Nato 1999 Kosovo

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, 1999 1.Context of the conflict: The death of Tito in 1980 was the starting point of a long period of political instability and national unrest in Yugoslavia. The most important causes are: -

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The destruction of the Serbian cultural and architectural heritage in Kosovo A large number of Serbs leaving Kosovo in the mid-1980s, being subjected to ‘’physical, political, legal and cultural genocide’’ (David Binder, New York Times, 1987) 1989 attempt to establish multi-party elections and remove the independence of Kosovar institutions, and closing down the Kosovo Assembly The emergence and increased frustration of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), Albanians convinced that only an armed resistance can change the situation; Rugova’s plea for UN peacekeeping in 1997. Increased insecurity between Jan.-March, 1999 and the Jan. 15th Racak massacre  March, 1999 Rambouillet Agreement drafted by NATO, calling for NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous province within Yugoslavia, and the allocation of 30,000 NATO troops to maintain order in Kosovo. Yugoslavia, with Russian support, rejects the proposal, and NATO uses the rejection as a justification to start the bombings.

2.The legality of the intervention: Although the Unites Nations Security Council did not expressly sanction NATO’s use of force, NATO did not have the backing of the institutions before it decided to launch its attacks thus many regard the intervention as illegal. Under the Chapter VII of the UN charter, the Security Council is given full power for the maintenance of international peace and security. On the other hand, after Russia tabled a draft condemning NATO’s intervention it was supported only by China and Namibia, and not other UN members, leading to the conclusion that ‘’the law would be interpreted flexibly depending upon the persuasiveness of the case’’. As the UN considers NATO to be a ‘regional arrangement’ under ART 52, it allows it to deal with the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided their actions are consistent with the purposes and principles of UN. 3.The legitimacy of the intervention: The case of Kosovo was considered a ‘supreme humanitarian emergency’ ( genocide, mass killings) by the intervening states, which breached many international legal commitments that Yugoslavia already accepted, thus NATO’s intervention is considered to be ‘morally justifiable’ by the USA, all EU countries, and Yugoslavia’s neighbours. Milosevic’s regime challenged global norms of common humanity, and NATO had a moral obligation to stop these crimes. 4. Success of the intervention: Short term successes were visible immediately after the involvement of NATO: the return of virtually all refugees to their homes had been accomplished, however most Serbians fled Kosovo out of fear of the Albanian reprisal, who constituted the majority.

But was it able to ensure long term humanitarian intervention by facilitating conflict resolution and reconstruction in consultation with local political actors (Parekh:1997) ? Some regard the context and cause of intervention as a clear sign of the weakness of Clinton administration, which has been unable to find a rationale for the bombings except ‘these wild allegations’. Before NATO’s involvement, the conflict between KLA and the Serbian forces occurred on a comparatively smaller scale. The raging civil war between the two forces escaladed to a completely new level after the NATO bombing campaign began. ( International Committee of Fourth International).