Bashir_hanafi Legal Theory And Hadith- A Study Of The Deobandi Attempts

Washington University in St. Louis

Washington University Open Scholarship Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Arts & Sciences

Spring 5-1-2014

Hanafi Legal Theory and Hadith: A Study of the Deobandi Attempts at "Rectifying" the Image of the Hanafi School Aamir Bashir Washington University in St. Louis, [email protected]

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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS Department of Jewish, Islamic, and Near Eastern Languages and Cultures

Ḥanafī Legal Theory and Ḥadīth: A Study of the Deobandī Attempts at “Rectifying” the Image of the Ḥanafī School

by Aamir Bashir

A thesis presented to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

May 2014 St. Louis, Missouri

Copyright © 2014, Aamir Bashir

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments Abstract

iv v

INTRODUCTION Background Problem Statement Literature Review Sources and Methodology Organization of the Study

1 1 4 6 9 11

CHAPTER 1: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT The Deobandīs Shāh Walī Allāh and His Legacy 1.2.1 Walī Allāh as a Renewer (Mujaddid) 1.2.2 Walī Allāh and Ḥadīth & Fiqh 1.2.3 Walī Allāh’s Ambiguous Legacy Deobandī Responses to Ahl-e-Hadīs

14 14 16 17 19 21 25 27

2.9

CHAPTER 2: DEOBANDĪ RE-ARTICULATION OF ḤANAFĪ LEGAL THEORY WITH RESPECT TO ḤADĪTH Deobandīs’ Sources Speculative Nature of Principles of Ḥadīth-Criticism Taṣḥīḥ (Validation/Declaration of Soundness) and Taḥsīn (Declaration of Fairness) of a Ḥadīth Conditions for the Use of a Weak Ḥadīth Rejecting Solitary Report (Khabar al-wāḥid) Position of the Opinions of Companions and Followers Principles of Narrator-Criticism, i.e. Commendation (Taʿdīl) and Discreditation (Jarḥ) Principles of Preference when Proofs Contradict (Taʿāruḍ bayna al-adilla wa altarjīḥ) Conclusion

52

3.1 3.2

CHAPTER 3: AFFIRMING ḤADĪTH CREDENTIALS OF ABŪ ḤANĪFA AND HIS COMPANIONS Deobandīs’ Sources Abū Ḥanīfa

1.1 1.2

1.3

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8

ii

28 30 32 36 38 39 41 48 51

52 54

3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3

3.3 3.4

Abū Ḥanīfa, the Follower (Tābiʿī) Abū Ḥanīfa, the Absolute Mujtahid Abū Ḥanīfa, the “Great Muḥaddith” 1. Personal Knowledge of Ḥadīth 2. Abū Ḥanīfa’s Status as a Reliable Narrator a. Abū Ḥanīfa Not an Innovator 3. Abū Ḥanīfa’s Muḥaddith Companions Other Ḥanafīs Conclusion

54 55 56 56 58 59 61 62 62 63

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

CHAPTER 4: TRAINING THE NEXT GENERATION OF ḤANAFĪ DEFENDERS Deobandī Curriculum Deobandī Pedagogy Current Situation Effects CONCLUSION

70

BIBLIOGRAPHY

75

iii

64 65 66 68

Acknowledgments

The idea for this paper came while I was attending the Summer Program at the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), Herndon, VA in 2013. Later, I was chosen to be a recipient of the IIIT Research Fellowship to work on this project. My heartfelt gratitude is to the scholars and researchers at IIIT who inspired this topic. In particular, I would like to thank Profs. Mahmoud Ayoub and Abdulaziz Sachedina who helped with and approved the research proposal. At Washington University in St. Louis, Prof. Hayrettin Yucesoy graciously agreed to supervise this topic for my MA thesis. I am deeply indebted to him for his continued guidance throughout the two semesters that I worked on this project. Had it not been for him, the project would not have finished on time, and would not have been presentable. I would also like to thank the other two members of my committee, Profs. John Bowen and Martin Jacobs for their insightful comments. I would be remiss if I did not also thank my classmates, the members of JINELC Grad reading group, Brett, Hannah and Lizzy. Our fruitful discussions greatly helped me streamline my thoughts. Above all, I owe more than I can express to my wife Maareah for supporting me throughout this MA and putting up with my haphazarad work schedule. Thank you from the bottom of my heart.

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS Ḥanafi Legal Theory and Ḥadīth: A Study of the Deobandi Attempts at “Rectifying” the Image of the Ḥanafī School by Aamir Bashir Master of Arts in Islamic & Near Eastern Studies Washington University in St. Louis, 2014 Associate Professor Hayrettin Yucesoy, Chair

Of the four main Sunnī schools of law, the Ḥanafī school and its eponymous founder Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767) have historically been labelled by their opponents as ahl al-ra’y (those who prefer reason over Ḥadīth (Prophetic reports)). This issue was quite charged in the early period of the development of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). It was reignited in nineteenth century India by a group of scholars who called themselves “Ahl-e-Hadīs.” In response, a group of Ḥanafī scholars, later called Deobandīs, attempted to defend their school by re-articulating Ḥanafī legal theory to explain the “proper” position of Ḥadīth in it, and by trying to demonstrate the Ḥadīth competence of Abū Ḥanīfa. In addition, Deobandīs also composed new Ḥadīth collections and commenatries on existing Ḥadīth works, with a view to “proving” that the Ḥanafī school was as grounded in Ḥadīth as any other Sunnī school. Moreover, they established a new curriculum in their madrasas (traditional Islamic schools/colleges) in which major attention was given to the relationship between Ḥanafī fiqh and Ḥadīth. Through textual analysis of Deobandi works and personal experience of the curriculum and pedagogy in a Deobandī madrasa, I argue that Deobandī articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīth was not mainly for the

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derivation of legal rulings but was meant to create “acceptance” of Ḥanafī Ḥadīth proofs on the part of their opponents, Ahl-e-Hadīs. Moreover, Deobandīs were not alone in trying to defend Abū Ḥanīfa and the Ḥanafī school. During the same period and earlier, in India and the Middle East, other Ḥanafīs were engaged in a similar defense of Abū Ḥanīfa and the Ḥanafī school against charges of indifference toward Ḥadīth. I also argue that the Deobandīs’ approach toward Ḥadīth and Ḥanafī fiqh is a detailed and somewhat altered application of the ideas Walī Allāh had held earlier in his craeer, namely, selective appropriation of Ḥanafī jurists’ work to bring forward those opinions from within the school that were closer to Ḥadīth, and therefore, to the Prophet sunna (practice).

vi

Introduction1

Background The largest concentration of Muslims today is found in South Asia, approximately 500 million, out of a global total of about 1.5 billion.2 The majority of South Asian Muslims are Sunnīs and the dominant school of thought among them is the Ḥanafī school.3 Within South Asian Ḥanafīs, two sub-schools dominate. These are the Barelvīs and the Deobandīs. While both groups have been relatively under-studied in modern scholarship, in the past decade or so, Deobandīs have been receiving increasing attention. This is not only because of geopolitical reasons (Islamic militancy in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir); Deobandīs are also the most influential intellectual group from among the Sunnī ʿulamā (traditional Islamic scholars) of South Asia, whose reach and impact goes far beyond South Asia.4 There is a network of Deobandī madrasas (traditional Islamic schools/colleges) that is spread throughout South Asia as well as in Southern Africa, South East Asia, Europe, and North America.

1

Transliteration: All Arabic words, as well as those common to Urdu and Arabic, are transliterated using the IJMES guidelines for transliterating Arabic. Words specific to Urdu are transliterated phonetically. Proper names of South Asian persons that may be Arabic in origin are transliterated in Arabic where possible. Hence, Walī Allāh. If there is a clear difference in pronunciation, then they are transliterated phonetically. Thus Fazlur Rahmān and not Faḍl alRaḥmān, Ahl-e-Hadīs and not Ahl al-Ḥadīth. “The Future of the Global Muslim Population,” Pew Research Forum, http://features.pewforum.org/muslimpopulation/?sort=Pop2010 (accessed February 2, 2014). 2

The Ḥanafī school is one of four main contemporary Sunnī schools, others being Mālikī, Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī. School is the English translation of the Arabic term madhhab, which literally means “way.” As a technical term, it may refer to the doctrine of any school of thought, be it in theology, Sufism, grammar, or law. With respect to law, it may refer to a body of opinions/doctrine of a collection of jurists who follow the principles or methods propounded by a scholar whom they consider to be the founder of their school (Imām). For the various definitions and usages of madhhab, see Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law: 9th-10th Centuries C.E. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), xiii-xvii. Also see Bernard Weiss, “The Madhhab in Islamic Legal Theory,” in The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and Progress, ed. Peri Bearman, Rudolph Peters and Frank Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 2005), 1-9. 3

Francis Robinson describes the Deobandī movement as the “most constructive and most important Islamic movement of the past century.” See Francis Robinson, Islam and Muslim History in South Asia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 255. 4

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The Deobandī movement arose in the middle of the nineteenth century as a Sunnī reformist movement. Its intellectual origins can be traced almost a century earlier to Shāh Walī Allāh (d. 1762) of Delhi.5 Walī Allāh was an erudite scholar who sought to “reform” Muslim thought and practice, both popular and scholarly, in a comprehensive manner. The foundation of his reform effort was his call for Muslims to forge closer links to the two bases of their religion, viz. the Qur’ān and the sunna (the example or way of the Prophet Muḥammad). This, at times, conflicted with the authority of established schools of law, prominent among them the Ḥanafī school, which dominated the Muslim India of his time. It seems Walī Allāh himself underwent some evolution in his thought over the course of his career. According to one modern scholar, in the early part of his life, he had sought to revise Ḥanafī law by selectively appropriating those opinions which were closer to Ḥadīth (Prophetic reports).6 Later, he moved to a larger project, namely reconciling all four Sunnī schools with Ḥadīth.7 This evolution, whose chronology cannot always be traced, has lent a certain degree of ambiguity to Walī Allāh’s thought and was the cause of the later split of Walī Allāh’s followers into two camps, the Deobandīs and Ahl-e-Hadīs.8 The former subscribed to Walī Allah’s views For a detailed study of Walī Allāh’s life and work, see Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, Shāh Walī Allāh and His Times (Canberra, Australia: Maʿrifat Publishing, 1980). For a review of Walī Allāh’s religious thought, see J.M.S. Baljon, Religion and Thought of Shāh Walī Allāh Dihlawī 1703-1762 (Leiden: Brill, 1986). For a brief overview of the links between Walī Allāh and the Deobandīs and other reform movements of the nineteenth century, see Francis Robinson “Islamic Reform and Modernities in South Asia,” in Islamic Reform in South Asia, ed. Filippo Osella and Caroline Osella (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 26-49. 5

The word ḥadīth means a saying that includes practice, opinion or silent confirmation ascribed to Prophet Muḥammad. In this paper, when I use it with a small ḥ, it will refer to a single Prophetic tradition. Its plural will be ḥadīths. I will use Ḥadīth with a capital H to refer to ḥadīths in general. 6

Miʿrāj Muḥammad, “Shāh Walī Allāh’s Attempts to Reconcile the Schools of Fiqh” (MA thesis, McGill University, 1968), 3-4. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 7

Deobandīs are named after a town called Deoband, located north of Delhi, where the first madrasa of the movement, later called Dār al-ʿUlūm, was established in 1866. Ahl-e-Hadīs is the Urdu version of ahl al-ḥadīth, which means “people who follow Prophetic reports.” The Ahl-e-Hadīs call themselves such since they consider themselves to be the true intellectual descendants of the ahl al-ḥadīth of early Islamic history. See Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Mīr Siālkotī, Tārīkh Ahl-e-Hadīs (Lahore: Islamic Publishing Co. 1970). An excellent overview of the 8

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of close connection of Muslims to the Qur’ān and the Sunna but tempered it with their strict adherence to the Ḥanafī school. The Ahl-e-Hadīs, on the other hand, took his advice to what they felt was its logical conclusion, and called for reliance solely on the Qur’ān and the sunna and abandonment of strict adherence to legal schools (taqlīd). Perhaps, it is a testament to Walī Allāh’s ambiguous legacy that his self-proclaimed followers, Deobandīs and Ahl-e-Hadīs, still argue over whether he died a Ḥanafī or a ghayr muqallid, i.e. one who does not adhere to any school of law. Since, both Deobandīs and Ahl-e-Hadīs saw themselves as inheritors of Walī Allāh’s reformist legacy, they sought to “cleanse” Muslim society of all those ideas and practices, which they felt were not based on the Qur’ān and the Sunna. While their initial focus was “reform” of popular Muslim ideas and practices, soon their attention turned towards each other. This was because of their diametrically opposed approach to teaching and learning Islam. While the Deobandīs insisted on adherence to the Ḥanafī school as the proper means for following the Qur’ān and the Sunna, the Ahl-e-Hadīs saw this as tantamount to abandoning the Qur’ān and the Sunna. Some of them even went to the extent of declaring it to be polytheism. The second issue that the two sides argued over was the role that Ḥadīth played in Ḥanafī jurisprudence. According to some Ahl-e-Hadīs, the Ḥanafī school favored rational speculation over Ḥadīth. Moreover, some among them also accused Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767), the eponymous founder of the Ḥanafī School, of being ignorant of Ḥadīth.9

Ḥanafī vs. Ahl-e-Hadīs divide in the nineteenth century in Urdu is ʿUbayd Allāh Sindhī, Shāh Walī Allāh kī siyāsī teḥrīk, ed. Muḥammad Sarwar (Lahore, Sindh Sāgar Academy, 2002). A more scholarly overview in Urdu is given in Mauj-e-Kausar by S.M. Ikram. See Shaykh Muḥammad Ikrām, Mauj-e-Kausar (Lahore: Idāra saqāfat-e-islāmia, 1979), 13-72. In English, Metcalf’s famous work on the Deobandī movement provides a good overview of the particular historical circumstances in which Deobandīs and Ahl-e-Hadīs emerged as distinct movements. See Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 46-86 & 264-297. 9

For examples of Ahl-e-Hadīs “charges” against Ḥanafīs, see Metcalf, Islamic Revival, 152, 212-213, 265, 270-271. 3

Problem Statement Modern scholars tend to agree that Walī Allāh’s reform effort encompassed multiple areas of Islamic thought and practice, and was quite comprehensive in its scope. They also agree that his work has provided the foundation for virtually every major Sunnī movement in India (modern South Asia) since the early nineteenth century.10 His emphasis on Sunna and ambiguous attitude toward the use of Ḥadīth in legal reasoning affected both Deobandīs and the Ahl-e-Hadīs. While this much has been acknowledged by scholars, the exact contours of this effect in the case of Deobandīs have not been documented. In this thesis, I seek to do just that. I begin by examining the immediate historical causes for the emergence of the Ahl-eHadīs vs. Ḥanafīs binary. Then, I explore the ways, theoretical/intellectual and practical, in which Deobandīs sought to defend the Ḥanafī school and Abū Ḥanīfa. Thus, I examine the particularly Deobandī articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory, which attempted to explain the “proper” position of Ḥadīth in it. This articulation also had a bearing on the Deobandī defense of Abū Ḥanīfa. The latter had been accused by his opponents, during his own time and later, that he was not a reliable transmitter of ḥadīths. Deobandīs used their discussions of legal theory coupled with historical testimonies of Abū Ḥanīfa’s contemporaries to demonstrate that Abū Hanīfa and other prominent Ḥanafīs were reliable transmitters of ḥadīths, were well versed in the Ḥadīth literature and used it as a source of legal reasoning. An important part of my examination of Deobandī defense of the Ḥanafī school and Abū Ḥanīfa is to identify the sources used by Deobandīs to make these claims, to see how they use Hanafī and non-Ḥanafī works as primary and secondary evidences. Identification and classification of the sources will also help to clarify 10

John Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 58. Aziz Ahmad has provided a detailed account of how Walī Allāh’s thought came to affect every major Muslim movement in India after him, including the traditionalist reform movements of the nineteenth century, viz. the Ahle-Hadīs and the Deobandīs. See Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 103-122. For further details on this link, see Metcalf, Islamic Revival, 3-86. 4

whether the Deobandīs’ arguments for defense of their school were completely novel or whether they were linked in some way to earlier debates in South Asia and elsewhere. Lastly, to complete the picture, I also examine the curriculum and pedagogy that the Deobandīs adopted in their madrasas to disseminate these arguments. It is a central argument of this thesis that the Deobandī articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīth was meant not so much to derive legal rulings but to create a space in which Ḥanafī Ḥadīth proofs could be considered “acceptable” by their opponents. It is also my contention that Deobandīs’ efforts at defending Abū Ḥanīfa and the Ḥanafī school in the face of charges of indifference towards Ḥadīth was not an isolated event. There were other Ḥanafīs engaged in a similar effort in South Asia and beyond during the same period as well as before it. An important earlier figure in this regard is ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Dehlawī (d. 1642). Just as in the nineteenth century, debates between those scholars who disliked taqlīd and those who insisted on following the Ḥanafī school had flared up in seventeenth century North India. In this climate, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq sought to defend the Ḥanafī school by writing commentaries on the one Ḥadīth collection that was prevalent in India at that time, namely, Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ. He sought to demonstrate the conformity of Ḥanafī fiqh (jurisprudence) to the Prophetic sunna using evidences from within Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ and from other Ḥadīth collections. The difference between him and Deobandīs is that the former had focused mainly on just one text, Mishkāt almaṣābīḥ, while the Deobandīs prepared commentaries on most major Ḥadīth collections, and also prepared newer collections. Moreover, the Deobandīs created a network of madrasas that has helped popularize and perpetuate their ideas. Furthermore, as I discuss in the second chapter, Deobandīs were not alone in their defense of the Ḥanafī school in the modern period. Prominent

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among these fellow defenders were ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī (d. 1886) from Lucknow, India and Zāhid al-Kawtharī (d. 1951) from Egypt. It is also my contention that Deobandīs’ approach towards Ḥadīth and Ḥanafī fiqh is a detailed and somewhat altered application of the ideas Walī Allāh had held earlier in his career, namely selective appropriation of the Ḥanafī jurists’ work to bring forward those opinions from within the school that were closer to Ḥadīth, and therefore, to the Prophetic sunna.11 While Walī Allāh had considered this to be a part of his larger reform effort to bring scholarly and popular Muslim thought and practice closer to the Qur’ān and the Sunna, the Deobandīs did not think so. Their reform efforts focused mainly on reforming popular thought and practice to bring them closer to the Qur’ān and the sunna as interpreted by the Ḥanafī school. Moreover, whatever work they did with respect to Ḥanafī fiqh’s relationship with Ḥadīth, they presented it as being nothing new; rather, a re-statement of the same old authentic Ḥanafī fiqh.

Literature Review Among those who have written extensively about Deobandīs, certain names stand out, such as Barbara Metcalf, Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Dietrich Reetz, and Yoginder Sikand. While they have all dealt with different aspects of the broader Deobandī movement, no one has directly engaged with the subject of this thesis. There is extensive literature on Deobandī madrasas but the themes under study are quite often conservative traditionalism vs. modernism, Islamism vs. apolitical Islamic activism, construction of authority, and so on. The closest that a work gets to dealing with Deobandī articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory is Zaman’s influential work The Ulama in Contemporary Islam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). The second

This is, of course, based on the chronology of the evolution in Walī Allāh’s thought as put forward by Miʿrāj Muḥammad, as cited above in f.n. 6. 11

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chapter titled “Constructions of Authority” discusses a number of Deobandī Ḥadīth commentaries, such as Iʿlā’ al-sunan, Lāmiʿ al-darārī ʿalā Jāmiʿ al-Bukhārī, and Fayḍ al-Bārī ʿalā Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. Unlike other works by him and others that mentioned Deobandī engagement with Ḥadīth, this work is the only one where contents of these works are actually engaged with. However, as the title of the chapter suggests, Zaman’s purpose is to examine how these works served to construct authority. Furthermore, because of limited space, he only engages with a few sections of each that relate to contemporary political issues as a way to highlight how tradition is created and preserved, and how authority is constructed. Thus, he discusses how the author of Iʿlā’ al-sunan, Ẓafar Aḥmad ʿUthmānī (d. 1973), uses commentary on a single ḥadīth to argue against the idea of “united nationalism” and in favor of the “twonation theory.”12 However, the author stops short of engaging broadly with the Deobandī articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīṭh. With respect to Ḥanafi legal theory in general, a number of modern works have dealt with various aspects of it. Among these is Mohammad Hashim Kamali’s Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 2006), which provides an overview of Islamic legal theory, including Ḥanafī perspectives. Although highly detailed and technical, it does not deal with the position of Ḥadīth in Hanafī legal theory. A similar limited view of Ḥanafī legal theory is to be found in Imran Ahsan Nyazee’s Islamic Jurisprudence: Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 2000). Wael Hallaq’s A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,

12

Among the Muslims of British India, two main political ideas held sway in the decade prior to the 1947 partition. One of these, called “united nationalism,” argued that nations are formed by territories, and thus all people living in India, Muslims and Hindus, are one nation. They should work together to evict the British and not fight among themselves. The other idea called “two-nation theory” argued that Muslims were a distinct nation by virtue of their religion. Hindus and the British were equally their enemies, and Muslims must work independently to safeguard their rights vis-à-vis Hindus when the British finally leave India. For more on this, see Jamal Malik, Islam in South Asia: A Short History (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 319-345. 7

1999) is more detailed in its treatment of Ḥanafī legal theory but has a limited discussion of Ḥadīth’s position in it. Deobandī articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory is conspicuous by its absence. In the field of Ḥadīth studies, Deobandī attitudes toward Ḥadīth are again understudied. Hashim Kamali’s A Textbook of Hadith Studies: Authenticity, Compilation, Classification and Criticism of Hadith (Markfield, UK: Islamic Foundation, 2005) and Jonathan Brown’s Ḥadith: Muhammad’s Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publications, 2009) are more narrowly focused on sources and reliability of Ḥadīth and include distinctions between various schools regarding their attitudes towards Ḥadīth. However, they do not discuss the Deobandī articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory. Among modern works on Ḥadīth, the only reference to Deobandīs that I could locate was a brief paragraph in Jonathan Brown’s “Even If It’s Not True It’s True: Using Unreliable Ḥadīths in Sunni Islam” (Islamic Law and Society 18 (2011):1-52). Brown mentions ʿUthmānī’s Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth as embodying “the permissive Sunni stance” with respect to the use of weak ḥadīths. According to Brown, ʿUthmānī’s argument for the unconditional use of weak ḥadīths was part of a larger argument that the Ḥanafī school has always heeded ḥadīths.13 However, beyond this brief mention, he has nothing else to say about the Deobandīs.

Jonathan Brown, “Even If It’s Not True It’s True: Using Unreliable Ḥadīths in Sunni Islam,” Islamic Law and Society 18 (2011):1-52. 13

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Sources and Methodology I seek to explore the Deobandī defense of the Ḥanafī school by engaging in textual analysis of relevant works by Deobandīs.14 In response to Ahl-e-Hadīs charges, Deobandis sought to prepare commentaries on major Ḥadīth works to show that Ḥanafī fiqh opinions could be demonstrated to be not in conflict with the ḥadīths in these collections. In this regard, they prepared commentaries and marginalia on the Ṣiḥāḥ Sitta (the six major Sunnī collections of Ḥadīth viz. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī of Abū ʿAbdillāh al-Bukhārī (d. 870), Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim of Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj (d. 875), Jāmiʿ al-Tirmidhī of Abū ʿĪsā al-Tirmidhī (d. 892), Sunan Abī Dāwūd of Abū Dāwūd al-Sijistānī (d. 888), Sunan al-Nasā’ī of Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Nasā’ī (d. 915), and Sunan Ibn Majah of Abū ʿAbdillāh ibn Mājah (d. 887)), as well as the Muwaṭṭā of Mālik ibn Anas (d. 795), and Sharḥ maʿāni al-āthār of Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 933). It should also be noted that some of these “commentaries” were actually lecture notes that were later compiled by students. The introductions in all of these commentaries deal with the history of codification of Ḥadīth, development of Ḥadīth sciences, and so on. However, because these authors are Ḥanafī, they usually use this opportunity to establish the credentials of their Imām (the eponymous founder), Abū Ḥanīfa. They also seek to prove the validity of the Ḥanafī school and that it is grounded in Ḥadīth. In addition to Ḥadīth works, Deobandī authors have also written biographical works dedicated to Abū Ḥanīfa, many of which are in Urdu while some are in Arabic. Almost always these include a section on his qualifications as a Ḥadīth expert and his standing as a jurist. In addition to these, there are polemical works dedicated to refuting Ahl-eHadīs charges that the Ḥanafī School is not grounded in Ḥadīth. Deobandī Ḥadīth works can be seen as polemical as well since refuting Ahl-e-Hadīs charges is the underlying theme. However, For a detailed list of scholarly works by Deobandī scholars including those related to Ḥadīth, see “Dawr ʿulamā’ Deoband fī majāl al-tā’līf,” Dār al-ʿUlūm Deoband, http://www.darululoomdeoband.com/arabic/magazine/tmp/1326796357fix4sub2file.htm (accessed September 10, 2013). 14

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since they do not directly engage in a polemical debate with the Ahl-e-Hadīs; therefore, I call them non-polemical works. For the purpose of this thesis, my particular focus will be on the non-polemical Deobandī works. One work among these stands out. This is the 22-volume collection of ḥadīths titled Iʿlā’ al-sunan [Elevation of Sunnas] prepared by Ẓafar Aḥmad ʿUthmānī under the order and supervision of ʿUthmānī’s spiritual mentor (Sufi shaykh) and uncle Ashraf ʿAlī Thānvī (d. 1943), himself a very prominent Deobandī scholar. The work is organized according to fiqh chapters and provides Ḥadīth proofs for most Ḥanafī opinions. It also has three introductions (muqaddima), each spanning a separate volume. The first one titled Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth [Principles of Ḥadīth Sciences] is a detailed exposition of the Ḥanafī principles of Ḥadīthcriticism as Deobandīs understood them. This work will serve as the main source for this thesis’ second chapter. The second introduction titled Fawā’id fī ʿulūm al-fiqh [Notes on Fiqh Sciences] was written by ʿUthmānī’s colleague Ḥabīb Aḥmad Kīrānwī (d. unknown). It is a detailed refutation of those who seek to negate the validity of taqlīd. As such it is beyond the scope of this thesis. The third introduction titled Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn [Abū Ḥanīfa and His Muḥaddith Companions] is a comprehensive defense of Abū Ḥanīfa and his companions’ knowledge and attitude towards Ḥadīth. As such, it will serve as the main source for this thesis’ third chapter. While there are many other works written by Deobandīs on these subjects, I have chosen these two introductions as representative of Deobandī ideas because they themselves see these as prestigious and representative of their school.15

15

Personal interaction with various Deobandī scholars. 10

Organization of the Study The Introduction introduces the topic, the problem statement, literature review, my sources, an outline of the thesis, and my methodology in research. The first chapter provides historical background to the topic. It begins by providing a brief overview of the intellectual climate of Muslim North India during and immediately preceding Walī Allāh’s time, followed by a discussion of Walī Allāh’s overall intellectual project with a particular reference to his opinions regarding the relationship between Ḥadīth and fiqh. It argues that the ambiguity in Walī Allāh’s thought with respect to Ḥadīth and fiqh allowed his self-proclaimed followers to crystallize as two distinct groups, namely Ahl-e-Hadīs and Deobandīs. Moreover, the Deobandīs were put on the defensive vis-à-vis Ahl-e-Hadīs because of the intellectual environment created by Walī Allāh and his successors in which a Sunnī could not be seen to be in opposition to Ḥadīth. The second and third chapters document in detail the Deobandī non-polemical intellectual responses to Ahl-e-Hadīs charges. Thus, the second chapter discusses the Deoabandī articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory. The starting point for Deobandīs is that principles of Ḥadīthcriticism are speculative and differed upon among Ḥadīth scholars. Thus, one scholar may declare a ḥadīth to be sound (ṣaḥīḥ) or fair (ḥasan) while another may consider it to be weak (ḍaʿīf) and vice versa. Moreover, while Ḥanafīs share majority of terms and principles with the generality of Ḥadīth scholars, they disagree in some places. A prominent example of this is their particular attitude towards discreditation (jarḥ) of narrators and acceptance of a suspended report (mursal). In the case of the former, Ḥanafīs vigorously reject discreditation of narrators unless it is supported with detailed description of that discreditation so that a muḥaddith can decide whether the discreditation is acceptable or not. Similarly, they are more accepting of suspended reports than other Ḥadīth scholars.

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The third chapter details Deobandīs’ arguments that Abū Ḥanīfa and his companions were well-versed in Ḥadīth. The Deobandīs sought to demonstrate that Abū Ḥanīfa was a follower (tābiʿī, someone who had seen a companion of the Prophet), 16 and was an absolute mujtahid, i.e. someone who is able to carry out ijtihād (independent reasoning) at the highest level.17 For Deobandīs, being a follower not only meant greater prestige for Abū Ḥanīfa, it also implied that he had better access to the companions and through them to the Prophetic reports (Ḥadīth). Moreover, being an absolute mujathid implied that Abū Ḥanīfa had good command of Ḥadīth because ijtihād of this order is not possible unless the mujtahid is well-versed in the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth literature. Beyond these two indirect arguments for Abū Ḥanīfa’s knowledge of Ḥadith, Deobandīs also provided reports from Abū Ḥanīfa’s contemporaries that document his knowledge and command of Ḥadīth. Deobandīs used the same argument, viz. reports from contemporaries to demonstrate Abū Ḥanīfa’s companions’ knowledge of Ḥadīṭh. The companions discussed in this chapter are Abū Yūsuf (d. 798) and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 805). In the fourth chapter, I examine how Deobandīs have sought to spread their school, particularly through establishment of madrasas around the world. I analyze the curriculum and pedagogy adopted in these madrasas, and how they differ from the ones prevalent in eighteenth

In Sunnī thought, great importance is attached to the first three generations of Muslims. These are defined as follows: 1) companion (ṣaḥābī): someone who saw the Prophet Muḥammad while a believer and died as such.; 2) follower/successor (tābiʿī): someone who saw a companion while a believer and died as such; and 3) follower of the follower/successor to the successor (tabʿ tābiʿī): someone who saw a follower while a believer and died as such. 16

Ijtihād literally means to exert oneself to the fullest. As a technical term, it refers to the jurist’s act of exerting himself/herself to the utmost to find God’s command in a given matter when the Qur’an and the sunna do not provide clear guidance. The one who engages in this act is called a mujtahid. For Ḥanafīs, ijtihād has various levels. The highest of these is called itjihād muṭlaq (absolute ijtihād), hence mujtahid muṭlaq (absolute mujtahid). It refers to a jurist’s ability to directly derive rulings from the Qur’ān and the sunna in all matters of law. It also entails his ability to create a methodology/legal thoery (uṣūl al-fiqh) for this derivation. It is mujtahids such as these that give their name to the various schools of law. Examples include Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767), Mālik ibn Anas (d. 795), Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820) and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855). 17

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century north India. I use my personal experience as a student in one such madrasa, Jāmiʿa Ashrafia in Lahore, Pakistan, to help document this. The last chapter concludes the thesis by stating that the Deobandī efforts at “rectifying” the image of the Ḥanafī School seems to be only the latest in a line of Ḥanafī defenses of their school over the centuries. Based on this, I also suggest a future line of inquiry, namely, comparison of Deobandī articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory with that articulated by other Ḥanafī scholars from other eras and regions, to see if there is evolution or divergences in Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīth.

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Chapter 1: The Historical Context

In this chapter, I examine the historical circumstances which led to the emergence of the Ahl-e-Hadīs and Deobandī schools. An important component in this regard is the ambiguous intellectual legacy of Shāh Walī Allāh. Both groups claim him to be their intellectual predecessor. Their claims notwithstanding, this is not a linear link. The circumstances in which he operated were quite different from the circumstances in which Deobandīs and Ahl-e-Hadīs operated, as will be seen shortly. I begin by taking a brief look at the Deobandīs, followed by a discussion of Walī Allāh’s thought and its links with the modern Deobandī movement. In the process, I will also explore the reasons for the emergence of Ahl-e-Hadīs, whose polemical attacks against the Ḥanafīs precipitated the Deobandīs’ response that is the subject of this study.

1.1: The Deobandīs As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Deobandī movement arose in the middle of the nineteenth century as a Sunnī reform movement. The movement is named after Deoband, a midsized town located north of Delhi, where a madrasa, later called Dār al-ʿUlūm, was set up in 1866. The main founder of Dār al-ʿUlūm was Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim Nānautvī (d. 1880). Nānautvī envisioned a chain of similar madrasas spread all over India to serve the religious educational needs of the Muslims of India. Within months, he was laying the foundations of other madrasas in Saharanpur, Moradabad, Amroha, Delhi, and other cities and towns. However, amongst all these, the madrasa at Deoband occupied a unique position. It was the first and had the most prominent scholars associated with it. Soon, all those scholars who were associated with these madrasas came to be known as Deobandīs. These ʿulamā did not choose this name for

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themselves and were at pains to explain that they were not a new sect but the same old ahl alsunna wa al-jamāʿa (people of the Prophetic way and the community, Sunnīs for short).18 However, the name stuck and after some time, these ʿulamā also tacitly accepted it as indicating their particular approach to Islam within the overall framework of ahl al-sunna wa al-jamāʿa. In terms of their intellectual/scholarly orientation, Qārī Muḥammad Tayyib (d. 1983), the former rector (muhtamim) of Dār al-ʿUlūm described it as follows: [The term] “ʿulamā of Deoband” does not only refer to the people who are based in the Dār al-ʿUlūm at Deoband for teaching, giving legal opinions, preaching, writing, or for some other purposes. Rather, it refers to all those ʿulamā whose mental outlook and thought is connected to the thought of Mujaddid Alf-e-Sānī Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī and that of Imām Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi… All the ʿulamā of the hundreds of madrasas in the (various) districts of India are Deobandī.19 It is important to note here that Ṭayyib has clearly identified Deobandīs with Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1624) and Shāh Walī Allāh, both of whom are major Sunnī reformers of the Mughal period.20 Thus, Deobandīs consider themselves to belong to a chain of reformers that extends down from Sirhindī to Walī Allāh and through his ideological descendants to the early leaders of the Deobandī movement.21 This tradition represents the reformist streak within the Sunnīs of Thus, Qārī Muḥammad Ṭayyib (d. 1983), the grandson of Muḥammad Qāsim Nānautvī, and the former rector (muhtamim) of Dār al-ʿUlūm Deoband defined Deobandīs as follows: “As far as their religious orientation and particular outlook is concerned, the ʿulamā of Deoband are fully ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamāʿa. This is not a new sect nor is it a group with new set of beliefs, which time and circumstances may have created.” See Qārī Muḥammad Ṭayyib, ʿUlamā Deoband kā dīnī rukh aur maslakī mizāj (Lahore: Idāra-e-islamiāt, 1988), 23. 18

19

Tayyib, ʿUlamā Deoband, 22.

Sirhindī was called Mujaddid Alf-e-Sānī (renewer of the second millennium) by his followers, and is seen by them as ushering in a new era in South Asian Islam, one whose effects can still be felt. For more on that, see Yohanan Friedmann, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi: An Outline of His Thought and a Study of His Image in the Eyes of Posterity (Montreal: McGill-Queen University Press, 1971). 20

The links between the Deobandī movement and Walī Allāh are well documented in modern scholarship. Moreover, most scholars of South Asian Islam agree that the Deobandīs and the Ahl-e-Ḥadīth are the intellectual descendants of Walī Allāh. This includes all the modern scholars that I have consulted so far. See, for example, Nehemiah Levitzion and John Voll, eds., Eighteenth-Century Revival and Reform in Islam (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 19. Also, see Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change, 113. 21

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South Asia. While Sirhindī’s intellectual work is not relevant to this study since he did not engage with the position of Ḥadīth vis-à-vis Ḥanafī legal theory, Walī Allāh’s thought and intellectual legacy is, and it is to him that we now turn.

1.2: Shāh Walī Allāh and His Legacy Born in 1701 in Delhi, Walī Allāh grew up in a household known for its religious achievements. He completed the then prevalent curriculum of education, in both traditional (manqūlāt) and rational sciences (maʿqūlāt) by the age of 17. After his father’s death, he succeeded him as the principal of Madrasat Raḥīmiyya, which his father had founded in Delhi. Here, he taught for more than ten years until he decided to go for the annual pilgrimage to Makka in 1731. He spent 14 months in the Ḥijāz, performed the pilgrimage twice and studied with the scholars of Makka and Madina. In Madina, he furthered his Ḥadīth studies with the foremost Ḥadīth scholar of that city Muḥammad Abū Ṭāhir al-Kūrānī al-Kurdī al-Madanī (d. 1733).22 After having spent fourteen months in the Ḥijāz, Walī Allāh returned to Delhi and re-started teaching at Madrasat Raḥīmiyya. Although trained in the Ḥanafī school, Walī Allāh came to be convinced of the superiority of Ḥadīth over fiqh. Some writers have taken the view that this happened only after his visit to the Ḥijāz.23 According to Miʿrāj Muḥammad, that is not the case. Rather, during the course of his early training, he had developed this conviction under the influence of his father ʿAbd al-Raḥīm and his other prominent teacher Afzal Siālkotī (d. 1750). In fact, he had It would be useful to note here that Abū Ṭāhir’s father Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī al-Kurdī (d. 1689), who was an erudite scholar himself, has been described as “SalafÊ in matters of creed” and someone who “used to defend Ibn Taymiyya while also making allowance for the Sufis whose statements could be taken to mean incarnation and physical union with God.” See Sayyid Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī Nadvī, Tārīkh-e-daʿwat-o-ʿazīmat (Karachi: Majlis nashriāt-e-Islām, n.d.), 5:111-112. 22

23

Notably Zāhid al-Kawtharī in his Ḥusn al-taqāḍī, as cited in Miʿrāj Muḥammad, 96. 16

developed strong anti-taqlīd tendencies during the period before his visit to the Ḥijāz. During this period, he studied major works of the four Sunnī schools of law, along with their evidences. As a result of the “discrepancies” he found between the rulings of these schools and Ḥadīth texts, he began to oppose taqlīd. During this period, he openly attacked Ḥanafī scholars for their lack of attention to Ḥadīth, and suffered because of that. It was only after his visit to the Ḥijāz that he decided to tone down his rhetoric. Most of his works were composed after his return from the Ḥijāz, including his magnum opus Ḥujjat Allāh al-bāligha [The Conclusive Argument from God]. During this time, he trained a number of students, most prominent among them his eldest son Shāh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (d. 1823).

1.2.1: WalÊ AllÉh as a Renewer (Mujaddid)24 Most Sunnī groups in South Asia regard Walī Allāh as the renewer (mujaddid) of the twelfth Islamic century who initiated an intellectual movement for a comprehensive reform of Muslim thought and practice.25 According to Voll, Walī Allāh was not primarily concerned with the challenges coming from the modernizing West; rather, “his reformism arose out of the interactions between the changing local conditions.”26 Thus, he felt that the general decline of Mujaddid is the active participle from the verbal noun tajdīd (renewal). The theological basis for tajdīd in Sunnī thought is the ḥadith narrated by Abū Dāwūd in his Sunan, “Every hundred years, Allah will send for this nation someone who will renew for it, its religion.” See Abū Dāwūd al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, ed. Muḥammad Muḥy al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd (Beirut: Dār iḥyā’ al-turāth al-ʿarabī, n.d.), 4:109. The premise behind this ḥadīth is that while decay is an intrinsic characteristic of human society, the Islamic umma is different in that a core group of people will always carry the “true” message. Thus, when the larger Muslim society gets “corrupted,” someone from this group will rise to reform (iṣlāḥ) Muslim thought and practice and hence, renew the religion for the umma. For a brief overview of the two Sunnī concepts of tajdīd and iṣlāḥ, see John Voll, “Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah,” in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. John Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 3247. 24

ʿAmīd al-Zamān Qāsmī Kīrānvī, “Shāh Walī Allāh kī tajdīdī khidmāt: chand pehlū,” in Imām Shāh Walī AllÉh aur un kay afkār aur naẓariāt, ed. ʿAṭā al-Raḥmān Qāsmī, (Lahore: Maktaba Khalīl, 2005), 90. 25

26

Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change, 58. It should be noted here that while British colonialism was already making its mark on coastal regions of India during this period, the north-central region had not been directly impacted by the British. 17

Muslim fortunes in India was as much a result of political divisions as of intellectual/scholarly divisions and conflicts. The latter included the rivalry between various schools of thought and between those who followed a school vs. those who did not follow any school (the latter can be considered the forerunners of the group that later came to be called Ahl-e-Hadīs).27 In this environment, Walī Allāh attempted an integration (taṭbīq) of the entire Islamic intellectual system, something which according to Fazlur Rahman, was unprecedented in the entire history of traditional Islam.28 Walī Allāh’s reform efforts, thus, spanned the whole spectrum of Islamic faith and practice beginning with matters of creed especially tawḥīd (oneness of Allah), and extending to the Qur’ān, Ḥadīth, fiqh, political theory, economic reform, etc.29 Walī Allāh’s massive reform project was two-pronged. One was the establishment of the outward khilāfa (the political dimension); the other was the establishment and renewal of internal khilāfa (the social, spiritual and intellectual dimension).30 With respect to the latter, Walī Allāh focused on revitalizing the concepts of tawḥīd (oneness of God) and sunna in the lives of Muslims. This meant forging a closer connection between the ordinary Muslim and Qur’ān and Ḥadīth.

To better understand the environment in which Walī Allāh was operating, it will be helpful to take an overview of the then prevalent intellectual currents in India. A useful resource is Miʿrāj Muḥammad, “Shāh Walī Allāh’s Attempts,” 1-36. In Urdu, useful overviews can be found in ʿAlī Nadvī, Tazkira Hazrat Shāh Walī Allāh Dehlavī, 135-140; Shaykh Muḥammad Ikrām, Rūd-e-Kausar, 528-534 & 551-567; and Sayyid Muḥammad Miān, ʿUlamā Hind kā shāndār māzī (Karachi: Maktaba Rashīdia, n.d.), 2:1-6. 27

28

Fazlur Rahman, “The Thinker of Crisis: Shah Waliy-Ullah,” in Pakistan Quarterly 6, no. 2 (1956): 44.

Voll describes Walī Allāh as a prime example of the particular approach to Islamic revivalism as it appeared in the eighteenth century, with its emphasis on bringing together Ḥadīth and neo-Sufism. For more on that, see Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change, 29-30. 29

30

Daniel Brown, Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 23. Also see Kīrānvī, “Shāh Walī Allāh kī tajdīdī khidmāt,” 93.

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1.2.2: Walī Allāh and Ḥadīth & Fiqh With respect to the study of Ḥadīth in South Asia, the dominant view among South Asian Sunnīs for the past century has been that until Walī Allāh popularized it in the eighteenth century, Ḥadīth had a marginal place in South Asian intellectual/academic circles.31 This view has been challenged quite strongly by the likes of Manāẓir Aḥsan Gīlānī (d. 1956) in his Pāk-o-Hind main Musalmānon kā Niẓām-e-Taʿlīm-o-Tarbiyyat [The Muslim Educational System in Indo-Pak Subcontinent]. Nevertheless, the former view has remained dominant. This has to do with two factors. One is the towering personality of Walī Allāh himself whose contributions to Islamic thought overshadowed those of his predecessors in South Asia because of their comprehensiveness. The other reason is that his self-styled followers sought to present him as the mujaddid par excellence who “brought light to the darkness” that was Muslim India (modern South Asia) of the time. The prolific literary output of these followers/supporters shaped the narrative in a way that extolled Walī Allāh at the expense of those before him. When it comes to Walī Allāh and Ḥadīth, modern scholars tend to have the same opinion as the one dominant among South Asian Sunnīs. To be sure, some of them have questioned certain views about Aḥmad Sirhindī, an important predecessor of Walī Allāh’s, whose modernday Sunnī supporters extol him for his political activism much the same way as they extol Walī Allāh for his political activism and contributions to Islamic scholarship, including Ḥadīth. Thus, Yohanan Friedmann has argued that Sirhindī did not have a robust political agenda. He comes across as a political player because of the interpretations of his later followers, which skew our

31

Shaykh Muḥammad Ikrām, Rūd-e-Kausar (Lahore: Idara saqāfat-e-islāmia, 1984), 556-557.

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understanding of his overall thought.32 One could apply the same general reasoning to the case of Walī Allāh’s contributions to the study of Ḥadīth in South Asia. Thus, according to Miʿrāj Muḥammad, Walī Allāh was not the first one to popularize Ḥadīth in North India.33 In fact, during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, Gujarat in western India had emerged as a major center of Ḥadīth scholarship. Gradually, links began to develop between the ʿulamā based in northern India and those in Gujarat and the Ḥijāz. As interest in Hadīth increased among the ʿulamā of northern India, more and more Ḥanafīs began to feel threatened by the popularization of Ḥadīth literature, which seemed to negate many aspects of Ḥanafī fiqh. Gradually, two opposite tendencies emerged. One tendency was a growing emphasis on sunna and Hadīth, and disinclination to follow any school of law. The other was to defend the Ḥanafī School by showing it to be in conformity with the Ḥadīth texts. A notable effort in this vein was made by the Naqshbandī Sufi scholar ʿAbd al-Haqq al-Dehlawī (d. 1642).34 Realizing the tension between Ḥadīth texts and Ḥanafī fiqh, he sought to remedy it by writing a commentary on Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ of al-Khaṭīb alTabrīzī (d. 1340 or 1341), which was the main Ḥadīth text used in India at that time. In this Persian commentary titled Ashiʿʿat al-Lamaʿāt, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq tried to support Ḥanafī fiqh rulings by using ḥadīths found in other Ḥadīth collections as evidences. As Miʿrāj Muḥammad has pointed out, these efforts did not succeed in bridging the divide that had developed between strict adherents of the Ḥanafī school and those scholars who were demanding strict adherence to the Qur’ān and Hadīth only and abandonment of schools of

32

This is the main argument in Friedmann’s previously cited Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī.

33

Miʿrāj Muḥammad, “Shāh Walī Allāh’s Attempts,” 15-18.

For a brief overview of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s life and work, see Scott Kugle, “ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq, An Accidental Revivalist: Knowledge and Power in the Passage from Delhi to Makka,” in Journal of Islamic Studies 19, no. 2 (2008): 196246. 34

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fiqh. That task it seems fell to Walī Allāh. His solution was to undertake a review of Ḥanafi fiqh. An important element of this review process was to selectively appropriate those opinions of the early Ḥanafi scholars (Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, and Muḥammad al-Shaybānī) which appeared to be closest to Ḥadīth texts. Moreover, in those matters in which these three scholars had been silent, Walī Allāh proposed that the opinions of those later Ḥanafī scholars should be preferred who were well versed in Ḥadīth as opposed to those who were not.35 While this may have been Walī Allāh’s plan, he seems to have abandoned it for a more ambitious project, namely integration/harmonization (taṭbīq) between the four Sunnī schools of fiqh and Ḥadīth. His magnum opus Ḥujjat Allāh al-bāligha bears testimony to that. Furthermore, his two commentaries on Mālik’s Muwaṭṭā, al-Musawwā [The Straightened] (in Arabic) and al-Muṣaffā [The Purified] (in Persian) are also an example of such an endeavor. In these works, he makes use of the opinions of not just the four living Sunnī schools but also of extinct Sunnī schools. His main focus, however, remained the Ḥanafī and the Shāfiʿī schools, the former he had inherited and the second he had learned to respect during the course of his studies.

1.2.3: Walī Allāh’s Ambiguous Legacy As mentioned earlier, Walī Allāh’s thought seems to have evolved over time. However, since we cannot fully trace the chronological development of his thought in his works, his intellectual

Baljon, Religion and Thought of Walī Allāh, 155; and Miʿrāj Muḥammad, “Shāh Walī Allāh’s Attempts,” 104. Zafar Ishaq Ansari has reached a different conclusion. According to him, Walī Allāh’s approach to juristic disagreements was to reject the idea that a jurist should adhere to one school. Moreover, he felt that ordinary Muslims did not need to identify themselves as belonging to a particular school. Rather, they should follow the advice given by muftis (juris-consults). His main sources for reaching this conclusion are Ḥujjat Allāh al-bālighah and al-ʿIqd al-jīd. See Zafar Ishaq Ansari, “Shah Wali Allah and Fiqhi Disagreements” in Iqbal 15, no. 3 (Jan 1967): 44-52. I give more credence to Miʿrāj Muḥammad’s arguments since his research is much more comprehensive and takes into account, as far as is possible, the historical evolution of Walī Allāh’s thought in his various works. 35

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works come across as ambiguous and at times contradictory.36 Thus, in one place, he forcefully argues for abandonment of taqlīd and strict adherence to the Qur’ān and sunna alone, while in another place, he speaks of the virtues of following one school of fiqh.37 It is because of these ambiguities that his legacy remains contested to this day.38 After WalÊ AllÉh’s death, his sons took up the mantle of scholarship left vacant by their father. Among them, Shāh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (d. 1823) was the most prominent and lived the longest. He is credited with spreading his father’s knowledge especially with regards to Ḥadīth throughout South Asia. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz’s contributions notwithstanding, WalÊ AllÉh’s reform movement found its fullest expression in early nineteenth century, when Muslim political power in India had fragmented and weakened considerably. In this climate, Wali Allah’s biological, spiritual and intellectual descendants spearheaded a major reform and revival movement called “Tehrīk-e-Mujāhidīn.” The movement was led by Sayyid Aḥmad of Rae Barelī and Shāh Ismāʿīl, Walī Allāh’s grandson.39 The reformist rhetoric and actions of this movement soon led to a hardening of sectarian positions. In the beginning, it was the Ḥanafī ʿulamā of Badaun and Khayrabad who took issue with the former’s attempts to oppose popular practices. This

36

Miʿrāj Muḥammad, “Shāh Walī Allāh’s Attempts,” 4-9.

37

See, for example, Fuyūḍ al-Ḥaramayn, 319, as cited in Miʿrāj Muḥammad, “Shāh Walī Allāh’s Attempts.”

The main Ahl-e-Hadīs works that paint Walī Allāh as essentially an adherent of the Ahl-e-Hadīs school of thought are as follows: Muḥammad Ismāʿīl Salafī’s Tehrīk-e-āzādī-e-fikr aur Shāh Walī Allāh kī tajdīdī masāʿī [Movement for Freedom of Thought and Shāh Walī Allāh’s Renewal Effort]; Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Mīr Siālkotī’s Tārīkh Ahl-eHadīs [History of the Ahl-e-Hadīs], and Abū Yaḥyā Imām Khān Naushahrvī’s Tarājim ʿulamā-e-Ḥadīs Hind [Biographies of the Ahl-e-Hadīth Scholars of India]. For a representative Deobandī work, see Ṭayyib, ʿUlamā Deoband, 23. 38

For a brief overview of this movement and its leaders, see Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3rd ed., s.v. “Barelwī, Sayyid Ahmad.” The author, Marc Gaborieu has shown the links between Barelwī and Walī Allāh and Sirhindī’s Naqshbandī Mujaddidī Sufi order. 39

22

opposition later on crystallized in the form of the Barelvī movement of Aḥmad Razā Khān of Bareilly.40 After the death of Sayyid Aḥmad and Shāh Ismāʿīl on the battlefield in 1831, their movement split into two factions. The dividing factor was the members’ attitude towards taqlīd. It seems reasonable to assume that diverging tendencies existed within the movement before 1831 as well. However, perhaps because of the charismatic personality of Sayyid Aḥmad, the movement did not split. After the defeat in 1831, because of the absence of a unifying charismatic figure, these diverging tendencies came to the fore.41 Thus, during this period, one group of scholars openly began to attack taqlīd in general and Ḥanafīs in particular. Many among them were also actively teaching Ḥadīth and writing commentaries on Ḥadīth texts, in the process “shaming” Ḥanafīs indirectly by showing them to not be as engaged in Ḥadīth as much as the Ahl-e-Ḥadīs and by not living up to Walī Allāh’s legacy. 42 This camp later called itself Ahl-e-Ḥadīs. In opposition to this camp, the other camp insisted on strict adherence to one school, specifically the Ḥanafī school because it was the dominant school in India at the time. Although this camp shared the former camps’ emphasis on tawḥīd and opposition to bidʿa, their focus on direct access to the Qur’an and sunna was moderated by their adherence to traditional Ḥanafī

40

Bareilly and Rae Bareilly are two separate towns. The former is in the western part of Uttar Pradesh in a region called Rohilkhand inhabited by a large Pashtun Muslim population. The latter is in the central part of the state near the capital Lucknow. Aḥmad Razā Khān Barelvī was from Bareilly while Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī was from Rae Barelī. 41

Ikrām, Mauj-e-Kausar, 29-32.

For a listing of the various works in Ḥadīth and fiqh that appeared during this period at the hands of Ahl-e-Hadīs scholars, see Abū Yaḥyā Imām Khān Noshehrvī, Hindustān main Ahl-e-Hadīs kī ilmī khidmāt (Chichawatnī, Pakistan: Maktaba Nazīria, 1970). For examples of polemical attacks, see Muḥammad Ismāʿīl Salafī, Tehrīk-eĀzādi-e-Fikr aur Shāh Walī Allāh kī tajdīdī masāʿī (Chichawatni, Pakistan: Maktaba Nazīria, 1969). For an example of a Ḥadīth commentary that has anti-Ḥanafī material in it as well, see Shams al-Ḥaqq ʿAẓīmābādī, ʿAwn al-Maʿbūd Sharḥ Sunan Abī Dāwūd (Madina: al-Maktaba al-Salafiyya, 1968). 42

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scholarship. These Ḥanafī scholars later crystallized as the Deobandī jamāʿat (community/group) or jamāʿat ʿulamā-e-Deoband (community of Deobandī scholars). Since both Deobandīs and Ahl-e-Ḥadīs had emerged from the larger Walī Allāhī jamāʿat, they shared the legacy of Walī Allāh’s project to review received fiqh literature to bring it closer to the Qur’ān and the sunna. As Robinson has pointed out, in the case of the Deobandī movement, this review merely meant a shift in emphasis in the madrasa curriculum from theology and philosophy to Qur’an and Hadīth, while in the case of Ahl-e-Hadīs, it meant ignoring the medieval legal legacy and appropriating Qur’an and Ḥadīth directly to engage in ijtihād as and when needed.43 Because of their different emphases, it was natural that the two groups would engage in direct and indirect debates. For the Ahl-e-Hadīs, the Ḥanafīs were guilty of deliberately ignoring Ḥadīth. For Deobandīs and other Ḥanafīs, Ahl-e-Hadīs were guilty of being literalists. Moreover, since the majority of Indian Muslims were Ḥanafīs, Deobandīs felt that Ahl-e-Hadīs efforts at propagating their ideas were a disruptive force that sowed confusion among ordinary Muslims. For many Ahl-e-Hadīs scholars, there was enough information in the works of classical and medieval Ḥadīth scholars, which could be used against the Ḥanafīs. This was because of the historical animosity that many Ḥadīth scholars had had towards Abū Ḥanīfa and his students/followers. During his lifetime, Abū Ḥanīfa himself had been labelled as someone who favored reason (ahl al-ra’y) over Ḥadīth. This attitude has persisted throughout history to varying degrees.44 A typical example is Ta’rīkh Baghdād by the Shāfiʿī scholar al-Khaṭīb alBaghdādī (d. 1071) in which he devotes about hundred and forty pages to discussing various

43

Robinson, “Islamic Reform and Modernities,” 28-29.

44

I will deal with this issue at some length in the next two chapters. 24

reports about Abū Ḥanīfa.45 Of these, about forty pages mention positive reports, while about eighty mention negative reports. Interestingly, al-Baghdādī does not give his assessment of these reports, thus leaving the field open for others to use them as they deem fit. In fact, Ta’rīkh Baghdād has continued to serve as a useful source for those seeking to vilify Abū Ḥanīfa, as well as for those seeking to defend him.

1.3 Deobandī Responses to Ahl-e-Hadīs In the face of Ahl-e-Hadīs’ polemical attacks, Deobandīs sought to defend their school and its eponymous founder, Abū Ḥanīfa. Their responses can be divided into two main categories, polemical and non-polemical. The polemical responses included public debates as well as publication of polemical materials that demonstrated the “superiority” of the Ḥanafī school vis-àvis the Ahl-e-Hadīs methodology of directly accessing Qur’ān and Ḥadīth without recourse to juristic scholarship. The non-polemical responses can be divided into two further sub-categories: scholarly works and education. Among scholarly works, Deobandīs probably devoted most attention to writing commentaries on major Ḥadīth collections such as the ṣiḥāḥ sitta. Moreover, they prepared a new collection titled Iʿlā’ al-sunan which sought to provide Ḥadīth proofs for all rulings within the Ḥanafī school. Along with these works, Deobandīs also prepared biographies of Abū Ḥanīfa and other prominent Ḥanafīs with a view to demonstrating their knowledge of Ḥadīth. Lastly, Deobandīs sought to articulate the “proper” position of Ḥadīth in Ḥanafī legal theory as well as the Ḥanafīs’ principles of Ḥadīth- and narrator-criticism. While these works are

The edition that I have used for this paper is published by Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī. See Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Ta’rīkh Madīnat al-salām wa akhbār muḥaddithīhā wa dhikr quṭṭānihā al-ʿulamā’ min ghayr ahlihā wa wāridīhā, (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2001), 15: 444-586. The long title is often shortened to Ta’rīkh Baghdād. Throughout this paper, I will refer to it thus. 45

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ostensibly non-polemical, an underlying purpose behind all of these works is to answer Ahl-eHadīs charges against the Ḥanafīs. These scholarly works were written in both Arabic and Urdu. The second category of non-polemical responses included the creation of a network of madrasas where a new curriculum was adopted. Even though, it retained the old name dars-enizāmī, it was a far cry from the dars-e-nizāmī prepared by Mullā Niẓām al-Dīn Sihālvī (d. 1748). Unlike the original dars-e-nizāmī, which had focused more on rational sciences, the Deobandī curriculum tried to find a balance between rational and transmitted sciences. The last year of the new curriculum, called dawrat al-ḥadīth, was dedicated to a study of the major Ḥadīth collections including the ṣiḥāḥ sitta, the two Muwaṭṭā’s of Mālik and Muḥammad, and Sharḥ maʿāni al-āthār of al-Ṭaḥāwī. An important pedagogical element of the dawrat al-ḥadīth was to resolve the conflicts between rulings of the Ḥanafī school and ḥadīths contained in these collections. In the following chapters, I examine each of these responses one by one. Thus, in the second chapter, I explore the Deobandī articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīth, and in the third chapter, I explore their defense of Abū Ḥanīfa and other prominent Ḥanafīs. The scholarly works mentioned above will serve as sources for these two chapters. The fourth chapter will provide a brief overview of the Deobandī non-polemical response to Ahl-e-Hadīs through education. As for the polemical responses, they will not be the subject of this study.

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Chapter 2: Deobandī Re-articulation of Ḥanafī Legal Theory With Respect to Ḥadīth

Among the many charges that the Ahl-e-Hadīs had levelled against the Ḥanafīs, perhaps the most important one was that the latter chose to deliberately ignore ḥadīths. In the intellectual environment of nineteenth century North India, this was a serious charge because it implied that the Ḥanafīs were consciously ignoring the Prophet’s commands. This “logical implication” had led some Ahl-e-Hadīs to declare Ḥanafīs to be non-Muslims. While such pronouncements were few, a milder version of this criticism was more prevalent among the Ahl-e-Hadīs, namely, Ḥanafī Ḥadīth proofs were weak because many of them were not to be found in the ṣiḥāḥ sitta. Moreover, Ahl-e-Hadis alleged that those proofs that were to be found in the ṣiḥāḥ sitta were only rarely to be found in the two Ṣaḥīḥ’s of al-Bukhārī and Muslim and hence could not be considered as sound as the ones in these two collections.46 The Deobandī response to these charges was to try to explain the “proper” position of Ḥadīth in Ḥanafī legal theory, which they felt would absolve Ḥanafīs of Ahl-e-Hadīs charges. The starting point for Deobandīs was their argument that principles of Ḥadīth-criticism are speculative (ẓannī) and differed upon among Ḥadīth scholars. Thus, one scholar may declare a report to be sound (ṣaḥīḥ) or fair (ḥasan) while another may consider it to be weak (ḍaʿīf) and vice versa. Moreover, while Ḥanafīs share majority of terms and principles with the generality of Ḥadīth scholars ((jamāʿat al-muḥaddithīn)), they disagree in some places. Of the many works that Deobandī scholars penned to explain Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīth, one of the most important and representative work is Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm alḤadīth of Ẓafar Aḥmad ʿUthmānī. Considering that this work serves as the main Deobandī Muḥammad Taqī ʿUthmānī, Dars-e-Tirmizī, ed. Rashīd Ashraf Sayfī (Karachi: Maktaba Dār al-ʿUlūm Karachi, 2004), 1: 80. 46

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articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīth, one would imagine that Ḥanafī works would serve as main sources. However, that is not always the case. More often than not, it is a non-Ḥanafī Ḥadīth work. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ahl-e-Hadīs polemicists had chosen to rely on works of medieval non-Ḥanafī Ḥadīth scholars to prepare their charges against the Ḥanafīs. Therefore, Deobandīs also chose to refer to older works by those authors whom the Ahl-e-Hadīs held in high esteem. I begin with a discussion of the sources used by ʿUthmānī in his Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm alḤadīth to get a better understanding of how Deobandīs derived authority and sought legitimacy. I will follow that by a broad overview of their articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīth

2.1: Deobandīs’ Sources The main non-Ḥanafī sources that ʿUthmānī refers to are as follows: Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāẓ and Mīzān al-iʿtidāl fī naqd al-rijāl of Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 1348), Fatḥ al-Bārī sharh Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, its introduction Hady al-sārī, Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb, Nuzhat al-naẓar sharḥ Nukhbat alfikr and Lisān al-mīzān of Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 1448), Fatḥ al-Mughīth bi sharḥ Alfiyyat alḤadīth of Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī (d. 1497), and Tadrīb al-rāwī of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 1505). Among the less cited non-Ḥanafī works are al-ʿIlal of Abū ʿĪsā al-Tirmidhī (d. 892), Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim of Sharaf al-Dīn al-Nawawī (d. 1277), Rafʿ al-malām ʿan al-a’imma alaʿlām and Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), and Iʿlām al-muwaqqiʿīn of Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d. 1350). It is clear from the list given above that barring books like al-Tirmidhī’s al-ʿIlal, ʿUthmānī has mostly relied on books by authors who are mainly Shāfiʿī, while a few are

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Ḥanbalīs. They are all from the medieval period when Sunnī Ḥadīth sciences had reached relative maturity. This is why works by these authors continue to serve as major references in modern Sunnī Ḥadīth scholarship.47 Works by Ḥanafīs include the following: Naṣb al-rāya of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAlī al-Zaylaʿī (d. 1342), al-Dībāj al-mudhahhab of al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 1413), ʿUmdat al-qārī sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ alBukhārī of Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī (d. 1453), Qafw al-athar fī ʿulūm ṣafw al-athar of Raḍī al-Dīn ibn al-Ḥanbalī al-Ḥanafī (d. 1563 or 1564), Ashiʿʿat al-Lamaʿāt of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq Muḥaddith Dehlawī (d. 1642), Kashshāf iṣṭilāhāt al-funūn of Muḥammad Aʿlā Thanvī (d. c. 18th century), Fawātīh al-Raḥamūt sharḥ Musallam al-thubūt of ʿAbd al-ʿAlī al-Anṣārī (d. 1810), al-Rafʿ wa al-takmīl and al-Ajwiba al-fāḍila of ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī (d. 1886), Fayḍ al-Bārī ʿalā Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī of Anwar Shāh Kashmīrī (d. 1933), and Fiqh ahl al-ʿIrāq wa Ḥadīthihim of Zāhid alKawtharī (d. 1951). Among these, the most often used sources are Qafw al-athar and al-Rafʿ wa al-takmīl. As can be seen, along with medieval works, a number of works from the modern period are also included among the Ḥanafī sources, which suggests that Deobandī debates with Ahl-eHadīs formed part of a larger debate taking place between Salafīs and Ahl-e-Hadīs on the one hand and Ḥanafīs on the other, across regions (South Asia and the Middle East). The author of al-Rafʿ wa al-takmīl, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī, who belonged to the famous family of ʿulamā of Farangi Mahall, had himself debated with Ahl-e-Hadīs scholars on the trustworthiness of Abū

For a brief overview of the development of Ḥadīth sciences and their position in Sunnī thought, see the chapter titled “The Formation of Sunnī Traditionalism” in Jonathan Berkey, The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-1800 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 141-151. Also see Richard Bulliet, Islam: The View from the Edge (New York: Columbia University, 1994), 126-127; and Jonathan Brown, The Canonization of al-Bukhārī and Muslim: The Formation and Function of the Sunnī Ḥadīth Canon (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 367-368. 47

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Ḥanīfa and the position of qiyās (analogical reasoning) in Islamic jurisprudence.48 Similarly, alKawtharī, who was a former Ottoman official and had settled down in Egypt, had also engaged in extensive debates with his Salafī detractors in the Middle East.49 Having looked at the sources ʿUthmānī referred to in his Qawāʿid ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, we now look at the salient features of his articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīth.

2.2: Speculative Nature of the Principles of Ḥadīth-Criticism50 The starting point for Deobandīs, as mentioned above, was to assert that all principles of Ḥadīthcriticism are speculative.51 Moreover, the principles of declaring a ḥadīth to be sound or otherwise are differed upon and vary according to the taste (dhawq) of each muḥaddith or mujtahid. For example, Muslim and al-Bukhārī differ over ʿanʿana (a particular type of ḥadīth in which the narrator does not use an expression that would indicate that he/she actually met the person from whom they are narrating). Al-Bukhārī stipulates that such a narrator must have met the person from whom he is narrating with ʿanʿana, at least once in his lifetime. On the other hand, Muslim merely stipulates that the two should be contemporaries and there should be a possibility that the two may have met. Despite this difference of opinion, both are accepted as legitimate authorities in the field of Ḥadīth-criticism.52 Similarly, Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 965), a famous

48

For a brief overview of the Farangi Mahall family of scholars, see Francis Robinson, The Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia (London: Hurst and Co., 2001). Unfortunately, no academic study of Zāhid al-Kawtharī’s life and work seems to have been undertaken. For a brief hagiographical biography, see G. F. Haddad, “Imam al-Kawthari (May Allah be well-pleased with him), Living Islam, http://livingislam.org/o/kawth_e.html (accessed March 24, 2014). 49

Sections 2.2 onwards are primarily descriptions of the principles enunciated by ʿUthmānī. My comments, as and when they appear, are only those that are clearly stated as such. 50

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghudda (Karachi: Idārat al-Qur’ān wa alʿulūm al-islāmiyyah, n.d.), 20. 51

52

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 20-21. 30

Ḥadīth scholar, has differed from the majority of Ḥadīth scholars regarding the acceptance of the report of an anonymous (majhūl) person. According to him, such a ḥadīth is acceptable as long as the person he is narrating from and the latter’s teacher are both reliable (thiqa), and the ḥadīth is not munkar, i.e. the ḥadīth does not contradict the report of someone who is more trustworthy. Majority of the Ḥadīth scholars do not accept such a ḥadīth.53 After giving these examples, ʿUthmānī goes on to assert that since the principles of Ḥadīth-criticism are speculative and differed upon, therefore, declaring a narrator to be reliable (thiqa) or weak (ḍaʿīf), and declaring a ḥadīth to be sound (ṣaḥīḥ) or weak (ḍaʿīf) is also differed upon. In the context of making this general argument, ʿUthmānī cites numerous early and medieval works by prominent Ḥadīth scholars including al-ʿIlal, Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāẓ, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, and Fatḥ al-Bārī. However, more important than these is his quotation from Ibn Taymiyya’s Rafʿ al-malām ʿan al-a’imma al-aʿlām. According to Ibn Taymiyya, as cited by ʿUthmānī, none of the Imāms (leading scholars/eponymous founders) [of fiqh schools] that have been accepted by the umma can be accused of intentionally opposing the Prophet in any of his sunnas, be they minor or major. Therefore, if an Imām seems to be in conflict with a sound ḥadīth, it could be for a number of legitimate reasons. Among the many reasons given by Ibn Taymiyya, ʿUthmānī cites the following two: one, this Imām may have considered the ḥadīth in question to be weak while others considered it to be sound. The second is that the conditions for the soundness of a ḥadīth may be different for this Imām as opposed to other scholars. Thus, for example, this Imām may also consider it a condition to compare the text (matn) of the ḥadīth with the Qur’ān and the

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 21. For a brief overview of the various Ḥadīth terms, see Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Nukhbat al-Fikr, trans. Musa Furber, in Sunna Notes: Studies in Hadith and Doctrine (UK: Aqsa Publications, 2005), 1: 169-194. A similar list is also found in Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 22-48. 53

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[otherwise established] sunna, or that the narrator has to be a jurist (faqīh) if the ḥadīth opposes qiyās, or that the ḥadīth should have been more well known if its text concerns a matter which is commonly-occurring.54 The interesting thing to note here is the Ibn Taymiyya seems to be answering the charges that the Ahl-e-Hadīs were to later make against the Ḥanafīs. Having made the general argument in support of the possibility that Abū Ḥanīfa and other Ḥanafīs may have graded ḥadiths based on criteria different from other Ḥadīth scholars, ʿUthmānī goes on to state various Ḥanafī principles of Ḥadīth- and narrator-criticism as follows:

2.3 Taṣḥīḥ (Validation/Declaration of Soundness) and Taḥsīn (Declaration of Fairness) of a Ḥadīth In chapter two of his Qawāʿid fī ʿUlūm al-Ḥadīth, ʿUthmānī has listed thirteen principles for determining whether a ḥadīth is sound or fair.55 Some of the important ones among these are as follows: 1. When a muḥaddith uses a certain ḥadīth as evidence, then this action by itself amounts to his validation (taṣḥīḥ) of it. By the same token, if a mujtahid uses a certain ḥadīth as evidence, then this also amounts to his validation of it. Thus, every ḥadīth that alShaybānī or al-Ṭaḥāwī mention in their books as evidence is sound because they were both muḥaddiths and mujtahids.56 The logical implication of this principle is that even if other Ḥadīth scholars were to declare these ḥadīths to be weak, it would be irrelevant. 2. When some qarīna (context) indicates soundness of an otherwise weak ḥadīth, then it is considered a sound ḥadīth. An example is the Ḥanafī ruling regarding a utensil, which a 54

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 49-50.

55

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 56-91.

56

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 57-59.

32

dog has licked (wulūgh al-kalb fi al-inā’). According to Ḥanafīs, such a utensil has to be washed three times for it to become ritually clean. The Ḥanafī proof is a ḥadīth from Abū Hurayra to that effect. The ḥadīth has a weak chain but because there is another report, which states that Abū Hurayra himself always used to wash a utensil three times if a dog had licked it; therefore, his ḥadīth from the Prophet would now be considered sound.57 3. If a certain ḥadīth gains acceptance among the ʿulamā, then that is its validation even if the ḥadīth does not have a sound chain.58 An example of this is the Prophet’s renewing the marriage of his daughter Zaynab to her former husband Abū al-ʿĀṣṣ ibn al-Rabīʿ with a new dower and a new contract when the latter converted to Islam. This ḥadīth has a weak chain and opposing it is a ḥadīth with a stronger chain, which states that the Prophet did not renew their marriage.59 Majority of the jurists have adopted the ḥadīth with a weak chain and discarded the one with the strong chain. 60 Because of the jurists’ acting upon this ḥadīth, it can now compete with sound ḥadīths. 4. When a certain ḥadīth gains acceptance among the umma, then it is considered to be in the same category as a mass transmitted ḥadīth (fī maʿna al-tawātur). An example is the narration from ʿĀ’isha that the Prophet said that “the irrevocable divorce of a slave-girl is [achieved with] two divorces, and her waiting period is two menstrual cycles.” Because

57

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 56-60.

58

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 60-62.

This ḥadīth is cited by al-Tirmidhī in the chapter on two spouses who are polytheists and then one of them converts to Islam. See Taqī ʿUthmānī, Dars-e-Tirmizī, 1: 84-85. 59

60

Apparently, the weak ḥadīth is supported by other evidences, which Taqī ʿUthmānī does not cite.

33

the umma has accepted this ḥadīth, therefore it will be considered mass transmitted even though it is weak with respect to its chain.61 5. Sound ḥadīths are not limited to the two Ṣaḥīḥ’s of al-Bukhārī and Muslim but are found outside of them as well. Here, ʿUthmānī cites these two authors themselves expressing as much. His conclusion from this is that one could therefore oppose a sound ḥadīth found in one or both of the two Ṣaḥīḥ’s by another sound ḥadīth narrated by someone else in another collection. He goes on to cite al-ʿAsqalānī from Fatḥ al-Bārī saying that if two sound ḥadīths are in contradiction, then the one in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī does not get automatic precedence; rather, each will be judged based upon the narrators who appear in the chain. Whichever has a stronger chain will be deemed more sound, irrespective of whether it is in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī or not. Moreover, ʿUthmānī cites both al-ʿAsqalānī and al-Suyūṭī to assert that the superiority of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī over all other collections is in general terms not in the sense that every ḥadīth in it is sounder than any that is found outside of it.62 An extension of this principle is that reference to the ṣiḥāḥ sitta is needed only after the second and third Islamic centuries. Abū Ḥanīfa flourished before these works were compiled. It is possible that a ḥadīth reached him through a sound chain and the chain became weaker after him, which is why it was not included in these collections. Moreover, since al-Bukhāri and Muslim have themselves acknowledged that they did not

61

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 62.

62

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 63-66.

34

include all sound ḥadīths in their collections; therefore, a ḥadīth’s occurrence outside of these two Ṣaḥīḥ’s does not automatically render it weak.63 6. A fair ḥadīth is like a sound ḥadīth when being used as evidence even though the former’s chain is weaker compared to the latter. This is why some scholars such as alḤākim al-Nīsābūrī (d. 1012) and Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 965) count a fair ḥadīth among sound ḥadīths. Moreover, a ḥadīth which is fair by itself (ḥasan li dhātihi) can rise to the level of a sound ḥadīth when it has more than one narration. Similarly, a weak ḥadīth can rise to the level of a fair ḥadīth if it has more than one narration. In such a case, it can be used as evidence just like a fair ḥadīth.64 7. That ḥadīth which Abū Dāwūd has not commented on (sakata ʿanhu) in his Sunan is qualified to be used as evidence. Similarly, whatever ḥadīths al-ʿAsqalānī has quoted in his Fatḥ al-Bārī that are not in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, and has not commented on them, will be considered to be either sound or fair in al-ʿAsqalānī’s estimation.65 8. Finally, a Ḥadīth scholar’s statement about a certain ḥadīth that it is the most sound ḥadīth on the subject does not mean that it is actually sound by itself; rather, it merely means that all other ḥadīths on the subject have weaker chains than it. This ḥadīth could be weak by itself but others would then be weaker according to this scholar.66

This is a point often made by Deobandī scholars in their Ḥadīth lectures. Personal experience during Ḥadīth lectures at Jāmiʿa Ashrafia, Lahore, Pakistan, 2006. 63

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 78. ʿUthmānī’s sources in this regard include Tadrīb al-rāwī, Sharḥ al-nukhba and Fatḥ al-Bārī of al-ʿAsqalānī, Mā thabata bi al-sunna of al-Ḥāfiẓ al-ʿIrāqī, and al-Mīzān al-kubrā of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī. 64

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 89. ʿUthmānī cites Nayl al-awṭār of al-Shawkānī, Naṣb al-rāya of al-Zaylaʿī, al-Targhīb wa al-tarhīb, and Tadrīb al-rāwī to support this assertion. 65

66

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 91.

35

2.4: Conditions for the Use of a Weak Ḥadīth ʿUthmānī has devoted the third chapter of his Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth to principles governing the use of a weak ḥadīth. Some of these are as follows: 1. Weak ḥadīths can be used for faḍā’il al-aʿmāl (supererogatory works). The wisdom behind acting upon such a weak ḥadīth is that if such a ḥadīth is actually (fī nafs al-amr) sound, then its right has been fulfilled; otherwise, if nothing forbidden has been made permissible and nothing permissible has been made forbidden, and no other person’s right has been taken, then there is no harm in acting upon it. Furthermore, according to al-Suyūṭī, a weak ḥadīth can also be acted upon in matters of aḥkām (legal rulings) as long as such a weak ḥadīth entails caution (iḥtiyāṭ).67 2. A condition for acting upon a weak ḥadīth is that it should not be extremely weak, that it should fall under some general principle (aṣl ʿāmm), and that one should not consider this act to be sunna. Extreme weakness refers to a case when every narration of the ḥadīth has someone who is either a liar (kadhdhāb) or is accused of lying (muttaham bi al-kadhib).68 3. If a ḥadīth has a weak chain then this ḥadīth must be described as weak with respect to the chain and not with respect to the text because it is possible that there may be another chain which is sound. Only when an Imām [of Ḥadīth?] has declared that this ḥadīth is not narrated with any sound chain, or when the weakness of the ḥadīth has been specified, then the ḥadīth can be described as weak without reference to the chain. In short, one should refrain from declaring a ḥadīth to be weak merely because of one chain Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 92-93. His sources include al-Durr al-Mukhtār of al-Ḥaṣkafī (d. 1677) and Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s (d. 1836) commentary on it titled Radd al-muḥtār ʿala al-Durr al-mukhtār aka Ḥāshiyat Ibn ʿĀbidin. The latter cites al-ʿAsqalānī’s Sharḥ al-arbaʿīn. 67

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 94-95. His sources include al-Durr al-mukhtār, Ḥāshiyat Ibn ʿĀbidīn and al-Suyūṭī’s Sharḥ al-taqrīb. 68

36

until its proper context is known. A mujtahid can figure out the proper ruling for a “weak” ḥadīth by seeing if it accords with qiyās, or with statements of the companions or followers, etc.69 4. One must differentiate between a weak ḥadīth and a muḍaʿʿaf ḥadīth. The latter is one whose weakness is differed upon. This difference of opinion could be with respect to the chain or the text. Such a hadīth is of a rank higher than weak. ʿUthmānī goes on to cite al-Suyūṭī and al-ʿAsqalānī concluding that ḥadīths whose soundness is differed upon are of many ranks. Such ḥadīṭhs are found in the two Ṣaḥīḥs of al-Bukhārī and Muslim. His other conclusion is that a suspended report, narration of a mudallis (someone who does not clearly state that he actually heard from the narrator above him), and the narration of someone whose uprightness is not known, are all types of ḥadīths whose soundness is differed upon. Thus, they belong to the larger category of muḍaʿʿaf and not of weak ḥadīths.70 5. A weak ḥadīth can be used to establish istiḥbāb (recommendation).71 6. A weak ḥadīth can be used to support a position, which is already supported by some other evidence.72 7. There are two levels of extreme weakness. One is that whose extremeness is agreed upon, and the other is the one whose extremeness is differed upon. The first one cannot be used as evidence (ḥujja) but the latter can be used.73

69

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 95. His main source for this principle is Tadrīb al-rāwī.

70

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 108-110.

71

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 110-111.

72

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 111.

73

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 115. 37

8. A number of terms are used by muḥaddiths to refer to acceptable (maqbūl) ḥadīths. One of these is ṣāliḥ, which refers to both sound and fair ḥadīths. It can also be used for those weak ḥadīths, which can be used as evidence.74

2.5: Rejecting Solitary Report (Khabar al-wāḥid) According to ʿUthmānī, a solitary report is to be rejected if it opposes a well-known sunna, i.e. something, which has been established through mass transmitted (mutawātir) ḥadīth or a wellknown (mashhūr) ḥadīth. Similarly, if a solitary report pertains to a public incident and contradicts a report from a group of companions, then it will be rejected. For example, when a group of companions narrate that the Prophet used to say the basmala (the formula: bism Allāh al-Raḥmān al-Raḥīm) in a low voice in ritual prayer, then the solitary report of someone who says that he used to say it out loud, will be rejected. Lastly, if leading companions ignored the report and used their reason regarding the matter, then this is an indication that either the report is abrogated, weak or even broken-chained (munqaṭiʿ).75 ʿUthmānī sums this up by saying that in addition to the uprightness and accuracy of the narrator, the Ḥanafīs’ condition for the soundness of a ḥadīth is also that the ḥadīth does not contradict unequivocal statement of the Qur’an or a well-known sunna, and that it has not been ignored (or not acted upon) in the first generation, and that it is not the only report concerning a matter of public nature. An interesting application of some of these principles regarding a solitary report is the issue of reciting sūrat al-Fātiḥa behind the imām (praryer leader) in ritual prayer. According to Abū Ḥanīfa, one should not recite while praying behind the imām. According to many other

74

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 116.

75

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 125-126. 38

scholars including al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Ḥanbal, one’s prayer is not valid unless they recite sūrat alFātiḥa. Their proof is the ḥadīth narrated by the authors of the ṣiḥāḥ sitta and Ibn Ḥanbal in his Musnad, “there is no prayer for the one who does not recite the opening of the book (sūrat alFātiḥa).” ʿUthmānī argues against the obligation of reciting sūrat al-Fātiḥa by saying the Qur’ān only requires one to recite some portion of the Qur’an, as stated in the Qur’ānic verse “recite as much of the Qur’ān as is easy (faqra’ū mā tayassara min al-Qur’ān) [Q 02:37]. According to ʿUthmānī, the word mā in the Qur’ānic verse is either general (ʿāmm) or unrestricted (muṭlaq). In both cases, a solitary report, which is a speculative proof cannot specify (takhṣīṣ) the general nor can it restrict (taqyīd) the unrestricted.76

2.6: Position of the Opinions of Companions and Followers77 According to ʿUthmānī, the opinions of companions and followers can have multiple levels of importance. If a companion describes something as being the sunna (min al-sunna kadhā) without qualifying it with respect to its doer, then it automatically refers to a sunna of the Prophet. It is then at the level of a raised-chain report (ḥadīth marfūʿ) and is a proof (ḥujja) by itself. Similarly, if a follower says that “they used to do such and such” without specifying the doer, then it will automatically be understood to refer to companions unless there is a reason to suggest otherwise. The same will also be true if a follower were to say that the predecessors (salaf) used to do such and such, or used to say such and such. For a follower, the predecessors are only the companions.

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Iʿlā’ al-Sunan, 2: 234-235. Ẓafar ʿUthmānī’s discussion of the subject continues for many pages involving many more principles of Ḥanafī legal theory. For those interested in the whole discussion, see Ẓafar Aḥmad ʿUthmānī, Iʿlā’ al-Sunan, ed. Muḥammad Taqī ʿUthmānī (Karachi: Idārat al-Qur’ān wa al-ʿulūm alislāmiyyah, 1997), 2: 229-242. 76

77

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 125-137. 39

Moreover, according to ʿUthmānī, if a companion mentions something about a subject other than language and other than something in which one can exercise ijtihād, then it also has the ruling of a raised-chain report. An important restriction in this case is that such a companion must not be someone who reads ancient books because in that case he may have acquired his knowledge from there. The same will be true of the statement of a follower with the same restrictions. His statement will have the ruling of a raised-chain report. The only difference will be that his report will be considered a suspended report and not a connected (muttaṣil) one because the last link in the chain, namely, the name of the companion, is missing. Lastly, ʿUthmānī discusses the statement of a mujtahid companion regarding a matter in which there is no text of the Qur’ān or Ḥadīth. According to ʿUthmānī, this is also a proof (ḥujja) by itself. In the presence of such a statement, qiyās will not be followed. If such a statement had become widespread during the time of companions and other companions remained silent and accepted it, then it is mandatory (wājib) to follow it. If the companions had differed over it, then those coming after them can follow the opinion of any of them but they do not have the right to exercise ijtihād. The same will apply to the statement of a senior follower whose fatwā (non-binding legal opinion) became well known during the time of the companions, and none of them opposed him. Thus, according to ʿUthmānī, the opinion of Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d. 714) is also a proof for the Ḥanafīs even though he is not one of the senior followers in terms of age. Rather, his opinion has value because of his expertise in fiqh, and because of his knowledge of the school of ʿAbdullāh ibn Masʿūd (d. 650), a prominent companion of the Prophet. According to ʿUthmānī, Abū Ḥanīfa used to give great weight to the opinions of al-Nakhaʿī because quite often the latter merely repeated the opinion of ʿAbdullāh ibn Masʿūd. Thus, in the case of placing of hands during the

40

ritual prayer, the Ḥanafī position is that the hands should be placed below the navel. The main proof in this regard is the statement of Abū Majliz Lāhiq ibn Ḥumayd (d. 100/101 AH) and Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī.78 The former was a senior follower and his fatwās were well known during the time of the companions, while the latter’s status despite being a junior follower has been elaborated above.

2.7 Principles of Narrator-criticism, i.e. Commendation (Taʿdīl) and Discreditation (Jarḥ) The seventh chapter in ʿUthmānī’s Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth is dedicated to the principles of narrator-criticism. Some of the important principles in this regard are as follows: 1. Ambiguous discreditation (al-jarḥ al-mubham) is generally not accepted, and is only accepted with respect to someone whom no one has declared to be reliable. This is the opposite of commendation, which is accepted even when it is ambiguous and is not accompanied with an explanation of the reason for commendation. The reason for this difference is that sometimes people discredit someone because of something, which they consider to be a cause for discreditation even though it might actually not be such a thing. Therefore, the cause should be mentioned so that other Ḥadīth scholars can decide for themselves whether it actually merits discreditation or not.79 2. If there is both commendation and discreditation regarding a certain narrator, and both are ambiguous, then commendation will be given preference. If, however, the discreditation is explained (mufassar) and only the commendation is ambiguous, then the former will have precedence. On the other hand, if the commendor (muʿaddil) says that

78

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Iʿlā’ al-sunan, 2: 191-192.

79

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 167-174.

41

“so and so is reliable and whoever discredited him was wrong,” or that “whoever discredited him did so without proof,” then the commendation will have precedence. An example of this is Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr’s statement regarding ʿIkrima al-Barbarī (d. 722), viz. “he is one of the prominent scholars and whoever discredited him had no proof for that.”80 3.

If someone’s uprightness and greatness in knowledge is established in the umma (worldwide Muslim community), then his discreditation, even if it is explained, is not effective. A ḥadīth narrated by such a person will be sound and not merely fair. A prominent example of such a person is the above-mentioned ʿIkrima who was discredited by many but Ḥadīth scholars did not accept this discreditation because his uprightness and leadership in knowledge is established. His narrations are, therefore, considered sound.81

4. Not every person’s discreditation of another is accepted. This is because sometimes the discreditor himself is discredited due to something. Established Ḥadīth scholars such as al-Nasā’ī, Ibn Ḥibbān, Abū Ḥātim (d. 890), etc. are known to exaggerate when discrediting someone. Their discreditation of someone cannot be accepted at face-value. ʿUthmānī has devoted considerable space to this discussion. He quotes al-Dhahabī and alʿAsqalānī to argue that narrator-critics tend to vary in terms of their exaggeration in discrediting someone. Thus, Shuʿba (d. 776) and Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 777) from the first generation (ṭabaqa), Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd al-Qaṭṭān (d. 813) from the second generation, Yaḥyā ibn Maʿīn (d. 847) from the third generation, Abū Ḥātim (d. 890) from the fourth generation, and among the later scholars (muta’akhkhirīn), Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 1200) , al80

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 174-176.

81

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 176-177. 42

Raḍī al-Ṣāghānī (d. 1252), and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) are among critics who tend to exaggerate. ʿUthmānī also describes a particular sub-type of such critics who may be moderate in general but are particularly harsh with respect to a certain group or individual. Thus, al-Dhahabī is particularly harsh on Sufis and Ashʿarīs. Al-Dāraquṭnī (d. 995) is particularly harsh on Abū Ḥanīfa and his companions, and al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī is particularly harsh on Abū Ḥanīfa and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. According to the sources cited by ʿUthmānī, the discrediting of those critics who tend to exaggerate in general or with respect to a particular group cannot be accepted at face value. Rather, if the one being criticized is already well known for his uprightness and knowledge, or if his commendors (mādiḥūn) are many while his discreditors (dhāmmīn) are few, and there is a context of religious or group-based bigotry, then such discreditation will not be accepted.82 5. In terms of attributes that are required in a narrator for his narration to be accepted, ʿUthmānī states that all the leading authorities (a’imma) of Hadīth and fiqh agree that he must be upright (ʿādil), and accurate (ḍābiṭ) in his narration. These two conditions mean that he should be a sane adult Muslim, who is free of things that would cause him to be declared an immoral person (fāsiq). Moreover, he should be alert (mutayaqqiẓ) and not negligent (ghayr mughaffal), he should have sound memory (ḥāfiẓ) if he narrates from memory, and should take care to make sure that his books are not altered if he narrates from his books. Lastly, these two mean that he should be knowledgeable of what would change the meaning when he narrates the report. A necessary result of these conditions is

82

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 177-197. 43

that the report of a disbeliever, a crazy person, a child, a negligent person or an immoral person will not be accepted. According to ʿUthmānī, ḍabṭ means that a person’s memory of what he hears is more preponderant than his lack of memory. At the same time, some degree of forgetfulness and mistake is natural and a person will not be discredited (majrūḥ) if he makes a mistake in one ḥadīth. Moreover, not being an immoral person (fāsiq) means that the person in question does not engage in any of the major sins, and does not persist in committing minor sins.83 6. Discreditation is to be considered only when it pertains to matters, which were mentioned above as conditions for an acceptable narrator. Other things cannot be defined as cause of discreditation. Thus, narrating a suspended-chain report, or engaging in fiqh, or working for a ruler if the work is legitimate by itself, etc. are not valid causes for someone’s discreditation. The same applies to the case when a person does not narrate much, or does not have many teachers of Ḥadīth, or has not traveled widely in search of Ḥadīth. The reason is that none of these things affects a person’s uprightness or accuracy of transmission in any way. Apart from the above, ambiguous aspersion (al-ṭaʿn al-mubham) reported from one of the leading scholars of Ḥadīth regarding some narrator does not count as discreditation. Thus, a Ḥadīth scholar’s saying that a certain ḥadīth is discredited (majrūḥ) or disclaimed (munkar) is not enough unless he were to clearly specify something which is accepted as discreditation by all. If it is differed upon such that some may consider it discreditation while others may not do so, then it will not be accepted.

83

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 197-198.

44

This is especially important in the case of a person who is otherwise known for his sincerity and lack of prejudice/bigotry (taʿaṣṣub).84 7. If a narrator from whom some report has been narrated refuses to acknowledge it as his narration, then there is some detail. If the refusal is that of rejection (inkār jāḥid) such that he says “I did not narrate this,” then all Ḥadīth scholars agree that one cannot act upon this ḥadīth. If however, the refusal is of that of hesitation (inkār mutawaqqif) such that he says “I do not remember narrating this,” then according to Abū Yūsuf and alKarkhī, one cannot act upon the ḥadith, while according to Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, one can act upon the ḥadīth.85 8. If a narrator acts against the report that he narrated after having narrated it, then one cannot act upon such a report. However, if this action is from before his narration of it, or its date is unknown, then it is not discreditation. 86 9. Companions’ or a companion’s acting against a ḥadīth necessitates aspersion in the ḥadīth if the ḥadīth is equivocal, and it is not possible that it would have been unknown to him or them. However, if there is a possibility that he or they may not have known of it, then this action does not cause discreditation of the ḥadīth. Conversely, companions’ acting upon a ḥadīth is a proof of its soundness.87 10. Ignorance regarding the narrator (jahālat al-rāwī): Not knowing the name of a companion narrator does not affect the soundness of the ḥadīth because all companions

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 199-201. His sources include al-Manār and Nūr al-Anwār, two important Ḥanafī legal theory texts from the early modern period. 84

85

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 201. His sources are al-Manār and Nūr al-Anwār.

86

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 202. His sources are al-Manār and Nūr al-Anwār.

87

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 202. His sources are al-Manār and Nūr al-Anwār.

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are considered to be upright (kulluhum ʿudūl). As for the case of someone other than a companion, there can be two cases, ambiguous and non-ambiguous. According to ʿUthmānī, ḥadīth from a narrator with ambiguous ignorance will be accepted as long as he is from one of the first three generations. With respect to the non-ambiguous case, if both the person and character of the narrator is unknown (majhūl al-ʿayn), then if his ḥadīth appeared in the second or the third generation, then it is permissible to act on the ḥadīth. However, if it appeared after the third generation, then it is not permissible to act on it.88 11. If a narrator is known to be upright and is also known for narrations, then his report will be accepted, irrespective of whether he is a jurist (faqīh) or not, and irrespective of whether his report aligns with qiyās or not.89 12. Uprightness can also be proven through fame. Thus, if a person’s uprightness is wellknown among people of knowledge, be they Ḥadīth scholars or others, then his good reputation suffices for uprightness. In this case, there is no need to find an explicit report stating that so and so is upright, truthful, or trustworthy. According to ʿUthmānī, this principle applies to many early scholars such as Abū Ḥanīfa, Mālik, Sufyān al-Thawrī, Sufyān ibn ʿUyayna (d. 814), al-Awzāʿī (d. 774), al-Shāfiʿī, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Abū Yūsuf, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, etc.90 13. If an upright person narrates from an unknown person, then that narration by itself can be considered a substitute for commendation of the one narrated from. This is because if the upright person knew anything that would discredit this person, he either would not have 88

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 202-209.

89

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 207-208.

90

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 210-212.

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narrated from him or would have mentioned it. However, this level of scrupulousness can only be expected in the first three generations. Thus, this principle is limited to these generations.91 According to ʿUthmānī, certain leading scholars of the early generations are known for their scrupulousness in that they would only narrate from a reliable person. Thus, if there is a narration from one of these scholars and the person above him is not specified, it will automatically be assumed that he is reliable. ʿUthmānī has provided a long list of such scholars with evidences from earlier sources to demonstrate that they only narrated from reliable narrators. Such scholars include the following: Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd al-Qaṭṭān, Mālik ibn Anas, Shuʿba, Saʿīḍ ibn al-Musayyab (d. 715), Muḥammad ibn Sīrīn (d. 733), Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, Yaḥyā ibn Maʿīn, Sufyān ibn ʿUyana, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, al-Bukhārī, al-Nasā’ī, Abū Dāwūd, and Abū Ḥanīfa. ʿUthmānī goes on to cite alShaʿrānī at length to demonstrate that Abū Ḥanīfa was extremely scrupulous in his narrations and that he would only narrate from those whom he trusted.92 14. Innovation (bidʿa): Accoridng to ʿUthmānī, while there is a great deal of difference of opinion among Sunnī scholars of Ḥadīth and legal theory, the dominant position for the Ḥanafīs, as stated by Ibn al-Ḥanbalī, is that if the innovation is such that it amounts to disbelief, such as believing in divine incarnation in human form, then such a person’s narration is rejected. If, however, the innovation he subscribes to does not lead to disbelief, then if he is otherwise morally upright and reliable, and does not preach this

91

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 213-215.

92

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 216-227.

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innovation, then his narration can be accepted. Examples of such innovative groups include moderate Shīʿīs, Khawārij, and Murji’īs.93

2.8 Principles of Preference when Proofs Contradict (Taʿāruḍ bayna al-adillah wa al-tarjīḥ) ʿUthmānī sets out by stating that in reality (fī nafs al-amr), there can be no contradiction in legal proofs (ḥujaj sharʿiyya) because that would mean that God’s commands are frivolous. Rather, the contradiction is only outward and superficial. It is the job of the jurist to remove this apparent contradiction between legal proofs. He can do so through abrogation if the early (mutaqaddim) and the later (muta’akhkhir) are known and the two proofs can accept abrogation. A typical example for the Ḥanafīs is that of raising hands (rafʿ al-yadayn) during ritual prayer. There are multiple reports from the Prophet regarding raising hands during prayer. According to some reports, he did so at the beginning of the prayer (takbīr al-taḥrīma) only. According to other reports, he also did so while going down into rukūʿ (bowing) and while getting up from it, and while doing down into sajda (prostration) and while getting up from it, and so on. According to Ḥanafīs, there was a gradual process of abrogating the raising of the hands. The last stage was when raising the hands was required only at the beginning of the prayer.94 If abrogation does not work, then, if possible, one proof will have to be given preference over the other. If that is not possible, then the two proofs will be harmonized (jamʿ) as much as possible. If harmonization is not possible either, then the two proofs will be considered void, and one will resort to the proof that is below the two in rank. Thus, if there seemed to be a contradiction between two verses of the Qur’an, and this contradiction could not be resolved, Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 227-231. I will discuss the issue of Murji’īs in more detail in the next chapter because it has a direct bearing upon the “uprightness” of Abū Ḥanīfa and hence his reliability as a narrator. 93

94

Mahmūd Hasan Gangohi, Adilla-e-kāmila (Karachi: Qadīmī kutubkhāna, n.d.), 23-36.

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then one would resort to a solitary report (khabar al-wāḥid). If the contradiction is between two solitary reports and cannot be resolved, then one will resort to the statements of the companions or to qiyās.95 Some of the other principles for resolving contradiction between proofs, many of which are elaborations of the above discussion, outlined by ʿUthmānī are as follows: 1. It is not permissible to give precedence based on the number of proofs. Thus, if one of the two contradicting reports has multiple narrators while the other has less, then this by no means is a cause for giving precedence to the former. The reason is that moral uprightness is what matters and not the number of narrators.96 2. When two narrators are equal in terms of memory and accuracy of transmission, and one of them is a jurist who understands the nuances of words, then his narration will have precedence. A typical example of this contrast is the story related by one of Wakīʿ ibn alJarrāḥ’s (d. 812) students. He relates that Wakīʿ asked us, “which of the two following chains is more beloved to you, al-Aʿmash from Abū Wā’il from ʿAbdullāh [ibn ʿUmar], or Sufyān from Manṣūr from Ibrāhīm from ʿAlqama from ‘Abdullāh [ibn Masʿūd]?” The student says we all said, “We prefer the first one [because it was shorter].” Upon this, Wakīʿ replied, “Al-Aʿmash and Abū Wā’il are old people, while Sufyān, Manṣūr, Ibrāhīm and ʿAlqama are all jurists.” The implication is that the narration transmitted by jurists is better than the one transmitted by old men, even if the latter is shorter.97

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 288-289. According to ʿUthmānī, there is difference of opinion over whether statements of the companions come first or qiyās. According to al-Karkhi, the two are of the same rank. According to al-Pazdawī, the statements of the companions have precedence over qiyās. 95

96

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 294 & 297.

97

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 298. 49

Another example of this principle is the famous dialogue that took place between Abū Ḥanīfa and al-Awzāʿī. According to the story, Abū Ḥanīfa and al-Awzāʿī were together in Makka. Al-Awzāʿī said to Abū Ḥanīfa, “Why is it that you do not raise your hands in ritual prayer while going down into rukūʿ and while raising your head from it?” Abū Ḥanifa replied, “Because nothing sound is reported from the Prophet in this regard.” Al-Awzāʿī was surprised and said, “How can you say that when al-Zuhrī narrated to me from Sālim who narrated from his father [Ibn ʿUmar], who narrated about the Prophet that he would raise his hands in the beginning of ritual prayer, at the time of going down into rukūʿ, and while rising from it.” Abū Ḥanīfa replied, “Hammād narrated to us from Ibrāhīm, who narrated from ʿAlqama and al-Aswad, who narrated from ʿAbdullāh [ibn Masʿūd] that the Prophet would not raise his hands except at the beginning of ritual prayer.” Al-Awzāʿī replied, “I narrate to you from al-Zuhrī from Sālim from his father, and you narrate from Ḥammād from Ibrāḥīm?” Abū Ḥanīfa’s response was, “Ḥammād had more knowledge of jurisprudence (afqah) than al-Zuhrī, and Ibrāhīm had more knowledge of jurisprudence than Sālīm, and ʿAlqama is no less than Ibn ʿUmar although the latter has the virtue of companionship.” He went on to say, “al-Aswad had great virtue and ʿAbdullāh is ‘Abdullāh.” Upon this, al-Awzāʿi became quite. This is a clear case of Abū Ḥanīfa giving preference to the juridical qualifications of the narrator while al-Awzāʿi is more concerned about the shortness of the chain. As ʿUthmānī explicitly points out, shortness of chain has no intrinsic value for the Ḥanafīs, rather, jurisprudential knowledge of the narrator has much greater weight.98

98

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 297-300 & 302.

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2.9: Conclusion It is clear from the principles listed above that ʿUthmānī’s purpose, and by extension that of Deobandīs in general, behind articulating these principles was to create a space for the Ḥanafīs to justify their existing fiqh. Theirs was not an articulation of legal theory for derivation of new rulings. Rather, it was a case of back-projection whereby Deobandīs were seeking room for the continued validity of Ḥanafī rulings despite their apparent “weakness” in terms of Ḥadīth proofs. Actually ʿUthmānī states as much when he says that that not all of the books of Ḥadīth from the early period have survived, which means that we do not have full access to the entire corpus of Ḥadīth that would have been available to the early Ḥanafī masters. Therefore, when a statement is found in a book of fiqh and some weak ḥadīth supports it, the alignment between qiyās and the weak ḥadīth, allows one to accept the ḥadīth.99 The principles listed under the section on narrator-criticism indicate the Deobandīs’ desire to see early Ḥanafī scholars declared reliable transmitters. One of the charges that the Ahle-Hadīs had brought forth from medieval texts, which contained reports from Abū Ḥanīfa’s contemporaries, was that because he practiced qiyās; therefore, he was unreliable as a transmitter. Moreover, because he had not travelled much; therefore, his knowledge of Ḥadīth was limited. The same applied to his companions such as Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad alShaybānī. In the following chapter, I further explore Deobandī efforts at “exonerating” Abū Ḥanīfa and his companions from such charges.

99

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 117. 51

Chapter 3: Affirming Ḥadīth Credentials of Abū Ḥanīfah and His Companions

As mentioned in the first chapter, the Deobandī authors used every opportunity available to them while working on Ḥadīth to defend Abū Ḥanīfa and other early Ḥanafīs as a way to defend their school. The most prominent work, as mentioned earlier, in this regard is Ẓafar ʿUthmānī’s Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn. Other discussions on the same subject in the introductions to Ḥadīth commentaries by Deobandī authors are mainly summaries of the discussions in this work.

3.1: Deobandīs’ Sources The charges that Ahl-e-Hadīs authors/scholars had brought against Abū Ḥanīfa were mainly regurgitation of charges by various early and medieval Ḥadīth scholars. These included his unreliability as a narrator on account of his innovation (being a Murji’ī), his lack of knowledge of Ḥadīth, his derision for Ḥadīth, etc. Perhaps, the best collection of such charges is found in Ta’rīkh Baghdād. As mentioned earlier, its author al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 1071) devoted large space to a collection of positive and negative reports about Abū Ḥanīfa without passing his own judgment regarding the authenticity or otherwise of these reports. Just as the Ahl-e-Hadīs used Ta’rīkh Baghdād for their purposes, Deobandīs also extensively quoted reports from Ta’rīkh Baghdād to support their claims about Abū Ḥanīfa. Another important work in this regard is al-Intiqā’ fiʿ Faḍā’il al-Thalātha al-Fuqahā’ of the Mālikī scholar Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 1071). While his contemporary al-Baghdādī had merely chosen to narrate positive and negative reports about Abū Ḥanīfa, Ibn ʿAdb al-Barr actively

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chose to defend him against charges of indifference or antagonism towards Ḥadīth. His arguments and statements appear in all of the Deobandī works under study. Other sources fall into two main categories. One is biographies/biographical dictionaries penned by Ḥanafīs and non-Ḥanafīs, which provide reports about Abū Ḥanīfa’s engagement with Ḥadīth, his status among his contemporaries, and their praises for him. Examples of this type include al-Jawāhir al-muḍiyyā fī ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafiyya of ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Abī al-Wafā’ alQurashī (d. 1373), Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāẓ of Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, Tahdhīb al-kamāl of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Mizzī, Tabyīḍ al-ṣaḥīfah of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, and al-Khayrāt al-ḥisān of Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d. 1566). While all of these are medieval works, the value of these works is due to two reasons. One is the prestigious status of their authors in the eyes of Ḥadīth scholars in general and the Ahl-e-Hadīs in particular. The other is they provide reports from earlier sources which are no longer extant. The second category of books are the works of the early Ḥadīth scholars which contain reports, positive and negative, about Abū Ḥanīfa and his students, and also often have hints about the unreliability of Abū Ḥanīfa. Thus, al-Bukhārī refers to Abū Ḥanīfa’s statements by saying qāla baʿḍ al-nās (some say), while contrasting this statement with the statement of the Prophet. Ḥadīth scholars in general perceive this style as indicative of al-Bukhārī’s disapproval of Abū Ḥanīfa. Similarly, al-Tirmidhī refers to Abū Ḥanīfa and his companions as baʿḍ ahl Kūfa (one/some of the Kufans). Deobandīs engage with such works as well in an attempt to show that these authors were either mistaken or were prejudiced. The rest of this chapter will mainly focus on Abū Ḥanīfa and Deobandīs’ defense of his reliability as a narrator, and status as a Ḥadīth master in the face of the charges/issues mentioned

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above. This will be followed by a brief look at Deobandīs’ arguments in support of Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, Abū Ḥanīfa’s two most important students.100

3.2: Abū Ḥanīfa As mentioned earlier, the main target of Ahl-e-Hadīs charges was Abū Ḥanīfa. Deobandī responses to their charges against him regarding the latter’s conscious indifference towards Ḥadīth as enshrined in the Ḥanafī school have already been looked at in the previous chapter. Now, we look at their responses to the charge that he did not know Ḥadīth at all.

3.2.1: Abū Ḥanīfa, the Follower (Ṭābiʿī) The first argument that ʿUthmānī makes is that Abū Ḥanīfa was a follower. He had met a number of companions including Anas ibn Mālik who died in 712, i.e. during Abū Ḥanīfa’s lifetime. He begins by arguing that even though medieval scholars have debated the definition of a follower, the dominant opinion is that any Muslim who meets a companion is a follower. Since it has been mentioned by numerous medieval scholars such as al-Nawawī in his Tahdhīb al-asmā’ wa allughāt, al-Dhahabī in his Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāẓ, al-Mizzī in his Tahdhīb al-kamāl, and al-Suyūṭī in his Tabyīḍ al-ṣaḥīfah that Abū Ḥanīfah had met Anas ibn Mālik; therefore, it is proven that he was a follower. Having demonstrated that Abū Ḥanīfa was a follower, ʿUthmānī goes on to assert that not only did he meet companion(s) but he also narrated ḥadīths from them. Thus, he cites a report in al-Jawāhir al-muḍiyya from Abū Ḥanīfa himself in which he describes listening to a ḥadīth being narrated by ʿAbdullāh ibn al-Ḥārith ibn Juz’, a companion, in Makka in the year 93 or 96

I use the word “important” because they are important to later Ḥanafīs. During Abū Hanīfa’s life, al-Shaybānī was very young and other students of the former held much higher status than him. 100

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AH. The ḥadīth that ibn Juz’ narrated is as follows: “the one who seeks understanding of God’s religion, God takes care of his worries and provision from where he does not imagine (man tafaqqaha fī dīn Allāh kafāhu Allāh hammahu wa rizqahu min ḥaythu lā yahtasib). ʿUthmānī does not limit himself to just this report. He also cites an older work, Jāmiʿ al-masānīd of Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd al-Khawārizmī (d. 1266), with a different narration of the same report. Demonstrating that Abū Ḥanīfa was a follower serves two purposes for ʿUthmānī. Firstly, he has a higher rank than that of other Sunnī Imāms since none of them was a follower. Moreover, being a follower means he has a closer link to the ḥadīths of the Prophet, a distinction that cannot be claimed by another Imām.

3.2.2: Abū Ḥanīfa, the Absolute Mujtahid ʿUthmānī’s next argument is that Abū Ḥanīfah was an absolute mujtahid (mujtahid muṭlaq). Like the previous one, this is also an indirect argument. ʿUthmānī cites a long list of reports from Abū Ḥanīfa’s contemporaries, cited by al-Dhahabī in his Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāẓ, who declared him to be the most knowledgeable person of his time, among other accolades. These contemporaries include Makkī ibn Ibrāhīm, one of the teachers of al-Bukhārī. Others include Abū Yūsuf, Abū Ḥanīfa’s famous student, ʿAbdullāh ibn al-Mubārak, a famous muḥaddith in his own right, Yazīd ibn Hārūn, etc. After listing all these reports, ʿUthmānī asserts that it is obvious that during the time of Abū Ḥanīfa, the only thing that was referred to as knowledge was the knowledge of Qur’ān and Ḥadīth. It follows, therefore, that Abū Ḥanīfa had excellent command of Ḥadīth.101 Building off this, ʿUthmānī argues that since everyone agrees that Abū Hanīfa was an absolute mujtahid, and it is also known that a person cannot be an absolute mujtahid unless he

Ẓafar Aḥmad ʿUthmānī, Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn (Karachi: Idārat al-Qur’ān wa al-ʿulūm alislāmiyyah, 1993), 12. 101

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has command of all the necessary sciences, including Ḥadīth; therefore, it is proven that Abū Ḥanīfa was a muḥaddith. For each step of this argument, ʿUthmānī cites numerous reports supporting the premise that Abū Ḥanīfa was a mujtahid muṭlaq, and the claim that a mujtahid muṭlaq has to know Ḥadīth really well. For the latter, he cites a statement of Muḥammad ibn alḤasan (al-Shaybānī?) cited in Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn of Ibn al-Qayyim. His other evidence is the detailed defense of Abū Ḥanīfa against charges of ignorance of Ḥadīth by Ibn Khaldūn in his Muqaddima.

3.2.3: Abū Ḥanīfa, the “Great Muḥaddith” After having argued his case for Abū Ḥanīfa using indirect arguments, ʿUthmānī focuses on direct evidences. These are as follows:

1. Personal Knowledge of Ḥadīth ʿUthmānī refers to al-Dhahabī’s Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāẓ, in whose introduction, al-Dhahabī states that this (Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāẓ) is a biographical dictionary of those “who determine narrators’ moral uprightness (an important criterion in narrator-criticism), who are bearers of Prophetic knowledge, and whose ijtihād is relied upon for determining a narrator’s reliability (tawthīq) or weakness (taḍʿīf), and for determining a ḥadīth’s soundness (taṣḥīḥ) or forgery (tazyīf).” Since, Abū Ḥanīfa is one of those whose biography is included in this work; it, therefore, follows that al-Dhahabī considered him to embody all these qualities. The reference to al-Dhahabī is important because his name enjoys great prestige among Ḥadīth scholars, a fact not lost on ʿUthmānī.102

102

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn, 15.

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Later, ʿUthmānī cites numerous reports from various sources such as al-Khayrāt al-ḥisān, Ta’rīkh Baghdād, Tabyīḍ al-ṣaḥīfa, Iʿlām al-muwaqqiʿīn, etc. to prove that Abū Ḥanīfa knew numerous ḥadīths. A particular point that ʿUthmānī is keen to identify in these reports is that Abū Ḥanīfa’s city Kufa was a major center of Ḥadīth studies where important Ḥadīth scholars such as Sufyān ibn ʿUyayna, Sufyān al-Thawrī, al-Aʿmash, Wakīʿ and ʿAbdullāh ibn al-Mubārak flourished during Abū Ḥanīfa’s time. According to ʿUthmānī, among these, Wakīʿ and ibn alMubārak followed Abū Ḥanīfa’s fiqh, which is a sign of the trust that these Ḥadīth scholars placed in him.103 Another implication is that Abū Ḥanīfa did not have to travel far to acquire Ḥadīth since it was so easily available in Kufa. In the course of this discussion, ʿUthmānī cites the famous incident that is reported to have taken place between al-Aʿmash and Abū Ḥanīfa. According to the story, Abū Ḥanīfa was present in al-Aʿmash’s gathering when the latter was asked about some legal issue. While alAʿmash had no reply for the questioner, Abū Hanīfa replied. Upon being asked what his basis for the answer was, Abū Ḥanīfa is reported to have narrated reports with multiple chains, which alAʿmash had narrated to him. Upon this, al-Aʿmash was pleasantly shocked. He is reported to have said: “I did not know that you acted upon these ḥadīths. O group of jurists, you are doctors (aṭibbā’) and we (muḥaddiths) are pharmacists (ṣayādila), and you, Abū Ḥanīfa have a share of both.”104 ʿUthmānī’s goal in citing this incident seems to be two-fold. One is that jurists and muḥaddiths have different roles to play. The job of the latter is to narrate reports, while their interpretation is the job of the former. The second is that Abū Ḥanīfa excelled in both, and not only that, his own Ḥadīth teacher acknowledged as much.

103

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn, 16.

104

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn, 18-19.

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2. Abū Ḥanīfa’s Status as a Reliable Narrator: ʿUthmānī has also devoted a full chapter to a rebuttal of the aspersions (maṭāʿin) that some scholars (some medieval, some Abū Ḥanīfa’s contemporaries, and some ʿUthmānī’s contemporaries) had cast on Abū Ḥanīfa with respect to his reliability as a Ḥadīth-narrator. It is interesting to note that ʿUthmānī does not name any of the critics that were his contemporaries but does name critics from the past. These critics included Ḥadīth scholars from among Abū Ḥanīfa’s contemporaries and later. Certain names stand out such as al-Nasā’ī (d. 915), Ibn ʿAdī (d. 975 or 978), al-Dāraquṭnī (d. 995) and Abū Nuʿaym al-Asfahānī (d. 1038). The first three had declared Abū Ḥanīfa to be a weak narrator and the last had shown his dislike towards Abū Ḥanīfa by not including him in his Ḥilyat al-awliyā’, which is a biographical dictionary of pious Muslim men and women and in which all other prominent Sunnī scholars had been included.105 While discussing Abū Ḥanīfa’s critics, ʿUthmānī also mentions a report narrated by alBukhārī in his al-Ta’rīkh al-Ṣaghīr from Nuʿaym ibn Ḥammād, according to whom, Sufyān [alThawrī] expressed happiness at the death of Abū Ḥanīfa by saying that the latter was the worst thing that happened to Islam. ʿUthmānī expresses extreme anger but is careful to direct it at Nuʿaym ibn Ḥammād and not al-Bukhārī. He says that the latter merely narrated what his teacher narrated to him. The real responsibility lies with Nuʿaym ibn Ḥammād who, although considered reliable by some scholars, has also been accused by others of forging ḥadīths against Abū Ḥanīfa, as mentioned in Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb of al-ʿAsqalānī and Mīzān al-iʿtidāl of alDhahabī.106 After citing these aspersions against Nuʿaym ibn Ḥammād, ʿUthmānī says that he considers him to be above forging ḥadīths. At the same time, there is no doubt that he was

105

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn, 32.

106

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn, 33-34.

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prejudiced against the Ḥanafīs. Therefore, his statement or narration regarding them will never be accepted. It seems all these answers are not enough for ʿUthmānī, so he goes on to say that even if Nuʿaym ibn Ḥammād’s narration was actually true, then we have to keep in mind that Sufyān, it is not clear whether ʿUthmānī means Sufyān ibn ʿUyayna or Sufyān al-Thawrī, was a contemporary of Abū Ḥanīfa and there are reports of him praising Abū Ḥanīfa, such as his saying, “We were like sparrows in front of a hawk,” and that “He [Abū Ḥanīfa] was the leader of the scholars.” Moreover, ʿUthmānī says that al-Subkī [Tāj al-Dīn?] has pointed out that one should not pay attention to anything negative narrated from Sufyān regarding Abū Ḥanīfa because it is born of contemporariness (muʿāṣara) and/or mutual aversion (munāfara).107 It is obvious from all of ʿUthmānī’s responses that he is in a bind. He cannot fully exonerate Abū Ḥanifa without casting aspersion on one or more of the Ḥadīth scholars. His is, therefore, a delicate balancing act, which may or may not answer all the objections of the opponents but which provides enough reason for Abū Ḥanīfa’s supporters to feel confident in the veracity of their Imam.

2 (a) Abū Ḥanīfa, Not an Innovator: Another important issue with respect to Abū Ḥanīfa’s status as a reliable narrator of ḥadīths is the issue of him being an innovator, specifically a Murji’ī. As discussed in the previous chapter, Ḥanafīs like other Ḥadīth scholars consider innovation to be something, which can cause a person to be declared an unreliable narrator. There are reports to be found in medieval works in which different Ḥadīth scholars are reported to have said that Abū

107

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn, 34. 59

Ḥanīfa was a Murji’ī.108 ʿUthmānī’s contemporaries were citing these reports as part of their overall campaign against Ḥanafīs and Abū Ḥanīfa. In response, ʿUthmānī engages in a long discussion of the meaning and types of irjā’ (the verbal noun from which the active participle Murji’ī is derived). Citing several medieval authorities on theology such as al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390) and al-Āmidī (d. 1233), ʿUthmānī argues that irjā’, which literally means “delay,” can have multiple technical meanings. One of these is to delay having an opinion about the wars that took place among companions after the death of the third caliph, ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān (d. 656). According to ʿUthmānī, there is nothing wrong with this type of irjā’. Rather, it is a form of piety and God-fearingness (taqwā). The second meaning of irjā’ is to say that major sins do not harm a person if he has īmān, since actions are not part of īmān.109 This is the opinion of the famous sect of Murji’īs. According to ʿUthmānī, this type of irjā’ is definitely an innovation and discredits a narrator. The third type of irjā’ is that used by the Muʿtazilīs. According to ʿUthmānī, since the Muʿtazilīs believe that the one who commits a major sin and dies without repentance must be punished through eternal damnation in Hell (mukhallad fi al-nār), they would call those who did not share the same opinion and left the matter to God’s will, as Murji’īs. According to ʿUthmānī, there is nothing wrong with this type of irjā’; rather, it is the standard opinion of Ahl-Sunna. After discussing these types of irjā’, ʿUthmānī explains that there are a number of reasons why people referred to Abū Ḥanīfa as a Murji’ī. One of these is that the Murji’īs spread

A very interesting case is that of al-Dhahabī’s Mīzān al-iʿtidāl. According to ʿUthmānī, al-Dhahabī has actually refuted those who accused Abū Ḥanīfa of being a Murj’ī but one of ʿUthmānī’s unnamed contemporaries chose to understand the same text to mean that al-Dhahabī considered Abū Ḥanīfa to be a Murji’ī. See Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn, 52-53. 108

Īmān is variously translated as faith or belief. For the purpose of our discussion, I am not translating it because its definition is the subject of debate among these various Islamic groups, and translating it would lead to privileging one understanding over another. 109

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false rumors about him to gain support for their cause. The other reason is that Abū Ḥanīfa did not consider īmān to be composed of affirmation (taṣdīq) and works (aʿmāl) but only of affirmation, unlike the majority of Ḥadīth scholars who considered īmān to be composed of affirmation and actions. Because of this, many Ḥadīth scholars labeled him and his companions as Murji’īs. It is thus frequently found in the works of narrator-criticism. However, according to ʿUthmānī, this labeling does not qualify as actual aspersion (ṭaʿn) because these scholars failed to discern the difference between Murji’īs on the one hand and Abū Ḥanīfa and his companions on the other hand. The former believed that actions were unimportant because they were not part of īmān, while the latter believed that actions were important even though they were not part of īmān.110

3. Abū Ḥanīfa’s Muḥaddith Companions: According to ʿUthmānī, Abū Ḥanīfa was not operating alone. Rather, his companions included experts in different fields such as Arabic language, rhetoric, qiyās, and Ḥadīth.111 These Ḥadīth scholars who formed part of his committee at various times numbered up to thirty-three individuals, many of whom also directly narrated ḥadīths from Abū Ḥanīfa. Apart from his two famous students Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad al-Shaybānī and Abū Yūsuf, the list includes many prominent Ḥadīth scholars from the second century of Islam such as Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd al-Qaṭṭān, Sufyān ibn ʿUyayna, ʿAbdullā ibn al-Mubārak, Wakīʿ ibn al-Jarrāḥ, etc.112

110

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 232-242.

111

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Ḥadīth, 330-331.

112

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn, 82-127. 61

3.3: Other Ḥanafīs While the majority of Deobandī effort is expended on defending Abū Ḥanīfa against charges of ignorance of Ḥadīth, ʿUthmānī has also devoted considerable space to other Ḥanafīs in his Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn, who excelled in Ḥadīth sciences. These include the thirtythree mentioned above as Abū Hanīfa’s muḥaddith companions. Besides these, ʿUthmānī has listed more than a hundred other Ḥanafī scholars from the second through fourth centuries who excelled in Ḥadīth. Providing short biographical notes on each of them, ʿUthmānī argues for his claim that early Ḥanafīs were well versed in Ḥadīth. Hence, for him, Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīth has its “real” roots in the legal thought of Abū Ḥanīfa and his immediate and later followers.

3.4: Conclusion Unlike the case for the “proper” position of Ḥadīth in Ḥanafī legal theory, the case for Abū Ḥanīfa has been much easier for Deobandīs. The main reason is the presence of extensive literature from medieval times from Ḥanafīs and non-Ḥanafīs, who have argued for the moral probity, knowledge, and juristic acumen of Abū Hanīfa. These scholars include the Mālikī Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr and Ibn al-Khaldūn, the Shāfiʿī al-Haytamī and al-Suyūṭī, and numerous Ḥanafīs. Perhaps, it will be useful to end this chapter with Ibn Khaldūn’s statement regarding Abū Ḥanīfa. He says: An angry deviant has said that one of the mujtahids had little knowledge of Ḥadīth and this is why few ḥadīths are narrated from him… There are few narrations from Imam Abū Ḥanīfa only because he was very strict in narrating. This is the reason large number of ḥadīths are not narrated from him. It is not that he abandoned narrating ḥadīth. He is far from it. An indication of him being one of the senior mujtahids in the science of Ḥadīth is that his school is relied upon among Ḥadīth scholars.113 113

Ẓafar ʿUthmānī, Abū Ḥanīfa wa aṣḥābuhu al-muḥaddithūn, 15. 62

Chapter 4: Training the Next Generation of Ḥanafī Defenders

Since the founding of the Dār al-ʿUlūm at Deoband in 1866, and establishment of similar madrasas in the following years, the number of Deobandī madrasas has continued to rise. While accurate figures are hard to come by, in 2002, the Pakistani federal minister for religious affairs put the total number of madrasas in Pakistan at 10,000 with a million to 1.7 million students enrolled for at least short periods of time.114 Perhaps a similar number could be estimated for India and Bangladesh.115 Of these, perhaps one-third, if not more, belong to the Deobandī Ḥanafī school. One reason why an accurate measure of madrasa numbers and enrollment remains challenging is that few are officially registered, maybe only up to a third of the actual number.116 Beyond South Asia, growing numbers of Deobandī madrasas are to be found in Southern Africa, Europe, North America and South East Asia. Reetz has explored the connections between various madrasas in these regions.117 In this chapter, I do not engage with socio-political dimensions of the spread of Deobandī madrasas. Therefore, the numbers of institutions and their enrolled students are not my focus. Rather, I focus on the curriculum followed in these madrasas which has a bearing on Deobandīs’

114

Jamal Malik, Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching Terror? (New York: Routledge, 2008), 101n4.

115

I could not find any reliable source with estimates for the number of madrasas in India and Bangladesh. However, considering that the number of Muslims in these two countries is close to that in Pakistan, one could speculate that a similar number of madrasas serve these two communities as well. 116

Adeline Delavande and Basit Zafar, Stereotypes and Madrassas: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 501 (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2013), 9, http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr501.pdf (accessed March 30, 2014). Dietrich Reetz, “The Deoband Universe: What Makes a Transcultural and Transnational Educational Movement of Islam?,” in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27, no. 1 (2007): 139-159. 117

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attempts to defend their claim that the Ḥanafī school is grounded in Ḥadīth.118 In this regard, I particularly focus on the curriculum used at Jamiʿa Ashrafia, a prominent Deobandī madrasa in Lahore, Pakistan, where I studied from 2004 to 2006.

4.1: Deobandī Curriculum Prior to the establishment of the Dār al-ʿUlūm at Deoband in 1866, curriculum of Islamic madrasas in India was dominated by two orientations initiated by two prominent personalities. One was Shāh Wālī Allāh who taught at Madrasat Raḥīmiyya in Delhi, and the other was Niẓām al-Dīn Sihālvī of Lucknow (d. 1748) who taught at Farangī Mahall in Lucknow. Of the two, Wālī Allāh’s curriculum focused on the teaching of Ḥadīth especially the Ṣiḥāḥ Sitta, alMuwaṭṭā of Mālik, and Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ. Sihālvī, on the other hand, focused on developing a “comprehensive” curriculum, which came to be called dars-e-nizāmī, after him. Sihālvī focused more on the ma‘qūlāt (rational sciences) and fiqh than on the manqūlāt (transmitted sciences). In fact, an examination of this curriculum shows that it included ten books on logic, five on dialectics and three on philosophy while only a portion from two works of Qur’ānic exegesis (tafsīr) and one book of Ḥadīth was studied.119 This curriculum proved extremely popular because of its ability to prepare students for independent study and critical thinking. Even the Shīʿites of Lucknow came to the Sunnī school of Farangī Mahall to study

Not much has been written in this regard with the exception of Manāẓir Aḥsan Gīlānī’s (1956) description of how he studied Ḥadīth in Dār al-ʿUlūm Deoband during his school years there. This short work has been translated into English by Muhammad Qasim Zaman and will serve as one of my references. See Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Studying Ḥadīth in a Madrasa in the Early Twentieth Century,” in Islam in South Asia in Practice, ed. Barbara Metcalf (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 225-239. 118

119

Al-Nadwi & Moinuddin, Survey of Muslim Education: India (Cambridge: The Islamic Academy, 1985), 10.

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because of the reputation of this curriculum at producing well-rounded and rational individuals who could go on to serve as scholars, judges, and administrators.120 Walī Allāh’s curriculum and Sihālvī’s curriculum represented two extremes in their emphasis upon the transmitted and the rational sciences, respectively. Quite a number of people took advantage of both the curricula but there was still no single unified curriculum. That came about with the founding of the Dār al-ʿUlūm at Deoband in 1866. The curriculum adopted at Dār al-ʿUlūm, although still referred to as dars-e-nizāmī, was a combination of the two. On the one hand, rational sciences were studied in almost as much detail as Sihālvī had envisaged. On the other hand, Walī Allāh’s emphasis on Ḥadīth was also incorporated so that during the last year of study, called the dawrat al-ḥadīth, the ṣiḥāḥ sitta, as well as portions from Sharḥ maʿānī alāthār of al-Ṭaḥāwī, and the Muwaṭṭa’s of Mālik and Muḥammad were studied in their totality.

4.2: Deobandī Pedagogy In Walī Allāh’s scheme, before engaging in the study of the ṣiḥāḥ sitta, a student would study Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ in detail with discussions on juridical and other matters. After that, the student would go through the ṣiḥāḥ sitta with his teacher(s) without much discussion. This was called sard al-ḥadīth (Ḥadīth recital). The purpose, it seems, was to familiarize the student with the large body of Ḥadīth. With the Deobandis, this changed. Not only did they engage in detailed juridical discussions while teaching Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ, they did the same in the ṣiḥāḥ sitta as well as the two Muwaṭṭa’s and Sharḥ maʿāni al-āthār, thereby ending the concept of sard alḥadīṭh. It is through this process that some of the Deobandī Ḥadīth works such as al-Kawkab aldurrī sharḥ Jāmiʿ al-Tirmidhī and Fayḍ al-Bārī sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī were created. These are

Juan Cole, Roots of North Indian Shī’ism in Iran and Iraq: Religion and State in Awadh, 1722-1859 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 43. 120

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basically lectures notes taken by students which were later edited and annotated, and then published as Ḥadīth commentaries.

4.3: Current Situation This curriculum continues till today with some modifications. In many madrasas, all the ṣiḥāḥ sitta are not always completed. While Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Jāmiʿ al-Tirmidhī and Sunan Abī Dāwūd are almost always studied cover to cover; quite often, only portions from Sunan ibn Mājah and Sunan al-Nasā’i are studied. The same goes for the two versions of Muwaṭṭa’ and Sharḥ Maʿāni al-āthār. This is also the format that I followed when was I was enrolled in dawrat al-ḥadīth at Jāmiʿ Ashrafia in years 2005-2006. It is interesting to note here that Sharḥ maʿāni al-āthār is the work of Abū Jaʿfar alṬaḥāwī (d. 935), a major Ḥanafī scholar from the early period. He provides detailed Ḥadīth proofs for Ḥanafī opinions. Yet his book receives less attention than the ṣiḥāḥ sitta. The reason can perhaps be found in Deobandī focus on answering their detractors who use the ṣiḥāḥ sitta as evidence. The students are being trained to answer the objections of Ahl-e-Hadīs. Therefore, their Ḥadīth curriculum has to focus on those Ḥadīth works that the Ahl-e-Hadīs use to attack the Ḥanafī school. Some Deobandīs have tried to change the situation by calling for more focus on alṬaḥāwī’s work. Notable among such scholars is Zakariyyā Kāndhlavī (d. 1982). Those madrasas that have been established by his followers have increased the portion of Sharḥ maʿāni al-āthār studied from one-fourth of the book to one-half. This is the case with many British and South African madrasas, and is also the case with Darul Uloom Canada, which is the new incarnation

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of Darul Uloom al-Madania of Buffalo, New York. However, to my knowledge, there is no Deobandī madrasa where Sharḥ maʿāni al-āthār is studied cover to cover. Apart from the major collections of Ḥadīth studied at the end of the 8-year ʿālim course, students study other Ḥadīth collections during their preceding years as well.121 Many of these are later additions and did not exist at the time of the founding of Dār al-ʿUlūm Deoband. Thus, in the second year, students study Zād al-ṭālibīn, a short collection of brief ḥadīths meant to teach aspects of Arabic grammar through ḥadīths. Its compiler was a prominent Deobandī scholar, ʿĀshiq Ilāhi Bulandshahrī Muhājir Madanī (d. 1999). In the third and fourth years, students study Nawawī’s famous collection Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn. In the fifth year, students study Āthār al-sunan, which is a collection of ḥadīths in support of the Ḥanafī school, compiled by the nineteenth century non-Deobandī Ḥanafī scholar Muḥammad ibn Subḥān ʿAlī al-Nīmawī (d. 1904). ʿUthmānī’s Iʿlā’ al-sunan is patterned after it, the difference being that the former only dealt with ḥadīths related to matters of ritual cleanliness (ṭahāra) and ritual prayer (ṣalā), while the later is comprehensive dealing with all areas traditionally covered by fiqh texts. In their sixth year, students study Musnad al-Imām al-Aʿẓam (aka Musnad Abī Ḥanīfa), which is a collection of ḥadīths narrated from Abū Ḥanīfa. In the seventh year, students study Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ, and the eighth year is dawrat al-ḥadīth, whose details have been explained earlier.

121

The length of the course is normally eight years in South Asia. In South Africa, UK and North America, the course is quite often reduced to six or seven years, and sometimes to five years. In this thesis, I am using the curriculum suggested by the Deobandī board of madrasas (Wifāq al-Madāris al-ʿArabiyya) of Pakistan. It is followed by the vast majority of Deobandī madrasas in Pakistan. See “Niṣāb,” Wifāq al-madāris, http://www.wifaqulmadaris.org/nisab.php (accessed April 1, 2004). 67

4.4: Effects It is clear from the list of books given above that the number of Ḥadīth texts studied in contemporary Deobandī madrasas is more than a dozen, a far cry from the single collection of Ḥadīth studied during ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s time (the seventeenth century) as well as in Sihālvī’s original dars-e-nizāmī. The purpose it seems is two-fold, to thoroughly familiarize students with Ḥadīth literature and to convinve them of the strength of the Ḥanafī school’s Ḥadīth proofs. It is obvious that someone who graduates after eight years of ʿālim course from a Deobandī madrasa will have gained thorough familiarity with Ḥadīth literature. What is not so clear is whether such a person will also have graduated convinced of the strength of the Ḥadīth proofs of the Ḥanafī school. To my knowledge, no systematic study of the graduates of Deobandī madrasas has been undertaken to gauge the degree to which they are convinced that the Ḥanafī school is grounded in Ḥadīth. In the absence of such a systematic study, I have only my own experience and the experience of some of my classmates to draw on. In my case, ever since I got into a madrasa, I had been hearing claims about the superiority of the Ḥanafī school over other Sunnī schools, and that it is grounded in Ḥadīth as much as any other Sunnī school if not more. Nevertheless, many of the students, myself included, doubted it because of the apparent distance between some of the ḥadīths and the rulings of Ḥanafī fiqh that we knew. However, during the course of dawrat al-ḥadīth, we gradually became convinced that the Ḥanafī school is grounded in Ḥadīth. The main factor in this regard was the degree to which our teachers provided “convincing” answers to the objections raised by the Ahl-e-Hadīs against the Ḥanafīs. Another factor was that we rarely engaged with chain-criticism in class; rather, discussions almost always focused on providing ḥadīths in defense of Ḥanafī claims without

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regard to their level of authenticity. There were few references to works on Ḥanafī principles of Ḥadīth-criticism such as ʿUthmānī’s Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Hadīth. As to what are the causes for that, one can only speculate. Is it because these principles are not authentically Ḥanafī, or not acceptable to other Ḥadīth scholars, or is there a shortage of qualified Ḥadīth-critics among Deoabandīs? Perhaps, the last metioned is the main cause, especially if we were to consider the number of specialization courses offered by Deobandī madrasas. While almost every major Deobandī madrasa around the world offers a post-ʿālim, 1-2 year sepecialization in fiqh (takhaṣṣuṣ fi al-fiqh) course, only less than a dozen around the world offer such a post-ʿālim sepecialization in Ḥadīth (takhaṣṣuṣ fi al-ḥadīth) course.

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Conclusion

The Deobandī movement arose as a Sunnī reformist movement in the middle of the nineteenth century. Deobandīs’ intellectual ancestor, Walī Allāh, had started a comprehensive reform movement for the rejuvenation of Muslim thought and practice in India. However, a century later, his self-styled followers split into two camps because of their disagreements over his intellectual legacy. While both groups shared his emphasis on tawḥīd and sunna, they differed over the exact way to approach Qur’ān and Ḥadīth. The Ahl-e-Hadīs believed that these twin sources of Islamic thought and practice had to be approached without any intermediaries, while the Deobandīs believed that the Ḥanafī school provided the best interpretation of Qur’ān and Ḥadīth for Indian Muslims to follow. The intellectual differences between the two groups soon led to openly acrimonious relations between the two. Ahl-e-Hadīs accused the Ḥanafīs of abandoning the Ḥadīth of the Prophet, while their Deobandī opponents accused them of causing dissension in Muslim ranks. Deobandī responses to Ahl-e-Hadīs charges regarding Ḥanafī attitudes towards Ḥadīth fell into two broad categories, polemical and non-polemical. In this thesis, I have only dealt with the latter. Deobandī non-polemical responses consisted of scholarly works on Ḥadīth collections, as well as articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīth. Deobandīs also composed biographies of their eponymous founder, Abū Ḥanīfa, to defend him against Ahl-e-Hadīs attacks regarding his reliability as a narrator and knowledge of Ḥadīth. Another dimension of Deobandīs’ response was the setting up of madrasas across South Asia and beyond to propagate their school.

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Just as the Ahl-e-Hadīs had used medieval sources to attack Ḥanafīs in general and Abū Ḥanīfa in particular, Deobandīs also resorted to these sources which often contained positive and negative reports about Abū Ḥanīfa. Furthermore, Deobandīs relied on works composed by earlier medieval non-Ḥanafī scholars such as Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Ibn Khaldūn, and al-Suyūṭī, who had defended Abū Ḥanīfa during their time against similar charges. Deobandīs argued that not only was Abū Ḥanīfa a reliable narrator of ḥadīths, he was also a great scholar of Ḥadīth. The relative fewer number of ḥadīths narrated from him is because of his extreme caution regarding ascribing something to the Prophet that the latter did not actually say. With respect to the the Deobandī articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory, I have demonstrated using ʿUthmānī’s Qawāʿid fī ʿulūm al-Qur’ān that the Deobandīs were not so much interested in articulating principles for actual Ḥadīth-criticism as they were in creating a space for Ḥanafī Ḥadīth proofs to be considered “acceptable” by non-Ḥanafī Ḥadīth scholars. Hence, their emphasis on possible ways of raising the rank of weak hadīths to fair, of fair ḥadīths to sound, greater acceptance of suspended reports, greater acceptance of reports of unknown narrators, acceptance of companions’ and followers’ opinions, etc. The obvious question here is why would Deobandīs not articulate Ḥanafī legal theory for actual derivation of legal rulings and merely resort to making existing Ḥanafī rulings’ Ḥadīth proofs “acceptable” to their opponents? I believe the answer may lie in the early history of the Ḥanafī school. Unlike other Sunnī schools, whose substantive law developed over a longer period of time, Ḥanafī substantive law became extensive from a very early period and was also documented early on. This was through the six books of Muḥammad al-Shaybānī called the ẓāhir al-riwāya.122 Al-Shaybānī not only documented his own opinions in these books but also those

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These are al-Mabsūṭ, al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr, al-Siyar al-kabīr, al-Siyar al-ṣaghīr, and al-Ziyādāt. 71

of his teachers Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf. Because of the comprehensive nature of these six books, later Ḥanafīs did not need to engage in ijtihād as often as non-Ḥanafīs. This extensive documentation was coupled with the fact that the legal theory underlying the legal opinions of these early scholars was not preserved. Later Ḥanafīs were now in a bind. They trusted their teachers and teachers’ teachers but had no way of knowing what methodology they had used. This hampered their ability to derive new legal rulings. Furthermore, as other Sunnī schools articulated their legal methodologies, Ḥanafīs must have felt the pressure to present their schools’ methodology as well. Irrespective of what may have actually triggered it, early Ḥanafī legal theorists such as Abū Bakr Aḥmad al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 980), Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī (d. 1038/1039), ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad al-Pazdawī (d. 1089), Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Sarakhsī (d. 1089) engaged in a process of reverse-engineering or back-projection. They surveyed extant Ḥanafī substantive law and the random statements by Abū Ḥanīfa and his companions regarding legal theory to create a coherent legal theory. Works of Hanafī legal theory are therefore not so much manuals for derivation of new laws but more manuals to understand and justify existing Ḥanafī law. This situation was further compounded by the appearance of Ḥadīth collections, many of which contained ḥadīths directly opposed to Ḥanafī rulings. Whether it was a case of deliberate oversight on the part of their non-Ḥanafī authors is debatable. In any case, the Ḥanafīs went on the defensive and felt the need to prove their school’s rulings through Ḥadīth.123 Perhaps, the

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This is all speculative and not based on conclusive scholarship. Modern scholars continue to debate the exact details of early Islamic history, especially the role played by al-Shāfiʿī in “forcing” Sunnīs to accept Ḥadīth as the only way to approach the Prophetic sunna. Most recent works, such as Hallaq’s Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations, uphold this role ascribed to al-Shāfiʿī. Practicing Ḥanafīs have often been uncomfortable with this assertion. Most recently, Volkan Stodolsky has sought to challenge Hallaq’s thesis. See Volkan Yildiran Stodolsky, “A New Historical Model and Periodization for the Perception of the Sunnah of the Prophet and His Companions” (PhD diss., Univesity of Chicago, 2012). It remains to be seen how his work is received in the scholarly community.

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appearance of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Sharḥ maʿāni al-āthār in late third Islamic century can be explained thus. That is indeed how Sadeghi evaluates it.124 We see a similar process at play in seventeenth and eighteenth century India. First ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Dehlawī tried to defend the Ḥanafī school through writing Ḥadīth commentaries that explained Ḥanafī positions. Later, during the early part of his career, Walī Allāh attempted to selectively review the Ḥanafī school to bring it more in line with Ḥadīth. The Deobandī defense of the Ḥanafī school through their articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory vis-à-vis Ḥadīth, and their vigorous defense of Abū Ḥanīfa, thus appears to be only the latest in a long line of Ḥanafī defenses of their school and its eponymous founder. Moreover, they were not alone in the modern period. Already, we have seen through examination of Deobandī sources that at least two other Ḥanafī scholars of the modern period, namely ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī and Zāhid alKawtharī were engaged in similar debates with their Ahl-e-Hadīs and Salafī detractors, respectively. A number of possible courses of action emerge at this stage, many of them building on each other. The first one would be to engage in an exhaustive analysis of Deobandī fiqh literature to see to what extent they have adhered to their own articulation of Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīth. This would help confirm or alter the conclusions that I have reached in this thesis. Another possible line of inquiry would be to explore further the relationship between Walī Allāh’s legal thought and the Deobandīs and Ahl-e-Hadīs. Although a lot has been written on Walī Allāh but such a comparative examination which engages with primary texts for Walī Allāh’s legal thought, as well as Deobandīs’ and Ahl-e-Hadīs’ has not been undertaken. In my case, I relied on secondary literature about Walī Allāh’s legal thought. While understandable considering the limited scope of an MA thesis and the breadth and depth of his work, more 124

Behnam Sadeghi, The Logic of Law Making in Islam (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 131. 73

conclusive and original conclusions can be reached if one were to engage in comparative work using primary sources from Walī Allāh, the Deobandīs and the Ahl-e-Hadīs. An even more ambitious line of inquiry would be to engage in a comparative analysis of Ḥanafī articulations of their legal theory vis-à-vis Ḥadīth over the centuries and see how Deobandīs’ articulation of the same compares with them. Hopefully, such a comparison would tell us whether Ḥanafī legal theory with respect to Ḥadīth has evolved over the centuries or not, and whether these changes, if any, were a response to external factors such as Ahl-e-Hadīs attacks in the case of Deobandīs, or was there internal Ḥanafī desire to engage with Ḥadīth?

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