Saf Manual 1999.pdf

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE PNPM-D-O-3-1-99 [SAF] SAF OPERATIONS MESSAGE I wish to commend the Special Action Force of the Philippine National Police (SAF-PNP) for coming out with an Operations Manual which contains the rules, principles and tactics of our policing system. Indeed, the publication of this manual is a manifestation of your unwavering commitment to improve the performance of your command by imbibing the highest degree of professionalism and ethical standards to win the hearts and minds of our people. It is my hope that this handbook will be your constant guide in our pursuit of a truly professional, dynamic and respected police organization. Mabuhay kayong lahat!

RONALDO V PUNO Secretary

FORWARD The publication of this Manual is hoped to fill the long felt need of the men of Special Action Force (SAF) for reference on matters pertaining to the operational activities of the unit. This manual not only serves as a useful guide for the personnel of SAF but also for other members of the PNP who conduct similar operations. Emphasis is given on the guidelines and procedures a SAF personnel should undertaken in the performance of the mission. It will guide every reader on the aspects of Counter-Terrorism, Commando Operations, Civil Disturbance Management, Search and Rescue Operations and a lot on Special Operations. This manual is made simple so that every SAF personnel could understand and orient himself in the performance of his duties. PANFILO L LACSON Police Director Chief, PNP

PREFACE The central purpose of this new Special Action Force Manual has been prompted by a growing conviction that a focused emphasis be placed in both the principles and procedures of special operations. Both have been fleshed out- and now enfleshed in an organized fashion into this manual. No doubt the manual can shed a lot of light on special operations problems, which every police officer worth his uniform must be willing to face and solve. It can also be a source of education when disagreements occur on policy or when practice proceeds from unexamined assumptions. It is expected that the manual will be subject to the dynamics of revision and review from time to time. Thus, every reader is encourages not only to apply the principles set forth therein but also to contribute new ideas and fresh insights to further improve the same. Every reader’s serious commentary is most welcome. DIONY A. VENTURA, MNSA Police Director Director for Human Resource and Doctrines Development

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The force acknowledges the unwavering support and invaluable contributions Of the following SAF personnel for the accomplishment of this manual: Members of the Command Group and Directorial Staffs for their evaluation, guidance, encouragement and suggestion; The commanding Officers, 1st Batallion and Force Support Battalion and the Commandant, SAF School and their officers for their inputs; PSUPT ROMAN A FELIX (DSC), Chief Operations and Plans Division and his officers including Police officers II Jaydel B Manticahon for their collective effort in encoding, lay-outing, presenting and publishing this manual. Finally, this work is dedicated to the men and women of the Special Action Force. JOSE ODALUMPINES Police Senior Superintendent (GSC) Director, SAF

TABLE OF CONTENTS MESSAGE FOREWORD PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGMENT CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION Section Section Section Section

I. II. III. IV.

Mandate of the Unit Vision, Mission and Objectives Organization and Structure Functions

CHAPTER II - COUNTER - TERRORISM OPERATIONS Section I. Introduction Section II. Policies on Terrorism 2.1. National Crisis Management Committee Policies 2.2. PNP Crisis Management Policies Section III. Organization and Equipment 2.3. The Counter - Terrorist Unit 2.3.1. The Counter Terrorist Team 2.3.2. Extended Range Support Team (ERST) 2.3.3. The Security Team Section IV. Counter-Terrorist Operations 2.4. Function of Counter-Terrorist Team 2.5. Assault Process 2.6. Types of Assault 2.7. Utilization of Chemical Munitions Section V. Crisis Management 2.8. Crisis Management Objectives 2.9. Crisis Management Theory 2.10. Crisis Situation Checklist 2.11. Relationship with the NACAHT/NCMC 2.12. Terrorist Related Crisis Situation 2.13. Employment Section VI. Training 2.14. Urban Counter Revolutionary Warfare Course 2.15. Extended Range Support Team (ERST) Training 2.16. Police Intervention Techniques Training 2.17. Human Rights Seminar CHAPTER III - COMMANDO OPERATIONS Section I. Introduction Section II. Organization, Functions and Equipment 3.1. Organization

3.2. Functions and Equipment Section III. Patrolling and Scouting 3.3. Patrolling 3.4. Types of Patrols 3.5. Organization of Commando Patrol 3.6. Preparation and Execution 3.7. Reconnaissance Section IV. Raid 3.8. Organization of the Raid Force 3.9. Procedure of Raid Section V. Ambush and Counter-Ambush 3.10. Definition and Purpose 3.11. Ambush of Opportunity 3.12. The Deliberate Ambush 3.13. Counter-Ambush Tactics Section VI. Waterborne Operations 3.14. Mission 3.15. Organization 3.16. Duties and Responsibilities of Crew Members 3.17. Movement 3.18. Tactical Landings 3.19. Tactical Withdrawal Section VII. Airborne Operations 3.20. Parachute Operations 3.21. Air Landed Operations Section VIII. Airmobile Operations (Heliborne) 3.22. General 3.23. Missions 3.24. Limitations 3.35. Land Loading Procedure (Enplaning) 3.26. Deplaning Procedure 3.27. Conduct of Assault Section IX. Close Air Support (CAS) Operations 3.28. General 3.29. Priorities 3.30. Procedures in Directing an Aircraft Section X. Training 3.31. SAP Commando Course (SAFCC) 3.32. Basic Airborne Course (BAC) 3.33. BUSRROC/SCUBA CHAPTER IV – CIVIL DISTURBANCE MANAGEMENT OPNS Section I. Section II. Section I. Section II. 4.1.

Introduction Obiectives Introduction Objectives Ultimate Objective

4.2. Interim Objective Section III. Organization and Equipment 4.3. Organization 4.4. Composition 4.5. Equipment Section IV. Operational Tasks and Approaches 4.6. Operational Task 4.7. Integrated Task 4.8. Operational Approaches Section V. Control Principles 4.9. Civil Disturbance 4.10. Crowds or Mobs 4.11. Police Response in Crowd Control Section VI. Area Isolation 4.12. Objective 4.13. Techniques Section VII. Executions 4.14. Kinds of Formation 4.15. Application of Force CHAPTER V - SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS Section I. Introduction Section II. The Search and Rescue System 5. l. SAR System 5.2. SAR Organization 5.3. Equipment 5.4. Emergency Phases Section III. Search and Rescue Emergency Care 5.5. Emergency Care Component 5.6. Emergency Care SAR Personnel 5.7. Emergency Care Service 5.8. Evacuation and Transport Facilities 5.9. Fixed Medical Facilities Section IV. The SAR Stages 5.10. Awareness Initial Action Stage 5.11. Initial Action Stage 5.12. Planning Stage 5.13. Operation Stage 5.14. Terminating the Search Section V. Training 80 CHAPTER VI - SUPPORT OPERATIONS Section I. Light Armor Operations 6.1. Introduction 6.2. Operation 6.2.1. Mission

6.2.2. Doctrine 6.2.3. Movement 6.2.4. Contact with the Enemy 6.2.5. Harboring 6.3. Organization, Training and Equipment 6.3.1. Composition 6.3.2. Organizational Structure 6.3.3. Training 6.3.4. Equipage 6.4. Capabilities Section II. Explosive Ordnance Detection and Disposal 6.5. Mission 6.6. Organization and Equipage 6.6.1. Organizational Structure 6.6.2. Bomb Response Unit Personnel 6.6.3. Individual Basic Hand Tools 6.6.4. Commercial Hand Tools 6.6.5. Equipment-1 6.6.6. Equipment-11 6.7. Concept of Operation 6.8. Procedures in Explosive Ordnance Operations 6.8.1. Administrative Standard Operating Procedures 6.8.2. Operational Standard Operating Procedures 6.8.3. How to Handle Bomb Threats 6.8.4. Bomb Threat Check List 6.8.5. How to Render Safe Improvised Explosive Device 6.8.6. How to Detect Bombs/Explosives 6.9. Training and Seminars 6.9.1. Explosive Incident Countermeasure Course 6.9.2. Post Blast Investigation 6.9.3. Dog Handling Training 6.9.4. Tactical Explosive Entry Course CHAPTER VII - TRAINING Section I. Introduction Section II. Importance of Training Section III. Objectives of Training Section IV. Organization Section V. Guidelines in the Conduct of Training 7.1. Principles of Learning 7.2. The Performance-Oriented Training Appendix I - Definition of Terms Appendix II - Bibliography

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Section I. MANDATE OF THE UNIT The seed of the idea to create an elite force germinated at Camp Crame, the first "home " of the Special Action Force (SAF) a decade ago on May 16,1983 pursuant to Headquarters Philippine Constabulary General Orders Number 323. Then AFP Vice Chief of Staff and PC/INP Chief Fidel V Ramos, spearheaded the activation of the Philippine Constabulary Special Action Force (PC SAF) to combat terrorism, hijackings, urban-guerrilla warfare, insurgency and other forms of criminality. This, in effect, was the rationale behind the SAF's creation. Section II. VISION, MISSION AND OBJECTIVES SAF VISION We envision SAF as a highly-motivated, highly-disciplined, and especiallytrained unit armed with the most modern equipment that technology can provide and working in active partnership with the community, living up to the virtues: "Maka-Dios, Maka-Tao, Maka-Bayan at Maka-Kalikasan." SAF MISSION To conduct special operations as a Rapid Deployment Force in the country specifically in the areas of Counter-Terrorism, Hostage-Rescue, Commando-Type Unconventional Warfare, Civil Disturbance Management and Search & Rescue in times of national disasters/emergencies. OBJECTIVES The PNP SAF seeks to establish the unit's identity, institute reforms and prove itself capable of handling internal security problem with the following objectives: (a) To enhance national stability and unity by reducing the most serious threats to national security, namely: the dissident terrorist, ultra rightist groups and organized crime groups. (b) To accelerate the attainment of substantive operational and organizational reforms to strengthen the mission and capability of the SAP Section III. ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE ORGANIZATIONAL SET-UP The PNP Special Action Force is one of the National Support Units of the Philippine National Police and is under the supervision of the National Headquarters, PNP. The PNP SAP inherited the constabulary military model of organization. There is

the command group at the Headquarters, headed by the Director, PNP SAF; Deputy Director for Administration; Deputy Director for Operations; and the Chief of the Directorial Staff who is in-charge of the directorial staff [Chief, Personnel and Human Resource Div, Chief, Intelligence and Investigation Div, Chief, Operations and Plans Div, Chief, Logistics Div, Chief PCR Div, Chief, Comptrollership Div]. The PNP SAF has three (3) Line Battalions, one (1) Force Support Battalion and SAF School. Every line battalion has three line companies and a Headquarters Support Unit. The Force Support Battalion is composed of Light Armor Unit (LAU), EOD/Canine (K-9) Unit, Base Police, Special Support Unit and Maintenance Unit. SAF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE See ppt. Section IV. FUNCTIONS The Philippine National Police Special Action Force is mandated by law to preserve the internal security of the country. In the accomplishment of this mission, the PNP SAF was vested with the following functions: (a) To develop, organize and train organic personnel in the furtherance of the assigned mission. (b) To conduct counter-terrorist operations in urban and rural areas. (c) To conduct commando-type unconventional warfare (CUW) against lawless elements over extended period of time with minimal direction and control. (d) To conduct search and rescue (SAR) operations anywhere in the country during calamities and catastrophes. (e) To conduct Civil Disturbance Management (CDM) operations and address the requirements of stability and security operations in times of civil disobedience on a national scale. (f) To operate as Rapid Deployment Force ready and capable to strike anytime, anywhere in the country in support of other units and other agencies as higher headquarters may direct. (g) To perform other tasks as the Chief, PNP may direct.

CHAPTER 2 COUNTER-TERRORISM Section I. INTRODUCTION The Philippines today is faced with increasing levels of violence, proliferation of illegal drugs, and wanton acts of destruction perpetrated by criminals, ideologues, zealots, extremists and terrorist organizations. As law enforcers, SAF is tasked to confront all these threats to ensure public safety in order to achieve a peaceful and progressive community. The counter terrorist unit of the Special Action Force has been in the limelight during the conduct of special police operations in the land, however there is still a need to develop, train and review the procedures during operations. In this chapter, discussed are guiding policies, procedures in the conduct of counter-terrorist operations, limitations during crisis management situations and special training of SAF personnel. Section 11. POLICIES ON TERRORISM 2.1 National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC) Policies (a) Subscription to the anti-terrorism covenant (b) Coordinated and calculated response to terrorism (c) Considers terrorism as a criminal act (d) Lawful means and peaceful resolution of crisis (e) Crisis situation involving foreigners shall be coordinated with their government (f) Involvement of Filipino in crisis 2.2 PNP Crisis Management Policies (a) PNP shall be guided by the national policies (b) Use of graduated and armed response (c) No compromise with the terrorists (d) Efficient and effective handling of hostage situations (e) Respect for human rights (f) Development of PNP anti-terrorist capability at all levels Section III. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT 2.3. The Counter-Terrorist Unit (CTU) The counter-terrorist unit is basically composed of the counter-terrorist (CT) teams, extended range support teams (ERST) and the security teams, each having distinct responsibilities. They are specially organized, trained, equipped, and tasked to perform counter-terrorist operations. They must be effective in countering skilled

and determined adversaries who have taken the offensive in an increasingly violent form of armed conflict. 2.3.1 The Counter-Terrorist Team DESIGNATION RESPONSIBILITY INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT COMMON TO ALL

Lead man

Point man for AR 5.56 w/ optic Kevlar Eye protector clearing rooms, sight and flash Balaclava hood Black responsible for light suit Black vest Urban boots Low carry holster front security Gas mask Tear gas Half finger gloves Cover man Door opener, Assist Bolt cutter/sledge point man hammer/axe, AR 5.56, Shot gun Team leader Over-all in-charge SMG HK MP5(std), of the team 9mm Auto-rifle man Provide max. fire GALIL SAR,5.56 support Demolition Explosives & booby SMG SAR, 5.56, expert traps expert Demo Eqpt Asst. team Account members AR 5.56 w/ optic Leader sight & flashlight Aid man Employ first aid AR 5.56 w/ optic sight & flashlight Tail security Rear security/ AR 5.56 w/ flash cover light 2.3.2. The Extended Range Support Team (ERST) Basically the ERST are organized into two man pairs, the sniper and the spotter. It is the basic operational organization for their employment. The coachshooter relationship of the snipers is invaluable in target acquisition, estimation of range to targets, observation of bullet trace and impact, and offering connections to target engaged. The mutual support of the two snipers working together is a significant morale factor during employment in urban operations, combat environments and/or extended missions. The primary equipment and the duties and responsibilities of the ERST: Primary Equipment SNIPER Sniper Rifle with bipod Binocular

SPOTTER/OBSERVER Ml-A or M16A2 with M203 40mm Spotting Scope

Handgun Duties and Responsibilities SNIPER Writes Operations Order Coordinates with other units Leads while following enemy tracks Selects sniper hide location Detects and announces target indicators Observe half sectors with binoculars Adjust scope for wind, range and angle Shares range estimate with spotter Decides engagement priorities Engages human and material targets Designates night targets with tracer

Handgun

SPOTTER/OBSERVER Obtains and prepare any special gear Shares hide construction Draw sketches and range cards Shares range estimate with sniper Observes half sector with spotter scope Detects and announces target indicators Identifies target by priority Estimates wind Times the wind and tells sniper to fire Backs up sniper's shot Observes and reports bullet impact Operates radio Records information Operates diversionary devices Sterilizes site when abandoning hide

2.3.3. The Security Team The security teams are organized into eight (8) - man team. Their basic function is to provide perimeter defense during Crisis management situation and act as security forces during special operations. They are also well trained and equipped similar to that of the counter-terrorist team so that they can also perform the functions of the latter whenever situation warrants. 2.4. Functions of Counter-Terrorist Team The functions of the Counter-Terrorist Team is to handle all "high risk" criminal and terrorist threats. It shall conduct operations to effect: (a) Neutralize Terrorist (b) Rescue of Hostages (c) Destroy Terrorist Infrastructure and Installations (d) Locate and Recover Sensitive Items from Terrorist Organization (e) Interrupt Terrorist's Lines of Supply and Logistical Means 2.5. The Assault Process The assault process consists of a sequence of activities which are performed by the Counter-terrorist team during an operation. These activities are not all encompassing. They may be expanded or refined by incorporating lessons learned from realistic training or actual operations.

The assault process is divided into four (4) operational phases. These are the planning and preparation, movement, assault and recovery phase. 2.5.1. Planning Phase (a) Notification and Assembly of the CT Unit The planning phase includes the notification and assembly of the CT Unit. The alert procedure in notifying the unit must be developed and established in an SOP. These procedures should include: (1) A contact plan to notify each CT Unit member. This may be done by telephone, pager, or other means. (2) An assembly plan which permits the CT Unit to deploy to the incident scene with a prescribed time limit. (b) Issuance of the Warning Order Once the CT Unit is assembled (or a majority of the teams), the commander issues a warning order. This order includes the following: (1) A brief description of the situation. (2) The mission of the CT Unit. (3). An immediate course of action to include assignment of tasks within the CT Unit. (4) Coordinating instructions. (5) A tentative time schedule of activities from notification until the time of the assault or any deadline. After issuance of the warning order, the CT Unit (or a dedicated element within the CT Unit) will begin planning for an emergency assault. Depending upon the mode of transportation to the incident scene, this planning may continue in transit. (c) Deployment of the Security Teams Upon notification, pre-designated personnel proceed directly to the incident scene. Their function is to: (1) Select a suitable location to establish a tactical holding area. (2) Coordinate with first responders and crisis management at the scene. (3) Begin collecting intelligence on the target area. (4) Secure the inner perimeter of the incident area. (d) Deployment of the CT Teams and ERST Normally the main body of the CT Unit, composed of the CT Teams and ERST Teams deploys to a location near the incident scene to establish a tactical holding area. This should be outlined in SOP'S. Considerations for deployment are: (1) If assets are not dedicated to the CT Unit, the main body must coordinate for transportation.

(2) Individuals or teams are responsible for various tasks, i.e., distributing ammunition, collecting radios, loading vehicles, etc. (3) Accounting for men and equipment. (e) Establishment of Tactical Holding Area Upon arrival at the incident scene the CT Unit occupies and establishes the tactical holding area. It continues to plan and prepare for a deliberate assault while the negotiation is in progress. This includes activities such as: (1) Briefing team leaders on latest developments while team members carry out assigned tasks. (2) Deploying the ERST as soon as possible, usually 10 minutes after arrival at the tactical holding area. (3) Collecting and analyzing intelligence information. (4) Conducting or updating an existing target analysis. (5) Completing preparations for an emergency assault. (6) Conducting leaders' reconnaissance of the crisis site. (7) Conduct day and night rehearsals and walk-through. (8) Prepare equipment. 2.5.2. Movement Phase The movement phase of the operation consists of movement of the CT Team from the tactical holding area to the final assault positions (FAPs). This phase should be covered by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Considerations are: (a) The order of movement should be arranged so that the teams arrive at their last covered and concealed positions (LCCs) at the same time and at an orderly manner. (b) The movement should be controlled by the commander through the team leaders of various element. (c) Individual and team movement techniques are used. (d) ERST should overwatch the approach and provide direct fire support if necessary. (e) Cover and concealment should be used when possible. (f) Actions to be taken if the CT Team is compromised during the approach should be outlined in the plan. (g) Breaching equipment and charges should be prepared and primed no later than the LCC. h) Compromise authority should be given by the commander. (i) The CT Team should be prepared to execute the assault on order. (j) When all actions are completed in the LCC, teams move to their final assault positions on order. (k) Charges and any special equipment, such as ladders or ropes, may need to be placed at the final assault positions. (1) Positive command and control measures should be employed.

2.5.3. Assault Phase The assault phase begins upon initiation, usually on command or by a shot coming from the ERST. This phase covers all the assault skills you have practiced through withdrawal to the tactical holding area. As with the previous operational phases, most activities should be outlined by SOPs. Activities includes: (a) Gaining simultaneous entry through multiple entry points. (b) Using speed, surprise, and violence of action to clear and dominate the crisis site. (c) Avoiding friendly fire hazards. (d) Securing hostages, drugs, weapons, etc. (e) Enacting contingency plans such as alternate entry points, officer down procedures, etc. (f) Performing hostage processing. (g) Accounting for men and equipment. (h) On-site commander's brief. (i) Maintaining security. (j) Performing positive command control. (k) Withdrawing from the crisis site to the tactical holding area. This includes the sniper teams. 2.5.4. Recovery Phase This phase covers activities after each teams and member had returned to the tactical holding area. It includes: (a) Accounting for men and equipment (b) Conducting an immediate debrief with all personnel present. (c) It may be necessary to isolate the team to protect identification of the members and protect tactical information. (d) Re-deploying for rest and recuperation or a follow-on mission. (e) Preparing and writing an after action report. (f) This report may be brief and after the debriefing conducted by the CT Team at the tactical holding area. (g) Lessons learned should be incorporated into future training and be used to refine tactics. This is an ongoing process in itself. 2.6. Types of Assault (a) Dynamic Building Assault - assault elements will first preposition themselves on a concealed area, then will proceed to their breaching point which is their last line of compromise. This is where they will gain their entry into the building. Once ready, they will enter the building in a quick and surprising manner. Depending on the door materials used, breaching tools might be needed like hammer, axe or battering ram. After negotiating the first hindrance, they will divide

themselves into smaller groups and proceed clearing their designated area of responsibility. (b) Vehicle Assault - The vehicle (ie, bus) will be block and once immobilized the assault team will approach the door coming from the rear. Then 8th man will open the door using a breaching tool for the team to enter. He likewise positions himself in front of the bus to provide security to the entry team. Simultaneously, another team will occupy the opposite side. They will be divided into two and each pair will have a designated window to clear. They will run towards their assigned area, will the first element of each sub-group to lean against the bus and offer his knees to be used as a step by his partner so to have a clear view of the inside. (c) Aircraft Assault - The assaulting team uses a ladder to be able to reach the plane's door. (d) Barricaded Assault - The subject has a cover so it is not possible for the entry team to expose themselves into the open without elements providing cover fire. The use of tearing agent or stun grenade is advisable in this type of operation. (e) ERST Initiated/Explosives Assault - Snipers will be utilized in this type of assault. They will position to a place where they can have a view on the area; They are going to provide on-hand information necessary for the success of the assault. They entry team will proceed to the breaching point under the cover of the snipers. The demolitionist then will install explosives to be used as their breaching agent. On signal, the demolitionist will arm the explosive and will create an opening for the entry team to pass and proceed with assault. 2.7. Utilization of Chemical Munitions The use of chemical munitions should be considered as an alternative action in counter terrorist operations. It must also be in conjunction with the approved procedures and equipment during: (a) civil disturbance (b) barricaded subject (c) hostage situation Chemical munitions should not be used indiscriminately or in anticipation against mere threats of violence or resistance. 2.7.1. DOs (a) When firing projectiles, aim gas gun or launcher at 30 degrees. (b) When using chemicals inside buildings use only devices manufactured specifically for that purpose. (c) When dealing with a riot, make sure that adequate supplies of chemical munitions are immediately at hand. (d) Always use minimum force. (e) Make sure gas mask and filter are serviceable. (f) Use sufficient quantity of grenades or projectiles to cover the area occupied by the riot.

2.7.2. DON'Ts (a) Do not fire projectiles at rioters. (b) Do not use pyrotechnic (burning) grenades inside buildings. (c) Do not attempt to disperse violent rioters without proper equipment and planning. (d) Do not use excessive force. (e) Do not throw grenades directly at rioters, but on the ground in the appropriate direction according to wind directions. Section V. CRISIS MANAGEMENT 2.8. Crisis Management Objectives (a) Resolve without further injury (b) Safe release of any hostages (c) Apprehension of perpetrators 2.9. Crisis Management Theory: (a) Contain and Negotiate (b) Protect innocents from harm (c) Allow the passage of time so that the perpetrator can be reasoned with through negotiations (d) Allow the passage of time so that the response force can: (1) (2) (3) (4)

Evaluate situation Gather information Explore alternatives Formulate plan of action

2.10. Crisis Situation Checklist: This Checklist shall be adopted to guide the responding elements of the Crisis Resolution Team (CRT). 2.10.1. First Responders Action (a) Maintain radio contact at all times (b) Verify complaint (c) Determine perpetrator(s) location (d) Determine perpetrator(s) weapons (e) Communicate findings (f) Establish inner perimeter (g) Request necessary support (h) Communicate safe entry/exit routes (i) Evacuate trapped/injured, if possible

(j) Maintain command and control (k) Establish outer perimeter 2.10.2. Tactical Considerations (a) Establish command post and staging areas (b) Brief all personnel before deploying (c) Maintain fire discipline (d) Return non-essential personnel to service (e) Replace off-duty personnel with on-duty persons (f) Determine areas susceptible to hostile fire (g) Determine perpetrator(s) motives (h) Records check on perpetrator(s) (i) Isolate perpetrator(s) (j) Segregate all witnesses (k) Obtain floorplans, drawings, etc. (1) Descriptions of hostages/perpetrator(s) (m) Evacuation procedures (n) Request necessary support 2.10.3. Command Post Considerations (a) Inside outer perimeter/outside inner perimeter (b) Safe accessible routes to responding personnel (c) Defensible against snipers, mobs, onlookers (d) Sufficient parking (e) Adequate staging area (f) Water restrooms, available telephones (g) Accessible to helicopters (h) Maintain open lines to communications (i) Notify administrators (j) Maintain command post chronological log (k) Only authorized personnel are allowed inside (l) P.I.O. gives press adequate briefings 2.11 Relationship with the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking and Terrorism (NACAHT)/NCMC See ppt The Special Action force shall utilize its counter-terrorist unit (discussed in section 3) to augment the national tactical strike force which shall be tapped during terrorist-related crisis situations that shall be taken cognizance by NACAHT. (Executive Order No. 246 dated May 18, 1995.

2.12. Terrorist Related Crisis Situations 2.12.1. General The NACAHT shall take cognizance of all terrorist-related crisis situations which have national significance and/or strategic repercussions. Other terrorist related crisis situations aside from the aforementioned shall be taken cognizance by the concerned Crisis Management Committee (CMC) under the existing National Peace and Order Council (NPOC) structure. 2.12.2. Specific There are three categories of specific instances of terrorist related crisis situations which NACAHT shall take cognizance: Category 1 - Personality Involved (a) President's official family (b) Internationally protected persons (c) Heads of private and government vital installations and facilities (d) Heads of national government agencies Category 2 - Facility and Installation Involved (a) Strategic and vital government installations and facilities such as head of offices of departments, airports, seaports, oil depots, power/energy, transportation and communication facilities. (b) Embassies and foreign installations (c) Government-owned and commercial aircraft - passenger or cargo, domestic or international. (d) Commercial vessels - passenger or cargo, domestic or international Category 3 - Other Special Cases that NACAHT may take cognizance. 2.13. Employment As embodied in the Executive Order Number 246 dated 18 May 1995 entitled "Reconstituting the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking as the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking and Anti-Terrorism", the National Tactical Strike Forces, in which SAP is one of its components shall only be employed during terrorist-related crisis situations which NACAHT shall take cognizance. Other terrorist related situations shall be taken cognizance of by the concerned Crisis Management Committee (CMC) under the existing National Peace and Order Council (NPOC) structure. However, the local CMC may elevate decisions to the NCMC/NACAHT in the following modes: Mode 1 - Upon the request of a local CMC (regional, provincial and city/ municipal) under NPOC and upon acceptance by the NCMC.

Mode 2 - Upon the unilateral decision of the NCMC to take cognizance of a terrorist-related crisis situation from a local CMC under NPOC. Hence, the Counter Terrorist Unit of the Special Action Force shall only be employed during the aforementioned conditions. When employed, the CTU shall provide the Assault Team, ERST and Security Team to secure inner perimeter. While the negotiation is in progress, the CTU shall continually gather information and plan for the assault should the negotiation fails and situation calls for the "last option". Section VI. TRAINING 2.14. Urban Counter Revolutionary Warfare Course (UCRWC) "Sureshock" The main objective of this training focuses on anti-terrorism and hostage rescue operations. The training strategy is designed to be comprehensive, feasible, and proven effective in combating terrorist acts. With this kind of training, participants are expected to be proficient in the basic handling and treatment of weapons, entry techniques and how to respond to certain situations calling extraordinary people and expertise. 2.15. Extended Range Support Team (ERST) Training • • • •

This training develops the personnel to be proficient in providing: Extended range support operations Cover for scouting element and other team members Covert tactical intelligence collection capabilities Real time target site intelligence collection to support operations

2.16. Police Intervention Techniques Training Basically, this training enhances the capability of the personnel to become proficient in disarming and hand cuffing, suspect handling and other intervention techniques. 2.17. Human Rights Seminar This seminar is designed to provide personnel the basic information regarding the protection of human rights. Respect for human rights is of paramount concern of this unit. It helps the students understand the value of life. It also sets limitations where they must place themselves in the performance of their functions as police officers.

CHAPTER 3 COMMANDO OPERATIONS Section I. INTRODUCTION Commando operation is conducted under all conditions of weather and terrain (urban and rural operation) because of the intensive mental and physical training the SAF Commando Trooper has undergone. The Commando Unit can infiltrate or exfiltrate fortified areas by air, land or sea. It capitalizes on speed, surprise and stealth movement for the successful accomplishment of assigned mission. These capabilities make them an ideal unit to employ in deep penetration behind the enemy lines. Section II. ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS AND EQUIPMENT 3.1. Organization The Commando unit is composed of two (2) Commando Platoons and one (1) Support Platoon. Each Commando Platoon contains one (I) Reconnaissance Team and three (3) Commando Teams. The Support Platoon contains one (1) Heavy weapons team, one (1) Medical team, one (1) Commo team, and one (1) Special Equipment maintenance team / Transport Team COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE See ppt. 3.1.1. Commando Platoon - Consists of one (1) Reconnaissance Team and three (3) Commando Teams. The Reconnaissance Team is trained as surface and under water swimmers and as parachutist. It is employed primarily for reconnaissance mission. The Commando Teams serve as the main assault force and security of the commando unit. 3.1.2. Support Platoon - is composed of the following teams: (a) Heavy weapons team consists of eight (8) personnel responsible for employing fire support to the assaulting or withdrawing commando unit. (b) Medical team consists of eight (8) personnel responsible for first aid and evacuation of wounded troops. (c) Contact team consists of eight (8) personnel responsible for setting up field communication from the Field units and ACP back to RPC, RCP. (d) Special equipment team/transport consists of eight (8) personnel responsible for maintenance of special equipment of the commando unit.

3.2. Functions and Equipment 3.2.1. The Reconnaissance Team - is composed of eight (8) men who are all trained for Deep Reconnaissance missions. They are all Commando qualified who undergo further extensive training for this mission. DESIGNATION 1. LEAD SCOUT

FUNCTION Eyes and ears of the team, Responsible for front security

2. NAVIGATOR

Pathfinder of the team, Responsible in the selection of routes Trains, employs and controls the team, Responsible for the success and failure of the team

3. TEAM LEADER

4. RADIOMAN 5. RIFLEMAN

6. ASST TEAM LEADER

7. SNIPER

8. TAIL SCOUT

Communication specialist, Responsible for all radio communications Heavy Weapons Specialist, Responsible in giving fire support in case of enemy contact Responsible for accounting the team members, takes command of the team in the absence of the team leader Light weapon Specialist, Responsible in neutralizing the enemy from a distant covered position Demolition specialist, Medical specialist, Erases tracks of the team, Responsible for rear security

EQUIPMENT AR 15/Famas AR,NVS with mount for AR 15, NVG, Binoculars, Compass, Survival Knife HK 11 7.62 mm LMG, Binoculars, Maps, GPS, Compass, Survival Knife AR 15 w/ M203, Binoculars, Compass, Survival Knife, Handheld Radio, Camera AR 15/Famas AR, PRC 77, Compass, Survival Knife M60 LMG, compass, Survival Knife M 16 w/ M203, Binoculars, Compass, Survival Knife, Hand Held Radio Styre caliber .308 w/ scope, NVS, Compass, Survival Knife, Hand grenades, Rappelling equipment Ml 6 w/M203, Compass, Survival Knife, Medical kit, EOD tools, explosives

3.2.2. The Commando Team - is composed of eight (8) men who are all capable and dependable in their individual qualification and specialized skill. It is an Officer-led, assisted by men of any grade.

DESIGNATION 1. LEAD SCOUT 2. NAVIGATOR 3. TEAM LEADER

4. RADIOMAN

5. CONTACT MAN

6. ASST TEAM LEADER 7. SNIPER 8. TAIL SCOUT

FUNCTION Light weapon specialist, eyes and ears of the team, fluent in several dialects Heavy weapon specialists, speaks several dialects Trains, employs and control the team, very capable leader. He is conversant on troop leading procedures Commo specialist, speaks several dialect

EQUIPMENT Ml 6 Rifle, Binoculars, Starlight scope, NVG

Intel/Psy-op specialist, know several dialects & languages, expert in martial arts, versatile actor of the team Demolition specialist Assist demo specialist sharp shooter expert Erases tracks of the team, Medical specialist

M203, grenade, silent weapon, civilian clothes

M60, Lensatic compass, map, and GPS AR 154 (Baby Armalite) maps and compass

M-16 rifle, signal equips, radio sets, coiler wire, CEIO handbook

M16 rifle, Demo Sniper rifle, Demo equip M16, Med/first aid kit, camera

Section III. PATROLLING AND SCOUTING The Commando Unit whether I an offensive or defensive posture will continue to conduct patrols to prevent the unit from being surprised by the enemy and to gather valuable information or simply to maintain spirit of the offensive. 3.3 Patrolling A patrol is a unit sent out for a purpose of accomplishing a specific mission. This could be a small as commando team or as large as a commando unit. The patrol is an invaluable tool of the commander to reduce the enemy’s freedom of movement or hamper his operational probability, seriously weaken his influence in the area and to gather timely tactical intelligence data. Patrol are limited only by the continuity, skill and aggressiveness with which they are employed.

3.4. Types of Patrols All types of patrols are planned and conducted almost at the same way except for the action of the men for the objective. These plans of actions at the objective determine the type of patrol to be conducted. Commando Patrols are classified into the following categories: 3.4.1. Reconnaissance patrol. It is a patrol sent by a larger unit with the mission of gathering information concerning the enemy, the weather and terrain. In a specific area or location, a reconnaissance patrol maybe a point or area reconnaissance patrol. 3.4.2. Combat Patrol. It is a patrol sent out by a larger force with the mission of harassment, destruction or capture of enemy personnel, equipment and installations. This type of patrol also collects useful information whether related to the mission or not. The following are classified as combat patrols. (a) Patrol for local security. Also known as sanitizing patrol. In this type of combat patrol, the leader select a series of objective covering the area in of over which the patrol is to move. Action to be taken at each objective are planned, based on available information similar to crossing danger areas. Hence, the patrol leader must be alert to modify his plan if the situation at an objective is not exactly known. As each objective is secured, plans for the next objective are confirmed or modified and the patrol continues. The main objective of this type of patrol is to check for enemy presence in the vicinity of a given area. (b) Contact patrols. As in patrol for local security. Series of objectives are selected in the conduct of contact patrols. The patrols proceed from one objective to another until contact is established, then acts in accordance in a situation or as directed. In this particular type of patrol, the main objective is to establish or maintain contact. However, when contact with the enemy is immediately made, the patrol must not get engaged in a decisive combat. A contact patrol is sometimes referred to as Search and Rescue Attack Patrol. 3.5. Organization of Commando Patrol The size of patrol varies according to the mission it is tasked to perform. Members of the patrol are always grouped into different elements which have certain responsibilities, the individual members may have specific task to do at the objective. Following are the responsibilities of the elements of patrol: 3.5.1. Patrol Headquarters. The patrol headquarters provide control and command for the group. It is usually composed of the patrol leader, radio operator and messages. Other attachment with specific jobs to perform may also be present at the patrol headquarters, such as forward observers, explosive expert or medical aid men.

3.5.2. Assault Element. This element of combat patrol is responsible for engaging the enemy at the objective by physically attacking them, destroying their resources or seizing valuable materials, augmentation weapons and personnel maybe attached to the assault element for a particular purpose. 3.5.3. Support Element. The support element of a combat patrol is tasked to provide supporting fires for the assault element en route at the objective. It is also ready to reinforce the assault element when necessary. 3.5.4. Security Element. The security element is present both in the reconnaissance and combat patrol and is responsible to provide early warning and protection to the other elements at the objective area. It is also tasked to isolate the objective and seal it off from enemy reinforcement. 3.5.6. Reconnaissance Element. This element of reconnaissance patrol is tasked to gather information by reconnoitering or conducting surveillance of the objective. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF COMMANDO PATROL see ppt. 3.6. Preparation and Execution Upon receipt of a patrol order from a higher headquarters, the patrol leader organizes his unit. He then designates the members of its individual tasking and their and specific duties and responsibilities. He later briefs his men of the detail as directed in the patrol orders and ensures that the following important subjects are covered. 3.6.1. Movement. The patrol must move with utmost security. It must avoid contact if possible, unless it is in accordance to the place. The patrol's mission could be compromised when premature or unexpected contact has been made. More so, it has no reserve or any other unit to assist it if contact is made. In this regard, lead elements should master the scouting techniques to be able to spot the enemy early and to avoid premature contact. How to Draw a Panoramic Sketch 1. 2. 3. 4.

Draw a horizon. Put prominent points. Put notes above prominent points. Give sketches a title and indicate azimuth of most prominent features

and place, date and time when made. 5. Affix signature. Contact in reconnaissance patrols. If contact is established, the emphasis should be to break away from the engagement 3.6.2. Primary and Alternate Routes. Patrol leaders must select a primary and at least one alternate route to and from the patrol objective. This routes should be divided into legs or section, which starts and ends at a recognizable terrain features. These techniques will enable the patrol leader to remain oriented during the progress of the patrol. 3.6.3. Checkpoints. Patrol leaders may also designate checkpoints along the route of patrol. These are recognizable features, which could guide the members of the patrols, particularly the navigator in finding out if the patrol is in the right course to the objective. Pre-selected checkpoints must be marked in the map and should be essential navigational aid. It may be in the form of terrain features or prominent man made objects such as; rivers, bridges, or towers. 3.6.4. Departure and Re-entry to Friendly Lines. The movement through friendly lines is one of the most critical parts of the patrol. The patrol leader must Pages 26 and 27 are missing ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF AREA RECONNAISSANCE See ppt (b) Area Reconnaissance. The objective is not clearly defined and located thus all teams of the Platoon is utilized for Reconnaissance. When entire patrol is used to reconnoiter the area, each team form both reconnaissance and security mission. When the teams are not required to the objective rallying point where they started, they assemble at some other designated rallying point. This method of assembly will be used when teams must avoid moving through an area twice or when the objective is approached from the rear. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF AREA RECONNAISSANCE See ppt

Section IV. RAID The size of the Commando Raiding Force depends on the mission, nature and location of the target and the enemy situation. The raid force may vary from a few personnel attacking a checkpoint or a position of unprotected railroad track to a battalion attacking a large supply depot. Regardless of size, the Raid force consists of three basic elements: Command, assault and security. 3.8. Organization 3.8.1. Command element. This element is normally composed of the force commander and personnel providing general support for the raid. Command elements are not normally assigned with specific duties with any elements. The command element maybe placed with any of the major elements of the raid force, and wherever the raid force commander may best influence and control action. When personnel who normally comprise a command element, they are assigned to that element, and no separate command element is organized. 3.8.2. Assault element. The assault element is organized as determined by the mission and what is needed to accomplish the major objectives of the raid. It consist of the main action group or assault team and special task detail. It may include a support team, if weapons and suitable firing position are available, to deliver neutralizing and supporting fires. 3.8.3. Security element. The security element supports the raid by securing rallying points, gives early warning of enemy approach, blocks avenues of approach in to the objective area, prevents enemy escape from the objective area, covers the withdrawal of the assault elements and acts as the rear guard for the raid force. The size of the security elements depends on the enemy's capability to intervene and disrupt the operations. 3.8.4. Organization of a Commando Raid Unit. In Raid utilizing the Unit. It is composed of the Command Element, 2 Commando Platoons as the Assault Element and 1 Support Platoon. Each Commando Platoon contains 1 ReconTeam and 6 Assault Teams. The Support Platoon contains the Heavy weapons Team, Medical Team, Commo Team and Special Equipment Maintenance / Transport Team. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF A COMMANDO RAID UNIT See ppt

Composition of Special Teams for Demo,. Search, POW, and Investigation shall be from the elements composing the 6 Assault Teams.

3.8.5. Organization of a Commando Raid Platoon. In a rail utilizing this unit and 3 Commando Teams serving as the Assault Team. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF A COMMANDO RAID PLATOON

See ppt

Composition of Special Teams for Demo, Search, POW and Investigation shall be from the elements composing the 3 Assault Team. 3.8.5. organization of a Commando Raid Section. In this raid, the Section is composed of Security element from the Reconnaissance team or from the Commando Team and an Assault element from the Commando Team. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF A COMMANDO RAID SECTION See ppt

3.9. Procedure of Raids a. As the assault element moves into position, security element keeps command group informed of all enemy activities, firing only if detected and or order from the command group. b. Once the assault element begins its action, the security element prevents enemy entry into or escape from the object area. c. The security element covers the withdrawal of the assault element to the rallying point, withdrawing itself on orders, upon a prearranged signal. 3.9.1. Movement. Movement to the objective area is planned and conducted to allow the raid force to approach the target undetected. Movement may be over single or multiple routes. Every effort is made to avoid contact with the enemy during movement. Upon reaching the designated rendezvous, security groups are deployed and final coordination takes place before the attack position. 3.9.2. Action in the objective area. Special task details move to their positions and eliminate sentries, breach of remove obstacles, and execute other assigned task. The main action group quickly follows the special task details into the target area. Once the objectives of the raid has been accomplished, the main action

group and special task details withdraw, covered by fire or by security element. If the attack is unsuccessful, the action is terminated to prevent undue loss of personnel and the special task detail withdraw according to plan. The assault element assembles at one or more rallying points while the security elements remain in position to cover the withdrawal according to plan. The assault element withdraws on signal or at a prearrange time. 3.9.2. Withdrawal. is designed to achieve maximum deception of the enemy and minimum danger of the raid force. Frequently, in withdrawal operation, the raid force may disperse in smaller units, withdrawing in different directions, and reassembling at a later time at a pre-designated place to conduct further operation. Elements of the raid force can conduct other operations, such as an ambush or pursuing enemy force, during the withdrawal. (a) The various elements of raid force withdraw, on order, on a predetermined routes to the base area, through a series of rallying points. (b) Should the enemy organize a close pursuit of the assault element, the security element assist by fire movement, distracting the enemy, and slowing him down. (c) If other elements of the raid force are closely pursued by the enemy they do not attempt to reach the rallying point; but, on their own initiative, they lead the enemy away from the remainder of the force and attempt to lose him by evasive action in difficult terrain. (d) Specific instruction must be issued to the raiding force concerning such contingencies. Time-distance to be traveled, fire support and fire power, and physical condition of the raiding force personnel are factors that will decide what course of action will follow. (e) The raid force, or elements of it, may separate and proceed as small groups or individual to evade close pursuit. Section V. AMBUSH AND COUNTER AMBUSH 3.10. Definition and Purpose 3.10.1. Definition. Ambushes are surprise attacks from concealed positions, used against moving or temporarily halted targets such as trains, convoys, mounted columns, dismounted columns, individual vehicles, carrying parties, and reconnaissance and combat patrols. In an ambush, the enemy sets the time and the attacker selects the place. 3.10.2. Purpose. Ambushes are executed to destroy or capture personnel and supplies, harass and demoralize the enemy, delay or block movement of personnel and supplies, and channel enemy movement by rendering certain routes untenable for traffic. Ambushes are executed to reduce the enemy's combat effectiveness by harassment and destruction. Guerilla operation conducted deep in the enemy's rear areas may result in the enemy concentrating the majority of his movements to principal routes of communication where such targets are more vulnerable to attack by other forces. A secondary result is an increase in the combat effectiveness of the guerilla force.

3.11. Ambush of Opportunity 3.11.1. General. An ambush of opportunity is one in which available intelligence and information does not permit detailed planning, i.e., information to the effect that the enemy has increase patrolling action, but no significant route or formations and time intervals have been observed. Course of Action. The guerilla force sending out reconnaissance elements to develop this information must prepare this elements to execute any several courses of action. Courses of action taken in an ambush of opportunity are based on the types of targets that may be encountered and must be rehearsed prior to departure from base. Course of action taken are determined when the opportunity for ambush arises. 3.11.2. Conduct of the Ambush. Depending on the number of personnel participating on the ambush of opportunity, the ambush force seals off access to prevent enemy reaction forces from overrunning it position. Escapes route open to enemy, once the ambush is enacted , are covered by automatic weapon fire, delivering a heavy volume of fire for a short time and withdrawing quickly and quietly. The force does not assault, except by fire and physical contact. If possible they avoid being seen by the enemy. 3.11.3. Withdrawal. Withdrawal from the ambush site is accomplished rapidly to successive rallying points. Individual snipers may be used as rear security elements, to impede and harass an enemy reaction force. Small elements may in to one or two- man groups to further confuse enemy pursuit. Each member of the ambush force must be aware of the assembly points of safe areas. 3.12. The Deliberate Ambush 3.12.1. General. A deliberate ambush may be planned for an enemy force on the move in or out of the guerilla unit's zone of responsibility, or against enemy targets which present themselves with regularity, moving over the same routes, departing and entering their own areas at the same points or other established patterns of activities. Within the guerilla units zone of responsibility. The size and organization of the ambush force depends on the purpose of the ambush, the force targets to be ambushed, and the weapons and equipment with which the ambushed will be executed. 3.12.2. Organization. The deliberate ambush force is organized into Headquarters element. Assault element and Security element: (a) Headquarters Element. This element is normally constituted into the same segments as the raid force but usually will assume its position with the main assault element in order to control the action at the ambush site. (b) Assault Element. This element conducts the main attack against the ambush target which includes halting the column, killing or capturing personnel, recovering

supplies and equipment, and destroying unwanted vehicles and supplies which cannot be moved. When additional support is required, a support element can be formed within the assault element. (c) Security Element. This element isolates the ambush site using roadblocks, other ambushes, and outposts. Security elements cover the withdrawal of the assault elements and act as the rear guard during the withdrawal. 3.12.3 Organization for Linear ambush by a Commando Platoon See ppt Linear Ambush- is used the situation and terrain permits or as a part of an area ambush along approach or escape routes. The “L” or “V”, etc., types are variations of this basic Linear Ambush. 3.12.4. Organization for Area Ambush by a Commando Platoon See ppt

* Will accompany one of the ambush teams at the objective. Area ambush- is used when enemy route is detail termined is a particular trail. Patrol is divided into teams to cover all approaches into the area. All teams will allow enemy to pass trough until they have entered the designated killing zone. Outlaying teams will cut off all guerrillas attempting to escape. Typical Employment of Area Ambush See ppt 3.12.5 Organization for Vehicular Ambush by a Commando Unit See ppt Vehicular Ambush- The attack force is composed at both assault and support element. Security teams could cover demolition or obstacles and provide early warning or cut off enemy attempting escape from killing zone. Typical Employment of Vehicular Ambush See ppt

3.12.6. Conduct of the Ambush (a) Movement. The ambush force move over pre selected routes to the ambush site. One of the rendezvous point usually are used to consolidate forces and secure extra equipment along the routes to the ambush site. Last minutes intelligence is also provided at this stops by reconnaissance elements. Final coordination of the ambush is made at the final rendezvous points. (b) Actions at the Ambush Site. (1) Troops are move to a forward assembly area near the ambush site, and security elements move out secure their position first, and then the assault and support elements, with the command group, move into place. (2) As the approaching enemy column is detected, or at a pre-designated time, the ambush commander makes the final decision whether or not to execute the ambush. This information depends on information not received that may include the size of the enemy column, guard and security measures, and estimated worth of the target in light of the primary mission. (3) If the decision is made to execute the ambush, advance guards are allowed to pass through the main position. When the head of the halted by fire, demolitions, or obstacles. At this signal the entire assault elements opens fire. (4) Designated detail engage the advance and rear guards to prevent reinforcement of the main column. The volume of tire is rapid and directed at enemy personnel exiting from vehicles and concentrated on vehicles mounting automatic weapons. (5) The support element utilizes antitank grenades, rockets launchers, and recoilless rifles against armored vehicles. Machine guns lay banks or fixed fire across escape routes. Mortal shells, hand and rifle grenades are fired into killing zone. (6) If an assault is part of the mission, it is launched under covering fire on a prearranged signal. (7) After enemy resistance has been nullified, special parties move into the column to recover supplies, equipment, and ammunition. (8) When the commander desires to terminate the action, because the mission either has been accomplished or superior enemy reinforcement are arriving, he withdraws the assault and support elements first and then security elements which cover the withdrawal of the assault and support elements. (9) Withdrawal. Withdrawal from the ambush site is similar to withdrawal form a raid in that the security elements cover the assault and support elements. 3.12.7. Other Actions. If the purpose of the ambush is to harass and demoralize the enemy, a different tactic may be adopted. The advance guard is selected as the target of the ambush and the fire of the assault elements is directed against them. Repeated attacks against enemy advance guard: (a) Cause the use of disproportionately strong forces in advance guard duties. This may leave other positions of the column vulnerable or require the diversion of additional troops to convoy duty. (b) Create an adverse psychological effect on the enemy troops, and the continued casualties suffered by the advance guard make such duty unpopular.

3.12.8. Considerations for a Successful Ambush: (a) Men must have effective fires from all position. (b) Well trained team that possess a high standard of battle discipline. (c) Simple, effective plan in which each man knows his duty. If possible, recon the area before-hand. Use caution to avoid disclosing your intent. (d) All around security in all phases of the operation. Be especially careful while returning to friendly lines or base camp. (e) Placement of men and sitting of weapons concealment is first priority. (f) A simple clearly understood signal to open fire and case firing. 3.12.9. Operation in Swamps and Forests. Dismounted elements normally conducts this operations. The complex of mangroves, ferns, and palms normally found in this areas offers excellent concealment to the enemy and he frequently uses them for base areas and safe havens. The enemy usually locates his installations in areas close to streams to utilize the waterways for transportation of supply and equipment. Elements conduct extensive operations in this areas to defeat the enemy or to deny him use of the waterways. (a) Execution (1) The enemy's arrival in the killing zone is the most crucial moment in an ambush. When he reaches the designated location in the zone, the order is given to open the fire. All weapons deliver a large volume of fire into the killing zone to inflict maximum casualties before the enemy can take cover. Fire continues until the enemy is annihilated or until a friendly assault element is committed. (2) The ambush commander often has to use assault elements to move through the ambush site, destroying equipment, searching the dead and performing other necessary duties. The assault begins with the lifting or shifting of supporting fires. (3) During ambushes, along waterways, the concussion from exploding offensive grenades thrown into the water produces casualties among swimmers. The assault elements then use boats to capture prisoners. (b) Use of Assault Boats 1) When transporting an ambush force, assault boats move stealthily by using paddles of or poles instead of motors of by drifting into position with the current of tide. When they move this way, the motor is fastened to the boat in the apt position, ready for immediate use. (2) Whether and ambush site is selected to cover a road, trail, or waterway, the ambush force debarks and occupies concealed positions. The boats are concealed, and designated crewmen remain in or near their craft prepared to assist in the ambush or in the withdrawal. (3) If the ambush site is on a tidal waterways, changes in the water level and the direction of flow are considered in the plan. A considerable change in water level may prevent withdrawal by boat.

3.13. Counter Ambush Tactics 3.13.1. Reaction to far ambush. When The patrol is ambushed and there is no way to effectively close-in with the enemy, every one drops and return fire to extricate those caught in the killing zone, then withdraws to the PRP or withdraws by bounds. When withdrawing by bounds, the team execute this using the buddy elements of the team - while the first buddy elements is moving, the over watching elements provides base of fire. 3.13.2. Reaction to near ambush. When the patrol is ambushed so close that maneuver or withdrawal will result to the complete destruction/annihilation of the team, stand fast and engage the enemy. If on a very vulnerable or disadvantageous position, the TL will automatically command "Assault". 3.13.3. Reaction to vehicular Ambush. As much as possible, the team, when mounted, dismounts and clears possible ambush sites. However, the enemy also changes their tactics and conducts ambuscades in unexpected in unexpected ambush areas. For this reason, one must always be prepared for any situation that may come up. Upon ambush the team will: (a) Return fire even if the enemy is not seen; (b) If the driver is alive and the road is not blocked, he must drive the vehicle out of the killing zone instead of jumping out; (c) If the driver is alive and the road is blocked, he must drive the vehicle right through the ambushers; (d) If the driver was killed and the vehicle stops at the killing zone, troops on the near side provide base fire as the rest jumps out of the vehicle and maneuver; (e) Maximize use of grenades (specially smoke) to counter the ambush; and, (f) Most important is get out of the killing zone by fire and maneuver. 3.13.4. Riverine Counter-ambush tactics: a) The riverine environment offers the enemy many opportunities for ambushes. The population provides a cover for enemy ambush forces movement into and occupation of ambush sites. Accordingly, the riverine area rarely is considered secured and counter-ambush measures are planned in conjunction with all operations and movements. (b) When moving through open or broken terrain, security elements are employed to the front, rear, and flanks of the moving column, out to the maximum effective range of small arms fire. In wooded areas, security elements are minimum of 200 meters forward and must cover a front broad enough to prevent a line ambush, in which the long axis of the enemy parallels the direction of movement. The forward security elements are far enough to the front to allow the main body to deploy without serious interference from the enemy. When movements is along a canal or river, units may take advantage of adjacent canals to move security elements. (c) Routes of movements are reconnoitered in detail from the air by map and, if possible, by small reconnaissance patrols. Air observation is valuable, but is not a

substitute for a ground reconnaissance. An ambush force, once in place and camouflaged, is not likely to be detected from the air. (d) Local activities along roads or waterways are carefully observed to detect unusual patterns of behavior. No children in the area or no vehicular or boat traffic may indicate the presence of an enemy ambush force if the mission permits, frequent questioning of local civilians about recent enemy activities in the vicinity maybe advantageous. (e) Security is maintained from the beginning to the end of any movement; and dispersion, combat formations and observation are emphasized. Troops have tendency to relax and become careless when returning to a base area from an operation. This tendency increases as the units near the base area. 3.13.5. Counter-ambush actions on land. (a) When a unit is caught in an ambush, troops return fire in their assigned sector. The unit is organized to cover the entire area with a large volume of fire, and troops gain and maintain fire superiority. The unit increases speed and continuous movement unless the road is blocked. If movement stops, troops return fire immediately with organic weapons and follow-up with an assault on the primary ambush, using their individual weapons and supporting fires. Units entirely in the kill zone assault and overrun the ambush position. When only part of the unit is caught in the killing zone the elements not in contact act as maneuver force and attack the flanks and rears of the ambush. Personnel continue to fire even after the enemy cease fire to prevent the enemy's recovery of weapons and bodies. After overcoming the ambush, the area is searched to ensure that the ambush site is clear. (b) Troops moving through suspect areas carry offensive grenades, which they immediately throw toward the enemy when ambushed. Enemy ambush forces often hide at very close range and assault only after the friendly force has been attacked by long range fire. Offensive grenades may inflict heavy casualty on the concealed force and often prevent it from assaulting. (c) The immediate reaction plan provides for an assault to overrun the enemy positions. Enemy ambush forces often fire from only one flank to make the friendly forces to take cover in a mined area or killing zone. An assault toward the enemy normally lessens friendly casualties. 3.13.6. Counter-ambush tactics during water movement. (a) Even though suspected ambush site along waterways have been attacked by artillery or close air support fires, ambushes maybe encountered. The enemy generally select ambush site on waterways at point where maneuvering is difficult and the channel either brings the craft well over to one bank or restricts them in a narrow channel. Ambush forces usually hide in dense vegetation; but, in some areas they conceal themselves along dikes or in tall grass. High banks provide advantageous firing positions above the river craft and limit the range of friendly direct fire. Avenues of withdrawal are normally available to the enemy. Mudflats, steep banks, or slippery shores, hinder friendly troops assaulting from the river.

(b) Normally, the friendly units counters the ambush with suppressive fire and forward movements; it commits an element to suppress the ambush while the main body moves to the killing zone. The alternative course of action is to commit the entire unit in a coordinated attack to assault and annihilate the ambush force. The mission, the forces available, and the relative size of the ambush force determine the tactic to employ. (c) If a commander plans to counter the ambush with suppressive fire and forward movement, his plan includes the designation of ships and watercraft to take the ambush force under fire. The plan also includes instructions on the use of heavy weapons and close air support. If the unit's mission specifies destruction of any ambush forces encountered en route, plans are necessary to land elements for this purpose and to commit blocking forces or reserves. 3.13.7. Reaction to Enemy Fire. (a) The reaction of troops moving in assault boats to fires from an enemy outpost or ambush depends on the mission. When the mission requires avoiding contact, continued movement by waterway maybe extremely difficult. The waterborne element may wait until darkness and then move under cover of the opposite bank. It may be necessary to dismount and continue the movement on foot. (b) When the commander has authority to fight, he has possible courses of action. (1) When time is critical the element maintains forward movement and executes a coordinated plan for suppressive fire on the enemy position. (2) An assault team may attack the ambush force or place a smokescreen between it and the boats. When possible, the ambush force and enemy position are overrun. (c) A mission to seek out and eliminate enemy forces encountered requires a more deliberate attack on the enemy force. For example, when the leading boat comes under enemy fire, personnel in the two lead boats beach their craft and return the enemy's fire .The element leader goes ashore and, using all available cover and concealment, moves forward to reconnoiter the ambush site. He decides how best to use his force to destroy the enemy position quickly. By radio or arm and hand signal, he orders the element to beach all boats and to move forward. At least one automatic weapon remains at the boat assembly area. Boat operators protect their boats with automatic or individual weapons. After capture and destruction of enemy, the element continues the mission.

Section VI. WATERBORNE OPERATIONS 3.14. Mission. The equipage of a Commando unit with boats perform missions similar to those assigned for dismounted units in other areas. Boats increase mobility and permit units to operate at greater speed; cover greater distances; and carry more equipment, weapons, and ammunition. Personnel conducted reconnaissance and security tasks, maintaining contact between friendly units, and clearing blocked waterways can use the boats effectively. Units using boats for transportation, secure and hold key terrain features or relieve or reinforce isolated units. Boats may transport part of a larger force that uses other means of transportation for combat operations. The Command Unit normally use assault boats on relatively securing routes and not for assaults on known enemy positions. 3.15. Organization. The Commando Team which is composed of eight (8) men, samely composed the boat crew of a Waterbome Unit - a coxswain, navigator, and six (6) paddlers/observers. This paddlers/observers are located along each gunwale and the coxswain is located in the stern while the Navigator is at the bow. The starboard paddlers are numbered ONE, THREE and FIVE; the Port paddlers are numbered TWO, FOUR, and SIX from bow to stem. The Coxswain is crew member number seven and the navigator is crew member number eight. If additional passengers are carried, they are numbered consecutively from bow to stem starting with number nine. All boat team members are addressed by number. When the coxswain wishes to address a command to a pair of paddlers, he may use the terms "ONES", "TWOS", or "THREES" indicating crew members Number ONE and TWO, THREE and FOUR, and FIVE and SIX, respectively. (See Figure 2)

See ppt

See ppt

3.16. Duties and Responsibilities of Crew. (a) Number ONE is the stroke. He sets the rate of paddling and maintains the paddling rhythm as directed by the coxswain. He assist the coxswain in keeping the boat perpendicular to the breaker line when beaching or launching the boat. He assist the coxswain in avoiding obstacle in the water. He observes sector 12-2. (b) Number TWO also assist the coxswain in keeping the boat perpendicular to the breaker line and in avoiding obstacle. He handles the towline and quick release line during towing operations. He observes sector 10 - 12. (c) Number THREE and FOUR are responsible for lashing and unloading equipment in the boat. They are used as scout-swimmers during tactical boat

landings, if scout-swimmers are not carried as passengers. They observes sectors 24 and 8-10 respectively. (d) Number FIVE and SIX assist in lashing the unloading equipment in the after section of the boat. They assist the coxswain in maneuvering in swift currents. They rig and handle the sea anchor. They observe sectors 4-6 and 6-8 respectively. (e) Number SEVEN, the coxswain is responsible for the performance of the crew and the handling of the boat. He is responsible for the distribution of equipment and passengers in the boat. He issues all commands to crew members, and maintains force and speed, and operates the outboard motor if it is used. (f) Number eight serves as the air guard for immediate frontal security observations and the depth of the water. 3.17. Movement. (a) For administrative moves on extremely wide rivers, boats normally move along the center of the river beyond the range of effective small-arms fire. On narrower waterways, to take advantage of natural concealment, movement is as close to the shoreline as is consistent with the water mine threat. With the employment of 2 or more boats, this boats shall always maintain a relative position in their formation and operate as a team, moving from one observation point to another. Sharp bends in a river frequently obscure the view of the river ahead. Personnel from one of the boats go ashore to reconnoiter the river beyond the curve, Automatic weapons from the other boats cover the personnel ashore. Footprints along the banks of the waterway indicate the presence of enemy troops; waterfowl, suddenly alarm and lying toward the unit, usually indicate the movement of humans along the river. (b) The element leader may order halt to send messages, rest, eat, or reconnoiter specific areas. The area selected for a halt should provide cover, concealment, and good firing positions in favor of defense. The element maintains all-round security and continues to improve the position until it departs. (c) Secrecy of movement is difficult when using a motor and traveling against the current. At night, motor noise can be heard up to eight kilometers away. Movement with the current, without using the motor, reduces noise. (d) Movement maybe continuous, by successive bounds, of by alternate bounds. 3.18. Tactical Landings. As the boat approaches the surf zone, the coxswain send in his scout swimmers. The coxswain commands, "twos out" and crew members three and four enter the water and swim to the beach. Scout swimmers must avoid splitting a breaker line or foam line because such splitting result in their being silhouetted against a white foam background. The scout swimmers determines the presence or absence of enemy in the landing area, usually by moving singly about 50 meters in opposite directions after they reach beach. When they have determine that the landing area is free of

enemy, they signal the boat team that the landing area is clear usually by using filtered, hooded flashlight for a pre- arranged light signal. The scout swimmers signal from the point selected by them as most suitable for landing. After signaling the boat, the scout swimmers move in opposite directions away from the landing point to established listening and observation position. These security positions are at the limit of visibility from the landing point. When the boat team receives the signal from the scout swimmers, the coxswain orders to beach the boat at the point from which the signal originated. After the boat is ditched, it is hidden and camouflaged. 3.19. Tactical Withdrawals. During the initial exchange of recognition signals with the recovery vessel, the Commando boat team remain hidden near the boat cache during this exchange. The coxswain then orders a pair of scouts forward to determine if the withdrawal area is clear of enemy. These scouts reconnoiter the cache to see if it has been disturbed and observe the beach for the presence of enemy. After they have reported that the area is clear, the coxswain orders to prepare the boat for withdrawal. In some cases, this will require that the boat be inflated from air bottles or hand pumps. During this preparation, post individual scouts just short of the limit of visibility from the cache to warn of the approach of enemy. Usually, one observer is posted at each flank of the withdrawal area while the coxswain observes the route previously taken by the boat team on their way to the cache. The coxswain orders to launch the boat. Section VII. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS 3.20. Parachute operations. The great advantage of parachute operations is that they provide rapid, nearly simultaneous, delivery of a force on any terrain which is relatively free of obstacles. Disadvantage are the extensive special training and specialized equipment required, time required for assembly and reorganization after landing, and the weight penalty paid for parachutist and delivery kits. It is essential that airborne troops land on or as close to their objectives as possible. Such forces usually are employed in areas where there are few fixed defenses and a few well organized enemy combat troops. These condition facilitate rapid seizure of initial objectives. The vulnerability of air-dropped troops landing and reorganization, plus their reduced ground mobility, requires a force large enough and having a sufficient equipment to carry out the mission. The need for significant mass to seize and hold a ground objective normally requires that the assault be made from aircraft formation. The loading of airborne forces and equipment should be planned to ensure that arrival in the objective area is in the desired sequence for the employment in the ground action. 3.21. Air Landed Operations 3.21.1. Mission

(a) Certain phases of an operation, or even the entire operation may be accomplished by the delivery of troops and equipment to the objective area by air landing. This method offers the following advantages: (1) More economical use of available airlift; (2) Capability for delivery of larger, heavier items; (3) A readily available means of evacuation; (4) A greater degree of tactical integrity and the capability for more rapid employment of units after landing; and (5) The capability of using units with a minimum of special training and specialized equipment. (b) Air landing, however, has the following disadvantages: (1) Moderately level, unobstructed landing zone with adequate soil traffic ability are required; and (2) More time is required for delivery of a given size force than when delivery is by parachute. This is especially so, for small restricted landing facilities is generally required. 3.21.1. Organization for Movement. (a) The tactical integrity of participating units is a major consideration in an air landed operation. In situations where air landed units are expected to engage in combat upon landing, small units are landed organizationally intact with weapons, ammunitions, and personnel in the same aircraft whenever possible. Joint planning emphasizes placement as close to objective as possible, consistent with availability of landing zones and the operational capability of the tactical aircraft employed. Because of the vulnerability of the aircraft on the ground, unloading is accomplished as rapidly as possible. (b) The composition of loads of air landing serials of individual aircraft depends upon the airborne commander's requirements for varying degrees of mass and on the capability of available air facilities to support the given rate of delivery. These factors may also dictate a general sequence of airlift operations in an area. 3.21.2. Landing Procedures. (a) Air-landed elements which are preceded by parachute elements follow this elements as closely as possible and land on zones in proximity to parent unit they are to support. In re supply operations supplies and equipment are delivered at a preplanned rate to locations within the objective area which require a minimum of further movement and handling. The speed which air landed elements are delivered into the objective area depends largely upon the availability, capacity, and security of landing zones or other air facilities.

(b) The Air Force and ground commanders prepare plans and provide the means to cope with the problems of disabled aircraft on landing zones. The ground unit commander provides assistance in the movement of disabled aircraft that would otherwise interfere with landing operations. Section VIII. Airmobile Operations (Heliborne) 3.22. General. Airmobile operations are those in which combat forces and their equipment move about the battlefield in air vehicles under the control of a ground force commander to engage is ground combat. With this direct control or airlift, exercised through operations center channels, employment of combat elements is more responsive to changes in the tactical situation. Without it, advantages such as flexibility, surprise and immediate execution of orders would suffer. Airmobile operations include airlift of units in the combat zone and the air movement of equipment and supplies. 3.23. Missions. (a) Seizure and retentions of key terrain. (b) Isolate pocket resistance. (c) Conduct diversionary actions. (d) Raids. (e) Long range combat patrol. (f) Deep reconnaissance, observation and surveillance. (g) Counter guerilla operations. 3.24. Limitations. (a) Adverse weather conditions may curtail the use of aircraft. (b) Limited support weapons, heavy equipment and means of communication. (c) Limited capability to engage in sustained combat. (d) Lack of vehicular mobility. (e) Vulnerability to enemy action during landing, assembly and pick-up. (f) Loss of element of surprise. 3.25. Land loading procedure (Enplaning). Aircraft loading is with the maximum speed commensurate with safety. (a) On signal from troop loading officer or troop loading assistant at the loading site in the ready circle, the hell-team approaches the aircraft on the double with heli-team commander leading and the assistant commander bringing up the rear.

(b) The heli-team commander ensures that team members are in proper sequence within the column to facilitate rapid loading of equipment. (c) Upon reaching the entrance of the helicopter, the heli-team commander takes a position outside, sling rifle and assist team members to enplane. (d) Personnel enter the aircraft carries the rifle with their hands. (e) The passengers will pass from the heli-team commander to the troop leading assistant or flight deck guide. (f) When seated, each member places his rifle between the knees, fasten safety belts and raises his right arm to signal the heli-team commander that he is ready to take-off. (g) When the heli-team commander sees that all members are ready to be airborne, he either gives the crew chief thumbs up signal or taps the pilot's shoulder to signal him to take-off. (h) Crew served weapons are loaded as follows: (1) Light machine gun. Is loaded in three main loads; the gun group, the tripod and spare barrel case all carried by individual members like the rifle. (2) The 3.5 inch rocket launcher is placed under the seat immediately inside the rear of the cargo door. (3) 81 MM mortar is loaded in two components; the complete base plate and the tube, and the bipod assembly. 3.26. Deplaning Procedure. When approaching the landing zone, the pilot or crew chief will orient the heli- team commander as to the direction of north, south, east and west. They must try to establish for the heli-team commander his position in relation to an object that is well known to him on the ground. When the aircraft has landed, or crew chief will signal disembark. Personnel will unfasten safety belts and unload cautiously and rapidly to ensure that the aircraft is not exposed for a long period of time on the landing zone. 3.27. Conduct of assault. (a) Initially involves seizing and establishing landing site. Each squad of the first wave will be assigned a sector of responsibility of all or part of the landing site upon deplaning. The squad will destroy enemy elements located in the sector. (b) Seizure of the landing site. When the desired area is seized, the squad will set-up hasty defense to ensure the initial landing zone security. The squad leader accomplishes the reorganization and control, contact with friendly unit should be established as rapidly as possible. (c) Follow-up. Units landed in succeeding waves are employed as necessary to ensure seizure of the landing zone. If not required, they prepare for further offensive action to accomplish assigned mission. Section X. Close Air Support (CAS) Operations 3.28. General.

This section provides doctrine guidance to SAP unit commanders and staff officers in requesting and directing close air support (CAS). The CAS consists of air attacks against hostile targets which are in close proximity to SAP troops and which require detail integration of each air mission with the fire and maneuver of those forces. The CAS missions maybe executed by aircraft of the AFP and PNP air units. This section discusses that CAS provided by the tactical air unit of other services, which is used when SAP fire support means cannot fire on the target or when the added firepower of tactical fighter craft is necessary to obtain the results desired. 3.29. Priorities. (a) Priority I - are those targets that are preventing or are immediately capable of preventing the execution of the plan of action; e.g., enemy mortar fire or enemy columns moving up in sufficient force to penetrate SAP lines. (b) Priority II - Are those targets that are seriously interfering with the execution of the plan of action; e.g., a target that is delaying SAP troop movement or is causing heavy casualties during the movement. (c) Priority III - are those targets that are capable of ultimate serious interference with the execution of the plan of action; e.g., a target can able to execute a counter-attack against SAP troops during or after the movement. (d) Priority V - are those targets that are capable of only limited interference with the execution of the plan of action or influence thereon. 3.30. Procedures in directing an aircraft. (a) Direct the attention of the pilot to a prominent landmark »ear the target. (b) Use the clock method in locating your position to the pilot. The nose of the aircraft is designated as 12 o'clock and the rear is 6 o'clock. (c) Once the pilot identifies your location, describe the target in terms of direction and distance (e.g., from my position, target is 300 meters bearing 15 degrees northeast). (d) In the absence of communication to the aircraft, use panels to identify your location and the enemy. Panel should be in form of arrow pointing towards the enemy. (e) When the pilot says "cleared hot", it means that he has identified the correct target and is cleared to attack it. (f) When the pilot says "Stop, Stop, Stop" it means that he has identified the wrong target and not to attack. Section XI. TRAINING 3.31. SAF Commando Course.

This is the foundation course of every SAP operator and the result of the integration of Ranger and Reconnaissance Course. This focuses on small unit tactics and the acquisition of skills necessary for such operation. 3.32. Basic Airborne Course This course is meant to train Commandos on air insertion and exfiltration. 3.33. Basic Underwater Search, Rescue and Recovery Operations Course This course is meant to train Commandos on underwater operations.

CHAPTER 4 CIVIL DISTURBANCE MANAGEMENT Section I. INTRODUCTION Civil disturbances have been thought of exclusively riots, and this concept has had a direct bearing on the planning, training, and operation of civilian and military control forces. However, The term " civil disturbances, " with its connotation of illegal activity, is sometimes used to include a broad range of confrontations which vary in intensity (and purpose) from a peaceful assembly in public place to violent and destructive attack on people and property. This requires that agencies which have a control force mission develop responses based on the variable nature of the threat and provide for a degree of flexibility and selectivity. The past emphasis on the violent aspects has often resulted in control force responses which could, or did, aggravate rather than reduce the problem. Some demonstrations such as picketing or "marches," usually conducted as authorized by a permit, are legitimate form of protest and generally should not be classed as disturbances even though some elements of inconvenience to the public is involved. However, the possibility exist that a clique within the group demonstrators, or factions not connected with the group, will take advantage of the opportunity to escalate the occasions to the higher levels of disorder. Therefore, the management of civil disturbances must be based on the peculiarities of each situation. Section II. OBJECTIVES The management of civil disturbance in a free society is difficult, demanding task that requires careful preparations and exact execution of control force. The control force must be capable of applying any one or combination of the task and techniques discussed in this chapter. The commander must be prepared to select which of these task and techniques would be proper response to successfully manage the particular disturbance confronting his command. An improper or poorly executed control force of response could have the effect of increasing the intensity of disturbance. 4.1. Ultimate Objective Restoration of Order. The ultimate objective of a police force committed to the management of civil disturbances is the restoration of state of law and order." Law and Order " is a relative term that can be generated to the state of normalcy in the community. This objective includes the pursuing a course of action which contributes to the long- term maintenance of law and order. Control force action which accomplishes immediate control only at the price increased social hostilities and potentially greater future violence should be avoided and alternative responses should be sought. 4.2. Interim Objective

Intensity Reduction. In many civil disturbances full control cannot be attained immediately. The commander must reduce the intensity of disturbance to lower level that can be realistically attained, given all the conditions and variables influencing that particular situation. The interim objective is essentially a compromise. On the one hand, the control force must avoid attempting to impose a degree of control beyond its actual capabilities or through provocative measures of force, lest it only worsen the situation. On the other hand the, control force must take effective active action to attain an acceptable degree of security and continued functioning of threatened community. Factors which may influence or necessitate the decision to seek an interim objectives are: (a) Magnitude of Confrontation - The size or the extent of many disturbances may make the enforcement of all laws impossible in affected areas. (b) Readiness of Reserve Forces - In the initial stages of confrontation, the capability of control forces will be fairly limited, pending the assembly of additional forces and the erection of field facilities. (c) Time of Day - During the certain hours of the day, large number of bystanders or hangers-on can be expected to be present at a confrontation making their potential involvement an important factor. Section lll. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT 4.3. Organization See ppt 4.4. Composition (a) 1 Company Commander (b) 1 Deputy and Ex-0 (c) 2 Platoon Leaders (d) 88 Elements 4.5. Equipment (a) Rattan Stick (b) Wricker Shield (c) Kevlar (d) Body Armored Vest (e) Pistol (for Security Team) (f) Rifle (for Security Team) (g) Whistle (for Platoon Leader) (h) Handcuff (i) Gas Mask (j) Tear Gas (k) Water Canon (1 per Company)

Section IV. OPERATIONAL TASKS AND APPROACHES In any civil disturbance control operation certain tasks must be accomplished to achieve the ultimate objective of restoring and maintaining law and order. To do this, action must be taken to gain control of the situation. Control forces must perform certain tasks that will develop a physical and psychological environment which will permit law enforcement personnel to enforce the law and maintain order. The importance of having a high degree of flexibility and selectivity in the response cannot be over-emphasized. It is equally important that the operational tasks be selected only after a careful evaluation of the situation. This evaluation must consider the uniqueness of the situation. In this respect, the commander selects those tasks which are most likely to reduce the intensity of the confrontation by effectively managing the given situation. Therefore, not all tasks will apply in all situations, but control force commanders and unit leaders must identify those tasks which must be performed and then develop plans and procedures for their accomplishment. 4.6. Operational Tasks (a) Isolate the area (b) Secure likely Targets (c) Control crowds (d) Establish area control (e) Neutralize special threats 4.7. Integrated Tasks (a) Gather, record and report information (b) Apprehend violators (c) Maintain communications (d) Maintain mobile reserves (e) Inform the public (f) Protect fire service operations (g) Process detained personnel 4.8. Operational Approaches (a) The commitment of SAF Personnel must be viewed as a last resort. Their role, therefore, should never be greater than is absolutely necessary under the particular circumstances which prevail. This does not mean, however, that the number of troops employed should be minimized. On the contrary, the degree of force required to control a disturbance is frequently inversely proportionate to the number of available personnel. Doubts concerning the number of troops required, therefore, should normally be resolve in favor of large numbers since the presence of such large numbers may prevent the development of situations in which the use of deadly force is necessary. A large reserve of troops should be maintained during civil disturbance operations. The knowledge that a large reserve force is available

builds morale among law enforcement personnel and contributes toward preventing overreaction to provocative acts by disorderly persons. (b) In selecting an operational approach to a civil disturbance situation, the commander and his staff must adhere scrupulously to the "minimum necessary force" principle; for example, crowd control formations or riot control agents should not be used if saturation of area with manpower would suffice. (c) Every effort should be made to avoid appearing as an alien invading force and to present the image of a restrained and well-disciplined force whose sole purpose is to assist in restoration of law and order with a minimum loss of life and property and due respect for those citizens whose involvement may be purely accidental. Further, while control force personnel should be visible, tactics or force concentrations which might tend to excite rather than to calm should be avoided where possible. (d) Consistent with the controlling principle that he must use only the minimum force necessary to accomplish his mission, the commander armed his troops with the following; (1) Rattan Stick. The Rattan Stick is most effective in a crowd control operation and is considered the primary weapons for such operations. The Rattan Stick is considered to be an offensive weapon with reduced lethality and, unlike the rifle, the loss of a Rattan Stick to the crowd does not create a serious threat. In order to insure that additional levels of force are immediately available, units committed with the Rattan Stick must have riot control agent disperser teams (security teams) and selected marksmen in direct support. Except with extremely violent crowds, the Rattan Stick in the hands of well-trained personnel is the most appropriate weapon. (2) Wricker Shield. The Wricker Shield is a very effective and protective equipment against violent attack, throwing of rocks, beating and the like, by the demonstrator. The Wricker Shield may serve also as the temporary wall when so arranged as in setting up of umbrella. At instances when fire truck starts pouring pressurized water to the piles of demonstrators, the Wricker Shield can be used as an umbrella against the water. (3) Kevlar. The kevlar serve as the protection from flying objects thrown or beating by the crowd. At a certain level, it can also serve as a protection from intended and accidental fires. (4) Handcuff. The handcuff will be utilized for keeping arrested violent demonstrators or initiators of violence within the crowd. Section V. CONTROL PRINCIPLES 4.9. Civil Disturbance Past experience in civil disturbance control operations has identified seven principles of greatest value and broadest application in successfully controlling a civil disturbance. The principles, as discussed in this section, have no order or priority of application. With one exception, the degree of importance of each varies according

to the particular circumstances of specific disorder. The exception is the principle of minimum force which is applicable in full measure to every disturbance situation. (a) Threat Awareness. The successful and efficient employment of CDM Contingent forces is vitally dependent on timely, accurate information. Too often, however, the analysis of potential disturbances has been predominantly, if not entirely, based on organization, intentions, and activities of the demonstrators. In this respect, responses have been based on the perceived intentions and activities of the more vocal and militant but much smaller element without proper consideration of the reaction of the numerous, more peaceful participants or on-looker to such a response. Additional, equal attention must be given to as appraisal of how the affected community will respond to likely demonstrator's actions-and to the reactions of control forces. If the control force reacts in a manner which alienates the people in the community, the intensity of the disturbance could be increased. (b) Professional Imagery. In many civil disturbance situations, the demonstrators and the control force are, in effect, competing for the sympathy of the general public. The demonstrators seek to increase participation in the disturbance; the control force seeks to prevent involvement in the general public. The establishment of a favorable professional image by the control force which would weigh public sympathy in their favor is great advantage. Conversely, an unfavorable or unpopular image would increase the control force's problems and abet the aims of the dissidents. A favorable control force image is established by skillful performance of duty, discipline, courtesy, and the application of the principles discussed in this section. (c) Coordinate Preparation. Many civil disturbances involve control forces from different Police Units and Law Enforcement Organization. The success and efficiency of these diverse forces are dependent upon their working in harmony and mutual support towards common objectives. The spontaneous attainment of such coordinated action during a period of crisis is unlikely. Thorough and timely coordinated preparation will be required in which these diverse forces conduct essential planning and training for joint operations. (d) Operational Unity. The employment of diverse control forces from different governmental jurisdictions poses distinct supervisory problems. Unlike Police operations under a single command, civil disturbance operation may have no single commander with the requisite authority to direct all control forces. Where unity of command cannot be achieve, operational unity should be sought through such means as collocating operational centers, integrating communications systems, and delineating organizational responsibilities. (e) Public Acceptance. Inherent in civil disturbances is the possibility that certain actions by the control force may not be accepted by the general public; this then may cause presently uninvolved bystanders to support the demonstrators, thereby increasing the intensity of the activities of the demonstrators. Recognizing these possibilities, control forces must avoid actions which tend to produce greater harm than benefit. The selection of response which will serve to reduce the intensity of the situation requires that long range as well as immediate consequences be considered and that unnecessary actions offensive to community sensibilities be avoided.

(f) Objectivity-Neutrality. The objective of civil disturbance control in a free society is the restoration of law and order, not the imposition of punishment or the suppression of peaceful dissent. The conduct of the control forces must be emotionally objective and politically neutral, despite whatever personal feeling or political beliefs they hold as individuals. This outward display of objectivity-neutrality is particularly important where the demonstrators' actions are expressly designed to provoke the type of personal, unlawful control force reaction that would create greater support for the demonstrators. (g) Minimum Force (1) The commitment of SAF Contingent to support other law enforcement agencies must be considered as a serious condition, and their involvement must be limited to that degree justified by necessity. Unlike combat operations where the use of overwhelming firepower is desirable, civil disturbance control operations must be accomplished with minimum injury to persons or damage to property. The use of force must be restricted to the minimum degree consistent with mission accomplishment. The use of excessive or unnecessary force may subject the responsible person to civil or criminal liability and may serve to increase public sympathy for the demonstrators. (2) The commitment of large numbers of personnel in a civil disturbance operation should not be misconstrued as the application of unnecessary force or the application of more than minimum force. Early and massive commitment of personnel has in the past prevented, in many instances, the escalation of a low level civil disturbance into a violent confrontation. (3) When actually committing forces to a civil disturbance operation, consideration must be given to the relative merits of deploying forces in maximum number on a "high visibility" or "low visibility basis. There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches; however, the determining factor should be the mood and intent of the dissident element-the approach that is expected to reduce the intensity of their actions and preclude the involvement of subsequently greater numbers. 4.10. Crowds or Mobs (a) General. Civil disturbance operations, especially those conducted extended periods, will require control forces to confront a variety of crowds. The appropriate manner of controlling various types of crowds will be influenced by many variables, These include: (1) (2) (3) (4)

The current intensity level of the civil disturbance Public opinion Current policies Crowd mood, intent, composition and activity

(5) Capabilities and readiness of control forces. (6) Immediate and long range benefits of control force action. (7) Weather, terrain, and time of day (b) Crowd Control Options. Considerations of the variables listed above will indicate to the control force commander the general nature of the most appropriate manner of controlling a particular crowd. In general terms, four crowd control options are available to the commander, based on his objectives with a particular crowd. These options are available to provide the commander with flexibility of action. In order to enhance this flexibility there are numerous techniques available from which the commander may select and employ in various combinations in order to produce the desired results within the framework of the selected crowd control option. Combined with flexibility of arming control force personnel with either the Rattan Stick or rifle, the commander has the capability of selectively tailoring his response for whatever crowd situation with which is confronted. A prime consideration in selecting an option or options will be the effect of the response on reducing the intensity of the existing situation. The four crowd control option are listed below: (c) Monitor. This option consists of watching the crowd's progress and development by control force teams. Monitoring enables the commander to gauge the crowd's activity and intent in relation to the larger civil; disturbance and possibly influence the crowd through persuasive means. While monitoring activities will be employed throughout the crowd control operation, this portion is particularly appropriate for nonviolent demonstrations where more decisive actions is not feasible because of crowd size or where the intensity of the situation might escalate. This option is also appropriate as an interim measure pending the arrival of the additional control forces. Techniques for accomplishing this option includes passive observation of the crowd, and communication of interest and intent to leaders. (d) Disperse. This option consists of action taken to fragment a crowd and is specially applicable to small crowd situations in a congested urban environment. Its selection should include the consideration that such dispersion may increase and spread lawlessness rather than reduce it. Therefore, the commander should establish control over the routes of dispersal, and the areas or areas into which he plans to disperse the crowd; provide security for those facilities which might become likely targets for small groups; and be prepared to follow-up the dispersal operation with the apprehension of small group still active in the area. Techniques for accomplishing this option would include the proclamation, show of force, use of crowd control formations, and use of riots control agents. (e) Contain. This option consists of restraining a large number of individuals within the area they are presently occupying, thereby containing any further aggressive activity. This option would be appropriate in college campus situation to prevent demonstrators from spreading out to the surrounding communities and to prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the campus. Containment would also

be appropriate option where the systematic apprehension of crowd members is contemplated. Crowd control formations, perimeter patrols, and barricades compromises the techniques for this option. (f) Block. This option consists of the physical denial of a crowd's advance upon a facility or area which is the potential or actual target of dissident activity. Crowd control formations, principally the line, and barricades are the most appropriate techniques for this option. Barricades such as vehicles, concertina wire, and water filled barrels, can be erected to block or channelize the movement of the crowd. These devices, when used in combination with troops and other crowd control techniques, are useful in accomplishing the options of containment or blocking. 4.11. Police Response in Crowd Control (a) Police Response during the Planning and Formative Stage (1) Negotiate with demonstrator leaders (2) Police authorities send intermediaries (3) Send Intel agents (b) Police Response during Initial and Peaceful Stage (1) Allow demonstrators to supervise themselves (2) Allow private volunteers to supervise demonstrators (3) A show of force by the Police (c) Police Response During the Riotous Stage (1) Use respected civic leaders to appeal to the rioters to disperse (2) Use of police formations and arrests (3) Use of Military force - only as reserve (4) Use of additional forces (security team) (5) Use of special types of less lethal weapons and ammunitions (6) Use of horses and canines in crowd control (d) Response During the Violent Stage (1) Police stay away from violent demonstrators (2) Use of respected community leaders to persuade the demonstrators to stop the violence and surrender (3) Use of deadly force when necessary (e) Post Demonstration Stage (1) Main police force withdraws from the demonstrators area (2) Police maintains a show of force in the area. 4.12. Objective (a) This task encompasses the restriction and sealing off of the disturbed area. The objectives of isolation are to prevent the escape of individuals bent on expanding the disturbance, to expedite the departure of the uninvolved, and to exclude unauthorized personnel from entering the affected area. To prevent the

disorder from expanding in size and intensity, it is critical to preclude an influx of additional demonstrators or curious onlookers into the disturbed area. (b) When Special Action Force personnel are committed to assisting the civil authorities in controlling civil disturbances, the situation will be beyond the capability of local law enforcement agencies and a scene of major disorder should be expected. This disorder may be characterized by large groups penetrating line of defenses without inflicting injuries to other CDM units and generally causing havoc in the area or it may be characterized by large group participating in varying degrees of illegal conduct. The initial action taken by CDM contingent to control the disorder is critical and should include the immediate isolation of the disturbed area. (c) The initial commitment of control forces personnel may be required to clear a building or an area to isolate the individuals creating the disturbance from those not yet motivated or actively involved. The primary emphasis should be on identifying what area and who has to be isolated. 4.13. Techniques There are several techniques of accomplishing the isolation of disturbed area: (a) Barricades and Roadblocks. Barricades and roadblocks are physical barriers which deny or limit entry into and exit from the disturbed area. They can be used totally to deny passage of people and vehicles to pass. They must be positioned so as to preclude their being bypassed surrounded, or cut off from support. In many cases it maybe impractical to physically isolate an area due to the physical and geographical considerations such as in the case of college campus or suburban area. (b) Barricades Against Personnel. Civil disturbance operation contingency planning should provide for the availability of portable barricades which impede the message of personnel. Concertina wire is suitable material for rapid construction and effectiveness although wooden sawhorses, ropes and other field expedient devices may suffice. Concertina wire should be used sparingly and only under serious circumstances as it is indicative of violent disorders. (c) Roadblock Against Vehicles. The erection of effective roadblocks which cannot be easily breached by vehicles requires large, heavy construction materials. One item that can be stockpiled in advance is 55 gallon drums to be filled with water or earth on site. Other materials include sandbags, earthworks, trees, or heavy vehicles such as buses or trucks. Several roadblocks placed at interval of 25 to 50 feet provide sufficient depth to prevent breaches by heavy or high speed vehicles. (d) Construction Considerations. The constructions of barricades and roadblocks should provide cover from small arm fire where this threat is considered likely. Provision should be made for night illumination of approaches to the position; however, care must be taken not to silhouette the personnel manning it. Construction materials which would chip or shatter upon impact by thrown objects should be covered with canvas or sandbags to precluded injuries from flying fragments. Warning signs should be placed in front of the position directing unauthorized personnel not to approach the position. One technique of providing quickly erected barrier is the use of vehicles parked bumper to bumper; however,

this procedure may subject the vehicles to damage by a hostile crowd. Another device which maybe effectively employed both as a barricade, a locally fabricated frame of wood or metal with wire covering, which is easily fitted onto the bumper of the 1/4 ton vehicle. (e) Perimeter Patrols. Perimeter patrols should be established to prevent entry or exit from the disturbed area, particularly by individuals or groups attempting to bypass barricades and roadblocks. These patrols operate along the outer operational boundary of the disturbed area. Perimeter patrols can be integrated with area patrol routes within the disturbed area. (f) Pass and Identification Systems. Unit installation, or municipal contingency planning should include a pass and identification system providing for the entry and exit of authorized personnel to and from the isolated area. Procedures should be established for press personnel, public work crews, and for any other personnel who have legitimate purpose for entering and exiting the isolated area. Considerations must be given to those persons residing within the disturbed area who must travel to and from work. An effective pass and identification system requires careful and detailed planning as a contingency measure. (g) Public Utility Control. Insure that civil authorities have established a means for controlling public utilities to include street lights, gas, electric, water and telephone service so that they may be turned on or off to support the tactics employed for the control forces. Section VII. EXECUTIONS 4.14. Kinds of Formation (a) Stand by Formation. Preparatory formation that depends on the space of the area. Column formation may be used for road type stand by area while mass formation may be used for parking area type stand by area. See ppt (b) Single Line Formation. Single line formation is a formation purposely to set or establish limit to the crowd. This is executed when the crowd is within the state of control. See ppt (c) Double Line Formation. Double line formation is executed to support / beet up the single line formation. This is done when the crowd starts to become unruly and they start pushing the first line. This is also preparatory formation for an impending violent act by the crowd to the CDM personnel. See ppt

(d) Wedge Formation. A wedge formation is executed to penetrate or break the crowd. This is usually done when there is that necessity to separate / isolate the truly and the violent groups in a crowd. See ppt (e) Double Wedge Formation. A double wedge formation is organized to acquire a stronger capability of penetrate and protection from violent moves by the crowd. See ppt f) Arrow Formation. An arrow formation is designated to escort VIP's passing through the crowd. The number of personnel to compose the formation depends on the level of the status of the crowd, i.e., crowd, an unruly crowd, friendly crowd, hostile crowd or violent one. See ppt g) Circle Formation. A circle formation or any closed formation is especially designated to isolate a violent crowd and the eventual arrest of a crowd leader or a violent initiator. See ppt (h) Umbrella Formation. This kind of formation is utilized when the crowd becomes unruly and will start attacking the control force. See ppt 4.15. Application of Force 4.15.1. General (a) Operation by SAF personnel will not be authorized until the Chief, PNP is advised by the requesting unit that the situation cannot be controlled with the units personnel resources available. The task force commander's mission is to help restore law and order and to help maintain it until such time as the local forces can control the situation without SAF assistance. In performing this mission, the task force commander may find it necessary to participate actively not only in quelling the disturbance but also in helping to detain those responsible for it. (b) The guidelines to be followed are designed specifically for operations during civil disturbances. (c) The primary rule which governs the action of SAF personnel in assisting local authorities to restore law and order is that the contingent commander must at all times use the minimum force required to accomplish his mission. This paramount mission should control both selection of the appropriate operational techniques and tactics and the choice of option for arming control force personnel. Pursuant to this

principle, the use of deadly force; i.e., live ammunition or any other type of physical force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, is authorized only under extreme circumstances where certain specific criteria are met. To emphasize limitations on use offire power and to preclude automatic fire, commanders will ensure that rifles with only a safe or semi-automatic selection capability, or rifles modified to have only a safe or semi-automatic selection capability, will be used as the basic weapon for troops in a civil disturbance area. (d) All personnel, prior to participation in civil disturbance operations, will be briefed as to: (1) The specific mission of the unit (2) Rules governing the application of force as they apply to the specific situation. (3) An awareness situation on local situation, specifically addressing type of abuse which SAF personnel may be expected to receive and the proper response to these type of abuses. 4.15.2. Use of Non-deadly and Deadly Force (a) Task force commanders are authorized to use non-deadly force to control the disturbance, to prevent crimes and to apprehend or detain persons who have committed crimes; but the degree offered used must no greater than that reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The use of deadly force, however, in effect invokes the power of summary execution and can be therefore justified only by extreme necessity. Accordingly, its use is not authorized unless otherwise all the requirements of b, below, must be met in every case. (b) The use of deadly force is authorized only where all three of the following circumstances are present: (1) Lesser means have been exhausted or are unavailable (2) The risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons is not significantly increase by its use; and 3) The purpose of its use if one or more of the following: (i) Self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm. (ii) Prevention of crimes which involves a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm (for example, setting fire to an inhabited dwelling, or sniping); including the defense of other persons. (iii) Prevention of the destruction of property which the task force commander has determined are vital to public health or safety. (4) Detention or prevention of the escape of a person who, during the detention or in the act of escaping, presents a clear threats of loss of life or serious bodily harm to another person. (c) Every personnel has the right under the law to use reasonably necessary force to defend himself against violent and dangerous personal attack. The limitations described in the above paragraphs are not intended to infringe this right. However, it must be emphasized that a control force member is part of a unit and subject to a chain of command. As such, he must act in accord with his orders and

as a member of his unit. Therefore, unless an attack is directed at him personally, and his response can be directed specifically at the attacker, his response should be governed by the guidance of his immediate supervisor. (d) In each situation where SAF personnel are committed, the task force commander has the responsibility to determine which facilities within his area of operation constitute "vital facilities " and, as such, are within the parameters of the prerequisites which justifies the use of deadly force in order to be protected. It is imperative that those personnel assigned to security mission know if a particular facility or activity is so vital to the health and safety of the public that the use of deadly force would be justified in the protection of the facility or activity. (e) In addition the following policies regarding the use of deadly force will be observed: (1) Task force commanders may, at their discretion delegate the authority to authorize the use of deadly force, provided that such delegation is not inconsistent with this paragraph and that the person to whom such delegation is made understands the constraints upon the use of deadly force set forth previously. (2) Even when its use is authorize pursuant to established constraints, deadly force must be employed only with great selectivity and precision against the particular threat which justifies its use. For example, the receipt of sniper fire- however deadly from an unknown location can never justify returning the fire against any or all persons who may be visible on the streets or in nearby buildings. Such as indiscriminate response is far too likely result in casualties among innocent bystanders or fellow law enforcement personnel; the appropriate response is to take cover and attempt to locate the source of fire, so that the threat can be neutralized. (3) When possible, the use of deadly force should be preceded by a clear warning to the individual or group that the use of such force is contemplated or imminent. (4) Warning shots are not to be employed. Such firings constitutes a hazard innocent to a persons an can create the mistaken impression on the part of the citizens or fellow law enforcement personnel that sniping is widespread. (5) Task force commanders are authorized to have live ammunitions issued to personnel under their command. Guidance concerning placing magazines in weapons should be specified at this time. Individual soldiers will be instructed, however, that they may not load their weapon (place a round in the chamber) except when authorized by an officer or provided they are not under the direct control and supervision of an officer, when the circumstances would justify their used of deadly force to pursuant to b, above. Retention of control by officer over the loading of weapons until such time as the need for such action is clearly established is of critical importance in preventing the unjustified used of deadly force. Whenever possible, command control arrangements should be specifically designed to facilitate such careful control of deadly weapons. It must be realized that if a participant in the disturbance should seized a loaded weapon from a member of the control force, the potential or escalated violence will be greatly increased. (6) The presence of loaded weapons in tense situation may invite the application of deadly force in response to the provocation in which, while subject to censure, are

not sufficient to justify its use; and it increases the hazard that the improper discharge of a weapon by one or more individuals will lead others to reflex response on the mistaken assumption that an order to fire has been given. Officers should be instructed, therefore, that they have a personal obligation to withhold permission for loading until circumstances indicate a high probability that deadly force will imminently necessary, and justified pursuant to the criteria set forth in b, above. Strong command supervision must be exercised to assure that the loading of weapon is not authorized in a routine, premature or blanket manner. (7) Task force commanders should, at all times, exercise positive control over the use of weapons. The individual police personnel will be instructed that he may not fire his weapon except when authorized by an officer, or provided he is not under the direct supervision and control of an officer, when the circumstances would justify his use of deadly force pursuant to b, above. He must not only be thoroughly acquainted with the prerequisites with the use of deadly force, but he must also realize whenever he is operating as part of a unit or element under the immediate command and control of an officer, that the officer will determine whether the firing of live ammunition is necessary. For this reason, whenever possible, control force member should have ready access to an officer. (8) When firing ammunition, the marksman should, if possible, aim to wound rather than to kill.

CHAPTER 5 SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATION Section I. INTRODUCTION The PNP Special Action Force, as mandated in its mission, response whenever disaster whether natural or man-made strikes the country. Generally, the local government units have the primary concerned in addressing these situations with the support of the national government. But with its limited manpower and capabilities, these local government units seek the assistance of other able units such as the SAP. Usually during time of calamities, units whose primary mission is purely rescue operation are responding immediately to these situations. In addition, SAF reinforces the existing force in the disaster area through the guidance of the local disaster coordinating center and with the directive of higher headquarters. Particularly, SAF response in a reactive manner which means that disaster has already existed and that rescue operation is necessary to save lives and properties. Typically, SAF line units are deployed in a particular area. These units have the capability to react on any emergency situation, because they have trained personnel for search and rescue operation. In this chapter, the systems and operational procedures of search and rescue are described. These procedures guides the SAF search and rescue men to be able to undertake such operations properly. Section II. THE SEARCH AND RESCUE SYSTEM 5.1. SAR System Search and Rescue (SAR) is the employment of available personnel and facilities in rendering aid to persons and property in distress. It comprises the search for and provision of aid to persons who are, or feared to be, in need of assistance and the search for protection of property involved. The Search and Rescue system consists of five (5) SAR stages, supported by five components, that are necessary to render SAR services. From an operational viewpoint, the SAR system is activated when information is received that an emergency exists, or may exist, and is deactivated when the survivor or endangered craft is delivered to a position of treatment of a safety, respectively, when it has been determined that emergency actually existed, or when there is no longer hope for rescue. 5.2. SAR Organization The SAR system includes the following functional components; (a) SAR Headquarters. Provides for geographically define areas of SAR coordination responsibility and for centralized control and coordination capability to

ensure effective used of all available facilities for all types of SAR mission. Includes all SAR coordination, rescue coordination centers (RCC) rescue sub-centers (RSC), SAR mission coordination (SMC) and on scene commanders (OSC). (b) Operation Section. Provides the personnel necessary to perform the SAR mission. (c) Supply Section. Provides the equipment and facilities necessary to performed the stages of the SAR System. (d) Communication Section. Provides all communications media through which early detection, alerting, control, support, and coordination are maintained throughout the SAR System. (e) Emergency Care Section. Provides injured survivors with all necessary emergency treatment with in capabilities. Includes emergency first aid skills applied to the injured at the distress scene and life support enroute to an emergency receiving hospital. (f) Documentation Section. Provide for the collection and analysis of information pertaining to a SAR mission. It includes all data received from the awareness stage to the end of the mission conclusion stage. It specifically includes the survivor emergency treatment history from the time to rescue of his final transfer to a medical facility. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE See ppt 5.3. Equipment (a) Mask (b) Fins (c) Snorkel (d) Exposure Suit (e) Buoyancy Control Devices (f) Weight Belt (g) Tanks (h) Regulators 5.4. Emergency Phases i) Submersible Pressure Gauges (j) Knife (k) Whistle (1) Watercraft (m) Carabiner (n) Rappelling Rope (o) Underwater Flashlight There are three possible emergency phases into which most SAR incidents and subsequent SAR mission are classified. These emergency phases are in or order of progression:

(a) Uncertainly phase. This phase is assigned any time doubt exists as to the safety of a craft or a person because of knowledge of possible difficulties, or because of lack of information concerning progress or position. The key word is "doubt". (b) Alert phase. This phase is assigned any time apprehension exists for the safety of the craft or person because of definite information that serious difficulty exist which does not amount to a distress, or because of a continued lack of information concerning progress or position. The key word is "apprehension". (c) Distress phase. This phase is assigned any time immediate assistance is required by aircraft or person because of being threatened by grave and imminent danger or because of continuous lack of information concerning progress or position. The key word are "grave danger" and "immediate assistance." These phases are used to indicate the seriousness of the SAR incident and for generally determining the action to be taken at any stage of the mission. The code words are used in international civil aviation communications. Upon initial notification of the SAR incident, it is immediately classified into any one of these three emergency phases. As the incident progresses, the emergency phase may changed depending upon how the situation develops. Section III. SEARCH AND RESCUE EMERGENCY CARE 5.5. Emergency Care Component Emergency care supports the SAR System by providing four major capabilities: (a) SAR personnel trained in emergency care. (b) Lifesaving and life-sustaining services to survivors after rescue; (c) Survivor evacuation and transport facilities ;and (d) Medical facilities to receive injured survivors . 5.6. Emergency Care SAR Personnel (a) SAR personnel who are trained emergency medical care can provide lifesaving services to injured survivors at the distress scene. In addition, these personnel provide life support and life-sustaining services during survivors extraction from wreckage, evacuation from the distress scene, and transport to a receiving medical facility. (b) SAR personnel assigned as crew men to various search and rescue unit must be qualified to administer basic life saving first aid to survivors at the scene. (c) When it is known that a rescue craft will be dealing with injured or seriously ill persons, the most medically competent personnel available should be added to the crew. Ideally this means that ,in such cases, every effort should be made to send a doctor as a part of the crew. If a doctor is not available then trained medical personnel should be used such as, corpsmen, para-medical personnel ,or specially trained emergency care SAR crewmen. 5.7. Emergency Care Service

Injured survivors are provided with life saving and life-sustaining emergency medical care according to the competence of SAF personnel involved. The capability of sustaining the life of those who have been rescue is just as important as the searching for, and rescuing of, survivors. The obligation of the survivor id not terminated until the survivors is safely delivered to an appropriate medical facility when necessary. SAR personnel fulfill these obligations to injured survivors by administration of on scene first aid, by enroute life saving and life-support of activities when personnel have been trained for such care and adequate equipment is available, and by delivering injured or ill survivors to an appropriate medical facility of an ambulance for further transfer to such a facility. 5.8. Evacuation and Transport Facilities (a) General. Survivors must be evacuated from the distress scene, transported, and delivered to receive, medical facilities or safe delivering point. Often the rescue facility is also transport facility. However under some circumstances an additional facility is necessary, either to speed suffering survivors to a medical facility or provide better emergency medical care enroute, or both. Examples such instance are: Survivors are rescued from the water in the state of shock by a boat and then delivered to a helicopter for faster transportation; a ground party find survivors for an aircraft crash and a helicopter with a doctor aboard is dispatched to evacuate the injured; a merchant ship rescue survivor from a ship fire at sea and another merchant ship with medical facilities and doctors aboard is diverted to removed and hospitalize the injured. (b) Selecting Transport Facility. When a choice is available, There are four areas that should be considered by the SMC when selecting or requesting appropriate survivor transport facility: (1) The medical training or qualifications of its crew or attendants. (2) Its capability to reach the survivors in the shortest possible time, unless already on scene. (3) The emergency medical equipment installed in the facility which can be used to stabilize the victim's injuries and other condition upon arrival on scene, and to sustain their stabilization during transit. (4) Its capability for transporting the survivors in a manner that neither aggravates the survivors injuries nor produces new injuries or medical complications. (c) Transport Facility Types. The facilities used to place SAR personnel at the distress scene who are capable of administering emergency care are usually primary SAR units. The facilities to be dispatched, to evacuate and to transport injured or seriously ill survivors from the distress scene to the receiving medical facility may be ambulance, ground vehicles of any type, helicopter, fixed- wing aircraft, medical evacuation aircraft, and marine craft. (d) Ambulance. Ground transportation of injured survivors is usually accomplished by the use of ambulances when the helicopter transportation is not available, and ambulances can reach the scene.

Ambulances should be manned by well trained attendants and equipped with adequate life-support equipment. 5.9. Fixed Medical Facilities Fixed medical facilities are emergency medical, care centers, general hospitals, private hospitals, clinics, sanitarium, and first aid stations. Selection of medical facility for the survivors depends on their capacity of handling and their quality treatment. Section IV. THE SEARCH AND RESCUE STAGES 5.10. Awareness Initial Action Stage The awareness and the initial action stage are the first two stages in which the SAR operates. Before the SAR system can be activated it must first become aware that the emergency or potential emergency situation exists. The SAR system must then evaluate that information and take various actions through out some or all of the following stages. The awareness stage is defined as the attaining of initial knowledge of the existence of an actual or potential emergency situation or incident. It includes of the receiving of information by any person or agency, who in turn subsequently notifies the SAR system. Initiate awareness. An accident normally occurs prior to a distressed person's attempt to communicate his situation. Sometimes the person can anticipate the occurrence of an emergency situation, and is able to communicate prior to the incident. In any case the communication phase must be initiated prior to the SAR system becoming aware of the situation. This may be accomplished by the person in emergency situation communicating a ship, aircraft, or other radio stations, by this situation being observed by nearby personnel, or by others monitoring his craft's progress and becoming alarmed at either a lack of communications or a non-arrival at destination. 5.11. Initial Action Stage The initial action stage is the second stage of the SAR system. It is the stage during which the system commence its response to an accident. Once the SAR system has been notified on the existence of an incident, the complete resources of the system may be used to resolve that incident. (a) Initial action events. There are five operational events which may occur within the initial action stage: (1) (2) (3) (4)

Incident evaluation Emergency phase classification SAR facilities alerted Preliminary communication search

(5) Extended communication search (b) SAR Mission Coordination (SMC) Designation. The Rescue Coordination Centers may designate as SMC shortly after the awareness stage is completed. If a designation is not made, the SMC responsibilities automatically devolve upon the RCC controller as representative of the SAR coordination. The RCC may also designate as SMC at some later stage of the operation if circumstances dictate that this action is necessary for better coordination of the mission. Under no circumstances should the lack of a specific SMC designation stop or delay the response of any individual, unit, or facility from responding to an incident of which they become aware and for which they can render assistance. 5.12. Planning Stage During this stage effective plans are developed, including the necessary coordination to implement them. This stage may begin immediately after a SAR incident is assigned an emergency phase if the initial action stage have been completed. Generally, its beginning depends directly upon the apparent urgency of the SAR incident reported to the SAR system. It therefore may or may not overlap the initial action stage. This stage ends when all distressed persons or distressed craft have been delivered to a safety or the mission is terminated. 5.12.1 Search Planning Sequence. Search planning involves a series of computation and considerations. Generally, the following sequence is followed: (a) Determine the position of the emergency. Consider effects of wind and water current moving the survivors from the point of initial distress to where the search craft arrive on scene. (b) Determine size of area to search to allow for errors in the distress position estimate, navigation errors of the search and errors in drift calculations. (c) Select the best search pattern to use for the circumstances of the particular emergency. (d) The type of search target is considered and the distance from which it can be detected with available censors. (e) The number of available search and rescue unit and other limiting factors are considered as necessary to develop a search plan that can be completed under the existing circumstances. (f) The SMC coordinates with all participating agencies, and advises SRUs of his coordinated search action plan. 5.12.2 Search Planning Methods. (a) Generally, the degree of search planning necessary is initially determined by the environment of the SAR incident, the accuracy of the reporter location of the incident, the availability of suitable SAR units, and the elapsed time since the incident occurred.

(b) The environment of the SAR incident will dictate specific factors that must be considered in the search planning. For example, several survivor drift factors are involved for missions occurring in oceanic areas while only one drift factor may be involved in mountainous areas. (c) If the position is known, search planning is relatively simple; if only the intended track is known, search planning is more difficult; but if only the general or possible area is known, search planning can be very difficult. No matter how accurately the incident location is known, search planning is required. It may involve only a rapid but professional consideration of each step or it may involve several hours to continuous evaluation, weighing of influencing factors computations, and extensive coordination before even one SRU is dispatched. To meet all of these possibilities a number of search planning methods have been developed. 5.12.3. SAR Incident Location (a) Position Known (b) Track Known (c) Area Known 5.13. Operation Stage 5.13.1. Conduct of Operation. The SMC shall be guided by appropriate International Civil Aviation Organization SAR manuals in the conduct of the SAR operation. He shall be guided but not limited to the following activities: (a) Estimation of the most probable position of the distressed craft and the location of the survivors. (b) Determination of a search area large enough to ensure that the survivors are within the search area. (c) Selection of the equipment to be used in the search. (d) Selection of the search pattern to be used. (e) Allocation of search resources. (f) Actions taken by locating units and other units at the scene of the accident. (g) Determination of the means of rescue and probable medical attention needed; and (h) Preparation of the post operation report. 5.13.2. Search Operation (a) During search operation, facilities proceed to the scene and conduct search operations until distressed persons or craft are located or the mission is terminated. Search operation begin within the first search unit is briefed and dispatched to a search area. This may occur immediately after a SAR incident is assigned an emergency phase in the initial action stage, or it may occur after the SMC has developed a search plan. Generally, its beginning depends directly upon the apparent urgency of the SAR incident reported to the SAR system. It can thus overlap both the initial action stage and the planning stage at its beginning. Search operation end when all distressed persons have been located, or the mission is terminated.

(b) In a strict sense, search operations will occur even during mission in which accurate distress locations are known or reported. Effecting a rendezvous between the search and rescue units and the distressed person will require search effort on the part of the SRU to eliminate or reduce time delays. (c) There are eight (8) specific event which may occur sequentially during search operations. These events are: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

search briefing dispatched of search unit SRU enroute travel on scene search distressed craft/person sighting on scene relief return to base debriefing of search crew/team

5.14. Terminating the Search If, at the completion of the planned search effort, contact has not been made, the planner must decide if further search is justified. It is quite possible that adverse weather may have reduced the probability of detection of unacceptable level. In such a case the area must be given an additional search or searches until the probability has been raised to the planned level. When terminating an operation, either because survivors have been found and rescued or because a determination is made that further search would not be justified, the SMC shall notify the operating agency of the distressed craft and all participating agencies and facilities of the termination and the reason therefore. Section V. TRAINING Search and rescue operation is a specialized undertaking in SAF. Before engaging to this activity the personnel have to undergo a series of rigid training. One of the related courses offered is the SAF Commando Course, a six (6) months course and the basic foundation of a SAF Trooper. In this course almost all the basic of rescue operation is being teach such as rope management, rappelling, land navigation, map reading, and many others. Advancing and going further, a SAF trooper specialized in Basic Underwater Search Rescue and Recovery Operation Course (BUSRROC). This is a forty five (45) days training which is more rigid than ordinary SCUBA course. In here a SAF personnel learns the fundamentals of swimming, SCUBA equipment and skills, survival at sea, diving physics, medical aspects of diving, underwater techniques and procedure, underwater communication system, and many others. A personnel graduated from these courses is now considered a qualified search and rescue personnel of the SAF, ready to serve, so that others may live.

CHAPTER 6 SUPPORT OPERATIONS Section I. LIGHT ARMOR OPERATIONS 6.1. Introduction The Light Armor Unit was activated several months after the activation of Special Operations Battalion (SOB) in 1993 pursuant to General Orders No. 1 HSAE The unit was initially composed of one (1) PCO and six (6) PNCOS from PNP-SAF and five PNCOs from RECOM 4 placed on TDY status while the unit is still in the transition period. This unit was organized to provide fire and armor support to PNP SAF ISO Battalions and other PNP units in their operational activities. Initially, the primary assets of this unit were two (2) V-150 Commando vehicles, two (2) V-200 Chaimite vehicles, and one (1) Hummer Vehicle. At present, only two V-150 Commando vehicles are operational. The unit was very effective in providing fire support to SAF Battalions during the deployment in Mindanao and Negros Province. On 07 October 1998, the Light Armor Company was taken out from the 1st Battalion, the forerunner of SOB or CRG and was subsequently absorbed by the Force Support Battalion (FSB) by virtue of General Orders No 172. At present, the unit is focusing its activities on anti-criminal activities and rescue operations. 6.2. Operation 6.2.1. Mission. The primary mission of this unit is to provide security, perform reconnaissance as an economy of force unit, and to conduct offensive, defensive and delay operations in coordination with other PNP Units. 6.2.2. Doctrine. The foremost operational concept is the Combined Arms Doctrine. This is the concept of complimenting ground operational forces with armored vehicles because of its versatility and flexibility for combat operations. The following are the most commonly used operational concept in Light Armor Operation. 6.2.3. Movement. Light Armor Vehicles will not be deployed in the operational area unless provided with a back-up vehicle and personnel. This is very important specially when engagement with the enemy is expected. This is for the reason that LAV will not be easily pinned down by the enemy fire during engagement if provided with back-up. There are three movement techniques used on Light Armor Operation; (a) Traveling - where maximum speed is necessary and no enemy contact is expected. All elements of the unit move simultaneously with the unit leader located where he can best control.

(b) Traveling Over watch - When contact with the enemy is possible. Lead vehicle move ahead of the other vehicles at a certain speed and distance. The trailing element moves at variable speed and may pause for short periods to over watch the lead element. (c) Bounding Over watch - Movement technique used when enemy contact is expected. It is done by maneuvering LAVs alternately; the other one over watching the other. 6.2.4. Contact with the Enemy When enemy contact is inevitable, the concept of suppressive fire is being employed. This is done to protect operating troops and vehicles from casualties and damages that maybe inflicted by the enemy. If the enemy cannot be suppressed, LAV’s withdraws and/or maneuvers to the most advantageous position. On cases of casualties, the crews must see to it that they be evacuated to a safe place and properly taken cared of. In such cases that the LAV is pinned down by enemy fires, the crews must exert all efforts to protect the vehicle from being totally destroyed by the enemy. 6.2.5. Harboring During harboring, LAV crews must see to it that the following SOPs are being observed; (a) The vehicle must not be left unattended. At least three crews must always man the vehicle. (b) The vehicle safety must be the prime consideration of its crews. 6.3. Organization, Training, and Equipment 6.3.1. Composition The Light Armor Unit adopts the Armored Cavalry Troops doctrine in its organizational set-up. Armored Cavalry Troop is the combination of armored vehicle and ground police operational forces. The following is the ideal troop composition of this unit; DESCRIPTION Admin Team Armored Cavalry Section Security Team TOTAL

PCO 2 1

PNCO 6 12

TOTAL 8 13

1 4

7 25

8 29

The Administrative Team is composed of the following; (a) Unit Commander (b) Unit Ex-0 (c) Senior PNCO

(d) Admin PNCO (e) Operations PNCO (f) Intel PNCO (g) Supply PNCO (h) Maintenance PNCO The Armored Cavalry Section who will be manning two LAVs is composed of the following; (a) One Section Leader (b) Two Team Leaders (c) Two Drivers (d) Two Assistant Drivers (e) Two Gunners (f) Two Radio Operators (g) Two Ammunition Bearers The Security Team will be composed of one Special Action Team who will serve as back-up/security of the LAVs during movements/operations. 6.3.2. Organizational Structure The following is the Light Armor Unit's Organizational Structure; 6.3.3. Training The Training requirements of personnel of this unit are as follows; (a) SAP Commando or equivalent course (b) Police Armored Cavalry Training or equivalent Armor Training (c) Urban Counter Revolutionary Warfare Course (d) Heavy Weapons Training (e) Crew -Served Weapons Training (f) Demolition Course (EOD)/ Explosive Incidents Counter Measure Course (g) Civil Disturbance Management (CDM) (h) Basic Airborne Course (Optional) 6.3.4. Equipage (a) Mobility (1) Two (2) V150 Commando Vehicles or two Simba Armored Fighting Vehicles to be manned by two cavalry teams respectively. (2) One (1) all terrain vehicle which will serve as troop carrier and back-up vehicle of LAVs. (b) Firearms

All LAV crews must be equipped with AR15 for ease and mobility inside the vehicle. The individual firearm requirements are as follows; (c) Armored Cavalry Team Team Leader Driver Assistant Driver Gunner Ammo Bearer Radio Operator

AR15 AR15 AR15W/M203GL AR15w/M203GL AR15 AR15

(d) Security Team Team Leader Assistant Team Leader Lead Scout Navigator Sniper Contact Man Radio Man Tail Scout

AR15 M16A2w/M203GL M16A2 M16A2 M14 or Galil M60 LMG M16A2 M16A2w/M203GL

(e) Summary Quantity 16pcs 11 pcs 1 pc 1 pc 6 pcs 29 pcs

Description AR 15 Rifles M16A2 Rifles Ml 4 Rifle M60 LMG M203 GL 9 mm Pistols

(f) Ammunition Quantity 6,000 rds 7,000 rds 10,000 rds 700 rds 2,000 rds

Description Cal 50 (Linked) 7.62 mm (Linked) 5.56 mm 7.62 mm 9 mm

(g) Magazines Quantity 216 pcs 58pcs 8 pcs

Description 5.56 mm 9 mm 7.62 mm

(h) Individual Equipment Quantity 18 pcs 18 pcs 29 pcs 3 pcs 3 pcs 3 pcs 3 pcs

Description Ballistic Helmet Goggles Vest Binoculars NVG NVS Lensatic Compass

(i) Communication Quantity 2 units 4 units 13 units

Description Base Radio Handheld Radios Headphones

6.4. Capabilities (a) In line with the PNP Mission in general, and SAF Mission in particular, the following are the Light Armor capabilities in serving and protecting the people against threat to person, liberty, and property; (b) The LAU can provide maximum security services to the local populace through rescue operations during calamities, escort duties to VIPs and many other services in line with its mission. (c) The Unit is also capable in providing fire support services to line units in their campaign against insurgency and other threat to National Security. (d) The unit can also provide police services to the community such as anticriminality and other incidents which pose a threat to person, life, property, and liberty. (e) It can also perform special police duties against terrorism. (f) The unit can also be very effective in supporting other police personnel in the performance of their official duties. Section II. OPERATION 6.5. Mission

EXPLOSIVE

ORDNANCE

DETECTION

AND

DISPOSAL

(a) To respond to Bomb Threats acts of terrorism, resolve explosive incidents, bomb detection and recovery operations with minimum risk to life and property. (b) To provide standards for the training of bomb technicians, as well as other Law Enforcement Agencies and Organizations. 6.6. Organization and Equipage 6.6.1. Organizational Structure See ppt

CHAPTER 7 TRAINING SECTION I. INTRODUCTION Training is any organized learning activity to prepare individual soldiers, teams and units forspecific job performance. It is a leaders most difficult and most important responsibility during peace time. It is a commanders vital responsibility for the welfare of his men and as General Erwin Rommel said, "The best form of welfare for the troops is first class training". The PNP SAF units' responsibility will center mainly on training its unit to meet the highest professional standards at a minimum cost when caused may be measured in terms of lives. The core of SAF professionalism is expertise. Expertise on the other hand, is mainly the result of every personnels' personal efforts and the training he receives. Training enables the individual to learn knowledge and develop the skills to do his job correctly. Collectively this individual expertise amounts to unit efficiency, thus ensuring the accomplishment of mission. SECTION II. IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING The necessity for continuous and progressive training is based on the need to have a unit which is in constant readiness, capable of neutralizing organized and syndicated crimes and the enemies of the state through prompt and sustained police operations. Tasked with this delicate and sensitive type of police operations, the unit sees to it that the standard of training among its personnel always maintains a high state. Training at times may be arduous and the challenge is on the unit to make it exciting. In planning and conducting training, there must be a constant challenge among the students physically and mentally, so they can derive a real sense of accomplishment and satisfaction. This feeling of accomplishments often helps overcome problems that are caused by low morale, poor discipline and other administrative matters.

SECTION III. OBJECTIVES OF TRAINING For any police training activities to be successful, it must accomplish the following five basic objectives: (a) Discipline - Training in police discipline is very important aspect of all police training. It is essential that all personnel must recognize and respect authority and give unhesitating obedience to that authority. (b) Health, Strength and Endurance - Training activities must be gird towards the development of these physical characteristics. This objective is necessary to attain if the men are to withstand the rigors and hardship of police operations. (c) Technical proficiency - Each member of the team must have sufficient knowledge and possess the skills necessary to properly performed his assigned duties. He must be professional in his own field - meaning, he knows every aspect of his job thoroughly. (d) Teamwork - Each individual must know how to employ his technical proficiency with other team members and to operate as part of the team. He must willingly subordinate his own interest to those of the team as whole. (e) Tactical proficiency - This is the ultimate goal of all police training and is achieved after all objectives are attained. It is the ability of the unit to consistently operate effective in police operations. SECTION IV. ORGANIZATION See ppt SECTION V. GUIDELINES IN THE CONDUCT OF TRAINING 7.1. PRINCIPLES OF LEARNING To be an effective trainor, one must first understand the principles of learning. These principles are the generalizations of rules which, if properly applied by instructors, will make learning more efficient. Other principles may be added in the list, but the following are most important: (a) Motivation - Learning is an active process and as such, students must be motivated to learn from themselves. It is very necessary that trainors should create a desire to leam among his students. This desire must come from within the students, Following are techniques to motivate: (1) Define your Objectives - Students will have more desire to learn a particular knowledge if they are convinced that such know-how will be beneficial to them. The instructor therefore must strive to make the students feel that they need this particular training.

(2) Make the Students Responsible that He Learns - Students will leam more when they are accountable for learning what they are being taught. It is necessary that students should understand his right from the very beginning. Giving regular examination and awarding low or good grades serves to remind them that you are serious in giving them such responsibility in learning. (3) Use Students Participation - The best way to keep the students interested and to maintain their motivation is to make them participate in the instruction. If the students feel that he is part of the learning process, his interest will kept high. This is mainly the principle behind performance-oriented training. (4) Use Varied Instructional Methods - Student interest is often lost if the trainor uses the same method of instruction, all the time especially if this method is always the lecture and conference type. The students motivation will be kept high if the instructor occasionally varies his methods or uses different types of training aids. (5) Make Use of Recognition - A student will strive harder to leam the subject if he knows his performance will be recognized. When commenting on student performance, point out the favorable or good points first and then follow with mistakes or bad points. End your comment with suggestions on how to correct, improve your performance. (6) Use competition - Men have natural impulse to excel in any competition. Make use of his innate competitive spirit to motivate your students. Plan your training that such students will strive to out-perform each other. Competitive activities should be given intelligent guidelines by the trainor, since those who are consistently on the bottom may forever loose their desire to be on top. (7) Give rewards for good performance and used punishment when all other means fail - All other means of motivation is the giving of rewards for outstanding performance. This is a powerful incentive but often causes the students to excel only for the purpose of rewards rather than the real objectives of the training. The least desirable technique of motivation is punishment. It should only be used as a last resort. This technique often breeds resentment, antagonism and desire to avoid the form of learning to which it is attached. (b) Purpose - Learning is enhance more rapidly and effectively when it is done with a specific purpose. Students rapidly acquire skills, knowledge, techniques and appreciation when those achievements are necessary in order to attain particular objectives. The instructor should emphasize the objective of the particular lesson and should repeatedly make reference to this purpose as he covers the main point of the instruction. The purpose must be explained clearly to the students and each should understand how this purpose fits into his over-all needs, later in the field. (c) Adjustment - The instructor should understand that when a student learns new skills, techniques, he must, to a certain extent make mental adjustments. Because of this the trainor must expect that as the students "grows" in his learnings some changes will take place in his thinking. (d) Activity - For the students to effectively learn the knowledge and develop the attitude being taught to him, he must be made to participate in some activity during the instruction. It is often said that the best way of learning is "not by listening but by doing." (e) Association - Students associate new knowledge with past learning. It is for this reason that trainors should plan their instruction after considering the

training of their students. Explanations using illustrations and words, which the students understand, giving example from their past experience often drives home the point of instructions. (f) Realism - Learning is more efficient if the training is conducted realistically. Students will be more motivated to learn if they know that the materials being taught to them are functional or have ready application in the field. (g) Incidental Learning - Incidental learning refers to the learning that a student attains other than what he is intended in training. Such may be favorable traits, habits, attitudes and character which in final analysis may be important as the specific knowledge and primary skills being taught, police discipline and physical fitness is a by-product through incidental learning of individual's training in drills and ceremonies. 7.2. THE PERFORMANCE-ORIENTED TRAINING Most effective approach to training is the performance-oriented training. Unlike conventional trainings which relies mainly on lecture as its chief method of instruction, performance-oriented training uses short demonstrations and follows the principles of "learning by doing" as its main means of instruction. Performance-oriented training strives to relate to each individual student the job by making him the focal point of training and by giving him the time to meet the standard. If he does not meet such standards, he practices until he can. (a) The Training Objective - Performance-oriented training begins and ends with the training objective. The training objective for this type of training must be properly structured and completed. The training objectives serves as a guide for planning and actual conduct of training and as means to evaluate the effectivity of the training at the end of the activity. A properly structured training objectives consists of the following elements. (b) Tasks to be accomplished - What particular skills do you want the student to acquire at the end of the training. (c) Condition which the tasks to be accomplished - What condition do you wish the students to demonstrate the skills to be acquired. (d) Training standard of acceptable performance - How well do you expect the students to perform. Following are the example of performance training objective : (1) Task: Each assaulting team must be able to clear their respective targets at the least possible time, with accuracy given the sufficient/ limited information or details of the objective. (2) Condition: Given a two-storey building to be assaulted with eight known numbers of rooms, the details of each room is (1) sufficient;(2) insufficient and there is no more time left to acquire such information. (3) Training Standard: The students will be able to clear their respective assigned rooms with accuracy and speed following the correct execution of standing

operating procedures and safety procedures within the 45 seconds time when there is sufficient data regarding the target to be assaulted; and, within the 50 seconds time for situations where there is limited information regarding the target. (e) How to conduct a Performance-Oriented Training The steps below is known as the backward planning process which the trainor could follow to ensure the conduct of an effective and efficient training; be it a career , foundation or specialized courses. This 4 steps process is based on the performance-oriented training concept and stresses the need for students to meet established training standards. (1) STEP 1: Decide What Results You Intend To Achieve After Training -Seek guidance from your commander or decide for yourself as to what particular result do you want to achieve with your men after the training. This is usually done by writing down a complete and precise traininobjective as discussed earlier. (2) STEP 2: Prepare to Conduct Training - Develop the training objective. Based on it, decide your immediate training objectives. Organize these immediate training objectives into logical and progressive sequence. Finally. Attend to all administrative requirements of the training (prepare lesson plans, coordinate for the availability of instructors, training aids, training requirements, etc.) (3) STEP 3: Conduct Training to standards - Continuously supervise, monitor and evaluate the conduct of training to ensure that the student's performance meet the standards that you have established in your training objective. (4) STEP 4: Conduct Training Evaluation - Evaluate the performance of the students and find out if you are successful in attaining your training objectives. Also find out if there is a necessity for further training if your students fall short of the standard. APPENDIX I DEFINITION OF TERMS ANTI-TERRORISM - Defensive measure employed to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism. AREA RECONNAISSANCE - Direct effort to obtain detailed information concerning the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area which is critical to the operation. ASSAULT - Culmination of attack which closes with the enemy. ATTACK - An offensive action characterized by movement supported by fires. BREACHING OPERATION - Clearing of enemy trenches to open enemy position to assault troops.

BREACHING POINT - One or more locations where entry into the crisis point by assault teams will be accomplished (multiple/simultaneous breaching points desired). CHEMICAL EXPLOSION - Involves the extremely rapid conversion of substance, solid or liquid into gas. The resulting gasses have a much greater volume than the substances from they are generated. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE - Often involving elderly women, young females and mothers with small children as well as men whose nonviolent posture places the control of violence in an awkward position. CIVIL DISTURBANCE - A broad range of confrontations which vary in intensity (and purpose) from a peaceful assembly in public place to violent and destructive attack on people and property. COMBINED ARMS - The doctrine of organizing two or more arms mutually supporting one another. COMPROMISE AUTHORITY - Authorization given to CT team to conduct an immediate assault of the Crisis Point if compromised prior to arriving at their designated breaching position. Compromise authority provides that once the assault is launch, it will not be aborted. The assault force will not place into potential compromise situation until authority is given to proceed with the assault in the event of compromise. COUNTER-TERRORISM - Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist acts, including the gathering of information and threat analysis in support of these measures. CREW - Personnel manning the armor vehicle. DEFENSE OPERATION - A coordinated effort to defeat an attacker and prevent him from achieving his objectives. DELAY OPERATION - An operation against the enemy in order for the commander to have enough time to plan his offensive action. DETONATING CORD - A kind of high explosive use by the bomb technicians to easily fabricated into a breaching charge that will effectively breach most doors or windows currently being produced for rural or urban dwelling. DISPERSED RIOTS - Involving many small groups of dissidents, many of whom are acting irrationally out of sheer frustrations and bitterness. These groups may operate independently, or in concert over a wide urban area, dispersing when threatened by control force operations, later reassembling elsewhere.

ECONOMY OF FORCE - The allocation of minimum essential combat capability or strength to secondary fforts so that forces maybe concentrated in the area where the decision is sought. ELECTRIC BLASTING CAPS - These are used when a source of electricity, such as blasting machine or battery, is available. There are caps with delay capability, and with various lengths of lead wire. EXPLOSION - The sudden and violent escape of gasses from accompanied by high temperatures, violent shock and loud noise. EXPLOSIVES - Are substances that violently change to a gaseous form, through chemical reaction and release pressure and heat equally in all directions. Explosives are classified as either high or low, depending on the detonating velocity or speed ( in meters or feet-per second) at which change takes place, and on other characteristics, such as shattering effect. FIRE SUPPORT - Fire assistance to ground forces who are close with the enemy. FORMATION - arrangement of vehicles during movement. HIGH EXPLOSIVES - Deflagrate between 1000 ( 3200 feet-per-second) and 8500 meters-per-second ( 27,888 feet-per-second ) This gives them a tremendous shattering and cutting effect. All commercial cutting and breaching charges are high explosives. HOSTAGE SITUATION - A hostage situation is a set of circumstances wherein a suspected law violator is holding a person captive by the use of force, violence or the threat of violence and the police are in close confrontation with the suspect and his captive. IDEALISTIC PROTEST - Involving fanatically young participants for whom normal deterrents such as the threat of arrest or use of force had limited or no effect. LIGHT ARMOR VEHICLE - Fighting vehicle provided with armour capabilities used to provide fire support to operating troops. LOW EXPLOSIVES - Deflagrate (explode) up to a speed of 1300 feet-per-second. This gives them more of a pushing or shoving effect. Black powder is a low explosive. MASS DEMONSTRATION - Involving hundreds or thousands of people, many of whom are non-violent and within their rights to protest but because of the number can overwhelm the capabilities of law enforcement agencies. MECHANICAL EXPLOSION - Involves the gradual conversion of a substance such as water to a gas, such as steam. Mounting pressure within a container, as when a steam boiler explodes.

MOVEMENT TECHNIQUE - Manner of traversing terrain used by a unit. It maybe travelling, travelling over watch or bounding over watch. MOVEMENT TO CONTACT - Offensive operation designed to gain initial ground contact with the enemy or to regain lost contact. NEUTRALIZE - To render personnel or equipment ineffective or unusable. NON-ELECTRIC BLASTING CAPS - These caps are initiated by time fuse or detonating cord. They must not be used in extremely wet areas, without waterproofing. The caps are flared at the open end to receive time or safety fuse. OFFENSE - Combat operation designed primarily to destroy the enemy. RECOVERY OPERATION - Extrication of damaged or disabled equipment and moving it to locations where repairs can be made. SECURITY OPERATION - Operation designed to obtain information and provide reaction time, maneuver space, and protection. SUPPRESSION - Direct and indirect fires brought to bear on enemy forces, weapons, or equipment to prevent effective fires on friendly forces. TERRORISM - The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological. TERRORISM - Involving extremely violent, often nihilistic or even anarchistic tactics, such as sniping or bombing attacks, which make conventional police operations extremely hazardous, and probably ineffective. APPENDIX II BIBLIOGRAPHY Amphibious Reconnaissance - Department of the Navy, US Marine Corps FM 2-2, pp 31,65-70 Armor Operations Manual - Light Armor Brigade, Philippine Army Bomb Search & Incident Planning - by Ted Williams, 1989 COSAC Battalion Operational Manual Crisis Management Team Handout Crisis Response Team Handbook EIC Anti-Terrorist Assistance Program - Bureau of Diplomatic Security, US Department of State Explosive Entry/Techniques Tactical Teams - by Steven Mattoon, December 1989 Explosives and Demolitions - Field Manual - Department of the Army, US Army

Handouts on CDM Operations Improvised Munitions - by R A Wills, July 6, 1990 Joint Airborne Operations - AFPM 3-3, pp 8-1, 8-5, April 1979 Marine Troop Leader PNPTC Training Manual Ranger Handbook - United States Army Infantry School, March 1987 Riverine Warfare Field Manual – Department of the Arm US Army FM 31 -75, pp 3-5, B-1, 1971 SAT Manual - SAF School, 1999 Sniper Field Manual SWAT Employment Team Handbook US Army CDM Manual CHIEF, CTU