-cralaw

EN BANC [G.R. No. 93867 : December 18, 1990.] 192 SCRA 358 SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Petitioner, vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. DECISION CRUZ, J.: The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat attempt. The qualifications of the respondent are conceded by the petitioner and are not in issue in this case. What is the power of the President of the Philippines to make the challenged designation in view of the status of the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution that "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity." The petitioner invokes the case of Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101, where President Elpidio Quirino designated the Solicitor General as acting member of the Commission on Elections and the Court revoked the designation as contrary to the Constitution. It is also alleged that the respondent is not even the senior member of the Commission on Elections, being outranked by Associate Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.:-cralaw The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary. In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that no such designation is necessary in the case of the Supreme Court because the temporary succession cited is provided for in Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. A similar rule is found in Section 5 of BP 129 for the Court of Appeals. There is no such arrangement, however, in the case of the Commission on Elections. The designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of "administrative expediency," to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC. Expediency is a dubious justification. It may also be an overstatement to suggest that the operations of the Commission on Elections would have been disturbed or stalemated if the President of the Philippines had not stepped in and designated an Acting Chairman. There did not seem to be any such problem. In any event, even assuming that difficulty, we do not agree that "only the President (could) act to fill the hiatus," as the Solicitor General maintains. Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.chanrobles virtual law library It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be removed at will from her

permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no less true, however, that she can be replaced as Acting Chairman, with or without cause, and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that temporary position. The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This is still a government of laws and not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however wellmeaning. In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make. The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation. But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar. The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines. WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the respondent is hereby ordered to desist from serving as such. This is without prejudice to the incumbent Associate Commissioners of the Commission on Elections restoring her to the same position if they so desire, or choosing another member in her place, pending the appointment of a permanent Chairman by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.: rd SO ORDERED. Fernan C . J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave. Sarmiento, J., took no part. EN BANC

SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., G.R. No. 158088 REP. ETTA ROSALES, PHILIPPINE COALITION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL Present: CRIMINAL COURT, TASK FORCE DETAINEES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Davide, Jr., C.J., FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF Puno, INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCES, Panganiban, BIANCA HACINTHA R. ROQUE, Quisumbing, HARRISON JACOB R. ROQUE, Ynares-Santiago, AHMED PAGLINAWAN, RON P. SALO, *Sandoval-Gutierrez, LEAVIDES G. DOMINGO, EDGARDO *Carpio, CARLO VISTAN, NOEL VILLAROMAN, Austria-Martinez, CELESTE CEMBRANO, LIZA ABIERA, *Corona, JAIME ARROYO, MARWIL LLASOS, Carpio Morales, CRISTINA ATENDIDO, ISRAFEL Callejo, Sr.,

FAGELA, and ROMEL BAGARES, Azcuna, Petitioners, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and - versus - Garcia, JJ. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, represented by Promulgated: HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and the DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, represented by HON. BLAS OPLE, July 6, 2005 Respondents. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION PUNO J.: This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. [1] Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute.[2] The Statute was opened for signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. [3] Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.[4] Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification. It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty. [5] The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing of the petitioners to file the instant suit. It also contended that the petition at bar violates the rule on hierarchy of courts. On the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence. A petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a

duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. [6] We have held that to be given due course, a petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every case must therefore be an aggrieved party in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed. [7] The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is being challenged. The term interest is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. [8] The petition at bar was filed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who asserts his legal standing to file the suit as member of the Senate; Congresswoman Loretta Ann Rosales, a member of the House of Representatives and Chairperson of its Committee on Human Rights; the Philippine Coalition for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court which is composed of individuals and corporate entities dedicated to the Philippine ratification of the Rome Statute; the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, a juridical entity with the avowed purpose of promoting the cause of human rights and human rights victims in the country; the Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearances, a juridical entity duly organized and existing pursuant to Philippine Laws with the avowed purpose of promoting the cause of families and victims of human rights violations in the country; Bianca Hacintha Roque and Harrison Jacob Roque, aged two (2) and one (1), respectively, at the time of filing of the instant petition, and suing under the doctrine of inter-generational rights enunciated in the case of Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.;[9] and a group of fifth year working law students from the University of the Philippines College of Law who are suing as taxpayers. The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[10] We find that among the petitioners, only Senator Pimentel has the legal standing to file the instant suit. The other petitioners maintain their standing as advocates and defenders of human rights, and as citizens of the country. They have not shown, however, that they have sustained or will sustain a direct injury from the non-transmittal of the signed text of the Rome Statute to the Senate. Their contention that they will be deprived of their remedies for the protection and enforcement of their rights does not persuade. The Rome Statute is intended to complement national criminal laws and courts. Sufficient remedies are available under our national laws to protect our citizens against human rights violations and petitioners can always seek redress for any abuse in our domestic courts. As regards Senator Pimentel, it has been held that to the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. [11] Thus, legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. The petition at bar invokes the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence to a treaty entered into by the executive branch, in this case, the Rome Statute. The petition seeks to order the executive branch to transmit the copy of the treaty to the Senate to allow it to exercise such authority. Senator Pimentel, as member of the institution, certainly has the legal standing to assert such authority of the Senate.

We now go to the substantive issue. The core issue in this petition for mandamus is whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President. We rule in the negative. In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations.[12] As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.[13] In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive. Section 10 (7), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provided: Sec. 10. (7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of twothirds of all the Members of the Senate, to make treaties xxx. Section 14 (1) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution stated: Sec. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa. The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. [14] By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nations pursuit of political maturity and growth.[15] In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate. We disagree. Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this wise: The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.

Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even collapse in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration. If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state. Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them. xxx The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature. [16] [emphasis supplied] Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. [17] Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25, 1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine representative, the same shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President for ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provisions of the treaty to render it effective. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 459 reads:

Sec. 7. Domestic Requirements for the Entry into Force of a Treaty or an Executive Agreement. The domestic requirements for the entry into force of a treaty or an executive agreement, or any amendment thereto, shall be as follows: A. Executive Agreements. i. All executive agreements shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs after their signing for the preparation of the ratification papers. The transmittal shall include the highlights of the agreements and the benefits which will accrue to the Philippines arising from them. ii. The Department of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to the endorsement by the concerned agency, shall transmit the agreements to the President of the Philippines for his ratification. The original signed instrument of ratification shall then be returned to the Department of Foreign Affairs for appropriate action. B. Treaties. i. All treaties, regardless of their designation, shall comply with the requirements provided in subparagraph[s] 1 and 2, item A (Executive Agreements) of this Section. In addition, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the treaties to the Senate of the Philippines for concurrence in the ratification by the President. A certified true copy of the treaties, in such numbers as may be required by the Senate, together with a certified true copy of the ratification instrument, shall accompany the submission of the treaties to the Senate. ii. Upon receipt of the concurrence by the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provision of the treaties in effecting their entry into force. Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement

of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. [18] There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense. [19] It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. [20] Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. [21] Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly,[22] such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. [23] The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Associate Justice (on official leave) CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice Associate Justice (on official leave) ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice Associate Justice (on official leave) RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Associate Justice ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice Associate Justice CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice

*

On official leave.

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[6]

Article 1, Rome Statute. Article 5, Rome Statute. Annex B of Petition, Rollo, p. 101. Article 25, Rome Statute. Article 18, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads: Article 18 Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.

Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987). Joya vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 225 SCRA 568 (1993). [9] 224 SCRA 792 (1993). [10] Gonzales vs. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733 (2000). [11] Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 346 SCRA 485 (2000). [12] Cortes, The Philippine Presidency: A Study of Executive Power (1966), p. 187. [13] Cruz, Philippine Political Law (1996 Ed.), p. 223. [14] Cortes, supra note 12, p. 189. [15] Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000). [16] Cruz, International Law (1998 Ed.), pp. 172-174. [17] Bayan vs. Zamora, supra note 15. [18] Salonga and Yap, Public International Law (5th Edition), p. 138. [19] Cruz, International Law, supra note 16, p.174. [20] Bayan vs. Zamora, supra note 15. [21] Cruz, International Law, supra note 16, p.174. [22] Salonga and Yap, supra note 18. [23] See Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil. 366 (1910). [7] [8]

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-4221. August 30, 1952.] MARCELO D. MONTENEGRO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. GEN. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA and COLONEL EULOGIO BALAO, Respondents-Appellees. Felixberto M. Serrano and Honorio Ilagan for Appellant. Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for Appellees. Jesus G. Barrera, Francisco A. Rodrigo, Enrique Fernando and Claudio Teehankee as amici curiae. SYLLABUS 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EX POST FACTO LAWS. — The constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder or ex post facto laws applies only to statutes. 2. HABEAS CORPUS; SUSPENSION THEREOF; PROCLAMATION NO. 210; SEDITION, NOT INCLUDED THEREIN. — The stay of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, ordered in Proclamation No. 210, is in accordance with the powers expressly vested in the President by the Constitution. However, the word "sedition" in Proclamation No. 210 should be deemed a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole. 3. ID.; ID. — The president has power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it, in cases of (1) invasion, (2) insurrection, (3) rebellion, or (4) imminent danger thereof. The official declaration that "there is actual danger of rebellion which may extend throughout the country" amply justifies the suspension of the writ. 4. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVENESS. — The President’s declaration about the existence of danger is conclusive upon the courts. 5. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF SUSPENSION ON CASES FILED BEFORE THE PROCLAMATION. — A proclamation of the President suspending the writ of habeas corpus is valid and efficient in law to suspend all proceedings pending upon habeas corpus. 6. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS STATED IN THE PETITION. — In habeas corpus cases, averments of facts in the return, in the absence of denial or appropriate pleading avoiding their effect, will be taken as true and conclusive, regardless of the allegations contained in the petition.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.: The purpose of this appeal from the Court of First Instance of Quezon City is to test the validity of Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A few months ago the same proclamation came up for discussion in connection with the request for bail of some prisoners charged with rebellion. 1 The divided opinion of this Court did not squarely pass on the validity of the proclamation; but, assuming it was obligatory, both sides proceeded to determine its effect upon the right of such prisoners to go on bail. This decision will now consider the points debated regarding the aforesaid presidential order. The facts are few and simple: About five o’clock in the morning of October 18, 1950, Maximino Montenegro was arrested with others at the Samanillo Bldg., Manila, by agents of the Military Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection or sedition. So far as the record discloses, he is still under arrest in the custody of respondents. On October 22, 1950, the President issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. On October 21, 1950, Maximino’s father, the petitioner, submitted this application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking the release of his son. Opposing the writ, respondents admitted having the body of Maximino, but questioned judicial authority to go further in the matter, invoking the above-mentioned proclamation. Petitioner replied that such proclamation was void, and that, anyway, it did not apply to his son, who had been arrested before its promulgation. Heeding the suspension order, the court of first instance denied the release prayed for. Hence this appeal, founded mainly on the petitioner’s propositions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library (a) The proclamation is unconstitutional "because it partakes of a bill of attainder, or an ex post facto law; and unlawfully includes sedition which under the Constitution is not a ground for suspension" ; (b) "There is no state of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof," the only situations permitting discontinuance of the writ of habeas corpus; showing was made that the petitioner’s son was included within the terms thereof. (c) Supposing the proclamation is valid, no prima facie Proclamation No. 210 reads partly as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "WHEREAS, lawless elements of the country have committed overt acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion for the purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted authorities and, in pursuance thereof, have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the state; "WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed raids, sorties and ambushes and the wanton acts of murder, rape, spoilage, looting, arson, planned destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against police and constabularly detachments, as well as against civilian lives and properties, as reported by the Commanding General of the Armed Forces, have seriously endangered and still continue to endanger the public safety;

"WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion have been perpetrated by various groups of persons well organized for concerted action and well armed with machine guns, rifles, pistols and other automatic weapons, by reason whereof there is actual danger of rebellion which may extend throughout the country; "WHEREAS, 100 leading members of these lawless elements have been apprehended and are presently under detention, and strong and convincing evidence has been found in their possession to show that they are engaged in rebellious, seditious and otherwise subversive acts as above set forth; and "WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken to insure the peace and security of the population and to maintain the authority of the government; "NOW, THEREFORE, I, ELPIDIO QUIRINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by article VII, section 10, paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of sedition, insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith."cralaw virtua1aw library A. t is first argued that the proclamation is invalid because it "partakes" of a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law, and violates the constitutional precept that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. The argument is devoid of merit. The prohibition applies only to statutes. U. S. v. Gen. El., 80 Fed. Supp. 989; De Pass v. Bidwell, 124 Fed., 615. 1 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. (16 C. J. S. p. 902; U. S. v. Lovett (1946) 328 U. S. 303). Anyway, if, as we find, the stay of the writ was ordered in accordance with the powers expressly vested in the President by the Constitution, such order must be deemed an exception to the general prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder — supposing there is a conflict between the prohibition and the suspension. On the other hand there is no doubt it was erroneous to include those accused of sedition among the persons as to whom suspension of the writ is decreed. Under the Constitution the only grounds for suspension of the privilege of the writ are "invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof." Obviously, however, the inclusion of sedition does not invalidate the entire proclamation; and it is immaterial in this case, inasmuch as the petitioner’s descendant is confined in jail not only for sedition, but for the graver offense of rebellion and insurrection. Without doing violence to the presidential directive, but in obedience to the supreme law of the land, the word "sedition" in Proclamation No. 210 should be deemed a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole. B. In his second proposition appellant insists there is no state of invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof. "There are" he admits "intermittent sorties and lightning attacks by organized bands in different places" ; but, he argues, "such sorties are occasional, localized and transitory. And the proclamation speaks no more than of overt acts of insurrection and rebellion, not of cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof." On this subject it is noted that the President concluded from the facts recited in the proclamation, and others connected therewith, that "there is actual danger of rebellion which may extend throughout the country." Such official declaration implying much more than imminent danger of rebellion amply justifies the suspension of the writ. To the petitioner’s unpracticed eye the repeated encounters between dissident elements and military troops may seem sporadic, isolated, or casual. But the officers charged with the Nation’s security, analyzed the extent and pattern of such violent clashes and arrived at the conclusion that they are warp and woof of a general scheme to overthrow this government vi

et armis, by force and arms. And we agree with the Solicitor General that in the light of the views of the United States Supreme Court thru Marshall, Taney and Story quoted with approval in Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil., 87, pp. 98 and 100) the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension belongs to the President and "his decision is final and conclusive" upon the courts and upon all other persons. Indeed as Justice Johnson said in that decision, whereas the Executive branch of the Government is enabled thru its civil and military branches to obtain information about peace and order from every quarter and corner of the nation, the judicial department, with its very limited machinery can not be in better position to ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing in the Archipelago. But even supposing the President’s appraisal of the situation is merely prima facie, we see that petitioner in this litigation has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness which the judiciary accords to acts of the Executive and Legislative Departments of our Government. C. The petitioner’s last contention is that the respondents failed to establish that his son is included within the terms of the proclamation. On this topic, respondents’ return officially informed the court that Maximino had been arrested and was under custody for complicity in the commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection and sedition against the Republic of the Philippines. Not having traversed that allegation in time, petitioner must be deemed to have conceded it. ". . . In the absence of a denial, or appropriate pleading avoiding their effect, averment of facts in the return will be taken as true and conclusive, regardless of the allegations contained in the petition; and the only question for determination is whether or not the facts stated in the return, as a matter of law, authorizes the restraint under investigation." (39 C. J. S., 664-665.) D. An interesting issue is posed by amici curiae. The Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus except when the public safety requires it, in cases of (1) invasion (2) insurrection or (3) rebellion. Article VII Section 10 authorizes the President to suspend the privilege, when public safety requires it, in cases of (1) invasion (2) insurrection or (3) rebellion or (4) imminent danger thereof. "Imminent danger," is no cause for suspension under the Bill of Rights. It is under Article VII. To complicate matters, during the debates of the Constitutional Convention on the Bill of Rights, particularly the suspension of the writ, the Convention voted down an amendment adding a fourth cause of suspension: imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion. Professor Aruego, a member of the Convention, describes the incident as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library During the debates on the first draft, Delegate Francisco proposed an amendment inserting, as a fourth cause for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus imminent danger of the three causes included herein. When submitted to a vote for the first time, the amendment was carried. "After his motion for a reconsideration of the amendment was approved, Delegate Orense

spoke against the amendment alleging that it would be dangerous to make imminent danger a ground for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. In part, he said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "‘Gentlemen, this phrase is too ambiguous, and in the hands of a President who believes more or less a dictator, it is extremely dangerous; it would be a sword with which he would behead us.’ "In defense of the amendment, Delegate Francisco pointed out that it was intended to make this part of the bill of rights conform to that part of the draft giving the President the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus also in the case of an imminent danger of invasion or rebellion. When asked by Delegate Rafols if the phrase, imminent danger, might not be struck out from the corresponding provision under the executive power instead, Delegate Francisco answered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "‘Outright, it is possible to eliminate the phrase, imminent danger thereof, in the page I have mentioned. But I say, going to the essence and referring exclusively to the necessity of including the words, of imminent danger of one or the other, I wish to say the following: that it should not be necessary that there exists a rebellion, insurrection, or invasion in order that habeas corpus may be suspended. It should be sufficient that there exists not a danger but an imminent danger, and the word, imminent, should be maintained. When there exists an imminent danger, the State requires for its protection and for that of all the citizens the suspension of habeas corpus.’ "When put to vote for the second time, the amendment was defeated with 72 votes against and 56 votes in favor of the same." (I Aruego’s Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 180-181) Nevertheless when the President’s specific powers under Article VII, were taken up, there was no objection to his authority to suspend in case of "imminent danger." (At least we are not informed of any debate thereon.) Now then, what is the effect of the seeming discrepancy?. Is the prohibition of suspension in the bill of rights to be interpreted as limiting Legislative powers only - not executive measures under section VII? Has Article VII (sec. 10) pro tanto modified the bill of rights in the same manner that a subsequent section of a statute modifies a previous one?. The difference between the two constitutional provisions would seem to be: whereas the bill of rights impliedly denies suspension in case of imminent danger of invasion etc., Article VII sec. 10 expressly authorizes the President to suspend when there is imminent danger of invasion etc. The following statements in a footnote in Cooley’s Constitutional limitations (8th Ed.) p. 129, appear to be persuasive:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "It is a general rule in the construction of writings, that, a general intent appearing, it shall control the particular intent; but this rule must sometimes give way, and effect must be given to a particular intent plainly expressed in one part of a constitution, though apparently opposed to a general intent deduced from other parts. Warren V. Shuman, 5 Tex. 441. In Quick V. Whitewater Township, 7 Ind. 570, it was said that if two provisions of a written constitution are irreconcilably repugnant, that which is last in order of time and in local position is to be preferred. In Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Rambolt, 67 Tex. 654, 4 S. W. 356, this rule was recognized as a last resort, but if the last provision is more comprehensive and specific, it was held that it should be given effect on that ground."cralaw virtua1aw library

And in Hoag v. Washington Oregon Corp. (1915) 147 Pac. Rep., 756 at p. 763 it was said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "It is a familiar rule of construction that, where two provisions of a written Constitution are repugnant to each other, that which is last in order of time and in local position is to be preferred. Quick v. White Water Township, 7 Ind. 570; G., C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Rambolt, 67 Tex. 654, 4 S. W. 356. So, even assuming the two clauses discussed are repugnant, the latter must prevail."cralaw virtua1aw library Wherefore in the light of these precedents, the constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article VII may not correctly be placed in doubt. E. The petitioner insisted in the court below that the suspension should not apply to his son, because the latter had been arrested and had filed the petition before the Executive proclamation. On this phase of the controversy, it is our opinion that the order of suspension affects the power of the courts and operates immediately on all petitions therein pending at the time of its promulgation. "A proclamation of the President suspending the writ of habeas corpus was held valid and efficient in law to suspend all proceedings pending upon habeas corpus, which was issued and served prior to the date of the proclamation. Matter of Dunn, D. C. N. Y. 1863, 25 How. Prac. 467, Fed. Cas. No. 4,171."cralaw virtua1aw library F. Premises considered, the decision of the court a quo refusing to release the prisoner is affirmed, without costs. Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur. Endnotes:

1. Hernandez v. Montesa, G. R. No. L-4964, Nava v. Gatmaitan, G. R. No. L-4855, Angeles v. Abaya, G. R. No. L-5102, October, 1951. (90 Phil. 172). 1. Cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall U. S. 386, 1 Law Ed. 648.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 129406

March 6, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO, Respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Before the Court is this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the March 28, 19951 and March 13, 19972 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, in Civil Case No. 0034, insofar as said resolutions ordered the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to pay private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto or his corporations the value of 227 shares of stock of the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI) at P150,000.00 per share, registered in the name of said private respondent or his corporations. The facts: Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages. The case is one of several suits involving ill-gotten or unexplained wealth that petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan against private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto and others pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 14, 3 series of 1986. Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1,4 series of 1986, the PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in

NOGCCI owned by private respondent Benedicto and registered in his name or under the names of corporations he owned or controlled. Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as members of the Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which passed, sometime in October 1986, a resolution effecting a corporate policy change. The change consisted of assessing a monthly membership due of P150.00 for each NOGCCI share. Prior to this resolution, an investor purchasing more than one NOGCCI share was exempt from paying monthly membership due for the second and subsequent shares that he/she owned. Subsequently, on March 29, 1987, the NOGCCI Board passed another resolution, this time increasing the monthly membership due from P150.00 to P250.00 for each share. As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in question, PCGG did not pay the corresponding monthly membership due thereon totaling P2,959,471.00. On account thereof, the 227 sequestered shares were declared delinquent to be disposed of in an auction sale. Apprised of the above development and evidently to prevent the projected auction sale of the same shares, PCGG filed a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 5348. The complaint, however, was dismissed, paving the way for the auction sale for the delinquent 227 shares of stock. On August 5, 1989, an auction sale was conducted. On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034. The agreement contained a general release clause5 whereunder petitioner Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares, among other Benedicto’s properties, petitioner Republic acknowledging that it was within private respondent Benedicto’s capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his profession. 6 Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner Republic that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten. In a decision dated October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan approved the Compromise Agreement and accordingly rendered judgment in accordance with its terms. In the process of implementing the Compromise Agreement, either of the parties would, from time to time, move for a ruling by the Sandiganbayan on the proper manner of implementing or interpreting a specific provision therein. On February 22, 1994, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a "Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends" praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties’ Compromise Agreement in that case. In a Resolution7 promulgated on December 6, 1994, the Sandiganbayan granted Benedicto’s aforementioned motion but placed the subject shares under the custody of its Clerk of Court, thus: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the said "Motion for Release From Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends" is hereby GRANTED and it is directed that said shares/dividends be delivered/placed under the custody of the Clerk of Court, Sandiganbayan, Manila subject to this Court’s disposition.

On March 28, 1995, the Sandiganbayan came out with the herein first assailed Resolution,8 which clarified its aforementioned December 6, 1994 Resolution and directed the immediate implementation thereof by requiring PCGG, among other things: (b) To deliver to the Clerk of Court the 227 sequestered shares of [NOGCCI] registered in the name of nominees of ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO free from all liens and encumbrances, or in default thereof, to pay their value at P150,000.00 per share which can be deducted from [the Republic’s] cash share in the Compromise Agreement. [Words in bracket added] (Emphasis Supplied). Owing to PCGG’s failure to comply with the above directive, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a Motion for Compliance dated July 25, 1995, followed by an Ex-Parte Motion for Early Resolution dated February 12, 1996. Acting thereon, the Sandiganbayan promulgated yet another Resolution9 on February 23, 1996, dispositively reading: WHEREFORE, finding merit in the instant motion for early resolution and considering that, indeed, the PCGG has not shown any justifiable ground as to why it has not complied with its obligation as set forth in the Order of December 6, 1994 up to this date and which Order was issued pursuant to the Compromise Agreement and has already become final and executory, accordingly, the Presidential Commission on Good Government is hereby given a final extension of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof within which to comply with the Order of December 6, 1994 as stated hereinabove. On April 1, 1996, PCGG filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration, 10 praying for the setting aside of the Resolution of February 23, 1996. On April 11, 1996, private respondent Benedicto filed a Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy. Resolving these two motions, the Sandiganbayan, in its second assailed Resolution11 dated March 13, 1997, denied that portion of the PCGG’s Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration concerning the subject 227 NOGCCI shares and granted Benedicto’s Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy. Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on the sole issue of whether or not the public respondent Sandiganbayan, Second Division, gravely abused its discretion in holding that the PCGG is at fault for not paying the membership dues on the 227 sequestered NOGCCI shares of stock, a failing which eventually led to the foreclosure sale thereof. The petition lacks merit. To begin with, PCGG itself does not dispute its being considered as a receiver insofar as the sequestered 227 NOGCCI shares of stock are concerned.12 PCGG also acknowledges that as such receiver, one of its functions is to pay outstanding debts pertaining to the sequestered entity or property,13 in this case the 227 NOGCCI shares in question. It contends, however, that membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be considered as an outstanding debt for which PCGG, as receiver, must pay. It also claims to have exercised due diligence to prevent the loss through delinquency sale of the subject NOGCCI shares, specifically inviting attention to the injunctive suit, i.e., Civil Case No. 5348, it filed before the RTC of Bacolod City to enjoin the foreclosure sale of the shares. The filing of the injunction complaint adverted to, without more, cannot plausibly tilt the balance in favor of PCGG. To the mind of the Court, such filing is a case of acting too little and too late. It cannot be over-emphasized that it behooved the PCGG’s fiscal agents to preserve, like a responsible father of the family, the value of the shares of stock under their administration. But far from acting as such father, what the fiscal agents did under the premises was to allow the element of delinquency to set in before acting by embarking on a tedious process of going to court after the auction sale had been announced and scheduled.

The PCGG’s posture that to the owner of the sequestered shares rests the burden of paying the membership dues is untenable. For one, it lost sight of the reality that such dues are basically obligations attached to the shares, which, in the final analysis, shall be made liable, thru delinquency sale in case of default in payment of the dues. For another, the PCGG as sequestrator-receiver of such shares is, as stressed earlier, duty bound to preserve the value of such shares. Needless to state, adopting timely measures to obviate the loss of those shares forms part of such duty and due diligence. The Sandiganbayan, to be sure, cannot plausibly be faulted for finding the PCGG liable for the loss of the 227 NOGCCI shares. There can be no quibbling, as indeed the graft court so declared in its assailed and related resolutions respecting the NOGCCI shares of stock, that PCGG’s fiscal agents, while sitting in the NOGCCI Board of Directors agreed to the amendment of the rule pertaining to membership dues. Hence, it is not amiss to state, as did the Sandiganbayan, that the PCGG-designated fiscal agents, no less, had a direct hand in the loss of the sequestered shares through delinquency and their eventual sale through public auction. While perhaps anti-climactic to so mention it at this stage, the unfortunate loss of the shares ought not to have come to pass had those fiscal agents prudently not agreed to the passage of the NOGCCI board resolutions charging membership dues on shares without playing representatives. Given the circumstances leading to the auction sale of the subject NOGCCI shares, PCGG’s lament about public respondent Sandiganbayan having erred or, worse still, having gravely abused its discretion in its determination as to who is at fault for the loss of the shares in question can hardly be given cogency. For sure, even if the Sandiganbayan were wrong in its findings, which does not seem to be in this case, it is a well-settled rule of jurisprudence that certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Corollarily, errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings and conclusions are beyond the corrective hand of certiorari. 14 The extraordinary writ of certiorari may be availed only upon a showing, in the minimum, that the respondent tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. 15 The term "grave abuse of discretion" connotes capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction. 16 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 17 Sadly, this is completely absent in the present case. For, at bottom, the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan did no more than to direct PCGG to comply with its part of the bargain under the compromise agreement it freely entered into with private respondent Benedicto. Simply put, the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan have firm basis in fact and in law. Lest it be overlooked, the issue of liability for the shares in question had, as both public and private respondents asserted, long become final and executory. Petitioner’s narration of facts in its present petition is even misleading as it conveniently fails to make reference to two (2) resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan. We refer to that court’s resolutions of December 6, 199418 and February 23, 199619 as well as several intervening pleadings which served as basis for the decisions reached therein. As it were, the present petition questions only and focuses on the March 28, 199520 and March 13, 199721 resolutions, which merely reiterated and clarified the graft court’s underlying resolution of December 6, 1994. And to place matters in the proper perspective, PCGG’s failure to comply with the December 6, 1994 resolution prompted the issuance of the clarificatory and/or reiteratory resolutions aforementioned.

In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit.22 As argued, the order for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on a government agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim.23 But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked.24 For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it.25 Petitioner Republic’s act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity against private respondent Benedicto’s prayers in the same case. In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, 26 breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement. Finally, it is apropos to stress that the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034 envisaged the immediate recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth without further litigation by the government, and buying peace on the part of the aging Benedicto. 27 Sadly, that stated objective has come to naught as not only had the litigation continued to ensue, but, worse, private respondent Benedicto passed away on May 15, 2000,28 with the trial of Civil Case No. 0034 still in swing, so much so that the late Benedicto had to be substituted by the administratrix of his estate.29 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairperson ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice ATTESTATION

RENATO C. CORONA Asscociate Justice

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. REYNATO S .PUNO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

Footnotes 1 Penned by Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal, with Associate Justices Minita Chico-Nazario (now a member of this Court) and Roberto M. Lagman, concurring; Rollo, pp. 14-27. 2 Rollo, pp. 28-43. 3 Issued by then Pres. Corazon C. Aquino investing the Sandiganbayan exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, members of his immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees. 4 Creating the PCGG to assist the President in the recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by then former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates and defining its powers. 5 Par. II (a). 6 Petition, Rollo, p. 6. 7 Rollo, pp. 127-132, Annex 6 of Comment. 8 Rollo, pp. 14-27, Annex "A" of the Petition. 9 Rollo, pp. 138-139, Annex 9 of Comment. 10 Rollo, pp. 44-46, Annex "C" of the Petition. 11 Rollo, pp. 28-43, Annex "B" of the Petition. 12 Petition, Rollo, p. 7. 13 Id. at pp. 7-8, Petition, citing Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. v. PCGG, 150 SCRA 181 (1987). 14 Lee v. People, 393 SCRA 397 (2002). 15 Camacho v. Coresis, Jr., 387 SCRA 628 (2002). 16 Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., 163 SCRA 489 (1988). 17 Duero v. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 11 (2002). 18 See Note #7, supra. 19 See Note #9, supra. 20 See Note # 1, supra. 21 See Note #2, supra. 22 Reply, Rollo, p. 160; and Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 260-261. 23 Id., citing Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120 (1966). 24 Rejoinder, Rollo, pp. 169-170. 25 Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Phil. 905, 912 (1954). 26 Santos v. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 284 (1952). 27 March 28, 1995 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan; Rollo, p. 20.

28 29

Notice of death, Rollo, pp. 210-212. Rollo, p. 228.