Compiled Assignment Questions Group 3

KC08803 ETHICS AND LAWS FOR ENGINEERS ASSIGNMENT 1: DUE 13 NOV, PRESENTATION 13 NOV 8. Engineers are often entrusted with the responsibility of implementing large-scale projects involving millions of Ringgits. In view of the large amount of money changing hands, the integrity and ethical standards of engineers are being put to test. What measures can an engineer take to prevent corruption and unethical practice of cutting corners in order to safeguard the good image of the engineering profession?

ASSIGNMENT 2: DUE 11 DEC 21. LATE CONFESSION In 1968, Norm Lewis was a 51-year-old doctoral candidate in history at the University of Washington.62 While taking his final exam in the program, he excused himself to go to the bathroom, where he looked at his notes. For the next 32 years, Lewis told no one. At age 83, he decided to confess, and he wrote to the president of the university admitting that he had cheated and that he had regretted it ever since. Commenting on the case, Jeanne Wilson, president of the Center for Academic Integrity remarked, ‘‘I think there is an important lesson here for students about the costs of cheating. He has felt guilty all these years, and has felt burdened by this secret, believing that he never really earned the degree he was awarded.’’ Wilson’s position is that the University of Washington should not take action against Lewis, given his confession, his age, and the fact that, after all, he did complete his coursework and a dissertation. But, she added, ‘‘On the other hand, I think an institution might feel compelled to revoke the degree if we were talking about a medical or law degree or license, or some other professional field such as engineering or education, and the individual were younger and still employed on the basis of that degree or license.’’ Discuss the ethical issues this case raises, both for Dr. Lewis and for University of Washington officials. Evaluate Jeanne Wilson’s analysis, especially as it might apply to engineers.

ASSIGNMENT 3: DUE 4 DEC CASE STUDY: THE TOKAIMURA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT Nuclear energy is a very sensitive issue in Japan. The aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II gave the Japanese people firsthand knowledge of the devastating effects of exposure to nuclear radiation. So, their concerns about nuclear safety are perhaps even greater than elsewhere in the world. Although Japan is one of the most industrialized and richest nations in the world, they are energy-resource poor. Virtually all of the necessary fuel for conventional power plants must be imported. So the use of nuclear power plants to generate electricity is very attractive to Japan as a means for diversifying their electrical energy production and reducing reliance on fossil fuel imports. Japan has a very active nuclear energy research program. In 1999, three workers at a Japanese nuclear fuel plant were exposed to high doses of radiation when an accident occurred while they were preparing nuclear reactor fuel. There were concerns about exposure of the surrounding neighbourhoods to radiation, leading to the temporary evacuation of 161 people living near the plant. Eventually, two of the workers died as result of this accident [World Nuclear Association website]. The fuel preparation plant at Tokaimura was owned by Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Company (JCO), a subsidiary of the large Sumitomo family of companies. This small plant was used to process up to 3,000 kg a year of highly enriched uranium (up to 20% U-235) used in research and experimental reactors. Of utmost importance in any fuel manufacturing process involving uranium is to avoid criticality. This means preventing the concentration of uranium from reaching a critical mass and ensuring that conditions do not allow a nuclear chain reaction to begin. Achieving criticality is what makes a nuclear reactor operate, but it is to be avoided during the processing of fuel. As originally designed and approved, the fuel production process called for dissolving uranium oxide powder in nitric acid in a dissolution tank, transferring this solution to a storage column where it was mixed with other components, and finally transferring the mixture to a precipitation tank. Preventing criticality was designed into the fuel production process and the equipment. For example, the storage column was designed to prevent a nuclear chain reaction from occurring, and the process had built-in controls to keep the amount of radioactive material transferred into the precipitation tank below critical levels. Control of the amount of

uranium in the precipitation tank was essential in preventing a critical mass of material in the final stage of the process. After a few years of operation, the company modified the fuel production process without seeking permission from the government authorities in charge of regulating this type of plant. The changes included dissolving the uranium oxide in stainless steel buckets instead of in the dissolution tank, having the workers directly tip the solution from the buckets into the precipitation tank, and using mechanical stirring in the precipitation tank to mix the materials rather than having this occur in the criticality-safe storage column. Using this new process, there was no longer any automated control over the amount of material tipped into the precipitation tank. These changes were made to simplify and speed up the process. On September 30, 1999, three workers were using the modified procedure to prepare a batch of fuel enriched to 18.8%. Previously, the new process had only been used for batches at 5% enrichment, and so criticality was not an issue. As they tipped material into the precipitation tank, a critical mass was reached and a self-sustaining nuclear fission chain reaction began. Once this began, intense gamma and neutron radiation was emitted, triggering alarms. Within five hours of the start of the intense emission, 161 people in the nearby neighbourhood were evacuated. The criticality continued for approximately 20 hours and was finally stopped when workers drained water from a cooling sheath around the precipitation tank (water reflects neutrons, so draining the sheath allowed neutrons to escape from the tank so they would no longer contribute to keeping the chain reaction going) and replaced it with a boric acid solution (this absorbs neutrons and ensured that the chain reaction would not start back up). Although the emission of neutrons ceased, gamma radiation was still being emitted. There was only a slight release of radioactive material outside the tank and outside the environs of the plant, so the Japanese government classified this as a Level 4 accident, based on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) created by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Level 4 means that the event is an irradiation accident rather than a contamination accident. The IAEA attributed the accident to human error and breaches of accepted safety procedures. JCO admitted that it had violated normal safety procedures and had violated laws related to radiation safety. The plant’s operating license was revoked in 2000. Ultimately, all three of the workers originally exposed to the radiation became very ill, and two of them died. In addition, other workers were exposed to radiation and became sick as well, although none died.

It would be easy to simply attribute this accident to “human error.” However, there are other errors here as well: management, regulatory, and engineering. Management at JCO was responsible for allowing the changes in the process to take place without proper analysis and without regard for the potential consequences of these changes. Although the plant received twice-annual inspections from the Japanese regulatory agency with authority over nuclear materials processing, evidently these visits were not thorough enough. Indeed, it was reported that none of these regulatory visits occurred while fuel processing was actually taking place. Engineering errors occurred through insufficient oversight of changes that had been made to the enrichment process and failure to foresee the consequences of these changes. Basically, the corporate safety and corporate ethics culture within JCO was insufficient to ensure the protection of its workers and the people living near its plant. What responsibility do engineers have for this accident? Engineers would have been involved in all aspects of the decision making that led to this accident. JCO employed engineers both in the design of the fuel production process and in the design of the associated processing equipment. JCO also had engineers employed in management positions related to this plant. Finally, engineers worked for the nuclear regulatory agency in Japan that had oversight over the Tokaimura plant.