Constitutional Law Review

1 BIRAOGO VS. PTC FACTS:

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that: (a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. (b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes. ISSUES: 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1; 2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; 3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; 4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause. RULING: The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public.

2 He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. 2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the fundin 3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. 4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

IMBONG VS COMELEC G.R. NO. L-32432 SEPTEMBER 11, 1970 RAUL M. GONZALES vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970 FACTS: These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code. On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention “shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives,” 1 “and that any

3 other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution.” 2 On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914. Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

Justice Fernando “ I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political parties and civic, professional and other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. 2 The right of an individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in activities is embraced within if not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution. This particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin being traceable to the Malolos Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention; Whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PABLITO ANDAN

DECISION:

Rights of Suspects under Custodial Investigation

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

Confessions given to a Municipal Mayor

RATIO: – Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution -Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132: Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4 – Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population. – Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention. – Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations. Dissenting Opinion:

FACTS: Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at Fatima was on her way to her school dormitory in Valenzuelal, Metro Manila when Pablito Andan asked her to check the blood pressure of the grandmother of Andan’s wife but there was nobody inside the house. She was punched in the abdomen by Andan and was brought to the kitchen where he raped her. She was left in the toilet until it was dark and was dragged to the backyard. It was when Andan lifted her over the fence to the adjacent vacant lot where she started to move. Andan hit her head with a concrete block to silence her and dragged her body to a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. The death of Marianne drew public attention which prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form a team of police officers to solve the case. Apart from the vacant lot, they also searched Andan’s nearby house and found evidences linked to the crime. The occupants of the house were interviewed and learned that accused-appellant was in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. A police team lead by Mayor Trinidad located Andan and took him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated where he said that Dizon killed the girl. The three were then brought to Andan’s house where he showed the police where the bags of Marianne were hidden. They were then brought back to the police station while waiting for the result of the investigation. The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were gathered at the police headquarters for the result of the investigation, Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approved him and whispered a request that they talk privately to which the mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the Andan agreed to tell the truth and admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and the media representatives witness the confession. Mayor Trinidad first asked for a lawyer to

4 assist the appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and recorded in video. In the presence of the media and his relatives, Andan admitted to the crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne and that he falsely implicated Larin and Dizon because of ill-feelings against them.

Andre Marti and his wife Shirley wanted to send packages to their friend in Switzerland and contracted the services of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders. When asked by the forwarder if they could examine and inspect the packages, Marti refused, assuring that the packages simply contained books and cigars.

However, appellant entered a plea of “not guilty” during his arraignment. He provided an alibi why he was at his father’s house at another barangay and testified that policemen tortured and coerced him to admit the crime but the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to death.

However, the proprietor opened the boxes for final inspection as part of their SOP. Upon opening, they suspected that the contents were illegal drugs.

ISSUE:

The proprietor reported the incident to NBI which confirmed that the suspected content were marijuana.

Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without the assistance of counsel is in violation of the constitution and cannot be admitted as evidence in court.

In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were opened and found dried marijuana leaves inside.

RULING:

After Marti was traced by NBI, he was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the appellant’s confession before the mayor is inadmissible. A municipal mayor has “operational supervision and control” over the local police and may be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, Andan’s confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all and no police authority ordered the appellant to talk to the mayor. It was the appellant who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor acted as a confidant and not as a law enforcer and therefore did not violate his constitutional rights.

Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him, which, according to him, is obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.

Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confession. Hence, we hold that appellant’s confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

ISSUE: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? NO.

The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government. Its protection is directed only to governmental action. This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen.

Andan was found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.

In this case, the evidence was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention of State authorities. Therefore, there is no reason why it should not be admitted to prosecute him.

PEOPLE V. MARTI, G.R. NO. 81561, 193 SCRA 57, JANUARY 18, 1991

Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence.

"Package of marijuana to be sent abroad"

The Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor who made a reasonable search of the packages in compliance with SOP AND b) the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected into a warrantless search and seizure. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It’s a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint is imposed.

Marti further argued that since the Constitution expressly declares as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals. The Court answered that the Constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.

5

ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, (2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.

In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof. As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectability, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances and subject to the specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of government. In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.

6 The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows: RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties. RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclearfree policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories. ISSUES: Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional. DISCUSSIONS:

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we connect the outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as internal waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.

HELD:

RULINGS:

The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.

MAGALONA VS. ERMITA FACTS: In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.

Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein. The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.

7

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL

the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Issue 2:

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). This Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of consensus points reached between GRP and MILF Peace Panel and of the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro Homeland

Yes. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the government is a proper matter for judicial review. In the case at bar, the failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected amounts to a departure from the mandate under E.O. No. 3 and the fact that the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution, rendered the petition ripe for adjudication.

According to the stipulations in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the Bangasmoro Homeland is vested to the Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD describes the Bangasmoro people as the first nation with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted by the MOA-AD the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangasmoro. It was also stipulated that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its internal waters.

Issue 3:

ISSUES:

The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

Issue 4:

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

Yes, there is a violation of the people’s right to information.An essential element of this right is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order.

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 4. Whether there is a violation of the peoples’ right to information on matters of public concern. 5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself. 6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and 7. Whether MOA-AD is constitutional

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. Issue 5: No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind the Philippines under international law. It would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to the Agreement, this would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law. Issue 6:

HELD: Issue 1: The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception to the moot and academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide

Yes. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. These petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. Issue 7:

8 Yes. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be reconciled with the present constitution. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them. The associative relationship between the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional because the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

Article 12

The court denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss and granted the main and intervening petitions.

2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

MARCOS V MANGLAPUS GR No. 88211 September 15, 1989 Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.

3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant. 4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

FACTS: (1) This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to order respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. This is in response to Marcos’s wish to return to the Philippines to die. The petitioner’s case is founded on the following provisions in the Bill of Rights: Section 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. And other contentions including: President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. The right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

(2) The respondents contend primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights, citing Article II Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service. Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. And the decision of other countries to ban deposed dictators like Cuba (Fulgencio Batista), etc. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines (2) Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return. HELD:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

Petition dismissed. President did not act with abuse of discretion in determining the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time since it poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

RATIO:

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

(1) Even from afar, the Marcoses had the capacity to stir trouble to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers.

9 (2) Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. (3) "What the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is President." (Corwin) Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. (4) The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. (5) Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

DE LEON VS ESGUERRA G.R. NO. 78059 153 SCRA 602 AUGUST 31, 1987 Petitioner: Alfredo M. De Leon, et al. Respondents: Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra in his capacity as

OIC Governor in the province of Rizal, et al. FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain together with other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Pronice of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Barangay Election Act of 1982. Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra which provided the designation of respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of the same barangay and the other respondents as members of the barangay Council of the same barangay and municipality. Petitioners maintain that Sec 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 provides that the terms of office shall be six (6) years which shall continue until their successors shall have elected and qualified. Also, in accordance with the recent ratification of the 1987 Constitution, it seems that respondent OIC Governor no longer had the authority to replace them as well as designate successors. Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions. ISSUE: Whether or not designation of respondents to replace petitioners was valid. HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. SC declared that the Memorandum issued by respondent OIC Governor designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Councilmen of Barangay Dolores has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date therefore, the provisional constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Effectivity of the Constitution is also immediately upon its ratification.