Constitutional Law Cases.docx

Constitutional Law cases Macalintal v. PET 

Paragraph 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

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Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

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The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing the former’s petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional. Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

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The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

(1) Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution (2) Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power. (1) Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. (2) No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.

The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent. G.R. No. 146710-15      March 2, 2001 EN BANC Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President. During his term, he experienced a sharp descent from power. As a result, he and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. Several cases previously filed against Estrada in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are bribery and graft and corruption, plunder, forfeiture, graft, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, among others. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is immune from the charges filed against RULING: No. The petitioner is not immune from the cases filed against him by virtue of him being an unsitting president. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He won and formally assumed his office.

On August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court. ISSUE: Whether or not President Duterte’s issuance of the order is a manifestation of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. No. President Duterte’s issuance of the order is not a manifestation of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. Truly, the President’s discretion is not totally unfettered. Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation, discretion is not unconfined and vagrant but canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. At bar, President Duterte, through the public respondents, acted within the bounds of the law and jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocates, the Court must uphold what is legal and just. And that is not to deny Marcos of his rightful place at the LNMB. For even the Framers of our Constitution intend that full respect for human rights is available at any stage of a person’s development, from the time he or she becomes a person to the time he or she leaves this earth. There are certain things that are better left for history - not this Court - to adjudge. The Court could only do so much in accordance with the clearly established rules and principles. Beyond that, it is ultimately for the people themselves, as the sovereign, to decide, a task that may require the better perspective that the passage of time provides. In the meantime, the country must move on and let this issue rest.

Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director IV” of the EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the pendency of the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their appointments. Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a memorandum removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that their ad interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. (1) No. The exercise by the President of her constitutional power to make ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in appointing officials who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to immediately qualify and assume office. Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President because the Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the instant case.

(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: “The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only

until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC. In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

On October 8, 1956, Pepsi-Cola wrote a letter to the Secretary of Commerce and Industry requesting for special permit to withdraw certain commodities from the customshouse which were imported without any dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange. Said commodities consisted of 1,183 units of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not covered by any Central Bank release certificate. On the same date, the company addressed an identical request to the Secretary of Finance who was also the Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank. Senator Pedro Sabido, in behalf of the company, likewise wrote said official urging that authority be given to withdraw the abovementioned concentrates. Not content with this step, he also wrote to Dr. Andres Castillo, Acting Governor of the Central Bank, urging the same matter. Then Secretary Hernandez wrote another letter to Dr. Castillo stating, "Senator Sabido is taking this to you personally. Unless we have legal objection, I would like to authorize the withdrawal of the concentrates upon... payment of all charges. Please expedite action."

Page 45 Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of CongressG.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004Ponente: J. Puno: Facts: Senator Pimentel Jr. seeks to declare null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee and prohibit it with its continuous action. He claims that with the adjournment on June 11, 2004 by the Congress of its last regular session, its legal existence has ended thus all pending matters and proceedings end upon the expiration of the Congress. Issue: Will Senator Pimentel’s action prosper? Ruling: NO. Petitioner's claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section4, Article VII of the Constitution. Moreover, as pointed out in the Comment filed by the Senate Panel for respondent Joint Committee and that of the Office of the Solicitor General, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee, they citing the observations of former Senate President Jovito Salonga. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25, 1992.On June 16, 1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President. Thereafter, on June 22, 1992, the Eighth Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice President, respectively. Upon the other hand, during the 1998Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25,1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for President and Vice President on May 27, 1998. The Tenth Congress then convened in joint public session on May 29, 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and proclaimed Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapaga lArroyo as President and Vice-President, respectively.

BANDA VS ERMITA(GR NO. 166620; APRIL 20, 2010)FACTS: The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo which amended Sec. 6 of Executive Order No. 285, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.

They perceive it as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO contending that it is beyond the executive powers of Pres. Arroyo to amend or repeal EO No. 285 issued by former Pres. Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers and that EO No. 378 violates petitioners’ security of tenure because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO. ISSUE: Whether or not Pres. Arroyo can amend or repeal EO No. 285 by the mereissuance of another executive order.

HELD: it is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President. Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the President (a) to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vic eversa. In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred to another agency. Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms and publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception of election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the Commission on Elections may determine. At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election forms. Pursuant to Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the President’s power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported

by specific provisions in general appropriations laws. Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62 which evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.

On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines ISSUE: Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement is constitutional? RULING: YES. With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government, the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As an integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international obligation. Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law.

FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement. ISSUE: 1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review. 2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military. RULING: 1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

RUBEN E. TIU v. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON GR No. 211269, June 15, 2016

Facts: 

On June 16, 2000, petitioner was found guilty of selling "shabu". Consequently, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The conviction became final and executory in 2004. On March 24, 2009, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued a resolution recommending the grant of executive clemency to petitioner. On June 3, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo granted him "conditional pardon without parole conditions," but was still "subject to the conditions indicated in [the individual pardon papers]." It turned out that no such papers were issued in petitioner's favor and that the records of his case were referred back to the BPP.

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Respondent Natividad G. Dizon, Chairman of the BPP, confirmed in a letter that petitioner's Certificate of Conditional Pardon without Parole Conditions was not signed by PGMA and the BPP had resolved to defer action thereon pending compliance with all the basic requirements for executive clemency.

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On July 7, 2014, petitioner filed the instant Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus, insisting on the efficacy and enforceability of his conditional pardon without parole conditions, which allegedly necessitates his release from prison.

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On the other hand, respondents maintain that a prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment and retaining classification as a penal colonist will automatically have his sentence modified to 30 years of imprisonment only "when receiving the executive approval for this classification." However, petitioner failed to obtain such executive approval. Petitioner's colonist status granted merely by the Director of Corrections, without executive approval, did not modify his sentence. Hence, there being no unlawful restraint, no writ of habeas corpus should be issued in his favor

Issue: Whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should be issued in favor of petitioner.

Ruling:

No. The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee.

In this case, petitioner failed to show, however, that his further incarceration is no longer lawful and that he is entitled to relief under a writ of habeas corpus. The executive clemency extended by PGMA on June 3, 2010 to a number of prisoners including petitioner was made "subject to the conditions indicated in the corresponding documents." It is undisputed, however, that no individual pardon papers were issued in petitioner's favor, thereby rendering the grant of executive clemency to him as incomplete and ineffective.

Notably, when the records of petitioner's case were referred back to the BPP, it required compliance first with all the basic requirements for executive clemency before acting thereon. This is not to say, however, that petitioner's pardon papers may not have been issued due to non- compliance with the requirements, which is a matter that the Court shall not, and could not, resolve here. This is because the grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

Ang-Angco vs, Castillo (DIGEST) G.R. No. L-17169 - November 30, 1963

CONSTI LAW 1 – 2013 -aleah-

PETITIONER: ISIDRO C. ANG-ANGCO RESPONDENT: HON. NATALIO P. CASTILLO, ET AL. PONENTE: BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: FACTS: 1. On October 8, 1956, Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a letter to the Secretary of Commerce and Industry requesting for special permit to withdraw 1,188 units of Pepsi-cola concentrates from the customs house which were imported without any dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange and were not covered by any Central Bank release certificate. 2. Failing to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank on October 13, 1956, the counsel of the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc., approached Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco in an attempt to secure from him the immediate release of the concentrates. Seeing that the importation did not carry any release certificate from the Central Bank, Mr. Ang-Angco advised the counsel to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office that had jurisdiction over the case. 3. Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez, from the No-Dollar Import Office, wrote a letter addressed to Mr. Ang-Angco, stating that his office had no objection to the release of the 1,188 units of concentrates but that it could not take action on the request as "the same is not within the jurisdiction of the No-Dollar Import Office within the contemplation of R.A. No. 1410." 4. Pepsi-Cola Co. counsel showed to Mr. Ang-Angco the letter from Mr. Lopez. But upon perusing it, Mr. Ang-Angco still hesitated to grant the release. He suggested instead amending the letter in order to remove the ambiguity appearing therein, but Mr. Lopez refused to amend the letter stating that the same was neither a permit nor a release. 5. Mr. Ang-Angco contacted Secretary of Finance Hernandez via telephone and read to him the letter, to which the Secretary verbally expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco, though still in doubt as to the propriety of the suggested action, finally authorized the release of the concentrates upon payment of the corresponding duties, customs charges, fees and taxes. 6. Upon knowing the release of the concentrates, Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan immediately ordered their seizure but only a negligible portion thereof remained in the warehouse. And he filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco charging him of grave neglect of duty and observed a conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the customs service. On the strength of this complaint, President Ramon Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee to investigate Ang-Angco, resulting to the latter’s suspension. But on April 1, 1957, Collector Ang-Angco was reinstated to his office by Secretary Hernandez. The decision, however, on the administrative case against him remained pending until the death of President Magsaysay. 7. After around three years from the termination of the investigation during which period Ang-Angco had already been discharging the duties of his office, Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of President Garcia, rendered a decision on the case on February 12, 1960 finding Ang-Angco "guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service", and considering him resigned effective from the date of notice, with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs. 8. Upon knowing this decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-Angco wrote a letter to President Carlos P. Garcia calling attention to the fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo in removing him from office. 9. Denied of his Motions, Ang-Angco filed before this Court the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus with a petition for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The Court gave due course to the petition, but denied the request for injunction.

Ang-Angco vs, Castillo (DIGEST) G.R. No. L-17169 - November 30, 1963

The herein action of Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo as authorized by the President was questioned by the Petitioner, among others: That the Exec. Secretary violated Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which vests in the Commissioner of Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against officers and employees in the classified service; That since petitioner is an officer who belongs to the classified civil service and is not a presidential appointee, but one appointed by the Secretary of Finance under the Revised Administrative Code, he cannot be removed from the service by the President in utter disregard of the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1959.

Respondent Castillo contended that the power of control given by the Constitution to the President over officers and employees in the executive department can only be limited by the Constitution and not by Congress, for to permit Congress to do so would be to diminish the authority conferred on the President by the Constitution which is tantamount to amending the Constitution itself.

ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to take direct action on the case of petitioner Ang-Angco even if he belongs to the classified service in spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

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No. Two provisions of our Constitution which are apparently in conflict, the power of control by the President embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII, and the protection extended to those who are in the civil service of our government embodied in Section 4, Article XII.

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There is some point in the argument that the Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution).

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With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959. Thus, “the action taken by

respondent Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the President, in taking direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law and should be set aside.

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the Constitution).

The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18, Article VII.

(2) WON the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately.

(3) WON the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out powers, (2) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (3) declaration of martial law.

(4) WON there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law is that the petitioner should be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.

2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is completely independent from Congress’ duty to review.

It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, such a revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition “in an appropriate proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.

The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.

3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s decision pertaining to which extraordinary power should he use to avail in a given set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called “graduation of powers” does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides which power to choose.

4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration.

The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.

The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof.

As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.

The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.