Etika Di Jerman

lkchnology in Society, Vol. 15, pp. 427-439, 1993 Printed in the USA. All rights reserved.

0160-791X/93 $6.00 + .OO Copyright 0 1993 Pergamon Press Ltd.

The Historical and Philosophical Development of Engineering Ethics in Germany Alois Huning and Carl Mitcham

ABSTRACT German engineering is distinguished not only by its technical leadership in such fields as chemicals and automobiles, but also by the special form that social and ethical concerns have taken in the profession. This review begins with an overview of the historical background from the late 19th century through World War II, followed by considerations of the postwar professional renewal, and then the professional response to consumer and environmental criticisms during the 1970s and 1980s. Key topics ao?dressed include engineering ethics, technology assessment, and professional engineering development.

German engineering is widely regarded as exercising technical leadership in such fields as chemicals, automobiles, and electronics. What is not so widely appreciated is that the development of engineering as a profession during the last hundred years also distinguishes German engineering from its counterparts in other countries. This review, after sketching the historical background from the late 19th century through World War II, concentrates on issues and institutional developments as they emerged first in the postwar period of institutional renewal (1945 to mid 196Os), and then again under conditions of increasing consumer and environmental criticism (late 1960s to present). An appreciation of the distinctive social features of German engineering can contribute to practical relations, and the achievements of German engineers in the Alois Huning

is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dusseldorf; and from 1969 to 1973 was executive head of the central committee ‘Mensch und Technik” of the Verein Deutscher Ingenieure. In 1979 he received the VDZ Medal of Honor. His publications include Das Schaffen des Ingenieurs, 3rd edition (Dusseldorf: VDZ Verlag, 1987). Carl Mitcham is Director of the Science, Technology, and Society Program at Penn State University. His Thinking Through Technology: The Path from Engineering to Philosophy is forthcoming from University of Chicago Press. 427

428

A. Huning and C. Mitcham

area of professional self-understanding deserves consideration by those working to promote related developments in their own countries.

1. Historical

Background

As in other countries throughout the world, the professionalization of engineering has been promoted by both social organization and educational institutionalization, often operating against an antagonistic sociocultural background. Although the V&rein Deutscher Ingenieure (VDI, or Association of German Engineers) was founded in 1856, it was not until almost half a century later in 1899 that an engineering faculty at the Bauakademie in Berlin was allowed to confer the degree of a “doctor of engineering sciences.” Even then, however, the traditional faculties or colleges did not really consider engineering education equal in status to their own, and succeeded in discriminating against the doctorate in engineering sciences by requiring that their title could only be written in German (Doktor-Ingenieur), whereas more traditional doctorates were identified in Latin. In this light, it is not surprising that the tradition of philosophical and ethical reflection on technology is rather young - and, indeed, dates from the same period when efforts were being made to gain full academic status for the engineers. The first book to use the phrase “philosophy of technology,” for instance, is Ernst Kapp’s Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik [Outlines of a Philosophy of Technology], published in 1877.1 Although it constituted a new area of philosophical reflection, early German philosophy of technology nevertheless drew on a broad historical background, including Platonic, Aristotelian, and Christian elements. But it was especially influenced by the ideas of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) - both of whom thus helped shape engineering ethics and the general ethics of technics and technology. In brief, Kant’s influence dominated with regard to individual ethics, whereas Hegel was more important for a social ethics concerned with the influences and consequences of technology. Today these merge in a great project for developing a personal as well as social ethics of the engineer, and with the general issue of the moral assessment of technology. Kant himself distinguishes three types of imperative: technical, pragmatic, and categorical.2 Only the last is an absolute or unconditional imperative. Both pragmatic and technical imperatives remain hypothetical, that is, dependent on the willing of those ends to which they supply the means. Pragmatic imperatives operate within the framework of one condition, the universal aspiration of humanity for happiness. The technical imperative is even more completely conditional, in the sense that it is not concerned with ends at all, but only with the

Engineering Ethics in Germany

429

means to any end whatsoever. If I want this or that, then I have to do this or use that as the appropriate means. For Kant, such conditionality is characteristic of all technology, so that technology is thus fundamentally ambivalent. It can be used for good or bad ends; it does not have any end inherent in itself. According to Kant, therefore, technology and decision making on the basis of technical imperatives constitutes a distinctly lower level of human reflection. His demand is that every technical action ultimately be guided by pragmatic imperatives - or even by the categorical moral imperative.3 Hegel, for his part, has influenced philosophical reflection on technology through an analysis of the future development of technology which, according to him, tends toward automation. Hegel’s teaching concerning the progressive differentiation of needs and wants, as well as of production, has also been important. But perhaps of greatest significance has been his analysis of the dialectics of master and slave. The master, not wanting to become involved with technology, compels a slave to supply his needs; but precisely in his techno-logical conquest of the material world, the slave more than the master realizes the inherent dignity of human beings, as well as their fundamental equality. It is thus from the slave or user of technology that the impetus or drive toward automation develops and, through this, the possibility of a society where there are neither masters nor slaves, but only free citizens who participate equally in reciprocal contributions to both production and consumption.* The philosophy of technology of Ernst Kapp (1808-1896) a left-wing follower of Hegel and contemporary of Karl Marx, is based on a fundamentally optimistic extension of this dialectic. Indeed, Kapp does not develop a special ethics, because for him technology is the historical objectivization of humanity and of all human potentialities. Technologies are what Kapp calls “organ projections.” The ethics of technology is simply general ethics, and the ethics of the engineer is but general ethics applied to a particular profession. Kapp is convinced that through progress in technology a higher moral consciousness will emerge, with the consequence that conflicts between individuals and between states will be minimized. He even thinks that laws will become less and less necessary and will finally be replaced by ethics.5 From Kapp in the late 1800s until the end of World War II, the question of engineering ethics was not a central issue. Instead discussion focused (as in both Marxism and liberalism) primarily on questions concerning the economic organization of technical production and the distribution of its goods and services. Most publications dealing with the engineering profession were full of praise for engineering activities, and many even argued that the professional attitude of the engineer could contribute to the development of a truly human morality Everything on earth would be better if the attitude of the engineer influenced the entire population, because technology was seen as an education in true

430

A. Huning and C. Mitcham

humanism, especially since engineering does not allow for selfcenteredness, but is concentrated on its object - and objectivity implies justice and peace. Such, for instance, was essentially the argument of the technocracy movement in the United States.6 In Germany this attitude was also often based on religious convictions, which viewed the engineer as completing Gods creation by fulfilling a divine task in the service of humanity - as was argued, for instance, by Friedrich Dessauer (1881-1963) in his Philosophic der Technik [Philosophy of Technology] (1927).7 Dessauer himself did research in biophysics and engineering, especially on deep penetration X-ray therapy. His philosophical interests were primarily directed toward the anthropological and theological dimensions of science and technology. Thus, he saw technology in general as an expression of the spirit - of humanity, of the universe, and finally of God. In Platonic language, he viewed solutions to technological problems as already given in a transcendent realm of ideas, to be found and imitated in the intentional shaping and forming of a new reality out of materials given by nature. For a time during the first half of the 20th century, Dessauer functioned as a kind of semiofficial philosopher of technology for the VDI. From his ideas the VDI found inspiration to stand up against many of the cultural critics of technology who flourished during the period between the two wars. As a result of World War II, however, this situation underwent a radical transformation.

2. Post- World War II Discussions The immediate reaction to the important role technology played in World War II was a widespread pessimism concerning highly developed technology and a tendency to condemn engineers as morally irresponsible contributors to the crimes of the war. The engineerarchitect Albert Speer sums up this view when he writes, at the end of his memoir Inside the Third Reich, Dazzled by the possibilities of technology I devoted crucial years of my life to servingit. But in the end my feelingsabout it are highly skeptical.8 The counter argument, of course, was that only through technology could a way out of the postwar destruction be found. It was in this climate that the VDI became an institution where engineers met to reflect on their situation and special responsibilities. The refounding of the VDI in 1947 was inaugurated with an international conference on engineering education with the motto “Technik als ethische und kulturelle Aufgabe ” [Technology as ethical and cultural task]. Karl Jaspers’ philosophical rejection of the idea of

Engineering Ethics in Germany

431

collective guilt legitimated not only the refounding of the German state, but also such professional institutions as the VDI.9 Following the initial conference and several smaller meetings of concerned members, the VDI proceeded to organize four important postwar conferences in which philosophers and engineers tried to answer the special challenges and questions posed to German engineers by World War II, and by the past and future development of technology. These conferences were, in order: l

l

l

l

Kassel, 1950: “??ber die Verantwortung des Ingenieurs” [Concerning the responsibility of engineers110 Marburg, 1951: “Mensch und Arbeit im technischen Zeitalter” [Human beings and work in the technological ageIll Tiibingen, 1953: “Die Wandlungen des Menschen durch die Technik” [The changes of humanity through technologyl12 Miinster, 1955: “Der Mensch im Kraftfeld der Technik” [Humanity in the force-field of technology113

It was at the first of these conferences that an “Engineer’s Confession” was drafted. This “Confession, n in its very title and the repeated references to the “Beruf’ of the engineer in ways that call forth associations with the idea of a spiritual vocation, exhibits a distinctly religious tone. In the words of the “Confession”: The ENGINEER should pursue his profession with respect for values beyond science and knowledge and with humbleness toward the Almighty who governs his earthly existence. The ENGINEER should place professional work at the service of humanity and maintain the profession in those same principles of honesty, justice, and impartiality that are the law for all people. The ENGINEER should work with respect for the dignity of human life and so as to fulfill his service to his fellowmen without regard for distinctions of origin, social rank, and worldview. The ENGINEER should not bow down to those who disregard human rights and misuse the essence of technology; he should be a loyal coworker for human morality and culture. The ENGINEER should always work together with his professional colleagues for a sensible development of technology; he should respect their activity just as he expects them to rightly value his own creativity. The ENGINEER should place the honor of his whole profession above economic advantage; he should behave so that his profession is accorded in all public arenas with as much respect and recognition as it deserves.14 For a number of years afterward this every new member of the VDI. It was also at these conferences that honor from an exile first in Turkey and by his active opposition to Hitler, was

“Confession”

was handed

out to

Dessauer, who had returned with then in Switzerland, forced there asked to rewrite his Philosophic

432

A. Huning

and C. Mitcham

der Technik. In 1956, on the occasion of the VDI centenary, he published Streit urn die Technik [Controversy about Technology], which

immediately became a kind of reference book for questions concerning the philosophical aspects of technology.l5 In the same year, concerned engineers from industrial practice and scientific research, in association with philosophers or philosophically inclined individuals, formed a VDI central committee on “Mensch und Technik” [Humanity and Technology], and in 1973 renamed the “Der Ingenieur in Beruf und Gesellschaft” [The Engineer in Profession and Society]. This central committee was divided into working subcommittees on “Pedagogy and Technology,” “Religion and Technology,” “ Language and Technology,” “Sociology and Technology,” as well as “Philosophy and Technology” - the latter, especially, regularly dealing with problems of engineering ethics. Thus was the discussion of philosophical ethics institutionalized within the VDI in a manner unlike that which has taken place in other countries, where professional ethics has been pursued both less philosophically and with less institutional recognition. An initial project of the uMensch und Technik” committee was the critical evaluation of various interpretations of technology, from which came a large number of articles published in VDI-Nachrichten, the weekly newspaper of the VDI. Beginning in 1963, the most important of these articles were reprinted in annual collections that have been given wide circulation. Indicative of the social and institutional character of these discussions, the first of these, Mensch und Technik, Verbffentlichungen [Humanity and Technology, Publications], covering the years 1961-1962, contains contributions from engineers and philosophers, and opens with a short statement by Theodor Heuss, President of the Federal Republic.

3. From the 1960s Through the 1980s Through the mid 196Os, most of the work of the “Mensch und Technik” commission was done in subcommittees and small publications. When the new VDI headquarters building was opened in Dusseldorf in 1967, a biannual “Day of the Engineer” conference was established in which the general theme, instead of being some technical subject, was “Technik und Gesellschaft” [Technology and Society]. The lectures from this conference were published in 1968, with contributions from diverse engineers, philosophers, economists, and others. In 1970 a three-day public conference was organized in Ludwigshafen on “Wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Auswirkungen des technische Fortschritts” [Economic and Social Consequences of Technical Progress], which was given more extensive media coverage than any previous VDI meeting. The proceedings were later brought out in paperback and

Engineering Ethics in Germany

433

became the foundation for a series which, by virtue of VDI sponsorship, gave philosophical, ethical, and political issues a new respect in the engineering community and even beyond.16 It was at the Ludwigshafen conference also that the problem of “technology assessment” was for the first time publicly discussed in Germany. As an outgrowth of these discussions about the role of engineers and their social responsibility, the German Commission for UNESCO collaborated with the VDI in organizing an international conference on “Ingenieurausbildung und soziale Verantwortung” [Engineering Education and Social Responsibility] in Munich in 1972, with proceedings appearing two years later. A follow-up conference at Darmstadt in 1978 led to publication of the widely cited, bilingual volume Ingenieure fiir die ZukunftlEngineers for Tomorrow (1980).17 One theme of this conference, which was echoed by representatives from the U.S. as well, concerned the need to include more social science in the engineering curriculum, in order to help engineers overcome a certain naivete about the role of technical rationality in social institutions. At the same time, the existing social sciences were strongly criticized as too ideological and lacking in sufficient appreciation of the real character of engineering. During the 1970s the “Philosophy and Technology” subcommittee of the “Mensch und Technik” central committee focused on the problem of value changes in German public opinion and especially on changes caused by the growing sensitivity to environmental problems. Such changes were promoted by publication of The Limits to Growth (1972) and by the political success of the Greens, who argued for a return to smaller-scale technology that was less dangerous and more human. Two volumes on professional ethics and questions of engineering education addressed these new issues. The first was published in 1975 under the title Werte und Wertordnungen in Technik und Gesellschaft [Values and Value Orderings in Technology and Society]. The second appeared the following year as Wertprtiferenzen in Technik und Gesellschafi [Value preferences in Technology and Society]. l8 The philosophical work of the “Mensch und Technik” committee had an influence that gradually expanded beyond the VDI. Since leading West German thinkers were drawn into the discussions of this circle, papers inspired by their participation began to appear in books and periodicals not associated with the VDI, so that “Mensch und Technik” work became known to an ever broader public. In fact, philosophical discussion of technology in Germany - with the exception of that centered around the Frankfurt School and the followers of Heidegger, neither of which has exercised any serious influence on the formation of public policy - has been dominated by the inner circle of the philosophy subcommittee in the VDI. Reflective of this public role, one of the next major conferences in which this subcommittee was involved picked up on growing public

434

A. Huning and C. Mitcham

concern for technology assessment. “Ma@tlibe der Technikbewertung” [Standards for Technology Evaluation] held in November 1977 in Dusseldorf was the result. An important tendency to note in the German discussion of technology assessment is indicated by a tension between the alternate words “Technikfolgenabschitzung” and “Technikbewertung.” Both terms can and have been used as equivalent to the English “technology assessment.” Some prefer the former precisely because it is subject to the same abbreviation as the English term - TA. But the latter tends to connote more ethical or value-based senses of assessment, and as U.S. practice has narrowed the focus of TA toward cost-benefit analysis, “Technikbewertung” has become the preferred term in German, in part to emphasize differences. One consequence of these efforts was a grant from the Volkswagen Foundation to support a three-year research project on the influence of nontechnical values on technical imperatives and standards. This project too was supervised by a group of engineers and philosophers from the now renamed “Der Ingenieur in Beruf und Gesellschaft” committee. Some results were published under the title Ideal und Wirklichkeit der Techniksteuerung [Ideal and Reality in the Control of Technology].19 Here the focus is not only legal structures, but also the values, needs, and desires that govern technological development. Such conferences and publications constituted the background for two influential working groups formed to contribute to development of a new code of ethics for engineers, since the language of the “Engineer’s Confession” had rapidly become dated, and its ideological background was no longer acceptable to the engineering community as a whole. The results of the first group’s work were summarized in 1980 in a small publication with the unpretentious title, VDI: Zukiinftige Aufgaben [VDI: Future TasksJ20 In this report engineers were summoned to take part in the formulation of societal, political, and ethical goals; to be ready for cooperation with others, while bringing to discussion the necessary information about what is technically possible and that for which one can bear responsibility; and to subordinate the whole technical development to general goals through acceptance of measures regulating the direction of development. As a general Zeitmotiv for the engineer, this document proposed that The goal of all engineers is the improvement of the possibilities whole of humanity through the development and appropriate technical means.

of life for the utilization of

This general rule applies to the entire field of technology in which societal, political, and ethical goals are to be accepted as guidelines for technological activities. It applies to the professional work of the engineer, where the development and cultivation of a professional ethics

Engineering Ethics in Germany

435

for engineers is said to be necessary, and where a professional code ought to protect personal conscience and individual willingness to accept responsibility It applies to politics and aims for a complete integration of technology into the general political system of values, including public information about technical facts, about possible alternative solutions, the limits of technology, risks, and conflicting goals. Finally, it includes the whole sphere of culture, where technology must be accepted as an integral part of the cultural achievements of humanity. This replacement of the “Engineer’s Confession” by the rather sober declaration of future tasks for engineers, the VDI, and technologicalindustrial society also needs to be understood against the background of the general social situation in the Federal Republic of Germany. This was the late period of the center-left coalition government of Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-1974) and Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982). In 1971 the government had established a commission on economic and social change that helped publicize issues dealing with the future role of technology. It was also a period of radical left terrorism, spy scandals (one of which brought about Brandt’s resignation), and the emergence of Green environmentalism. Energy problems and defense issues, as promoted by the Greens, became topics for debate throughout the West. Nuclear energy in both weapons and power plants came under special attack. With the election of the center-right coalition government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982-present), discussions about the future role of technology did not come to an end. On the contrary, they became so urgent and vital that ethical problems concerning the use of nuclear power, genetic engineering, in vitro fertilization, and other problems were discussed in party meetings, and even became the subject of party programs and declarations, such as a Christian-Democratic declaration on “Science, Technology, and Ethics.” In order to support legislation, Enqubte Commissions (from the French word “enqu&te,” meaning inquiry or investigation) were created to assess special technologies, and in the federal government as well as in the states of the republic, ministers for environmental problems were appointed. This is the context for the second working group within “Der Ingenieur in Beruf und Gesellschaft” committee, which completed in 1986 a project that had lasted for almost 10 years outlining new guidelines for technology assessment. The preliminary “Empfehlungen zur Technikbewertung” [Recommendations on Technology Evaluation] (1986) became, in 1991, VDI-Richtlinien 3780, “Technikbewertung: Begriffe und Grundlagen” [Technology Evaluation: Concepts and Foundations]. This directive contains five sections outlining, in turn, definitions, the meaning of value systems for technology, values in technical activities, methods of technology evaluation, and institutions for the evaluation of technology. With regard to engineering ethics, section three is the most significant. It identifies eight fields of value, which can be grouped into three

A. Huning and C. Mitcham

436

categories. In the first are functional or technical efficiency, economic efficiency, and the material standard of living. In the second are safety, health, and environmental quality. Each of these sets of three is schematized as independent but interactive - although not always mutually interactive - value fields. In the third, however, are the two much more closely linked values of individual personal development and quality of social life. Such relations can be summarized in Figure 1. All technologies, especially with regard to the anticipation of future developments, should be evaluated on the basis of these criteria. If a technology fails to meet any standard, engineers can refer to this directive and refuse to cooperate since, as VDI Richtlinien, they now have the status of regulatory law and have indeed already been referred to in court cases. Thus, these directives provide an objective basis to which an individual can refer ethical judgments on technical activities and in order to justify specific decisions. The individual engineer is not left alone with a personal conscience, but finds support in a rule or guideline accepted by the engineering community as a whole.

\ DEVELOPMENT

PUNCl'IONAL /

ORTECHNICAL

I

SAFETY

Figure 1. Values in Technology Action

Engineering Ethics in Germany

437

4. Current Problems and Activities With formulation of the guidelines for technology assessment and the subsequent publication of a small textbook on Technik und Ethik [Technology and Ethics] (1987), as well as a VDI pamphlet on Ingenieurverantwortung und Technikethik [Engineering Responsibility and the Ethics of Technology] (1991),21 a formative stage in the development of engineering ethics has clearly been completed. Discussions continue, however, especially on how and to what extent technological disasters such as those at Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1989) should influence the ethical assessment of technological risk. Such discussions often refer to Hans Jonas’ argument in Das Prinzip Verantwortung (1979). 22 Jonas’ thesis, in what he terms the “heuristics of fear,” is that the possibility of future catastrophe must be granted more influence on our decisions than likely benefits. As a result, many philosophers are prone to what can be called “negative ethics.” They claim that it is not possible to put forth positive norms for our technical activities, but that instead we must formulate negative boundaries and limits. From this perspective, for example, they argue that the use of atomic energy cannot or only under very restricted conditions and for a limited time be a technology that we can take responsibility for, especially with regard to future generations. Others take a less skeptical and more optimistic view. They claim that technological progress has not gone far enough as long as many people are forced to live in surroundings and under conditions unworthy of humanity. These thinkers are much more willing to accept calculated risks of new technologies, and they argue that there has never been any technology wholly free of risk. The contemporary human rights discussion includes the claim that all human beings have a right to the same quality of life, which clearly can only be achieved by further technical progress on a global scale. Another subject of philosophical reflection and political action concerns how to deal with the fact that technology is less and less the work of individual persons. Especially in the chemical industry and in computer science and information technology, the results of technological work are very much due to collaborative efforts. Who then is to be held responsible for the good or bad effects of such a technology? The question of collective guilt is now posed in the form of a problem about how to establish collective institutions so that they are called upon to justify their operations or what they bring about. Collective responsibility is not impossible to realize if one only thinks in terms of financial fines or compensations; but collective responsibility seems impossible on the moral level where individuals finally are the decision makers and have to take up the responsibility for their share of the collective decision. But what happens when the bad consequences of a risk-filled action only

438

A. Huning and C. Mitcham

come to pass after the persons involved have died? This problem of the relation between individual and collective responsibility, and of the need for institutional formations to promote a responsibility reaching far into the future, are among the most important and the most urgent problems currently at issue in the field of engineering ethics.

Notes 1. E. Kapp,Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik: Zur enfsfehungsgeschichfe der K&fur aus neuen Gesichfspunkfen [Outlines of a philosophy of technology: Contributions to the history of the development of culture from new perspectives] (Braunschweig: Westermann, 1877). Reprinted, Dusseldorf: Stern-Verlag Janssen, 1978. 2. See I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Mefaphysik der Siffen (1875), Section Two. 3. Utilitarian cost-benefit assessments of technology constitute what Kant would call pragmatic moral evaluations. According to Kant, the first formula of the categorical imperative is “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” One German philosopher who has attempted to extend the principles of this imperative to technology is Gunther Anders. In his “Commandments in the Atomic Age” (included in C. Mitcham and R. Mackey, eds., Philosophy and Technology [New York: Free Press, 1972; 198311, Anders reformulates the categorical imperative as “Have and use only those things, the inherent maxims of which could become your own maxims and thus the maxims of a universal law.” 4. See G. W. F. Hegel, Phanomenologie o!es Geisfes, B, IX. 5. See Kapp, Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik, chapter XIII, “Der Sfaaf,” especially pp. 349 tf. 6. See, for example, T. Veblen, The Engineers and the Price System (New York: Huebsch, 1921). 7. F. Dessauer, Philosophie der Tech&k: Das Proplem der Realisierung [Philosophy of Technology: The Problem of Realization] (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1927). An English translation of Park II, chapters l-3, can be found under the title “Technology in Its Proper Sphere,” in C. Mitcham and R. Mackey, (eds.), Philosophy and Technology (New York: Free Press, 1972; 1983). 8. A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich, Richard and Clara Winston (trans.) (New York; Macmillan, 1970), p. 619. 9. K. Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage: Ein Beifrag zur deufschen Frage (Zurich: 1946); E. B. Ashton (trans.), The Question of German Guilt (New York: 1947). 10. For proceedings, see “Uber die Veranfworfung des Zngenieurs” [Concerning the responsibility of engineers], VDI-Zeitschrift, vol. 92 (1950), pp. 589-627. 11. For proceedings, see “Mensch and Arbeif im fechnischen Zeifalfer” [Human being and work in the technological agel, VDI-Zeitschrift, vol. 93 (1951), pp. 655-663 and 766-773. 12. For proceedings, see “Die Wandlungen des Menschen durch die Technik” [The changes of humanity through technology], VDI-Zeitschrif, vol. 96 (1954), pp. 113-159. 13. For proceedings, see “Der Mensch im Krafffeld der Technik” [Human beings in the force-field of technology], VDI-Zeitschrif, vol. 97 (19551, pp. 897-933. Subsequently published in book form, Dusseldorf: VDI-Verlag, 1955. 14. This translation is from C. Mitcham, Engineering Ethics Throughout the World (University Park, PA: STS Press, 1992). 15. F. Dessauer, Sfreif urn die Technik [Controversy about technology] (Frankfurt: Knecht, 1956). 16. Wirfschaftliche und gesellschaffliche Auswirkungen des fechnischen Forfschriffs [Economic and social consequences of technical progress] (Dusseldorf: VDI Verlag, 1971). 17. H. Bohme ted.), Zngenieure fur die Zunkunff/Engineers for Tomorrow (Munich: Heinz Moos, 1980). 18. S. Moser and A Huning (eds.), Werte und Werfordnungen in Technik und Gesellschaff [Values and value orderings in technology and society1 (Dusseldorf: VDI-Verlag, 1975); and S. Moser and A. Huning (eds.), Werfpraferenzen in Technik und Gesellschaff [Value preferences in technology and society] (Dusseldorf: VDI-Verlag, 1976).

Engineering

Ethics in Germany

439

19. l? Rapp (ed.), Ideal wad Wrklichkeit der Techniksteuerung [Ideal and reality in the control of technology1 (DusseldorfVDI-Verlag, 1982). 20. &rein Deutscher Zngenieure, VDZ: Zukunftige Aufgaben WDI: Future Tasks1 (Dusseldorf: VDI, 1980). pp. vi, 41. 21. H. Lenk and G. Ropohl (eds.), Technik und Ethik [Technology and ethics] (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1987); and Zngenieurueruntwotiung und Technikethik [Engineering responsibility and the ethics of technology1 (Dusseldorf: VDI, 1991). 22. H. Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Ersuch einer Ethik fur die technologische Zivilisation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979). English trans.: The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age H. Jonas and D. Heer (trans.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).