299040736-proceedings-inside-special-ops.pdf

Copyright © 2009, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland (410) 268-6110 www.usni.org

By Captain John J. Burnham, U.S. Navy

NSW’s traditional operations now include even more—and faster—irregular warfare. This is not going to change anytime soon.

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n Easter Sunday, SEALs rescued Maersk Alabama Captain Richard Phillips off the coast of Somalia and quickly dispatched three pirates. This brought Naval Special Warfare (NSW) into the spotlight for a few news cycles. Footage of Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training ran on cable news, statistics on operational deployments and recruiting got air time. The coverage highlighted one of NSW’s core missions: 22

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maritime special operations. But this incident of strategic application was only one in a long stretch of NSW operations since 11 September 2001. Like the other units inside the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), SEALs and the NSW community have continuously adapted during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. As the current fight approaches the eight-year mark—longer than NSW’s direct www.usni.org

involvement in either World War II or Vietnam—we must assess our performance as well as how the nature of this enemy is changing the organization, capabilities, and strategic employment scheme of naval special warfare. While balancing the very different demands of maritime special operations and the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, we need to explore how to maintain meaningful ties to the Navy as well as to USSOCOM. And we need to study the question of where to put resources for the next fight.

Movement: NSW Legacy As a small force in a big service, NSW has always used combat necessity and evolving conflicts, along with their important after-effects, to shape the community and its capabilities. This has involved defining the capability required, devising the training and outlining resource requirements, convincing sometimes reluctant theater commanders of the mission feasibility and value of the force, and finding the right operators for the job. World War II saw the beginning of “the long struggle by the navy’s frogmen to define their mission and understand who they are.”1 From the early days there was a broad scope of missions: Scouts and Raiders in China behind enemy lines as advisers, Naval Combat Demolition Units blowing obstacles in support of the Normandy landings, underwater demolition teams in the Pacific supporting amphibious landings after the disaster at Tarawa. The early focus was on direct action, not so much counterinsurgency or nation-building.2 That shifted when President John F. Kennedy encouraged all the services to expand special operations. In a 1962 speech at West Point, Kennedy described his vision: “This is another type of war, new in intensity, ancient in origins—wars by guerrillas, subversion, insurgents, assassins; wars by ambush instead of by conventional combat. . . . It requires a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.”3 The Navy’s Unconventional Activities Committee recommended the formation of a unit on each coast to be the focal point for Navy involvement in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations: Sea Air Land (SEAL) teams.4 This marked the first step away from direct Fleet support. Drawn from the existing UDTs, SEALs hit the radar in Vietnam, where their advisers were from 1962 to 1973, and their platoons operated from 1965 to 1971. Underwater-demolition and SEAL teams reconnected with Fleet commanders after Vietnam through direct support deployments with battle groups and expanded partner training with other countries’ maritime special operations forces. In 1983, all remaining UDTs converted AP Photo (Aaron Favila)

CRITICAL ONGOING EFFORTS In 2002, U.S. special forces and SEALs trained with local counterparts in the southern Philippines jungle. The militant extremist group they aimed to take out, Abu Sayyaf, has been linked with al Qaeda and continues to operate.

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to SEAL teams. The Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), a one-star headquarters, was established as the stateside command. In 1987 the U.S. Special Operations Command was created, carving NSW away from the Fleet and into a dedicated SOF chain of command—which continued to report through the Navy administratively. As a minority in a command dominated by the Army and Air Force, NSW played limited but critical roles. One of the biggest issues was that NSW continued to deploy in much the same way it had for 30 years: in platoon-size elements, attached directly to ships or Theater Special Operations Commanders. By the late 1990s, it was apparent that the community needed to update its organization. The force was expanding, operational requirements overseas were shifting, and training needed to be streamlined.

NSW 21 Sets the Stage NSW 21, as NAVSPECWARCOM’s overarching plan for these changes was known, was the most comprehensive community reorganization since UDTs had shifted to SEAL Teams. The goal was to increase relevance and effectiveness to reflect the maturity of theater SOF operations while maintaining operational support and focus to the Fleet commanders. As one of many structural and operational changes, SEAL teams would now deploy with operations, intelligence, and logistics enablers into theaters as NSW squadrons, not piecemeal to individual commanders. The transition was not always smooth, but in the end the new NSW 21 organization provided the Fleet and theater commanders with more responsive capability. It set the stage for NSW to effectively deploy after 9/11 to meet the new mission requirements.

Into the Present In recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, USSOCOM commander Admiral Eric Olson noted that special operations forces (SOF) are employing many of their core capabilities—unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, civil affairs, information operations, and partnering with host nation forces.5 The benefits of using NSW in many cases revolve around their small footprint, the precision of their operations, and their ability to blend and adapt to environment and mission requirements. This year (and since just after 9/11) about 85 percent of overseas SOF units are deployed to the Central Command theater of operations, and that percentage is about the same for NSW.6 Tactically, the mission scope covers all operations: urban, desert, and riverine combat in Iraq; long-range small-unit operations in Afghanistan; maritime special operations in the Philippines; and a number of continuing training relationships with the maritime special operations forces of numerous countries in all theaters. Staffs and specialty augments have been involved as well—intelligence, communicaPROCEEDINGS •

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AP Photo

LEGACY OF COVERTNESS SEALs in Vietnam (here in 1969, watching the detonation of a satchel charge they set to destroy a Vietcong bunker) were known for timely information-gathering and quick action. Today, those same skills are applied to real-time pictures of enemy networks and individual targets.

tions, logistics, administrative support—and the entire community has been expeditionary. Broadly speaking, NSW has changed since 9/11 in three primary ways: the fusion of operations and intelligence (ops/intel), interagency teamwork, and a refocusing on irregular warfare.

The Ops/Intel Cycle Much has been written about the SOF find-fix-finishexploit-analyze cycle that describes how operations and intelligence come together before target execution at the tactical and operational levels, with the rapid exploitation and follow-on analysis that leads back into the ops cycle. This is a vastly improved dynamic from pre-9/11 processes.7 SEALs in Vietnam were known for their ability to gather timely, quality tactical intelligence and act on it quickly. In today’s ops/intel machine, that same thread connects strategic intelligence straight to the tactical level, operations that are then augmented by manned and unmanned 24

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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance platforms. These provide a real-time picture of the enemy network and individual targets. The exploitation cycle has likewise expanded. Intelligence gained from operations is fed directly to the larger intel community, complementing the national collection and starting the cycle again. Operating at the “speed of war” now extends up, down, and across the spectrum.8

Joint and Interagency Teamwork Joint special ops increased during the 1990s, but the interagency effort had nowhere near the same level of effort or emphasis. That has now changed. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force structure has come a long way since Operation Desert Storm. Today, SEALs work not only with conventional U.S., Coalition, and partner nation forces; they also interact directly with representatives from every agency in our government. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have served as living laboratories for NSW in joint/interagency operations. www.usni.org

Whether it is working with Provincial Reconstruction SOCOM priority, and NSW’s inherent access to countries Team representatives from the Departments of State, with maritime special operations forces has been a key Commerce, Agriculture, Justice, or the U.S. Agency part of this effort. The concept of conducting operations for International Development; or having almost all the “by, with, and through” partner nation forces is a rule, but “three letter” agencies live and work with them in their so is maintaining the ability to conduct unilateral operaspaces, NSW members are now experiencing levels of tions when required. interaction leagues beyond pre-9/11 days. Tactical lesNSW has benefited from the Navy’s increased focus sons learned can be shared or improved upon, and chal- on irregular warfare. This past spring the Office of Naval lenges or obstructions at higher staff levels can be more Intelligence created four subordinate commands, one of easily surmounted when people deal face to face and which is the John F. Kennedy Irregular Warfare Center. communicate with others who have had similar deployed Thus, a five-year ONI project was given formal structure.9 experiences. Initiatives like this will increase the connection with what The system is not perfect. Some information stovepipes NSW is already doing around the world. remain, and the occasional organizational turf battle still Funding for NSW has also improved, as have ways in occurs. But overall it is a vast improvement, and it’s a which money can be used. In the 1990s, training and worktwo-way street. As NSW gains from its contact and work ing with foreign SOF was done under the Joint/Combined with other agencies and departments, those representatives Exchange Training program. This system maintained relaare exposed to NSW—its people, the tactics, the opera- tionships but could not be “operationalized.” In 2003, Contions, and the results. gress appropriated $25 million for Another factor that will have geographic combatant commandWe need to think about positive long-term effects is the ers to bolster partner nation forces huge number of Navy augmentees and gain access, through employwhat the world will be in the ground fight. When an O-5 ing indigenous units, to hostile like in ten years. submariner or aviator has spent areas where U.S. forces cannot a year commanding a Provincial openly operate. Known as “1208 Reconstruction Team and has funding” for the relevant section worked daily with the SEAL and SF units in his province, in the legislation, it has been renewed and expanded since it’s a powerful lesson in understanding NSW. Similarly, its inception, and proven to be a valuable force multiplier Navy intel specialists in an interagency task force work for NSW.10 side by side with CIA, NSA, DIA, NGA and other perAs in any dynamic environment, we must exploit opporsonnel from all the intelligence disciplines, directly sup- tunities, address issues, and improve processes. Enduring porting operations and interacting with the operators. And situations like post-9/11 operations have long-term effects, Seabees, communicators, and supply personnel live at the of course, and discussing them goes beyond tactical lesforward operating base with the assault forces, building sons learned. the camp and interacting with locals for contracted serCombat Leadership vices. They are immersed in the overall battle rhythm. An NSW operator who enlisted or was commissioned The legion of Sailors and officers who have lived and worked with NSW in Operations Enduring Freedom and in 2000 and finished BUD/S or Special Warfare CombatIraqi Freedom will be like the bulge in the economic fore- ant Crewman training in 2001 has known only combat cast charts: Years from now, when they are O-6s and E-9s, deployment cycles for the first half of his career. Reserve they will have a fundamentally different outlook based on NSW groups are staffed with combat veterans who retheir time working in those environments. This is good for turn to support the forward-deployed task forces on their augmentation cycles. This unprecedented level of diverse NSW and for the Fleet as a whole. experience is having a significant impact on the commuIrregular Warfare nity. The full scope of benefits will be clear as junior NSW has a long operational history in the areas that operators and technicians assume leadership positions, now make up what is termed irregular warfare. In today’s mentored by combat veterans and with current relevant counterinsurgency environment, unilateral combat opera- experience themselves. This kind of a game-changing factor could be a boon tions must fit into a larger framework of security, development, and governance. The success of this effort will have to NSW. The potential downside is that a community with the long-term effects of denying sanctuary to the enemy too much of the same type of perspective in its ranks may get stuck in the rut of fighting the last war, or, as Admiral and stabilizing the region. NSW forces have continued to improve the combination Olson expressed it, concern over “short-term gains in comof advising and operations as they work with Iraqi and bat experience at the cost of reduced capability in specific Afghan army and police, Philippine maritime comman- skill areas not utilized in OEF and OIF.”11 dos, and other nations’ forces during training exchanges. For this reason it is crucial that we gain perspective on Bringing irregular warfare to a full capability has been a the thematic and organizational changes. We must lift the www.usni.org

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principles out of tactical white noise and guide the community on the best path forward. For example, instruction in language and cultural knowledge must be prioritized and considered a long-term training investment. There are only so many frogmen and too many countries in which operations are possible. We need vision to determine where the next focus areas should be.

Finding the New Operators At the other end of the leadership chain, recruiting continues to be strong. There was a concern that the operational tempo and demands would push people away. However, the new operators understand the deployment cycles and requirements of the career—and they accept them. What would have been categorized as a crushing op tempo in the 1990s is now considered normal.12 Motivated operators and high morale are critical factors for a long fight. But high as the warriors’ enthusiasm may be, that of their families may not last. We must continue with our attention and concern for the well-being of spouses, children, and other family members, while continuing to ensure operators get the proper amount of time between deployments to stay on top of the wave.

Maintaining the Fleet Connection

NSW Expanding Leadership Roles The past ten years have seen a significant increase in SEAL leadership in the Navy and joint arenas. In 1999 NAVSPECWARCOM was a one-star headquarters, and the highest leadership outside NSW lifelines was at the O-6 and E-9 levels in the Theater Special Operations Commands. Ten years later, NAVSPECWARCOM is a two-star command with a Force Master Chief. SEAL flag officers work at SOCOM HQ, at the National Counterterrorism Center, and on the National Security Council staff. SEALs have been commanders of Special Operations Command−Central and Special Operations Command−Europe, a SEAL twostar is the Fourth Fleet commander, a SEAL three-star commands the Joint Special Operations Command, and a SEAL four-star commands USSOCOM. Today’s senior flag officers and senior enlisted entered NSW in the mid-1970s, when the Navy was considering shifting the two SEAL teams to the reserves; their career arcs have seen a considerable shift in the community’s relationship with the Navy.

Looking Ahead We need to look beyond today’s fight and think about what the world will be like ten years from now. NSW will be in the war zones for some time to come, but when the

DOD (Bradley A. Lail)

In a number of categories—personnel augmentation for deployments, increased budgeting, and high recruiting priorities—the Navy’s support to NSW has improved dramatically in the past ten years. And despite the operational demands of the current fight, we remain connected to the Fleet in training and other professional exchanges, along with officer and senior enlisted placement on key naval and joint staffs. This close relationship results in service support for current and emerging joint NSW requirements, support that

pays real dividends. What still remains, though, is for the rapport to be strengthened between non-Fleet expeditionary ops elements of the Navy. This means NSW, the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (formed January 2006), and the Marine Special Operations Command (directed by the Secretary of Defense in fall 2005). Given the relatively recent creation of each, it’s about the right time to engage at deeper levels and shore up linkages.

ACCELERATED OP TEMPO USSOCOM commander Admiral Eric T. Olson (right) recently testified before the House Armed Services Committee that his forces were using core unconventional-warfare capabilities while partnering with host nation forces—at an operational pace he termed “the new normal.” Appearing with him are Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle A. Flournoy (center) and Commander, U.S. Central Command General David H. Petraeus (left).

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U.S. Marine Corps (Chago Zapata)

larger while you figure out exactly what to do next. Organizationally, NSW has been doing that for most of its existence. Since 9/11, its contributions have been increasingly recognized, resourced, and supported. But with greater gifts come greater responsibilities. The upcoming decade will require the community to ruthlessly scrutinize and assess its core missions. For example, significant acquisition decisions about maritime platforms are coming in the next few years. SEALs and other NSW team members, even as they continue to perform numerous critical operations in support of the global fight, must always remember that only one force inside SOCOM—NSW—is charged with and capable of the unique maritime special operations missions. And, as Maersk Alabama Captain Phillips knows, keeping that edge sharp is a no-fail requirement. 1. Orr Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1992), 101. Two of the best references on the origins and history of NSW are this and The Naked Warriors, the 1956 classic by legendary frogman Francis Fane (available as a Naval Institute Press reprint). 2. Susan Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1997), 65. 3. Speech given at West Point, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 453. 4. Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters, 76. 5. Testimony of Admiral Eric Olson, USSOCOM Commander, FY2010 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for USSOCOM, 4 June 2009. U.S. House ComADVISING AND FIGHTING U.S. special forces work in Iraq and Afghanistan to help secure the mittee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorpopulation and disrupt enemy networks. Here, a female Army soldier in the Iraqi Special Operaism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities. Available through Federal News Service, www.fnsg.com. tions Forces Brigade prepares for a joint operation in an Najaf province. 6. Testimony of Admiral Eric Olson, 4 June 2009. 7. Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, Thomas Cantrell, ISR: SOF Best Practices,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 3rd quarter 2008. joint task forces wind down and the bureaucratic amber “Employing 8. Ibid. resin again hardens around the various organizations, it 9. Robert K. Ackerman, “Naval Intelligence Ramps Up Activities,” Signal, February will be essential for our tactical relationships to have 2009. P.L. 108-375, Section 1208, 28 October 2004. Available at ww.dod.mil/dodgc/ matured. It’s easy when everyone is deployed together, 10. olc/docs/PL108-375.pdf. but when the temporary overseas structures dissipate, as 11. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Advance Policy Questions for Vice military and civilian counterparts climb their respective Admiral Eric T. Olson, USN, Nominee for Commander, U.S. Special Operations Com12 June 2007. Available at www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/ organizational ladders, a permanent, institutionalized solu- mand, June/Olson%2006-12-07.pdf. tion must already be in place. 12. Testimony of Admiral Eric Olson, 4 June 2009.

As he goes through his small-unit drills, every young frogman learns that the goal of a SEAL element when faced with an enemy force is to create a momentary impression of overwhelming fire superiority. You need to make the unknown enemy think your element is a lot

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Captain Burnham, a SEAL with combat experience in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, is Deputy Commander, Naval Special Warfare Development Group in Dam Neck, Virginia.

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