Article 14 Of The Indian Constitution

Article 14 of the Indian Constitution Article 14 states that “Equality before law - The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth”. Article 14-18 embodies the ideas of both negative and positive equality (formal and substantive equality). The framers of the Constitution were aware of the existing social inequalities in India due to discriminatory social structure and they wanted the Indian State to take positive measures to promote equality in positive sense. Two concepts are involves in Article 14, viz. ‘equality before the law’ and ‘equal protection of law’. The first is a negative concept which ensures that there is no special privilege in favour of any one, that all are equal subject to the ordinary law of the land and that no person, whatever be his rank or condition, is above the law. There are certain exceptions to it, such as – foreign diplomats enjoy immunity from the country’s judicial process, Art. 361 extends immunity to the President of India. The second concept, ‘equal protection of laws’, is positive in content. It does not mean that identically the same law should apply to all persons, or that every law must have a universal application within the country irrespective of different circumstances. Equal protection of the laws does not postulate equal treatment of all person without distinctions. What it postulates is the application of the same laws alike and without discrimination to all persons similarly situated. It denotes equality of treatment in equal circumstances. Doctrine of Reasonable Classification Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not prohibit legislative classification (special legislations for doctors, lawyers etc.). The principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application to all persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position. Article 14 allows for reasonable classification of persons, objects and transactions by the Legislature for the purpose of achieving specific ends. Classification to be reasonable should fulfil following two test – 1. It should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It should be based on an intelligible differentia, some real and substantial distinction, which distinguishes persons or things grouped together in the class from others left out of it. 2. The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must have a rational or reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. Illustration – Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, person who have not attained majority i.e. the age of 18 or above cannot enter into a contract. The two classes are adults and minors. The

basis of this classification is the age. Age obviously has a relation to the object of legislation i.e. the capacity to enter into contract. This section therefore satisfies both the requirements of a valid classification and it groups adults and minors separately and such grouping has rational relation with the object of legislation that is capacity to make a contract. A classification need not be scientifically perfect or logically complete. The person who pleads that article 14 has been violated, must not only prove that he has been treated differently from others, but he has also been treated differently from persons similarly circumstanced. Procedural Inequality

State   of   West   Bengal   v.   Anwar   Ali   Sarkar   and   49   others – •

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Section 5(1) of WB Special Courts Act 1950 conferred power to the government to classify offences, classes of offences, cases, classes of cases to be tried by special criminal courts. The Preamble of the Act states: ‘To provide for speedier trial of certain offences’. Using this particular section, offences committed by Anwar Ali ad 49 others were picked up and sent for Special Criminal Court. The SC observed that a special law will not be violative of art 14 if it lays down proper guidelines for classifying offenes but the special procedures presribed by such law should be substantially different from procedure under ordinary law. They argued that they were subjected to discriminatory treatment and that the procedure laid down by this act was cumbersome and harsh than the procedure of trial by Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the Section 5(1) was invalidated as it conferred arbitrary powers on the government to classify offences… at its own pleasure. The object as stated in the Preamble was too vague and uncertain to afford a basis for reasonable classification. SC observed that the differentia i.e., the basis of classification and the object of the act are two different things. The object by itself cannot be the basis of classification of offences or cases for in the absence of any special circumstances which may distinguish one offence or case from another offence or cases. The court said that the act did not lay down any basis for classification nor did it mention clearly what kind of cases were to be directed for trial by special courts. The procedure laid down by the act varied substantially from the procedure laid down for trial by CrPC.

Kathi  Raning  Rawat  vs.  State  of  Saurashtra   •

The object as mentioned in the Ordinance was to provide ‘public safety, public order and preservation of peace and tranquility’ and four distinct categories of offences were directed by the government to be tried by special courts, especially speedy trial of cases arising out of activities of dacoits and other criminals guilty of violent crimes.

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Court held that a distinction must be drawn between ‘discrimination without reason’ and ‘discrimination with reason’. The main objection to the West Bengal Act in the above case was that it permitted ‘discrimination without reason’. However, in the present case, a nexus between offences of particular category and object with which Ordinance was promulgated can be established and this suffices the repel the charge of discrimination and justify the special treatment of those offences. Court held that state is competent to deal with offences which affect the maintenance of public order and that such offences shall be tried as expeditiously as possible in accordance with a special procedure.

Kedarnath  Bajoria  v.  State  of  W.B.   •

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Section 4 of the West Bengal Criminal Law (amendment) special courts act, 1949 was challenged in this case because it enabled the government to single out a particular case for reference to the special courts for trial by procedure for special procedure which denied to an accused tried under it the advantages enjoyed by those tried by ordinary procedure. The Act was contended to have an object of speedier trial and punishment of the offences set out in the preamble. Patanjali Shastri, C.J., delivered majority judgement, “viewed against this background, it will be seen that by and large the types of offences mentioned in the schedule to the Act are those that were common and widely prevalent, during this period, and it was evidently to prevent or to place an effective check upon the commission of such offences that the impugned legislation was considered necessary. Hence the system of special courts deal with the special type of offences under a shortened and simplified procedure was devised, and it seems to us that the legislation in question is based on a perfectly intelligible principle of classification having a clear and reasonable relation to the object sought to be attained.” Rejecting the contention by the petitioner the court noticed that the legislature here is not discriminating but it fails to make a proper scientific classification. It, from the statute texts, leaves on the administrative bodies to make a selective application of the law to persons or things within the defined group. “The equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article 1 of the constitution does not mean that all laws must be general in character and universal in application and that the State is no longer to have the power of distinguishing and classifying persons or things for the purposes of legislation.” This interpretation left to the administration is not an absolute discretionary power as the law allows the body to allot and classify from a selective application of the law.

Magan  Lal  Chagan  Lal  v.  Municipal  Corporation  –     •

Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 and Government Premise Eviction Act 1955 conferred power on authorities to hold and conduct a trial under the supervision of an Officer (legally trained and well-skilled) for speedy eviction proceedings against unauthorized occupants of government and corporation premises.

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These laws were challenged on the ground of availability of two procedures for eviction of unauthorized premises, one under the ordinary Civil Procedure Code and another under the Special Procedure of the said acts. The law upheld as it made valid classifications and provided sufficient guidelines to the executive for exercising discretion. The court said that where a statute providing for a more drastic procedure different from the ordinary procedure covers the whole field covered by the ordinary procedure, without any guidelines as to the class of cases in which either procedure is to be restored to the statute will be hit by art. 14. The Kathi Raning case would seem to lay down the principle that if the legislation indicated the policy which inspired it and the object which it seeks to attain, the mere fact that there is no precise classification but has the selective application to be made by executive is not a sufficient ground to condemn the provision as arbitrary. How to check the validity of the legislation – ascertain the policy and object of the statute. Then apply dual test – classification must be based on intelligible differentia and the basis of classification has nexus with the policy or object. A legislation may either itself make a classificaiton for its application or non-application or may leave the classification to be made by the executive. It determiningt the validity, the court will examine and ascertain if the statute has laid down any principle or policy for the guidance of exercise of the discretion by the exectuive, or for the administration in the matter of selection or classification. The legislation would be striked down if no principles or policy has been laid down. The reason is that the legislation gives arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the authority which would enable it to discriminate between persion or things similarly situated.

In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujeeb – There existed a system of selection by oral interview which was challenged in the court because it gave arbitrary powers to allocate 15% marks for the interview. Jusitce PN Bhagwati stated that “the doctrine of classification which is evolved by the courts is not paraphrase of Article 14 nor it is the objective and end of the article. It is merely a judicial formula for determining whether the legislative or executive action in question is arbitrary and therefore constituting the denial of equality. If the classification is not reasonable and does not satisfy the two conditions referred to above (1) intelligible differentia and (2) rational relation between the differentia and the object sought, impugned legislation or executive action would plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of equality under Article 14 would be breached.” The importance of doctrine of reasonable classification must be examined in the light of principle of non-arbitrariness stated above. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State Action because an arbitrary action will be negation of Equality. The present position is that Article 14 is no longer equated with doctrine of reasonable classification. Article 14 is primarily a guarantee against arbitrariness in State Action and doctrine of reasonable classification has been evolved only as a subsidiary rule for testing whether a particular state action is arbitrary or not.