Leonen-poli Digests

Administrative Due Process BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent. LEONEN, J

Facts: In 2005, Gayak, an officer of the BSP was assigned to the Davao. In light of Gayak's transfer, Verlina Silo (Silo) and Yap were designated as Acting Bank Officer III and Bank Officer II, respectively. A month later, Silo transferred her cash accountabilities in the amount of P988 million to Yap. Six (6) months later, Gayak returned to the Cotabato Branch and Yap turned over her cash accountability back to Silo. COA audited Yap's cash accountability. The audit was needed before Yap could transfer her cash accountability back to Silo. However, the Audit Team could no longer locate Silo Silo informed Dequita, the Manager of BSP Cotabato admitting misappropriating a portion of Yap's accountability when she still had custody over it. Dequita notify the Audit Team about the information. This prompted the Audit Team to conduct a piece-by-piece cash count, not just a random sampling count. The Audit Team discovered the irregularity when they counted the P1,000.00 notes and found shortage in the amount of P32 million from Yap's cash accountabilities. Silo admitted responsibility for the cash shortage. BSP investigated the matter and Silo appeared before it. Yap, Dequita, and Silo admitted repeatedly stealing cash from her accountabilities for five (5) years. Silo then assigned to BSP all the benefits she would receive from BSP, her retirement benefits from GSIS, and the cash equivalent of her leave credits to pay for the amount she misappropriated. COA filed administrative charges against Dequita, Silo, and Yap before the Office of the Ombudsman. Office of the Ombudsman found Silo liable of the administrative charge against her but dismissed the administrative charges against Dequita and Yap. COA interposed that it still did not release Dequita and Yap from their responsibility over the funds entrusted to them. BSP contented that Silo had assumed full responsibility of the cash shortage because of her clear admission. Petitioner maintains that it was only allowed an opportunity to be heard when it filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which respondent denied, while Yap, Dequita, and the other bank officers were never given the opportunity to present their own evidence. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is correct when it was denied of due process by COA in an administrative proceeding. Ruling: YES. Due process in administrative proceedings does not require the submission of pleadings or a trial-type of hearing. Due process is satisfied if the party is duly notified of the allegations against him or her and is given a chance to present his or her defense. Furthermore, due process requires that the proffered defense should have been considered by the tribunal in arriving at its decision. In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, which ruled that administrative due process only requires the following: (a) The party should be allowed to present his or her own case and submit supporting evidence; (b)The deciding tribunal must consider the party's evidence; (c) There is evidence to support the tribunal's decision; (d) The evidence supporting the tribunal's decision must be substantial or such "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (e) The tribunal's decision was based on the evidence presented or the records of the case disclosed to the parties; (f) The tribunal's decision must be based on the judges' independent consideration of the facts and law governing the case; and (g) The tribunal's decision must be rendered such that the issues of the case and the reasons for the decisions are known to the parties. It is beyond dispute that Yap, Dequita, and the other bank officials of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Cotabato Branch were denied due process with the issuance of the assailed Commission on Audit Decision.

Validity of Warrant of Arrest SIMEON LAPI y MAHIPUS, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent LEONEN, J

Facts: In 2006, Operatives of the Bacolod City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Group conducted a stake-out operation in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City. During the operation, Police Officer 2 Ronald Villeran (P02 Villeran) heard noises from one (1) of the houses. He "peeped through its window"8 and saw Lapi, Sacare, and Lim "having a pot session." P02 Villeran tried to enter the house through the main door, but the door was locked. He then tried to enter through the kitchen door. Upon entry, he met someone trying to flee, but P02 Villeran restrained the person. 10 Then, P02 Villeran "peeked into the adjacent room" and saw that the pot session was ongoing. He entered the room and introduced himself as a police officer. Lapi, Sacare, and Lim tried to escape, but were caught by P02 Villeran's team members, who were waiting by the main door. After investigation, it was found that the accused tested positive for the use of methamphetamine hydrochloride.In the petitioner’s defense, he narrated that several men took his money and handcuff him and boarded him on a tricycle. Lapi stated that he was subject to drug test upon reaching the police headquarters. In 2010, the Regional Trial Court found Lapi guilty. It ruled that the warrantless arrest against him was legal since he was caught in flagrante delicto. Lapi appealed to the Court of Appeals, however, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is illegal despite the fact he failed to object its validity before arraignment. Ruling: NO. A citizen's right to be secure against any unreasonable searches and seizures is sacrosanct. No less than the Constitution guarantees that the State cannot intrude into the citizen's persons, house, papers, and effects without a warrant issued by a judge finding probable cause. Here, petitioner was seen by police officers participating in a "pot session." P02 Villeran, respondent's primary witness, testified that on the day of the incident, he and other police operatives were conducting a "stakeout operation" in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City. Here, however, petitioner admits that he failed to question the validity of his arrest before arraignment.   He did not move to quash the Information against him before entering his plea. 57 He was assisted by counsel when he entered his plea. 58 Likewise, he was able to present his evidence. The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. The Court have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. We have also held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.

Validity of Warrantless Arrest JESUS APARENTE Y VOCALAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts: In 2006, they were at Barangay Pantok, Binangonan., Rizal patrolling the area as part of surveillance operations in relation to illegal drugs and "Video Karera" activities. They saw two (2) men, one of whom was later identified as Aparente, in an alley around three (3) meters away. They watched as the other man handed Aparente a small plastic sachet. They saw Aparente inspect the sachet, flicking it against the light emitted from a street light and a lamp from a house nearby. When the police officers approached, the two (2) men fled. Only Aparente was caught. PO1 Dela Cruz told Aparente to open his hands. They found a small sachet with a white crystalline substance, which the police officers confiscated. They brought Aparente to the Binangonan Police Station where a police investigator marked the confiscated sachet with Aparente's initials. It was later found that the sachets were methamphetamine hydrochloride. The Regional Trial Court found the appellant guilty of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Aparente appealed the foregoing Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence against him was obtained from an illegal warrantless arrest. He also contended that the prosecution failed to establish that the rules on chain of custody were followed and that his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The appellate affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the circumstances of petitioner Jesus Aparente's warrantless arrest violated his constitutional rights Ruling: NO. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Further, probable cause may be in the form of overt acts which show that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed. Thus, a warrantless arrest that precedes a warrantless search may be valid, as long as these two (2) acts were substantially contemporaneous, and there was probable cause. In this case, the arrest and the search were substantially contemporaneous. Thus, what must be evaluated is whether or not the arresting officers had probable cause for petitioner's arrest when they made the search. Here, the arresting officers saw a man hand petitioner a small plastic sachet, which petitioner then inspected by flicking it against the light of a lamp post in an alley. Upon the officers' approach, these two (2) men fled. These overt acts and circumstances were observed personally by the arresting officers and, taken together, constitute reasonable suspicion that these two (2) men were violating Republic Act No. 9165, Thus, that the search preceded the arrest does not render invalid the search and arrest of petitioner.

Just Compensation NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SPS. MARGARITO ASOQUE AND TARCINIA ASOQUE, Respondents. LEONEN, J

Facts: Spouses were the registered owners of a parcel of agricultural land. In 1988, respondents spouses voluntarily offered to sell their land to the government under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines initially valued the subject lot based on the guidelines prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 17, Series of 1989. The land was revalued but respondents rejected the valuation. The parties brought the matter of valuation to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board which affirmed petitioner's second valuation Respondents-spouses filed with the Regional Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), a complaint for determination of just compensation. The SAC issued its Decision directing the defendants Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to pay plaintiffs. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence it appealed the decision with the CA. Appeal is granted. Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration arguing that the CA erred in awarding interest at the rate of 12%. The CA issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Hence, appeal to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari by petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines seeking to annul and set aside the Decision of the CA Issue: Whether or not there was a delay for the payment of just compensation. Ruling: YES. There was delay in the payment of just compensation which entitles the respondents spouses to the payment of interest from the time the property was transferred in the name of the government. The Supreme Court agrees with the CA that petitioner should pay interest for the delay in the payment of just compensation. However, such payment of interest should be computed up to the full payment of just compensation. The court allowed the grant of interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment of just compensation. A right-of-way easement or burden becomes a "taking" under eminent domain when there is material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses of the property for an indefinite period.The intrusion into the property must be so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his or her exploitation of it. Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution provides a substantive guarantee that private property that is taken by the state for public use should be paid for with just compensation. If the state does not agree with the property owner on a price, the state, through the competent government agency, should file the proper expropriation action under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. In case of a taking without the proper expropriation action filed, the property owner may file its own action to question the propriety of the taking or to compel the payment of just compensation. Among these inverse condemnation actions is a complaint for payment of just compensation and damages.

Citizenship RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE POELLAMANZARES, Respondents LEONEN, J

Facts: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar on 3rd day of September year 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and Emiliano's wife. The relatives then reported and registered the child as a founding with the Civil Registrar of Iloilo. The child was then named Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar. Grace was adopted by celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces).The petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar"in her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth. The trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe" on 13th day of May year 1974. Although there wereannotations placed in the child’s foundling certificate but it was only in 2005 that Susan Roces found out that their lawyer failed to secure a new Certificate of Live Birth with a Poe’s new name as well as the name of the adoptive parents. Roces then submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Poe was released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo. At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan.Initially, the petitioner was enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines but she chose to pursue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Poe graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. In 1988, she was issued a Philippine passport. On 27 July 1991, Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to the US right after the wedding. The petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16th day of April year 1992 in the US. In 2001, Poe became a naturalized American Citizen and she obtained a US Passport that same year.  In April 2004, Poe came back to the Philippines in order to support her father’s candidacy. It was at this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter. Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. Poe returned to the US in July 2004 with her two daughters. Poe returned in December 2004 after knowing her father’s deteriorating condition. The latter died and Poe stayed until February 2005 to take care of the funeral arrangements. Poe wanted to be with her grieving mother that is why she and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime first quarter of 2005. They prepared for resettlement including notification of their children’s schools, coordination with property movers and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to how they can bring their pet dog. According to Poe, as early as 2004, she already quit her job in the US. Poe came home on May 24, 2005 and immediately secured a TIN while her husband stayed in the US. They stayed with her mother until she and husband was able to purchase a condominium in San Juan sometime February 2006. On February 14, 2006, Poe went back to the US to set up the other family belongings. She commuted back in March 2006. In early 2006, Poe and husband acquired a property in Corinthian Hills in Quezon City where they

built their family home. On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 9225. On July 10, 2006, she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children. The Bureau of Immigration acted in favor of the petition on July 18, 2006. She and her children were then considered dual citizens. Poe then registered as voter in August 2006 and secured a Philippine passport thereafter. On October 6, 2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of the MTRCB. Before assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the US before a notary public in Pasig City on October 20, 2010. The following day, she submitted the Affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and took her oath as a chairperson of MTRCB. Poe from them on, she stopped using her American passport. On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the US before the Vice Consul of the US Embassy in Manila. On December 9, 2011, the US Vice Consul issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US effective October 21, 2010. On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator saying thatshe was resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months before May 13, 2013. She was then proclaimed a Senator on May 16, 2013. On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 elections. She declared that she is a natural born and her residence in the Philippine up to the day before election would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. There were some petitions filed against Poe because there are some issues about her that made her have this case in running for president. Petitions were filed against Poe alleging that (1) she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she stated that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years 11 months up to the day before May 9, 2016 Elections, (2) she is not natural born considering that Poe is a foundling and (3) Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied, rejected,or cancelled for committing material misrepresentations in her Certificate of Candidacy. Issue: Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Ruling: Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency. First, there is a very high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Grace Poe's physical features are typical of Filipinos. As a matter of fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents’ nationality. That high probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. Second, by votes of 7-5, the Supreme Court pronounced and said that foundlings are as a natural-born citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention manifests that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the Supreme Court felt the need to examine or test the intent of the framers. Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

Midnight Appointmets THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF AURORA, Petitioner, v. HILARIO M. MARCO, Respondents LEONEN, J Facts: Marco was permanently appointed as Corporate Development Specialist II by Gov. Ong 5 days before the end of her term in June 30, 2004.  His appointment, along with 25 other appointments, was accompanied by a certification stating that funds were available for the position. When the new Gov took over, the appointments made by Gov Ong were revoked based on the recall made by Budget Officer regarding the availability of funds for the position. Marcos sought reconsideration from the CSC Regional Office but was denied.  On appeal, the CSC through a resolution dated Apr 14 held the validity of the appointment on the ground that it complied with the CSC rules and that the recall of the certification did not affect its validity because evidence was not presented. Instead of filing an MR, the Province filed a petition for relief. It was denied by the CSC because it was not allowed by the rules. Meanwhile, Marco filed a motion to implement the Apr 14 Resolution, which was granted. The Province filed an MR of the Apr 14 Resolution but was again denied because it was not filed within the 15-day reglementary period. Finally, the Province filed before the CA a petition for certiorari via Rule 43 against the CSC’s second order implementing the Apr 14 resolution, invoking the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments.  The CA denied the petition and upheld the CSC decision. Issue:  Whether or not the prohibition on midnight appointments apply to appointments made by local executives Ruling: No. The prohibition under Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential appointments, and not to those made by local executives.  In this case, the appointment is valid because there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his/her tenure. A midnight appointment "refers to those appointments made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential election." Midnight appointments are prohibited under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is "duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he [or she] should not do acts which he [or she] ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his [or her] successor."  An outgoing President should not "deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments." However, the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives.

COMELEC ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS ARARO PARTY-LIST, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. LEONEN, J Facts: The COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers in the May 10, 2010 elections initially proclaimed (28) party-list organizations as winners involving a total of (35) seats guaranteed and additional seats. Petitioner, Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc., (ARARO) was a duly accredited party-list under Republic Act No. 7941 ranked fiftieth (50th). Petitioner then filed an election protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning the Resolution of the COMELEC that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups. Petitioner asks that this Court to modify the COMELEC's interpretation of the formula stated in BANAT v. COMELEC by making the divisor for the computation of the percentage votes, from total number of votes cast minus the votes for the disqualified party-list candidates, to the total number of votes cast regardless whether party-list groups are disqualified; and enjoin the public COMELEC from proclaiming the remaining winning party-list candidates until it modifies the interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC to the formula proposed by the petitioner. The Court did not issue any TRO, the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winning party-list groups. The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the COMELEC is flawed because votes that were spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists were not counted. The National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 10-009 applies the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271 and G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009 to arrive at the winning party-list groups and their guaranteed seats. Number of votes of party-list over Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list equals the Total number of votes for party-list candidates. The Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list should be greater than or equal to 2% or 0.02 to entitle a party-list candidate to one (1) seat in the first round. There will be a second round if the total number of guaranteed seats awarded in the first round is less than the total number of party-list seats available. If the total seats available for party-lists are not yet awarded after the second round (this is computed by getting the sum of the seats awarded in the first round and the additional seats awarded in the second round), the next in the party-list ranking will be given one (1) seat each until all seats are fully distributed. A three-seat cap per party-list, however, is imposed on winning groups. Fractional seats are not rounded off and are disregarded. The petitioner argues that the Commission on Elections interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC is flawed because it is not in accordance with the law.The petitioner distinguishes the phrases,valid votes cast for party-list candidates on the one hand as against votes cast for the party-list system on the other. The petitioner argues that the correct interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-list Law does not distinguish between valid and invalid votes. The COMELEC argues that this will contradict CIBAC v. COMELEC, 549 Phil. 767 (2007) and BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271 and G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009. It asserts that neither can the phrase be construed to include the number of voters who did not even vote for any qualified party-list candidate, as these voters cannot be considered to have cast any vote "for the party-list system."

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC to determine the party-list groups that would be proclaimed in the 2010 elections. `

Ruling: YES. The Court agrees with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid due to no cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor. Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the party-list system shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of representation: The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED as follows: Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast for partylist groups whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor. The divisor shall also not include votes that are declared spoiled or invalid.

Just Compensation JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, Petitioner, v. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA, Respondent. LEONEN, J Facts: NAPOCOR instituted expropriation proceedings over parcels of land in Brgy. Maginhawa, Bato, Catanduanes for a right-of-way easement, construction and maintenance of its Substation Island Grid Project. NAPOCOR offered a price of P500.00 per square meter. However, respondents (property owners) objected and alleged that the value of properties was P2000.00 per square meter. On Dec. 16, 2002 RTC of Virac, Catanduanes confirmed the NAPOCOR’s right to expropriate and ordered the creation of a commission to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid to respondents. On Jan. 28, 2003 NAPOCOR filed a Notice to Take Possession on the basis of Rule 67 Rules of Court alleging its entitlement thereof in view of its deposit with Land Bank of the Philippines in the amount of P 3280.00 on the provisional value of the properties. On July 10, 2003 the court appointed commissioners recommended a fair market value of P1500.00 per square meter based on their research and proper considerations on the present market value of properties, location, and surrounding properties in the area. NAPOCOR opposed the recommendation of the commissioners arguing, inter alia, that: a) the opinions given by people who live in the area must not be given weight due to their lack of real estate expertise; b) The Provincial Appraisal Committee valued said lot at P500.00 per square meter; c) The approved zonal values of real properties in Catanduanes classified as Residential Regular (RR) is P105.00 per square meter. d) Only an easement of right-of-way shall be acquired over the properties of the defendants which remain classified as cocoland and as provided in RA 6395 (NPC Charter), shall not exceed 10% of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. NAPOCOR amended its complaint stating that it need the properties to construct the Substation Island Grid Project instead of just an easement of right of way and made a deposit with Land Bank in the amount of P580, 769.93 alleging that this represented the value of 3,954 square meters sought to be expropriated. NAPOCOR then filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession which was granted by the RTC. Upon the granted motion of time extension to remove the properties of the respondents, the trial court fixed the value of the structures and improvements on the land to P827, 000.00 and ordered NAPOCOR to deposit the additional amount of P262, 639.17 which it failed to deposit to which the trial court resolves by CANCELING the Writ of Possession. The appeal made by NAPOCOR was denied by the CA. In a turn of events, NAPOCOR stated that it no longer needed the properties as it was set to acquire an alternative site and filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal praying for withdrawal of its appeal for its Amended Complaint to be dismissed. Issue: Whether or not the National Power Corporation failed to comply with the guidelines in Republic Act No. 8974 in relation to just compensation.

Ruling: YES. The power of eminent domain is an inherent competence of the state. It is essential to a sovereign. Thus, the Constitution does not explicitly define this power but subjects it to a limitation: that it be exercised only for public use and with payment of just compensation. Whether the use is public or whether the compensation is constitutionally just will be determined finally by the courts. However, the manner of its exercise such as which government instrumentality can be delegated with the power to condemn,' under what conditions, and how may be limited by law. Republic Act No. 8974 does these, but it should not be read as superseding the power of this court to promulgate rules of procedure. Thus, the existing rules should be read in conjunction with the law that limits and conditions the power of eminent domain. There are, of course, instances when immediate payment cannot be made even if the implementing agency is willing to do so. The owner of the property is not precluded from contesting the power of the implementing agency to exercise eminent domain, the necessity of the taking, the public character of its use, or the proffered' value by the implementing agency. In these instances, the implementing agency may deposit the proffered value with the trial court having jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings. Considering that the National Power Corporation failed to comply with the guidelines in Republic Act No. 8974, a Writ of Possession should not have been issued.\

Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) HA DATU TAWAHIG (RODERICK D. SUMATRA), TRIBAL CHIEFTAIN, HIGAONON TRIBE, PETITIONER, v. THE HONORABLE CEBU CITY PROSECUTOR I LINETH LAPINID, CEBU CITY PROSECUTOR II FERNANDO GUBALANE, ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR ERNESTO NARIDO, JR., CEBU CITY PROSECUTOR NICOLAS SELLON, AND THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 12, CEBU CITY ESTELA ALMA SINGCO, RESPONDENTS. LEONEN, J Facts: In 2006, Lorriane Igot filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Cebu City Prosecutor charging Sumatra with rape. Prosecutor Lapinid found probable cause to charge Sumatra with rape and recommended filing a corresponding information. Judge Singco directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Sumatra, but he would not be arrested until in 2013. Sumatra filed a Motion arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction over him. Accused through counsel asserts that the present controversy is purely a dispute involving indigenous cultural communities over which customary laws must apply in accordance with their tribal justice system and under the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. The Judge denying the motion ruled that IPRA does not apply to the prosecution of a "dispute" such as this case as it does not involve claims over ancestral domain nor it relates (sic) to the rights of indigenous communities/people which would require the application of customary laws and practices to resolve the "dispute" between the parties herein. Datu Bontito Leon Kilat a "customary lawyer," filed a Motion to Release the Indigenous Person. The Judge denied the motion. Gonzales filed before the trial court to appear as counsel for Sumatra. The Judge still denied the motion. Thus, Sumatra filed a petition, he added that the Dadantulan Tribal Court issued a Resolution and declaring that he "should be spared from criminal, civil and administrative liability." This Court denies the Petition. Petitioner is well-served to disabuse himself of the notion that the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act will shield him from prosecution and prospective liability for crimes. Issue: Whether the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act works to remove from courts of law jurisdiction over criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. Ruling: YES. The 1987 Constitution vests this Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. However, it is not only this Court that has the competence to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The Court of Appeals and regional trial courts are equally capable of taking cognizance of petitions for such writs. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. Applying this doctrine is not merely for practicality; it also ensures that courts at varying levels act in accord with their respective competencies.

The 1987 Constitution qualifies the State's duty of "recognizing] and promoting] the rights of indigenous cultural communities" as necessarily operating "within the framework of national unity and development." This reference to "national unity" is as much an articulation of an ideal as it is a legal formulation. Thus, it entails the imperative of legal harmony. Customary laws and practices are valid and viable only to the extent that they do not undermine the proper scope and application of legislative enactments, including criminal statutes. Validity of Habeas Corpus IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Respondents. LEONEN, J Facts: In 2009, Datu Salibo and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. While in Saudi Arabia, Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah. He subsequently returned to the Philippines. In 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang. Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. Salibo argued that he was not Butukan Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.

The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not Butukan S. Malang. Afterwards, the police apprehended Salibo and detained him at the Police station. Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.  the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice). The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang charged with murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. On appeal, by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's Decision. The Court of Appeals found that Salibo's arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest. Issue: Whether or not Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus. Ruling: YES. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus. Called the "great writ of liberty" the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty." The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts, respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued. Speedy Disposition of Cases (Bill of Rights)

CESAR MATAS CAGANG, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. LEONEN, J Facts: On February 10, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging that Amelia May Constantino, Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan of the Vice Governor's Office, Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption by diverting public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as "dummies." The complaint was referred to the Commission on Audit for audit investigation On November 17, 2011 (7 years after), the OMB filed Informations for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents against Cagang, Camanay, Zoleta, Macagcalat, and Mangalen. Cagang argued that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the Informations. Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan and Roque v. Ombudsman, he argued that the delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. The OMB, on the other hand, filed a Comment/Opposition arguing that there was no showing that delay in the filing was intentional, capricious, whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons. Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest but it was subsequently dismissed. The Sandiganbayan argued that there was no inordinate delay in the issuance of the information, considering that 40 different individuals were involved with direct participation in more or less 81 different transactions. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the Information filed against him violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Issue: Whether or not inordinate delay exists in this case. Ruling: NO. Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query on when a case is deemed to have commenced. What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not determined by “mere mathematical reckoning.” It requires consideration of a number of factors, including the time required to investigate the complaint, to file the information, to conduct an arraignment, the application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper, and the submission of the case for decision. Unforeseen circumstances, such as unavoidable postponements or force majeure, must also be taken into account. In Dansal v. Fernandez, this Court recognized that the right to speedy disposition of cases does not only include the period from which a case is submitted for resolution. Rather, it covers the entire period of investigation even before trial. Thus, the right may be invoked as early as the preliminary investigation or inquest. Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation violates the

accused’s right to due process and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. The burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during the given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the delay was inordinate. Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is not determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver of right. The Existence of Probable Cause IZA L. MAZA, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASIÑO, AND RAFAEL V. MARIANO, petitioners, VS. HON. EVELYN A. TURLA, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALAYAN CITY, BRANCH 40, FLORO F. FLORENDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OFFICER-IN-CHARGE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, ANTONIO LL. LAPUS, JR., EDISON V. RAFANAN, AND EDDIE C. GUTIERREZ, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS MEMBERS OF THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS, AND RAUL M. GONZALEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents. LEONEN, J Facts: Petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casiño, and Rafael V. Mariano (petitioners) are former members of the House of Representatives. Liza represented Gabriela Women's Party (Gabriela), Saturnino and Teodoro represented Bayan Muna Party-List (Bayan Muna), while Rafael represented Anakpawis Party-List (Anakpawis) In 3 letters, Police Senior Inspector Palomo referred 3 cases of murder against the petitioners and 15 others. He named 19 individuals who were allegedly responsible for the death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe. His findings show that the named individuals conspired, planned, and implemented the killing of the supporters of ANAKBAYAN Party List. Carlito and Danilo were ANAKBAYAN community organizers while Jimmy was mistaken as ANAKBAYAN supporter. He recommended that preliminary investigation be conducted and that an information for each count of murder be filed against 19 individuals. Petitioners filed a special appearance with MTQ the subpoena and to expunge supporting affidavits as there is no valid complaint filed against them. They also claimed that the preliminary investigation conducted was highly irregular, and that the subpoena was patently defective, amounting to a denial of their rights to due process. The panel of prosecutors issued a joint resolution. The panel found probable cause for murder in the killing of Carlito and Jimmy, and for kidnapping with murder in the killing of Danilo Felipe, against the nineteen 19 suspects. However, the panel considered one of the suspects, Julie Flores Sinohin, as a state witness. The panel recommended that the corresponding Informations be filed against the remaining suspects. On the same day, two (2) Informations for murder were filed before RTC Palayan City, (Palayan cases) and an Information for kidnapping with murder was filed in Guimba, Nueva Ecija (Guimba case).Presiding Judge Turla issued an Order on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla held that "the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed in [the Palayan] cases"

Petitioners moved for partial reconsideration of the order, praying for the outright dismissal of the Palayan cases for lack of probable case. Denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioners claim that Judge Turla acted with GADLEJ when she remanded the case back to the prosecutors. Petitioners also argue that the setting aside of the Joint Resolution establishes the non-existence of probable cause against them. Thus, the cases against them should have been dismissed. Petitioners aver that the documents submitted by the prosecution are neither relevant nor admissible evidence. The documents "do not establish the complicity of the petitioner party-list representatives to the death of the supposed victims." Issue: Whether or not there was probable cause in this case. Ruling; YES. The trial court judge's determination of probable cause is based on her or his personal evaluation of the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence. The determination of probable cause by the trial court judge is a judicial function, whereas the determination of probable cause by the prosecutors is an executive function. Thus, when Judge Turla held that the prosecutors' conduct of preliminary investigation was "incomplete" and that their determination of probable cause "has not measured up to [the] standard," she encroached upon the exclusive function of the prosecutors. Instead of determining probable cause, she ruled on the propriety of the preliminary investigation. The remand of the criminal cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of another preliminary investigation is improper. A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt on the existence of probable cause. Regardless of Judge Turla's assessment on the conduct of the preliminary investigation, it was incumbent upon her to determine the existence of probable cause against the accused after a personal evaluation of the prosecutors' report and the supporting documents. She could even disregard the report if she found it unsatisfactory, and/or require the prosecutors to submit additional evidence. There was no option for her to remand the case back to the panel of prosecutors for another preliminary investigation. In doing so, she acted without any legal basis.

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts CRISANTO M. AALA ET AL, petitioners, vs. HON. REY T. UY, respondent LEONEN, J Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City proposed an ordinance sought to adopt a new schedule of market values and assessment levels of real properties in Tagum City. It was then passed and become City Ordinance No. 516, s-2011. It was forwarded to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte which was approved with modification. The petitioner filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte an Opposition/Objection to City Ordinance in violation of certain Sections of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte issued Resolution declaring certain Sections of City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 as invalid. However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City passed Resolution City Ordinance as valid in accordance to Section 56(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DILG Opinion. It argued that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte failed to take action on City Ordinance within 30 days from its receipt.36 Hence, City Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. City Ordinance published on a newspaper of general circulation in Tagum City which alarmed to the petioners. The petitioners filed before this Court an original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus and a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners seek to nullify the ordinance on the ground that respondents enacted it with grave abuse of discretion.42 They invoke this Court's original jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution 43 in view of the need to immediately resolve the issues they have raised. Well-aware of the doctrines on the hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies, they beg this Court's indulgence to allow immediate and direct resort to it. According to petitioners, this case is exempt from the application of the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. They anchor their claim on the ground that the redress they desire cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts. Furthermore, petitioners assert that the issue they have raised is purely legal and that the case involves paramount public interest, which warrants the relaxation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Respondents attack the propriety of the remedy of which petitioners have availed themselves. Respondents point out that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is only directed against judicial and quasi-judicial acts. 77 According to respondents, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City exercised a legislative function in enacting the questioned ordinance and is, thus, beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari. Moreover, there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to petitioners under the law.

Citing Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, respondents argue that petitioners should have exhausted administrative remedies by filing an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Respondents further argue that in directly filing their Petition before this Court, petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. They stress that the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Issue: Whether or not this case falls under the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts Ruling: No. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter" it must remain as a "court of last resort." This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of dealing with causes in the first instance. As expressly provided in the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction "over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus." However, this Court has emphasized in People v. Cuaresma that the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus does not exclusively pertain to this Court. Rather, it is shared with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts. Nevertheless, "this concurrence of jurisdiction" does not give parties unfettered discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate venue where petitions for extraordinary writs should be filed. Parties cannot randomly select the court or forum to which their actions will be directed. This Court will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower courts. This holds especially true when questions of fact are raised. Unlike this Court, trial courts and the Court of Appeals are better equipped to resolve questions of fact. They are in the best position to deal with causes in the first instance.

Chain of Custody (Bill of Rights) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DIOSCORO COMOSO TUREMUTSA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT LEONEN, J Facts: In 2005, Comoso was charged with violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, particularly for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The Prosecution witnesses testified that on March 26, 2005, the Anti-Drug Special Operation Task Force and Drug Enforcement Action Division planned a buy-bust operation after receiving information from their civilian asset that a certain "Coro" was selling illegal drugs in Quimson, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa City. Aquino (PO2 Aquino) and PO3 Fernanded proceeded to the area of the operation. They parked their motorcycle and walked to the target area, where the asset told them to wait since their target, later identified as Comoso, was still playing tong-its. The police officers waited by a store, while their asset waited in front of Comoso's house. Soon after, Comoso arrived. There, he handed a plastic sachet supposedly containing marijuana in exchange for the asset's buy-bust money. It was identified that the transaction had been consummated. The police officers arrested Comoso. The RTC found Comoso guily beyond reasonable doubt of R.A. 9165. Comoso appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that: (1) the poseur-buyer, the sole witness to the transaction, was never presented as a witness; and (2) the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti was not properly established. Maintaining that the chain of custody was established, the Court of Appeals excused the absence of photographs of the seized items since there were justifiable reasons for noncompliance. It found that the prosecution had duly established that PO2 Aquino had custody of the seized items from their seizure until their turnover to the crime laboratory. The Solicitor-General maintained that the chain of custody remained unbroken, it argues that the integrity of the evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that evidence has been tampered with. Issue: Whether or not the failure to comply with the chain of custody requirements in drugs cases will result in an accused's acquittal. Ruling: YES. Because the prosecution was unable to establish accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence must prevail. Accused-appellant must, thus, be acquitted.

Chain of custody in the seizure of illegal drugs is defined as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to

safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition Generally, noncompliance with these requirements would not have rendered the search and seizure invalid "under justifiable grounds." However, the absence of any justification only serves to magnify the irregularity of the police officer's performance of their official duties. Indeed, the often minuscule amounts of dangerous drugs seized by law enforcement officers compel courts to be more circumspect in the examination of the evidence. Reasonable doubt arises in the prosecution's narrative when the links in the chain of custody cannot be properly established. There is no guarantee that the evidence had not been tampered with, substituted, or altered. Chain of Custody (Bill of Rights) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. EDGARDO ROYOL Y ASICO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. LEONEN, J Facts: Edgardo A. Royol, a garbage collector, was charged with violating Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. According to the prosecution, at around 9:00 a.m. on November 27, 2007, a confidential informant went to the Tarlac Provincial Police Office in Camp Makabulos, Tarlac City and reported that Royol had been selling illegal drugs in Barangay Lourdes, Bamban, Tarlac. The informant allegedly told PO2 Baquiran that he was due to meet Royol that morning. A buy-bust team was formed with PO2 Baquiran as poseur-buyer, and Inspector Silva, Police Officer 1 Francis Capinding, and Police Officer 2 Christopher Soriano (PO2 Soriano) as arresting officers. Four (4) other members of the team were tasked as back-up. PO2 Baquiran was provided with two (2) marked P500.00 bills. It was also agreed that PO2 Baquiran would scratch his head to signal to the rest of the team that the sale of drugs had been consummated. He was apprehended by the police officers and it was subsequently discovered that it was marijuana. The RTC ruled that he is guilty of the crime charged. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision the lower court. Issue: Whether or not prosecution established accused-appellant Edgardo A. Royol's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 Ruling: YES. In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence. It is not enough that the evidence offered has probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it has an actual connection with the transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are important. Furthermore, noncompliance with Section 21 means that critical elements of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs remain wanting. Such noncompliance justifies an accused's acquittal. Here, the case against accused-appellant is woefully lacking in satisfying these requirements. Complete and utter noncompliance with the chain of custody requirements of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act), inescapably leads to an accused's

acquittal. Conviction cannot be sustained by a mere presumption of regularity and the approximation of compliance. There is no semblance of compliance with Section 21(1). All the prosecution has to support its assertions on the integrity of the marijuana that was allegedly obtained from accused-appellant is its bare claim that it was marked at the Tarlac Provincial Police Office. Worse, the prosecution failed to account for the presence of even just one (1) of the persons required by Section 21(1) to be present during the inventory and photographing. There was no elected public official. Neither was there a representative of the National Prosecution Service nor was there a media representative. The prosecution did not even maintain that accused-appellant himself was present.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ROLANDO TERNIDA Y MUNAR, ACCUSED-APPELLANT LEONEN, J Facts: On November 12, 2009, a confidential informant told the San Fernando City Police that an illegal drug transaction involving Ternida would take place in five (5) days at Quezon Avenue, San Fernando City, La Union. Acting on the tip, the San Fernando City Police formed a buy-bust team composed of Police Officer PO2 Annague, who was designated as the poseur-buyer, Inspector Quesada, PO3 Raul Dapula, and PO3 Paul (PO3 Batnag, who was designated as back-up. The team carried out the operation. The officers spotted Ternida along Quezon Avenue. PO2 Annague approached him, while PO3 Batnag stayed at a distance where he could observe the transaction. Ternida asked how much PO2 Annague would buy, to which PO2 Annague said P1,000.00 worth. Ternida then gave PO2 Annague one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of crystalline substance in exchange for PO2 Annague's P1,000.00 bill, which had been designated as the buy-bust money. The police officers subsequently apprehended Terrida. It was later discovered that the sachet contained methamphetamine hydrochloride. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty of beyond reasonable doubt of R.A. 9165. On appeal, Ternida argued that the prosecution failed to preserve the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. He pointed out that the seized item was not marked with the date of seizure, which meant that it could not be distinguished from other evidence that may have been in the police officer's possession. Moreover, he claimed that the drugs allegedly seized were not photographed. He asserted that the prosecution did not give justifiable grounds for the apprehending officers' failure to comply with the chain of custody requirements under the law. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, Ternida elevated the case to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant Rolando Ternida y Munar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Ruling: NO. To convict an accused of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must not only prove that the sale took place, but also present the corpus delicti in evidence. In doing this, the prosecution must establish the chain of custody of the seized items to prove with moral certainty the identity of the dangerous drug seized. Article II, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act

provides the procedures that the apprehending team must observe to comply with the chain of custody requirements in handling seized drugs.  That the photographing and physical inventory of the seized drugs must be done immediately where seizure had taken place minimizes the possibility that evidence may be planted. Noncompliance with this legally mandated procedure, upon seizure, raises doubt that what was submitted for laboratory examination and as evidence in court was seized from an accused. Here, the prosecution failed to provide any evidence that the allegedly seized drugs were photographed upon seizure, in the presence of the accused. That no photograph of the seized drugs was offered in evidence raises questions as to whether the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was seized from accused-appellant in the buy-bust operation. Thus, before courts may consider the seized drugs as evidence despite noncompliance with the legal requirements, justifiable grounds must be identified and proved. The prosecution must establish the steps taken to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. It has the positive duty to establish its reasons for the procedural lapses. Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON, petitioner, VS. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, JUDGE ROLINE GINEZ- JABALDE, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 74 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF OLONGAPO CITY, AND MARILOU LAUDE Y SERDONCILLO, respondents. LEONEN, J Facts: A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National Police-Olongapo City Police Office and private respondent Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo (Laude) against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton. During the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City found probable cause against Pemberton for the crime of murder and filed for an Information. Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton's Petition for Review and stated that based on the evidence on record, there was "no reason to alter, modify, or reverse the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City. Pemberton filed this Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Pemberton argues that in sustaining a finding of probable cause, Secretary De Lima committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or absence of jurisdiction based on the following grounds: (a) Secretary De Lima took into account additional evidence which the City Prosecutor allegedly had no authority to receive and which Pemberton had no opportunity to address and rebut, thereby denying him due process of law;(b) Secretary De Lima found probable cause to charge Pemberton with the crime of murder when "the evidence on record does not support the existence of probable cause to indict [him] . . . with either homicide or murder[;]" and (c) Secretary De Lima found that "the killing was attended with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength[,] and cruelty despite prevailing jurisprudence dictating that the elements of these qualifying circumstances . . . be established by direct evidence.” Secretary De Lima, through the Office of the Solicitor General, points out that this Petition is procedurally infirm. The Petition assails the appreciation of evidence and law by Secretary De Lima, which are "errors of judgment . . . [that] cannot be remedied by a writ of certiorari." Further, by filing this Petition before this court and not the Court of Appeals, Pemberton violated the principle of hierarchy of courts. Moreover, the case is moot and academic, considering that the Regional Trial Court has convicted Pemberton for the crime charged

Issue: WON petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing his Petition before the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeals. Ruling: NO. The SC proceeded to name exceptional cases, where direct resort to this Court may be allowed: First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches of the government. In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners' right to freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases. The case before this court involves an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has become a rare occasion when private citizens actively engage the public in political discourse A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection. In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in this decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the context of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one's chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily includes the right to free speech and expression. The protection of these fundamental constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court. Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether the right of suffrage includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question which this court has yet to provide substantial answers to, through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is allowed. Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution through the assailed issuances. Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court. Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place in the same situation. Besides, this court affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in order that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future. Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression. In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally compelling reason to justify the direct resort to this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court. Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public

policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past, questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens' right to bear arms, government contracts involving modernization of voters' registration lists, and the status and existence of a public office.