Pre-week And Last Minute Lecture In Remedial Law (2019 Bar) Atty. Salvador N. Moya Ii, Ll.m. I. General Principles

PRE-WEEK AND LAST MINUTE LECTURE IN REMEDIAL LAW (2019 BAR) BY: ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II, LL.M. PART I I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES SUBSTANTIVE LAW VS. REMEDIAL LAW Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer. As opposed to Adjective or Remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions.1 Fabian vs. Hon. Desierto2 laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature. In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is— whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.3 1.Q.

How should our procedural rules be treated?

1.A. In the case of Castells vs. Saudi Arabian Airlines (704 SCRA 206, 28 August 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that: Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. 2.Q.

Can procedural laws be given retroactive effect? Explain.

2.A

Yes. In the following cases:

1.

Dee vs. Harvest All Investment Limited (820 SCRA 585, 15 March 2017)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], citing the case of Tan, Jr. vs. CA4 Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Salvana (726 SCRA 141, 10 June 2014)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.], it was held that:

2.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. 3.Q.

Explain the archiving of cases in our procedural rules.

3.A. In the case of Balao vs. Ermita (833 SCRA 532, 1 August 2017)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which action thereon can be taken. RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT

1 2 3

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4.Q.

What is Judicial Power?

4.A.

In the following cases:

See Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 774 SCRA 431 (10 November 2015). 356 Phil. 787 (1998). Fabian vs. Desierto, supra. See also Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra; Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Judge Laigo, et al., 768 Phil. 239 (2015); Jaylo, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 751 Phil. 123 (2015); Land Bank of the Phils. vs. De Leon, 447 Phil. 495 (2003); and Bernabe vs. Alejo, 424 Phil. 933 (2002). 424 Phil. 556 (2002).

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2

1. 2.

3.

Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) vs. Quezon City (835 SCRA 350, 8 August 2017)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]; International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. vs. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines)(798 SCRA 250, 26 July 2016)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]; (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration from the Decision dated 8 December 2015, 776 SCRA 434)(En Banc)[Villarama, J.] Carpio-Morales vs. CA (6th Division)(774 SCRA 431, 10 November 2015)(En Banc)[PerlasBernabe, J.], it was held that:

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.5 This power is provided by Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case.6 Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY 5.Q.

What is the Hierarchy of Courts Doctrine? Explain.

5.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2. 3.

Courage, et al. vs. CIR (G.R. No. 213446, 3 July 2018)(En Banc)[Caguioa, J.] De Lima vs. Guerrero (10 October 2017)(En Banc)[Velasco, Jr., J.] Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Provincial Government of Lanao Del Norte (838 SCRA 26, 29 August 2017)(En Banc)[Velasco, Jr., J.] Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) vs. Quezon City (835 SCRA 350, 8 August 2017)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Rosales vs. ERC (788 SCRA 292, 5 April 2016)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.] De Castro vs. Carlos (696 SCRA 400, 16 April 2013)(En Banc)[Sereno, CJ.], the High Court pronounced that:

4. 5. 6.

The hierarchy of courts doctrine prohibits parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts.7 Nevertheless, this doctrine is not an iron-clad rule; it also admits of exceptions, such as when the case involves matters of transcendental importance. Direct invocation of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction should only be allowed when there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition.8 6.Q. When can there be immediate resort to the Supreme Court as an exception to the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts? 6.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Rama vs. Moises (835 SCRA 222, 8 August 2017)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.] Aala vs. Uy supra, citing the case of Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections (747 SCRA 1, 21 January 2015)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.],

the Supreme Court summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to the Supreme Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) (2) (3) (4) 5 6

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when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; when the case involves transcendental importance; when the case is novel; when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court;

Araullo vs. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457 (2014)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.]. Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed., p. 959, as cited also in the Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, p. 661. See Chiquita Brands, Inc. vs. Omelio (7 June 2017). Dagan vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 721 Phil. 400 (2013).

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(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)

when time is of the essence; when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.

DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE/JUDICIAL STABILITY 7.Q.

What is the Doctrine of Judicial Stability or Non-Interference and its rationale?

7.A. In the case of Tan vs. Cinco (793 SCRA 610, 15 June 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of Barroso vs. Omelio49, the High Court ruled that: The doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: No court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: A court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment. 8.Q. Does the Doctrine of Non-Interference apply to laws passed by Congress increasing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court? 8.A. Yes. In Carpio-Morales vs. CA (6th Division)(774 SCRA 431, 10 November 2015)(En Banc) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory findings issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770, which was invalidated in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto.9 In Fabian, the Supreme Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

II. JURISDICTION CLASSIFICATION OF JURISDICTION 9.Q.

What is Jurisdiction? Explain.

9.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Bilag vs. Ay-Ay (824 SCRA 78, 24 April 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] DAR vs. Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation (715 SCRA 650, 11 February 2014)(En Banc)[Villarama, Jr., J.] Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Republic (686 SCRA 472, 27 November 2012)(En Banc)[Velasco, Jr., J.], the High Court said that:

3.

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.10

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356 Phil. 787 (1998). Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation vs. Bureau of Customs, 759 SCRA 306 (17 June 2015).

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10.Q. Constitution?

When can the Supreme Court exercise its Expanded Jurisdiction under the 1987

10.A. In SPARK vs. Quezon City supra, the high court held that: It requires the presence of actual case or controversy.11 Under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act. An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.12 Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. ORIGINAL VS. APPELLATE JURISDICTION ORIGINAL – Those courts in which, under the law, actions or proceedings may originally be commenced. APPELLATE – Courts which have the power to review on appeal the decisions or orders of a lower court. GENERAL VS. SPECIAL JURISDICTION GENERAL – Those competent to decide their own jurisdiction and to take cognizance of all kinds of cases, unless otherwise provided by law or Rules. Ex. RTC‘s (Sec. 19, B.P. BLG. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691) SPECIAL OR LIMITED – Those which have no power to decide their own jurisdiction and can only try cases permitted by statute. Ex. MTC. (Sec. 33, B.P. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691) EXCLUSIVE VS. CONCURRENT EXCLUSIVE – or the power to adjudicate a case or proceeding to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. CONCURRENT – sometimes referred to as confluent or coordinate jurisdiction, which is the power conferred upon different courts, whether of the same or different ranks, to take cognizance at the same stage of the same case in the same or different judicial territories. DOCTRINES OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS AND CONTINUITY OF JURISDICTION 11.Q.

What is the Hierarchy of Courts Doctrine? Explain.

11.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2. 3.

Courage, et al. vs. CIR (G.R. No. 213446, 3 July 2018)(En Banc)[Caguioa, J.] De Lima vs. Guerrero (10 October 2017)(En Banc)[Velasco, Jr. J.] Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Provincial Government of Lanao Del Norte (838 SCRA 26, 29 August 2017)(En Banc)[Velasco, Jr., J.] Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) vs. Quezon City (835 SCRA 350, 8 August 2017)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Rosales vs. ERC (788 SCRA 292, 5 April 2016)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.] De Castro vs. Carlos (696 SCRA 400, 16 April 2013)(En Banc)[Sereno, CJ.], the High Court explained:

4. 5. 6.

The hierarchy of courts doctrine prohibits parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts.13 Nevertheless, this doctrine is not an iron-clad rule; it also admits of

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See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. vs. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc. (6 December 2016). Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416 (2013). See Chiquita Brands, Inc. vs. Omelio (7 June 2017).

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exceptions,14 such as when the case involves matters of transcendental importance. Direct invocation of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction should only be allowed when there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition.15 ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES JURISDICTION OVER THE PLAINTIFF OR PETITIONER – This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner and coupled with the payments of docket fees. (Manchester and Sun Insurance vs. Asuncion) JURISIDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT OR RESPONDENT – This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, by valid service of summons. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER Court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.16 JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times, by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings provided by Section 5, Rule 10, ROC. 12.Q.

When does the court acquire jurisdiction over the case?

12.A. In the case of Ramones vs. Spouses Teodorico Guimoc (G.R. No. 226645, 13 August 2018) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], in liberalizing the payment of docket fees, the High Court made the following pronouncements: In the 1987 case of Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA,17 the Court laid down the general rule that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. In the 2009 case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd v. Asuncion,18 it was clarified that: The clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, x x x must require the private respondent to pay the same. Accordingly, subsequent decisions now uniformly hold that when insufficient filing fees are initially paid by the plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.19 Thus, in line with this legal paradigm, prevailing case law demonstrates that the non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the case, 14

15 16 17 18 19

The exceptions to the hierarchy of courts doctrine were enumerated in The Dioceses of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections (751 Phil. 301 [2015]), as follows: (1) there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (2) the issues involved are of transcendental importance, such that the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence; (3) in cases of first impression; (4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court; (5) the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored; (6) when the subject of review is an act of a constitutional organ; (7) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression; and (8) when the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." Dagan vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 721 Phil. 400 (2013). Home Guaranty Corporation v. R-II Builders, Inc., 660 Phil. 517 (2011). 233 Phil. 579 (1987). 252 Phil. 280 (1989). See Lu vs. Lu Ym, 612 Phil. 390 (2009).

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subject to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency assessment. 20 The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not fair if the party has acted in good faith. Thus, in the cases of: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Rivera vs. del Rosario;21 Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. vs. Navarro; 22 United Overseas Bank vs. Ros;23 The Heirs of Reinoso, Sr. vs. CA,24

the Court has consistently ruled that jurisdiction was validly acquired by the courts a quo therein upon the full payment of the docket fees as assessed by the clerk of court. In these cases, the Court held that the liberal doctrine in the matter of paying docket fees enunciated in Sun Insurance, and not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply in cases where insufficient filing fees were paid based on the assessment made by the clerk of court, provided that there was no intention to defraud the government. In so ruling, the Court explained that when there is underpayment of docket fees, the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the party filing the action would be required to pay the deficiency which shall constitute a lien on the judgment. In Ramones the Supreme Court clarified that: As such, applying the principles above-discussed, the Court holds that the court a quo properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. However, petitioner should pay the deficiency that shall be considered as a lien on the monetary awards in her favor pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. JURISDICTION OVER THE RES OR THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in cutodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant. 13.Q.

What is the general rule on venue in real actions?

13.A. In Briones vs. Court of Appeals,25 the Supreme Court ruled that, the general rule is, the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. JURISDICTION VS. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where the court has jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an EXERCISE OF THAT JURISDICTION.(Herrera vs. Barretto, G.R. No. 8692, September 10, 1913)(En Banc)Moreland, J.) JURISDICTION VS. VENUE 14.Q.

20 21 22 23 24 25

Distinguish jurisdiction from venue.

Fedman Development Corporation vs. Agcaoili, 672 Phil. 23 (2011). 464 Phil. 783 (2004). 553 Phil. 48 (2007). 556 Phil. 178 (2007). 669 Phil. 272 (2011). 750 Phil. 891 (2015).

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14.A. In the case of Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. vs. Pineda, Jr., et al. (G.R. No. 227147, 30 July 2018)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court made the following pronouncements: Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case. In addition to being conferred by the· Constitution and the law, the rule is settled that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.26 Whereas, venue, pertains to the place or geographical location where a case is filed. JURISDICTION OVER CASES COVERED BY BARANGAY CONCILIATION, SMALL CLAIMS CASES, AND CASES COVERED BY SUMMARY PROCEDURE I.

CIRCULAR NO. 14-93, 15 JULY 1993, KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCEDURE

I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law (formerly P.D. 1508, repealed and now replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991), and prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government offices, except in the following disputes: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

12.

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Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree to submit their difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon; Any complaint by or against corporations, partnership or juridical entities, since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents (Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon; Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); Offenses where there is no private offended party; Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further continued, specifically the following: a. Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention (see Sec. 412 (b) (1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law); b. Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his rightful custody over another or a person illegally deprived or on acting in his behalf; c. Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support during the pendency of the action; and d. Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations. Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice; Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)(Sec. 46 & 47, R.A. 6657); Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations (Montoya vs. Escayo, et al., 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain offices of the Department of Labor and Employment); Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in court. (See Sanchez vs. Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459).

Home Guaranty Corporation v. R-II Builders, Inc., 660 Phil. 517 (2011).

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II.

SMALL CLAIMS, A.M. NO. 08-8-7-SC, 1 FEBRUARY 2016 (AS AMENDED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FEBRUARY 26, 2019 EN BANC RESOLUTION TO TAKE EFFECT ON 01 APRIL 2019)

Section 2. Scope. - These Rules shall govern procedure in actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MTCTs) for payment of money where the value of the claim does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of these courts under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7691 (Four Hundred Thousand Pesos [P400,000.00] for the MeTCs and Three Hundred Thousand Pesos [P300,000.00] for the MTCCs, MTCs, and MCTCs), exclusive of interest and costs. x-x-x-x-x Section 5. Applicability.– The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all actions that are purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of money. The claim or demand may be: (a)

(b) (c)

For money owed under any of the following: 1. Contract of Lease; 2. Contract of Loan; 3. Contract of Services; 4. Contract of Sale; or 5. Contract of Mortgage; For liquidated damages arising from contracts; The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration award involving a money claim covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec. 417 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991.

x-x-x-x-x Section 8. Joinder of Claims. Plaintiff may join in a single statement of claim one or more separate small claims against a defendant provided that the total amount claimed, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of the concerned court under R.A. 7691 (Four Hundred Thousand Pesos [P400,000.00] for the MeTCs and Three Hundred Thousand Pesos [P300,000.00] for the MTCCs, MTCs, and MCTCs). x-x-x (In accordance with the February 26, 2019 En Banc Resolution, to take effect 01 April 2019 per OCA Circular No. 45-2019 dated 21 March 2019). III. 1991 REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE (CASES COVERED) A.

Civil Cases:

(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). (2) All other civil cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiff's claim does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs. B.

Criminal Cases:

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; Violations of the rental law; Violations of municipal or city ordinances; All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).

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This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiffs cause of action is pleaded in the same complaint with another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a criminal case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal case subject to the ordinary procedure.

III. CIVIL PROCEDURE GENERAL PROVISIONS (RULE 1) 15.Q. In a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages, can the court rule on the determination of decedent‘s legitimate heirs? 15.A. No. In the case of Heirs of Madaleno Ypon vs. Ricaforte (700 SCRA 778, 8 July 2013)[PerlasBernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: The rule that the determination of a decedent‘s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. 16.Q. Is there any exception to the rule that the determination of a decedent‘s lawful heirs should be made in a special proceeding and not in a case of Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages? 16.A. By way of exception: for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,27or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.28 CAUSE OF ACTION (RULE 2) 17.Q.

Define cause of action.

17.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Ubas, Sr., vs. Chan (816 SCRA 659, 6 February 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe,J.] Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr. (705 SCRA 511, 11 September 2013) (Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs. Ricaforte (700 SCRA 778, 8 July 2013)(Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], the High Court pronounced that:

3.

A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.29 18.Q.

What are the elements of a cause of action?

18.A.

Its essential elements are as follows:

(1)

plaintiff's right, which arises from or is created by whatever means, and is covered by whatever law; defendant's obligation not to violate such right; and defendant's act or omission in violation of the such right and for which plaintiff's may seek relief from defendant. (Pamaran vs. Bank of Commerce, 795 SCRA 430, 4 July 2016.)

(2) (3)

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28

29

Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan vs. CA, 581 SCRA 70 (13 March 2009). When there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance x x x it would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir x x x specially when the parties to the civil case had] voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceedings [and] the RTC had assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased. (Republic vs. Mangotara, 624 SCRA 360, 7 July 2010, citing Portugal vs. Portugal-Beltran, 467 SCRA 184, 16 August 2005). Heirs of Ypon vs. Ricaforte, 713 Phil. 570 (2013).

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PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS (RULE 3) 19.Q.

Who may be parties to a civil action?

19.A. In the case of Association of Flood Victims vs. COMELEC (732 SCRA 100, 5 August 2014)(En Banc)[Carpio, C.J.], the High Court ruled that: Under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3, only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, which must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. 20.Q.

Who is a real party-in-interest in a civil case?

20.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Ocampo vs. Mendoza (816 SCRA 300, 31 January 2017)(En Banc)[Sereno, CJ.] Laus vs. Optimum Security Services, Inc. (783 SCRA 257, 3 February 2016) (First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], citing the case of Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman,30 the High Court said that:

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, in contrast to a necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. (Villondo vs. Quijano, 686 SCRA 694, 3 December 2012; Miñoza vs. Lopez, 648 SCRA 684, 13 April 2011.) 21.Q.

Can any association or organization institute a suit for and in behalf of its members?

21.A. Yes. An association has the legal personality to file a suit and represent its members if the outcome of the case will affect their vital interests. Similarly, an organization has the standing to assert the concern of its constituents.31 22.Q.

What is the rule on real parties-in-interest? Explain.

22.A. In the case of Ang vs. Pacunio (762 SCRA 411, 8 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The rule on real parties in interest has two (2) requirements, namely: (a) (b)

to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party in interest; and the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.

Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. One having no material interest cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.32 23.Q. Can an unregistered association institute a legal action in its own name and on behalf of its alleged members? 23.A. No. in the case of Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association, Inc. vs. The Quezon City Government, et al. (G.R. No. 230651, 18 September 2018)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: Jurisprudence provides that an unregistered association, having no separate juridical personality, lacks the capacity to sue in its own name.33 The Rules of Court mandates that only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Non-compliance with this requirement renders a case dismissible on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue, which refers to a plaintiff's general disability to 30 31

32 33

538 Phil. 319 (2006). Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. vs. Yuipco, 523 Phil. 51 (2006), citing Executive Secretary vs. Court of Appeals, 473 Phil. 27 (2004). Goco vs. CA, 631 Phil. 394 (2010). Association of Flood Victims vs. Commission on Elections, 740 Phil. 472 (2014). See also Dueñas vs. Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association, 474 Phil. 834 (2004) and Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Hektarya vs. Mosquera, 547 Phil. 560 (2007).

11

sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party.34 24.Q. Can the suit filed by an unregistered association be converted to a Taxpayer‘s Suit to avoid dismissal of the case? 24.A. No. In Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association, Inc. vs. The Quezon City Government, et al., supra, the Supreme Court held that: Being an unincorporated association – had no capacity to sue in its own name and accordingly, its representative who filed the petition in its behalf, had no personality to bring an action in court. Moreover, in Dueñas v. Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association,35 the Court held that the complaint filed by an unregistered association cannot be treated as a suit by the persons who signed it. 25.Q. Can a court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions question the decision of an appellate court which reversed its decision? 25.A. No. In Republic vs. Namboku Peak, Inc. (730 SCRA 64, 18 July 2014), the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Labor is not the real party-in-interest vested with personality to file the petition. It would have been the duty of the private petitioners to appear and defend the ruling of the Secretary of Labor for they are the ones who were interested that the same be sustained. As to the Secretary of Labor, she was impleaded in the Petitions for Certiorari filed before the CA as a nominal party because one of the issues involved therein was whether she committed an error of jurisdiction. But that does not make her a real party-in-interest or vests her with authority to appeal the Decisions of the CA in case it reverses her ruling. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only real parties-in-interest who participated in the litigation of the case before the CA can avail of an appeal by certiorari. 26.Q.

Who is a real party defendant?

26.A. A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.36 (Hing vs. Choachuy, Sr., 699 SCRA 667, 26 June 2013.) PROBLEM: 27.Q. ALDO Realty, a juridical entity engaged in renting out apartment buildings, owns the ABC Building which consists of three (3) floors occupied by the Chua family, the majority owner of the realty company. In front of the said building, there is an on-going construction of HINGTO Hardware, owned by HINGTO family. The Chua and Hingto families have a standing property boundary dispute. The Chua installed a CCTV camera right in front of the on-going construction. Thus, the Hingto lodged a complaint with the Barangay as the camera invaded their right to privacy. As the dispute was not settled amicably, they instituted a civil case in violation of Art. 26 (1) of the Civil Code. The Chua Family filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they are not the real party defendant as they are only renting the apartment building. Rule on the Motion to Dismiss. 27.A. The Motion to Dismiss should be denied. The Chua Family is the real party defendant. Although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Chua family. The personalities of respondents and Aldo Realty seem to merge. ‗The Chua‘s are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. Thus, the Chua‘s are the proper parties to this suit. (Hing vs. Choachuy, Sr., supra.)

34

35 36

28.Q.

Who is an indispensable party to a civil suit?

28.A.

In the following cases:

Alabang Development Corporation vs. Alabang Hills Village Association, 734 Phil. 664 (2014), citing Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 875 (1996). 474 Phil. 834 (2004) Reyes vs. Enriquez, 551 SCRA 86 (10 April 2008).

12

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Sabado (838 SCRA 425, 30 August 2017)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Rosales vs. ERC (788 SCRA 292, 5 April 2016)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.] Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran (757 SCRA 160, 22 April 2015) (Special Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Divinagracia vs. Parilla (753 SCRA 87, 11 March 2015)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] People of the Philippines vs. Go (736 SCRA 501, 24 September 2014)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (682 SCRA 59, 26 September 2012) (Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that:

An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.37 The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment.38 29.Q.

Is failure to join an indispensable party a ground for dismissal of the case?

29.A.

No. In the following cases:

1.

Laus vs. Optimum Security Services, Inc. (783 SCRA 257, 3 February 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] People of the Philippines vs. Go (736 SCRA 501, 24 September 2014)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (682 SCRA 59, 26 September 2012) (Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that:

2. 3.

Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, as the remedy in such case is to implead the party claimed to be indispensable, considering that parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action.39 30.Q.

What is the effect of failure to implead an indispensable party?

30.A. If there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. It is precisely ‗when an indispensable party is not before the court that an action should be dismissed.‘ The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. 40 (NLMK-OLALIA-KMU vs. Keihin Philippines Corporation, supra.) PROBLEM: In a case, petitioners impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner the former President Gloria MacapagalArroyo for the following reasons: Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, also of legal age, Filipino and resident of Malacañang Palace, Manila Philippines. Steward Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo happens to be the incumbent President of the Philippine Islands. She is personally impleaded in this suit as an unwilling co-petitioner by reason of her express declaration and undertaking under the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect Your Petitioners' habitat, among others. She is meantime dominated as an unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of material time in seeking her signature and imprimatur hereof and due to possible legal complications that may hereafter arise by reason of her official relations with public respondents under the alter ego principle in political law.

37 38 39 40

Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. vs. Dela Cruz, 502 Phil. 816 (2005). Crisologo vs. JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation, 717 SCRA 644 (3 March 2014). Vda. De Manguerra vs. Risos, 563 SCRA 499 (28 August 2008). Arcelona vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 20 (2 October 1997).

13

31.Q.

Is the petitioner correct? Explain.

31.A. No. In the case of Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs. Reyes (756 SCRA 513, 21 April 2015)(En Banc)[Leonardo-De Castro, J.], it was held that: Under Section 10, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would be a denial of due process. 32.Q.

When can there be a class suit? Explain.

32.A. In Arigo vs. Swift (735 SCRA 102, 16 September 2014)(En Banc)[Villarama, Jr. J.], the Supreme Court, citing the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,41 the Supreme Court held that: On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations. Thus: Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. PROBLEM: Jose Dimas owned a parcel of land consisting of 20,000 square meters located in San Nicolas, City of Iraga, Province of Katbanga. On January 15, 2016, he entered into a contract to sell with Laging Panalo Corporation. The contract price is P10M payable in three (3) years. The downpayment is P2.0M and the remaining balance shall be paid in equal monthly installments for two (2) years. After the lapse of three (3) years and full payment of the contract price, Dimas failed to execute the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale and to deliver the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the subject property to Laging Panalo Corporation. Thus, a formal letter of demand was sent to Dimas. However, despite receipt thereof, Dimas did not comply. A case for specific performance and damages was filed against Dimas with the RTC of Iraga on February 1, 2019. After the submission of the parties‘ respective pleadings, the case was set for Pre-Trial on March 1, 2019. However, on February 28, 2019, Dimas died. His counsel filed a Notice of Death to the court. 33.Q.

Will the case of specific performance and damages survive the death of Jose Dimas? Explain.

33.A. Yes. In Pacific Rehouse Corporation vs. Ngo (789 SCRA 308, 12 April 2016)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], a case with similar factual milieu with the problem, the High Court held that: Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the substitution of a party-litigant who dies during the pendency of a case by his heirs, provided that the claim subject of said case is not extinguished by his death. As early as in Bonilla v.

41

224 SCRA 792 (30 July 1993).

14

Barcena,42 the Court has settled that if the claim in an action affects property and property rights, then the action survives the death of a party-litigant. 34.Q.

Is the rule on transfer of interest mandatory? Explain.

34.A. No. A transferee pendente lite is deemed joined in the pending action from the moment when the transfer of interest is perfected.43 The trial court has the discretion to allow or disallow the substitution or joinder by the transferee. Discretion is permitted because, in general, the transferee‘s interest is deemed by law as adequately represented and protected by the participation of his transferors in the case. There may be no need for the transferee pendente lite to be substituted or joined in the case because, in legal contemplation, he is not really denied protection as his interest is one and the same as his transferors, who are already parties to the case.44 While the rule allows for discretion, the paramount consideration for the exercise thereof should be the protection of the parties‘ interests and their rights to due process. Thus, his participation in the case should have been allowed by due process considerations.45 (Heirs of Francisca Medrano vs. De Vera, 627 SCRA 108, 9 August 2010.) 35.Q.

What is the liability of a defendant-transferee pendente lite?

35.A. As transferee pendente lite, defendant would be bound by any judgment against his transferors under the rules of res judicata. (Heirs of Francisca Medrano vs. De Vera, supra.) 36.Q. If in case an indigent party succeeded in his case, what is the proper disposition of the court relative to his unpaid filing fees? 36.A. In Mactan Rock Industries, Inc. Et al. vs. Germo (G.R. No. 228799, 10 January 2018)[PerlasBernabe, J.], it was held that: It is only proper that the appropriate filing fees be considered as a lien on the monetary awards due to the indigent litigant, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. VENUE (RULE 4) 37.Q.

Where is the venue of personal actions?

37.A. In the case of Ley Construction and Development Corporation vs. Sedano (837 SCRA 632, 23 August 2017)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.46 38.Q.

What are the exceptions to the rule on venue?

38.A. In the case of Briones vs. Court of Appeals (746 SCRA 240, 14 January 2015)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of Legaspi vs. Republic of the Phils. (581 Phil. 381, 2008), instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue, viz: 1. The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter. 2. As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as exclusively, 42 43 44 45

46

163 Phil. 516 (1976). Santiago Land Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 79 (28 January 1997). Id., and its Resolution in 276 SCRA 674 (7 August 1997). See also Dela Cruz vs. Joaquin, 464 SCRA 576 (28 July 2005), which states: The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every party‘s right to due process. x x x No adjudication can be made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied. The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting judgments. Section 2, Rule 4, Rules of Court.

15

waiving for this purpose any other venue, shall only preceding the designation of venue, to the exclusion of the other courts, or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.47 PROBLEM: Kaye Pineda obtained a loan from RFC Inc., in the amount of P10,000,000.00. The subject Promissory Note has venue stipulation and reads as, ―any action to enforce payment of any sums due under this Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within the National Capital Judicial Region or in any place where RFC Inc., has a branch/office at its sole option.‖ Considering that RFC has a branch office in San Mateo, Rizal, the collection suit was filed therein. However, it was dismissed motu proprio by the RTC on the ground of improper venue. 39.Q.

Is the stipulation in the Promissory Note restrictive? Explain.

39.A. Yes, the stipulation in the Promissory Note was restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of: (a) the National Capital Judicial Region; or (b) any place where petitioner has a branch/office. In light of petitioner's standing allegation that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal, it appears that venue has been properly laid, unless such allegation has been disputed and successfully rebutted later on. 40.Q. Is the RTC, San Mateo correct when it dismissed the collection suit motu proprio on the ground of improper venue? Explain. 40.A. The RTC, San Mateo is wrong. Even if it appears that venue has been improperly laid, it is wellsettled that the courts may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. Without any objection at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is deemed waived.48 The Court's ruling in Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. v. Nolasco49 is instructive on this matter, to wit: Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the Courts of First Instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperlv laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case. In sum, the RTC, San Mateo, erred in motu proprio dismissing complaint before it. 41.Q.

What is a real action?

41.A. A real action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. (Cabrera vs. Francisco, 704 SCRA 103, 28 August 2013.) 42.Q.

Distinguish real action from personal action.

42.A. a) A real action is one affecting title to or possession of real property or interest therein; all other actions are personal actions. Personal actions include those filed for recovery of personal property, or for enforcement of contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for injury committed to a person or property.50

47 48 49 50

750 Phil. 891 (2015). Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. vs. Nolasco, 799 Phil. 598 (2016). 799 Phil. 598 (2016). Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hontanosas, Jr. (25 June 2014).

16

b) A real action must be filed in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the subject real property, while a personal action may be filed where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or if the defendant is a non-resident, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the parties may agree in writing to limit the venue of future actions between them to a specified place.51 (Pamaran vs. Bank of Commerce, 795 SCRA 430, 4 July 2016. PLEADINGS KINDS OF PLEADINGS (RULE 6) 43.Q.

Can a letter-complaint be considered as a pleading?

43.A. No. Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines pleadings as written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. In Monsanto vs. Lim, 735 SCRA 252 (17 September 2014), the Regional Director of the Home Development Mutual Fund (PAGIBIG) requested the intervention of Executive Judge of the RTC of Catbalogan, Samar on the alleged anomalous auction sale conducted by a certain Sheriff. The Supreme Court stressed that the Pag-IBIG‘s letter could not be considered as a formal complaint or petition. First, the parties to the case were not identified pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 and Section 1, Rule 7. Second, the so-called claim or cause of action was not properly mentioned or specified. Third, the letter miserably failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 7, Rules of Court. The letter bore no caption; it was not even assigned a docket number; the parties were not properly identified; the allegations were not properly set forth; no particular relief is sought; in fact, only the intervention of the Executive Judge Monsanto is requested; it was not signed by a counsel; and most of all, there is no verification or certification against forum-shopping. 44.Q.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

What is a counterclaim; What is a permissive counterclaim? What determines the payment of docket fee for a counterclaim? What is the prevailing rule on counterclaims in terms of payment of docket fees? What are the tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not?

44.A. In the case of Sy-Vargas vs. The Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr. (805 SCRA 438, 5 October 2016) (First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that: (1) A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action. Any other claim is permissive.52 (Calibre Traders, Inc. vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc., 633 SCRA 34, 13 October 2010). (2) A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed 53 separately in another case. (3) The nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. (4) The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.54 On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.55 51 52 53 54 55

Section 4(b), Rule 4, Rules of Court; Mangila vs. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 162 (12 August 2002). Cruz-Agana vs. Judge Santiago-Lagman, 495 Phil. 188 (2005). See Alba, Jr. vs. Malapajo (13 January 2016). Bungcayao, Sr. vs. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation, 632 Phil. 391 (2010). See Alba, Jr. vs. Malapajo (13 January 2016). In Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. vs. Lerma (566 Phil. 1, 2008), it was held that "effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims." However, in OCA Circular No. 96-2009 entitled "Docket Fees For

17

(5) In Spouses Mendiola vs. CA,56 the Court had devised tests in determining whether or not a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive: The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the following, to wit: (a) (b) (c) (d)

45.Q.

Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court?57 The fourth test is the ‗compelling test of compulsoriness‘.58 (Calibre, Traders Inc. vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc., supra.) Is the non-payment of docket fees for counterclaims a ground for its dismissal?

45.A. No. The counterclaim should not be dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees. Instead, the docket fees required shall constitute a judgment lien on the monetary awards in respondents' favor. In Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Legasto, 59 citing, Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the Court held that: In instances where a litigant's non-payment of docket fees was made in good faith and without any intention of defrauding the government, the clerk of court of the court a quo should be ordered to assess the amount of deficient docket fees due from such litigant, which will constitute a judgment lien on the amount awarded to him, and enforce such lien. 46.Q.

What are the elements of a compulsory counterclaim?

46.A. A counterclaim is compulsory and is considered barred if not set up where the following circumstances are present: 1) 2) 3)

that it arises out of the, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party‘s claim, that it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.60 (Calibre, Traders Inc. vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc., supra.)

PARTS OF A PLEADING (RULE 7) 47.Q.

What is controlling in the pleading submitted in court?

47.A. It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. 61 (Genato vs. Viola, 611 SCRA 677, 5 February 2010.) 48.Q. Does the provision of Section 3, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as regards to the responsibility of counsel and party to inform the court of its new address apply to quasi-judicial bodies like the COA?

56 57

58 59 60 61

48.A.

Yes. In the following cases:

1.

LLDA vs. COA (G.R. No. 211341, 27 November 2018)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.]

Compulsory Counterclaims," dated August 13, 2009, it was clarified that the rule on imposition of filing fees on compulsory counterclaims has been suspended. Such suspension remains in force up to this day. 691 Phil. 244 (2012). Sandejas vs. Ignacio, Jr., 541 SCRA 61 (19 December 2007), citing Tan vs. Kaakbay Finance Corporation, 452 Phil. 637 (2003), Intestate Estate of Dalisay vs. Hon. Marasigan, 327 Phil. 298 (1996) and Quintanilla vs. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 811 (1997). Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation, 402 Phil. 962 (2001). 521 Phil. 469 (2006). Javier vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 605 (31 March 1989). Vlason Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 269 (1999). See Almuete vs. Andres, 421 Phil. 522 (2001); See also Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals, 438 SCRA 201 (13 September 2004).

18

2.

Layug vs. COMELEC (667 SCRA 135, 28 February 2012)(En Banc) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that:

It is the responsibility of a party to inform the court of the change of his address to enable him to receive the said resolution or order in the event the court orders that an order or resolution be served on him.62 This is recognized in Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. In the case of quasi judicial proceedings before the COA, the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit (COA Rules) does not have a direct provision regarding a party's obligation to inform the Commission of any change in address. Nonetheless, pursuant to the suppletory character of the Rules of Court to the COA Rules,63 the duty of the party or counsel pertaining to changes of address is applicable to COA's quasi-judicial proceedings. 49.Q.

What is the purpose of the verification in a pleading?

49.A. In the case of Torres-Gomez vs. Codilla, Jr. (668 SCRA 600, 20 March 2012)(En Banc)[Sereno, J.], it was held that: The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.64 The verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. 50.Q.

What is Forum Shopping? Explain.

50.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Galang vs. Peakhold Finance Corporation and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City (24 January 2018)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Ignacio vs. Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City (839 SCRA 304, 11 September 2017) (Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Provincial Government of Lanao Del Norte (838 SCRA 26, 29 August 2017)(En Banc)[Velasco, Jr., J.] Lim vs. Mejica (802 SCRA 432, 13 September 2016)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Dy vs. Yu (762 SCRA 357, 8 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] SJS Officers vs. Lim (742 SCRA 1, 25 November 2014)(En Banc)[Perez, J.] Asian Construction and Development Coporation vs. Sumitomo Corporation (704 SCRA 332, 28 August 2013) (Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Abbott Laboratories Philippines vs. Alcqraz (701 SCRA 682, 23 July 2013)(En Banc)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Kapisanang Pangkaunlaran ng Kababaihang Portrero, Inc. vs. Barreno (698 SCRA 79, 10 June 2013)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the Supreme Court defined forum shopping as:

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

The act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. More particularly, forum shopping can be committed in three ways, namely: (a) (b) (c)

62 63 64 65

by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).65

Garrucho vs. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 150 (2005). Section 1, Rule XV, 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit. Alde vs. Bernal, 616 SCRA 60 (18 March 2010). Villanueva vs. CA, 655 SCRA 707 (22 August 2011); Commissioner of Customs vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), 791 SCRA 82 (20 April 2016); Asia United Bank vs. Goodland Company, Inc., 645 SCRA 205 (9 March 2011).

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Forum shopping is treated as an act of malpractice and, in this accord, constitutes a ground for the summary dismissal of the actions involved.66 The rule against forum shopping seeks to prevent the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.67 51.Q. What are the guidelines with respect to the non-compliance with the requirements or submission of a defective verification and certification against forum shopping? 51.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

De Lima vs. Guerrero (843 SCRA 1, 10 October 2017)(En Banc)[Velasco, Jr., J.] Fernandez vs. Villegas, 733 SCRA 548, 20 August 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court made the following pronouncements:

A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping: 1) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. 2) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.68 3) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of ―substantial compliance‖ or presence of ―special circumstances or compelling reasons.‖ 4) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.69 5) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.70 PROBLEM: Amalia and Dina Dimaintindihan are sisters and co-owners of a real property, where they have a lessee named Antonio Dimaculangan. As they want to fully occupy the premises, they filed an ejectment suit against him. However, they lost the case in the MTC. The decision was affirmed by the RTC. On appeal to the CA, only Amalia signed the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. The CA dismissed the petition due to defective Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. 52.Q. 66

67

68 69 70

Was the CA correct? Explain.

Chemphil Export and Import Corporation vs. CA, 251 SCRA 257 (12 December 1995); and Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, 234 SCRA 455 (25 July 1994). Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc. vs. Paxton Development Corporation, 457 Phil. 740 (2003); Yu vs. Lim, 645 Phil. 421 (2010). Bacolor vs. VL Makabali Memorial Hospital, Inc. (790 SCRA 20, 18 April 2016). Pigcaulan vs. Security and Credit Investigation, Inc., 663 SCRA 1 (16 January 2012). Ingles vs. Estrada, 695 SCRA 285 (8 April 2013), citing Altres vs. Empleo, 594 Phil. 246 (2008); Heirs of Babai Guiambangan vs. Municipality of Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat, 798 SCRA 584 (27 July 2016); Bacolor vs. VL Makabali Memorial Hospital, Inc., 790 SCRA 20 (18 April 2016); Jacinto vs. Gumaru, Jr., 724 SCRA 343 (2 June 2014).

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52.A. No. In the case of Fernandez vs. Villegas, 733 SCRA 548, 20 August 2014)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], a case with similar factual milieu of the problem, it was held that: Applying the guidelines in Fernandez in this case, particularly those stated in paragraphs 3 and 5 (above enumerated 53.Q), the Supreme Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the petition due to a defective verification and certification against forum shopping. First, there was Substantial Compliance with the Verification Requirement. Amalia is not only a resident of the subject property but is a co-owner thereof together with her coplaintiff/sister, Dina. As such, she is one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the CA petition and is therefore qualified to sign the verification attached thereto in view of paragraph 4 of the said guidelines. In fact, Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. To reiterate, both Amalia and Dima are co-plaintiffs in the ejectment suit. Thus, they share a commonality of interest and cause of action as against respondent. Notably, even the petition for review filed before the CA indicated that they are the petitioners therein and that the same was filed on their behalf. Hence, the lone signature of Amalia on the verification attached to the CA petition constituted substantial compliance with the rules.71 As held in the case of Medado v. Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing: Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action. Besides, it is settled that the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Therefore, the courts may simply order the correction of the pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. Second, there was Substantial Compliance with the Certification Against Forum Shopping Requirement. Following paragraph 3 of the guidelines as stated in Fernandez vs. Villegas supra, there was also substantial compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement, notwithstanding the fact that only Amalia signed the same. It has been held that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances – as in this case where the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense – the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the certification against forum shopping may be relaxed. 72 Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the petition on this score. Similar to the rules on verification, the rules on forum shopping are designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice; hence, it should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objectives. The requirement of strict compliance with the provisions on certification against forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature to the effect that the certification cannot altogether be dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not prohibit substantial compliance with the rules under justifiable circumstances,73 as also in this case. As there was substantial compliance with the above-discussed procedural requirements at the onset, plaintiffs‘ subsequent failure to file an amended verification and certification, should not have warranted the dismissal of the CA petition. 53.Q. Is there a difference between proscription against forum shopping and violation of the certification requirement? 53.A. 71

72 73

Yes. In the following cases:

See Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Judge Ponferrada, 536 Phil. 705 (2006); Calo vs. Villanueva, 480 SCRA 561 (30 January 2006); and Cavile vs. Heirs of Cavile, 448 Phil. 302 (2003). Ingles vs. Estrada, supra. See also Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo vs. Soliman, 695 SCRA 453 (10 April 2013). Bautista vs. Causapin, Jr., 652 SCRA 442 (22 June 2011).

21

1. 2. 3.

Crisostomo vs. Nazareno (726 SCRA 1, 10 June 2014)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) vs. CA (708 SCRA 523, 23 October 2013)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Abbott Laboratories Philippines vs. Alcaraz (701 SCRA 682, 23 July 2013)(En Banc)[PerlasBernabe, J.], citing the case of Sps. Ong vs. CA,74 it was held that:

Separate from the proscription against forum shopping75 is the violation of the certification requirement against forum shopping. The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification requirement should by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt.76 Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. 54.Q. Is a Board Resolution necessary to be attached to a Notice of Appeal instituted by a juridical person through its representative? 54.A. No. In the case of United Interior Manggahan Homeowners Association vs. De Luna (845 SCRA 213, 20 November 201)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], The High Court ruled that a notice of appeal is not a pleading, initiatory or otherwise, that, when required by the law or the rules, must contain, among others, a verification and certification against forum shopping to be signed by the party or his/her representative, and, in the case of a representative, proof of his/her authority to file the action, i.e., power of attorney or secretary's certificate with copy of the board resolution. 55.Q. Can a party be held liable for violation of the rule on Non-Forum Shopping if he filed an appeal and petition for certiorari at the same time? 55.A. Yes. In Philippine Postal Corporation vs. CA (711 SCRA 632, 9 December 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Respondent Crisanto De Guzman is liable for violation of NonForum Shopping by pursuing two (2) separate remedies – petition for certiorari and appeal – that have long been held to be mutually exclusive, and not alternative or cumulative remedies.77 Evidently, the ultimate relief sought by said remedies which De Guzman filed only within a few months from each other is one and the same – the setting aside of the resolution dismissing him from the service. As illumined in the case of Sps. Zosa v. Judge Estrella,78 wherein several precedents have been cited on the subject matter:79 The successive filing of a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari both to assail the trial court‘s dismissal order for non–suit constitutes forum shopping. Thus, Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. 56.Q.

What is the rationale of the rule on non-forum shopping in this jurisdiction?

56.A. In Vicente vs. Acil Corporation (763 SCRA 1, 15 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: While a litigant‘s right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, once his case has been 74 75

76 77 78 79

433 Phil. 490 (2002). Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari . It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. The established rule is that for forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same essential facts and circumstances, and must raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and issues. x x x. (Cruz vs. Caraos, 550 Phil. 98, 2007). 433 Phil. 490 (2002). See Young vs. Sy, 534 Phil. 246 (2006). 593 Phil. 71 (2008). Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. vs. Baltao, 489 Phil. 702, 709 (2005); and Candido vs. Camacho, 424 Phil. 291 (2002).

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adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should not be permitted to initiate similar suits hoping to secure a favorable ruling, for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of justice.80 After all, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the life of the law, 81 as in this case. 57.Q. What is the duty of the plaintiff in filing initiatory pleading under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? 57.A. Section 5(b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that a plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete statement of the present status of any pending case if the latter involves the same issues as the one that was filed. If there is no such similar pending case, Section 5(a) of the same rule provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath that to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending. PROBLEM: follows:

Mr. John Laurence Buelo filed a total of four (4) cases against Sabungero Corporation, which are as (a) (b) (c) (d) 58.Q.

Annulment Case seeking to annul the alleged fraudulent mortgage document involving the subject lot; Petition for Relief Case seeking to set aside the ex-parte writ of possession issued in favor of Sabungero Corporation; Certiorari Case imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 0210 in dismissing the Petition for Relief Case on the ground of forum shopping; and Criminal Complaint seeking to indict Jess Dima, the President of Sabungero Corporation, and Mr. William Samangtingnan for the crime of Qualified Theft. Was there forum shopping committed by Mr. Buelo? Explain.

58.A. None. The issues raised and to be determined in these cases are different. In the Annulment Case, the issue is whether or not the deed of real estate mortgage is void, thereby entitling Mr. Buelo to the recovery of the subject lot. In the Petition for Relief Case, the issue is whether or not extrinsic fraud was actually employed by Sabungero Corporation during the Ex-Parte Petition proceedings. In the Certiorari Case, the issue is whether or not the RTC-Br. 0210 acted with grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Buelo‘s Petition for Relief. Lastly, in the Criminal Complaint, the issue is whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the President of Sabungero Corporation and Samangtingnan committed the crime of Qualified Theft and should stand trial therefor. In Galang vs. Peakhold Finance Corporation supra, the Supreme Court through the pen of Madam Justice Perlas-Bernabe held that: The Court finds that Galang correctly declared in the Amended Complaint in the Annulment Case that she did not commence any action or proceeding which involves the same causes of actions, reliefs, and issues in any court, tribunal, or agency at the time she filed the said Amended Complaint, or anytime thereafter. In this light, there is no litis pendentia, as the cases essentially involve different causes of actions, reliefs, and issues. Thus, any judgment rendered in one will not necessarily amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. This holds true even if the complaint in the Annulment Case was subsequently amended by Galang. Moreover, the cases also differ in their form and nature, for while a ruling in the Annulment Case may result in the recovery of ownership and possession of the subject lot, a favorable ruling in the other cases will not have the same effect, considering that: (a) the granting of the Certiorari Case will lead to the granting of the Petition for Relief Case; (b) a favorable result in the Petition for Relief Case would end up in the conduct of adversarial proceedings before a writ of possession concerning the subject lot may be issued; and (c) the resolution of the Criminal Complaint is only determinative of whether or not the President of Peakhold and/or Donasco should be indicted of the crime of Qualified Theft and stand trial therefor. 59.Q. Is there forum shopping if cases for unlawful detainer and action for recovery of ownership are both pending? 59.A.

80 81

There is none. The causes of action in the two cases are not identical or similar.

Yau vs. Silverio, Sr., 567 Phil. 493 (2008). Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation vs. Oriental Assurance Corporation, 439 Phil. 663, 672 (2002).

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In the summary action of unlawful detainer, the question to be resolved is which party has the better or superior right to the physical/material possession (or de facto possession) of the disputed premises. Whereas, in the action for recovery of ownership, the question to be resolved is which party has the lawful title or dominical right (i.e., owner's right) to the disputed premises. Thus, in Malabanan vs. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc.,82 where the petitioner therein asserted, among others, that the complaint for unlawful detainer against him must be dismissed on grounds of litis pendencia and forum-shopping in view of the pending case for annulment of an action for dacion en pago and for the transfer certificate of title in another case, the Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled rule that a pending action involving ownership neither suspends nor bars the proceedings in the summary action for ejectment pertaining to the same property, in view of the dissimilarities or differences in the reliefs prayed for. (Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. vs. Ando, supra.) 60.Q. Is the subsequent filing of verification and certification of non-forum shopping by the party considered as substantial compliance? 60.A. Yes. The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance, pro hac vice.83 (Anderson vs. Ho, supra.) 61.Q.

Explain the principle of Res Judicata.

61.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Santos (782 SCRA 441, 27 January 2016)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] De Leon vs. Dela Llana (750 SCRA 531, 11 February 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Puerto Azul Land, Inc. vs. Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation, 735 SCRA 333, 17 September 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court explained that:

2. 3.

Res judicata (meaning, a matter adjudged)84 is a fundamental principle of law which precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment.85 It means that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. 86Res judicata has two (2) concepts: The first is bar by prior judgment in which the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal; While the second concept is conclusiveness of judgment in which any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.87 There is a bar by prior judgment where there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred. There is conclusiveness of judgment, on the other hand, where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action. 62.Q.

82 83 84

85 86

87

What are the elements in order for a case to be barred by prior judgment or res judicata?

605 Phil. 523 (2009). Donato vs. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil. 676 (2003). See definition of "res judicata" as cited in Manila Electric Company vs. Phil. Consumers Foundation, Inc., 425 Phil. 65 (2002), citing 46 Am Jur § 514. See Union Bank of the Phils. vs. ASB Development Corp., 582 Phil. 559 (2008). See Pryce Corporation vs. China Banking Corporation (18 February 2014), citing Spouses Antonio vs. Sayman Vda. de Monje, 646 Phil. 90 (2010). Borra vs. CA, 705 SCRA 222 (9 September 2013).

24

62.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Vallecer (848 SCRA 268, 6 December 2017)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Marilag vs. Martinez (763 SCRA 533, 22 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that:

2.

The elements are as follows: (a) (b) (c) (d) 63.Q.

the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.88 Explain the concept of litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil case.

63.A. Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) (b) (c)

identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other.89

MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS (RULE 8) 64.Q. Will the use of the word ―specifically" deny in the Answer constitute compliance with the requirement of specific denial under the Rules of Court? 64.A. No. In the case of Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. (760 SCRA 486, 29 June 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The mere statement in the answer, i.e., that they specifically deny the pertinent allegations of the Complaint for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit plaintiffs purposes, does not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. Verily, a denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. Stated otherwise, a general denial does not become specific by the use of the word ―specifically.‖ 90 Neither does it become so by the simple expedient of coupling the same with a broad conclusion of law that the allegations contested are self-serving or are intended to suit plaintiffs purposes. In Permanent Savings & Loan Bank v. Velarde,91 citing the earlier case of Songco v. Sellner,92 the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, viz: This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either. 93 To add, Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further requires that the defendant sets forth what he claims to be the facts, which requirement, likewise, remains absent from the Answer in this case. 88 89

90 91 92 93

Heirs of Miguel vs. Heirs of Miguel, 719 SCRA 413 (19 March 2014). Brown-Araneta vs. Araneta, 707 SCRA 222 (9 October 2013); Yap vs. Chua, 672 SCRA 419 (13 June 2012); See Fontana Development Corporation vs. Vukasinovic, 804 SCRA 153 (21 September 2016); Commissioner of Customs vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), 791 SCRA 82 (20 April 2016); Asia United Bank vs. Goodland Company, Inc., 645 SCRA 205 (9 March 2011). Camitan vs. CA, 540 Phil. 377 (2006). 482 Phil. 193 (2004). 37 Phil. 254 (1917). Permanent Savings & Loan Bank vs. Velarde, supra.

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Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the specific denial under oath" requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the proper conclusion, as arrived at by the CA, is that petitioners had impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the documents evidencing their loan obligation to respondent. To this, case law enlightens that the admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized. 65.Q.

What is ‗negative pregnant‘ and its effect?

65.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Valdez vs. Dabon, Jr. (775 SCRA 1, 16 November 2015)(En Banc)(Per Curiam) Venzon vs. Rural Bank of Buenavista (Agusan Del Norte), Inc. (704 SCRA 138, 28 August 2013)(Second Division)[Del Castillo, J.], it was held that:

A negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstance alone is denied while the fact itself is admitted. 94 A denial in the form of a negative pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since it cannot be ascertained whether it is the fact or only the qualification that is intended to be denied.95 Profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge, or means of knowing as ineffectual, is no denial at all.96 EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD (RULE 9)

namely:

66.Q.

What are the instances when the court may dismiss the claim motu proprio?

66.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Moreno vs. Kahn et al. (G.R. No. 217744, July 30, 2018)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Edron Construction Corporation vs. Provincial Government of Surigao Del Sur (826 SCRA 47, 5 June 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that:

Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, (a) (b) (c) (d)

lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia: res judicata; and prescription of action.

67.Q.

Distinguish Section 1, Rule 9 from Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

67.A. Rule 16 treats the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. Whereas, Section l, Rule 9 specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Otherwise stated, if a defendant fails to raise a defense not specifically excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, such defense shall be deemed waived, and consequently, defendant is already estopped from relying upon the same in further proceedings.30 68.Q. 94 95 96

Can the defense of lack of jurisdiction be raised even for the first time on appeal?

Guevarra vs. Eala, 555 Phil. 713 (2007). Citing 41 Am. Jur. 429. Vergara, Sr. vs. Judge Suelto, 240 Phil. 719 (1987), citing Moran. Comments on the Rules. 1970 ed. Vol. 1. (p. 335); Gutierrez vs. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 752 (1976); Philippine Advertising Counsellors, Inc. vs. Hon. Revilla, 152 Phil. 213 (1973); J.P. & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc., 139 Phil. 77 (1969).

26

68.A. Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription, which must be apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In other words, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal.97 In fact, the court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that lack of jurisdiction exists. (Heirs of Telesforo Julao vs. De Jesus, 736 SCRA 596, 29 September 2014.) AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS (RULE 10) 69.Q.

Can the plaintiff be allowed to amend his complaint for the third time?

69.A. Yes. In the case of Tatlonghari vs. banko Kabayan-Ibaan Rural Bank Inc. (799 SCRA 516, 3 August 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Jurisprudence states that bona fide amendments to pleadings should be allowed in the interest of justice so that every case may, so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and the multiplicity of suits thus be prevented. Hence, as long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an amended pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes binding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion.98 As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality. This is especially true when a motion for leave is filed during the early stages of proceedings or, at least, before trial. FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS, AND RESOLUTIONS (RULE 13) 70.Q.

What is the rule on notice if the client is represented by counsel? Explain.

70.A. In Pagdanganan, Jr., et al. vs. Sarmiento (735 SCRA 584, 17 September 2014)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court explained: If a litigant is represented by counsel, notices of all kinds, including court orders and decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to him is considered notice to his client. As declared in the case of GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. vs. Hon. Principe:99The rule is that when a party is represented by counsel in an action in court, notices of all kinds including motions, pleadings and orders must be served on the counsel. And notice to such counsel is notice to the client. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment, valid and regular on its face. 71.Q.

What is the reckoning period of receipt of the Decision or Order for purposes of Appeal?

71.A. For purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or representative of record. This procedure is in line with the established rule that if a party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel. The purpose of the rule is to maintain a uniform procedure calculated to place in competent hands the prosecution of a party's case. 100 When a party to a suit appears by counsel, service of every judgment and all orders of the court must be sent to the counsel. Notice to counsel is an effective notice to the client, while notice to the client and not his counsel is not notice in law.101 Therefore, receipt of notice by the counsel of record is the reckoning point of the reglementary period.102 (Malixi vs. Mexicali Philippines, 792 SCRA 586, 8 June 2016.) Explain.

72.Q.

If the filing of a pleading was done via registered mail, what is the required proof of service?

72.A. In Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. vs. COA Proper (748 SCRA 286, 27 January 2015)(En Banc Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration)[Bersamin, J.], it was held that: Section 13 thus requires that 97

Heirs of Jose Fernando vs. De Belen, 700 SCRA 556 (3 July 2013). Yujuico vs. United Resources Asset Management, Inc., 760 SCRA 610 (29 June 2015), citing Torres vs. Tomacruz, 49 Phil. 913 (1927); Tiu vs. Philippine Bank of Communications, 613 Phil. 56 (2009), and Quirao vs. Quirao, 460 Phil. 605 (2003). 99 474 SCRA 555 (11 November 2005). 100 Mancenido vs. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 627 (2000). 101 Ramos vs. Spouses Lim, 497 Phil. 560 (2005). 102 Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc. vs. Ledesma, 754 SCRA 400 (25 March 2015). 98

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if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted. 103 In Fortune Life Insurance Company Inc., the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail under Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458, 70498 and 70524 attached to the appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition. The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the rule. This was the reason why the Court held in the resolution of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not comply with the requirement of proof of service. 73.Q.

What is the procedure in the cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens?

73.A. The notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. 74.Q.

In what cases will the Notice of Lis Pendens be applicable?

74.A. In the case of Gagoomal vs. Villacorta (663 SCRA 444, 18 January 2012)(Third Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: A notice of lis pendens is proper in the following actions and their concomitant proceedings: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

an action to recover possession of real estate; an action to quiet title thereto; an action to remove clouds thereon; an action for partition; and any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.104

Thus, a notice of lis pendens is only valid and effective when it affects title over or right of possession of a real property. 75.Q.

What is the meaning of lis pendens?

75.A. Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. (Dela Merced vs. Government Service Insurance System, 661 SCRA 83, 23 November 2011.) 76.Q. property?

What is the effect of the annotation of lis pendens on future transactions over the subject

76.A. In Dela Merced vs. Government Service Insurance System supra, the Supreme Court cited the discussion of an authority on land titles and registration, in this wise: Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any cancellation or issuance of the title of the land involved as well as any subsequent transaction affecting the same, would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. In other words, upon the termination of the litigation there can be no risk of losing the property or any part thereof as a result of any conveyance of the land or any encumbrance that may be made thereon posterior to the filing of the notice of lis pendens.105Thus, the filing of a notice of lis pendens has a twofold effect:

103 104 105

Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 388 SCRA 72 (29 August 2002). Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325 (17 April 1990). Peña. Registration of Land Titles and Deeds. 2008 ed. (p. 482); Juan P. Pellicer & Co. Inc. vs. Philippine Realty Corporation, 87 Phil. 302 (1950).

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(1) (2)

to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. 106

77.Q. What is the risk of the transferee pendente lite of a real property with the annotation of notice of lis pendens at the back of the title? 77.A. In Dela Merced vs. Government Service Insurance System supra, the Court has emphasized that when a transferee pendente lite takes property with notice of lis pendens, such transferee undertakes to respect the outcome of the litigation. As held in Selph vs. Vda. de Aguilar,107 an order to cancel the transferor‘s title may be enforced against his transferee, whose title is expressly subject to the outcome of the litigation by the fact of the annotation of lis pendens. As also explained in another case, the title obtained by the transferee pendente lite affords him no special protection; he cannot invoke the rights of a purchaser in good faith and cannot acquire better rights than those of his predecessor-in-interest.108 SUMMONS (RULE 14) 78.Q. corporation?

How can the court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant if it is a domestic

78.A. When the defendant is a domestic corporation, service of summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. However, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired not only by proper service of summons but also by defendant‘s voluntary appearance without expressly objecting to the court‘s jurisdiction, as embodied in Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. (Atiko Trans, Inc. vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., 655 SCRA 625, 17 August 2011.) 79.Q.

How can the court acquire jurisdiction if the defendant is a foreign entity?

79.A. In Pioneer International, Ltd. vs. Guadiz, Jr.,109 the Supreme Court held that when the defendant is a foreign juridical entity, service of summons may be made upon: (1) (2) (3)

its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose; the government official designated by law to receive summons if the corporation does not have a resident agent; or any of the corporation‘s officers or agents within the Philippines.

Thus, in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant foreign private juridical entity under Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, there must be prior valid service of summons upon the agent of such defendant. (Atiko Trans, Inc. vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., supra.) 80.Q. the court?

What are the instances which are considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of

80.A. In Palma vs. Galvez,110 the High Court reiterated the oft-repeated rule that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. (Atiko Trans, Inc. vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., supra.) 81.Q. Is the special appearance of the defendant questioning the jurisdiction of the court considered as voluntary? 81.A. No. In Lhuillier vs. British Airways (615 SCRA 380, 15 March 2010), it was held that a special appearance to question a court‘s jurisdiction is not voluntary appearance. A defendant who files a motion to 106 107 108 109 110

Spouses Conrado and Ma. Corona Romero vs. Court of Appeals, 458 SCRA 483 (16 May 2005). 107 Phil. 443 (1960). Yu vs. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897 (1995). 535 SCRA 584 (11 October 2007); Decided prior to the amendment of Section 12, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 615 SCRA 86 (10 March 2010).

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dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearance means is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons. 111 MOTIONS IN GENERAL (RULE 15) 82.Q. What is the effect of a Motion for Postponement without compliance with Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? Explain. 82.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Mauleon vs. Porter (730 SCRA 229, 18 July 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Laude vs. Ginez-Jabalde (775 SCRA 408, 24 November 2015)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.], the High Court ruled:

The motion deserves scant consideration and, in fact, should not even be received considering the three (3)-day notice rule on motions, stated in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. No party has the right to assume that such motion would be approved by the courts.112 In Laude vs. Ginez-Jabalde supra, on the failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule when they filed the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail, the Supreme Court ruled, that the act of the petitioner was unjustified. Thus: Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party's right to procedural due process.113 While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights.114 The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant.115In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process. 83.Q.

Distinguish Manifestation from Motion.

83.A. In the case of Festin vs. Zubiri (827 SCRA 181, 19 June 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled: A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless otherwise indicated. In a manifestation, the manifesting party makes a statement to inform the court, rather than to contest or argue.116 In contrast, a motion is an application for relief from the court other than by a pleading117 and must be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of service to the other party, unless the motion is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party.118 Settled is the rule that a motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for the rule is simple: to afford an opportunity for the other party to agree or object to the motion before the court resolves it. This is in keeping with the principle of due process.119

111

112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119

La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78 (31 August 1994); Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, 603 SCRA 348 (12 October 2009). Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. vs. Apiag, 471 SCRA 111 (30 September 2005). See Jehan Shipping Corporation vs. National Food Authority, 514 Phil. 166 (2005)[Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. See Anama vs. Court of Appeals, et al, 680 Phil. 305 (2012)[Per J. Mendoza, Third Division]. See Jehan Shipping Corporation vs. National Food Authority, 514 Phil. 166 (2005)[Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. See Neri vs. de Ia Peña, 497 Phil. 73 (2005). Sec. 1, Rule 15, Rules of Court. Sec. 4, Rule 15, Rules of Court. See Boiser vs. Aguirre, Jr., 497 Phil. 728 (2005). In Boiser vs. Aguirre, a judge was found administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting a motion filed without the requisite notice of hearing and proof of service. In Neri vs. dela Peña, a judge was found liable for acting on an ex parte manifestation and basing his decision on it while the other party

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84.Q. What is the consequence of a motion without compliance with Sections 4-5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? Explain. 84.A. The failure to comply with the mandatory requirements under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court renders the motion defective. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma.120 85.Q.

Is there any exception to the three (3) day-notice rule?

85.A.

Yes. In the following cases:

1. 2.

Layug vs. COMELEC (667 SCRA 135, 28 February 2012)(En Banc) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Republic vs. Cortez (817 SCRA 19, 7 February 2017)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.], the High Court held that:

Generally, all written motions are required to include a notice of hearing and must be addressed to all parties and served to them at least three (3) days before the date of the hearing. When a party fails to comply, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by the filing or pendency.121 This three-day notice rule, however, is not absolute. The motion may still be acted upon by the court provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights.122 86.Q.

What is the concept of the Omnibus Motion Rule?

86.A. Under the Omnibus Motion Rule embodied in Section 8 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, all available objections that are not included in a party‘s motion shall be deemed waived. (Home Development Mutual Fund vs. See, 652 SCRA 478, 22 June 2011.) MOTION TO DISMISS (RULE 16) 87.Q.

When can a Motion to Dismiss be filed in an ordinary civil action?

87.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Edron Construction Corporation vs. Provincial Government of Surigao Del Sur (826 SCRA 47, 5 June 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Aldersgate College, Inc. vs. Gauuan (685 SCRA 646, 14 November 2012)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that:

2.

In an ordinary civil action, a motion to dismiss must generally be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint and on the grounds enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 88.Q.

What is cause of action?

88.A. In the case of Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr. (705 SCRA 511, 11 September 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.123 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.124

120 121 122 123 124

89.Q.

What are the elements of a cause of action?

89.A.

In the following cases:

was completely unaware of the manifestation's existence. The Court held that the judge's act seriously ran afoul of the precepts of fair play. Preysler, Jr. vs. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation, 621 SCRA 636 (28 June 2010). Nuñez vs. GSIS Family Bank, 511 Phil. 735 (2005)[Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division]. Laude vs. Ginez-Jabalde, 775 SCRA 408 (24 November 2015)[Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. See Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court. Peltan Dev., Inc. vs. CA, 336 Phil. 824 (1997).

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1. 2.

Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank Phils.) vs. Funai Philippines Corporation (762 SCRA 82, 8 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Yap-Co vs. Uy (750 SCRA 504, 11 February 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that:

A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) (b) (c)

the legal right of the plaintiff; the correlative obligation of the defendant; and the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right.125

If these elements are present such that the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed.126 Explain.

90.Q.

How can a cause of action be determined to have been sufficiently stated in the Complaint?

90.A. A complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.127 Thus, if the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained, then the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.128 91.Q.

When is a complaint dismissible on the ground that it states no cause of action? Explain.

91.A. The resolution on this matter should stem from an analysis on whether or not the complaint is able to convey a cause of action; and not that the complainant has no cause of action. Lest it be misunderstood, failure to state a cause of action is properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (Rules), while the latter is not a ground for dismissal under the same rule. In the case of Yap-Co vs. Uy supra, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the CA which reversed the RTC dismissal of the complaint. The high court held that: Fundamental is the rule that a motion to dismiss grounded on failure to state a cause of action refers only to the insufficiency of the pleading. In this case, the Court finds that the subject complaint sufficiently averred actual fraud on the part of petitioner in procuring her title to the subject property to the prejudice of respondents who claim to have acquired it first. Thus, outright dismissal for failure to state a cause of action was improper. Explain.

92.Q.

Is there a difference between ‗failure to state a cause of action‘ and ‗lack of cause of action‘?

92.A. Yes. In the case of Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank Phils.) vs. Funai Philippines Corporation (762 SCRA 82, 8 July 2015)[First Division][Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The two (2) grounds are distinguished as follows: 1. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading. While lack of cause of action is the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. 2. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. While dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.129 125

126 127 128 129

Heirs of Faustino Mesina vs. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr., 695 SCRA 345 (8 April 2013); University of Santo Tomas vs. Sanchez, 626 SCRA 126, 29 July 2010. See Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs. Ricaforte, 700 SCRA 778 (8 July 2013). See Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. vs. Judge, Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Br. 8, 484 SCRA 272 (10 March 2006). The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. vs. CA, 274 Phil. 947 (1991). See Zuñiga-Santos vs. Santos-Gran, 745 Phil. 171 (8 October 2014). See also Macaslang vs. Zamora, 649 SCRA 92 (30 May 2011).

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93.Q. There is hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the complaint even if a Motion to Dismiss is filed for failure to state a cause of action. Up to what extent is the admission? 93.A. The hypothetical admission extends only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint, as well as inferences fairly deductible therefrom.130 The filing of the motion to dismiss assailing the sufficiency of the complaint does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere conclusions of law; nor allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor scandalous matter inserted merely to insult the opposing party; nor to legally impossible facts; nor to facts which appear unfounded by a record incorporated in the pleading, or by a document referred to; nor to general averments contradicted by more specific averments.131 (Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank Phils.) vs. Funai Philippines Corporation, supra.) action?

94.Q.

What is incumbent upon the court if the ground for a Motion to Dismiss is lack of cause of

94.A. The defense of lack of cause of action requires a full-blown trial. Distinguished from failure to state a cause of action, which refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action.132Section 6, Rule 16 allows the court to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses pleaded in the answer based on grounds for dismissal under the same rule. The ground of lack of cause of action, however, is not one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, hence, not proper for resolution during a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Section 6 thereof. 95.Q. Is the non-referral of the case to the Lupong Tagapamayapa jurisdictional in character, such that non-compliance therewith pursuant to Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may motu proprio dismiss the case? Explain. 95.A. No. In the case of Lansangan vs. Caisip (G.R. No. 212987, 6 August 2018)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds that may be raised in a motion to dismiss a complaint. As a general rule, the above-listed grounds must be invoked by the party-litigant at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, such grounds are deemed waived. As an exception, however, the courts may order the motu proprio dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The non-referral to the barangay conciliation proceedings is anchored on Section 412 (a) 133 of RA 7160 or the 1991 Local Government Code. Under Section 409(a) of RA 7160, disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay. The said provision is lifted from Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, the primordial objective of a prior barangay conciliation is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in courts. Subject to certain exemptions, a party's failure to comply with this requirement before filing a case in court would render his complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with a condition precedent, pursuant to Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In the case of Aquino vs. Aure, the Court clarified that such conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, such that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Also in the case of in Banares II v. Balising, it was mentioned that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature, and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss or in a responsive pleading. 130 131

132 133

Zuñiga-Santos vs. Santos-Gran, supra. NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, 661 SCRA 328 (28 November 2011), citing Tan vs. CA, 356 Phil. 555 (1998). Aquino, et al. vs. Quiazon, et al, supra, citing Dabuco vs. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 939 (2000). Section 412. Conciliation.— (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court.— No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

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In the case, however, of Lansangan vs. Caisip supra, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a qou as the ground that the non-compliance with a condition precedent, i.e., undergoing prior barangay conciliation proceedings, was not invoked at the earliest opportunity. In fact, respondent was declared in default for failure to file a responsive pleading despite due notice. Therefore, it was grave error for the courts a quo to order the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on said ground. 96.Q.

(1) (2)

Is the denial of a Motion to Dismiss under Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure considered as an Interlocutory Order? Is a Certiorari Petition the proper remedy if a Motion to Dismiss under Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is denied? Explain.

96.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Republic vs. Transunion Corporation (722 SCRA 273, 21 April 2014)(Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Republic vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (685 SCRA 216, 12 November 2012) (Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that:

2.

(1) Yes. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. (2) As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.134 97.Q. What factors should be determined and considered in resolving a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court? 97.A. In the case of Republic vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (685 SCRA 216, 12 November 2012)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action are to be determined from: 1. 2. 3.

the material allegations of the complaint; the law in force at the time the complaint is filed; and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred.135

Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the same. 98.Q. What is the remedy of the party whose case was dismissed based on the enumerated grounds under Section 1, Rule 16? 98.A. In the case of Corales vs. Republic (703 SCRA 623, 27 August 2013)(En Banc)[Perez, J.], it was ruled that: The proper remedy therefrom is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.136 But, if the reason for the dismissal is based on paragraphs (f), (h), or (i) (i.e., res judicata, prescription, extinguishment of the claim or demand, and unenforceability under the Statute of Frauds), the dismissal, under Section 5, of Rule 16, is with prejudice and the remedy of the aggrieved party is to appeal the order granting the motion to dismiss. (United Alloy Philippines Corporation vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, supra.)

134 135 136

Republic vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 685 SCRA 216 (12 November 2012). Arzaga vs. Copias, 448 Phil. 171 (2003); Del Mar vs. PAGCOR, 400 Phil. 307 (2000). Palma vs. Hon. Galvez, 629 Phil. 86 (2010).

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PROBLEM: Relative to Mr. Cho Leng‘s claim over the estate of a certain real property, Senator Tapang expressed his opinion that based on his office's review of the documents, appears to be a front or nominee or is acting as a dummy of the actual and beneficial owner of the estate, who is VP Tapang. He made defamatory remarks against Mr. Cho Leng during media interviews at the Senate, particularly during gaps and breaks in the plenary hearings as well as committee hearings, and upon the media's request to respond to Mr. Cho Leng‘s claim. Thus, on 15 March 2019, Mr. Cho Leng filed a Complaint for Damages against Senator Tapang for the latter's alleged defamatory statements before the media specifically his repeated accusations that Mr. Cho Leng, is a mere dummy of VP Banat. Senator Tapang filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss premised on the following grounds: a) b) c) d)

The Complaint failed to state a cause of action; Parliamentary immunity. With the defense invoking the defendant's parliamentary immunity from suit, it claims that this Court has no jurisdiction over the instant case. Whether or not a motion to dismiss was filed to prevent a preliminary hearing on the defendant's special and affirmative defenses.

He subsequently filed a Motion to Set Special and Affirmative Defenses for Preliminary Hearing on the strength of Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which allows the court to hold a preliminary hearing on any of the grounds for dismissal provided in the same rule as may have been pleaded as an affirmative defense in the Answer. The Motion was opposed by Mr. Cho Leng on the grounds that the motion failed to comply with the provisions of the Rules of Court on motions, and a preliminary hearing on petitioner's special and affirmative defenses was prohibited as petitioner had filed a motion to dismiss. The RTC Denied the Motion to Dismiss as well as his Motion for Reconsideration. 99.Q. Based on the foregoing, is Senator Tapang correct that a preliminary hearing of his affirmative defenses is necessary to allow him to present evidence for the immediate dismissal of the case? Explain. 99.A. No. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses may be allowed only when no motion to dismiss has been filed. Section 6, however, must be construed in the light of Section 3 of the same Rule, which requires courts to resolve a motion to dismiss and prohibits deferment of such resolution on the ground of indubitability. Thus, Section 6 disallows a preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses once a motion to dismiss has been filed because such defenses should have already been resolved.137 In this case, Senator Tapang‘s motion to dismiss has not been resolved when he moved for a preliminary hearing. The motion did not contain a notice of hearing and was not actually heard. Even so, a preliminary hearing is not warranted. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS (Rule 17) 100.Q. What is the effect on the counterclaim of the defendant if the plaintiff caused the dismissal of the complaint? Explain. 100.A. In the case of Blay vs. Baña (G.R. No. 232189, 7 March 2018)(Second Division)[Perlas Bernabe, J.], it was held that: As per the second sentence of Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for the dismissal, the rule is that the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Explain.

101.Q.

Is there a difference between dismissal of the action and dismissal of the complaint?

101.A. Yes. Commentaries on the subject elucidate that instead of an action shall not be dismissed, the present rule uses the term complaint. A dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant inspite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action.138 However, as stated in the third sentence of 137 138

California and Hawaiian Sugar Co. vs. Pioneer Ins. and Surety Corp., 399 Phil. 795 (2000). Herrera, O. M., Remedial Law, 2000 Ed., Vol. I, p. 785.

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Section 2, Rule 17, if the defendant desires to prosecute his counterclaim in the same action, he is required to file a manifestation within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be prosecuted in a separate action. As explained by renowned remedial law expert, former Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his treatise on the matter: Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of the complaint to which a counterclaim has been interpose, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to dismiss.139 102.Q. Can the plaintiff refuse to proceed with the pre-trial as ordered by the trial court in view of the alleged filing of a petition for certiorari with the appellate court? 102.A. No. In Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs. Santos (729 SCRA 35, 2 July 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Petitioner‘s refusal to proceed with the pre-trial could not be justified by the filing of the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioner‘s assertion that the alleged sham, contemptuous lies contained in respondents‘ Answer should be stricken off from the records first before the pretrial could proceed is, at best, speculative as it was palpably anchored on the mere supposition that its petition would be granted. It bears stressing that the rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the litigants. These rules are established to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of the judicial system. By trifling with the rules and the court processes, and openly defying the order of the trial court to proceed to pre-trial, petitioner only has itself to blame for the dismissal of its Complaint. The dismissal is a matter within the trial court‘s sound discretion, which, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. 103.Q. Can the dismissal of the case be set aside on the ground that the counsel negligently failed to appear during the trial, which caused the failure to prosecute for unreasonable length of time? Explain. 103.A. Yes. In the case of Yap-Co vs. Uy (750 SCRA 504, 11 February 2015)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], it was held that: The application of the Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not, to the Court‘s mind, warranted in this case since, as correctly found by the CA, respondents‘ counsel acted negligently in failing to attend the scheduled hearing dates and even notify respondents of the same so as to enable them to travel all the way from Aurora, Isabela to Manila and attend said hearings. Verily, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer‘s palpable mistake or negligence and where the interest of justice so requires.140 Concurring with the CA, the Court finds that respondents would be deprived of the opportunity to prove the legitimacy of their claims if the RTC‘s dismissal of the case – on a procedural technicality at that, which was clearly caused by the palpable negligence of their counsel – is sustained. Considering that respondents appear to have legal and factual bases for their grievance, it would better serve the higher interest of substantial justice to allow the parties‘ conflicting claims to be resolved on the merits. 104.Q. revive it?

If the case was dismissed without prejudice, what is the proper remedy of the party to

104.A. In the case of Ciron vs. Gutierrez (756 SCRA 110, 20 April 2015)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], citing the case of Bañares II vs. Balising,141 the Court explained that: An order dismissing a case without prejudice can attain finality if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed and that, in such case, the proper remedy to revive the case is not to file a motion as the court already lost its power to amend or modify its order. After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. A final judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same.

139 140 141

Regalado, F. D., Remedial Law Compendium, 10 Ed., Vol. 1, p. 302. See Multi-Trans Agency Phils., Inc. vs. Oriental Assurance Corp., 608 Phil. 478 (2009). 384 Phil. 567 (2000).

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After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the court's power to amend and modify, a party wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.45 105.Q.

Distinguish remand of the case from dismissal with and without prejudice.

105.A. In the case of Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) vs. CA (708 SCRA 523, 23 October 2013) (Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the distinctions are as follows: A remand means an order to send back; or the sending of the case back to the same court where it came for the purpose of having some action on it there;142 A dismissal refers to an order or judgment finally disposing of an action, suit, motion, etc. which may either be with prejudice or without.143 The dismissal is deemed with prejudice when the adjudication is based on the merits and bars the right to bring an action on the same claim or cause and without prejudice when the case can be refiled despite its having been previously dismissed. PRE-TRIAL (RULE 18) 106.Q.

What is the nature of pre-trial? Explain.

106.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Dinglasan-Delos Santos vs. Abejon, 821 SCRA 132, 20 March 2017)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.]; Office of the Court Administrator vs. Chavez (819 SCRA 446, 7 March 2017)(En Banc)[Per Curiam]; Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs. Santos (729 SCRA 35, 2 July 2014)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that:

2. 3.

It is mandatory in character, and a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. More significantly, a pre-trial has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case.144

trial.145

107.Q.

What is the purpose of pre-trial?

107.A.

In order to realize the paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating, and expediting

108.Q. Can the marking of exhibits during the preliminary conference be delegated to the Branch Clerk of Court by the Judge? 108.A. Yes. The presiding judge may, before the start of the pre-trial conference, refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference to assist the parties in reaching a settlement, to mark documents or exhibits to be presented by the parties and copies thereof to be attached to the records after comparison and to consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the case. The rules require the presence of both parties to the case. INTERVENTION (RULE 19) 109.Q.

Who has jurisdiction over an intervention?

109.A. In the case of Pulgar vs. RTC of Mauban Quezon, Branch 64 (734 SCRA 527, 10 September 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by 142 143 144 145

Moreno, F. B., Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., p. 810. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. p. 421 (1979). See Anson Trade Center, Inc. vs. Pacific Banking Corporation, 600 Phil. 806 (2009). Dr. Vera v. Rigor, 556 Phil. 561 (2007).

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jurisdiction over the main action.146 Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. Intervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such right or interests. Otherwise stated, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original party. Where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of intervention ceases.147 110.Q.

What is intervention?

110.A. Jurisprudence defines intervention as a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings.148 It is, however, settled that intervention is not a matter of right, but is instead addressed to the sound discretion of the courts149 and can be secured only in accordance with the terms of the applicable statute or rule.150 111.Q.

What is incumbent upon a party in order to be allowed to intervene?

111.A. To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the intervenor must possess legal interest in the matter in controversy. Legal interest is defined as such interest that is actual and material, direct and immediate such that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.151 In addition to legal interest, the intervenor must file the motion to intervene before rendition of the judgment, the intervention being ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation, not an independent action.152Corollarily, when the case is resolved or is otherwise terminated, the right to intervene likewise expires. PROBLEM: In an administrative case filed against Jose Dima, the Office of the Ombudsman found him guilty of Grave Misconduct, and accordingly, meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with accessory penalties. His Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. He went to the Court of Appeals. The CA modified the penalty to the effect that Jose Dima was only guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty and imposed upon him the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months. Dissatisfied with the CA ruling, the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was not expressly impleaded as a party-respondent in the case, and thus, prayed for leave to intervene. In a Resolution, the CA denied the Ombudsman's Omnibus Motion for lack of interest to intervene in the proceeding. 112.Q. Does the Office of the Ombudsman has the right to intervene in an administrative case on appeal to the CA? Explain. 112.A. Yes. In the case of Office of the Ombudsman vs. Bongais, et al. (G.R. No. 226405, 23 July 2018) (Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of Ombudsman vs. Samaniego,153 the Supreme Court held that: The Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene on appeal in administrative cases resolved by it. Thus, Even if not impleaded as a party in the proceedings, the Office of the Ombudsman has legal interest to intervene and defend its ruling in administrative cases before the CA, its interest proceeding, as it is, from its duty to act as a champion of the people and to preserve the integrity of the public service. Moreover, the Office of the 146 147 148

149 150 151 152 153

Asian Terminals, Inc. vs. Judge Bautista-Ricafort, 536 Phil. 614 (2006). Cariño vs. Ofilada, 217 SCRA 206 (18 January 1993). See Ombudsman vs. Samaniego, 586 Phil. 497 (2008), citing Manalo vs. CA, 419 Phil. 215 (2001). See also Ombudsman vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 189100 (21 June 2017). Ombudsman vs. Gutierrez, supra. Ombudsman vs. Samaniego, supra. Magsaysay-Labrador vs. CA, 259 Phil. 748 (1989). See Ombudsman vs. Gutierrez, supra, citing Manalo vs. CA, supra. See Ombudsman vs. Samaniego, supra, citing Manalo vs. CA, 419 Phil. 215 (2001). See also Ombudsman vs. Gutierrez, supra.

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Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in the inquiry into whether respondent committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an offense punishable under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was in keeping with its duty to act as a champion of the people and preserve the integrity of public service that petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its authority. It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court after a consideration of the appropriate circumstances. However, such discretion is not without limitations. One of the limits in the exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and the Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the Ombudsman's powers as provided in the Constitution and RA 6770. 113.Q.

Is the ruling of the CA correct? Explain.

113.A. Yes. The Supreme Court Denied the Motion to Intervene of the Ombudsman because it was already filed beyond the allowable period or before judgment. In the 2017 case of Gutierrez, the Court clarified this apparent conflict between Sison, Magno, and Liggayu, on the one hand, and Samaniego, De Chavez, and Quimbo on the other hand, as it held that: As things currently stand, Samaniego remains to be the prevailing doctrine. The Ombudsman has legal interest in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases. Petitioner could not then be faulted for filing its Omnibus Motion before the appellate court x x x. x x x x It is the requirement of timeliness that petitioner failed to satisfy, prompting the appellate court to issue the July 23, 2009 Resolution denying the Omnibus Motion. This course of action by the CA finds jurisprudential basis in Magno, Sison, and Liggayu. x x x A review of these cases would show that the Ombudsman prayed for the admission of its pleading-in-intervention after the CA has already rendered judgment, and despite the Ombudsman's knowledge of the pendency of the case, in clear contravention of Sec. 2, Rule 19. This substantial distinction from the cases earlier discussed justifies the denial of the motions to intervene in Magno, Sison, and Liggayu. x x x x Thus, in the three cases that seemingly strayed from Samaniego, it can be said that under the circumstances obtaining therein, the appellate court had a valid reason for disallowing the Ombudsman to participate in those cases because the latter only moved for intervention after the CA already rendered judgment. By that time, intervention is no longer warranted. In this case of Jose Dima, the Ombudsman has no legal standing to intervene before the CA. This is because the period for filing a motion to intervene has already lapsed. It was filed after the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. 114.Q. intervene?

Are there exceptions to the rule that even after judgment, a party may be allowed to

114.A. Yes. As jurisprudence has shown, interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule when: a) b) c) d) e)

demanded by the higher interest of justice; to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard; to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties;154 or, because of the grave legal issues raised,155 Stated otherwise, the rule may be relaxed and intervention may be allowed subject to the court's discretion after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.156

After all, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice; its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. 154

155 156

See Quinto vs. Commission on Elections, 627 Phil. 193 (2010), citing Lim vs. Pacquing, 310 Phil. 722 (1995). See also Tahanan Development Corporation vs. CA, 203 Phil. 652 (1982); Director of Lands vs. CA, 190 Phil. 311 (1981); and Mago vs. CA, 363 Phil. 225 (1999). Ombudsman vs. CA and Santos, 537 Phil. 751 (2006); and Ombudsman vs. Beltran, 606 Phil. 573 (2009). See Quinto vs. Commission on Elections, supra, citing Heirs of Restrivera vs. De Guzman, 478 Phil. 592 (2004). See also Ombudsman vs. Miedes, Sr., 570 Phil. 464, (2008); and Mago vs. CA, supra.

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115.Q.

Will a Complaint-in-Intervention subsist if the principal complaint is dismissed?

115.A. No. In the case of B. Sta. Rita & Co., Inc. and Arlene Sta. Rita Kanapi vs. Gueco (704 SCRA 320, 28 August 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and a supplement of the principal action. In other words, the complaint-in-intervention essentially latch on the complaint for its legal efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads to its concomitant dismissal. Applying these principles to this case therefore lead to the conclusion that the dismissal of the main complaint in the reformation case necessarily resulted in the dismissal of petitioner Arlene Sta. Rita Kanapi and the Heirs of Edgardo‘s Complaint-inIntervention lodged in the same case. 116.Q. injunction?

Can a person who is not a main party to the case be bound by the provisional remedy of

116.A. No. In Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals (691 SCRA 167, 19 February 2013)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.], the High Court ruled that: Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed, he cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.157 117.Q.

What is the purpose of a Complaint-in- Intervention?

117.A. In Majestic Finance and Investment Co., Inc. vs. Tito (739 SCRA 217, 22 October 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Case law states that intervention is never an independent action, but is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct or unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, who is claiming a certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such right or interests. In other words, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original party. Thus, as a general rule, where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for and, consequently, the right of intervention ceases.158 COMPUTATION OF TIME (RULE 22) 118.Q. If the 15th day to file a Motion for Reconsideration is a Saturday, and the movant filed it on a Monday or on the 17th day, is the Motion for Reconsideration timely filed? Explain. 118.A. Yes. In the case of Sy-Vargas vs. The Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr. (805 SCRA 438, 5 October 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Records bear out that in the assailed 1 October 2015 Resolution, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for being purportedly filed out of time. The CA explained that since the registry return receipt showed that petitioner and Kathryn's counsel received the assailed 14 March 2014 Decision, it only had until 29 March 2014 to file a motion for reconsideration. However, they only filed such motion on 31 March 2014, thus, rendering the assailed CA Decision final and executory. However, the CA failed to take into consideration that March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday. In these situations, Section 1, Rule 22 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies. Since 29 March 2014 fell on a Saturday, petitioner and Kathryn were completely justified in filing their motion for reconsideration on the next working day: Monday, 31 March 2014. Accordingly, the CA should not have considered it filed out of time, and instead, resolved such motion on the merits. MODES OF DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS (RULES 23 AND 24) 119.Q.

157 158

What are the instances when a defendant can take deposition?

Mabayo Farms, Inc. vs. CA and Antonio Santos, 435 Phil. 112 (2002). Cariño vs. Ofilada, 217 SCRA 206 (18 January 1993), as cited in B. Sta. Rita & Co., Inc. vs. Gueco, 704 SCRA 320 (28 August 2013).

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119.A.

The two instances are as follows:

(1)

After the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the property subject of the action; and After an answer has been served.

(2)

Both instances presuppose that the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. (Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, 623 SCRA 354, 5 July 2010.) INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES (RULE 25) 120.Q.

Can the adverse party be called to the witness stand?

120.A. As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. (Afulugencia vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., 715 SCRA 399, 5 February 2014.) 121.Q.

What is the purpose of the prohibition in Section 6, Rule 25?

121.A. The provision seeks to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays. Its goal is to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written interrogatories might bring. Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party‘s testimony,159 compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party‘s being bound by the adverse party‘s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling party‘s cause. Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand. Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the court‘s precious time, if not pointless entertainment. (Afulugencia vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., supra.) ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY (RULE 26) 122.Q.

What must be observed if a party received a request for admission?

122.A. In the case of Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. vs. Toledo (697 SCRA 425, 5 June 2013) (Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Based on Sections 1-2, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, once a party serves a request for admission regarding the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served is given a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a sworn statement answering the same. 123.Q. If said party failed to comply with it in accordance with Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, what would be the effect? 123.A. Should the latter fail to file and serve such answer, each of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted.160 159 160

Gaw vs. Chua, 551 SCRA 505 (16 April 2008). See Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan, 531 SCRA 385 (28 August 2007); Manzano vs. Despabiladeras, 447 SCRA 123 (16 December 2004); Motor Service Co., Inc. vs. Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., 96 Phil. 688 (1955).

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124.Q.

Is there an exception to this rule?

124.A. The exception to this rule is when the party to whom such request for admission is served had already controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if the matters in a request for admission have already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.161 TRIAL (RULE 30) 125.Q.

What is the order of trial in civil cases? Explain.

125.A. In Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) vs. Republic (663 SCRA 515, 24 January 2012)(En Banc)[Velasco, Jr., J.], a coco levy fund case, it was held that: For the orderly administration of justice, the plaintiff shall first adduce evidence in support of his complaint and after the formal offer of evidence and the ruling thereon, then comes the turn of defendant under Section 3(b) to adduce evidence in support of his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and third party complaint, if any. Deviation from such order of trial is purely discretionary upon the trial court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, which cannot be questioned by the parties unless the vitiating element of grave abuse of discretion supervenes. Thus, the right of COCOFED to present evidence on the main case had not yet ripened. And the rendition of the partial summary judgments overtook their right to present evidence on their defenses. CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE (RULE 31) 126.Q.

What is meant by consolidation of cases?

126.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Puncio vs. Toyota Shaw/ Pasig, Inc. (795 SCRA 32, 28 June 2016)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr. (705 SCRA 511, 11 September 2013) (Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], it was held that:

2.

It is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties.162Consolidation of cases is a procedure sanctioned by the Rules of Court for actions which involve a common question of law or fact before the court. 127.Q.

What is the rationale for consolidation of cases?

127.A. To have all cases, which are intimately related, acted upon by one branch of the court to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered and in effect, prevent confusion, unnecessary costs,163 and delay.164 It is an action sought to avoid multiplicity of suits; guard against oppression and abuse; clear congested dockets; and to simplify the work of the trial court in order to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigant.165 128.Q.

What is the required test to determine whether consolidation is proper?

128.A. The test is to check whether the cases involve the resolution of common questions of law, related facts,166 or the same parties. Consolidation is proper whenever the subject matter involved and the relief

161 162 163 164 165 166

Limos vs. Odones, 628 SCRA 288 (11 August 2010). Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. Excelsa Industries, Inc., 685 Phil. 694, 700 (2012). Deutsche Bank AG vs. CA, 683 Phil. 80 (2012), citing Benguet Corporation Inc. vs. CA, 247-A Phil. 356 (1988). Section 1, Rule 31, Rules of Court. Deutsche Bank AG vs. CA, supra. See Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law (Revised Edition), 1994 Ed., p. 48, citing Active Wood Products Co., Inc. vs. CA, 260 Phil. 825 (1990).

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demanded in the different suits make it expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights of the parties by hearing the suits together.167 However, it must be stressed that an essential requisite of consolidation is that the several actions which should be pending before the court, arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence.168 As succinctly stated in the rules, consolidation is allowed when there are similar actions which are pending before the court169 - for there is nothing to consolidate when a matter has already been resolved and the very purpose of consolidation, to avoid conflicting decisions and multiplicity of suits, rendered futile. 129.Q.

Is consolidation of cases allowed in the Court of Appeals? Explain.

129.A. Yes. In Re: Letter Complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana Against Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., et al. (700 SCRA 348, 2 July 2013)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], the High Court ruled: Section 3(a), Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals has forthrightly mandated the consolidation of related cases assigned to different Justices. The consolidation of two or more actions is authorized where the cases arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction and that consolidation will not give one party an undue advantage or that consolidation will not prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.170 As to parties, their substantial identity will suffice. Substantial identity of parties exists when there is a community of interest or privity of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second, even if the latter has not been impleaded in the first case.171 As to issues, what is required is mere identity of issues where the parties, although not identical, present conflicting claims.172 The justification for consolidation is to prevent a judge from deciding identical issues presented in the case assigned to him in a manner that will prejudice another judge from deciding a similar case before him. It is true that under the Rules of Court, the consolidation of cases for trial is permissive and a matter of judicial discretion.173 This is because trials held in the first instance require the attendance of the parties, their respective counsel and their witnesses, a task that surely entails an expense that can multiply if there are several proceedings upon the same issues involving the same parties. At the trial stage, the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and undue vexation to the parties is the primary objective of consolidation of cases.174 130.Q.

What is the nature of consolidation of cases in the Court of Appeals? Explain.

130.A. It is mandatory. The permissiveness of consolidation does not carry over to the appellate stage where the primary objective is less the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and undue vexation than it is the ideal realization of the dual function of all appellate adjudications. 131.Q.

Who moves for consolidation of cases in the appellate court?

131.A. All attorneys appearing as counsel for the initiating parties has direct responsibility to give prompt notice of any related cases pending in the courts, and to move for the consolidation of such related cases in the proper courts. This responsibility proceeds from their express undertakings in the certifications against forum-shopping that accompany their initiatory pleadings pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 7 and related rules in the Rules of Court, to the effect that they have not theretofore commenced any actions or filed any claims involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of their knowledge, no such other actions or claims are pending therein; that if there were such other pending actions or claims, to render complete statements of the present status thereof; and if they should thereafter learn that the same or 167 168

169 170 171 172 173

174

Deutsche Bank AG vs. CA, supra. Philippine National Bank vs. Gotesco Tyan Ming Development, Inc., 606 Phil. 806 (2009), citing Teston vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 511 Phil. 221 (2005). Section 1, Rule 31, Rules of Court. Caños vs. Peralta, 115 SCRA 843 (19 August 1982). Heirs of Trinidad De Leon Vda. de Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 422 SCRA 101 (5 February 2004). Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. vs. Chavez, 618 SCRA 559 (20 April 2010). Mega-Land Resources and Development Corporation vs. C-E Construction Corporation, 528 SCRA 622 (31 July 2007); People vs. Sandiganbayan, 409 SCRA 419 (21 August 2003). Yu, Sr. vs. Basilio G. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc., 504 SCRA 618 (17 October 2006).

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similar actions or claims have been filed or are pending, they shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the courts wherein the said complaints or initiatory pleadings have been filed. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE (RULE 33) 132.Q.

What is Demurrer to Evidence in civil cases?

132.A. In Gonzales vs. Bugaay (666 SCRA 493, 22 February 2012)(Third Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of Celino vs. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago,175 a demurrer to evidence was defined as a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case. 133.Q.

Can a Demurrer to Evidence be filed after the court rendered its judgment?

133.A. No. Being considered as a motion to dismiss, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment.176 In Gonzales, respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence after the RTC promulgated its Decision. While respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was granted, it was for the sole purpose of receiving and offering for admission the documents not presented at the trial. As respondents never complied with the directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion should be deemed abandoned. Consequently, the RTC's original Decision stands. Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in granting the demurrer and dismissing the Amended Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an available remedy to respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC had correctly done. JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (RULE 34) 134.Q.

When can there be a judgment on the pleadings? Explain.

134.A. In the case of Government Service Insurance System vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. (710 SCRA 337, 20 November 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: When an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party‘s pleading, judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. The rule is stated in Section 1, Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In this relation, jurisprudence dictates that an answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse party‘s pleadings.177 As such, it is a form of judgment that is exclusively based on the submitted pleadings without the introduction of evidence as the factual issues remain uncontroverted.178 SUMMARY JUDGMENTS (RULE 35) 135.Q.

What is the consequence of the rendition of summary judgment?

135.A. In the case of Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) Pag-Ibig Fund vs. Christina Sagun, et al. (G.R. No. 205698, 31 July 2018)(En Banc) [Bersamin, J.], the High Court held that: The rendition of a summary judgment does not always result in the full adjudication of all the issues raised in a case. 179 In such event, a partial summary judgment is rendered in the context of Section 4, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Clearly, such a partial summary judgment - because it does not put an end to the action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for - cannot be 175 176 177 178 179

435 SCRA 690 (30 July 2004). Choa vs. Choa, 392 SCRA 641 (26 November 2002). Mongao vs. Pryce Properties Corporation, 467 SCRA 201 (18 August 2005). See Luzon Development Bank vs. Conquilla, 470 SCRA 533 (21 September 2005). Philippine Business Bank vs. Chua, 634 SCRA 635 (15 November 2010).

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considered a final judgment. It remains to be an interlocutory judgment or order, instead of a final judgment, and is not to be dealt with and resolved separately from the other aspects of the case. 136.Q.

What is the proper recourse against partial summary judgment?

136.A. The aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65. The reason is that, partial summary judgment is interlocutory, the remedy could not be an appeal, for only a final judgment or order could be appealed. Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court makes this clear enough by expressly forbidding an appeal from being taken from such interlocutory judgment or order, to wit: No appeal may be taken from: x x x x (f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and x x x x In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65. Thus, summary judgment could be assailed only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 137.Q.

When can there be a summary judgment?

137.A. In Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) vs. Republic (663 SCRA 515, 24 January 2012)(En Banc)[Velasco, Jr., J.], a coco levy fund case, the High Court ruled that: Summary judgment may be allowed where, save for the amount of damages, there is, as shown by affidavits and like evidentiary documents, no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue, means an issue of fact that calls for the presentation of evidence.180 RENDITION AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS (RULE 36) 138.Q. What is the mandatory period for the trial court judges to decide a case submitted for decision and what is the imposable penalty in case of non-compliance? Explain. 138.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Chavez (819 SCRA 446, 7 March 2017)(En Banc)[Per Curiam] Re: Findings on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the 7 th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, LiloanCompostela, Liloan, Cebu (789 SCRA 138, 12 April 2016)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Office of the Court Administrator vs. Tandinco, Jr. (775 SCRA 41, 16 November 2015)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], the High Court held that:

2. 3.

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days. The Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 likewise directs judges to administer justice without delay and dispose of the courts' business promptly within the period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period is mandatory.181 In Re: Cases Submitted for Decision Before Hon. Teresito A. Andoy, former Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Cainta, Rizal,182 the Court stressed the importance of deciding cases within the periods prescribed by law and, at the same time, reiterated that a judge's failure to decide a case within the prescribed period constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions, to wit: Judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. It also deprives the parties of their right 180 181

182

PNB vs. Noah‘s Ark Sugar Refinery, 226 SCRA 36 (1 September 1993). See Re: Cases Submitted for Decision Before Hon Teresita A. Andoy, former Judge; Municipal Trial Court, Cainta, Rizal, 634 Phil. 378 (2010), citing Gachon vs. Devera, Jr., 340 Phil. 647 (1997). 634 Phil. 378 (2010)

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to the speedy disposition of their cases. The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. 139.Q.

What is judgment on the merits? Explain.

139.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Dy vs. Yu (762 SCRA 357, 8 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] De Leon vs. Dela Llana (750 SCRA 531, 11 February 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing Allied Banking Corporation vs. CA183 and Escarte vs. Office of the President,184 it was held that:

A judgment on the merits is one wherein there is an unequivocal determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the causes of action and the subject matter.185 A judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law to the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objectives or contentions. 140.Q.

What is the import of Section 5, Rule 36?

140.A. In the case of Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) Pag-Ibig Fund vs. Christina Sagun, et al. (G.R. No. 205698, 31 July 2018)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], it was held that: The rule requires the action to proceed as to the remaining but unresolved claims. POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION (RULE 37) 141.Q. What is the Second Motion for Reconsideration that is proscribed by the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? Explain. 141.A. In the case of Peralta vs. Omelio (708 SCRA 65, 22 October 2013)(En Banc)[Per Curiam], it was held that: The proscription against a second motion for reconsideration is directed against a judgment or final order. Thus, in Peralta vs. High Court ruled: The rule that a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited by the Rules applies to final judgments and orders, not interlocutory orders. This is clear from the Interim or Transitional Rules Relative to the Implementation of B.P. 129. Section 4 of the Interim Rules provides that no party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment. A second motion for reconsideration attacking an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a rehash or mere reiteration of grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court; it, however, cannot be rejected on the ground that a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law. 142.Q. What is the classification of an Order granting or denying an application for preliminary injunction? Explain. 142.A. The said Order is interlocutory in nature.186 Thus, an order denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not a final order, and hence the filing of a second motion for reconsideration of 183 184 185 186

229 SCRA 252 (10 January 1994). 192 SCRA 1 (4 December 1990). Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, 411 Phil. 369 (2001). Australian Professional Realty, Inc. vs. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas Province, 668 SCRA 253 (14 March 2012), citing City of Naga vs. Asuncion, 557 SCRA 528 (9 July 2008) and Ex-Mayor Tambaoan vs. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 683 (2001).

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the said order, is not prohibited. Being an interlocutory order which is not appealable, the subsequent order granting the application for preliminary injunction may be challenged in a petition for certiorari before the CA. The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.187 EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS (RULE 39) 143.Q.

What is the concept of Execution of Judgment?

143.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Confederation of Coconut Farmers Organizations of the Philippines, Inc. (CCFOP) vs. Aquino III (835 SCRA 311, 8 August 2017)(En Banc)[Mendoza, J.] DENR vs. UPCI (751 SCRA 389, 23 February 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court explained that:

2.

Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party.188Execution has been defined as a remedy afforded by law for the enforcement of a judgment, its object being to obtain satisfaction of the judgment on which the writ is issued.189 Being a remedy, it is thus optional on the winning litigant and may avail it in case the judgment cannot be enforced. In other words, a party litigant may choose to have a judgment enforced and if for some reason he cannot do so, he may decide to avail of the coercive measure of execution in order for the judgment to be realized. A writ of execution was never meant to be a prerequisite before a judgment may be enforced. 144.Q.

In the issuance of a Writ of Execution, what is needed to be complied with?

144.A. In Republic vs. Estate of Hans Menzi (685 SCRA 291, 13 November 2012)(En Banc)[Perez, J.], it was held that: A writ of execution must adhere to every essential particular of the judgment sought to be executed.190 The writ cannot vary or go beyond the terms of the judgment and must conform to the dispositive portion thereof.191 Time and again, it has been ruled that an order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or, for that matter, exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. 192 145.Q. remedy?

In what instances can there be errors in the execution of judgment and what is the available

145.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Frondozo vs. MERALCO (837 SCRA 378, 22 August 2017)(En Banc)[Carpio, J.] City Government of Makati vs. Odena (703 SCRA 460, 13 August 2013)(En Banc)[Sereno, CJ.], it was held that:

During execution proceedings, errors may be committed such that the rights of a party may be prejudiced, in which case corrective measures are called for. These may involve instances where— (1) (2) (3) (4) 187

188 189 190 191 192

the Writ of Execution varies the judgment; there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court;

Australian Professional Realty, Inc. vs. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas Province supra, citing Barbieto vs. Court of Appeals, 604 SCRA 825 (30 October 2009). Heirs of Mateo Pidacan vs. Air Transportation Office, 629 SCRA 451 (25 August 2010). Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc. vs. CA, 378 Phil. 498 (1999). Cabang vs. Basay, 582 SCRA 172 (20 March 2009). Suyat vs. Gonzales-Tesoro, 513 Phil. 85 (2005) General Milling Corporation-Independent Labor Union (GMC-ILU) vs. General Milling Corporation, 652 SCRA 235 (15 June 2011).

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(5) (6)

the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or Writ of Execution was improvidently issued, or is defective in substance, or was issued against the wrong party, or the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.193

In such event, one of the corrective measures that may be taken is the quashing of the Writ of Execution.194 (Araullo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 711 SCRA 570, 4 December 2013.) 146.Q. Can the Supreme Court issue a Writ of Execution pursuant to Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? 146.A. Court ruled:

Yes. In Camino vs. Pasagui (816 SCRA 274, 31 January 2017)(En Banc)[Per Curiam], the High

Judgments declared to be immediately executory, as in this case are enforceable after their rendition. Similar to judgments or orders that become final and executory, the execution of the decision in the case at bar is already a matter of right.195 The judgment obligee may, therefore, file a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in the court of origin as provided for under Rule 39, Sec. 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In Camino, the case did not originate from the lower courts, but instead is an original action for disbarment filed by the complainant against the respondent, accusing the latter of Estafa through Abuse of Confidence. Consequently, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court should issue the Writ of Execution prayed for. But, in as much as the Supreme Court does not have a sheriff of its own to execute its own decision and considering that the complainant resides in Tacloban City, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Tacloban City was directed to execute the money judgment against the respondent in accordance with Rule 39, Section of the Rules of Court. Likewise, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Tacloban City was ordered to enforce the Court's directive for respondent to return all the pertinent documents in his possession to the complainant pursuant to Section 11 of the Rules of Court. 147.Q. What is the indispensable requirement in order that an execution pending appeal may be granted by the court? Explain. 147.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Centennial Guarantee Assurance Corporation vs. Universal Motors Corporation (737 SCRA 654, 8 October 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Government Service Insurance System vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. (710 SCRA 337, 20 November 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that:

2.

In order to grant execution pending appeal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules, the following requisites must concur: (a) (b) (c)

there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and the good reason must be stated in a special order.196

Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the existence of ―good reasons‖ for the immediate execution of a judgment is an indispensable requirement as this is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending appeal.197 Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution, lest judgment becomes illusory, that is, the prevailing party‘s chances for recovery on execution from the judgment debtor are altogether nullified.

193 194 195 196 197

Banaga vs. Judge Majaducon, 526 Phil. 641 (2006). Ibatan vs. Melicor, 188 SCRA 598 (20 August 1990). See Anama vs. Court of Appeals, 680 Phil. 305 (2012). Archinet International, Inc. vs. Becco Philippines, Inc., 590 SCRA 168 (19 June 2009). See Archinet International, Inc. vs. Becco Philippines, Inc., 607 Phil. 829 (2009).

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The ―good reason‖ yardstick imports a superior circumstance demanding urgency that will outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party198 and one such ―good reason‖ that has been held to justify discretionary execution is the imminent danger of insolvency of the defeated party.199 148.Q.

Does the COMELEC has the power to issue discretionary Writ of Execution in election cases?

148.A. Yes. In Sobejana-Condon vs. COMELEC (678 SCRA 267, 10 August 2012)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.], it was held that: COMELEC En Banc has the power to order discretionary execution of judgment. This is based on the suppletory application of the Rules of Court as expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron,200 the Supreme Court stressed the import of the provision vis-ã-vis election cases when it was held, that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. 149.Q.

Can a decision be executed even pending appeal?

149.A. Yes. While the Court concedes that execution takes place only when decisions become final and executory, there are cases that may be executed pending appeal or are immediately executory pursuant to the provisions of the Rules and the statutes as well as by court order. Yet, the fact that a decision is immediately executory does not prevent a party from questioning the decision before a court of law. 150.Q.

What is the lifetime of a Writ of Execution?

150.A. In the case of Astorga and Repol Law Offices vs. Villanueva (751 SCRA 410, 24 February 2015)(En Banc)[Per Curiam], the High Court ruled that: A writ of execution continues to be effective during the period within which a judgment may be enforced by motion, which is within five (5) years from the entry of judgment. After the lapse of the five (5) year period, the judgment may be revived and executed before it is barred by the statue of limitations. The failure to execute the judgment could result in years of protracted litigation. Thus, the Sheriff must exert the necessary effort to ensure that the judgment is duly executed. 151.Q. What is required of the court in the issuance of an Order granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution? Explain. 151.A. In the case of Sia vs. Arcenas (746 SCRA 272, 12 January 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Orders pertaining to execution of judgments must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. As such, it may not vary, or go beyond, the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce.201 Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity.202 152.Q.

Can a Writ of Execution bind a person even if he is not a party to the case? Explain.

152.A. No. In Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) vs. Republic (805 SCRA 1, 5 October 2016)(En Banc)[Velasco, Jr., J.], the High Court held that: As a rule, execution may issue only upon a person who is a party to the action or proceeding, and not against one who did not have or was denied his day in court. In the case of Atilano vs. Asaali it was held: 27It is well-settled that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court. Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent third parties. 153.Q.

198 199

200 201 202

What is a Writ of Possession? When will it be issued?

See Government Service Insurance System vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., 710 SCRA 337 (20 November 2013). See Phil. Nails & Wires Corp. vs. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., 445 Phil. 465 (2003). See also Philippine National Bank vs. Puno, 252 Phil. 234 (1989). 468 Phil. 130 (2004). See Lao vs. King, 532 Phil. 305 (2006), citing Dev‘t. Bank of the Phils. vs. Union Bank of the Phils., 464 Phil. 161 (2004). Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee vs. Jancom Environmental Corporation, 526 Phil. 761 (2006), citing Equatorial Realty Dev‘t., Inc. vs. Mayfair Theater, Inc., 387 Phil. 885 (2000).

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153.A. In Sia vs. Arcenas (746 SCRA 272, 12 January 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held: A writ of possession is defined as a "Writ of Execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to the person entitled under the judgment."203 It may be issued under the following instances: (a) (b) (c) (d)

land registration proceedings under Section 17of Act No. 496, otherwise known as "The Land Registration Act;" judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and in execution sale Proceeding therefrom, the issuance of a writ of possession is only proper in order to execute judgments ordering the delivery of specific properties to a litigant, in accordance with Section 10, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.

154.Q. What is the proper remedy of the winning party if the losing party refuses delivery of the possession of a real property upon enforcement of the writ of execution by the sheriff? 154.A. In Martinez vs. Martin (743 SCRA 718, 3 December 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of Pascua vs. Heirs of Segundo Simeon,204 the Supreme Court held that: The proper remedy is for the sheriff to dispossess them of the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the winning party. However, if subsequent to such dispossession, the losing party enters into or upon the properties for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession or in any manner disturb the possession of the winning party, then and only then may the losing party be charged with and punished for contempt. 155.Q.

What is the role of the sheriff in our judicial system?

155.A. In Santos vs. Leno, Jr. (784 SCRA 449, 23 February 2016)(En Banc)[Per Curiam], the High Court said: Sheriffs are officers of the court who serve and execute writs addressed to them by the court, who prepare and submit returns of their proceedings and keep custody of attached properties. 205 Proceedings for attachment are said to be harsh, extraordinary and summary in nature — a rigorous remedy that exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance.206 Sheriffs are held to the highest standards in the performance of their duties, keeping in mind that public office is a public trust. 156.Q. If a Writ of Mandamus is issued by the court, does it include the payment of money or sale or delivery of personal property? Explain. 156.A. No. In Sia vs. Arcenas (746 SCRA 272, 12 January 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled: The issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the performance of a ministerial duty, does not include the payment of money or the sale or delivery of real or personal property, the same is in the nature of a special judgment207 – that is which a judgment directs the performance of a specific act requiring the party or person to personally do because of his personal qualifications and circumstances. 208 As such, execution of the said judgment should be governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. This is in consonance with the rule on service and enforcement of orders or judgments concerning, among others, the special civil action of mandamus under Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The rule therefore is that the service and execution of a special judgment, such as a favorable judgment in mandamus should be deemed to be limited to directing compliance with the judgment, and in case of disobedience, to have the disobedient person required by law to obey such judgment punished with contempt. Explain. 203

204 205

206 207 208

157.Q.

What is the duty of the sheriff in case of sale of the subject property under execution?

Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Abad Santos, 608 SCRA 222 (15 December 2009), citing Black‘s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 1444. 244 Phil. 1 (1988). Villanueva-Fabella vs. Judge Lee, 464 Phil. 548 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division], citing the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, vol. 1, Chaps. VI and VII. Citing Lirio vs. Ramos, 331 Phil. 378 (1996)[Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division]. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation vs. Abayari, 617 Phil. 446, 458 (2009). Sandico, Sr. vs. Piguing, 149 Phil. 422 (1971).

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157.A. In Roxas vs. Sicat (A.M. No. P-17-3639, 23 January 2018)(En Banc)[Per Curiam], it was held that: The Sheriff shall give the judgment debtor a notice on the sale of the property; there must be proof of publication of the notice and of the raffle among the accredited publishing companies for the selection of the newspaper that would publish the notice of sale of property. These are mandated by of Section 15, (a), (c) and (d), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The failure of the Sheriff to do these tasks before proceeding, shall constitute gross neglect of duty and inefficiency in the performance of official duties. It also constitutes misconduct for the irregularities in the conduct of the auction sale of the property under execution. 158.Q. What is the remedy of a third person whose property was inadvertently levied by a Sheriff in the implementation of a Writ of Execution of a money judgment? Explain. 158.A. In Gagoomal vs. Villacorta (663 SCRA 444, 18 January 2012)(Third Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled: The remedy is TERCERIA. It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man‘s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. 159.Q. Under Act 3135, as amended by Act. 4118, upon the expiration of the one (1) year redemption period from date of registration with the ROD, the purchaser in an auction sale has the right to apply an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession. It is a ministerial duty on the part of the court to grant such an application? Is there any exception that it will not be granted by the RTC where it is filed? Explain. 159.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Heirs of Jose Peñaflor vs. Heirs of Artemio and Lydia dela Cruz (836 SCRA 292, 9 August 2017)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Marquez vs. Alindog (714 SCRA 460, 22 January 2014)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that:

2.

Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court - which is applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages per Section 6 of Act No. 3135 - provides that upon the expiration of the redemption period, the possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner, unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. 160.Q. What is the duty of the trial court in case there is a third party who filed an opposition and who happens to be in actual possession of the subject property extra-judicially foreclosed? Explain. 160.A. Where a third party has raised in an opposition to the writ of possession or in a motion to quash the same his actual possession thereof upon a claim of ownership or a right adverse to that of the debtor or mortgagor the procedure is for the trial court to order a hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession, conformably with the time-honored principle of due process. Notably, when this opposition is made, the proceeding for the issuance of a writ of possession loses its nature of being an ex parte, and instead, turns adversarial. Explain.

161.Q.

What does third party mean under Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure?

161.A. In the case of Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. vs. Centeno (693 SCRA 110, 11 March 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of China Banking Corporation vs. Lozada,209 the Supreme Court held that: The phrase a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party adversely to the judgment obligor.210

209 210

557 SCRA 177 (4 July 2008). BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel Sales Center, Inc., 639 SCRA 405 (12 January 2011).

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162.Q. Can the purchaser apply for an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession before the expiration of the one (1) year redemption period of an extra-judicially foreclosed real estate mortgage? 162.A. Yes. In Okabe vs. Saturnino (733 SCRA 652, 26 August 2014)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.], the Supreme Court pronounced: Section 7 of Act No. 3135,211 as amended by Act No. 4118,212 the purchaser or the mortgagee who is also the purchaser in the foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period,213 upon an ex-parte motion and after furnishing a bond. In GC Dalton Industries, Inc. vs. Equitable PCI Bank,214 the Supreme Court held that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of title. Also, in China Banking Corporation vs. Ordinario,215 it was held that under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property. In the recent case of Spouses Nicasio Marquez and Anita Marquez vs. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog,216 although the Supreme Court allowed the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to demand possession of the land during the redemption period, it still required the posting of a bond under Section 7 of Act No. 3135. 163.Q. What is the import of Section 6, Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118, if the one (1) year redemption period of the real property purchased has already lapsed? 163.A. The provision of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court relative to an execution sale is made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by virtue of Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended.217 Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the property, and its possession shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor. In which case, the issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be ex-parte and nonadversarial. Thus, where the property levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to conduct a hearing to determine the nature of said possession, i.e., whether or not he is in possession of the subject property under a claim adverse to that of the judgment debtor. 164.Q.

What is meant by res judicata?

164.A. In Dy vs. Yu (762 SCRA 357, 8 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], res judicata was defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. It rests on the principle that parties should not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.218 165.Q.

What are the two (2) concepts of the Doctrine of Res Judicata? Explain.

165.A. In Fenix (CEZA) International, Inc. vs. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. (G.R. No. 235258, 6 August 2018)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Under Section 47 (b) and (c), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, there are two (2) distinct concepts of res judicata, namely: (a) Bar by former judgment – There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar 211 212

213 214 215 216 217 218

An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real-Estate Mortgages. An Act to Amend Act Numbered Thirty-One Hundred and Thirty-Five, Entitled "An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages." Fortaleza vs. Lapitan, 678 SCRA 469 (15 August 2012). 596 SCRA 723 (24 August 2009). 447 Phil. 557 (2003). G.R. No. 184045 (22 January 2014). See Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. vs. Lamb Construction Consortium Corporation, 606 SCRA 159 (27 November 2009). Degayo vs. Magbanua-Dinglasan (757 Phil. 376, 6 April 2015)(Second Division)[Brion, J.]; Solidbank Union vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, 680 SCRA 629 (17 September 2012).

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to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.219 The bar by prior judgment requires the following elements to be present for it to operate: (a) (b) (c)

a former final judgment that was rendered on the merits; the court in the former judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions.

In contrast, the elements of conclusiveness of judgment are identity of: (a) (b)

parties; and subject matter in the first and second case.220

It is well-settled that only substantial, and not absolute, identity of the parties is required for res judicata to lie. There is substantial identity of the parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case. 221 There is identity of causes of action when the same evidence will sustain both actions or when the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions are identical.222 (Solidbank Union vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, supra.) (b) Conclusiveness of judgment – If there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.223 APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS (RULE 40) 166.Q.

Is the right to appeal part of due process? Explain.

166.A. No. In the case of Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Salvana (726 SCRA 141, 10 June 2014)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.], it was held that: The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.224 If it is not granted by the Constitution, it can only be availed of when a statute provides for it. 225 When made available by law or regulation, however, a person cannot be deprived of that right to appeal. Otherwise, there will be a violation of the constitutional requirement of due process of law. 167.Q. When a complaint for forcible entry was filed with the MTC, is it proper on appeal for the CA to order the remand of the case to the RTC for trial on the merits in an action for recovery of possession and ownership? 167.A. No. In Javier vs. Lumontad (744 SCRA 1, 3 December 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of Arbizo vs. Sps. Santillan,226 it was held that: Given that a forcible entry complaint had been 219 220

221 222 223 224

225

226

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Coquia, Jr., 646 SCRA 215 (23 March 2011). See Ley Construction & Development Corporation vs. Philippine Commercial & International Bank, 635 Phil. 503 (2010), citing Alcantara vs. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 582 Phil. 717 (2008); Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. vs. Ando, 791 SCRA 337, 30 May 2016; Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Coquia, Jr., supra. Sempio vs. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 627 (1998), citing Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 630 (21 September 1993). Escareal vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 495 Phil, 107 (2005). In Spouses Ocampo vs. Heirs of Dionisio, 744 Phil. 716 (2014). Bello vs. Fernando, 114 Phil. 101 (1962) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., En Banc], citing Aguilar vs. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898 (1931)[Per J. Villamor, En Banc]; Santiago vs. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397 (1947)[Per J. Feria, En Banc]. Spouses De la Cruz vs. Ramiscal, 491 Phil. 62 (2005)[Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]. See also United States vs. Yu Ten, 33 Phil. 122 (1916)[Per J. Johnson, En Banc]; Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation vs. Board of Investments, 578 SCRA 69 (4 February 2009)[Per J. Tinga, Second Division]; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 259 (1999)[Per J. Buena, Second Division]. 570 Phil. 200 (2008).

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properly filed before the MTC, the CA thus erred in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for trial on the merits in an action for recovery of possession and ownership, otherwise known as an accion reivindicatoria,227 pursuant to Paragraph 2, Section 8, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts by express provision of Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Even in cases where the issue of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases,228 as they are given the authority to make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession.229 It must be clarified, however, that such adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership. APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS (RULE 41) PROBLEM: Sometime in January 2016, the United Cadig Neighborhood Homeowners‘ Association (UCNHA) represented by its President, Laurence Buelo, filed with the RTC of Butawan a Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction with Damages against defendants Spouses Diman and Amalia Buenas. After the UCNHA rested its case, Sps. Buenas filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC eventually granted in an Order dated 5 March 2016. Thereby, UCNHA‘s complaint was dismissed. UCNHA moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC. Consequently, Buelo filed a Notice of Appeal within the fifteen (15)-day period from date of receipt of the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration. On their part, Sps. Buenas filed an Omnibus Motion to Strike Out Notice of Appeal and Issue Certificate of Finality, claiming that Buelo failed to attach a Board Resolution authorizing him to file the Notice of Appeal on behalf of the UCNHA, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9904. The RTC granted the Motion of Sps. Buenas and ordered UCNHA‘s Notice of Appeal to be expunged from the records for lack of authority from its Board of Directors to initiate the appeal, pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 9904. However, it was found out that UCNHA paid the appeal fee within the reglementary period. The UCNHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration attaching therewith a copy of Board Resolution of the Board of Directors confirming Buelo‘s authority to, among others, represent UCNHA. Defendants Buenas filed an opposition reiterating that Buelo did not attach a Board Resolution authorizing him to file the Notice of Appeal on behalf of UCNHA; and has failed to show proof of payment of the required appeal fees. They added that Buelo‘s motion for reconsideration failed to comply with the three (3)-day notice rule under Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied UCNHA‘s Motion for Reconsideration and declared its Order dated 5 March 2016 granting the Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence final and executory. UCNHA filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 directly with the Supreme Court. 168.Q. Is the direct resort of Certiorari Petition to the Supreme Court by UCNHA the proper remedy? Explain. 168.A. Yes. In the case of United Interior Manggahan Homeowners Association vs. De Luna (845 SCRA 213, 20 November 2017)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] , the High Court ruled that: A direct resort to the Supreme Court is allowed when the questions involved are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice.230 Under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 1, Rule 41 of the same Rules provides that no appeal 227

228 229 230

Accion reivindicatoria x x x is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. (Javier vs. Veridiano II, 237 SCRA 565, 10 October 1994.) See Heirs of Basilisa Hernandez vs. Vergara, Jr., 533 Phil. 458 (2006). Cabrera vs. Getaruela, 604 Phil. 59 (2009), citing Spouses Pascual vs. Spouses Coronel, 554 Phil. 351 (2007). See Valmores vs. Achacoso (19 July 2017), citing Maza vs. Turla (15 February 2017), and The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301 (2015).

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may be taken from, among others, an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; the aggrieved party may, however, file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. In this case, the assailed Order March 5, 2016 – expunging Buelo‘s Notice of Appeal from the records of the case– is effectively an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal that precludes resort to an appeal. Hence, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 41, its only recourse is via the present certiorari action. Moreover, certiorari is the proper remedy when the assailed orders were issued in excess of or without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess thereof. Grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, existing law, or jurisprudence. The RTC of Butawan order dated March 6, 2016, expunging from the records Buelo‘s Notice of Appeal was a grave legal error and contradicts established procedural rules. In this relation, it should be observed that while strict adherence to the judicial hierarchy of courts has been the long standing policy of the courts, it is not without exception as the Court possesses full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over Buelo‘s petitions filed directly with it. 169.Q. What is the immediate remedy of a party in case an Order of Execution in an ejectment suit is granted by the trial court? 169.A. In Mauleon vs. Porter (730 SCRA 229, 18 July 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: An aggrieved party may resort to the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 1(e), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that an order of execution is not appealable. This is because an order of execution is not a final order or resolution within the contemplation of the rules, but is issued to carry out the enforcement of a final judgment or order against the losing party, hence, generally not appealable.231 While there are circumstances wherein appeal from an improper execution is allowed,232 none obtains in this case. Consequently, the Court finds that petitioner properly availed of the remedy of certiorari before the RTC, contrary to the finding of the CA that she should have appealed therefrom. 170.Q. What is the consequence if a party simultaneously filed an appeal under Rule 41 and a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65? Explain. 170.A. The simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.233 The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal. 234 Corollary thereto, an appeal renders a pending petition for certiorari superfluous and mandates its dismissal. 171.Q. jurisdiction?

What is the mode of appeal of the adverse decision of the RTC in the exercise of its original

171.A. In Yalong vs. People (704 SCRA 195, 28 August 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 case, the High Court ruled that: Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules provides that appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the latter court. While the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the inappropriate filing of a petition for review instead of a required notice of appeal is dismissible (unlike its converse, i.e., the filing of a notice of appeal when what is required is the filing of a petition for review). 172.Q. What is the consequence if, instead of filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC which rendered its decision in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the losing party filed a Petition for Certiorari? Explain. 231 232

233 234

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Planta, 497 Phil. 194 (2005). In Banaga vs. Judge Majaducon (526 Phil. 641 [2006]), the Court enumerated the following exceptional circumstances where a party may elevate the matter of an improper execution for appeal, to wit: (a) the writ of execution varies the judgment; (b) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; (c) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; (d) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court; (e) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or (f) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority. Magestrado vs. People, 527 SCRA 125 (10 July 2007), citing Fajardo vs. Bautista, 232 SCRA 291 (10 May 1994). Balindong vs. Dacalos, 441 SCRA 607 (10 November 2004), citing Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. JANCOM Environmental Corp., 375 SCRA 320 (January 30, 2002).

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172.A. In Yalong, his failure to file a notice of appeal with the RTC within the proper reglementary period, the RTC Decision had attained finality which thereby bars him from further contesting the same. 173.Q. Can a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 be treated as a Notice of Appeal instead? Explain. 173.A. No. In Yalong, the contention of the petitioner-appellant that a petition for review may be treated as a notice of appeal since the contents of the former already include the required contents of the latter, cannot be given credence since these modes of appeal clearly remain distinct procedures which cannot, absent any compelling reason therefor, be loosely interchanged with one another. A notice of appeal is filed with the regional trial court that rendered the assailed decision, judgment or final order, while a petition for review is filed with the CA. Also, a notice of appeal is required when the RTC issues a decision, judgment or final order in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, while a petition for review is required when such issuance was in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, in Yalong, the filing of the subject petition for review cannot be simply accorded the same effect as the filing of a notice of appeal. 174.Q.

What are the three (3) modes of appeal of the decision of the RTC?

174.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2. 3.

Republic vs. Cortez (817 SCRA 19, 7 February 2017)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.] Alangdeo vs. Do Mogan (761 SCRA 272, 1 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. Reyes (699 SCRA 217, 19 June 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that:

Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three (3) ways by which an appeal from the RTC's decision may be undertaken, depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (a) an ordinary appeal (by Notice of Appeal) to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; This first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and of law. (b) a petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of the Rules, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and of law; and (c) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with the Supreme Court where only questions of law are raised or involved.235 This third mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules is filed with the Supreme Court only on questions of law. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the partieslitigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn there from is correct, is a question of law.236Should a party raise only questions of law through an ordinary appeal taken under Rule 41, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that the said appeal shall be dismissed. 175.Q. What is the consequence of non-compliance with Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the payment of docket and other lawful fees in case of appeal? Explain. 175.A. In the case of Lee vs. Land Bank of the Philippines (784 SCRA 342, 17 February 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute237 and Gonzales vs. Pe,238 the Supreme Court clarified the requirement of full payment of docket and other lawful fees:

235 236 237 238

Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. People, 710 SCRA 358 (20 November 2013). Republic vs. Medida, 678 SCRA 317 (13 August 2012). 726 SCRA 559 (18 June 2014). 670 Phil. 597 (2011).

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The procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. 176.Q.

Does the filing of Notice of Appeal divest the trial court of its jurisdiction? Explain.

176.A. No. In the case of United Interior Manggahan Homeowners Association vs. De Luna (845 SCRA 213, 20 November 2017)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the Supreme Court held that: Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. In fact, under Section 13 of the same Rules, the trial court, prior to the transmittal of the original record or record on appeal, may, motu propio or on motion, order the dismissal of the appeal on the grounds specified therein. In other words, the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not automatically divest the trial court of its jurisdiction, since the appeal is deemed perfected as to the appellant only; it is not deemed perfected, for purposes of divesting the court of its jurisdiction, before the expiration of the period to appeal of the other parties. Under the Rules, an appeal from cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be made to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal or record of appeal in cases required by law with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. The appeal shall be taken, with the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees paid, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. PROBLEM: Petitioner Jess Dima filed a case for collection of sum of money with application for writ of preliminary attachment against respondent Anthony Tavern with the RTC of Iliyan City. The RTC issued a Writ of Attachment against the respondent‘s properties. Petitioner further filed an Amended Complaint, which was later denied by the RTC. The respondent, on the other hand, filed an Answer Ad Cautelam Ex-Abudante with Compulsory Counterclaim. Further, respondent filed a Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment. It was denied by the RTC including its motion for reconsideration. Respondent went to the CA on certiorari under Rule 65. After exchanges of pleadings, the RTC rendered a decision on the main case and dismissed petitioner's Amended Complaint. Petitioner timely filed a Notice Appeal and paid the corresponding docket fees, which was granted by the RTC. The respondent did not appeal the main decision. Meanwhile, in a Decision which partly granted the certiorari petition of the respondent, the CA ordered the RTC to appoint Commissioners as provided under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court as well as the subsequent discharge of any excess attachment, if so found therein, and, on the other hand, denied respondent‘s Motion for Discovery. The CA held the following: (a) On the issue of attachment: The trial by commissioners under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court was proper so that the parties may finally settle their conflicting valuations; and (b) On the matter of discovery: Petitioner could not be compelled to produce the originals sought by respondents for inspection since they were not in the former's possession. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration but was, however, denied. Hence, petitioner went to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.

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177.Q. Did the RTC lose its jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary attachment after petitioner appealed the decision in the main case, and thereafter the RTC ordered the transmittal of the records to the CA? 177.A. Yes. In Northern Islands Co., Inc. vs. Garcia (753 SCRA 603, 18 March 2015)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], a case with similar factual milieu wit the problem, the High Court ruled that: Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court losses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. In this case, petitioner had duly perfected its appeal of the RTC's Decision resolving the Main Case through the timely filing of its Notice of Appeal together with the payment of the appropriate docket fees. The RTC, had actually confirmed this fact, and thereby ordered the elevation of the entire records to the CA. Thus, based on Section 9, Rule 41, it cannot be seriously doubted that the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the main case. 178.Q. Is the CA correct when it ordered the appointment of Commissioners and the subsequent discharge of any excess attachment found by said Commissioners? Explain. 178.A. No. With the RTC's loss of jurisdiction over the main case necessarily comes its loss of jurisdiction all over matters merely ancillary thereto. Thus, the propriety of conducting a trial by commissioners in order to determine the excessiveness of the subject preliminary attachment, being a mere ancillary matter to the main case is now mooted by its supervening appeal in CA. 179.Q. Is the failure to present proof of payment of appeal fees to the trial court a ground for the denial of the Notice of Appeal? 179.A. No. In United Interior Manggahan Homeowners Association vs. De Luna supra, it was held that: Under the Rules, it is the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period that would justify the court in dismissing the appeal. It should be pointed out that failure to present proof of payment of the appeal fees, is not fatal to party‘s appeal. PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS (RULE 42) 180.Q.

What are the requisites in order for an appellate jurisdiction to attach? Explain.

180.A. In Bautista vs. Doniego, Jr. (797 SCRA 724, 20 July 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: For appellate jurisdiction to attach, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) (b) (c) (d)

the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the CA within the time for doing so; he must have filed his petition for review within the reglementary period; he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and the other parties must have perfected their appeals in due time.239

In this regard, the Rules of Court require that in an appeal by way of a petition for review, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees.240 To perfect the appeal, the party has to file the petition for review and to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. The law and its intent are clear and unequivocal that the petition is perfected upon its filing and the payment of the docket fees. Consequently, without the petition, the CA cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the case. 181.Q. Is an extension of time to file Petition for Review to the CTA allowed under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? Explain. 181.A. Yes. In Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. vs. Toledo (697 SCRA 425, 5 June 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: Although the RRCTA does not explicitly sanction extensions to file a petition for review with the CTA, Section 1, Rule 7 thereof reads that in the absence of any express provision in the RRCTA, Rules 42, 43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of Court may be applied in a suppletory manner. In particular, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9282 makes reference to the procedure under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. In this light, Section 1 of Rule 42 states that the period for filing a petition for review may be 239 240

Fernandez vs. CA, 497 Phil. 748 (2005). Citing the Minutes of the meeting of the Rules of Court Revision Committee, September 18, 1991, p. 11.

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extended upon motion of the concerned party. Thus, in City of Manila vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,241 the Court held that: The original period for filing the petition for review may be extended for a period of fifteen (15) days, which for the most compelling reasons, may be extended for another period not exceeding fifteen (15) days. In other words, the reglementary period provided under Section 3, Rule 8 of the RRCTA is extendible and as such, CTA Division‘s grant of respondents‘ motion for extension falls squarely within the law. APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES TO THE COURT OF APPEALS (RULE 43) 182.Q. What is the scope of a Rule 43 appeal as far as the Civil Service Commission (CSC) is concerned? Explain. 182.A. First, the jurisdiction of the CA over petitions for review under Rule 43 is not limited to judgments and final orders of the CSC, but can extend to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions issued by the latter. In PAGCOR vs. Aumentado, Jr.,242 the Supreme Court ruled that it is clear from the provision of Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the CA‘s jurisdiction covers not merely final judgments and final orders of the CSC, but also awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of the CSC. Second, although the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable, the CA failed to consider that there are exceptions to this rule, as illustrated in this case. 183.Q.

Who is considered as a government party for purposes of appeal?

183.A. In Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Salvana (726 SCRA 141, 10 June 2014)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.], it was held that: The present rule is that a government party is a party adversely affected for purposes of appeal provided that the government party that has a right to appeal must be the office or agency prosecuting the case. 184.Q.

Can the CSC file an appeal if its decision is reversed by the Court of Appeals?

184.A. Yes. Despite the limitation on the government party‘s right to appeal, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld that right in CSC vs. Dacoycoy.243 In CSC vs. Almojuela,244 it was ruled that: More than ten years have passed since the Court first recognized in Dacoycoy the CSC‘s standing to appeal the CA‘s decisions reversing or modifying its resolutions seriously prejudicial to the civil service system. Since then, the ruling in Dacoycoy has been subjected to clarifications and qualifications but the doctrine has remained the same: The CSC has standing as a real party in interest and can appeal the CA‘s decisions modifying or reversing the CSC‘s rulings, when the CA action would have an adverse impact on the integrity of the civil service. As the government‘s central personnel agency, the CSC is tasked to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; it has a stake in ensuring that the proper disciplinary action is imposed on an erring public employee, and this stake would be adversely affected by a ruling absolving or lightening the CSC-imposed penalty. Further, a decision that declares a public employee not guilty of the charge against him would have no other appellant than the CSC. To be sure, it would not be appealed by the public employee who has been absolved of the charge against him; neither would the complainant appeal the decision, as he acted merely as a witness for the government. We thus find no reason to disturb the settled Dacoycoy doctrine. In CSC vs. Yu,245 this court allowed the CSC to appeal the Court of Appeals‘ decision granting the reinstatement of a government employee whose appointment had been revoked by the Commission.

241 242 243 244 245

595 SCRA 299 (4 August 2009). 625 SCRA 241 (22 July 2010). 366 Phil. 86 (1999)[Per J. Pardo, En Banc]. 694 SCRA 441 (2 April 2013)[Per J. Brion, En Banc]. 678 SCRA 39 (31 July 2012)[Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

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185.Q. decision?

If the decision of the disciplining authority is reversed by the CSC, can it appeal the adverse

185.A. Yes. In NPC vs. CSC and Tanfelix,246 the NPC had previously filed an administrative complaint against one of its employees, Rodrigo Tanfelix, resulting in his dismissal from service. When the Civil Service Commission exonerated Tanfelix and the Court of Appeals affirmed the exoneration, the National Power Corporation was allowed to appeal. These cases, however, allowed the disciplining authority to appeal only from a decision exonerating the said employee. In this case, respondent was not exonerated; she was found guilty, but the finding was modified. This court previously stated that: If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same.81 Dacoycoy, Philippine National Bank, and the URACCS failed to contemplate a situation where the Civil Service Commission modified the penalty from dismissal to suspension. The erring civil servant was not exonerated, and the finding of guilt still stood. In these situations, the disciplinary authority should be allowed to appeal the modification of the decision. 186.Q. Is the cancellation of Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) by the Office of the President appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43? Explain. 186.A. No. In the case of Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation vs. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation (777 SCRA 258, 9 December 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The CA improperly took cognizance of the case on appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court for the reason that the OP's cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA was not one which could be classified as an exercise of its quasi-judicial authority, thus negating the CA's jurisdiction over the case. The OP's cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA is obviously not an adjudication in the sense above-described. It cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The OP - at the instance of Redmont at that - was exercising an administrative function pursuant to the President's authority247 to invoke the Republic's right under paragraph a (iii), Section 17.2 of the FTAA. With the legal treatment and parameters of an FTAA in mind, it becomes apparent that the OP's cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA is an exercise of a contractual right that is purely administrative in nature, and thus, cannot be treated as an adjudication, again, in the sense above-discussed. As one of the contracting parties to the FTAA, the OP could not have adjudicated on the matter in which it is an interested party, as in a court case where rights and duties of parties are settled before an impartial tribunal. In a very loose sense, the OP's cancellation/revocation may be taken as a decision but only to the extent of considering it as its final administrative action internal to its channels. It is not one for which we should employ the conventional import of the phrase final and executory, as accorded to proper judicial/quasi-judicial decisions, and its concomitant effect of barring further recourse of a party. 187.Q. Is the enumeration in Section 1, Rule 43 as regards to the jurisdiction of the CA over quasijudicial bodies exclusive? 187.A. No. In Cayao-Lasam vs. Spouses Ramolete,248 it was clarified that the enumeration of the quasi-judicial agencies under Section 1, Rule 43 is not exclusive. The Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasijudicial functions. The phrase ―among these agencies‖ confirms that the enumeration made in the Rule is not exclusive to the agencies therein listed. Thus, although unmentioned in the enumeration, the Court, in the case of Dwikarna vs. Hon. Domingo,249 held that the decisions rendered by the BOI Board of Commissioners may be appealable to the CA via Rule 43 in the event that a motion for reconsideration therefrom is denied: If petitioner is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, he can move for its reconsideration. If his motion is denied, then he can elevate his case by way of a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 188.Q. The decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is final and executory even pending appeal. In the event that the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is reversed by 246 247 248 249

663 SCRA 492 (24 January 2012)[Per J. Abad, En Banc]. See Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. 595 Phil. 56 (2008). 477 Phil. 891 (2004).

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the Court of Appeals, would that decision be also final and executory even pending appeal to the Supreme Court? Explain. 188. A. Yes. In the case of Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) vs. P/Supt. Ermilando Villafuerte (G.R. Nos. 219771 & 219773, 18 September 2018)(En Banc) [Caguioa, J.], it was held that: The CA has a concomitant responsibility to ensure that, in case of exoneration, such a decision must perforce be immediately executory, notwithstanding an appeal that may be lodged by the Ombudsman with the Court. The Court finds such rule necessary to fulfill the interests of justice and fairness, given that not only the livelihoods of our public servants are at stake, but likewise the efficient operations of government as a whole. The Office of the Ombudsman is, by special designation of the Constitution, the protector of the people.250 As such, the Constitution has bequeathed upon it a unique arsenal of powers to investigate any and all acts or omissions of public officers that appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. 251 As well, it is empowered to impose penalties in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. 252 In this regard, while the nature of its functions is largely prosecutorial, the Office of the Ombudsman is not, by any means, exempted from upholding the fundamental rights of all citizens as safeguarded by the Constitution. This was stressed by the Court in Morales, Jr. vs. Carpio-Morales:253 x x x The Ombudsman's duty is not only to prosecute but, more importantly, to ensure that justice is served. This means determining, at the earliest possible time, whether the process should continue or should be terminated. The duty includes using all the resources necessary to prosecute an offending public officer where it is warranted, as well as to refrain from placing any undue burden on the parties in the case, or government resources where the same is not. Following the pronouncements in Morales, Jr., the Ombudsman is thus reminded to exercise the utmost circumspection in its own pursuit of justice. It must be stressed that it is not prosecuting ordinary citizens, but public servants who play instrumental roles in our system of government, regardless of rank. In this regard, to stubbornly pursue baseless cases against public officers not only places an unnecessary burden upon their person, but also ultimately hampers the effective dispensation of government functions due to the unique positions that they occupy. The responsibility of the Ombudsman is made even greater given that a decision imposing the penalty of dismissal is immediately executory and is not stayed by a pending appeal. Accordingly, this Decision shall be immediately executory insofar as the reinstatement of P/Supt. Ermilando O. Villafuerte to his former position is concerned, which shall be without loss of seniority rights and with payment of backwages and all benefits which would have accrued as if he had not been illegally dismissed, following Section 58 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.254 189.Q. Is the decision of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) subject to judicial review? Explain. 189.A. Yes. In the case of Asian Construction and Development Coporation vs. Sumitomo Corporation (704 SCRA 332, 28 August 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that: Executive Order No. 1008,255 which vests upon the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, plainly states that the arbitral award shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the Court.256 Later, however, the Court, in Revised Administrative Circular RAC No. 1-95,257 modified this rule, directing that the appeals from the arbitral award of the CIAC be first brought to the CA on questions of fact, law or mixed questions of fact and law. This amendment was eventually transposed into the present CIAC Revised Rules which direct that a petition for review from a final award may be taken by any of the parties within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 250 251 252 253 254 255

256 257

Sec. 12, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution. Sec. 13(1), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Apolonio, 683 Phil. 553 (2012). 791 Phil. 539 (2016). CSC Resolution No. 1701077, promulgated on 3 July 2017. Creating an Arbitration Machinery in the Construction Industry of the Philippines," otherwise known as the "Construction Industry Arbitration Law. Section 19 of EO 1008. See also F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. vs. HR Construction Corp., 668 SCRA 302 (14 March 2012). RAC 1-95 dated 16 May 1995.

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Notably, the current provision is in harmony with the Court‘s pronouncement that despite statutory provisions making the decisions of certain administrative agencies final, the Court still takes cognizance of petitions showing want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantial justice or erroneous interpretation of the law and that, in particular, voluntary arbitrators, by the nature of their functions, act in a quasi-judicial capacity, such that their decisions are within the scope of judicial review.258 190.Q. What is the proper remedy to modify or reverse the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators? Explain. 190.A. In the case of Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines, Inc. vs. Bacolod Sales Force Union-Congress of Independent Organization-ALU (804 SCRA 139, 21 September 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: The proper remedy is to appeal the award or decision before the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules259 on questions of fact, of law, mixed questions of fact and law,260 or a mistake of judgment. However, in several cases, the Court allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari from the VA's judgment to the CA under Rule 65 of the same Rules,261 where the VA was averred to have acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT (RULE 45) 191.Q. What is the scope of Appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? Explain. 191.A. In Bintudan vs. COA (821 SCRA 211, 21 March 2017)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], it was held that: An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is available only as a remedy from a decision or final order of a lower court. This limitation is imposed by Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution. , which pertinently provides: Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxxx 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: xxxx Implementing the limitation is Section 1 of Rule 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 192.Q. What is the general rule in filing an Appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? 192.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Deocariza vs. Fleet Management Services Philippines, Inc. (G.R. No. 229955, 23 July 2018) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Encarnacion Construction & Industrial Corporation vs. Phoenix Ready Mix Concrete Development & Construction, Inc (838 SCRA 500, 4 September 2017)(Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Heirs of Peter Donton vs. Stier (837 SCRA 583, 23 August 2017)(Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr. vs. Manzano (827 SCRA 253, 19 June 2017)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Mendoza (821 SCRA 41, 20 March 2017)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Felicilda vs. Uy (803 SCRA 296, 14 September 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Torrefiel vs. Beauty Lane Phils., Inc. (799 SCRA 470, 3 August 2016) (First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.]

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

258 259

260 261

As held in Philrock, Inc. vs. CIAC, 359 SCRA 632 (26 June 2001) See Philippine Electric Corporation vs. CA, 744 SCRA 361 (10 December 2014); Royal Plant Workers Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.-Cebu Plant, 709 Phil. 350 (2013); Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt vs. Magsalin, 665 Phil. 584 (2011); Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-Nuwhrain-APL vs. Bacungan, 601 Phil. 365 (2009); AMA Computer College-Santiago City, Inc. vs. Nacino, 568 Phil. 465 (2008); Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. LEYECO IV Employees Union-ALU, 562 Phil. 743 (2007); Centro Escolar University Faculty and Allied Workers Union-Independent vs. CA, 523 Phil. 427 (2006); Manila Midtown Hotel vs. Borromeo, 482 Phil. 137 (2004); and Sevilla Trading Company vs. Semana, 472 Phil. 220 (2004). See Section 3, Rule 43 of the Rules. See Mora vs. Avesco Marketing Corporation, 591 Phil. 827 (2008); and Unicraft Industries Int'l. Corp. vs. CA, 407 Phil. 527 (2001).

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8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

United Overseas Bank of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Board of Commissioners HLURB (760 SCRA 300, 23 June 2015)[Peralta, J.] INC Shipmanagement, Inc. vs. Moradas (713 SCRA 475, 15 January 2014)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Philippine Plaza Holdings, Inc. vs. Episcope (692 SCRA 227, 27 February 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Tan vs. Andrade (703 SCRA 198, 7 August 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] PAGCOR vs. Marquez (698 SCRA 709, 18 June 2013)(En Banc)[Villarama, Jr., J.] Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Gonzaga (698 SCRA 103, 10 June 2013) (Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that:

The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in and resolved by this Court on petitions brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, because the Court, not being a trier of facts, is not duty-bound to reexamine and calibrate the evidence on record.262 Findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally accorded finality and respect. 263 The Court is confined to the review of errors of law that may have been committed in the judgment under review. 264 The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive.265 193.Q. As a general rule, a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done by the Supreme Court acting on a Petition for Review on Certiorari because it is not a trier of facts and only reviews questions of law.266 Are there exceptions to this rule? 193.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Gamboa vs. Maunlad Trans, Inc. (G.R. No. 232905, 20 August 2018)(Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Ayson vs. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (811 SCRA 520, 1 December 2016)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Reyes vs. Heirs of Benjamin Malance (801 SCRA 485, 24 August 2016)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Ambray vs. Tsourous (795 SCRA 627, 5 July 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Tatel vs. JLFP Investigation Security Agency, Inc. (752 SCRA 55, 25 February 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. vs. Avestruz (751 SCRA 161, 18 February 2015)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Co vs. Yeung (735 SCRA 66, 10 September 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] National Transmission Corporation vs. Alphaomega Integrated Corporation (731 SCRA 299, 30 July 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz (723 SCRA 33, 22 April 2014)(En Banc on Motion for Reconsideration)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Land Bank of the Philippines vs. San Juan, Jr. (694 SCRA 387, 2 April 2013)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], the High Court ruled that:

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

The recognized exceptions tare as follows: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 262 263 264 265 266

when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (Perla vs. Baring, 685 SCRA 101, 12 November 2012.) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion; when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (Saso vs. 88 Aces Maritime Services, Inc., 772 SCRA 189, 7 October 2015; Ico vs. Systems Technology Institute, Inc., 729 SCRA 439, 9 July 2014.) when the findings of fact are conflicting;

See Leoncio vs. MST Marine Services' (Phils.), Inc. (6 December 2017). Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. vs. Ramos, 814 SCRA 428 (18 January 2017). See Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co, Inc. vs. People of the Philippines, 721 Phil. 760 (2013). Citing Chan vs. CA, 144 Phil. 678 (1970), in Remalante vs. Tibe, 241 Phil. 930 (1988). See Maersk-Filipinas Crewing Inc. vs. Avestruz, 751 SCRA 161 (18 February 2015), citing Jao vs. BCC Products Sales, Inc., 686 Phil. 36 (2012).

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6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11)

when in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (Silos vs. Philippine National Bank, 728 SCRA 617, 2 July 2014.) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs, are disputed by the respondent; when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.267 (Republic vs. Pasicolan, 755 SCRA 495, 15 April 2015.)

194.Q. Under the Rule 45 petition, only purely question of law shall be raised. When can there be a question of fact? 194.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) vs. P/Supt. Ermilando Villafuerte (G.R. Nos. 219771 & 219773, 18 September 2018)(En Banc) [Caguioa, J.] Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Mendoza (821 SCRA 41, 20 March 2017)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Sarabia Manor Hotel Corporation (702 SCRA 432, 29 July 2013)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court made the following pronouncements:

2. 3.

There is a 'question of law' when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; On the other hand, there is a 'question of fact' when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 195.Q.

What is the test for determining whether the error was one of law or fact?

195.A. In the case of National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms (NASECORE) vs. MERALCO (805 SCRA 501, 10 October 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of law or fact is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact.268 Where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual. 196.Q. Is a motion for extension of time to file a Motion for Reconsideration allowed under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? 196.A. No. In Revelisa Realty, Inc. vs. First Sta. Clara Builders Corporation (713 SCRA 619, 15 January 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a petition for review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar motion seeking to extend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other courts. This rule was first laid down in the 1986 case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon269 wherein it was held that: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.

267 268

269

Lorenzo vs. Government Service Insurance System, 706 SCRA 602 (2 October 2013). Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. Reyes, 711 Phil. 631 (2013); Bernales vs. Heirs of Julian Sambaan, 610 SCRA 90 (15 January 2010), citing the case of Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil. 805 (1995). 226 Phil. 144 (1986).

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Restating the rule in the 1991 case of Rolloque vs. CA,270 the Court emphasized that the 15-day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. Hence, the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period before a judgment becomes final and executory. 197.Q. What is the prescribed period for the payment of docket fees in an Appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45? Explain. 197.A. In the case of City of Manila vs. Colet (744 SCRA 265, 10 December 2014)(En Banc)[Leonardo De Castro, J.], it was held that: Under Revised Circular No. 1-88, effective July 1, 1991, the word is ―may‖ in the first paragraph thereof. Thus, payment of docketing and other fees.– Section 1 of Rule 45 requires that petitions for review be filed and the required fees paid within the prescribed period. Unless exempted by law or rule, such fees must be fully paid in accordance with this Circular; otherwise, the Court may deny the petition outright. The same rule shall govern petitions under Rule 65. Hence, denial of the petition for review outright for failure to pay docketing and other fees within the prescribed period was also directory and not mandatory upon the Court under Revised Circular No. 1-88. 198.Q. What is the indispensable requirement for the perfection of an appeal and for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case? 198.A. In the case of Atilano vs. Asaali (680 SCRA 345, 10 September 2012)(Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], it was held that: Payment of the full amount of docket fees is an indispensable step to the perfection of an appeal, and the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon such payment.271 Corollary to this, the Court has consistently held that procedural rules are not to be disregarded simply because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party‘s substantive rights. These same rules may be relaxed, for persuasive and weighty reasons, to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with procedure.272 Thus, in La Salette College vs. Pilotin,273 the Court explained: Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances. 199.Q. In filing an Appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, what is necessary to be attached in the petition? 199.A. In Aluag vs. BIR Multi-Purpose Cooperative (848 SCRA 284, 6 December 2017)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that: Sections 3 and 5 of Rule 45, in relation to Section 5 (d) of Rule 56, of the Rules of Court, and item 2 of Revised Circular No. 1-88274 require a proof of service to the lower court concerned to be attached to the petition filed before the Supreme Court. In the case of Aluag, she failed to serve a copy of the petition to the CA, thereby giving the Supreme Court sufficient ground to deny her petition. Her omission even led to the CA's issuance of the resolution declaring the finality of its Decision. Aluag's procedural mishap is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of her petition, especially since the rules themselves expressly say so.275

270 271 272 273 274

275

271 Phil. 40 (1991). Panay Railways, Inc. vs. Heva Management and Development Corporation (25 January 2012). Far Corporation vs. Magdaluyo, 443 SCRA 218 (19 November 2004). 418 SCRA 381 (11 December 2003). Supreme Court Resolution dated May 16, 1991 Re: Amendment to Circular No. 1-88, paragraph 2 of which reads thus: (2) Form and Service of petition A petition filed under Rule 45, or under Rule 65, or a motion for extension may be denied outright if it is not clearly legible, or there is no proof of service on the lower court, tribunal, or office concerned and on the adverse party in accordance with Section 3, 5 and I 0 of Rule 13, attached to the petition or motion for extension when filed. See Indoyon, Jr. vs. CA, 706 Phil. 200 (2013).

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200.Q. On appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, what will be the consequence if a government agency or its authorized representative failed to sign the Sworn Certification against Forum Shopping but it was signed by one of the lawyers of the OSG? 200.A. In the case of CSC vs. Almojuela (694 SCRA 441, 2 April 2013)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held that: Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for review that does not comply with the required certification against forum shopping is a ground for its dismissal. This certification must be executed by the petitioner, not by counsel. It is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been retained only for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification. It is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement under Section 4, Rule 45 and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition.276 201.Q. Is there any instance where the Supreme Court has given due course to the Appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari despite non-compliance with Section 4, Rule 45? Explain. 201.A. Yes. When the demands of substantial justice convinced the Supreme Court to apply the Rules liberally by way of compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement;277 the rule on certification against forum shopping, while obligatory, is not jurisdictional. Justifiable circumstances may intervene and be recognized, leading the Court to relax the application of this rule. 278In People of the Philippines vs. de Grano, et al.,279 for instance, the Supreme Court permitted the private prosecutor to sign the certification in behalf of his client who went into hiding after being taken out of the witness protection program. This is the case that the OSG invoked in the certification against forum shopping signed by Associate Solicitor Millan-Decano who stated in her footnote that pursuant to People vs. de Grano, et al., the handling lawyers of the OSG may sign verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. A reading of People of the Philippines vs. de Grano, et al., a decision from the Third Division of the Supreme Court, shows that it cannot be used to support the OSG‘s conclusion. De Grano affirms a long line of Supreme Court decisions where the Court allowed the liberal application of the rules on certification against forum shopping in the interest of substantial justice. But to merit the Court‘s consideration, the petitioner(s) must show reasonable basis for its/their failure to personally sign the certification. They must convince the Court that the petition‘s outright dismissal would defeat the administration of justice. One of the cases cited in Grano was City Warden of the Manila City Jail vs. Estrella, a case decided by the Second Division of this Court, which allowed the Solicitor General to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition before the CA or with this Court. The decision held that certification by the OSG constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules, considering that the OSG is the legal representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities. In Hon. Constantino-David, et. al. vs. Pangandaman-Gania,280 an En Banc decision, the Supreme Court clarified the application of City Warden of the Manila City Jail vs. Estrella,281 and held that this case does not give the OSG the license to sign the certification against forum shopping in behalf of government agencies at all times. The Supreme Court explained that the reason we authorized the Solicitor General to sign the certification against forum shopping is because it was then acting as a ‗People‘s Tribune,‘ an instance when the Solicitor takes a position adverse and contrary to the Government‘s because it is incumbent upon him to present to the Court what he considers would legally uphold government‘s best interest, although the position may run counter to a client's position; in this case, the Solicitor General appealed the trial court‘s order despite the City Warden‘s apparent acquiesance to it and in the process took a position contrary to the City Warden‘s. The rule is different when the OSG acts as a government agency‘s counsel of record. It is necessary for the petitioning government agency or its authorized representatives to certify against forum shopping, because they, and not the OSG, are in the best position to know if another case is pending before another

276

277 278

279 280 281

Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 30 (1 October 1998); Expertravel & Tours, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 459 SCRA 147 (26 May 2005). Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, 402 SCRA 449 (30 April 2003). People of the Philippines vs. de Grano et. al., 588 SCRA 550 (5 June 2009) citing Ateneo de Naga University vs. Manalo, 458 SCRA 325 (9 May 2005). 588 SCRA 550 (5 June 2009). 409 SCRA 80 (14 August 2003). 364 SCRA 257 (31 August 2001).

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court. The reason for this requirement was succinctly explained in Hon. Constantino-David, et al. vs. Pangandaman-Gania: The fact that the OSG under the 1987 Administrative Code is the only lawyer for a government agency wanting to file a petition or complaint does not automatically vest the OSG with the authority to execute in its name the certificate of non-forum shopping for a client office. In some instances, these government agencies have legal departments which inadvertently take legal matters requiring court representation into their own hands without the OSG‘s intervention. Consequently, the OSG would have no personal knowledge of the history of a particular case so as to adequately execute the certificate of non-forum shopping; and even if the OSG does have the relevant information, the courts on the other hand would have no way of ascertaining the accuracy of the OSG‘s assertion without precise references in the record of the case. Thus, unless equitable circumstances which are manifest from the record of a case prevail, it becomes necessary for the concerned government agency or its authorized representatives to certify for non-forum shopping if only to be sure that no other similar case or incident is pending before any other court. 202.Q. What are the justifications that would allow the OSG to sign the Sworn Certification of NonForum Shopping without the signature of the government agency‘s authorized representative? Explain. 202.A. There may be situations when the OSG would have difficulty in securing the signatures of government officials for the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. But these situations cannot serve as excuse for the OSG to wantonly undertake by itself the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. If the OSG is compelled by circumstances to verify and certify the pleading in behalf of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to inform the courts of its reasons for doing so, beyond simply citing cases where the Court allowed the OSG to sign the certification. In Hon. Constantino-David, et al. vs. Pangandaman-Gania, the Court dealt with this situation and enumerated the following requirements before the OSG can undertake a non-forum shopping certifications as counsel of record for a client agency: (a) allege under oath the circumstances that make signatures of the concerned officials impossible to obtain within the period for filing the initiatory pleading; (b) append to the petition or complaint such authentic document to prove that the partypetitioner or complainant authorized the filing of the petition or complaint and understood and adopted the allegations set forth therein, and an affirmation that no action or claim involving the same issues has been filed or commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency; and, (c) undertake to inform the court promptly and reasonably of any change in the stance of the client agency.282 Under these principles, the CSC‘s petition for review on certiorari before this Court is defective for failure to attach a proper certification against forum shopping. In the certificate, the associate solicitor merely stated that she has prepared and filed the petition in her capacity as the petition‘s handling lawyer, and citing People v. Grano, claimed that the OSG‘s handling lawyers are allowed to verify and sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. No explanation was given why the signatures of the CSC‘s authorized representatives could not be secured. 203.Q.

What is the general rule on appeal?

203.A. In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. De Guzman (744 SCRA 153, 8 December 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: As a general rule, an appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege, and as such, may only be availed in the manner provided by the law and the rules. Thus, a party who seeks to exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules; otherwise, the privilege is lost.283 Therefore, an appeal must be perfected within the reglementary period provided by law; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory. However, as in all cases, there are exceptions to the strict application of the rules in perfecting an appeal,284 such as when said appeal is meritorious.285 Verily, strict implementation of the rules on appeals must 282 283

284

409 SCRA 80 (14 August 2003). Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation vs. Icao (1 January 2014), citing BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Pryce Gases, Inc., 653 SCRA 42 (29 June 2011). TFS, Incorporated vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 618 SCRA 346 (19 April 2010).

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give way to the factual and legal reality that is evident from the records of the case. After all, the primary objective of the laws is to dispense justice and equity, not the contrary.286 APPEAL BY PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI IN LABOR CASES cases?

204.Q.

What is the approach that must be taken by the Supreme Court in a Rule 45 Petition in labor

204.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Barroga vs. Quezon Colleges of the North, et al. (G.R. No. 235572, 5 December 2018)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Philippine Pizza, Inc. vs. Porras, et al. (G.R. No. 230030, 29 August 2018)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court pronounced that:

2.

In a Rule 45 review, the Court examines the correctness of the CA Decision in contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits the review to questions of law. In ruling for legal correctness, the Court views the CA Decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari was presented to the CA. Hence, the Court has to examine the CA Decision from the prism of whether the CA correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC Decision.287Case law states that grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.288 205.Q.

When can there be grave abuse of discretion in labor cases?

205.A. In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, which refers to that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Thus, if the NLRC ruling has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss the petition.289 206.Q. In reviewing a labor case elevated to the CA, can the CA apply a minute resolution promulgated by the Supreme Court involving the same petitioner? Will the doctrine of stare decisis apply? 206.A. No. In Philippine Pizza, Inc. vs. Porras, et al., supra, the Supreme Court answered in the negative. It sustained the findings of the NLRC and reversed the CA, it was held that: The CA erroneously ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. In arriving at its Decision, the CA adopted the Court's minute resolution in Philippine Pizza, Inc., as it purportedly stemmed from a similar complaint for illegal dismissal filed by a delivery rider against PPI and CBMI. In the said case, the Court found CBMI to be a labor-only contractor and held PPI as the employer of the delivery rider. The CA's reliance on the Philippine Pizza, Inc.'s minute resolution is, however, misplaced. Case law instructs that although the Court's dismissal of a case via a minute resolution constitutes a disposition on the merits, the same could not be treated as a binding precedent to cases involving other persons who are not parties to the case, or another subject matter that may or may not have the same parties and issues.290 In other words, a minute resolution does not necessarily bind non-parties to the action even if it amounts to a final action on a case.291 In this case, records do not bear proof that respondents were also parties to the Philippine Pizza, Inc.'s case or that they participated or were involved therein. Moreover, there was no showing that the subject matters of the two (2) cases were in some way similar or related to one another, since the minute resolution in the case of Philippine Pizza, Inc. did not contain a complete statement of the facts, as well as a discussion of the applicable 285 286 287

288 289 290

291

See Commission on Appointments vs. Paler, 614 SCRA 127 (3 March 2010). Semblante vs. CA, 655 SCRA 444 (15 August 2011); See Quebral vs. Angbus Construction, Inc., 807 SCRA 176 (7 November 2016), citing Montoya vs. Transmed Manila Corporation, 613 Phil. 696 (2009). See Quebral vs. Angbus Construction, Inc., supra, citing Gadia vs. Sykes Asia, Inc., 752 Phil. 413 (2015). Quebral vs. Angbus Construction, Inc., supra. See Read-Rite Philippines, Inc. vs. Francisco (16 August 2017), citing Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 616 Phil. 387 (2009). See Read-Rite Philippines, Inc. vs. Francisco, supra, citing Alonso vs. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 426 Phil. 61 (2002).

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laws and jurisprudence that became the basis for the Court's minute resolution therein. In this light, the principle of stare decisis cannot be invoked to obtain a dismissal of the instant petition 207.Q.

What findings of the appellate court are conclusive with the Supreme Court under Rule 45?

207.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Bigler vs. People (785 SCRA 478, 2 March 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Krystle Realty Development Corporation vs. Alibin (733 SCRA 2, 13 August 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled:

In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.292 Where the factual findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals coincide, the same are binding on the Supreme Court. 293 (Nicolas vs. People, 790 SCRA 680, 20 April 2016.) Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, and in fact accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the record.294 Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,295 even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.296 (Bernales vs. Heirs of Julian Sambaan, supra.) Moreover, factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.297 (Angeles vs. Bucad, 730 SCRA 295, 21 July 2014; See also Philippine Science High School-Cagayan Valley Campus vs. Pirra Construction Enterprises, 803 SCRA 137, 14 September 2016; Jose vs. Novida, 728 SCRA 552, 2 July 2014; Nahas vs. Olarte, 724 SCRA 224, 2 June 2014; Apo Cement Corporation vs. Baptisma, 674 SCRA 162, 20 June 2012; Hipolito, Jr. vs. Cinco, 661 SCRA 311, 28 November 2011.) 208.Q. Is the decision of the Court of Appeals in labor cases elevated to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 conclusive? 208.A. In Abbott Laboratories Philippines vs. Alcaraz (723 SCRA 25, 22 April 2014)(En Banc)[PerlasBernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: While NLRC decisions are, by their nature, final and executory 298 and, hence, not subject to appellate review,299 the Court is not precluded from considering other questions of law aside from the CA‘s finding on the NLRC‘s grave abuse of discretion. While the focal point of analysis revolves on this issue, the Court may deal with ancillary issues – such as, in this case, the question of how a probationary employee is deemed to have been informed of the standards of his regularization – if only to determine if the concepts and principles of labor law were correctly applied or misapplied by the NLRC in its decision. In other words, the Court‘s analysis of the NLRC‘s interpretation of the environmental principles and concepts of labor law is not completely prohibited in – as it is complementary to – a Rule 45 review of labor cases.300 In Magsaysay Maritime Corp. vs. Cruz (792 SCRA 344, 6 June 2016), the Supreme Court was compelled to resolve the factual issues and examine the evidence on record in view of the opposing positions of the Labor Arbiter and the CA, on one hand, and the NLRC on the other.301 (See also Doehle-Philman Manning Agency, Inc. vs. Haro, 790 SCRA 41, 18 April 2016; Heirs of the Late Delfin Dela Cruz vs. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., 756 SCRA 141, 20 April 2015.) 292

293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301

Best Wear Garments vs. De Lemos, 687 SCRA 355 (5 December 2012); See also SamarMed Distribution vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 701 SCRA 148 (15 July 2013); Co vs. Vargas, 660 SCRA 451 (16 November 2011); National Union of Workers in the Hotel Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter vs. Court of Appeals (Former 8th Divs.), 591 Phil. 570 (2008). Soriamont Steamship Agencies, Inc. vs. Sprint Transport Services, Inc., 610 Phil. 291 (2009). Xentrex Motors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 258 (1998). Judge Español vs. Judge Mupas, 484 Phil. 636 (2004). Bascos, Jr. vs. Tagahanan, 579 SCRA 653 (18 February 2009). Sugar Regulatory Administration vs. Tormon, 686 SCRA 854 (4 December 2012). See Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended. See St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, 356 Phil. 811 (1998). Angeles vs. Bucad, 730 SCRA 295 (21 July 2014). Tagle vs. Anglo-Eastern Crew Management, Phils., Inc., 729 SCRA 677 (9 July 2014).

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209.Q. on appeal?

Can points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the lower court be raised

209.A.

No. In the following cases:

1. 2.

Roque vs. Aguado (720 SCRA 780, 7 April 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Bajaro (686 SCRA 39, 21 November 2012) (Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that:

Litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice. (Andres vs. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Incorporated, 768 SCRA 56, 24 August 2015; Bautista vs. Civil Service Commission, 625 SCRA 251, 22 July 2010.) Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule.302 210.Q.

What is the recognized rule in case the party failed to appeal the adverse judgment?

210.A. In Taganito Mining Corporation vs. CIR (726 SCRA 637, 18 June 2014)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: It is well-settled that a party who does not appeal from a judgment can no longer seek modification or reversal of the same.303 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (RULE 57) 211.Q.

Explain the concept of attachment as a provisional remedy.

211.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Northern Islands Co., Inc. vs. Garcia (753 SCRA 603, 18 March 2015)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], citing the case of Sps. Olib vs. Judge Pastora;304 Lim, Jr. vs. Lazaro (700 SCRA 547, 3 July 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled:

2.

Attachment is a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence apart from the main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant. Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified. Where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have been issued as an incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected. 212.Q.

What is the nature of an action when there is an application for attachment?

212.A. In Ligon vs. RTC, Branch 56, Makati (717 SCRA 373, 26 February 2014)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very 302 303

304

Krystle Realty Development Corporation vs. Alibin, 733 SCRA 1 (13 August 2014). Communities Cagayan, Inc. vs. Nanol, 685 SCRA 453 (14 November 2012); see Yano vs. Sanchez, 612 SCRA 347 (11 February 2010); and see also Loy, Jr. vs. San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (SMCEU-PTGWO), 605 SCRA 212 (24 November 2009). 266 Phil 762 (1990).

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dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner‘s debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.305 213.Q.

What is required in order to protect the interest of the attaching creditor?

213.A. A prior registration of an attachment lien creates a preference,306 such that when an attachment has been duly levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes the property subject to the said attachment.307 As provided under PD 1529, said registration operates as a form of constructive notice to all persons. 214.Q.

What is garnishment?

214.A. In the case of BPI vs. Lee (678 SCRA 171, 1 August 2012)(Third Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: Garnishment is a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation.308A writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution except that it emanates at the beginning, instead of at the termination, of a suit. It places the attached properties in custodia legis, obtaining pendente lite a lien until the judgment of the proper tribunal on the plaintiff‘s claim is established, when the lien becomes effective as of the date of the levy.309 case?

215.Q.

What is the effect if a Writ of Garnishment was served to a person who is not a party to the

215.A. Upon service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes a virtual party or forced intervenor to the case and the trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind the garnishee to comply with its orders and processes. In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. vs. Ramolete,310 the Supreme Court ruled: In order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to bind the person of the garnishee, it is not necessary that summons be served upon him. The garnishee need not be impleaded as a party to the case. All that is necessary for the trial court lawfully to bind the person of the garnishee or any person who has in his possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor is service upon him of the writ of garnishment. The Rules of Court themselves do not require that the garnishee be served with summons or impleaded in the case in order to make him liable. 216.Q.

What is the lifetime of an attachment lien?

216.A. In the case of Lim, Jr. vs. Lazaro (700 SCRA 547, 3 July 2013)(Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], it was held that: While the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.311 217.Q. Will the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and approved by the trial court, where the case is pending, be a ground to discharge the attachment? 217.A. No. In Lim vs. Lazaro supra, indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had already been approved by the RTC in its Amended Decision, the obligations thereunder have yet to be fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro‘s properties should have continued to subsist. 218.Q.

305 306 307 308 309 310 311

When can a court dissolve or discharge an attachment or garnishment?

Valdevieso vs. Damalerio, 492 Phil. 51 (2005). Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Monillas, 550 SCRA 251 (28 March 2008). See Joaquin vs. Avellano, 6 Phil. 551 (1906). National Power Corporation vs. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, 598 SCRA 326 (4 September 2009). Santos vs. Aquino, Jr., 205 SCRA 127 (13 January 1992). 203 SCRA 487 (13 November 1991). Chemphil Export & Import Corporation vs. CA, 251 SCRA 257 (12 December 1995), citing BF Homes, Incorporated vs. CA, 190 SCRA 262 (3 October 1990).

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218.A. In the case of BPI vs. Lee (678 SCRA 171, 1 August 2012)(Third Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Preliminary attachment or garnishment cannot be dissolved except on grounds specifically provided312 in the Revised Rules of Court, namely:313 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

the debtor has posted a counter-bond or has made the requisite cash deposit;314 the attachment was improperly or irregularly issued315as where there is no ground for attachment, or the affidavit and/or bond filed therefor are defective or insufficient; the attachment is excessive, but the discharge shall be limited to the excess;316 the property attachment is exempt from preliminary attachment; or the judgment is rendered against the attaching creditor.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (RULE 58) 219.Q.

What is preliminary injunction?

219.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Espiritu vs. Sazon (785 SCRA 454, 2 March 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Carpio-Morales vs. CA (6th Division)(774 SCRA 431, 10 November 2015) (En Banc)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. vs. Atlocom Wireless System, Inc. (760 SCRA 625, 30 June 2015)(En Banc)[Villarama, Jr., J.] Vinuya vs. Romulo (732 SCRA 595, 12 August 2014)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], the High Court held that:

3. 4.

A preliminary injunction is defined as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.317 It may be a prohibitory injunction, which requires a party to refrain from doing a particular act; or A mandatory injunction, which commands a party to perform a positive act to correct a wrong in the past.318 It is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action.319 Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction is defined under Section 1, Rule 58, while Section 3 of the same Rule enumerates the grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5 thereof, a TRO may be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under certain procedural parameters. 220.Q.

Can a property be taken with the issuance of an injunction? Explain.

220.A. No. In the case of Laus vs. Optimum Security Services, Inc. (783 SCRA 257, 3 February 2016) (First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The settled rule that injunctive reliefs are not granted for the purpose of taking the property, the legal title to which is in dispute, out of the possession of one person and putting it into the hands of another before the right of ownership is determined. The reason for this doctrine is that before the issue of ownership is determined in light of the evidence presented, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in their status quo so that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other. 221.Q. Once the preliminary injunction is granted, would this mean that it is also the ponencia of the case? Explain.

312 313 314 315 316 317 318

319

Santos vs. Aquino, Jr., 205 SCRA 127 (13 January 1992). Florenz Regalado, I Remedial Law Compendium 695-696 (2005). Sec. 12, Rule 57, Rules of Court. Sec. 13, Rule 57, Rules of Court. Sec. 13, Rule 57, Rules of Court. Urbanes, Jr. vs.Court of Appeals, 407 Phil. 856 (2001). Sy vs. Autobus Transport Systems, Inc., 686 SCRA 707 (3 December 2012), citing City Government of Butuan vs. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., 651 Phil. 37 (2010). The Incorporators of Mindanao Institute, Inc. vs. The United Church of Christ in the Philippines, 668 SCRA637 (21 March 2012).

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221.A. No. In Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals (691 SCRA 167, 19 February 2013)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.], it was held that: A preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are passed upon. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.320 On the other hand, ponencia refers to the rendition of a decision in a case on the merits, which disposes of the main controversy. It is settled that as an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. 222.Q. In applying for a writ of preliminary injunction, what is incumbent upon the applicant to prove to the court for its issuance? 222.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2. 3.

LLDA vs. COA (G.R. No. 211341, 27 November 2018)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.] Cayabyab vs. Dimson (830 SCRA 520, 10 July 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Consular Area Residents Association, Inc. vs. Casanova (789 SCRA 209, 12 April 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe J.] Almadovar vs. Pulido-Tan (775 SCRA 63, 16 November 2015)(En Banc)[Mendoza, J.] Tom vs. Rodriguez (761 SCRA 679, 6 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Alangdeo vs. Do Mogan (761 SCRA 272, 1 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Province of Cagayan vs. Lara (702 SCRA 183, 24 July 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. vs. Atlocom Wireless System, Inc., supra., the High Court ruled that:

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

The following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction will issue: (1) (2) (3) (4)

The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is, a right in esse; There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant;321 and No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.322

The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction is discretionary upon the trial court because the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination. For this reason, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be disturbed unless it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.323 A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete evidence as the plaintiff is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. As such, the evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give the trial court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case. 324 223.Q.

What does the right to be protected by injunction mean?

223.A. It means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.325 An injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.326 A writ of preliminary injunction being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy, it must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. In the

320 321 322

323 324 325 326

Mabayo Farms, Inc. vs. CA and Antonio Santos, 435 Phil. 112 (2002). Pacsports Phils., Inc. vs. Niccolo Sports, Inc., 421 Phil. 1019 (2001); Sy vs. Autobus Transport Systems, Inc., supra. The Incorporators of Mindanao Institute, Inc. vs. The United Church of Christ in the Philippines, 668 SCRA637 (21 March 2012); St. James College of Parañaque vs. Equitable PCI Bank, 627 SCRA 328 (9 August 2010); Aldover vs. Court of Appeals, 706 SCRA 188, 23 September 2013. Sy vs. Autobus Transport Systems, Inc., supra. Nowcio vs. Lim, Jr. (23 March 2015). City Government of Butuan vs. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., 651 Phil. 37 (2010). Thunder Security and Investigation Agency/Lasala vs. NFA (Region I), et al., 670 Phil. 351 (2011).

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absence of the same, and where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.327 224.Q.

What is the proper criterion for the issuance of preliminary injunction?

224.A. In Special Audit Team, COA vs. CA (696 SCRA 166, 11 April 2013)(En Banc)[Sereno, CJ.], it was held that: A preliminary injunction is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. 328 Factually, there must exist a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. 329 As the Supreme Court has previously ruled, while the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear. Lacking a clear legal right,330 the provisional remedy should not have been issued, all the more because the factual support for issuing the writ had not been established. In giving injunctive relief, courts cannot reverse the burden of proof, for to do so would assume the proposition which the petitioner is inceptively duty bound to prove.331 This concern is not a mere technicality, but lies at the heart of procedural law, for every case before a court of law requires a cause of action.332 225.Q.

What is the extent of liability of an injunction bond?

225.A. In Centennial Guarantee Assurance Corporation vs. Universal Motors Corporation (737 SCRA 654, 8 October 2014)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of Paramount Insurance Corp. vs. CA,333 it was held that: Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules provides that the injunction bond is answerable for all damages that may be occasioned by the improper issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The bond insures with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain no ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be dissolved. Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to account to the defendant in the injunction suit for all: (1)such damages; (2) costs and damages; (3) costs, damages and reasonable attorney‘s fees as shall be incurred or sustained by the person enjoined in case it is determined that the injunction was wrongfully issued. 226.Q.

When can the court grant the application for injunction or TRO?

226.A. An application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing of a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded. Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued immediately. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard. 227.Q.

What are the parameters in the issuance of an Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)?

227.A. In the case of Rodriguez vs. Noel, Jr. (A.M. No. RTJ-18-2525, 25 June 2018)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Based on Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the parameters are as follows: (1) (2) (3) (4)

327

328 329 330 331 332 333

it is issued only in matters of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury; it shall be effective for only 72 hours counted from its issuance; within this original 72-hour period, the issuing judge must conduct a summary hearing to determine the propriety of extending the TRO; and in no case shall the total period of the TRO which shall include the original 72 hours exceed twenty (20) days.

Overseas Workers Welfare Administration vs. Chavez, 551 Phil. 890 (2007), citing Tayag vs. Lacson, 426 SCRA282 (25 March 2004). Power Sites and Signs, Inc. vs. United Neon, 605 SCRA 196 (24 November 2009). National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Vera, 252 Phil. 747 (1989). Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 384 (10 July 1992). Government Service Insurance System vs. Hon. Florendo, 258 Phil. 694 (1989). Republic vs. Hon. De Los Angeles, 148-B Phil. 902 (1971). 369 Phil. 641 (1999).

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Within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provided herein. Thus, the issuance of the Ex-parte 72 hours TRO upon compliance with the parameters above, shall be included in the computation of the twenty (20) day period. The same cannot be extended. After the lapsed of the twenty (20) days period and no injunction has been issued, the TRO becomes functus officio. 228.Q.

What is the liability of a judge if he issued a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) without a period?

228.A. In Boston Finance and Investment Corporation vs. Gonzalez (A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520, 9 October 2018)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: In issuing an indefinite cease and desist order, respondent clearly failed to observe the rules and restrictions regarding the issuance of a TRO, which are basic tenets of procedure, and hence, renders him administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. Case law states that when a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. 334 It is of no moment that he was motivated by good faith or acted without malice, as these affect his competency and conduct as a judge in the discharge of his official functions. According to jurisprudence, gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. 335 EXCEPTIONS TO THE TWENTY (20) DAY TRO ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT 229.Q. Under Section 5, Rule 58, the lifetime of a TRO issued by the RTC is 20 days. If no injunction is issued after the lapsed of the 20-day period, it becomes functus officio. Is there any exception? 229.A. Yes. In the case of Garcia vs. Drilon (699 SCRA 352, 25 June 2013)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: In case of violation of R.A. No. 9262, the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) which is effective for 30 days can be extended by the designated Family Court of the RTC for another 30 days each time until final judgment is rendered. Thus, to obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. 230.Q. Can the Court of Appeals issue a TRO against a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) issued by the RTC designated as a Family Court? Explain. 230.A. No. Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, a 60-day TRO cannot be issued by the appellate court. It is proscribed, because it will effectively hinder the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner. As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,336 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,337 should not be enjoined. 231.Q. In the opposition of the respondent in violation of R.A. No. 9262 case, he alleged that the law is unconstitutional. Will that entitle him to an injunctive relief? Explain. 231.A. No. The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.338 In Younger vs. Harris, Jr.,339 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus: Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and,

334 335 336 337 338 339

Conquilla vs. Bernardo, 657 Phil. 289, 299 (2011). De los Santos-Reyes vs. Montesa, Jr., 317 Phil. 101 (1995). Secs. 22 and 31, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. Sec. 26 (b), A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. Sto. Domingo vs. De Los Angeles, 185 Phil. 94 (1980). 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), cited in The Executive Secretary vs. Court of Appeals, 473 Phil. 27 (2004).

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hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC. 232.Q.

What is the ground for the dissolution of preliminary injunction?

232.A. In Liberty Broadcasting Network Inc. vs. Atlocom Wireless System, Inc., supra, a preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court on condition that he will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. Two (2) conditions must concur: First, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer; Second, the defendant files a counter bond.340 233.Q.

What is the effect of a recall of Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) issued by the Supreme Court?

233.A. In the case of City of Davao vs. Olanolan (822 SCRA 481, 17 April 2017)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], citing the case of Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez,341 it was held that: The recall of the SQAO is effectively dissolution of the said issuance. An order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective, even though it is not final. A dismissal, discontinuance, or non suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution. Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. There must be a new exercise of judicial power. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES (RULE 63) 234.Q. What are the requisites for an action of Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to prosper? 234.A. In Republic vs. Roque (706 SCRA 273, 24 September 2013)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that: The requisites are as follows: First, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; Second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; Third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question; Fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ―ripening seeds‖ of one between persons whose interests are adverse; Fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and Sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.342 235.Q.

In a Petition for Declaratory Relief, is there an actual judicial controversy?

235.A. None. In the case of Department of Transportation (DOTR), et al. vs. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association (G.R. No. 230107, 24 July 2018)(En Banc)[Velasco, J.], it was held that: One of the requisites for an action for declaratory relief is that, it must be filed before any breach or violation of an obligation as provided in Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, in the en banc decision in the case of the Department of Transportation (DOTR), et al. vs. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association supra, a case which concerns the constitutionality of establishing the "Oil Pollution Management Fund," under Section 22(a) of

340 341 342

Sps. Yap vs. International Exchange Bank, 573 Phil. 515 (2008). 291 Phil. 664 (1993). Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., 566 Phil. 458 (2008).

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Republic Act No. 9483343 and Section 1, Rule of its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), by imposing "ten centavos (10c) per liter for every delivery or transshipment of oil made by tanker barges and tanker haulers, the Supreme Court held that: There is no actual case involved in a Petition for Declaratory Relief. It cannot, therefore, be the proper vehicle to invoke the judicial review powers to declare a statute unconstitutional. It is elementary that before this Court can rule on a constitutional issue, there must first be a justiciable controversy. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.344 As emphasized in Angara vs. Electoral Commission,345 any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. 236.Q. issuances?

What is the proper remedy to question the constitutionality of a law like R.A. No. 9483 and its

236.A. In the Department of Transportation (DOTR), et al. vs. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association supra, the high court said: To question the constitutionality of the subject issuances, the parties should have invoked the expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The adverted section defines judicial power as the power not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. There is a grave abuse of discretion when there is patent violation of the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence. On this score, it has been ruled that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo, and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.346 Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution. In DOTR case, while the petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy, the Supreme Court treated the petition as Certiorari and Prohibition in order to finally resolve the issues involved in the case that far outweighs the rigid application of the rules. 237.Q.

Does the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief?

237.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

SJS Officers vs. Lim (742 SCRA 1, 25 November 2014)(En Banc)[Perez, J.] Galicto vs. Aquino III (667 SCRA 150, 28 February 2012)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held that:

The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.347 238.Q. Prohibition?

When can the Supreme Court treat a Petition for Declaratory Relief as that of a Petition for

238.A. It will be treated as one for prohibition, provided that the case has far-reaching implications and transcendental issues that need to be resolved.348 In the case of Jaworski vs. PAGCOR,349 the Supreme Court

343

344 345 346

347

An Act Providing for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1992 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes. Board of Optometry vs. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 (30 July 1996), cited in Velarde vs. Social Justice Society (28 April 2004). 63 Phil. 139 (1936). See Ifurung vs. Carpio-Morales (24 April 2018), citing Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan vs. Quezon City (8 August 2014). Citing Tano vs. Hon. Gov. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670 (1997); Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236 (1 July 1993).

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ratiocinated: Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC AND COA (RULE 64 IN RELATION TO RULE 65) 239.Q.

What is the legal basis of a Certiorari Petition under Rule 64?

239.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Bintudan vs. COA (821 SCRA 211, 21 March 2017)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.] City Government of General Santos City vs. COA (723 SCRA 77, 22 April 2014)(En Banc) [Leonen, J.] Fontanilla vs. COA (794 SCRA 213, 21 June 2016)(En Banc)(Brion, J.] Causing vs. COMELEC (734 SCRA 495, 9 September 2014)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.] Reblora vs. AFP (698 SCRA 727, 18 June 2013)(En Banc)[Perez, J.](Rule 45 was used instead of Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65), it was held that:

3. 4. 5.

Section 7, Art. IX in relation to Article IX-C and D of the 1987 Constitution governs the review of the COMELEC (En Banc) and COA decisions, final orders or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari as well as by the COMELEC en banc, by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. To differentiate this review from the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the Court incorporated a new rule (Rule 64) in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court under the title Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit. Except for the period for bringing the petition for review, Rule 64 is a replication of the provisions of Rule 65 on the special civil action for certiorari. COMELEC CASES REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT VIA RULE 64 IN RELATION TO RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROBLEM: Petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa was the losing candidate for Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose Occidental Mindoro in the 2013 Elections. Respondent Romulo De Mesa Festin emerged as winner with a margin of 1,204 votes. Petitioner filed an election protest against the respondent alleging irregularities attending the conduct of the elections. Specifically, petitioner brought to the attention of the court the complaints of various voters who claimed that several ballots were pre-marked or that the ovals appearing on the face of the ballots corresponding to the name of petitioner were embossed or waxed to prevent them from being shaded. As a consequence of the alleged massive electoral fraud and irregularities in the 92 clustered precincts of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Villarosa claimed that Festin was illegally proclaimed. After the revision, the RTC, Branch 46 of Occidental Mindoro, proclaimed petitioner Villarosa as the real winner. It further granted the Motion for Execution of the petitioner pending appeal. Respondent went to the COMELEC. The First Division issued a TRO and eventually the newly constituted Special First Division issued an Injunction enjoining the RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro from enforcing its decision. The petitioner questioned the legality of the formation of the Special First Division and the validity of its order. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc, the petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion. 240.Q.

Is the petitioner correct? Explain.

240.A. No. In the case of Villarosa vs. Festin (732 SCRA 110, 5 August 2014)(En Banc)[Velasco, J.], it was held that: Petitioner‘s recourse, aside from being unsound in substance, is procedurally infirm. The governing 348

349

Aquino vs. COMELEC, 617 SCRA 623 (7 April 2010), citing Del Mar vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 400 Phil. 307 (2000) and Fortich vs. Corona, 352 Phil. 461 (1998). Sen. Jaworski vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 464 Phil. 375 (2004).

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provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. In the instructive case of Ambil vs. Commission on Elections,350 the Supreme Court have interpreted the provision to limit the remedy of certiorari against final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasijudicial powers. Certiorari will not generally lie against an order, ruling, or decision of a COMELEC division for being premature, taking into account the availability of the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a motion for reconsideration. As elucidated in the case: Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. The above doctrine further gained force when it was reiterated in the recent ruling in Cagas vs. COMELEC,351 in which the Supreme Court held that a party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an election protest may not directly assail the said order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course. 241.Q. What are the decisions, orders, or rulings of the Constitutional Commissions that may be brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari? 241.A. In Querubin vs. COMELEC (776 SCRA 715, 8 December 2015)(En Banc)[Velasco, Jr. J.], it was held that: It only relates to those rendered in the commissions' exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.352 In the case of the COMELEC, this would limit the provision's coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its authority to be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of elective offices. 353 Consequently, Rule 64, which complemented the procedural requirement under Article IX-A, Section 7, should likewise be read in the same sense—that of excluding from its coverage decisions, rulings, and orders rendered by the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions. In such instances, a Rule 65 petition for certiorari is the proper remedy. 242.Q. of a case?

In case a party availed the wrong mode of remedy, can the Supreme Court take cognizance

242.A. Yes. In GMA Network, Inc. vs. COMELEC (734 SCRA 88, 2 September 2014)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.](political ad ban), the Supreme Court in considering the very important and pivotal issues raised, and the limited time, such technicality should not deter the Court from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance. This Supreme Court has in the past seen fit to step in and resolve petitions despite their being the subject of an improper remedy, in view of the public importance of the issues raised therein.354 243.Q. Can the initial findings of the COMELEC that Smartmatic is eligible to participate in the bidding process for the procurement of 23,000 units of optical mark readers be subjected to a Rule 64 Petition? 243.A. No. The case does not stem from an election controversy involving the election, qualification, or the returns of an elective office. Rather, it pertains to the propriety of the polling commission's conduct of the procurement process, and its initial finding that Smartmatic JV is eligible to participate therein. It springs from the COMELEC's compliance with the Constitutional directive to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Specifically, it arose from the electoral commission's exercise of Sec. 12 of RA 8436, otherwise known as the Automated Elections Law, as amended by RA 9369, which authorized the COMELEC to procure, in accordance with existing laws, by purchase, lease, rent or other forms of acquisition, supplies, equipment, materials, software, facilities, and other services, from local or foreign sources free from taxes and import duties, subject to accounting and auditing rules and 350 351 352 353 354

344 SCRA 358 (25 October 2000). 663 SCRA 644 (24 January 2012). Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99 (17 July 1996). Bedol vs. Comelec, 606 SCRA 554 (3 December 2009). Dela Llana vs. Chairperson, Commission on Audit, 665 SCRA 176 (7 February 2012).

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regulation. The subject matter of Smartmatic JV's protest, therefore, does not qualify as one necessitating the COMELEC's exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that could properly be the subject of a Rule 64 petition, but is, in fact, administrative in nature. Petitioners should then have sought redress via a petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the COMELEC en banc's June 29, 2015 Decision granting the protest. As a caveat, however, the writ will only lie upon showing that the COMELEC acted capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Decision, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.355 Mere abuse of discretion will not suffice. It goes without saying that petitioners' action, having been lodged through an improper petition, is susceptible to outright dismissal. As the Court held in Pates vs. COMELEC,356 a Rule 64 petition cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. 357 The clear distinction between the instant, petition and Pates, however, is that in Pates, therein petitioner failed to present an exceptional circumstance or any compelling reason that would have warranted the liberal application of the Rules of Court. In stark contrast, herein petitioners, as will later on be discussed, were able to establish a meritorious case for the relaxation of the rules, relieving them from the rigid application of procedural requirements. We therefore treat the instant recourse as one filed not merely in relation to, but under Rule 65. 244.Q.

Is Rule 64 the exclusive remedy for all COMELEC‘s acts?

244.A. No. In Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC (747 SCRA 1, 21 January 2015)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.], it was held that: Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction.358 As a special civil action, there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 245.Q. When can the Supreme Court intervene in the appreciation of evidence by the COMELEC under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65? Explain. 245.A. In Dano vs. COMELEC (802 SCRA 446, 13 September 2016)(En Banc)[Sereno, CJ.], the Supreme Court, in ruling that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner had failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials, it cited the case of Mitra vs. COMELEC,359 thus: This Court explained that the appreciation and evaluation of evidence by COMELEC is not ordinarily reviewed in a petition for certiorari. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, this Court is not only obliged, but constitutionally mandated to intervene.360 This case is one such instance in which this Court has to intervene. Here, instead of evaluating the probative value of the evidence presented by petitioner, COMELEC abruptly concluded that she had failed to reestablish her domicile in Sevilla, simply because she was admittedly absent from the municipality for four months. We remind the commission that the summary nature of proceedings under Section 78 only allows it to rule on patent material misrepresentations of facts, not to make conclusions of law that are even contrary to jurisprudence.

355 356 357

358 359 360

Duco vs. Comelec, 596 SCRA 572 (19 August 2009). 591 SCRA 481 (30 June 2009). Pates vs. Comelec, supra. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two - i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to - is Section 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides). See Macabago vs. Commission on Elections, 440 Phil. 683 (2002)[Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc]. 636 Phil. 753 (2010). Citing Section 1, par. 2, Article VIII of the Constitution.

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Physical presence, along with animus manendi et revertendi, is an essential requirement for the acquisition of a domicile of choice.361 However, the law does not require that physical presence be unbroken. In Japzon vs. COMELEC,362 this Court ruled that to be considered a resident of a municipality, the candidate is not required to stay and never leave the place for a full one-year period prior to the date of the election. In Sabili vs. COMELEC,363 this Court reiterated that the law does not require a candidate to be at home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement. 246.Q. Party List?

Was there grave abuse of discretion if the COMELEC cancelled the accreditation/nomination of a

246.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Aliance (A-IPRA) vs. COMELEC (696 SCRA 563, 16 April 2013)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.] Alcantara vs. COMELEC (696 SCRA 547, 16 April 2013)(En Banc)[Brion, J.] Alliance of Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) vs. COMELEC (705 SCRA 340, 10 September 2013)(En Banc)[Perez, J.], the High Court ruled that:

2. 3.

There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. It is within its jurisdiction. Thus, in the 2013 case of Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Aliance (A-IPRA) vs. COMELEC, citing the case of Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections.364 It was held that: We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision. The determination of who is the rightful representative of a political party or the legitimate nominee of a party-list group lies with the COMELEC, as part and parcel of its constitutional task of registering political parties, organizations and coalitions under Section 2(5), Article IX(C) of the 1987 Constitution. In Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. COMELEC,365 it was held that the COMELEC correctly ruled that the ascertainment of the identity of a political party and its legitimate officers is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. 247.Q. What is the standard of review if a petitioner went to the Supreme Court via Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? 247.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2. 3. 4.

Albania vs. COMELEC (826 SCRA 191, 6 June 2017)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.] Maturan vs. COMELEC (821 SCRA 587, 28 March 2017)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.] Aquino vs. COMELEC (753 SCRA 214, 17 March 2015)(En Banc)[Brion, J.] Naval vs. COMELEC (729 SCRA 299, 8 July 2014)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.], the High Court ruled that:

As a Rule 64 petition (viewed from a Rule 65 approach), the Court's standard of review is grave abuse of discretion or such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of

361 362 363 364 365

See Limbona vs. Comelec, 578 Phil. 364 (2008); Domino vs. Comelec, 369 Phil. 798 (1999). 596 Phil. 354 (2009). 686 Phil. 649 (2012). G.R. No. 204125 (2 April 2013). 468 Phil. 70 (2004).

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passion and hostility.366 A lower court or tribunal's violation of the Constitution, law or existing jurisprudence 367 or their use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint their action with grave abuse of discretion.368 248.Q. remedy?

In case of adverse decision of an election protest filed with the MTC, what is the proper

248.A. In the case of Barangay Chairman Herbert O. Chua vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 236573, 14 August 2018)(En Banc)[Reyes, Jr., J.], it was held that: Appeals from decisions of the MeTC in election protest cases are classified as ordinary actions under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. As such, decisions or resolutions pertaining to the same shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from promulgation. The concerned party, however, may file a petition for certiorari with this Court to interrupt the period and challenge the ruling on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 249.Q. What is the remedy of an aggrieved party from the adverse resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in an election protest case? 249.A. In Angelia vs. Commission on Elections,369 the Court stressed that the resolution of Comelec En Banc is not subject to reconsideration and, therefore, any party who disagreed with it had only one recourse, and that is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Even supposing that a motion for reconsideration was filed, the concerned party need not wait for the resolution of the same and may nonetheless proceed to file a petition for certiorari with this Court within the reglementary period. Thus, in Angelia, the Court further elaborated, viz: As the case before the COMELEC did not involve an election offense, reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution was not possible and petitioner had no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For him to wait until the COMELEC denied his motion would be to allow the reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari with this Court to run and expire.28 COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) 250.Q. What is the nature of a Certiorari Petition under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure against the decision of the COA? Explain. 250.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

LLDA vs. COA (G.R. No. 211341, 27 November 2018)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.] Sevilla vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 227797, 13 November 2018)(En Banc)[Carpio, J.], the High Court ruled that:

A petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues. Indeed, the office of a petition for certiorari is not to correct simple errors of judgment.370 Grave abuse of discretion arises when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, such as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. It occurs when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence. 371 It is a well-established principle that, in a special civil action for certiorari, petitioner has the burden of proving not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent issuing the impugned order, decision, or resolution.372 An aggrieved party can assail the Decision of the COA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, as ruled in the case of Maritime Industry Authority vs. Commission on Audit:373A petition under Rule 64 may prosper only after a finding that the administrative agency committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Not all errors of the Commission on Audit is reviewable by this court. Thus, a Rule 65 petition is a unique and special rule because it commands limited review of the question raised. As 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373

Mendoza vs. COMELEC, et. al., 618 Phil. 706 (2009); Varias vs. Commission on Elections, 612 SCRA 386 (11 February 2010). Fernandez vs. COMELEC, 535 Phil. 122 (2006). Varias vs. Commission on Elections, supra. 388 Phil. 560 (2000). Juan vs. Commission on Elections, 550 Phil. 294 (2007). Albania vs. Commission on Elections, 826 SCRA 191 (6 June 2017). Maturan vs. Commission on Elections, 821 SCRA 587 (28 March 2017). 750 Phil. 288 (2015).

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an extraordinary remedy, its purpose is simply to keep the public respondent within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to relieve the petitioner from the public respondent's arbitrary acts. In this review, the Court is confined solely to questions of jurisdiction whenever a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function acts without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 251.Q. What is the constant ruling of the Supreme Court as regards to the findings of an administrative tribunal like the COA or COMELEC? Explain. 251.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Philippine Health Insurance Corporation vs. COA (G.R. No. 222710, 24 July 2018)(En Banc) [Tijam, J.] Caballero vs. COMELEC (771 SCRA 213, 22 September 2015)(En Banc) [Peralta, J.] Maritime Industry Authority vs. COA (745 SCRA 300, 13 January 2015)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.] BCDA vs. Pulido Tan (743 SCRA 441, 2 December 2014)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.] Delos Santos vs. COA (703 SCRA 501, 13 August 2013)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was ruled that:

2. 3. 4. 5.

The Supreme Court has consistently held that findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded not only respect but also finality, unless found to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The same was aptly discussed in the case of Maritime,374 citing City of General Santos vs. Commission on Audit,375 to wit: It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws that they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. 252.Q. Should the COA‘s interpretation of its own auditing rules and regulations be given great weight by the Supreme Court in deciding cases related thereto? 252.A. Yes. It should be accorded great weight and respect, as expounded in Espinas, et al. vs. COA,376 thus: The CoA's audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check-andbalance system inherent in our system of government.15 As an essential complement, the CoA has been vested with the exclusive authority to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. This is found in Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Thus, in the case of Montejo vs. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 232272, 24 July 2018)(En Banc), Mr. Justice Peralta expounded: As an independent constitutional body conferred with such power, it reasonably follows that the CoA's interpretation of its own auditing rules and regulations, as enunciated in its decisions, should be accorded great weight and respect. In the recent case of Delos Santos vs. CoA,377 the Court explained the general policy of the Court towards CoA decisions reviewed under certiorari parameters: The CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

374 375 376 377

750 Phil. 288 (2015). 733 Phil. 687 (2014). 731 Phil. 67 (2014). 716 Phil. 322 (2013).

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It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. The concept is well-entrenched: grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism. Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as grave must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.378 253.Q. What should be the proper disposition of cases involving the disallowance of salaries, emoluments, benefits, and allowances due to government employees? 253.A. Jurisprudences379 have settled that recipients or payees in good faith need not refund these disallowed amounts.380 For as long as there is no showing of ill intent and the disbursement was made in good faith, public officers and employees who receive subsequently disallowed benefits or allowances may keep the amounts disbursed to them.381 254.Q. employees?

What is the proper remedy in administrative disciplinary cases decided by the COA against its

254.A. Appeal to the Civil Service Commission pursuant to the provision of the 1987 Administrative Code is the proper remedy and not a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.382 Rule 64 governs the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections. It refers to Rule 65 for the mode of review of the judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections. A petition filed under Rule 65 requires that the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by this Constitution, or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. The Administrative Code of 1987 is the law that provided for the Civil Service Commission's appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases. 255.Q. What is the legal basis of the thirty (30)-day period for filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? Explain.

378

379

380

381

382

Dimapilis-Baldoz vs. COA, 714 Phil. 171 (2013); Ramiscal vs. Sandiganbayan, 842 SCRA 317 (10 October 2017)(En Banc)[Jardeleza, J.]. Development Academy of the Philippines vs. Pulido-Tan, et al., 806 SCRA 362 (18 October 2016), citing Mendoza vs. Commission on Audit, 717 Phil. 491 (2013)[Per J. Leonen, En Banc]; Magno vs. Commission on Audit, 558 Phil. 76 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc]; Singson vs. Commission on Audit, 641 Phil. 154 (2010)[Per J. Peralta, En Banc]; Lumayna vs. Commission on Audit, 616 Phil. 928 (2009)[Per J. del Castillo, En Banc]; Barbo vs. Commission on Audit, 589 Phil. 289 (2008) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc]; Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance System vs. Commission on Audit, et al., 480 Phil. 861 (2004)[Per J. Tinga, En Banc]; Veloso vs. Commission on Audit, 672 Phil. 419 (2011)[Per J. Peralta, En Banc]; Abanilla vs. Commission on Audit, 505 Phil. 202 (2005)[Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]; Home Development Mutual Fund vs. Commission on Audit, 483 Phil. 666 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]; Public Estates Authority vs. Commission on Audit, 541 Phil. 412 (2007)[Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]; Bases Conversion and Development Authority vs. Commission on Audit, 599 Phil. 455 (2009)[Per J. Carpio, En Banc]; Benguet State University vs. Commission on Audit, supra [Per J. Nachura, En Banc]; Agra vs. Commission on Audit, 661 Phil. 563 (2011)[Per J. LeonardoDe Castro, En Banc]; and Blaquera vs. Commission on Audit, 356 Phil. 678 (1998)[Fer J. Purisima, En Banc]. Citing Manila International Airport Authority vs. Commission on Audit, 681 Phil. 644 (2012)[Per J. Reyes, En Banc]; Benguet State University vs. Commission on Audit, supra note 13 [Per J. Nachura, En Banc]. Citing Brion, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Technical Education and Skills Development Authority vs. Commission on Audit, 729 Phil. 60 (2014)[Per J. Carpio, En Banc]. See Cadena vs. Civil Service Commission, 679 Phil. 165 (2012).

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255.A. In the case of The Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs. COA (745 SCRA 269, 13 January 2015)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.], it was held that: This rule is based on Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has a reglementary period of 60 days from receipt of denial of the motion for reconsideration. The Constitution, however, specifies that the reglementary period for assailing the decisions, orders, or rulings of the constitutional commissions is thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision, order, or ruling. For this reason, a separate rule was enacted in the Rules of Court. Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the guidelines for filing a petition for certiorari under this rule. Section 2 of the rule specifies that a judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided. The phrase, except as hereinafter provided, specifies that any petition for certiorari filed under this rule follows the same requisites as those of Rule 65 except for certain provisions found only in Rule 64. One of these provisions concerns the time given to file the petition which is 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. 256.Q. Procedure?

What is the difference between a Rule 64 and Rule 65 Petition under the 1997 Rules of Civil

256.A. The difference between Rule 64 and Rule 65 has already been exhaustively discussed by the Supreme Court in Pates vs. Commission on Elections:383 Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two – i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to – is Section 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides). 257.Q. What must be observed in availing the extraordinary remedy of Certiorari under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? 257.A. Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe the rules laid down by law.384 To reiterate, a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 must be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. If a motion for reconsideration is filed and eventually denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. PROBLEM: In a case, the petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration or the motion for new trial.16 258.Q. Is the fresh period rule applied under Rule 42 also applicable in a Certiorari Petition under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? Explain. 258.A.

No. In the following cases:

1.

Fortune Life Insurance Company Inc. vs. (COA) Proper (845 SCRA 599, 21 November 2017)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.] Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. vs. COA Proper, 748 SCRA 286, 27 January 2015) [Bersamin, J.], it was held that:

2.

383 384

609 Phil. 260 (2009) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]. Macapanton B. Batugan vs. Hon. Rasad G. Balindong, 600 Phil. 518 (2009).

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The petitioner‘s position cannot be sustained. There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule 64. The Fresh Period Rule applies only to appeals in civil and criminal cases, and in special proceedings filed under Rule 40, Rule 41, Rule 42, Rule 43, Rule 45,385 and Rule 122.386 Under Rule 64, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial. In this case, petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late. In the case of Pates vs. Commission on Elections,387 it was held that: the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper. 259.Q. What is the consequence of failure to comply with the requirements of Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping in accordance with Section 5 in relation to Section 3, Rule 64? 259.A. In Buisan, et al. vs. COA (816 SCRA 346, 31 January 2017)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.], the High Court ruled that: Section 5 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court requires, among others, that in a petition for review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of COA, the petition should be verified and contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the fourth paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. The failure of the petitioner to comply any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. In the case of Buisan, et al. the certification against forum shopping was signed by Montawal, the mayor of the Municipality of Montawal, Maguindanao. Her bare statement that she was the petitioners' duly constituted attorney-in-fact in filing the petition before the COA can hardly constitute as compliance with the rules. She did not even append a Special Power of Attorney executed by the affected landowners. Montawal's legal capacity to sue on behalf of the petitioners is questionable, considering that her authority to represent the claimants was even assailed by the petitioners, when they filed with the COA a Motion to Dismiss the Petition filed therein by Montawal. In the case of natural persons, the rule requires the parties themselves to sign the certification against forum shopping. The reason for such requirement is that the petitioner himself knows better than anyone else whether a separate case has been filed or pending which involves substantially the same issues.388 In Buisan, et al. the certification against forum shopping in the filing of this petition was neither signed by the petitioners nor their counsel, but by the mayor of their town who is not even one of the petitioners in this case. Evidently, the petitioners failed to comply with the certification against forum shopping requirement absent any compelling reason as to warrant an exception based on the circumstances of the case. 389 260.Q. What is the established rule on the findings of fact by a quasi-judicial agency of the government, like the COMELEC, if it reached the Supreme Court? Explain. 260.A. In Jalover vs. Osmeña (736 SCRA 267, 23 September 2014)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held that: Under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. In light of the limited authority of the Supreme Court to review findings of fact, it do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation 385 386 387 388 389

Panolino vs. Tajala, 622 SCRA 209 (29 June 2010). Yu vs. Tatad, 642 SCRA 421 (9 February 2011). Pates vs. Commission on Elections, 591 SCRA 481 (30 June 2009). Fuentebella vs. Castro, 526 Phil. 668 (2006). Altres, et al. vs. Empleo, et al., 594 Phil. 246 (2008).

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of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Supreme Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction. CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, AND MANDAMUS (RULE 65) SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI (SEC. 1, R-65) 261.Q.

Define the special civil action of Certiorari.

261.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)(844 SCRA 244, 7 November 2017)(En Banc) [Reyes, Jr., J.] Genpact Services Inc. vs. Santos-Falceso (833 SCRA 460, 31 July 2017)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Hayudini vs. COMELEC (723 SCRA 223, 22 April 2014)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.] Reyes vs. COMELEC (708 SCRA 197, 22 October 2013)(En Banc)[Perez, J.] Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. vs. Banko Sentral Monetary Board (688 SCRA 530, 15 January 2013)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.], the High Court defined it as:

2. 3. 4. 5.

The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus: When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds and available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is actually proved to exist. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the arbitrary exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, such an abuse must be patent and gross.390 262.Q. 262.A. held that:

Is the Department of Justice (DOJ) a quasi-judicial agency? Explain. No. In Dacudao vs. Gonzales (688 SCRA 109, 8 January 2013)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], it was

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista vs. Court of Appeals,391 the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating: While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi- judicial in nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.

390

391

Beluso vs. COMELEC, 621 SCRA 450 (22 June 2010); Sunico vs. Gutierrez, 818 SCRA 207 (21 February 2017)(En Banc)[Per Curiam]. 360 SCRA 618 (6 July 2001).

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263.Q.

What is a quasi-judicial agency?

263.A. A Quasi-Judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of law. SUPERVISORY WRITS 264.Q.

How are the writs of Certiorari and Prohibition characterized?

264.A. In the case of Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc., represented herein by its president, Dr. Rolando Villote vs. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc. and Christian Cangco (812 SCRA 452, 6 December 2016)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], the High Court ruled that: The use of petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 is a remedy that judiciaries have used long before our Rules of Court existed.392 These writs - now recognized and regulated as remedies under Rule 65 of our Rules of Court - have been characterized a supervisory writs used by superior courts to keep lower courts within the confines of their granted jurisdictions, thereby ensuring orderliness in lower courts' rulings. The Supreme Court confirmed this characterization in Madrigal Transport vs. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,393 when it was held that a writ is founded on the supervisory jurisdiction of appellate courts over inferior courts, and is issued to keep the latter within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Thus, the writ corrects only errors of jurisdiction of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and cannot be used to correct errors of law or fact. For these mistakes of judgment, the appropriate remedy is an appeal. 265.Q.

What is the required justification for granting the remedy of certiorari?

265.A.

In the following cases:

1.

PNCC Skyway Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment (790 SCRA 427, 19 April 2016)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Dacles vs. Millenium Erectors Corporation (762 SCRA 420, 8 July 2015)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Gadia vs. Skypes Asia, Inc. (748 SCRA 633, 28 January 2015, 28 January 2015)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Briones vs. CA (746 SCRA 240, 14 January 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Michelin Asia Pacific Application Support Center, Inc. vs. Ortiz (741 SCRA 121, 19 November 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. vs. Hipe, Jr. (740 SCRA 330, 12 November 2014)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Omni Hauling Services, Inc., vs. Bon (734 SCRA 270, 3 September 2014)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Ayungo vs. Beamko Shipmanagement Corporation (717 SCRA 538, 26 February 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Ramos vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. (711 SCRA 590, 4 December 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Republic vs. Roque (706 SCRA 273, 24 September 2013)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled:

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

It was uniformly held in the above-enumerated cases that: To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered ―grave,‖ discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.394 Further, there is grave abuse of discretion, when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence.395 392 393 394 395

LBP vs. CA, 409 SCRA 455 (25 August 2003). 436 SCRA 123 (2004). Ramos vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 203186 (4 December 2013). See Carpio-Aforale vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-2 (10 November 20l5).

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PROBLEM: Hon. Antonio Villamar is the MTC Judge in the Municipality of Palitok, Province of Iliyan. He has been in the judiciary for four years. Upon learning that there is a vacancy for an RTC Judge in his province, he applied for the position with the JBC. However, his application was denied due course in view of the policy that judges of the first level courts, like him, must first comply with the five (5) years service requirement before the application can be accepted. Judge Villamar disagrees with the policy of the JBC. According to him, it is unconstitutional. Hence, he filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and declaratory relief against the JBC, questioning its five-year policy. 266.Q.

Are the remedies availed of by Judge Villamar correct? Explain.

266.A. In the case of Villanueva vs. JBC (755 SCRA 182, 7 April 2015)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.], a case with similar factual milieu with the problem, the High Court ruled: CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION PROPER The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65.396 As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. vs. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al.,397 this Court explained that: With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra. In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy. Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.398 Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules. REMEDY OF MANDAMUS INAPPROPRIATE The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he was not included in the list

396 397 398

Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. vs. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al., G.R. No. 209287 (1 July 2014). G.R. No. 209287 (1 July 2014). Francis H. Jardeleza vs. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, the Judicial and Bar Council and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 213181 (19 August 2014).

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of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. 399 The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. 400 Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive. The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on the discretion of the JBC, thus: The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary does not create an entitlement or expectation that his or her name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. By submitting an application or accepting a recommendation, one submits to the authority of the JBC to subject the former to the search, screening, and selection process, and to use its discretion in deciding whether or not one should be included in the list. Indeed, assuming that if one has the legal right to be included in the list of candidates simply because he or she possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications, then the application process would then be reduced to a mere mechanical function of the JBC; and the search, screening, and selection process would not only be unnecessary, but also improper. However, this is clearly not the constitutional intent. One's inclusion in the list of candidates is subject to the discretion of the JBC over the selection of nominees for a particular judicial post. Such candidate's inclusion is not, therefore, a legally demandable right, but simply a privilege the conferment of which is subject to the JBC's sound discretion. Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment, that is, a promotion from a firstlevel court to a second level court. There is no law, however, that grants him the right to a promotion to second-level courts. Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC. DECLARATORY RELIEF IMPROPER The petition for declaratory relief is improper. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder.401 The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach. 402 In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.

399

400 401 402

Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc., Celso A. Fernandez and Manuel V. Fernandez vs. Puerto Princesa City, Mayor Edward Hagedorn and City Council of Puerto Princesa City, G.R. No. 181792 (21 April 2014). Special People, Inc. Foundation vs. Canda, 688 SCRA 403 (14 January 2013). Malana, et al. vs. Tappa, et al., 616 Phil. 177 (2009). Hon. Quisumbing, et al. vs. Gov. Garcia, et al., 593 Phil. 655 (2008).

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Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. 403 The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691. Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be dismissed. CERTIORARI AS A REMEDY IN SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS 267.Q. A proceeding for presumptive declaration of death under the Family Code is considered summary in nature. Can Certiorari be availed of to challenge the final orders of the trial court? Explain. 267.A. Yes. In Republic vs. Cantor (712 SCRA 1, 10 December 2013)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], a proceedings for Declaration of Presumptive Death), it was held that: A losing party in this proceeding is not entirely left without a remedy. While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI IN LABOR CASES 268.Q. In labor cases, when can there be grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC to warrant the issuance of a certiorari writ? 268.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Ramos vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., supra Talaroc vs. Arpaphil Shipping Corporation (838 SCRA 402, 30 August 2017)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] UST vs. Samahang Manggagawa ng UST (824 SCRA 52, 24 April 2017)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Sumifru (Philippines) Corporation vs. Baya (822 SCRA 564, 17 April 2017)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Cebu People‘s Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs. Carbonilla, Jr. (792 SCRA 418, 27 January 2016) (First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. vs. Hipe, Jr., supra Gandia vs. Skypes Asia, Inc., supra Magsaysay Maritime Corporation vs. Panogalinog (763 SCRA 140, 15 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Molon (691 SCRA 113, 18 February 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that:

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence. This requirement of substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In a special civil action for certiorari, the CA is authorized to make its own factual determination when it finds that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in overlooking or disregarding evidence which are material to the controversy. The Court, in turn, has the same authority to sift through the factual findings of both the CA and the NLRC in the event of their conflict. PROBLEM: The Labor Arbiter did not include in his Decision the award of interest in case of non-payment of the monetary award from the date of finality of the decision. On appeal to the NLRC, the employee was awarded an interest of 12% per annum from the date of finality of the judgment, if unpaid. Upon elevation to the CA, it reinstated the original decision of the Labor Arbiter and deleted the interest rate previously awarded by the NLRC. 403

See Bankers Association of the Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, 710 SCRA 608 (27 November 2013).

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269.Q. Can the action of the CA be considered grave abuse of discretion which warrant the Petition for Certiorari to be given due course by the Supreme Court? Explain. 269.A. Yes. In the case of Gonzales vs. Solid Cement Corporation (684 SCRA 344, 23 October 2012) (En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held that: In a certiorari petition, the scope of review is limited to the determination of whether a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; such grave abuse of discretion can exist when the ruling entity used the wrong considerations and thereby acted outside the contemplation of law. In justifying the return to and adoption of the LA‘s execution order, the CA solely relied on the doctrine of immutability of judgment which it considered to the exclusion of other attendant and relevant factors. This is a fatal error that amounted to grave abuse of discretion, particularly on the award of 12% interest. The seminal case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals404 cannot be clearer on the rate of interest that applies: When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest x x x shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. In BPI, we even said that this natural consequence of a final judgment is not defeated notwithstanding the fact that the parties were at variance in the computation of what is due 405 under the judgment. In this case of Gonzales vs. Solid Cement Corporation, the LA‘s failure to include this award in its order was properly corrected by the NLRC on appeal, only to be unreasonably deleted by the CA. Such deletion, based solely on the immutability of the judgment in the original case, is a wrong consideration that fatally afflicts and renders the CA‘s ruling void. 270.Q. What is the Certiorari remedy available from the decision of the Court Appeals which originated from the NLRC? 270.A. In the case of Quintanar vs. Coca Cola Bottlers, Philippines, Inc. (794 SCRA 654, 28 June 2016) (En Banc)[Mendoza, J.], it was held that: It is the Appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising only purely question of law. Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot at the same time alleged, that the CA abused its discretion in rendering its decision. Well-settled is the rule that grave abuse of discretion or errors of jurisdiction may be corrected only by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Such corrective remedies do not avail in a petition for review on certiorari which is confined to correcting errors of judgment only. Thus, if the petitioners have availed of the remedy under Rule 45, recourse to Rule 65 cannot be allowed either as an add-on or as a substitute for appeal.406 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI IN CRIMINAL CASES 271.Q.

When can there be grave abuse of discretion in the context of filing criminal charges?

271.A. In the case of Alberto vs. Court of Appeals (699 SCRA 104, 19 June 2013)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: In the context of filing criminal charges, grave abuse of discretion exists in cases where the determination of probable cause is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as ―grave‖ must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.407 In this regard, case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.408 272.Q. If the accused filed a Demurrer to Evidence and the same was granted by the Sandiganbayan, what is the proper remedy of the state? 272.A. In the case of People vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)(665 SCRA 89, 7 February 2012)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held that: A review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused's demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the 404 405 406

407 408

234 SCRA 78 (12 July 1994). G.R. Nos. 178699 and 178735 (21 September 2011). Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Employee Labor Union, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 687 Phil. 351 (2012); and Cebu Woman's Club vs. de la Victoria, 384 Phil. 264 (2000). See Chua Huat vs. CA, 276 Phil. 1 (1991). See Tavera-Luna, Inc. vs. Nable, 67 Phil. 340 (1939).

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narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 409 Mere allegations of grave abuse of discretion, however, are not enough to establish this ground; so also, mere abuse of discretion is not sufficient.410On the petitioner lies the burden of demonstrating, plainly and distinctly, all facts essential to establish its right to a writ of certiorari.411 There is grave abuse of discretion when the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in the exercise of its judgment. An act is done without jurisdiction if the public respondent does not have the legal power to act or where the respondent, being clothed with the power to act, oversteps its authority as determined by law, or acts outside the contemplation of law. 273.Q.

When can a remedy of the adverse party be considered as plain, speedy and adequate?

273.A. In Tze Sun Wong vs. Wong (743 SCRA 567, 3 December 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Case law explains that a remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. 412 In this relation, it has been recognized that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be deemed proper when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, x x x where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, xxx and xxx in case of urgency.413 274.Q. Is Certiorari the proper remedy during the pendency of the ruling of the accused‘s Motion to Quash? Explain. 274.A. No. In the case of De Lima vs. Guerrero (10 October 2017)(En Banc)[Velasco, Jr., J.], the High Court ruled: Certiorari cannot be availed of due to prematurity. In De Lima, petitioner asks for a writ of certiorari annulling the Order dated February 23, 2017 finding probable cause, the warrant of arrest and the Order dated February 24, 2017 committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center. Clearly petitioner seeks the recall of said orders to effectuate her release from detention and restore her liberty. She did not ask for the dismissal of the subject criminal case. More importantly, her request for the issuance of a writ of prohibition with prayer until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality, is an unmistakable admission that the RTC has yet to rule on her Motion to Quash and the existence of the RTC's authority to rule on the said motion. This admission against interest binds the petitioner; an admission against interest being the best evidence that affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.414 It is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true.415 It can be presumed then that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is her fault if it does not.416 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF MANDAMUS TREATED AS A CERTIORARI PETITION 275.Q. Certiorari?

When can a petition tagged as a Petition for Mandamus also be treated as a Petition for

275.A. In the case of Mandanas et al. vs. Ochoa, et al. (G.R. No. 199802, 3 July 2018)(En Banc) [Bersamin, J.], it was held that: Garcia's petition, while dubbed as a petition for mandamus, is also a petition for certiorari because it alleges that Congress thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is worth reminding that the actual nature of every action is determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or the complaint itself, not by the nomenclature used to designate the same.417 Moreover, neither should the prayer for relief be controlling; hence, the courts may still grant the proper 409 410

411

412 413 414

415 416 417

People vs. Laguio, Jr., 518 SCRA 393 (16 March 2007). Marcelo B. Gananden, Oscar B. Mina, Jose M. Bautista and Ernesto H. Narciso, Jr. vs. Honorable Office of the Ombudsman and Robert K. Humiwat, G.R. Nos. 169359-61 (1 June 2011). Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA 294 (11 November 2004). The petitioner must allege in the petition and establish facts to show that: (a) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Bordomeo vs. CA, 691 SCRA 269 (20 February 2013). Francisco Motors Corp. vs. CA, 535 Phil. 736 (2006). Taghoy vs. Spouses Tigol, Jr., 640 Phil. 385 (2010), citing Heirs of Miguel Franco vs. Court of Appeals, 463 Phil. 417 (2003); Yuliongsiu vs. PNB, 130 Phil. 575 (1968). Citing Republic vs. Bautista, 532 SCRA 598 (11 September 2007); Bon vs. People, 464 Phil. 125 (2004). Citing Rufina Patis Factory vs. Alusitain, 478 Phil. 544 (2004). Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs. Formaran, III, G.R. No. 175914 (10 February 2009).

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relief as the facts alleged in the pleadings and the evidence introduced may warrant even without a prayer for specific remedy.418 In this regard, Garcia's allegation of the unconstitutionality of the insertion by Congress of the words internal revenue in the phrase national taxes justifies treating his petition as one for certiorari. It becomes our duty, then, to assume jurisdiction over his petition. In Araullo vs. Aquino III,419 the Court has emphatically opined that the Court's certiorari jurisdiction under the expanded judicial power as stated in the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution can be asserted. 276.Q.

What is the Doctrine of Operative Fact? Explain?

276.A. In Mandanas, et al. vs. Ochoa, et al. (G.R. No. 199802, 3 July 2018)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], the High Court explained that: The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.420 But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. 421 It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. 277.Q.

Define ministerial functions.

277.A. Ministerial functions are those which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.422 PROBLEM: The officers and members of the Philippine Public Health Association, Inc. (PPHAI) assailed the validity of Joint Circular No. 1 dated November 29, 2012 of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the Department of Health (DOH) as well as Item 6.5 of the Joint Circular dated September 3, 2012 of the DBM and the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Petitioners contend that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion when they issued DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012 and DBM-CSC Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012 which prescribe certain requirements on the grant of benefits that are not otherwise required by RA No. 7305. Specifically, petitioners assert that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular grants the payment of Hazard Pay only if the nature of the PHWs' duties expose them to danger when RA No. 7305 does not make any qualification. They likewise claim that said circular unduly fixes Subsistence Allowance at P50 for each day of full-time service and P25 for part-time service which are not in accordance with prevailing circumstances determined by the Secretary of Health as required by RA No. 7305. Moreover, petitioners fault respondents for the premature effectivity of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular which they believe should have been on January 29, 2012 and not on January 1, 2012. As to the grant of Longevity Pay, petitioners posit that the same was wrongfully granted only to PHWs holding regular plantilla positions. Petitioners likewise criticize the DBM-CSC Joint Circular insofar as it withheld the Step Increment due to length of service from those who are already being granted Longevity Pay. As a result, petitioners claim that the subject circulars are void for being an undue exercise of legislative power by administrative bodies. 278.Q. Can the issuance of the Joint Department Circulars of DBM, CSC and DOH be questioned via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition? Explain. 418 419 420 421 422

Evangelista vs. Santiago, 457 SCRA 744 (29 April 2005). 728 SCRA 1 (1 July 2014). Citing Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship's Management, 649 SCRA 369 (30 May 2011). Citing League of Cities Philippines vs. COMELEC, 628 SCRA 819 (24 August 2010). Citing De Guzman, Jr. vs. Mendoza, 493 Phil. 690 (2005); Sismaet vs. Sabas, 473 Phil. 230 (2004); Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Torio, 348 Phil. 74 (1998).

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278.A. No. In the case of Cawad vs. Abad (764 SCRA 1, 28 July 2015)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.], the High Court ruled that: Respondents did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity in their issuance of the assailed joint circulars. In issuing and implementing the subject circulars, respondents were not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. The issuance and enforcement by the Secretaries of the DBM, CSC and DOH of the questioned joint circulars were done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative and administrative functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by them in their exercise of delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of powers from the separation of the branches of the government.423 Based on the foregoing, certiorari and prohibition do not lie against herein respondents' issuances. It is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances illegal because petitions for certiorari seek solely to correct defects in jurisdiction, and not to correct just any error committed by a court, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless such court, board, or officer thereby acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 424 It is likewise beyond the territory of a writ of prohibition since generally, the purpose of the same is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. It affords relief against usurpation of jurisdiction by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction, the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. 425 279.Q. prosper?

Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. What are the requisites for Certiorari to

279.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Limkaichong vs. Land Bank of the Philippines (799 SCRA 139, 2 August 2016)(En Banc) [Bersamin, J.] Cawad vs. Abad supra, it was held that:

2.

The following requisites must concur for certiorari to prosper, namely: (1) (2) (3)

the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions; such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and there is no appeal or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.426

Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority, grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power - is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 427 Certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse.428 It is proper only when appeal is not available to the aggrieved party.429 (Home Development Mutual Fund [HDMF] vs. See, 652 SCRA 478, 22 June 2011.) 280.Q. When can the court set aside administrative decisions rendered by the executive branch of the government? Explain.

423 424

425 426

427

428 429

Citing De Guzman, Jr. vs. Mendoza, 493 Phil. 690 (2005). Yusay vs. Court of Appeals, 647 SCRA 269 (6 April 2011), citing Republic vs. Yang Chi Hao, 617 Phil. 422 (2009) and Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 262 (1997). Holy Spirit Homeowners' Association, Inc. vs. Sec. Defensor, 529 Phil. 573 (2006). Villanueva vs. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, 691 SCRA 556 (25 February 2013); De los Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 573 SCRA 690 (11 December 2008). Estate of Soledad Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 653 SCRA 543 (6 July 2011); Philippine National Bank vs. DKS International, Inc., 610 SCRA 603 (22 January 2010). Heirs of Lourdes Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 196 (2004). Section 1, Rule 41 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court.

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280.A. In the case Gonzales III vs. OP (679 SCRA 615, 4 September 2012)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.](MR by the OP through the OSG was denied per decision dated 28 January 2014)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held that: The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. In this case, while the evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing on the part of petitioner, the Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP's conclusion that the imputed acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner's offenses, as they factually appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal of public trust would be to ignore the significance of the legislature's intent in prescribing the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for causes that, theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations that justify the removal by impeachment of the highest officials of the land. PROHIBITION (SEC. 2, R-65) 281.Q. What is the proper function of a Petition for Prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? 281.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Zabal, et al. vs. Duterte, et al. (G.R. No. 238467, 12 February 2019)(En Banc)[Del Castillo, J.] Southern Luzon Drug Corporation vs. DSWD (824 SCRA 164, 25 April 2017)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.] Ferrer, Jr. vs. Bautista (760 SCRA 652, 30 June 2015)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.] Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.) vs. Presbitero, Jr. (755 SCRA 90, 7 April 2015)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.] Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Atlanta Industries, Inc. (729 SCRA, 2 July 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Corales vs. Republic (703 SCRA 623, 27 August 2013)(En Banc)[Perez, J.], the High Court ruled:

3. 4. 5. 6.

As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the performance of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.430 It must be stressed, though, that resort to prohibition and mandamus on the basis of alleged constitutional violations is not without limitations. After all, this Court does not have unrestrained authority to rule on just about any and every claim of constitutional violation. Prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered directing the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. NON-ISSUANCE OF INJUCTIVE RELIEF UNDER R.A. NO. 8975431 282.Q. R.A. No. 8975 enjoins the RTCs from issuing injunctive reliefs filed by a private individual against government infrastructure projects. Does the expressed prohibition include assuming jurisdiction over the case? 282.A. No. In the case of Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.) vs. Presbitero, Jr. (755 SCRA 90, 7 April 2015)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.], it was held that: This court has set the limit on the prohibition found in Presidential Decree No. 1818 by explaining that lower courts are not prohibited from enjoining administrative acts when questions of law exist and the acts do not involve administrative discretion in technical cases: Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. In such cases, let the hammer fall and let it fall hard.432

430 431

432

Vivas vs. The Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 716 Phil. 132 (2013). An Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (2000). Hernandez vs. NAPOCOR, 520 Phil. 38 (2006)[Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].

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The general rule of prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 does not preclude lower courts from assuming jurisdiction when the ultimate relief prayed for is to nullify a national government infrastructure project and its implementation: However, it must be clarified that Republic Act No. 8975 does not ordinarily warrant the outright dismissal of any complaint or petition before the lower courts seeking permanent injunctive relief from the implementation of national government infrastructure projects. What is expressly prohibited by the statute is the issuance of the provisional reliefs of temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions. It does not preclude the lower courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints or petitions that seek as ultimate relief the nullification or implementation of a national government infrastructure project. A statute such as Republic Act No. 8975 cannot diminish the constitutionally mandated judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Section 3 of the law in fact mandates, thus: If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws. Thus, when a court is called upon to rule on an initiatory pleading in any material aspect pertinent to a national government infrastructure project, the court ordinarily may not dismiss the action based solely on Republic Act No. 8975 but is merely enjoined from granting provisional reliefs. If no other ground obtains to dismiss the action, the court should decide the case on the merits.433 283.Q.

Sections 1-2 of P.D. No. 1818 and the second paragraph of Section 3, R.A. No. 8975 provides

that: Sections 1-2 P.D. No. 1818 Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation. Section 2. This decree shall take effect immediately. Section 3, Second Paragraph, R.A. No. 8975: This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought. Are all government infrastructure projects without classifications covered under the above-cited provisions? 283.A. No. The Regional Trial Court can issue injunctive relief against government infrastructure projects, even those undertaken by local governments, considering that the prohibition in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8957 only mentions national government projects. These courts can issue injunctive relief when there are compelling constitutional violations— only when the right is clear, there is a need to prevent grave and irreparable injuries, and the public interest at stake in restraining or enjoining the project while the action is pending far outweighs the inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is awarded. 284.Q. Considering the prohibition of the RTC‘s issuance of injunctive relief under PD No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975, can a party simultaneously avail of legal remedies before the Regional Trial Court and the Supreme Court?

433

Republic vs. Nolasco, 496 Phil. 853 (2005)[Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

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284.A. No. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 8975 or in Presidential Decree No. 1818 that allows the simultaneous availment of legal remedies before the Regional Trial Court and the Supreme Court. Republic Act No. 8975, even when read with Presidential Decree No. 1818, does not sanction the splitting of a cause of action in order for a party to avail itself of the ancilliary remedy of a temporary restraining order from this court. 285.Q.

What are the requisites in order for a party to be entitled to a Writ of Prohibition?

285.A. In the case of Consular Area Residents Association, Inc. vs. Casanova (789 SCRA 209, 12 April 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The party must establish and comply with the following requisites: (a) (b) (c)

it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial[quasi-judicial) or ministerial; the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.434

286.Q. Is a petition for Prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the proper remedy to prohibit the legislative branch of the government from proceeding with its legislative inquiry in aid of legislation? 286.A. Yes. In Agcaoili, Jr., et al. vs. Fariñas, et al. (G.R. No. 232395, 3 July 2018)[En Banc][Tijam, J.], the Supreme Court ruled that: Under the Supreme Court's expanded jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. In Agcaoili, Jr., et al. the respondents principally oppose co-petitioner Marcos' petition for prohibition on the ground that a writ of prohibition does not lie to enjoin legislative or quasi-legislative actions. In support thereof, respondents cite the cases of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association435 and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.436 The Supreme Court disagreed. Contrary to respondents' contention, nowhere in The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee did the Court finally settle that prohibition does not lie against legislative functions. The import of the Court's decision in said case is the recognition of the Constitutional authority of the Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and provided that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Thus, if these Constitutionally-prescribed requirements are met, courts have no authority to prohibit Congressional committees from requiring the attendance of persons to whom it issues a subpoena. On the other hand, the Court's pronouncement in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association should be taken in its proper context. The principal relief sought by petitioners therein was the invalidation of the implementing rules issued by the National Government Center Administration Committee pursuant to its quasi-legislative power. Hence, the Court therein stated that prohibition is not the proper remedy but an ordinary action for nullification, over which the Court generally exercises not primary, but appellate jurisdiction. In any case, the availability of the remedy of prohibition for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Legislative and Executive branches has been categorically affirmed by the Court in Judge Villanueva vs. Judicial and Bar Council,437 thus: With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra. Thus,

434 435 436 437

Montes vs. CA, 523 Phil. 98 (2006), citing Longino vs. General, 491 Phil. 600 (2005). 529 Phil. 573 (2006). 455 Phil. 61 (2003). 757 Phil. 534 (2015).

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petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.438 287.Q. In Agcaoili, et. al. vs. Fariñas, et al., supra, was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Congress in the conduct of legislative inquiry? 287.A. None. In Agcaoili, co-petitioner Marcos failed to show that the subject legislative inquiry violates the Constitution or that the conduct thereof was attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. While there is no question that a writ of prohibition lies against legislative functions, the Supreme Court finds no justification for the issuance thereof in the said case. It held further that: The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is expressly provided by the Constitution under Section 21, Article VI thereof. MANDAMUS (SEC. 3, R-65) 288.Q.

What is a Writ of Mandamus? Explain.

288.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2. 3. 4.

Baguilat, Jr. vs. Alvarez (832 SCRA 111, 25 July 2017)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] City of Davao vs. Olanolan (822 SCRA 481, 17 April 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Franco vs. ERC (788 SCRA 251, 5 April 2016)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.] Cudia vs. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (751 SCRA 469, 24 February 2015)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.] Martinez vs. Martin (743 SCRA 718, 3 December 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Layug vs. COMELEC (667 SCRA 135, 28 February 2012)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court pronounced:

5. 6.

Writ of Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his or its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.439 A writ of mandamus is a command from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. 289.Q. Can members of the House of Representatives compel the Speaker and Majority Floor Leader via a Petition for Mandamus to the Supreme Court for them to be recognized as Minority Leader and members thereof? 289.A. No. By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers doctrine.440 Verily, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void only because it thinks that the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.441 290.Q.

Distinguish discretionary act from ministerial act.

290.A. In the case of Marquez vs. Alindog (714 SCRA 460, 22 January 2014)(Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], the High Court explained that: A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. Whereas, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge 438 439 440 441

Citing Araullo, et al. vs. President Benigno S.C. Aquino III, et al., 737 Phil. 457 (2014). National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation vs. Abayari, 617 Phil. 446 (2009). Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona, 359 Phil. 276 (1998). Citing Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 343 Phil. 42 (1997).

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of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. The use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive. 291.Q.

What is incumbent upon the petitioner to show for the issuance of a writ of mandamus?

291.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Mandanas, et al. vs. Ochoa, et al. (G.R. No. 199802, 3 July 2018)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.] In the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement vs. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy (746 SCRA 352, 21 January 2015)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.], the High Court ruled:

For the writ of mandamus to issue, the petitioner must show that the act sought to be performed or compelled is ministerial on the part of the respondent. An act is ministerial when it does not require the exercise of judgment and the act is performed pursuant to a legal mandate. The burden of proof is on the mandamus petitioner to show that he is entitled to the performance of a legal right, and that the respondent has a corresponding duty to perform the act. The writ of mandamus may not issue to compel an official to do anything that is not his duty to do, or that is his duty not to do, or to obtain for the petitioner anything to which he is not entitled by law.442 292.Q. Appointment in the government service needs the attestation of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) being the central personnel agency of the government. Is the attestation of appointments by the CSC a ministerial function, hence compellable by mandamus? Explain. 292.A. Yes. The Civil Service Commission‘s attestation is a ministerial duty once it finds the appointee eligible for the position. The Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether or not the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law. 443 If the appointee possesses the required civil service eligibility, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment. 293.Q. If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, does it necessarily mean that a party can go directly to the Supreme Court? Explain. 293.A. No. In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Atlanta Industries, Inc. (729 SCRA 12, 2 July 2012)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: While the Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, if what is assailed relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Court. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The foregoing rule corresponds to Section 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,444 otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980" (BP 129), which gives Regional Trial Courts original jurisdiction over cases of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction but lays down the limitation that the writs issued therein are enforceable only within their respective territorial jurisdictions. 294.Q. What are the instances when the sixty (60)-day period to file a petition for certiorari may be given an extension of fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the adverse judgment, order, or resolution or from the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, if one is filed? 294.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Central Bicol University State University of Agriculture vs. Province of Camarines Sur (764 SCRA 394, 29 July 2015) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Castells vs. Saudi Arabian Airlines (704 SCRA 206, 28 August 2013)(Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], it was held that:

2.

442

443 444

In the Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement vs. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, 746 SCRA 352 (21 January 2015), citing Uy Kiao Eng vs. Lee, 610 SCRA 211 (15 January 2010). Luego vs. Civil Service Commission, 227 Phil. 303 (1986)[Per J. Cruz, En Banc]. An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.

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Under exceptional cases, however, the Court has held that the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court‘s sound discretion.445 Eventually, in Labao vs. Flores,446 the Supreme Court laid down the following recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the 60-day reglementary period: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)

when the most persuasive and weighty reasons obtain; when it is necessary to do so in order to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; in case of the good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time of the default; when special or compelling circumstances exist; when the merits of the case so demand; when the cause of the delay was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; when there is no showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; when the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; in case of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10) when the peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case so require; when substantial justice and fair play are thereby served; when the importance of the issues involved call for the relaxation; in the exercise of sound discretion by the court guided by all the attendant circumstances; and when the exceptional nature of the case and strong public interest so demand.447

In the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) Pag-Ibig Fund vs. Christina Sagun, et al. (G.R. No. 205698, 31 July 2018)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], the Supreme Court relaxed the 60 days period and held that: Herein, the broader interest of justice and the attendant peculiar legal and equitable circumstances dictated that the HDMF's petition for certiorari be resolved on its merits despite its filing beyond the reglementary period. The HDMF believed in good faith that it had duly filed the motion for reconsideration vis-avis the January 30, 2012 summary judgment. Although the Makati RTC noted the HDMF's tailure to secure the COA's concurrence, and resolved to treat the HDMF's motion for reconsideration as a mere scrap of paper, the reglementary period to file the petition for certiorari had already lapsed, such failure to file on time was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the HDMF. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. (Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. [Formerly Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc.] vs. Court of Appeals, 715 SCRA 153, 3 February 2014.) 295.Q.

What is the pre-requisite in availing the remedy of certiorari or prohibition?

295.A.

In the following cases:

1. 2.

Ocampo vs. Enriquez (835 SCRA 484, 8 August 2017)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.] Genpact Services Inc. vs. Santos-Falceo (833 SCRA 460, 31 July 2017)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)(774 SCRA 431, 10 November 2015)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Bucal vs. Bucal (759 SCRA 262, 17 June 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that:

3. 4.

As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 296.Q.

What is the rationale of this pre-requisite?

296.A. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances 445 446 447

See Domdom vs. Third & Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, 627 Phil. 341 (2010). 634 SCRA 723 (15 November 2010). Republic vs. St. Vincent De Paul Colleges, Inc., 678 SCRA 738 (22 August 2012).

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of the case.448 Jurisprudence states that it is the inadequacy, and not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.449 297.Q.

Is there any exception to this pre-requisite? Explain.

297. A. Yes. Certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition.450 These are: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)

where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.451

In the case of Carpio-Morales, the exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on the authority of the CA - and of the Supreme Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key government institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of transcendental public importance that demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA is justified. 298.Q.

Is a Motion for Reconsideration a condition sine qua non in filing a petition for certiorari?

298.A. Yes. In the case of Fernandez vs. Botica Claudio (733 SCRA 133, 14 August 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: The filing of a motion for reconsideration from the order, resolution or decision of the NLRC is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can avail of a petition for certiorari.452 This is to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify its perceived errors or mistakes, if any.453 Hence, the more prudent recourse for respondent should have been to move for the immediate resolution of its motion for reconsideration before the NLRC instead of filing a petition for certiorari before the CA. Having failed to do so, her petition for certiorari was prematurely filed, and the CA should have dismissed the same. 299.Q. Will the finality and thereafter entry of judgment preclude the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65? 299.A. No. In Philippine National Bank vs. Arcobillas, supra, the High Court recognizes that the finality of the NLRC‘s Decision does not preclude the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of 448 449

450

451 452

453

See Republic vs. Bayao, 697 SCRA 313 (5 June 2013). See Bordomeo vs. CA, 691 SCRA 269 (20 February 2013), citing Heirs of Spouses Reterta vs. Spouses Mores, 671 Phil. 346 (2011). See AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. vs. Solid Homes, Inc., 658 Phil. 68 (2011); citing Diamond Builders Conglomeration vs. Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, 564 Phil 756 (2007). Citing Siok Ping Tang vs. Subic Bay Distribution Inc., 653 Phil. 124 (2010). Republic vs. Pantranco North Express, Inc. (PNEI), 666 SCRA 199 (15 February 2012). See also Dr. Santos vs. CA, 563 Phil. 240 (2007). Dr. Santos vs. CA, 563 Phil. 240 (2007).

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Court. That the NLRC issues an entry of judgment after the lapse of ten (10) days from the parties‘ receipt of its Decision will only give rise to the prevailing party‘s right to move for the execution thereof but will not prevent the CA from taking cognizance of a Petition for Certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations. However, it is a well-established rule that a Motion for Reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari. The rationale for the rule is that the law intends to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be had. 300.Q. When will the sixty (60)-day period for filing a special civil action of certiorari under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure start to run? 300.A. In Vinuya vs. Romulo (732 SCRA 595, 12 August 2014)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], it was held that: As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner receives the assailed judgment, final order or resolution, or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such motion is required or not. To establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the assailed judgment, final order or resolution or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the petition; otherwise, the petition for certiorari must be dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot be understated, for such dates determine the timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari. MATERIAL DATA RULE 301.Q.

What are the three (3) essential dates that must be stated in a Petition for Certiorari?

301.A. As the Supreme Court has emphasized in Tambong vs. R. Jorge Development Corporation:454 There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65: First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; Second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and Third, when notice of the denial thereof was received. Failure of petitioner to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance with the Rules. The Supreme Court has further said in Santos vs. Court of Appeals:455The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. 302.Q. Is the lower court precluded from proceeding with a case if a Petition for Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court? 302.A.

No. In the following cases:

1.

Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division (G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458, and 210141-42, 31 July 2018)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.] Reyes vs. Ombudsman (787 SCRA 354, 15 March 2016)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs. Santos (729 SCRA 35, 2 July 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled:

2. 3.

The pendency of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court will not prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding to trial absent the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. The ruling was anchored on the provision of Section 7,456 Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Since the Supreme Court did not issue injunctive relief when the Petition in G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 was filed, the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted from proceeding with trial. It was only upon the filing of the Petition in G.R. Nos. 210141-42 that the High Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.

454 455 456

500 SCRA 399 (31 August 2006). 360 SCRA 521 (5 July 2001). As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC (2007).

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A petition for certiorari does not divest the lower courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. Unlike an appeal, a petition for certiorari is an original action; it is not a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. It is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, under Section 7 of Rule 65, the higher court should issue against the public respondent a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction in order to interrupt the course of the principal case. The petitioner in a Rule 65 petition has the burden of proof to show that there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of an injunctive writ or order to suspend the proceedings before the public respondent. She should show the existence of an, urgent necessity for the writ or order, so that serious damage may be prevented.457 QUO WARRANTO (RULE 66) 303.Q.

What is a Petition for Quo Warranto?

303.A. In the case of De Castro vs. Carlos (696 SCRA 400, 16 April 2013)(En Banc)[Sereno, CJ.], the High Court defined PQW as a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited.458 Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. 304.Q. Is impeachment the sole remedy in removing impeachable appointive or elective officials in the government? 304.A. No. In a separate opinion of Madam Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe in G.R. No. 237428 (Republic vs. Sereno) dated 11 May 2018, she said: Owing to both the "political" and "offense-based" nature of these grounds, I am thus inclined to believe that impeachment is not the sole mode of "removing" impeachable officials as it be clearly absurd for any of them to remain in office despite their failure to meet the minimum eligibility requirements, which failure does not constitute a ground for impeachment. Sensibly, there should be a remedy to oust all our public officials, no matter how high-ranking they are or critical their functions may be, upon a determination that they have not actually qualified for election or appointment. While I do recognize the wisdom of insulating impeachable officials from suits that may impede the performance of vital public functions, ultimately, this concern cannot override the basic qualification requirements of public office. There is no doubt that qualification should precede authority. Every public office is created and conferred by law. In the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration in Republic vs. Sereno (G.R. No. 237428, 19 June 2018), Mr. Justice Tijam pointed out that: Underlying all constitutional provisions on government service is the principle that public office is a public trust. 459 The people, therefore, have the right to have only qualified individuals appointed to public office. To construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as proscribing a quo warranto petition is to deprive the State of a remedy to correct a public wrong arising from defective or void appointments. Equity, however, will not suffer a wrong to be without remedy. 460 It stands to reason, therefore, that quo warranto should be available to question the validity of appointments especially of impeachable officers since they occupy the upper echelons of government and are capable of wielding vast power and influence on matters of law and policy. 305.Q.

Can a title to a public office be collaterally attacked?

305.A. No. In the case of Consular Area Residents Association, Inc. vs. Casanova (789 SCRA 209, 12 April 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], where the position of the BCDA President and Chief Executive Officer, which is a public office by nature, was collaterally attacked via petition for prohibition and with application for injunction, it was held that: The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto

457

458 459 460

Trajano vs. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, 726 SCRA 298 (11 June 2014); Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr., 730 SCRA 152 (18 July 2014); Juliano-Llave vs. Republic, 646 SCRA 637 (30 March 2011). Mendoza vs. Allas, 362 Phil. 238 (1999). Sectin 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution. Re: Request of National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Legal Aid Clients from Paying Filing, Docket and Other Fees, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, 28 August 2009.

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proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally.461 Also, it has already been settled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer. 306.Q.

Are quo warranto and impeachment proceedings the same?

306.A. No. In Republic of the Philippines vs. Sereno (G.R. No. 237428, 19 June 2018)(En Banc)[Tijam, J.], it was held that: Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct proceedings, although both may result in the ouster of a public officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the relief of "ouster", while impeachment affords "removal." 307.Q.

Distinguish quo warranto and impeachment proceedings?

307.A.

The two (2) may be distinguished as follows:

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or title to a public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment.462 It is the proper action to inquire into a public officer's eligibility463 or the validity of his appointment.464 Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the right to the use or exercise of the office. Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process undertaken by the legislature to determine whether the public officer committed any of the impeachable offenses, namely, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. 465 It does not ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or election, or challenge the legality of his assumption of office. Conviction for any of the impeachable offenses shall result in the removal of the impeachable official from office.466 308.Q. Does the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over a Petition for Quo Warranto filed by the OSG against Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno? Explain. 308.A. Yes. The OSG's quo warranto petition challenged CJ Sereno‘s right and title to the position of Chief Justice. He averred that in failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court, respondent could not be said to possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member of the Judiciary. The OSG thus prayed that respondent's appointment as Chief Justice be declared void. Clearly, the OSG questioned CJ Sereno‘s eligibility for appointment as Chief Justice and sought to invalidate such appointment. The OSG's petition, therefore, is one for quo warranto over which the Court exercises original jurisdiction. As the Court previously held, where the dispute is on the eligibility to perform the duties by the person sought to be ousted or disqualified a quo warranto is the proper action. Explain.

309.Q.

Is the appointing or recommending authority a necessary party in a quo warranto action?

309.A. No. Under Section 6, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, when the action is against a person for usurping a public office, position or franchise, it is only required that, if there be a person who claims to be entitled thereto, his or her name should be set forth in the petition with an averment of his or her right to the office, position or franchise and that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons claiming to be entitled to the public office, position or franchise may be made parties and their respective rights may be determined in the same quo warranto action. The appointing authority, or in this case the recommending authority which is the JBC, is therefore not a necessary party in a quo warranto action. 310.Q.

What is the Doctrine of Ancillary Jurisdiction?

310.A. The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction implies the grant of necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate its jurisdiction and subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every 461 462 463 464 465 466

Topacio vs. Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan Gregory Santos Ong, 595 Phil. 491 (2008). Sen. Defensor Santiago vs. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276 (1998). Fortuno vs. Judge Palma, 240 Phil. 656 (1987). Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126 (1949) and J/Sr. Supt. Engaño vs. Court of Appeals, 526 Phil. 291 (2006). Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution. Sections 2 and 3(7), Article XI, 1987 Constitution.

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regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates.467 Accordingly, demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.468 In any case, the rules on quo warranto vests upon the Court ancillary jurisdiction to render such further judgment as justice requires.469 Explain.

311.Q.

Can the one (1) year prescriptive period on quo warranto be applied against the state?

311.A. No. In Republic vs. Sereno supra, Mr. Justice Tijam further said that: The long line of cases decided by this Court since the 1900's, which specifically explained the spirit behind the rule providing a prescriptive period for the filing of an action for quo warranto, reveals that such limitation can be applied only against private individuals claiming rights to a public office, not against the State. Indeed, there is no proprietary right over a public office. Hence, a claimed right over a public office may be waived. In fact, even Constitutionally-protected rights may be waived. Thus, the Court have consistently held that the inaction of a person claiming right over a public office to assert the same within the prescriptive period provided by the rules, may be considered a waiver of such right. This is where the difference between a quo warranto filed by a private individual as opposed to one filed by the State through the Solicitor General lies. There is no claim of right over a public office where it is the State itself, through the Solicitor General, which files a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the person holding the public office. As the Court have emphasized in the assailed Decision, unlike Constitutionally-protected rights, Constitutionallyrequired qualifications for a public office can never be waived either deliberately or by mere passage of time. While a private individual may, in proper instances, be deemed to have waived his or her right over title to public office and/or to have acquiesced or consented to the loss of such right, no organized society would allow, much more a prudent court would consider, the State to have waived by mere lapse of time, its right to uphold and ensure compliance with the requirements for such office, fixed by no less than the Constitution, the fundamental law upon which the foundations of a State stand, especially so when the government cannot be faulted for such lapse. 312.Q. applicable?

When is the one (1) year prescriptive period under Section 11, Rule 66 on Quo Warranto

312.A. In Republic vs. Sereno supra, Mr. Justice Tijam clarified and said: To be clear, this Court is not abolishing the limitation set by the rules in instituting a petition for quo warranto. The one-year presciptive period under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court still stands. However, for reasons explained above and in the main Decision, this Court made distinctions as to when such prescriptive period applies, to wit: (1) when filed by the State at its own instance, through the Solicitor General,470 prescription shall not apply. This, of course, does not equate to a blanket authority given to the Solicitor General to indiscriminately file baseless quo warranto actions in disregard of the constitutionally-protected rights of individuals; (2) when filed by the Solicitor General or public prosecutor at the request and upon relation of another person, with leave of court,471 prescription shall apply except when established jurisprudential exceptions472 are present; and

467 468 469 470 471 472

McPhail vs. People (1895) 160 Ill 77, 43 NE 382, 52 Am St Rep 306. State ex rel. Stovall vs. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355,22 P.3d 124 (2001). State ex rel. Security Sav. & Trust Co. vs. School District No. 9 of Tillamook County (1934) 148 Or 273, 36 P2d 179. Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. Section 3, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. (1) there was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of the petitioner, amounting to the abandonment of his right to the position; (2) it was an act of the government through its responsible officials which contributed to the delay in the filing of the action; and (3) the petition was grounded upon the assertion that petitioner's removal from the questioned position was contrary to law. [Cristobal vs. Melchor and Arcala, 168 Phil. 328 (1977)].

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(3) when filed by an individual in his or her own name, 473 prescription shall apply, except when established jurisprudential exceptions are present. In fine, Our pronouncement in the assailed Decision as to this matter explained that certain circumstances preclude the absolute and strict application of the prescriptive period provided under the rules in filing a petition for quo warranto. Thus, an action for quo warranto is imprescriptible if brought by the State at its own instance, as in the instant case. In any case, and as aptly discussed in the main Decision, the peculiarities of the instant case preclude strict application of the one-year prescriptive period against the State. JUSTICE PERLAS-BERNABE OBSERVATION: As observed by Justice Perlas-Bernabe in her Separate Opinion, "xxx if there is one thing that is glaringly apparent from these proceedings, it is actually the lack of respondent's candor and forthrightness in the submission of her SALNs." Respondent's actions prevented the State from discovering her disqualification within the prescriptive period. Most certainly, thus the instant case is one of those proper cases where the one-year prescriptive period set under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court should not apply. EXPROPRIATION (RULE 67) GUIDELINES FOR EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS (SEC. 4, RA 8974) 313.Q. What is the purpose of the payment of just compensation to the owner of the property subject of expropriation? 313.A. The purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken, but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld in a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted.474 Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the latter's property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due consideration to the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken. In addition, the Court also recognizes that the owner's loss is not only his property, but also its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value must be immediately paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential income lost. The value of the landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due, and interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum after taking has been completed.475This shall comprise the real, substantial, full, and ample value of the expropriated property, and constitutes due compliance with the constitutional mandate of just compensation in eminent domain. Explain.

314.Q.

Does the delay of payment for just compensation entitle the owner thereof to interest?

314.A.

Yes. In the following cases:

1.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Macabagdal (G.R. No. 227215, 10 January 2018)[PerlasBernabe, J.] Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Santos (782 SCRA 441, 27 January 2016)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that:

2.

It is settled that the delay in the payment of just compensation amounts to an effective forbearance of money, entitling the landowner to interest on the difference in the amount between the final amount as adjudged by the court and the initial payment made by the government.476 315.Q. 473 474 475 476

When can the plaintiff take possession of the expropriated property?

Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. Sec. of the Dep't. of Public Works and Highways vs. Sps. Tecson, 758 Phil. 604 (2015). Apo Fruits Corp. vs. Land Bank of the Phils., 647 Phil. 251 (2010). See Evergreen Manufacturing Corp. vs. Republic, G.R. Nos. 218628 and 218631 (6 September 2017); and Republic vs. Cebuan, G.R. No. 206702 (7 June 2017).

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315.A. In the case of Felisa Agricultural Corporation vs. National Transmission Corporation (G.R. Nos. 231655 and 231670, 2 July 2018)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The general rule is that upon the filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to take or enter into possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. 316.Q.

Is there any exception to the rule?

316.A. Yes. An exception to this procedure is provided by RA 8974477 with respect to national government projects, which requires the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the property to be expropriated as the provisional value.478 317.Q. What is the purpose of the deposit embodied in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and R.A. No. 8974? 317.A. Whether a deposit is made under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or the provisional value of the property is paid pursuant to RA 8974,479 the said amount serves the double-purpose of: (a) pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated, and (b) indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed.480 Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court requires the expropriator to deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property to be expropriated prior to entry. The assessed value of a real property constitutes a mere percentage of its fair market value based on the assessment levels fixed under the pertinent ordinance passed by the local government where the property is located. In contrast, RA 8974 requires the payment of the amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal value of the property, which is usually a higher amount. 318.Q. Did the provisions of R.A No. 8974 supersede Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court relative to the system of deposit before the government can take possession of the expropriated property? Explain. 318.A. Yes. In Republic of the Philippines vs. Judge Gingoyon,481 the Court recognized that while expropriation proceedings have always demanded just compensation in exchange for private property, the deposit requirement under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court impeded immediate compensation to the private owner, especially in cases wherein the determination of the final amount of compensation would prove highly disputed. Thus, it categorically declared that it is the plain intent of RA 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of 'immediate payment' in cases involving national government infrastructure projects.6 319.Q.

Is physical possession of the property expropriated equivalent to expropriation?

319.A. No. The physical possession gained by entering the property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim of acquiring ownership thereon. In Republic vs. Hon. Tagle,482 the Court explained: The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership. Mere physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property. Its actual occupation, which renders academic the need for it to enter, does not by itself include its acquisition of all the rights of ownership. Ineludibly, the writ of possession is both necessary and practical, because mere physical possession that is

477

478

479 480

481 482

An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes, approved on 7 November 2000. Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc., 603 Phil. 471 (2009). RA 8974 has been repealed by RA 10752, which substantially maintained in Section 6 thereof the requirement of "deposit" of 100% of the value of the land based on the current relevant BIR zonal valuation issued not more than three (3) years prior to the filing of the expropriation complaint. Section 6 of RA 10752 reverted to the term "deposit." See Visayan Refining Co. vs. Camus, 40 Phil. 550 (1919). See also Capitol Steel Corp. vs. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, 539 Phil. 644 (2006). 514 Phil. 657 (2005). 359 Phil. 892 (1998).

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gained by entering the property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to possess, the expropriated property. 320.Q.

Does the R.A. No. 8974 take away from the Court the determination of just compensation?

320.A. No. It must be emphasized that RA 8974 does not take away from the courts the power to judicially determine the amount of just compensation. It merely provides relevant standards in order to facilitate the determination of just compensation, and sets the minimum price of the property as the provisional value to immediately recompense the landowner with the same degree of speed as the taking of the property, which reconciles the inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings with a position of fundamental equity.483 321.Q. What are the three (3) interrelated concepts in determining the payment of just compensation in expropriation proceedings? Explain. 321.A. In Republic vs. Mupas (769 SCRA 384, 8 September 2015)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held that: The three (3) interrelated concepts in just compensation are as follows: (1) (2) (3)

the valuation period of just compensation under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court; the reckoning period of interest in eminent domain cases pursuant to Section 9, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution; and the initial and final payments of just compensation under RA 8974.

322.Q. Will the failure of the Clerk of Court to furnish the parties of the final report of the commissioners render the decision of the trial court null and void? Explain. 322.A. No. In Republic vs. Mupas (769 SCRA 384, 08 September 2015)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held that: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that the clerk of court shall serve copies of the commissioners' final report on all interested parties upon the filing of the report. Each party shall have ten days within which to file their objections to the report's findings.484 Upon the expiration of the ten-day period or after all the parties have filed their objections and after hearing, the trial court may: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; for cause shown, recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of facts; set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; partially accept the report; and make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation; and to the defendant, the just compensation for the property so taken.485

The essence of procedural due process is the right to be heard.486 The procedural due process requirements in an eminent domain case are satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to present their evidence before the commissioners whose findings (together with the pleadings, evidence of the parties, and the entire record of the case) are reviewed and considered by the expropriation court. It is the parties' total failure to present evidence on just compensation that renders the trial court's ruling void. The opportunity to present evidence during the trial remains to be the vital requirement in the observance of due process.487 Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the BOC's report which is merely advisory and recommendatory in character. 323.Q. 323.A. was held that:

483 484 485 486 487

In expropriation proceedings, who must be included as party defendant/s? Explain. In the case of Republic vs. Mupas (769 SCRA 384, 8 September 2015)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it

514 Phil. 657 (2005). Section 7, Rule 67, Rules of Court. Section 8, Rule 67, Rules of Court. Arroyo vs. Rosal Homeowners Association, Inc., 684 SCRA 297 (22 October 2012). National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Dela Cruz, 543 Phil. 64 (2007).

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The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying, or claiming to own the property. Under Sections 8 and 14 of RA 8974 IRR, in relation with Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, all persons who claim to have lawful interest in the property to be condemned should be included as defendants in the complaint for expropriation: 324.Q.

In expropriation proceedings, who must shoulder the costs incurred?

324.A. In Republic vs. Mupas (769 SCRA 384, 8 September 2015)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held that: Based on the clear terms of Section 12, Rule 67, it is the plaintiff - in this case of Republic vs. Mupas, the Government - not the property owner or third-party intervenors, i.e., Takenaka and Asahikosan, who shall shoulder the costs of the expropriation before the court of origin. Since the expenses of the BOC form part of the costs of the suit - as these are expenses necessary in prosecuting or defending an action or a distinct proceeding within an action - the Government solely bears the expenses of the BOC. The property owner shall only bear the costs of the appeal if he loses in his appeal. FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE (JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE (RULE 68) EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE (ACT 3135, AS AMENDED) THE GENERAL BANKING LAW OF 2000 (SEC. 47, RA 8791) 325.Q. What is the right of a purchaser in an auction sale of real property subject of an ExtraJudicial Foreclosure? 325.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Heirs of Jose Peñaflor vs. Heris of Artemio and Lydia dela Cruz (836 SCRA 292, 9 August 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.] Marquez vs. Alindog (714 SCRA 460, 22 January 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that:

2.

The purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property becomes the absolute owner of the property if no redemption is made within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale by those entitled to redeem. As absolute owner, he is entitled to all the rights of ownership over a property recognized in Article 428 of the New Civil Code, not least of which is possession, or jus possidendi. 326.Q. What is the duty of the Regional Trial Court in case an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession is filed by the purchaser? 326.A. The purchaser in a foreclosure sale may demand possession as a matter of right. This is why Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, imposes upon the RTC a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession to the new owner upon a mere ex parte motion. 327.Q. What is the purpose of an ex-parte issuance of writ of possession under Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118? Explain. 327.A. The purpose of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, is to expeditiously accord the mortgagee who has already shown a prima facie right of ownership over the subject property (based on his consolidated title over the same) his incidental right to possess the foreclosed property. PARTITION (RULE 69) Explain.

328.Q.

In a judicial partition, what is required in order to have a final determination of the petition?

328.A. In Divinagracia vs. Parilla (753 SCRA 87, 11 March 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: All the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.488 488

Sepulveda, Sr. vs. Atty. Pelaez, 490 Phil. 710 (2005).

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329.Q.

What is the remedy in case of non-joinder of indispensable parties in a partition case?

329.A. In Heirs of Mesina vs. Heirs of Fian, Sr.,489 the Supreme Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER (RULE 70) 330.Q.

What is the objective of an ejectment case?

330.A. In the case of Marcelo vs. Pichay (718 SCRA 464, 12 March 2014)(Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], it was held that: Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property,490 and that it becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment which has become executory.491 331.Q. What must be alleged by the plaintiff in order that a case may be considered as Forcible Entry under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? Explain. 331.A. In Javier vs. Lumontad (744 SCRA 1, 3 December 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. In the case of Pagadora vs. Ilao,492 the invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the defendant‘s act of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. 332.Q.

Who may file a case of forcible entry?

332.A. In the case of Philippine Tourism Authority vs. Sabandal-Herzenstiel (701 SCRA 517, 17 July 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a case of forcible entry may be filed by a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. (Heirs of Rogelio Isip, Sr. vs. Quintos, 678 SCRA 104, 1 August 2012.) 333.Q. Will the failure to describe in detail the manner of respondent‘s entry into the subject property mean that the case is not forcible entry? 333.A. No. Jurisprudence states that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the exclusion of the lawful possessor would necessarily imply the use of force. As held in Estel vs. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr.:493 Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary. In the instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged that the possession of the subject property was wrested from them through violence and force.

489 490 491

492 493

695 SCRA 345 (8 April 2013). National Onion Growers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. vs. Lo, 479 Phil. 249 (2004). Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. vs. CA, 678 SCRA 622 (22 August 2012); See also Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 662 SCRA 14 (12 December 2011). 663 SCRA 17 (16 January 2012).

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334.Q.

What is the basic inquiry in a case of forcible entry?

334.A. In the case of Fahrenbach vs. Pangilinan (834 SCRA 597, 7 August 2017)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The only question that the courts must resolve in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute.494 The main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de Jure that either party may set forth in his pleading. The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue.495 In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical possession of the premises until it was deprived thereof by the defendant. 335.Q.

What does physical possession mean in contemplation of law?

335.A. Jurisprudence states that the law does not require a person to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before it can be said that he is in possession thereof.496 In Fahrenbach vs. Pangilinan, respondent had sufficiently proven her prior possession de facto of the subject lot. Records disclose that respondent occasionally visited the subject lot since she acquired the same from Abid in September 1995. She even paid the lot's realty taxes, as well as requested for a survey authority thereon. In fact, she submitted old photographs showing herself on the subject lot, the identity of which petitioners did not contend. These factors are considered as exercise of possession. 336.Q.

Do weekly visits to the property mean actual and physical possession?

336.A. Yes. In Fahrenbach, citing the case of Bunyi vs. Factor,497 the Supreme Court held that: visiting the property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession. The fact of her residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of possession of the subject property. 337.Q.

When can tacking of possession be applied? Explain.

337.A. In Fahrenbach, citing the case of Nenita Quality Foods Corporation vs. Galabo,498 the Supreme Court clarified that tacking of possession only applies to possession de Jure, or that possession which has for its purpose the claim of ownership, viz: True, the law allows a present possessor to tack his possession to that of his predecessor-in-interest to be deemed in possession of the property for the period required by law. Possession in this regard, however, pertains to possession de jure and the tacking is made for the purpose of completing the time required for acquiring or losing ownership through prescription. We reiterate - possession in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession. In cases of forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.499 (Heirs of Rogelio Isip, Sr. vs. Quintos, supra.)Possession de facto [i.e., the physical possession of a property], and not possession de jure is the only issue in a forcible entry case. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party‘s possession, provided that he has in his favor priority in time.500 As used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, ‗possession‘ refers to physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.501 (Villondo vs. Quijano, 686 SCRA 694, 3 December 2012.) 338.Q. Which court has jurisdiction if the plaintiff alleged in the complaint for ejectment that the dispossession has lasted for more than one (1) year? 338.A. In Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Vallecer (848 SCRA 268, 6 December 2017)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: It is the RTC and not MTC as the dispossession is more than one-year period to bring a case for forcible entry had expired. The remedy is the plenary action of accion publiciana, which may be 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501

See Mangaser vs. Ugay, 749 Phil. 372 (2014). See Echanes vs. Spouses Hailar, G.R. No. 203880 (10 August 2016). Mangaser vs. Ugay, supra. 609 Phil. 134 (2009). 702 Phil. 506 (2013). Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146 (1995). Bunyi vs. Factor, 591 SCRA 350 (30 June 2009). De Grano vs. Lacaba, 589 SCRA 148 (16 June 2009), citing Spouses Tirona vs. Hon. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285 (2001).

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instituted within 10 years. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.502 (Padre vs. Badillo, 640 SCRA 50, 19 January 2011.) ACCION PUBLICIANA/ACCION PLENARIA DE POSESION, WHEN In Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Vallecer supra, citing the case of Gabriel, Jr. vs. Crisologo,503 the Supreme Court thoroughly discussed the nature and purpose of an accion publiciana: Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. When parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.504 339.Q. When there is a subsisting lease contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, what are the requisites for purposes of filing an unlawful detainer suit? Explain. 339.A. In the case of Zaragoza vs. Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc. (828 SCRA 452, 28 June 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of Spouses Manzanilla vs. Waterfields Industries Corporation,505 the High Court ruled: For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, two requisites must concur: (1) (2)

there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease, and there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate.

The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued. Implied in the first requisite, which is needed to establish the cause of action of the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer suit, is the presentation of the contract of lease entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant, the same being needed to establish the lease conditions alleged to have been violated. 340.Q. What is the effect of failure of the defendant to attend the preliminary conference in an ejectment suit? Explain. 340.A. In the case of Mauleon vs. Porter (730 SCRA 229, 18 July 2014)(Second Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], it was held that: The Court, on motion on the plaintiff, can render judgment on the pleadings. This is in accordance with Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. The use of the word ―shall‖ in the provisions makes the attendance of the parties in the preliminary conference mandatory, and non-appearance thereat is excusable only when the party offers a justifiable cause for his failure to attend.506 341.Q.

What is the period for the court to render judgment in an ejectment case? Explain.

341.A. In Dulang vs. Regencia (724 SCRA 214, 2 June 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Ejectment case is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision thereon must be issued.507 502 503 504 505 506 507

Encarnacion vs. Amigo, 502 SCRA 172 (15 September 2006), citing Lopez vs. David, Jr., 426 SCRA 535 (30 March 2004). 735 Phil. 673 (2014). Id. at 683, citing Urieta Vda. De Aguilar vs. Spouses Alfaro, 631 Phil. 131 (2010). 739 Phil. 94 (2014). Five Star Mktg. Co., Inc. vs. Booc, 561 Phil. 167 (2007), citing Tubiano vs. Razo, 390 Phil. 863 (2000). See Section 10, Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. (Sec. 11, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

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342.Q. If the defendant raised the defense of ownership in an ejectment suit, can the MTC resolve the issue without transgressing the law on jurisdiction? Explain. 342.A. Yes. In the case of Optimum Development Bank vs. Jovellanos (711 SCRA 548, 4 December 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Metropolitan Trial Courts are conditionally vested with authority to resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case where the determination is essential to a complete adjudication of the issue of possession. 343.Q.

What does actual possession mean in contemplation of ejectment cases?

343.A. In Heirs of Rogelio Isip, Sr. vs. Quintos, supra, the Supreme Court cited the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals508 in defining actual possession, to wit: Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as those a party would naturally exercise over his own property. It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy. This declaration is in conformity with Art. 524 of the Civil Code providing that possession may be exercised in one‘s own name or in the name of another. In the case of Dalida vs. Court of Appeals,509 it was held that a mere caretaker of a land has no right of possession over such land. 344.Q. What is the reckoning period for the respondent to be held liable for the arrears in rent in case of forcible entry? Explain. 344.A. In the case of Fahrenbach vs. Pangilinan (834 SCRA 597, 7 August 2017)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Rent is due respondent from the time petitioners intruded upon her possession. Under Section 17, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the judgment in cases for forcible entry shall include the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. 345.Q. When can the immediate execution of judgment under Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure be stayed? 345.A.

In Mauleon vs. Porter supra, the high court held that:

It can only be stayed if: 1. 2. 3.

the defendant perfects an appeal; files a supersedeas bond, and makes periodic deposit of rental or other reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject premises during the pendency of the appeal.510 These requirements are mandatory and concurrent, without which execution will issue as a matter of right. 511

346.Q. What is the consequence of the judgment of the RTC in an ejectment case if it affirmed the decision of the MTC against the defendant? 346.A. In the case of Maravilla, et al. vs. Bugarin, et al. (G.R. Nos. 226199 and 227242-54, 1 October 2018)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: In ejectment cases, the judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is immediately executory. This in consonance with Section 21, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the

508

374 Phil. 236 (1999). 202 Phil. 804 (1982). 510 Ocampo vs. Vda. De Fernandez, 552 Phil. 166 (2007). 511 Republic of the Phils. (represented by the Phil. Orthopedic Center) vs. Spouses Luriz, 542 Phil. 137 (2007). 509

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RTC, or in the appellate court's discretion, suspended or modified,512 or supervening events occur which have brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and would make the execution inequitable. 513 CONTEMPT (RULE 71) 347.Q.

Define Contempt of Court.

347.A.

In the following cases:

1.

Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. vs. COA (845 SCRA 599, 21 November 2017)(En Banc) [Bersamin, J.] Ligon vs. RTC, Branch 56 Makati (717 SCRA 73, 26 February 2014)(First Division)[PerlasBernabe, J.], the High Court defined:

2.

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation.514 348.Q.

What are the kinds of contempt of court? Explain.

348.A. In the case of Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Parung (688 SCRA 485, 14 January 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held: Contempt of court is of two (2) kinds, namely: a) Direct; and b) Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt.515In Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation CONTEMPT OF COURT is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court‘s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.516 512 513 514

515

516

See Air Transportation Office vs. CA, 737 Phil. 61 (2014). See Antonio vs. Geronimo, 512 Phil. 711 (2005). Lorenzo Shipping Corporation vs. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, 656 SCRA 331 (31 August 2011); Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. vs. Cantos, 710 SCRA 514, 25 November 2013. Baculi vs. Belen, 586 SCRA 69 (20 April 2009), citing Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, RTC, Br. 121, Caloocan City in Crim. Cases Q–97–69655 to 56 for Child Abuse, 567 Phil. 189 (2008). Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Calanza, 633 SCRA 186 (13 October 2010); Lu Ym vs. Mahinay, 491 SCRA 253 (16 June 2006).

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349.Q.

How should the power of contempt be exercised by the court?

349.A. The power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative, not on the vindictive principle, and only when necessary in the interest of justice.517 PROBLEM: Sheriff Jess Dima, armed with a writ of execution, served and implemented it against the defendant. The defendant pleaded to Sheriff Dima to wait for a while, because according to him, there was a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining the implementation of the said writ. A fax copy of the TRO was even presented to him. Despite the plea of the defendant, Sheriff Dima proceeded. In the meantime, he received a telephone call from the Court of Appeals that a TRO was indeed issued enjoining him to proceed with the execution. However, Sheriff Dima reasoned out that he is not bound by a mere telephone call and he should have been served with the TRO. It was only after completing the execution that the process server of the CA served the TRO on him. 350.Q.

Is Sheriff Jess Dima liable for contempt? Explain.

350.A. Yes. In the case of Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank Phils.) vs. Funai Philippines Corporation (762 SCRA 82, 8 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: The act of the Sheriff is an open defiance of the TRO, constitutes contumacious behavior falling under Section 3 (b), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which is punishable by a fine not exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both. Sheriff Dima failed to exercise circumspection in the enforcement of the writ of execution, given the information that a TRO had already been issued by the CA enjoining him from implementing the same. This clearly evinces an intention to defy the TRO. Sheriff Dima, being an officer of the court, should have exercised prudence by verifying whether there was really a TRO issued so as to avoid committing an act that would result in the thwarting of the appellate Court's order. Assuming that the execution was already completed and that the process server was fifteen minutes late in serving the TRO, the phone call and the presentation of the fax copy of the TRO sufficiently notified him of the Court's order which enjoined them (the Sheriffs) from carrying out the writ of execution. The fact of his prior actual knowledge was never refuted by him. It was also undisputed that he already knew of the existence of the TRO even before he started with the execution. In this relation, the Court does not find credence in Sheriff Dima‘s insistence that while he may have "gotten wind" of the TRO through a cellular phone call, he was not bound thereby unless an official copy of the TRO was duly served upon him. Settled is the rule that where a party has actual notice, no matter how acquired, of an injunction clearly informing him from what he must abstain, he is "legally bound from that time to desist from what he is restrained and inhibited from doing, and will be punished for a violation thereof, even though it may not have served, or may have been served on him defectively."518 351.Q. Is filing of unfounded administrative complaint against sitting Justices of the Court of Appeals constitute indirect contempt? Explain. 351.A.

Yes. In the following cases:

1.

Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarment of AMA Land, Inc. (represented by Joseph B. Usita) Against Court of Appeals Associate Justices Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario (718 SCRA 335, 11 March 2014)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.] Re: Verified Complaint of Thomas S. Merdegia Against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso, Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Relative to CA G.R. SP No. 119461 (711 SCRA 705, 10 December 2013)(En Banc) [Brion, J.], the High Court ruled that:

2.

It constitutes indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation vs. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines519 the Supreme Court made the following pronouncements: 517 518 519

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Calanza, 633 SCRA 186 (13 October 2010). See Spouses Lee vs. CA, 528 Phil. 1050 (2006). 656 SCRA 331 (31 August 2011).

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Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation. 352.Q. How can a person be charged with indirect contempt of court under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? Explain. 352.A.

In Peralta vs. Omelio (708 SCRA 65, 22 October 2013)(En Banc)[Per Curiam], it was held that:

Under Section 4, Rule 71, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person may be charged with indirect contempt only by either of two (2) alternative ways, namely: (1) by a verified petition, if initiated by a party; or (2) by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, if made by a court against which the contempt is committed. In short, a charge of indirect contempt must be initiated through a verified petition, unless the charge is directly made by the court against which the contemptuous act is committed.520 353.Q. How is the power of contempt exercised by the court and what is the imposable penalty if a person is adjudged with indirect contempt of court? Explain. 353.A. In the case of Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. vs. (COA) Proper (845 SCRA 599, 21 November 2017)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], it was held that: The courts have inherent power to impose a penalty for contempt that is reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the offense. The degree of punishment lies within the sound discretion of the courts.521 Ever mindful that the inherent power of contempt should be exercised on the preservative, not on the vindictive, principle,522 and that the penalty should be meted according to the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment.523 Under Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the penalty of fine not exceeding P30,000.00, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both fine and imprisonment, may be meted as punishment for contemptuous conduct committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank.

-NOTHING FOLLOWSGOOD LUCK AND GOD BLESS. MAY ALL OF YOU REACH THE UNREACHABLE STAR!!! 520 521 522

523

Mallari vs. Government Service Insurance System, 611 SCRA 32 (25 January 2010). Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation, 482 SCRA 501 (16 February 2006). Limbona vs. Lee, 507 SCRA 452 (20 November 2006); Province of Camarines Norte vs. Province of Quezon, 367 SCRA 91 (11 October 2001). Rodriguez vs. Blancaflor, 645 SCRA 286 (14 March 2011).