sky but exploding nowhere close to them or, fortunately, me. I closed and tried to fly directly astern, but tried to keep far enough back to stay out of the searchlight cone. I closed to 200 feet and opened fire with the four .50s and hit the Jap in the right wing root. I was about to fire the 20mm, but the Jap burst into flame and dove toward the ground. The other Bettys were warned and took evasive action. Our ground radar controller called another Betty nearby, and I stayed at altitude and turned toward the searchlights. The largest light, known as 'Senior Everyready,' caught another Betty that was behind me. I turned a 180 and firewalled the fighter to close the gap before the bomber escaped the lights. I closed too fast and had to cut the throttle and bank to keep from overrunning. Slowing down, I was able to get on the Jap's tail, but I was in the searchlight's beam myself. The bomber tail gunner opened fire and I felt my ship taking some pretty good hits. I pulled both triggers, and the 20mm and .50 calibers exploded the bomber in a flash. Ground radar reported an all clear, and I came in for a landing. After I came to a stop I was told that both Japanese bombers were on fire in the air before the first hit the ground, and that the whole battle took around a minute-it seemed much longer. The next day my crew chief and I found a hole in my horizontal stabilizer that was big enough to put my head through, which I did, and had my photo taken." A Time magazine article (7 February 1944 issue) entitled "Bull S Eye in the South Pacific" quoted Meigs as saying why he flew through his own AA fire against orders: "I figured if they couldn't hit the Japs, they couldn't hit me." The article stated that Meigs had shot down a Betty, and a minute later shot down its companion to a cheering audience below. Detachment "B 's" remaining P-70s were useless for high altitude night interception sorties and were assigned to daylight intruder missions. Captains Ralph Tuttle and Earl Bennett were flying their P-70s on an intruder mission under Japanese radar looking for targets of opportunity off Buin. They came upon a Japanese airfield with five torpedo bombers lined up, and Tuttle made a firing pass and destroyed all five. As he passed over the field he spotted a number of barges being unloaded at a nearby dock. Continuing on his firing run he exploded the fuel-carrying barges. American PT boats had been hunted by Japanese float planes at night, and the P-70s were to rendezvous and fly cover for the PT boats that were to be bait to draw out the float planes. The P-70s would fire their guns at the Kolombangara coast in an effort to get the float planes to take off. The plan was tried on the 13 th, and a Japanese float plane fell into the trap and was ambushed as he flew into attack position. The P-70 closed to 150 feet, but only one of its guns fired and the Jap escaped.

The Japanese lack of success in daylight forced them to increase the nighttime air activity, at which they excelled. On the night of 14 September the Japanese made repeated raids on Guadalcanal, Munda, and Barakoma. COMAIR New Georgia reported 79 bogies in flights of two or three. They were not bothered by American night fighters and search lights, and AA guns firing 2,900 rounds did no damage. The Japanese dropped tuned dipoles suspended from parachutes 30 miles from their target. The dipoles would cause saturation echoes looking like an orbiting bogie on American radar screens. Until a valid radar plot could be established the fighter controller could not vector his night fighters. This interval of uncertainty usually lasted two minutes, during which the Japanese would have closed an additional eight to ten miles, and more importantly, the radar contact would have been lost. On 6 November two Detachment "B" P-38s were sent on a daytime patrol to find a Japanese photo recon plane. ILt. Charles Van Bibber shot down a photo recon Zero near Santa Isabel Island for the eighth and last victory for the Detachment, and a P-38 night fighter in the Solomons. On 15 December Detachment "B" was disbanded, and some of its personnel were transferred to the 419NFS, which became operational on 10 December, equipped with P-38s and a few P-70s. A few of its personnel were returned to the 6NFS, based in New Guinea. It would not be until May 1944 that the 6NFS would receive P-61 Black Widows and become successful as a NFS, scoring 16 victories over the Marianas and Iwo Jima. By late September the number of ground support missions declined, and missions against enemy airbases prevailed. In September the Bougainville airfields Kahili, Ballale, Buka, and Kara, a new field west of Kahili, drew 24 attacks from COMAIRSOLS' bombers. In daylight Japanese fighters flew almost all defensive sorties, and in light of their August losses only when they had the advantage. The Japanese increased their nighttime attacks on the Allied bases on Guadalcanal, Munda, and the new field at Barakoma on Vella Lavella. As a result, the 13 th Fighter Command claimed only 11 Japanese aircraft destroyed in daylight for the month. As the fighting on New Georgia wound down, COMAIRSOPAC advocated that COMAIR New Georgia be removed from the operational control of the New Georgia Occupation Force and become a task unit command of COMAIRSOLS instead. On 23 September Halsey approved the move. On the 21 st the first four-engine bomber landed at the bomber field on Munda. On 23 September a utility aircraft and four fighters landed at Barakoma, on Vella Lavella, for the first time. But it was not until 17 October when dispersal areas were completed and the ground crews arrived that the 58 th Seabees declared Barakoma operational. On the n rd a flight of P-38s led by ILt. John Mulvey, of the newly rested 339FS, made the squadron's first enemy contact during an escort of 21 B-24s to Kahili. About 40 Zeros were over the target area, but only a few pressed an attack. 2Lt. Samuel Howie shot down a Zero as it came in on a head on pass, as he hit it when it exposed its belly as it pulled up. On 25 September Maj. John Little, who had been the 44FS CO since 25 May, was replaced by eight victory ace Maj. Robert Westbrook. Fred Hampson, an Associated Press War Correspondent, described Westbrook:

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II "He is sometimes referred to as the Adonis of the l3'h fighters. He is one of the very few pilots who looks like the movie versiontall, handsome, mustachioed, debonair. He once took actress Frances Langford for a piggy-back ride in his P-38." On the 26'h, 12 339FS P-38s were on an escort of B-24s over Kahili and were attacked by Zeros. lLt. Morris Wilson's P-38 had its engine shot out, and he was shot through the left arm and ditched between Buraku Island and the Russells. After two and a half days afloat in his life raft he was picked up by a LeI and returned to Guadalcanal. On 30 September the 339'h was flying bomber escort to Kahili when the Japanese sent up Zeros to intervene. 2Lt. Victor Whistler shot down two Zeros, and then he and his wingman were overwhelmed by Zeros. Whistler did not return to base, and his wingman, lLt. Eugene Pafford, landed with head and arm wounds caused by glass from a bullet that shattered his canopy. Whistler was awarded the DFC.

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On 25 September Maj. John Little, who had been with the 44FS since 25 May. was replaced by eight victory ace Maj. Robert Westbrook. (Smith)

15 Assessment of the New Georgia Campaign

The principal result of Toenails was that three new airbases (Munda, Barakoma, and Segi) moved Allied airpower 200 miles closer to Rabaul, and gave it bases to more quickly intercept the dwindling number of Japanese air raids on Guadalcanal and the Russells. Now relatively free from Japanese air attacks, the Allies were able to assemble the men and materiel for future operations, and no longer was Allied shipping in jeopardy. The New Georgia victory was one of complete and equal integration of air, land, and sea forces. Although it was not until 25 August that all New Georgia was secured, Munda airfield was operational on l3 August, less than nine months after the Japanese had landed there on 21 November 1942. During the 37-day campaign Allied aircraft had destroyed 358 Japanese aircraft and lost 71 fighters and 22 bombers of all types. The Rendova Patrol had been so efficient that the Japanese were never able to support their troops with daylight attacks or cause any substantial damage to invasion shipping. The Japanese night attacks continued with annoying persistence. COMAIR New Georgia had requested 44 close air support strikes, and 39 were carried out, 27 against the Munda area. Air liaison parties

requested seven strikes from COMAIR, but only four were approved and executed. Of the 1,833 bomber sorties, Marine SBDs and TBFs carried out 1,649. The failures of the campaign were adequate and daily photoreconnaissance, the failure to cut off New Georgia from its adjacent bases, and the continued failure to develop an adequate night-fighter presence. Satisfactory aerial photos were often received late, as several days went by before requested areas were photographed, and when the photos were developed it was found that they were often of the wrong area! Japanese supplies and reinforcements were brought in almost nightly by barges and small boats. At the end of the campaign the Japanese were able to evacuate a large number of troops, especially from Bairoka and Kolombangara. Although the by-pass of Kolombangara was strategically successful and forced the Japanese to evacuate the island, they were again successful in doing so as they had been off Guadalcanal in February. They sent in destroyers and barges, and during five days in late September and early October they evacuated 9,400 troops. Also continuing from the Guadalcanal campaign was the Americans' inability to stop nightly harassing air attacks that were probably the most effective aspect of the Japanese air campaign in the Solomons.

MundaAirstrip as Japanese artillery on nearby Baanga Island shelled the Seabees rebuilding the runway (USMC)

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Part Four Northern Solomons

1 Bouganville Campaign, Preparation October 1943

In 1942 the invasion of Rabaul was considered necessary to secure the Southwest-South Pacific area. But circumstances caused the Combined Chiefs of Staff to reconsider at Quebec Conference in August 1943, and neutralization and by-pass was considered to be a sufficient and much less costly alternative. The CCS called off the invasion of Rabaul, as Halsey did not have enough ground troops for what would be a bloody assault. Instead, the major Allied thrust was to be through the Central Pacific instead of New Britain, New Guinea, and the Philippines. The CCS directed Nimitz was to plan a new offensive in the Central Pacific, and a secondary advance in the SWPA and South Pacific by MacArthur and Halsey, by-passing Rabaul. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the large stronghold to be reduced by airpower. The strong-willed MacArthur, thinking only of his "return" to the Philippines, continued to adhere to his ElktonCartwheel plan. He pressed the attacks on Salamaua, Lae, and Finschhafen that made implicit the establishment of airbases in the Northern Solomons by November or December 1943. After the Japanese were driven from New Georgia the Allies turned their attention to the islands in the Northern Solomons. In the grand strategy, invasion schedules in the Solomons were not only dependent on the "Europe first" schedule, but now for Nimitz' battles in the Central Pacific. Immediately after the capture of New Georgia, Halsey and his staff on Noumea needed to reconsider their original invasion plans. The Japanese had defended points in the area in proportion to their perceived importance. Initially, in September, Adm. King insisted that the Buin-Kahili-Kara area be the focus of attack on Bougai~ville. But Halsey knew, in light of the recent costly drawn out Munda campaign, the strength of the Kahili and Kara airfields and garrison would cause prohibitive casualties. The Treasury Islands and Choiseul were considered next, but their capture would not accomplish the required strategic objectives. Halsey proposed the capture of the Shortland, Ballale, and Faisi group of islands off the southern Bougainville coast for their airfields, and then as a site for the artillery reduction of Kahili/Kara (much like the artillery reduction of Munda from Rendova). Reconnaissance showed that the Shortlands beaches were inadequate for amphibious landings, and there was limited terrain for further airfield expansion. Finally, in late September the Allied planners settled on a landing on

Bougainville, but Halsey did not have enough Marine infantry or landing craft to make a direct attack on the heavily defended areas around the airfields located on the northern and southern ends of the island. Also, the aircraft based in the Central Solomons had only sufficient range to support an invasion of the southern half of Bougainville. MacArthur was eager to invade somewhere to secure and build airfields to reduce the Rabaul airfields to support his invasion of western New Britain in December. MacArthur had planned an intensive air campaign against Rabaul with Kenney's SAF between 15 October-IS November, and decided that 1 November would be the optimal date for any invasion of Bougainville. MacArthur was willing to accept any invasion plan, particularly one which would comply with the Elkton-Cartwheel plan, and would further his plan to return to the Philippines. Halsey had decided that it was not necessary to capture all of Bougainville, much of which was heavily defended and would be very costly to take. Instead, he would invade and hold a perimeter in which to construct

Cape Torokina on Empress Augusta Bay was chosen as the landing site for Operation Cherryblossom, as the west central coast was lightly occupied by only I ,000 Japanese troops, and a soil sample brought back by a landing party revealed that an airstrip could be built there. (USAF)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II the airfields necessary to base fighter escorts for incoming longrange bombers, and for the short-range SBDs and TBFs to hit Rabaul airfields. Bougainville was the largest island in the Solomons chain, measuring 125 miles long by an average of 30 miles wide, and had a population of about 40,000 that lived primarily in villages of less than 200 people. After New Georgia fell, it was the last obstacle barring the Allies from Rabaul. It was the typical Solomon Island, with high forest-covered volcanic mountains running down its entire length, and alluvial plains that were made up of impassable mangrove swamps covering its perimeter. The island lies at the west entrance of the Slot, and its ideal location made it the advanced supply and refueling base for the Japanese against Guadalcanal and the Central Solomons. The Japanese occupied and fortified the northern coast and the southeastern end of the island, which were the areas where most of the population lived. The dense jungle prohibited much inland travel, and commerce was via barge traffic from point to point along the coast. The Japanese had built two airfields on the northern end of the island (on Buka Island and Bonis) and two on the southern end (Kahili and the new Kara base). There was the seaplane base at Kieta, on the east central coast, and there also was the airfield on Ballale Island, off the southern end. Bougainville was readily sustained by airfields on New Britain, New Ireland,

and Truk, and was under the protection of naval units from Rabaul and Truk. Halsey had been left with the final decision whether to invade Bougainville's east coast or west coast. Intelligence was gathered by air recon and submarine patrols. Poor weather, enemy air interception, and the lack of fighter escort hindered air recon. The objective was to capture a beachhead six by eight miles that would by-pass all but several thousand of the 40,000 troops on Bougainville. Cape Torokina, on the west central coast on Empress Augusta Bay, was chosen as the landing site for Operation Cherryblossom, as it was lightly occupied by only 1,000 Japanese troops, and a soil sample brought back by a recon palty revealed that an airstrip could be built there. Once this beachhead was captured, the troops there would have to defend the perimeter for an extended period while the airfields were being constructed from which Rabaul would be attacked. Halsey had estimated that it would take the Japanese ten to twelve weeks to move reinforcements and artillery to the invasion area through the impenetrable jungles. Torokina was on the open sea, which would make small boat landings hazardous, and there were no satisfactory anchorages for large ships offshore. But it was the only area on the otherwise unprotected coast that provided some safety against high seas and monsoons. The beachhead would be jeopardized by air attack from Kahili, Ballale, Buka, Bonis, and Kara airfields, and the seaplane base at Kieta, which were all within 65 miles of the beachhead, and Rabaul's five airfields, which were only 210 miles to the northwest. It would be imperative that these nearby Japanese airfields be neutralized and a forceful CAP be established. Tactical and operational aviation in the Solomons was under the command of COMAIRSOLS, which was a subordinate command of AIRSOPAC, organized on 15 February 1943. From 25 July it had been under the command of Maj.Gen Nathan Twining (AAF), who would be relieved on 20 November by Maj.Gen. Ralph Mitchell (USMC). Twining and COMAIRSOLS had four commands under their control: Fighter Command: Controlled all fighters planes from all four services and had operational control over all information centers, fighter direction stations, radar networks and forward airbase AA. (Commander, Col. W.O. Brice USMC) (2) Strike Command: Control of USMC, USN, and RNZAF divebomber, torpedo-bomber and search aircraft. (Commander, Lt.Coi. David O'Neill USMC) (3) Bomber Command: Controlled heavy and medium bombers (B-24s and B-25s) of the AAF and some USN PB4Y bomb squadrons. (Commander, Brig.Gen. William Metheny AAF) (4) Photo Wing: Controlled all photo recon aircraft. (Commander, Col. George Hansen AAF) (1)

Maj,Gen, Ralph Mitchell relieved Nathan Twining as COMAIRSOLs on 20 November. (USN)

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The anti-barge campaign continued through September, and on the 4 th four P-39s of the 70FS and four F4Us attacked barges off the western coast of Choiseul. They destroyed 16 large barges between Poro Island, off Sambi Head, and at West Cape, off the island's northwest end. During a second mission a P-39 destroyed another barge offthe east coast. The anti-barge campaign was greatly aided by the coast watcher network and friendly natives who informed

Part Four, Chapter 1 - Bouganville Campaign, Preparation October 1943 on their movement. USN destroyers operated nightly in the Vella and Kula Gulfs in an attempt to prevent enemy evacuation. On the 27 th and 28 th they had intercepted barges moving to Kolombangara from Choiseul and destroyed at least ten. B-24s sank 15 barges during that week, and sank a transport and a destroyer, as well as damaging another DD on the 28 th off Cape Alexander. In the upcoming Bougainville campaign COMAIRSOLS again was assigned search and recon missions, CAP and support for the amphibious landings at the Treasury Islands and at Empress Augusta Bay, and to intercept Japanese air attacks coming down from Rabaul or Buin. After the air campaign against Japanese barges was concluded in early October 1943, the 728 COMAIRSOLS aircraft in 52 squadrons were assigned to attack and suppress the Japanese air bases on Bougainville and Buka as a preliminary to the landings. This was the largest number of aircraft thus far in the Pacific. COMAIRSOLS was comprised of four individual services integrated for tactical objectives: (1) U.S. Navy units under COMAIRSOPAC; (2) 13 th Air Force; (3) 1" and 2 nd MAWs; and (4) RNZAF units. Service USN AAF USMC RNZAF Totals

Squadrons 19 16 14 3 52

Aircraft 274 216 181 57 728

There were 314 fighters available: Number 45 27 48 31 103

Base (# airfields) Guadalcanal (4) Russells (2) Segi (1) Munda (2) Ondonga (2)

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Barakoma (1)

AlC Type AAF: P-38s, P-39s, P-40s USMC: F4Us and PVs/AAF: P-38s USN: F6Fs USN: F4Us/AAF: P-39sIUSMC: F4Us USN: F4Us/AAF: P-39s/ RNZAF: P-40s USMC: F4Us 314 on 12 airfields

There were 317 bombers: Number Base AlCType 52 Guadalcanal AAF: B-24s (52) 27 Guadalcanal USN: PB4Ys (27) 15 Guadalcanal RNZAF: PVs 48 Russells AAF: B-25s (48) 27 Russells USN: PVs 100 Munda USN & USMC: SBDs 48 Munda USN & USMC: TBFs 317 There also were 97 miscellaneous recon, transport, and rescue aircraft. On 1 September, to more directly control all air operations over the invasion itself, a new echelon was established at Espiritu Santo and designated Air Command North Solomons (COMAIRNORSOLS). It was placed under the command of Brig.Gen. Field Harris (USMC) and secured its personnel from the forward echelon of the 1st MAW. COMAIRNORSOLS was assigned operational control of all aircraft in the Bougainville and Treasury invasion area through two subordinate fighter commands-one on Treasury and the other at Bougainville (Torokina)-and also had operational control of all AA guns. In early October the bulk Japanese air strength was based at Rabaul in VAdm Kusaka's 11 th Air Fleet, and the remainder at bases at southern Bougainville. As COMAIRSOLS increased its attacks on Bougainville Kusaka withdrew the remaining aircraft to Rabaul. When Kenney's 5AF increased its attacks on Rabaul Kusaka often moved his aircraft back to Kavieng, on New Ireland. Nonetheless, he maintained over 200 aircraft at Rabaul. The Japanese had about 10,000 pilots, aircrew, and ground crew to fly and service the aircraft and facilities. By mid-September Munda Airfield had finally been captured, and was in operation for fighters and being lengthened for bomber operations. The Segi Strip, on the southeast end of New Georgia,

The AAF components were: 38 P-38s of the 339FS on Guadalcanal and the Russells; 40 P-39s of the 12'h, 68 t h, and 70 th FS on Guadalcanal and Ondonga; and 18 P-40s of the 44FS on Guadalcanal. There were five Marine fighter squadrons: VMF-211 (F4U-Ru'ssells); VMF-212 (F4Us-Barakoma and Vella Lavella); VMF-215 (F4Us-Russells); VMF-221 (F4Us-Vella Lavella); and VMF-531(N) (F4U-Russells). There were five USN fighter squadrons: VF-12 (F6Fs-Guadalcanal); VF-17 (F4Us Ondonga); VF-33 (F6Fs-Segi); VF-38 (F6Fs-Guadalcanal); VF-40 (F6Fs-Segi); and VF-75 N) (F4U-Munda)

339th Fighter Squadron pilots: Standing (L-R) Eugene Pafford, Murray Shubin, George Weart, Bill Harris, Donald Warner, and George Chandler. Kneeling (L-R) George Traner, and Harry Jordon. (Canning)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II was also captured and in full operation. Allied troops were fighting on Vella Lavella, but Barakoma Airfield was in Allied hands. Thirtythree pilots with 20 new P-38s and 60 enlisted men of the 339FS arrived at Guadalcanal and returned to combat for the last phase in the battle for the Solomons. The accomplishments of the 339FS during the next six weeks were the best in Sunsetter annals. It would play an important part in eradicating Japanese air power while escorting B-24s to Kahili, conducting sporadic fighter sweeps to Kahili or Buna, and supporting the Allied invasions on Sterling Island and at Cape Torokina. Munda Airfield, at 170 miles, was halfway between Fighter Two and the usual target of Kahili. Munda was an excellent staging and servicing point from Guadalcanal. Of the 60 339 1h enlisted men sent from New Caledonia in September, 25 mechanics and ten armorers were based at Munda in October (the other 25 were sent back to New Caledonia). The 35 men at Munda worked with the 11 til Airdrome Battalion under rugged tropical conditions with inadequate service and repair facilities. The P-38s would often land late in the day and needed to be checked out, refueled, and rearmed and prepared for another mission the next morning. Capt. William Griffith led veterans Brewster, Hardaway, Harris, Howie,

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Moore, Mulvaney, Novak, Pedro, Rake, Rudolph, Shubin, and Webber, and newcomers Eubanks, Frick, Haggard, Hopkins, LaBarge, McCloud, Pederson, Richards, Pafford, Serwat, Shimp, Stewart, Whistler, and Wilson to Fighter Two on Guadalcanal, and then onto Munda. (As a footnote, in civilian life ILt. Robert Shimp played piano for several top American dance bands, such as Gus Amhem and Jimmy Greer.) Conditions on Munda were also much better since they had left for R&R. Quonset Huts were replacing tents, and food was much improved, as the Navy brought in supplies regularly without much Japanese interference. Bill Harris (339FS): "When we were at Munda, at certain times of the year for three or four weeks there were millions of land crabs on some kind of migration. They would never go around anything. Even though the heat was oppressive you had to keep your tent sides down, or they would crawl over your bunks with you in them. They would be squashed over the runway by the thousands, and we had to worry about skidding off the runway. Their slime would get caught up in our wheel wells and cause quite a mess. Then all of a sudden they would be gone."

2 October 1943

Air action had been quiet since the 13 th Fighter Command's last victory on 18 September. On 1 October 2Lt. Raymond Farkas and Capt. Cotesworth Head of the 44FS shared a Zero in combat over Vella LaVella at 1440. On 4 October the 339FS returned to combat, sending 20 P-38s to fly high cover for B-24s attacking target in the Kahili area. The B-24s began their bombing run from 18,000 feet with the P-38s scissoring at 20,000. As the bombers finished their bombing run they made a right hand tum that made them vulnerable, as the bomber gunners found it difficult to get deflection shots at any attacking fighter. The Japanese had been waiting for this opportunity, and the Zeros dove on the bombers. Meanwhile, Lt. Hemy Pedro developed engine problems over Kahili and was jumped by three Zeros. 2Lt. Kenneth McCloud, his wingman, did his job and kept the Zeros off Pedro's tail. lLt. Bill Harris flew to the rescue and shot down a Zero. Harris pulled up to catch another Zero diving on Pedro and fired two short bursts that hit its left wing root, and it exploded, with pieces falling into the ocean. Lts. Mulvey and Peterson claimed a Zero each, and 2Lt. Donald Livesey, Harris' wingman, set one on fire, but it flew off, and as he was escorting the bombers he did not pursue and could only claim a probable. After the B-24s made their tum and were heading southeast toward Guadalcanal the Zeros climbed out of range. The escorting P-38s made many feints at the Zeros, firing at long range to keep them away from the bombers. The Japanese fighter formation would send one or two Zeros down to tempt the P-38s to leave the bombers, but only experienced flight leaders were allowed to leave the formation briefly, hoping to get a good, quick shot at a Zero that ventured too close. Occasionally an inexperienced newcomer would be tempted and go after an approaching decoy. During the mission a P-38 left the bomber formation, and Harris and his wingman, 2Lt. Livesey, both out of ammunition, flew after the wayward pilot to protect him and get him to return to the formation. The two pilots made passes at the Japanese, but soon other Zeros came in to attack. Harris and Livesey quickly turned back to the bomber formation, but a Jap from 4 o'clock hit Harris' right main fuel tank. Harris, worried that the fuel would ignite, cut his right engine, feathered the prop, and switched the fuel from the ruptured tank for immediate use to reduce the fire risk. Harris was

becoming an expert on one-engine flying and landed safely on Munda. Later, his crew chief was checking his parachute pack and a 20mm explosive shell fell out. Harris was lucky on two counts; the 20mm shell did not explode and that he did not have to bailout with a shredded chute. The 339 lh scored four victories. Harris got his fifth Japanese aircraft to become an ace, and lLt. John Mulvey and Lt.Col. William Councill of 13AF HQ were credited with a Zero each. lLts. Gordon Brewster and Donald Stewart shared a Zero. In the "Story of the 339111 Fighter Squadron" Harris described the responsibility of the bomber escort pilot: "Our job is to escort bombers and to bring those bombers back. Shooting down Zeros is only secondary. The only real glory, the only real heroics are in the completion of a successful mission. We are taught to be conservative in fighting Zeros and not to be led out of formation on wild goose chases by cunning Jap tricks. Consequently, our bombers have effectively and methodically wiped out Japanese airfieldsa and troop, ship, and supply concentrations. One thing I can say for our pilots, they are always where they belong in any formation, in any flight. No pilot is any better, really, than any other. A man becomes a leader only because he has had more actual experience. He usually makes the first move in an attack, makes the first pass. Leaders like Rake (Erwin), Bruzaka (Edmund), and Kerstetter (Robert) accounted for much of our aerial success, hitting attacking Jap fighter formations fast and hard, dispersing and breaking up their formations, and preventing their tapping our bombers." On the 6 t h, the 42BG flew its first low-level attack on a Japanese airfield when 24 B-25s escorted by 14 P-38s raided Kahili from the west before sundown. Four waves of Mitchells attacked at 160 feet, dropping 239 parafrag clusters, and strafed the field with nose and turret guns. The attack was over in three minutes, and a large number of aircraft were damaged and destroyed on the ground; the base was inoperable for the next few days. Fortunately for the P-38s no aircraft came up to oppose the attack, as the P-38s were too heavy to maneuver with Zeros at low altitude, which would be

213

13th Fighter Command in World War II

R.Adm.Theodore Wilkinson (left) and Lt.Gen. Millard Harmon discuss strategy in the chart room of the transport McCawley. (USAF)

a problem in the future on low level escort. Two Mitchells were hit by AA fire, and the formation was scattered after the attack and then had to land after dark. On the return, ILt. Gordon Brewster's P-38, probably hit by ground fire, continued to lose altitude as it approached Munda. Brewster was escorted by two flight members who were unable to contact him on the radio, and they watched him crash into the ocean 20 miles short of Munda's searchlights. On 6-7 October R.Adm. Matsuji Ijuin was ordered to evacuate 600 Japanese troops from Vella Lavella using nine destroyers. Ijuin was again opposed by Adm. Theodore Wilkinson, whose trap he had eluded off Horaniu in mid-August. Wilkinson could only marshal six destroyers divided equally in two groups. The Japanese were met by one group of three TG 31.2 destroyers off Vella Lavella, and each lost a destroyer, but the Japanese were turned back from their evacuation attempt. However, two days later the Japanese completed their evacuation of the central Solomons by withdrawing

Lt. Donald Livesey (339FS) stands by his wrecked P-38 after he crash-landed on Vella Lavella. He was unable to lower his landing gear when a 20mm cannon hit his left engine. (USAF)

214

their remaining troops from Kolombangara to Bougainville by barges, but lost 31 barges to USN destroyers and 25 to air attacks. On the 7th , two flights of 339 th Lightnings, one led by ILt. Bill Harris and the other by ILt. Emil Novak, searched for survivors of a Japanese destroyer sunk in the Vella Lavella invasion and a B-25 crew lost in the same area. About 25 miles northwest of Vella Lavella they found numerous Japanese survivors clinging on the wreckage and more swimming. Nearby were B-25 bomber survivors in life rafts. 2Lt. Pedersen of Novak's flight developed engine problems and was sent back to Munda with ILt. George Hopkins to report the survivor's position. USN destroyer radar warned of ~wo bogies approaching at 12,000 feet over the P-38s that were flying at only 1,000 feet, and vulnerable to a diving attack. Harris ordered his fighters to spread out and begin a high-speed climbing turn. At 8,000 feet ILt. Novak and 2Lt. Donald Livesey were bounced by Zeros diving out of the sun, and Livesey's P-38 was damaged. 2Lt. William Frick and Harris saw the Japanese attack and turned to chase the Zeros that were diving toward cloud cover 4,000 feet below. Harris opened fire immediately at long range and hit the Zero as it was about to enter the clouds. The second Zero turned to escape, but Harris' .50s stitched bullets through the wing and into the engine. The Jap spiraled through the clouds, and later a destroyer confirmed that an aircraft had crashed into the sea to give Harris his sixth victory. Pederson's engine caught fire, but he was able to cut the fuel, feather the prop, and nurse the fighter east toward safety. As he approached the newly captured Barakoma airstrip on Vella Lavella he was unable to lower his gear, but was able to safely belly in. The ruggedness of the P-38 was demonstrated as Livesey, too, was al~o able to safely crash land in his damaged P-38. PI boats were given the position of the B-25 crew and rushed out to the rescue. On the 8th , Maj. Louis Kittel of the 70FS shot down a Betty 60 miles south of Guadalcanal. On the 9 th the 44FS was assigned a sweep of enemy gun and radar installations at Poporang Island, off the southeast coast of Bougainville. The squadron left at 0900 and arrived 45 minutes later under the cover of Marine F4Us. The flight was flying P-39s instead of their P-40s. ILt. John Lessing was the flight leader, and his wingman was ILt. Robert Corbett; element leader was ILt. Andrew Sawers, and his wingman was 2Lt. K. Holmes. The flight approached at sea level in elements abreast to evade radar, then climbed up to 1,200 feet to strafe in line of elements astern. The radar tower was the primary target, but the gun positions had to be taken out first and then the radar tower. After the attack they moved on to strafe tents on Morgusiai Island, then rejoined their F4U cover and returned to Munda at 1025. Back at base that day 2Lt. William Pollard was KIFA when he lost flying speed on landing after a test flight and crashed. On 10 October, nBS B-24s escorted by I6339FS and 44FS P-38s attacked Kahili. The 44FS had just transitioned to a few Lightnings, and Maj. Robert Westbrook, the new 44 th CO, flew as a wingman to Bill Harris (who was now a Captain) of the 339FS to gain experience in the new fighter. Both pilots led their squadrons with seven victories each, and ILt. Murray Shubin, also flying in the mission, also had seven victories. As they reached Kahili 30 to 40 Zeros approached from above and 15 dove on the bomber for-

Part Four, Chapter 2 - October 1943 leader's tail. And thus he gains experience and takes his place ultimately as a leader. Many half-plane credits are shared by wingmen. The leader makes the first pass on the Jap, closely followed by his wingman, who puts in the finishing bursts. Many pilots owe their lives to wingmen who chase or pick off enemy planes from their tails. Wingmen often give up their own lives in protecting their leader's tails. The leader just isn't in a maneuverable position to swing into his own wingman's tail to rescue him in time. For these reasons many wingmen never survive the grueling test-hours of combat, and pass on to oblivion without all the recognition due them for the important part they have played. They go down into the records as second or first lieutenants killed or missing in action without medals and without the full news publicity that is rightfully theirs." 44 th "Vampire Squadron" pilots pose in front of their PAOs, probably after a mission, as one pilot is holding a clip board, one has on a Mae West, and two others are carrying .45s in a shoulder (1 st right) and hip holster (2 nd left). (Lansdale/Nat Archives)

mation through the P-38 cover. Harris was able to get off a quick burst and a Zero fell in flames. The Zeros shot down a B-24 and damaged several others in their attack, but the bombers continued on their bomb run. Four B-24 crew bailed out of a crippled Liberator, and another B-24 imprudently left the formation to protect the parachutes and was attacked by Zeros, which shot out two of its engines. Harris took his flight below to check on the four B-24 parachutes and met the Zeros that had dove through the B-24 formation and were now strafing the parachutes and the crippled B24. Harris came on three Zeros that were busy trying to finish off the B-24, and he hit two unsuspecting Zeros to score two more quick victories. He hit his fourth Zero of the day, and Westbrook came in and also got hits. The Jap did not flame, and the two shared a probable. Harris fired at another Zero but could not follow it, as he tried to get a shot on another Zero that passed in front of him. Westbrook pulled up from Harris' wing and shot it down. The three American flights above were also having a good day, shooting down six Zeros and claiming three probables. Scoring a Zero each were: ILt. John Mulvey (plus a probable); lLt. Donald Webber; FlO Arlington Labarge (plus a probable); and 2Lt. James Eubanks. lLt. Murray Shubin claimed two Zeros for his eighth and ninth victories. Lt.Col. William Councill of the 347FG HQ was flying with the 339 1h ' and claimed a Zero probable. The Liberator gunners claimed one Zero. At the end of the day the 13FC ace race stood at Harris 9 victories, Shubin 9, and Westbrook 8; but Westbrook had just scored his first of 13 P-38 victories. No P-38s were lost during the day's combat; but Lt. Braydon Hardaway was killed when he lost flying speed and crashed coming into Munda for a landing. Although Harris had a great wingman (Westbrook) on this mission, he gave credit to the invaluable duty of the wingman in general ("Story of the 339/1' Fighter Squadron"): "But the wingman is half the team, even though he may have less experience. He is as important as anybody else. He protects his

Capt. Bill Harris was a veteran with nine victories at this time and recounted his combat experiences and lessons learned while with the 339FS: "For one thing, we learued the high price of using P-38s at too low and altitude without effective top cover. Most of our losses (64%-author) came on six TBF-SBD escort missions. The usual

ILt Bill Harris (339FS) on 10 October 1943 after shooting down two Zekes over Choiseul Island. (Harris)

275

13/h Fighter Command in World War II altitude on these jobs ranged from 15,000 feet down to 2,000 feetmuch too low for comfort and well-being. Our scissoring had to be worked over, too. The Japs began hitting on the outside of our weave, causing us several casualties. We countered by making our scissors tighter and flatter. Gradually, as the campaign went on, we adopted other commandments of combat. Some of these were: Remember your mission. Get the bombers to the target. Always keep on the offensive as long as possible. But when you make a pass at a Zero, always return at once to the bomber formation. Never make a second pass away from the bombers. When switching from the offensive to defensive, keep all fighters in elements in a compact group. If separated from your element leader or wingman, waste no time in joining up with the first plane in sight, and return to the center of activity at the first opportunity. Always turn into an attacking Zero. Make a head-on pass whenever possible. Make sure that belly tanks are dropped well clear of any friendly planes below. Drop them soon enough so that you can reform, and be in position before the enemy attack. On a deflection shot at distances over 250 yards, don't be fooled by apparent hits on enemy planes. The tracers should lead the plane slightly on such long shots. It is much easier to shorten your lead than to pull it up from the tail forward. Our fighters are superior to the Zekes in speed, low angle climb, and firepower. To take advantage of these factors when attacking, try to keep the Zeros from using their advantages of quick acceleration, low speed high angle climb, and ability to turn. Avoid dogfighting with the Zeke, but when the chips are down, don't be afraid to demand everything your airplane has in turn, climb, and speed. These are the tactics we evolved, and they proved pretty successful. But as one of the boys said, three factors meant more than anything else for our winning the Rabaul scrap: (1) Always keeping our fighters together; (2) Ditto; (3) Ditto." On the II t\ eight 44FS P-40s and 16 12th and 70 th FS P-39s escorted SBDs and TBFs on a bombing run on Kahili. The P-40s rendezvoused with the bombers over Benita Point, Rendova, and followed them over the target at 12,000 feet. After the bombing run they saw 15 Zeros in combat with Marine F4Us ofVMF-213. Capt. Cotesworth Head damaged a Zero at the west end of Kahili Airfield, and as he turned to rejoin his formation he saw an enemy two seat aircraft similar to a Sonia. He closed and fired a burst, hitting its belly tank and fuselage, and causing the aircraft to smoke. Head, almost out of ammo and alone, headed for cloud cover. When he came out of the cloud he noticed his victim crash land in the water near Myler Point. VMF-213 shot down five Zeros, including three by lLt. Wilbur Thomas for his 14-l6'h victories. Again, despite their heavy losses the Japanese continued to maintain a dangerous air presence. Photo recon showed 294 aircraft on Rabaul on the 11 t\ and on the 12th the airfields at Kahili-

216

Buka-Ballale had 60 fighters, four Bettys, and seven Vals. The Japanese were improving the airfields at Buka-Bonis and Kara. The American kill to loss ratio had once been as much as 5 to I, but had fallen off, and recently the two air forces were trading losses one for one. Twining had 200 fighters available, which should have been adequate for all bomber strike mission escort and for the infrequent ground support and barge-busting missions. But it was the requirements of CAP over Barakoma and the daylight cover for the destroyer task forces that prevented the attainment of consistent escort of and strikes by heavy bombers on Japanese targets. The Japanese were becoming more selective in combat, and inst~ad of rushing into combat they were declining combat unless they had superior numbers. Twining felt that the Navy was not contributing, as it only had one fighter squadron available in the Solomons in August and September. 5 th Air Force Air Offensive vs. Rabaul To aid Halsey's upcoming Bougainville invasion, on I November Gen. Kenney's 5AF B-25s and P-38s began the air campaign against Rabaul airfields and shipping. Dobodura, on eastern New Guinea, was the SAP's bomber base, and its P-38s could stage through Kiriwina and escort the bombers all the way to Rabaul. The large Japanese base was a prime target, as Simpson Harbor was packed with transports and cargo vessels, numerous assorted craft, and a few warships. Its warehouses were full, and its five airfields were crowded with aircraft. On 12, the 5th Air Force sent out 349 aircraft, 87 B-24s, 114 B-25s, 125 P-38s, 12 Beaufighters, and assorted recon and weather aircraft. The Beaufighters and Lightnings attacked the airfields, and the bombers hit the shipping in the harbor. The Japanese ~ere surprised and did not send up any aircraft to intercept. Initial post raid reports greatly exaggerated the damage to shipping and the airfields. Bad weather over New Guinea canceled operations for the next several days. A large mission sent out on the 18 th was mostly turned back by bad weather, but on the 23 rd , 24th, and 25 th attacks were successfully made on Rabaul. Bad weather again stopped attacks until the 29 th when B-24 bombers escorted by P-38s bombed Vanakanau. The Air Offensive vs. Bougainville and its Airfields The success of the Bougainville campaign depended on Twining's bombers' and fighters' ability to gain air supremacy over the Japanese air forces that menaced Torokina from four bases that were less than 65 miles away. Kahili (near Buin on the southeast coast), Ballale (in the Shortlands), Kieta (on the northwest coast abollt 40 miles northeast of the beachhead area), and the new base at Kara were located at the southern end of Bougainville. Buka and the new base at Bonis Plantation were located at the northern end of Bougainville. Torokina was exposed between these five Bougainville bases and from the five Rabaul airfields 220 miles to the northwest. Twining directed that the three airfields on sOllthern Bougainville be reduced by D-Day, 1 November. To accomplish this he had five fields in the Central Solomons: Munda; Segi; the two strips at Ondonga; the Russell medium bomber strip; and the new field at Vella Lavella. During the New Georgia campaign COMAIRSOLS had attacked the Bougainville fields with its dive-

Part Four, Chapter 2 - October 1943

Betty bomber in a revetment atVunakanau Airfield. (USAF)

bombers attacking the Buin-Kahili area and heavy bombers hitting Kahili, Buka, and Bonis. Kahili was considered the primary target, as it was the most utilized of all Japanese airfields. SBDs and TBFs moved up from Henderson to Munda, B-25s moved into the Russells to occupy the space left by fighters that departed for forward bases, and the B-24s were established at the Guadalcanal bomber fields. During October COMAIRSOLS aircraft flew missions 21 of the 31 days. Fighters and dive-bombers flew low-level bombing and strafing missions, while heavy and medium bombers flew highlevel bombing missions against Japanese airfields. Kahili and Kara in the south received the brunt of the attacks, being hit 23 and 17 times, respectively. Buka, in the north, and nearby Ballale and midisland Kieta were also heavily hit. SBDs and TBFs of Strike Command attacked the AA defenses, runways, and any parked aircraft on Kahili and Ballale. B-25s on low level bombing and strafing runs attacked Kahili, Ballale, and Buka, and on a few occasions, Kieta. B-24s bombed from 17,000 to 20,000 feet primarily against Kahili, and then Buka/Bonis. The bombers were escorted by two fighters per bomber in the missions flown in August and September, but as the Japanese resistance declined the ratio declined to one fighter per bomber in early October. The bombing missions did apparent heavy damage to the Japanese fields, but the enemy was able to quickly repair the bomb craters. Also, if the bombs were not accurately spaced the runway could be used from its undamaged portions. Reconnaissance showed Kara to have 30 unfilled craters on its runway, but Japanese fighters were able to use the undamaged portion for operations. On 15 October, Twining ordered the attacks to begin. when 21 B-24s escorted by 12 P-38s of the 339FS and 16 F4Us of Pappy Boyington's VMF-214 "Black Sheep" Squadron bombed Kahili. The Japanese sent up IS Zeros and the Corsairs shot down six, and Boyington got a Zero that day to become a double ace with ten victories. The P-38s were shut out, but the AAF bombers severely cratered the runway. On October 17 Boyington's VMF-214 F4Us escorted six B-25s to Ballale and shot down 14 of 35 Zeros for the loss of one Corsair. Boyington got three Zekes to give him 13. On the 181h , three squadrons ofB-24s escorted by 339FS P-38s led by

1Lt. James Eubanks attacked the shipping in BalJale Harbor at 1030. After the B-24s dropped their bombs Zeros took off and climbed above their formation. The Zeros feinted long-range attacks to draw off the P-38s that were scissoring back and forth over the Liberators. If a Zero got too close a flight or element of P-38s would briefly take off after it and then return to escort. Eubanks and his wingman, 2Lt. Theodore Foss, shared a victory over one of the 20 attacking Zeros that got too close. 1Lt. Jarrold Lilliedoll's P-38 had its tire perforated by a bullet, but he was able to make a dicey but successful landing. The Marines had another good day, with VMF221 claiming six Zekes and Boyington's Black Sheep getting eight. On the 191h , Kara was attacked by 24 B-24s escorted by 14 339FS P-38s. The bombers were at 18,000 feet, with low cumulus cloud below and thin cloud cover at 20,000 feet. 1Lt. George Eubanks was leading a close cover flight over the B-24s, and Capt. Bill Harris was above him in high cover. Harris' flight had to drop down closer due to the clouds above him. There were three flights above the clouds to prevent Zeros from diving on the bombers through the clouds. When the bombers turned off the target they climbed up through the high cloud cover and forced Eubank's flight up through the high clouds. Eubanks' fighter collided with Lt. Richard's (Harris' wingman) aircraft; both planes were lost, and both pilots were listed as MIA. One chute was seen, but three Zeros flew after it, and it was reported that they probably strafed the defenseless pilot. ILt. Erwin Rake destroyed a Zero in a furious dogfight over Fauro Island, and bomber gunners claimed five Zeros. By the 22 nd the air raids on Japanese fields were producing results. That day, Kahili was attacked twice by B-24s and once by a large formation of 48 SBDs and 24 TBFs escorted by 68 fighters. The first Liberator attack, made by ten bombers escorted by F6F Hellcats ofVF-40, was unopposed. VF-40 had deployed to Segi Point on New Georgia in November and moved to Barakoma on Vella Lavella in December under Lt.Cdr. John Rembert, but scored no victories and claimed one probable and six damaged over New Ireland during its tour. The second attack consisted of 12 B-24s escorted by 16 P-40s of the 12 th , 68 th , and 70 th Fighter Squadrons. The formation was intercepted by nine Zeros that made several half-hearted attacks, and Capt. Harry Walters of the 70FS claimed a Zero that was flying alone at a low altitude. The P-40 pilot dove from 7,000 feet to shoot it down. Twenty-four fighters strafed Kara airfield and destroyed 16 aircraft on the ground without a loss or opposition. On the 23 rd , 16 P-38s of the 339FS escorted 11 B-24s over Kahili that dropped 44 tons of bombs without opposition. On the 26 th , 15 P-38s of339FS bombed and strafed the Bonis Plantation airstrip and BukaAirdrome. They killed 200-300 construction workers repairing the field or in their tents. At Buka four Zeros were hit in one revetment, two were left burning, and a bomber was hit on the runway. Buildings, gun emplacements, and fuel dumps in the area were attacked. After leaving the target they attacked auxiliary naval vessels and set one on fire. The heavy bombers dropped twice as many bombs in October as in September, and the bombing campaign was successful, as during the last six missions of the month the heavies met no Jap fighter resistance and they flew without escort during the last four missions. On the day before the invasion (31 October) all Japanese airfields on southern Bougainville were listed as inoperable.

217

3 Bougainville Campaign, 27 October-25 November

The Treasury Island Invasion, Operation Goodtime, 27 October 1942 On the 27 1h the Treasury Islands were invaded (Operation Goodtime) so captured airfields there could offer air cover for the shipping supporting the imminent Bougainville invasion. The Treasurys consisted of two small islands-Mono, the larger, and Stirling-and were located about 20 miles SSW of Shortland Island and 35 miles south ofBuin. New Zealand troops invaded Mono and Stirling supported by P-38s, P-39s, and PAOs. On Mono the handful of Japanese defenders were easily overcome and Stirling was undefended. The 87 1h Seabees began immediately to build an airstrip on Stirling Island.

On D-Day the Japanese sent 30 dive-bombers and 50 Zeros from Rabaul against the invasion shipping in several waves. After taking off from Munda at 1240, the first two flights of 339FS P-38s led by ILl. Murray Shubin were on CAP 30 minutes later over the invasion beaches. Us. Haggard, Mulvey, Pederson, and Turner had to return early, leaving Shubin, Brown, Howie, and Shimp to patrol. At 1515, flying at 20,000, feet they spotted Val dive-bombers at 10,000 feet ready to make a run on the destroyers below them. Shubin's CAP shot down five Vals and damaged another (by Shimp). ILl. Samuel Howie shot down three Vals and ILl. Murray Shubin two Vals to become the first 13FC double ace with 11 victories (that was to be his total for the war). In his after combat report

TREASURY ISLANDS (SOLOMON

ISLANDS)

The Treasurys consisted of two small islands; Mono, the larger. and Stirling, located. The 87 th Seabees began immediately to build an airstrip on Stirling Island of the Treasury Islands. (USAF)

STATUTE

I o

Treasury Islands. (USN)

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MILE S

Part Four, Chapter 3 - Bougainville Campaign, 27 October-25 November Howie stated that the American destroyers below warned him off, as he was in their cone of AA fire. He ignored the warning, feeling that if the Navy gunners could not hit the Japs he was also safe from their fire. He shot down two Vals and got on the tail of another, whose rear gunner was firing at him. Howie fired a short burst, killing the gunner, and traced his bullets up the fuselage, sending the Val into the water (Howie interview). Capt. Bill Harris took off from Munda at 1430, and led the second 339FS section of eight P-38s just in time to get into the air battle over Treasury Island. Harris dove on a formation of 15 of what were described in the combat report as a "new type unescorted Kate" (probably a Judyauthor). Harris shot one down on his first run, and Lts. William Frick and Donald Stewart shared a "new Kate." This was Harris' tenth victory to make him a double ace. A following wave of 12 Japanese aircraft was intercepted 20 miles west of Treasury Island by eight fighters of the 44FS. 2Lts. William Gilchrist and Frank Mekus of the 70FS, but flying their P-39s with the 44FS, shared a Val victory. Eight 44FS PAOs destroyed two Vals (lLt. George Gibbs one Val, and 2Lt. James Corbett and lLt. William Kester shared one) and two Zeros (Capt. Thea Jennings one Zero, and 2Lt. William Green and FlO John Cosgrove of the 70FS, flying his P-39

I Lt. Samuel Howie shot down three Vals. Howie is shown here with Lt. Darrell Cramer, who became an ace in the ETa. (Howie)

with the 44FS, shared a Zero). Four RNZAF P-40s attacked a wave of nine Zeros and shot down four. No Allied aircraft were lost during the battle, but the first Japanese wave did serious damage to the fighter-director destroyer Cony. When the 3391h 'S P-38s returned to Fighter Two triple victor, Sam Howie, celebrated by executing three slow victory rolls over the base. He was so low over the runway on his third roll that everyone thought he would surely augur in, but he managed to complete the roll with his wing only inches from the ground. Howie said "I don't think I was that close to hitting the wing, but they had a better view, as I was looking ahead to see where I was headed." Shubin left combat a short time later as the l3AF fourth highest scorer and was promoted to Captain and awarded the Silver Star. For the remainder of the war he remained Stateside and made the Air Force his career in the postwar. On 27 October the 67FS was ordered from Woodlark to Munda, where it would take part in the attacks against New Ireland and New Britain flying the P-39N model. Its main duty there were escort missions, along with patrols and ground support. From 29

1Lt. Murray Shubin, probably in November 1943 just before he rotated home, as his victory panel has been removed from his aircraft. Shubin was officially credited with I I victories, but this panel shows 12, as he was credited with the probable on his five victory day on 16 June 1943. PR accounts gave him credit for six victories that day. (Shubin via Lansdale)

219

13 th Fighter Command in World War II through 31 October it flew escort for PV-l s to Kieta, SBD escort to Kara, and dawn and dusk patrols and scramble alerts. The squadron flew constant dawn to dusk patrols over the landing operations, but despite numerous Japanese attacks the 67'h pilots were patrolling just before or after these attacks, though they did strafe targets of opportunity on Bougainville on their way back to base. The 67FS was then returned to Guadalcanal from their detached duty to the 5AF and the Woodlark Island campaign, and the 347FG was back to full strength Immediately prior to the Bougainville landings, nearby Japanese airfields and harbors were heavily attacked. On the 29'h, Buka Airfield was attacked by 81 bombers and 46 fighters, and the Bonins were attacked by 12 Venturas and a Mitchell. The next day Kieta airfield was attacked by ten B-25s and 44FS fighters that encountered no fighter opposition. Meanwhile, Tonolei harbor was attacked by 26 fighters, including 12 P-39s. Kara airfield was hit on the 30'h and 31 Sl by 211 bombers and 120 fighters. In the last half of October the pre-invasion air attacks on the Japanese airfields on

-.

Mitsubishi G4M I Betty bombers of the 705 Kokutai flew out of Buka during the constant combat of the Central Solomons campaign. Note the heavy weathering and unpainted replacement panels on the closest bomber. (National Archives)

Bougainville and Buka increased, as during that period these targets were hit by 294 B-24 sorties, 151 B-25 sorties, 38 Ventura sorties, and 491 SBD and 251 TBF sorties. 13FC, USN, and USMC fighters flew 1,115 sorties flying escort, sweeps, and strafing SOfties. The fields at Buin and Ballale were hit particularly hard and were put out of operation for hours at a time, and were virtually inoperable 9n D-Day. When the Japanese airfields in the Central Solomons were forced out of operations, according to their figures they had lost the following aircraft:

Buka Air Field, built in spring 1942 on Buka Island. laying off southern Bougainville. (USAF)

220

Aichi D3A I Val dive-bomber taking off from a Rabaul airfeld. Although the Val's strong fixed carrier-landing gear lessened its performance, it did make takeoffs and landings easier on primitive jungle strips. (National Archives via Lansdale)

Part Four, Chapter 3 - Bougainville Campaign, 27 October-25 November Base Name Kahili Kara Buka Ballale

Period of Operations 12/42-10/43 09/43-10/43 03/43-10/43 12/42-10/43

Dive Bombers 120 30 50 30

Torpedo Medium Fighters Bombers Bombers 25 10 30

10

20 12

On 1 November, the 200 aircraft of the Japanese 11 th Air Fleet on Rabaul were reinforced by 82 Zeros, 45 dive-bombers, 40 torpedo-bombers, and six reconnaissance aircraft from Adm. Koga's Third Air Fleet carrier force anchored at Truk. These aircraft were on a ten-day loan to be used in Operation "Ro-Go," the plan to crush the impending Allied offensive at Bougainville. The Navy forces at Rabaul were: 938 Air Group 958 Air Group 201 Air Group 204 Air Group 253 Air Group 501 Air Group 552 Air Group Combined Fleet

16 Petes/12 Jakes 16 Petes/12 Jakes 50 Zeros 50 Zeros 50 Zeros 20 Judys 12 Kates124 Vals 300 carrier aircraft

In August 1943 the 250 Army aircraft that had been on duty during the evacuation of Guadalcanal in February 1943 had been transferred to Wewak, New Guinea, when the 4 th Air Army established its headquarters there. So all Army aircraft, except a few recon and liaison planes, left their base at Ropopo, Rabaul, at a crucial time in the air battle. During this time Japanese naval air force units were rotated in and out of Rabaul, being organized and disbanded in almost indiscriminate fashion. Operating under the 11 th Air Fleet, the 25'h and 26 th Air Flotillas were the two IJNAF administrative headquarters controlling the Navy air groups. The flight echelons of the two Flotillas were organized as the 5th and 6th Air Attack Forces for tactical purposes. At the beginning of the Allied air offensive in September 1943, the 11 th Air Fleet had 300 aircraft and about 10,000 personnel, including 1,500 pilots and air crew. There were three fighter groups (the 201 st, 204 t\ and 253 rd ), each with an approximate strength of 50 aircraft and 75 pilots. From this point there were steady combat and operational losses that were to be made good with 50 monthly replacement aircraft (80% fighters). A large number of these replacements, drawn from land-based units in qu'iet areas, especially the Netherlands Indies, were lost in transit staging through Truk and Kavieng. Also, war-weary Rabaul veterans and their aircraft were exchanged for pilots and aircraft in quiet areas. These 172 aircraft of Koga's Third Air Fleet had just arrived and were not used during the first day of the invasion. Koga had originally planned to move these aircraft in mid-October, but delayed when he received reports that the U.S. Pacific Fleet was on the move in the Marshalls. By the end of October Koga was certain these reports were false and sent the 173 carrier aircraft to Rabaui. Koga decided to launch Operation "Ro-Go," which was a repeat of Yamamoto's I-Go Operation, attempting to equalize the balance of power in the theater. These pilots were some of the last experienced

carrier pilots in the Combined Fleet, and were considered the only pilots left to be able to stop American airpower. They had been used in March and suffered 15% casualties, and then they were thrown into the Munda battle and again suffered heavy losses; now the emergency at Bougainville put them in danger again. Adm. Jinichi Kusaka at Rabaul and the damaged airfields on Bougainville responded quickly to the Allied invasion at Torokina. On the day of their arrival (l November), the Allies landed at Torokina, and RoGo would dissipate into a costly series of raids on the Allied beachhead. On 1 November at 0730 the Third Marines landed at Cape Torokina on Empress Augusta Bay after eight SBDs and 31 TBFs bombed and strafed the beaches. COMAIRSOLS put up a 32 plane continual CAP over the beaches to intercept the Japanese air attacks that were certain to come. The CAP of 16 P-38s were at 20,00025,000 feet, and below them were eight each of AAF and RNZAF P-40s. The warning came just as the Marines hit the beaches when the Japanese sent in the first of three heavy air attacks. About 30 Zeros swooped down and were met by eight RNZAF P-40s of the 18 th Squadron that destroyed seven without a loss. Eight P-38s of the 339FS led by Ll.Coi. John McGinn of 347FG HQ were orbiting over Princess Augusta Bay in the early morning at 23,000 feet when they spotted 20 Zeros 3,000 feet below and shot down eight without a loss. Ll.Coi. John McGinn and his wingman, ILl. Benjamin King (now fully recovered from his two month's experience on

Bougainville. (USN)

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13th Fighter Command in World War II Mono Island), got one each. lLt. Glen Hart shot downed two, and his wingman, 2Lt. Frederick Seaman, one as they dove on the Zero formation. lLt. Harry Jordon, leading the second flight, and 2Lt. John Barker leading the element claimed one Zero each. Later that morning, another 339 th patrol of nine P-38s led by Capt. V Harter were at 26,000 feet about 40 miles east of Cape St. George, New Ireland. There was little action until a lone Betty happened on the scene and was pounced on. lLt. Darrell Cramer and Capt. Joseph Restifo got to the hapless target first and shared a Betty victory. The second Japanese attack of 16 Vals escorted by Zeros came in at 0900. The Japs were met by the newly arrived land-based Navy Corsairs of VF-17 operating out of Ondonga, New Georgia. The "Jolly Rogers" shot down six Zeros, two by Lt. Cdr. Tom Blackburn, the first two of 11 Japanese aircraft he would claim during his tour in the Pacific. Even though they scared off most of the dive-bombers, several got through to the invasion shipping but did no damage, and naval AA gunners claimed four Vals. The third air attack came during the afternoon when 26 Zeros came in and were driven off by Marine Corsairs ofVMF-215 that shot down five. lLt. Robert Hanson became an ace with two victories of the 25 he would score before being KIA. The Allied claims for the day were 25 Japanese aircraft (Japanese records show 22) for the loss of one F4U.

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay 2/3 November 1943 On 2 November the Japanese Navy sent down three heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and six destroyers from Rabaul under VAdm. Sentaro Omari to destroy the American transports off the beachhead. The enemy force was discovered at 0130 by two 5BG snoopers, and one dropped six 500lb. bombs that slightly damaged the Flagship Haguro. An hour later four USN light cruisers and eight destroyers ofTF 39, under R.Adm. Aaron Merrill, engaged the Japanese in the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay. In the running three-hour battle the two forces parried, with the Japanese attempts to light the American ships with searchlights foiled by expertly laid smoke screens. In the end it was the superior American radar that was decisive in the battle. The Japanese were forced to withdraw after they lost the light cruiser Sendai and a destroyer, and suffered damage to two heavy cruisers and a destroyer. The USN light cruiser Denver and two destroyers were damaged. The Japanese force did get within 35 miles of the Rendova anchorage, but was turned back by the U.S. avy, which would finally could claim one of the few Naval surface victories in the Solomons. Kenney's S"l Air Force Returns to Finish Off Rabaul After sunrise on the 2nd , a large force of 89 Zeros and 18 dive bombers were sent to attack Merrill's task force but did little damage and lost 23 aircraft-none to AAF fighters, but 17 to naval AA gunners and six to VF-33 F6F Hellcats. Adm. Kusaka was ready to send a large formation of bombers down from Rabaul to attack TF 39, but a large air attack on Rabaul by the 5AF checked his plans. During the afternoon, Kenney's 5 th Air Force returned to Rabaul with 75 B25s escorted by 57 P-38s of the 80 th and 432 nd Fighter Squadrons in a well-planned mission that used phosphorous bombs to create a smoke screen to blind Japanese AA gunners. The attack ran into

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unexpected heavy resistance from the newly arrived Japanese carrier pilots from the Combined Fleet at Truk, and the B-25s lost nine aircraft on their low-level runs over the shipping in the harbor and the P-38s lost nine. Four more aircraft crashed before they returned to base. Despite his heavy losses, Kenney claimed 114,000 tons of Japanese shipping destroyed or damaged, 85 enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged in the air and on the ground, and 300,000 tons of supplies lost. In his memoir, Kenney Reports, Kenney wrote of the 2 November mission: "Never in the history of warfare had so much destruction been wrought upon the forces of a belligerent nation so swiftly and at so little cost to the victor." As with the late October attacks, Kenney's estimates were again optimistic, as Japanese records indicate the loss of 20 aircraft and 5,000 tons of shipping (somewhat conservative loss figures, but probably closer to actual figures-author). The results of Kenney's 5'h Air Force raids on Rabaul were soon found not to be as effective as planned or claimed, as the following raids ran into continued heavy resistance. Rabaul would remain a thorn in the Americans' side until March 1944. It would be by-passed, but the Japanese would not surrender until the end of the war. For the next several days the Japanese air effort on the new beachhead consisted of a small raid on the 3rd from Bougainville airfields that was easily driven off by patrolling VMF-211 pilots. On the 4 th , Japanese Second Fleet VAdm. Takeo Kurita marshaled seven heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and four destroyers from Truk to join two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and four or more destroyers at Rabaul with plans to attack the Torokina beachhead at Bougainville. On 5 November Task Force 38, consisting of two carriers-the newly commissioned Princeton and the old Saratoga-covered by two cruisers and nine destroyers was heading toward Rabaul at 30 knots. There were 107 aircraft on TF 38: 32 SBDs; 16 TBFs; and 33 F6Fs on the Saratoga under AG 12 commander, Cdr. Henry Caldwell, and seven TBFs and 19 F4Us on the smaller Princeton under AG 23 commander Lt.Cdr. Harold Funk. Navy F6Fs were to fly from Barakoma to interdict Kurita's force before it sailed. None of the aircraft had ever been to Rabaul, and were only familiar with it through recon photos The Navy formation flew through heavy overcast covering New Britain and the Solomons. But the poor weather did have the advantage of concealing TF 38 from reconnaissance, hiding the incoming American planes, and lulling the Japanese command into believing that it would preclude any air attack that day. After the 5AF attacks on the 2nd there still were Army Tony fighters on Lakunai and Navy Zeros at Vanakanau and Rapopo. The supposedly decimated Japanese air units were scrambled quickly and destroyed ten Navy aircraft and 15 crewmen. The Japanese lost 28 Japanese aircraft, 19 probables, and 17 damaged. But the attack surprised the warships in Simpson Harbor, as they were slow in weighing anchor to reach St. George's Channel, where they could maneuver more successfully. Sherman's SBD and TBF bombers struck the panicked shipping in the confines of Simpson Harbor and Blanche Bay and damaged four heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and two destroyers. The Navy attack

/ Part Four, Chapter 3 - Bougainville Campaign, 27 October-25 November was so damaging to the Japanese Navy that the cruiser attack was not only canceled, but the cruisers retreated back to Truk or Japan for repairs and would not return to the South Pacific. The Japanese retaliated by sending 18 aircraft down to Torokina and attacked a few landing craft and PT boats, losing a plane to PT anti-aircraft. Japanese propaganda claimed the U.S. Navy had lost two carriers, three cruisers, and a destroyer! However, on 20 November the Japanese naval threat so intimidated CINCPAC that it sent three carriers (CVs Essex, Bunker Hill, and the CVL Independence) and nine destroyers of CTG 50.3 under R.Adm. Alfred Montgomery from the Central Pacific; they were intended for the invasion of Tarawa, but were transferred to Halsey, in the South Pacific. Despite the withdrawal of their cruisers the Japanese Navy was still active, as two days later, at dawn on the 7'\ four Japanese destroyers arrived off Empress Augusta Bay and unloaded a surprise force of 475 infantry just west of the American perimeter. These Japanese attacked the 3rd Marine Division, but by the next day the Japanese body count was 377. This was the first of three landings and attacks totaling

Gen. Hitoshi Imamura planned three attacks totaling 3,000 men, but only one was carried out, and the remainder were canceled when the Japanese lost air control of the air and sea. (USN)

3,000 men planned by Gen. Hitoshi Imamura, but the remainder were canceled when the Japanese lost air control of the air and sea. On the 8'h the Japanese finally sent down a substantial air attack of over a hundred bombers and fighters to Bougainville too late to aid the newly-landed Japanese, who had counterattacked and by now had been virtually elimjnated. But there was a tempting target in R.Adm. Laurence DuBose's light cruiser division of three cruisers and four destroyers offshore, or the six U.S. Navy transports and AKAs that were unloading the second echelon of troops and supplies. After Munda fell in August the 339FS based at Guadalcanal was staged through Munda. But the landings at Torobna were so far away that the 339'h overnighted at Munda to be able to maintain a standing eight-plane high cover patrol from dawn to dusk. A typical day for half the new men was to get up early and leave Fighter Two at Guadalcanal to fly 350 miles to patrol off Cape Torokina until relieved. They would land at Munda, have lunch while their aircraft were refueled, and then take off for an afternoon patrol over Torobna. They would stay overnight at Munda and fly the same patrol the next day, then return to Fighter Two for a two-day rest while the other half would repeat the operation. These missions would be known as the "Torobna Patrol" and would continue into late November. An additional duty was a constant CAP over the shipping and men that were building the base at Sterling. The first two-flight 339'h patrol under Maj. Henry Lawrence had overrughted and was scheduled to take off from Munda at 0400, which meant they had to get up at 0230 to be ready for the 30-45 minute flight in the dark to cover the landing beaches at sunrise. Maj. Lawrence led Greyhound-l flight, and lLt. George Chandler led Greyhound-2 flight. Once they arrived over Torokina the P-38 pilots flew at 23,000 feet and could patrol for four hours on their internal and two 165-gallon external fuel tanks. Despite being in the tropics, flying a P-38 with its notoriously poor heaters at 23,000 could be a very cold experience. The temperature on the ground throughout the day and night was hot and humid, so the pilots couldn't tolerate wearing fleece-lined boots and jackets in pre-flight, taxiing, waiting for take off, and then laying over at Munda, so most wore only sweaters. The two patrolling flights could not leave until the next rotation ofP-38s arrived. Then they would fly the 3045 rrnnutes back to Munda to be refueled and to grab something to eat and relieve themselves to be ready to fly the third patrol of the day. At 1200 over a hundred Vals and Zero escorts were discovered heading for Bougainville. Because of the large attacking force Lawrence's two flights were ordered to scramble ASAP. Lawrence's flight was refueled and ready and took off, leaving Chandler's flight to finish its refueling. Lawrence led his eight P-38s toward a large formation of 30-40 Zeros and a smaller number of dive-bombers at 20,000 feet. Lawrence's flight dove to attack the Zeros, which went into a Lufbery, which was an advantageous defensive posture for Zeros against the less maneuverable P-38. Once refueled Chandler led his flight off at full throttle to catch up with Greyhound-I. Fighter controllers informed Lawrence that another Japanese force of 15 Zeros and dive-bombers were at 8,000 to 15,000 feet above shipping in the Bay and were about to attack. Lawrence broke off his attack on the Lufbery and rushed toward the Bay. While they were

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13th Fighter Command in World War II closing Chandler heard the fighter director on a destroyer in the Bay vector Lawrence toward the bogies overhead. The fighter director also summoned the 70FS and 44FS P-40s that were assigned eight-plane intermediate patrol over the beachhead because of their performance limitations. All available Marine and avy aircraft were also dispatched to defend the shipping at the beachhead, leaving Chandler's flight as the sole attackers of the larger formation that Lawrence had left in their Lufbury and were now also heading toward the Bay. Chandler led his flight to meet the bombers and their Zero escorts at 20,000 feet. Being outnumbered, Chandler approached the formation from 6 o'clock high and line abreast to dive through the Zeros. The plan was to avoid any dogfighting, drawing off the Zero escort so that when the bombers reached the beachhead they would be unprotected. Chandler's flight was closing too fast to drop their tanks and had to throttle back to do so. Once the tanks were jettisoned the Chandler flight headed for the Zeros. Being in line abreast, the Zeros had to break off early or end up getting shot at. As the Japanese headed closer to their beachhead target Lawrence turned his flight and dove through the Zeros from 6 o'clock high. The two flights made three passes all the way to the beach, but did not shoot down any Zeros. Once at the beach the P38s joined the P-40s, F4Us, and F6Fs in a swirling dogfight. The Zeros were carrying bombs and diving on the shipping, and Chandler chased after two of them during their bombing runs. Chandler was above and behind the two, with the rear Jap fighter 50-70 yards behind his leader. But Chandler had too much overtaking speed and realized that if he didn't hit the rear fighter with a good burst he would become the target as he overflew the fighter. He had to quickly decide to fire or pull up and away. He decided to try to hit the cockpit, and if he did not succeed to pull up at the last second and gamble on the skill and reflexes of the Jap pilot. Chandler opened fire at 200 feet with a short one second burst and shattered the canopy and pulled up to avoid a collision. This firing pass then put him in position to fire at the leading Zero, and he hit its cockpit at close range and had to quickly pull up at full power at a steep angle to get out of the way of falling aircraft parts. In Chandler's flight single Zeros were claimed by his wingman, 2Lt. Robert Smith, and FlO James Kennedy (of the 12FS, flying for the 339 th ). In Lawrence's flight lLt. Thomas Walker shot down a Judy and a Zero, and his wingman, 2Lt. Wayne Anderson, shot down a Zero, as did 2Lt. William Fincher. The 339 th lost a Lightning and its pilot, lLt. Carl. Squires of Chandler's flight, when he became separated from his wingman on a firing pass. Capt. John Voss led six P-40s from the 70 th and 44 th FS over Cape Torokina. They attacked the Japanese bombers and shot down seven Vals. Voss shot one down before he was shot down and lost. 2Lt. Joseph Gunder shot down two Vals and damaged another, while 2Lts. Franklin Crain and John Roehm of the 44FS got one each, and 2Lt. John Dollen and lLt. Robert McGown of the 70FS also claimed on Val each. Voss and another P-40 were shot down, but a rescue vessel later picked up the second pilot. Marine squadron VMF-212 shot down five Japanese aircraft for the loss of one F4U and its pilot. Navy F6Fs claimed six Japanese and lost two. When the 339 th returned to land at Munda, 13AF CO Brig.Gen. Earl Barnes was on hand to congratulate them on their great day. lLt. Thomas Walker buzzed and slow-rolled the field to commemo-

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rate his two victories. As he completed his second, lower, and more daring slow roll, his fighter disappeared below a hill located at the end of the runway. Everyone held their breath, thinking the fighter was about to crash, until it reappeared and came around to land. Walker climbed out of his aircraft and walked over to Barnes, who greeted him with: "I was a little worried about you on that second slow roll!" Walker answered with: "You were worried? What the hell do you think I was doing?" Barnes patted him on the back and said: "You did a great job, today. Now if your flying skills equal your slow rolls, you're going to be one hell of a fighter pilot!" He would be so, becoming an ace with six victories. The Japanese sent 21 torpedo bombers down at dusk to attack Adm. Lawrence DuBose's covering task force. The Japanese claimed that they had sunk four battleships and two cruisers, but only the cruiser Birmingham was damaged by three bombs. The Japanese lost ten bombers to AA fire. The total for the day was 26 Japanese aircraft to American fighters for the loss of six U.S. fighters. The Vals managed to damage the transport Fuller with two bombs, but by early evening all the ships off Torokina were unloaded and left the area. The 8th would be the last day of large-scale Japanese air raids, but they would continue to send several small daylight raids and a few small nighttime raids against the beachhead, but never in any strength, as Rabaul would become the focus of Allied air power. The 8 November action was to be the last enemy contact for the 339 th for the remainder of 1943. On 1 December the entire squadron, except for 35 enlisted men and two ground officers on Munda, returned to New Caledonia and on to Auckland. This was the first time since its activation 14 months before and the downing of 119.5 Japanese aircraft that the Sunsetters had no pilots in combat. The "official formula" for completing a tour of duty was to score ten points. The points were computed by the number of hours flown divided by 100, plus the number of missions divided by ten, plus the number of months in the area divided by three. Robert Westbrook, CO of the 44FS, wrote: "Oh yes, about how long may you may expect to be out here. There is no rotation policy-such as so many hours and so many points entitling one to go home. The average tour of duty lasts about IS months. If you are especially good in the air and in squadron ground activities you may be here longer-with the possible compensation of an appropriate raise in rank." ("How to Stay Alive Flying Combat") The 13 th Air Force Rest Area Flight Surgeon, Maj. James Crane, stated: "We have found, however, that it is not advisable for a man to fly continuously until the total is reached. Such a steady strain and grind would result in great loss of physical and mental efficiency. So, in order to aid our men in working toward the two things they want most to do-destroy the enemy and return home-we give them periodic leaves to a rest area. Squadrons rotate their duty, and each outfit spends nine days in a climate and environment different than the forward bases." (Air Force Magazine, April 1944)

Part Four, Chapter 3 - Bougainville Campaign, 27 October-25 November The 339 th was way overdue, even for leave! Special Services of the Service Command established the rest areas, and its personnel administered, supplied, and maintained them. New Zealand was an ideal R&R destination for the nine-day leave. Army psychologists had determined that nine days was the ideal leave time, as a shorter leave would allow less time for recreation after days of travel to and from New Zealand. Longer leave time was thought to make the airman want to linger on and not want to return to the war. When the "restees" arrived at Auckland Airport after their long flight from Cactus or New Caledonia they checked in with the Special Service Officer, who issued them their billets and mimeographed handouts describing local facilities, such as restaurants, canteens, dance halls, theaters, and churches. Rules and regulations were minimal, and the experience was made as simple and convenient as possible. All men could draw pay from the Finance Officer, which could be quite substantial, as the men were not paid for their long period in combat and had nothing to buy on Guadalcanal anyhow. Fortunate officers were billeted to the Kia Ora or the Maungakiakai Hotels in the countryside, operated by the Red Cross. The Kia Ora (meaning "good luck" in the Maori language) was the most popular accommodation because of its excellent food and beautiful location. It was opened in December 1942 and could accommodate 48 men in private rooms. The main lounge featured a large open fireplace, where hotel social life centered. Hotel recreation was pool, billiards, ping-pong, the ubiquitous card games, and the very British croquet. A formal dance was held every Sunday or Monday night in the lounge, complete with fresh flowers and candles and followed by a midnight gourmet buffet. Meals were excellent, and there was an open kitchen policy that allowed the men to prepare snacks from the well-stocked refrigerator and pantry. Horseback riding, tennis, and golf could be arranged. Many men kept the silver Maori tiki given to each guest as he registered as life-long souvenirs. However, the men were not required to live at any of these hotels, but could live in a hotel in the center of Auckland, such as the Waverly, Royal, and Central Hotels. Enlisted men were granted leave less often, but were sent to the beautiful Western Springs, which had a large natural spring-fed swimming pool, tennis and badminton courts, a large recreation hall, and 18hole golf course. Sam Howie (339FS): "Our leaves started with a very long, tiring non-stop flight in a C-47 from New Caledonia to Auckland. We didn't mind the flight, as we were looking forward to drinking whiskey and chasing girls. On my first leave I stayed at the Kia Ora, and on my second I stayed at the Waverley Hotel. At the Kia Ora we had an excellent mess, but when I stayed at the Waverley I went out to eat in Auckland. One night at the Kia Ora I sat next to President Roosevelt's son and struck up a conversation over a glass of milk. There was no curfew, and we could do just about anything we wanted. The ew Zealanders were very nice and helpful, and the girls were friendly. Auckland was the largest city in New Zealand, but I got the impression that it was similar to an American city 2S years earlier. For a large city things were slow and easy, with no one hustling around. For example, they didn't have traffic lights. At busy intersections there

was a little round platform with a policeman on it who moved a pole with 'stop' and 'go' arms on it. Just outside Auckland everything was rural with a lot of farms and sheep." However, most of the men spent their leave at one of the rest homes that were planned by the Army and built by the Seabees. The Special Services, with the Red Cross, managed the mess and recreational programs, and operated some rest homes. The Red Cross wholly operated others with the assistance of volunteer New Zealand hostesses and a regular Army staff. A Flight Surgeon lived in each of the homes to minister to any airman suffering combat fatigue. Each home had a totally informal atmosphere and was usually located on acres of grounds only a short distance from the center of the city, many overlooking Auckland's beautiful harbor. Fresh food was available and abundant, and the men rapidly put on the pounds they had lost back on Guadalcanal. The men were charged $2 a day to stay in the rest homes and for meals. They could go out for meals in Auckland on the provided shuttle service and spend the night on the town. The morning after their arrival the men would report to the flight surgeon for a physical and were tested for malaria. Many men spent their leaves in the hospital recuperating. Bill Harris of the 339FS spent most of his leaves recuperating from malaria and cysts. They were also interviewed by two flight surgeons and a nurse trained in psychiatry. The interviews asked about a man's personal history and flying history, and they were given a Form 64 psychological examination. The findings were compared with the findings of the squadron's own flight surgeon, who had accompanied the squadron on leave. Some men who were ill or run down were given extra leave, and a very few men who needed to be observed and treated for battle fatigue were hospitalized. Auckland was a city of about a quarter million and offered the serviceman on leave a multitude of activities. Many of the Americans were from small rural towns and had never experienced the "big city." Auckland had numerous bars and clubs and available women. The Civic Theatre was an important meeting place for American men and Kiwi women. In the early evening movies were shown there, and afterward dances were held. There were various clubs available, each with its own personality. The Glendowie Club on the outskirts of Auckland was favored for its dancing and dining. The Peter Pan was casual and a place to meet that someone, while the Trocadero was sophisticated and the place to bring that someone when she became special. New Zealand girls were fond of the beach, swimming, bicycling, horseback riding, tennis, and golf, especially with American men. When not in the pursuit of the opposite sex, many of the restees lost many dollars at one of the two horse racing tracks. For the culturally inclined there was the Auckland Art Galley, with its fine collection of European and local painting and sculpture. Her Majesty's Theatre was there for the few men interested in legitimate theater. For the tourist there was nearby Rotorua, which is the "Yellowstone" of New Zealand, with its geysers, hot springs, and fumaroles. For the fisherman, New Zealand's trout fishing is world class. If there were a transportation crunch back to New Caledonia the men would get a few extra days leave. Doug Canning (67FS):

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II "During my first tour our squadron went to Sydney, Australia, on leave. There I had connected with a young lady, and we were having such a good time that after nine days we got the crew chief of the Gooney Bird (C-47) that was to fly us back to write up the plane as not flyable. After 20 days we were told to get that plane flying and back up here ( ew Caledonia) or they'd court martial everyone of us." After the pilots returned to New Caledonia from leave, the entire 339 th and its hardware was moved from Oua Tom by truck in six long days to Noumea harbor, where the enlisted men boarded a ship and reached Guadalcanal on 22 December. The pilots flew to Espiritu Santo for training in a few leftover 44FS P-38s and a few PAOs. They flew simulated combat with New Zealand and U.S. Navy pilots stationed there. Training was not always easy in the often-repaired aircraft. Lt. Shrock's hydraulics went out, and he made a wheels up crash landing. Kennedy's engine cut out on take off and he pancaked. Lt. Skinner Kincaid lost an engine as he took off and tried to return to the field, but landed short and crashed into trees and was KIFA. The 339 th 's P-38s were sent to Munda for use by the 44FS until the 339 th arrived at its unknown assignment. In mid-January the squadron left the Espiritu in a C-47 transport for Fighter Two, stayed overnight, and then flew to Munda. From Munda they flew to Stirling Island in the Treasury Island Group. During their training sojourn at Espiritu Santo the 339th pilots were again taught rules for escorting bombers: (1) Remember you mission. Get the bombers back. (2) Keep the escorts together. Always stay with the bombers and do not be Jured away by Japanese "playing tag." If the Japanese persist in trying to lure the escorts away or come too close a pilot could turn quickly into the attacker and snap off a quick burst and then return immediately to his position in the escort. The P-38 has the advantage over Zero in a head-on pass due to its superior firepower. Never make a second pass away from the bombers. (3) Escorts should never get too far ahead of the bombers as the bombers become more vulnerable to head-on and the escorts are also susceptible to attacks from the rear. (4) Always fly in escort in even numbers as two aircraft flying together are superior to two escort aircraft flying widely spaced apart. (5) Escort fighter pilots must constantly be vigilant to their surroundings particularly when the bombers turn away from their targets. At this crucial time the escorts should be positioned inside and above the turning bombers. This allows the escort pilots to watch for enemy attacks from the outside and prevents attacks from the inside. Also, bomber gunners are at a disadvantage in turns as their gunnery must be at increased deflection. (6) Expended belly tanks should be dropped well clear of any friendly planes below. Drop them soon enough so that you can be back in position before an enemy attack. (7) If an escort aircraft were damaged during the mission it is to fly with the bombers, tucked in as closely as possible so that the bomber's gunners could protect it.

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In the 11 days of Operation Ro-Go against Allied lines of communication and the Torokina beachhead Koga had dispatched the 173 aircraft and 192 crew from Truk. During the first 15 days after the invasion the Torokina beachhead underwent 52 alerts, 11 bombings, and two strafings, but significant damage was only done on the 8th • By the 11 th Koga had lost 121 of the 173 aircraft and 86 crew, including 40% of his torpedo-bomber crews and a devastating 75% of his dive-bomber crews. Meanwhile, Kusaka's 11 th Air Fleet had lost about 70 aircraft. Japanese pilot and crew inexperience, heavy AA fire, and Allied fighter interception, along with the confusion of explosions, especially at night, led the Japanese, always prone to wild exaggeration, to claim to have sunk five battleships, 19 cruisers, seven destroyers, and nine transports! This overstatement in claims was to continue throughout the war. On the 12th , after these exorbitant aircraft losses, Adm. Koga withdrew what was left of his Third Air Fleet to Truk to rebuild. A futile attempt was made to replace these aircraft by diverting 26 carrier bombers from the Marshall Islands to Rabaul. Unfortunately for the Japanese, they left only six days before the American operations there and were unavailable to defend against the invasion there. These large losses later affected Koga's plans to intercept Nimitz's U.S. Pacific Fleet if it invaded the Gilberts. When Nimitz moved into Tarawa in the Gilberts on 21 November Koga's Fleet had to remain at Truk, still licking its wounds. After the Japanese daylight air threat subsided the P-39s were brought in to strafe targets of opportunity, and some P-38s were released from CAP to strafe targets along the east and west Bougainville coasts. The fighters would takeoff and search trails and waterways for movement. The Piva, Torokina, and Jaba Rivers, and the trails along and leading to them were strafed, as the Japanese were arduously moving up reinforcements and artillery toward the battle. Anything suspicious was a target, including huts, dugout canoes, and camp fires. Sorties were flown along the coasts searching for troop and supply barges. As in the Munda campaign, the Japanese extensively used barges, and on 19 November Twining designated them as a primary target. The heavily camouflaged

A Marine patrol puts out air recognition panels on New Britain.These panels were formed from a combination of cloth and corrugated steel sheets.The panels were used to direct supply drops and to protect friendly troops from friendly strafing and bombing. (U.s. Army)

Part Four, Chapter 3 - Bougainville Campaign, 27 October-25 November

Troops roll oil drums from a fuel dump at Puruata Island, Bougainville, after a Japanese air attack. (USMC)

barges were hunted relentlessly by P-39s and B-25s that became particularly adept in knocking them out. The Japanese had to hide the barges in sheltered inlets along the coasts of New Britain, New Ireland, and Bougainville during daylight and make short runs at night to their destination or next daytime shelter. Around RabauI the Japanese constructed elaborate barge tunnels along Blanche Bay, some with rail engines used to pull the barges into the tunnels. Before October 1943 the Rabaul barge routes extended throughout the Bismarcks and to Bougainville, but their supply radius began to shrink from this time on. The coast watcher network was helpful in informing COMAIRNORSOLS of enemy activity, but their designated targets were often difficult to locate by aircraft unless there was a conspicuous landmark nearby. However, their general information was invaluable for searching areas of enemy activity to make low level bombing and strafing sorties. Initially theAAF did not do much close support, as the Marine SBDs and TBFs considered that their specialty, especially when supporting their own infantry. In December the AAF took over the ground support role, but was reluctant to place bombs close to friendly troops. At 0350, 17 November, a flight of Japanese torpedo bombers attacked 16 USN transports and APDs 22 miles off Torokina. Although AA shot down five, one of their torpedoes sunk the transport McKean, which was the only ship lost during the Bougainville

operation. Later that morning, 55 Zeros and ten Judy and Kate bombers attacked shipping in Empress Augusta Bay. VF-17 shot down nine Zeros and a Kate, with Maj. Nathan Post and ILt. Harold Segal shooting down three Judys each for their eighth and tenth victories, respectively. For the month of operations in November on Bougainville the Allies had undergone 90 alerts and 22 bombing and strafing attacks that caused one transport sunk, 24 killed, and 98 wounded on the ground, for which the Japanese lost 191 aircraft. From this point on the Japanese abandoned Operation Ro-Go, and Adm. Kurita gave up Rabaul as a lost cause, except for aircraft reinforcements and Bougainville as a delaying opportunity. For the first ten days after D-Day the Allies had almost complete air superiority, as the nearby Bougainville enemy airbases had been attacked into submission and the Japanese were forced to attack from airbases at Rabaul and New Ireland. However, by the 20 th COMAIRNORSOLS air reconnaissance estimated that 15 Japanese airfields within 250 miles of Torokina were either under construction or were repaired or operational again. The completion of the Cape Torokina airstrips was rushed to meet this threat. By the 26 th the beachhead was expanded to five miles along the beach and four miles inland. The original plans for airfields on Bougainville called for the small fighter strip (Torokina) to be started

Bulldozers and graders of the 71 st Seabees chopping an airfield out of the jungle at the Torokina fighter field, Bougainville, mid-November 1943. (USN)

Two weeks later the Seabees have graded and put down the foundation and top cover for the Torokina fighter field that is now ready for the steel matting. (USN)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II

71 51 Seabees laying PSP (pierced steel plank) at Cape Torokina, Bougainville. (USN)

Operational Torokina Fighter Field on 10 December. Coral taxi ways and steel-matted runway. (USN)

on the third day after the landings by the 71 st Seabees to provide air cover during the construction of the Piva bomber field. Torokina was to accommodate 35 fighters and dive-bombers, but served many times that number before the completion of Pi va. After the landings the construction of the road network to provide supplies from the beachhead to the front had priority over airstrip construction. The Seabees had to work day and night, and during the first days were close to the battle lines and subject to artillery and sniper fire. There was little choice in the location of the field, as it had to be close to the Bay, near Torokina Point. This meant that heavy jungle first had to be cleared, and then foul muck had to removed to reach a suitable foundation. The Japanese tried to slow the construction of the Torokina airfields, and during the first 26 days there were 90 enemy alerts. However, COMAIRNORSOLS CAP and Marine AA fire was so effective that bombs were dropped on only 26 of the 90 alerts with 24 killed and 96 wounded. On the 24th enough matting had been laid so that a SBD could make an emergency landing on the nearly completed Torokina airfield, and by 10 December the field was pronounced operational, and the first 18 Marine Corsairs landed. On 13 December Halsey sent a message congratulating the

Seabees on their achievement (COMSOPAC to CG, IMAC, 13 Dec43):

Maj. Louis Kittel, CO ofthe 70FS, standing in front ofa P-39N in late 1943. (USAF)

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"In smashing through swamp, jungle, and Japs to build that airstrip, your men have proven there is neither bull or dozing at Torokina. A well done to them all. Halsey." The airstrip was located close to the sea and only four feet above sea level. It had a 4,230 x 100-foot runway covered by Marston steel mat, as was the 50-foot taxiway running parallel to the runway. Torokina was 300 miles southwest from Rabaul. Since the strip was so close to the sea the enlisted men could swim and sunbathe while their fighters were out on a mission. The short-range P-39s had to stage through the Green Islands, while the P-38s were able to fly there non-stop. The P-39s of the 70FS under Maj. Louis Kittel began operations there on the 17 th • The Marines had expanded their perimeter to seven miles in length and four miles deep by mid-December, where it remained, as the Japanese put up stiff resistance in the difficult terrain. The P-39 pilots had jungle savvy after their experience at Guadalcanal and were able to seek out Japanese troops and supplies hidden under the jungle canopy in their ground support and interdiction missions. The Marines based Maj. Gregory "Pappy" Boyington's VMF-2l4 "Black Sheep" and VMFs212, -215, and -216 at Torokina to lead the fighter sweeps on Rabaul. On the morning of 21 November a flight of 67FS P-39s took off at 0430 to be on station over Torokina at 0600. A few Vals escorted by Zekes and Tonys came in to attack shipping, and lLt. William Haymes shot down a Japanese Army Tony for the first l3FC aerial victory in nearly two weeks. The 67FS'would intercept no more Japanese over Torokina and finished their tour mainly strafing Japanese barges and targets of opportunity over Tonolei Harbor, Shortlands, and targets on Bougainville. Although heavy AA fire was encountered, there were no 67 th losses during these missions. The squadron ended their tour on 16 December. In addition to the troops on Rabaul there were 40,000 troops of Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake's 17 th Army concentrated at Buin, the Shortlands, and the northern tip of Bougainville. The Japanese High

Part Four, Chapter 3 - Bougainville Campaign, 27 October-25 November

67FS P-39s taxiing at Cape Torokina in late 1943 (USAF)

Command wanted to launch a major counterattack using these troops against the American beachhead at Torokina. But Hyakutake argued that the Torokina invasion was a faint, and like Hitler, who thought the major Normandy landings would be at Calais, he thought that the Americans would launch their major attack first against Buin and then Buka. EventuaiIy, only 1,400 of these troops were transported to Torokina, and neither the Buin nor Buka invasions ever took place, and Hyakutake's troops spent their days under harassment from SOPAC aircraft. On 25 November the final naval battle of the Solomons campaign took place off Cape Sl. George at the entrance of Sl. George's Channel off the south end of New Ireland Island. Cdr. Arleigh "31Knot" Burke and his DesRon 23 group of four destroyers were prowling off the two airbases of Buka and Bonis, located off the northwest tip of Bougainville. These vulnerable airbases had been under constant attack from aircraft based at Munda, and five Japanese destroyers under Capt. Koyota Kagawa were sent to evacuate the veteran aviation personnel based there. In the battle Burke's destroyers sunk three valuable Japanese destroyers, and from that point on U.S. Navy destroyers ruled the seas of the Central and

Northern Solomons, as they cruised and bombarded the Japanese bases in the area at will. On 27 November the remaining detachment of 339FS pilots strafed the Chabai area on Bougainville, with ILl. William Fincher knocking out a heavy gun emplacement, lLt. Thomas Walker knocking out four AA positions, and Capt. George Chandler strafing five camouflaged barges. The 44FS transitioned to the twin-engined P38 from their P-40s on this day, as well. They would fly their first P-38 mission on 4 December, leaving from Munda and strafing warehouses and huts on Bougainville. On the 61", 15 44FS P-38s left Munda at 1000 and strafed small villages and huts on the west coast of Buka Island. On the 121", the squadron escorted 17 B-25s to Bougainville's Portan Plantation and afterward strafed Tenekow Plantation. The next day seven P-38s escorted 18 B-25s to Tenekow Plantation, where they also strafed, and on the 15 1h , 14 P-38s escorted B-25s to Buka Island and again strafed Tenekow Plantation. On the 191",41 B-24s were escorted by 48 P-38s, P-40s, and F4Us, but due to bad weather only a handful of Liberators reached the target, and the 441h 'S P-38s again made no enemy contact. ILl. Robert Fox was KIFA when his P-38 was returning from Munda to Guadalcanal and plunged into the sea and exploded. After the completion of the fighter strip work was rushed on the Pi va bomber field, and by 19 December it was ready for limited operations and was completely ready by the end of the month. The Piva fighter field was delayed by the shortage of steel matting that was used for the bomber field and was operational by 9 January. The completion of these fields provided a base for quick air support for nearby infantry, put Rabaul within 220 miles, and gave the bombers escort to targets on New Britain and New Ireland. The Torokina fighter bases reduced Japanese air effectiveness. From 26 November to 28 December there were 46 enemy air alerts, and only five were able to reach the area to drop bombs.

Piva Bomber base on Bougainville under construction by the 71'" Seabees in January 1944. (USN)

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4 Conclusions of the Bougainville Operation

The attack on Bougainville and the diversionary invasions deep into Japanese occupied territory extended Allied supply lines that had been vulnerable to Japanese air and sea attacks from Rabaul. SOPAC bet and won that the increasing strength of their air and sea power would keep Japanese air and sea attacks in check, and the Bougainville invasion, despite hard fighting, was taken with relatively little loss in lives and materiel. After midDecember Allied air superiority south of Rabaul was complete, and the Japanese no longer dared to send aircraft or naval vessels into the area. The capture of Bougainville led to the collapse of the Japanese defensive positions in the Bismarcks, and the operations in the Green Islands and Emirau were carried out without enemy opposition. The capture of Bougainville brought the Northern Solomons Campaign to a conclusion, as the last island in the Solomons chain had been taken, and the objectives of the campaign had been achieved.

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Part Five Reduction of Rabaul

1 Phase One, Prelude: October-November 1943

Rabaul was bombed for the first time on November 1942 by the heavy bombers of the 5AF and 13AF, but until October 1943 they had flown only 619 sorties, mostly against shipping in Simpson Harbor and shore and ground installations around Rabaul Town. During this time the Japanese admitted to 40 aircraft shot down. In October 1943 the Allied air attacks increased dramatically, with 417 sorties being flown that month and 55 enemy fighters being shot down. Japanese air strength at Rabaul had been at its peak in November, as its numbers had increased by the influx of evacuated aircraft from the Solomons, and by the 300 canier aircraft from the Combined Fleet. At this time the four airfields around Rabaul had 586 aircraft, of which at least 390 were fighters. On 11 November Rabaul was devastated in a three-pronged attack. First 23 5AF B24s bombed Rabaul's Lakunai airfield, followed by a large force of USN aircraft from five carrier air groups-Sherman's two and Montgomery's three-that had arrived from the Central Pacific. After their damaging attack on the 5 th carrier aircraft again attacked Simpson Harbor, flying from 160 miles east of Rabaul. But bad weather and lack of targets (the cruisers had been withdrawn after the USN attack on the 5th ) reduced the score to a destroyer sunk,

Rabaul. (USN)

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and a light cruiser and destroyer damaged. The Japanese sent up almost all their available aircraft (68) to intercept the 0900 raid and lost 37 to YF-9 off the Essex and YF-18 off the Bunker Hill, which were providing cover. The 5BG and 307BG sent 42 B-24s staging through Munda to attack Japanese shipping trying to escape from the Navy attack on the harbor. However, clouds limited the attack and bombs were dropped from 16,000 to 20,000 feet through the clouds without observable results. The U.S. avy bombers returned to their caniers to rearm for a second attack in the afternoon, but V.Adm. Kusaka sent out 108 of his 11 th Air Fleet to follow the returning bombers to Montgomery's carriers to the south. At 1300 radar picked up the enemy force 100 miles out, and Montgomery's three caniers closed ranks and were surrounded by the destroyers formutualAA protection. Lt.Cdr. Tommy Blackburn's YF-17 F4Us and YF-33 F6Fs, land-based at Ondonga and Segi, along with carrier-based YF-9 and YF-18 accounted for an astounding but obviously over-claimed 101 Yals, Kates, and Zeros, essentially decimating Rabaul airpower. Most postwar studies and histories put the end of Rabaul as an effective base as mid-November 1943. Kenney's 5 th Air Force had

Part Five, Chapter 1 - Phase One, Prelude: October-November 1943

Air attack on Rabaul on 2 November.The photo is of poor quality, but shows Lakunai Air Field towards ships anchored in Simpson Harbor.The aircraft in the center of the airstrip is an Irving night-~ghter: and at the lower left are two Sallys, with another Sally under camouflage netting. (Lansdale)

left for New Guinea after its B-25s and P-38s had done substantial damage to Rabaul's shipping, installations, and defending fighters, and the Navy had its great day on the ll lh . The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey's (USSBS) Analysis Division's The Campaigns of the Pacific War states: "By the end of November, a total of 4,481 sorties by United States aircraft from the South Pacific command with the loss of only 69 planes had reduced the Japanese air garrison to impotence and forced them to resort to sporadic night raids of limited effectiveness." The USSBS, The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan also states: "Heavy raids in October and a final strike 2 November by B25s and P-38s, completely surprised the enemy and resulted in such heavy destruction that it was obvious that Rabaul was no longer a satisfactory base for any kind of operations." This USSBS statement was undoubtedly influenced by Kenney's inflated claims that his 51h Air Force had reduced Rabaul to ineffectiveness. While its air garrison had been diminished, Rabaul remained more than a "satisfactory base," but was a formidable bastion with 98,000 troops, about three-quarters 81h Army and onefourth Navy, stationed mostly at Rabaul, and the rest spread over New Britain. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were wise in their decision to by-pass Rabaul, as these troops could have exacted a terrible toll on the Allies if the Rabaul area were invaded. Instead the JCS de-

cided that the next Pacific thrust would be toward the west, and Seeadler Harbor in the Admiralties. Seeadler was a more suitable harbor in a move west toward the Philippines than Rabaul's Simpson Harbor, which would only have been useful in an Allied northward move toward Truk and the Marianas. Meanwhile, pressure needed to be exerted to keep Rabaul's defenders in check. The Japanese had a stock of 55,000 tons of food and an extensive system of gardens to augment food reserves, and they began rationing in January. During the coming siege the defenders were never near starvation or malnutrition, which plagued other by-passed islands (e.g. the Marshall Islands). Rabaul was defended by 367 AA guns and 19 radar units with a 360-degree, 90-mile radius, all of which were linked by an efficient communications and early warning system. The Japanese had prepared for an invasion by fortifying the potentiallanding beaches with concrete and heavy log pillboxes, barbed wire, and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, along with offshore underwater obstacles and mines. There were over 1,000 buildings and 4,900 vehicles on the island, and at the end of the year the Japanese began to develop an extensive system of 350 miles of tunnels and caves. There were 680 vessels in Simpson Harbor and hiding in adjacent Karavia Bay. The majority (650) were numerous daihatsus (lightly armed barges), fishing boats, and small cargo vessels, as the Japanese withdrew their warships, except for 20 destroyers and ten submarines. These vessels were to be relentlessly attacked, and a blockade was to be instituted. Throughout the war 517 small boats and barges were destroyed-468 Army and 49 Navy-by Allied air and surface sorties. The majority of these losses occurred from August 1943 to March 1944. Although 191 aircraft had been destroyed, there were still 80 or more available to the Japanese, plus 80 or so damaged but repairable or useful in salvage. The Japanese were able to heavily reinforce their depleted air reserves with Zeros from Kavieng, located on the northern tip of New Ireland, about 175 miles to the northwest. This air reinforcement was very effective, as on 3 January photoreconnaissance showed over 200 aircraft on Rabaul airfields. It was obvious that any invasion of New Britain would be in jeopardy from the continual threat of a strong base at Rabaul. To finally render Rabaul impotent was left to COMAIRSOLS under Maj.Gen. Ralph Mitchell (USMC). Mitchell had taken command on 20 November from Maj.Gen. Nathan Twining, who went to Italy to take command of the 15'h Air Force from Gen. Jimmy Doolittle. Mitchell inherited 498 operational aircraft: 199 fighters; 200 light and medium bombers; and 99 heavy bombers-about twice the Japanese air operational strength. To finally reduce Rabaul and the island of New Britain, Mitchell continued the inexorable bombing by AAF heavy and medium bombers escorted by AAF fighters and sent out fighter sweeps to hunt down and destroy enemy aircraft. The fighter sweep had succeeded in the Solomons, especially in canceling the Japanese air arm at Kahili, and now would be carried out from Bougainville when the 71 Sl Seabees completed the airfield at Torokina on 10 December.

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2 December 1943

As Bougainville was being conquered there was a growing controversy at COMAIRSOLS as to how the impending air offensive against Rabaul should be implemented. The fighter was to be the cornerstone of the Rabaul air offensive for two main reasons. First, as escorts they made possible large-scale bombing by SBDs and TBFs that were more vulnerable to enemy fighters than the heavily armed B-24s and B-25s. Secondly, the fighters could operate independently on fighter sweeps on enemy fields, destroying their aircraft on the ground and in the air. Later, when the Japanese withdrew their fighters from Rabaul, a third dimension was added, as the fighters became fighter-bombers. Mitchell's general plan of attack was to continuously hit Rabaul by first sending in fighter sweeps, followed by escorted dive-bombers, and escorted and unescorted heavy and medium bombers. Often bad weather prevented attacks on Rabaul, and secondary targets around Bougainville were hit instead. A COMAIRSOL's Intelligence Summary (18-19 December 1943) noted: "Rabaul's Japs were blessed and Bougainville's airforces were damned when weather prevented rendezvous of the large Liberator strike with fighter escort and alternate targets on Bougainville were taken." The number of B-24s was limited, and as soon as the bomber base at Piva at Torokina was operational then Strike Command could send SBDs and TBFs, and when Stiring was ready Bomber Command could add B-25s to the mix. The Japanese then could be hit by fighters and bombers from high, medium, and low altitudes, from all quadrants, and 24/7, weather permitting. Despite evidence that the airfields around Rabaul based substantial numbers of aircraft for nearly five weeks until the 17 th of December, the 13AF had almost no contact with Japanese aircraft. On the 17 th SOPAC began a sustained air offensive against Rabaul with a large fighter sweep of 31 Corsairs, 22 Hellcats, and 23 RNZAF P-40s. This powerful force took off from New Georgia and staged through Torokina for fuel and final briefing, and took off again at 0830. But the Japanese did not respond, and only the low-flying New Zealanders of the 14th and 16th Squadrons had any

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bona fide combat, shooting down five and losing two. One of Boyington's Corsairs and a VF-33 Hellcat got a Zero a piece. Three RNZAF fliers were lost, including Wing Commander T.O. Freeman. In debriefing, Boyington felt that there were too many fighters for effective control of the air battle. By mid-December the Japanese position in the Solomons and New Britain was doubtful at best. The Japanese had no mobility on the sea, as their warships had been turned back on every attempt to interdict the beachhead. Cargo vessels and barges were continually harassed from the air and by PT boats, and were unable to evacuate or reinforce positions. On the ground, the Japanese advance toward the Torokina beachhead on Bougainville had been slowed to a crawl by the thick jungle. They had lost the Southern Solomons, New Georgia, and Vella Lavella. Their troops on their bases on Choiseul, southern Bougainville, Ballale, and Shortland Island, although holding large, well equipped, and well supplied garrisons, were immobile and were a liability, and were going to stagnate as they were by-passed. The Allies had almost total air supremacy, and the southern Bougainville airfields had been under constant attack and their facilities could not be repaired, and their aircraft were withdrawn to Rabaul. On the 15 th MacArthur's troops invaded Arawe, on far western New Britain, thus placing Rabaul and Kavieng between bomber bases to be built there and new bomber bases at Torokina. On the 19th the 5BG and 307BG sent 41 B-24s to Rabaul town and harbor escorted by 48 fighters, including 44FS P-38s. There was heavy weather over the target, only six bombers made it to the target, and the 44 th made no contact. VMF-222 claimed three Zekes. On 23 December 5BG B-24s struck Rabaul's Lakunai and Vanakanau airfields escorted by Marine F4Us and P-38s ofthe 44FS. Since receiving their P-38s on 27 November the 44 th had not met any Japanese aircraft and had not scored an aerial victory in their new fighters. As the bombers withdrew from the target they were attacked by over 60 Zeros. VMF-214, led by the redoubtable Pappy Boyington, shot down 28 Zeros and lost three. The 27 P-38s took off from Munda at 1150 and rendezvoused with the Corsairs over Cape Torokina at 1250. The P-38 high cover flights (at 24,000 feet) were led by Capts. Frank Gaunt and Douglas Currey; the 22,000 foot flights were led by Capt. Grant Smith; and ILl. Maj. Robert

Part Five, Chapter 2 - December 1943 Westbrook, Capt. Robert Krohn, and lLt Robert Holman led the low cover flights at 20,000 feet. They flew directly toward Rabaul and over Cape St. George and met the returning B-24s being pursued by 20-30 Zeros. Westbrook and his wingman, 2Lt. Raymond Fouquet, dove on a Zero. Fouquet banked away and climbed to 15,000 feet and latched on the tail of a Zero. The Jap pulled up into a loop to try to get on the P-38's tail, but was unable to do so, and the Zero rolled over and then came at Fouquet head-on and took a fatal burst. Meanwhile, Westbrook found that he had a Zero on his tail and was unable to shake it until the Jap pilot saw his comrade get shot down by Fouquet and lost his nerve and broke off. As Westbrook climbed to rejoin the formation a Zero crossed in front of him and he gave it a long burst that sent it spiraling down in flames. Westbrook then saw a Zero on the tail of Lt. George Condor and made a firing pass and caused some smoke for a damaged claim. Of all the 27 P-38s only Westbrook's flight made enemy contact, but the 44 th 's Lightnings were finally blooded. The Marines had a big day with 29 victories: Boyington's VMF-214 with 25 and VMF-213 with four. Boyington got four for his 15-18 victories (not including his claimed six air victories in China with the Flying Tigers that were actually strafing victories). Westbrook's victory was his ninth. The next day 24 Liberators of the 307BG bombed Vunakanau Airfield, near Rabaul, and six bombed Lakunai with an escort of 17 44FS P-38s. The P-38s took off from Munda at 1030 and escorted the bombers at 25,000 feet over Rabaul at 1300. After the bombing run the P-38s escorted the Liberators past Cape St. George and then returned to Rabaul to hunt Zeros. At 1330 Maj. Westbrook spotted a single Zero about 1,000 feet below and dove and fired on it, causing it to smoke. lLt. Howard Cleveland of the 70FS dove in and finished it off, and the two shared the victory. Westbrook immediately turned into another Zero and exploded it. He then fired on another Zero, causing it to smoke, and this damaged aircraft was given the coup d' grace by lLt. Byron Bowman for another shared victory. The busy Westbrook spotted a flight of three Zeros and dove on them to get his third victory to make him a double ace with 12 victories. Cleveland was joined by 2Lt. Theo Schoettel, whose guns had jammed, and dove at very high speed after a Zero that took violent evasive action on the way down. Diving 12,000 feet, Cleveland closed slowly to 200 yards and fired a long burst and sent the Jap down in flames. After Bowman shared the victory with Westbrook, he climbed and saw three Zeros below and dove on the one on the left. The Jap broke, and Bowman followed it down for 3,000 fe~t and then fired and flamed it. He climbed again and saw two Zeros on Westbrook's tail. Bowman gave the one closest to Westbrook a burst and it started to smoke, but he had to break off to rescue his CO from the second Zero before he saw the results of his attack. Westbrook was being fired on by the second Zero when Bowman dove and hit the attacker with a 90-degree deflection shot that hit the pilot and the aircraft spun in. These were Bowman's only, but very important, victories of the war. Capt. Douglas Currey's flight was flying at 25,000 feet and saw ~5-20 Zeros below at 23,000 feet. Currey and Lt. Richard

Mushlit made one pass and made an unsubstantiated damage claim on two of them. lLt. James Parker also made a pass and came out of it with a Zero on his tail. He went into a dive at 20,000 feet and pulled out 14,000 feet later, losing his pursuer. But as Parker leveled out another Zero came at him head-on. Parker instinctively fired and exploded the Zero, and as he pulled up he had another Zero in his sights and a burst caused some smoke for a probable. Parker found himself alone among 15 Japanese aircraft looking for a fight. One Zero dove from 10,000 feet, put a 20mm shell into his left engine, and then brazenly pulled up alongside and gave the American a cocky smile. Parker headed for a large cloud, and once in it he feathered the faltering prop and returned to base. USN fighters of VF-33 shot down six more Zeros, depleting the Japanese Zero strength by 14 that day. In conjunction with this attack was a 48-plane fighter sweep, including 24 RNZAF P-40s. The New Zealanders had their best and worst day of the war, shooting down 12 Zeros, but losing six planes and five pilots. On Christmas Day five 5BG B-24s were able to penetrate heavy clouds and bomb Lakunai airfield. Sixteen 44FS P-38s flew top cover, while the Marine F4Us and RNZAF P-40s flew medium and low cover. The four flights ofP-38s took off at 0945 and flew northwest toward their bomber rendezvous. At 1200, Westbrook saw 18 Zeros almost over Rabaul Town, half of which attacked the bombers, while the other nine tried to escape the AAF fighters. Westbrook chased after the third Zero from the left and had to make a 180degree turn before firing, sending the turning Zero into a shallow dive. Westbrook followed and continued firing until the Zero turned over on its back and finally caught fire. Westbrook pulled up with FlO Rex Byers and fired on several lone Zeros without observable effect. As the two approached Duke of York Island a Zero got on Byers' tail, and Westbrook climbed up to the rear, fired on Byer's pursuer, and sent it into a slow spiral that turned into a smoking spin, throwing off pieces. Byers then returned the favor, as he shot a Zero off his CO's tail. Westbrook's Lightning was hit and his left engine began to burn. Westbrook turned to look for Byers but saw him also with an engine smoking, heading for a cloud chased by three Zeros. Westbrook was trying to reach the safety of nearby clouds and was attacked by several Zeros, but a F4U piloted by lLt. Ira Firestone of VMF-223 shot down one and damaged another. Westbrook's engine fire extinguished itself, and he returned safely to Barakoma at 1430. Westbrook claimed two Zeros to give him six victories in three days for 14 total victories, but he was also saved from Zeros on his tail three times. Despite his ace status Westbrook insisted on teamwork in his squadron: "With us no pilot goes up on a pedestal just because he shoots down a bunch of Japs. We aren't supermen. We're a team. When one of us hits the jackpot, it is partly luck in being in the right spot at the right time, but mainly the work your wingman and the other boys do in protecting your tail. In one of the dogfights on Christmas Day-the worst scrap I was ever in-a chap in my outfit knocked a Jap off my tail who would have surely riddled me. Later I was able to follow through and pick one off his tail.

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131h Fighter Command in World War II We're well trained. It's instinctive for us to protect each other. That's our big advantage over the Japanese. They lack the teamwork spirit American Flyers have." (Tribute to Lt. Col. Robert Westbrook, 13'h AF, Dec. 1944) Capt. Grant Smith's flight was on high cover at 25,000 feet over Cape Gazelle at 1200 when they encountered a large formation of Zeros at their altitude and to their port. Many of the Zeros then dove on the bombers, and Smith and ILt. William Green dove after them. Smith started one smoking, and Green then hit a Zero that was on Smith's tail, both getting damage credits. When he pulled up Green met a Zero head-on and hit its engine, which smoked, but no flames were seen-another damaged credit. ILt. Andrew Sawers and 2Lt. Dewint Zaricor dove on another Zero, Sawers got in a long burst, and the enemy fighter smoked heavily and went into an uncontrolled spin. Lt. Zaricor fired on another Zero and caused it to smoke for a damaged claim. ILts. Earl Heckler and John Roehm made a pass on a Zero, and Heckler got a damaged claim. Capt. Frank Gaunt on medium cover led his flight to the bomber formation and scissored over them. They fired at attacking Zeros without results. The 44 th claimed five victories and four damaged. During the mission Capt. Wallace Jennings had mechanical difficulties with his landing gear and flew along with the bomber formation for protection; he crash-landed safely at Barakoma. 2Lt. James Corbett

had both propellers malfunction as he approached Torokina and accomplished a safe dead stick crash-landing on the beach. ILl. John Cox and FlO Rex Byers were listed as MIA. VF-33 claimed two Zeros, VMF-223 got 4/2/2, and VMF-214 got 4/2/1. Also, on Christmas Day R.Adm. Frederick Sherman's Canier Task Force (TF-38) attacked Kavieng at dawn. The target of the 31 F6Fs, 28 TBFs, and 27 SB2Cs was the shipping in the harbor. They met no opposition, as Kavieng's fighters had been transferred to Rabaul the day before, because the USN used a decoy pre-invasion naval bombardment of the Buka-Bonis area to draw them there. Since there were no enemy fighters the attack went off as planned, but there were only a few ships in the harbor, and only a freighter was sunk and another damaged. On the 26 th , after three weeks of sustained heavy bombing of Japanese defensive positions by the 5 th Air Force, the 1st Marine Division, under Gen. MacArthur, landed at Cape Glossier. Although it was less than 50 miles from the northeastern coast of New Guinea, the Americans had a foothold on the western tip of New Britain. On the 27 th and 28 th, Marine fighters ofVMF-214, -216, and223 swept Rabaul and claimed 18/2/2 enemy fighters on the 27 th and 34/2/4 on the 28 th • On the 30th the 5BG's 72" d and 394th Bomb Squadrons, escorted by 24 fighters, sent ten B-24s to bomb Tobera airbase and II to bomb Rabaul Town. Although the Japanese sent up 70 Zeros the escorts failed to score. Bomber gunner claims again seemed to be exorbitant at 12. One B-24 was shot down, that of

The 44FS Group photo with 126 victories, which places this photo on Christmas Day 1943.The Vampire insignia is at the center, and the diagram at the right of it states "Points of Enemy Contact." 44th CO Maj. Robert Westbrook is standing under the prop hub in a baseball hat. (Lansdale/Nat. Archives)

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Part Five, Chapter 2 - December 1943 Group Commander Col. Marion Unruh. The next day search planes located eight of the downed crew off the east coast of New Ireland and dropped supplies, but on their return search planes were unable to relocate the crew. During the last half of December SOPAC aircraft had flown 617 sorties on Rabaul and destroyed 147 Japanese aircraft for the loss of 19. Japanese figures show fewer of their aircraft lost, as U.S. bomber gunner claims were overstated. The 44FS was now the top squadron in the 13FC with 135 total victories over the Solomons. The reason for the squadron's success was the combat tactics taught by their CO, Robert Westbrook. Later, Westbrook spelled out these combat tactic principles to use on the "Nipper" in the treatise, "How to Stay Alive in Flying Combat": "The following are a few points on aerial combat which should be habits while in the target area: a) Look around b) Stick together c) Stick with your element leader. Should you lose him join with anyone. The pilot who is careless about getting off by himself will get it sooner or later. d) An immediate attack is the best defense. If you have an even to better altitude advantage tangle with anything up to twice your number. e) Don't try to turn with the Nip. It can't be done in any Allied aircraft. Break off when the lead can be no longer held. At slow speeds (200-220) this will be approximately 40-50 degrees of turn. At high speed (350-375) as much as 180 degrees. f) Be prepared for his turns on your approach-starting shallow and then "reefing in" as you close within range. g) Tum into the attack

h) Keep up speed-it's the big advantage. i) Hold fire until within range. Bullet drop, loss of impact force, and dispersion make long range shooting impractical. j) Try for low quarter 10-20 degree deflection stern attack after diving slightly below and behind him. k) Don't rely on tracer or deflection shooting. Use the gunsight. I) Allow and extra 1/4 to 112 ring when two G's or more are being pulled on a pursuit curve. Error on the long side. m) Bullet drop is not compensated for when you are in a bankyou must aim high on the line of flight-as along top of the Nip fuselage. n) Our planes are equipped with gun booster. The rate of fire is so increased that a four second burst will bum out the barrels on the first burst. Succeeding bursts must be reduced in length to twosecond maximums if firing is in quick succession. 0) If a Nipper catches you, tum away from your element leader so that he will be able to tum into the Nip. Do this while pulling into a shallow balls-out climb or dive using plenty of evasive action. p) The Nipper's favorite evasive action is the split "s" close to the ground-don't let him "auger you in;" its been done! q) If you are latched badly while on escort, drag the Nipper across close to the bomber formation and let their guns brush him off. r) Stick together. These bits of advice have worked in the past and apply now; however, there may be better ways of defeating the enemy brought out in each new combat. Remember as much of the details of a scrap as possible and give the dope to your intelligence officer-it may have someone's neck on the next one."

237

3 Rabaul Phase Two: January 1944

In November the Japanese had 586 aircraft available in the South Pacific. Air operations in the Solomons, interceptions of heavy bomber attacks, and the first U.S. Navy carrier attacks had cost the Japanese at least 100 aircraft. After two weeks the remnants of the Combined Fleet's 300 "loaner" aircraft were returned to the Combined Fleet in Truk. In December the Allies put their airfields on Bougainville into operation and the Japanese lost 64 more aircraft, but this aircraft loss was eased by the arrival of 120 carrier aircraft from the Combined Fleet. By the first of the year the 586 figure had been reduced to about 240. After the first of the year the Allied raids on Rabaul increased in intensity. On 7 January Maj.Gen. Hubert Harmon took over command of the 13AF. At the end of 1943 there were several base changes for 13AF units. The 18FG HQ remained on Guadalcanal, but its 44FS, reequipped with P-38s, flew out of Munda. The 347FG HQ and 339FS moved to Stirling Island on 15 January, and the 67FS moved back to the Russells. The 68FS was based back on Fiji from December. The 42BG, and its 70th and 75 th BS, moved to Stirling on 20 January; the 69 th BS rejoined it in February, while the 390th BS remained in the Russells. The 371BS and 3nBS of the 307BG, and the 23BS and nBS of the 5BG moved to Munda on 9 January. On 10 December Lt.Coi. William "Wild Bill" Councill became the CO of the 18FG, relieving Lt.Coi. Aaron Tyler, who had been its CO since December 1941. The turn of the year found the Japanese on the defensive everywhere in the Solomons, New Britain, and New Guinea, but they were still able to mount a significant air response and AA fire, especially over the Rabaul area. Rabaul needed to be neutralized if the offensive toward New Guinea was to succeed in defeating the Japanese troops there, and to provide a base for the invasion of the Philippines. The key targets for the 13AF and 5AF were the five all-weather airfields near Rabaul, all strategically sited around Simpson Harbor and Keravia Bay. Lakunai, located on the eastside of Simpson Harbor, on the coastal flats of Crater Peninsula, was the major Japanese fighter and dive-bomber base. It had been captured from the Australians, and the Japanese Navy had improved the field to 4,750 x 525 feet with two and a half miles of taxiways, 90 fighter, and 10 bomber revetments. Lukanai was the only Rabaul runway constructed of compacted sand and ash. There were two 238

small wooden and steel hangars, and 20 barracks for 800 personnel. The largest airdrome was Vunakanau, located on a 1,000 foot plateau inland from Keravia Bay, ten miles south of Rabaul, was also an improved RAAF base. It was a 5,100 x 750-foot runway with a 4,100 x 140-foot concrete field inside, with 90 fighter and

Lt.Col. William "Wild Bill" Councill became the CO of the 18FG, relieving Lt.Col. Aaron Tylec who had been its CO since December 1941. (Smith)

Part Five, Chapter 3 - Rabaul Phase Two: January 1944

TARGETS-

.

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60 bomber revetments connected by six and a half miles of taxiways. It had one large ex-RAAF hangar and barracks for 2,500 personnel. In summer 1942 the Japanese began construction on two new fields. The first was Rapopo, which was located at Lesson Point, on the coast about 14 miles southeast of Rabaul, and was completed in December 1942 as a bomber field. It was the longest Rabaul runway at 6,900 feet, and had a concrete field of 4,600 x 135 feet with three miles of taxiways connecting 94 bomber and 10 fighter revetments. The second field was the Army field at Keravat, located 13 miles southwest of Rabaul on Kabaira Bay. Drainage problems stopped construction, but the Navy resumed construction; the field was never surfaced or used operationally. In the early summer of 1943 the Japanese began construction of a fifth field, Tobera, that was located well inland between Vunakanau and Rapopo Airfields. It was 5,300 x 700 foot, with a 3,600 x 100-foot concrete central runway, and had two miles of taxiways for 75 fighters and two bombers, and was completed in August 1943. All five fields were close enough together to be mutually supporting and to allow the exchange of aircrews and aircraft, but separated enough so all could not be neutralized at once. There was an auxiliary field on Duke of York Island that was left uncompleted once the Allied air attacks began in earnest. There were also several other airstrips on New Britain. Gasmata was on the south-central coast of New Britain and was redeveloped from an existing Australian runway captured in February 1942. Once Allied air attacks began Gasmata became non-operational, as its dispersal areas were poorly placed. Cape Hoskins airdrome, located opposite Gasmata on the north central coast of New Britain, was completed in September 1943. Cape Gloucester, on the far western end of New Britain, had two airstrips that threatened Allied bases on eastern New Guinea. There

were four additional operational airfields near New Britain. Kavieng and nearby Panapai were located off the northern tip of New Ireland island, which was WNW of Rabaul. Besides Rabaul, Kavieng was the largest Japanese airbase complex in the Bismarcks. Kavieng was completed in August 1942, and a satellite field at Panapai was completed in April 1943. Namatami and Borpop were 50 miles northeast of Rabaul on New Ireland's eastern shore. The Admiralty Islands, far to the WNW, had two airfields, but neither was used to any degree. In August 1943 the 60 fighters and 40 bombers of the Fourth Air Army were withdrawn from Rabaul to defend Wewak (on New Guinea) from the 5AP. During the Munda campaign the ll'h Air Fleet took heavy losses that had forced the 2nd Carrier division to transfer to Rabaul from Truk, and further losses forced the transfer of the 151 Carrier Division to Rabaul. The Fourth Air Army was decimated over New Guinea by the 5AF and further weakened when it was forced to transfer its 7'h Air Division to the Celebes in November 1943 to replace naval aircraft that had been sent to Rabaul. The Japanese usually sent up all available fighters to intercept Allied air attacks, ranging from 50 fa as many as 200 aircraft earlier. After takeoff the Jap fighters formed up over Lakunai or Tobera Airfields and then flew out over Cape St. George to layer at different altitudes to meet the incoming Allied formations. Early in the air campaign the Japanese fighter aircraft maintained disciplined fighting formations, but after they lost a large number of fighters and their experienced pilots and Allied air strength increased they resorted to individual attacks. Japanese fighters were reported to have frequently dropped small aerial bombs on bomber formations before their firing runs, but these attacks were ineffective, achieving few casualties and failing to break up the bomber formations. The favored Japanese gunnery tactic was to approach bombers from

239

13th Fighter Command in World War II the front and fighters from the rear. However, the Japanese found that their fighters were unable to catch the fast American F6Fs, F4Us, and P-38s, and had to resort to frontal attacks on them, also. The American fighters scissored over the bombers during escort, and this tactic was particularly effective against frontal attacks. The American fighter pilots were disciplined and were not easily drawn off by Japanese decoy attacks. The post-war USSBS interrogations of Japanese pilots revealed that they considered P-39s, then P-40s, and then P-38s easier prey than the F6F, but considered the F4U the best Allied fighter. Allied bomber and fighter pilots feared Rabaul's concentrated AA defenses-, which were augmented by that of Japanese shipping while it was anchored in Blanche Bay. Until July 1944 the Japanese were able to expend large amounts of AA shells on Allied air attacks. To conserve personnel and aircraft the Japanese had reduced and then suspended air operations from their vulnerable forward air bases in the Northern Solomons. In November and December COMAIRSOLS' principle duty was the support of operations in the Northern Solomons. A small portion of the missions were to support the Torokina beachhead, while the majority were sent against Japanese bases on Bougainville and its surrounding islands. Barge hunting had significantly reduced Japanese sea transportation between Rabaul and the Japanese forces in the northern Solomons. The Japanese had to reduce and then stop air reconnaissance around Bougainville due to the almost complete loss of their recon aircraft. Blanche Bay at Rabaul was one of the best natural harbors in the Pacific. It was surrounded by hills and measured six miles long by two and half miles wide. The Bay was divided into four inner harbors with three-Karavia Bay, Matupi, and Simpson Harborsproviding useful deep anchorages. Simpson was the most developed of the three and was able to accommodate 300,000 tons of shipping. Rabaul Town, Keravia, Ralum, Rataval, Talil, Tawai Point, and Vunapope were the major supply points. The port of Rabaul had seven wharves, and Simpson Harbor had several additional new piers. The Japanese Southeastern Fleet and the Eighth Area Army each stored all their supplies in Rabaul for all naval and army units in the Bismarcks-Solomons-eastern New Guinea area. Until February 1944 these stocks were stored in warehouses, but afterward were removed to be protected in newly dug tunnels and caves. The Japanese dispersed their small boats and barges and submarine facilities in the north end of Blanche Bay. During 1943 the Japanese avy and Army combined their antiaircraft defenses. The Army controlled 192 guns located around their Rapopo airfield and around their dumps and installations. The Navy controlled 175 guns located around their airfields at Tobera, Lakunai, and Vanakanau, and naval shore installations. Both services shared in the defense of Simpson Harbor and its shipping. However, the Army guns were frequently down due to repair and parts shortages, and during October 1943 to February 1944 only 86 of the 192 Army guns were in use. There probably were about 250 guns, ranging from 13mm machine guns to 12.7mm cannon, in commission against the AIRSOLS attacks on Rabaul. Radar gunfire control was limited, as it was the first type manufactured by Japan and was plagued by bugs and virtually ineffective. Japanese range and altitude finders were also ineffective. Over Rabaul Japa-

240

nese fighter pilots flew alongside American bomber formations and radioed altitude and speed figures to gun positions below, but this was also often ineffective due to communication problems. The Japanese Southeastern Fleet had constructed a comprehensive and effective early warning 90-mile radar system of II radar sets in the Rabaul area. Besides the sets at Rabaul the system had sets extending southwest along the New Britain coast, on Cape St. George, at Kavieng, and at Buka, at the end of New Georgia. When contact was made with an incoming enemy air strike its position gave from 30 to 60 minutes advanced warning from Rabaul. Besides these sets there were about a dozen smaller 72-mile sets stripped from aircraft. Every approach to the Gazelle Peninsula was covered by radar. A COMAIRSOLS attack coming to Rabaul on a course north of Bougainville would be picked up by radar on Buka and give Rabaul a 50-60 minute warning. If they flew a course over the Solomons Sea to the south, radar on the peninsula's eastern side would give Rabaul 30 minutes warning. The five radar sets on the St. George coast would also give a half hour warning. If the attackers flew around New Ireland's southern end and then flew across the nanow island to Rabaul, 20 minutes warning was available. Radar coverage to the north and west of Rabaul was comprehensive and could not be penetrated by surprise. By this time it became obvious that Rabaul could not be neutralized through high altitude bombing with heavy bombers. Kenney's and Twining's attacks were not as successful as anticipated, but caused enough damage to prompt the Japanese to evacuate their warships and begin to excavate caves and tunnels to escape the bombings. The 13AF constructed a total of six airstrips: three on Bougainville; two on Nissan; and one on Stirling. The first strip was constructed over volcanic sands at Cape Torokina; immediately west of Empress Augusta Bay; and was ready on 10 December 1943 when VMF-216 flew in to establish a base there. It was a 4,200 x 100 foot single runway covered by Marston Matting. The next two strips on Bougainville were the Piva bomber strips. The completion of two dive, torpedo, medium, and heavy bomber bases on Bougainville near the Piva River-Piva North (Uncle) and Piva South (Yoke)-were necessary to step up Rabaul's destruction. Piva Uncle was started on 29 November by the 36th Seabees and completed on 30 December when 18 AAF transport aircraft landed there. "Uncle" was a single 8,000 x 300-foot airfield covered by Marston mat with warm-up aprons at each end. Uncle was located 4.5 miles north of Cape Torokina and was ready on Christmas Day. Piva Yoke was started on 10 December by the 77 th Seabees and not completed until 9 January because of the shortage of steel matting "Yoke" was a 4,400 x 150 Marston-covered bomber strip located a half-mile south of Pi va North. These bomber strips were important, as bombers could be based at Bougainville, take off in the early morning, and reach Rabm.il in the morning before clouds covered it. As with the early Japanese air raids on Guadalcanal, this made the arrival ofAmerican air attacks on Rabaul predictable. In mid-November, the Guadalcanal and New Georgiabased B-24s of the 13AF had begun bombing missions over Rabaul every few days, and were escorted by fighters from the new forward fighter airfields at Torokina and in the Treasury Islands. On Stirling Island, 27 miles southwest of Bougainville, was a 7,000 x

Part Five, Chapter 3 - Rabaul Phase Two: January 1944 150 foot coral surfaced runway that covered much of the small island. It was ready on 3 January 1944, when three flights ofP-38s of the 44FS arrived. The l3BC B-25 medium bombers and l3FC P38s were now in place to conduct daily attacks on Rabaul. The SOP for these attacks was to dispatch two P-38 squadrons ahead of the bombers. As the leading P-38 squadrons approached the target area, enemy fighters would either be sitting on their airfields, but more usually were alerted by radar and waiting at altitude. The leading P-38 flights would try to draw off the waiting Zeros, diving through the enemy formation and shooting down as many as possible, and then climb and do it again, or if unopposed go into a high-speed shallow dive, strafing the airfields to prevent fighters from taking off. The escort flights of P-38s would fly high cover at 25,000 feet for the B-24s that were flying at 18,000 to 20,000 feet. On New Year's Day, 15 B-24s (21 took off) bombed Lakunai airfield at 1200 with an escort of 48 Navy F6Fs and 25 44FS P-38s. AA fire over the target was heavy and accurate, and the Japanese sent up a large number of Zeros to intercept the Americans. The 44FS took off at 0930 from Munda in seven flights, but three pilots turned back early with mechanical problems. Maj. Westbrook led the first five flights to the target just ahead of the bombers to sweep the area of Japanese fighters, and Capt. Robert Krohn led the last two flights as high cover. Westbrook had spread his flights laterally and over Rabaul when he saw about 20 Zeros climbing to intercept the bombers. The P-38s dove to attack, but were only able to get several long-distance shots. Capt. Cotesworth Head attacked a Zero, but it quickly dove away from combat. Capt. Harold Dreckman's flight saw several Zeros that also refused combat, so the Vampires were shut out to start the year. VF-30, VF-33, and VF-40 claimed seven destroyed for the day, and gunners on the 15 B-24s claimed an unbelievable and obviously overestimated 20! VF-30 flew off the carrier Monterey, stationed in the area for a few days and getting 13 victories while there. VF-33 arrived at Guadalcanal on 27 August 1943 flying F6Fs under Lt.Cdr. Hawley Russell. In their deployment there they claimed 20 Zeros. In mid-October they moved and were land-based at Segi Point, New Georgia, to support air strikes in the northern Solomons. During their stay at Segi they scored 53.5 victories of a wartime total 73.5 victories to become the top-scoring land-based Navy F6F Hellcat squadron. It also had four aces during the tour: Ens. Frank Schneider (7); Lt. Carlos Ken Hildebrandt (5); LtUg) James Kinsella (5); and Ens. Jack Watson

almost daily land-based SBDfTBF attacks from Bougainville, where 50 to 100 plane missions could now be mounted. On 3 January Marines sent out a F4U sweep and claimed six Zeros, but Black Sheep leader Pappy Boyington was shot down after three victories for the day and finished the war with 22 victories in the South Pacific. It was feared Boyington was KIA, but it was not known until after the war that he was taken prisoner. On 4 January 18 44 th P-38s took off to escort B-24s to Lukunai. They flew to rendezvous with other escorts at Torokina, but the area was socked in and none of the other escorts joined them. They managed to find a few B-24s and flew top cover for them to Buka, their secondary target. Except for minor AA fire no enemy action was encountered, but the Marine F4Us of VMF-211, -214, and223, while continuing on without finding the B-24s, shot down 12 Japanese. The Marines flew 150 SBDs and TBFs from Munda into Piva North (Uncle) on 5 January for staging to Rabaul, but poor weather scrubbed the mission. On the 7 th the weather cleared and the Marine bombers were dispatched, but the target (Tobera Airfield) was closed in, and Rapopo Airfield, which was packed with aircraft, was passed by due to poor photo recon intelligence.

(5).

After his Christmas attack on Kavieng R.Adm. Frederick Sherman returned, sending Carrier TF-38 Hellcat fighters, Dauntless dive-bombers, and Helldiver torpedo-bombers. This time there were two light cruisers and two destroyers in the harbor, and about 30 Zeros were sent up to intercept. The Navy pilots claimed 12-14 Zekes, and with expert handling the enemy warships escaped with only slight damage. Three Navy aircraft were lost. On the 4th Sherman sent his third attack to Kavieng to attack a reported cruiser force that turned out to be large destroyers. The torpedo attacks were ineffective in the reef-filled waters, and only slight damage was done by strafing. Three Zeros were shot down for the loss of one F6F. This was to be the last of the intermittent carrier strikes on the Rabaul area, but the Japanese there would now suffer under

Col. Leonard Dusard (left), CO of the 347FG, later named Lt.Col Robert Westbrook as his deputy Co. (Harris)

241

13 th Fighter Command in World War II On the 6th a fighter sweep to Rabaul was planned for 20 44FS P-38s to fly at 27,000 and 28,000 feet, while 32 F4Us and 24 F6Fs were stepped down in 1,000 feet intervals to 20,000 feet. A second sweep was planned at 10,000 feet. The fighters rendezvoused over Torokina, but they flew at 17,000 feet due to bad weather up St. George Channel to Watpi on New Ireland. On the way to target two P-38s had engine trouble and were escorted back to Stirling by their wingmen-scratch four P-38s. The bad weather continued, and 24 F4Us and all 24 F6Fs turned back at Watpi, leaving 16 P-38s and eight F4Us-only 24 of the scheduled 76 fighters-to continue the mission. Maj. Robert Wes~brook led the P-38 flights with Lt.Col. Leo Dusard, who was flying along for the day, as his wingman. Dusard, the newly appointed 347 th 's group commander, was a popular choice, as many of its pilots had trained under him at Glendale, CA. He replaced Maj. George McNeese, who had held the post since October 1942 when the group was formed. Two Zeros were first sighted off the end of Cape St. George, about 10 to 15 miles in front of the P-38s, but they broke away. The Vampires continued on to Matakaput, New Ireland, where Westbrook spotted Zeros behind him, just east of Rapopo. Westbrook dropped down and waggled his wings at the F4U formation to warn them of the Zeros, and then turned his formation and attacked the Zeros. As they approached Rapopo 18-20 Japanese planes at 13,000 feet were sighted near Kati Point. Westbrook's flight dove on the enemy, and Dusard got a 90-degree deflection shot and missed as the Zeros turned into the Lightnings. Both sides came head-on and fired, but all missed as they passed at high speed. The flight made a quick 180 and chandelled to gain altitude over St. George Channel, and came on more Zeros coming up from Rapopo. The two enemies met head-on, and Dusard hit a Zero with a burst that flamed it. Dusard's left engine intake blew up, and a Jap fighter hit his fighter on its second pass, causing more damage. Dusard escaped, covered by 1Lt. Richard Wheeler of Capt. Magnus Francis' fourth flight. Dusard did not feather his windmilling bad engine so as to trick the Japanese to think that it was in operation. The Japanese were everywhere. Westbrook's radio was inoperable, as he tried to get his flight out of harm's way by making a 180 turn so that they could fight their way out to Cape Gazelle. Westbrook fired a headon burst on a Zero that started to smoke badly, but was credited as a probable. He saw a Zero making a pass on a P-38 and started toward it, but as he did it turned into him. Westbrook and the Zero stayed on a head-to-head course, but the superior firepower of the P-38 demolished the Jap. ILt. James Long, second element leader, saw a lone P-38 being pursued by two Zeros. Long shot at one, knocking off pieces, and it burst into flames and crashed into the sea, but the second Zero hit the P-38. Long followed it down and saw its pilot slide back the canopy and bailout. In his attack Long lost his wingman, 2Lt. Robert Stoll, who was listed MIA/KIA. Second flight leader, Capt. Cotesworth Head, turned his four Lightnings towards six Zeros. He made a 20-30 degree deflection shot to the left of Westbrook's flight but missed. He fired at two more Zeros and also missed them. So far it was not the Captain's day. He saw a Hamp at 4,000 feet above and to the left and made several passes at the enemy fighter, one head-on, one no-deflection, and then several from the rear. The stubborn Jap showed sev242

eral 20mm cannon and .50 caliber holes in its fuselage, but refused to smoke. Head would claim a probable as he broke off this attack to dive on a Zero below and to the left. Head closed and got into good position. He fired a continuous burst that started a fire, and the Zero crashed into a beach for his ninth victory. Head looked down and saw a P-38 losing altitude with its right engine smoking and being pursued by Zeros. Head took a shot at long range and chased the Zeros away. He continued to watch the P-38 as it descended, and at 2,000 feet its engine exploded and the fighter tumbled into the water with its pilot. Head was on his way to rejoin his flight when eight Zeros appeared from above and put IS holes in his fighter. Head dove away and finally joined Westbrook's flight; they returned to base and found that his wingman, 1Lt. Tavis Wells, disappeared during the combat. Capt. Harold Dreckman led the third flight down with Westbrook's flight and hit a Zero with a good burst, but did not stick around long enough to see the final result. After the flight turned a 180, a Zero made a head-on pass on Dreckman and he shot pieces off the Jap, who spun in. The running combat continued with Zeros ducking in and out of the clouds. Dreckman got shots at three more Zeros without observable results. He took his flight down to

ILt. Richard Wheeler shot down two Zekes, which were Wheeler's third and fourth victories after getting two PAO victories on 15 July, 1943. (Smith)

Part Five, Chapter 3 - Rabaul Phase Two: January 1944 cover a damaged P-38, and after he was sure it could make it back to base, he flew on and joined with his second element, lLt. Louis Anthony and 2Lt. Jack Laurie, who had just shared a Zero, and the trio headed home. Fourth flight leader Capt. Magnus Francis had to return to base with engine trouble, and was escorted back to base by wingman 2Lt. Harold Slupe. Element leader lLt. Richard Wheeler lost contact with wingman 2Lt. Winfield MacFarland and was the lone member of the flight, and followed the other P-38s up St. George Channel. Just north of Duke of York Island six Zeros attacked, and he made a head-on pass, firing both his cannon and machine guns, and smoked the target, which then crashed into the Channel waters. Wheeler climbed back up into the fight and made another head-on pass on a Zeke and got his second victory, as it smoked and halfrolled to the left and dove into the sea. These were Wheeler's third and fourth victories after getting two P-40 victories on 15 July, 1943. Wheeler was out of ammunition and went over to escort Lt.Col. Dusard in his damaged fighter.

Capt. Frank "Wildman" Gaunt scored his first P-38 victory and eighth and last of the war, making him the sixth leading 13FC ace. (Author)

Capt. Carl Hay led the fifth flight and claimed two Zero probables, and his wingman, 2Lt. James Corbett, shot down a Zero to bring the squadron's daily total to nine victories and five probables. However, the 44 th lost lLt. Travis Wells and 2Lt. Robert Stoll. Westbrook got a Zero for his fifteenth and last victory until his next tour in September. The Marine F4Us were credited with two Zeros. On 7 January Capt. Wallace Jennings was leading the third of five flights that took off from Stirling Island to escort B-24s to Rabaul. At take off the weather was closing in, and after he took off his engine malfunctioned and he was seen to circle at 1,500 feet over the island by Capt. Frank Gaunt. Gaunt radioed Jennings to cut his fuel mixture, but the engine caught fire and immediately the entire fighter was on fire and crashed into the sea before Jennings could bailout. On 9 January USMC and USN SBDs and TBFs flying from their new base at Piva North made their first run on Rabaul. The bombers and their escorts met 50 Jap fighters, and the Marines (VMFs-211, -212, and -321) claimed 21 shot down, and the Navy (VF-33) three. That day 16 44FS P-38s took off from Stirling Island to fly high cover for 10 B-24s. On their approach to Rabaul the Liberators flew through a heavy cloud bank that fighter mission leader, Capt. Cotesworth Head, elected to fly over, but once on the other side he was unable to pick up the bomber formation and returned to base. . On the 11 th 16 P-38s of the 44FS and 18FG escorted SBDs and TBFs on roving high cover for a bombing mission to Lakunai Airfield. At 40 miles from Cape St. George at 12,000 feet the P-38s flew ahead of the bomber formation, and at 15 miles from the Cape temporarily lost them in bad weather. The fighters headed back to track down the bombers and sighted 20-30 Zeros about 3,000 above the bombers. Capt. Frank Gaunt saw two flights of Zeros in front of and to the left of the main formation. Gaunt picked out the element leader of the second flight and fired a good burst, and the enemy rolled away. Gaunt moved on to fire at the Jap's wingman, who also rolled, but with his engine burning for Gaunt's first P-38 victory and eighth and last of the war (the sixth leading 13FC ace). "Doc" Gaunt, former medical student from Missouri, moved on and fired at two more Zeros without confirmed results. Flight leaders Capts. Douglas Currey and Grant Smith, and 2Lts. Winfield MacFarland and Donald Anderson all claimed probabies on the Zeros, who seemed reluctant to fight and took immediate evasive action, diving away from conflict. On the 14th Capt. Cotesworth Head led a flight of P-38s on an early afternoon patrol over Torokina Airfield on Bougainville to look for pilots who had crash-landed or bailed out in the area. At 1500 the air controller vectored the flight towards a bogie 60 miles to the southwest. Head placed his second element at 10,000 feet just below the overcast, and he and his wingman, 2Lt. John Roehm, flew to 15,000 feet above it. The controller's accurate information put the P-38s three miles astern of a Kate dive-bomber carrying two 300lb. bombs. Head came up to 50-60 feet on the Kate and hit it with a short burst that blew it up to make him a double ace with ten victories. Head was so close that the blast blinded him, rocked his fighter, and covered it with oil, smoke, and soot, making it dif-

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II ficult for him to see once the flash effect subsided. Head called his wingman over to look at his aircraft for damage, but none was seen, and the two returned to base. The Marines had a big day with 36 victories, 19 by VMF-215. lLt. Robert Hanson became an ace in a day with five victories, giving him ten total victories. VF-40, in its third deployment in the Solomons, got three victories this day, and would claim four victories during January to give them 20 for the third highest land-based F6F squadron total. It had one ace, Ens. Robert Carlson, with five victories. It would move on to Bougainville in late February and ended its tour in the Treasury Islands, but scored no further victories. VF-38; under Lt.Cdr. John Anderson, moved to Segi Point with VF-40 until 10 December, and then moved to Barakoma and Piva, where they scored five victories in late January over New Ireland. In February VF-38 would score ten more victories to give it 22 F6F victories, the second highest land-based Hellcat total for the war (it had no aces) On I January Lt.Col. Leo Dusard, the 339 1h squadron CO, had become the commander of the 347FG. The group's three squadrons were scattered over the Pacific. The 67FS had been transferred from Bougainville back to the Russells, and the 68FS was relieved from its station on Guadalcanal. The 339FS arrived at Stirling in mid-January to join 20 pilots of the 44FS. The Sunsetters were scheduled to replace the Vampires in several days, as the 441h was to get some R&R in New Zealand. Stirling is the southern most of the two Treasury Islands; the larger northern island, Mono, lays only a few hundred yards from Stirling. Stirling is the tip of a massive volcano protruding 16,000 feet from the sea floor. The island is three miles long and less than a mile wide, and is made up of white coral. The Seabees cut a glaring white coral 7,000 x ISO foot runway on the western end of the island. The end of the runway was sited on a cliff 60 feet above the sea, and huge surrounding mahogany trees were cut to construct base facilities. The pilots of the 3391h arrived by C-47 on 16 January, but the equipment, 338 personnel, and ground crews were shipped in LCIs (small Landing Craft Infantry) from Guadalcanal. Unfortunately, the small ships ran into an extended tropical storm with 30 to 50 foot waves, causing almost all aboard to be seasick during the entire miserable fourday voyage. The only thing good about the storm was that it canceled the mission scheduled for the day after they arrived. However, the 339 1h was greeted by a lone Jap Zero that dropped through a hole in the clouds. The Zero probably was so surprised to find the airfield occupied that it did not drop a bomb or strafe the field. As could be expected, that night Washing Machine Charlie made the first of his nightly raids on the base. On the 20lh B-25s of the 42BG's 70lh and 7 yh Medium Bomb Squadrons were based on the western end of the field and were joined by the 69BS several days later. On 17 January a mixed formation of 24 339FS and 44FS P38s, with the 441h 'S Capt. Frank Gaunt as mission leader, escorted 49 SBDs and 18 TBFs to shipping in Rabaul's Simpson Harbor. Navy F4Fs and Marine F4Us were to provide medium and low cover. On their way to the target five P-38s returned to Stirling due to operational failure. The remaining Lightnings rendezvoused with the bombers west of Taiof Island, but no Navy or Marine fighters rendezvoused. The P-38s had to reorganize and stacked in two layers over the bombers, one at 12,000 feet and the other a 20,000. 244

There were two layers of clouds over the target, and the formation flew between them. Plans were for the SBDs to call in the fighters when they reached the target, and then they were to begin their bomb runs. But as the bombers reached Simpson Harbor they saw a small hole in the clouds below and peeled off through it without calling Capt. Gaunt. The bombers soon called for fighter support, and the P-38s made a steep, diving 180 to find the bombers and then to scissor over them. The diving maneuver dispersed the P38s, who were surprised by Zeros diving through the top cloud cover. Initially eight Zeros were spotted, followed by 40 to 50 more that dove on the now scissoring Lightnings below. The P-38 flights tried to take cover in the clouds, but the attack soon developed into individual dogfights extending from Simpson Harbor to Cape Gazelle. Capt. Cotesworth Head got three of the unit's four victories that day to give him 13 victories. Capt. Robert Corbett of the 44FS got a Zero, and lLt. Louis Anthony got a probable. 339 111 pilot FlO James Kennedy claimed a Zero and damaged another, while lLt. Jarrold Lilliedoll shot down a Zero as it dove through the clouds and also added two probables. lLt. Henry Meigs (339 Ih ) claimed three Zero probables, and 2Lt. John Shank one probable. Eight P-38s were lost, four from the 44FS (ILt. Earl Heckler, 2Lts John Munson, Theodore Schoettel, and George Shell) and four from the 339 1h (Lts. Hart, Brown, Black, and Langen). The losses were due to the bomber's low approach that put the P-38 escorts at a disadvantage to a superior force of Japanese who had the benefit of altitude (19,000 to 20,000 feet). Low level escort demanded that the escorts stay with the Zeros and keep them busy while the bombers were on their bombing runs and turning to leave the target. At a price the Lightnings fulfilled their obligation, but the large P-38s just could not stay with the nimble Zeros as could the F4Us and F6Fs, nor even as the P-40s and F4Fs were able to do. A SBD and TBF were also lost. As the bombers completed their bomb runs the Marine fighters arrived and the eight remaining P-38s returned to base. The

Cotesworth Head's P-38 at the end of his tour. Note that his bombing missions have been denoted on the right just below the cockpit windshield. Head was shot down on a bomber escort mission after scoring his 14th and last victory, making him the third ranked 13FC ace of the war. (Smith)

Part Five, Chapter 3 - Rabaul Phase Two: January 1944 F4Us and F6Fs from Torokina from rendezvousing. The 14 P-38s of the 44FS led by Cotesworth Head were the only cover for the bombers. Capt. Head's flight covered the first bomber squadron, lLt. James Long's flight flew cover for the second bomber squadron, and lLts. Howard Cleveland and James Reddington's flights covered the third squadron. The Mitchells attacked Tobera Airfield at 150 feet, starting several fires and drawing some automatic AA fire. After the bomb run Japanese fighters were sighted, and the P38s began to scissor over the bombers at a dangerously low altitude. When the formation was about five miles out over the New Britain coast the 20 to 30 Zeros attacked from the rear from a height advantage of 4,000 feet. The Zeros did not make a concentrated attack, instead coming in individually, and the P-38s turned into them and the air battle turned into a shooting Zeros off one another's tails contest. 2Lts. Robert Connolly and George Seeberg went after a Zero that was on the tail of a P-38 and began to fire out of range, but closed and at 250 yards put enough ammo into the Zero to cause it to crash into the water. Connolly turned around and saw two Zeros on his tail, but lLt. James Reddington, who was covering a straggling B-25, came over and shot the nearest Zero off Connolly's tail, then put a short burst toward the other to chase it off. Reddington then caught a Zero by surprise from the rear and hit it hard, and it went into the water. Reddington continued after a Zero and climbed to give it a four second burst into the fuselage and cockpit, starting a fire in the wing root for his third victory of the day and only victories of the war. During the battle the P-38s continued their protection of the bombers. Capt. Head was scissoring over the Mitchells and turned into an attacking Zero and shot it down. The crew of a B-25 reported seeing Head's victory, and then saw Head's P-38 being attacked by two Zeros that hit it in the right engine. A P38 came over to help Head and turned the Zero away with a long deflection shot. lLt. John Roehm chased after this Zero, which climbed and began to stall. Roehm got several good hits, and the Jap made a half roll and Roehm hitit in the belly. Then as the tough Zero leveled off Roehm hit him in the engine and it was seen to hit the water. Roehm and another P-38 went back to scissor over Head's wounded fighter. For some reason Head did a chandelle to the left and his escorts lost him. Another B-25 crew saw the P-38 make a water landing ten miles east of the mouth of the Warangei River, ew Britain, and radioed that position to the Dumbo rescue PBYs. Reddington took over command of the mission and did an excellent job in coordinating the protection of the bombers, meeting and driving off a number of Japanese firing runs. Head was never found, and his victory that day was number 14 and would make him the second 13FC ace at the time and the third highest scoring ace of the 13FC in the war. It was the l3AP's low-level escort orders that contributed to Head's death. Almost two-thirds of the P-38 losses came on SDBrrBF escort missions that were flown between 2,000 and 15,000 feet, far too low for effective P-38 combat operations. On the 19th the other half of the 339 th 's pilots arrived on Stirling. They arrived just in time to spend the night in their foxholes, as Japanese bombers were overhead most of the night, making six bombing attacks on the field. Two B-25s and a P-38 were destroyed, several aircraft were damaged, and stores were set on fire. Before Capt. James Reddington scored his only three victories of the war on I8 being relieved the next day, a flight of reluctant 44FS P-38 pilots

Marines shot down 17 Zeros for the loss of a F4U and F6F. 2Lt. Glen Hart of the 339FS, who was present during the Pearl Harbor attack, had a particularly harrowing experience after being shot down. He was knocked unconscious as he ditched into the water, but came to as the P-38 was sinking and managed to wiggle out of the cockpit and swim to the surface. Hart sustained numerous cuts and bruises to the head and arms, a large gash over his right eye, and a large bump on his forehead. He got into his life raft and administered self first aid. During the afternoon of the second day at sea he managed to spear a small fish and had sushi. On the third day he captured a seagull, slit its throat, drank its blood, cut out its breast, and ate raw poultry with a piece of chocolate from the emergency kit. The next day a floating coconut slacked his thirst. On the fifth day a "big ass" seagull started to peck at him while he was asleep. He grabbed on, captured, and ate it. Hart was finally rescued on the seventh day after scaring large schools of sharks away by slapping the water with his paddle over the last two days. On the 18 th a return mission to Rabaul was scheduled for 70 fighters to escort 34 B-25s, but a takeoff accident prevented the

January. (Smith) 245

13th Fighter Command in World War II took off from Stirling that morning for another attack on Rabaul. After the loss of Capt. Head the day before there were no regrets when the mission was turned back by bad weather. During its South Pacific tour the 44FS had lost six experienced captains and leaders who shot down 22 aircraft. From 20 January to 18 February the 44FS went on R&R, spending nine days in Auckland, New Zealand, with the officers staying at the famous "Kia Ora." Capt. Joseph Lesicka became CO of the 44 th on 21 January, but was soon replaced by Maj. Peyton Mathis, who had flown fighters out of England from July to November 1942 and North Africa from November to May 1943 when he returned to America. When the 44 th pilots returned from New Zealand they were sent to Guadalcanal and attached to the 12FS for intensive training for their next combat tour. On 20 February the 44 th 's designation was officially changed from single engine (SE) to twin engine (TE), even though they had been flying the P-38 during their tour. After their training with the 12FS the 44 th pilots were sent to Stirling to be attached to the 339FS. 44 th CO Maj. Robert Westbrook returned to California as the top 13AF fighter ace with IS victories. The leading ace in the Pacific was Capt. Richard Bong, who had 21 victories, but would return to combat in February for another tour when he would pick up seven more victories for 28 total. Westbrook volunteered for another tour and returned to the Pacific flying as a Lt. Colonel with 13 th Fighter Command; he was assigned as CO of the 339FS/347FG stationed at Sanapor, in the Halmahera Islands. In addition to squadron command duties he was the 347FG Deputy Group Commander. He would score five victories over the Celebes and Philippines. On 22 November he was leading the 339th over Mindoro in the Philippines on a strafing mission on gunboats. In poor visibility he and his wingman were hit by accurate AA fire from a gunboat. None of his flight had seen him bailout before his fighter crashed. Later a PBY search plane rescued his wingman, but no trace of Westbrook was ever found. Like Westbrook, eight victory ace Capt. Frank Gaunt returned to the States, but requested an additional combat tour and served with the 325FG in Italy from April 1944 to the end of the war without any additional combat claims. ILl. Joseph Lesicka (nine victories) returned to the U.S. and flew a second tour as a Captain with the 18FG in May 1945 and claimed a damaged Oscar over the Celebes flying a P-38. lLt. Cyrus Gladen, a five-victory ace who had flown 164 missions, returned to the States and did not return to combat. After the 44 th left combat Adm. Halsey sent Gen. Harmon the following radiogram lauding the squadron. Harmon passed the message to the men of the squadron: 5 February 1944 YOUR BAG OF JAP PLANES DURING THE LAST TEN DAYS IS MOST REMARKABLE. THEREFORE, PLEASE CONVEY MYHEARTIESTCONGRATUALTIO S TO ARMY AIR FORCE PERSONNEL ON THEIR DSETRUCTION OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT IN THE SOLOMONS-NEW BRITAIN AREA. YOUR CONTINUED EFFORTS WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT AND CONTIUING EFFECT ON ALL FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THIS THEATRE. Admiral Halsey

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On 20 January the 339FS flew 12 P-38s of Maj. Lawrence's section off Stirling Island to join Marine VMF-321 F4Us to cover B-25s of the 70BS/42BG, also based at Stirling, on a strafing/fragmentation bombing of Rapopo Airfield, just west of Cape Gazelle. Again the mission planner called for the P-38s to fly to the target with the low-flying Mitchells, while the F4Us were to fly high cover in advance of the B-25s. As they crossed the New Britain coast near Cape Gazelle the Lightning pilots spotted a large formation of approaching Zeros. The P-38s dropped their external tanks and went full throttle to gain as much speed and altitude as possible for the fight. The weather was not in the Americans' favor, as the clouds were low and broken, allowing the Japanese to come in close to the bombers and escorts. For a while the escorts lost the bombers in the clouds, and the Zeros took advantage by shooting down two bombers and Lt. Kelly's P-38. A Zero dove on squadron leader Maj. Henry Lawrence, and another came at Capt. George Chandler head-on at high speed. The Zero passed over Chandler, who broke off to intercept Lawrence's attacker. As Chandler closed the Zero broke off and Chandler heard the thumps of 20mm shells hitting the left engine of his "Barbara Ann. "Chandler made the same mistake many pilots made in underestimating the Zero's ability to follow and complete the split-So Both Chandler and the Jap came out of the maneuver, Chandler pushed the stick forward, and the Japanese pilot was unable to follow. Chandler's Allison engine was engulfed in flames that were threatening to eat through the firewall and explode the fuel in the internal wing tank. Chandler decided to bailout, but as he rolled the fighter to open the canopy he saw Japanese AA gunners firing from a nearby hilltop. Chandler had to choose between flying with the burning engine to escape or bailing out and to either be hit by AA fire or be taken prisoner. Chandler leveled the fighter out and was able to cut the fuel to the burning engine and was surprised when the fire went out. He feathered the prop and looked for a B-25 to escort him back to base. As he flew with a B-25, its pilot turned to close and fire on an AA position on another hilltop. Chandler watched in horror as the Mitchell misjudged its approach and smashed into the hilltop, knocking out the gun, and then rolled over on its back and exploded in a fireball in the jungle on the other side. Chandler joined B-25s coming back from the attack and tried to keep up with them at tree top level on one engine. Chandler saw a Zero closing at 3 o'clock high and getting ready to make a high side attack, but the Lightning pilot turned into the attack to make the Jap bank so steeply that he could not fire without hitting the jungle in his pull out. The enemy pilot broke off but rolled left to make a big circle to return in a right turn to get on Chandler's tail. As Chandler was preparing to turn into the impending attack a F4U got on the Zero's tail and exploded it. Chandler flew back to Stirling and followed another P-38 with an engine shut down flown by Lt. C. Smith in the landing pattern. Smith's damaged P-38 came in too slow and was not able to clear the cliff at the west end of the runway, and as he tried to apply power to reach the runway he crashed into the water and was unable to get out of his sinking fighter. Chandler had to manually crank down the landing gear, as his hydraulics were out, but made a safe landing. (From correspondence with Chandler) The Marines had a good day over New Britain, as they

Part Five, Chapter 3 - Rabaul Phase Two: January 1944 shot down 15 Zeros (VMF-211 got six, VMF-321 got three, and VMF-215 got six). Over the next several days the 339'h flew escort missions. On the 21 st the pilots and ground crews struggled out of their foxholes at Stirling after a night of Washing Machine Charlie raids to get ready for a SBD/TBF escort mission to help stop the Japanese attacking the perimeter around Torokina on Bougainville. Capt. Bill Harris led eight P-38s there to rendezvous with the Marine bombers, but after orbiting for an hour they flew back to Stirling when the bombers did not arrive. On the 22nd the 339 'h was on patrol and was bounced by 70 Zeros. Several of the Zeros were carrying phosphorous bombs that they dropped from 6,000 feet above the P-38s. 2Lt. Frederick Seaman had one explode directly in front of his plane, and the intensely burning particles bore into his aircraft; within seconds both engines caught on fire, and the plane went into a spin into the water near Duke of York Island, near Rabaul. 2Lt. Edwin Studley was also hit and made a water landing in Buka Passage; he was reported floating in his life raft. Later Bill HalTis took a flight

On 29 January 2Lt. Kenneth McCloud got credit for two victories when the Zero he shot down collided with another and both crashed. A third Zero shot up McCloud's Lightning, and he was forced to ditch and was rescued after being adrift for nine harrowing days. (Harris)

of P-38s to escort a PBY to find and rescue Studley. The patrol plane spotted him and landed nearby, while the P-38s flew cover overhead. Studley swam from his raft toward the Dumbo. As he approached it didn't slow down because it couldn't stop due to low batteries. The PBY crew threw Studley a line, dragging him through the water as they reeled him in like a fish through the side blister as the PBY was taxiing to take off. On the 23 rd 80 AAF, USN, and USMC fighters were scheduled for another low-level SBD escort. Twelve 339FS P-38s were to be included, but the squadron had only nine operational for the mission. Just after take off three aborted-two lost engines, and the third had gunsight problemsso only six P-38s continued on the mission. 2Lt. Kenneth McCloud shot down a Zero over Lakunai, just east of Cape Gazelle, and Lt. Yeilding was shot down in flames over the sea and listed MIA. On the 24 th nine 339th P-38s were on escort on a raid on Tobera airfield when they were attacked by 40 Zeros. This time the P-38s had the advantage of high cover. ILt. Truman Barnes shot down two, his first victories on his way to becoming an ace, and Capt. George Chandler and ILt. Thomas Walker each got one. Again the Marine Corsairs scored heavily on these days, as they shot down 18 on the 22nd , 56 on the 23 rd , and 21 on the 24 th . Six new P-38s arrived on Stirling on the 2S'h and were put into action on the next day when the 339'h put up 16 P-38s to fly high 30,000-foot cover for a SBD/ TBF mission on Lakunai Airfield. Marine and Navy fighters flew low and intermediate cover for their bombers and intercepted and shot down 23 Japanese fighters that did not engage the high-flying P-38s. VMF-215 claimed 14, and Blackburn's VF-17, back on a new tour, claimed nine. When the 339 'h pilots landed they were greeted by the news that 2Lt. Glen Hart had been picked up after seven days floating in the ocean off ew Ireland and was on his way back to Stirling. On the 27 'h Maj. Lawrence led his section to Rapopo and Tobera Airfields to fly high cover for heavy bombers. A few Japanese fighters intercepted, but stayed out of range and did not press any attacks. Several dropped phosphorous bombs on the bombers as they were leaving the area but did not hit anything. The Marine Corsairs claimed six and VF-17 Corsairs claimed 16. On 28 January at 0630, 14 of the 339 th took off to escort B-25s that dropped parafrags and strafed on another low-level mission to Tobera airfield. The P-38s flew at 15,000 feet just above the bombers as they neared St. George's Channel. As they passed over the coastline they were shadowed by Zeros from above and fired on by accurate AA fire from below. The B-25s continued to fly through the AA, and as they neared Tobera they made a right 90-degree turn and dove to bomb the field. The P-38s'dove with them, and so did the Japanese Zeros. In the dive several Lightning pilots had their windshields fog over with condensation from the warmer air, which blinded them for several minutes. Again the P-38s suffered at low altitude. 1Lt. Benim and 2Lt. Thomas were hit and forced to make water landings just east of Cape St. George, but were rescued by a PBY later that afternoon. Lts. Schrock, Serwat, and McCloud did not return and were listed as MIA. Lts. Latham and Hopkins limped back to base on one engine, and Latham counted 14 Jap 20mm shell holes in his aircraft. The 339th could take a little solace in shooting down five Japanese and a probable (by 1Lt. Jarrold Lilliedoll). Capt. Stanley Walden (a former Royal Canadian Air 247

13th Fighter Command in World War II Force instructor), lLt. Donald Stewart, and 2Lt. William Thomas each downed a Zero. 2Lt. Kenneth McCloud got credit for two victories when the Zero he shot down collided with another and both crashed. A third Zero shot up McCloud's Lightning, and he was forced to ditch. His Lightning sunk within a half minute, and his cockpit was nearly filled with water before he got hjs seatbelt unbuckled. The fighter turned tail up, and as it went underwater, McCloud stepped out on a wing and floated up to the surface. Soon Japanese aircraft flew over to search the area, but did not discover him and flew away. For the first two days he floated in his dinghy, waving frantically at search planes that flew over but did not come back. For the next two days violent storms kicked up huge waves that upset his life raft. On the fifth day he awoke to find a tern perching at his feet. Keeping his blanket over his head, he was able to slowly sneak up on the tern and grab it. He skinned and ate it raw for breakfast. McCloud had difficulty sleeping, as his raft was con6nually bumped by sharks picking off small fish swimming under it. On the sixth he caught a large albatross, skinned it, and cut it into strips. He dipped it into seawater and made albatross jerky by drying it in the hot sun. Finally, after nine days a Navy ship rescued him, and after recuperating for three days on board he was returned to base. The loss offive pilots and nine fighters was a demoralizing blow. Again, the P-38 was forced to fly missions directed by Halsey's Navy-controlled Fighter Command that expected the Army fighters to escort Navy and Marine bombers in low-level attacks, resulting in heavy losses. The P-38 pilots had proven that their fighter was far superior to the Zeros at high altitude, and it angered them to be sacrificed in low-altitude missions. The P-38 had a higher maximum ceiling than Japanese fighters and bombers, and therefore always could have the altitude advantage. With this altitude advantage the Lightnings could ruve through an enemy formation, and its tremendous firepower concentrated in its nose could devastate any enemy aircraft. There was no way for the Japanese to counter attack as the P-38 zoomed through the formation, as they were unable to catch it in its dive. Meanwhile, the Marine VMFs and Navy VF-17s continued to take a terrible toll on the Japanese, claiming 19 and IS, respectively. On the 29'h, Harris led his sec60n on a B-24 mission to the airfield at Lakunai providing high cover at 20,000. The Japanese intercepted but stayed out of range. Harris chased one that came in close and got off an ineffective snap shot. The mission was successful, as no bombers or P-38s were lost to the enemy and the Liberators dropped their bombs unmolested.. On the 30th the 339th sent up four flights led by Maj. William Lawrence (mission leader), Capt. George Chandler, Capt. Elmer Jurgensen, and lLt. Truman Barnes to escort heavy bombers. The escort was at hjgh cover, and again the Japanese fighters were reluctant to become trapped between the high flying P-38s and the bomber's gunners. All escorts and bombers returned safely to base. On the 31 st of January, Harris led 18 P-38s on a B-24 mission to Vanakanau. Bad weather over the target caused the mission to divert to Tobera, its secondary target. No Jap fighters were scrambled, but there was heavy, accurate AA fire; all bombers and escorts returned to base, some with minor

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AA damage. While the AAF was shut out on the last three days of January, the Marjnes continued to claim large victory totals. The Marine aviators claimed 18 victories on the 29 th , 13 on the 30th , and nine on the 31 st, while Blackburn's Navy VF-17 claimed 11 on the 29 th, 13 on the 30 th , and only one on the 31 st . VF-17 ace LtUg) Ira "Ike" Kepford got four Zeros on the 29 th and a Zero and a Tony on the next day to give him 12 victories. The 17 th Photo Recon Squadron had sent its first detachment of men (a small lab detachment) to Bougainville on 9 December to Piva Airstrip. This detachment would work overtime to cover the Marine and Army infantry advance on Bougainville, and also its daily reconnaissance of Rabaul. It would not be until late January that a large cadre of enlisted men arrived at Piva, followed by the F-5s' ardval on 31 January from Munda. As soon as they arrived the Japanese began shelling the field, and the shelling became so jntense that finally the aircraft had to be moved back to Munda. For the next three weeks, until the Japanese artillery was silenced, the planes had to fly into Piva to be quickly serviced and then leave for their mission to ejther Rabaul or around BougainvilJe, and then return to Munda. As the Japanese strongholds at Buka, Kahili, and the Shortlands were reduced, Bougainville secured, and AAF B24s withdrawn from their attacks on Rabaul, the 17 th PRS had less and less responsibility, and the few missions flown were milk runs. The Lone Wolves suffered from monotony and boredom at Bougainville, and men were rotated back to the more developed headquarters base at Guadalcanal. During jts 29 months of operations with the 13AF they flew 12,859 pilot hours, flying almost 2.9 million miles and taking 3,667 rolls offilm totaling 775,000 prints. In January, despite periods of rain, SOPAC aircraft flew more than 2,000 sorties against Rabaul in 28 major daylight attacks and five major night attacks, dropping 899 tons of bombs on Rabaul, 564 tons by the 13AF. The Allies claimed an inflated 412 (503 in one COMAIRSOLS source) Japanese aircraft destroyed, but later revised figures put that total at 133 aircraft! Heavy bombers had flown 263 sorties to Rabaul, B-25s 180 sorties, SBDs 368, TBFs 227, and fighters 1850. Over 100 planes were lost, including eight B-24s, 14 B-25s, eight SBDs, five TBFs, 19 P-38s, 37 F4Us, five F6Fs, and six P-40s (RNZAF). The Japanese clamed 618 aircraft' No matter what the score was, losses had no effect on the Allied air offensive, which now had more than enough aircraft. The damage wreaked on the Japanese, both in the air and on the ground, was having a disastrous effect. Although the majority ofRabaul's buildings had been destroyed, damage to Japanese stores was light for the tonnage of bombs expended. In late November the Japanese had begun to dig tunnels in Rabaul's volcanic rock, moving anything of value underground. However, ships and aircraft were particularly hard hit. Fewer and fewer Japanese fighters intercepted the bombing raids, and surface shipping no longer used Simpson Harbor. During the period Kavieng also came under increased air attack. Halsey had expected to have to invade the north end of New Ireland to cut off Rabaul from its supply from Kavieng and its airfield. The Japanese realized the threat and reinforced Kavieng and the Admiralties to protect Rabaul.

Part Five, Chapter 3 - Rabaul Phase Two: January 1944 In his book Zero l , Martin Caidin (with Horikoshi and Okumiya) quotes the carrier air group's operations officer, who gives a description of the hopelessness of the Japanese aircrew under the relentless air attacks: "The days passed in a blur. Every day we sent the Zeros up on frantic interception flights. The young and inexperienced student pilots had become battle-hardened veterans, their faces showing the sudden realization of death all about them. Not for a moment did the Americans ease their relentless pressure. Day and night the bombers came to pound Rabaul, to smash at the airfield and shipping in the harbor, while the fighters screamed low in daring strafing passes, shooting up everything they considered a worthwhile targetOIt was obvious that so long as we continued the battle in its present fashion, the Americans would grind us under." Because of attrition through the strafing of their airfields and aerial combat, the Japanese did not have enough fighters to counter so many Allied aircraft, and those they did have were flown by pilots who were exhausted and demoralized. Their Zeros were no longer as good as the new American fighters, such as the Hellcat, Corsair, and Lightning. Japanese AA defenses were increasingly less effective by repeated dive and medium bomber attacks. Caidin (ibid. Zero!) sites a demoralizing order given to 2nd Air Squadron pilots who were to: "attack and defend yourselves only when the battle circumstances appear particularly favorable to you." Circumstances never seemed to be favorable. Frequent bad weather was Rabaul's only ally, but then alternate targets were attacked. These targets, particularly the airfields at Borpop and Namatami and the outlying radar stations, were attacked instead, and damage to them added to the reduction of Rabaul's defenses. In its January monthly summary the 13AF assessed the P-38: "The major difficulty encountered by Fighter Command units was experienced by the P-38 squadrons during the month of January. Since the P-38 first came into the theater in the fall of 1943, it had been known that this aircraft was not a low altitude interceptor, and that only above 20,000 feet could it dogfight with a Zero on favorable terms. Nevertheless, during the month of January the Lightning was used rep({atedly as a low altitude interceptor, and with resultant heavy losses in aircraft and pilots to the squadrons concerned. There were apparently two reasons for this improper utilization of the P-38 during the January assaults on Rabaul. First, the SBDs and TBFs,

which the P-38s were called on to cover in conjunction with the F4Us and F6Fs, bombed from 1,500 feet to 3,000 feet. Inasmuch as it was SOP that the bombers be covered at all times, it was necessary for all levels of fighter cover from high to low and close cover to follow the bombers on their run and as they rallied. When the P-38s were jumped by Jap interceptors at such a level they were at a great disadvantage. The most unfortunate example of this situation is the 17 January mission in which eight P38s were lost. The second reason for the improper use of the P-38 was an unexpected development. It is apparent from the Fighter Command mission reports of the period that the Marine fighter pilots did not always discharge their escort responsibilities in accordance with the prearranged plans; for time and time again pilots report that the F4Us were either out of position or failed to maintain their assigned position in the formation. If the Corsairs were on low or close cover and left this position which they frequently did, P-38s were obliged to drop down to cover the bombers, thereby placing themselves in a highly disadvantageous position. One mechanical difficulty caused P-38 pilots some trouble during the period on some Ale. The intake manifolds had been separating from the scroll joint that caused a fire between the cylinder banks and engine failure. Colonel Dusard, Commanding Officer of the 347 t11 Fighter Group, reported that this condition has happened too frequently causing the death of one of his pilots and necessitated on one occasion, his return from Rabaul on a single engine. Once the cause was clearly understood, this defect was ironed out. Some inconvenience was caused Stirling-based P-38 pilots during the period by the poor quality of VHF communications at that base. According to Colonel Leo F. Dusard, this situation was due mainly to unfavorable terrain features in the Treasury Island Group. The VHF beam, which tended project out horizontally was blocked by the hills which lay to the north of the base, thereby making dependable reception uncertain." So it was revealed from the 13AF report on the P-38 that the Marine Corsairs often left their escort positions to go after the Jap fighters, increasing their victory totals at the expense of the disciplined Lightning pilots, who did their primary job and protected the bombers. Capt. George Chandler related the Air Force fighter pilot's credo (Story of the 3391" Fighter Squadron): "First, we stick together; second we stick together; and third we stick together. We've got teamwork and they haven't."

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4 February 1944: Not the End by Any Means

During the first 19 days of February the AIlies further increased the tempo of their attacks, as of the 740 aircraft they had available in the Solomons there was a daily average of 480 operational. BBC B-24s flew 256 sorties and B-25s flew 263 sorties, while SBDs and TBFs flew 817. Fighters flew 1,579 sorties and claimed 171 Japanese aircraft, but this figure was much lower (60?) according to Japanese records. The real taIly probably lays somewhere between. From November 1943 to March 1944 the total Japanese aircraft losses over Rabaul and the Solomons was 359 (USSBS figures) aircraft. At the same time over New Guinea the Japanese losses totaled another 118 Rabaul-based Navy aircraft. Japanese Army aircraft lost in attempting to reinforce Rabaul were 250 aircraft, of which 20 were shot down and 180 were destroyed on the ground, and another 50 were lost in accidents or simply expended from over use. Heavy rain blanketed the South Pacific during the first two days of February and canceled bomber and fighter operations. On 3 February, on a heavy bomber escort over Lakunai the 339 'h encountered a force of incoming Zeros. The P-38s dove through their for-

On 3 February, on a heavy bomber escort to Lakunai Capt. George Chandler was leading his section and shot down a Zero for his fifth victory to make him an ace, (Chandler)

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mation before they were able to attack the bombers and shot down four. Capt. Joseph Restifo got two, and 2Lt. Harry Andrews and lLt. Kermit Hartman shared a victory. Capt. George Chandler was leading his section, and as he approached Rabaul his engines started to run roughly and he turned back to Stirling, but was soon able to smooth them out. He returned to the escort at 35,000 feet where he thought he would be safe. But as he looked up he saw a Jap fighter above him about to stall. When the Jap dove, Chandler also dove and shot off one of the enemy's wings for his fifth victory to make him an ace. The same day 25 victory Marine ace 1Lt. Robert Hanson was kiIled on a strafing run on Cape St. George and was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor on 1 August. On the 4th the heavy rains returned, but Bill Harris led his section on a B-24 escort to Vanakanau Airfield. The weather cleared as they approached the target with the P-38s at 20,000 feet and the bombers 5,000 feet below. About 30 Zeros were scrambled, but were wavering in their decision to attack the bombers with the P38s flying over them. One Zero decided to make an attack and lLt. Myron Pedersen was sent to attack and dove and shot it down. Chandler held his escorts back from going after the Zeros to protect the bombers from a possible second Jap attack that may have been lurking nearby and returned to base without losing a bomber or P-38. That night the Japanese resumed their bombing of Sterling, and despite the searchlights and heavy AA fire they would roar over the field and drop their bombs and scurry off. The next day, Maj. Lawrence led his section to escort B-24s to Lakunai. When they arrived at the target, SBDs and TBFs were already attacking the area and had the Zeros' attention. Except for a pair of Zeros that dropped phosphorous bombs on the formation without doing any damage the Japs left the B-24s alone. Back at Stirling BiIl Harris had the day off, but was testing a P-38 when Stirling radar picked up a bogie and vectored him toward it. The bogie stayed hidden in heavy clouds and Harris had to give up his hunt. On the 6th Harris led his section on an early B-24 escort to four airfields in the Rabaul area: Tobera; Rapopo; Vunakanau; and Lakunai. B-25s were just completing their bomb runs when the B24s arrived at high altitudes, and the Japanese fighters were at low altitudes, having chased the MitcheIls. As Harris' section approached

Part Five, Chapter 4 - February 1944: Not the End by Any Means Lakunai over St. George Channel the Zeros climbed and attacked them. 2Lt. Donald Livesey and 2Lt. Charles Klauda turned into an attacking Zero and smoked it, but it then headed into the safety of nearby clouds for a shared probable claim. ILt. Myron Pedersen fired at another Zero that rolled over and dived away from him without seeing its fate for another probable. Over Lakunai ILt. George Hopkins hit another Zero but could also only claim a probable. Two Zeros closed on an oblivious Bill Harris who was busy leading his section, and put a few bullets into his P-38 and severed an oilhne. Harris shut down the damaged engine and feathered the prop, and again returned to base on one engine, another close call. 2Lt. William Frick also had an engine hit, but he mistakenly shut down both engines and barely escaped crashing into St. George's Channel before he got the good engine restarted and returned for a safe landing on Stirling. On the 9'h, 20 339'h P-38s escorted B-24s over Tobera into heavy weather. Recon aircraft had reported that the storm was breaking up east of Cape St. George and clear weather stretched east to Buka Island, off the western end of Bougainville. The P-38s flew top cover at 30,000 feet over F6Fs and F4Us that were layered between the P-38s and B-24s. Flying on Harris' wing was Lt.Col. Leo Dusard from 347'h HQ, and his element leader was ILt. Donald Livesey; his wingman was ILt. Charles Klauda, who was born in Czechoslovakia. At 1300 the bomber formation was still short of the target when four Zeros dove steeply from 8 o'clock toward Harris' flight. Harris pulled up and left to get a shot at the Japanese flight leader and blew him out of the air. Harris fired a short burst, half snap rolled to his right, and hit the first Jap's wingman with a 90-degree deflection shot, also blowing him up. The maneuver put Harris a little above and to the right of Dusard, who was firing on a Zero that then turned in front of Harris, who fired a short burst. The Zero turned over and dove into the clouds, smoking heavily, for a shared victory with Dusard. Livesey and Klauda turned on an attacking Zero and shared a victory. Capt. Bill Harris' two and a half victories gave him 12.5 (The mission report shows a shared victory with Dusard, but some reports give both pilots a full victory). A large force of Zeros bounced the other 339th flights, but at 30,000 feet

Capt. Bill Harris' two and a half victories on 9 February to give him 12.5, (Harris)

the Lightnings were in their fighting milieu, as they broke into a dogfight over Cape Gazelle and Tobera. The Lightnings dove into the attack and kept the Zeros away from the B-24s during their bomb run. As the bombers turned away from the target the Zeros continued their attack more aggressively. ILt. Hemy Meigs got a Zero for his fourth victory, while 44FS holdovers ILt. Morris Wilson got a Zero (and a probable) and ILt. Myron Pederson claimed a probable, and shared another probable with 2Lt. John Zink. The squadron claimed six victories and three probables, but more importantly did not lose a P-38 or B-24. On the 10th Maj. Lawrence led 20 P-38s on a B-24 escort to Tobera. A large number of Zeros, estimated at 75-85 aircraft in the combat report, were scrambled to make a resolute attack to stop the bombers. The air battle took place above 20,000 feet, where the P38s had their way with the Zeros. Nine pilots scored ten victories. Scoring one Zero victory each were: ILt. Truman Barnes; 2Lt. Russell Christiansen; ILt. William Fincher (and a probable); 2Lt. John Shank; 2Lt. Robert Smith; ILt. Thomas Walker (who became an ace that day); FlO James Kennedy; and Capt. Harry Jordon. Capt. Elmer Jurgensen of 347F HQ (Operations and Weather Officer) got two victories. It was another good day for the Sunsetters. On the 11'il, the 13AF was back over Tobera with Sunsetter P38s again escorting B-24s. The Zeros remained below the bombers, but one made a pass to drop a phosphorous bomb on the formation. Harris' section remained disciplined and stayed with the bomber formation, and only one Zero got into the cover and was shot down by ILt. Billy Moore. On the 14th 16 339FS P-38s of Bill Harris' section escorted B25s on a low level bomb run on Vunakanau Airfield. As the Lightnings approached the field their pilots could see clouds of dust rising as the Zeros took off to intercept. Harris had four flights stacked up to 16,000 feet and tightened on the B-25s; they made passes and feints at the attacking Zeros when they arrived to keep them off the bombers during their attack. Harris and his wingman quickly left and returned to the formation after attacking several Zeros trying to rush in at the Mitchells. Harris shot down a Japanese flight leader and his wingman. ILt. Eugene Pafford also got in a short burst at a brave Zero pilot who tried to penetrate the cover. Four Zeros got to altitude and dove from 6 o'clock and surprised Harris' flight. ILt. Charles Klauda and Harris had engines damaged. Pafford had his engine hit and bullets struck his cockpit, destroying his instrument panel and leaving him bleeding from the head, shoulder, and arm. Harris tried to regroup his damaged flight and turn them around to get back to base. Ten Zeros continued to harass them, but in the retreat Harris managed to shoot down another Zero. Harris' damaged engine was still running, and he decided to lead a few of the Zeros away from his damaged flight by diving. Two Zeros followed, but Harris' engine overheated and he had to level off to shut it down and feather the prop. He did a few evasive maneuvers, but wanted to get all the diving speed he could in order to get to the deck first and level off and get away. The seas were very high that day, and he figured he would be a more difficult target at wave-top level. Now four Zeros were following him very closely, pursued by another P38 that was flown by former night-fighter pilot ILt. Hemy Meigs. Harris claims that two Zeros followed so close and were so worried

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13th Fighter Command in World War II by Meigs that they crashed into the sea. Harris flew in the troughs between the high waves, pulling up over the wave tops and back down into a trough to evade the two Zeros. Meigs continued to fly above the undulating and weaving Harris and the Zeros trying to get a shot, but the Zeros finally pulled away and returned to Rabaul. Harris began a gradual climb and headed back to base and landed without a problem. As he taxied his good engine cut out as it ran out of fuel and "Hattie" had to be towed back to its revetment. lLt. Eugene Pafford's aircraft was hit for the second time in his tour. In his combat report he described the incident: "Steel slugs were really bouncing around my cockpit. My left engine was shot out, my canopy blown off, my instrument panel and radio knocked out, the rudder shot out of commission, the left aileron shot off, and my left wing completely riddled with cannon shell. I bled like Hell! The only thing I can say about it is that this can become non-habit forming as far as I am concerned."

ILt. Eugene Pafford covered with numerous bandages after the Rabaul mission of 30 September 1943 (Chandler)

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Pafford had a piece of shrapnel in his shoulder and was bleeding severely and dazed as he was helped out of the shot up cockpit. Capt. George Chandler described Pafford's nerve-racking flight back to base: "I have never seen a worse shot up plane in my combat days except those that have crashed or plunged into the sea. We had to lead him back to his base. He was in a dazed condition and only semi-conscious enough to lower his wheels in landing. How Lt. Pafford got back is a mystery to us all. It was sheer grit plus extreme luck." ("Story ofthe 339''' FighterSquadmn"). After he landed safely he headed to New Zealand on medical leave. Outflanking Rabaul On 15 February New Zealand troops captured Nissan in the Green Island group without a fight. Nissen Island is an eight-mile long oval-shaped atoll 40 miles northwest of the northern end of Buka/ Bougainville Islands, and is located only 120 miles east of Rabaul and about a 100 miles east of Kavieng. Its proximity to these bases made it prone to Japanese counter attack when it was invaded, but once Rabaul airpower had been neutralized this was no longer a worry. The newly formed 22nd Seabee Regiment began the construction of a forward airfield there that was completed ahead of schedule, and on 1 April the first SBDs and TBFs shared the field with VMF-1l4 and VMF-212 F4Us. By 15 April 13BC B-24s landed on Green en route to strikes on Truk. The field became so crowded with aircraft and Seabee construction equipment that the SBDs and TBFs would taxi with their wings folded. The Green Island airfields flew COMAIRSOLS missions to isolate the next objective, the Admiralties in the Bismarcks. The capture of the Admiralties, located 200 miles from Wewak, New Guinea, and 260 miles from Kavieng would separate Gen. Imamura on Rabaul and his 8th Area Army fighting on New Guinea. On the 29 th U.S. Army troops landed on Los Negros, in the Admiralty Islands, and took the island after a month of fighting, thereby outflanking both New Britain and New Ireland. The capture of the Admiralties gave the Americans the superb Seeadler Harbor, laying in a hook formed by Manus, the larger island to the west, and the smaller Los Negros Island to the east. The Japanese had built two airfields, one on each island-Lorengau on Manus and Momote on Los Negros-that they used as staging points between Rabaul and ew Guinea. While the ground battle continued the Seabees made Momote operational on 7 March, and then went onto Lonengrau, which they found to be unsatisfactory for further development, and moved to Mokerang Plantation on Los Negros and built an airbase that became operational by 21 April. Soon Manus, as the base network, Seeadler Harbor naval base, and the two airfields became an important staging and supporting point for American operations during the remainder of 1944. MacArthur continued to press for the capture of Kavieng, but Halsey felt it could be by-passed, and that Emirau in the 51. Matthias Group could be taken more easily and would put an airbase 130 miles northwest of Kavieng and closer to the Carolines as a target for air operations. When Adm. Nimitz concurred, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the seizure of Emirau. On 29 March the island was invaded without opposition, as the Japanese had evacu-

Part Five, Chapter 4 - February 1944: Not the End by Any Means

RING AROUND RABAUL

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ated it two months before. Emirau was projected to be a major base, with two 7,000-foot bomber bases and a 5,000-foot fighter field. By mid-May the Emirau bases became part of the ring of COMAIRSOLS and 5AF bases that pounded Kavieng and RabauI. MacArthur then captured Saidor, Bodagjim, and Madang, on New Guinea's northeastern shore, and isolated all Japanese troops on eastern New Guinea. Then on 6 March Talasea on the north shore of New Britain was captured, obstructing any Japanese evacuation from New Britain, and Rabaul was truly isolated and by-passed. On the lS'h the 68FS flew an early morning patrol, and lLt. William Lawrence damaged a Val and lLt. William Butler claimed a Tony probable near Green Island. At 0940, during an escort to

Vunakanau Airdrome, 17 P-38s of the 339FS engaged 40 Zeros and came out winners, with seven victories for one loss (ILt. George Traner). lLt. Henry Meigs, who had scored three victories at night with the 6NFS, shot down two Zeros to give him six victories and make him an ace. Capt. Bill Harris got two Zeros to give him 14.5 total victories and make him the second highest 13FC scorer, following Robert Westbrook with 15. Harris would not score again until 22 June 1945 when he was with the 18FG to become the second highest 13FC scorer after Westbrook, who had 20. Other victors that day were lLts. Donald Stewart, George Traner, and 2Lt. Donald Livesey. 2Lt. John Zink claimed a probable. Traner was shot down, and while inflating his life raft punctured it with his

Capt. Bill Harris got two Zeros to give him 14.5 total victories and make him the second high I3FC scorer following Robert Westbrook with 15. Harris would not score again until 22 June 1945 when he was with the 18FG, to become the second highest I3FC scorer afterWestbrook, who had 20. (Harris)

ILt. George Traner was shot down and floated around in his life vest for several hours before a Navy ship picked him up. Traner was youthful and very small in statue, and the ship's captain could not believe he was married and a pilot.The captain offered him a position as his cabin boy, which was to serve as his nickname throughout his tour (Smith)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II knife and lost all his supplies. He floated around in his life vest for several hours before a Navy ship picked him up. Traner was youthful and very small in stature, and the ship's captain could not believe he was married and a pilot. The captain offered him a position as his cabin boy, which was to serve as his nickname throughout his tour. On the 17 th the Japanese sent up 50 Zeros to intercept 145 Marine SBDs, TBFs, and their F4U, F6F, and P-40 (RNZAF) escorts. Marine VMF-217 and VMF-222 shot down six Japanese aircraft. Marine night-fighters of VMF (N)-531 shot down two Jakes early in the morning. On the 18 th, 15 339 th pilots would fly their last missions before returning to the States, and the squadron would claim five victories. Four B-25s were escorted by four P-38s led by ILt. Truman Barnes on a low level strafing attack on Tobera Airfield. This small formation was to fly to the target at wave top level and arrive at Tobera ten minutes before a larger force of 48 high flying B-24s came over. Their purpose was to suppress the Japanese air response to the major attack. Barnes described the mission:

ILt. Truman Barnes became the I3AFCs twentieth and last ace with two Zeros downed. (Barnes)

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"Since no one volunteers for a low-level bomber escort mission we flight leaders drew cards the night before to see who the lucky flight would be. I drew first and got the jack of spades. 1 breathed a sigh of relief as I was about ready to go home. The other five drew and it was hard to believe that my jack was the low card. We took off before dawn and joined up with the B-25s. About an hour and a half-later, never flying more than 25 feet above the water, we could see the Rabaul area. Flying almost due north, the lead bomber navigator was to make a left turn at a precise point into St. George Bay. This was to avoid flying over the beehive of AA or the Ropopo Airdrome. From my position I could tell we were going too far north. Maintaining radio silence I rocked my wings to the lead bomber. He made an immediate left turn and fire-walled the throttles. This left the P-38s lagging badly as the B-25 could accelerate much faster than the P-38 at sea-level. The Japanese AA beehive was cleared but our flight path took us back over Ropopo at which time we caught up with the B-25s. Luckily the element of surprise was still with us, how, I'll never know! Tobera Air Field, our target, now was just over 20 miles ahead. In the next few minutes the B-24s at 30,000 feet should have been located by Japanese radar. As Tobera came into view I could see Zeros gathering in clusters at the end of the runway. I spread my flight while the B-25s went right down the runway centerline skipping their bombs into the ganged up Zeros. A few got airborne but not for long. My flight was strafing and hitting what we could in the air and I got two Zeros. We made a hard left turn and shortly were over the water again, heading southeasterly. To the right of our course I spotted aircraft. I sent my element leader out to identify. As he approached he fired in front of them. They then gave him many profiles and they turned out to be two Navy PVs sent out to assist us in case we were shot down. While flying out I received a radio call from my friend George Chandler who was flying high cover for the B-24s. I told him that only a few Zeros from Tobera would be up to greet him. This, of course, made his day." The Barnes' P-38s arrived just as the Zeros were taking off and destroyed five Zeros for its final victories over Rabaul. 2Lts. Russell Christiansen, Donald Cae, and ILt. Thomas Walker (his sixth and last victory) got one Zero each. ILt. Truman Barnes became the 13AFC's twentieth and last ace when he bagged two Zeros. The destruction to the taxiing and parked aircraft was heavy, and the strafing attack so disoriented the Japanese that their resistance to the next attack was nil. VF-17 did shoot down seven Zeros over Cape Gazelle. ILt. Thomas Walker left for the States after flying 129 missions and shooting down six Japanese aircraft to serve as an instructor for the rest of the war. ILt. Truman "Barney" Barnes transferred out of the 347FG after these victories and did not return to combat. The following day Capt. Bill Harris led a patrol over the Green Islands and met no enemy aircraft. The Marines shot down three Japanese aircraft on the 18 th and two on the 19 th meeting very limited resistance. VF-17 would shoot down seven Zeros on the 18 th and have their last hurrah, shooting down 16 on the next day over Rabaul and Cape Siar. Lt.(jg) Ira Kepford added three victories to finish his tour as the Navy's highest scoring Corsair pilot with 16 victories. VF-38 added five victo-

Part Five, Chapter 4 - February 1944: Not the End by Any Means ries over Tobera that day to give it 22 victories from mid-September 1943, as it was land-based at Guadakanal, New Georgia, and Bougainville. The next big days for Navy F6Fs were in the Marianas, where they shot down 94 Japanese on the 16t h, 30 on the 17 t h, 21 on the 19 th, and 35 on the nnd. In January and February the Navy VFl7's Corsairs scored 60.5 and 46 victories respectively, ending its Solomons service with 13 aces, including triple ace Lt(jg) Ira "Ike" Kepford (16), plus Lt.Cdr. Tom Blackburn (11), Lt(jg) Howard Burriss (7.5), Lt. Oscar Chenoweth (8.5), Lt(jg) Paul Cordray (7), Lt(jg) John Crosby (5.25), Lt(jg) Daniel Cunningham (7), Lt. Merle Davenport (6.25), Lt(jg) Dorris Freeman (9), Lt. Clement Gile (8), Ens. Thomas Harris (8 + 1 VF-18), Lt. Earl May (8), and Ens. Frederick Streig (5). Its 152 total victories made it the top Navy F4U squadron of the war. On the 18 th pilots of the 12FS had flown into Stirling to relieve and replace 15 pilots of the 339 th , who had been in the South Pacific for over a year. Maj. John Endriss replaced Maj. Lawrence as 339 th CO. On the 18 th Harris had led his last patrol, but was not sent home; instead he was assigned to the l3FC to serve under Brig.Gen. Earl Barnes, l3FC CO in Brisbane, Australia. Harris was modest about his achievements: "I feel that God gave me some special gifts and put me in a position use them to defeat the enemy of our country. I am really no more hero than any the other men that were out there. We were all trying to win the war, then come home and continue our lives know-

ing that within ourselves that we did our best." (Correspondence: April 1986) The remaining 339'h pilots flew daily strafing and bombing runs on the remaining Japanese ground installations, airfields, and shipping. The Japanese 2nd Air Flotilla made its last significant interception on the 19th when it sent up 36 Zeros to intercept 139 Allied aircraft, including 71 Strike Command SBDs and TBFs. Both sides inflated claims, as 23 planes were claimed shot down by the Americans and 31 by the Japanese. After this day missions to Rabaul were considered "milk runs." On 20 February the Japanese threw in the towel and withdrew the remaining aircraft (30 Zeros, six Bettys, eight Vals, ten Judys, and five or six Kates) ofVAdm. Jinichi Kusaka's 11 th Air Fleet out of Rabaul. The aircraft were sent to Truk, where on 16-17 February VAdm. Raymond Spruance had just destroyed 200,000 tons of shipping and 250-275 aircraft intended for Rabaul. Adm. Koga now needed these aircraft to defend Truk. The 204'h Air Group was down to one operational fighter by mid-February, and the 253 rd Air Group (Tobera) had only the Zeros left behind from the 2nd Carrier Division. On January 30, 1944,30 Japanese 201" Air Group pilots were withdrawn to Saipan, leaving their war-weary Zeros. Rabaul's value had been centered in its ability to shield Truk from attack, and the destruction there by the USN attack showed Truk to be vulnerable, and thus Rabaul's role in its defense was over and its defenses were stripped. In January and February SOPAC aircraft dropped 4,229 tons of bombs on Rabaul and claimed an inflated 730 Japanese aircraft destroyed (including 82 by 13FC fighters and an inflated 49 by l3BC bombers). The 730 included 147 for the last two weeks in December, 412 in January, and 171 through 19 February. The Allied claims were: USMC-393; USN-166; AAF-13l; and RNZAF-40. The Japanese placed their losses at 219 aircraft. However, if they had 292 aircraft in December and flew in 138 more, then finally withdrew 57, these figures indicate that they lost at least 370, or half of SOPAC's estimate. After the withdrawal, all VAdm. Kusaka had in his aircraft inventory were 15 grounded Zeros and eight Jake float planes. Allied recon photos showed only 70 aircraft of all types available in the entire Bismarck area. Soon six Zeros were refurbished and ready to fight, but after 20 February the Japanese were able to send no more than six aircraft up to intercept air raids, and most often the American attackers met no opposition. Also, on the 20 th the Japanese attempted to evacuate many of the experienced ground crews to the Central Pacific on two of the last merchant vessels at Rabaul. The next day COMAIRSOLS patrols sunk the vessels, and the following day the rescue tug crowded with survivors was sunk. The loss of these valuable veteran ground crews was to be as devastating to Japanese air operations in the Central Pacific as the loss of aircrews.

Brig.Gen. Earl Barnes, CO of the 13Fighter Command, with a tropical friend. (Harris)

255

5 The "Milk Runs" Begin

With the withdrawal of Japanese fighters the Allied aerial offensive against Rabaul actually increased. The Rabaul air offensive over the next year and a half was one of mostly routine attacks. COMAIRSOLS began an agenda of systemic destruction in utilizing its fighters and bombers. This air offensive was coordinated by COMAIRSOLS using every type of aircraft under its command. The l3BC sent out B-24s on daily missions until 23 March, when it diverted them to attacks on Truk and other targets in the Carolines. Twenty-four 13BC B-25s were joined by three SBD and three TBF squadrons on Piva and three SBD and one TBF at Green. These Navy and Marine bomber squadrons comprised of 160 to 170 aircraft, of which a third to a half were on daily operations. l3FC fighters were reassigned to a fighter-bomber role, with the P-39s and P-40s initially carrying a 500lb. bomb and the P-38s carrying two 500 pounders. Soon the l3FC single engine fighters were carrying a 1000lb. bomb and the P-38 two 1000lb. bombs. The Marines fitted F4Us with bombs and conducted tests on targets on New Ireland, but did not use bombs extensively until the Marshalls campaign-they did strafe ground targets. COMAIRSOLS developed a 24-hour harassment from the air using 13FC B-25s initially and then switching to Marine PBJs (Marine B-25 Mitchells). COMAIRSOLS' first objective was to annihilate Rabaul Town, and it was divided into 14 target areas that were subdivided into two or three areas. Fighter-bombers were assigned to Rabaul Town, while B-24s, B-25s, SBDs, and TBFs were to destroy the two largest Japanese supply bases, one two miles west of Ropopo, and the other on the northwest coast, three miles west of RabauI. During the first three months of 1944 the 13AF dropped 4,632 tons of bombs on Rabaul and 640 tons on New Ireland. Except for brief interruptions for repair the five Rabaul airfields remained operational until the aircraft evacuation in mid-February. Despite the Japanese withdrawal of their air units American heavy bombers continued dropping bombs from medium to high altitudes, causing extensive cratering ofthe Japanese airfields. Previously, Japanese work crews were usually able to put the field back into operation within a day. After February damage to Rapopo was no longer repaired, and it was abandoned. In July 1944 Lakunai was abandoned after all of its buildings had been destroyed during 256

the first two months of 1944. Tobera was occupied until June 1945 because its barracks and operations offices had been moved underground. Vanakanau was occupied and theoretically operational throughout the war, despite having all of its buildings being destroyed and its operational runway length reduced to 2,650 feet. But the evacuation of aircraft in February made all attempts at underground dispersal and repairs of the few remaining aircraft a dubious exercise. On 16 March 12FS pilots Maj. Francis Daugherty of the l8FG and Lt. Francis Cheney of the l2FS shared a victory over a Dinah south of Vanakanau Airdrome for the last 13FC victory for almost five months (until 5 August 1944). On 15 March, lLt. James Walley of VMF-222 shot down a Rufe float plane over Nabuto Bay, New Ireland, for the Marine Corps' last victory in the area before it left for raids on the Marshall Islands at the end of the month. The Navy had shot its last Japanese aircraft in the area on 12 February when Lt(jg) Larry Englade ofVF-38 shot down a Zero near Gardner Island before the Navy left the area to concentrate on Truk, where it shot down 94 Japanese aircraft on 17 February alone. On 25 February, after heavy merchant shipping losses, the last large cargo vessel left Rabaul, and the area was dependent on small cargo vessels. Until this time the Japanese had lost 70 ofthese small cargo vessels and would lose 44 more in the next eight months. The numerous daihatsu barges and small boats were used increasingly, as they were more easily hidden and replaced. After February the only barge routes from Rabaul were those to points along the coast of New Britain and the Duke of York Islands. On 23 February P-38s flew their first fighter-bomber mission over Rabaul, and over the next several days dropped 59 tons of GP and 43 tons of incendiaries on the fields. Heavy AA fire hit several P-38s, but none were shot down. The l3FC fighter-bombers continued to bomb Rabaul throughout July, flying 1,300 sorties and dropping 1,834 tons of bombs in March; that number diminished to 350 sorties, dropping 360 tons in July. In late December 1943 Gen. Hyakutake was finally convinced that the real Allied invasion on Bougainville was at Torokina, and moved his troops and artillery from the eastern end of Bougainville through almost impenetrable juggle toward the beachhead and its three airfields. On 8 March, after two months of heroic and almost

Part Five, Chapter 5 - The "Milk Runs" Begin impossible effort, the Japanese had concentrated more field artillery than anywhere it had fought in the South Pacific and began to bombard the airfields, destroying three F4Us on Piva South and a B-24 on Piva North. The shells damaged 19 other aircraft and killed one and wounded about a dozen airfield personnel, and that night ten others were wounded, two seriously. During the day Strike Command flew 120 sorties, dropping 60 tons of bombs on the nearby Japanese. Fighter Command P-39s dropped bombs on enemy gun positions at Hanemo and Mom, and were followed by F4Us that strafed these targets. Despite the Japanese artillery fire B-25s and B-24s took off from Torokina to bomb Rabaul for the first time without fighter escort. The next day the Japanese occupied the hills surrounding the perimeter and attacked and took vital Hill 700. The airfield perimeter was vulnerable, and Strike Command flew 107 missions and dropped 65 tons of bombs on Hills 250, 700, 1000, and 1111. The Japanese threat caused COMAIRSOLS to put Plan Able into effect, nightly evacuating all the aircraft inside the perimeter to Barakoma, Munda, or the recently completed strip on

Green Island. The missions to Rabaul were postponed, as all missions were to be flown against the attacking Japanese. That night at each of these evacuation fields the ground crews had to service 40 to 100 extra planes and their crews so that they would be ready to return to Bougainville to attack the Japanese the next morning, and then fly missions from there during the daytime. On the lOth Strike Command flew 160 sorties on the Japanese artillery positions, but on the 12th the shelling intensified on both Piva strips that were just over a mile from the perimeter. Despite the Marston mat on both runways being cratered with shell holes the 114 SBDs and 45 TBFs flew almost continuous missions. On the 13 th they were joined by SBDs and TBFs from other bases, and 131 SBDs and 95 TBFs dropped 123 tons of bombs that day and 145 tons the next day to pound the Japanese positions. The heavy fighting continued until the Japanese made their final desperate attack during the night of 23-24 March and were finally repulsed, and the threat to the airfields was ended. Hyakutake lost 5,469 troops, and those in retreat were now starving. Finally, after 16 days the three airfields in the perimeter resumed their raids on Rabaul.

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6 March 1944

March was a month of bombing and strafing attacks on Japanese installations, supply dumps, and troop concentrations for the 44 th/339 1h Fighter Squadrons based at Stirling. The microfilmed combat reports for the month were generally brief and uninformative: 15 March: the last of 436 Japanese aircraft was shot down by the 13AF over Rabaul. Maj. Francis Daugherty of the 18FG HQ and lLt. Francis Cheney of the 12FS shared a Dinah at 1545 three miles SE of Vanakanau Airfield. 19March: ten P-38s bombed Rabaul Town with two aircraft damaged slightly by AA fire. 20 March: 12 P-38s bombed Rataval Supply Area. 21 March: Lightnings flew three missions. An early morning flight took off at 0555 and flew task force cover for four hours and was relieved by three P-38s that left at 1148 and returned at 1500. Two flights left Stirling at 0945 and bombed Lakunai Airdrome, Rabaul. 22 March: 11 P-38s bombed the Laruma River area. 23 March: 13 P-38s left to bomb Keravia Bay fuel dumps but that target was socked in by bad weather and the alternative target was the Shortland Islands. 24 March: 13 P-38s bombed Vunapope at 13,000 feet and peeled off into a 65-degree dive and released their 500lb. GP bombs at 5,000 feet at an lAS of 500mph.

Three flights of P-38s left Stirling at 0815 for Tilili Bay led by Capt. James Reddington. The P-38s carried a 500lb. incendiary cluster and a belly tank. One P-38 returned early due to engine problems while the remainder flew over St. George Channel and the Duke of York Island to Tawui Point and approached the target from west to east. The bomb run was made at level flight from 3,000 feet at an lAS of 350mph. Ten of the clusters were dropped on the target and two fell into the sea just north of the target. One bomb could not be released because of mechanical problems and was jettisoned into the sea near Watom Island. After the bombing run the fighters flew into St. George's Channel and returned immediately for a second run. They strafed from several hundred feet altitude and put thousands of rounds of 20mm cannon and .50 caliber machine gun bullets into warehouses setting two large fires and numerous smaller fires. As usual no enemy aircraft were encountered and AA fire was light and inaccurate. 27 March: II P-38s bombed Vunapope. 28 March: 13 P-38s bombed Rabaul Town taking off in three flights under Capt. Andrew Sawyers. The P-38s were armed with a 500lb. Mark I Incendiary bomb and a belly tank. After the 0830 take off, one plane returned to base due to material failure while the others flew toward Simpson Harbor and attacked the southeastern section of Rabaul Town. Eleven pilots dropped their bombs from 8,000 feet after a 50-degree dive at an lAS of 3s0mph. The bombs fell into the target area and one large and numerous smaller fires were started. One bomb was jettisoned over the ocean.

25 March: 14 P-38s bombed Talili Bay.

29 March: 14 P-38s were scheduled to bomb Rataval Supply Dump but the area was closed in and the mission was shifted to the Monoitu Mission and Mibo River mouth.

26 March: (14 P-38s flew the typical bombing mission of the month)

30 March: 10 P-38s bombed Rabaul Town.

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Part Five, Chapter 6 - March 1944 31 March: 14 P-38s again bombed Rabaul Town. By mid-March two-thirds of Rabaul's 1,400 buildings were destroyed, the airdrome runways were cratered, and hangars and buildings destroyed. No fighter opposition was met. The Japanese did not dare to resupply Rabaul by sea. The l3AF B-24s were pulled from combat and prepared to bomb a new target; Truk Atoll in the

Carolines was now the major Japanese air and naval base in the Pacific. The 13AF and 7AF B-24s would act together to punish Truk. Rabaul was left to the P-39s of the 67 th and 68 th squadrons that began flying out of Torokina on 8 March. In April the 70FS replaced the 67 th • In late March many of the 44FS pilots were sent to Auckland for R&R, and again afterwards were sent to Guadalcanal and attached to the l2FS for combat duty, and returned to continue their bombing of Rabaul.

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7 April 1944

On 2 April 28 pilots of the 70FS left Ondonga, New Georgia, for Torokina, Bougainville, to relieve the 67FS and finish the mop up of the remaining Japanese that were now by-passed. Meanwhile, pilots from the 68FS arrived at Ondonga for training. During April the 70FS participated in daily dive-bombing missions ranging from two to three, to as many as five to six flights of P-39s leaving from Torokina, refueling and arming at Green Island, and then flying to their targets. The P-39s often carried belly fuel tanks from Green Island, along with their ordnance, and on their return they usually overnighted there. A total of 76 separate missions were flown in April, with each pilot averaging 40 combat hours. Lt.Col. Milton Adams or Maj. Thomas Crandall led the larger missions, while Captains Cecil Taylor, John Wasson, Robert Peek, and Russell Carnes led the smaller missions, or served as flight leaders on the large missions. It was not unusual for one, two, or three P-39s to abort their flights due to mechanical problems after take off from Torokina, followed by more aborts onward to the target from their

In early April 1944 the 70FS left Ondonga; the 68FS transferred there for training and took over a camp that had been named "Spamville" after the ubiquitous "meat." The four men in the foreground in the caps are (L-R) Finkbinec Swegle, Swanson, and Roth (I Sgt.). (Palmer)

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Green Island stopover. The squadron dive-bombed and strafed airfields, supply, and personnel areas, troop concentrations, and bridges and roads in the Rabaul area, New Britain, Buka, and Bougainville. The fighter-bombers of the 13FC conducted dive-bombing attacks on shipping and maritime facilities in New Britain's Simpson Harbor, Tonolei Harbor, Vuanpope, Rataval, and Talili Bays, and the Airdromes at Vunakanua, Lakunai, Karavat, Rapopo, Tobera, and Rabaul Town. The ordnance was 4x500lb M-69 incendiary bombs. Pilots started their dives at 3,500 to 5,000 feet and released them at 2,000 to 2,500 feet, or 4x500 GP bombs with the dives starting at 7,000 to 8,000 feet and release at 3,500 to 4,000 feet. As the month closed and the larger targets were neutralized, the missions were sent to smaller targets, such as villages (sometimes called missions) and plantations in flights or even two-plane sections. Experimental dive-bombing techniques using 2x250lb. OP bombs attached on two under wing racks on the P-39 were tried for the first time. Bell Aircraft Company representatives were sent out

Ground crew filling the oxygen bottles of a P-39Q ofthe 70FS at Torokina in May I944.This was to be the last hurrah for the Airacobra, as the 70FS and finally the 67FS were the last squadrons in the Pacific to fly the fighter. (Palmer)

Part Five, Chapter 7 - April 1944 to supervise the installation. On 7 April Lt.Col. Milton Adams and 2Lt. Waddell flew a mission to dive-bomb Toimonapu Plantation. On level flight the under wing bombs caused only a slight decrease in the flight characteristics of the P-39. The jury-rigged release procedure for pre-armed bombs was complicated, as the pilot had to turn on his camera switch and then press his cannon button. The pilots started their dives at 5,500 feet at a 45-degree angle and released their bombs at 2,500 feet and an lAS of 360mph. After some initial difficulties with the arming wires and bomb release mechanisms, it was found that the under wing racks were successful in increasing the fighter-bomber capabilities of the P-39. Starting on the lyh, daily flights of 12 70FS P-39s flew the 265 miles directly from Torokina to New Britain, with no stop at Green Island, carrying belly fuel tanks and the two wing bombs. For the month the 70FS expended: 24-1 ,000lb.; 307-500lb.; and 146-2501b. GP bombs, 168-300lb. demolition bombs, 108-500lb. magnesium clusters, 62500lb. M-69 bombs, and 65,320 rounds of .50 caliber and 2,807 rounds of 37mm cannon ammunition. Although no enemy air opposition was encountered and AA fire was usually non-existent or light and inaccurate, these missions and just plain flying were not without danger for the pilots of the 70 th . On 2 April lLt. James Goode was KIA when his engine failed while on a routine training mission from Ondonga, New Georgia. He attempted to land but was coming in too fast to brake and tried to go around again, but his landing gear hit some debris on the end of the runway. His P-39 lifted, but rolled and crashed into a sea bank on Arunel Island. On 7 April Lt. William Thomas had about a foot and a half of his right stabilizer torn off when a falling bomb hit it. He crash-landed uninjured on Green Island and returned to Torokina by boat that same day. On 9 April 2Lt. Richard Southwell crashed safely on Green Island on the way in from Torokina when his landing gear collapsed on landing. On 18 April 2Lt. Glenn Wittbrott shot five holes in his supposedly synchronized propeller when he test fired his guns and had to return to base. On the 19 th ILt. Bill Hanks' aircraft was hit by heavy AA fire around Lakunai Airdrome and bailed out close to the land in St. Georges Channel, near Praed Point. His squadronmates circled over the floating Hanks and his parachute until they ran low on fuel and had to return to base, but subsequent searches failed to find him. It must be noted that these extensive searches for downed pilots were important to the pilot's morale, as there were rumors of cruel treatment of prisoners by the Japanese. After the war, investigations verified brutal treatment of Chinese and Indian laborers and Allied pilot paws by the Japanese on Rabaul. There were documented'cases of torture, executions for minor offenses, medical mistreatment, and even ritual cannibalism and live burials. The 44FS flew combat missions everyday until 18 April. The missions usually took off from Stirling Island in the early morning carrying bombs-one 1,000lb GP bomb, or two 500lb. GP bombs, or two 500lb. magnesium incendiary bombs. They carried no belly drop tanks, which meant they had to make a refueling stop at Green Island. No AA damage was reported for the month, as AAfire ranged from none at some targets to the more usual occurrence-light and very inaccurateAA fire from light to medium guns. Japanese fight-

ers were not seen on any mission. After the 18 th the squadron spent the remainder of the month and then through May participating in intensive training for new pilots, who replaced the veterans that returned home. The mission reports for April 44FS missions were short and to the point: 1 April: 12 P-38s left Stirling at 0900 carrying no belly tank which allowed them to be armed with two 500lb. incendiary bombs. The target were the buildings near Toboi Wharf in the southwestern section of Rabaul Town. On the way to the target a weather front caused the formation to turn back and bomb back up target, Monoitu Mission. The P-38s dropped 24 clusters at 9,000 feet in level flight. The attack was successful as a tight pattern of small fires measuring one by two miles was observed by circling pilots. 2 April: 12 P-38s took off at 0715 calTying two 500lb.incendiary bombs and no belly fuel tank to attack the eastern section of Rabaul Town. Two pilots aborted. When they reached the target area at 10,000 feet they found it socked in by 10110 cloud. The formation dropped down to 6,500 feet to get below the cloud layer where they were able to drop 20 bombs in a good pattern of hits.

3 April: Ten P-38s left Stirling with two 500lb. incendiary bombs at 0905 for a mission to the Keravia Bay gasoline storage facility at Rabaul. One P-38 turned back as it was unable to reach formation altitude. They descended from 10,000 feet and dropped their incendiary clusters at 5,000 feet in level fight at an lAS of 300mph. The bombing was accurate as two large and many small fires were started. 4-5 April: Missions were canceled on both days due to bad weather. 6 April: Three P-38 flights with two 500lb. incendiary bombs and no auxiliary fuel tanks took off at 1005 to attack Rataval and secondary target, Vunapope Airfield on Rabaul. One fighter turned back with engine problems and the remaining aircraft reached the target at 1150 and dove from 10,000 feet, north to south, and released their bombs at 5,000 feet at a 65-degree angle and 415mph lAS. The attack hit the area with 19 of 22 bombs as three bombs hung up due to mechanical release problems and were carried back to base. Several fires were started and heavy black smoke was seen rising from the target area. The P-38s refueled at Green Island at 1450 and landed at Stirling at 1605. 7 April: Two Lightning flights with two 500lb. incendiary bombs took off at 0750 to again attack Rataval and secondary, Vunapope. The bombs were dropped after descending from 9,000 to 5,000 feet over a dispersed area with fires being observed. 8 April: 12 P-38s armed with two 1,000lb. GP bombs to strike Rabaul. The bombs were dropped in a 60-degree dive descending from 12,000 to 5,000 feet at 450IAS. Six bombs hit directly on the target and 18 landed just west of the target.

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II 9 April: At 0955 nine P-38s took off with two 500lb. incendiary bombs and descended from 10,000 to 5,000 feet at 30-degrees at 320mph lAS and dropped 15 of 18 clusters on target Raluana, Rabaul. 10 April: The target for the day was Tobera Airfield runway and Lakunai coral runway as a secondary with two 1,000lb. 1110th second delayed fused bombs. After leaving at 0850 the eight P-38s climbed to 15,000 feet and at target dove to 7,000 feet to release their bombs at a 45-degree angle at 400mph lAS. Us. John Pollock and Burman Lehrbiel got direct hits on the end of the runway and six bombs hit the middle and right of the runway and the remaining six hit the dispersal area. After rendezvousing over Kabanga Bay returned toward Green Island. Us. Barney Bowman and James Fritsch strafed a collection of huts near Vunapope. 11 April: At 0853, seven P-38s calTying two 500lb, GP bombs took off to attack Vunakanau's concrete runway. The bomb run was made from a 70-degree dive from 9,000 to 7,000 feet at high speed (500mph lAS). All bombs hit the airfield in a good pattern and a warehouse was destroyed by a direct hit and three large fires were started rising to 2,000 feet. Lt. Henry Storino's fighter blew a tire after refueling at Green and swerved into a ditch, damaging the aircraft.

12 April: Five P-38s carrying two 1,000lb. bombs took off at 0850. The five fighters flew at 14,000 feet to Rabaul targets and as an alternate, the coral runway at Lakunai Airfield on Rabaul. When they approached, they dove 10,000 feet at 45-degrees and at 450mph lAS. Nine bombs directly hit the runways at Vunakanau but there were no Japanese planes based there to take off to intercept. On their way back the flight encountered light, medium and heavy AA fire off Cape Gazelle but it caused no damage.

13 April: Eight P-38s each carrying two 500lb. GP instantaneousfused bombs, took off at 0740 but after 45 minutes two aircraft encountered mechanical problems and returned to base. The remaining six P-38s dove on the target from 12,000 feet to 5,000 feet at 6O-degrees and 430mph lAS. Results were could not be seen due to a heavy cumulus cloud over the target. After the attack the P-38s strafed Rataval Supply Dump at 1,000 feet and then flew to Green Island. Maj. Peyton Mathis had to belly-in as his left wheel wouldn't lower, totaling his plane but escaping injury. CO, Mathis commandeered one of the serviceable aircraft and led the flight back to Stirling, strafing enemy tents and huts at Cape Hanpan, Buka and on northwest Bougainville. 14 April: A flight ofP-38s left Stirling early, 0615 to fly cover over a naval unit, The rendezvous was scheduled at 0700 but they did not find it until 0800. The flight 'was relieved at 0840 by four F4Us. At 1010 another flight of P-38s flew cover for the task force and

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this time found it on schedule and were relieved without incident at 1240. 15 April: At 0620, three P-38s took off from Stirling and headed to Torokina to be armed with two 500lb. incendiaries and then to attack Vunapope and Kahili as the secondary. One P-38 returned to base but at 0640 another flight left for Torokina to join the two remaining fighters. At 0750 six aircraft took off for the target but three had to return due to material failure. The three remaining proceeded to Vunapope, dove 5,000 feet to 5,000 feet and dropped their six clusters at 30 degrees causing a series of explosions and fires. -

16 April: A flight of Lightnings flown by Capt. Howard Cleveland, flight leader, and Us. Jack Laurie, Richard Cartwright and Joseph Adams, escorted a PBY to pick up the survivors of a PV crash off Ballale Island. They flew over the Dumbo while it landed one mile north of Mono Island. Japanese shore batteries opened fire on the rescue and the Vampires swooped and strafed the guns, knocking out several. Because of the heavy fire the PBY had to take off, leaving two of the PV crew and two of their own. The P-38s started back with the PBY but returned when another PBY was called in. The P-38s were almost out of ammunition but returned to draw gunfire by flying over the area at 3,000 feet. Three of the American aircraft were badly damaged but remained until the rescue was completed. Adams had two bullet holes in his windshield and hits in his wing. Capt. Cleveland had his left engine shot out and hydraulic fluid splashed him in the face and eyes. The P-38s started to return to Stirling but Capt. Cleveland had a had to head for more nearby Munda to crash land his aircraft without hydraulics. The aircraft had to be written off but Cleveland was uninjured. The other two damaged P-38s (Cartwright and Adams) landed safely and the Laurie headed to Stirling. All four pilots were awarded the DFC for this mission. 17 April: 11 P-38s left Stirling for Torokina where they were to be armed with two 500lb. incendiary bombs and fly on to Matupi Island and Vunapope as the secondary. A mechanical reduced the attack to ten fighter-bombers that dove from 8,000 to 3,000 feet, releasing their bombs at 45-degrees and 420mph lAS. The bombs started smoking fires and the fighters returned to Green Island to refuel and return to Stirling. One P-38 had to remain at Green to repair damage to its horizontal stabilizer that was damaged by a bomb blast on release.

18 April: At 0600, five P-38s left Stirling for the trip to Torokina for two 500lb. incendiary bomb loading and then on to attack on Vunapope. They dove from 12,000 to 5,000 feet to release their bombs at 50 degrees and 420mph lAS. All the bombs hit into the area of the target causing three large explosions followed by fires and heavy smoke.

8 May 1944: The End, for All Intents and Purposes

For all intents and purposes, by the beginning of May 1944 the air war over Rabaul was no more than seeking out the leftovers of previous attacks. About 10,000 Japanese had died in New Georgia, Bougainville, and Rabaul, and 4,700 were killed in combat for Rabaul, most during the October 1943-July 1944 period. Now a garrison of 80,000 troops had been cut off and prevented from fighting anywhere else for the Emperor. The Allies had destroyed at least 820 Rabaul-based aircraft, and there was virtually no air resistance after the 20 February aircraft withdrawal. The Imperial Japanese Navy lost the cream of their fighter and bomber pilots and crews, and would have problems in rebuilding their air forces. Rabaul was abandoned strategically and no longer an offensive threat. All but 120 of the 1,400 buildings on Rabaul had been destroyed. Of the 4,913 vehicles 884 were destroyed, and 1,697 just wore out. There were no ships in Simpson Harbor, as 517 of the 640 small Daihatsu barges were sunk, along with 30 naval vessels, 154 large cargo ships, and 70 small cargo ships. The last large cargo vessels left in February, the last cargo submarine left in April, and

Rabaul became completely blockaded. There were 350 miles of tunnels and caves to protect men and supplies from more extensive casualties. With rationing and gardening food was not a vital concern. Only 500 tons of the 30,000 tons of well-dispersed ammunition, and only 93 of the 367 guns were destroyed. Yet AA fire was meager and inaccurate, as the bombing and strafing was successful in suppressing the AA fire, and many guns were inoperable because they were worn out and in need of spare parts. After midFebruary there was virtually no aircraft on any of its airfields. The reduction of Rabaul ended with a wimper, not a bang, as the former bastion of the South Pacific would sustain the war's longest air offensive--44 months from February 1942 to August 1945. Ninetyeight American air combat squadrons dropped 20,584 tons of bombs (3,360 by the 5 th Air Force, the remainder by AIRSOPAC units) on any target, including, as the running gag went, outhouses. Over the first six months of 1944 the most powerful Japanese base in the South Pacific was blockaded and then neutralized mainly by air power, allowing it to be by-passed, denying its men and supplies from contributing any further to the war.

ALLIED OFFENSIVE AGAINST RABAUL TONNAGE

SORTIES

Morine Corps

14,718

Army Navy British Empire

~490

Total

4,608 2.536 29,354

Army

11,037

Morine Corps 7, 142 Navy 1.458 British Empire -ill Total 20,584

I,OOOr

_

KEY

Marine Carps

--- Army

--N".'9'

-

BritIsh Empire

Allied Air Offensive vs. Rabaul.

(USSBS)

Sautra: u.s.sJlS.;rM AI/ied ClmpaignAgainst Raboul

263

Part Six Beyond Rabaul: A Summing Up

Part Six - Beyond Rabaul: A Summing Up Rabaul and Kavieng were finally neutralized, and the 13AF entered a new operational assignment. It was to support the capture of positions on New Guinea and the Netherlands East Indies, from which MacArthur could attack the Philippines. But fIrst 13AF heavy bombers were assigned to bomb Truk atoll, another key Japanese naval and air base located in the Caroline Islands. This air campaign in the Central Pacific was intended to aid in the offensives in the Carolines and Marianas, and to neutralize outer islands surrounding the western Philippines. These raids were to be conducted with 7AF B-24s that had begun to bomb Truk on the nights of 14 and 28 March. The 3701h , 371'1, 3nnd , and 424 th Bomb Squadrons of the 370BG were now entirely equipped with B-24s, as was the 23'd, 31 st , nnd, and 394th Bomb Squadrons of the 5BG. The 42BG's 69 th , 70 th , 75 th , 1001l,, and 390th Bomb Squadrons were equipped with B25 Mitchell medium bombers. The heavy bombers flew from Munda's Piva fields and refueled at the Green Islands, then flew 1,600 mile unescorted round trip missions to bomb bases on four of Truk's twelve major islands. Once the Los Negros Islands were captured the 5BG moved to Momote Airfield at the start of the second week of April, and at the end of the month the 307BG moved to Mokerang. The move to the Admiralties gave the l3AF almost complete control of the Bismarck Sea and the approaches to Rabaul, Kavieng, and the northeastern coast of New Guinea to help MacArthur's troops advancing in New Guinea toward Hollandia and Biak. The 131h Air Task Force was formed from l3AF heavy bombers on 11 April and controlled by ADVON 5AF under Maj.Gen. St. Clair Streett. In June the l3ATF heavy bombers supported the invasion of Saipan in the Marianas by bombing Truk and Yap Island. During this time the 13 th Air Task Force was disbanded, and the 13ATF was transferred from SOPAC to the SWPA, and then, along with the 5AF, formed the Far East Air Force (FAEF) under Lt.Gen. George Kenney on 15 June 1944. That day Maj.Gen Streett became CG ofthe 13AF, and its heavy bombers. 13AF medium bombers and fighters were transferred from COMAIRSOLS to COMAIRNORSOLS, which would not become operational until 30 September. In the meantime, from March through July 13AF medium bombers and fighters had attacked the airfields, supply areas, and installations around Rabaul, and targets in the Bougainville and Buka area. During this time they ran into no opposition from Japanese Air Forces, and by the end of July they had neutralized targets in those areas and were ready to move to advanced airfields. In May the 70FS had converted to P-38s, and by June all 18FG squadrons were equipped with the P-38. From April and June the 67 th and 68 th Fighter Squadrons transitioned to the P-38, and in July the 347FG was a full P-38 unit. In August l3FC units moved to Mar Strip, Sansapor, on western New Guinea, as the l8FG was followed by 347FG Headquarters, and then by the 339FS. The 67 th and 68 th Fighter Squadrons moved to nearby Middleburg Island, just off the coast of Sansapor. On 5 August 1944 a P-61 piloted by Capt. Alphonse Lukas, with Radar Operator 2Lt. John Blankenship and gunner S/Sgt. Glen DeForrest of Detachment "A" of the 419 NFS (l8FG) based at Noemfoor shot down a Sally bomber. This was the first victory for the l3FC since 16 March, when Maj. Francis Daugherty of the 18FG

and 1Lt. Francis Cheney of the 12FS shared a Dinah over Vanakanau Airfield. In September l3AF medium bombers and fighters flew missions supporting MacArthur's 15 September invasion of Morotai, located at the northernmost end of the Molucca Islands. They hit airfields at Ceram, Boeroe, Kai, and Halmahera with little air opposition. During September the 13FC flew with a mixed group of pilots from the 18FG and 347FG and claimed eight Japanese fighters. On 1 September the 4l9NFS claimed a Dinah, and on 2 and 6 September 339FS pilots shot down a Jake and Topsy. On 25 September the 347FG flew a mixed group of pilots from the 68 th and 70 th FS on a mission to Kandari Island led by Lt.Col. Robert Westbrook, of the 347FG HQ. They shot down two Oscars, one by Westbrook for his 16th victory. Five days later, over Ambesia, in the south Celebes, three more Japanese aircraft were downed, another by Westbrook. For the month the 13FC scored only eight victories. After taking Morotai, the oil refineries at Balikpapan were targeted for bombing. These refineries provided the Japanese with five million barrels of high-grade oil per year. The 307 th and 5 th Bomb

Lt.Col. Robert Westbrook, shortly after returning for his fourth combat tour as the Deputy CO of the 347FG. Here he has scored his 16th victory on 25 September 1944. (Author)

265

131h Fighter Command in World War II Groups and bombers from the 90 th BG of the 5 th Air Force flew five major missions from the last day in September through 18 October. The first two missions were unescorted, and 5AF fighters escorted the third mission on 10 October and claimed 18 Japanese aircraft. On 14 October 98 B-24s equally divided from the 5AF and 13AF were sent out to bomb the Edeleanu Refinery. The 13FC sent 42 P38s as escort with 5AF P-38s and P-47s. Only six P-38s of the 68FS led by Maj. Leonard Shapiro reached Balikpapan. Their air victory total was a Tojo (ILt. John Hearnden) and a Tony (ILt. Clyde McBride, who also Claimed an Oscar probable). The 5FC had a great day, with 36 victories mainly by the 40FS and 41FS of the 35FG. On the fifth and last mission on 18 October the 13FC sent out 75 fighter escorts, but only eight reached the target mainly due to weather that also hindered the Japanese, as there were no interceptions or air losses. The five bombing raids were a success, as the bombers destroyed Edeleanu Refinery and severely damaged Pandansari, and the Japanese were unable to repair the damage until the beginning of January. As the invasion of the Philippines took place on 20 October the 42BG and 18FG were based on San sapoI', the 347FG at Middleburg, the 307BG at oemfoor, and the 5BG had just moved to Morotai. The 13AF moved its HQ to Morotai on 29 October, and soon other 13AF groups were located there. Morotai had two very good reveted fields, one at Wama and the other at Pitoe. The 18FG was based at Wama in early November, the 307BG after staging through Pitoe moved there in mid-November, and the 42BG moved there in February 1945. The base was a thorn in the Japanese side, and they conducted night attacks on the field 82 times through January 1945. It seemed the 13FC could not escape Washing Machine Charlie or Louie the Louse. Also during October the 13FC and 42BG flying from Sansapor repeatedly attacked Japanese airfields and installations at Boeroe, Celebes, Ceram-Ambon, and Halmahera that threatened Morotai. While these attacks yielded only a few aerial victories, they did destroy supplies and damage aircraft on the ground and kept the runways unusable. The big day that month was on the 23 rd , when Westbrook led six P-38s to Boeloedowang Airdrome and came upon six airborne Japanese fighters. Westbrook shot down an Oscar at 2,000 feet, and then got a second and third as they were taking off, then added a strafing victory claim on another grounded Oscar. This would give Westbrook 20 total victories to make him the top 13FC ace of the war. Maj. Chandler Worley (347FG HQ) and 2Lt. Max Jenkins and ILt. Simon Snider of the 339FS each claimed a Tojo. On the 23 rd seven P-38s led by Maj. John Endriss of the 13FC strafed Limboeng AID and destroyed a Nell on the ground and claimed a two-masted schooner along the coast. Also of note in October was the first tactical napalm mission in the SWPA, as the 12FS dropped 75-gallon belly tanks on oil storage tanks at Boela on Ceram Island on the 22nd , starting fires. In November the 347FG continued operations out of Middleburg in the Celebes. On the 3rd a dozen 44FS P-38s were escorting 5AF B-25s to Alicante and Bacolod Airdromes in the Negros Islands. ILt. John Pollock shot down two Oscars over Alicante, and 2Lt. James Vahey and ILt. Leslie Koval each got 266

Oscars over Bacolod. Three other Oscars were damaged that day. On the 7 th 13 P-38s carrying 165-gallon auxiliary tanks flew four hours to attack Makassar airfields in the Celebes. Four P-38s flying top cover dove on three twin-engine Nicks, and three 339FS (lLts. Donald Coe, Alvin Windes, and John Zink) knocked down a Nick each over Mandai Airdrome. The other nine P-38s attacked 25 Japanese parked on Mandai's two runways. They flew 63 passes and bagged 17 aircraft on the ground. The 347 th was awarded the DUe for the mission. These would be the last of 163.5 victories for the 339 th, tops in the 13Fe. Meanwhile, the 44FS was only seven victories behind with 156.5 victories and nine months left in the Pacific war. On the 10th 33 18FG P-38s left Wama carrying a 1000lb. bomb and 300-gallon drop tanks to attack a large Japanese transport protected by two light cruisers and four destroyers at Ormac Bay, Leyte. The formation arrived in the early afternoon and was attacked by eight Japanese Oscars that were driven off, with two suffering damage. Despite heavy AA fire that brought down three P-38s and seriously damaged another, the Lightnings scored two direct hits on the transport that sunk at once. A Japanese destroyer was claimed, but there is no mention of it in Japanese records for the day. After the mission the fighters landed at Tacloban Airfield on Leyte. The next morning eight of these P-38s from the 12FS flew a search mission over Ormac Bay. They were attacked by over 50 Japanese Zekes in the Negros-Panay area and accounted for eight for the 13FC's best day since Rabaul. ILt. Donald Warner shot down three Zeros, and Capt. George Weart got a double, while Lts. Edgar Scott, Christopher Squire, and Robert Russell (who did not return from the mission) got one each. Four more Zekes were claimed as probables. On the 12th Capt. Joseph Duhon OOFS) and Capt. Ben Smith (l8FG) each shot down a Zeke over Alicante and Tacloban, respectively. On the 18 th 13AF heavy bombers were assigned to attack the vital oil separating plant at Tarakan, with bomb-carrying P-38s assigned to the two large tank storage farms, B-25s to the harbor shipping, and top-cover to P-47s. The raid was a complete surprise and success, as the oil fires raged in the area for days and only one fighter was lost. The 13FC escorted B-24s to Brunei, on the west coast of Borneo, for the first time in mid-November for an attack on a large Japanese Task Force. The history-making mission had fighters fly 1,900 miles round trip. The 13FC would not score an aerial victory until the 20 t h, when ILt. Wilfrid Henkey shot down a Pete when eight 68FS P-38s attacked shipping at Makasser. It was a good day for the 68 t h, as they flew through heavy AA fire to claim five freighters and a fuel barge and damaged six more vessels and was awarded another DUe. On 22 November, 23 P-38s of the 347FG returned to Makasser to attack the few remaining aircraft left on Mandai AID. On their way to the target they encountered an escorted convoy and won another DUC for, as the citation describes: " ...the Group sank a freighter-transport, a gunboat, a threemasted schooner, and a seaplane at anchor; set fire to nine other merchant vessels; and caused one merchant vessel to be beached." ILt. Carl Skogland got a Dinah over Bacolod AID in the Negros during the mission. The cost was high, as three P-38s were lost to

Part Six - Beyond Rabaul: A Summing Up heavy convoy AA fire, including leading 13FC ace and esteemed leader Lt.Col. Robert Westbrook, who was shot down while attacking an AA boat. On the 25 th the 70FS attacked Fabrica AID, and 2Lt. John Boeye shot down a Hamp and damaged an Oscar, and four other 70 th pilots each damaged an Oscar each. The same day over Mindanao, 1Lts.Winfield McFarland and John Strate each shot down Sally bombers. On the 26 th Capt. Robert Connolly (44FS) got an Oscar over Davao City, and on the 27 th 12FS ILts. Roland Rees and Robert Wiesenger shot down Kates over Leyte Gulf. On the 29 th the 12FS attacked Sassa AID on Mindanao, and ILts. Russell Hendrickson, Roland Rees, Eugene Summerich (plus a probable), and Carmen Hultin shot down single Zekes. On the last day of November the 70FS attacked along the east coast of Panay, and Capt. Marvin Moore had a good day, as he shot down a Tony and Hamp and damaged two Oscars. 2Lt. Gerald Holly shot down an Oscar and damaged two more. For the month the 13FC shot down 33 aircraft and almost destroyed that many on the ground, and won three DUCs. December opened with the 12FS scoring five victories on the 151 over Fabrica AID in the Negros. ILt. George Gessler destroyed two Oscars, and fellow ILts. Maurice Smith, James Spofford, and John Szela claimed one apiece. It was the best day in a long time for the l3FC. There would be a two week l3FC drought in scoring, while the 5FC would be having big days over the Philippines, including: on 5 December it claimed 10 victories; on 6 December 11 victories; on 7 December 66 victories; on 10 December 10 victories; on 11 December 19 victories; and on 14 December 21 victories. The 5FC was in the right place at the right time, thanks to MacArthur and Kenney. On the 14th the 70FS claimed five victories over Binalbagan AID, with an Oscar and a Tojo going to Capt. Joseph Gunder (18FG) and a Tojo to ILl. Ellis Bentley, while lLt. Richard Smith and Capt. Marvin Moore downed Oscars. On the 16th the 70FS and l2FS attacked Jesselton ND on North Borneo. lLt. John Szela (70FS) downed a Nick, and Maj. William Cowper

and 2Lt. William Stuff got a Lilly each. The l3FC would not score again until the end of the month, while the 5FC was again running up huge totals: on 20 December it scored 21 victories; on 21 December 11 victories; on 22 December 19 victories; on 24 December 33 victories; on 25 December 46 victories; and on 26 December 17 victories. On the 29 th lLt. James Spofford of the 12FS finally claimed a Nick over Sidate AID on the north Celebes, and on the 30th Capt. Richard Stewart of the 419NFS got a Betty just off Cape Opmarai. While December had produced 15 air victories, the entire year 1945 to the end of the war in August would yield only 22 more. The 13FC was involved in pre-invasion support missions in areas of little Japanese air opposition, while the 5FC was adding to its victory totals in fruitful areas of the Philippines. The first l3FC victory of the new year came on the 8th when Maj. John Endriss of l3FC HQ shot down a Nick over Manggar ND, Borneo. On 31 January Capt. James Spofford of the l2FS would score his third victory when he downed an Oscar over Koshun Airdrome on Formosa. lLts. Creel Pickel and Donald Warner shared a Zero on the same mission. In February the 13FC, now under the command of Brig.Gen. Paul Wurtsmith, was the assault air force to support the U.S. 8th Army in its actions in the southern Philippines. The irony was that now it had two Marine Aircraft Groups (with two fighter and two dive-bomber units) attached to it, whereas in the early days at Cactus the Army Air Force was attached to the Marines. On 7 February Capt. George Weart (12FS) shot down an Irving over Itbayat Island, Bataan, and on 11 February lLt. Donald Herman would score the last victory (40.5 total) for the 12FS when he shot down a Nick over Formosa. The 13AF was ordered to support the invasion at Palawan on 28 February, and the 347FG moved up to San Jose, Mindoro, on the 22 od , and was followed by the 18FG on 1 March. On 5 March the 347FG moved again to Palawan, which enabled it to attack targets in the southern and central Philippines. In March Panay Island (18 th ), Cebu (26 th ), and Negros (29 th ) were

Bill Harris felt like many in the 13FC that Kenney's 5AF received all the front line glory in 1944 and 1945, and that MacArthur put the 13FC in rear areas where it could not score aerial victories, but did the dirty work of strafing and support. (Harris)

267

13th Fighter Command in World War II invaded, and were supported by the 13FC. On 17 April the U.S. 8th Army invaded Mindinao at Parang, which marked the twelfth invasion supported by the 13AP. Its fighters and bombers supported the pre-invasion attacks, while the Marines provided close support for the infantry once it was ashore. During March and April the 13FC in addition to their responsibilities in the Philippines and operated sporadically over other outlaying areas. It was in these areas that the 13 th Fighter Command's last victories would occur. On 3 March lLt. George Rapson shot down a Sally over Phan Rang, French Indo China, for the last 70FS victory of its total 52.5 victories. On 16 March four 68FS pilots (Capt. Wilfred Henkey, Capt. Walter 0Ison,2Lt. George Ryzek, and lLt. Russell Shaffer) each shot down an Oscar near Balikpapan for the last of the 68FS's 48 victories of the war. On 10 April lLt. Raymond Sofaly got the last double victory day for the l3FC when he shot down a Tojo and Oscar west of Saigon Airport. On 18 April Capt. William Starke shot down a Sally over Formosa that would be the last of 163.5 victories for the 44FS and tie the 339FS for top 13FC total squadron victories. The Vampires had only managed to score seven victories in nine months. On 13 June lLt. Harold Michaels (419NFS) got the last 13FC night fighter victory (of 13 total FS victories) when he and his P-61 crew shot down a Nick over Brunei Bay. On 22 June Lt.Coi. Bill

268

Harris, flying for the 13FG HQ, got his 15.5 victory when he shot down an Oscar over Mandai AID, Celebes, for the 13FC's next to last victory day. On 4 August 1945 Captains George Dubois and Daniel Shaw of the 67FS would down a Tojo each off Singapore to conclude 67FS scoring (28.5 total victories) and 13FC scoring (527.5 wartime victories). The 13 th Air Force had found itself in an auxiliary role after Rabaul. The Jungle Air Force had become the forgotten Air Force. Bill Harris: "The newspapers back home made it sound as though all the fighting in the air in the Philippines was being done by'the 5th Air Force. We did our job and did it well. We just weren't given the chance to be in the right place at the right time by MacArthur. That went to Kenny's boys in the Fifth." 13 th Air Force commanding general Maj.Gen. St. Clair Streett: "Our job is to do what we can to help win the war, not to talk about it. We think we have done and are doing a good job. If we are to give credit-all of it-goes to the men who are doing the actual fighting, the men on the ground." (Air Force Magazine, May 1945)

Part Seven Appendices

Fighters of the 13th Fighter Command

Lockheed P-38 Lightning The P-38 was major player in all combat theaters, performing a wide variety of roles and destroyed more Japanese aircraft in the Pacific than any other Air Force fighter. Its design was conceived in 1937 at a time when worldwide interest in twin-engine single seat fighter design was revived. It was to become the only twinengine design from that time to attain mass production and see wide service in WW-2. The H.L. Hibbard design was in response to a 1936 USAAC specification for a twin-engine interceptor and was a radical departure from conventional American fighter development. An inventory of divergence from the conventional were its tricycle landing gear, twin booms, impressive firepower (four .50 caliber machine guns and a 20mm cannon), and its size and power which were twice that of its contemporaries making it the largest, heaviest, and fastest American fighter of the time. The Lockheed Model 22 was the winner of the competition and in June 1937 one XP-38 prototype was ordered and was to be powered by the new Allison V-1710 engine developed by Norman Golman. It was first flow by Lt. Ben Kelsey on 27 January 1939 but crashed two weeks later.

P-38L instrument panel. Flight instruments were clustered on the right side and engine instruments were on the left side. (USAF)

270

Despite the crash the Army was so impressed by it s performance that it ordered 13 YP-38s. The first YP-38 flew on 16 September 1940 with more powerful 1150hp Allison V-I7l 0 engines and the replacement of two of the four .50s by .30s and the 20mm cannon by the 37mm. The production version of 35 P-38Ds (there were no A, B or Cs) had the original XP-38 machine gun arrangement, pilot

P-38L Control column was mounted from the floor to the pilot's right.The two grips were stick-style. (USAF)

Part Seven, Appendices - Fighters of the 13 th Fighter Command armor, self-sealing fuel tanks, and minor airframe modifications. It was followed by 210 P-38Es that reverted back to the 20mm cannon and carried twice the ammunition. The name Lightning was given by the RAF which had ordered three Lightning I's and a subsequent order for 524 Lightning Is that was soon canceled. The remaining 140 Lightning I's were repossessed by the USAAF and these I's were converted to the F and G standard. An increase in engine power was the major improvement in the F and G models that enabled them to carry external fuel tanks and/or weapons on under wing racks for the first time. A production run of 527 P-38Fs and 1082 P-38Gs with deliveries during 1942 supplying enough P38s for deployment in the ETa, North Africa and some to the Pacific. A further increase in horsepower marked the 601 P-38Hs. The 2970 P-38Js were the only Lightnings to undergo major external changes with the introduction of chin air cooler intakes under the prop spinners, a flat panel replaced the curved windscreen and the radiators located in the booms were enlarged. It was the fastest of the P-38s with a top speed of 420 mph and its increased internal fuel capacity, along with external tanks, gave it an endurance of 12 hours. The L-model was the most prolific with 3810 being produced by Lockheed and a further 2000 were ordered from Vultee but only 113 were completed by Vultee before the order was canceled at the end of the war. Two 1475hp V-1710-111 engines powered the L. As was the case with most long-lived mass produced aircraft, the P-38 was converted for other duties. The 75 P-38Ms (from the L model) were converted into two seat radar-equipped night fighters. The undesignated "Droop Snoot" and pathfinder models were P-38 J and L model conversions fitted with bombardier type Plexiglas noses. The P-38 as the F-4 or F-5 was the most numerous photo recon aircraft of WW-2 with approximately 1400 being converted from the P-38E, F, G, H, J, and L. A total of 9923 Lightnings were produced.

because of the armor plate which could easily be looked around if you moved your head a little to the side. I preferred this inconvenience to removing the armor plate! Despite the location of twin engines on each side, visibility around them was good. Ground visibility on takeoff and landing was excellent as there was no engine in front and the tricycle landing gear lowered the nose. For take off you would apply the brakes to a full stop and advance the throttles until the turbo kicked in. The entire plane would shake and vibrate and the nose strut would compress until the brakes were released. Then the Lightning would bound down the runway with the two counter-rotating props causing no torque. The controls were well located for use and convenience. The Lightning had a wheel instead of a stick. They were less tiring to use over long flights than some other fighters with between the leg sticks. Once trimmed for straight and level flight the Lightning was a hands-off fighter. The aircraft had good stall characteristics and could be readily eased out of a stall after a little practical experience but the first stalls could be a scary experience. As heavy as the plane was it should have had power assist on the wheel. This was added on the L models that were heavier and clumsier than the lighter models D to F. The J seemed most balanced to me, however the L's had more power. Maneuverability in early models was inadequate but was improved in later models by the addition of dive and maneuvering flaps. Our high speed climbs and shallow dives gave us the distinct advantage of being able to engage or disengage from the Jap at our discretion. The communications system was fair and we had quite a bit of

Flying the P-38 Lightning by Bill Harris: 15.5 victories, 339FS and 18FG During training at Muroc Dry Lake, later named Edwards AFB, I learned to pre-flight the P-38. With two engines etc. it did take longer than a single engine fighter but it was simple to do so. Also, it was my first fighter and one that I had dreamed of for years to fly, so it was an act of love to check it out and just be around it. Later in combat the pre-flight was second nature and you trusted your Crew Chief and ground crew. The cockpit was about perfect in size for me at 5'8' but some of my taller pilot friends could be a bit cramped. A 6'6" wingman and former B-25 pilot was not able to wear a seat pack parachute when flying but adjustable seat ands rudder pedals helped. Early cockpit heating was poor. Even in the tropics at altitudes over 25,000 feet the cockpit windows could frost over. Throughout my entire time in the various P-38 models I was never warm enough but I guess we had it better than P-38 pilots in Europe. The instrument layout was excellent and grouped for easy use for a twin engine fighter. Every important instrument could seen with one sweep of the eyes and any abnormality noticed at once. Cockpit visibility was good except for the 10 o'clock and 2 o'clock down at a 20degree angle. The only other blind spot was directly to the rear 271

13 th Fighter Command in World War II trouble keeping them operating. Since the engines were mounted in the twin nacelles there was no engine heat as in a single engine fighter which was an advantage during taxiing in the jungle heat. Even though they had a reputation for unreliability and maintenance problems, I liked the two Allison V-1710's. They were powerful and I never had a dependability issue with them. As I recall I only came back from a mission twice due to engine problems which was great considering the operating and maintenance conditions in the Pacific. With two engines it was more likely that one would be shot out, however the other was enough to come home on. I should know I did it eight times! Being a twin-engine fighter the P-38 had no problems with torque whereas a single-engine fighter at high speeds was constantly battling it and could only turn fast in one direction. In early missions we had to worry about fuel conservation. Eight hundred mile missions with 15 minutes of combat were a stretch and the last half an hour were used watching the fuel gauge. Col. Charles Lindbergh put out some figures on slowing the engines down and raising the manifold pressure that could double our mileage. Capt. Joe Grunder of the 18 th Fighter Group did some studies on operating engines at different RPMs and fuel mixture settings and we were able to lengthen our range to as much as 2300 miles nonstop in ten hours. We usually used two 165-gallon fuel tanks but sometimes switched to one 330-gallon fuel tank and a 2000-pound bomb on anti-shipping sorties or two 330-gallon napalm tanks on short-range ground support missions. The long range of the P-38 became one of its premier combat characteristics over the vast stretches of ocean we had to fly over in the Pacific. We could climb at over 4000 fpm, reaching combat altitude in seven to eight minutes. We had a 400+ mph maximum speed at war emergency power at 25,000 feet. Cruising speed was 230 mph. The Lightning was still a fighting aircraft at 35,000 feet and had a service ceiling of 44,000 feet. I ran the engines at full war emergency power for 20 minutes one time it was really necessary or else. The specs said five minutes was tops but I never had an engine falter under war emergency power. At low altitude a Jap Zero could out turn the P-38 and at low speeds it could out climb it. But at high speeds and high altitude it couldn't out turn or out climb the Lightning. The P-38 fuselage nose nacelle mounted a 20 mm cannon with 150 rounds and four .50 cal. machine guns with 300 to 500 rpg. There was no fighter that could compare to the bullet pattern fired from a P-38. All the fire power was concentrated directly ahead. In combat my guns only jammed once and failed to fire. The gun camera was poor probably due to the damp weather that ruined the film. In three years of combat I only got one picture of a shoot down. The P-38 could sustain a lot of damage and still keep on flying. Squadron member, Rex Barber, had 104 holes in his plane after the Yamamoto mission. I had a hole in my wing over 18 inches in diameter and didn't even realize it until the flight was over. Another time I lost over one quarter of my horizontal stabilizer and the outboard hinge while strafing a destroyer and flew the damaged fighter back 700 miles safely home. In other words the P-38 was a mighty tough airplane. In retrospect, I think the P-38 was the best all around airplane in the Pacific once we learned to use it at its full capacity.

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Photo demonstrates the many removable cowlings and panels that accessed the Allison V-171 0 engine and gun bays. (USAF)

Bell P-39/P-400 Airacobra The Bell Aircraft Company had been in business for less than three years when the XP-39 made its debut on 6 April 1938. The aircraft was a divergence from the conventional as designer, Robert J. Woods, installed the 1150hp Allison V-171 0 engine below and behind the cockpit, amidships, near the center of gravity. This placement permitted a smaller nose configuration, afforded better handling and n;aneuverability and allowed the placement of the armamentin the most advantageous position, the centerline of the fighter. The drawback of the engine placement was that the propeller needed to be connected to the engine via an eight-foot shaft coupled to a gearbox in the nose. Also, engine air-cooling was accomplished through scoops located on the fuselage sides (later, the on the wing leading edge). Other unique features were that it was the first USAAC single engine fighter to employ a tricycle landing gear and automobile type cockpit doors. The first flights were performed with a supercharged engine giving the prototype a performance of nearly 400-mph at 20,000 feet but these tests revealed that some modifications needed to be made. The usual evaluation lot of 13 YP-39s for service testing was contracted for the end ofApril. However, the planes in this order were without superchargers, a decision that would alter the combat future of the P-39. The result was a lower rated engine driving a heavier gross weight aircraft due to the modifications causing the performance to fall to less than 370 mph at only 13,500 feet. The armament was impressive: two .30 cal. and two .50 cal. machine guns in the nose and a 37mm cannon which utilized the space usually occupied by a forward mounted engine. On 10 August 1939, the USAAC placed an order for 80 Bell P-45 Airacobras but this identification was changed to the P39C. The Cs were equipped with bullet proof windshields and selfsealing fuel tanks and further modifications subsequently added to the fighter's weight and denigrated performance. Only 20 Cs were produced and the remaining 60 were converted to the D model. The first contracts were placed by the French government but taken over

Part Seven, Appendices - Fighters of the 13th Fighter Command by the British Purchasing Commission in 1940 when France fell 0 the Germans. The first P-39s reached the RAF in July 1941 and became operational in October. Without superchargers these aircraft were limited to ground support duties and withdrawn from service with the remainder turned over to the USAAF for training purposes. A further 863 Ds were produced and used in a ground support role as the V-17l0-35 engine performed best under 10,000 feet. The D and P-400 (repossessed and rejected RAF Airacobras) in USAAF service saw action in the months after Pearl Harbor. They were found to be totally inadequate in aerial combat but did yeoman work in ground particularly in North Africa and the South Pacific. The D through M models differed mainly in engine power rating and armament. Models were E (3 test models), F (229), G (1800 to K, L, M, ), J (25), K (210), L (250), M (240), N (2095), and Q (4905). There were no H, I, 0 or P models. Some 4758 (200 were lost in rou te) Nand Q models were sent to Russia under LendLease. The Nand Q were similarly powered with the Q somewhat faster and armed with .50s instead of .30s. These aircraft served well on the Eastern Front in a ground support capacity for the Soviets between 1942-45. A total of 9558 Airacobras were produced and would give rise to the P-63 Kingcobras (1725 As and 1227 Cs built). The P-63s did not see US service.

Flying the P-39 Airacobra by Paul Bechtel: Two P-39 victories 18 FG (5 total) I had a lot of experience with the P-39 having started my flying career in that type aircraft in February 1941, in the YB-39 at Patterson Field, Ohio. I flew it quite a bit there doing both Accelerated Service Testing and regular squadron flying. My Squadron, the 39th PS, was the first in theAAF to be outfitted with the P-39. After moving to Christmas Island in early 1942, I again flew the P-39, training new pilots with the 12th Squadron of the 18 th Fighter Group. Of all the fighters I ever flew, I think I liked the P-39 the best insofar as the flying, ground handling, visibility and general handling performance were concerned. Previously, I had flown the P-35 and P-36 so the more recently designed P-39 had changes that made it more modern. It was faster and performed better in the air and on the ground. Initially, I was impressed and satisfied with the armament until I got into combat where I began to rethink this. The P-39 had six machine guns: two or four .30 caliber free-firing guns in each wing,

two .50 caliber machine guns in the fuselage which were synchronized to fire through the propeller and a 37mm cannon which fired through the propeller spinner. The 37mm never did work right in any of the outfits I was in. It would jam after two or three shots and usually the jam could not be cleared in the air. We tried to scrounge 20mm guns when we could to replace the 37. A 20mm was the standard in the British P-400 export version of the P-39 and in the P-38 it was a good reliable gun. Once we got into actual combat, I believe that all of us began to realize the importance our gun installations. Our targets were either always moving in the air or hiding on the ground and when you finally were able to get one in your sights you wanted to throw as much lead as possible in the short time you were "on target." That meant that you wanted to have to have a many big guns as possible delivering as many rounds as possible. The 37mm was big but it was slow and undependable. The .30 caliber free-firing wing guns delivered many more rounds than the .50 caliber prop-synchronized guns per period of firing but the .50's were much more destructive than the .30's. I think we all began to look forward to flying fighters, such as the P-38, P-47 or P-5l, which carried a lot of free-firing .50's. When we got into combat with the Jap Zero we couldn't maneuver with it because of our heavier wing loading. They had no armor plate and were much lighter and so were much more maneuverable. The only way you could cope with them in combat was to hit them first and get out, turn around and try to hit them again. In our early P-400's, the British export version, we couldn't go above 10-12,000 feet because its high-pressure oxygen system required equipment we did not have. This limited us to ground support work. When we received our P-39's that altitude limitation went away but our reputation for this role was established. In my opinion, the .30 caliber machine guns were as effective against ground troops as the .50's since their rate of fire was faster. But the .50's were more effective against hard targets such as vehicles, gun emplacements, shipping, etc. My two P-39 victories over Munda on Christmas eve 1942, were over very cooperative Zeros. They let me join up in their formation like I was one of their own. So I pulled up behind them and wrapped them up. They seemed to turn on my tail instead of the other way around. They didn't do that too often which was lucky for me. Overall, the P-39 fought a good war. It didn't shoot down a lot of the enemy but it did its strafing and ground support duties very, very well.

P-39D of 12FS on Christmas Island. (Bechtel)

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13Th Fighter Command in World War II Flying the P-400 Airacobra by Capt. John ("Tommy") Thompson: Premier ground strafer/67FS Since we (the 67 th Fighter Squadron-author) used the P-400 primarily for ground support that is where I have most of my recollections of the sturdy little fighter. I am now over 90 years old (2003author) and my memory is getting lousy. I did go on a few aerial combat missions but with marginal results. On my first mission I got into aerial combat and I soon learned we couldn't compete with the Zero. I was pretty badly shot up and received two hits on the protective glass behind my head. One shell came between the glass plate and its side frame and hit me in the shoulder. I dove out of that combat as fast as I could and headed back to Henderson. Another bullet had hit the engine regulator but it continued to run until my final approach to the landing strip. I pulled back on the throttle and the engine abruptly stopped and I had to make a dead stick landing. After landing, I looked over my plane and counted 17 holes. It was not too long before the P-400s were pulled from air combat and we were sent on ground support missions for which they were wellsuited. When we strafed Japanese barges all the infantry in them would open up and they all didn't miss so I came back from several barge strafing missions with holes in my aircraft. I decided that if I were hit I would take my chances getting the aircraft back to base rather than being captured by the Japanese. In all our ground support missions we were usually met with ground fire and I was hit several times. I my case the protective armor plate, the protective glass fore and aft of the pilot and rubberized self-sealing gas tanks did a good job of getting me through several of those missions. On bombing and strafing missions I had good visibility in all directions from the cockpit as the canopy was almost a full bubble. The cockpit was comfortable for and averagesized pilot and everything was right at the pilot's fingertips or elbows. The P-400 was built for the RAF and was a pretty little fighter being streamlined and modern looking for its time. Its slim profile offered a minimum of target. The Allison V-171 0 engine was placed behind the cockpit which gave the fighter better handling and maneuverability and allowed most of its armament to be placed in the most advantageous position in the center line of the fighter. The disadvantage of this engine placement was that the propeller needed to be connected to the engine by long shaft running under the cockpit to a reduction gearbox in the nose. After starting the fighter all those gears and linkages would shake and rattle until there were enough revs to smooth things out. Cooling the engine was a problem and you could not take too long to get into the air or the engine would overheat and you have to shutdown. The engine and its linkages were generally reliable but low-altitude rated. The Allison gave out about 1,200-horse power which made it the fastest climbing fighter to 12,000 feet at Guadalcanal. But it didn't have a turbo supercharger so it wasn't much good over 12-14,000 feet where the fighter just about stopped dead in the air. Even if the P-400 was able to reach 20,000 to 25,000 feet, the altitude where the Japs flew, we had the British high-pressure oxygen system which was not compatible with our system so 12,000 feet was all the higher we could fly without oxygen and then not for long. Below 12,000 feet the P-400 was more maneuverable and had good shallow climb characteristics which made it ideal for ground support missions.

Fuel consumption was about two hours, which was too little for air combat but more than enough for short-range ground support missions. Over Guadalcanal we took off and made a turn and were on the targets almost immediately, we bombed and then strafed several times and returned to base needing to be rearmed only. Our radios weren't very good and were awfully noisy. You had to turn them up so loud to hear over the engine noise The engine noise was loud but not nearly as bad for your ears as the radio noise in the headphones. I wear two hearing aids today and I think a lot of my hearing problems today were caused back then. We were directed to Japanese targets in the thick jungle by smoke shells or panels put out by the Marines. Even though we could not see the actual targets the Aircobra's armament and bombs were very effective. It was a stable gun platform and was the most heavily armed American fighter on Guadalcanal. The P-400 was armed with Hispano-Suiza 20mm cannon with 60 rounds that were much better than the 37mm American cannon with 15 rounds in the P-39. The 37mm jammed often and fired its shells very slowly and at a looping trajectory that made the gun difficult to aim. But when the P-39's 37mm worked it could put some pretty good-sized holes in Japanese ships and barges but the 20mms put out more shells, more accurately. We didn't use our 20mm too often as there was a shortage of ammunition for them at the time. The four .30 caliber machine guns in the wings fired a lot of bullets very quickly and were very effective against ground troops. But the fewer bullets from the two synchronized .50 caliber machine guns and the 20mm cannon P-400's nose cowling were much more destructive against vehicles, gun emplacements and shipping than .30 caliber bullets. You couldn't use the cannon and machine guns together as their trajectories were so different. When we (Lts. Bryan Brown and Eugene Davis-author) bombed and strafed the Japs attacking the Marines on Bloody Ridge, the fire from our P-400s was devastating and killed hundreds of Japanese. The P-400s were sturdy, durable and reliable aircraft and found their place on Guadalcanal as excellent ground support and antishipping fighters. They fought until they were all destroyed but held the line until better fighters such as the P-38s arrived.

P-400 being crated for shipment to the UK (Bell Aircraft Co. via USAF)

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Part Seven, Appendices - Fighters of the 13th Fighter Command The P-4001P-39 Aerial Victories The first Bell Airacobras that the 67FS received were crated export P-400s still carrying RAF roundels, serials, and camouflage. The squadron trained at Tontouta, New Caledonia, and was then assigned to Guadalcanal where it and other arriving squadrons received additional "domestic" P-39s. Soon the fighter showed it lacked high altitude performance. However, combat in the Solomons often involved enemy aircraft covering their naval forces or attacking American positions; all taking place under 10,000 feet. On 26 January 1943, 2Lt. William Fiedler, flying a P-39D with the 70 th FS, shot down a Zero over Wagana Island at 0850 for his first victory. On 4 February, the "Tokyo Express" sent 22 destroyers, covered by 25 Zeros, down the Slot to evacuate Japanese troops from Guadalcanal, which they considered a lost cause. Led by Capt. James Robinson, the 70 th intercepted the Japanese forces at 1610, 200 miles out, just north of Kolombangara. Fiedler got a Zero in the fight. In April Fiedler was transferred to the 68 th FS. On 12 June, 50 zeros flew a fighter sweep toward the Russell islands and the Americans sent up all serviceable fighters (90) to meet the threat. As part of the 31 Japanese aircraft lost that day, Fiedler claimed a Zero for his third victory at 1035, ten miles west of Cape Esperance. Four days later a coast watcher on Vella Lavella radioed that 38 Zeros followed by another 30 Zeros escorting 50 Val dive bombers were on their way at noon from the northwest to attack Navy transports off Guadalcanal. Between 1315 and 1400, the U.S. put 104 aircraft in the air to meet the Japanese over the Russell Islands and to cover shipping off Guadalcanal. The Japanese attacked from two directions, one formation over Beaufort Bay and the other from the north. Both formations were immediately engaged but about 30 Vals got to the transports. Six P-39s of the 68 th FS were the last aircraft to take off, being held in reserve to meet a possible threat to the transports which had now materialized. At 1400, the first dogfights took place, running from base, Fighter I, to Koli Point to the east. Fiedler claimed two Vals, the second with his 37mm cannon inoperable, using only his four small .30 cal. wing-mounted machine guns and Fiedler had become an ace. In a predawn mission on 30 June, to avoid taxiing Fiedler and his squadron decided to wait on the opposite end of the runway until four flights of P-38s took off. This was made necessary because the P-39 had a bad reputation for overheating during even during short taxi times. To get out of the hot cockpit the pilots sat on the wings of their aircraft, watching the P38s. One of the Lightnings had some kind of problem on takeoff and rolled over at liftoff, crashing into the P-39s, killing Fiedler. Excluding the 45 P-400 victories, the P-39 would score approximately 113 victories in the Pacific. Through necessity it was to assume a ground attack role, for which it was discovered to be more suited and more successful. So, in the critical months before sufficient numbers of P-38s could come into inventory, the P-39 made a effective contribution to American air power. It was not long before lLt. Tom Lynch found himself flying a 35'h FS P-400 while on tdy (temporary duty) from the 39th FS. In the morning of20 May 1942 an assorted group ofP-40s, P-39s and P-400s of the 35 th , 36th, and 39'h fighter squadrons escorted C-47 transports. The formation was attacked and Lynch downed two Zeros near Waigani with his 20mm cannon for the first of his 20 victories

P-39 ace William Fiedler's P-39N. (Canning)

(17 in the P-38). Six days later he downed another Zero over Mt. Lawson while escorting transports to Wau. Lynch's three PAOO victories make him, along with lLt. Donald Green. (also of the 39th , who got a Zero on 9 June and two Zeros on 18 June 1942), the topscoring P-400 pilots. Capt. Dale Brannon of the 67 FS claimed 2.5 Zeros over Guadalcanal in late August 1942. Flown by capable pilots the 100 P-400s were able to claim 45 victories before being retired from combat

Curtiss P-40 Warhawk The P-40 was America's first mass-produced single seat fighter and operated with the USAAC and other Allied Air Forces in every theater of the war. During the first half of the war it and the PAO made up more than half of USAAC fighter strength. Although not an outstanding fighter aircraft it was on hand at the time the P-47, P-38 and P-51 were in the early stages of development and production and gained a reputation for dependability and ruggedness and was able to hold its own only when using the validated tactics. The deficiencies of the P-40 could not be blamed on the Donovan Reese Berlin design team at Curtiss but on the AAC's 1930's concept of bombardment aviation taking precedence over pursuit aviation that

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P40E instrument panel. (USAF)

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13 th Fighter Command in World War II repressed American fighter development. The P-40 was built for ruggedness, handling capability and low altitude performance. The BerlinlCurtiss team had designed the P-36 (Hawk 75A) in 1934 and the P-40 was a direct extension of that design which was unable to compete with its contemporaries. The prototype XPAO, designated the Hawk-81A by Curtiss, was a converted P-36 airframe with an Allison 1040hpV-171O-19 liquid-cooled engine and first flew on 14 October 1938 with Edgar Elliott at the controls. On 27 April 1939, an order for 524 PAOs (there were no P-40As) was placed and the first production model flew on 4 April 1940. The initial order of 524 was later reduced to 200 to allow Curtiss to run 192 for the French government. These in turn were diverted to the RAF who named it the Tomahawk I. Because this fighter was only armed with two .30 caliber machine guns, no protective armor or self-sealing tanks, the British sent them to the Middle East. After the 200 th production aircraft, two additional wing-mounted .30 cal. were added along with some protective armament and self-sealing tanks as the P-40B. The RAF took delivery of 110 as the Tomahawk II while the USAAF took delivery of 131. One hundred of the RAF order was diverted to supply the American Volunteer Group in China. The P-40C added two more wing guns for six total (two .50s in the cowling and four .30s in the wing). The USAAF received 193 and the RAF 930 as the Tomahawk lIB. The 1040hp V1710-33 engined PAO, PAOB and P-40C were essentially similar except for armament and some internal differences. The first significant redesign occurred in 1941 in the PAOD that had an 1150hp Allison V-1710-39 engine in a shorter nose without the two-.50 caliber nose guns. The four wing guns were upgraded to .50 caliber and provisions for a fuselage drop tank or 500lb. bomb and six 20lb. underwing bombs. Only 22 Ds were delivered to the USAAC and 560 to the RAF as the Kittyhawk I. The PAOE (Kittyhawk IA) had its armament increased to six .50s and was the first large scale production model. Of the 2320 built, 820 went to the USAAC and 1500 to the RAE It was faster at altitude and better armed but climb and maneuverability continued to be mediocre. The P-40F exchanged its Allison for a 1300hp Packard-Merlin 28 engine. Of the 1311 built, 100 went to the Soviet Union and others to the Free French (FAFL) but the RAF Kittyhawk II was canceled. The RAF took delivery of 21 P-40Ks, 600 PAOMs (Kittyhawk III) and 586 P-40Ns (Kittyhawk IV). There were 1300 P-40Ks (increased fin area) produced, 700 P-40Ls (similar to the P-40F but with only four guns) and 4219 P-40Ns (four guns and F and L characteristics along with the 1360hp V-171O-81 engine). The N was the most numerous model with 5216 being built. The P-40R was the conversion of 300+ P-40F and L models from Merlin to Allison engines to be used as advanced trainers. PAO production ceased in December 1944 when the 13,738 th rolled off the production line. Flying the P-40 "Hawks" by Capt. Stan Palmer, 68 th Fighter Squadron During my World War 2 Army Air Force career I was fortunate to have flown nearly every P-40 model that Curtiss manufactured: Tomahawks, Kittyhawks, Warhawks. Model A's, C's, D's, E's, F's, K's, M's, N's, R's, XP-Q's, two seat trainers, Allison and Rolls Royce engined. Let me say at the onset that World War 2 historians

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and pilots who were NOT at Hawaii, the Philippines, the ChinaBurma-India theater, Alaska, Australia and the South Pacific in 1942 and 1943 should NOT bad mouth the P-39s and PAOs we HAD to fly by saying that the P-38, P-47 and P-51 were better fighters. They were better fighters but they were NOT available to equip our squadrons during that time. Be content to extol their merit over Europe and the Pacific during 1944 until the end of the war. The P40 was more than a good fighter and could be a great fighter in the hands of a great pilot such as Robert Westbrook. Over 10,000 were manufactured and P-40s were flown by a few squadrons until the end of the war. My training ClassAIB (14 March 1941) was typical of all Cadets of the 1939Al period. The 308 cadets in the graduating class consisted of 25 West Point grads and 283 Flying Cadets. There were nine 1941 classes, 41-A through 41-1. During my training I had 203 flying hours: 60 hours in the PT-13 Stearman at Glendale, California, 70 hours in the BT-9 at Randolph Field, Texas and 70 in the BC-1 at Kelly Field, Texas. I had only three hours in theAT-6 as it was just coming off the North American production lines at the time. I was one of 24 pilots of 41-B who were assigned to Selfridge Field, Michigan which was one of the several long-standing Pursuit plane bases that included Mitchel Field on Long Island and Hamilton Field in California. Selfridge was a grass field as concrete runways were uncommon. The P-39s and PAOs from the production lines went to equip combat squadrons and only the P-36 Mohawk was available in numbers for transition training to pursuit fighters. The Mohawk with its R-1830 engine was similar to a P-40 Tomahawk with its V-I7l0 engine in size but not horsepower. By mid-May we were checked out in the Seversky P-35 but not the Seversky PA3, the Republic PA7 forerunner. By the end of June a few flights in P-39s and PAOs (A's and C's) were added. From 24 July to 7 August I was one of eight Class 40-A to 41-B pilots sent to Wright-Patterson Field, Dayton, Ohio to fly Accelerated Service Tests on the new PAOD and E Kittyhawks without checkout in the Tomahawk. The P-40 DIE was a heavier aircraft to support armor plate, larger fuel tanks and six .50 machine guns. After flying the Ds and Es I definitely preferred the Tomahawk but not in combat. It was a pilot's aircraft as you did not have to be as concerned about "snapping out" of a tight turn and stalling into a spin. Also you didn't need as much altitude to recover as with the heavier DIEs, you just couldn't get into trouble too close to the ground. Here we were assigned to gather data such as power runs, fuel consumption, night flight, climb to various altitudes and landing distance. Returning to Selfridge, I was assigned the 68 th Pursuit Squadron of the 58 th Pursuit Group at Harding Field, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. After the outbreak of the war I was one of a flight of six pilots assigned to ferry new PAOEs from eastern depot to Sacramento, California. The PAOs were ear marked for a new squadron to be sent to Alaska and to be commanded by Jack Chennault, son of the Flying Tiger commander in China. After ferrying the PAOEs we had to spend four and a half days on the Sunset Limited train back to Louisiana. I now had 62 hours in the P-40 before the 68 th Fighter Squadron was shipped by troop train to San Francisco and then troop ship to Australia in February 1942. We had no assignment of aircraft until we were transferred in May to Tongatabu Island, 800 miles

Part Seven, Appendices - Fighters of the 13 th Fighter Command south of Fiji. Here a freighter unloaded 25 wing, fuselage and propeller crates for 25 P-40Es with the Allison V-171O-39 engine. By 23 May our mechanics had assembled the first PAOE and soon all pilots flew everyday except for a rare bad weather day. At Fiji we took part in training flights along with dusk and dawn patrols for air defense missions, circling the small island as far as our fuel allowed. By August flying the P-40 had became automatic to me, I didn't have to think about what I had to do next. The gear always went up or down, I just placed the throttle at the conect power settings, any whisper of the '40 was heard and answered. RAF pilot John McGee's High Flight comes to mind when I think of flying the P-40: "I have slipped the surly bonds of earth, and danced the skies on laughter silver wings. Sunward I've climbed, and joined the tumbling mirth. Of sun-split clouds, and done a hundred things." Today I still remember flying at high altitude over the Pacific, fighter pilots in a four-man flight following each other over, under and through clouds. In September I tested the K models that had arrived to replace the four Es we lost in the ocean. When the New Zealanders relieved the 68th in October 1942 I had 246 hours in the P-40. We left our P-40s behind for the Kiwis as we went to New Caledonia. We anived at New Caledonia, the HQ of the 347 th Fighter Group on I November where I became the squadron's CO and was promoted to Captain. From here we moved to Guadalcanal, flying P-39s and P-400s, the export version Airacobra flying mainly divebombing and strafing missions looking for Jap troops along the front lines and for barges along the shorelines. We were happy to receive new P-40F Warhawks that had the Rolls Royce V-1650-1 Merlin engine when seven arri ved just before Christmas. A Crew Chief was assigned to a fighter and he would make sure the fighter was in top condition. He and the ground crew could perform minor tasks such as spark plug changes but the flight or line chief determined repairs and maintenance.. At Tonga the pilots had done pre-flight inspections to learn P-40 tech orders but at Cactus, now in a war situation, each morning the Crew Chief would run-up the engine and did the preflight inspection. Here the pilots sat waiting for a Red Alert (scramble) in the ready tent or flew on an assigned mission. On a scramble the pilots were driven by jeep to their assigned fighter that was shared with other pilots since we

more pilots than planes on Fighter 2 on Cactus. Since it was relatively cool near the ocean we did not have to worry about engine overheating problems with the P-40. The cockpit was roomy and the controls and instruments were easy to reach and were readily visible. In training we first passed the "blindfold test" so that reaching the conect controls became automatic. As with all "tail-draggers" the P-40 needed to be "S' d" down the strip for takeoff to see if the area ahead was clear. In close quarters along the flight line, mechanics would sit on the wings giving hand signals to the pilot. On the take off roll the pilot had to keep the nose straight as power was applied. As speed increased the tail rose and visibility over the nose improved and the fighter lifted off at about 80mph. We climbed to altitude using climb power setting at about !60mph. We cruised at a minimum 180mph to a usual 210mph (add 3% per 1,000 feet to get ground speed) but we could use War Emergency water injection for a few minutes in an emergency situation. Our radios generally worked well close to base but distant thunderstorms often caused static problems on missions when trying to contact base. Our American oxygen systems were reliable and we never had a problem. Both the Allison V-17! 0 and Rolls Royce Merlin V- I650 were highly regarded and reliable but like all liquid-cooled engines were vulnerable to damage. I flew both and was not aware of any difference between the two in flight. Fuel consumption to target was determined before the mission and we able to escort bombers to Bougainville when 75-gallon auxiliary fuel tanks were replaced by the 109-gallon tanks that we called the "bathtub" because of its shape. On landing approach the gear was lowered, proper flap settings chosen and power was used until the wheels touched. We kept the tail up for vision until the fighter slowed and then eased the tail down. Note: the greatest invention for wayward pilots was the steerable tail wheel for the P-40D and later models While taxiing slowly, it would swivel; as soon as speed above taxiing was reached it would lock in a straight-ahead position. This avoided ground loops on both takeoffs and landings. To taxi the pilot might have to give the throttle a burst to "kick" the tail wheel from straight to swivel using the rudder. Pilots could improperly use wheel brakes when landing too fast, or too long or trying to stop a ground loop. Improper braking would cause the nose to dip and the prop to strike the ground which cause the engine to have to be replaced. I have had experience in bailing out of the PAO. If you were out of control you just had to get out ASAP, hoping to clear the tail. If you were in control, you would roll the plane over with the seat belt released and fall out to avoid striking the tail. If there were no Japs around I would choose to ditch parallel to a shoreline in shallow water. Here I would have a better chance of being seen in the ocean and being picked up by a Dumbo (PBY). I also could get ashore to food and water and linking up with coast watchers and/or friendly natives. For a ditching you would leave the gear up apply full flaps to slow your speed, keep the nose up and stalI into the water. If you ditched you had to worry about hitting your head on the gunsight and tried to get one arm up to protect your face. Our six .50 caliber machine guns were effective for Jap bombers but as far as hitting a fighter four would have been enough as the boresight pattern X-ing forward at the same distance would have finished off a fragile Zero. Two less guns and ammo would have

Good view of the accessible Rolls Royce Merlin engine on a 68FS P-40.

277

13th Fighter Command in World War 1I made the PAO lighter and quicker. Six guns were better for strafing ground targets. As the war progressed the majority of our missions were strafing ground targets and fewer Jap planes were sent up to intercept us so the six guns were better. By December 1942, Marine Squadrons with John Smith, Marion Carl and Joe Foss had clobbered the Japanese fighters and bombers and the Jap Air Forces had ceased their attacks. The emphasis had turned to the offensive giving it to the Japs in the Northern Solomons. Cactus Fighter Command put the Warhawks on close cover escort at 20,000 feet for the B-17s and put the P-38s at high cover at 30,000 feet. Most of the time the Zeros were off in the distance and were reluctant to attack now that the bombers had escorts. Returning to Tontouta, New Caledonia in late February 1943, I flew the P-40M with the Allison V-1719-71 engine. It was a stripped P-40 with only four wing guns that gave the fighter better climb performance and handling in turns. On my second and last combat tour, 1 April to 15 May 1943 was an anti-climax as the Nip Air Force was a no show. I flew only 20 combat missions and 63 hours in the P-40F. Most of our missions were four to eight plane patrols over Russell Island, the escort of Navy photo planes, CAP over Navy vessels and an occasional false alarm scramble. As per medical regs that meant "pooped-out in equatorial climate" I returned to the States in summer 1943 and got to choose my next assignment. In July I went to Curtiss-Wright in Buffalo,

278

New York to the AAF Flight Test and Inspection Division. Here I was immersed in flying acceptance test flights for P-40Ns and Rs and C-46s. I logged 187 hours in 118 flying days on 341 P-40 acceptance tests in 17 months. The production line turned out seven PAOs per day but often acceptance tests were delayed by bad weather and the P-40s piled up. To reduce the backlog we were forced to trim the tests from an hour to 30 minutes, flying from four to eight P-40s per day. In the air we recorded the test results on a knee note pad but also had paper work to complete after parking. I also flew PA7s, P-51s, OA-lOs (AAF PBY Catalinas) contractor Tech Order Compliance (TOC) at the Modification and Experimental Hangar where the XP-40 Q2 and Q3 and the RP-40N were prepared for tests. The two cockpit RP-40N Trainer was flown for the first time on 8 July 1944. But this was far too late as the Pentagon should have known at least by 1941 that much of the damage and Joss in P40 training could have been prevented with this instructor/student training aircraft. The lightweight XP-40Qs were equipped with the powerful Allison V-1710-121 engine, had a bubble canopy, three degree tilt nose, clipped wings, a small air scoop and 75-inch water injection. It was a great aircraft but too late to arouse any interest. My last flight in the PAO was during a "Welcome Home" day for Eisenhower after VE-Day over Washington DC. Aircraft of all possible types were assembled from around the country and rendezvoused in Virginia in a huge armada. I was placed in a formation of 20 or 24 P-40s and we passed in review, what a sight!

13th Fighter Command Aces

Name Ll.Col. Robert Westbrook LtCol. Bill Harris Capt. Cotesworth Head ILt. Murray Shubin ILt. Joseph Lesicka Capt. Frank Gaunt Maj. John Mitchell ILt. Lucien Shuler Capt. Elmer Wheadon ILt. Henry Meigs ILt. Thomas Walker ILt. Jack Bade ILl. Rex Barber 1Lt. Truman Barnes Capt. Robert Byrnes Capt. George Chandler ILt.William Fiedler ILt. Cyrus Gladen ILt. Besby Holmes Capt. Thomas Lanphier Maj. Paul Bechtel

Squadron Aces 18 th Fighter Group 12'h Fighter Squadron Bechtel, Paul (4+ 1 FC) 44'h Fighter Squadron Westbrook, Robert (15+5 347FC) Head, Cotesworth (14) Lesicka, Joseph (9) Gaunt, Frank (8) Shuler, Lucien (7)

21 Aces of the 13 th Air Force Unit V Notes 44FS&347FG 20 KIA 11/22/44 339FS&18FG 16 44FS 14 KIA 01/16/44 339FS 5 victories 06/16/43 11 44FS 8.5 5 victories 07/15/43 44FS 8 339FS 8 Scored 3v.with 15FG/7AF 44FS 7 44FS 5 victories 07/01/43 7 6NFS/339FS 6 3v. 6NFS/3v. 339FS 339FS 6 44FS 5 339FS 5 Shot down Yamamoto 339FS 5 44FS 5 339FS 5 70FS/68FS 5 Only American P-39 ace 339FS 5 339FS 5 70FS 5 12FS 5 Destroyed Zero in a USMC F4U on 09/02/43 13 th Fighter Command Aces 70'h Fighter Squadron No aces with the 18FG

347 th Fighter Group 67'h Fighter Squadron No aces Wheadon, Elmer (7) Bade, Jake (5) Byrnes, Robert (5) Gladen, Cyrus (5)

68'h Fighter Squadron Fiedler, William (5) 70'h Fighter Squadron Lanphier, Thomas (5?)

279

13th Fighter Command in World War II 339 th Fighter Squadron Harris, Bill (14.5+1 ISFC) Shubin, Murray (11) Mitchell, John (S+3 WW-2+4 Korea) Walker, Thomas (6)

Barnes, Truman (5) Chandler, George (5) Holmes, Besby (5) Barber, Rex (5)

Other Meigs, Henry (3 6NFS+339FS)

13th Fighter Command Ace Biographies Robert Burdette Westbrook, Jr. ("Westy") 20 Victories Born: 9 November 1917 Los Angeles, CA KIA: 22 November 1944 AA fire over Makassar Strait Awards: 2 Silver Stars, DSC, 2 DFCs, 16 Air Medals Aircraft names: P-40: "Princess Pat" P-3S: 'The Florida Thrush" Biography: Westbrook entered ROTC at Hollywood High School and attended UCLA for a year when he joined the California National Guard. He was called up in Roosevelt's national emergency in March 1941. He attended Infantry Officer Candidate School

(OCS) and was commissioned a 2Lt. He applied for flight training and was commissioned a 2Lt. in the AAC. He received his wings at Luke Field (AZ) in Class 42-G on 26 July 1942. He was assigned to the 44FS/1SFG on August 15, 1942. He made lLt. in October 1942 and was sent to Elfate and then Guadalcanal with the 44FS. He scored his first victory over a Zero on 22 January 1943 in a P40F over Guadalcanal. He became an ace as a Captain on June 12, 1943 when he shot down a Zeke flying a P-40F over the Russell Islands. On December 24, 1943 he became a double ace as a Major when he shot down 3 Zekes over Rabaul flying a P-3SJ. He became a triple ace on 6 January 1944 when he shot down a Zeke over Cape Gazelle flying a P-3SJ. After leaving the Solomons/Rabaul campaign he became a 20-victory ace and the highest scoring pilot in the 13AF when he shot down 2 Oscars over the Celebes on 23 October 1944 as a Lt.Col. with 347FG HQ flying a P-3SJ. Westbrook was the CO of the 44FS from 25 September 1943 to 20 January 1944. He was aide-de-camp for the 13AF CG. In May 1944 he was Deputy CO of the 347FG. Westbrook was KIA on 22 November 1944. Combat Record: Date Jap AlC A/C Unit 01/27/43 Zero P-40F 44F 02/13/43 Zero Zero prob. " 06/07/43 2 Zekes 06/12/43 Zeke 07/0l/43

Hap

Zeke

10/10/43 Zero (2 nd mission) 0.5 Zeke 12/23/43

09/25/44 09/30/44

Zeke Zeke dam. " 0.5 Zeke P-3SJ " Zeke 0.5 Zeke Zeke Zeke P-3SH " Zeke Zeke P-3SJ" Zeke prob." Oscar Oscar

10/23/44

Oscar

12/24/43

12/25/43 01/06/44

2 Oscars Totals: Robert Westbrook (Author)

280

P-3SH "

20/2.5/1

Rank Claim Location lLt. Guadalcanal Bougainville Bougainville Capt. Russell Island NE coast of Russell Island Maj. Between Rendova Harbor & Munda Pt. Between Rendova Harbor & Munda Pt. Kahili NW end of Choiseul Island Cape St. George Cape St. George Rabaul Rabaul Rabaul Rabaul Rabaul Rabaul Cape Gazelle Cape Gazelle Kendari Lt.Col. Ambesia, New Celebes Boeloedowang Airdrome Boeloedowang Airdrome

Part Seven, Appendices - 13 th Fighter Command Aces AAF gunnery school at Matagorda Field (TX). In November 1944 he returned for his another combat tour where he scored his 16th and last victory over the Celebes. He became CO of the 18FG in April 1945 and remained in that position until December when he returned to the States. After leaving the service Harris became involved in the logging/lumber and cattle/ranching business in California and Nevada. Combat Record: Date JapA/C 06/07/43 2 Zekes 06/16/43 2 Zekes 10/04/43 Zeke 10/07/43 Zeke 10/10/43 Zero (2 nd mission) 2 Zekes

10/27/43 02/09/44* 02/15/44

0.5 Zeke prob. Divebomber 3 Zekes 2 Zekes

01/22/45

AlC Unit Rank Claim Location P-38G 339FS 2Lt. Russell Island Beaufort Bay P-38H " ILt. Kahili 25 miles NW of Vella Lavella Kahili NWendof Choiseul Island Wend of " Choiseul Island Capt. Treasury Islands

P-38J"

Tobera Airfield Vunakanau Airfield Mandai, Celebes

Oscar P-38L 18FG Lt/Col. Totals: 16/0.5/0 *One of the Zekes was listed as shared with Lt.Col. Leo Dusard, but each pilot received a full victory credit.

Bill Harris (Harris)

Bill Harris 16 Victories Born: 15 June 1914 Strathmore CA Awards: Bronze Star, 2 DFCs, 23 Air Medals Aircraft name: "Hattie" (After his mother) Biography: After four years (1936-40) in the Navy, Harris joined the Army Reserves. He took his primary and basic training at Cal Aero Academy (CA). He was commissioned a 2Lt. and won his wings on 30 October 1942 at Luke Field (AZ) in Class-42J. He was assigned to the 339FS/347FG on 1 February 1943. He scored his first victories over 2 Zekes on 7 June 1943 as a 2Lt. flying a P-38G. He became an ace on 4 October as a lLt. in a P-38H over a Zeke over Kahili. He became a double ace on 27 October as a Captain when he shot down a Japanese dive-bomber over the Treasury Islands. On 15 February he got victory numbers 14-15 when he shot down 2 Zekes in a P-38J. In mid-February 1944 he transferred to the 18FC and returned to the U.S. and spent time teaching at the Cotesworth Head (Author)

281

13th Fighter Command in World War II Cotesworth Bradway Head, Jr. ("CB") 14 Victories Born: 15 April 1916 Berkeley CA MIA/KIA: 18 January 1944 Rabau1 aerial combat Awards: 3 DFCs, 10 Air Medals Biography: After joining the Army reserves, Head was commissioned a 2Lt. Head and awarded his wings on 26 July 1942 at Luke Field (AZ) Class 42-G. He was assigned to the 44FS/18FG at the end of December 1942 and sent to the South Pacific. ILt. Head scored his first victories, two Vals and Zeke, over Henderson Field on 16 June 1943 flying a P-40. He became an ace on 4 August when he shot down a Zero over Munda Airfield. He became a double ace as a Captain flying a P-38J when he shot down a Kate on 14 January 1944. Head scored his 14th ands last victory on 18 January but was MIA/KIA when he was shot down over Rabaul. Combat Record: Date JapA/C 06/16/43 2 Vals

Murray Shubin (Author)

AlC P-40

Unit 44FS

Zeke 06/30/43

Dave 0.5 Zeke

"

08/04/43 09/18/43

Zeke Zero

10/01/43

0.5 Zeke

10/11/43

u/i alc type Zero dam. " Zeke P-38J "

01/06/44

"

Hamp prob. 01/14/44

Kate

01/17/44

Zeke Zeke Zeke

01/18/44

Zeke Totals: 14/1/1

Rank Claim Location ILt. East of Henderson Field East of Henderson Field NW of Rendova NW coast of Rendova Munda Airfield NWofBaga Island Capt. Barkoma, Vella Lavella Kahili

St. George Channel to Rabaul St. George Channel to Rabaul 60 moles SW Cape Torokina South of Simpson Harbor Blanche Bay Off Cape Gazelle Off New Britain

Murray Joseph Shubin 11 Victories Born: 2 April 1917 Pittsburgh, PA Awards: DSC, 2 DFCs, 5 Air Medals Aircraft names: P-38G "Oriole" (After his fiancee)

282

Biography: After flying gliders as a teen, Shubin graduated from Kenyon College in Ohio with a BS degree in 1940 and participated in intercollegiate flying meets. In 1940 he attended the Boeing School of Aeronautics and was the winner of the national sport landing contest. He joined the Army Reserves and was an Aviation Cadet from mid-January to the end of September 1942. On 29 September he was given his wings and 2Lt. commission at Luke Field (AZ). He was assigned to the 329 th FS but was transferred to the 339FS/347FG on 5 January 1943. 2Lt. Shubin scored his first victory, a float Zero, on 2/02/1943 flying a P-38G. Shubin would have a great day on 16 June 1943 when he shot down 5 Zekes to become one of three ,l3FC aces-in-day. He would become a double ace on 27 October when he shot down 2 Vals over Stirling Island for his last victories of the war. Shubin remained in the post-war Air Force becoming a Major in early 1947 and a Lt.Col. in May 1954. Shubin died of a heart attack in France on 23 July 1956 where he was serving as the CO of the 71 st BS(Tac)/38 th BW (Tac). Combat record: Date Jap A/C A/C Unit Rank Claim Location Over Shortland 02/02/43 Float Zero P-38G 339FS 2Lt. Island Russell Island 06/07/43 Zeke OffSW end of 06/16/43 2 Zekes Guadalcanal Off Cape 2 Zekes Esperance Zeke prob." Off Cape Esperance East of Savo Zeke Island P-38H" ILt. Kahili 2 Zeros 10/10/43 Stirling Island 10/27/43 2 Vals Totals: 11/1/0

Part Seven, Appendices - 13th Fighter Command Aces Joseph J. Lesicka ("Ugly Joe"I"Jumpin' Joe") 9 Victories Born: 29 December 1919 Los Angeles, CA Awards: 2 DFCs, 6 Air Medals Biography: Lesicka joined the Army Reserves and was pilot rated and commissioned a 2Lt. on 26 July 1942 at Luke Field (AZ). He was assigned to the 45FS/18FG in Hawaii but was transferred to the 44FS of that Group in May. lLt. Lesicka scored his first victory on 16 June 1943 flying a P-40 when he was credited with a Val east of Henderson Field. On 15 July Lesicka had dream combat day when he shot down 3 Zeros, a Betty and a Kate to become the third 13FC ace-in-day. He was the acting CO of the 44FS for 3 weeks in early 1944. After completing his tour with 9 victories he returned to the States. He flew a second combat tour flying a P-38L with the 44FS in the Celebes where he damaged an Oscar as a Captain and the CO of the 44FS. Combat record: Date JapAiC Val 06/16/43 06/30/43 07/12/43 07/15/43

Joseph Lesicka (Lesicka)

08/07/43 06/22/45

AlC

Unit PAO

Float biplane Zeke Zero Kate Betty 2 Zeros Zero P-38L " Oscar dam. Totals: 9/0/1

Rank Claim Location 44FS lLt. East of Henderson Field NW coast of Rendova Over Munda Airfield Vella Lavella Vella Lavella Vella Lavella Vella Lavella Munda/Rendova Capt. Mandai Aitiield, Celebes

Frank Leon Gaunt ("Wildman") 8 Victories Born: 11 April 1918 North Platte, NB Awards: Silver Star, DFC, 13 Air Medals Aircraft names: P-40 "The Twerp" Biography: Before he joined the Army Aviation Cadet program Gaunt spent 3 1/2 years studying osteopathy and quit only weeks before graduation to join the Army Air Corps. He took primary training at Rankin Academy and basic training at Hammer Field, Fresno (CA). Gaunt was commissioned a 2Lt. and received his wings on 21 May 1942 at Mather Field, Sacramento(CA) with Class 41G. He was assigned to the 72FS/18FG in Hawaii for P-40 gunnery training and then was sent to the 68FS/347FG on I February 1943 and then quickly was transferred to the 44FS/18FG in mid-March 1943. lLt. Gaunt scored his first victory on 16 June 1943 when he shot down 2 Vals over Henderson Field. Capt. Gaunt became an ace on 15 July when he shot down 3 Zeros over Blackett Strait near Vella Lavella. After finishing his tour he returned to the States with 8 victories but got into "constant trouble" and was court marshaled for "dangerous flying." He asked "his old drinking buddy" Gen. Frank Gaunt (Gaunt) 283

13 th Fighter Command in World War II Strothers to return him to a second combat tour with the 325FG in Italy in April 1944. He flew strafing missions there until the end of the war. After the war he graduated with a BA from the University of Southern California, graduated from Kirksville College of Osteopathy in 1954 with a DO in Medicine and in 1962 graduated from the University of California, Irvine with a MD. He practiced for 30 years first in the Los Angeles area and then in Springfield MO before retiring. Combat record: Date Jap A/C 06/16/43 2 Vals 07/12/43

Zeke

3 Zeros Zero Zeke prob."

01/11/44

Combat record: Date JapAiC 10/09/42 Float plane 10/23/42 Zero 11/07/42

AlC P-40

Zeke dam. " 07/15/43 08/15/43

kills in a F-86 to end his career with 15 victories. He retired from the Air Force in July 1958.

Zero Totals: 8/1/1

Unit 44FS

Rank Claim Location Over Henderson lLt. Field Capt. Over Munda Airfield Over Munda Airfield Blackett Strait West of Ganongga Island West of Ganongga island Rabaul

John William Mitchell 8 Victories (+ 3 15FG + 4 Korea) Born: 14 July 1915 Enid, MS Awards: Pacific: DSC, Navy Cross, 2 Air Medals Central Pacific: Bronze Star, DFC, 5 Air Medals Korea: DFC, 3 Air Medals, Legion of Merit Aircraft names: P-38G "Squinch" P-51D "Annie" F-86E "Nina II" Biography: Mitchell graduated from Columbia University in 1934 with an Economics degree and then graduated from the University of Georgia in 1939. He joined the Army Reserves and was commissioned a 2Lt. and received his wings on 26 July 1940 at Kelly Field (TX). He was assigned to the 55PS/20PG and was promoted to lLt. on 1 November 1941. He was sent to the 70PS in Samoa in early February 1942 and promoted to Captain on 1 March 1942. In midSeptember 1942 he was transferred to the 67FS and then in early October 1942 was transferred to the 339FS1347FG. Capt. Mitchell scored his first victory on 9 October 1942 flying a P-39K and became an ace in a P-38G when he scored 2 victories over Zeros over the Slot on 27 January 1943. He was promoted to Major on 9 February 1943 and led the Yamamoto mission on 18 April. He returned to the States at the end of his tour in May 1943 with 8 victories. He was promoted to Lt.Col. on 1 August 1944. He was transferred to the 7FC on 16 April 1945 and on 8 May to the 15FG where he scored 3 victories and a damaged. He served as CO of he 15FG.and was promoted to Col. On 25 August 1945. Mitchell served in the post-war AAF and was the CO of the 51FIW in Korea from rnidJune 1952 until the end of May 1953. Mitchell scored 4 MiG-IS

01/05/43 01/27/43 01/29/43 02/02/43

06/10/45 06/26/45 07/16/45 01/21/53 02/15/53 03/09/53 04/11/53 04/30/53 05/15/53

A/C Unit Rank Claim Location P-39K 339FS Capt. 150 miles NW of Guadalcanal Guadalcanal/ Tulagi Rufe Santa Isabel Island Float Zero P-38G " Tonolei Harbor Cape Esperance 2 Zeros to Russell Island Betty Guadalcanal Over Shortland Float Zero " Island 13FC Total: 8/0/0 P-51D 15FG Lt.Col. Off Japan Hamp dam. Kiso River Zeke 2 Georges" 21FG " Near Tsu 7FC Total: 3/0/1 MiG-15 F-86E 39FIS Col. Korea MiG-IS Korea dam. Korea MiG-15 Korea MiG-15 Korea . MiG-15 dam. MiG-IS Korea Korean Total: 4/0/2 Career Total: 15/0/3

Two great aces years later, Mitchell (left) and Gabby Gabreski. (Author)

284

Part Seven, Appendices - 13 th Fighter Command Aces Lucien Bob Shuler ("Bob") 7 Victories Born: 3 January 1920 Griffin, GA Awards: Pacific: 2 DFCs, 16 Air Medals Korea: DFC, 6 Air Medals Biography: Shuler graduated (AAdegree) from Young L.G. Harris College (GA) and was a high school coach before he joined the Army Reserves in early August 1941. He was commissioned a 2Ll. and received his wings on 23 June 1942 at Stockton Field (CA). He was assigned to the 77FSI20FG on 25 June 1943 at Morris Field (NC) and then transferred to the 45FS/15FG on 16 August 1942 at Wheeler Field (HI). He was then transferred to the 347FG at New Caledonia on 1 February 1943 and finally was transferred to the 44FS/18FG on 13 March 1943 on Guadalcanal. Shuler shot down a Val on 16 June 1943 in a P-40 for his first victory. He became an ace on 4 August when he shot down 4 Zekes over Munda Airfield. He returned to the States and was a base gunnery officer at Pinnellas AFB (FL). In September 1945 he went into inactive reserves until mid-September 1949 when he re-entered the Air Force and served as an instructor. He served a one-year tour in Korea in 1950-51 flying over ground support 100 missions. He was promoted to Maj. in June 1952, to Ll.Col. in June 1964 and Col. in January 1968. He retired from theAir Force in August 1973 as a Colonel. Shuler graduated from Mercer University (GA) with BA (English) and MA (Education) degrees. Combat record: Date Jap AlC 06/16/43 Val 08/01143 08/04/43

Zero 4 Zekes

08/10/43

Hap

AlC P-40

Lucien Shuler (Shuler)

Unit 44FS

Rank Claim Location ILl. Over Henderson Field Over Giza Island Over Munda Airfield Over western New Georgia

Total: 7/0/0

Elmer Melvin Wheadon ("Mel", "Doc") 7 Victories Born: 29 March 1915 Sacramento, CA Awards: Silver Star, DFC, 12 Air Medals, Purple Heart Biography: Wheadon left his chiropractic practice and joined the Army Reserves and then entered the cadet program in early January 1942. He took primary fight training at Ryan Aeronautics in San Diego and basic at Minter Field (CA). He was awarded his 2Ll. commission and wings on 26 July 1942, at Luke Field (AZ), Class 42-G. He was assigned to the 44FS/18FG at Bellows Field (HI) in September 1942 and moved on to Efate for further training. ILl. Wheadon scored his first victory, a Zero, on 27 January 1943 flying a P-40 over Guadalcanal. Wheadon was of the three 13FC aces-in-day when he downed 4 Vals and a Zeke on 1 July 1943. After he completed his combat tour he served as a fighter tactics flight instructor. In 1946 he left the service to resume his chiropractic career. Elmer Wheadon (Author)

285

13th Fighter Command in World War II Combat record: Date JapA/C 01/27/43 Zero 07/01/43 4 Vals

AIC Unit P-40F 44FS

Zeke 09/14/43

Zeke t:eke prob. "

Rank Claim Location lLt. Guadalcanal Btwn. Rendova & Munda Pt. Btwn. Rendova & MundaPt. Off Kahili Airfield Off Kahili Airfield

Totals: 7/1/0

Combat record: Date Jap AIC 08/15/43 Betty 09/21/43 01/17/43 02/09/43 02/15/43

Betty Betty 3 Zekes prob. Zeke 2 Zekes

AIC Unit Rank Claim Location P-38G 6NFS 2Lt. SW of Fighter 2, Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Duke of York Island Tobera Airfield Vunakanau Airfield

Total: 6/3/0

Henry Meigs (Author)

Henry Meigs II 6 Victories Born: 12 June 1921 New York City, NY Awards: Silver Star, DFC, 8 Air Medals Biography: Meigs joined the Army Reserves in early January 1942 and won his wings and 2Lt. Commission on 1 October 1942 at Spence Field (GA) where he remained as an Advanced Training Instructor until January 1943 when he was sent to Glendale (CA) for P-38 training. He was assigned to the 339FS/347FG at the end of May 1943 and then to the 6NFS. Meigs scored his first victory, a Betty, flying a P-38G with the 6NFS over Guadalcanal on the night of 15 August 1943. He would score two more Betty victories at night with the 6NFS. He was transferred to the 12FS/18FG and then transferred back to the 339FS and became an ace with 2 Zeke victories on 2 February 1943. In December 1943 he transferred to the 417NFS. He returned to the States in April 1944 and left the AAF at the end of the war. He entered the University of Kentucky and graduated in 1949 from law school, serving 23 years as a state circuit court judge.

286

Thomas Walker (Author)

Thomas Hamilton Walker ("Bloody Walker") 6 Victories Born: 1920 Mound, MN Awards: DFC, 12 Air Medals Biography: Walker joined the Army Reserves in December 1941and received his 2Lt. commission and wings on 30 October 1942 at Luke Field (AZ) with Class-42J. He was assigned to the 331FS/ 329FG to train in the P-38 but was soon transferred to the 339FS/ 347FG on 21 April 1943. Walker scored his first victory on 3 July over a Zeke in a P-38 near Rendova Island. He became an ace on 10 February 1944 when he shot down an intercepting Zeke over ToberaAirfield. He returned to the States in March 1944 to become a P-38 instructor at China AFB (CA) and left the service in September 1945. It was reported that Walker died of a suspected suicide in the early 1950s.

Part Seven, Appendices - 13 th Fighter Command Aces Combat record: Unit Rank Date JapA/C AlC P-38G 339FS 2Lt. 07/03/43 Zeke Island P-38H " 11/08/43 Zeke ILt. Divebomber(?) 01/24/44 Zeke 02/10/44

Zeke

02/18/44

Zeke Total: 6/0/0

Claim Location NW of Rendova Cape Torokina Cape Torokina Off Rapopo Airfield South of Tobera Airfield Tobera Airfield

Jack Albrecht Bade ("Spyder") 5 Victories Born: 9 October 1920 Minneapolis, MN Awards: DSC. DFC. 9 Air Medals, Navy Air Medal, Purple Heart Aircraft names: PAO "Reckless Prostitute" Biography: Bade joined the Army Reserves in 1941 and on 26 July 1942 won his 2Lt. commission and wings at Luke Field (AZ), Class 42-G. He was assigned to the 44FS/18FG, Bellows Field (HI) and went with the squadron to Guadalcanal. 2Lt. Bade got his first victory on 4 February 1943 against a Zero over New Georgia. 1Lt. Bade became an ace on 30 June 1943 when he shot down a Dave off Rendova. Bade returned to the States in September 1943 and instructed in P-39s at Larson Field (WA) until he left the service as a Major in 1946. He became a test pilot for Republic Aviation and was killed in a F-105 in a mid-air collision in on 2 May 1963 in New York.

Jack Bade (Bade)

Combat record: Date Jap A/C 02/04/43 Zero

A/C Unit P-40F 44FS

02/13/43

Zero

06/07/43

Zeke prob." Zeke

06/16/43

Zeke

06/30/43

Dave

Rank Claim Location 2Lt. North tip of New Georgia South coast Bougainville 1Lt. Russell Island Off BW'aku Island Between Henderson & Savo Island NW coast of Rendova

Total: 5/1/0

Rex Theodore Barber 5 Victories Born: 6 May 1917 Culver, OR Awards: 2 Silver Stars, Navy Cross, Air Medal, Purple Heart Aircraft names: P-38G "Diablo" Biography: Rex Barber graduated from Oregon State University in 1940 and joined the Army reserves and served as a Private and then

Rex Barber (Barber)

287

13th Fighter Command in World War II became a Aviation Cadet. He was awarded his commission and wings at Mather Field (CA) on 31 October 1941 with Class 41-H. He was assigned to the 70FS/35FG and moved to Guadalcanal via Fiji in December 1942. He scored his first victory on 28 December 1942 over a Betty over Munda Airfield while flying a P-39. The pilots of the 70FS were incorporated into the 339FS flying P-38s. Barber would become an ace while flying in the controversial Yamamoto mission on 18 April 1943 when he shot down a Zeke and the Betty bomber in which Yamamoto was a passenger. He returned to the States after this mission and was promoted to Capt. and was assigned to fly with the 449FS in China flying the P-38. He was credited with 2 probables and a damaged there and was promoted to Maj. He was shot down on 29 April 1944 and was injured but evaded. He was returned to America to treat his injuries and remained in a California hospital for 8 months. He became the CO of the 29FS/412FG March Field (CA) flying the P-59 and P-80 jet aircraft but the war ended before the unit could go into combat. He remained in the post-war Air Force and retired in March 1961 as a Colonel. Combat record: Date JapAiC 12128/42 Betty 04/07/43 2 Zeros 04/18143 Betty

02/10/44 02/12/44

Truman Barnes (Barnes)

288

AlC Unit Rank Claim Location P-39D 70FS lLt. Munda Airfield P-38G 339FS " Cape Esperance SW coast of Bougainville Betty dam." Near Moila Pt. Bougainville SW coast of Zeke Bougainville 13FC Total: 5/0/1 Nick dam. P-38H 449FS Capt. China 2 Oscar China prob. 449FS Totals: 0/2/1

Truman Sheldon Barnes ("Barney") 5 Victories Born: 27 May 1919 Milford, CT Awards: Silver Star, 13 Air Medals Biography: Born in CT but raised in CA Barnes joined the Army Reserves in early October 1939 and served as a Private before enlisting in the AAC in October 1941. Barnes was initially sent to mechanics school at the Boeing School for Aeronautics and assigned to the 73BG in Alaska. He entered aviation cadet training in midMarch 1942. He completed primary and basic training at Cal Aero Academy and won his wings and commission on 30 October 1942 at Luke Field (AZ) with Class-42J. He trained in the P-38 for several months at Mills Field (CA) and then was assigned to the 339FS in December 1943. lLt. Barnes scored his first victory on 24 January when he shot down 2 Zeros over Rabaul. Three weeks later he became an ace when he shot down 2 more Zeros over Tobera Airfield. He was transferred out of the 3476FG that February. He was promoted to Capt. at the end of October 1944 and Maj. in early May 1947 when he was released from service. He then went into the Regular Army and then back to the Air Force where he remained until he left at the end of June 1952. He became disenchanted with several business ventures and joined the CAT (Civil Air Transport) that later became "Air America" and "he flew around Asia for the next 18 years." After the Vietnam War he flew for Interstate Airlines until he retired in April 1986. Combat Record: Date JapAiC 01/24/43 2 Zekes 02/10/43 Zeke 02/18/43

A/C Unit Rank Claim Location P-38J 339FS lLt. Rabaul South of Tobera Airfield Tobera Airfield

2 Zekes Total: 5/010

Robert Byrnes (Byrnes)

Part Seven, Appendices - 13 th Fighter Command Aces Robert Charlton Byrnes ("Bobby") 5 Victories Born: IS September 1915 Jena, LA Awards: DFC, 8 Air Medals Biography: Before joining the Army Reserves Byrnes studied Engineering at the University of Alabama and LSD. He enlisted as an Aviation Cadet in early November 1941 at Barksdale Field (LA). He received his 2Lt. Commission and wings at Foster Field (TX) on 3 July 1942 and was assigned to the 44FS/18FG. He scored his first victory on 5 June 1943 downing a Zeke over Kahili and became an ace on 31 August when he shot down a Val off Vella Lavella. After 115 combat missions he returned to the States and served as Operations Officer at Peterson Field (CO) and Director of Flying at Dalhart AFB (TX). In civilian life he was a very successful auto dealer in his hometown of Winnfield, LA. Byrnes died on 7 July 1976. Combat record: Date Jap AlC 06/05/43 Zeke 06/12/43 Zeke

AlC Unit P-40F 44FS

06/16/43

2 Zekes

08/31/43

Val Val prob. " Total: 5/110

Rank Claim Location lLt. Kahili Off Russell island North of Guadalcanal Capt. Vella Lavella Off Vella Lavella

George Throckmorton Chandler ("Throck") 5 Victories Born: 1 February 1921 Wichita KS Awards: DFC, 10 Air Medals Aircraft names: P-38G "Barbara Ann" Biography: Chandler attended Wichita University for two years before joining the Army Reserves. He was awarded his 2Lt. commission and wings as part of Class 42-G at Luke Field (AZ) on 26 July 1942. He was assigned to the 47FS/1SFG flying PADs in Hawaii. He was transferred to the 49FS/8FG in February 1943 at Port Moresby but the next month he transferred back to Hawaii with the 72FS/318 FG. Finally he ended up with the 339FS/347FG in early May at New Caledonia flying the P-38. The 2Lt. scored his first victory on 3 July 1943 over a Hap near Rendova Island and became an ace on 3 February 1944 over Lakunai Airfield when he shot down a Zero. Capt. Chandler returned to the US in early 1944. From May 1944 to September 1945 he was an instructor in tactics at Chico (CA). He separated from the AAF in January 1946 as a Major and pursued a career in banking in Kansas. He is a major force in the Second Yamamoto Mission Association whose objective has been to investigate and resolve the identity of the Yamamoto shooter.

George Chandler (Chandler)

Combat record: Date Jap AIC AIC Unit 07/03/43 Hap P-38G 339FS 1110843 2 Zekes P-38H " 01/24/44 Zeke 02/03/44 Zeke P-38J" Total: 5/010

Rank 2Lt. 1Lt. Capt.

Claim Location Off Rendova Cape Torokina Rabaul Lukanai Airfield

William Frederick Fiedler, Jr. 5 Victories Born: ? Indianapolis IN Awards: DFC, 6 Air Medals, Navy Air Medal Biography: Fiedler joined the Army Reserves and received his 2Lt. commission and wings from Stockton Field (CA) on 23 June 1942. He was assigned to the 70FS/347FG and scored his first victory on 26 January 1943 when he shot down a Zero offWagina Island flying a P-39D. He transferred to the 68Fs and became an ace on 16 June 1943 when he shot down 2 Vals over Henderson again flying a P-39. Fiedler was the only American P-39 ace. In a predawn mission on 30 June, to avoid overheating while taxiing, Fiedler and his squadron decided to wait on the opposite end of the runway until four flights ofP-38s took off. To get out of the hot cockpit the pilots sat on the wings of their aircraft, watching the P-38s. One of the Lightnings had some kind of problem on takeoff and rolled over at liftoff, crashing into the P-39s, killing Fiedler.

289

13 th Fighter Command in World War II

William Fiedler (Canning)

Combat record: Date JapA/C 01/26/43 Zero

Cyrus Gladen (Gladen)

A/C Unit P-39D 70FS

02/04/43

Zero

06/12/43

Zeke

06/16/43

2Vals P-39K " Total:5/0/0

P-39N 68FS

Rank Claim Location 2Lt. OffWagina Island lLt. North of Kolombangara Off Cape Esperance Over Henderson

Cyrus Raymond Gladen ("Cy") 5 Victories Born: 4 November 1920 Bemidji, MN Awards: Silver Star, DFC, 12 Air Medals Biography: Gladenjoined the Almy reserves in 1940 and was originally trained as a chemical warfare specialist before transferring to the AAC in July 1941. He was a mechanic at Hickam Field during the Pearl Harbor attack. He transfelTed to the States as an Aviation Cadet and became pilot rated as a 2Lt. on 5 August 1942 at Moore Field (TX).with Class-42G. He was posted to the 72FS/318FG but went to the 44FS in mid-March 1943. Gladen scored in only two combats getting 2 Zekes on 16 June 1943 and 3 Vals on 31 August 1943 to become an ace. He remained in the Air Force Reserves after the war and graduated from the University of Oregon in Business Administration.

290

Combat record: Date JapA/C 06/16/43 2 Zekes 08/31/43

AlC Unit P-40F 44FS

3 Vals

Rank Claim Location 2Lt. North of Guadalcanal lLt. Barkoma & Vella Lavella

Total: 5/0/0 Besby Frank Holmes ("Frank") 5 Victories Born: 5 December 1917 San Francisco, CA Awards: Navy Cross, 3 DFCs, Air Medal Aircraft names: P-38G "Ole" Biography: Holmes graduated from San Francisco City College in 1938 and applied for AAC pilot training in January 1940 but was not until 15 March 1941 that Holmes became an Aviation Cadet. He took primary at Oxnard (CA) and basic at Bakersfield (CA). He was awarded his 2Lt. commission and wings on 1 November at Luke Field (AZ). He was sent to Wheeler Field, Hawaii flying the P-36 and was present during the Pearl Harbor attack. Holmes actually got into the air, his second flight in the P-36, but the Japanese attack was over and he had to evade heavy friendly AA fire. He was transfelTed to the 339FS/347FG at he end of November 1942. He scored his first victory over Tonolei Harbor when he shot down a float biplane on 5 January 1943. He became an ace during the

Part Seven, Appendices - 13th Fighter Command Aces Combat record: Date Jap AlC AlC Unit Rank Claim Location 01105/43 Float P-38G 339FS lLt. Tonolei Harbor biplane 2FBP Tonolei Harbor prob. Zero prob. " 01120/43 Between Fauro & Shortland Island 01125/43 Zero Savo Island 01127/43 Zero prob. " Cape Esperance to Russell Island 02/02/43 Zero 25 miles SE of Shortland Island 04/18/43 Betty Near Moila Pt., Bougainville Zeke SW coast of Bougainville Total: 5/4/0

Thomas George Lanphier, Jr. 5 Victories Born: 27 November 1915 Panama City, Panama Awards: 2 Silver Stars, Navy Cross, DFC, Air Medal Aircraft name: P-38G "Phoebe" Biography: Lanphier graduated with a BA in Journalism in 1941 from Stanford. He joined the Army Reserves and was awarded his

Besby Holmes (Holmes)

Yamamoto mission, on 18 April 1943, when he shot down the second Adm. Ugaki Betty and a Zeke. He was promoted to Capt. in July 1943 and transferred out of the 347FG and returned to the States in January 1944 after three combat tours and was flying P63s at Redmond AFB (OR) and was slated to be a squadron CO as the war ended. He remained in the post-war Air Force and was promoted to Maj. in July 1946 but was released from active service andjoined the Reserves in June 1947 and retired from the Air Force Reserves as a Lt.Col. in 1980. He graduated form the University of Oregon in 1949 with a degree in Business Administration. He retired from a career with Allstate Insurance Company in 1983.

Thomas Lanphier (Author)

291

13th Fighter Command in World War II wings and 2Lt. commission on 31 October 1941 at Stockton Field (CA). He was assigned to the 70FS/35FG and was shipped to Fiji until December 1942. The squadron was assigned to the 347FG and sent to Guadalcanal flying the P-39. Lanphier claimed an unsubstantiated Zero on 24 December but did get 3 Zeros on 7 April 1943 as a Capt. over Cape Esperance. During the Yamamoto mission Lanphier claimed a Zeke and the Yamamoto Betty. But postwar investigation could not verify this victory although it was not removed from his record. After the Yamamoto mission he returned to the States and was promoted to Maj. in November 1943 and to Lt.Coi. in February 1945. During May 1944 he flew several missions to test tactics over Europe. After the war he was the editor of newspapers in Boise, ID. He was promoted to Col. in the Reserves in May 1950. From 1951 to 1960 he was the Vice President of General Dynamic's Convair Division. He died of cancer in 1987, steadfastly maintaining that he had shot down Yamamoto until the day he died. Combat record: Date Jap AlC 12/24/42 Zero(7) 04/07/43 04/18/43

3 Zeros Zeke

AlC Unit P-39K 70FS P-38G"

Beuy(7) Total: 4,57,67/0/0

Paul Bechtel (Bechtel)

292

Rank Claim Location Over lLt. Guadalcanal Capt. Cape Esperance SW coast of Bougainville SW coast of Bougainville

Paul Sarachon Bechtel 5 Victories Born: 4 March 1917 Goodland, KS Awards: DFC, Navy DFC, 5 Air Medals Biography: Bechtel graduated with a BS degree in Engineering from the University of Wyoming. He joined the Army reserves in June 1939 and won his 2Lt. commission and wings on 23 March 1940 at Kelly Field (TX) He was sent to the 39PS/3IPS and then transferred to the 50PG in May 1941 and became the CO of the 12PS. He led the 12FS to Guadalcanal as a Maj. on 21 December and got his first victories, 2 Zeros, on the 24 th flying a P-39K over Munda Pt. He served 2 combat tours at Guadalcanal and transferred to the 13FC as its Operations Officer. He flew combat missions and on 2 September 1943 he became an ace flying a borrowed Marine F4U as he shot a Zero off the tail of VMF-124 CO, Don Yost. After the war he transferred to the Air Force and during the Korean War commanded a B-29 Weather Recon Unit. From 1953-63 he served in R&D commands. He was promoted to Col. In June 1952 and retired from the Air Force in January 1963. Combat record: Date Jap AlC 12/24/42 2 Zeros Zero prob. 04/01/43 Zeke 04/07/43 09/02/43 Total: 5/1/0

Zeke Zeke

Rank Claim Location Maj Munda Pt. Munda Pt. Russell Islands Savo Island Kahili 13FC "

AlC Unit P-39K 12FS " P-38G "

F4U

Part Seven, Appendices - 13th Fighter Command Aces 13FC Aces Notes: Darrell Cramer flew with the 339FS in 1943 and scored a Zero probable on 11 February 1943 as a 2Lt. flying a P-38 over Vila. As a lLt. he shared a Betty on 1 November 1 off Cape St. George. He returned to the States in December 1943 and transferred to the 338FS/55FG in August 1944. He claimed 6.5 victories with that squadron over Europe to become an ace. He retired from the Air Force as a Brig.General in 1973.

John McGinn flew with the 339FS and the 347FG/HQ as a Capt. from May to November 1943. He shot down Zekes on 16 June (over Fighter 2), 17 July (over Kahili) and I November with 347FG/ HQ (over Empress Augusta Bay). He returned to America and then transferred to the 338FS/55FG and saw combat in Europe. He shot down a FW-190 and Me-109 in September 1944 to become an ace. McGinn remained in the post-war Air Force and retired from the Air Force as a Colonel in 1963.

Darrell Cramer (Cramer)

John McGinn (McGinn)

293

Group & Squadron COs (to September 1943)

18 th Fighter Group 1941-Maj. WR. Morgan 12/41-Lt.Col. A.W Tyer 12/43-Lt.Col. WH. Councill 12th Fighter Squadron 12/19/42-Maj. PS. Bechtel 01/27/43-Capt. TJ. Graves 02126/43-Capt. R.D. Ruehale 03/07/43-Maj. P.S. Bechtel Os/18/43-Capt. C.S. Nichols 06/1s/43-Capt. Tl Graves 07/11/43-Capt. C.S. Nichols 08128/43-Lt.Col. L.S. McGown 44 th Fighter Squadron 1l/07/41-Lt. J.S. McBride 08123/42-Capt. E.W Stewart 09/09/42-Maj. K. Tyler Os/24/43-Maj. lE. Little 09I2s/43-Maj. R.B. Westbrook 347 th Fighter Group 1O/03/42-Lt.Col. G.M. McNeese 0l/0l/44-Lt.Col. Leo Dusard 67 th Fighter Squadron 01/l6/41-1Lt. Arthur Kingham 02/09/41-? Unknown 04129/41-Capt. John Kilborn 05/01/41-1 Lt. Dale Brannon 08/14/41-2Lt. lA. Thompson 08/41-Capt. Dale Brannon 1OI2s/42-Unknown ?-Maj. ? Hecht (KIFA) 08/19/43-Maj. ? Collins

294

08124/43-Lt.Col. John Wilson (sAF) 10I2s/43-Maj. ? Collins 68 th Fighter Squadron 01/16/41-1Lt. R.M. Caldwell 1l/09/42-1Lt. S.A. Palmer 12/31/42-Capt. R.B. Hubbell (MIA) 01/27/43-ILt. EV Purnell 02/0s/43-Capt. K.P. Conradi 02/13/43-Capt. R.C. Williams 02I2s/43-ILt. PC. Hancock 03/14/43-Capt. WT Hull 04/03/43-Capt. SA Palmer Os/01/43-Capt. R.c. Williams OsI29/43-1Lt. J.W Whitsett 06/1s/43-1Lt. TG. Johnson 06/17/43-Capt. J.D. Robinson 08/12/43-Lt.Col. WB. Wilmott 70 th Fighter Squadron 01/01/41-Capt. H.B. Wright 04/30/41-1Lt. H. Viccellio 09126/41-Capt. H.B. Wright 12/10/41-ILt. H. Viccellio 1O/10/42-Capt. W. Williams (KIA) 04/07/43-Capt. R.T. Rivers 04122/43-Maj. L.R. Kittel 1l/1l/43-Capt. G.G. Duren 11/30/43-Lt.Col. M.B. Adams Os/14/44-Maj. TC. Crandall 09/14/44-Maj. W.R. Cowper 339 lh Fighter Squadron 1O/03/42-Maj.D.D. Brannon 1l/2s/42-Maj. J.W Mitchell Osl2l/43-Maj.J.S. Evans 08/30/43-Maj. H.W Lawrence 04/18/44-Maj. J.Z. Endriss

13 th Fighter Command Squadron Victories

18 th Fighter Group/HQ Date Jap. AlC Pilot Name 12/24/43 Zeke ILt. James Parker 12/24/43 Zeke prob. ILt. James Parker 03/16/44 0.5 Dinah Maj. Francis Daugherty (.5)

Location Rabaul Rabaul Vunakanau Airfield

Period Total: 1.5/1/0 War Total: 6.5/1/0 12th Fighter Squadron/18 th Fighter Group Date Jap. A/C Pilot Name Location 12/24/42 Zeke 2Lt. Everett Anglin Munda Point 12/24/42 Zeke Capt. James Baird (0.5) Munda Point ILt. James Lamburth (0.5) 12/24/42 2 Zeros Maj. Paul Bechtel Munda Point 12/24/42 Zero prob. Maj. Paul Bechtel Munda Point

12 Fighter Squadron: (Ames via Lansdale) Top (L-R) Dr. Piccilo (Flight Surgeon), Lt. Hockett, Lt. Clark, Lt. Kuehnle, Lt. Moore. Lt. Stratton. Lt. Meigs. Capt. Angelin. Lt.Ames. and Lt. Smith Middle (L-R) Lt. Long. Lt. Nichols, Maj. Kittle (CO), Maj. Bechtel (CO), Capt. Baird, Lt. Graves, and Lt.White. Bottom (L-R) Lt. Sapp?, Lt. F. White. Lt. Scott, Lt. Honaker, Lt. Wells

12/24/42 Zero prob. lLt. Roger Ames (0.5) 2Lt. Joseph Young (0.5) 01115/43 Zero prob. Capt. Cyril Nichols 01115/43 Zero prob. ILt. Roger Ames 04/01/43 Zeke Maj. Paul Bechtel 04/01/43 Zeke ILt. William Smith 04/07/43 Zeke Maj. Paul Bechtel 05/13/43 Betty lLt. William Smith 05/13/43 Betty prob. lLt. William Smith 06/10/43 Betty 2Lt. Floyd White 08/15/43 Zeke Capt. Cyril Nichols F/O Cecil Moore 08/30/43 Type 0 08/30/43 Type 0 F/O Cecil Moore 08/30/43 Type 0 Capt. Eldon Stratton 09/15/43 Zero lLt. Robert Mein (0.5) ILt. Perry Wells (0.5) 09/15/43 Zero ILt. Peny Wells 03/16/44 0.5 Dinah ILt. Francis Cheney (0.5) Period Total: 15/5/0 War Total: 40.5/1112 44 th Fighter Squadron/l8 th Fighter Group Date Jap. A/C Pilot Name 01/27/43 Zero 2Lt. Dale Tarbet ILt. Robert Westbrook 01/27/43 Zero lLt. Elmer Wheadon 01/27/43 Zero 01/27/43 Zero prob. Capt. Kenneth Taylor 01127043 Zero prob. Maj. Kermit Tyler 01128/43 Zero ILt. Henry Matson 02/02/43 Zero ILt. Raymond Morrissey 02/02/43 Zero 2Lt. Dale Tarbet 02/02/43 Zero 2Lt. John Wood 02/04/43 Zero 2Lt. Jack Bade . lLt. Henry Matson 02/04/43 Zero 02/04/43 Zero Capt. Albert Johnson 02/04/43 Zero prob. ILt. Michael Carter 02/04/43 Zero prob. ILt. Henry Matson

Munda Point Off New Georgia Off New Georgia Russell Islands Russell Islands Savo Island Over Guadalcanal Over Guadalcanal Off Ndeni Island Kahili Kahili Kahili Kahili Ballale Ballale Vunakanau AID

Location ear Arulgio Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Vella Lavella Buin Harbor Buin Harbor Buin Harbor Off New Georgia Off New Georgia Off New Georgia Off New Georgia Off New Georgia 295

13th Fighter Command in World War II 06/16/43 Zeke

ILt. Dale Tarbet

06/16/43 Zeke

ILt. Jack Bade

06/16/43 Zeke 2Lt. Robert Holman

44th Fighter Squadron November 1943 at New Caledonia (Smith) Bottom (L-R) Zaricor, Jennings, Shuler, Blakeney, Gaunt, Westbrook, Condor, Krohn, and Beauregard. Middle (L-R) Connolly, Long, Smith, Cleveland, Reddington, Gladen, Dreckman, Farkas, Glomen, Anthony, and Bowman.Top (L-R) Sawyers, Corbett, Mushlit, Parker, Curry, Heckler. Fox, Holman, Francis, Mueller, and Hay.

02/13/43 Zero 02/13/43 Zero 02/13/43 02/13/43 02/13/43 02/2743

Zero prob. Zero Zero prob. Pete

02/27/43 Pete prob. 06/05/43 06/05/43 06/07/43 06/07/43 06/07/43 06/07/43 06/07/43 06/07/43 06/07/43 06/07/43 06/07/43 06/12/43 06/12/43 06/12/43 06/16/43

Zeke Zeke 2 Zekes Zeke prob. Zeke prob. Zeke prob. Zeke Zeke 2 Zekes 2 Zekes Zeke prob. Zeke Zeke Zeke Val

06//16/43 Val 06/16/43 2 Zekes 06/16/43 2 Zekes 06/16/43 2 Zekes

296

2Lt. Jack Bade Bougainville south coast Capt. Albert Johnson Bougainville south coast Capt. Albert Johnson Bougainville 2Lt. Raymond Morrissey Bougainville ILt. Robert Westbrook Bougainville Capt. John Little OffNE end of Vella Lavella OffNE end of Capt. John Little Vella Lavella ILt. Robert Byrnes Kahili 2Lt. Magnus Russell Island ILt. Henry Matson Russell Island ILt. Douglas Currey Russell Island ILt. Robert Holman Russell Island 2Lt. Charles Sacket Russell Island ILt. Jack Bade Off Buraku Island ILt. Carl Newlander Russell Island ILt. James Parker Russell Island ILt. Robert Westbrook Russell Island ILt. William Cargill Russell Island Russell Island ILt. Robert Byrnes Capt. Robert Westbrook Russell Island ILt. Henry Matson Russell Island ILt. Douglas Curry Over Henderson Field ILt. Lucien Shuler Over Henderson Field 2Lt. Mack Bunderson North of Guadalcanal ILt. Robert Byrnes North of Guadalcanal 2Lt. Cyrus Gladen North of Guadalcanal

06/16/43 2 Vals

ILt. Cotesworth Head

06/16/43 Zeke

ILt. Cotesworth Head

06/16/43 Val

lLt. Joseph Lesicka

06/16/43 Val

ILt. John Wood

06/16/43 2 Vals ILt. Frank Gaunt 06/16/43 Val 2Lt. Wallace Jennings 06/30/43 Float plane 2Lt. Carl Hay

North of Guadalcanal Btwn. Henderson and Savo Is. Btwn. Henderson and Savo Is. East of Henderson Field East of Henderson Field East of Henderson Field East of Henderson Field Henderson Field Henderson Field NW coast of Rendova NW coast of Rendova

06/30/43 Float plane ILt. Cotesworth Head (0.5) ILt. Robert Krohn (0.5) 06/30/43 Float plane lLt. Jack Bade NW coast of Rendova 06/30/43 Float plane lLt. Joseph Lesicka NW coast of Rendova NW coast of 06/30/43 Float plane ILt. Bruce Macklin Rendova NW coast of 06/30/43 Float plane Capt. John Voss Rendova 07/01/43 Val Btwn. Rendova ILt. Douglas Currey and Munda Pt. Btwn. Rendova 07/01/43 Val I Lt. Magnus Francis and Munda Pt. 07/01/43 Hap Btwn. Rendova lLt. Magnus Francis and Munda Pt. 07/01/43 Zeke Btwn. Rendova ILt. Magnus Francis and Munda Pt. Btwn. Rendova 07/01/43 0.5 Val ILt. Magnus Francis and Munda Pt. or Kate (0.5) Btwn. Rendova 07/01/43 Zero dam. ILt. Magnus Francis and Munda Pt. Btwn. Rendova ILt. Carl Newlander 07/01/43 Zeke and Munda Pt. Btwn. Rendova 2Lt. Charles Sacket 07/01/43 2 Vals and Munda Pt. Btwn. Rendova 07/01/43 Zeke 2Lt. Charles Sacket and Munda Pt. 07/01/43 Hap Maj. Robert Westbrook Btwn. Rendova and Munda Pt. 07/01/43 Zeke Maj. Robert Westbrook Btwn. Rendova and Munda Pt. Btwn. Rendova 07/01/434 Vals ILt. Elmer Wheadon and Munda Pt. Btwn. Rendova 07/01/43 Zeke ILt. Elmer Wheadon and Munda Pt.

Part Seven, Appendices - 13 th Fighter Command Squadron Victories 07/05/43 Zeke 07/05/43 Zeke

07/12/43 Zeke 07/12/43 Zeke dam. 07/12/43 Zeke 07112/43 Zeke 07/12/43 Zeke dam. 07115/43 Zeke dam.

f

07/15/43 07/15/43 07/15/43 07/15/43 07/15/43 07/15/43 07/15/43 07115/43

3 Zeros Zero Zero Kate Betty 2 Zeros Zero 2 Zeros

07115/43 Zero 07/25/43 Zero

07/25/43 Zero dam. 07/25/43 Zero 08/01143· Zero 08/04/43 Zeke 08/04/43 4 Zekes 08/04/43 Zeke 08/04/43 Zeke 08/07/43 Zero 08/07/43 Zero

08/1 0/43 Hap 08/15/43 Zero 08/15/43 Zero 08/15/43 Zero prob. 08/15/43 Val

2Lt. Wallace Jennings lLt. Harold Dreckman (0.5) lLt. John Wood (0.5) Capt. Frank Gaunt

Rendova Over Munda

Over Munda Airfield Capt. Frank Gaunt Over Munda Airfield lLt. Joseph Lesicka Over Munda Airfield F/O Andrew Murray Over Munda AilfIeld F/O Andrew Murray Over Munda Airfield lLt. Robert Krohn Over Munda Airfield Capt. Frank Gaunt Blackett Strait 2Lt. Carl Hay Blackett Strait Vella Lavella lLt. Joseph Lesicka lLt. Joseph Lesicka Vella Lavella lLt. Joseph Lesicka Vella Lavella lLt Joseph Lesicka Vella Lavella 2Lt. Robert Robb Giza Island coast 2Lt. Richard Wheeler East of Giza Island lLt. Harold Dreckman East of Giza Island Capt. John Voss (0.5) East of Lambetti Plantation F/O John Cosgrove East of Lambetti (0.5) Plantation Capt. John Voss East of Lambetti Plantation Capt. John Voss East of Lambetti Plantation lLt. Lucien Shuler Over Giza Island lLt. Cotesworth Head Munda Airfield lLt. Lucien Shuler Munda Airfield lLt. Grant Smith Munda Airfield lLt. Robert Robb Munda Airfield lLt. Joseph Lesicka MundaiRendova area lLt. Frank Radzuikinas MundaiRendova (0.5) area lLt. Bruce Macklin (0.5) lLt. Lucien Shuler Over western New Georgia lLt. John Cox Boga Island coast Capt. Frank Gaunt Over Ganongga Island Capt. Frank Gaunt Over Ganongga Island lLt. William Kester Vella Lavella

08/15/43 Zeke prob. 2Lt. Robert Magown

08/31143 Val 08/31143 Val prob. 08/31143 Val

Capt. Robert Byrnes Capt. Robert Byrnes lLt. Robert Fox

08/31143 Zeke dam. lLt. Robert Fox 08/31/43 Val prob.

lLt. Robert Fox

08/31143 3 Vals

lLt. Cyrus Gladen

09/14/43 09/14/43 09/18/43 10/01/43

Zeke Zeke prob. Zero Zero

Ganonggal Kolombangara Islands Off Vella Lavella Off Vella Lavella BarakomaiVela Lavella BarakomaiVella Lavella BarakomalVella Lavella BarakomalVella Lavella Off Kahili Off Kahili Off Baga Island Barakoma

Capt. Elmer Wheadon Capt. Elmer Wheadon lLt. Cotesworth Head 2Lt. Raymond Farkas (0.5) Capt. Cotesworth Head (0.5) 10/10/43 Zero Maj. Robert Westbrook Kahili 10/10/43 0.5 Zeke Maj. Robert Westbrook Off NW Choiseul prob. Island 10/11/43 u/i ale Capt. Cotesworth Head Kahili 10/11/43 Zeke dam. Capt. Cotesworth Head Kahili 10/27/43 Val 2Lt. James Corbett (0.5) Off Treasury Islands lLt. William Kester (0.5) 10/27/43 Val lLt. Gearge Gibbs Off Treasury Islands 10/27/43 0.5 Zeke 2Lt. William Green Off Treasury (0.5) Islands 10/2743 Zeke Capt. Theo Jennings Off Treasury Islands lLt. A. Ferguson Off Treasury 10/27/43 Val prob. Islands 11108/43 Val lLt. Franklin Crain Cape Torokina 11108/43 Val 2Lt. John Roehm Cape Torokina 11/08/43 Val Capt. John Voss Torokina Bay 12/23/43 Zeke 2Lt. Raymond Fouquet Cape St. George 12/23/43 Zeke Maj. Robert Westbrook Cape St. George 12/23/43 Zeke dam. Maj. Robert Westbrook Cape St. George 12/24/43 Zeke Maj. Robert Westbrook Rabaul (0.5) lLt. Byron Bowman (0.5) lLt. Byron Bowman 12/24/43 Zeke Rabaul 12/24/43 Zeke prob. Lt. Byron Bowman Rabaul 12/24/43 Zeke lLt. Byron Bowman Rabaul 12/24/43 Zeke Maj. Robert Westbrook Rabaul 12/24/43 0.5 Zeke Maj. Robert Westbrook Rabaul (0.5) 12/24/43 Zeke Maj. Robert Westbrook Rabaul 12/25/43 Zeke F/O Rex Byers East of Duke of York Island 12/25/43 Zeke Maj. Robert Westbrook Rabaul

297

13 th Fighter Command in World War II Maj. Robert Westbrook York Island 12/25/43 Zeke 1Lt. Andrew Sawers 01/06/44 Zeke Capt. Harold Dreckman 01/06/44 Zeke prob. Capt. Harold Dreckman 12/25/43 Zeke

East of Duke of

Cape Gazelle Cape Gazelle Cape St. George to Lakunai East of Rapopo lLt. James Long 01/06/44 Zeke Maj. Robert Westbrook Cape Gazelle 01/06/44 Zeke 01/06/44 Zeke prob. Maj. Robert Westbrook Cape Gazelle 1Lt. Richard Wheeler 01/06/44 2 Zekes North of Duke of York Island 01/06/44 Zeke 1Lt. Louis Anthony (0.5) St. George Channel to Rabaul 2Lt. Jack Laurie (0.5) 2Lt. James Corbett 01/06/44 Zeke St. George Channel to Rabaul 01/06/44 Zeke Capt. Cotesworth Head St. George Channel to Rabaul 01/06/44 Hamp prob. Capt. Cotesworth Head St. George Channel to Rabaul 01/06/44 2 Zekes Capt. Carl Hay St. George Chanprob. nel to Rabaul 01/11/44 Zero Capt. Frank Gaunt Rabaul area 01/11/44 Zeke prob. Capt. Douglas Currey Rabaul area 01/11/44 Zeke prob. Capt. Grant Smith Rabaul area 01/11/44 Zeke prob. 2Lt. Winfield McFarland Rabaul area 01/11144 Zeke prob. 2Lt. Donald Anderson Rabaul area 01114/44 Kate Capt. Cotesworth Head SW of Cape Torokina 01/17/44 Zeke Capt. Cotesworth Head Ocean south of Simpson Harbor 01/17/44 Zeke Capt. Cotesworth Head Blanche Bay 01/17/44 Zeke Capt. Cotesworth Head Off Cape Gazelle 1Lt. Robert Corbett 01/17/44 Zeke Simpson Harbor lLt. Louis Anthony 01/17/44 2 Zekes Duke of York prob. Island 01/18/44 Zeke Capt. Cotesworth Head Off New Britain Island 01/18/44 3 Zekes 1Lt. James Reddington Tobera Airfield 01/18/44 Zeke lLt. John Roehm Tobera Airfield 01/18/44 Zeke 2Lt. Robert Connelly Tobera Airfield Period total: 151.5/31.5/12 War total: 163.5/33.5/15 3471h Fighter GrouplHQ Date Jap. AlC Pilot Name 12/19/42 Float Maj. Dale Brannon biplane 12/19/42 Float BP Maj. Dale Brannon prob. ll/01/43 Zeke Capt. John McGinn 11/01/43 Zeke prob. Capt. John McGinn

298

Location Tonolei Harbor Tonolei Harbor Empress Augusta Bay Empress Augusta Bay

01/06/44 Zeke

Lt.Col. Leo Dusard

02/09/44 0.5 Zeke 02/10/44 Zeke 02/10/44 Zeke

Lt.Col. Leo Dusard Capt. Elmer Jurgensen Capt. Elmer Jurgensen

St. George Channel Tobera Airfield Tobera Airfield East coast of New Britain

Period Total: 5.5/2/0 War Total: 11.5/2/0

67 th Fighter Squadron "Fighting Cocks" pose on P-400 "Hell's Bells" (Lansdale) Sitting on Wing (L-R) Albert Faquharson (no shirt),james janman (cap),Jerome Sawyer (t-shirt), and james Campbell. Near cockpit: F. Williams (Pith helmet) and A. Fitzgerald (cap/shirtless). Both were armorers. Front: (L-R) F. Fjelstad, George Dewey. Leland Ramp (leaning on wing behind Dewey), Besby Holmes (dark jacket holding door),james Morton (cap holding door), Delton Goerke (cap behind Morton), Douglas Canning (holding door/hand on hip), Robert Kerstetter Gust behind Goerke shoulder), G. Headtler, and D. Miller.

67 th Fighter Squadron/347 lh Fighter Group Date Jap. AIC Pilot Name 08/24/42 Zero Capt. Dale Brannon 08/30/42 Zero 2Lt. Deltis Fincher 08/30/42 Zero Capt. Dale Brannon 08/30/42 Zero 2Lt. Barclay Dillon 08/30/42 Zero prob. 2Lt. Barclay Dillon 08/30/42 Zero 1Lt. Albert Dutton 08/30/42 Zero lLt. Richard Johnson 08/30/42 Zero prob. Capt. John Thompson ll/07/42 Rufe 1Lt. Robert Ferguson ll/11/42 Zero 1Lt. James McLanahan 11/12/42 Betty 12/03/42 Float biplane 12/03/42 Float biplane 12/03/42 2 Float biplanes 12/03/42 Float BP prob.

ILt. James McLanahan 1Lt. Peter Childress

Location Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Off Cape Esperance Guadalcanal Guadalcanal

ILt. Zed Fountain

Guadalcanal

ILt. Lynwood Glazier

Guadalcanal

ILt. Peter Childress

Guadalcanal

Part Seven, Appendices - 13th Fighter Command Squadron Victories 12/03/42 Float BP

ILt. Lynwood Glazier

prob. 12116/42 Zero 02/01/43 Zero

Capt. John Thompson Capt. Jerome Sawyer

Guadalcanal

Guadalcanal 140 miles NW Henderson North of 02/04/43 Zero prob. ILt. Nilo Inciardi Kolombangara North of 02/04/42 Zero prob. 1Lt. Robert Tullis Kolombangara ILt. Isaac LaLonde (0.5) Russell Island 03/06/43 Val lLt. Wallace McClendon (0.5) Russell Island ILt. Arnold Patterson 03/06/43 Val Russell Island ILt. Arnold Patterson 03/06/43 Val prob. ILt. Arnold Patterson Russell Island 03/06/43 Val (0.5) Capt. Jerome Sawyer (0.5) Capt. Jerome Sawyer Russell Island 03/06/43 Val Capt. Jerome Sawyer Russell Island 03/06/43 Val prob. 2Lt. Fred Horne (0.5) Off Rendova 05/22/43 Betty Period Total: 17.5/8/0 War Total: 28.5/9/2

01115/43 3 Petes

01115/43 01115/43

01115/43 01118/43

01118/43 01120/43 01120/43 01120/43 01120143

01120/43 01127/43

01127/43 01127/43 04/0743 06112/43

06112/43 06/12/43 06112143

06116/43 06116/43

06116/43 06116/43

06116/43 06116/43

06116/43 68 th Fighter Group, May 1943, Fighter Two (Palmer) Standing (L-R) Capt. Raymond Williams, Lt. Russell Shambrook, Lt. William "Pat" Patton, Lt. Henry Waldmire, Capt.William Hull, Lt. Kenneth Kellum, Lt. George Heckert, and Lt. Rollins Snelling. Kneeling (L-R) Lt Frederick Ploetz, Lt. Martin Ryan, Lt. Martin Smith, Lt. Theodore Jennings, Lt. Robert Kester, Lt. Lloyd "Cotton" Huff, Lt. Robert Kennedy, and Capt. Stan Palmer. (Note: Lts. Kester and Jennings were on loan from the 44FS)

68 th Fighter Squadron/347 th Fighter Group Date Jap. Ale Pilot Name 11112/42 Zero ILt. Martin Ryan 01/05/43 Float Capt. Robert Hubbell biplane 01/05/43 Float BP ILt. Emmett Norris prob.

Location Guadalcanal Tonolei Harbor Tonolei Harbor

0616/43 06116/43

06116/43 07/09/43 07/11143 07/25143 07125/43 08/30/43

ILt. Lloyd Huff

North of ew Georgia 2 Petes ILt. Robert Kennedy 50 miles north of New Georgia 2 Petes ILt. Martin Smith 50 miles north of New Georgia ILt. Allen Webb 50 miles north of 2 Petes New Georgia Float Zero lLt. Joseph Lynch Shortland Island Float Zero ILt. Allen Webb Shortland Island Pete Capt. Robert Hubbell Btwn. Fauro & Shortland Is. Pete prob. Capt. Robert Hubbell Btwn. Fauro & Shortland Is. 2 Pete prob. ILt. Robert Kennedy Btwn. Fauro & Shortland Is. Btwn. Fauro & Pete ILt. Frederick Ploetz Shortland Is. Btwn. Fauro & Pete ILt. Martin Smith Shortland Is. lLt. Frederick Purnell Near Cape Zero Esperance Zero lLt. Frederick Purnell Guadalcanal Zero dam. lLt. Frederick Purnell Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Zeke lLt. Henry Waldmire Off Russell island Zeke lLt. Robert Fetch lLt. William Fieldler Off Cape Zeke Esperance ILt. Samuel Barnes Russell Island Zeke Zeke ILt. Charles Harris Russell Island 2Lt. Thomas Clark Off Lunga Point Zeke ILt. Robert Fetch Off Lunga Point Zeke Off Lunga Point Zeke lLt. Charles Harris Toward Cape Zeke ILt. Charles Harris Esperance ILt. Richard Kent Near Henderson Val Field ILt. Richard Kent ear Henderson Val dam. Field Near Henderson Val dam. 2Lt. Robert Decker Field 2Lt. Franklin Clark Over Henderson Zeke Field Over Henderson 2 Vals ILt. William Fieldler Field Over Henderson 2 Vals ILt. William Wells Field Rendova Harbor Zeke 2Lt. Robert Butler ILt.Edward Whitman Rice Anchorage/ Zeke Kula Gulf 2Lt. Bernard Fleming MundalRendova Zeke ILt. Edward Kobbeman Munda/Rendova Zeke Kahili to Vella ILt. Andrew Cane Zero Lavella

299

13 th Fighter Command in World War II 08/30/43 Zero

2Lt. Roy Fowler

09/06/43 Zeke 09/06/43 Zeke dam. 02/15/44 Val dam. 02/15/44 Tony prob. Period Totals: 40/5/5 War Totals: 48/8/7

F/O John Workman ILt. IF.Wehner ILt. William Lawrence ILt. William Butler

Kahili to Vella Lavella Morgusiai Island Morgusiai Island Off Green Island Ambitie Island

02/04/43 Zero

Capt. James Robinson

02/04/43 Zero

Capt. James Robinson

02/27/43 03/10/43 03/10/43 03/10/43 03/10/43 04/07/43 04/07/43 04/07/43 04/07/43 04/18/43

Float Zero Zeke Zeke Zeke Val Zero 3 Zekes Zero Zeke Zeke

Capt. Robert Petit 2Lt. Franklin Clark ILt. Calvin Gorham ILt. William Daggitt Capt. Richard Rivers Capt. Leonard Frame Capt. Thomas Lanphier ILt. Joseph Moore ILt. Darrell Cosart Capt. Thomas Lanphier

04/18/43 Betty(?)

Capt. Thomas Lanphier

05/13/43 Zeke

Maj. Louis Kittel

05/13/43 Zeke dam. Maj. Louis Kittel 05/19/43 Betty

Maj. Louis Kittel

05/19/43 Betty

Maj. Louis Kittel

OS/22/43 .5 Betty 06/16/43 Val

Capt. Leonard Frame Capt. William Norris

06/16/43 Zeke

Capt. Leonard Frame

th

70 Fighter Squadron (347FGA via Lansdale):Top (L-R) I Lt. Allan Shepard (Squadron Adjutant), 2Lt. Leonard Frame, 2Lt. Waldon Williams (KIA), 2Lt. Robert Petit, 2Lt. Fred Purnell, 2Lt. Wallace Dinn (KIA), 2Lt. Philip Hendrix, 2Lt. John Hendrix (Armament), 2Lt. Darrell Cosart, 2Lt. Thomas Lanphier, and 2Lt. Richard Hopper. Middle (L-R) 2Lt. Howard Stern (KIA), 2Lt. Joseph Moore, 2Lt. Julius Jacobson, 2Lt. Jack Lomax, 2Lt.James Robinson, 2Lt. Leonard Farran (KIA), 2Lt. Rex Barber, 2Lt. George Topoll (KIA), 2Lt. Howard Atwood (Personnel), and 2Lt. Richard Koenig. Bottom (L-R) 2Lt. MarshallVargas (Communications), 2Lt.Wiliiam Houseworth, 2Lt. Donald Hanson (KIA), I Lt. John Mitchell. "Blackie" (Squadron mascot), 2Lt. William Shaw (KIA), I Lt. Henry Viccellio (Squadron CO), 2Lt. James McLanahan, 2Lt. Kenneth Fjelstad, 2Lt. Chester Kuntz, 2Lt. Oscar Gillion, and 2Lt. Clyde Carriker.

70 th Fighter Squadron/347 th Fighter Group Date Jap.A/C Pilot Name 11/11/42 Betty ILt. William Norris 12/24/42 Zero ILt. Thomas Lanphier 12/26/42 Zero lLt. Joseph Moore 12/28/42 Betty 01/14/43 Float biplane 0114/43 FloatFP dam. 01/15/43 Pete

ILt. Rex Barber ILt. Gearge Topoll 2Lt. Harvey Dunbar ILt. Darrell Cosart

01/15/43 2 Petes

Capt. Richard Rivers

01/15/43 Pete

lLt. Phillip Hendrix

01/26/43 Zero 02/04/43 Zero

2Lt. William Fieldler ILt. William Fieldler

300

Location Guadalcanal Guadalcanal Lambetti AF, New Georgia Munda Point AF Rekata Bay, Santa Isabel Is. Rekata Bay, Santa Isabel Is. 50 miles north of New Georgia 50 miles north of New Georgia 50 miles north of New Georgia OffWagina Island North of Kolombangara

06/30/43 3 Float BPs Capt. Harry Walters 06/30/43 Float biplane 07/25/43 Zero 08/04/43 Zeke 08/07/43 Zero 08/12/43 Zeke 09/16/43 Jake?

Capt. Wade Harper

09/18/43 Zeke

2Lt. David Works

10/08/43 Betty

Maj. Louis Kittel

10/22/43 Zeke 10/27/43 0.5 Zeke

Capt. Harry Walters F/O John Cosgrove

10/27/43 Val

2Lt. William Gilchrist (0.5) 2Lt. Frank Merkus (0.5) 2Lt. John Dollen 2Lt. Joseph Gunder 2Lt. Joseph Gunder 2Lt. Joseph Gunder ILt. Robert McGown

11/08/43 11/08/43 11/08/43 11/08/43 11/08/43

Val Val dam. Val Val Val

2Lt. Howard Cleveland F/O John Cosgrove ILt. Herbert Shafer F/O John Cosgrove 2Lt. Cecil Taylor

North of Kolombangara North of Kolombangara Central Solomons Russell Island Russell Island Russell Island Russell Island Cape Esperance Cape Esperance Cape Esperance Tulagi SW coast of Bougainville SW coast of Bougainville North of Cape Esperance North of Cape Esperance Off Cape Esperance Cape Esperance & Henderson Off Rendova Over Henderson Field North of Savo Island NW coast of Rendova NW coast of Rendova MundalRendova Munda Airfield RendovaIMunda Kahili NW of Vella Lavell a NWofBaga Island 60 miles south of Guadalcanal Kahili 20 miles west of Treasury Island Treasury Island

Cape Torokina Cape Torokina Cape Torokina Cape Torokina Cape Torokina

Part Seven, Appendices - 13th Fighter Command Squadron Victories 12/24/43 0.5 Zero lLt. Howard Cleveland 12/24/43 Zeke lLt. Howard Cleveland Period Totals: 49.5/114 War Totals: 52.5/5/17

Rabaul Rabaul

12/19/42 Float BP prob. 01/05/43 Float biplane 01105/43 2 Float BP 01/05/43 Float biplane 01/20/43 Zero prob. 01/20/43 Zero prob. 01120/43 2 Zeros

-! -'

.

01125/43 Zero 01/25/43 Zero 01/27/43 Zero 01127/43 2 Zeros 01127/43 Zero prob.

th

Aces of the 339 Fighter Squadron in February 1944 (Harris): Standing (LR) Henry Meigs (6), George Chandler (5) and Truman Barnes (5). Kneeling (L-R) Bill Harris (16) and Thomas Walker (6).

0112943 Betty 02/02/43 Zero 02/02/43 Float Zero

339 th Fighter Squadron/347 th Fighter Group Date Jap.A/e Pilot Name 10/09/42 Float plane Capt. John Mitchell

02/02/43 Float Zero

10/09/42 Float plane

02/10/43 Betty

10/09/42 Float plane 10/11/42 10/11/42 10/15/42 10/23/42 11107/42 11107/42 11107/42 11107/42 11107/42 11/18/42 11/18/42 12/10/42 12/10/42 12/10/42 12/10/42 12/10/42 12/10/42 12/19/42

Betty Betty Zero Zero

Location 150 miles NW from Guadalcanal lLt. William Shaw 150 miles NW from Guadalcanal lLt. Frederick Purnell 150 miles NW from Guadalcanal 2Lt. Robert Rist Guadalcanal Capt. William Sharpsteen Guadalcanal Capt. William Sharpsteen Guadalcanal Capt. John Mitchell Guadalcanal/ Tulagi Capt. John Mitchell Santa Isabel lLt. William Shaw Santa Isabel Guadalcanal lLt. Wallace Dinn Guadalcanal lLt. James Geyer lLt. Frederick Purnell Guadalcanal lLt. Deltis Fincher Tonolei Harbor 2Lt. James Obermiller Tonolei Harbor lLt. Edgar Barr Tonolei harbor lLt. Danforth Miller Tonolei Harbor 2Lt. Edmund Brzuska Tonolei Harbor lLt. Douglas Canning Tonolei Harbor 2Lt. Delton Goerke Tonolei Harbor 2Lt. Grant Reagh Tonolei Harbor lLt. Deltis Fincher Tonolei Harbor

Rufe Zero Rufe Float Zero Pete 2 Zeros Zero Float Zero Zero Float Zero Zero Zero Zero prob. Float biplane 12/19/42 Float BP Capt. William Sharpsteen Tonolei Harbor prob.

02/11143 Zero prob. 02/13/43 Zero 02/13/43 Zero 02/14/43 02/14/43 02/14/43 02/14/43 02/14/43 04/07/43 04/07/43 04/07/43

Zero Zero prob. Zero prob. 2 Zeros Zero prob. 2 Zeros Zero Zero prob.

04/18/43 Betty 04/18/43 Zeke 04/18/43 Betty 04/18/43 Zeke 06/07/43 2 Zekes 06/07/43 Zeke

2Lt. Grant Reagh

Bougainville

lLt. Besby Holmes

Tonolei Harbor

lLt. Besby Holmes Capt. John Mitchell

Tonolei Harbor Tonolei Harbor

lLt. Besby Holmes

Btwn. Fauro & Shortland lLt. Frederick Purnell Btwn. Fauro & Shortland· Capt. William Shaw Btwn. Fauro & Shortland 2Lt. Ray Bezner Savo Island lLt. Besby Holmes Savo Island 2Lt. Ray Bezner Cape Esperance to Russell Is. Capt. John Mitchell Cape Esperance to Russell Is. lLt. Besby Holmes Cape Esperance to Russell is. Capt. John Mitchell Guadalcanal lLt. Besby Holmes 25 miles of Shortland Island Capt. John Mitchell Over Shortland Island 2Lt. Murray Shubin Over Shortland Island 2Lt. Robert Rist North end of Choiseul Island 2Lt. Darrell Cramer Vila 2Lt. Robert Rist South coast of Bougainville 2LtJohn Lockridge South coast of Bougainville lLt. William Griffith Shortland Islands lLt. William Griffith Shortland Islands lLt. Brian Brown Shortland Islands Capt. James Geyer Shortland Islands Capt. James Geyer Shortland Islands lLt. Rex Barber Cape Esperance lIt. James McLanahan Cape Esperance lLt. James McLanahan Btwn. Russell & Henderson lLt. Rex Barber SW coast of Bougainville lLt. Rex Berber SW coast of Bougainville lLt. Besby Holmes Near Moila Pt., Bougainville lLt. Besby Holmes SW coast of Bougainville 2Lt. Bill Harris Russell Island Russell island 2Lt. Murray Shubin

301

13 th Fighter Command in World War II 06/07/43 Zeke prob. 2Lt. Robert Tucker 06/12/43 Zeke 1Lt. William Honaker

Russell Island West of Cape Esperance 06/16/43 2 Zekes 2Lt. Bill Harris Beaufort Bay 06116/43 2 Zekes 2Lt. Murray Shubin Off SW tip of Guadalcanal 06116/43 2 Zekes 2Lt. Murray Shubin Near Cape Esperance & Savo 06116/43 Zeke prob. 2Lt. Murray Shubin Near Cape Esperance & Savo 06/16/43 Zeke 2Lt. Murray Shubin East of Savo Island 06/16/43 Hap 2Lt. Charles Van Bibber Beaufort Bay 06/16/43 Zeke 2Lt. Donald Webber Btwn. Lunga & Savo Island 06116/43 Zeke Capt. John McGinn Just inland of Fighter 2 06116/43 Zeke 2Lt. Robert Sylvester Over Fighter 2 07/03/43 Hap 2Lt. George Chandler NW of Rendova 07/03/43 Hap 2Lt. Harry Andrews (0.5) NW of Rendova lLt. Earl Conrad (0.5) 07/03/43 Zeke 2Lt. Harry Walker NW of Rendova 07/03/43 Zeke lLt. Ray Bezner NW of Rendova 07/03/43 Zeke lLt. James Hoyle SW of Rendova 07117/43 Hap 2Lt. Glen Hart Kahili 07/03/43 Zero lIt. Harry Jordon Kahili 07/03/43 Zeke lLt. Webster Kincaid Kahili 07/03/43 Zeke 2Lt. Benjamin King Kahili 07/03/43 Zeke 2Lt. Benjamin King Kahili 07/03/43 Zeke Capt. John McGinn Kahili 09/23/43 Zero 2Lt. Samuel Howie Kahili 09/30/43 2 Zeros 2Lt. Victor Whistler Kahili to Vella Lavella 10/04/43 Zeke ILt. Gordon Brewster Kahili (0.5) ILt. Donald Stewart (0.5) 10/04/43 Zeke ILt. Bill Harris Kahili 10/04/43 Zeke ILt. John Mulvey Kahili 10/07/43 Zeke lLt. Bill Harris 25 miles NW of Vella Lavella 10110/43 Zero ILt. Bill Harris Kahili 10110/43 Zero F/O Arlington LaBarge Kahili 10110/43 2 Zeros lLt. Murray Shubin Kahili 10110/43 Zeke NWendof 2Lt. James Eubanks Choiseul 10110/43 2 Zekes ILt. Bill Harris NW end of Choiseul 10110/43 Zeke ILt. John Mulvey NW end of Choiseul 10110/43 Zeke lLt. Donald Webber NW end of Choiseul 10110/43 0.5 Zeke Wend of lLt. Bill Harris prob. Choiseul 10110/43 Zeke prob. ILt. John Mulvey NW end of Choiseul 302

NWend of Choiseul Lt.Col. William Council NWend of Choiseul lLt. James Eubanks Ballale to Vella (0.5) Lavella 2Lt. Theodore Foss (0.5) 1Lt. Erwin Rake Fauro Island 2Lt. William Frick (0.5) Near Treasury Islands lLt. Donald Stewart (0.5) Capt. Bill Harris Near Treasury Island lLt. Samuel Howie Stirling Island lLt. Murray Shubin Stirling Island West off Treasury 2Lt. Robert Shimp Island 2Lt. John Barker Empress Augusta Bay lLt. Glen Hart Empress Augusta Bay lLt. Harry Jordon Empress Augusta Bay lLt. Benjamin King Empress Augusta Bay 2Lt. Frederick Seaman Empress Augusta Bay lLt. Glen Hart (0.5) Empress Augusta Bay 2Lt. Frederick Seaman (0.5) lLt. Darrell Cramer (0.5) 40 miles east of Cape St. George Capt. John Restifo (0.5) 2Lt. Wayne Anderson Cape Torokina ILt. George Chandler Cape Torokina 2Lt. William Fincher Cape Torokina Cape Torokina F/O James Kennedy Cape Torokina 2Lt. Robert Smith lLt. Thomas Walker Cape Torokina lLt. Thomas Walker Cape Torokina

10110/43 Zeke prob. F/O Arlington LaBarge 10/10/43 Zeke prob. 10118/43 Zeke

10119/43 Zeke 10/27/43 Divebomber(?) 10/27/43 Divebomber(?) 10/27/43 3 Vals 10/27/43 2 Vals 10/27/43 Val dam. 11/01/43 Zeke 11/01/43 2 Zekes 11/01/43 Zeke 11/01/43 Zeke 11/01/43 Zeke 11/01/43 Zeke prob.

11/01/43 Betty

11/08/43 11/08/43 11/08/43 11/08/43 11/08/43 11/08/43 11/08/43 01/17/44 01117/44 01/17/44 01/17/44 01117/44 01/17/44 01/23/44

Zeke, 2 Zekes Zeke Hamp Zeke Zeke Divebomber(?) Zeke Zeke dam. Zeke 2 Zeke dam. 3 Zeke prob. Zeke prob. Zeke

01/24/44 2Zeke 01/24/44 Zeke 01/24/44 Zeke

F/O James Kennedy F/O James Kennedy lLt. Jarrold Lilliedoll ILt. Jarrold Lilliedoll

Simpson Harbor Simpson Harbor Simpson Harbor Simpson Harbor

lLt. Henry Meigs

Duke of York Island Simpson Harbor Lakunai to Cape Gazelle Rabaul area Rabaul area Near Rapopo Airfield

2Lt. John Shank 2Lt. Kenneth McCloud ILt. Truman Barnes Capt. George Chandler ILt. Thomas Walker

Part Seven, Appendices - 13th Fighter Command Squadron Victories 01/28/44 01/28/44 01/28/44 01/28/44 01/28/44 02/03/44

2 Zekes Zeke Zeke Zeke Zeke prob. Zeke

02/03/44 02/03/44 02/03/44 02/04/44

Zeke Zeke Zeke prob. Zeke

02/06/44 Zeke prob. 02/06/44 Zeke prob.

02/06/44 Zeke prob. 02/09/44 Zeke

02/09/44 Zeke 02/09/44 Zeke prob. 02/09/44 Zeke prob. 02/09/44 Zeke prob.

02/09/44 02/09/44 02/09/44 02/1 0/44 02/10/44

Zeke 0.5 Zeke Zeke Zeke Zeke

02/10/44 Zeke prob. 02/10/44 Zeke 02/10/44 Zeke

2Lt. Kenneth McCloud Tobera Airfield 1Lt. Donald Stewart Tobera Airfield 2Lt. William Thomas Tobera Airfield Capt. S. Walden Tobera Airfield ILt. Jarrold Lilliedoll Tobera Airfield 2Lt. Harry Andrews (0.5) Lakunai Airfield 1Lt. Kermit Hartman (0.5) Capt. George Chandler Lakunai Airfield Capt. Joseph Restifo Lakunai Aitfield 2Lt. Edwin Studley Talikiakun Bay 1Lt. Myron Pederson Vunakanau Airfield 1Lt. Myron Pederson St. George Channel 2Lt. Charles Klauda (0.5) St. George Channel 2Lt. Donald Livesey (0.5) 1Lt. George Hopkins Lakunai Airfield ILt. Donald Livesey Tobera Airfield (0.5) ILt. Charles Klauda (0.5) 1Lt. Morris Wilson Cape Gazelle, near Tobera AIF 1Lt. Morris Wilson Cape Gazelle near ToberaA/F 1Lt. Myron Pederson Cape Gazelle near ToberaAIF 1Lt. Myron Pederson Cape Gazelle, (0.5) near Tobera A/F 2Lt. John Zink (0.5) Capt. Bill Harris Tobera Airfield Capt. Bill Harris Tobera Airfield ILt. Hemy Miegs Tobera Airfield 1Lt. Truman Barnes South of Tobera 2Lt. Russell Christensen St. George Channel ILt. William Fincher St. George Channel ILt. William Fincher Off Kabanga Bay Capt. Harry Jordon Tobera Airfield

02/1 0/44 Zeke

F/O James Kennedy

St. George Channel 02/10/44 Zeke 2Lt. John Shank Tobera Airfield 02/10/44 Zeke 2Lt. Robert Smith Tobera Airfield 02/1 0/44 Zeke 1Lt. Thomas Walker South of Tobera Airfield 02/11/44 Zeke 1Lt. Billy Moore Tobera Airfield 02/15/44 Zeke 1Lt. Donald Livesey Vunakanau Airfield 02/15/44 2 Zekes Capt. Bill Harris Vunakanau Airfield 02/15/44 2 Zekes 1Lt. Henry Meigs Vunakanau Airfield 02/15/44 Zeke 1Lt. Donald Stewart eastofVunakanau Airfield 02/15/44 Zeke 1Lt. George Traner Vunakanau Airfield 02/15/44 Zeke prob. 2Lt. John Zink Vunakanau Airfield 02/18/44 2 Zeke ILt. Truman Barnes Tobera Airfield 02/18/44 Zeke 2Lt. Russell Christensen Tobera Airfield 02/18/44 Zeke 2Lt. Donald Coe Tobera Airfield 02/18/44 Zeke ILt. Thomas Walker Tobera Airfield Period Total: 156.5/35.5/2 War Total: 163.5/35.5/3 6th Night Fighter Squadron/l3Air Force (only) Date Location Jap.AJC Pilot Name 04/19/43 Betty Capt. Earl Bennett Near Tulagi T/Sgt. Raymond Mooney (0.0) 07/12/43 Betty 1Lt. Russell Tuttle Russell Island 08/13/43 Betty dam. Capt. Emerson Barker Guadalcanal 08/14/43 Betty 1Lt. James Harrell Russell 08/15/43 Betty 2Lt. Henry Meigs Fighter 2 09/21143 Betty 2Lt. Henry Meigs Guadalcanal 09/21143 Betty 2Lt. Henry Meigs Guadalcanal 11/06/43 Hamp ILt. Charles Van Bibber SE end of Santa Isabel Period Total: 7/0/1 War Total: 25/2/2

303

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Abbreviations

A6M-Mitsubishi Zero/Zeke/Hap/Hamp fighter (IJNAF/IJAAF) A-20-Douglas Havoc/Boston light bomber (AAF) AA-Anti-aircraft AAC-Army Air Corps AAF-Army Air Force AM-Air Medal BSN-Nakajima Kate bomber (IJNAF) B-17-Boeing Flying Fortress heavy bomber (AAF) B-24-Consoildated Liberator heavy bomber (AAF) B-2S-North American Mitchell medium bomber (AAF) B-26-Martin Marauder medium bomber (AAF) BB-Battleship BG-Bomb Group BS-Bomb Squadron BS-Bronze Star C-47-Douglas Dakota transport (AAF) CA-Heavy Cruiser CAP-Combat Air Patrol CB-Naval Construction Battalions ("Seabees") CG-Commanding General C-in-C- Commander-in-Chief CINCPAC-Commander-in-Chief, Pacific CL-Light Cruiser CMH-Congressional Medal of Honor CO-Commanding Officer COMAIRNORSOLS-Comrnander Air North Solomons COMAIRSOLS-Commander Air Solomons COMAIRSOPAC-Commander Aircraft South Pacific COMGENSOPAC-Commanding General, US Army Forces, South Pacific COMSOPAC-Commander South Pacific CV- Aircraft Carrier CVL-Light Aircraft Carrier D3A-Aichi Val dive-bomber DD-Destroyer DFC-Distinguished Flying Cross DSC-Distinguished Service Cross DUC-Distinguished Unit Citation

F4F-Grumman Wildcat fighter (USMCIUSN) F4U-Chance-Voight Corsair fighter (USMC/USN) F-S-Lockheed Lightning photo recon aircl~aft (P-38) F6F-Grumrnan Hellcat fighter (USNIUSMC) FEP-Float bi-plane FC-Fighter Command FG-Fighter Group FP-Float plane FBP- Float bi-plane FS-Fighter Squadron G4M-Mitsubishi Betty medium bomber (IJNAF/IJAAF) GCI-Ground Control Intercept IJAAF-Imperial Japanese Army Air Force IJNAF-Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force JCS-Joint Chiefs of Staff MAW-Marine Air Wing NFS-Night Fighter Squadron P-38-Lockheed Lightning fighter (AAF) P-39-Bell Airacobra fighter (AAF) P-400-Bell Airacobra fighter (export version) (AAF) P-40-Curtiss Warhawk, fighter (AAF) (Tomahawk, Kittyhawk-RAF export) P-70-Douglas Nighthawk night-fighter «A-20) (AAF) PBY-Consolidated Catalina amphibian (Dumbo, Black Cat) (USN) PB4Y-Consolidated Privateer patrol bomber (US B-24) PH-Purple Heart PRG-Photo reconnaissance group PRS-Photo reconnaissance squadron PSP-Pierced Steel Plank (Marston Mat) R4D-Douglas transport (USN/USMC) PRS-Photo Recon Squadron RAAF-Royal Australian Air Force RNZAF-Royal New Zealand Air Force R/O-Radar Operator SBD-Douglas Dauntless dive-bomber (USMCIUS SOPAC-South Pacific SOWESPAC-Southwest Pacific Command (MacArthur) SS-Silver Star

321

13th Fighter Command in World War II TBF-Grumman Avenger torpedo-bomber (USMC/USN) USAAF-United States Army Air Force USMC-United States Marine Corps USN-United States Navy YF- Navy Fighter Squadron YMF-Marine Fighter Squadron Code ames Blissful-Marine raid on Choiseul Buttons-Espiritu Santo Cactus-Guadalcanal/Henderson Airfields Cartwheel-Seizure of Rabaul (New Britain) Cherry Blossom-Torokina (Bougainville) landings Cleanslate-Russell Island landings

322

Elkton-Joint SOPAC and SOWESPAC for the reduction of Rabaul Goodtime-New Zealand invasion of the Treasury Islands Iron Bottom Sound-Water between Tulagi and Guadalcanal Mainyard-Guadalcanal after Cactus Poppy-New Caledonia Ringbolt-Tulagi Roses-Elfate Shoestring-Invasion of Tulagi and later included Guadalcanal Slot-Soloman's sheltered inside passage Toenails-Invasion of New Georgia and surrounding areas Watchtower- Invasion of the Tulagi area "X"-Guadalcanal "Y"- Tulagi

Fighter Director Codes

In late November 1942, Lt. Lewis Mattison (USN), the Senior Fighter Director Officer at Guadalcanal issued the following Fighter Director Code: Bogey-Unidentified aircraft Small Bogey-One to five planes Large Bogey-More than ten planes Bandit-Enemy aircraft Bombers-Enemy level bombers (large) Hawks-Enemy dive-bombers Rats-Enemy fighters Chickens-Friendly fighters Mattress-Base of clouds or ceiling Quilt-Top of clouds Popeye-In clouds Angels Mattress Etc.-Fly at base of clouds etc. What is Mattress Etc.-Give altitude at base of clouds etc. Angels-Altitude-e.g. 10,000 feet-Angels Ten, 7,500 feet-Angels Seven and a half etc. Lights-Turn on or check your IFF Negat Lights-Tum off your IFF Vector-Fly magnetic course ofOrbit-Circle lazy, turning as short as practicable Orbit Figure 8-Describe figure 8 at right angles to present vector with position at time of order as center Gate-Maximum speed, pour it on Position-What is your position? (Either geographic or bearing and distance from base) Guns-Ammunition. How much ammunition do you have? Guns Plus (or Minus)-I have more (or less) than half my ammo Juice-Gas, How much gas do you have? Juice Plus (or Minus)-I have more (or less) than half my gas No Dope-There is any information; continue last order

323

Bibliography and Sources

Author's Note: Over the past 35 years I have collected over 14,000 books and magazines, 1,000s of photos, and literally miles of microfilm on WWII. The major sources of material for the framework of this book were the thousands of pages of microfilmed records of the l3AF, 13FC, l8FG, and 347FG, the individual squadrons of the 13FC, and the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. The microfilm included official and unofficial combat reports, documents, unit histories, personal narrations, and interrogations. Most of the documents on this microfilm were irrelevant, and the wheat had to be separated from the chaff over long hours of peering at the bright screen of the microfilm reader.

Microfilm Army Air Force, "AAF in the South Pacific to October 1942" (AAFRH-1), Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence (December 1944) USSBS, "The Allied Air Campaign Against Rabaul, " USSBS (Pacific) Naval Analysis Division. (1 September 1946) 13 th Air Force, Roll A7717, A7633 & A7634, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL l3 1h Air Force Official History, Guadalcanal, Rolls A7673 & A7674, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL 13 th Air Force Official History, Solomons, Rolls A7675 & A7676, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL 347FG, Rolls B0301 & B0302, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL l8FG, Rolls B0083 & B0084, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL l2FS, Roll A0722, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL 44FS, Roll A0740, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL 67FS, Rolls A0749 & A0750, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL 68FS, Rolls A0750 & A075l, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL 70FS, Roll A0752 & A0753, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL 324

339FS, Roll A0776 & A0777, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL

Correspondence/Interviews for book: *Special thanks Correspondence and telephone interview: Truman Barnes, April 2003 *Correspondence and telephone interview: Doug Canning, Feb.May 2003 *Correspondence and telephone interview: George Chandler, May 2003 Correspondence and telephone interview: Peter Childress, March 2003. *Correspondence and telephone interview: Bill Harris, April 1991 and May 2003 Correspondence and telephone interview: Sam Howie April 2003 *Correspondence and telephone interview: Stan Palmer, March-May 2003 Correspondence and telephone interview: Rollin Snelling, April 2003 *Correspondence and telephone interview: John Thompson, May 2003 (The following were contacted in the early 1990s as part of doing biographies of WWII U.S. fighter aces for the American Fighter Aces Association Album:) *Correspondence and telephone interview: Rex Barber Correspondence: Truman Barnes *Correspondence: Paul Bechtel Correspondence: Robert Byrnes *Correspondence: George Chandler Correspondence: Frank Gaunt Correspondence: Cy Gladen Correspondence: Besby Holmes Correspondence: Joe Lesicka Correspondence: Henry Meigs *Correspondence: John Mitchell *Correspondence: Lucien and Barbara Shuler *Correspondence: Grant Smith Correspondence: Elmer Wheadon

Part Seven, Appendices - Bibliography and Sources Books and Pamphlets Agawa, Hiro, Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Kodasha, Tokyo, 1979 Altobello, Brian, Into the Shadows Furious: The Brutal Battle for New Georgia, Presidio, CA, 2000 Bergerud, Eric, Touched With Fire: Land War in the South Pacific, Viking, NY, 1996 Bergerud, Eric, Touched With Fire: Air War in the South Pacific, Westview, CO, 2000 Bodie, Wan'en, Lockheed P-38 Lightning, Widewing, GA, 1994 Bureau of Yards and Docks, Building the Navy's Bases in World War 2,2 Vo1s., GPO, Wash. DC, 1947 Cleveland, William, Grey Geese Calling, llBG Assoc., MN, 1981 Coggins, Jack, Campaign for Guadalcanal, Battle That Changed History, Doubleday, NJ, 1972 Coomb, Jack, Derailing the Tokyo Express, Stackpole, PA, 1991 Craven, Wesley & Cate, James, Army Air Forces in World War 2, The Pacific-Guadalcanal to Saipan, VolA, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1955 Craven, Wesley & Cate, James, Army Air Forces in World War 2, Men & Planes, Vo1.6, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1955 Dorr, Robert & Scutts, Jerry, Bell P-39 Airacobra, Crowood, UK, 2000 Ferguson, Robert, Guadalcanal, Island of Fire, Aero, PA, 1987 Frank, Richard, Guadalcanal: Definitive Account ofthe Landmark Battle, Random House, NY, 1990 Griffith, Samuel, The Battlefor Guadalcanal, Lippencott, PA, 1963 Halsey, William & Bryan, J, Admiral Halsey's Story, McGraw Hill, NY, 1947 Hammel, Eric, Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea, The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Pacifica, CA, 1998 Hammel, Eric, Guadalcanal: Starvation Island, Crown, NY, 1987 Hansen, Paul M., Amazing Facts in the Life of Paul M. Hansen: Unique Average American, Heritage Press, WA, 2000 Hata, Ikuhiko and Izawa, Yasuko, Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War 2, Naval Institute Press, MD, 1989 Hess, William, Pacific Sweep, The Fifth and Thirteenth Fighter Commands in World War 2, Doubleday, NY, 1974. Horton, D.C., New Georgia: Pattern for Victory, Ballantine, NY, 1971 Hough, Frank, Ludwig, Verle & Shaw, Henry, History of Marine Corps Operations in World War 2: Vol.1, Pearl Harbor and Guadalcanal, USMC Historical Division, Wash. DC, 1966 Hough, Frank & Crown, John, Campaign in New Britain, USMC Historical Branch, Wash. DC, 1952 Hoyt, Edwin, Guadalcanal, Stein & Day, NY, 1981 Hoyt, Edwin, Glory of the Solomons, Stein & Day, NY, 1983 Johnsen, Frederick, Bell P-39/P-63 Airacobra/Kingcobra, Specialty, MN,1998 Johnson, Edwin, A BriefHistory of the 68 th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, 1940-1962, Private printing, 68FS, IN, 1962 Kilpatrick, C.W., Naval Night Battles in the Solomons, Exposition, FL,1981 Kinzey, Bert, P-38 Lightning in Scale and Detail, Parts I&ll, Squadron/Signal, TX, 1996

Kinzey, Bert, P-39 Airacobra in Scale and Detail, Squadron! Signal, TX, 1999 Kinzey, Bert, P-40 Warhawk in Scale and Detail Vol.1, Squadron! Signal, TX, 1999 Koberger, Charles, Pacific Turning Point: The Solomons Campaign, 1942-43, Praeger, CT, 1995 Lanphier, Thomas, Unpublished Biography c. 1980-85 Leakie, Robert, Challenge for the Pacific, Doubleday, NY, 1965 Lippincott, Benjamin, From Fiji Through the Philippines, MacMillan, NY, 1946 Lofgren, Stephen, Northern Solomons, US Army Center of Military History, Wash. DC, 1995 Lundstrom, John, The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign, NIP, MD, 1994 Matthews, Birch, Cobra: Bell Aircraft Corporation, Schiffer, PA, 1996 Maurer, Maurer, Air Force Combat Units of World War 2, USGPO, Wash, DC, 1961 Maurer, Maurer, Air Force Combat Squadrons of World War 2, USAF Historical Division, Wash. DC, 1969 McGee, William, Solomon's Campaign, 1942-1943, From Guadalcanal to Bougainville, Vol. 2, BMC, Santa Barbara, CA, 2002 Mellinger, George & Stanaway, John, P-39 AiracobraAces ofWorld War 2, Osprey, UK, 2001 Mersky, Peter, Time of the Aces: Marine Pilots in the Solomons, 1942-1944, WW-2 Commemorative Series, USMC Historical Center, Wash, DC, 1993 Miller, John, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, U.S. Army Center for Military History, Wash. DC, 1949 Miller, John, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, WW-2, U.S. Army Center for Military History, Wash. DC, 1959 Miller, Thomas, Cactus Air Force, Harper & Row, NY, 1969 Mitchell, Rock, Airacobra Advantage: Flying Cannon, Pictorial Histories, MT, 1992 Mueller, Joseph, Guadalcanal1942,Osprey, UK, 1992 Moore, Col. Thomas, Story of the 339th Fighter Squadron, 339FS, March, 1944. Morison, Samuel, History of us Naval Operations in WW-2, Little Brown, MA, 1947 Vol. V: Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 to February 1943 Vol. VI: Breaking the Bismarck Barrier, 22 July to 1 May 1944 Okumirya, Matsutake and Horikoshi, Jiro with Caidin, Martin, Zero!, Dutton, NY, 1956 O'Leary, Michael, USAAF Fighters, Blandford, UK, 1986 Olynyk, Frank, Stars and Bars, Grub Street, UK, 1995 Olynyk, Frank, USN Credits For the Destruction ofEnemy Aircraft in Air-to Air Combat World War 2, Pvt. Printing, OH, 1982 Olynyk, Frank, USMC Credits For the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft in Air-to Air Combat World War 2, Pvt. Printing, OH, 1981 Olynyk, Frank, USAAF (Pacific Theater) Credits For the Destruction ofEnemy Aircraft in Air-to Air Combat World War 2, Pvt. Printing, OH, 1985 Rentz, John, Bougainville and the Northern Solomons, USMC Historical Section, Wash. DC, 1948 325

13 th Fighter Command in World War II Rentz, John, Marines in the Central Solomons, USMC Historical Section, Wash. DC, 1952 Rust, Ken & Bell, Dana, Thirteenth Air Force Story, Historical Aviation, CA, Sakaida, Henry, Imperial Navy Aces ofWW-2, 1937-1945, Osprey, UK, 1999 Sakaida, Henry, Siege ofRabaul, Phalanx, M , 1996 Sakaida, Henry, Winged Samara, Champlain, AZ, 1985 17 th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, 1T" Photo Reconnaissance Squadron History, Pvt. Printing, Palawan, P.I., 1945 Shaw, Henry & Kane, Douglas, 1solation ofRabaul, Vol.2, USMC G-3 Division, Wash. DC, 1963 Sherrod, Robert, History ofMarine Corps Aviation in World War 2, Nautical & Aviation, MD, 1987 Stanaway, John, Peter Three Eight, Pictorial Histories, MT, 1986 Stanaway, John, P-38 Lightning Aces ofthe Pacific and CB1, Osprey, UK, 1997 Starke, William, Vampire Squadron, Robinson, CA, 1985 Tagaya, Osamu, Mitsubishi Type 1 Rikko 'Betty' Units of World War 2, Osprey, UK, 2001 Taylor, Theodore, Magnificent Mitscher, Norton, NY, 1954 13 lh Air Force, "Tribute to Lt. Col. Robert Westbrook", Dec. 1944. Tillman, Barrett, US Navy Fighter Squadrons in World War 2, Specialty, MN, 1997 U.S. Army Air Forces, Pacific Counterblow, AAF HQ, Wash. DC., 1952 (reprint) U.S. Army Air Forces, Pilot's Operating Instructions for the P-38, AAF, Wash. DC. 1944 U.S. Army Air Forces, Pilot's Operating 1nstructions for the P-39, AAF, Wash. DC. 1944 U.S. Army Air Forces, Pilot's Operating Instructions for the P-40, AAF, Wash. DC. 1943 U.S. Army Air Forces, 'Transcript of Proceedings" by the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR Docket: 91-02347, October 17-18,1991) U.S. Navy, Action Report of 17 April 1943 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Military Analysis Division, Wash. DC Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Japan, 1946 Air Campaigns of the Pacific War, 1947 Campaigns of the Pacific, 1946 Wagner, Ray, Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk #35, Profile, UK, 1971 Westbrook, Robert, "How to Stay Alive Flying Combat," 347 1h Fighter Group, 1944 Wolf, William, Victory Roll, American Fighter Pilot and Aircraft in World War 2, Schiffer, PA, 2002 Zimmerman, John, Guadalcanal Campaign, Lancaster, IL, 1949

Magazines/Articles Bachman, Lawrence, "Blocking Rabaul by Air," Air Force, May 1944 (microfilm) Colliers Magazine, March 13, 1943 Burroughs, Hulbert, "Air Force in Action in the Solomons," Air Force, January 1943 (microfilm) Crane, James, "Time Out for Rest," Air Force. April 1944 (microfilm)

326

Dinn, Wallace, "My Solomons Canoe Trip," Air Force, March 1943 (microfilm) Flight Journal, P-38 Lightning in Action, Summer 2003 Flight Journal, Pacific Fighters: Air Combat Stories, Winter 2001 Frazer, Charles, "Be Ready for Anything," Air Force September 1943 (microfilm) Furler, E.H., "Klunker," Air Classics, October 1883 Hollway, Don, "Cactus Air Force: Thorn in Japan's Side, " Aviation History, March 1995 Johansen, Herbert, "The Fighting 13 1h ," Air Force, May 1945 Kent, Richard, "Flying the P-39 Airacobra," What Were They Like to Fly? VoU, Sun Flower, KS, 1975 Larsen, George, "Henderson Field: History's Slim Difference, Part 1," Air Classics, October 1994 Larsen, George, "Henderson Field: History's Slim Difference, Part 2," Air Classics, November 1994 Marolda, Edward, "Deadly Battle: The Fightfor Guadalcanal," Air Classics, August 1993 Mizahi, Joseph, "50 Bombers Headed Your Way, " Wings, August 1986 O'Leary, Michael, "Gamecocks Go to War, " Air Classics: Victorious Eagles: Vol.l1N0.2 Rust, Kenn, "The 1T" P.R. Sqdn., " American Aviation Historical Society Journal, Fall 1961 Time Magazine, "Bull's Eye in the South Pacific," 7 February 1944

Videos Cromwell Productions, "Battle.field: Guadalcanal, " UK, 200 J Traditions Military History, "Guadalcanal: Official Marine Films," Avion Park, "This is Guadalcanal, " KY, 1999 US News, "Masters of War: Turning Point at Guadalcanal, " NY, 1995 Daystar, "Guadalcanal: The Island of Death," OR, 1999 Yamamoto Bibliography Magazine, Newspaper Articles, Videos, and Websites Chandler, George, "Fighter Pilot's Odyssey of 44 Years to Determine Who Shot Down Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, " SYMA, November 10, 1987 Darby, Dr. Charles, "Transcript of Proceedings" by the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR Docket: 91-02347, October 17-18, 1991) Darby, Dr. Charles, Interview Guttman, Jon, " Controversy Surrounding the Life and Death of Admiral Isoroko Yamamoto," World War 2, September 1990 History Channel (Video), "Deadmen's Secrets: Yamamoto Mission, " Nugus-Martin Productions, 2002 Kohn, Richard, "A Note on the Yamamoto Aerial Victory Credit Controversy," Air Power History, Spring 1992 Lanphier, Thomas, Three part article, New Times, September 1214, 1945 Lanphier, Thomas, "I Shot Down Yamamoto," Reader's Digest, December 1966 New York Times, "Yamamoto's Killer Identified by Army," September 12, 1945

Part Seven, Appendices - Bibliography and Sources Stanaway, John, "Historian's Comer: Yamamoto Mission Reporting, " P-38 National Association, March 2003 Second Yamamoto Mission Association website Taylor, Blaine, "Ambush in Hostile Skies," Military History, August 1988 Taylor, Blaine, "The Plot to Kill Admiral Yamamoto, Part 1, " Air Classics, April 1989 Taylor, Blaine, "The Plot to Kill Admiral Yamamoto, Part 2, " Air Classics, May 1989 Wible, John, "The Yamamoto Mission," Journal of the American Aviation Historical Society, Fall 1967

Books Agawa, Hiroyuki, Reluctant Admiral, Kodasha, Tokyo, 1979 Closterman, Pierre, Flames in the Sky, Penguin, UK, 1952 Davis, Burke, Get Yamamoto!, Random House, NY, 1969 Glines, Carroll, Attack on Yamamoto, Orion, NY, 1990 Hall, R. Cargill, Lightning Over Bougainville: Yamamoto Mission Reconsidered, Smithsonian, Wash. DC, 199 I Hoyt, Edwin, Last Kamikaze: Story o.fAdm. Matome Ugaki, Praeger, CT, 1993 Potter, John Deane, Yamamoto, Paperback Library, NY, 1965 Ugaki, MatomeAdm., Fading Victory, Pittsburgh Press, PA, 1991 Wible, John, Yamamoto Mission, imitz Foundation, TX, 1988

327

Index

(':, indicates 13FC pilot) A

Abe, V.Adm.: 81 *Adams, Joseph: 262 *Adams, Milton: 167,260,261 Ainsworth, Walden: 186,189 Akiyama, Teruo: 186 *Ames, Roger: 96, 102, 139, 139,155 *Anderson, Donald: 243 Anderson, John: 243 *Anderson, Wayne: 224 *Andrews, Harry: 185,250 *Anglin, Everett: 96, 139, 139, 150 *Anthony, Louis: 244 Arnold, Henry "Hap": 10,26,41,52,67,84, 150 Ashcraft, W.S.: 41 *Ashton, William: 18

328

B

*Bade, Jack: 109, 109, 117,117,170,170,171,175,182, 287 *Baird, Frederick: 107 *Baird, James: 96 *Baker, Emmerson: 199 *Baker, Richard: 185 Bandy, J.I.: 182 *Banfield, Lt.: 60 *Barbe~Rex:6,31,94,97,124, 124,125,133,134,139 (2), 139, 142, 143-7, 149,150,150-5,155, 157-60, 167, 272,287,287 Barnes, Earl: 224, 255, 255 Barker, John: 222 *Barnes, Samuel: 171, 174 * Barnes, Truman: 177,247,248,251,254,254,288,288 *Barr, Edgar: 65,66,93 Bauer, Joseph: 24,65,80 *Bauer, Robert: 75, 87, 88,109 *Bechtel, Paul: 95, 94, 95, 131, 133, 192,203,273,292, 292

Part Seven, Appendices - Index *Benum, Lt.: 247 *Bennett, Earl: 165 *Bentley, Ellis: 267 *Berkow, Joseph: 200 *Bezner, Raymond: 103,104,105,172,185 *Bell, Gordon: 41, 64 *Bergquist, K.P.: 11 *Bishop, Samuel: 11 Blackburn, Tom: 197,222,247,255 "Boeye, John: 267 Bong, Richard: 8 *Borders, Andrew: 203 *Bowman, Barney: 262 *Bowman, Byron: 235 Boyington, Gregory "Pappy": 217,228,234,235,241, *Brannon, Dale: 14, 15, 16,23,29,29,35,39,46,47,48 (2),50,51,53,54,70,76,84,194,275 Breene, Robert: 22 ':'Brewster,Gordon: 87,92,213,214 Brice, William: 72, 210 *Brown, Byron: 36,46,48,50,51 *Brown, Lt.: 218 ':'Brown, Frederick: 119 Browning, Miles: 67 *Bruce, James: 14, *Buck, A.J.: 94, 123, 124,124 *Bunderson, Mack: 174, 175,203 *Burgess, Lt.: 110 *Butler, Robert: 188 *Butler, William: 253 *Brzuska, Edwin: 29,46,83,93,213 ':'Byers, Rex: 202, 235 *Byrnes, Robert: 103,169,170,171,174,202,202,203, 288 C Caidin, Martin: 130,249 Caldwell, Henry: 222 Caldwell, Turner: 35,41,49 Callaghan, Daniel: 76, 77, 78 *Campbell, James: 58, 65

*Canning, Douglas: 6,29,31,33,34,36,54,54,55,58,59, 80,93,105,105,122,139,139,143-4,147,151,155, 167,225 *Capa, Andrew: 202, 203 *Cargill, William: 171, 175, Carl, Marion: 35,39,57,57,87,278 *Carnes, Russell: 260 *Carter, Michael: 109 *Cartwright, Richard: 262 *Chandler, George: 6, 154, 155, 185, 185, 187,194, 194, 211,223,229,246,247,248,249,250,250,253,289, 289 *Cheney, Francis: 203, 256, 258 *Childress, Peter: 15, 15,36,39,45,48,48,51,83,91 *Chilson, Robert: 29, 39 *Christian, Thomas: 14, 39,46,54 *Christiansen, Hans: 11 ':'Christiansen, Russell: 251, 254 *Clark, Frank: 77, 121, 176,177 *Clark, Thomas: 110,176 Clemons, Martin: 34, 34 *Cleveland, Howard: 192,235,245,262 *Coe, Donald: 254,266 ':'Collins, Capt.: 180 *Condon, John: 142, 153 *Condor, George: 235 *Connolly, Robert: 245,267 *Conrad, Earl: 185, 185, 187 *Conradi, Karl: 106, 132 *Cooley, Albert: 61 *Corbett, Robert: 214, 219, 243, 244: *Cosart, Darrell: 94, 101,101,102, 132,132 *Cosgrove, John: 199,219 *Councill, William: 213, 215, 238, 238 *Cox, Charles: 192, 200 *Crain, Franklin: 224 Crane, James: 224 *Cramer, Darrell: 117, 219, 222, 293, 293 *Crandall, Thomas: 167,260 Crouch, Tim: 142 *Curry, Douglas: 171,175, 182, 183, 185, 186,234,235, 243 Curtis, John: 192

329

13 th Fighter Command in World War II D Daggitt, William: 94,97, 121 Dale, Eben: 124, 125, Darby, Dr. Charles: 6, 152, ] 60-62 *Daugherty, Francis: 256, 258, 265 Davis, Burke: 142, 154 *Dav~,Eugene:29,46,47,48,50,51

Davis, Raymond, "Duke": 61, 65, 66 *Decker, Lt.: 110 *Deforrest, Glen: 265 *Dewe~George:54,58,64,65,73,74

*Dews, Lt.: 60, 65, 74 *DilIon, Barclay: 36, 37, 39 Dillon, Katherine: 144 *Dinn,Wallace: 60,65,71,71,75,99 *Dollen, John: 224 *Dreckman, Harold: 175, 185,189,190, 193,241,242 DuBose, Laurence: 223, 224 *Dunbar, Harvey: 94, 100 *Duhon, Joseph: 266 *Dusard, Henry: 241, 242, 243, 244, 251 *Dutton, Albert: 39 E Edson, Merritt: 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52 *Ehrman, Lt.: 185, *Ehrenmann, William: 188 Eldridge, John: 41, 59, 61, 69,74 Emmons, Delos: 45,46, 101,164 *Endriss, John: 255,266 Englade, Larry: 256 *Erwin, Lt.: 29 *Eubanks, George: 2] 7 *Evans, John: 167, 191, 194 *Everest, Frank: 22, 117 F *Farkas, Raymond: 213 *Farquharson, Albert: 51,52, 53,54,58,83, 83, 84 *Farron, Lt.: 59, 60, 65 *Ferguson, Robert: 48, 51, 52, 75 *Fernam, K: 51 *Fetch, Robert: 171, 176,

330

*Fincher, Deltis: 29, 35, 35, 46, 47, 48, 51, 83 *Fincher, William: 224,229,251 *Fiedler, William: 109,109,171,176,177,275,289,290 Fitch, Aubrey: 89, 100, 128, 167, 179 *Fitzgerald, A.: 58 Fitzpatrick, J.T.: 182 *Fjelsted, F.: 58, *Fleming, Bernard: 192 *Folts, John: 18 Fontana, Paul: 72 *Forsythe, Maj.: 103 Foss,Joseph: 57(2),62,64,68,75,77,87,102,278 *Foss, Theodore: 217 *Fowler, Roy: 202 Fletcher, Frank: 22, 23, 25, *Fountain, Zeb: 37,37,46,48,51,91 *Fouquet, Raymond: 235 *Fox, Robert: 229 *Fox, William: 89,202 *Frame, Leonard: 132, 132, 168, 176, ':'Francis, Magnus: 169, 170, 182, ] 83,242,243 *Frick, William: 214, 219, 251 *Frinkenstein, Joseph: 118 *Fritsch, James: 262 Funk, Harold: 222 G

Galer, Robert: 24,39,46,50,52,57,64,66 Gardner, "Lefty": 156 Gardner, Matt: 46, 48 *Gaunt, Frank: 175, 188,190, 190,200,200,234,243, 243,244,246,283,283 Geiger, Roy: 41,41,51,52,57,65,75,86 *Geyer, James: 75, 118 Ghormley, Robert: 21,22,22,23,25,42,50,56,67, 100 *Gibbs, George: 219 *Gilchrist, William: 219 *GilIon, Oscar: 59, 60, 60, 62, 62 Gise, William: 117 *Gladen,Cy: 174,174,202,202,246,290,290 *Glazier, Linwood: 36, 37, 46, 47, 48, 51, 91 . *Glidden, Elmer: 41 Glines, Carroll: 6, 142, 148

Part Seven, Appendices - Index *Glommen, Martell: 194 *Goerke, Delton: 51,52,54,58,64,83,93,139,139, 143-4, 151,155, 167 Goldstein, Donald: 144 Golman, Norman: 270 *Goode, James: 261 Gorham, Calvin: 110, 121 Gotto, Aritomo: 61 *Grabner, Lawrence: 139, 139 Green, Donald: 275 ':'Green, William: 219 *Griffith, William: lt8, 172, 174, 177,212 Grinnell, Roy: 143 Griswold, Oscar: 187 *Gunder, Joseph: 224, 267, 272 H

*Haggard, Lt.: 218 Hall, R. Cargill: 142, 155, 156, Halsey, William, "Bull": 67,67,70,75,89,91,97,125, 127,128,138,149,150,151,167,179,205,209,223, 228,246,248 *Hancock, Paul: 106 *Hanks, William: 261 *Hansen, Donald: 77, 77 Hansen, George: 210 *Hansen, Paul: 104, 131 Hanson, Robert: 222, 244 *Hardaway, Braydon: 215 Harmon, Hubert: 101 Harmon, Millard: 22,26,29,42,44,45,52,56,67,67,68, 76,83,87,97,128,164,167,187,188,196,214 *Harper, Wade: 182 *Harrell, James: 199 *Harris, Bill: 6,8,8,30,32,32,93,121,122,149,167, , 170,171,172,174,177,194,199,211,213,214,215, 215,217,219,225,247,248,250,251,251,253,253, 267,267,268,270,270,281,281 *Harris, Charles: 171, 176, ':'Hart, Glen: 191, 222, 245 *Hart, John: 24, 102,247 *Harter, V.: 222 *Hartman, Kermit: 250 *Hay, Carl: 182,190,243

*Haynes, William: 228 *Head, Cotesworth: 8, 12,175, 175, 182, 185, 186, 195, 199,204,213,216,241,242,243,244,245,246,281, 282 *Head, Vernon: 36,46,46,47,48, 83, *Headtler, G.: 58, 65, 69, 73 *Heckert, G.: 131 *Heckler, Earl: 244 ':'Hecht, Maj.: 180 Hedges, Robert: 87 Henderson, Lofton: 27 *Hendrickson, Russell: 267 *Hendrix, Phillip: 94, 102,102, 124 *Henke, Albert: 168 *Henkey, Wilfred: 266, 268 *Hearnden, John: 266 *Herman, Donald: 267 Hester, John: 119, 179, 187, 196 Hibbard, H.L.: 270 ':'Hilken, Ronald: 94, 99 Hill, David "Tex": 153 *Hine, Raymond: 94, 103, 139, 143, 146,147, 150 *Hoffman, G.E.: 103 *Holly, Gerald: 267 *Holman, Robert: 171,175,182 ':'Holmes, Besby: 54, 58, 59, 62, 64, 65, 69, 73, 79, 99, 99, 103, 104, 107, 134, 139(2), 139, 143, 147, 149, 150-4, 155,167,291,291 *Holman, Robert: 235 *Holmes, K.: 214 *Holtner, J.L.: 11 *Honaker, William: 171, 194 *Hopkins, George: 214, 247, 251 ':'Horne, Fred: 168 *Howie, Sam: 31, 195,205,218,219,219,225 *Hoyle, James: 172, 185 *Hubbard, Thomas: 14,54,59,62,64, *Hubbell, Robert: 16,99, 103, 104, 105, 105 *Huey, Wellman: 118 *Huff, Lloyd: 102,131, 135 *Hulbert, H.: 131, *Hull, William: 75, 106, 106 *Hultin, Carman: 267 Hyakutake, Hyakichi: 38,51,55,70, 73, 75,86,228,256

331

131h Fighter Command in World War II I

"'Imberg, Ralph: 193,193 Ichiki, Kiyono: 29 Ichimaru, Rinosake: 130,223,223 Iden, Ruben: 41 Injuin, Matsuji: 201, 214 Imamura, Hitoshi: 99,252 ';'Inciardi, Nilo: 75, 109 Izaki, Shunji: 189

J "'Jacobson, Julius "Jake": 54,59,60,69,69,73,74, 139, 139,155,167 "'James, Lt.: 191 ':'Jamison, Glen: 22, 22, "'Jarman, James: 53,54,58,75 "'Jenkins, Max: 266 ';'Jennings, Theo: 185,186,219 "'Jennings, Wallace: 175,185,186,243 Jensen, Hayden: 64 "'Johnson, Albert: 117 *Johnson, Richard: 37, 46,47,48,51, *Johnson, Thomas: 117 *Jordon, Darrell: 203 *Jordon, Harry: 191,211,222,251 "'Jurgenson, Elmer: 248,251 K *Kaiser, R.: 51. 59, 64, 65 Kakuji, Kakuta: 130 Kauslick, AI: 156 Kawaguchi, Kiyotake: 38,46,47,50,55,68, ':'Kellum, Kenneth: 75,77,92 Kenney, George: 7, 76,101,103,129,211,216,222, Kennedy, Donald: 34 "'Kennedy, James: 224,244,251 Kennedy, John F.: 186 *Kennedy, Robert: 102 "'Kent, Richard: 176, 189 Kepford, Ira: 248, 254 "'Kerstetter, Robert: 58, 59, 64, 65, 121, 213 "'Kester, William: 200, 219 "'Kincaid, Skinner: 226 "'Kincaid, Webster: 191

332

Kincaid, Thomas: 70, 75 *King, Benjamin: 191 King, Ernest: 21, 51, 72, 150 Kim, Louis: 41,51,55,61 *Kingham, A.R.: 11 "'Kirk, Kenneth: 96 "'Kittel, Louis: 139,139,166, 168,168,171,214,228,228 *Klauda, Charles: 251 *Kobbemann, Edward: 192 *Koenig, Richard: 110, 110 Koga, Mineichi: 166, 167,221,226 Kohn, Richard: 142,156-7, Kondo, Nobutake: 70, 80, 81 Kosaka, Kanae: 130,137,138,148,148 *Koval, Leslie: 266 "'Krohn, Robert: 182, 185, 235, 241 *Kuntz, Lt.: 110 Kurita, Takeo: 222 Kusaka, Jinichi: 58, 59, 211, 222, 226, 229 L *Labarge, Arlington: 215 *Lalonde, Isaac: 121 *Lamburth, James: 99 *Lanphier, Thomas: 80,94,96,123, 125,132,133, 134, 139(2),139,143-7,149, 150,150-4, 151, 152,157-60, 167,291,291 Lansdale, James: 6,8,125,130,142,160 *Latham, Lt.: 247 *Larson, Harold: 51 *Lawrence, Henry: 172, 194,223,246,247,248,250,251, 253,255 *Laurie, Jack: 262 Lee, James: 41 Lee, Willis: 81 *Lehrbiel, Burman: 262 *Lesicka, Joseph: 175, 176, 182, 188, 189, 190, 197, 198, 246,283,283 *Lessing, John: 214 *Lewis, Jackson: 119 *Lilliedoll, Jarrold: 217,244,248 Lindbergh, Charles: 272 *Little, John: 119,175,205,206 "'Livesey, Donald: 213,214,214,251,253

Part Seven, Appendices - Index *Lockridge, Lt.: 117 Lodge, J. Norman: 150 *Long, Albert: 139,139 *Long,James:242,245 *Lucas, Alphonse: 265 *Lynch, Joseph: 102 Lynch, Thomas: 275 M

MacArthur, Douglas: 7,41, 127,127,128,209,252 "'MacFarland, Winfield: 243, 267 *Macklin, Bruce: 182, 192, 197 *Mancini, John: 107 Mangrum, Richard: 24, 28, 35, 41, 57, 66 Marsh, Charles: 148 Marshall, George: 21, 45, 51, 52, 72 *Mason, Charles: 100,101, *Matson, Henry: 103,106,109,171 "'Mathis, Peyton: 262 Maurer, Maurer: 154 "'McBride, Clyde: 266 *McBride, J.S.: 11,12 McCain, John: 22,23,24,83 McCauley, Francis: 89 *McClanahan, James: 75,77,86,86,87,92,124,133,133, 139,143-4, *McClendon, Wallace: 121 *McCloud, Kenneth: 213, 247, 247, 248 *McCormick, Harlan: 100 *McDaniel, N.: 105 *McDonald, Donald: 132 *McGinn, John: 172,174,191,221,293,293 ':'McGown, Robert: 200, 224 McGuigan, Joseph: 140, 149, 154 *McKulla, Lawrence: 104 *McNeese, George: 53, 54, 134, 242 *Meigs, Henry: 199, 204, 244, 251, 253, 286, 286 *Mein, Robert: 203 "'Mekus, Frank: 219 Merrill, Aaron: 179 Metheny, William: 192, 210 Metke, Henry: 147,148 *Michaels, Harold: 268

Mikawa, Gunichi: 25,65,81 *Miller, Danforth: 52,53,54,58,59,65,83,86,93 Mills, James: 148 *Mitchell, John: 54,59,60(2),60,61,65,69, 70, 70, 71, 73,74,75,84,84,97,99,104,105,106,107,134,139, 139, 140,140,142-4,147,149, 150,150-5, 151, 152, 155,164,167,194,284,284 Mitchell, Ralph: 101,210,210,233 Mitscher, Marc: 101,125,138,149,176,179,192 ':'Moore, Cecil: 201, 201, 202 *Moore, Joseph: 31,97, 124,125,132,143-4, Moore, Luther: 101 "'Moore, Marvin: 267 *Moore, Lt.: 94 Morrell, Benjamin: 23 Morrison, William: 140, 149, 154 *Morrissey, Raymond: 103,107,117 *Morton, James: 52,53,54,58,59,64,117 *Moseley, Ralph: 104, 131 Mulcahy, Francis: 100, 179, 196 *Mulvey, John: 118, 205, 213, 215, 218 *Munson, John: 244 Murayama, Maseo: 51,68,69,70 *Murray, Andrew: 188 *Murray, George: 70 ':'Murray, John: 18, 107 *Mushlit, Richard: 235 N Nagumo, Chuichi: 70, 131 *Nash, R.: 131 Nasu, Yumio: 68 *Newlander, Carl: 171,182, '83, *Newton, A.C.: 11 *Nichols, Cyril: 102,171,200 *Njus, Kaspar: 193 Nimitz, Chester: 24,67,88, 127, 127, 128, 138, 150,226, 252 *Nord, Ardell: 107 *Norris, Emmett: 94,99,103 ':'Norris, William: 75,77,87, 131,175 *Novak, Emil: 75, 214 Noyes, Leigh: 23

333

13th Fighter Command in World War II

o *Obermiller, James: 48, 84 Oka, Col.: 70 *Olson, Walter: 268 Olynyk,Frank: 153 O'Neill, David: 192,210 Ostrum Charles: 182 Owens, Raymond: 192 P-Q *Pace, Morris: 190 *Pafford,Eugene:206,211,251,252,252 *Palmer, Stan: 6, 16, 102,103,106,132,135, 166,276 *Parker, James: 171,182,184 Patch, Alexander: 10, 88, 97 *Patton, Lt.: 87 :;'Patterson, Arnold: 59, 62, 73, 73, 74,86,92, 121 *Payne, Buell: 203 *Pederson, Myron: 213, 214, 218, 250, 251 *Pedro, Henry: 171,172,177,213 *Peek, Robert: 260 *Petit, Robert: 6,94,119, 120, 121, 123,123, 124, 125, 132, 143 ';'Petterson, Raymond: 107 *Phillips, George: 84 *Pickel, Creel: 267 *Ploetz, Frederick: 103,103, 131, 166 *Pollock, John: 262,266 *Pollard, William: 214 Post, Nathan: 91, 227 *Price, John: 193, 194 *Purnell, Frederick: 59,60, 74, 74, 103, 104, 106 R *Radzuikinas, Frank: 197 *Rake, Erwin: 172, 177, 213 :;'Ramp, Leland: 58,58,59 *Rankin, William: 182 *Rapson, George: 268 *Reddington, James: 245, 245 ':'Reed, James: 107 *Rees, Roland: 267 Rembert, John: 217 *Restifo, Joseph: 222, 250

334

Richard, Robert: 41,72 Rickenbacker, Eddie: 17,57,87,90 Rinosuke, Ichimaru: 59, *Rist, Robert: 61, 117, *Rivers, Richard: 14, 94, 102, 102, 121 *Robb, Robert: 190, 195, 200 *Robinson, James: 108, 108 *Roberts, John: 107 *Roehm, John: 224,245 Rowell, Ross: 51 Rupertus, William: 24 Russell, Hawley: 241 *Russell, Robert: 266 *Ryan, Martin: 48,75,77,87,94, 131 *Ryzek, George: 268 S *SackeU, Charles: 171, 182, 183, 186, 203 Sadayoshi, Yamada: 25, 59 Sakai, Saburo: 25 Sailer, Joseph: 41,72,75, Sampson, William: 28 Sano,Tadayoshi:73 Saunders, Lavern: 23,83,83 *Sawyer, Jerome: 53,58,59,62,64,65,107, 121 *Sawyers, Andrew: 214,258 *Schottel, Theo: 235, 244 *Shrock, Lt.: 247 *Scott, Edgar: 266 Scott, Norman: 61,76,78 *Seaman, Glen: 222 Segal, Harold: 227 Seigo, Yamagata: 59 *Serwat, Lt.: 247 Seville, Gordon: 44 *Sewart, Allan: 35, 83 *Shafer, Herbert: 198 *Shaffer, Russell: 268 *Shambrook, Lt.: 75, 131 *Shank,John:244,251 *Shapiro, Leonard: 266 *Sharpsteen, William: 13,59,60,61,65,83, *Shaw, William: 59,60,73,74, 103,103,105 *Shell, George: 244

[ Part Seven, Appendices - Index Sherman, Frederick: 241 *Sherman, Lawrence: 23 *Shimp, Robert: 212, 218 Shipp, VVayne: 143 *Shubin, Murray: 8, 107, 170, 171, 172, 173(2),173,177, 190,211,214,218,219,219,282,282 *Shuler, Lucien: 175,182,192, 194,195, 198,285,285 *Shrock, Lt.: 226 Simpler, Leroy: 49, 50, 66 *Skogland, Carl: 266 *Silvers, Howard: 185 *Slupe, Harold: 243 *Smith, Benjamin: 266 *Smith, Grant: 6, 186, 186, 195, 198,199,234,243 Smith, John: 24,28,29,44,46,50,57,57,278 Smith, Leo: 39, 41 *Smith, Maurice: 267 Smith, Martin: 102, 103, 131 *Smith, Richard: 267 *Smith, Robert: 224, 251 *Smith, VVilliam: 133, 139,139,166 *Snelling, Roland: 166 *Snider, Simon: 266 *Sofaly, Raymond: 268 *Sooter, Ralph: 170 *Southwell, Richard: 261 *Spofford, James: 267 *Squire, Christopher: 266 *Squires, Carl: 224 *Starke, VVilliam: 268 *Stern,Howard: 59,60,61,61 *Stewart, Donald: 174,213,219,248,253 *Stewart, E.VV.: 12 *Stewart, Richard: 267 Stimpson, Charles: 171,176 *Stoll, Robert: 242, 243 *Storino, Henry: 262 *Stratton, Eldon: 139,139,150,202 *Strate, John: 267 Streett, St.Clair: 265, 268 Strother, Dean: 22, 100, 134,150,192 *Studley, Edwin: 247 *Stuff, VVilliam: 267 Sumiyoshi, Tadashi: 68, 69

*Summerich, Eugene: 267 Swett, James: 134 *Sylvester, Robert: 172,174,185 *Szela, John: 267 T Tabuchi, Jisaburo: 145 Tanaka, Raizo: 28, 35, 36, 63, 80, 81, 88, 90, 93, 189 Takama, R.Adm.: 63,65 Takeo, Kurita: 63 *Tarbet, Dale: 103,104,107,174, 175,175 *Taylor, Cecil: 103,203,260 *Taylor, Kenneth: 104, 104, 105, 107 *Tedder, John: 175,176, *Thomas, James: 41 Thomas, VVilbur: 182, 216 *Thomas, VVilliam: 248, 261 *Thompson, John "Tommy": 14,31,36,37,38,46,47, 48,50,50,51,54,83,93,274 *Tinsley, VV.F.: 126 *Tomlinson, Edwin: 165 *Topoll, George: 94, 100, 124, 125, 132,132 Torkelson, Ross: 182 *Trane~George: 211,253,253 *Tucker, Robert: 170 *Tullis, Robert: 86,87,109 *Turner, Lt.: 218 Turner, Richmond, "Kelly": 23,24,25,56,76,88,179 *Tuttle, Ralph: 191 Twining, Nathan: 22,22,87,91, 100,101,136, 150,187, 192,204,216,217,233 *Tyler, Kermit: 12,70,103,107, *Tyler, Aaron: 139,150,174,238

U-Y Ugaki, Matome: 138,138, 139,143,145,149,155 Unruh, Marion: 199 *Yahey, James: 266 *Yan Bibber, Charles: 172,205 Yandegrift, Alexander: 22,23,24,25,44,45,46,50,52, 56,98,100 *Yiccellio, Henry: 13,94,94, 123, 125,135,139 *Voss, John: 175,192,223

335

13th Fighter Command in World War II W *Waddell, Lt.: 261 Wagner, Boyd: 44 *Wagoner, Earl: 194 *Walden, Stanley: 248 *Waldmire, Lt.: 75,87 '"Walker, Thomas: 185,224,229,247,251,253,286,286 Wallace, William: 24,39,62 Walley, James: 256 *Walsh, Lt.: 51 Walsh, Kenneth: 123, 131, 199, 201 *Walters, Harry: 182,191,217 *Warner, Donald: 211,266,267 *Wasson, John: 260 Waterman, J.: 65 *Weart, George: 211,266,267 *Webb, Allen: 102 *Webber, Donald: 171, 172, 177, 215 *Wekel, Allan: 107 *Welch, George: 104,105 *Wells, Perry: 204, 204 *Wells, Travis: 243 *Wells, William: 176, 177 *Westbrook, Robert: 8,12,103,107, 117,117,170,170, 171,182,183,205,214,215,224,235,236,241,241, 242,246,253,265,265,266,267,280,280 *Wharton Sidney: 164, *Wheadon, Elmer: 103,104,107, 182,182,183,190,203, 285,285 *Wheeler, Richard: 190, 242, 242 *Whistler, Victor: 206 White, Charles: 171 *White, Donald: 118

336

*Whiteman, George: 11 ';'Whitman, Edward: 188 *Whittaker, Gordon: 139,139,148 Wible, John: 142 *Wiesenger, Robert: 267 Wilkinson, Theodore: 201,214,214 *Williams, F.: 58, *Williams, Raymond: 75,87,106,106,132, *Williams, Waldon: 110, 133 *Windes, Alvin: 266 *Wilson, John: 180 *Wilson, Morris: 206,251 *Wittbrott, Glenn: 261 *Woldering, Daniel: 190, *Wood,John: 107,109,175,185,186 Woods, Louis: 75, 89, 91 *Workman, John: 203 *Works, David: 203 *Worley, Chandler: 266 Worthham, Coleman: 195 Wurtsmith, Paul: 267 Wright, Carlton: 88 *Wythes, Keith: 36, 39 X-Y-Z Yamagada, Masasato: 51 Yamamoto, Adm. Ishoroku: 6,88,130,130,131,135,135, 137 (2), 137, 138, 138, 139, 142-5, 148, 149, 150-4 Yanagiya, Kenji: 154-5, 155, 156,156 *Yeilding, Lt.: 247 Yost, Donald: 96, 203 *Young, Joseph: 96, 133 Yunck, Michael: 91 *Zink, John: 251,253,266

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