Armenia Azerbijan Conflict

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Armenia – Azerbaijan Conflict

• The long-running conflict has concerned the international community in part because of its threat to stability in a region that serves as a corridor for pipelines taking oil and gas to world markets

Introduction • Late September 2020, heavy fighting broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh • Claimed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, due to the failure of mediation efforts, increased militarization, and frequent cease-fire violations • More than a thousand soldiers and civilians have been killed, with hundreds more wounded on both sides • Armenia and Azerbaijan initially rejected pressure from the United Nations and countries like the United States and Russia to hold talks and end hostilities, and instead pledged to continue fighting

Introduction • Tensions escalated further when both sides switched from cross-border shelling to the use of longer-range artillery and other heavy weaponry • In early October 2020, Russia negotiated a cease-fire which broke down; two additional cease-fires were negotiated by France in coordination with Russia and the United States, and then the United States directly. These cease-fires also collapsed almost immediately as fighting continued with reported violations by both Armenia and Azerbaijan • These recent hostilities follow a series of cross-border attacks that occurred over the summer, including four days of clashes and shelling in July 2020 that killed an Azerbaijani general and nearly twenty people

Background • In the 1920s, the Soviet government established the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region— where 95 percent of the population is ethnically Armenian—within Azerbaijan • Under Bolshevik rule, fighting between the two countries was kept in check, but, as the Soviet Union began to collapse, so did its grip on Armenia and Azerbaijan • Under international law, Nagorno-Karabakh is recognized as part of Azerbaijan. But the ethnic Armenians who make up the vast majority of the population reject Azerbaijani rule • In 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh legislature passed a resolution to join Armenia despite the region's legal location within Azerbaijan’s borders • As the Soviet Union was dissolving in 1991, the autonomous region officially declared independence. War erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region, leaving roughly thirty thousand casualties and hundreds of thousands of refugees. • By 1993, Armenia controlled Nagorno-Karabakh and occupied 20 percent of the surrounding Azerbaijani territory. In 1994, Russia brokered a cease-fire which has remained in place since

Background • But artillery shelling and minor skirmishes between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops have caused hundreds of deaths • Early April 2016 witnessed the most intense fighting since 1994, killing dozens and resulting in more than three hundred casualties • After four days of fighting, the two sides announced that they had agreed on a new cease-fire • However, a breakdown in talks was followed by repeated cease-fire violations, and tensions have remained high

Role of Minsk Group • Negotiation and mediation efforts, primarily led by the Minsk Group, have failed to produce a permanent solution to the conflict • The Minsk Group, a mediation effort led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was created in 1994 to address the dispute and is cochaired by the United States, France, and Russia • The co-chairs organize summits between the leaders of the two countries and hold individual meetings • The group has successfully negotiated cease-fires, but the territorial issues remain as intractable as ever • In October 2017, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan met in Geneva under the auspices of the Minsk Group, beginning a series of talks on a possible settlement of the conflict

Concerns • Without successful mediation efforts, cease-fire violations and renewed tensions threaten to reignite a military conflict between the countries and destabilize the South Caucasus region • This could also disrupt oil and gas exports from the region, since Azerbaijan, which produces about eight hundred thousand barrels of oil per day, is a significant oil and gas exporter to Central Asia and Europe • Turkey has pledged to support Azerbaijan, and Iran has a large Azeri minority, which could escalate a crisis and further complicate efforts to secure peace in the region

Turkey’s Role • The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has become an important component of Turkish foreign policy • Over the years, Ankara’s support for Baku has grown exponentially • Diplomacy was an element of this support, but more significant was the dispatch of sophisticated weaponry • Greater support for Azerbaijan coincided with Turkey’s more active foreign policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean

Turkey’s Role • The reason for Ankara’s assertiveness could be access to energy and trade routes • Turkey has always supported Azerbaijan on the basis of cultural ties and common geopolitical aspirations • Over the past several years there has been a tilt toward more robust Turkish military aid to Azerbaijan • Several factors caused this • The first is energy flow • As Turkey’s gas consumption increased, Azerbaijan gradually became its major gas supplier

Turkey’s Role • In May 2020, Azerbaijan officially became Turkey’s top gas supplier • This became possible after the launch of TANAP (Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline) • In late 2019. The $6.5 billion project is part of the $40 billion Southern Gas Corridor, a network of pipelines that connect Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II field to the vast European market • TANAP has the capacity to transport up to 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Caspian gas per year: 10 bcm to Europe and 6 bcm to the Turkish market

Turkey’s Role • Geopolitical thinking could be at play here, as Turkey has long worried that its aspirations in the South Caucasus and elsewhere could render it dependent on Russian gas • As differences with Russia over Libya and Syria multiplied, Ankara sought alternative ways to reduce its dependence on Russian gas • Indeed, Turkey’s defense industry chief said after the July fighting that the country was ready to help its eastern ally • Joint military drills followed in Baku, Nakhchivan, Ganja, Kurdamir, and Yevlakh

Turkey’s Role • Azerbaijani gas is thus set to play a central role in Turkey’s evolving approach toward Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict • According to Erdoğan, Ankara’s support for Azerbaijan was part of Turkey’s quest for its “deserved place in the world order.” It fits into the overall pattern of the country’s foreign policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean • The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an opportunity for Turkey at a time when the world’s major powers are distracted by internal matters, the resurgent pandemic, ensuing economic problems, and most of all the lack of active leadership. In that environment, Turkey has been openly pushing to alter the status quo over Nagorno-Karabakh

Turkey’s Role • Ankara was betting that despite their differences over Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey and Russia will be able to find a lasting solution to the conflict • Cooperation mixed with intense competition has been a hallmark of RussianTurkish relations for several years • As the case of north Syria shows, they can work out durable solutions despite tensions between them • More broadly, they have cooperated in the sidelining of Western powers in both Syria and Libya, and a similar trend is emerging around NagornoKarabakh • The Russians, like the Turks, have expressed readiness to cooperate to deescalate the tension

Turkey’s Role • The developing trend of Russia-Turkey cooperation/competition around Nagorno-Karabakh could be yet another theater in which the last remaining Western negotiating influence disappears • It could also be similar to the way they brokered a relative peace in Syria by sidelining Western powers

Russian Perspective • Though it remains to be seen how far the Kremlin is willing to go in tolerating growing Turkish involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it recognizes that the status quo between Armenia and Azerbaijan has become untenable • Azerbaijan is stronger militarily, a status it achieved through a vast, decades-long expansion of its military budget • Turkey’s military aid to Baku and general diplomatic support have pulled the two states closer together • If Azerbaijan did not receive some territories back, Ankara could ramp up its military support for Baku, potentially sparking another military standoff • Moscow’s biggest fear could be that efforts to keep the status quo will alienate Azerbaijan from Russia and move it closer to its Turkic kin, and perhaps to the West in general

Peace deal • Russian peacekeepers have been deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh after Moscow brokered a peace deal that sparked celebrations in Azerbaijan and protests in Armenia • Truce was announced late on 9 Nov • The ceasefire may end a six-week war in which Azerbaijan launched its largest offensive in a generation to retake Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions under Armenian control

Peace deal • The agreement confirmed the influence of Russia and Turkey in the region, while sidelining western powers • News of the deal set off a protests in the Armenian capital. Hundreds of people took to the streets and stormed government buildings soon after Armenia’s prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, announced the “painful” deal early on Tuesday • The parliament’s speaker, Ararat Mirzoyan, was caught up in the violence and beaten unconscious by an angry mob • The agreement calls for Armenian forces to turn over control of some areas it held outside the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh, including the eastern district of Agdam

Peace deal • Armenians will also turn over the Lachin region, which holds the main road leading from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia • The agreement calls for the road, the so-called Lachin corridor, to remain open and be protected by 1,960 Russian peacekeepers. Stepanakert will remain under control of the Armenian-backed government. • Pashinyan came to power in 2018 in a bloodless democratic revolution and there are already fears the loss of territory may provide an opportunity for authoritarian forces to reclaim power

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