Eastern Shipping Lines And Emnace Case Digest

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. v. JOSEPHINE LUCERO GR. No. L-60101, August 31, 1983 FACTS: On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. as captain to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon plying the Hongkong-Manila route, with the salary of P5,560.00 exclusive of ship board allowances and other benefits. Under the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila (also known as “allotment”) On February 16, 1980, while the vessel was en route from Hongkong to Manila where it was expected to arrive on February 18, 1980, Capt. Lucero sent three (3) messages to the Company's Manila office informing the respondent company of the turbulence the ship is encountering and that assistance is needed because the ship is sinking. The respondent company sent vessels for search and rescue operations. However, to no avail, there were no survivors found. Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon through its surveyors, confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the same. On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint with the National Seamen Board, Board for short, for payment of her accrued monthly allotment of P3,183.00, which the Company had stopped since March 1980 and for continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She contended that the contract of employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's arrival in Manila. The Company maintained that she is no longer entitled to such allotments thereby considering the total loss of the vessel. SEAMEN BOARD: Josephine must be awarded the continuing allotments. The rule of the presumption of death cannot be applied since the four-year period provided in Article 391(l) of the Civil Code had not yet expired. NLRC: Affirmed the decision of the Seamen Board ISSUE: Whether or not Josephine is entitled to such allotments? RULING: No, Mrs. Lucero is entitled only to the death benefits. The Supreme Court based its pronouncement in the following jurisprudence: 1. The presumption of death in such cases does not rest on the fact alone that the person in question has been absent and unheard from for a specific length of time, but also on the fact that the vessel has not been heard front The question, moreover, is not whether it is impossible that the person may be alive, but whether the circumstances do not present so strong a probability of his death that a court should act thereon. The presumption is even stronger where it appears affirmatively that the vessel was lost at sea, that nothing has been heard of a particular person who sailed thereon, and that a sufficient time has elapsed to permit the receipt of news of any possible survivors of the disaster. 2.

And in cases of homicide and murder where it not necessary to recover the body or to show where it can be found. Mere are cases like death at sea, where the finding or recovery of the body is impossible.

Hence, the Court has seen the facts established in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt. Lucero died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on February 16, 1980. Therefore, Mrs. Lucero, in turn is not entitled to the continuing allotments, instead only of the death benefit.

EMILIO EMNACE V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 126334, November 23, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Emnace, Vicente Tabanao (whose heirs are the respondents in this case) and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracia's withdrawal from the partnership. Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6) vehicles, two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Niño and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in the local branches of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Prudential Bank. Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao's untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment thereof. Tabana’s heirs filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages. Emnace raised in his motion to dismiss that the Tabanao heirs lacks capacity to sue of the estate of Tabanao. TRIAL COURT: The Tabanao heirs had a right to sue in their own names, in view of the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. CA: Affirmed the Trial Court’s decision ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents has legal capacity to sue although she was not appointed as administratix of his estate? RULING: YES. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao' s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. Hence, as successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent.