Process Safety For Pii - Day 1 .pdf

1/30/2016

Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

 Practical Process Safety Management Presented for kursus kompetensi Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia March 2016

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Alvin Alfiyansyah

Current Job title : Senior Loss Prevention Engineer, Qatargas OPCO 

Chemical Engineering – BChe, Itenas 1995-2000

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MBA – General Management, IPMI Jakarta 2010-2012

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MSc – Safety & Risk Management, Heriot-Watt University, UK 2011-2015 (expected)

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Technical Authority in Project HES Management; Process Safety; Loss Prevention; Risk Management; HSE Audit; Safety in Design; PSSR; Process Hazard Analysis (PHA).

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Married – 1 daughter, 1 son

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Past experiences : 

MSW Champion – Chevron Indonesia Company (3 yrs)

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Project Safety Engineer – Chevron Indonesia Company (2 yrs)

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SHEQ Advisor – AMEC for bp Indonesia (0,8 yrs)

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Acting Lead Process Safety Engineer – Technip Indonesia (4,5 yrs)

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Project Sales Engineer – PT UDM (2 yrs)

Certification :

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Certified Lead Auditor ISO 9001 and OHSAS 18001 (BVQI) Certified Project HSE Management Expert (Qatargas and Chevron) Certified PHA Facilitator (Qatargas and Chevron) Certified SIS / SOA / SIL Facilitator (Chevron/TUV)

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Membership : ASSE, AICHe, ICheMe, IATMI, IAFMI, KMI, IIPS, BKK-PII, CCPS Global Network

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Housekeeping & Ground Rules Emergency Response Hours

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08:00 – 15:30 Min. 2 Coffee Breaks & 1 Lunch Break Flexible, but on time

Ground Rules : HP is on Silent Mode Mix English and Indonesian presentation

Handphone Use

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Silent/Vibrate Only mode, Accept call outside class SMS-ing? Do appropriately

Facilities (toilet, mushola, canteen / restaurant, etc.) Be punctual Avoid side conversations (except during exercise)

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Address issue to instructor for class discussion

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Training Objectives Know about process safety Introduction comprises of process safety history and its regulation across USA, UK and Indonesia. Understand process safety management model, anatomy of process incidents, and catastrophes of process incidents . Understand basic process safety concept and layer of protection. Know about summary application of design solutions, prescriptive risk management and what went wrong cases. Understand role of process safety engineer and summary in how to distribute process safety competency in a company. Understand process safety management and their key elements refer to OSHA PSM. Understand how to manage process safety management integration with common HSEQ management system. Understand key performance indicator in process safety management. .

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Reference Books            

Marshall, Vic., Ruhemann, Steve., “Fundamental of Process Safety”, IChemE, 2001 Crowl, D.A., Louvar, J.F., “Chemical Process Safety: Fundamental with Applications” Prentice Hall, 2002 CCPS, “Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures”, 1992 CCPS, “Guidelines for Design Solution for Process Equipment Failure” CCPS, “Plant Guidelines for Technical Management of Chemical Process Safety”, 1995 CCPS, “Guidelines for Engineering Design of Process Safety”, 1993 CCPS “Guidelines for integrating process safety management, environmental, safety, health, and quality”, 1996 CCPS “Process Safety leading and lagging metric”, 2011 HSE UK, HSG254 “Developing process safety indicator”, 2006 HSE UK COMAH and Seveso II API RP 754 Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries, 2010 Dupont and DNV presentation materials 5

Other Reading Lees, Frank P., “Loss Prevention in the Process Industries”, Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996. Kletz, Trevor A., “Learning from Accident”, Butterworth-Heinemann, 1994 Kletz, Trevor A., “What Went Wrong? Case Histories of Process Plant Disasters”, Gulf Publishing, 1994 Kletz, Trevor A., “Still Going Wrong? Case Histories of Process Plant Disasters”, Butterworth-Heinemann, 2003 Sanders, Roy E., “Chemical Process Safety: Learning from Case Histories”, Butterworth-Heinemann Kletz, Trevor A., “Process Plants: A Handbook for Inherently Safer Design”, Taylor and Francis Wikipedia -> http://www.wikipedia.org Indonesian Regulation in HSE and Process Safety. KMI, IIPS, IATMI, IAFMI, BKK-PII, SPE articles, CCPS discussion group. Other process safety books and articles from journals/publications.

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Training Format This is not a formal lecture. Presentations on key principles. No calculation, no formula.

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Refer to Crowl & Louvar for Safety Engineering calculation

Exercises and workshop collaborate with individual participation. Discussion and questions encouraged.

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Ask questions if in doubt Strike question while presentation is hot

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Training Agenda Chapter 1 : Process Safety Introduction 

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Day 1 – Safety Moment History of HSE and Process Safety  Oil and Gas Value Chain  LNG Value Chain  Process Safety History and its terminology  Process Safety History and Regulation in USA, UK, Indonesia Catastrophes in the Process Industries Process Safety Management Model Process Safety Management Anatomy of Process Incident

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Safety Moment Mumbai High North (Bombay High North) Incident

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Located 160 km West of Mumbai in 73 m water depth. Platform owned and operated by ONGC- National oil company

Why did an injured finger have a major impact on offshore platform ???

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Mumbai High North Platform 

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At about 14:00 hours on 27 July 2005, a crewman (chef) on the support vessel Samudra Suraksha injured his finger, and the decision was taken to transfer him to the Platform for medical attention, in spite of bad weather and high waves. Control of the vessel was lost and it collided with risers on the Platform.

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Incident Result  

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Damage to the risers led to serious oil leakage and rapidly spreading fire. 227 people on platform, 84 on board support vessel Samudra Suraksha and 73 on Noble Charlie Yester drilling rig, which also had to be abandoned. Rescued in 15 hours : 362. 22 fatalities (including 11 missing presumed dead). 6 divers in decompression chamber on dive support vessel - rescued the next day. Platform, support vessel and the Charlie Yester completely destroyed and 1 helicopter lost. The platform was lost in less than 2 hours. 100,000 bbl/day production lost for several weeks. 11

Oil and Gas Value Chain

LNG Facility

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LNG Value Chain

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What went wrong ?   

Design: Unprotected risers close to boat landing Operational: Failure to assess risk of routine activities in abnormal conditions. Cultural: Investigation concluded that this was passive, accepting, not challenging task.

“PSM vs HSE Management”, what is the difference ? ”

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Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

Day 1 - Chapter 1

Process Safety Introduction

Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

History of HSE and Process Safety Presented for kursus kompetensi Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia March 2016

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Industrial Paradigm Production : “Lean” 1960

“Mass” 1913

“Flexible” “Reconfigurable” 1980 2000

Objective : “Knowledge Science” Computerization Production Management

“Interchangeable Parts”

Approach:

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Garis Besar aplikasi strategi dalam HSE manajemen

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Dupont (2004-2005) Unsafe Act/At-risk Behavior 96% Other causes : 4%

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Are safety performance and safety culture related?

2012

Total Recordable Rate

8 6 4 2

* 0 40

60

80

100

Relative Culture Strength 19

Learning About You – What Industry are you associated with? NAICS 211 212 221 2211 2212 311 322 324 325 327 331 336 424 481 48-49 4862

Total Recordable Rate* 2008 BLS Industry Average

8 6 4

Industry Oil and Gas Extraction Mining (except Oil and Gas) Utilities Electric Gen., Transmission, and Distribution Natural Gas Distribution Food Manufacturing Paper Manufacturing Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing Chemical Manufacturing Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing Primary Metal Manufacturing Transportation Equipment Manufacturing Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods Air Transportation Transportation and Warehousing Natural Gas Pipelines

Entire Organization

Avg TRR* 1.4 3.5 3.5 3.2 4.3 6.2 3.7 1.9 2.7 5.9 7.2 6.0 4.7 8.7 5.7 2.3

Avg RCS 54 61 52 46 59 35 40 47 64 55 45 44 55 29 42 57

* TRR based on 200,000 hours

2

Benchmark Best

0 40

60

80

100

Relative Culture Strength

2012 20

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Risk Management History – Overall 0 BC to ++1900

1939

1960-1969 Corporate (1963), Technological Risk Management (1963), Insurance (1964), Project (1969)

1st Prophet / First Human to Last Prophet / Rasul

1972-1980 1999 ++2000 Statistical & Historical Risk Management Approach (HSE UK)

Finance (American Finance Association – 1939-1946)

Company & Industry Expectation

Risk Matrix concept and regulation (HSE UK)

** Taken from various sources by Alvin

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Sejarah Keselamatan Proses – Amerika --1900++

1920-1950

1960

1970

1984

1992

2000+

Standardization OSH OSHA CCPS PSM Massive Oil Trend Standard Exploration (1860)

Organization Grows : ASME (1880) AICHE (1908) API (1919)

Company & Industry Expectation Process safety influencee to risk management Sources : HM Inspector Factories (1974)

** Taken from Various sources

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Sejarah Aturan Keselamatan Proses – Contoh evolusi aplikasi dalam dunia Industri 1989, American Chemistry Council  4 elemen psm 1990, American Petroleum Institute (API)  management of process hazards (11 elements) 1992, OSHA  29 CFR part 1910 psm (14 elements) 1992, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, through CCPS  12 elements 1996, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Risk Management Plant (RMP) 40 CFR PART 68 1998, Instrumentation and Safe Automation Society (ISA)  ISA S.84 SE No. 140/Men/PPK- KK/II/2004, Minister of Man Power Indonesia  Major Hazard Installation “Hal diatas adalah pendekatan manajemen risiko secara HSE/OE dalam dunia industri” 23

Common Terminology Used in America Loss Prevention instead of Technological Risk Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) instead Hazard Identification Layer of Protection instead of Lines of Defend Spade/Blind instead of spectacle blind Process Safety instead of Technical Risk Recommended Practice driven from industry data and best practice Mentoring is recommended to facilitator of process hazard analysis or risk assessment new to the role or not fullfill company/organization specification.

Process Safety Management is about: Process, Plant and People It is begin with Management Commitment The purpose is to protect people, avoid environmental impact and assets. 24

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Risk Analysis Methodologies Qualitative

Quantitative

:

•What-IF/Checklist •HAZOP •Hazard Identification and Analysis (JSA, JLA)

• : • • • •

Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index Mond Fire Explosion & Toxicity Index Fire Explosion and Risk Analysis SIL Study FMEA

Typical Quantitative Study used for PHA in America is using above methodologies and also INDEX… INDEX… INDEX … Dow’s Chemical Exposure Index Toxic Damage Index Fire & Explosion Damage Index

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Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index (example) Attachment shows steps and important notes for calculating Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index

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The larger the value, the more hazardous the process. More bigger penalty factor achieved in calculating DFEI mean our installation has higher degree of hazards and can causing higher assurance/insurance premium rate for such facilities. Need specific DFEI training or lecturer to understand steps for calculating degree of hazards.

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Risk Management in Europe • In Europe: • Seveso Directive I –1974 *(version II – 1984) : Oil & Gas • Nuclear safety case regulation 1974 • In UK Sector: HSE-UK Offshore Safety Case -1992 • In Norway: Use of Risk Analyses –1990 • In Functional Safety Area : IEC-61508 (2000) and IEC-61511 (2002) • International Standard ISO/IEC 27001-2013 : Information security management

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Sejarah Keselamatan Proses – Eropa 1833 1843 1893 1956 1959 1974 1975 HM Factory Inspectorate (Factory Act 1833) 3000 Textiles Mills

1st Women Inspectors Appointed (1895 : Quarry Inspector for Steam Power Formed)

Nuclear Installation Act

Health & Safety Executive formed

Flixborough (Seveso I) “HS at Work Act”

Mines Inspectorate Appointed (Mines Act 1842) Agriculture (HS Welfare Act)

** Taken from HSE UK and various sources

Piper Alpha/Lord Cullen Report – Safety Case

1988

1999 2000+ COMAH / Seveso II

Functional Safety and Risk Management - Safety Reps & Safety Committee Regulation (1977) - Control of Lead at Work Regulation (1980) - Notification of Accidents and Dangerous Occurences Regulation (1980) - 1st Aid Regulation (1981) - CIMAH / Bhopal / PSM – 1984 - Reportiing Injury, Disease, Dangerous Occurrence Regulation (1985) - Ionising Radiation (1985) - Control of Asbestos at Work (1987) - Control of Substance Hazardous to Health (1988) - Noise at Work & Electricity at Work (1989) - Workplace Safety, PPE & Manual Handling (1992) - Construction Regulation (1994) - Tankfarm / Buncefield rule (2005)

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Development in Oil and Gas Sector Shell –EP 95-0352 Quantitative Risk Assessment (1995) BP –GP 48-50 Guidance on Practice for Major Accident Risk Process (2005) Total –GS-EP-SAF-041 Technological Risk Assessment Methodology (2008)

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European approach to risk management and PSM : •

More into Probabilistic / Performance Based Approaches Very Detailed and Multi steps, Collaboration from many entities Based on Societal Impact

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•

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Sejarah Aturan HSE– Indonesia 1945-1960

1970

1970 -1980

1980 -1990

UU No. 1 Berbagai PP Industry Standardization ttg K3 di industri Migas, Tambang dan Gedung Era VR 1910

1980 -1990

1990 -1999 2000++

Diversifikasi PP ttg K3 : - Dokter - Lalin - Kebakaran - Lifting, dst.

Era privatisasi inspeksi K3 Dan terbitnya syarat kesehatan kerja

Pengaruh SNI dan OtDa

Era Transformasi Ahli K3 (1992) PJK3 (1994) SMK3 (1996)

** Taken from Various sources (Alvin’s library)

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Mari kita bahas satu topik : Investigasi Kecelakaan Incident Investigation Principle

Cost of Incident (COI) = Revenue Impact + Expense Impact + Incremental Capital Impact

Revenue : Production Loss x Product Price Expense : Repair or Replacement Cost Incremental Capital : Additional Cost implemented after incident (need upgrade instead of replacement)

Incident Investigation flowchart :    

Higher impact (COI) triggers use of robust and advance incident investigation techniques Higher impact (COI) triggers involvement of several expert and senior root cause analysis facilitator Higher impact (COI) triggers involvement of company management Higher impact (COI) measured against company HSE management system

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Fakta Kompetensi vs Hak Ahli K3 SYARAT ADM.

SELEKSI

DIKLAT

EVALUASI

SERTIFIKASI

No

Jenis

Syarat

Hak

Kewajiban

1

Ahli K3

a. D3 + 4 th S1 + 2 th b. Permohonan Prsh c. Biodata d. FC ijasah e. Sertifikat Ahli K3 f. Pasphoto (4x6)

• Riksa/uji • Minta keterangan • Rekomendasi

•Rencana kerja •Lapor dan membuat laporan

2

PJK3

a. b. c. d. e.

TK  100 orang Resiko bahaya tinggi Keanggotaan (3 + 3) Ketua (decision maker) Bentuk (bebas)

•dilantik •formal (SK)

•Membuat laporan •safety meeting

3

PJK3 Inspeksi / Diklat

a. b. c. d. e. f.

Badan Hukum SIUP NPWP Wajib Lapor Peralatan memadai Ahli K3 spesialis

•melakukan kegiatan sesuai SK •Mendapat imbalan jasa

•mentaati peraturan •mengutamakan pelayanan untk syarat2 K3 •Kontrak kerja •Memelihara dokumen min. 5 thn.

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Incident Data Base – country case example Pre-1980 (USA) International and National Company Internal Data Base

Post 1980 (USA) International and National Company Internal Data Base

Data Status Classified

Country Regulator (DoT, DoE, Country Regulator (DoT, DoE, DoD, OSHA, EPA, etc.) DoD, DoL-OSHA, EPA, etc.)

Classified

Lesson learn – not available

Independent Country Board : CSB

Open to public

Independent world wide association : IADC, IOGP/OGP, etc.

Open to public Detail - open with request

International Consultant : WSAtkins, Acutech, etc.

Open to public with request

Lesson learn by academic professor or professional

Permitted with source declaration

INDONESIA (1970 to present) : PusLabFor PolRI dan Jamsostek/BPJS Depnaker, DepTransportasi dan Perhubungan, DepESDM, DepLH, etc. All Data are Classified ! 34

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HSE Implementation : Incident Investigation – country case Item

USA

UK

Indonesia

Regulation

Occupational Safety and Health Act 1970

Health and Safety Act 1974

UU No. 1 tentang K3

Content

26 SubPart

27 Chapter

11 Chapter

Agency

DoL - OSHA

HSE Executive

Depnaker and affected department

Involving Party with role and responsibility statement

Agency Inspector Employee Company

Agency Inspector Employee Company

Agency (Pengawas) Direktur Perusahaan P2K3

Penalty

According to court result

According to court result

Rp. 100.000,- or criminal offense as per Police report

Investigation responsibility – major incident

State Agency or authorize person selected by Agency

State Agency or authorize person selected by Agency

Pengawas K3 atau Polisi

Incident Investigation

Focus on Root Causes Selected by Agency or Authorize Person

Focus on Root Causes or Selected by Agency Authorize Person

Focus on Actor & Penalty Method is selected by Agency or Police

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Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

Catastrophes in Industries Presented for kursus kompetensi Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia March 2016

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Catastrophes in the Industry    

Flixborough, England 1974 Caprolactam manufacturing plant Explosion and fire  

28 deaths >US$160 million in damage

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Catastrophes in the Industry    

Seveso, Italy 1976 Agricultural Chemical Plant Release of Dioxin  

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Animals and vegetation killed Population exposed suffered a higher than normal cancer rate

BKK – PII

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Catastrophes in the Industry    

Mexico City 1984 LPG Storage Terminal Explosions and fires 

>300 deaths

BKK – PII

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Catastrophes in the Industry    

Bhopal, India 1984 Insecticide production plant Release of Methyl Isocyanate  

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>3000 deaths >10,000 people injured

BKK – PII

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Catastrophes in the Industry    

Chernobyl, Russia 1986 Graphite-moderated Nuclear Power Reactor Release of radioactive fission products   

31 deaths 50,000 people evacuated 3000 sq miles unfit for habitation

BKK – PII

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Catastrophes in the Industry    

Piper Alpha, North Sea 1988 Oil & gas production platform Fire and explosion  

167 deaths Platform destroyed

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Catastrophes in the Industry

bp Texas - 2005

Lapindo - 2006

DeepWater Horizon Drilling April 2010

Crane Sudirman Palace -2007

Petrowidada, 2004

PT Mandom, 2015

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Kecelakaan Kerja Terbesar di Indonesia 

Pt Badak LNG, Bontang, Kaltim  

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Pt Petrowidada, Gresik, Jawa Timur   

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15 April 1983 4 orang meninggal; puluhan orang cedera; kesalahan pada saat start-up menyebabkan ledakan awan uap (VCE) Lng

21 Januari 2004 3 orang meninggal, 70 orang cedera, ledakan awan uap (vce) phtalic acid dan maleic acid

Pt Mandom, Cibitung, Jawa Barat  

10 Juli 2015 28 orang meninggal, 31 orang cedera, ledakan aerosol di pabrik kosmetik

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Catastrophes in the Industry Discussion  How do you view all those catastrophes?  Why could they happen?  How could have they been prevented?

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The Nature of the Accident Process 

Three types of chemical plant accidents Type of accident

Probability of occurrence

Potential for fatalities

Potential for economic loss

Fire

High

Low

Intermediate

Explosion

Intermediate

Intermediate

High

Toxic Release

Low

High

Low Source: Crowl & Louvar, 2002

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BKK – PII

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The Nature of the Accident Process 

Type of loss for large hydrocarbon chemical plant accidents

Source: Marsh Inc., 1998

BKK – PII

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The Nature of the Accident Process 

Hardware associated with largest losses Piping Systems Miscellaneous Storage tanks Reactor piping system Process holding tanks

Source: Marsh Inc., 1987

Valves Heat exchangers Process towers Compressors Pumps Gauges 0

10

20

30

40

50

Number of accidents

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BKK – PII

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Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

Process Safety Management Model Presented for kursus kompetensi Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia March 2016

Something we bother 37 process safety accidents in 2004 causing 12 fatalities and 122 injuries  We have that knowledge, but how can we contribute to accident prevention? 

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PSM in Indonesia  Too many process safety incidents  No PSM regulation for PSM per se (itself)  Partial implementation; a whole system only in a few big companies  Must deal with poor safety culture  Low awareness & limited resources  Law enforcement needs improvement

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PSM Development Cycle

52

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PSM model ala Indonesia (IIPS)

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CCPS PSM Element (1989)            

Accountability: Objectives and Goals Process Knowledge and Documentation Capital Project Review and Design Procedures Process Risk Management Management of Change Process and Equipment Integrity Incident Investigation Training and Performance Human Factors Standards, Codes, and Laws Audits and Corrective Actions Enhancement of Process Safety Knowledge

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PSM vs Risk Management Model

Safety Case 2015

COMAH 2015 OSHA PSM 2013 55

Process Safety Management OSHA 1919.119 Employee Participation Training Process Hazard Analysis Process Safety Information Mechanical Integrity Operating Procedure Hot Work Permit Management of Change Pre Start Up Safety Review Emergency Planning & Response Incident Investigation Contractors Compliance Audit Trade Secret

Seveso II (COMAH) Process Description Surrounding Environment Management System Policy Organization Processes Risk Assessment Permit to Work MOC Performance Measurement Audit & Review Major Hazard Identification Systematic Major Hazard Risk Assessment Demonstration of : Prevention, Control, Mitigation, Emergency Response Plans, Safety Report

Safety Case Facility Descriptioon (Offshore : Platform & Reservoir Description) Policy Organization Processes Risk Assessment Permit to Work MOC Performance Measurement Audit & Review Major Hazard Identification Systematic Major Hazard Risk Assessment Demonstration of : Prevention, Control, Mitigation, Evacuation Rescue & Recovery, Safety Case

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PSM vs Safety Case

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Design Safety Case workflow

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Operational Safety Case workflow

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Functional Safety  Latest approach in risk management and process safety by introducing functional safety requirement

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What is SIL and what SIS is needed ? 

Sets of performance standards for Safety Instrumented Systems based on risk level

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Safety Integrity Level

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SIL 4 extremely rare in process industry, NEED DESIGN REVIEW.

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PSM vs. EPA Risk Management Plans(RMP) The principal areas in which the requirements of the EPA differ from the OSHA Rule are: Different chemical list and Threshold Quantities (TQ) for some chemicals. e.g., Chlorine 1500 lbs. (PSM) v. 2500 lbs. (RMP) EPA requires hazard assessments that include analyses of the “worst case” accident consequences. EPA requires preparation of written risk management plans to document the risk management program. The plans must be submitted to designated agencies and will be available to the public. Risk Management Plans must be registered with the EPA. 63

Resources for developing OSHA PSM      

European Economic Community (EEC) World Bank International Labor Office (ILO) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) States, Industry, & Labor Organizations

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PSM Plan

Act

PSM

Check

Do

Exercise in groups : Identify 14 PSM elements for each cycle (15 minutes)

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Hierarchy of PSM element (OSHA)

66

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Process Safety Management Element (OSHA) Employee Participation

Trade Secret System Wide

Process Hazard PSM Training Analysis Process Safety Information

Incident Investigation Emergency Response

Reaction

PSM

Accountability

Preventi on

Operating Procedure Mechanical Integrity

CSMS

Control

Management of PSSR & Safe PSM Audit Work Practices Change 67

Definisi Process Safety Management 

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Menurut American Society of Safety Engineer (ASSE) di tahun 1986, PSM adalah aplikasi prinsip sistem manajemen untuk mengidentifikasi, memahami, dan mengontrol bahaya proses yang berdampak pada karyawan, asset fasilitas dan lingkungan. Sedangkan CCPS, AIChE -1992, PSM diartikan sebagai sebagai set komprehensif dari kebijakankebijakan, prosedur-prosedur, dan praktek-praktek yang dibuat dan dapat digunakan, tersedia, dan efektif untuk mencegah kecelakaan besar.

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Why do we need PSM ?  It is Industry Product  To remember and learn from incident (we do not forget actual incident or famous incident)  Develop employee awareness to employee and people  Adhere to local rule, country regulation, and international standard 

Increase performance and profit

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Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

Process Safety Management (PSM) Presented for kursus kompetensi Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia March 2016

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What is Process Safety Management (PSM)? CCPS, AIChE: “Comprehensive sets of policies, procedures, and practices designed to ensure that barriers to major accidents are in place, in use and effective” OSHA: “A systematic approach to chemical process hazards management, when implemented, will ensure that the means for preventing catastrophic release, fire and explosion are understood, and that the necessary preventive measures and lines of defence are installed and maintained”

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Why are all interested in PSM?  

Numerous catastrophes caused by release of highly hazardous materials over the past years Regulators, lawmakers, management, employees, the media focused, etc focused on tasks being done to manage processes involving hazardous materials

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Regulatory Requirements on PSM   

1970s – Seveso directives in Europe Mid to late 1980s – Regulations on manufacture, handling and storage of hazardous materials in the USA 1992 – OSHA PSM (29 CFR 1910.119)

In Indonesia  No specific requirements on PSM 



SMK3 – PerMenaker 1996. 3.3.4 “Pengendalian resiko kecelakaan dan penyakit akibat kerja dalam proses rekayasa harus dimulai sejak tahap perancangan dan perencanaan” Surat Edaran Menakertrans #140/PPK-KK/2004 – Pemenuhan kewajiban syarat-syarat keselamatan dan kesehatan kerja di industri kimia dengan potensi bahaya besar

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A Different View of PSM 



Firstly introduced by the American Chemistry Council (was Chemical Manufacturers Association) in the middle of 1988. Now, more than ten PSM models were conceptualized.     



API 750 (Now Inactive) EPA RMP (Risk Management Program) OSHA CCPS Industry: i.e. DuPont

The most wide-range industrial implemented models is OSHA’s PSM since it is backed up by US Federal regulation. 74

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A Different View of PSM

*RMP: Risk Management Program

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Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

Anatomy of Process Incident Presented for kursus kompetensi Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia March 2016

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Anatomy of Process Incidents Propagating Factors

Hazard

Initiating Events

*Source: CCPS, SIL selection book, Fundamentals of process safety book

Incidents Risk Reduction Factors

Intermediate Events PROCESS SAFETY

POTENTIAL IMPACT

Outcome s

LOSS OF CONTAINMENT

ENGINEERING SAFETY PERSONNEL / OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

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Anatomy of Process Incidents • Hazard An inherent physical or chemical characteristics that has potential for causing harm to people, property, or the environment – – – –

Chemical Hazards Physical Hazards Biological Hazards Human Factors

Source: Vic Marshall, 2001

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Anatomy of Process Incidents Exercise • Hazard Identify the following hazards which exist in the process plant (10 minutes) – Chemical Hazards – Physical Hazards – Biological Hazards – Ergonomic Factors *Chevron copyright

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Anatomy of Process Incidents Exercise • Hazard Identify the following hazards which exist in the process plant – Chemical Hazards • Flammable materials, Combustible materials, Unstable materials, Corrosive materials, Asphyxiant, Shock-sensitive materials, Highly reactive materials, Toxic materials, Inert gases, Combustible dusts, Pyrophoric materials – Physical Hazards (Forms of energy absorbed by employees) • Heat, Cold, Vibration, Noise, Ionizing radiation, Nonionizing radiation (visible light, IR, UV, Laser, Microwave) – Biological Hazards • Viruses, Bacteria, Fungi, Parasites, Insects, Plants and Animals – Human Factors • Physical, Physiological, Psychological 80

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Anatomy of Process Incidents • Concept of A Hazard System – – – – – – – – – – –

Realization Secondary sources in a hazard system Overlapping of a system Differing laws Different levels of realization Chronic and acute sources Passive and active sources Mobile and static receptors Onsite and offsite receptors Attenuation Binary nature of hazards

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Anatomy of Process Incidents 

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Factors Affecting Process Hazards  Technology advances/new innovation  Increasing capacity  Increasing variety of products  Increasing intensity of production  Increasing number of type of hazards  Population density and industry location  Gaps between plant development and safety system  Safety is not integral part of plant development

BKK – PII

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Anatomy of Process Incidents  Process Hazards Significant Inventories of: Extreme Physical Condition:           

Flammable materials Combustible materials temperature Unstable materials Corrosive materials Asphyxiant Shock-sensitive materials Highly reactive materials Toxic materials Inert gases Combustible dusts Pyrophoric materials

- High temperature - Cryogenic - High pressure - Vacuum - Pressure cycling - Temperature cycling - Liquid/water hammering - Ionizing radiation - High voltage/current - Corrosion - Erosion BKK – PII

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Anatomy of Process Incidents 

Initiating Events

Process upsets  Process deviations  Pressure  Temperature  Flowrate  Concentration  Phase/state change  Impurities  Reaction rate/heat of reaction  Spontaneous reaction  Polymerization  Runaway reaction  Internal explosion  Decomposition  Containment failures  Pipes, tanks, vessels, gaskets/seals  Equipment malfunctions  Pumps, valves, instruments, sensors, interlock failures  Loss of utilities  Electricity, nitrogen, water, refrigeration, air, heat transfer fluids, steam, ventilation

Management systems failures • Inadequate staffing • Insufficient training • Lack of administrative controls and audits Human errors • Design • Construction • Operations • Maintenance • Testing and inspection External events • Extreme weather conditions • Earthquakes • Nearby accidents' impacts • Vandalism/sabotage

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Anatomy of Process Incidents 

Intermediate Events Risk reduction factors • Control/operator responses  Safety system failure • Alarms Ignition sources • Control system response  Furnaces, flares, incinerators • Manual and automatic ESD  Vehicles • Fire/gas detection system  Electrical switches  Static electricity • Safety system responses  Hot surfaces • Relief valves  Cigarettes Management systems failure • Depressurization systems • Isolation systems Human errors  Omission • High reliability trips  Commission • Back-up systems  Fault diagnosis • Mitigation system responses  Decision making • Dikes and drainage Domino effects  Other containment failures • Flares  Other material releases • Fire protection systems External conditions • Explosion vents  Meteorology  Visibility • Toxic gas absorption

Propagating factors  

 





Equipment failure

Risk reduction factors – cont. • Emergency plan responses • Sirens/warnings • Emergency procedures • Personnel safety equipment • Sheltering • Escape and evacuation • External events • Early detection • Early warning • Specially designed • structures • Training • Other management systems

BKK – PII

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Anatomy of Process Incidents 

Incident Outcomes

Phenomena  Discharge  Flash and evaporation  Dispersion  Neutral or buoyant gas  Dense gas  Fires  Pool fires  Jet fires  Flash fires  Explosions  BLEVEs  Fireballs  Confined explosions  Unconfined vapor cloud explosions  Physical explosions  Dust explosions  Detonations  Condensed phase detonations  Missiles

Consequences • Effect analysis  Toxic effects  Thermal effects  Overpressure effects • Damage assessments  Community  Workforce  Environment  Company assets  Production

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Anatomy of Process Incidents Exercise: Flixborough (20 minutes) Propagating Factors

Hazard

Initiating Events

Risk Reduction Factors

Outcome s

Identify all items under each element of process incident

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Anatomy of Process Incidents Group Exercise (20’) Identify all items under each element of process incident for Flixborough accident

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Back up Slide : Flixborough Disaster Temporary Modifications

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Flixborough Disaster Temporary Modifications     

Six reactors in series – each reactor slightly lower than the one before for gravity flow 28-inch-diameter connecting pipes for expansion Reactor 5 removed as a result of a crack 20-inch by-pass temporarily installed The temporary by-pass pipe failed 2months later  

50 tons of hot cyclohexane released and ignited 28 people killed and plant destroyed

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What Went Wrong? Flixborough    



Temporary pipe was not properly supported – rested on scaffolding Bellows allowed “squirm” or free-to-rotate No professionally qualified engineer Those who designed and built it did not know how to design large pipes required to operate at high temperature and gauge pressure No knowledge on highly-stressed piping

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