Sarsosa Vda De Barsobia Vs Cuenco To Ong Ching Po Vs Ca

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EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA and PACITA W. VALLAR vs VICTORIANO T. CUENCO, G.R. No. L-33048. April 16, 1982 FACTS: 

The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoining parcels of coconut land located at Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental (now Camiguin province).



The entire land was owned previously by a certain Leocadia Balisado, who had sold it to the spouses Patricio Barsobia (now deceased) and Epifania Sarsosa, who were Filipino citizens.



Epifania who was then a widow, sold the land in controversy to a Chinese, Ong King Po who later took actual possession and enjoyed the fruits of the property.



Ong King Po later litigated the property to Victoriano Cuenco, a naturalized Filipino who immediately took possession of the property.



Epifania later usurped the controverted property who later sold one-half of the property to Pacita Vallar.



Epifania claimed that it was not her intention to sell the property as it was only to evidence her indebtedness to Ong King Po.



Cuenco then filed a case for Forcible Entry against Epifania before the MTC which was later dismissed since the question of possession could not be properly determined without first settling the issue on ownership.



Cuenco later filed a case in the CFI for recovery of possession and ownership of the said land. The CFI rendered a decision in favor of Epifania and Vallar.



The CA later reversed the Decision decreeing instead that Cuenco was the owner of the litigated property.

ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the property? CUENCO. HELD: No private lands shall be transferred or conveyed to aliens. There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning, because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the

1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po, she could have been declared entitled to the litigated land. But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated property. Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GUILLERMO GONZALVES G.R. No. 74170 July 18, 1989 Facts:    





The case principally concerns Chua Kim Uy @ Teng Be, who became a naturalized Filipino citizen in 1977. Chua Kim was the adopted son of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. When Gregorio Reyes Uy Un died, his adopted son Chua Kim, took possession of the properties acquired by him in 1934. Chua Kim filed a petition for the issuance of confirmation and registration of title of the lots to his name. His petition was granted by the CFI of Quezon. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, challenged the correctness of the Order and appealed it to the Court of Appeals. However, CA affirmed RTC’s ruling. Hence this appeal. Respondent contended that the conveyances to Chua Kim were made while he was still an alien, i.e., prior to his taking oath as a naturalized Philippine citizen on January 7, 1977, at a time when he was disqualified to acquire ownership of land in the Philippines (ART XIII, SEC. 5, 1935 Constitution; ART. XIV, Sec. 14, 1973 Constitution); hence, his asserted titles are null and void.

Issue: WON the registration of the lots under the name of Chua Kim was valid. YES Held: Conveyance of residential land to an alien prior to his acquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization is valid Be this as it may, the acquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine citizenship should foreclose any further debate regarding the title to the property in controversy, in line with this Court's rulings relative to persons similarly situated. In Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547, for instance, the ruling was as follows: ...The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person.

The lots in question were conveyed to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un in December 1934, so 1935 constitution is not applicable Plainly, the conveyances were made before the 1935 Constitution went into effect, i.e., at a time when there was no prohibition against acquisition of private agricultural lands by aliens. Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the lands thus purchased by him, and his ownership was not at all affected either: (1) by the principle subsequently enunciated in the 1935 Constitution that aliens were incapacitated to acquire lands in the country, since that constitutional principle has no retrospective application, or (2) by his and his successor's omission to procure the registration of the property prior to the coming into effect of the Constitution. Chua Kim acquired the lots through succession in 1946 Since the death of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un in San Narciso, Quezon, in 1946, Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be had been in continuous possession of the lands in concept of owner, as the putative heir of his adoptive father without protest whatever from any person. Note: Chua Kim because a naturalized Filipino citizen only on January 1977 It was indeed Chua Kim's being in possession of the property in concept of owner, and his status as adopted son of Gregorio Reyes, that were the factors that caused his involvement in Civil Case No. C-385 of the CFI at Calauag, Quezon, at the instance of the original parties thereto, 22 and his participation in the Compromise Agreement later executed by all parties. As already mentioned, that compromise agreement, approved by judgment rendered on July 29, 1970, implicity recognized Chua Kim's title to the lands in question.

SOCORRO VASQUEZ vs.LI SENG GIAP and LI SENG GIAP & SONS CASE: G.R. No. L-3676, January 31, 1955

corporation to which the parcel of land has been transferred, must also be valid, 96.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned by Filipinos. Action for annulment not Rescission

FACTS:  

 





Vasquez sold and transferred to Li Seng Giap, then Chinese citizen, a parcel of land together with a house in Tondo, Manila In 1940: Li Seng Giap sold and transferred unto Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., whose shareholdings then were owned by Chinese citizens, the property, together with the improvements thereon, and duly registered under a TCT Li Seng Giap was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on 1941, Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. is now a Filipino corporation, 96.67 per cent of its stock being owned by Filipinos, and duly authorized by its articles of incorporation to own, acquire or dispose of real properties. Vasquez filed an action to rescind the sale on the ground that the Li Seng Giap was an alien and under the Constitution incapable to own and hold title to lands. The Court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint with cost against Vasquez.

ISSUE: WON Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. is allowed to acquire the property. YES. HELD: The subsequent naturalization of Giap and transfer to a Filipino corporation cured the defect. The majority of the Court has ruled that in Sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party. Vasquez argued that if at the time of the conveyance of the real property Giap was incapable of holding title to such real estate, the contract of sale was null or void and may be annulled, and his subsequent naturalization as a Filipino citizen cannot retroact to the date of the conveyance to make it lawful and valid. However, if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. The title to the parcel of land of the Giap, a naturalized Filipino citizen, being valid that of the domestic

The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated upon any of the grounds provided for in Article 1291 of the old Civil Code and because the action of rescission involves lesion or damage and seeks to repair it. It is an action for annulment under Chapter VI, Title II, Book II, on nullity of contracts, based on a defect in the contract which invalidates it independently of such lesion or damages.

ONG CHING PO versus COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD PARIAN G.R. Nos. 113472-73 December 20, 1994 FACTS:

respondent as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an alien he was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To sustain such an outrageous contention would be giving a high premium to a violation of our nationalization laws.

Spouses Soledad Parian and Ong Yee bought a parcel of land in Fundidor Street, San Nicolas from Ong Joi Jong. The transfer was in a notarized Deed of Sale and was also registered (Exhibit A). Subsequently, Ong Yee died.

Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of Exhibit "B" has been established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to law.

Soledad filed unlawful detainer against her brother-inlaw Ong Ching Po contending that she entrusted the administration of the house to Ong Ching Po while the spouses were residing in Ilo-ilo but when her husband Ong Yee died, she asked Ong Ching Po to leave the house.

On the other hand, the Deed of Sale presented by Soledad Parian is duly notarized document.

On the other hand, Ong Ching Po filed an action of reconveyance and damages against Soledad contending that he has the right over the land because Ong Joi Jong sold it to him. The Deed of Sale (Exhibit B) presented by Ong Ching Po says that the reason why the title is constituted in the name of Soledad was that Ong Ching Po was not yet a Filipino citizen. ISSUE: Which of the two Deed of Sales has more probative value? (Soledad Parian’s or Ong Ching Po’s) HELD: It is the Deed of Sale in favor of Soledad Parian that must be given value. We cannot go along with the claim that petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private

Other issues: Was the sale made with due consideration? Yes it appears that the price for the land was paid out of Soledad Parian and Ong Yee’s conjugal funds. Such transaction is a common practice in Filipino-family affairs. Was there delivery? Yes. Even though there was no physical possession of the spouses because they were residing in Ilo-ilo, under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred."

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