Consti 1 Digests (usjr Law; Tth)

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CASE: DE LEON V. ESGUERRA NAME: BACALOD, CHRISTIAN PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: There was a group of candidates who won during the barangay held on May 17 1982 elections namely Alfredo M. Deleon as Barangay Chairman, Barangay Councilors Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion of Barangay Dolores TayTay Rizal. However the OIC governor Benjamin Esguerra issued a Memorandum dated February 7 1987 (antedated on December 1 1986) replacing the elected officials the new official who were Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Chairman and Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as Barangay councilours Contention of petitioners: Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. Contention of Respondents: Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided: SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986.

ISSUE/S: WON the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the One year period which ended on February 25 1987 RULING: Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned. Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1987, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice. But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading. SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be

considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading: Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. Decision: the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition. Without costs. SO ORDERED.

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CASE: NITAFAN V. CIR NAME: SAW, BIM PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: The petitioners are Regional Trial Court judges. They sought to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court from making deductions of withholding taxes from their salaries. According to the petitioners, the tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers is a violation of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that: “The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased”. In other words, by deducting withholding taxes, the judges asserted that their salaries are being decreased, they also cite Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David (excludes them from income tax) as their legal basis. The petitioners claim that since the 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, petitioners claimed that the intent of the framers was to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries. Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution states: SEC. 6. No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax. ISSUE/S: W/N members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax RULING: Yes The primary task in constitutional interpretation is to ascertain the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. The true intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. Comparing the different constitutional provisions: The 1935 Constitution provided: The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their continuance in office. And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically stipulated: No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.

The provision in the 1987 Constitution (Section 10, Article VIII), which petitioners rely on, reads: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers (1935 Constitution). But the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution which negates the contention of the petitioners was clear upon the course of deliberations by the Constitutional Commission. During the draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, it contained the phrase "their salary shall not be diminished nor subjected to income tax". But during the debates, 2 commissioners objected to the part on tax exemption as this violates the principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of the law. And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches in the government. It was also agreed upon by the commissioners that even though there are no General Provisions on non-exemption from tax of salaries of public officers, when we put a period after the word "decreased", the interpretation should be that the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore. (the salaries of the judges are now subject to income tax) FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted. Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.

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CASE: SANTIAGO VS GUINGONA NAME: PEPITO, VICTORIA PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted a petition for quo warranto seeking to oust Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and to declare Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader. The Senate convened for the first regular session for the eleventh Congress. The agenda was the election of officers. Senator Fernan gaining majority vote of 20 to 2, was declared as the President of the Senate. Sen. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and thus also a minority, had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the court the subject petition for quo warranto alleging that Sen. Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and execising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Sen. Tatad. ISSUE/S: 1.)Whether the court have jurisdiction over the petition 2.)Whether there was an actual violation of the Constitution 3.)Whether Sen. Guingona was usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of senate minority leader 4.)Whether Sen. Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Sen. Guingona as the minority leader RULING: 1.)NO, there was no violation. The court may only inquire as to whether an act of congress or its officials has been with grave abuse of discretion. The constitution is clear regarding the manner of electing the Senate President and a House Speaker but is silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chamber of Congress. The method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the court. The constitution vests in each house the power to determine the rules of its proceedings. The court has no authority to interfere into the exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold. 2.)NO, there was no usurpation. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent.

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In this case,

petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate

minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader. Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

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CASE: BONDOC VS PINEDA NAME: TAALA, DEIRDRE PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein RULING: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an

independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another. THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

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CASE: NORTH COTABATO V. GRP PEACE PANEL NAME: BACOLOD, CHRISTIAN PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MILF is a rebel group. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize because the petitioners applied for a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same. Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting." A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which

was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Province of North Cotabato8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.9 Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOAAD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. ISSUE: Whether the Bansangmoro Judicial Entity (BJE) is a state. RULING: Yes. The MOA-AD alludes to the international law concept of association. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. 4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD. Keitner and Reisman state that [a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN membership. According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the

governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either government. In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from having access to these territories for military purposes. It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an international association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of independence.152 In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X: SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with

other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of associfation runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied) As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE. The MOA-AD, moreover, would not comply with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows: SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied) Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary155 instructs:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOAAD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity. Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.157 Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states: 1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows: "As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous region who are: (a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and (b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions." Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region." International laws do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States. There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples

their own police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows: 1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States. Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary. It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended 6

CASE: MAGALLONA V. ERMITA NAME: SAW, BIM PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: In 1961, Congress passed RA 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic state following the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (UNCLOS I) which codifies the sovereign rights of states over their territorial sea, but the breadth of which remains undetermined. In March 2009, RA 3046 was amended by RA 9522 to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners (law professors, law students, legislators in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers, legislators) assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely:

(1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and; (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To support their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.

ISSUE/S: W/N RA 9522 is unconstitutional RULING: No. RA 9522 is constitutional Petitioners' contention: 1. Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory" because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. SC: UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is a treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts. On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. This gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2),

the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. 2. Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that area prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. SC: The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose. Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal. SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. Far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121" of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. 3. Petitioners argue that RA 9522 is invalid for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo. SC: Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines

of Sabah: Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. 4. As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. SC: Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this through Art. 49. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise.

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CASE: LAWYERS LEAGUE VS PRES. AQUINO NAME: PEPITO, VICTORIA PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." ISSUE/S: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate. RULING: Yes. The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.

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CASE: PEOPLE V. PERFECTO NAME: TAALA, DEIRDRE PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: In this case, the accused was charged with having published an article in the newspaper La Nacion reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. In this Court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding that Article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of Article 256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the Libel law. In the course of the main opinion in the Perfecto case, it found this significant sentence: “Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected Article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.” ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is still in effect despite the change of sovereignty from Spanish to United State. RULING: No, the Article 256 of the SPC is not in effect and cannot be applied in this case. First, the article was enacted to protect the Spanish officials who were representatives of the King. However, there are no longer Kings nor representatives of the Kings to protect at present and “Minister of the Crown” does not exist in the current government. Second, the Philippine Libel Law (Act No. 227) had repealed so much in the provision that relates to written defamation, abuse and insult in the SPC and based on the facts, the defendant violated neither of the two laws. Lastly, the change from Spanish to American sovereignty of the Philippines. As stated as a general principle of public law, the laws that regulates the relations of the inhabitants of the acquired territory to the previous sovereign are abrogated. Therefore, the judgment was reversed, and the defendantappellant was acquitted.

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CASE: MACARIOLA V. ASUNCION NAME: BACOLOD, CHRISTIAN PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: Respondent judge was charged for having violated (1) Article 1491 of the New Civil Code when he acquired by purchase portion of a lot which was involved in a civil case decided by him; (2) Article 14 of the Code of Commerce, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Civil Service Rules, and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance. ISSUE: Whether the judge is liable. HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that there was no violation of Paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code because the sale took place after finality of the decision; that respondent may not be held liable under paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce (which is of Spanish vintage), because the provision partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees and as such is deemed to have been automatically abrogated with the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States; that respondent cannot be held liable under Paragraph H, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because there is no showing (a) that he participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transaction of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., or (b) that said corporation gained any undue advantage by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, and because neither the 1935 nor the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines or any existing law expressly prohibits members of the Judiciary from engaging or having any interest in any lawful business. The prohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that " . . . for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code. Although Article 14 of the Code of Commerce is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges. Political law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887). It must be recalled that a political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and election. POLITICAL LAW CASES and PRINCIPLES BY CHRISTINE SANTIAGO RUFLO 2 2010 Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States to the Republic of the Philippines,

Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

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CASE: PEOPLE V. GOZO NAME: SAW, BIM PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: Loreta Gozo, appellant, seeks for a reversal of the judgment of the Court of the First Instance of Zambales of her conviction in violation of an ordinance in Olongapo, Zambales requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for any construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Believing in the advice of Ernesto Evalle, an assistant in the City Mayor’s Office and sole neighbors, the appellant never bothered to obtain the necessary Mayor’s permit before demolishing and constructing a new one. However, on December 29, 1966, Juan Malones, a building and lot inspector of the City Engineer’s Office of Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force apprehended the four carpenters working on the house of the accused and brought them to the Olongapo City police headquarters for interrogation. After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S of 1964 with the City Fiscal’s Office. The City Court of Olongapo City found her guilty of the said violation and sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the costs. The Court of Instance of Zambales, on appeal, also found her guilty on the same violation stated but sentenced her merely with a payment to a fine of P200.00 and to demolish the house erected. She elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and raised the issue on the validity of the City Ordinance on constitutional ground or at the very least, its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base. ISSUE/S: W/N Municipal Ordinance No.14, s. of 1964 was enforceable considering where the house was erected was within the US Naval base. RULING: Yes The Municipal Ordinance No. 14, s of 1964 is enforceable against Gozo on the grounds that the Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. The Philippine Government merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases and that the consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy or expediency. Under the terms of the Treaty, the US Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the US Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Base Agreement). Therefore, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State, through Olongapo City, does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base. Consequently, Loreta Gozo was found guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No.14, s of 1964.

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CASE: U.S. V. RUIZ NAME: BACOLOD, CHRISTIAN PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: ISSUE/S: RULING:

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CASE: SANDERS V. VERIDIANO NAME: PEPITO, VICTORIA PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines.Private respondent Rossi and Wyerwere both employed as game room attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status. However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, they placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear." Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status .So,private respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.

However,petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.However, the motion was denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?

RULING:Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters,the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts. It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz,the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent. The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

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CASE: RUIZ V. CABAHUG NAME: TAALA, DEIRDRE PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: The Secretary of National Defense, defendant Hon. Sotero B. Cabahug, accepted the bid of Allied Technologists, Inc. on July 31, 1950 for the furnishing of the architectural and engineering services in the construction of the Veterans Hospital at the price of Php 302, 700. The architectural requirements were submitted by Allied Technologies through Enrique Ruiz, Jose Herrera and Pablo Panlillo and were approved by the United States Veterans Administration and a contract was signed due to the technical objection to the capacity of the said company in the practice of architecture and upon the advice of the Secretary of Justice. The defendants allegedly took 15% of the sum due to Allied Technologies, Inc. at the time of the payment of the contract price for the reason that Panlillo asserted that he is the sole architect of the Veterans Hospital, excluding Ruiz and Herrera, the assertion of which was abetted by defendant Jimenez (the first cause of action). The plaintiffs were to be deprived of their share of professional services and their professional prestige and standing were to be gravely damaged unless the defendants are prevented from recognizing Panlillo as the sole architect. Furthermore, the second cause of action is Title II of the contract where at any time prior to six months after completion and acceptance of the work under Title I, the Government may direct Allied Technologists, Inc. to do the services stated in said Title II yet nevertheless the completion the government declined to direct the plaintiffs to perform the job. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the government can be sued for withholding the 15% of the sum and depriving the plaintiffs of their share. RULING: The case is a not a suit against the government, which could not be sued without its consent. It was found that the government has already allotted the full amount for the contract price; it was the defendant-officials which were responsible for the allegation. This was to be directed to the officials alone, where they are compelled to act in accordance with the rights established by Ruiz and Herrera or to desist them from paying and recognizing the rights and interests in the funds retained and the credit for the job finished. The order of dismissal was reversed and set aside and the case was remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings with costs against the defendants.

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CASE: U.S. V. GUINTO NAME: MAGNO, CARMILLE PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: (US vs. Guinto) Private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services in the said. Among those who submitted their bids were Private respondents Valencia, Tanglao and Del Pilar. Valencia has been concenssionaire inside Clark base for 34 years; del Pilar for 12 years and Tanglao for 50 years. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, including the Civil Engineering Area (CEA) which was not included in the invitation to bid which was objected by the private respondents. The latter complained to the Phil. Area Exchange (PHAX). The PHAX through its representatives who were the petitioners in this case (Reeves and Smouse), explained that the Civil engineering concession had not been awarded to Ramon Dizon as a result of the solicitation and that the solicitation of the CEA barbershop would be available and private respondents would be notified. Private respondents: Filed a complaint to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding and to allow respondents by a writ of preliminary injuction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation. The respondent court issued an ex parte order directing the individual petitioner to maintain the status quo. Petitioners: Filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America, which had NOT waived its nonsuability. The officials/employees of the U.S. Air Force were also immune from suit. Trial Court: 1986, Denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. On 1988, denied the petitioners motion to dismiss. (US vs. Rodrigo) Private Respodent Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioner for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center. in Baguio City. It has been ascertained after investigation from the testimony of petitioners that respondent Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Petitioner Lamachia suspended him and referred the case to a board. The board unanimously found him guilty recommended dismissal, it was effected by Col. Kimball. Respondent Genove’s reaction was to file his complaint in the RTC against the individual petitioners. Petitioners, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was against the U.S., which had NOT given its consent to be sued. Respondent Judge denied the motion. Petitioners then went to SC seeking certioarari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. (US vs. Ceballos) Private respondent Bautista wa san employee in Camp O’Donell an extension of Clark Air

Base as a barracks boy. Bautista was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by individual petitioners who were officers of the US Air force and special agaents. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against Bautista in the RTC. Petitioner testified against respondent a this trial and as aresult Bautista was dismissed from his employment. Bautista filed a complaint for damages against petitioners. Marianno Navarro, a special councel assigned to the International Law Division, entered a special appearance for the petitioners and moved for extention because the US had not yet designated counsel to represent the petitioners. Within the extended period, the petitioners without the assistance of counsel or authority form the US DOJ alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of the laws of the Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the agreement. The law firm retained to represent the petitioners invoked that the they were acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained of and the complaint against them was in effect a suit against US without its consent. (US vs. Vergara) Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioner (except USA), for injuries sustained by the respondents as a result of the acts of petitioners. There is a conflict of factual allegations: Respondents: Petitioners beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed the dogs on them which bit them several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries in them Petitioners: Deny this claim and claim that respondents were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. The dogs were called off and respondents were immediately taken for treatment. The United States of America and the individual petitioners argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the US without consent to be sued. Petitioners were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done in performance of their duty. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty RULING: There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied. In US vs. Guinto, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents. The contracts in question being decidedly commercial. The barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as required in most military organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee. In US vs. Rodrigo, United States government itself cannot claim such immunity. The reason is that

by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. Private petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. The Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. All persons availing themselves of this facility pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are concededly reasonable and relatively low, such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Complaint against the petitioners in the court below must still be dismissed. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence before us, which we have carefully examined. The board unanimously affirmed the findings of the investigators and recommended Genove's dismissal. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite properly in terminating the private respondent's employment for his unbelievably nauseating act. In US vs. Ceballos, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. In US vs Vergara, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties. 15

CASE: THE HOLY SEE V. ROSARIO NAME: MAGNO, CARMILLE PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: Petitioner who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Private Respondent, Starbright Sales, is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business. A controversy over a parcel of land (Lot 5-A) was registered in the name of petitioner. Lot 5-A is contiguous to two other lots B and D registered in the name of Phil Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through messenger Cirilos as agent. Licup assigned his rights to the sale to Private respondent Starbright Sales. Refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots, a dispute arose as who of the parties has responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by Petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana. Private Respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for annulment of the sale and specific performance and damages against petitioner. Complaint alleged that: They agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lot 5-A, B, & D for 1,240sqm.

That the sellers clear the said lots of squatters with the condition that earnest money be paid worth 100k. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters refusal to vacate the lots, proposing either to undertake the eviction or returned the earnest money. Respondent would undertake the eviction but the purchase price be reduced to 1,150 sqm. They discovered that petitioner and PRC without notice to respondents, sold the lots to Tropicana and was registered in the name of Tropicana. Respondent demanded the rescission of the sale. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. TC issued an order denying petitioners motion to dismiss. ISSUE: Whether or not the Holy See is immune from suit as its business relations regarding selling the lot to a private entity. RULING: Yes. The adopted generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis (private acts) . However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

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CASE: GERMAN AGENCY VS. CA NAME: MAGNO, CARMILLE PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: In 1971, the government of Germany and Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning Technical Cooperation. The agreement affirmed the countries common interest in promoting technical and economic development of their States and recognized the benefits to be be derived by both States from closer technical co-operation. And allowed arrangements concerning individual projects. In 1999, The Philippines government and German Government agreed to an arrangement which affirmed the common commitment of both governments to promote jointly a project called, Social Heal Insurance Networking and Empowerment (SHINE), which was designed to enable Phil. Families especially poor ones to maintain their health and secure health care. The arrangement stated the various obligations of the Filipino and German governments. The Philippines designated the DOH and PhilHealth with the implementation of SHINE and the German government charged the GTZ with the implementation of its contributions. Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE. The following are: Magtaas was hired as an information system manager and project officer; Dionco as a project assistant; Ramos as a project assistant and liason. Dela Paz and Tamayo as programmers and Ramilo as driver and multipurpose service man. Nicolay, a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager which arose disagreements between Nicolay and private respoondents such as salary adjustments. Private respondents further alleged that as a result of Nicolay's "new thrust, resources have been used inappropriately;" that the new management style was "not congruent with the original goals of the project;" that Nicolay herself suffered from "cultural insensitivity" that consequently failed to sustain healthy relations with SHINE's partners and staff. Private respondents received a letter from Nicolay informing them for pre-termination of their contracts of employment on the grounds of serious and gross insubordination resulting to loss of confidence and trust. The private respondents led a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. Named as respondents therein where GTZ, the Director of its Manila office Hans Peter Paulenz, its Assistant Project Manager Christian Jahn, and Nicolay. GTZ filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case. Which led to filing a “reiterating motion to dismiss” but Labor arbiter rendered a decision granting the complaint for illegal dismissal. GTZ did not elevate the case to the the NLRC but opted to assail the decision by way of certiorari with the CA but was dismissed by the CA. ISSUE: WON GTZ is immune from suit? RULING: NO If the instant suit had been brought directly against the Federal Republic of Germany, there would be no doubt that it is a suit brought against a State, and the only necessary inquiry is whether said State had consented to be sued. However, the present suit was brought against GTZ.

Neither GTZ nor the OSG go beyond the claim that petitioner is "the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany." On the other hand, private respondents asserted before the Labor Arbiter that GTZ was "a private corporation engaged in the implementation of development projects." In truth, private respondents were unable to adduce any evidence to substantiate their claim that GTZ was a "private corporation", and the Labor Arbiter acted rashly in accepting such claim without explanation. But neither has GTZ supplied any evidence defining its legal nature beyond that of the bare descriptive "implementing agency". It appears that GTZ was actually organized not through a legislative public charter, but under private law, in the same way that Philippine corporations can be organized under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the Philippine government. The characterization of GTZ as an "implementing agency of the Federal Republic of Germany", yet it bolsters the notion that as a company organized under private law, it has a legal personality independent of that of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany, in its own official website, described GTZ as a private company owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or controlled corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued. GTZ has failed to obtain a certification of immunity from suit from the Department of Foreign affairs. If GT has done so' then there would be no ambiguity in their claim that they are immune from suit 17

CASE: MERRITT V. GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS NAME: TAALA, DEIRDRE PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: Merritt was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura when he was bumped by an ambulance owned by General Hospital, a government hospital. Merritt sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work as a constructor. Later, the legislature enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of General Hospital; and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the Government, in enacting Act 2457, conceded its liability to the plaintiff 2. Whether or not the Government should be held liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance RULING: - No, the government did not concede its liability to the plaintiff. By consenting to be sued, a

state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. - No, the government should not be held liable for the negligent act of the driver. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable only when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable. Main Points: - The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code) - The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. - The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest. 18

CASE: REPUBLIC V. VILLASOR NAME: BACALOD, CHRISTIAN PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner, confirming the award in the amount of P1.7 million. On June 24, 1969, respondent Judge Villasor, issued an Order declaring the decision final and executory. Pursuant to the said decision, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued. Because of this Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment with several Banks, specially on the `monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits. The Philippine Veterans Bank received the notice of garnishment. So now, the petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, is filing a certiorari and prohibition proceeding to nullify and set aside the order declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not respondent Judge Villasor acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment. RULING: Yes. The court ruled that: “…The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.” Therefore, respondent Judge Villasor acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Thus, the order declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued is null and void. **comment: in the syllabus, this case is under State Immunity, but the case mainly talks about the liability of the state in terms of disbursing public funds. However, it has a lot of explanations (I pasted it below) in the ruling as to how and why as a general rule, the State cannot be sued unless with its consent. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." It is stated in Article XV, Sec. 16 of 1935 Constitution that "The State may not be sued without its consent." A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. In the case of Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, it was decided that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known

propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined."

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CASE: UNIVERSITY OF THE PH V. DIZON NAME: SAW, BIM PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS:UP entered into a construction agreement with Stern Builders Corporation for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños. Stern Builders submitted three billings, but UP paid only two of the billings. The third billing was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders to sue UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of Stern Builders, and a motion for execution was granted. The sheriff served notices of garnishment on UP’s depository banks, namely: Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the Philippines.

ISSUE/S: W/N the funds of UP were the proper subject of garnishment

RULING: No. The funds of UP are government funds that are public in character. UP is a chartered institution performing legitimate government function, an institution of higher

learning, not a corporation established for profit and declaring any dividends. In enacting Republic Act No. 9500 (The University of the Philippines Charter of 2008), Congress has declared UP as the national university "dedicated to the search for truth and knowledge as well as the development of future leaders." UP is a government instrumentality performing the State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. All the funds going into the possession of UP constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with UP’s mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of UP are government funds that are public in character. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability. Jurisprudence discussion on the distinction between suability and liability: Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. Republic v. Villasor: Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. UP correctly submits here that the garnishment of its funds to satisfy the judgment awards of actual and moral damages (including attorney’s fees) was not validly made if there was no special appropriation by Congress to cover the liability. There should be an express authorization by Congress or by the head of a government agency in control of the funds, and subject to pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations. The Constitution strictly mandated that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. An appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered UP liable would be satisfied. Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of State liability, the prosecution,

enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in P.D. No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. All money claims against the Government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit. * Notwithstanding the rule that government properties are not subject to levy and execution unless otherwise provided for by statute or municipal ordinance, the Court has, distinguished between government funds and properties for public use and those not held for public use. In Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo the Court ruled that "where property of a municipal or other public corporation is sought to be subjected to execution to satisfy judgments recovered against such corporation, the question as to whether such property is leviable or not is to be determined by the usage and purposes for which it is held: 1. Properties held for public uses – and generally everything held for governmental purposes – are not subject to levy and sale under execution against such corporation. The same rule applies to funds in the hands of a public officer and taxes due to a municipal corporation. 2. Where a municipal corporation owns in its proprietary capacity, as distinguished from its public or government capacity, property not used or used for a public purpose but for quasi-private purposes, it is the general rule that such property may be seized and sold under execution against the corporation. 3. Property held for public purposes is not subject to execution merely because it is temporarily used for private purposes. If the public use is wholly abandoned, such property becomes subject to execution. 20

CASE: FONTANILLA V. MALIAMAN NAME: PEPITO, VICTORIA PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: ISSUE/S: RULING:

CITIZENSHIP

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CASE: KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA NAME: BACOLOD, CHRISTIAN PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition to set aside the appointment of Gregory Ong as AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that Ong is not a natural-born citizen and thus, is disqualified to become a member of the Supreme Court. Respondent Ermita, on the other hand, contended that Ong was appointed from a list of candidates given by the JBC and they have referred the matter back to the latter for the determination of the issue regarding Ong’s citizenship. Respondent Ong contended that he is truly a natural-born citizen, following a series of changes in nationalities and whatnot with respect to his ancestors. He also contended that the petitioner has no standing to file the said petition. ISSUE/S: WON Ong is a Natural Born citizen RULING: First, on the issue of standing, the petitioners have standing as the issue involved is of utmost importance—the citizenship of a person to be appointed as a member of the Supreme Court. Second, on the principal issue of the case, the Court took judicial notice of Ong’s petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, respondent alleged that he is qualified to be admitted because among others he is a Filipino citizen, and that he became a citizen because his father became a naturalized Filipino citizen and being a minor then, thus he too became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers o this father. It was on basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of no less than Ong that the Court allowed him to take his oath as a lawyer. It is clear therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, as the petitioner correctly submitted, no substantial change in an entry in the civil register can be made without a judicial order. Change in the citizenship status is a substantial change. The long string of events that Ong alleged leading to him being a natural-born citizen, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings. NOTE: In this case, there has been no ouster from an appointment. There may be approval of the appointment but it lacks other acts that will complete the appointment. The last act in an appointment is the delivery of the commission. It is now up to the appointee—he must accept the appointment, take an oath of office, assume office, etc. It doesn’t end here. The CSC can either reject or approve of the appointment. When the appointee doesn’t pursue all the acts to assume office, the question is whether or not he can be held liable. The law doesn’t provide really that there is a period to accept or reject an appointment.

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CASE: MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER IMMIGRATION NAME: BACOLOD, CHRISTIAN PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines and was permitted to stay for a period of one month. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962. On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-inlaw.' ISSUE: Whether Lau became a Filipino citizen upon marriage to Moya. RULING: We hereby hold that portion of Section 9(g) of the Immigration Act providing: "An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act." does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehement]y expressed disapproval of convenient ruses employed by aliens to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back on his representation and stay permanently, without first departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him of the departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of 'change' or 'correction', for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on

false pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining and verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident." On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this hag been conferred upon him. Consider, for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether or not they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd construction. In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus discussed, therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are well taken. Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. The naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-avis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. The avowed policy of "selective admission" more particularly refers to a case where a citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy to be come citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application is cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operations of law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizens of the Philippines. We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the

Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizens, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Section 16 is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization a Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should not follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied that same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1 [5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen. The leading idea or purpose of Section 15 was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the provisions concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to who they are related, the effect is for said person to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of the Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship commences. The legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified

from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of the said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited Section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.

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CASE: BURCA VS. REPUBLIC NAME: DEIRDRE TAALA PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: Zita Ngo is a Chinese national married to Florencio Burca a Filipino citizen. She claims that she possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization as a Filipino citizen , she applied for cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration. This was opposed by the Solicitor General, but the trial court dismissed the opposition and declare that Zita Ngo Burca hass all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen and that she being married to a Filipino citizen is hereby declared as a citizen of the Philippines. Such judgment of the trial court was appealed. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the petition of Zita Ngo Burca should be granted? RULING: NO The SC discussed here that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized. An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor

by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void. As to the merits of the case: Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's "present and former places of residence. The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former places of residence is that "information regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical surrounding". the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal. We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case". These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must fail. Here, the case was submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner. No other witnesses were presented. This does not meet with the legal requirement. Upon the view we take of his case, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the petition dismissed.

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CASE: EDISON SO VS. REPUBLIC NAME: SAW, BIM PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: Petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473(Revised Naturalization Law, as amended). Aside from his own allegations of himself, a joint affidavit of his two witnesses was attached to his petition. They alleged that he has all the qualifications provided under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473 The RTC issued an order setting the petition for hearing. The entire petition was ordered published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building. No one opposed the petition. The first witness was the legal consultant of his family's business. The 2nd witness was his classmate and knew him for 10 years or more. Both testified but merely answered yes or no or general statements. The witnesses testified that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines. The RTC granted the petition. Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the decision. Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee failed to prove that he possesses all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473. It insisted that his two (2) character witnesses did not know him well enough to vouch for his fitness to become a Filipino citizen; they merely made general statements without giving specific details about his character and moral conduct. CA reversed the decision of RTC. Later on reversed by CA for not complying with the requirements (at least 21 yrs old) and no credible witnesses. 20 yrs old pa man d.ay cya. Petitioner avers that the requirements for naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI 270, in relation to Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and 1379, had been relaxed after the Philippine government entered into diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China; the requirements were further relaxed when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 (The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000)(18 yrs old) was signed into law. Petitioner contends that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should possess are those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473. Respondent countered that R.A. No. 9139 (which took effect on August 8, 2001 and where the applicant’s age requirement was lowered to eighteen (18) years old), refers only to administrative naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization.

ISSUE/S: W/N Edison So possess all the qualifications needed to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.

RULING: No. To determine whether or not an applicant for naturalization is entitled to become a Filipino citizen, it is necessary to resolve the following issues: (1) whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial act; and (2) whether or not the witnesses presented by petitioner are "credible" in accordance with the jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No. 473. 1. SC mentioned the 3 ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act. Petitioner is wrong in his contention that what he should possess are those under RA no. 9139. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws. CA 473 covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. There is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications. In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473. (not less than 21) 2. In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were competent to vouch for his good moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. It must be stressed that character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicant’s conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons. Also, the petitioner’s witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough; their testimonies do

not satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law. Additional contention: We do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the petition (did not oppose from the beginning). A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.

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CASE: KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA NAME: BACOLOD, CHRISTIAN PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: ISSUE/S: RULING:

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CASE: JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC NAME: PEPITO, VICTORIA PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: ISSUE/S: RULING:

27

CASE: VILLANDO VS. HRET NAME: PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: Private respondent Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over other contender and was proclaimed as Representative. She assumed office as Member of the House of Representtive. A petition filed by Biraogo, Paras and Petitioner Vilando, which questioned the citizenship of private responndent, involving either the disqualification or the proclamation, were filed before the COMELEC which reached the Court which was dismissed and directed them to seek relief before the HRET. Petitioner Vilando and Paras filed separate petitions for Quo warranto against private respondent before the HRET which were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the eligibility of one and same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office. Also, she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage Private respondent asserted that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and had already attained the status of res judicata. That the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack. HRET dismissied both peitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the HRET.

ISSUE: WON Private Respondent Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citzen. RULING: YES. Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution which provides: Article IV Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship Limkaichong’s father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father. Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age (Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter, accomplished voter’s affidavit and ran as a candidate and was elected mayor. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship.) . The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The present petition filed by Vilando was dismissed. The Court affirms the decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified. 28

CASE: CASAN MACODE VS. COMELEC NAME: TAALA, DEIRDRE PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as “USA-American.” The COMELEC First Division ruled that the petition for disqualification be granted because he is still using his US passport after his renunciation of his US citizenship which negates his Affidavit of Renunciation. Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together

with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. The COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Arnado on the ground that the use of a US passport……. does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to “unrenounce” what he has earlier on renounced. Maquiling files a petition before the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the COMELEC En Banc. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office RULING: Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack. We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections. A candidate for the House of Representatives who was disqualified for failure to comply with the residence requirement under the Section 6, Art, VI of the Constitution could not be validly substituted. Distinctions between disqualification under Sec. 68 of the OEC and Section 78.

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CASE: VALLES VS. COMELEC NAME: SAW, BIM PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. In 1992 and 1995, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponents both times, alleging as ground her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections dismissed the petitions. The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles. Petitioner maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that: a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988; (Petitioner alleges that this is an express declaration under oath that she was a citizen of Australia thereby forfeiting her Philippine citizenship.) b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988. As regards to the COMELEC’s finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated.

ISSUE/S: W/N Rosalind lost her Philippine citizenship RULING: No It is clear that Rosalind is a Filipino citizen since Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.

As to the contention of petitioner that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship citing private respondent’s application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship: (1) By naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By express renunciation of citizenship; (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more; (4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country; (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; (6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is wrong. This issue has been put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC. In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vicemayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well. Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must

go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.

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CASE: FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC NAME: PEPITO, VICTORIA PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: ISSUE/S: RULING:

31

CASE: CO VS. HRET NAME: PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: The congressional election was held and among the candidates are the petitioners, Balinguit and Co and the private respondent, Ong Jr. Respondent Ong Jr. was proclaimed the duly elected representative. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent that (1)Ong Jr. is NOT a natural born citizen of the Philippines and (2) Is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) ruled in favor of private respondent that Ong Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Northern Samar for voting purposes.. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but was denied by HRET. Hence the petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON Private respondent is a Filipino citizen. RULING: YES. The Court affirmed the decision of HRET that respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laong, Northern Samar. The Court interprets Section 1, Par. 3 of the 1987 Constitution of Citizenship as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent “chose” to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos (It observed that “when protestee was only nine years of age, his father Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino). Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality if his father which he could possibly have chosen. Besides the same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention where Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by the bodies. History of the Case narrated by the SC: Private respondents grandfather (Ong Te) arrived in the Philippines from China and established his residence in the Samar. Private respondents grandfather was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the Spanish colonial administration. Private respondents father (Jose Ong Chuan) was born in China and was brought in Samar

by Ong Te. Private respondents father spent his childhood in Samar, grew in Laoag Samar and absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. Jose Ong Chuan met the mother of private respondent who was a natural born citizen. Jose Ong Chuan put a business which expanded and set-up branch in Manila. Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status, filed with the CFI of application for naturalization which declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen on April 1955 and took Oath of Allegiance and was issued certificate of naturalization. The private respondent’s house was burned to the ground but constructed another in one place which was burned down again and constructed 16-door apartment building. Private respondent went to Manila to study and graduated and passed the CPA examinations. Later, found a job as an examiner in the Central Bank. He worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. His elder brother was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention which as declared as a natural born Filipino on the basis of the mother’s citizenship. Private respondent registered himself as a voter and voted during elections. He ran in 1987 in the elections for representative. He was voted by the people as their representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the petitioners are combined, private respondent still lead. Jurisdiction? (*Maybe mag ask si atty) The Constitution explicitly provides that the HRET and Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of their respective members. (Morrero vs Bocar) SC ruled in this case that the power of the Electoral Commission is beyond judicial interference except upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process. 32

CASE: RE: VICENTE CHING, BAR MATTER NAME: PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: Vicente Ching is a legitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Ching was born in La Union on April 11, 1964. Since birth, he resided in the Philippines. He is also a Certified Public Accountant and a registered voter of La Union. In fact, he was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the May 12, 1992 synchronized elections. On July 17, 1998, having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University, Baguio City, he filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. He was conditionally admitted to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. On April 5, 1999, the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful examinees. However, because of the questionable status of his citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath and instead, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In compliance therewith, on 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation with attached Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and Oath of Allegiance dated July 15, 1999. Issue: Whether or not a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship 14 years after he has reached the age of majority.

Ruling: No, the Court ruled that Ching failed to validly elect his Philippine citizenship. When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. Under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625, which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority," which is 21 years old. The proper period for electing Philippine citizenship should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three. Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. But in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time. In the present case, Ching was already 35 years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625, or over 14 years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and

uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. **note: The Supreme Court denied Ching’s application for admission to the bar.

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CASE: BENGSON VS. HRET NAME: HONEY CATES PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." And whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won against petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was running for reelection. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. HRET dismissed the petition for quo warranto and declared respondent Cruz the duly elected

Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Ruling: Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a naturalborn citizen thereof. As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two years from its promulgation when the court is satified that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifcations and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship. The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. And as respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

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CASE: ALTAREJOS VS. COMELEC NAME: HONEY CATES PROVISION/ARTICLE: FACTS: Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 2004 national and local elections. On January 2004 respondents Altiche and Versoza filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country," based on a letter from the Bureau of Immigration, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence by the Bureau of Immigration. Petitioner said that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor. The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials are found in Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, under which, it is required that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not have acquired the right to reside abroad. In the present case, it has been established that respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides that "repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Respondent has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration COMELEC First Division the ruled that respondent is disqualified to run as mayor because he has yet to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship after being naturalized as a citizen of the US and also because of a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent

has also committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy by stating therein that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even perfected the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Such false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate for public office, which could be a valid ground for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in which the COMELEC en banc denied. Issue: Whether or not the registration of petitioner's repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Ruling: Yes. The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171, thus: SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen. The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after six years or on February 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of PD No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldo's repatriation to the date of filing of his application was justified by the Court. However, Republic Act No. 8171 has impliedly repealed Presidential Decree No. 725. The Court's ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one's application for repatriation subsists for the reason that if it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage

of such law. Accordingly, petitioner's repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.

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CASE: TECSON VS COMELEC NAME: TAALA, DEIRDRE PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: ISSUE/S: RULING:

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CASE: MA VS. FERNANDEZ NAME: FLORES, ROSEY PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: ISSUE/S: RULING:

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CASE: REP. OF THE PHILS VS. SAGUN NAME: FLORES, ROSEY PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: ISSUE/S: RULING:

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CASE: LLAMANZARES VS. COMELEC NAME: FLORES, ROSEY PROVISION/ARTICLE: LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC

FACTS:

On September 6, 1968, Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares was a foundling under the parental care and custody of Emiliano Militar and his wife. She was later adopted by celebrity spouses Fernando Poe and Susan Roces. The petitioner finished her studies in the United States with a degree of BA Political Science. When she got married to Teodoro Misael Daniel Llamanzares whose work was based in U.S., she finally decided to migrate. In October 2001, the petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner was forced to come back to the Philippines because her father got really sick. When her father died, she then decided to live in the Philippines and reacquire her Philippine citizenship. She took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Phils in pursuant to RA 9225. On October 6, 2010, she was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III as the Chairperson of MTRCB. In 2012, petitioner filed with COMELEC her COC for Senator for the 2013 Elections and in 2015 for her Presidency. She declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Phils up to the day before May 9, 2016 would be ten years and eleven months. This triggered several COMELEC cases against her.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a natural-born citizen?

HELD:

Yes. Grace Poe may be considered as Natural-Born citizen. It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already impliedly so recognized. There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties, adhering to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found. As to her domicile, petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned her U.S. domicile and relocated to the Phils for good. Her husband sold ther U.S. home, they purchased condominium in the Phils, then acquired a vacant lot for their new home in Corinthian Hills, her husband resigned from his work in the U.S. and their children got enrolled in Phil. Schools. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion and the Court annulled and set aside its decisions. Then Grace Poe was declared as a qualified candidate for President in the 2016 National and Local Elections.

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CASE: CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS COMELEC NAME: PROVISION/ARTICLE: :

40

CASE: AASJS, CALILUNG VS. DUTAMANONG NAME: FLORES, ROSEY PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS:

Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. According to the petitioner, the said law is unconstitutional as it violates Sec 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

ISSUE: WON RA 9225 is unconsititutional.

HELD:

No. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting RA 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, RA 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of RA 9225.

Moreover, Sec 5, Art IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a selfexecuting provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. RA 9225 aims to facilitate the reacquisition of the Phil citizenship by speedy means. Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Phils to the foreign country concerned because by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.

Therefore, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

41

CASE: MERCADO VS. MANZANO NAME: FLORES, ROSEY PROVISION/ARTICLE:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The results of the elections show that Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. The COMELEC granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec 40 of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Private responded filed a motion for reconsideration. COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared the private respondent qualified to run for the position. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998. Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification in running for any elective local position.

RULING: No. The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.

In the case at bar, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Phil. Citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The

filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. The petition for certiorari was dismissed for lack of merit.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. DefensorSantiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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CASE: CORODORA VS COMELEC NAME: HONEY CATES PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: ISSUE/S: RULING:

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CASE: LOPEZ VS COMELEC NAME: HONEY CATES PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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CASE: JACOT VS COMELEC NAME: HONEY CATES PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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CASE: MANUEL JAPZON VS COMELEC NAME: MAGNO, CARMILLE PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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CASE: ROSELLER DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC NAME: MAGNO, CARMILLE PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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CASE: UGDORACION, JR. VS COMELEC NAME: PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: ISSUE/S: RULING:

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

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CASE: VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN NAME: PEPITO, VICTORIA PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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CASE: KURODA VS. JALANDONI NAME: PEPITO, VICTORIA PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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CASE: SEC. OF JUSTICE VS LANTION NAME: PEPITO, VICTORIA PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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CASE: PHARMACEUTICAL VS DUQUE NAME: PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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CASE: ALIH VS CASTRO NAME: BACOLOD, CHRISTIAN PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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CASE: LAGMAN VS. ZOSA NAME: BACOLOD, CHRISTIAN PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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CASE: AGLIPAY VS RUIZ NAME: BACOLOD, CHRISTIAN PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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55

CASE: AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS CITY OF MANILA NAME: SAW, BIM PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: ISSUE/S: RULING:

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CASE: ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR NAME: SAW, BIM PROVISION/ARTICLE:

FACTS: ISSUE/S: RULING:

SEPARATION OF POWERS

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CASE: ARNAULT VS NAZARENO NAME: SAW, BIM PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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58

CASE: GONZALES VS OFFICE OF THE PRES NAME: PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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CASE: ESTRADA VS DESIERTO NAME: PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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CASE: NAME: PROVISION/ARTICLE:

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